6% (Jnrtwll SJaui §rl(nnl SJihtatj} KF801.B36 rne " Un,VerSi,yUbrary v.1 A freatise on the modern law of contract 3 1924 018 805 824 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924018805824 A TREATISE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS INCLUDING A FULL CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTRACTS AND UNDERTAKINGS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AS DETERMINED BY THE COURTS AND STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES BY CHARLES FISK BEACH Jr., author of • Public Corporations," "Private Corporations," "Insurance," "Receivers, 1 "Modern Equity Jurisprudence." "Modern Equity Practice," "Wills," "Injunctions," "Contributory Negligence," etc. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL I INDIANAPOLIS AND KANSAS CITY THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY 1897 Copyright 1896 BY THE BO WEN-MERRILL CO First Thousand October 24, 1896. Second Thousand December 10, 1896. Third Thousand September 15, 1897. KF 634 PRESS OF CARLON & HOLLENBECK, INDIANAPOLIS. TO THE HONOURABLE EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE OF LOUISIANA LAWYER JURIST DIPLOMAT AND MAN OF AFFAIRS LONG A LEADER OF THE BAR IN NEW ORLEANS SOMETIME A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AND NOW AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF OUR FEDERAL SUPREME COURT THESE VOLUMES ARE CORDIALLY AND RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED PREFACE. In these volumes the purpose has been to set forth in a plain and practical way a complete statement of the Modern Law of Contracts in all its branches and in very full detail. The statements are illustrated by explanatory notes and a full consideration of all the recent decisions reported either in England or America, and all of the earlier cases necessary to show the development of the principles. That this work might be a complement to my books on cor- porations, particular reference has been made to the contracts and engagements of public and private corporations. Five chapters have been devoted to corporate contracts, separate treatment being given to the undertakings of railroad compa- nies and building and loan associations. Contracts in restraint of trade and contracts against public policy have special consideration in separate chapters of un- usual length devoted to each subject. In the matter of authorities I have endeavored to cite every well considered case of recent years, giving these the preference over the earlier decisions with a view of making this what it purports to be — the Modern Law of Contracts. For some years I have been convinced that there is a recog- nized demand for a comprehensive treatise on the law of to-day (v) VI PREFACE. with reference to contracts, a work considering the recent de- velopments and modern applications of the law, rather than confining itself to elementary principles. It is with the hope that these volumes will supply that demand that they are offered to the profession. I wish to express my high appreciation for patient, labori- ous and intelligent assistance rendered in the preparation of these volumes by William E. Bullock, Esq., of the Brooklyn, New York, Bar. CHARLES FISK BEACH, Jr. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. CHAPTER I. INTRO D UCTO RY. SECTION. PAGE. 1. Simple contracts defined 1 2. Contract complete before formally written „ 3 3. Rule as to written draft 4 4. The promise — Consideration essential 6 5. Consideration further discussed — Mutual promises 8 6. New consideration where written contract changed 11 7. Execution and form of contracts 12 8. Delivery of contracts 13 9. What is a good delivery 14 10. The same subject continued 16 11. Contracts classified and distinguished 17 12. Sealed contracts 19 13. Sealed contracts further considered 21 14. Express and implied contracts 22 15. Implied contracts distinguished 24 16. Reservations and exceptions 25 17. Contracts of record 26 18. The same subject continued — Warrant of attorney 27 19. Merger in judgment ; 28 20. Merger of mortgage in legal title 29 21. Judgment as estoppel SO 22. The same subject continued — Illustrations 31 23. Statutes as contracts 32 24. The same subject continued — Treaties 34 25. State grants 35 26. Written evidence of contracts the best 36 27. Negotiable instruments— How far conclusive 37 28. Where written contract is unambiguous 40 29. Complete written contract excluding parol evidence 42 (vii) Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 30. Contracts in a foreign language 44 31. When parol evidence admissible, although contract written 46 32. Parol evidence as to written consideration *° 33. Notice and assent as evidence of contract ^9 34. Circumstantial evidence of contracts ^0 CHAPTER II. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 35. General nature of contract 53 36. What is a proposal 54 37. Eevocation of offer 58 38. The same subject continued 56 39. The same subject continued — Illustrations 57 40. Offer when revocable 57 41. General offers 59 42. Revocation of a general offer 60 43. Lapsing of offer by death 60 44. Proposal — Reasonable time 61 45. The effect of a mere inquiry on an offer — Rejection 62 46. Method of refusal 63 47. Proposals contained in tickets, receipts, etc 63 48. The same subject continued 65 49. What constitutes acceptance 65 50. Acceptance of written offer — Delivery 66 51. Absolute acceptance 67 52. The same subject continued — Illustrations 68 53. Acceptance to be without condition 69 54. Condition as rejection of offer 70 55. The same subject continued— Counter offers 72 56. Ancillary matters 73 57. Acceptance by conduct 73 58. The same subject continued 74 59. Revocability of an acceptance 76 60. The same subject continued — Effect of postal regulations 77y 61. Authority to accept by post 7S 62. Proposal and acceptance by letter 80 63. Proposals by telegraph 82 64. Contract by letters and telegrams 83 65. Certainty of proposal and acceptance 84 66. Place of contract , 87 67. The English doctrine of proposals in deeds 88 68. The same subject continued 89 69. The American doctrine 89 70. The same subject continued 90 71. Revocability of a deed before delivery — Mutuality 91 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. ix CHAPTER III. CERTAINTY. SECTION. PAGE. 72. Certainty as a general requisite 94 73. Thesame subject continued— Contracts sustained if possible 95 74. Eule of construction 96 75. Contracts to make future contracts 97 76. Miscellaneous uncertainties— Particular instances 98 77. The same subject continued— Stipulations reducible to certainty 99 78. Id certum est quod certum reddi potest 101 79. The same subject continued 101 80. Uncertainty as to time 103 81. Uncertainty as to place and time 106 82. "Car loads" 107 83. "More or less" 108 84. The same subject illustrated— "About" 109 85. "More or less" in descriptions of land 110 86. "Say," and "say about" 110 CHAPTER IV. CONDITIONS. 87. Kinds of covenants 113 88. Time of performance 113 89. Covenants construed as dependent 114 90. Mutual promises 116 91. Conditions in insurance policies 117 92. The same subject continued — Suicide 118 93. Examples of conditions precedent — Vendor and purchaser 119 94. Condition of arbitration — Waiver 120 95. Vendor and purchaser 121 96. Sales of goods 123 97. The same subject continued 124 98. Sale of goods to arrive 125 99. The same subject continued 125 100. Architect's or engineer's certificate of approval 126 101. The same subject continued — Illustrations 127 102. The same subject continued 128 . 103. Promise conditional upon approval of promiser 130 104. Eight of approval to be exercised reasonably 131 105. Eight of approval not to vary contract 133 106. Limitations upon the right to reject 134 107. Performance of conditions precedent 134 108. The same subject continued — Illustrations 135 109. Further illustrations — Waiver 136 k I X TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 110. Building contracts 138 111. The result of the cases *39 112. Substantial performance of building contracts 140 113. Substantial performance — Delay 141 114. Insufficient performance 142 115. The same subject continued— A contrary view 143 116. Doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States 144 117. Sales — Incomplete delivery 144 118. The New Yorkdoctrine 145 119. Personal services 146 120. The same subject continued 147 121. The same subject continued— Contrary view 148 122. Delivery by installments 149 123. Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor 150 124 Insolvency of buyer 152 125. Subscriptions to stock 15!$ 126. Waiver 154 127. Eecitals 154 128. Subscriptions before incorporation — How far absolute 155 129. The subject-matter of conditions in subscriptions to stock 155 130. How the condition must be stated 156 131. Performance 157 132. Performance — Full performance waived 158 133. Time of performance — Eeasonable time 160 134. Pleading 161 135. Conditional sales 161 136. Form of contract of conditional sale 163 137. Transfer of rights under conditional sale 164 138. Eights of the parties on default 164 139. Eights of buyer 165 140. Waiver of forfeiture and title 166 141. Destruction of the property 167 142. Eecording 168 143. Miscellaneous matters 169 144. Condition subsequent in deed — Subsequent defeasance 170 145. Surety's bond signed under condition 171 146. Eefunding dues to withdrawing members 172 CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATION. 147. Consideration denned 177 148. Sealed instruments 178, 149. Contracts in restraint of trade 179 150. Statutory abolition of seals 180 151. The same subject continued 181 152. Executed and executory considerations __ 182 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. XI SECTION. PAGE. 153. Moral obligation 183 154. The same subject continued — Exceptions 184 155. Benefits received — Consideration accepted involuntarily 185 156. Power to return the benefit 186 157. Existing legal obligation as a consideration 187 158. The same subject continued 189 159. Promise to new party 192 160. Past consideration 192 161. Consideration moved by previous request 193 162. Statute of limitations 194 163. The same subject continued 196 164. Doing what another is bound to do 197 165. Where party is already bound 197 166. The same subject continued. 199 167. Forbearance 200 168. Extension of time 201 169. Further illustrations 203 170. Forbearance to sue — Time 204 171. Extension — Paying interest — Surety's consent 205 172. The same subject continued 206 173. Nudum pactum — Promise of indulgence 208 174. Disputed and doubtful claims 209 175. Further illustrations 210 176. Forbearance where the right or claim is doubtful 211 177. Dismissing a suit 213 178. Mutual promises 214 179. The same subject continued— College endowment bond 215 180. Past consideration — Future services 220 181. Marriage 221 182. Illustrations 222 183. Eepresentations ; 222 184. Conveyances 223 185. Promise of third person 225 186. Illustrations of third person's promise 226 187. Marriage as the consideration of dower 227 388. Naming child as a consideration 228 189. Change of name as a consideration 229 190. Adequacy of consideration „ 230 191. Illustrations , 232 192. Further illustrations 233 193. Inadequacy in equity 234 194. The same subject continued 235 195. Consideration moving from plaintiff 236 196. Further illustrations 237 197. The English rule 238 198. Exceptions to the English rule 239 199. Restrictions upon the American rule allowing third party to sue 240 200. Limitations 241 201. Illegality— Rescission 245 Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 202. Rescission not to affect rights attached 246 203. Delivery essential to gift — Voluntary trust distinguished 248 204. Gift of savings bank deposit 251 205. Gratuitous subscriptions 252 206. The present doctrine 257 207. Revocation by death 258 208. Subscription to capital stock— Before incorporation 259 209. After incorporation 260 210. The consideration for such a subscription 260 211. Sufficient consideration illustrated 261 212. The same subject continued 262 213. The same subject continued 263 214. Insufficient consideration illustrated — Common carrier 265 215. Where grantee is to sell for grantor — The trust as consideration 266 CHAPTER VI. IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 216. Impossibility defined 269 217. The general rule 270 218. Impossibility by act of God 273 219. Contracts excepting acts of God 273 220. Events exempting carrier 274 221. The same subject continued 276 222. Physical impossibility at time of contracting — Known to the parties. 276 223. Further illustration 277 224. Legal impossibility at time of contracting 278 225. Impossibility caused by subsequent law 279 226. The same subject continued — Recovery pro tanto 282 227. Contracts of service 283 228. The same subject continued— Recovery 284 229. Further illustrations of recovery 285 230. Contracts for personal acts 286 231. What are contracts for personal acts 287 232. Contracts to build becoming impossible 289 233. The same subject continued 290 234. Particular contracts concerning specific things 291 235. The same subject continued — Further illustrations 292 236. Bailment 294 237. Delivery of goods 295 238. "Strikes" 296 239. Impossibility caused by the promisee 297 240. Impossibility caused by the promisor 300 241. Alternative promises 300 242. The same subject continued 301 243. False assumption of impossibility— Provisions excepting impossi- bility 302 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. xiii CHAPTER VII. WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. SECTION. PAGE. 244. Sales — Quantity 304 245. Sales — More or less 305 246. Insurance warranties — Nature and effect 307 247. The same subject continued — Illustrations 309 248. The same subject continued 310 249. Insurance warranty distinguished from representations 314 250. The same subject continued — Marine statute 315 251. Insurance warranties not favored 317 252. Description as warranty — Agent's mistake 318 253. Insurer may waive breach — Effect of waiver 319 254. Warranties in sales — Horses 321 255. The same subject continued — Machinery 322 256. Warranty of workmanship 323 257. Statements in catalogues 324 258. The same subject continued 325 259. Construction of warranties 327 260. The same subject continued 328 261. To what defects a warranty extends 330 262. The same subject continued — Horses 330 263. Warranty of horses— Stallions 331 264. Further illustrations — Soundness in horses 332 265. Open defects 333 266. Written contract excluding oral warranty 333 267. The same subject continued — Illustrations 334 268. Seller's oral warranty— Illustrations 337 269. Implied warranty excluded by written 338 270. Implied warranty as affected by acceptance — Sale by sample 340 271. The same subject continued — The federal doctrine 341 272. Co-existing implied and written warranties -342 273. Receipts and memorandum excluding oral warranty 343 274. Substitution of warranties 344 275. Implied warranty of identity — Genuineness of passage ticket 344 276. Implied warranty of quality 346 277. Warranty as to quality — Illustrations 347 278. Implied warranty as to fitness — Latent defects — Fraud 349 279. The same subject continued — Illustrations 351 280. Vendor's warranty as to value .-. 353 281. Warranty of future state of an article 354 282. Implied warranty of title 354 283. Seller's implied warranty of title— Exception 356 284. The same subject continued— When the seller is not in possession... 357 285. What constitutes breach of warranty of title 358 286. The same subject continued 359 287. Implied warranty of title by sheriffs and administrators 360 288. Implied warranty of title to bonds 361 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 289. General warranty covenant 362 290. Covenants of warranty— Grantor's rights 363 291. Damages for breach of warranty 364 292. Covenant of seizin— Damages for breach 367 293. Performance of building contract 368 294. The same subject continued— Digging wells 372 295. Method of performance 373 296. Miscellaneous 374 CHAPTER VIII. TENDER. 297. Tender defined 377 298. Necessity of tender — Illustration 378 299. What constitutes a tender 379 300. Statutory rules 379 301. Method of tender 380 302. Continued readiness to pay 381 303. The same subject continued 383 304. Time of tender 384 305. Notes and bills 385 306. Ordinary contracts '. 386 307. Tender of delivery of goods 387 308. Producing the money 388 309. Further illustrations 389 310. Production of the money due on a mortgage 390 311. Money available for tender , 391 312. Power of congress to pass legal tender acts 391 313. Waiver of defect of tender 392 314. Tender of note or check 393 315. Contracts payable in gold or silver dollars 394 316. Amount of tender 394 317. The same subject continued 395 318. Sufficiency of amount — Waiver 396 319. Tender on several debts 397 320. Conditional tender 398 321. The same subject continued 399 322. Giving receipt 400 323. To whom a tender should be made 401 324. Tendering at a bank 402 325. Tendering to an attorney at law 402 326. Tender of money into court 403 327. By whom a tender may be made 404 328. Tender under protest 404 329. Place of tender 405 330. Unliquidated damages 406 331. Effect of tender 407 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. XV SECTION. PAGE. 332. The same subject continued 408 333. Further illustrations 409 334. Vendee's tender and demand of performance 410 335. In cases of pledge and mortgage 411 336. Tendering back borrowed stock 412 337. Tendering railroad fare 412 338. Tender excused 413 339. Questions of practice 414 340. Touching costs 415 CHAPTER IX. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 341. Contracts for sale of land 416 342. Title founded on adverse possession 417 343. Title from a stranger 418 344. Remedying defects 419 345. Whether a title is marketable 419 346. The same subject continued — Illustrations 420 347. Duties of vendor 421 348. Burden of proof 421 349. Illustrations of unmarketable titles 422 350. Specified land to be conveyed 423 351. Sales in gross 424 352. Conflict in description 425 353. Compensation for deficiencies 425 354. Bona fide purchaser — Possession as notice 426 355. Vendor's lien 427 356. Vendor's lien — Liability of purchaser from vendee 428 357. Vendor's lien — Expressly reserved 430 358. Reserving lien on crops to secure purchase-money 432 359. Vendor's right to earnest money 433 360. Equitable mortgage analogous to vendor's lien 433 CHAPTER X. PAYMENT. 361. Payment defined 436 362. Conditional payment 438 363. Voluntary payments— Illustrations 439 364. Payment under protest 439 365. Compulsory payments — Recovery back 440 366. Payment by a stranger 441 367. Medium of payment — Illustration 442 368. Payment to creditor's creditor or to agent after principal's death 443 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 369. Paying creditor's debWWest Virginia doctrine 444 370. Payment by order 445 371. Payment by check 447 372. The same subject continued — Illustrations 448 373. Certified checks 450 374. Further illustration 451 375. Payment by bill or note 452 376. The same subject continued 453 377. Further illustrations 454 378. Evidence of intention to merge the debt 456 379. The same subject continued 457 380. Repayment of taxes illegally collected 458 381. Taxes paid under compulsion 459 382. The same subject continued 461 383. Receipts 463 384. Receipts in full 464 385. The same subject continued 465 386. Receipt under seal 465 387. Effect of a receipt 466 388. Application of payments 468 389. Payments on open account 469 390. Application by the creditor 470 391. Debts barred by statute of limitations 471 392. Rights of third parties 472 393. Time of appropriation 473 394. Appropriation by law 473 395. Partial payments 474 396. Further illustrations 475 397. Exception to the rule as to application of payments 477 398. The same subject continued 478 399. Payments made under mistake of fact 479 400. Payments made under mistake of law 481 401. Presumption of payment — Time of payment 482 402. Executor's duty to pay debts 484 CHAPTER XI. BREACH OF CONTRACT. 403. Putting it out of one's power to perform 486 404. Further illustrations 487 405. Promisee disabling promisor 488 406. Ill treatment 489 407. Bankruptcy or insolvency 491 408. The same subject continued 492 409. Refusal to perform, the time for performance not having arrived — The English rule 492 410. The same subject continued — Illustrations of the English rule 494 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. I. XVU SECTION. PAGE. 411. American rule as to renunciation of contract 495 412. The same subject continued 495 413. Character of notice 496 414. Notice repudiated 498 415. Notice retracted 499 416. Further illustrations 500 417. Scienter 501 418. Locatio operis faciendi— Defective performance 502 419. Seller's breach — Buyer's remedy 504 420. Loss of profits as damages for breach 505 421. Partial or entire breach — Profits as damages 506 CHAPTER XII. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 422. Accord and satisfaction defined 508 423. The subject illustrated 509 424. Further illustrations 511 425. The same subject continued 513 426. Accord supported by a consideration 515 427. Contracts under seal 515 428. The same subject continued 516 429. Subject-matter of an accord 517 430. The same subject continued 517 431. Payment of less sum than due 519 432. Compromises 520 433. The same subject continued 521 434. As to unliquidated demands 522 435. The same subject continued 523 436. Illegal claims 524 437. Accord executory 525 438. The same subject continued 526 439. Further illustrations 528 440. Accord without satisfaction 528 441. New promise 530 442. The same subject continued 531 443. Composition with creditors 532 444. The same subject continued 534 445. Liability of third party 535 446. The same subject continued 536 447. Further illustrations 537 448. Settlement by third person — New consideration 537 449. Accord and satisfaction by a joint creditor 539 450. Accord and satisfaction with a joint debtor 540 451. Reserving rights against co-debtors 541 452. Co-tort-feasors 541 I— ii Xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. PAGE. SECTION. 453. Accord and satisfaction by a stranger 542 454. Rescinding accord for mistake or fraud 543 455. Pleading 544 CHAPTER XIII. RELEASE. 456. Release defined - 546 457. Consideration of release 547 458. "Who may release — Limitations 548 459. Release under seal 549 460. What words make a release 550 461. The same subject continued 551 462. Effect at law 552 463. Effect in equity 553 464. Release in equity 554 465. Indorsements and entries operating as releases 555 466. Receipts and written memoranda sufficient to constitute a release... 556 467. "Where written release not controlled by parol evidence 557 468. Destruction of the obligation 558 469. Delivery of the obligation 559 470. Voluntary declarations 559 471. The same subject continued — Illustrations 560 472. Release of bills and notes 561 473. Release of actions 562 474. Release of debts 562 475. Release of dower — Between executors 563 476. Release of all demands 564 477. Accessory and consequential matters 564 478. What a general release does not cover 564 479. Recitals and object of release qualifying it 565 480. The same subject continued — Illustrations 566 481. Contingent release 567 482. Covenant not to sue 568 483. Covenant not to sue for a definite time 569 484. Release of sureties 569 485. ."Where extension to debtor does not release surety 571 486. Release of a co-debtor 572 487. Release of joint and several debtors 573 488. Release of a co-tort-feasor 574 489. Further of joint tort-feasors — Of partners 574 490. Statutory provisions 576 491. Express reservation of remedy against co-debtor 576 492. Covenant not to sue a co-debtor 577 493. Release by a co-creditor 577 494. Fraud and mistake 577 495. Release obtained by fraud — Illustrations ; 578 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. XIX SECTION. PAGE. 496. Release obtained by fraud 580 497. Legal effect of release procured by undue influence 581 498. Release by railroad employes' relief department 583 499. The same subject continued 585 500. Deed-poll or indenture — Instructions for drafting 587 501. Pleading 587 CHAPTER XIV. THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. 502. Its origin and purpose 590 503. Its effect on verbal contracts 592 504. Promises by executors and administrators 593 505. Promises to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another... 594 506. Oral agreements to answer for the debt of another 594 507. To whom the promise must be made 596 508. Original and collateral promises 598 509. Original undertakings — Promisor's interest 599 510. The same subject continued 601 511. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States 602 512. The rule in New York and Pennsylvania 602 513. The same subject continued 604 514. Further illustrations 606 515. Illustrations of original agreements 607 516. Where the promisor holds the debtor's funds, or where the old debt is extinguished 608 517. Relinquishment of lien — The modern rule 610 518. Independent promise releasing another 611 519. Del credere commission 612 520. As to contracts of indemnity 613 521. Oral promise to indemnify guarantor not within the statute 614 522. The same subject continued 616 523. Agreements in consideration of marriage 617 524. The same subject continued — Antenuptial contracts 618 525. Antenuptial parol agreements reduced to writing after marriage 619 526. Contracts relating to lands 620 527. Invalid verbal contracts as to land 621 528. Cases not within the statute — Constructive trusts 624 529. What not an interest in land— Mortgagee's interest 625 530. Part performance 626 531. Parol contract for sale of land and possession transferred 628 532. Parol contract for sale of land— Purchaser's possession 629 533. Parol sales of land in North Carolina 630 534. Executed oral lease — Statute to be pleaded 630 535. Executed parol contract for exchange of land not within the statute. 632 536. Fixtures 634 537. Cases not within the statute— Illustrations 635 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE- 538. Fructus industrial.es 636 539. Parol sale of perennial crops 637 540. Contracts for the sale of grass and growing trees 637 541. The same subject continued — Intention of the parties 639 542. Licenses to enter on lands 640 543. Easements 642 544. Rule as to sale of buildings 643 545. Partnerships to deal in lands 644 546. The same subject continued 645 547. Agreements not to be performed within a year 646 548. The same subject continued 647 549. The Texas doctrine 648 550. Illustrations — Cases within the statute 649 551. Illustrations — Cases not within the statute 652 552. Further illustrations — Cases not within the statute 653 553. Performance on one side within a year 655 554. Contracts for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise — Executory sales 656- 555. Contracts for the sale of goods distinguished from contracts for work and labor 657 556. The English rule i 659 557. The rule in New York 660 558. Shares in corporations and choses in action 660 559. Receipt and acceptance 661 560. The same subject continued 664 561. Further illustrations 660 562. Constructive delivery and acceptance 66" 563. Delivery to a, carrier 669 5G4. Delivery which takes contract out of the statute 670 565. Question for the jury 671 566. Earnest or part payment 672 567. Auctioneer's sales 673 568. Judicial sales 674 569. Form of the memorandum 674 570. The contents of the memorandum 676 571. The same subject continued 677 572. Sale of realty in Texas and Kentucky — The memorandum 679 573. What is a sufficient memorandum in other states 681 574. Whether the memorandum must show the consideration 682 575. Correspondence as evidence of the contract 6S4 576. Bought and sold notes — "Slip contracts" 685 577. Insufficient writings to take contract out of statute 686 578. The signature 687 579. Oral variation of written agreement 688 580. Parol discharge of written agreement 690 581. When parol evidence may be resorted to 691 582. Remedy for services rendered under voidable contract 692 583. As to pleading the statute 693 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. XXI CHAPTER XV. THE LAW OF PLACE. SECTION. PAGE. 584. Lex loci contractus 695 585. The same subject continued 697 586. Illustrations 690 587. City ordinances 702 588. As affecting marriage — South Carolina rule 703 589. Promissory notes 705 590. Exception to the general principle 707 591. Intention of parties 709 592. The place of performance 710 593. Performance governed by what law 711 594. The same subject continued 714 595. Lex fori 714 596. The same subject continued— Statutes of limitation 716 597. Valid contract not enforcible everywhere 717 598. Matters affecting the remedy 719 599. As to real estate 720 600. As to personal property 721 601. Exceptions to the general rule as to personal property 722 602. Voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors 723 603. Involuntary assignments under bankrupt and insolvent laws 725 604. Promissory notes and bills of exchange 726 605. The same subject continued 728 606. Interest 729 607. Days of grace 731 608. Insurance policies 731 609. The same subject continued 732 610. Contracts of carriers 733 611. Connecting lines of carriers — The English rule 735 612. The American rule 736 613. Contract tickets 738 614. Maritime contracts 739 615. Contracts of affreightment 740 CHAPTER XVI. TIME. 616. Time at law generally of the essence of a contract 743 617. Eelative to the sale of goods 745 618. Conditions precedent 746 619. When time is not of the essence of a contract 747 620. Time not generally regarded in equity as of the essence of a contract 749 621. Illustrations 750 622. When the property is subject to fluctuations in value 751 XX11 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTION. PAGE. 623. Stipulations in regard to real estate 752 624. Question of damages for delay, penalties or liquidated damages 753 625. The same subject continued 754 626. Illustrations 755 627. Stipulation in building contracts 758 628. The same subject continued — Illustrations of penalties 758 629. The intention of the parties and nature of the agreement — Controll- ing guides 759 630. Fractions of a day in the computation of time 761 631. Computation of time from a particular day or a particular event 762 632. The same subject continued 764 633. Time of payment of promissory notes 764 634. Day of performance falling on Sunday 765 635. Paper maturing on Sundays and holidays where grace is allowable.. 766 636. The term "month" 767 637. Constructions of the words " until," " by," " forthwith " and " im- mediate" 768 638. The words " from and after" 769 CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 639. Distinction between express and implied contracts 771 640. <2wm'-contracts or contracts implied in law 773 641. The same subject continued 774 642. Illustrations 775 643. Further illustrations 776 644. When silence imports assent 778 645. When the law will not imply a contract 779 646. The same subject continued 780 647. Waiver of tort and suing in assumpsit 780 648. Liability of corporations on implied contracts 782 649. Acceptance of benefits— Gratuitous services 783 650. Acceptance of benefits where a promise to pay is implied 785 651. The same subject continued — Illustrations 786 652. Request without benefit 787 653. Where the law will not imply a promise owing to relationship 788 654. The same subject continued — Illustrations 790 655. Parent and child — Rule as to services rendered 791 656. Case of a person standing in loco parentis 793 657. Exception to the general rule that a child is not entitled to compen- sation for services to a parent 794 658. Contract for services where skill is required 795 659. Implied contracts of professional men 796 660. Recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact 797 661. Effect of negligence upon the right of recovery 799 662. Recovery of money paid under mistake of law 800 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. Xxiii SECTION. PAGE. 663. Ignorantta juris nerninem excusat— Exception in the case of ignorance of a foreign law 801 664. Eecovery of money paid under duress or compulsion 802 665. Voluntary payment of taxes 804 666. Eecovery of illegal taxes paid under compulsion 805 667. Effectof a protest 806 CHAPTER XVIII. JOINT CONTRACTS. 668. Joint and joint and several contracts 809 669. Illustrations 810 670. Joint contracts in Louisiana— Mortgage as indivisible 811 671. The interest of the parties 813 672. The intention of the parties 815 673. Liability of joint obligors 816 674. Contracts of subscription 817 675. Effect of release of one joint debtor 818 676. The same subject continued 820 677. Effect of death of joint contractor at law 821 678. The rule in equity 822 679. Where the deceased joint debtor is surety 823 680. When a surety's estate is held liable 824 681. Partnership contracts 824 682. Contribution among joint debtors .- 826 683. Contribution among sureties 827 684. Actions on joint contracts 828 685. Actions on joint and several contracts 830 686. Judgments on joint contracts 831 687. The same subject continued 832 688. Statutory modification of the common law rules 833 689. The same subject continued 834 CHAPTER XIX. PART PERFORMANCE. 690. The rule at law 836 691. Part performance an equitable doctrine 837 692. Basis upon which the doctrine rests 838 693. Quantum meruit for part performed 840 694. AVhere no recovery for part performance 841 695. What acts do not constitute part performance 842 696. Acts of part performance — Possession 843 697. Continuance of possession — Landlord and tenant 845 698. Improvements 846 Xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. PAGE. SECTION. 699. Where the consideration is labor and services 848 700. Marriage 849 701. Parol gifts of land 850 CHAPTER XX. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 702. The intention of the parties the cardinal rule 852 703. Intent as ascertained from the language used 854 704. Construing written contracts — When oral evidence excluded 855 705. The same subject continued 856 706. Superseding the old by a new contract 857 707. Error of the parties 858 708. Reasonable construction to be adopted 859 709. The contract to be upheld if possible 860 710. Necessary implications 862 711. The whole contract to be considered 863 712. Construing particular clauses 864 713. Reading two instruments as one 866 714. Words to be given their ordinary meaning 868 715. When the ordinary sense will not control 869 716. Technical words 870 717. Where the contract is capable of two meanings 871 718. Repugnancy 872 719. Effect to be allowed to surrounding circumstances 873 720. The same subject continued 874 721. Construction by the parties 875 722. The same subject continued 877 723. The object of construction 878 724. Construction by parties — Estoppel 880 725. Parol evidence to show the construction of the parties 881 726. The rule contra proferentem 882 727. Grants 884 728. Contracts partly written and partly printed 885 729. The same subject continued 886 730. Punctuation 886 731. Whether a contract is entire or severable 887 732. Whether a contract is severable or joint 888 733. The same subject continued — Illustrations 890 734. Laws, customs and usages 890 735. Construction of deeds 892 736. The same subject continued 894 737. Construction of insurance policies 895 738. The same subject continued 896 739. Building contracts 897 740. Parol evidence admissible when 898 741. The same subject continued 899 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. XXV SECTION. PAGE. 742. Latent and patent ambiguities 900 743. Function of judge and jury respectively 901 744. The same subject continued 903 745. Oral contracts 904 746. Contracts of sale or return — Of sale or bailment 905 CHAPTER XXI. CUSTOM AND USAGE. 747. Custom as an element of contracts — General rule 907 748. Mississippi doctrine 909 749. Such custom illustrated — Knowledge of custom 910 750. Established custom defined 912 751. Knowledge of general custom presumed — As to railroads 913 752. The same subject continued — Question for jury 915 753. Express contract not to be contradicted or varied— Principal and agent 916 754. The South Carolina rule 917 755. Custom not to be contrary to law — Railway and banking customs 918 756. Customs to be reasonable 922 757. Plain terms not to be varied by custom 924 758. Proving custom as to measurement, etc., where contract silent 926 759. Commercial usage denned and considered 928 760. The same subject continued 930 761. Knowledge of local usage essential 931 762. Agent's knowledge imputed to principal — Bill of lading 932 763. How usage may be proved 934 764. The same subject continued 936 765. Personal customs or habits 936 "66. Usage as to authority of insurance agents 937 767. Custom construed — Charter-party— Demurrage 938 768. Relating to brokers 910 769. Banking custom aB to collections — Evidence 940 770. Excluding custom by notice — Pleading custom , 941 CHAPTER XXII. CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 771. Ending or changing contracts by conduct 94S 772. Election between ending and enforcing contract— Right to abandon.. 945 773. Effect of death— Of destruction of subject of contract 946 774. The same subject continued— Exceptions 948 775. Revoking agency by death 949 776. Varying or terminating written by subsequent, oral contracts 949 777. As to consideration of the parol contract 950 XXVI TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. I. SECTIOK. PAGE. 778. Writing ended by parol although not thus to be varied— Statute of frauds 951 779. Terminating contracts under seal by parol 952 780. Effect of parol modification of written contract 953 781. Parol extension or waiver of time of performance 954 782. Explaining written receipt by parol evidence 955 783. Where time of the essence — Abandonment— Waiver of condition 956 784. Writing not to be varied by contemporaneous oral agreement 957 785. Cases where contracts have been held not terminated or modified by parol 958 786. Novation 960 787. The same subject continued 961 788. Breaking contract of sale by sale to another 962 CHAPTER XXIII. RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 789. Equity jurisdiction— Damages as remedy 965 790. Rescission to prevent multiplicity of suits 967 791. Rescission compared with reformation 969 792. Restoring benefits on rescinding contract 969 793. Restoring the consideration 971 794. Keeping tender good 973 795. Requisite joinder 974 796. Rescission by vendor with forfeiture against vendee 976 797. Rescission for expressions of opinion — Future promise 978 798. The same subject continued — If parties in confidence 980 799. Concealment — Representations of value — Warranty 981 800. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous 982 801. Rescission for mistake of law 984 802. Where one party only ignorant 985 803. Rescinding release of legacy — Mistake of law— Concealment 987 804. Fraudulent representations 988 805. The same subject continued 990 806. Further illustrations 991 807. Estate not liable to purchaser for executor's representations — Res- toration 993 808. Rescinding coal lease for mutual mistake — Lessee's laches 994 809. Sale of ground rent — Mistake of law 995 810. Rescission for fraud 996 811. Fraud of vendee, although he pays consideration 997 S12. Election by defrauded purchaser — Acquiescence 998 813. Rescission for purchaser's fraud 999 814. The same subject continued 1000 815. Rescinding sale of goods for buyer's fraud 1001 816. Fraud must be proved as alleged 1003 817. Party put on inquiry — Want of diligence 1004 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. XXvii SECTION. PAGE. 818. Negligent execution of instrument 1005 819. Proof of fraud — Diligence 1006 820. Laches in rescinding by one knowing his rights 1007 821. Unreasonable delay 1009 822. Rescission of fraud— For inadequate consideration 1011 823. Deed of trust by husband or wife 1012 824. Effect of ratification 1013 825. Where persons are in confidential relations 1014 826. Physician and patient 1015 827. Rescinding deed of trust from wife to husband or son 1016 828. The same subject continued — Suit by heirs 1019 829. Rescission by married woman 1020 830. Parents' deeds to children 1021 831. Voluntary deed from father to son 1022 832. Deed of gift by old man — Confidential relation 1023 833. Conveyances by lunatics and drunkards 1024 834. Test of grantor's capacity 1026 835. Evidence of incapacity — Facts versus opinions 1027 836. Conveyance by erratic persons 1029 837. Where agent sells trust estate to own wife 1030 838. Stifling competition at judicial sale 1033 839. Canceling mortgage — Want of consideration 1034 840. The same subject continued — Security overruled 1036 841. Deed given for illegal purpose — Exception 1037 842. Where parties were in illicit relation 1040 843. Parties in pari delicto 1041 844. The same subject continued 1042 845. Rescission for non-performance .' 1043 846. Deed defrauding cotenants 1045 847. Directors' contracts for their own benefit 1046 848. Rescinding note procured by fraud — Enjoining transfer 1048 849. Rescission of sale where price payable in installments 1049 VOLUME II. CHAPTER XXIV. REFORMATION. 850. Jurisdiction of a court of equity 1051 851. The same subject continued 1052 852. Nature and effect of reformation 1054 853. Mutual mistake or fraud 1055 854. Mutual mistake — Reforming against sureties 1057 855. Contract not reformed into a new one 1059 856. Mistake as to legal effect— Court will not make instrument 1060 XXV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 857. Not reformed to prejudice of third persons— Vested rights protected. 1061 858. Reformation as against purchaser — Sheriff's deed 1062 859. Reformation for mistake —Rule as to diligence 1063 860. Rule as to proof of mistake 1° 64 861. Clear proof of mistake— Assuming payment of mortgage 1066 862. The same subject continued 1067 863. Complainant to prove mistake— Corroborating circumstances 1069 864. Reforming executor's bond for mistake— Voluntary deed 1070 865. Scrivener's mistake 1071 866. Mistakes in reducing to writing 1074 867. The same subject continued — Contracts with corporations 1075 868. Reformation of deed for misdescription 1076 869. Misdescription of land — Rule as to consideration 1077 870. The same subject continued 1079 871. Where instrument wants seal or witness — Two instruments taken together 1082 872. Where reformation unnecessary — Remedy at law 1083 873. Insurance policy — False representation of complainant 1084 874. Requisites of complaint 1085 875. Correction as to warranty in policy 1086 876. Insurance agent's mistake 1088 877. Parties 1089 CHAPTER XXV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 878. Definition — Ground of the jurisdiction 1091 879. Jurisdiction — Liquidated damages 1093 880. The same subject continued — Auxiliary jurisdiction 1096 881. No jurisdiction to award damages merely 1097 882. Where no remedy at law 1098 883. Enforcing contract which requires building to be done 1100 884. Discretion of court of equity — If contract inequitable 1102 885. Judicial discretion — Contract to be mutual 1104 886. Mutuality 1106 887. Optional contracts '. 1108 888. The same subject continued — Exchange of easements 1109 889. When mutuality unnecessary 1110 890. The same subject continued 1111 891. Certainty of contract as a requisite 1112 892. The same subject continued 1114 893. Id certum est, quod certum reddi potest 1116 894. Of vague contracts 1117 895. Conditional contract not enforcible 1119 896. Enforcing inequitable railroad contracts 1J21 897. Performance by complainant — Burden of proof 1122 898. Performance to be alleged — Tender 1125 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. XXIX SECTION. PAGE _ 839. Offer of performance in complaint— Performance as decreed 1126 900. Contract must be fair— Must conform to statute 1127 901. Must not be against public policy 1128 902. In cases of trust and fiduciary relation 1129 903. Consideration essential— If price deficient or excessive 1130 904. Consideration essential— Expression— Seal 1131 905. Testamentary agreements — When enforced 1132 906. Son's agreement to support father 1133 907. As to inventions made by employe 1134 908. Compelling vendee of land to take title— Vendor's laches 1136 909. Marketable title considered 1138 910. The same subject continued 1139 911. Debts and liens 1140 912. Tender of deed by vendor— Action at law construed as in equity... 1142 913. Averment of tender 1143 914. When vendor's delay to tender title is not laches 1145 915. Where vendee knows of and waives defect of title 1146 916. Decree against vendee — Form and requisites 1148 917. Enforcing agreement to make will— Executors as plaintiffs 1150 918. Statute as bar — Inequitable laches 1151 919. Exception as to laches — Rule as to limitations 1152 920. Where contract has restrictions as to use 1153 921. Enforcing purchase of part of land 1154 922. Enforcement against lender to vendee— Against second vendee 1156 923. When contract against vendor will not be enforced 1158 924. Enforcing contract against vendor — Vendee's laches — Tender of price 1160 925. Vendee's laches continued 1163 926. If transaction speculative 1165 927. Compensation for improvements 1167 928. Mining contract 1168 929. Vendor's estoppel to set up vendee's laches 1170 930. Enforcing contract in another jurisdiction 1171 931. Lex rei sitce 1173 932. Where description of land is imperfect 1173 933. Incomplete boundaries 1175 934. The rule in West Virginia 1178 935. The rule in Connecticut 1180 936. Enforcing land options and oral modifications — Wisconsin statute.. 1182 937. Enforcement by third person — Parties — Delivery to one of two 1183 938. Enforcing sale of heir's expectancy 1184 939. Against husband and wife 1185 940. Husband and wife's contract to convey 1187 941. Contract by husband for self and wife 1188 942. Of oral agreement to sell or lease land — Part performance 1190 943. Enforcing oral contracts for sale of land 1192 944. Rule as to performance 1194 945. Contract to be definite and certain 1195 946. The same subject continued 1197 XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PACE 947. The Texas doctrine 110:-! 948. The Kentucky doctrine — Pleading statute of frauds 119'J 949. Part performance of oral contracts explained 1200 950. Of building contract — Partial performance decreed 1202 951. Contract of separation 1204 952. Where contract improperly closed with agent 1205 953. Director's contract with corporation 1205 954. Enforcing release of dower 1206 955. Contracts for sale of personalty not usually enforced 1207 956. Of contracts relating to chattels, stock and patent rights 1208 957. Personal services — Specific performance 1210 958. Injunction in aid of specific performance 1212 959. Accounting as incidental to specific performance — Compensation.... 1213 960. Parties 1214 901. Pleadings — Variance 1215 962. Dismissal of bill without prejudice — Alternative decree 1217 CHAPTER XXVI. CONTRACTS OF CORPORATIONS. 963. Corporate power to make contracts 1220 964. Gas company's power to mortgage 1222 965. Implied powers of corporations — Charter as contract 1223 966. Incidental or implied powers 1224 967. The same subject continued 1225 968. Seal — Acknowledgment 1227 969. The same subject continued — Delivery to corporation 1229 970. Corporate seal essential to Tennessee conveyances 1230 971. Assignment in treasurer's name and with corporate seal 1232 972. Statutory requirements — Pleading 1233 973. Informal change of name 1235 974. Notice of meeting at which contract is made 1236 975. Contracts made before incorporation 1237 976. Charter as contract with the state — Exclusive right not granted 1239 977. Insurance policy as contract — Seal 1240 978. Corporation's contract with president's signature 1242 979. Chattel mortgage as the personal act and deed of the president 1243 980. Rule and test of ultra vires — Injunctions 1244 981. The same subject continued 1246 982. The Massachusetts doctrine 1247 983. Acts ultra vires — The Connecticut definition 1249 984. Ultra vires lease or sale of franchise — The remedy 1250 985. The same subject continued 1251 986. Act ultra vires — When stockholders estopped to attack 1252 987. Corporate sale in violation of charter 1254 988. Special illustrations of acts not ultra vires 1255 989. Voting trust agreements _ 1257 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. XXXI SECTION. PAGE. 990. Guaranteeing contracts of other corporations 1257 991. Investing in the stock of another corporation — When prohibited.. 1259 992. Holding stock of another corporation 1260 993. Ultra vires stock subscriptions in other companies 1261 994. The same subject continued— Ultra vires defense not favored 1262 995. Where benefits are received — Conflict of doctrine 1263 996. The same subject continued 1264 997. The rule in Georgia ; 1265 998. Contract to prevent competition— Acts of agents —Ratification 1267 999. Authority from by-laws — Limitations 1270 1000. Apparent authority — Ratification 1270 1001. Authority by resolution of board of directors 1271 1002. The same subject continued 1273 1003. Estoppel to deny officer's authority 1273 1004. Ratification of officer's unauthorized acts 1274 1005. Agents' authority from corporate acquiescence 1277 1006. Ratification of agents' contracts 1278 "\007. The same subject continued 1-79 1008. President to act as authorized by directors — Presumption 1—8 1 1009. President's general authority 1282 1010. Contracts by the president or general manager — As to cognovit 1283 1011. Treasurer's implied power to make notes 1285 1012. Contracts made by principal stockholders 1286 1013. How far the corporation is bound by its officer's acts and knowl- edge 1288 1014. Directors as trustees — Contracts with themselves 1289 J015. Directors buying claims against the corporation 1290 1016. The same subject continued 1291 1017. Directors acting for or against the corporation 1292 1018. The same subject continued — Laches 1293 1019. Where contracts are beneficial 1295 \020. Corporation liable for benefits received despite irregularities 1296 1021. Whether directors may act in a foreign state 1297 1022. A director as seller to himself 1298 L023. Directors voting themselves salaries — Ratification 12S 1 ') 1024. Contract for directors' benefit voidable not void— Assent 1300 1025. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous 1302 1026. Selling official influence 1303 1027. Signing receipt for own goods , 1304 1028. Where contract is executed 1305 1029. Enjoining the directors at the suit of stockholders 1306 1030. Contracts by promoters 1308 1031. The same subject continued 1309 1032. Personal liability of promoters 1310 1033. Corporations adopting promoter's contract 1312 1034. Officer's compensation for extra services 1316 1035. Employment of counsel by vice-president 1318 1036. Subscription for stock as contract— Shareholders' contract mutual. 1318 1037. Conditions precedent to subscribers' liability l"-0 XXX11 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1038. Subscription before incorporation 1321 1039. Irregular incorporation— Subscriber's acquiescence 1322 1040. When subscriber is estopped 1323 1041. The Louisiana rule — Subscriber estopped 1325 1042. Withdrawal of subscription— By death or insanity— Notice 1327 1043. Subscriptions procured by fraud 1330 1044. The same subject continued — Laches 1331 1045. Transferof shares 1332 1046. Disclosing corporate insolvency as between stockholders 1333 1047. Be facto corporations— Liabilities arising therefrom 1334 1048. The same subject continued 1337 1049. De facto officers— Binding acts 1338 1050. Proving officer's authority where official minutes are lost 1339 1051. Making of notes, etc., by the president and secretary of the cor- poration 1340 1052. Corporate liability on stock certificates...- 1344 1053. The same subject continued 1345 CHAPTER XXVII. DEBTS OF INCORPORATIONS. 1054. Implied authority to borrow, etc 1348 1055. Estoppel to deny indebtedness 1348 1056. Unauthorized notes and loans — Lender put on inquiry 1350 1057. Authority to issue notes not necessarily express 1351 1058. Implied power to make notes 1351 1059. Insolvent corporation's notes 1352 1060. Judgment note by insolvent corporation — The Illinois rule 1353 1061. President's power to make notes 1354 1062. His authority inferred from acquiescence — Banks more strict 1356 1063. Notes by the general agent of an industrial corporation 1356 1064. Notes by treasurer 1357 1065. Railroad manager's notes and checks —Powers of a foreign agent.. 1358 1066. Ambiguous note signed by superintendent 1360 1067. Note in favor of church — Suit by trustees 1361 1068. Security for loan valid 1361 1069. Limited loans — Mortgages «. 1363 1070. Corporation mortgage to secure bank 1363 1071. Corporate mortgage in favor of director 1364 1072. Bonds— Mortgages— Ratification 1366 ! r '~3. The same subject continued 1368 1074. Agent to sell bonds may not pledge them 1369 1075. Primary liability of corporation 1370 1076. Stockholders' liability for corporate debts 1370 1077. The rule in Ohio 1372 1078. The rule in Tennessee 1374 1079. The rule under New York statutes 1375 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. XXX111 SECTION. PAGE. 1080. The same subject continued 1377 1081. Creditor's bill— Parties— Practice 1379 1082. Creditor's bill 1381 1083. The rule in Wisconsin 1383 1084. Stockholders' statutory liability contractual — "Waiver 1384 1085. Statutory liability of corporate trustees 1386 1086. Corporate preference of creditors— Missouri statutes 1389 1087. Collusive preferences — Corporate debts left unpaid 1390 1088. Preference of directors — Arkansas doctrine 1392 1089. Bondholders as parties to foreclose 1393 1090. Incorporation not complete — Creditor versus purchaser 1394 1091. The trust fund doctrine 1395 1092. Capital stock as trust fund for creditors 1398 1093. The same subject continued — The rule in North Carolina 1399 1094. South Dakota trust fund doctrine ". 1401 1095. Corporators — When liable as partners 1402 CHAPTER XXVIII. CONTRACTS OF RAILROAD COMPANIES. 1096. Railroad rules as contract— Railroad leases 1409 1097. Leases— The Illinois statute 1411 1098. Pennsylvania railroad leases 1413 1099. Merger and lease — The New Jersey rule 1414 1100. Railroad mortgages in Ohio 1415 1101. Mortgage, when void as to rolling stock 1416 1102. Mortgage liens on after-acquired rolling stock 1417 1103. Traffic agreements 1419 1104. Joint traffic contracts 1420 1105. Joint through rates 1423 1106. Pooling contracts 1424 1107. Competition considered 1425 1108. The same subject continued 1426 1109. Railroad bonds— Statutes affecting 1427 1110. Guaranty of another company's bonds 1429 1111. Enjoining purchase of another line 1430 1112. Reasonable contract with shipper— Protecting railroads 1432 1113. De facto railroad companies — Liability to creditors 1433 1114. Railroad operated by lessees or receiver 1435 1115. Receivers of railroads embracing leased lines— Liability 1436 1116. Railroad loans on mortgage bonds only 1437 1117. Compelling railroad to operate entire line 1439 I— iii XXXIV TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. CHAPTER XXIX. REORGANIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION. SECTION. PAGE. 1118. Reorganization — Nature and purpose 1441 1119. Effect of reorganization 1443 1120. The same subject continued 1444 1121. Eeorganization not unfavorably regarded 1445 1122. Merger distinguished from reorganization 1448 1123. Stockholders' rights after reorganization 1449 1124. Consolidation is statutory 1450 1125. Irregularities in consolidation 1451 1126. Residence of consolidated company 1452 1127. New corporation as successor of the old ones 1453 1128. The same subject continued — Evidence 1456 1129. Powers and liabilities of consolidated companies — Misjoinder 1457 1130. The same subject continued— The rule in New Jersey 1459 1131. Consolidated company's right to bonds 1460 1132. Stockholders' rights in case of consolidation 1461 CHAPTER XXX. CONTRACTS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 1133. Municipal corporations not in contract relation with state 1465 1134. Compliance with city charter or statute 1466 1135. The same subject continued 1467 1136. Municipal agents to act as prescribed by statute 1468 1137. The same subject — Application to police board • 1470 1138. Implied and incidental municipal powers 1471 1139. The same subject continued — Municipalities distinguished 1474 1140. Implied obligation to do justice — Allowed claims 1475 1141. Health ordinances and contracts 1477 1142. Municipal ordinances considered 1479 1143. Impairing contracts by subsequent ordinance — Police power 1481 1144. When resolution of council not a contract 1482 1145. Fraudulent contracts — Ratification 1484 1146. Contracts by township trustees — By committees 1485 1147. Proving school district contracts 1486 1148. Limitations as to time 1487 1149. Persons contracting with city put on inquiry 1488 1150. The same subject continued — Estoppel by use , 1490 1151. Contractor's risk — Extra services 1492 1152. Contractor's enforcement of assessments for street improvement... 1493 1153. Liabilities to and for contractors 1495 1154. Contractor's bond— Assigned contract— City succeeding to village. 1497 1155. Authorized official action conclusive 1498 1156. Strict rule as to ultra vires „ 1499 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. XXXV SECTION. PAGE. 1157. Property held for public use — Misappropriation 1501 1158. Franchise for private purpose — Monopoly 1503 1159. Ultra vires employment of physician by health board 1505 1160. Appropriating street for railroad 1506 1161. Ratifying ultra vires and informal contracts 1507 1162. The same subject continued 1509 1163. Retaining benefits as estoppel — Borough contract 1510 1164. Contracts with attorney for services 1511 1165. Ultra vires sewer contracts 1513 1166. Pleading ultra vires 1514 1167. Ultra vires payment recoverable 1514 1168. Debt restrictions — Charging debts on new territory 1515 1169. The same subject continued — The rule in Texas 1517 1170. The same subject continued — The rule in Missouri 1518 1171. The same subject continued — Injunctions 1520 1172. Unauthorized appropriations 1521 1173. Authorized municipal bonds in hands of bona fide purchaser 1524 1174. The same subject continued — The rule in Kansas 1528 1175. Raising money by issuing bonds — The rule in Indiana 1532 1176. Bonds in excess of authorized tax 1533 1177. Municipal bonds to aid railroads 1534 1178. The same subject continued 1537 1179. Railroad bonds violating state constitution.... 1538 1180. Void bonds— Joint bonds 1541 1181. Enjoining delivery of bonds where road not made — Fraud 1542 1182. Awardingcontract to bidders — Fraud enjoined 1544 1183. Judicial control of — Discretion as to bids 1545 1184. Discretion as to bids for contracts — The rule in New Jersey 1547 1185. The same subject continued— Bids for lighting streets 1550 1186. The same subject continued — The rule in Pennsylvania 1551 1187. Advertising forbids 1553 1188. The same subject continued... 1555 1189. Licenses • 1556 1190. No power to license street nuisance — Invalid permits 1556 1191. Sewer contracts — Mandamus by contractor 1558 1192. Contracts for water and light—Vote of electors 1559 1193. The same subject continued — Limitations 1561 1194. The same subject continued— The rule in Indiana 1564 1195. Validity considered 1565 1196. Contracts for lighting streets • 1568 1197. The same subject continued— The rule in New Jersey 1569 1198. Gas company's public obligation 1571 1199. The rule in Indiana and elsewhere 1572 1200. City contract to supply water— Damages 1574 1201. Contracts for safe keeping of streets... 1575 1202. City contract with water company 1577 1203. Mutual liabilities 1578 1204. Contract with railroad and telegraph companies 1580 1205. Grants by city not to be impaired 1581 XXXVI TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1206. City charter to street railroad as contract 1584 1207. Bridge contracts 1585 1208. The same subject continued— Expense exceeding revenue 1586 1209. Officer appointing himself 1587 1210. Corrupt municipal officers 1589 CHAPTER XXXI. OP BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS. 1211. Nature and object — Mutuality— Ultra vires 1593 1212. Borrowers and non-borrowers — Assessments to meet losses 1597 1213. .Constitutionality 1599 1214. Ambiguous by-laws — Loans only to members 1600 1215. Company, how far bound by officers' acts 1601 1216. Powers — As to stocks — Homesteads 1603 1217. Loans to other than members invalid 1604 1218. Applying stock payments on loans 1605 1219. The same subject continued 1606 1220. Fines— Interest on loans 1607 1221. Forfeiting stock for non-payment of dues 1609 1222. Relief from forfeiture 1611 1223. Withdrawal of members 1613 1224. Withdrawing members' rights — Set-off 1616 1225. Eules as to usury 1618 1226. Where usury sanctioned by statute 1620 1227. Devices to cover usury 1621 1228. The same subject continued — The rule in South Carolina. 1622 1229. The Georgia doctrine 1624 1230. Conflicting laws 1626 1231. Premiums as related to usury — Conflict 1628 CHAPTER XXXII. CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. (a} Composition with Creditors. 1232. Consideration of the agreement 1630 1233. When all the creditors must join 1631 1234. Parol agreements— Seal 1633 1235. Performance of agreement by debtor 1633 1236. Compositions under Massachusetts statutes 1634 1237. Secret agreements with a, creditor 1634 1238. The same subject continued — Effect of the composition 1635 1239. Actsof third party 1636 1240. Fraud in composition agreements— The rule in New York 1637 TABLE OF CONTENTS — VOL. II. XXXV11 SECTION. PAGE. 1241. The rule in Massachusetts 1639 1242. Notes in pursuance of secret agreement are void 1640 (6) Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors. 1243. Nature — Construction — Acknowledgment 1641 1244. Distinguished from mortgages 1642 1245. Creditor's assent to assignment 1643 1246. Assignee's relation to assignor — To creditors 1644 1247. Fraudulent assignments — Use reserved 1645 1248. Fraudulent preferences — Fictitious debt — Pleading 1646 1249. The same subject continued — Illegal interest 1648 CHAPTER XXXIII. CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN. .'250. Married woman's contracts void where no separate estate 1651 1251. The rule in New York 1652 1252. Married women's emancipation — Ratification thereafter 1653 1253. Ratifying void contracts after discoverture 1655 1254. Necessaries for family — Who liable 1656 1255. The rule in New York and Indiana 1659 1256. Necessaries for wife living separate 1660 1257. Conveyances from husband to wife — Fraud 1661 1258. Sufficient consideration therefor 1662 1259. Debt to wife as consideration 1664 1260. Conveyance to wife by insolvent husband 1664 1261. Where land really belongs to the wife 1665 1262. Husband's transfers to wife scrutinized 1666 1263. Delivery of deed from husband to wife 1667 1264. Husband's gifts to wife 1668 1265. Where husband is in debt 1670 1266. Gifts by wife to husband— When in trust for her 1671 1267. Gift of rents or principal 1672 1268. Gifts between spouses in Louisiana— Alienation of dowry 1673 1269. Loan by wife to her husband 1675 1270. The same subject continued 1676 1271 . Acquiring separate property— Profits from farm 1677 1272. The rule in Pennsylaania, Missouri and Vermont 1678 1273. The rule in Texas 1680 1274. The Texas presumption in favor of community property 1681 1275. Borrowed money as separate estate— Mortgage therefor 1683 1276. Earnings from keeping boarders 1684 1277. The rule in California, Montana, Virginia and New York 1686 1278. Wife's land —Wife's horses— The rule in Pennsylvania 1687 1279. Proceeds of separate property— Crops— Interest 1689 1280. As to cattle's increase 1 69 1 1281. Legacy as separate estate— Products through husband's efforts 1691 XXXV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. 8ECTI0N. PAGE. 1282. Evidence of wife's separate property 1692 1283. Further illustrations 1694 1284. Liability for improvements on separate estate 1694 1285. Suing wife on covenants as separate estate contract 1696 1286. Separate estate liable for expenses in divorce suit 1697 1287. Charging or disposing of separate estate 1698 1288. The rule in Florida 1699 1289. The rule in Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama 1701 1290. When separate estate must be expressly charged 1702 1291. The rule in New York 1704 1292. Separate estate notes — Effect of fraud 1704 1293. Wife's possession of chattels as notice— Her deed 1705 1294. Her chattels in husband's possession 1706 1295. Her agent— As to realty 1707 1296. The husband as the wife's agent 1708 1297. Evidence of husband's agency — Conflicting doctrines ,. 1709 1298. Marriage settlements — Presumption of fraud — Writing required... 1710 1299. Liberal construction in wife's favor 1712 1300. Full disclosure required 1714 1301. Ratification of antenuptial contract after marriage 1715 1302. Post-nuptial settlement after antenuptial promise — Marriage as wife's part performance 1716 1303. Post-nuptial settlements presumed to be void as to creditors 1717 1304. Wife as husband's surety 1719 1305. Further illustrations 1721 1306. The wife as surety in Nebraska, Georgia and Kentucky 1723 1307. The rule in Indiana and Tennessee 1724 1308. Her suretyship a question of fact 1725 1309. Woman's conveyance in fraud of prospective husband 1727 1310. Wife's right of disposition 1727 1311. Wife's deed— Formal requisites 1729 1312. Conveying her real estate 1730 1313. The same subject continued 1732 1314. Wife's contracts to convey — Vendee's lien 1732 1315. Direct conveyances between husband and wife 1733 1316. The rule under the Oregon and California codes 1734 1317. The rule in New York 1735 1318. Florida conveyances by wife — Securing husband's debts 1737 1319. Texas conveyances of wife's separate realty — Husband's joinder... 1737 1320. Conveying property after separation from husband , 1739 1321. Mortgages by the wife 1740 1322. The same subject continued 1741 1323. Mortgage in Louisiana of wife's separate paraphernal property 1742 1324. Sale of wife's personalty — Of her equitable estate 1743 1325. Notes between husband and wife — Indorsements 1745 1326. Wife's indorsement of husband's note 1746 1327. Husband's note to wife — Under California code 1747 1328. Contracts of married women in trade 1747 J329. Partnership with others than her husband 1748 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. XXXix SECTION. PAGE. 1330. The same subject continued 1750 1 1331. Her mutual account with partnership— In Pennsylvania 1751 1332. Wife's contracts in partnership with husband 1752 1333. The same subject continued 1754 1334. Stock dealings between husband and wife 1755 1335. Assignment of policy on husband's life 1757 1336. Wife's contracts of separation from her husband 1758 1337. Disposing of community property 1759 1338. The same subject continued 1760 1339. Community property charges and debts 1762 1340. Estate by entireties — Restrictions upon alienation 1762 1341. Price paid by wife — Tenancy in common 1765 1342. Effect of divorce on estate by entirety 1766 1343. Actions between husband and wife — Limitations 1769 CHAPTER XXXIV. CONTRACTS OP INFANTS. 1344. As to executed and executory contracts 1770 1345. Contracts of infants void or voidable 1771 1346. Defense of infancy available for infants only 1773 1347. Ratification inferred from acts 1774 1348. The same subject continued 1775 1349. Ratifying mortgage by paying interest — Alabama doctrine 1776 1350. Ratifying mortgage by recitals 1777 1351. Ratifying deed— Attacking decree 1779 1352. Infant's acquiescence as ratification — Knowledge of facts 1780 1353. Restoring consideration by infant 1781 1354. The same subject continued 1782 1355. Infant's recovery of what he has paid — Fraud 1784 1356. Disaffirmance — Reasonable time 1785 1357. Reasonable time as applied to infant wife 1787 1358. Disaffirmance by action to rescind 1789 1359. Estoppel to disaffirm — Benefits received 1791 1360. Fraud as estoppel 1792 1361. Disaffirming deed within statutory limitation 1793 1362. Disaffirming mortgage of personalty 1795 1363. Disaffirming stock transactions 1795 1364. Disaffirming partnership contracts 1796 1365. Disaffirming contract to work 1797 1366. Necessaries furnished to an infant 1798 1367. The same subject continued— Quantum meruit 1799 1368. The rule in Connecticut, North Carolina and Massachusetts 1800 1369. Infancy as defense in torts 1801 1370. Tort in falsely representing age— Estoppel 1802 1371. Mechanic's lien on infant's property— Ratification 1803 1372. Burden of proving infancy 1804 Xl TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1373. Guardian's appointment not retroactive 1804 1374. English relief act applied 1805 1375. Breach of marriage promise— The English " Infant's Belief Act ".- 1806 1376. Infant as party to settlements 18 °7 1377. Apprenticeship agreements 1807 CHAPTER XXXV. OF LUNATICS AND PERSONS UNDER DURESS. 1378. Test of mental capacity 1810 1379. Evidence of mental capacity — Limit as to time 1811 1380. Inquisition in lunacy — Decree when conclusive 1812 1381. The finding upon an inquisition not conclusive 1813 1382. Lunacy adjudged — Contracts thereafter void 1814 1383. Taking commercial paper from lunatic 1816 1384. Settlement with lunatics for injuries 1816 1385. Gifts by person of unsound mind 1817 1386. Imbecility — Monomania 1818 1387. Delusions of the donor as to subject of gift 1819 1388. Instrument executed before notice of insanity or office found 1820 1389. Where the party is committed to asylum without inquisition 1821 1390. Deeds by insane person void at law 1823 1391. Undue influence — Deeds between parent and child 1823 1892. Dealings with persons known to be insane 1825 1393. Dealings with intoxicated persons ,, 1826 1394. Contracts with feeble-minded persons 1827 1395. Duress to extort notes or receipts 1827 1396. Lawful threats— Where no warrant issued — Voluntary payment... 1828 1397. The same subject continued 1829 1398. Where the party threatened is guilty, but threats unrelated 1830 (399. Threat to prosecute third person — When duress — Estoppel — Bati- flcation 1832 1400. Husband's duress of wife 1834 1401. Threatening old man as duress— Preventing bail 1835 1402. Where threat operates on affections 1836 1403. Bestoriag benefits by lunatic 1837 1404. Insane person— How far liable for torts 1837 1405. As to mental condition when married 1839 1406. Lunacy as ground for divorce — Incurable mania 1840 1407. Contracts for necessaries 1840 1408. The same subject continued 1842 1409. Sale of a lunatic's realty to pay his debts 1843 1410. The same subject continued 1845 1411. Control of lunatics by the court of chancery in Delaware 1846 1412. Contracts for support of insane poor 1847 1413. The same subject continued 1849 1414. Actions by and against lunatic — Committee as party — Limitations 1850 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. xli CHAPTER XXXVI. ILLEGAL AND FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS. SECTION. PAGE. 1415. General rule as to enforcing illegal contracts 1852 1416. Where contract does not rest on original illegality 1853 1417. Pleading illegality— Evidence 1855 1418. Purchaser's knowledge of illegality of fraud 1855 1419. Agent buying or selling for himself 1856 1420. Where mortgagor retained possession not as mortgagee's agent 1857 1421. Consideration illegal in part 1859 1422. The same subject continued 1861 1423. The rule in Texas 1862 1424. Illegality affecting whole contract 1863 1425. Where contract in part violation of statute 1864 1426. Where there are distinct engagements 1867 1427. Particeps criminis left where found 1868 1428. Agent as particeps criminis 1869 1429. Where one party repents 1869 1430. Recovery of money paid on usurious contracts 1870 1431. Parties in pari delicto 1871 1432. The same subject continued — The effect of an injunction 1872 1433. Where parties not in pari delicto 1873 1434. Fraud as ground of action — In pari delicto 1874 1435. Gift of entire property fraudulent as to creditors 1874 1436. Privileged commercial fraud 1875 1437. What misrepresentations are actionable fraud 1876 1438. The same subject continued 1877 1439. Fraudulent allegations of value 1878 '1440. Notes given to prevent prosecution 1880 CHAPTER XXXVII. CONTRACTS ILLEGAL BY STATUTE. 1441. Contracts violating statutes void as against public policy 1882 1442. Contracts violating statutes — Negotiable instruments 1884 1443. Not enforcible although illegality not pleaded 1885 1444. Violations of federal statutes 1886 1445. Violations of penal laws— If contract not declared void 1887 1446. Contracts void, although not expressly made so by the statute 1888 1447. The same subject continued — Apparent conflict 1890 1448. Where the contract is declared void 1892 1449. Where the statute points out the consequence of its violation 1893 1450. Illustrations 1894 J451. Party pleading illegality not to retain benefits 1894 1452. Violations of liquor laws 1895 xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1453. Ratification 1897 1454. The same subject continued 1898 1455. Partnership with a licensed dealer 1899 1456. Where business not wholly in liquors 1900 1457. Knowledge of vendee's intent to violate law 1901 1458. The rule in New Hampshire 1902 1459. Sale of lottery tickets 1903 1460. When lottery not construed illegal 1905 1461. Unlawful consolidation of stock 1906 1462. Physicians and plumbers acting without licenses 1906 1463. The same subject continued 1907 1464. Non-resident physicians— Indiana statute 1909 1465. Minors working in factories 1911 CHAPTER XXXVIII. STOCK EXCHANGE AND GAMBLING CONTRACTS. 1466. Gambling contracts void, although on indifferent matters 1913 1467. Kentucky wagers — Recovery 1914 1468. Not gambling if delivery contemplated 1915 1469. The rule applied in Illinois and Massachusetts 1917 1470. The rule elsewhere 1918 1471. Grain options 1919 1472. Gold coin— Optional delivery 1920 1473. Contracts void where delivery not intended, but only difference to be paid 1921 1474. Differences in Rhode Island 1922 1475. Differences under Missouri statute 1923 1476. Differences in Texas 1924 1477. Differences in Arkansas — Broker's advances and commissions 1925 1478. Futures illegal under Illinois code — Recovery by loser 1926 1479. Selling stock on margins in California — Recovery from broker 1927 1480. Notes for stock gambling consideration 1929 1481. Recovering profits of stock gambling from broker 1930 1482. Notes for loan to pay wager where lender not interested 1931 1483. Such loans further considered 1933 1484. The same subject continued 1934 1485. Bohemian oats speculation 1935 1486. Option dealing in grain 1936 1487. Selling pools under New York statute 1937 1488. Enforcing the New York law in other states 1938 1489. The Louisiana lottery in New York 1939 1490. Election bets 1940 1491. Games on behalf of charity 1943 1492. Check for money lost at cards — Ohio statute 1943 1493. Racing for premiums or purses— Pennsylvania strictness 1944 1494. Racing bets — Recovery 194& TABLE OF CONTENTS— VOL. II. xliii SECTION. PAGE. 1495. Recovery from stakeholder 1947 1496. The same subject continued 1948 1497. Where trustfunds lost in gambling 1950 CHAPTER XXXIX. CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 1498. Public policy defined 1952 1499. Rules not arbitrary — Receiving benefits as estoppel 1953 1500. What contracts are contrary to public policy 1954 1501. Lottery schemes against public policy 1955 1502. Common carriers — Stipulations for non-liability 1956 1503. The rule in Wisconsin 1959 1504. The rule in Nebraska and Ohio 1961 1505. Carrier's stipulations against liability 1962 1506. The rale in Missouri 1964 1507. The rule in Indiana and the rule in the federal courts 1966 1508. The rule as to interstate shipments 1968 1509. Limiting time to exercise the remedy 1969 1510. Railroad exemptions for setting fires 1970 1511. Executor's assignment of fees 1971 1512. Marriage brokerage 1972 1513. Tempting agent or trustee to disloyalty to principal 1972 1514. The same subject continued — Railroad managers 1974 1515. Indemnifying executors against contemplated waste 1975 1516. Agreements of real estate agents to divide commissions 1975 1517. Contracts to build railroad stations at particular places 1976 1518. The same subject continued 1978 1519. Promoter's secret contracts 1978 1520. Combinations to increase prices 1980 1521. Violating federal statute against monopolies 1981 1522. Railroad agreements preventing competition 1982 1523. Railway rebates 1984 1524. Corruptly obtaining contracts or employment 1984 1525. The same subject continued 1985 1526. Personating physicians and other frauds on the public 1986 1527. Procuring appointment of administrator 1987 1528. Agreement to make stranger an heir 1988 1529. Contracts to procure legislation 1989 1530. Corrupt inducements to vote 1989 ,1531. Lobbying as against public policy 1990 1532. Lobbying in the federal congress , 1993 1533. Contracts distinguished from lobbying 1994 1534. Contracts inconsistent with impartial justice 1995 1535. The same subject continued— As pleading usury 1996 1536. Contracts to procure testimony 1997 1537. The same subject continued 1999 xliv TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1538. Preventing bidding at official sales 2000 1539. The same subject continued 2001 1540. Illustrations 2001 1541. Champerty and maintenance 2002 1542. Champertous agreements as against public policy 2005 1543. Contracts promoting family concord 2006 1544. Contracts relating to divorce 2006 1545. Inducing discontinuance of divorce proceedings 2007 1546. The same subject continued 2008 1547. Contract to pay divorced wife while unmarried 2009 1543. Compoundinga felony 2010 1549. When contract compounding felony is not void 2011 1550. Agreements to stifle prosecution 2013 1551. The same subject continued — Restoring consideration 2013 1552. Promise not to prosecute witness 2014 1553. Immoral consideration — Illicit intercourse 2015 1554. The same subject continued — Past immoral acts 2016 1555. Letting house for brothel— Prostitute's board 2017 1556. The same subject continued 2017 1557. Recruiting business contracts 2018 1558. Contracts with public enemies 2020 1559. Circulation of confederate notes — Contracts relating to them 2021 1560. Contracts for slaves 2022 1561 . Particeps criminis — Enforcing valid part 2023 CHAPTER XL. CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. 1562. General considerations — Public policy 2025 1563. Considerations of policy — California code 2027 1564. Restraint-When valid 2028 1565. Two grounds of public policy 2031 1566. The earlier doctrine 2032 1567. The present Englishrule 2033 1568. The same subject continued— The federal doctrine 2034 1569. The modern and American rule 2035 1570. Consideration of such contracts, etc. — Liquidated damages 2038 1571. Contract limiting as to space 2038 1572. Contracts limiting as to time 2041 1573. Limit of time not essential 2042 1574. Contracts with employes 2045 1575. Protecting the purchaserof good-will 2046 1576. The same subject continued 2048 1577. The same subject continued 2049 1578. Such contracts divisible 2051 1579. Monopolies — Exclusive rights of way 2051 1580. Monopolies 2052 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. xlv SECTION. PAGE. 1581. Corporate partnerships 2053 1582. Contracts restraining sale of necessaries 2055 1583. Trusts — Recent decisions 2057 1584. Trusts — Technical and legal monopolies 2058 1585. Combinations to limit production and control prices 2059 1586. The same subject continued 2060 1587. Decisions holding the contrary doctrine 2062 1588.. The test question 2063 1589. When combination no defense to action for goods sold 2066 1590. Contracts void as preventing competition 2067 1591. The same subject continued — Illinois statute 2069 1592. The same subject continued — No relief to particeps criminis 2071 1593. Agreements for exclusive service and exclusive dealings 2072 1594. Protecting trade secrets and patent rights 2074 1595. By-law of the associated press 2076 1596. Restrictions in deeds and leases 2076 1597. Restrictions in deeds — Continued 2078 CHAPTER XLI. CONTKACTS BY AND WITH PUBLIC OFFICERS. 1598. Agreements to control elections or appointments 2079 1599. The same subject continued 2080 1600. Mortgage to secure compensation for appointment 2080 1601. Influencing conduct of officers for gain 2082 1602. Where magistrate contracts for percentage of stolen property 2083 1603. Assignment of official salary before it is earned 2084 1604. The same subject continued — Ratification 2085 1605. Illegal agreements regarding fees 2087 1606. The same subject continued 2087 1607. Deputy's agreement to divide fees with principal 2088 1608. The same subject continued 2089 1609. Contracts with government agents 2090 1610. Inducing sheriff to discharge from arrest 2091 CHAPTER XLII. SUNDAY CONTRACTS. 1611. Contracts made on Sunday under the common law 2093 1612. The English statute 2094 1613. Sunday laws in the "United States 2095 1614. Statutes prohibiting business on Sunday 2096 1615. Statutes prohibiting labor, but not business 2097 1616. The exceptions of necessity and charity 2099 xlvi TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1617. The same subject continued 2100 1618. Suits to enforce contracts made on Sunday 2100 1619. The same subject continued 2101 1620. Sales made on Sunday 2102 1621. The same subject continued 2103 1622. Telegrams on Sunday 2104 1623. Contracts of common carriers 2105 1624. Loaning money on Sunday 2106 1625. Deeds, mortgages and sealed instruments made on Sunday 2107 1626. Katification of contracts made on Sunday 2108 1627. The same subject continued 2109 1628. Ratification of contract of sale by retention of property 2110 1629. Notes and bills 2111 1630. Bona fide holder of a note made on Sunday 2113 CHAPTER XLIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 1631. State laws impairing the obligations of contracts 2116 1632. The same subject continued 2117 1633. Congress not prohibited by the constitution from passing such laws 2117 1634. Contracts of the United States with its citizens 2118 1635. Retroactive laws 2119 1636. Making invalid contracts valid 2120 1637. Vested rights 2121 1638. Marriage and divorce 2122 1639. Land grants deemed contracts 2123 1640. Laws relating to interest and usury 2124 1641. Effect of state insolvent laws on contracts 2125 1642. Contracts entered into by a state 2126 1643. Officers 2126 1644. Licenses 2128 1645. Bounties 2128 1646. Charters of private corporations — Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward 2129 1647. The same subject continued 2131 1648. When power to repeal or modify charter is reserved 2131 1649. Obligation of charter not impaired by state regulations 2132 1650. Exclusive privileges 2134 1651. Rule of construction 2135 1652. Stipulations in charters limiting the power of the state over taxa- tion 2136 1653. The same subject continued 2137 1654. Consideration necessary 2138 1655. Immunity from taxation not transferable 2139 TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. xlvii SECTION. PAGE. 1656. Distinction between repealable and irrepealable statutory exemp- tions from taxations 2140 1657. The taxing power— State tax on foreign-held bonds 2141 1658. Public corporations 2141 1659. Municipal corporations 2142 1660. Contracts of municipalities 2143 1661. Effect of repeal of municipal charter on rights of creditors 2144 1662. The rightof eminent domain 2145 1663. The police power of the state 2147 1664. Judicial decisions 2148 1665. Whether a judgment is a contract within the meaning of the pro- hibition 2149 1666. Change of interest on judgment 2151 1667. Laws affecting the remedy 2151 1668. The same subject continued 2153 1669. Laws delaying the collection of debts 2153 1670. Laws affecting the foreclosure of mortgages 2154 1671. Exemption laws 2156 1672. Statute of limitations 2157 1673. The Virginia coupon cases 2158 1674. The Fourteenth amendment 2160 1675. Limiting or forbidding the right of contract 2161 CHAPTER XLIV. ACTIONS ON CONTRACTS AT LAW. 1676. Whether action on contract or tort 2164 1677. Complaint to proceed on definite theory 2166 1678. Action in assumpsit on waiver of tort 2168 1679. What actions on contract survive the party's death 2169 1680. Action for money — Claim to be shown due 2170 1681. Where express contract not special — Recovery on implied prom- ises 2171 1682. Action for commissions — Evidence 2173 1683. Recovery limited to cause of action sued on— Written contract 2174 1684. The same subject continued 2175 1685. Pleading setting out contract 2176 1686. Alleging contract as written— Delivery of contract implied 2177 1687. Where written contract incomplete— Oral evidence to supply 2178 1688. Written contract controls legal conclusion— Pleading modification. 2180 1689. Written contract varied— Recovering quantum meruit 2181 1690. Written contract as importing consideration— Pleading considera- tion 2181 1691. When special averment of consideration unnecessary 2183 1692 When only parties to sealed contracts liable thereon— Ratifica- tion 2184 1693. Action on sealed instrument instead of assumpsit 2185 xlviii TABLE OF CONTENTS VOL. II. SECTION. PAGE. 1694. No recovery on altered contract — Repudiating 2186 1695. Premature action on entire contract 2187 1696. Action against joint and joint and several obligors 2188 1697. The same subject continued 2188 1698. Complaint defective as being on wrong theory 2190 1699. Complain to allege plaintiff's performance— Rule as to non-suit... 2191 1700. The same subject continued 2193 1701. Conditional contracts — Suit on warranty 2195 1702. A demand as condition precedent — Action as demand 2195 1703. Cases in which a demand is necessary 2196 1704. When demand not necessary 2198 1705. Ability to pay as condition 2198 1706. Failure to show excuse for plaintiff's non-performance 2199 1707. Demurrer for ambiguity of complaint 2201 1708. Demurring to complaint which states a defense 2203 1709. Action against loan association — Sufficient complaint 2205 1710. Action on agreement to procure insurance 220fi 1711. Actions against state— Effect of reversing former decisions 220(1 1712. Action by one for another's use — Parties 220(1 1713. Action by third person on promise to an other 220!) 1714. Action for breach at once — Two remedies 2211 1715. Breach where defendant makes performance impossible 2212 1716. Preventing performance — Damages sole remedy 2211! 1717. Plaintiff's obligation to find other employment 221,'i 1718. When action for breach the only remedy — Averment of breach 2216 1719. The same subject continued — Requisites of contract — Venue 2216 1720. Damages for breach — Measure of 2217 1721. The same subject continued 2219 1722. Action for future profits on other's continued breach 2220 1723. Action on building contract — Florida statute 2222 1724. The same subject continued — Where arbitration stipulated — Plans as evidence 2223 1725. The same subject continued — Architect's certificate— Demurrer 2225 1726. Recovery for work, etc., on house which is destroyed 2226 1727. The same subject continued— House destroyed by lightning 2227 1728. Where work accepted its value to be paid — Contract as evidence... 2229 1729. Recovery for part performance — For substantial performance 2230 1730. The same subject continued — In California — New York 2231 1731. General denials and issues 2233 1732. Demurrable plea — Plea admitting execution of contract 2234 1733. Defendant's performance as defense — Plaintiff's default as 2234 1734. Abandonment of contract as defense 2235 1735. Waiver of performance as defense 2236 1736. Act of God as defense— Impossibility as 2236 1737. Affidavit of defense— Requisites of 2238 1738. Plea that promise was voluntary 2239 1739. Pleading promise to forbear suit as bar 2239 1740. Pleading illegality of contract — Insanity 2240 TABLE OP CONTENTS VOL. II. xlix SECTION. PAGE. 1741. Illegal contract not actionable— Illegal bids 2241 1742. No action on champertous agreement 2242 1743. New matter in plaintiff's reply to the answer 2243 1744. Production of written contract— Same as evidence 2244 1745. What facts inadmissible to prove oral promise 2245 1746. Custom as evidence 2246 1747. Shipping book as evidence — Vouchers as 2247 1748. Expert's estimates and certificates as evidence 2248 1749. Where evidence conflicting, jury to decide 2251 1750. Existence of partnership when question for jury — Evidence of 2252 1751. Breach of parol contract for jury 2553 CHAPTER XLV. ACTIONS ON CONTEACTS IN* EQUITY. 1752. Grounds of equity jurisdiction — Inconsistent causes of action 2254 1753. Where equitable better than legal remedy 2255 1754. Equity jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of sui*s 2257 1755. Transferring action for damages to equity, etc 2258 1756. Impressing property conveyed with a trust 2260 1757. Enforcing contracts in restraint of trade — Injunction and damages. 2261 1758. Enjoining breach of contract — Accounting 2262 1759. Enjoining physician 2264 1760. Contract for personal services — Enjoining breach 2265 1761. Injunction to compel contract with lowest bidder 2266 1762. Staying injunction by appeal — Contempt 2267 1763. Reforming deed for mutual mistake — Evidence 2268 1764. The same subject continued — Oral evidence 2269 1765. Specific performance — Requisite to jurisdiction 2270 1766. The same subject continued — Contract uncertain — Legal remedy... 2272 1767. Where contract not uncertain — Election 2274 1768. Rescission instead of ejectment— Equity of action at law 2276 1769. Rescinding deed for grantor's insanity 2277 1770. Rescinding for fraud— Accounting 2278 1771. The same subject continued — As to bona fide holder 2281 1772. The same subject continued— Under Dakota statute 2282 1773. Rescinding for less than technical duress 2283 1774. Where parties in fiduciary relations 2283 1775. The same subject continued 2285 1776. Action to rescind conveyance to wife 2286 1777. Rescinding where grantee refuses to perform — Exemption 2287 1778. Lapse of time as bar to suit to rescind 2288 1779. As to parties in pari delicto 2289 I— iv TABLE OF CASES CITED. IMeferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Abbey v. Mace (Com. PI. 1892), 19 N. Y. Supl. 375, 2251 Abbot v. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9, 2257 Abbot v. Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 1254 Abbott v. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353, 781 Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio, 51, 836 Abbott v. Gilchrist, 88 Maine, 260, 658 Abbott v. Middleton, 7 H. L. C. 68, 884 Abbott v. New York and New England Railroad, 145 Mass. 450, 1455 Abbott v. Omaha, etc., Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416, 1335, 1384, 1385 Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14, 76 Abbott v. Wetherby, 6 Wash. 507, 1760 Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns. 297, 99, 676 Abegg v. Bishop, 142 N. Y. 286, 1647 Abell v. Chaffee, 154 Pa. St. 254, 1655, 1679, 1688, 1695 Abell v. Munson, 18 Mich. 305, 689 Aber v. Clark, 10 N. J. Law, 217, 1813 Abercrombie v. Baxter, 44 Ga. 36, 2117 Aberdeen, City of, v. Honey, 8 Wash. 251, 1507 Aberdeen R. Co. y. Blakie, 1 Macq. 461, 1293 1308 Abernathy v. Seagle, 98 N. Car. 553, ' 2173 Abes v. Davis, 46 Da. Ann. 818, 1674 Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444. 465, 521, 524 Abrams v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 87 Wis. 485, 1958, 1959 Abrey v. Crux, L. R. 5 C. P. 37, 5G1 Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bins. 376, 677 Acheson v. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1, 827 Acheson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Cal. 641, 2183 Achilles v. Achilles, 151 111. 136, 1714 Achilles v. Achilles, 137 111. 589, 1714 Ackla v. Ackla, 6 Pa. St. 228, 626, 2009 Acklen v. Hickman, 63 Ala. 494, 2250 Ackland v. Lutley, 9 Ad. & E. 879, 764 Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N. Y. 425, 594, 603, 604, 606 Adair v. Adair, 22 Ore. 115, 422 Adam Roth Grocery Co. v. Hopkins (Ky. 1895) , 29 S. W. Rep. 293, 1804 Adams v. Adams, 26 Ala. 272, 98 Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72, 2007 Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y. 381, 2006, 2008, 2009 Adams v. Adams' Admr., 23 Ind. 50, 795 Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 1783 Adams v. Burbank, 103 Cal. 646, 2229 Adams v. Carey (N. J. Eq. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 600, 625 Adams v. Cosby, 48 Ind. 153, 2229 Adams v. Cowles, 95 Mo. 501, 1161 Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358, 2109 Adams v. Goddard, 48 Maine, 212, 920 Adams v. Grey, 154 Pa. St. 258, 1654, 1679, 1688, 1752 Adams v. Hackett, 27 N. H. 289, 2128 Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73, 2096 Adams v. Hill, 16 Maine, 215, 868 Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306, 562 Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank^N.^,^ ( Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. St. 76, 238, 239 Adams v. Lambard, 80 Cal. 426, 1792 Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Aid. 681, 56, 57, 82 Adams v. McMillan, 7 Port. (Ala.) 73, 628 Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 1204, 1209 Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 275, 289, 2227, 2237 Adams v. Orange County Bank, 17 Wend. 514, 194 Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539, 910, 941 Adams v. Palmer, 51 Maine, 480, 2122 Adams v. Patrick, 30 Yt. 516, 592 Adams v. Railroad Co., 2 Cold. 645, 1221 Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah, 480, 991 Adams v. Reeves, 68 N. Car. 134, 803, 2206 Adams v. Rowan, 16 Miss. (8 Smed. & M.) 624, 2022 Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 441 Adams v. Thornton, 78 Ala. 489, 1003 Adams v. Townsend, 1 Mete. 483, 836 Adams v. Warner, 23 Vt. 395, 883 Adams v. Williams, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 2:27, 378 Adams v. Wood, 51 Mich. 411, 165 Adams Co. v. Hunter, 78 Iowa, 328, 1512, 2088 Adams, etc., Co. v. Deyette (S. Dak. Dec. 1895) , 65 N. W. Rep. 471, 1401 Adams Express Co. v. Reagan, 29 111. 21, 1968 Aday v. Echols, 18 Ala. 353, 1118 Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607, 2271 Adderly v. Storm, 6 Hill, 624, 1385 Artdyston, etc., Co. v. Copple, 94 Ky. 292, 578 Adee v. Bigler, 81 N. Y. 349, 27 Aderholt v. Embry, 78 Aln. 185, 477 Adkins v. Col. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27, 119 Adler v. Milwaukee Manufacturing H. Co., 13 Wis. 57, 1375, 1398 Administrators of Smith v. Wainwright, 24 Vt. 97, 757 Adsit v. Butler, 87 N. Y. 585, 27 .Etna Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 361, 362 Mtna. Ins. Co. v. Norman, 12 Ind. App. 652, 318 .Etna Ins. Co. v. Resh. 40 Mich. 241, 1764 .Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347, 876 .Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Pleasant Tp., 62 Fed. Rep. 718, 1540 Mtna. Iron Works v. Kossuth County, 79 Iowa, 40. 135 136, 144 jEtna National Bank v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co., 50 Conn. 167, 1257 Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292, 1129 Agawam Bank v. South Hadley, 128 Mass. 503, 1508 Agnew v. Bell, 4 Watts (Pa.), 31, 827 Agnew v. Brail, 124 111. 312, 210, 1473 Agnew v. McGill, 96 Ala. 496, 465, 466 Agra Bank, In re, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas. 160, 491 Agra & Masterman's Bank, In re, L. R. 2 Ch. 391, 54 Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. (U. S.) 225, 1738 Agricultural, etc., R. Co. v. Winchester, 13 Allen, 29, 1462 i) lii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Ahearn v. Ayres, 38 Mich. 692, 55 Ah Lep v. GongChoy, 13 Ore. 205, 835 Alilstrom v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Pac. Rep. 757 (Mont.) Ahrend v. Odiorne, 125 Mass. 50, 2185 Ahrens v. United Growers Co., 31 N. Y. Supl. 997, 510 Aiken v. Hyde, 99 Mass. 183, 133 Aiken v. McDonald (S. Car.), 20 S. E. Eep. 796, 366 Aiken v. Nogle, 47 Kan. 96, 646 Aiman v. Stout, 42 Pa. St. 114, 1031 Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans. 116, 268 Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 Weekly Eep. 630, 2056 Akers v. Demond, 103 Mass. 318, 731 Akin v. Peters, 45 Ark. 313, 455 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 98 Ala. 647, 1054, 1078 Alabama, etc., B. Co. v. Hill, 76 Ala. 303, 775 Alabama, etc., Insurance Co. v. John- ston, 80 Ala. 467, 318,769 Alabama, etc., Ins, Co. v. Thomas, 71 Ala. 578, 1611 Alabama G. S. R. Co. ». South & N. A. R. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 1110 Alamo Mills Co. v. Hercules Iron Works, 1 Texas Civ. App. 683, 2214 Albany City Nat. Bank v. Albany, 92 N. Y. 363, 783 Albany, etc., Insurance Co. v. Bay, 4 N. Y. 9, 1369 Albany Savings Institution * . Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40, 1060 Alberger v. National Bauk, i":> Mo. 313, l.i'-O, 1404 Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. 847, 1364 Albert v. Ziegler, 29 Pa. St. 50, 553, 562 Albert v. Winn, 5 Md. 66, 619 Albrecht v. Kraisinger, 44 111. App. 313, 952 Alcock v. Giberton, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 70, 2044 Alcock v. Little, 9 N. H. 259, 833 Alcorn v. Morgan, 77 Ind. If 4, 48 Alden v. Blague, Cro. Jac. 99, 515 Alden v. Hart, 161 Mass. r,7G, 316 Alden v. Thurber, 149 Ma.,s. 271, 521 Alderson v. Ennor, 45 111. 128, 1950 Aldine Manufacturing Co. v. Barnard, 84 Mich. 632, 781 Aldrich v. Ames, 9 Gray, 76, 597, 616 Aldrich v. Bailey (Sup.), 8 N. Y. Supl. 435, 1823 Aldrich v. Lyman, 6 R. I. 93, 214 Aldrich v. Wilmarth (S. Dak.), 54 N. W. Rep. 811, 372 Aldrich v. Wilmarth, 3 S. Dak. 523, 2193 Aldridge v. Amos, 9 Gray 76, 614 Alexander v. Alexander, 3 Pa. St. 56, 573 Alexander v. Brown, 1 C. & P. 283, 390 Alexander v. Caldwell, 55 Ala. 517, 1065, 1066 Alexander v. Greene, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 533, 1963 Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Bin. 238, 19, 20 Alexander v. Mills, L. R. 6 Ch. 124, 410 Alexander v. Newton, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 10U2 Alexander v. O'Donnell, 12 Kan. 608, 18>7 Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 3i9 Alexander v. Pierce, 10 N. H. 494, ls::n Alexander v. Sanders, 93 Ala. 345, 439 Alewyn v. Pryor, Ryan & Moody, 406, 125 Alford V. Burke, 21 Ga. 46, 1942 Alger t. North End, etc., Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 252 Alger v. Scoville, 1 Gray, 391, 597, 607 Alger v. Thaclier, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51, 1426, 2026, 2032, 2039, 2042, 2044, 2047, 2049, 2051 Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 136, lis Allan v. Eldred, 50 Wis. 132, 446 Allan t. Lake, IS Q. B. 560, 324, 325, 328 Allard v. Greasert. 61 N. Y. 1, 669, 670 Alleghany Baseball Club y. Bennett, 14 Fed. Rep. 257, 2073 Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. St. 81, 1536 Allen v. Allen, 47 Mich. 74, 1764 Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 2149 Allen v. Allen (Cal.), 27 Pac. Rep. 30, 280 Allen v. Arnold, 18 R. I. 809, 1380 Allen t. Atkinson, 21 Mich. 351, 397, 403, 1142 Allen v. Brown, 43 Ga. 305, 890 Allen y. Burke, 2 Md. Ch. 534. 1212 Allen y. Burlington, 45 Vt. 202, 806 Allen v. Cheeyer, 61 N. H. 32, 38a Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309, 4, 87 Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio, 2S4, 469 Allen v. Curies, 6 Ohio St. 505, 136, 138 Allen v. De Groodt, 105 Mo. 442, 15 Allen v. Deming, 11 N. H. 133, 454, 2096, 2101, 2113 Allen v. Dermott, 80 Mo. 56, 197 Allen v. Duflie, 43 Mich. 1, 2098, 2099 Allen v. Dunhma, 92 Tenn. 257, 1950' Allen v. Elder, 76 Ga. 674, 1058 Allen v. Farrington, 2 Sneed, 526, 543 Allen v. Fiske, 42 Vt. 462, 641 Allen v. Gardiner, 7 R. I. 22, 2094, 2096 Allen v. Harris. 1 Ld. Ray. 122, 508, 525, 526 Allen v. Hart, 72 111. 104, 990 Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. 458, 892 Allen v. Inhabitants of Cooper, 22 Maine, 133, 744 Allen v. Jaquish, 21 Wend. 028, 12, 517 Allen v. Lardner, 78 Hun (N. Y), 603, 18U0 Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591, 581 Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449, 148, 152 Allen v. Minor, 2 Call (Va.), 70, 1772 Allen v. Montgomery R. Co., 11 Ala. 437, 1375 Allen v. Mutual Compress Co., 101 Ala, 574, 159 Allen v. Nofsinger, 13 Ind. 494, 867 Allen v. Parker, 27 Maine, 531, 490 Allen v. Pearce, 84 Ga. 606, 1862 Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 140, 343 Allen y. Railroad Co., 11 Ala. 437, 1398 Allen v. Richard, 83 Mo. 55, 631 Allen's Admx. v. Richmond College, 41 Mo. 302, 7S5 Allen v. Roosevelt, 14 Wend. 101, 519, 524 Allen v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 473, 896 Allen v. St. Louis Bank, 120 C. S. 20, 922 Allen y. Snyder, 100 Mich. 2P0, 1018 Allen v. South Boston Railroad, 150 Mass. 200, 345 Allen y. Terry, 73 Ala. 123, 1728, 1744 Allen y. Thomas, 3 Met. (Kv.l 198, 1988, 2210 Allen v. Thompson, 10 N. H. 32, 609 Allen v. Thrall, 36 Vt. 711, 496 Allen v. Wall, 7 Wash. 316, 442 Allen v. Wheatley, 3 Blackf. 332, 543 Allen v. Wiustandly, 135 Ind. 105, 2273 Allen v. Woodward, 22 N. H. 544, 193 Allentown, Borough of, v. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421, 804 Aller y. Aller, 40 N. J. Law, 446, 12, 179, 181, 231, 234 Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N. Y. 670, Allies y. Probyn, 2 Cromp M. & R. 408, 527, 2240 Allin v. Shadburae's Executor, 1 Dana, 68, 816 Ailing v. Wenzel, 133 111. 264, 1371, 1391 Allis y. Billings, 2 Cush. 19, 210, 1473 Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. Rep. 148, 1232, 1405 Allis v. Meadow Springs Co., 67 Wis. 16, 457 Allison's Appeal, 77 Pa. St, 221, 2262, 2263 Allison y. Allison, 1 Yerg. 16, 110, 424 Allison v. Allison, 144 N. Y. 21, 1080 Allison v. Bristol Ins. Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 209, 2228 Allison y. Burns, 107 Pa. St. 50, 851 Allison v. Shelby R. Co., 10 Bush, 1, 1542 Allister v. Smith, 17 111. 328, 715 Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506, 578 Allshouse v. Ramsay, 6 Whart. 331, 405. TABLE OF CASES. liii [Eeferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, L. E. 15 Eq. Cas. 59, 2045 Alma, City of, v. Guaranty Sav. Bank, 60 Fed. Rep. 203, 1531 Almon v. Hamilton, 100 N. Y. 527, 1637 Alpass v. Watkins, 8 T. R. 516, 417 Alpaugh v. Wood, 53 N. J. Law, 638, 810 Alpha Mills v. Watertown Engine Co., 116 N. Car. 797, 345 Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala. 24, 46 Alsop v. Swathel, 7 Conn. 500, 15 Alston v. Richardson, 51 Texas, 1, 799 Altgelt v. City of San Antonio, 81 Texas, 436, 1567 Alvarez v. Brannan, 7 Cal. 503, 991, 992 Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T. R. 237, 696 Alvord v. Baker, 9 Wend. 323, 464 Alvord v. Marsh, 12 Allen, 603, 525 Alvord v. Smith, 63 Ind. 58, 1945 Ambach v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 30 Wkly. Law Bulletin, 111, 1962 Amedon v. Gannon, 6 Hun (N. Y.), 384, 32039 American, etc., Co. v. Gillette, 88 Mich. 231, 150 American Bank v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 123, 573 American Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 Kan. 35, IK), 463, 520 American Electric Co. v. Consumers' Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 43, 359, 360 American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Oregon Pottery Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 265, 1341, 1342, 1354 American Express Co. v. Lesem, 39 111. 312, 925 American Express Co. v. Pinckney, 29 111. 392,. 885 American Homestead Co. v. Linigan, 46 La. Ann. 1118, 1326 American Ins. Co. v. McAden, 109 Pa. St. 399, 2213 American Insurance Co. v. Oakley, 9 Paige, 496, 1277, 1282, 1318 Ames Iron Works v. Richardson, 55 Ark. 642, 166 American Lead Pencil Co. v . Wolfe, 30 Fla. 360, 602, 916 American Manganese Co. v. Virginia, etc., Co. (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 466, 881 American Mortgage Co. v. Wright, 101 Ala. 658, 1776 American Oak Leather Co. v. Porter (Iowa 1S95) , 62 N. W. Rep. 658, 686 American Seamen's Friend Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619, 1820 American Sug. Ref. Co. v. Fancher, 145 N. Y. 552, 2279 American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fancher, 81 Hun, 56, 1001, 1002 Ames v. Foster, 42 N. H. 381, 1746 Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed, 683, 1763, 1766, 1769 Amestoy v. Electric Rapid Transit Co., 95 Cal. 311. 1996 Amherst, Inhabitants of, v. Shelburne, 11 Gray (Mass.), 107, 1849 Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, 216, 217 Amiable Nancy, The, 3 Wheat. 546, 506 Amis v. Kyle. 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 31, 2096 Amisv. Smith, 16 Pet. 303, 830 Amkeney v. Hannon, 147 TJ. S. 118, 1653 Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 Maine, 580, 385, 765 Amort v. Christofferson, 57 Minn. 234, 599 Amory v. Meryweather, 2 B. & C. 573, 1929 Amsden v. Manchester, 40 Barb. 158, 466 Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615, 662 Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 301, 2145 Anchor Line v. Dater, 68 111. 369, 738 Anderson v. Cleburne, etc., Association (Texas App.) , 16 S. W. Rep. 298, 1601, 1605 Anderson v. Cranmer, 1 1 W. Va. 562, 1031 Anderson v. Davis, 9 Vt. 136, 609 Anderson v. Elsworth, 3 Gift 154, 253, 1014 Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. Cas. 484, 814 Anderson v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399, 676 Anderson v. Hayman, 1 H. B. 120, 601 Anderson v. Imhoff, 34 Neb. 335, 127 Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 2042, 2058 Anderson v. Kinley, 90 Iowa, 554, 1288 Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, 497, 828 Anderson, Matter of, 109 N. Y. 554, 1484 Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280, 295 Anderson v. Moore, 145 111. 61, 415, 955 Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600, 1346 Anderson v. Perkins, 10 Mont. 154, 476 Anderson v. Rogge (Texas App. 1894), 28 S. W. Rep. 106, 942 Anderson v. Santa Anna Township, 116 U. S. 356, 2207 Anderson v. Scott, 94 Mo. 637, 850 Anderson v. Simpson, 21 Iowa, 399, 844 Anderson v. Speers, 21 Hun, 568, 13S8 Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 315, 598, 013 Anderson v. Strassburger, 92 Cal. 38, 419 Anderson v. Whittaker (1892), 11 So. Rep. 919, 923 Anderson County Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 1526 Andes, Town of, v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312, 1534 Anding v. Levy, 57 Miss. 51, 1798 Andrew, In re, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 358, 398 Andrews, Ex parte, 18 Cal. 678, 2094 Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348, 1079 Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 419, 845, 1181 Andrews v. German National Bank, 9 Heisk. 211, 451 Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cow. 508, 716 Andrews v. Hyde, 3 Cliff. 516, 1066 Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 400, 224, 620 Andrews v. National Foundry Works, 61 Fed. Rep. 782, 1562 Andrews v. O'Mahoney, 112 U. S. 567, 674 Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65, 708, 710, 713, 730, 1626 Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309, 1304 Andrews v. Roach, 3 Ala. 590, 915 Andrews v. Rue, 34 N. J. Law, 402, 425 Andrews v. Sullivan, 2 Gilman, 327, 1107 Androscoggin, etc., Co. v. Metcalf, 65 Maine, 40, 781 Angel v. Simpson, 85 Ala. 53. 1117 Angell v. Duke, L. R. 10 Q. B. 174, 263 Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen (Mass.) , 211, 2049 Anglo-Egyptian Co. v. Reunie, L. R. 10 C. P. 271, 293, 2228 Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, 256 Anheuser, etc., Ass'n v. Bond, 66 Fed. Rep. 653, 714 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Mason, 44 Minn. 318, 1901 Ankeny v. Clark, 1 Wash. St. 549, 1138 Anna Maria. The. 2 Wheat. 32J 506 Annas v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 67 Wis. 46, 1959, 1960 Ann Berta Lodge v. Laverton, 42 Texas, 18, 842, 1199 Anonymous, 1 Esp. 349, 401 Anonymous, 1 Lord Ray. 182, 638 Anthony v. Boyd, 15 R. I. 495, 212 Anthony v. County of Jasper, 101 U. S. 693, 1516 Anthony Hitchcock, 71 Fed. Rep. 659, 2047 Anthony v. Hutchins, 10 R. I. 165, 1020 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693, 1529 Anthony v. Leftwich (1825), 3 Rand. (Va.) 238, H79 Anthony v. Perciful, 8 Ark. 494, 443 Anthony v. Price, 92 Ga. 170, 1646 Antoine v. Smith, 40 La. Ann. 560, 209 Automarchi v. Russell, 63 Ala. 356, 907 Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 TJ. S. 769, 32, 2159 liv TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833, 32, 2159 Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39, 556 Anvil Miami; Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540. 958 Anvil Mining Co. v . Sherman, 74 Wis. 226, Apgar v. Hiler, 24 N. J. Law, 812, 614, 616 Appeal, Barclay's, 64 Pa. St. 69, 196 Appeal, Brice's, 95 Pa. St. 145, 197 Appeal, Candor's, 27 Pa. St. 119, 182, 231, 234 Appeal, Hacker's, 121 Pa. St. 192, 19, 180 Appeal, Jones', 62 Pa. St. 324, 224 Appeal, Lukens', 143 Pa. St. 386, 209 Appeal, Slemmer's, 58 Pa. St. 155, 234 Appeal of Borough of Verona, 108 Pa. St. 83, 1577 Appeal of the City of Erie, 91 Pa. St. 398, 563, 1519, 1520, 1523, 1565 Appeal of Cornwall, etc., B. Co., 11 Am. St. Eep. 893, 898 Appeal of Forest Oil Co., 118 Pa. St. 138, 398 Appeal of Goodwin Gas Stove and Meter Co., 117 Pa. St. 514, 966, 1208 Appeal of Howard, 162 Pa. St. 374, 1577 Appeal of Rhodes, 156 Pa. St. 337, 1685 Appeal of Shaaber (Pa. Sup.), 17 Atl. Bep. 209, 1446 Appeal of Roop v. Real Estate, etc., Co., 132 Pa. St. 496, 1746 Appeal Tax Court v. Grand Lodge, 50 Md. 423, 2138 Apperson v. Exchange Bank (Ky.), 10 S. W. Rep. 809, 476 Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56, 432 Applebee v. Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 657, 489 Appleby v. Myers, L E. 2 C. P. 651, 293, 294, 2228 Applegate v. Koons, 74 Ind. 247, Applegate v. Mining Co., 117 U. S. 255, 1161 Appleton v. Norwalk, 53 Conn. 4, 165 Appleton v. Phoenix, etc., Ins. Co., 59 N. H. 237, 2257 Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray, 518, 8U0 Arapahoe Ins. Co. v. Piatt, 5 Colo. App. 515, 1311 Arbuckles v. Chad wick, 146 Pa. St. 393, 476 Arbuckle v. Cowtan, 3 Bos. & P. 321, 2084 Arbuckle v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 81 111. 429, 1458 Arbuckle v. Reaume, 96 Mich. 243, 727, 2102, 2112 Arbuckle v. Smith, 74 Mich. 568, 878 Archer v. Marsh, 6 A. & E. 595, 180, 2044 Archer v. State, 74 Md. 410, 30 Archer v. California Lumber Co., 24 Ore. 341, . 1056 Archibald v. Argall, 53 111. 307, 452 Ardis v. Priutup, 39 Ga. 648, 1713 Argenbright v. Campbell, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 144, 619, 1179 Argenti v. City of San Franciso, 16 Cal. 255, 1536 Argus Co., In rr, 1:K N. Y. 557 944 Argus Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 55 N. Y. 495, 675 Argyle Co. v. McNeill, 153 111. 669, 962 Arkansas Val. Smelting Co. v. Belden Min. Co., 127 U. S. 379, 1059 Arkell v. Commerce Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 191, M)5 Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102, 430 Armacost v. Lindley, 116 Ind. 295. 1672 Armfield v. Armfield, Freeman Ch. (Miss.) 311. 221 Armfield v. Tate, 7 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 258, HUE Arcnijo v. Abeytia, 25 Pac. Rep. 777, 5 U Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448, 170, 01 11 Armstead v. Bozeman, 1 Ired. Eq. 117, IOjh Armstead v. Ward, 2 Pat. & H. 512, 452 Armstrong V. American, etc., Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 1904, 1933 Armstrong v. Brownfield, 32 Kan. 116, 425 Armstrong v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 53 Minn. 183, 1967 Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 Ind. 52, 828 Armstrong v. Hayward, 6 Cal. 183, 541 Armstrong v. Lawson, 73 Ind. 498, 637, 638 Armstrong v. Prentice, 86 Wis. 210, 263 Armstrong v. School District, 28 Mo. App. 169, 543 Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss. 275, 1738 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 1304, 1854, 1862, 1891, 1902, 1933, 2016, 2108 Armstrong v. United States Express Co., 159 Pa. St. 640, 1959 Armstrong v. Vrooman, 11 Minn. 220, 674 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 1161 Arndt v. Harshaw, 53 Wis. 269, 1755 Arnold v. Bailey, 24 S. Car. 493, °™ Arnold v. Bernard, 8 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. N. S, 116, 2186 2211 540 Arnold v. Blabon, 147 Pa. St. 372, Arnold v. Camp, 12 Johns. 409, Arnold v. Clark, 45 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 252, Arnold v. Johnson, 1 Scam. 196, 478 Arnold v. Kreutzer, 67 Iowa, 214, 2063 Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass. 400. 237 Arnold v. Mayor, 4 M. & G. 860, 471 Arnold v. Nicbols, 64 N. Y. 117, 243 Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194, 730 Arnold v. Spurr, 130 Mass. 347, 1710 Arnold v. Stedman, 45 Pa. St. 186, 605 Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104, 761 Arnold v. United States, 147 U. S. 494, 770 Arnold v. Wilt, 86 Ind. 367, 1705 Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25, 1212 Arnot v. Pittston, etc., Co., 68 N. Y. 55S, 1425, 1864, 1893, 2058, 2060, 2069 Arnott v. City of Spokane, 6 Wash. 442, 1469 Arnott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 63 Hun, 028, 118 Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. Car. 116, 1671 Arrington v. Bell, 94 N. Car. 247, 1703 Arrington v. Porter, 47 Ala. 714, 844, 951 Arrington v. Sneed, 18 Texas, 135, 1899 Arrowsmith v. Hamering,39 Ohio St. 573, 770 Artcher v. Zeh, 5 Hill, 200, 654, 672 Arthur v. Caverly, 98 Mich. 82, 1696 Artisans' Bank v. Park Bank, 41 Barb. 599, 728 1754, 1755 1632 548 2017 379,390 Artman v. Ferguson, 73 Mich. 146, Artman v. Truby, 130 Pa. St. 619, Arton v. Booth, 4 J. B. Moore, 192, Asbbrook v. Dale, 27 Mo. App. 649, Asburn v. Poulter, 35 Conn. 553, Ashburner v. Parrish, 81 Pa. St. 52, Ashbury Railway, etc., Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653, 1246 Ashcrof t v. Butterworth, 136 Mass. 511, 677 Ashe v. Yungst, 65 Texas, 631, 1760 Ashenbroedel Club v. Finlay, 53 Mo. App. 256, 960 Asber v. Brock, 95 Ky. 270, 1200 Ashhurst's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 290, 1289, 1307, 1406, 1447 Ashley's Case, L. E. 9 Eq. 202, 1331 Ashley v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Fed. Eep. 65, 1428 Ashley v. Hendee, 56 Vt. 209, 465 Ashley v. Ryan, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 208, 440 Ashmead v. Reynolds, 127 Ind. 441, 1817, 1850 Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 837, 802 Ashtabula R. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 328, 155, 157 Ashton v. Pye, 5 Ves. 350, 557 Ashuelot, etc., Co. v. Hoit, 56 N. H. 548, 259, 1329 Ashuelot Nat. Bank v. School District, 56 Fed. Eep. 197, 1528 Ashuelot Railroad v. Elliot, 5S N. H. 451, 2132 Ashnrst v. Peck, 101 Ala. 499, 1121, 1126, 1213 Askey v. Williams, 74 Texas, 294, 1773 Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671, 8W Aspell v. Hosbein, 98 Mich. 117, 210-1 TABLE OF CASES. lv ISeferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1061-2291.'] Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 67 N. Y. 331, 826 Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Str. 916, 395, 2283 Astor v. Union Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202, 926 Astley v. Weldon, 2 B. & P. 854, 757 Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pul. 630, 761 Aston v. Aston, Ves. Sen. (Belt.) 134, 561 Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362, 2136 Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147, 2020 Atchison v. Bruff, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 381, 1799 Atchison K. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 461 Atchison, etc., K. Co. v. Grant, 6 Texas C. App. 674, 1959 Atchison, etc., B. Co. v. Lawler, 40 Neb. • 356. 1961 Atchison H. Co. ». Washburn, 5 Neb. 117, 1961 Atchison, etc., v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740, 736 Atchison Board, etc., v. De Kay, 148 U. S. 591 s 1531 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. English, 38 Kan. 110. 649, 655 Atchison B. Co. v. Lindley, 42 Kan. 714, 1432 Aten v. Brown. 14 111. App. 451, 831 Athens, City of, v. Hemerick, 89 Ga. 674, 1534 Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471, 259, 1322 Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471, 1328 Atkins v. Barnwell, 2 East, 505, 183, 184, 197 Atkins v. Busby, 25 Ark. 176, 2022 Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen, 487, 764 Atkins v. Van Buren School Tp., 77 Ind. 447, 95 Atkinson v. Chicago Tire & Spring Works (111. 1891), 27 N. E. Rep. 919, 2245 Atkinson v . Cox. 54 Ark. 444. 468 Atkinson v. Denby, 6 H. & N. 778, 802, 2014 Atkinson v. Denby, 7 Hurl. & N. 933, 1640, 1641 Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Maine, 111, 2120 Atkinson v. Farrington Co. (N. J. 1894), 28 Atl. Rep. 315, 1064 Atkinson v. Linden Steel Co., 138 111. 178, 2245 Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276, 506 Atkinson v. Pack, 114 N. Car. 597, 2219 Atkinson v. Philadelphia (Pa. 1894), 30 Atl. Rep. 383, 1553 Atkinson v. Richie, 10 East, 534, 279, 2237 Atkinson v. Stewart, 2 B. Mon. 348, 443 Atkinson v. Taylor, 34 Mo. App. 442, 416, 417, 419 Atkinson v. Truesdell, 127 N. Y. 230, 2246 Atkinson v. Whitney, 67 Miss. 655, , 1111 Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Exch. 776, 2039 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Speer, 32 Ga. 550, 2271 Atlantic Bank v. Franklin, 55 N. Y. 235, 200 Atlantic Co. v. Mayor, 53 N. Y. 64, 543 Atlantic City Water Works v. Read, 50 N. J. Law, 665, 1438, 1519 Atlantic, etc., Bank v. Harris, 118 Mass. 147, 345 Atlantic and Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Union Pacific Ry., 1 McCrary, 541, 1412, 2052 Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 690, 1182 Atlas National Bank v. Savery, 127 Mass. 75, 1249 Attleborough, etc., Bank v. Rogers, 125 Mass. 339, 1249 Attorney-General v. Board, 64 Mich. 607, 1523 Attorney-General v. Chicago &- N. W. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 1431 Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sen. 218, 674 Attorney-General v. Ewelme Hospital, 17 Beav. 366, 884 Attorney-General v. Parnther, 3 Brown Ch. 441, 2278 Attorney-General v. Railway Co., 5 App. Cas.473, m . 1226 Attorney-General v. Rumford Chemical Works, 32 Fed. Rep. 608, 885 Attorney-General v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239, 1248 Atwater v. American Nat. Bank, 152 Jll. 605, 1354 Atwater y. Hough, 29 Conn. 508, 657 Atwater v. Manchester Bank, 45 Minn. 341, 28 Atwater v. Schenck, 9 Wis. 160, 101, 1176 Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich. 118, 806 Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227, 679, 684, 853, 1096 Atwood v. Dolan, 34 W. Va. 563, 1678 Atwood v. Impson, 20 N. J. En. 150, 1662, 1856 Auburn Academy v. Strong, Hopkins Ch. (N. Y.) 278, 1412 Auburn, etc., Road Co. v. Douglas, 9 N. Y. 444, 1240 Auburn Bolt, etc., Co. Works v. Shultz. 143 Pa. St. 256, 374, 1329 Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush, 572, 60 Auditorial Board v. Aries, 15 Texas, 72, 33 Auffmordt v. Rasin, 102 U. S. 620, 2119 Augusta Bank v. Fogg, 82 Maine, 538, 251 Aultman v. Henderson. 32 111. App. 331, 123 Aultman v. Olsen, 43 Minn. 409, 163 Aultman v. Waddle, 40 Kan. 195, 2003, 2004 Aultman Co. v. Case, 68 Wis. 612, 365 Aultman Co. y. Shelton, 90 Iowa, 288, 338 Aultman, Taylor & Co. v. Hetherington, 42 Wis. 622, 364 Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Frasure, 95 Ky. 429, 1742 Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Obermeyer, 6 Neb. 260, 1652, 1666 Aurbach v. Le Sueur Mill Co., 28 Minn. 291, 1603 Aurora, City of, v. West, 22 Ind. 88, 1532, 1885 Aurora Horticultural Society v. Paddock, 80 111. 263, 1221 Aurora Insurance Co. v. Eddy, 55 111. 213. 317 Aurora Turnpike Co. v. Holthouse, 7 Ind. 59, 2132 Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540, 1472, 1485 Austin v. Austin, 9 Vt. 420, 490 Austin v. Barnum, 52 Minn. 136, 418 Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 1731 Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, K49 Austin v. Hall, 13 John. 286, 540, 543, 877 Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286, 606 Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 121, 2148 Austin v. Rawdon, 44 N. Y. 63, 2166, 2168 Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. 30, 037 Austin v. Seligman. 18 Fed. Rep. 519, 236 Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 752 Austin Real Estate Co. v. Bahn, 87 Texas, 582, 207 Austria, Emperor of, v. Day, 2 Gifi. 628, 392 Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 914 Averbeck v. Hall, 14 Bush (Ky.), 505, 2011 Avery v. Bowden, 5 E. & B. 714, 497 Avery v. Fisher, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 508, 1773 Avery v. Johann, 27 Wis. 246, 1»56 Avery v. Latimer, 14 Ohio, 542, 181 Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, 385, 386, 764, 766, 882, 899 Averv v. Wetmore, Kirby, 49, 475 Avery v. Willson, 81 N. Y. 341, 145, 2233 Avoy v. Long, 13 111. 147, 903 Await v. Eutaw, etc.,Assn., 34 Md. 435, 807 Awdley v. Awdley, 2 Vern. 192, 1844 Awkright v. Newbold, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 320, 990 Axtei v. Chase, 83 Ind. 546, 1081 Axtell v. Chase, 77 Ind. 74, 1081 Axtell's Petition, In re, 9d Mich. 244, 2256 Aycock v. Braun, 66 Texas, 201, 1988 Aycock v. Kimbroutrh, 71 Texas, 330, 1730 Aver v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447, " 521, 524, 541, 572 Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370, 18S4 Ayers, In re, 123 U. S. 443, 32 Ayers v. Newark, 49 N. J. Law, 170, 1549 Ivi TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Ayers v. Staley (N. J. Eq.), 18 Atl. Eep. 1046. 474 Aylesford's Case, Earl of, 2 Stra. 783, 844 Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Wins. 65, 619 Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 266, 2247 Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439, 712 Ayres v. Chicago, etc., Eailway Co., 71 Wis. 372, 1960 Ayres v. Chicago, etc., B. Co., 52 Iowa, 478, 187, 198, 199 Ayres v. Dutton, 87 Mich. 528, 375 Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah, 249, 628 Ayres v. Mitchell, 3 Smedes & M. 683, 409, 2281 B Babbitt v. Morrison, 58 N. H. 419, 1721 Babcock v. Chase, 92 Hun, 264, 229 , Babcock v. Clear, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 664, 500 Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488, 1873 Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561, 529, 531 Babcock v. Kuntsch, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 663, 202 Babcock v. Read, 99 N. Y. 609, 644, 645 Babcock y. Schuylkill E. E. Co., 133 N. Y. t, 4 ? ' , ^ "62 Babcock v. Utter, 1 Keves, 397, i; 13 Babcock v. Wilson, 17 Maine, 372, 214 Bach v. Levy, 101 N. Y. 511, :;,;,-, Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 53, 1010, 2275 Bachelder v. Fiske, 17 Mass. 464, S27 Backer v. Meyer, 43 Fed. Eep. 702, 1689 Backhouse v. Mohun, 3 Swanst. 434, 1108 Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 2130 Backus T. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211, 309 Bacon v. Cobb, 45 111. 52, 22:i7 Bacon v. Dyer, 12 Maine, 19, 402 Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227, 665 Bacon v. Miss. Insurance Co., 31 Miss. 116, 1341 Bacon v. Johnson, 56 Mich. 182, 1278 Bacon v. Kentucky Central E. Co., 95 Ky. 373, 1108 Bacon v. Wayne Co., 1 Mich. 461, 1471 Badart v. Foulon, 80 Md. 579, 43 Badcock, In re, L. H. 17 C. D. 361, 226 Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S. 439, 460 Badders v. Davis, 88 Ala. 367, 955 Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 1169 Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 1793 Badgett v. Frick, 28 S. Car. 176, 1048 Badische, etc., Fabrik v. Schoot, L. E. (1S92) 3 Ch. 447, 2034, 2041, 2045 Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 389, 667 Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. 284, 2S1 Bad Eiver Lumbering Co. v. Kaiser, 82 Wis. 166, 120 Bagaley v. Waters, 7 Ohio St. 359, 244 Bagley v. Perldie, 16 N. Y. 469, 753 Bagnall v. Carlton, L. E. 6 Ch. Div. 271, 1980 Baggs v. Baggs, 55 Ga. 590, 1768 Bailey v. Bailey, 56 Vt. 398, 263, 608, 609 Bailey v. Bensley, 87 111. 556, 913 Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455, 826, 827 Bailey v. County of Buchanan, 115 N. Y. ®7' „ , 399,400 Bailey v. Cromwell, 3 Scam. (111.) 71, 868 Bailey v. Day, 26 Maine, 88, 520 Bailey v. Do Crespigny, L. E. 4 Q. B. 597, 273 Bailey v. Gibbs, 9 Mo. 45, 1% Bailey v. Harris, 8 Iowa, 331, fitu Bailey v. Hemenway, 147 Mass. 326, 615 Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172, Jit") Bailey v. Inglee, 2 Paige, 278, 1 215 Bailey v. Insurance Co., 114 Mass. 177, 12 II Bailey v. Irwin, 72 Ala. 505, 694 Bailey v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 71 Maine, 472, 1578 Tl'iiloy v. Milner, 1 Abb. U. S. 261 2021 B.aley v. New England Ins. Co., 114 Mass. I 77 . 2184 Bailey v. Ogden, 3 John. 399 667, 675 Bailey v. Parbridge, 134 111. 188, 448 Bailey v. Eutjes, 86 N. Car. 517, 778 Bailey v. Woods, 17 N. H. 365, 138, 2181 Baillett v. Wheeler. 44 Barb. 162, 646 Baillie v. Moore, 8 Q. B. 489, 527 Bain v. Whitehaven, etc., E. Co., 3 H. L. Cas. 1, 717 Baines v. Geary, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 154, 2028 Baines v. Jevons, 7 Car. & P. 288, 668 Baird v. Patiilo (Texas 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 813, 1657 Baird v. United States, 96 U. S. 430, 519, 522 Baily'sCase, L. E. 5 Eq. 428, 62 Baily v. De Crespigny, L. E. 4 Q. B. 180, 280,282 Baker v. Arnot, 67 N. Y. 448, 362 Baker v. Baker, 2 S. Dak. 261, 453 Baker v. Baker, 28 N. J. Law, 13, 475 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 184, 2147 Baker v. City of Fairbury. 33 Neb. 674, 461 Baker v. Connell, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 469, 466 Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. Car. 116, 2044 Baker v. Denning, 8 A. & E. 94, 687 Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. & C. 704, 552 Baker v. Disbrow, 3 Eedf. (N. Y.) 348, 1780 Baker v. Guarantee, etc., Co., 31 Atl. Eep. 174 (N. J. Eq. 1895), 1438 Baker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 397, 146 Baker v. Holt, 56 Wis. 100, 68, 69 Baker v. Holtpzaflell, 4 Taunt. 45, 292 Baker v. Johnson, 42 N. Y. 120, 280 Baker v. Johnson Co., 37 Iowa, 186, 71 Baker v. Jordan, 73 N. Car. 145, 1727 Baker v. Kansas City E. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 214 Baker v. Kennett, 54 Bin. 82, 1781 Baker v. Lauterbach, lio Md. 64, 653, 692 Baker v. Maxwell, 99 Ala. 55^, 992, 993 Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150, 803 Baker v. Mott, 78 Hun, 141, 26, 170 Baker v. Neff, 73 Ind. 68, 1335 Bakeman v. Pooler, 15 Wend. 637, 389 Baker v. Eowell, 3 Strob. 25, 395 Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass. 405, 1797 Baker v. Stonebaker, 36 Mo. 338, 717 Baker v. Wheaton, 5 Mass. 309, 399 Baker v. Whiteside, 1 111. 174, 954 Baker v. Wiswell, 17 Neb. 52, 842 Balcom v. Craggin, 5 Pick. 295, 186 Bald Eagle, etc., E. Co. v. Nittany, etc., R. Co., 171 Pa. St. 284, 1419 Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37, 663, 668 Baldwin v. Bangor, 36 Maine, 518, 1576 Baldwin v. Carter, 17 Conn. 201, 900 Baldwin v. Fletcher, 48 Mich. 604, 1156 Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 223, 2125 Baldwin v. Hutchinson, 8 Ind. App. 454, 1834, 1835 Baldwin y. Kerlin, 46 Ind. 426, „ ,, . , 1176,1177,1178,1484 Baldwin v. National Hedge Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 853 1068 Baldwin v. Rosenman, 49 Conn. 105, 1636 Baldwin v. Salter, 8 Paige, 473, 955 Baldwin v. Society, etc., 9 Sim. 393, 1212 Baldy v. Stratton, 11 Pa. St. 316, 2015 Baldwin v. Van Vorst, 10 N. J. Eq. 577, 749 Baldenberg v. Warden, 14 W. Va. 397, 1179 Baldwin v. Williams, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 365, 661 Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 487 338 Bali v. Gilbert, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 397, 1941, 1947, 1948, 2072 Ball v. Doud, 26 Ore. 14, 2192,2223 2'24 Ball v. McGeoch, 81 Wis. 160, 545 Ball v. Stanley, 5 Yarger, 199, 393, 411 Ball, etc., Fastener Co. v. Ball Glove Fastener Co. , 58 Fed. Rep. 818, 1129 Ballard v. Ballard, 25 W. Va. 470, 1179 Ballard v. Lippman, 32 Fla. 481, 1737 Ballard v. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45, 525 Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. St. 358, 850 Ballentine v. Clark, 38 Mich. 395, 1077 TABLE OF CASES. lvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Ballentine V. North Mo. K. Co.. 40 Mo. 491 275 Ballou v. Billings, 136 Mass. 307, 954, 1044 Ballou v. Earle, 17 R. I. 441, 1965 Ballou v. Sherwood, 82 Neb. 666, 417 Bally v. Wells, 3 Wils. 25, 1102 Balme v. Wambaugh, 16 Minn. 116, 398, 401, 402 Baloou v. Hale, 47 N. H. 347, 621 Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 1521 Baltimore, City of, v. City of New Or- leans, 45 La. Ann. 526, 1469 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Western Union, etc., Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 319, 2052 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. IBS, 134 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647, 736 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Ragsdale (Ind. App.), 42 N. E. Rep. 1106, 1966 Baltimore and Ohio R. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287, 724 Baltimore Trust, etc., v. Baltimore, 64 Fed. Rep. 153, 1582 Baltzer v. Railroad Co., 115 U. S. 634, 1068 Balue v. Taylor, 136 Ind. 368, 969, 979, 1013, 2166 Bament v. LaDow, 66 Fed. Rep. 185, 1010 Bampton v. Paulin, 4 Bing. 264, 608 Banbury v. Arnold, 91 Cal. 606, 120, 1187 Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Maine, 120, 709, 1902 Bancroft v. Winspear, 44 Barb. 209, 874 Bane v. Detrick, 52 111. 19, 803 Banfield v. Banfield, 24 Ore. 571, 1063 Bang v. Brett (Minn.), 63 N. W. Rep. 1067, — Bangert v. Bangert, 13 Mo. App. 144, 1734 Bancor Electric Light Co. v. Robinson, 52 Fed. Rep. 520, 1346 Bangs v. Dunn, 66 Cal. 72, 2084 Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick. 368, 194 Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 251 Bank v. Crary, 1 Barb. 542, 638 Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 452 Bank v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191, 1231, 1234 Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill. 451, 427 Bank v. Deming. 17 Vt. 366, 1643 Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 587, 1249 Bank v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 275, 899 Bank v. Fulmer, 31 N. J. Law, 55, 955 Bank v. Gilstrap, 45 Mo. 419, 1287 Bank v. Hagner, 1 Pet. 455, 1142 Bank v. Hiatt, 58 Cal. 234, 992 Bank v. Kennedy, 17 Wall. 19, 859 Bank v. Letcher, 3 J. J. Marsh. 195, 532 Bank v. Levitt, 5 Ohio, 207, 1372 Bank v. Lowrey, 36 Neb. 290, 1S64 Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill, 501, 1283 Bank v. Owens, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 526, 1894 Bank v. Town of Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, pp. 31, 35, 1«9 Bank of Washington v.Triplett, 1 Pet. 25, 941 Bank v. Weaver (Cal.), 31 Pac. Rep. 160, 1340 Bank v. Wheeler, 72 N. Y. 201, 1553 Bank v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87, 1189 Bank of British America v. Simpson, 24 U. C. C. P. 357, 688 Bank of California v. Webb, 94 N. Y. 467, 473 Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) L. 516, „ 2136 Bank of Catskill v. Messenger, 9 Cow. 37, 574 Bank of Chenango v. Osgood, 4 Wend. 607, 569 Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodge, 8 Barb. 233 °^2 Bank of Chillicothe v. Swayne, 8 Ohio. 257, 1260 Bank of Chillicothe v. Town of Chilli- cothe. 7 Ohio, 31 (part 2), 1260 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 20, 780, to& Bank' of Columbia v. Hagner, 1 Pet. 455, 743 Bank of Commonwealth v. Mayor of New York, 43 N. Y. 189, 458, 460, 1805 Bank of Cumberland v. Mayberry, 48 Maine, 198, 2114 Bank of England v. Newman, 1 Ld. Raym. 442, 456 Bank of Bellows Falls v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 28 Vt. 470, 968 Bank of Galliopolis v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. 599 719 Bank' of Genese v. Patchin Bank, 13 N. Y. 309, 1285 Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. S. 174, 64, 273 Bank of Louisiana v. Williams, 46 Miss. 618, 714 Bank of Middlebury v. Rutland & W. R. Co., 30 Vt. 159, 1269 Bank of Mobile v. Dunn, 67 Ala. 381, 1611 Bank of Monroe v. Gifford, 79 Iowa, 300, 452 Bank of Montgomery v. Buggy Co., 100 Ala. 626, 1631 Bank of Montreal v. J. E. Potts Salt and Lumber Co., 90 Mich. 345, 1393, 1404, 1642 Bank of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 421, 460 Bank of New York Nat. B. Assn. v. Ameri- can Dock Co., 143 N. Y. 559, 1304, 1350 Bank of North America v. Sturdy, 7 R. I. 109, 1879 Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158, 776, 781 Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144 2130, 2137 Bank of River Falls v. German Am. Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 535, 2244 Bank of San Luis Obispo v. Wickersham, 99 Cal. 655, 971 Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 2130 Bank of Troy v. Topping, 9 Wend. 273, 593 Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 783, 1277, 1283, 1323 Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 34, 458 Bank of U. S. v. Donally, 8 Pet. 381, 21, 696, 715 Bank of United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527, 1265, 1888, 1897 Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25, 731, 891 Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizen's Bank, 21 La. Ann. 18, 2021, 2022 Banks v. Goodfellow, L. R. 5 Q. B. 549, 1812 Banks v. Harris Mfg. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 667, 677, 692, 2270 Banks v. New York Club, 68 Hun, 92, 1366 Banks v. Searles, 2 McMul. 356, 1880 Banks v. Werts, 13 Ind. 203, 2110 Banner, Ex parte, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 480, 210, 1473 Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N. Car. 581, 122 Barber v. Burrows, 51 Cal. 404, 12 Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 615, 1766, 1768 Barber Asphalt Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22, 1473 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 2147, 2160 Barclay, Ex parte, 7 Ves. 597, 457 Barclay's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 69, 196 Barclay v. Culver, 30 Hun, 1, 412 Barclay v. Lucas, 1 T. R. 291, 566 Bardart v. Foulon, 80 Md. 579, 45 Bargett v. Orient, etc., Ins. Co., 3 Bos. (N. Y.) 385, 897 Barhite's Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 404, 791 Barhydt v. Ellis, 45 N. Y. 107, 872. 885 Barickman v. Kukkendall, 6 Blackf . (Ind.) 21, 677 Barker, In re, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 241, 1844 Barker v. Birt, 10 Mees. & W. 61, 610 Barker v. Bradley, 42 N. Y. 316, 238, 562 Barker v. Brink, 4 Greene (Iowa), 59, 2198 Barker v. Buklin, 2 Denio, 45, 237, 260, 597, 607 lviii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. .] Barker v. Cobb, 36 N. H. 344, 490 Barker v. Cory, 15 Ohio, 9, 781, 2168 Barker v. Frye, 75 Maine, 29, 252 Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 539, 1798 Barker v. Lynch, 75 Wis. 624, 1755 Barker v. Northern Pao. E. Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 460, 580 Barker v. Troy, etc., Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 766, 875, 878 Barker v. Walbridge, 14 Minn. 469, 394 Barkwell v. Swan, 69 Miss. 907, 454 Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drewry, 1, 301, 619, 675 Barlow v. Gregory, 31 Conn. 261, 767 Barlow y. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704, 907, 920 Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 41, 243 Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 4 Mete. 270, 210, 1473 Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 859, 883 Barlow v. Smith, 4 Vt. 139, 192 Barlow v. Stalworth, 27 Ga. 517, 781 Barnaby v. Barnaby, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 221, 1776 Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 "Wis. 593, 1914 Barnard v. Campbell, 58 N. Y. 73, 2280 Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 21, 1018, 1019, 1064 Barnard y. Graves, 16 Pick. 41, 447 Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, 167, 915, 917, 926, 891, 2247 Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92, 75, 752 Barnard v. Lloyd. 85 Cal. 131, 2178 Barnard v. Russell, 19 Vt. 334. 95, 101 Barnard v. Tomson, L. R. 1 Ch. 374, 174, 175 Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Galloway, 5 S. Dak. 205, 951 Barnes v. Barnes, 50 Conn. 572, 1801 Barnes v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 130 Mass. 388, 836, 844 Barnes y. Brown, 80 N. Y. 527, 1306, 1307 Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146, 1030, 1041 Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 TJ. S. 540, 34 Barnes v. Kornegay, 62 Fed. Rep. 671, 2136 Barnes y. Lloyd, 1 How. (Miss.) 581, 532 Barnes v. McAllister, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 534, 2073 Barnes V. McMullins, 78 Mo. 260, 2168 Barnes y. Moore's Estate, 86 Mich. 585, 1C85 Barnes Y. Smith, 159 Mass. 344, 1917 Barnes y. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18. 256 Barnes y. Toye, L. B. 13 Q. B. D. 410, 1799 Barnes y. Trenton Gas Light Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 33, 1288 Barnes v. Ward, Busbee's Eq. 93, • 553 Barnet v. Patterson, 48 N. J. Law, 395, 1470 Barnett v. Barnes, 73 111. 216, 957 Bamptt y. Denison, 145 U. S. 135, 1537 Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 tnd. App. 103, 137, 215 Barnett v. Juday, 38 Ind. 86, 810 Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476, 724 Barnett v. Washington Glass Co., 12 Ind. App. 631, 629, 637 Barney v. Giles, 120 111. 154, 126 Barney & Smith Co. v. County Com'rs, 29 Weekly Law Bui. (Cin.) 366, 461 Barnhart V. Fulkertb, 90 Cal. 159, 1691 Barnhart y. Riddle, 2'J Pa. St. 92, 2264 Barnum y. Frost, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 398, J841 Barnum y. Young, 10 Neb. 309, 1652. 1723 Barnwell v. Kemptou, 22 Kan. 543, 135 Baron y. Placide, 7 La. Ann. 229, ffi-t Barr y. Glass Co., 51 Fed. Bep. 33, 1452 Barr y. New York, etc., K. Co., 125 N. Y. 263, 1301, 1306 Barr v. Plate Glass Co., 6 C. C. A. 260 ; 57 Fed. Rep. 86, 1446 Baradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 639, 119 Barreda v. Silsbco, 21 How. 116, 875 Barrett, Ex parte, 31 L. J. Ch. 558, 160 Barrett v. Alien, 10 Ohio, 426, 385, 386, 766 Barrett v. Barrett, 5 Ore. 411, 792 Barrett y. Carden, 65 Vt. 431, 1952, 2006 Barrett y. Geisinger, 148 111. 98, 839, 1190, 1191, 1197 Barrett y. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107, 668 Barrett y. Hall, 1 Aik. 269, 325, 328 Barrett y. Henrietta, etc., Bank, 78 Texas, 222, 236, 244 Barrett y. Lewis, 106 Ind. 120, 1720 Barrett v. Market St. R. Co., 81 Cal. 296, 413 Barreda y. Silsbee, 21 How. (U. S.) 146, 874 Barrett v. Third Aye. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628, 574 Barrell y. Trussell, 4 Taunt. 117, 608, 610 Barrett y. Weber, 125 N. Y. 18, 2012 Barrick y. Buba, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 563, 498 Barrick y. Giflord, 47 Ohio St. 180, 1382 Barril v. Calendar, etc., Water-Proofing Co., 2 N. Y. Supl. 758, 1316 Barringer y. Warden, 12 Cal. 311, 214 Barron y. Barron, 24 Vt. 575, 1680 Barron y. Burrill, 86 Maine, 66, 1319, 1:383 Barrow y. Ker, 10 La. Ann. 120, 68 Barron y. Mullin, 21 Minn. 374, 356 Barron y. Tucker, 53 Vt. 338, 1853 Barrow y. Barrow, 2 Dick. 504, 221, 223 Barrow y. Pike, 21 La. Ann. 14, 2022 Barrowman y. Free, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 500, 497 Barry y. Coombe, 1 Pet. 640, 688, 691, 1175 Barry y. Edmunds, 116 D. S. 550, 32, 2159 Barry y. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 300, 549 Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462, 596, 599, 827 Barstow y. Savage Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388, 1346 Bartel v. Lope, 6 Ore. 321, 408 Barter y. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9, 738 Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230, 725, 732 Bartholomew y. Bentley, 1 Ohio St. 37, 1260 Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28, 186, 268, 784 Bartles y. Gibson, 17 Fed. Rep. 273, 1856 Bartlett y. Bailey, 59 N. H. 408, 1790, 1797 Bartlett v. Drake, 100 Mass. 174, 1797, 1803 Bartlett v. Farrington, 120 Mass. 284, 453 Bartlett v. Robbins, 5 Mete. 184, 828 Bartlett v. Smith, 13 Fed. Rep. 263, 2072 Bartlett v. Stanchfleld, 148 Mass. 394, 344 Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 1886 Bartlett y. Wheeler, 44 Barb. 162, 649, 656 Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 259, 187, 198 Barton y. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 530, 864 Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 622, 902,950 Barton y. McKelway, 22 N. J. Law, 165, 919, 2246 Barton y. Port Jackson, etc., Plank Road Co., 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 397, 1972 Barton y. Spinning, 8 Wash. 458, 102 Barton v. Wells, 5 Wharton, 225, 2009 Barwick y. Reade, 1 H. Bl. 627, 2084 Bascom y. Cannon, 158 Pa. St. 225, 944 Bascom v. Smith, 164 Mass. 61, 857 Basford y. Pearson, 7 Allen, 504, 1753 Bash y. Culver Gold Mining Co., 7 Wash. 122. 1308 Bashore y. Whisler, 3 Watts. 490, 356 Basket y. Moss, 115 N. Car. 448, 1872, 2081 Baskin v. Andrews, 53 Hun, 95, 823 Bason v. Mining Co., 90 N. Car. 417, 1244 Bass y. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192, 668, 671 Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Maine, 127, 2198 Basset y. Beam (Idaho 1894), 36 Pao. Rep. 501, 1695 Bassett v. Camp, 54 Vt. 232, 663 Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319, 236, 237, 247, 2210 Bassett y. Percival, 5 Allen (Mass.), 345, 2288 Bassett y. Sanborn, 9 Gush. 58, 146 Bassett v. Shopardson, 52 Mich. 3, 1754 1755 Basshor y. Forbes, 36 Md. 154, 1386 Basye y. Ambrose, 28 Mo. 39, 755 Bateman y. Butler, 124 Ind. 223, 1183 Bateman v. Daniels, 5 Blackf. 71, 198 TABLE OF CASES. lix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Batahelder v. Sanborn (N. H.), 22 Atl, Rep. 535, 168 Bates V.American Mortgage Co., 37 S. Car. » 1683 Bates v. Baboock, 95 Cal. 479, G44 Bates v. Chesebro, 32 Wis. 594, 670 Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., 109 Cal. 160, 1221 1257 Bates v. Herrick, 82 Mich. 295, ' 501 Bates v. Keith Iron Co., 7 Met. 224, 1358 Bates v. Kelly, 80 Ala. 142, 1156 Bates v. Lewis, 3 Ohio St. 459, 1325 Bates v. Railroad Co., 147 Mass. 255, 1432 Bates v. Swiger (W. Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 874, 1161 Bates v. Thompson, 61 Texas, 335, 20S7 Bates v. Wilson, 14 Colo. 140, 1452 Bath Sav. Institution v. Hathorn, 88 Maine — , 33 Atl. Rep. 836, 249, 251 Batson v. King, 4 H. & N. 739, 593 Battell v. Matot, 58 Vt. 271, 694 Battelle v. Northwestern Pavement Co., 37 Minn. 89, 1313, 1316, 1452 Batsford v. Every, 44 Barb. (N. ¥.) 618, 2098 Batterbury v. Vyse, 2 Hurl. & C. 42, 129 Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171, 46 Battle v. McArthur, 49 Fed. Rep. 715, t. **, „ , 209,211,565 Battle V. Rochester City Bank, 3 N. Y. 88, 465 Batton v. Allen, 5 N. J. Eq. 99, 555 Baubichon, Estate of, 49 Cal. 19, 1713 Bauck v. Swan, 146 Pa. St. 444, 1676 Baughman v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 94 Ky. 150 1962 Baum v. Birchall, 150 Pa. St. 164, 720 Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172, 120 Baum v. Parkhurst, 21 Atl. Rep. 497, 238 Baum v. Parkhurst, 26 111. App. 128, 244 Baum v. Stone, 12 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 353, 1800 Baum v. Sweeney, 5 Wash. 712, 1544 Baumann v. James, L. R. 3 Ch. 508, 684 Baumann v. James, L. R. 3 Ch. 508, 691 Baumann v. Pinckney, 118 N. Y. 604, 1143 Baumgarten v. Broadaway, 77 N. Car. 8, 2044 Bausman v. Credit Co., 47 Minn. 377, 453 Bavington v. Clarke, 2 Penrose & Watts (Pa.), 115, 1802 Baxter v. Aubrey, 41 Mich. 13, 1141 Baxter v. Burfield, 2 Strange, 1266, 288 Baxter v. Bishop, 65 Iowa, 582, 68 Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465, 432 Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & Cr. ,,170, 1842 Baxter National Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, 696, 728 Baxter v. State, 9 Wis. 38, 869 Baxter v. West, 5 Daly, 460, 776 Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 1536 Bayha v. Webster Co., 18 Neb. 131, 1512 Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 120 Bayley v. Homan, 5 Bing. N. C. 915, 525 Bayley v. Williams, 4 GifE. 638, 1832 Baylies v. Fettyplace, 7 Mass. 325, 281 Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1 Exch. 425, 940 Baylisv. Dineley.3 M. &. S. 476, 1772 Bayly v. Merrel, Cro. Jac. 386, 1877 Baynard v. Eddings, 3 Strobh. 374, 110 Bayne v. United States, 93 U. S. 642, 472 Baywater v. Richardson, 1 Ad. & E. 508, 891 Beach v. Allen, 7 Hun, 441, 643 Beach v. Endress, 51 Barb. 570, 562 Beach v. First, etc., Church, 96 111. 177, 258, 1329 Beach v. Miller, 130 111. 162, 1298, 1334, 1354, 1365 Beach v. Miller, 51 111. 206, :; SI Beach v. Stearns, 1 Aik. 325, 4LI4 Beach v. Vandenburfdi, 10 Johns. 360, 1S6 Beadle v. Seat (Ala. 523), 15 So. Eep. 243, 1157 1105 Beadles v. McElrath, 85 Ky. 230, 1922 Beadles, Wood & Co. v. McElrath & Co.. 85Ky.230, 1915 Beagle v. Harby, 73 Hun, 310, 46, 47 Bealv. Chase, 31 Mich. 490, 2041, 2042, 2044, 2047, 2069 Beal v. City of Roanoke, 90 Va. 77, 1469, 1486 Beal v. Harrington, 116 111. 113, 428 Beale v. Thompson, 3 Bos. & P. 405, 2237 Beales v. See, 10 Pa. St. 66, 1838 Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818, 850 Beals v. Beals, 20 Ind. 163, 2210 Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114, 325 Beam v. Barnum, 21 Conn. 200, 521, 524 Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205, 597, 614 Bean v. Edge, 84 N. Y. 510, 162, 241 Beau v. Hyde Park, 143 Mass. 245, 1492 Bean v. Inhabitants of Jay, 23 Maine, 117, „. 1173 Bean v. Jay. 23 Maine, 117, 2i0 Bean v. Parker, 17 Mass. 591, 172 Bean v. Patterson, 122 U. S. 496, Kiwi Bean v. Western, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Car. 731, S83 Beard v. Arbuckle, 19 W. Va. 135, ! 15 Beard v. Beard, 3 Atk. 72, 2 S7 Beard v. City of Hopkinsville, 96 Ky. 239, 1519 Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200, 2032, 2039, 2043, 2045, 2264 Beard v. Horton, 86 Ala. 202, Beard v. Linthicum, 1 Md. Ch. 345, Beard v. Lofton, 102 Ind. 408, Beard v. St. Louis, etc., By. Co., 79 Iowa, 527, 736, 738 Beardsley v. Davis, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 159, 2206 Beardsloy v. Duntlov, 69 N. Y. 577, 435, 2274 Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201, 1771, 1775 Beardsley v. Knight, 10 Vt. 185, 1232 Beardstown, City of, v. City of Virginia, 76111.34, 1587 Bearss v. Ford, 108 111. 16, 851 Beasley v. Huyett, etc., Mfg. Co., 92 Ga. 273, 351 Beattie v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 90 N. Y. 643, 1278 Beatty v. Coble, 142 Ind. 329, 2044, 2045 Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler, 4 Pet. (U. S. ) 152, 2131 Beaumont v. Brengeri, 5 C. B. 301, 668 Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 4\3, 183 Beaupre v. Pacific & A. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155, 55 Beavan v. Eldridge, 2 Miles (Pa. ) , 353, 3S5 Beavan v. McDonnell, 9 Excl i. 3UJ, 1842 Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 4L1, 249, 250 Beaver v. Fulp, 136 Ind. 595, 198 Bebee v. Moore, 3 McLean, 387, 594 Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 36C, 2271 Beck v. Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180, 472 Beck v. Haas, 111 Mo. 264, 1690 Beck v. Kantorowicz, 3 Kay & J. 230, 1980 Beck v. Pounds, 20 Ga. 36, 815, 817 Beck v. Searson, 8 Rich. Eq. 130, 1020 Beck v. Snyder, 167 Pa. St. 234, 537 Beck v. Tarrant, 61 Texas, 402, 2189 Beck, etc., Co. v. Colorado, etc., Co., 52 Fed. Bep. 700, 748 Becker v. Anderson, 6 Neb. 499, 1048 Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317, 381, 383, 407 Becker v. Holm, 87 Wis. 86, 904 Becker v. Keokuk Water- Works, 79 Iowa, 419, 1514 Becker v. Mason, 93 Mich. 336, 1802 Becker v. Northway, 44 Minn. 61, 2168, 2169 Becker v. Riverside, etc., Turnpike Cm., 65 Ind. 468, 153 Becker v. Ten Eyck, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 68, 2089 Becker v. Torrance, 31 N. Y. 631, 603 Beckwith v. Talbot, 2 Colo. 6a >, 2233 Ecckwith, Matter of, 3 Hun (N. Y.), 443, 1>22 lx TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289, 624, 633, 684, 686 Bedell y. Bedell, 3 Hun, 580, 554 Bedford y. Hunt, 1 Mason, 302, 233 Bee Printing Co. v. Hichborn, 4 Allen, 63, 146 Beebe y. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, 279, 2237 Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53. 392, 401 Beecher y. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 2253 Beecher y. Conradt, 13 N. Y. 108, 1142 Beecher y. Wilson, 84 Va. 813, 1677, 1701, 1718 Beedle y. State, 62 Ind. 26, 48 Beene y. Collenberger, 38 Ala. 647, 800 Beer y. Landman (Texas 1895), 31 S. W. Eep. 805, 1042 Beer Company y. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 2147 Beerkle y. Edwards, 55 Iowa, 750, 595 Beers y. Haughton, 9 Pet, (U. S.) 329, 2i:.:s Beers y. St. John, 16 Conn. 322, 502 Beeston y. Collyer, 12 Moore, 552, 053 Begbie y. Levi, 1 Cromp. & J. 180, 2112, 2114 Begg y. Forbes, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 508, 901 Begole y. McKenzie. 26 Mich. 470, 145 Behaly v. Hatch, 1 Walker (Miss.) , 369, 390 Beham y. Ghio, 75 Texas 87, 1990, 2098 Beharrell v. Quimby, 162 Mass. 571, 129 Behl y. Schuett, 88 Wis. 471, 1836 Behn v. Holly, 133 Pa. St. 614, 1775 Behn y. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 135, 956 Behrley y. Behrley, 93 Ind. 255, 2203 Beioleyy. Carter, L.B. 4 Ch. 230, 416 Beitenman's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 183, 2107 Beitman y. Steiner, 98 Ala. 247, 1854 Belassis y. Hester, 1 Lord Ray. 280, 704 Belnu y. Bryan, K) Iowa, 348, 1000 Belch y. Miller, 32 Mo. App. 387, 94, 95, 853, 864 Belcher y. Costello, 122 Mass. 189, U-SO Belcher y. Beynolds, 2 Keny. pt. 2, p. 87, 1131 Belcher Sugar Hennery Co. y. St. Louis Grain Eleyator Co., 82 Mo. 1211, 1581 Belden y. Burke, 72 Hun, 51, 872, 883, 1288 Belding y. Smythe, 138 Mass. 530, 1827 Belger y. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 1963 Belknap y. Sealey, 14 N. ¥. 143, 110 Bell's Case, 22 Beav. 35, 260 Bell y. Bean, 75 Cal. 86, 201 Bell y. Boyd, 76 Texas, 133, 443 Bell y. Bruen, 1 How. 103, 52, 869, 871 Bell y. Buckley, 11 Ex. 631, 439 Bell y. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1, 468, 970, 1038, 1039 Bell y. Chaplain, Hardres 321, 815 Bell y. Clarke, 70 Miss. 603, 1013 Bell v. Holtby, L. E. 15 Eq. 178, 416 Bell y. Hudson, 73 Cal. 287, 1162 Bell v. Indian Liye Stock Co. (Texas), 11 S. W. Eep. 314, 15S7 Bell y. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176, 2052 1-VU y. Locke, 8 Paige, 75, 1987 U ■!! y. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 19 Hun, 238, 117 Bell y. Merrifield, 109 N. Y. 202, 1064 Bell y. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 194 Bell y. Parks, 18 Kan. 152, 201 Bell y. Pelt, 51 Ark. 433, 433 Bell y. Offutt, 10 Bush (Ky.), 632, 4 Belly. Eomaine, 30 N. J. Eq. 24, 955 Bell v. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 33, 832 Bell y. Thompson, 3 Mo. 84, 1389 Bell y. Western, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Robinson (La.), 423, 895 Bell y. Woodward, 46 N. H. 315, 893, 901 Bull's, etc., E. Co. y. Christy, 79 Pa. St. 54, 1308 Bellamy y. Bellamy, 6 Fla. 62, 2285 Bolleviile Savings Bank v. Winslow, 30 Fed. Esp. iid, 834 Bellows y. Rosenthal, 31 Ind. 116, 1090 Bellows y. Smith, 9 N. II. 285, 394 Bellows y. Sowles, 57 Vt. 10 1, 593, 594 Belo y. Commissioners, 76 N. Car. 489, 1516 Belohradsky y. Kuhn, CO 111. 517, 1018 Belshaw y. Bush, 11 C. B. 191, 543, 568 Belt y. Eobinson, 63 Fed. Eep. 90, 1645 Belton Compress Co. v. Saunders, 70 Texas, 6B9, 154 Beman y. Rufford, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 550, 1255 Bement y. LaDow, 66 Fed. Eep. 185, 989 Bemis y. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, 763 Benayides y. Hunt, 79 Texas, 383, 500 Benbow y. Soothsmith, 76 Iowa, 154, 595 Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Pot. 263, 807 Bender y. Been, 78 Iowa, 283, 180 Bender v. Bender, 88 Hun, 448, 21 Benedict v. Beebe, 11 John. 145, 635 Benedict y. Field, 16 N. Y. 595, 125 Benedict y. Lynch, 1 John. Ch. 370, 749 Benedict y. Ocean Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 389, 872 Benedict v. Williams, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 123, 22S0 Benford y. Gibson, 15 Ala. 521, 2127 Beul'ord y. School], 55 Pa. St. 393, 667 Benham y. Bishop, 9 Conn. 3330, 1777 Benham y. State, 116 Ind. 112, 1910 Benjamin y. Covert, 47 Wis. 375, 1759 Benjamin y. Hillard, 23 How. 149, 571 Benjamin y. McConnel, 9 111. 530, 550, 572 Bennett v. Allen, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 256, 20 Bennett y. Bennett, 37 W. Va. 396, 1676, 1677 Bennett v. Brooks, 9 Allen (Mass.), lis, 2096 Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403, 737 Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497, 2120 Bennett y. Hayden, 145 Pa. St. 586, 1845 Bennett v. Hull, 10 John. 364, 057 Bennett y. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238, 9:;0 Bennett y. Mclntire, 121 Ind. 231, 979, 2167 Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Texas Civ. App. 222, 1739 Bennett v. Morse (Colo. App.), 39 Pac. Eep. 582, 278, 820 Bennett y. Scutt, 18 Barb. 347, 638 Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448, 428 Bennett y. Stephens, 8 Ore. 444, 786 Bennett v. Stout, 98 111. 47, 1023 Bennett v. Virginia Ranch Co., 1 Texas Civ. App. 321, 1730 Bennett v. Wolverton. 24 Kan. 284, 1066 Benoist y. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307, 1819 Benseik v. Thomas, 66 Fed. Eep. 104, 1221, 1253, 1292 Bensel v. Gray, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. Eep. 417, 368 Bensinger Co. v. Cain (Texas App.), 18 S. W. Rep. 136, 165 Bensinger y. Wren, 100 Pa. St. 500, 1656 Benson v. Carmel, 8 Maine, 110, 391 Benson y. Brake, 55 Maine, 555, 2112 Benson v. Hove, 45 Minn. 40, 408 Benson v. Miller, 56 Minn. 410, 142 Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125, 440, 460, 807, 1829 Benson v. Phipps, 87 Texas, 578, 207, 539 Benson y. Shotwell, 87 Cal. 49, 418 Bent y. Alexander, 15 Mo. App. 181, 859. 864 Bent y. Wakefield Bank, L. E. 4 C. P. D. 1, 54 Bentall y. Burn, 3 B. & C. 423, 6P8 Bentley v. Harris, 2 Graft. 357, 224 Bentley v. Lamb (Pa. St.) 25 Am. Law Eog. (N. S.) 632, 185 Bentley v. O' Bryan, 111 111. 53. 1023 Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. Y. Eq. 462, 724 Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 125, 573, 574, 577, 819 Berdell v. Bissell, 6 Colo. 162, 438 Berg y. Atchison, etc., E. Co., 30 Kan. 561, 738 Bergeron y. Pamlico, etc., Banking Co., Ill N. Car. 45, 2206 Bergey's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 408, 1671 Bergmeier v. Eisenmengcr, 59 Minn. 175, 2195 Berkeley, etc., School y. Jarvis, 32 Conn. 412, 255, 257 Berlien y. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491, 1038 Berlin y. Gorbam, 34 N. H. 266, 2142 Berlin, Inhabitants of, v. New Britain, 9 Conn. 1249, TABLE OF CASES. lxi [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. J, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Berlin Machine Works v. Perry, 71 Wis. 495, 2026, 2030, 2047 Berlin Bridge Co. v. San Antonio, 62 Fed. Rep. 882, 1504, 1586 Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 237, 782, 2168 Bermondsley, Vestry of, v. Ramsey, L. R. 6 C. P. 247, 833 Bernard v. Taylor, 23 Ore. 416, 1869, 1913, 1924 Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341. 1058, 1082 Bernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Maine, 506, 652 Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N. Y. 304, 945 Bernstein v. Nealis, 114 N. Y. 347, 28 Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea, 271, 1763 Berrisford v. Woodroff, Cro. Jao. 404, 226 Berry v. American Central Co., 132 N. Y. 49, 384 Berry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36, 15, 90, 91 Berry v. Broach, 65 Miss. 450, 1557 Berry v. Brown, 1 Silvernail (N. Y. App.), 542, 243 Berry v. Brown, 107 N. Y. 659, 238 Berry v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wash. 3, 1545 Berry v. Clary, 77 Maine, 482, 2106 Berry v. Doremus, 30 N. J. Law, 399, 655 Berry v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 1, 540, 574, 818 Berry v. Hall, 105 N. Car. 154, 1811 Berry v. Hartzell, 91 Mo. 132, 11, 33 Berry v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 52 Kan. 774, 1458 Berry v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 52 Kan. 759, 1454 Berry v. Knights Templar, etc., Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 439, 119, 733 Berry v. Kowalsky, 95 Cal. 134, 2202 Berry v. Nail, 54 Ala. 446, 388 Berry v. Roberts, 40 N. Y. 432, 243 Berry v. Whidden, 62 N. H. 473, 32 Berry v. Woodburn (Cal. 1895), 40 Pac. Rep. 802, 1115 Berry Bros. v. Davis, 77 Texas, 191, 379 Berryhill v. B yington, 10 Iowa, 223, _ 378 Berryman v. Trustees of Cincinnati Southern Ry., 14 Bush (Ky.) , 755, 1978 Berthold v. Seevers Manufacturing Co., 89 Iowa, 506, 339 Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 1736, 1765, 1766, 1768 Berwick v. Horsfall, 4 C. B. N. S. 450, 902 Berwick, Mayor of, v. Oswald, 1 E. & B. 295, n nJ 515 Berwick-on-Tweed, Mayor of, v. Oswald, 3 E. & B. 653, 273 Besshears v. Rowe, 46 Mo. 501, 597 Bosson v. Eveland, 20 N. J. Eq. 468, 1675 Bessonies v. City of Indianapolis, 71 Ind. 189, 1557 Best v. Crall, 23 Kan. 482, 399 Best v. Gohlson, 89 111. 465, 1061 Bestor v. Wathen, 60 111. 138, 1977, 2083 Beswick v. Swindells, 3 A. & E. 868, 300 Bethelem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34, 490 Bethell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318, 1001 Betterbee v. Davis. 3 Camp. 70, 394 Bettini v. Gye, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 183. 117 Bettis v. Reynolds, 12 Iredell (N. Car.), 344, 1889 Bett's Appeal, 10 W. N. Cas. (Pa.) 431, 2039 Betts v. Farmers', etc., Trust Co., 21 Wis. 80, 1959 Bevau v. Carr, 1 Cababe & Ellis, 499, 655 Bevans v. Rees, 5 M. & W. 306, 394, 400 Beveridge v. N. Y. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 1, 241, 1411 Beverly v. Blackwood, 102 Cal. 83, 751 Bevil v. Hix, 12 B. Monroe (Ky.), 140, 1889 Bianchi v. Maggini, 17 Nev. 322, 2234 Bibb v Allen, 149 U*. S. 481, 685, 1916, 1919 Bibb v. Miller, 11 Bush (Ky.) , 308, 2024 Bibb v. Snodgrass, 97 Ala. 457, 452 Bibb County Loan Assn. v. Richards, 21 Ga. 592, 1621 Bice v. Marquette, etc , Building Co., 96 Mich. 24, 596, 599, 601 Bick v. Seal, 45 Mo. App. 475, 1804 Bickart v. Hoffman, 19 N. Y. Supl. 472, 8 Bickel v. Sheets, 24 Ind. 1, 1902 Bickford v. First National Bank, 42 111. 238, 451 Bickhart v. Hoffman, 19 N. Y. Supl. 472, 187 Bickle v. Beseke, 23 Ind. 18, 398 Bicknall v. Waterman, 5 R. I. 43, 1878 Biddle v. Boyard, 13 Pa. St. 150, 1346 Biddle v. City of Terrell, 82 Texas, 335, 1522, 1533, 1586, 1587 Biddle v. Hall, 99 Pa. St. 116, 1853 Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153, 1212 Bidleson v. Whytel, 3 Burr. 1545, 2150 Bidwell v. Overton (Com. PI. N. Y.), 13 N. Y. Supl. 274, 2192 Bierbauer v. Wirth, 10 Biss. (U. S.) 60, 1853 Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray, 174, 233 Bierrer's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 248, 1714 Bigge v. Parkinson, 7 Hurl. & N. 955, 339 Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202, 1920, 1921, 1927, 1935 Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 118, 119 Bigelow v. Colton, 13 Gray, 309, 40 Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 III. 197, 1335 Bigelow v. Rommelt, 24 N. J. Eq. 115, 954 Bigelow v. Wilson, 87 Iowa, 628, 2260 Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485, 763 Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 2176 Bigler v. Baker, 40 Neb. 325, 845, 1110 Bigler v. Morgan, 77 N. Y. 312, 411 Bigony v. Tyson, 75 Pa. St. 157, 2039 Bilbie v. Lnmlie, 2 East, 40J, 800 Bilborough v. Holmes, 5 Ch. Div. 255, 962 Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36, 663 Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534, 1024 Billings v. Accident Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 78, 119 Billings v. Ames, 32 Mo. 265. 2033 Billings v. A^pen, etc., Smelting Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 250, 974 Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1, 716 Billings v. Kankakee Coal Co., 67 111. 489, 1176 Billings v. Yanderbeck, 23 Barb. 546, 531, 532 Billingslea v. State, 85 Ala. 323, 2250 Billingslea v. Ward, 33 Md. 46, 1146 Billingsley v. Stratton, 11 Ind. 396, 949 Billington v. Cahill, 51 Hun, 132, 651, 652 Billiott v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529, 402 Bingham v. Barley, 55 Texas, 281, 1773 Bingham v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 243, 694 Bingham v. Mazcy, 15 111. 295, 360 Bingham v. Mulholland, 25 U. C. C. P. 210, 492 Bingham v. Weiderwax, 1 N. Y. 5U.>, 485 Binghamton Bridge, The, 3 Wall. 51, 853, 2134 Bininger, In re, 7 Blatch. 262, 153 Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94, 1210 Binney v. Delmar. 17 N. Y. Supl. 524, 578 Binney v. Globe Nat. Bank, 150 Mass. 574, 1745 Birch v. Earl of Liverpool, 9 Barn. & C. 392, 652 Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. & Ad. 443, 674 Bird v. Calvert, 22 S. Car. 1381, ■ Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494, 1358 Bird v. Gamman, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 883, 608, 610 Bird v. Keller, 77 Maine, 270, 2152 Bird v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 138, 644, 645 Bird v. Munroe, 66 Maine, 337, 593, 694 Bird v. Railroad Co., 8 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 46, 2263 Birdsall v. Birdsall, 52 Wis. 208, 838 Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64, 505 Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69, 419, 420, 421, 422 Birge v. Bock, 24 Mo. App. 330, 421 Birkbeck v. Ackroyd, 74 N. Y. 356, 1659, 1687 Birkett v. Chatterton, 13 R. I. 299, 1912 Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Salk. 27, 596, 598, 609 Birks v. French, 21 Kan. 238, 2098 lxii TABLE OF CASES. [.References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Birmingham, etc.. Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 97 Ala. 220, 942 Bisbee v. Ham, 47 Maine, 543, 554 Bish v. Johnson, 21 Ind. 299, 1462 Bishop v, American Preservers Co., 157 111. 284, 2053, 2059, 2071 Bishop v. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123, 639 Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289, 1462 Bishop v. Fletcher, 48 Mich. 555, 676 Bishop v. Honey, 34 Texas, 245, 1902, 2018 Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1, 2256 Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469. 1853, 1X59, 2026, 2049, 2050 Bishop v. Small, 63 Maine, 12, 1878 Bisland v. Provosty, 14 La. Ann. 169, 1742 Bi-Spool Machine Co, v. Acme Mfg. Co., 153 Mass. 404, 1243 Bissell v. Balcoro, 39 N. Y. 275, 296 Bissell v. Harrington. 18 Hun, 81, 644 Bissell v. Heath, 98 Mich. 472, 1319 Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287, 1524 Bissell v. Railroad Co., 22 N. Y. 259, 1230 Bissell v. Taylor, 41 Mich. 702, 1207 Bissig v. Britton 59 Mo. 204, 614 Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, 2177 Bixby v. Moor, 51 N. H. 402, 23, 774, 1900 Blachford v. Preston, 8 T. R. 89, 1883 Black v. Ashley, 80 Mich. 90, 935 Black v. Black, 62 Texas, 296, 1739 Black v. Black, 15 Ga. 445, 644 Black v. Black, 30 N. J. En. 215, 1017 Black v. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eg. 415, 1255 Black v. Chicago, fi. & Q. B. Co., 30 Neb. 193, 275 Black v. City of Columbia, 19 S. Car. 412, 1514 Black v. Del. & Bar. Can Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455. 1415 Black v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319, 1960 Black v. Lurk. 69 111. 70, 1061 Black v. Moseiev, 99 Ala. 447, 1728 Black v. Ostrander, 1 Colo. App. 272, 376 Black v. Pratt, etc., Co., 85 Ala. 504, 900 Black v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184, 2245 Black v. Ridgway, 131 Mass. 546, 2288 Black v. State, 83 Ala. 81, 46 Black v. Tennessee C. I. & R. Co., 93 Ala. 109, 1117 Black v. Woodrow, 39 Mich. 194, 280, 496 Blackburn v. Mann, 85 HI. 222, 617, 6(6 Blackburn v. Randolph. 33 Ark. 119, 1076 Blackburn v. Reilly, 47 N. J. Law, 290, 150, 152, 1049 Blackburne, Ex parte, 10 Ves. 204, 456 Blackett v. Royal Exchange Co., 2 Cromp. & J. 244, 167, 892, 926 Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56, 703 Blackman v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 555, 25 Blackmore v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 79 Iowa, 282, 342 Black River Lumber Co. v. Warner, 93Mo. 374. _ 930, 2217 Blackshire v. Iowa Homestead Co., 39 Iowa, 624, 1228 Blackstock v. New York R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48, 296 Blackwell v. Bainbridge, 19 N. Y. Supl. 681, 209 Blackwell v. Ryan, 21 S. Car. 112, 1133 Blackwood v. Borrowes, 2 Con. & L. 478, 564 Bladen v. The City of Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 464, 1486 Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167, 61 Blagborne v. Hunger, 101 Mich. 375, 952, 1035 Blagden v. Bradbear, 12 Ves. 466, 674, 677 Blake's Case, 6 Coke, 44, 515, 516 Blake v. Blake, 7 Iowa, 46, 234 Blake v. Brown, 80 Iowa, 277, 157 Blake v. Buffalo, etc., R., 56 N. Y. 485, 1307 Blake v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Gray, 265, 897 Blake v. Garwood, 42 N. J. Eg. 276, 949 Blake v. Niles, 13 N. H. 459, 280 Blake v. Voight, 134 N. Y. 69, 653 Blakeley v. El Paso Building Association (Texas 1894) , 26 S. W. Rep. 292, 1611 Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193, 1189, 1311 Blakemore v. Jones, 5 Texas Civ. App. 516, 568 Blakeney v. Goode, 30 Ohio St. 350, 653 Blakeslee v. Holt, 42 Conn. 226, 139 Blair v. Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 89 Mo. 383, 579, 581 Blair v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 89 Mo. 334, 588 Blair v. Corby, 37 Mo. 313, 930 Blair v. Rankin. 11 Mo. 440, 368 Blair v. Reed, 20 Tex. 310, 2240 Blainv. Wait, 69 N. Y. 113, 533,988 Blair v. Williams, 4 Lill. (Ky.) 34, 2154 Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt. 105, 447 Blair, etc., Co., The, v. Walker, 39 Iowa, 406, 647 Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144 Mass. 393, 2003 Blaisdell v. Holmes, 48 Vt. 492, 1843 Blalock v. Jackson, 94 Ga. 469, 202 Blalock v. Kernersville Manfg. Co., 110 N. Car. 103, 1383 Blanchard v. Cooke, 147 Mass. 215, 165 Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, 163 Blanchard v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 31 Mich. 43, 2271 Blanchard v. Dyer, 21 Maine, 111, 829 Blanchard v. Inhabitants of Ayer, 148 Mass. 174, 1492 Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 37, 1818 Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1, 708, 2125 Blanchard v. Trim, 38 N. Y. 225, 667, 2274 Blanchard v. Weeks, 34 Vt. 589, 653 Blanchor v. Cilley, 38 Maine, 553, 708 Blanchor v. Mansel, 47 Maine, 58, 708 Blanck v. Littell, 9 Daly (N. Y.), 268, 651 Bland v. Umstead, 23 Pa. St. 316, 287 Blanding v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 239, 651, 653, 655 Blaney v. Hoke, 14 Ohio St. 292, 4 Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. 62, no Blank v. Nohl, 112 Mo. 159, 2007 Blankenship v. Douglas, 26 Texas, 225, t,, , , • „ 1680 > 16 8 2 Blankenship v. Spencer, 31 W. Va. 510, 1179 Blanton v. Knox, 3 Mo. 342, 631 Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238, 559 Blasdell v. Souther, 6 Gray, 149, 954 Blazo v. Gill, 69 Hun, 69, 2°51 Blazo v. Gill, 23 N. Y. Supl. 373, 2248 Blazo v. Gill, 143 N. Y. 232, 141 Blaxton v. Pye, 2 Wils. 309, 1944 Bleak-ley v. White, 4 Paige, 654, 442, 445, 543 Bledsoe v. Thompson, 6 Rich. L. (S. Car.) ^, , 1942, 1947 Blennerhassett v. Sherman, 105 TF. S. 100, 1366 Blenkinsop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597, 672 Bless v. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647, 631 Bletz v. Willis, 19 D. C. 449, 122, 123 Blewett v. Gaynor, 77 Wis. 378, 543 Bliss v. Brainard, 41 N. H. 256, 708 Bliss v. Couch, 46 Kan. 400, 1859 Bliss v. Kaweah, etc., Irrigation Co., 65 Cal. 502, i34i Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, 286,' 1971, 2084, 2085 Bliss v. Matteson, 45 N. Y. 22, „„ 1307,1636,1638,1639,1986 Bliss v. Negus, 8 Mass. 46, 233 1860 Bliss v. New York, etc., Railroad Co., 160 Mass. 447, 579 531 Bliss v. Shwartz, 65 N. Y. 444, 190. 537, 1631 Blitz v. Union Steamboat Co., 51 Mich. 558, §59 Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 23 ci Ho i W - 4 »°r' ■»» ., „■ 892 . 912 . 92 ° Block v. McMurry, 56 Miss. 217, 2102 Blodget v. Morris, 14 N. Y. 482, 835 Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361, 731 TABLE OF CASES. lxiii [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Blodgett ^. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, 1657 Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68, 689, 600 Blood v. Hardy, 15 Maine, 61, 620 Blood v. La Serena Land Co. (Cal. 1895), 41 Pac. Hep. 1017, 1274, 1294 Bloodgood v. Meissner, 84 Wis. 452, 1685 Bloom v. Hazzard, 104 Cal. 810, 66 Bloom v. Noggle, 4 Ohio St. 45, 1643 Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 1894,2096,2098 Bloom v. Saberski, 28 N. Y. Supl. 731, 1907 Bloomer v. Bernstein, L. R. 9 C. P. 588, 150, 152 Bloomer v. Nolan, 36 Neb. 51. 1784, 1798, 1803 Bloomer v. Waldron, 3 Hill, 861, 1369 Bloss v. Adams & Bloomer, 23 Barb. 604, 1987 Bloss & Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393, 542, 576 Blossom v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.162, 117 Blount v. Guthrie, 99 N. Car. 93, 775 Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh (Va.) 29, 620, 1718 Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941, 491 Bloxsome t. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232, 2095 Bluefields, etc., Co. v. Wolfe (Tex. App.), 22 S. W.Rep. 269, 561 Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell (W. Va. 1893), 18 S. E. Bep. 493, 994, 995 Blumer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 622, 896 Blumer v. Pollak, 18 Fla. 707, 1737, 1748 Blunt v. Boyd, 3 Barb. 209, 607 Bluntzer v. Dewees, 79 Texas, 272, 415 Bly v. Second Nat. Bank, 79 Pa. St. 453, 1854, 1863, 2024 Blydenburgh v. Cotheal, 4 N. Y. 418, 702 Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts, 182, 239 Blythe v. Denver & R. G. H. Co., 15 Colo. 333, 275 Blythe v. Richards, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 211, 1779 Boals v. Nixon, 26 111. App. 128, 238, 517 Board v. Gillies, 138 Ind. 667, 13 Board v. Miller, 87 Ind. 257, 1483 Board v. Ristine, 124 Ind. 242, 1848 Board T. Schmoke, 51 Ind. 416, 1848 Board v. Shipley, 77 Ind. 553, - 1483 Boardman v. Cutter, 128 Mass. 388, 661 Boardman v. Davidson, 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 439, 2176 Boardman v. Gaillard, 1 Hun, 217, 465 Boardman v. Gaillard, 60 N. Y. 614, 2247 Boardman v. Lessees of Heed, 6 Peters, 328, 101, 864 Boardman v. Reed, 6 Pet. 328, 864 Boardman v. Spooner, 95 Mass. 353, 667, 687 Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487, 1954 Boardman v. Ward, 40 Minn. 399, 785 Board, etc., v. Hildebrand, 1 Ind. 555, 1848 Board, etc., v. Lomax, 5 Ind. App. 567, 1485 Board, etc., Kingman County v. Cornell University, 57 Fed. Rep. 149, 1535 Board, etc., Lawrence Co. v. McLahlon, 10 Ind. App. 95, 1485 Board, etc., of Hamilton County v. New- lin, 132 Ind. 27, 2248 Board, etc., Warren Co. v. Osburn, 4 Ind. App. 590, 1485 Board of Commissioners v. Cin. Steam Heating Co., 128 Ind. 240, 602, 1483 Board of Comrs. of Adams Co. v. Cole, 9 Ind. App. 474, 1910 Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co. v. LaFayette M. & B. R. Co., 50 Ind. 85, 1281 Board of Comrs. v. Lomax, 5 Ind. App. 567, 1910 Board of Commissioners v. National Land Co.. 23 Kan. 196, 460 Board of Comrs. v. State, 109 Ind. 596, 468 Board of Finance v. Jersey City, 31 Atl. Bep. 625, 1571 Board of Metropolitan Police v. Board of Auditors, 93 Mich. 806, 1471 Board of Supervisors v. Bowen, 4 Lans. 24, 210 Boast v. Firth, L. B. 4 C. P. 1, 284 Bockenham v. Thacker, 2 Vent. 71. 226 Bodenhamer v. Welch. 89 N. Car. 78, 1185 Bodine v. Killeen, 63 N. Y. 93, 1748 Bodine v. Morgan, 37 N. J. Eq. 426, 1828 BodweU. v. Bodwell, 66 Vt. 101, 1204 Boehl v. Railway Co., 44 Minn. 191, 1958, 1962 Boehm v. City of Baltimore, 61 Md. 259, 1479 BofBnger v. Tuyes, 120 U. S. 198, 548 Bogan v. Daughdrill, 51 Ala. 312, 1116, 1118 Bogardus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 N. Y. 328, 411 Bogardus v. Young, 64 Hun, 398, 231 Bogart v. Nan Velsor, 4 Edw. Ch. 718, 465 Boggess v. Boggess, 127 Mo. 305, 2278 Boggs v. Bodkin, 32 W. Va. 566, 1179 Boggs v. Lakeport, etc., Assn. (Cal. 1896) , 43 Pac. Rep. 1106, 1339 Bogie v. Bopie, 35 Wis. 659, 92 Bog Lead Mining Co. V. Montague, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 481, 662 Bohanan v. Bohanan, 96 111. 591, 1192 Bohanau v. Pope, 42 Maine, 93, 2210 Bohannon v. Travis, 94 Ky. 59, 1727 Bohm v. Locwer's, etc., Brewery Co. (Com. PI. N. Y.),9N. Y. Supl. 514, 1350 Bohn, etc.. Co. v. Lewis, 45 Minn. 164, 258 Bohrer v. Stumpff, 31 111. App. 139, 373 Boice v. Boice, 27 Minn. 371, 2155 Boice v. Hodge, 51 Ohio St. 236, 1373 Boies v. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 387, 214 Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 339, 351 Boland v. Industrial, etc., Association, 74 Hun, 385, 313 Bold v. Hutchinson. 5 De G. M. & G. 558, 223 Bolen v. Crosby, 49 N. Y. 183, 576 Bolles v. Lachs, 37 Minn. 315, 92 Boiling v. Kirby, 90 Ala. 215, 123 Bollinger v. Gallagher. 163 Pa. 245, 1706 Bollman v. Burt, 61 Md. 415, 150 Bolman v. Lohman, 79 Ala. 63, 885 Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 65, 231 Bommer v. American, etc., Manufactur- ing Co., 81 N. Y. 468, 1308, 1316 Bonce v. Dubuque, etc, R. Co., 53 Iowa, 278, 274 Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577, 327 Bond v. Manufacturing Co., 82 Texas, 309, 1511 Bond v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 19 N. J. Eq. 376, 128 Bond v. McMahon, 94 Mich. 557, 446 Bond v. Quattlebaum, 1 McCord, 584, 366 Boner v. Mahle, 3 La. Ann. 600, 813 Bonesteel v. Mayor of New York, 22 N. Y. 162, 2242 Bonesteel v. Todd, 9 Mich. 371, 835 Boney v. Hollingsworth, 23 Ala. 690, 1014 Bonner v. Bynum, 72 Miss. 442, 1011 Bonner v. Illinois Land Co., 75 DX 315, 1789 Bonney v. Bonney, 29 Iowa, 448, 543, 574 Bonney v. Haydock, 40 N. J. Eq. 513, 793 Bonnewell v. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 70, 4,5,87 Boody v. McKenney, 23 Maine, 517, 1780 Boody v. Rutland, etc., Railroad, 24 Vt. 660, 898 Booker v. Wingo, 29 S. Car. 116, 1S80 Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 1771, 1795 Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 2145 Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273. 116 Boone v. Stover, 66 Mo. 430, 635 Boor v. Lowrey, 103 Ind. 468, ' 2169, 2170 Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145, 491, 498 Booske v. Gulf Ice Co., 24 Fla. 550, 104, 1408 Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 669, 540, 572 Booth v. City of Pittsburgh, 154 Pa. St. 482, 1495 lxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] <_1 i"ii__1_ -an tt XT Ci non TOR I D^.+T„inl7 it T^o/iVi 3 TieiV ( Cc\T\T\A . 47fi. Booth t. Clark, 17 How. U. S. 322, 725 Booth v. Cleveland, etc., Mill Co., 74 N. Y. 15, 1271 Booth v. Cottingham, 126 Ind. 431, 1843 Booth v. Eighmie, 60 N. Y. 238, 598,609 Booth v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 74 N. Y. 228, 826 Booth v. Farmers' & M. N. Bank, 50 N. Y. 396. 1237 Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271, 422 Booth v. Hynes, 54 111. 363, 466 Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 1307 Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend. 66, 536 Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Mill Co., 60 N.Y. 487. 296 Booth v. Succession of Smith, 3 Wood's C. C. 19, 562 Booth, etc., Granite Co. v. Baird, 87 Hun, 452, 915, 935 Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626, 339 Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681, 194 Boozer v. Teague. 27 S. Car. 348, 842 Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 150, Borchsenius v. Canutson, 100 111. 82, Bordelon v. CoCo, 21 La. Ann. 671, Borders v. Murphy, 125 111. 577, Borel v. Bollins, 30 Cal. 408, Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440, Born v. First Nat. Bank, 123 Ind. 78, 446, 450, 721 Borough of Allentowu v. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421, 804 Borough of Milford v. Milford Water Co., 124 Pa. St. 610, 1578 Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23, 324 Borrowscale v. Bosworth, 99 Mass. 378, 671 Borst v. Corey, 16 Barb. 136, Borst v. Empie, 5 N. Y. 33, Boruff v. Hudson. 138 Ind. 280, Bosanquet v. Dashwood, 2 Doug, Bosanquet y. Wray, 6 Taunt. 597 Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day (Conn.) , 476. 2185 610 2022 1032 1275 234,235 620 95 1183, 1215 1, 1870 471 Bosher v. Richmond Land Co., 89 Va. 455, 1331 Bosley v. National, etc., Co., 123 N. Y. 550, 1002 Boster v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 36 W. Va. 318, 776, 781 Bostick v. ^Vinton, 1 Sneed, 525, 356 Boston v. District of Columbia, 19 Ct. of CI. 31, 784 Boston v. Henderson, 92 Mich. 606, 2214 Boston v. Nichols, 47 111. 353, 120, 694 Boston, City of, v. Simmons, 9 Cush. 373, 375 Boston Bank v. Chamberlin, 15 Mass. 220, 1779 Boston Duck Co. y. Dewey, 6 Gray, 446, 694 Boston Electric Co. v. City of Cambridge, 163 Mass. 64, 1492 Boston Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Mete. 181, 805 Boston, etc., Iron Works v. Montague, 108 Mass. 248, 383 Boston, etc., Light Co. v. Cambridge, 163 Mass. 64, 1491 Boston, Barre & Gardner R. Co. v. Wel- lington, 113 Mass. 79, 155 Boston, etc., R, Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224, 57 Boston and Montreal R. Co. v. Boston and Lowell R. Co., 65 N. H. 393, 1411 Boston and Providence Railroad v. Mid- land Railroad, 1 Gray, 340, 1455 Boston & P. R. Corp. v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 13 R. I. 260, 1255, 1264 Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 119 Mass. 498, 573 Boston Rubber Co. v. Peerless Wringer Co., 58 "Vt. 551, 510, 512, 522 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 360, 2145, 2146 Bostwick v. Chapman, 60 Conn. 553, 1257 635,640 149, 370 779 1060 13)59 1117 Boteler v. Roy, 40 Mo. App. 234, Botkin v. Mclntyre, 81 Mo. 557, Botsford v. McLean, 45 Barb. 478, Bottomley's Case, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 681 Bottoms v. Dyke, 102 Ala. 582, Botts, etc., v. Simpsonville Road Co., i Ky. 54, 1450 Boughner v. Meyer, 5 Colo. 71, 1948 Bouehton v. Knight, L. R. 3 P. & D. 64, 1812, 1820 Bouehton v. Smith, 142 N. Y. 674, 501 Bouic v. Maught, 76 Md. 440, 790 Bourland v. Gibson. 7 111. App. 227, 878 Bourne v. Gatliffe, 8 M. & G. 643, 124 Bourne v. Seymour, 16 C. B. 337, 109, 306 Bournique v. Arnold, 33 111. App. 303, 128 Boutell v. Cowdin, 9 Mass. 254, 254 Boutelle v. Melendy, 19 N. H. 196, 2111 Boutelle v. Smith. 110 Mass. Ill, 2049 Bouvey v. McNeal, 126 Ind. 541, 1720 Bowdell v. Parsons, 10 East, 359, 488 Bowden v. Achor, 95 Ga. 243, 970 Bowdre v. Carter, 64 Miss. 221, 1885 Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johnson, 338, 465 Bowen v. Conner, 6 Cush. 132, 26 Bowen v. Hastings, 47 Wis. 232, 832 Bowen v. Holly, 38 Vt. 574, 551 Bowen v. Lincoln Bldg and Loan Assn. 51 N. J. Eq. 272, 1629 Bowen v. McCarthy, 85 Mich. 26, 61 Bowen v. Newell, 13 N. Y. 290, 731 Bowen v. Owen, 11 Q. B. 130, 399 Bower v. Jones, 8 Bing. 65, 919 Bowers v. Bowers, 95 Pa. St. 477, 639 Bowers v. Bowers, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 697, 1712 Bowers v. Bowers, 26 Pa. St. 74, 1988 Bowe.s v. Smith, 28 N, Y. St. Rep. 346, 1659 Bowery, etc., Bank v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 339, 127 131 2225 Bowery, etc., Bank v. Wilson, 122 N.'Y. 478, 1971, 2085 Bowes v. Pontifex, 3 F. & F. 739, 666 Bowes v. Shand, 2 L. R. App. Cas. 455, 902, 956 Bowker v. Bradford, 140 Mass. 521, 1754 Bowlby v. Bell, 3 C. B. 284, 660 Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248, 935 Bowman v. Boyd, 21 Nev. 281, 462, 806 Bowman v. Branson, 111 Mo. 343, 2209 Bowman v. Cunningham, 78 111. 48, 951, 1107, 1197, 2272 Bowman v. First Nat. Bank, 9 Wash. 614, 941 Bowman v. Gonegal, 9 La. Ann. 328, 1128 Bowman v. Gork (Mich.), 63 N. W. Rep. 998, 17 Bowman v. Long, 89 111. 19, 864 Bowman v. Neely, 137 111. 443, 1047 Bowmar v. Peine, 64 Miss. 99, 195 Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kan. 364, 1899 Bowman v. Stewart, 165 Pa. St. 394. 881 Bowman v. Teall, 23 Wend. 306, 274 Bowmar v. Peine, 64 Miss. 99, 194 Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 344, 106, 2039, 2043, 2045 Bowyer v. Brampton, 2 Strange, 1155, 1943, 1944 Boyce v. Martin, 46 Mich. 239, 2211 Boyce v. McCullough, 3 Watts & S. 429, 951 Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., 37 W. Va. 73, 1230, 1360 Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644, 1802 Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy. 3 Pet. 210, 409 Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645, 281, 2147 Boyd v. Barclay, 1 Ala. 34, 1128 Boyd v. Bell, 69 Texas, 735, 824 Boyd v. Chaffe, 21 La. Ann. 476, 2022 Boyd v. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498, 1017, 1018, 1041, 1671 Boyd v. Frieze, 5 Gray, 553, 204, 205 Boyd v. Hind, 1 Hurl. & N. 938, 532, 1631 Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76, 456, 537 TABLE OF CASES. lxv [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Boyd v. Jones, 96 Ala. 305, 468 Boyd v. Lett, 1 C. B. 222, 123 Boyd v. Moyle, 2 C. B. 644, 220 Boyd v. Peachbottom R. Co., 90 Pa. St. 169, 155 Boyd v. Sappington, 4 Watts, 247, 788 Boyd v. Siffkin, 2 Camp. 326, Boyd v. Slayback, 63 Cal. 493, 17 Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342, 591, 837, 1111 Boyd v. Turpin, 94 N. Car. 137, 1741 Boyd v. Vanderbuilt Insurance Co., 90 Tenn. 212, 308 Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142, 616 Boyden v. Moore, 5 Mass. 365, 395 Boyer v. Berryman, 123 Ind. 451, 1817, 1820, 1850 Boyer v. Soules (Mich. 1895) , 62 N . W. Bep. 1000 599 Boyk&i v. Buie, 109 N. Car. 501, 513 Boykln v. Dohlonde, 37 Ala. 497, 606 Bovkin v. Watson's Admrs., 1 Const. Tr. (S. Car.) 157, 821 Boyle v. Agawam Canal Co., 22 Pick. (Mass.) 381, 2237 Boyle v. Guysinger, 12 Ind. 273, 2229 Boylston Nat. Bank v. Richardson, 101 Mass. 287, 800 Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N. Y. 93, 1372 Boynton v. Champlin, 42 111. 57, 430 Boynton v. Curie, 4 Mo. 599, 1948 Boynton v. Hatch, 47 N. Y. 225, 1372 Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, 1853 Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 2098 Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Maine, 286, 667 Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 519, 673 Brabook v. Boston, etc., Bank, 104 Mass. 228, 251 Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. & Aid. 722, 652 Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 66, 2161 Bracewell v. Williams, L. R. 2 C. P. 196, 212 Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. (Mass.) 335, 2085 Brackett v. Evans, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 79, 635 Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214, 1646 Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 716, 772 Bradburne v. Botfleld, 14 M. & W. 559. 814 Bradbury v. Butler, 1 Colo. App. 430, 927 Bradbury v. Marbury, 12 Ala. 520, 904 Bradbury v. Wild (1893) ,L. R. 1 Ch. 377, 174 Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 411, 459 Bradford v. Frankfort, etc., R. Co., 142 Ind. 383. 1451, 1452 Bradford v. French, 110 Mass. 365, 1797 Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 139, 324 Bradford v. Neill, 46 Minn. 347, 334, 335 Bradford v. Prescott, 85 Maine, 482, 40, 573 Bradford v. Roulston, 8 Irish Com. L. Rep. 468, 193 Bradford v. South Carolina Railroad, 7 Rich. L. 201, 737 Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 523, 1702 Bradley v. Anglo-Amer. Gas Co., 102 Cal. 627, 984 Bradley v. Ballard, 55 III. 413, 1249, 1268, 1275, 1348,1536 Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 279, 2073 Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Den. 61, 777, 821, 823, 827 Bradley v. King, 44 111. 339, 152 Bradley v. Long, 2 Strobh. 160, 560 Bradley v. Marshall,! 54 111. 173, 868 Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378, 1772 Bradley v. Rea, 103 Mass. 188, 2108 Bradley v. Rhea, 14 Allen, 20, 333 Bradley v. Richardson, 23 Vt. 720, 613 Bradley v. Saddler, 54 Ga. 681, 618 Bradley v. Town of Hammonton, 38 N. J. Law, 430, 1570 Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. Y. 291, 1730, 1731 Bradley v. Washington, etc., Co., 13 Pet. 89, 853, 893 Bradlee v. Warren Five Cents Savings Bank, 127 Mass. 107, 1358 Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N. Y. 495, 2247 Bradshaw V. Atkins, 110 111. 323, 1052 Bradshaw v. Davis, 12 Texas, 336, 387 Bradshaw v. McLoughlin, 39 Mich. 480, 299 Bradshaw v. Thomas, 7 Yerg. 497, 162 Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 1755 Bradstreet v. Heron, Abb. Adm. 209 124 Bradt v. Scott, 63 Hun, 632, 518 Brady v. Bayonne (N. J. Eq. 1895), 30 Ad. Rep. 968, 1484 Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210, 2168 Brady v. Cassidy, 145 N. Y. 171, 40, il, 159, 902, 2283 Brady v. City of New York, 132 N. Y. 415, 1559 Brady v. Harper (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Bep. 664, 990 Brady v. Hennion, 8 Bosw. 528, 110 Brady v. Mayor, etc., 20 N. Y. 312, 1552, 2242 Brady v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 11 Mich. 425, 702 Brady v. Smith, 8 Misc. R. 465, 107 Brady v. United Life Ins. Assn., 60 Fed. Rep. 727, 310 Bragg v. Pierce, 53 Maine, 65, 525, 526 Bramard v. Colchester. 31 Conn. 407, 2138 Brainard v. Holsaple, 4 G. Greene, 485, 969 Braithwaite v. Akin, 3 N. D. 305, 2168 Bramberry's Estate, In re, 156 Pa. St. 628, 1763, 1764 Bramhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 13, 2112 Branch v. Canandaigua R. Co., 3 Woods, 481, 1435 Branch v. Jesup, 106 TT. S. 468, 1226 Branch v. Palmer, 65 Ga. 210, 489 Branch of Bank v. Collins, 7 Ala. 95, 1300 Brand v. Lawrenceville Ry. Co. , 77 Ga. 506, 157 Brand v. Whelan, 18 111. App. 186, 614 Brande v. Grace, 154 Mass. 210, 1102 Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 158, 645 Branding v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 239, 647 Brandon v. Brown, 106 111. 519, 1781 Brandon v. Newington, 3 Q. B. 915, 397 Brandon Mfg. Co. v. Morse, 4S Vt. 322, 688 Branham v. Johnson, 62 Ind. 259, 2229 Brannon v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 789, 1521 Brantley v. Mayo, 85 Ga. 606, 2257 Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420, 1793 Brashear v. City of Madison, 142 Ind. 685, 1520 Brashear v. Moran, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 417, 615 Brassell v. Williams, 51 Ala. 349, 536 Bratton v. Lowry, 39 S. Car. 383, 1684 Braun v. Weller, L. E. 2 Ex. 183, 30 Braun v. Winans, 37 111. App. 248, 127, 128 Brawley v. Catron, 8 Leigh, 522, 430 Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 168, 110, 305, 306, 873, 874 Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82, 823 Bray v. Comer, 82 Ala. 183, 969 Bray v. Farweil, 81 N. Y. 600, 154, 1321 Bray v. Loomer, 61 Conn. 456, 951 Brazee v. Bryant, 50 Mich. 136, 2103 Bream v. Marsh, 4 Leigh, 21, 285 Breathwit v. Bank of Fordyce, 60 Ark. 26, 17 Breasted v. Farmers', etc., Co., 4 Hill, 73, 118 Breasted v. Farmers', etc., Co., 8 N. Y. 229, 119 Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La. Ann. 426, 414 Breck v. Cole, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 79, 1630, 1638 Breckenridge v. Brooks, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 335, 2259 Breckenridge V. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 236, 1772, 1773, 1795, 2276 Breckinridge v. Crocker, 78 Cal. 529, 2216 Breckinridge County v. McCracken, 61 Fed. Rep. 191, 1542 Brecknock Co. v. Pritchard, 6 T. R. 750, 2237 Bredin v. Dwen, 2 Watts (Pa.) , 95, 1811 Breed v. Cook, 15 Johns. 241, 455 Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523, 206, 594 Breed v. Hurd, 6 Pick. 356, 390 Ixvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291, .] Breed v.Judd, 1 Gray (Mass.), 455, 1783 Breen v. Moran, 51 Minn. 525, 350, 351, 928 Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. St. 313, 2154 Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis. 140, 384 Bremond v. McLean, 45 Texas, 10, 865 Breneman's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 641, 785 Brenham v. German, etc., Bank, 144 U. S. 173. 1528, 1532 Brenhara, City of, v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Texas, 542, 1566 Brennan v. Baiton, 2 Dru. & War. 349, 846 Bronnan v. Clark, 29 Neb. 3S5, 758, 759 Brennan v. Ostrander, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 426, 526 Brenner v. Brenner, 48 Ind. 262, 618 Brenner v. Luth, 28 Kan. 581, 40 Brenton v. Davis, 8 Blackf. 317, 331 Breslin v. Brown, 24 Ohio St. 565, 2002 Brett v. Monarch Society, L. E. 1 Q. B. 367, 174, 175 Breunich v. Weselman, 100 N. Y. 609, 383 Brewer v. Cropp, 10 Wash. 136, 645 Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337, 237, 240 Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N.J. Eq. 537, 2032 Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 543, 246, 247 Brewer t. Stone, 11 Gray (Mass.), 228, 2189 Brewer v. Union Pac. R. Co., 31 Hun, 545, 465 Brewster v. Bouers, 8 Cal. 501, 447 Brewster v. Brewster, 38 N. J. Law, 119, 3 Brewster v. Burnett, 125 Mass. 68, 1834 Brian v. Melton, 125 111. 647, 1033 Brice's Appeal, 95 Pa. St. 145, 197 Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533, 1022, 1824 Brice v. Hamilton, 12 S. Car. 32, 478 Brick v. Gannar, 36 Hun, 52, 654 Brick V. Plymouth Co., 63 Iowa, 462, 523 Brickley v. Walker, 68 Wis. 563, 1755 Briddon v. Great Northern B. Co., 28 L. J. Ex. 51, 275 Bride v. Clark, 161 Maes. 130, 1939 Bridge T. Wain. 1 Starkie, 419, 324, 325, 328 Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108, 342 Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. (U. S.) 116, 2134 Bridgefield B. Co. v. Reynolds, 46 Conn. 375, 1322 Bridenbecker v. Lowell, 32 Barb. 9, 1277 Bridgeport Land and Improvement Co. v. American Fire-Proof Steel Car Co., 94 Ala. 592, 1054 Bridget v. Cornish, 1 Mackey. 29, 163 Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N. Y. 424, 21 Bridger T. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601 26, 52 Bridgers v. Hutchins, 11 Ired. 68, 559 Bridges v. Phillips, 17 Texas, 12)*, 573 Bridges v. Russell, 30 Mo. App. 258, 465 Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert, 2 Pick. 579, 254 Bridgford v. Riddell, 55 111. 261, 1664 Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. (7 How.) 14, 2022 Brigg v. Hilton, 99 N. Y. 517, 46, 47, 504 Briggs V. Beach, 18 Vt. 115, 490 Briggs v. First Nat. Bank, 41 Neb. 17, 1723 Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt, 86, 2120 Briggs v. Munchon, 56 Mo. 467, 1176, 1177 Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 2184 Briggs v. Sutton, Spencer (N. J. Law), 581, 183 Briggs v. Tillotson, 5 Johns. 304, 214 Brigham v. Bigelow, 12 Mete. 268, 717 Brigham v. Home Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 319, 895 Brigham v. Martin (Mich.), 61 N. W. Rep. 276, 102 Bright v. Bright, 41 111. 97, 1194 Bright v. Coffman, 15 Ind. 371, 189, 520 Brill v. Rack (Ky. 1893) , 23 S. W. Eep. 511, 999 BrinckerhofE v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, 1394, 2284 Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 2284 Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sandf. Ch. 400, 556 Brindley v. Lawton (N. J. Eq. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 394, 1040 Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, 2154 Bringham v. Dana, 29 Vt. 1, 510 Brink v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 49 Vt. 442, 896 Brinkley v. Bethel, 9 Heisk. (Term.) 786, 1082 1232 Brinley v. Mann, 2 Cush. 337 123l| 1233 Brinkman v. Eisler. 7 N. Y. Supl. 193, 1886 Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498, 422, 1856 Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa, 538, 957, 1085 Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah, 480, 1210 Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143, 800, 802, 988 Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17, 73, 76 Briscoe v. Allison, 43 Hi. 291, 1539 Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 Miss. 361, 716 Brisendine v. Martin, 1 Ired. 286, 443 Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 1747, 1792 Brison v. Brison, 90 Cal. 323, 1747 Bristol v. Scranton, 57 Fed. Rep. 70, 1446 Bristol, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194, 736 Bristow v. Lane, 21 111. 194, 2210 Britain v. Rossiter, L. R. 11 Q. D. Div. 123, 656 Britain v. Rossiter, 48 L. J. Q. B. 362, 837 British, etc., Mortgage Co. v. Tibballs, 63 Iowa, 468, 450 British, etc., Mortgage Co. v. Long, 116 N. Car. 77, 1083 British Seamless Paper Box Co., In re, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 467, 1980 Brittain v. Crowther, 54 Fed. Rep. 295, 1685, 1689 Britton v. Angier, 48 N. H. 420, 683 Britton v. Lewis, 8 Rich. Eq. 271, 543 Britton v. McDonald, 43 N. J. Law, 591, 1549 Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 138, 147, 148, 779 Broad well v. Getman, 2 Denio, 87, 648, 649, 656 Brock v. Cox, :« Mo. App. 40, 792 Brock v. O'Dell (S. Car. 1895) , 21 S. E. Rep. 976. 1071 Brockway v. Thomas, 36 Ark. 518. 836 Brockwell v. Bullock, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 567, 1843 Brodek v. Farnum, 11 Wash. 565, 264, 961 Broden v. Conklin, 77 Cal. 330, 2177 Brodie v. St. Paul, 1 Ves. Jr. 326, 836 Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L. R. 2 App. Ca. 666, 74, 76, 87 Bromley v. Goff, 75 Mich. 213, 2211 Bromley v. Jefferies, 2 Vrrn. 215, 101 Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185, 543, 571 Bronson v. Xinzie, 1 How. (U. S.) 311, 2151, 2154 Bronson v. Leach, 74 Mich. 713, 324 Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 394 Brooke v. Haymr-s, L. R. 6 Eq. Cas. 25, 553 Brookfield, Inhabitants of, v. Allen, 6 Al- len (Mass.), 585, 1660 Brooklyn, City of, In re, 143 N. Y. 596, 1239 Brooklyn Bank v. DeGrauw, 23 Wend. 342, 381, 398, 525, 526 Brooklyn, etc., Road Co. v. Slaughter, 33 Ind. 185, 1281 Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Bledsoe, 52 Ala. 5:38, 499 Brooks v. Cooper, 50 N. J. Eq. 761, 1883 Brooks v. Eskins, 24 Mo. A] >p. 296, 1524 Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, 1306, 1854, 1S95, 1904, 1983, 2066 Brooks v. McMeekin, 37 S. ( or. 285, 227 Brooks v. Moore, 67 Barb. 393, 518 Brooks v. Morgan, 1 Har. (Del.) 123, 684, 1132 Brooks v. Rogers, 101 Ala. Ill, 561, 578 Brooks v. White, 2 Mete. 283, 525, 534, 636 Brookville, etc., Bank v. Kimble, 76 Ind. 195, 1733 Brookville, etc., Turnpike Co. v. McCarty, 8 Ind. 392, 1434 Brosnan v. McKee, 63 Mich. 454, 615 Brouncker v. Scott, 4 Taunt. 1, 2172 Broussard v. Broussard, 45 La. Ann. 1085, 699, 1743 TABLE OF CASES. lxvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Brower y. Fisher, i Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 441, 1815 Brown's Appeal, 94 Pa. St. 862, 1755 Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 306, 658 Brown v. Anderson, 19 Pac. Rep. 487, 104 Brown v. Bailey. 159 Pa. St. 151, 632 Brown v. Baldwin & Gleason Co., 13 N. Y. Supl. 893, 922 Brown v. Barngrover, 82 Iowa, 204, 28 Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 2145 Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 108, 1142 Brown v. Bennett, 75 Pa. St. 420, 1656 Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242, 325, 328, 332, 365 Brown v. Brine, 1 L. R. Exch. D. 5, 2008 Brown v. Brown, 33 N. J. Eq. 650, 843 Brown v. Brown, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 573, 869 Brown T.Brown (S. Car. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 412, 1020 Brown v. Brown, 154 111. 35, 2286, 2289 Brown v. Brown, 61 Texas, 56, 1667 Brown v. Brown, 124 Mo. 79, 1690 Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 533, 1993, 1994 Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443, 687 Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474, 542 Brown v. Campbell, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 176, 194 Brown v. Carter, 5 Ves. 862, 224 Brown v. City of Pomona, 103 Cal. 533, 1514 Brown v. College Corner, etc., Co., 56 Ind. 110, 799 618 751 447 193, 194 281 1173 1891 393,404 352 333 779 1633 595 Brown v. Combs, 29 N. J. Law, 36, Brown v. Conger, 8 Hun, 625, Brown v. Covillaud, 6 Cal. 566, Brown v. Cronise, 21 Cal. 386, Brown v. Crump, 1 Marsh. C. P. 567, Brown v. Delano, 12 Mass. 370, Brown v. Desmond, 100 Mass. 267, Brown v. Duncan, 10 B. & C. 93, Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle, 408, Brown v. Eastern Slate Co., 134 Mass, 590, Brown v. Edgington, 2 Man. & G. 279, Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132, Brown v. Fales, 139 Mass. 21, Brown v. Farnham, 55 Minn. 27, Brown v. Farmers', etc., Bank (Texas 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 285, Brown v. First Nat. Bank, 137 Ind. 655, 1953, 1995, 2083 Brown v. Fitch, 33 N. J. Law (4 Vr.), 418, 2191 Brown v. Foster, 108 N. Y. 387, 340, 504 Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136, 130, 167, 932 Brown v. Gilmore, 8 Maine, 107, 391 Brown v. Godfrey, 33 Vt. 120, 189 Brown v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 286, 1642 Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 403, — Brown v. Hall, 5 Lan. (N. Y.) 177, 1921 Brown v. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484, 2 Brown v. Harris, 2 Gray (Mass.), 359. 2228 Brown v. Hatton, 9 Ired. L. (N. Car.) 319, 904 Brown v. Haynes, 52 Maine, 578, 165 Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 160, 1644 Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667, 1333 Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 839, 1201 Brown v. Howe, 9 Gray, 84, 1838 Brown v. Inhabitants of Chesterville, 63 Maine, 241, 543 Brown v. Inhabitants of Winterport, 79 Maine, 305, 1477 Brown v. Insurance Co., 117 Mass. 479, 972 Browu v. Jones, 1 Atk. 188, 226 Brown v. Kling, 101 Cal. 295, 2027, 2028 Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136, 795 Brown v. Latham (Ga.), 18 S. E. Rep. 421, 183 Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. 535, Brown v. 621, Brown v. 21, Brown v. Brown v. Brown v. 110, Brown v. 568, Brown v. Mayor, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 726, 281 McCune, 5 Sandf. (N. H.) 224. 1785, 1793 904 1870 1823 494 1120 1640 3, 84, 146 447, 455 904 421 1834 836 205 1713 394, 117 2063 McGran, 14 Pet. 479, Mcintosh, 39 N. J. Law, 22, Miles, 16 N. Y. Supl. 251, Muller, L. R. 7 Ex. 319, Hunger, 42 Minn. 482, Nealley, 161 Mass. 1, Norton, 50 Hun, 248, Olmstead, 50 Cal. 162, Orland, 36 Maine, 376, Parish, 2 Dana, 6, Peck, 2 Wis. 261, Pollard, 89 Va. 696, Prophit, 53 Miss. 649, Ransey, 74 Ga. 210, Roger, etc., Ins. Co., 5 R. I, Rounsavell, 78 111. 589, Sanborn, 21 Minn. 402, 658, 689 School District, 55 Vt. 43, 1588 Shelby, 4 Ind. App. 477, 2240 Slater, 16 Conn. 192, 863, 872 Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 2125, 2149 Speyers, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 296, 1921 State, 82 Ga. 224, 2128 State, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 2160 Strait, 19 111. 88, 597 Sutton, 129 U. S. 238; 848, 1183 Symmes, 31 N. Y. Supl. 629, 510 Thompson, 31 S. Car. 436. 1683 Tinsley (Ky. 1892), 21 S. W. Rep. 1537 Todd (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 707 Toledo, etc., R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 1436 Tuttle, 80 Maine, 162, 791 Tuttle, 27 HI. App. 389, 831 United States, 8 Cranch (U.S.), 2030 Wabash, etc., R. Co., 18 Mo. App. 117 Watson, 6 B. Monroe (Ky.), 588, Brown v. Leach, 35 Maine, Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 3' Brown v. Leckie, 43 111. 497, Brown v. Lord. 7 Ore. 302, Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 320, 490 1878 451 844 543, 572 Brown v. Watson, 47 Maine, 161, 1576 Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y. 187, 603, 598 Brown v. Weldon, 27 Mo. App. 251, 1705 Brown v. Whipple, 58 N. H. 229, 676 Brown v. Winehill, 3 Wash. St. 524, 127 Brown v. Witter, 10 Ohio, 143, 417 Brown v. Wood, 121 Mass. 137, 1707 Brown v. Woodworth. 5 Barb. 550, 643 Browne v. Garborough, Cro. Eliz. 63, 226 Browne v. McDonald, 129 Mass. 66, 287 Browne v. Mount Holly Bank, 45 N. J. Law, 360, 568 Brownell v. Old Colony R. Co., 164 Mass. 29, 1439 Brownfield v. Brownfield, 43 111. 148, 1022 Browning v. Board of Comrs. Owen County, 44 Ind. 11, 378 Browning v. Crouse, 43 Mich. 489, 1633 Browning v. Home, etc., Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 508, 117 Browning v. Morris, Cowp. 790, 1870 Browning v. Stallard, 5 Taunt. 450, 608 Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13, 883 Brownlie v. Russell, L. E. 8 App. Cas. 235, 1624 Brua's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 204, 1922, 1923, 1930, 1946, 2016 Bruce v. Bruce, 95 Ala. 563, 1745 Brace v. Burdet, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 80, 2259 Bruce V. Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 43, 900 Bruce y. Smith, 44 Ind. 1, 214 Brace v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194, 1126, 1144 Bruell v. Colell, 1 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 308, 2211 Bruen v. Marquand, 17 John. 58, 577 Bruffett v. Great Western R. Co., 25 111. 353, 2130 Bruin v. Sasser, 25 La. Ann. 224, 2023 Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] T /~\ tn 1^ n T. 4 in 1 1C t T> 1_1: TT. -J *OETt.. Ol OCO Brum v. Insurance Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 140, 1454 Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala. 123, 289 Brumagin v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 803, 807 Brummitt v. McGuire, 107 N. Car. 351, 799 Brunnell v. Hudson Sawmill Co., 86 Wis. 587 912 Brun'ner v. Brennan, 49 Ind. 98, 360 Bruner v. Brown, 139 111. 600, 1308, 1400 Bruner v. Strong, 61 Texas, 555, 2225 Bruner v. Wheaton, 46 Mo. 363, 67 Brunhild v. Freeman, 77 N. Car. 128, 858 Brunswick Co. v. Dart, 93 Ga. 74, 1205 Brunswick v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120, 1902 Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. United Gas, etc., Co., 85 Maine, 532, 1250, 1251 Brush v. Blanchard, 18 111. 46, 51 Bryan v. Boltz, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 152, 1799 Bryan v. Foy, 69 N. Car. 45, 519, 524 Bryan v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 11 Bush, 597 736 Bryan, City of, y. Page, 51 Texas, 532, 1500, 1588 Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200, 1852, 1994 Bryan v. Scholl, 109 Ind. 367, 1176 Bryan v. Southwestern R. Co., 37 Ga. 26, 839 Bryan v. Thompson, 7 J. J. Marsh. 586, 549 Bryant v. Biddeford, 39 Maine, 193, 1576 Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Mass. 491, , 821 Bryant v. Booze, 55 Geo. 438, 76 Bryant y. Brazil, 3 N. W. Rep. 117, 190 Bryant v. Crosby, 40 Maine, 9, 637 Bryant v. Edson, 8 Vt. 325, 731 Bryant v. Erkstine, 55 Maine, 153, 490 Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228, 255 Bryant v. Isburgh, 13 Gray, 607, 347 Bryant v. Lord, 19 Minn. 396 (Ga. 342), 199 Bryant v. Ondrak, 34 N. Y. Supl. 384, Bryant v. Peck, etc., Co., 154 Mass. 460, 1827 Bryant y. Poughkeepsie, etc., Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 200, 885 Bryant y. Rich (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 146, 600 Bryant v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 825, 1923 Bryant y. Wilson, 71 Md. 440, 1146 Bryar v. Willcocks, 3 Cow. 150, 194 Bryne y. Marshall, 44 Ala. 355, 684, 867 Bryne y. Schuyler, etc., Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336, 127,11, 1255, 1260 Bryne v. Van Tienhoyen, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 344, 57 Bry^on y. Home for Soldiers, etc., 168 Pa. St. 352, 439 Bryson v. McCreary, 102 Ind. 1, 1496 Buchanan v. Andrew, 2 L. R. H. L. Sc. App. 286, 869 Buchanan y. Curry, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 137, 2021 Buchanan y. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 361, 1528,1539 Buchanan y. Sahlein, 9 Mo. App. 552, 1831, 1835 Buchanan y. Smith, 16 Wall. 277, 153 Buchanon v. Hazzard, 95 Pa. St. 240, 1656 Buchanon y. International Bank, 78 111. 500, 206 Buchanon v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 1588 Buchor y. Dillsburg, 76 Pa. St. 306, 260 Buck y. Albee, 26 Vt. 1x4, 1S54 Bttck y. Burk, 18 N. Y. 337, 860 Buck y. Pennsylvania R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 170, 1958 Buck v. Pickwell, 27 Vt. 157, 636, 639, 675 Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168, 1031 Buckhouse v. Crosby, 2 Eq.. Cas. Abr., p. 32, par. 44, 1108 Buckingham v. Jackson, 4 Biss. 295, 859 Buckingham v. Osborne, 44 Conn. 133, 662 Bucktand y. Johnson, 15 C. B. 145, 781 Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 100, 178 Bucklen v. Hasterllk, 155 111. 423, 21, 397, 4313 Buckley v. Dunn, 67 Miss. 710, 1708 Bucklin v. Davidson, 125 Pa. St. 362, 2253 Buckman v. Ferguson, 108 Cal. 33, 1468 Buckmaster v. Harrot, 7 Ves. 341, 620, 688 Bucknall v. Story, 46 Cal. 589, 460 Bucksport R. Co. v. Brewer, 67 Maine, 295, 153, 156 Bucksport R. Co. v. Buck, 65 Maine, 537, 155 Bucy y. Pittsburg Agricul. Works, 89 Iowa, 464, 342 Budd v. Budd, 59 Fed. Rep. 735, 1519, 1523 Budd v. Eyermann, 10 Mo. App. 437, 798 Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 48, 322, 338 Budd v. Hiler, 27 N. J. Law, 43, 781 Budgett v. Binnington, L. R. (1891) 1 Q. B. 35, 297 Budgett v. Binnington, L. R. 25 Q. B. D. (1890) 321, 296 Buel v. Boughton, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 91 1950 Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284, 1289, 1296, 1298, 1307, 1393, 1406 Buell v. Flower, 39 Conn. 462, 521, 524 Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich. 125, 1642. Buena Vista, etc., Co. v. Tuohy, 107 Cal. 243, 974 Buffalo v. O'Malley, 61 Wis. 255, 798, 799 Buffalo Nat. Bank v. Sharpe, 40 Neb. 123, 1288, 1741 Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., Ill N. Y. 132, 36 Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75, 1323, 1335 Buffalo, R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336, 259, 260, 1462 Buffington v. Bardon, 80 Wis. 635, 1313, 1314 Burlington v. Blackwell, 52 Ga. 129, 2208 Buffkin y. Baird, 73 N. Car. 283, 495 Buffum v Buffum, 11 N. H. 451, 401 Buford v. Keokuk, etc., Packet Co., 3 Mo. App. 159. 1260 Building Association y. Timmins, 3 Phila. R. 209, 1608 Buist y. Bryan (S. Car. 1895), 21 S.E. Rep. 537, 1623 Bulkeley v. Noble, 2 Pick. 337, 556 Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455, 190, 438, 465, 523, 538, 554 Bull v. City Df Quincy, 155 111. 566, 855 Bull v. Robison, 10 Exch. 342, 34S Bull y. Strong, 98 Cal. 27, 1693 Bullard v. Hascall, 25 Mich. 132, 1818 Bullard v. Inhabitants of Shoriey, 153 Mass. 559, 1102 Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Texas, 313, 730 Bullen v. McGillicuddy, 2 Dana (Ky.), 90, 537 Bullion, etc., Min. Co. v. Eureka Hill Min. Co., 5 Utah, 1, 2267 Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8, 990 Bullman v. North British Insurance Co., 159 Mass. 118, 1758 Bullock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367, 749, 752 Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, 1838 Bullock v. Falmouth, etc., Co., 85 Ky. 184, 260,654 Bullock v. Finley, 28 Fed. Rep. 514, 891 Bullock v. Grinstead, 95 Ky. 261, 1695 Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 365, 1699 Bumgardner v. Leayitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 1208 Bumpas v. Platner, 1 Johns. Ch. 213, 1148 Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo. 266, 930 Bunch y. Grave, 111 Ind. 351, 29 Bunch y. Hart, 138 lad. 1, 1664 Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 116, 789 Bunge v. Koop, 48 N. Y. 225, 190, 495, 537 Bunker y. Barron, 79 Maine, 62, 457 Bunn y. Bartlett, 8 N. Y. Supl. 160, 209 Bunn v. Lett, 19 N. Y. Supl. 728, 2196 Bunn y. Riker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 426, 1914, 1944 Bunn v. Todd, 107 N. Car. 266, 1243 Bunn v. Wells. 94 N. Car. 67, 886, 892 Bunnel v. Witherow, 29 Ind. 123, 224 Bunnell y. Taintor, 4 Conn. 568, 644 Bunting y. Darbyshire, 75 111. 408, 206 TABLE OF CASES. lxix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1061-2291.'] Bunting v. Mick, 5 Ind. App. 289, 1855 Burbank v. Crooker, 7 Gray, 158, 170 Burbank v. Dennis, 101 Cal. 90, 974, 1294 Burbank v. Pillsbury. 48 N. H. 475, 2256 Burbridge v. Cotton, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. 57, 1619 Burbridge v. Fackler, 2 MacArthur (U.S.), 407 1989 Burbridge v'. Gumbel, 72 Miss. 371, 909 Burch v. Augusta, etc., E. Co., 80 Ga. 296, 898 Burch v. Hubbard, 48 111. 164, 206 Burehard v. Dunbar, 82 111. 450, 710 Burchinell v. Smodle, 5 Colo. App. 417, 671 Burckhardt v. Burchhardt, 86 Ohio St. 261, 890 Burge v. Cedar Eapids, etc., By. Co., 32 Iowa, 101, 2288 Burger v. Koelsch, 77 Hun (N. Y.), 44, 1886 Burger v. Bice, 3 Ind. 125, 1955 Burgess v. Badger, 124 111. 288, 864, 876, 887 Burgett v. Barrick, 25 Kan. 526, 1803 Burgh v. Preston, 8 T. E. 483, 569 Burgin v. Giberson, 26 N. J. Eq. 72, 1063 Burgoyne v. Ohio, etc., Co., 5 Ohio St. 586, 821, 823, 2189 Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk. 397, 545 Burke v. Dillon (Iowa), 61 N. W. Bep. 370, 206 Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. St. 168, 541, 574, 576, 819 Burke v. Smith, 16 Wall. 390, 1400 Burke v. Snell, 42 Ark. 57, 452 Burke v. South Eastern By. Co., L. E. 2 C. P.D.I, 64 Burke v. Steel, 40 Ga. 217, 2208 Burke v. Taylor, 94 Ala. 530, 1014 Burke v. Wells Fargo & Co., 50 Cal. 218, 60 Burkhard v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 102 Pa. St. 268, 896 Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 31, 2009 Burkholder v. Plank, 69 Pa. St. 225, 179 Burkley v. Dayton, 14 John. 387, 549 Burkley v. United States, 19 Wall. 37, 506 Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray (Mass. ) , 387, 1661 Burley v. Barnhard, 9 N. Y.'St. Eep. 587, 1659 Burley v. Eussell, l6 N. H. 184, 1803 Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7 Cow. 92, 837 Burlingame v. Eowland, 77 Cal. 315, 846 Burlington, City of, v. Burlington St. By. Co., 49 Iowa, 144, 1582 Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Boestler, 15 Iowa, 555, 746, 747 Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312. 1423 Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 31 Fed. Eep. 652, 1862 Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. 335, 724 Burn t. Boulton, 2 C. B. 476, 469 Burn v. Miller, 4 Taunt. 745, 187 BurneU v. Moore, 17 So. Eep. — , 1068 Burnell v. Morris (Ala. 1895), 18 So. Eep. 82, 1053 Burnett v. Blackmar, 43 Ga. 569, 839 Burnett v. Kullak, 76 Cal. 536. 1162 Burnett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Mo. App. 599, 2105 Burney v. Ball, 24 Ga. 505, 559,649,652 Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73, 1977 Burnham y. Allen, 1 Gray, 496, 904 Burnham v. Bosenberger, 110 Mo. 468, 544 Burnham v. Spooner, 10 N. H. 165, 454 Burnie's Trustees, Ex parte, 1 DeG., M. & G. 440, 223 Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 167 Burns v. Berry, 42 Mich. 176, 1141 Burns v. Caskey, 100 Mich. 94, 1062, 1074 Burns v. Daggett, 141 Mass. 368, 843 Burns v. Foflansbee. 20 111. App. 41, 829 Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305, 13 Burns v. McGregor, 90 N. Car. 222, 1741 Burns v. Moore, 76 Ala. 339, 2100 Burns v. Singer Mfg. Co., 87 Ind. 541, 866 Burns v. Thompson, 39 La. Ann. 377, 1674 Burnside v. Lincoln County Court, 86 Ky. 423, 2128 Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, 237, 2210 Burr v. Boyer, 2 Neb. 265, 572 Burr v. Burr, 26 Pa. St. 284, 196 Burr v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 290, 52 Burr v. Smith, 21 Barb. 262, 442 Burr v. Swan, 118 Mass. 588, 1753 Burr v. Veeder, 3 Wend. 412, 798 Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen (Mass.) , 269, Burrall v. Bushwick E. Co., 75 N. Y. 211, 259, 411' Burrell v. Highleyman, 33 Mo. App. 183, 657 Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clifford (U. S.), 590, 2241, 224'.! BurrUl y. Daggett, 77 Maine, 545. 204* Burrill y. Garst (E. I. 1895), 31 Atl. Bep. 436, 1214 Burroughs v. Langley, 10 Md. 248, 913 Burroughs y. Norwich, etc., E. Co., 100 Mass. 26, 738 Burrows y. Alter, 7 Mo. 424, 579 Burrows v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 550, 155, 157 Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291, 671 Burrus v. Dawson, 66 Ala. 476, 1728 Burt y. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283, 354, 3n9 Burt y. Mason, 97 Mich. 127, 999 Burt y. Quisenberry, 132 111. 385, 1022, 1023 Burtis y. Bradford, 122 Mass. 129, 383 Burtis y. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246, 507, 495, 2211, 2222 Burtles y. State, 4 Md. 273, 2234 Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320, 667 Burton y. Marshall, 4 Gill (Md.), 487, 20'.j Burton v. Platter (C. C. A.), 53 Fed. Eep. '901, J' '» Burton y. Schildbach, 45 Mich. 504, 1 IS Burton y. Shotwell, 13 Bush, 271, f.7 Burton y. Stewart, 3 Wend. 236, 974 Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535, 411, 421 Busby y. Finn, 1 Ohio, 409, — - Busey v. Hooper, 35 Md. 15, 260 Bush v. Abraham, 25 Ore. 336, 437, 538 Bush y. Brooks, 70 Mich. 446, 2211 Bush y. Rawlins, 89 Ga. 117, 187 Bush y. Eobinson, 95 Ky. 178, 1386 Bushhell v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442, 671 Busk v. Spence, 4 Camp. 329, 126 Buss v. Woodward, 60 N. H. 58, 1721 Bussard y. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102, 767 Bussian v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 56 Wis. 325, 588 Butcher y. Butcher, 4 B. & P. 113, 566 Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Vera. 363, 1180 Butcher, Wm., Steel Works v. Atkinson, 68 HI. 421, H „ „ T 652 Butchers' Bank v. Brown, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 149, „. 568 Butchers', etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co., Ill U. S. 764, 2055, 2147 Butler y. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176, 2264 Butler y. Butler, 77 N. Y. 472, 890, 2213 Butler y. City of Charlestown, 7 Gray (Mass ) 12 1470 Butler y'. Durham, 3 Ired. Eq. 589, 1058 Butler y. Finck, 21 Hun (N.\.), 210, 2252 Butler v. Galletti, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465, 2073 Butler y. Harwitz, 7 Wall. 258, 394 Butler v. Lee, 11 Ala. 885, 1898, 2111 Butler y. Merchant (Texas App.), 27 S. "• „ Butler y. Moses, 43 Ohio St. 166, 876 Butler y. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., 94 Ga. 562, 162 5 Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill (N.Y.), 324, 2132 Butler y. Pennsylvania, 10 How. (U. S.) 402 2126 Butler v. Eichmond, etc., E. Co., 88 Ga. 594 545, 581 Butler v. Bockwell, 17 Colo. 290, 2151 Butler v. Eobertson, 11 Tex. 142, 1739 lxx TABLE OF CASES. {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Butler v. Thomson, 92 U. S. 412, 182 Butler y. Thoraburg, 131 Ind. 237. 1720 Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 62, 724 Butler Paper Co. v. Bobbins, 151 111. 588, 1392 Butler University v. Schoonover, 114 Ind. 381, 154 Butman v. Porter, 100 Mass. 337, 1120 Butt y. Biffe, 78 Ky. 352, 362 Butterfleld v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 294, 2226, 2228 Butterfleld v. Hartshorn, 7 N. H. 345, 962 Butternuts, etc., Turnpike Co. v. North, 1 Hill, 518, 156 Buttlar y. Bosenblath, 42 N. J. Eq. 651, 1767 Buttrick v. Holden, 8 Cush. 233, 487, 488 Butts y. Andrews, 136 Mass. 221, 1139 Butts y. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317, 1300, 1307 Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 575, 2148 Buxton y. Bust, L. E. 7 Ex. 1, 685 Buyck v. Schwing, 100 Ala. 355, 908, 931 Buzzell y. Cummings, 61 Vt. 213, 163 Buzzell y. Gallagher, 28 Wis. 678, 621 Byam v. Hampton, 57 Hun, 585, 123 Byars y. Spencer, 101 111. 429, 15 Byassee v. Keeses, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 372, 640 Byerlee y. Mendel, 3 Iowa, 382, 144 Byers y. Thompson, 66 111. 421, 51 Byford y. Girton, 90 Iowa, 661, 1708 Byrne y. Schiller, L. R. 9 Ex. 319, 2228 Byrne v. Van Tienhoyen, L. E. 5 C. P. D. 344, 56 Bymside y. Burdett, 15 W, Va. 702, 356 Byron y. Mayor, etc., 22 J. &. S. (N. Y. Super.) 411, 293, 299 By water y. Richardson. 1 A. &. E. 508, 333 Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 2165 c Cabe v. Jameson, 10 Ired. Law (N. Car.) 193, 517 Cabell v. Cabell, 1 Met, (Ky.) 319, 2122 Cabell y. Vaughan, 1 Wm. Saund. 291, 831 Cabot y. Haskius, 3 Pick. 83, 212, 665, 687 Cabot y. Winsor, 1 Allen, 546, 108, 109 Cabot, etc., Bridge v. Chapin, 6 Cush. 50, 155 Caddick y. Skidmore, 2 DeG. & J. 51, 644 Cade y. Jenkins. 88 Ga. 791, 165 Caden y. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137, 284, 285 Cadens y. Teasdale, 53 Vt. 469, 537 Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 21S5 Cahaba, Town Council of, y. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400, 804, 805, 1835 Cahalan v. Van Saint. 87 Iowa, 593, 1729 Cabillv. Bigelow, 18 Pick. 369, 592 Cain y. Bryant, 12 Heisk. 45, 445 Cain y. Commissioners, 86 N. Car. 8, 1516 Cain y. McGuire, 13 B. Mon. 340, 640 Cain y. Warlord, 33 Md. 23, 1031 Caines y. Smith, 15 M. & W. 189, l.«>s Cairo y. Zane, 149 U. S. 122, I52S Cairy y. Randolph, 6 La. Ann. 202, 2233 Calanchini y. Branstette.r, 84 Cal. 249, 811 Calcutta & Burmah Steam Nav. v. De Mattos, 32 L. J. Q. B. 322, 853 Calder y. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 2119 Calder y. Henderson, 2 U. S. App. 627, 2129 Calder y. Kurby, 5 Gray (Mass.), 597, 212s CaMiT y. Moran, 49 Mich. 14, 2B7 Cal Iwell y. Cassidy, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 271, 2196 Caldwell v. Eneas, 2 Mills (S. Car.), 348, 708 Caldwell y. Haley, 3 Texas, 317, 2214 Caldwell v. Hall, 49 Ark. 508, 416 Caldwell v. Martin, 29 S. Car. 22, 819 Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213, 1680 Calr, Ionia R. Co. y. Magistrates of Hel- ensburgh, 2 Macq. 391 ; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 695, 1314, 1315 Caley y. Philadelphia R. Co., 80 Pa. St. 363, 155, 156 Calhoun v. Leary, 6 Wash. 17, 1760, 1762 Calhoun y. Millard, 121 N. Y. 69, 1534 Calhoun y. Phillips, 87 Ga. 482, 2102 California, etc., Manufacturing Co. y. Schafer, 57 Cal. 396, 1320 California State Telegraph Co. y. Alta Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398, 2134 California Steam Navigation Co. y. Wright, 6 Cal. 258, 2029, 2030 Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320, 200, 204, 205, 596, 599, 600 Calkins v. Griswold.il Hun, 208, 798 Calkins v. Long, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 97, 1758 Calkins v. Seabury, etc., Co., 5 S. Dak. 299, 2101 Call v. Seymour, 40 Ohio St. 670, 162 Call y. Ward, 4 Watts. & S. (Pa.) 118, 1841 Callahan's Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 138, 1599 Callahan y. Donnolly, 45 Cal. 152, 2026, 2029 Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476, 2202 Callaway v. Fash, 50 Mo. 420, 1642 Callaway M. & M. Co. y. Clark, 32 Mo. 305, 1225 Callis y. Day, 38 Wis. 643, 1787 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 4-19, 210, 1473 Calreton y. Lovejoy, 54 Maine, 445, 249 Calton y. Lewis, 119 Ind. 181. 1176 Calvert y. Idaho Stage Co., 25 Ore. 412, 1268, 1269 Cambrelleng v. Purton, 125 N. Y. 610, 1141 Camden v. Mayhew, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. — ; 129 U. S. 73, 1444 Camden Bank v. Cilley, 83 Maine, 72, 474 Camden, City of, v. Green, 54 N. J. Law, 591, 804 Camden Horse R. Co. v. Citizens' Coach Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 525, 1135 Camden Trust Co. v. Burlington Carpet Co. (N. J. Eq.), 33 Atl. Rep. 479, 1459, 1460 Cameron v. Durkheim, 55 N. Y. 425, 1856 Cameron v. New York and Mt. Vernon Water Co., 62 Hun, 269, 1268 Cameron v. New York, etc., Water Co., 133 N. Y. 336, 1981 Cameron v. Peck, 37 Conn. 555, 2100, 2102 Cameron v. Warbritton, 9 Ind. 351, 198 Camfield v. Gilbert, 4 Esp. 221. 417 Camidge v. Alleuby, C. B. &. C. 373, 455 Cammack v. Soran, 30 Gratt. 292, 427 Camp t. Barker, 21 Vt. 469, 2185 Camp t. Moreman, 84 Ky. 635, 675 Camp y. Smith, 136 N. Y. 187, 473, 474 Campanari v. Woodburn, 15 C. B. 400, 61 Campau v. Moran, 31 Mich. 280, 2173 Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 298, 1017 Campbell's Estate, In re, 7 Pa. St. 100, 559 Campbell v. Allen, 38 Mo. App. 27, 197 Campbell v. Anderson, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 384, 2021 Campbell v. Bowles, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 652, 1686 Campbell y. Brown, 20 Ga. 415, 572 Campbell v. Clark, 44 Mo. App. 249, 800 Campbell v. Consalus. 25 N. \ . 613, 30 Campbell v. Day, 90 111. 363, 778 Campbell v. Fetterman's, 20 W. Va. 398, 1179 Campbell v. French, 6 T. R. 200, 764 Campbell v. Hatchett, 55 Ala. 548, 1066, 1069 Campbell v. Indianapolis, etc., Railway Co., 110 Ind. 490, 637 Campbell v. Insurance Co., 98 Mass. 381, 1241 ( 'ampbell v. Johnson , 44 Mo. 247, 425, 901 Campbell v. Jones, 6 T. R. 570, 114 Campbell y. McFadden (Texas App. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 436, 1167, 1215 Campbell v. New England, etc., Insurance Co., 98 Mass. 381, 318 Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 81, 710, 729 Campbell v. Pope, 96 Mo. 468, 1269, 1280 Campbell v. Potter, 147 111. 576, 1133 Campbell v. Richardson, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 406, 1944, 1946 TABLE OF CASES. lxxi [Beferenees are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Campbell v. Rust, 85 Va. 653, 1096 Campbell v. Sherman, 49 Mich. 534, 1278 Campbell v. Stein, 6 Dow. 116, 715 Campbell v. White, 22 Mich. 178, 1748 Campbell v. Whitson, 68 111. 240, 1023 Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Henkle, 19 D.C.95, 164,166 Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. Rep. 414, 132, 133, 134 Campe v. Home, 158 Pa. St. 508, 1679, 1688 Campion v. Cotton, 17 Yes. Jr. 264, 221, 223 Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 2118 Canadian, etc., R. Co. v. Western Union, etc., Co., 17 Can. Sup. Ct. 151, 2052 Canaiohario National Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191, 2281 Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 561, 2193 Canal Co. y. Pinkham, 1 Idaho, 790, 1452 Canal Co. v. Wheeley, 2 Barn. & Adol. 792, 1239 Canal & C. R. Co. v. St.Charles St. R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 10J9, 1264 Canal R. Co. v. Orleans R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 54, 1264 Canda v. Wick, 100 N. Y. 127, 495 Candee v. Smith, 93 N. Y. 349, 832 Candee v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471, 1961 Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 119, 182, 231, 234 Canfleld v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 93 N. Y. 532. 1958,1963 Canfleld v. Eleventh School Dist., 19 Conn. 529, 521, 524 Canfleld v. Ives, 18 Pick. 253, 16 Cangas v. Manufacturing Co., 37 Mo. App. 297, 70 Canhan v. Barry, 15 C. B. 597, 273 Cannan v. Bryce, 3 Barn. & Aid. 179, 1862, 1934 Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 242, 1653 Canney v. South Pac, etc., R. Co., 63CaL 501, 244 Cannon v. Boutwell, 53 Texas, 626, 1729 Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316, 1882 Cannon v. Doming, 3 S. D. 421, 1642, 1643 Cannon v. McMichael, 6 Mackey, 225, 163 Cannon River Co. v. Bogers, 46 Minn. 376, 523 Cantine v. Phillips, 5 Harr. 428, 789 Canton Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 79 Md. 524, 1120, 1147 Canton Dental Co. v. Webb, 16 N. Y. Supl. 932, 168 Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, 376, 814 Capital City Ins. Co. v. Detwiler, 23 111. App. 656, 190, 519 Capital, etc., Gas Light Co. v. City of Des Moines, 61 N. W. Rep. 1066, 1480 Capps v. Hastings Prospecting Co., 40 Neb. 470, „ 1324 Capuro v. Builders' Insurance Co., 39 Cal. 123, 1294 Carberry v. Tannehill, 1 Har. &.. J. (Md.) 224, 2271 Cardell v. Bridge, 9 Allen, 355, 146 Cardell v. Ryder, 35 Yt. 47, 1680 Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. St. 70, 916 Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 1755 Carey v. City of East Saginaw, 79 Mich. 73 1508, 1555 Carey v. Gunnison, 65 Iowa, 702, 1070 Carey v. Mackay, 82 Maine, 516, 2010 Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 72 Hun, 254, s > s Carleton v. Woods, 28 N. H. 290, 454, 1901 Carlisle v. Brennan, 67 Ind. 12, 1192 Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339, 1102, 1118 Carlisle v. Saginaw Valley Co., 27 Mich, 315. 260 Carliv. Snyder (N. J. Ch. 1893), 26Atl Hep. 977, , „„ 2042,2047 Carlton y. William, 77 Cal. 89, 1187 Carlyle, City of, v. Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co., 140 111. 445, 1519 Carlyle Water, Light ic Power Co. v. City of Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325, 1519 Carman v. Smick, 15 N. J. Law, 252, 657 Carmelich v. Mims, 88 Ala. 335, 2182 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 2006 Carmichael v. Walters, 33 Ga. 316, 1696 Carmien v. Whitaker, 36 Ind. 509, 831 Carmody v. Powers, 60 Mich. 26, 1324 Carnahan v. Tousey, 93 Ind. 561, 216 Carnall v. Wilson, 14 Ark. 482, 1065 Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 381, 240,728 Carnforth, etc., Co., Ex parte, L, R. 4 Ch. Div. 108, 492 Carondelet Iron Works v. Moore, 78 111. 658, 848 Carothers v. McNese, 43 Texas, 221, 1739, 1760 Carothers v. Wheeler, 1 Ore. 194, 386 Carpenter v. Allen, 16 La. Ann. 435, 1743 Carpenter v. Allen, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 322, 42 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 70 111. 457, 2289 Carpenter v. Dodge, 'a) Vt. 595, 560 Carpenter v. Freeland, Lalor (N. Y.), 37, 466 Carpenter v. Gay, 12 R. I. 306. 285 Carpenter v. Osbom, 102 N. Y. 552, 27 Carpenter v. Shanklin. 7 Blackf . 308, 12 Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251, 557 Carpenter v. Talbot, 33 Fed. Rep. 537, 1048 Carpentier v. Atherton, 25 Cal. 564, 442 Carr v. Dooley, 119 Mass. 294, 635 Carr v. Duval. 14 Pet. 77 67 Carr v. Hays, 25 Cent. Law Jour. 35, 900 Carr v. Hays. 110 Ind. 408, 855, 867 Carr v. Lackland, 112 Mo. 442, 1679 Carr v. McCarthy, 70 Mich. 258, 649, 652 Carr v. Miner, 92 111., 604. 382 Carr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & S. 407, 874 Carr v. Nat. Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45, 10 Carr v. Roach, 2 Duer, 20, 122 Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 33 Carr v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 152, 877 Carrier v. Sears, 4 Allen (Mass.), 336, 2276 Carriere v. Ticknor, 26 Ala. 575, 446 Carrigan v. Port Crescent Improvement Co., 6 Wash. 590, 1274, 1283 Carrington v. Potter, 37 Fed. Rep. 767, 182 Carrington v. Waff, 112 X. Car. 115, 488 Carroll v. City of St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444, 1512 Carroll v. Hickes, 10 Phila. ( Pa. ) 308, 2039 Carroll v. Norwood, 5 Harr. & J. 155, 884 Carroll v. Staten Island, etc., R. Co., 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 32 2105 Carroll v. Staten Island, etc., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 126. 2105 Carroll v. Sweet, 5 N. Y. Supl. 572, 447 Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19, 448, 451 Carroll v. Welch, 26 Texas, 147, 135, 144 Carson v. Carson. 40 Miss. 349, 2122 Carson v. Clark, 2 111. 113, 194 Carson v. German Ins. Co., 62 Iowa, 433, 417 Carson v. Heath, 86 Ga. 438, 442 Carshore v. Huyck, 6 Barb. 583, 196 Carskaddou v. South Bend, 141 Ind. 596, 1483, 2269 Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 483, 1758 Carson v. Stevens, 40 Neb. 112, 1666 Carter v. Ailing, 43 Fed. Rep. 208, 2030, 2040, 2045 Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312, 1814,1815,1823 Carter v. Carter, 2 Day, 442, 810, 811 Carter v. Carter, 14 Pick. 424, 817 Carter v. Gordon, 121 Ind. 383, 2174 Carter v. Holahan, 92 N . Y. 498, 241 Carter v. King, 11 Rich. L. 125, 182, 231, 235 Carter v. Phillips, 144 Mass. 100, 744, 2266 Carter v. Scargill, L. R. 10 Q. B. 564, 135 Carter v. Silber, L. R. (1892) 2 Ch. 278, 1807 Carter Co. v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 1542 Carter v. Shorter, 57 Ala. 253, 622, 628, 1117 lxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Carter v. Tice, 120 111. 277, 2285 Carter v. Toussaint, 5 B. & Aid. 855, 672 Carter v. Walker, 2 Rich. Law, 40, 360 Carter v. Wann, 45 Ala. 343, 1658 Carter v. Wormald, 1 Ex. 81, 526 Carter v. Zenblin, 68 Ind. 436, 561, 1183 Cartersville Imp., Gas and Water Co. v. Cartersville, 89 Ga. 683, 1562 Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 35 111. App. 449, 956 Cartwright v. Cooke, 3 B. & Ad. 701, 531 Cartwright v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476, 1320 1329 Caruthers y. Humphrey. 12 Mich. 270, 403, 410 Cary v. Bancroft, 14 Pick. 315, 394 Cary v. Dixon, 51 Miss. 593, 1746 Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 2117 Cary v. Mclntyre, 7 Colo. 173, 526 Cary v. Western Union Tel. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.),610, 1995 Cary-Halidy Lumber Co. v. Cain, 70 Miss. 628, 1231 Cary Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587, 1265 Casady v. Bosler, 11 Iowa, 242, 380, 381 Case 24, 3 Atk. 70, 545 Case v. Barber, Sir T. Jones, 158, 525 Case. v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 107, 181 Case v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 11 Ind. App. 517, 1967 Case v. Fant, 53 Fed. 41, 471 Case v. Fish. 58 Wis. 56, 475 Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 49, 1640 Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102. 358, 359 Case v. Hastings, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 125, 684 Case v. Lennington, 3 N. J. Law, 420, 98 Case v. Phcenix Bridge Co., 55 N. Y. Su- perior, 25, 161 Case of the Monopolies, 11 Coke, 84, 2052 Case of State Tax on Foreign held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 2141 Case Mfg. Co. v. Soxman 138 U. S. 431, 457 Case Plow Works v. Niles, etc., Co., 90 Wis. 590, 41, 323, 33.x, 351, 364 Casey v. Galli, 94 XJ. S. 673, 1326, 1428 Casey v. Gunn, 29 Mo. App. 14, 496 Cai-grain v. Milwaukee County, 81 Wis. 113, 1052 Cash v. Douglasville, 94 Ga. 557, 1515 Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103, 1652 Cashman v. Martin, 50 How. Pr. 337, 398 Cashman v. Root, 89 Cal. 373, 1929 Caskey v. City of Greensburgh, 78 Ind. 233, 2273 Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wallace, Jr., 131. 722 Casler v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 442, 872 Casler v. Thompson, 4 N. J. Eq. 59, 846 Cason v. Cheely, 6 Ga. 554, 657, 658 Cass v. Higenbotam, 27 Hun, 406, 398 Cass v. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 253, 399 Cass v. Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. St. 31, 260 Cass County v. Beck, 76 Iowa, 487, 2088 Cass County Bank v. Bricker, 34 Neb. 516, 2073 Cassard v. Hinman, 6 Bosw. 8, 1294 Cassell v. Collins, 23 Ala. 676, 635 Castle v. Sworder, 29 L. J. R. Ex. 235, 668 Castner v. Fisher, 104 N. C. 392, 438 Castor v. Jones, 86 Ind. 289, 1523 Castling v. Aubert, 2 East, 325, 609, 610 Caswell v. Gibbs, 33 Mich. 331, 2038 Cate v. Thayer, 8 Greenl. 71, 1175 Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 1131 Cathwright v. Callaway County, 10 Mo. 663, Catlett v. Bacon, 33 Miss. 269, 1111 Catlett v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 62 Ind. 366, 2110 Cathn v. Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233, 1404 Catlin v. Green, 120 N. Y. 441, 160 Catlin v. Haddox, 49 Conn. 492, 1776 Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217, 145, 149 Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218, 17:38 Cato v. Thompson, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 616, Caton v. Caton, L. R. 1 Ch. 137, 227, 618, 849, 1717 Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 127, 688 Caton v. Stewart, 76 N. Car. 357, 2079, 2091 Catterlin v. Armstrong, 101 Ind. 258, 2171 Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. St. 416, 256 Cauley v. Brook, 16 Cal. 11, 2207 Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 662, 663, 664 Cavanaugh v. Casselman, 88 Cal. 543, 423 Cavaness v. Ross, 83 Ark. 572, 519, 524 Cave v. Hastings, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 125, 691 Cavenaugh v. McLaughlin, 38 Minn. 83, 422 Cavender v. Waddington, 2 Mo. App. 551, 2220 Cavin, Matter of, v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 1002 Cawthorne v. Cordrey, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 406, 652 Caylor v. Roe, 99 Ind. 1, 617, 619, 979, 2167 Cayuga R. Co. v. Kyle, 5 Thomp. & C. 659, 158 Cazet v. Hubbell, 36 N. Y. 677, 674 Cecil v. Deyerle, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 775, 2124 Ceeder v. Lond Lumber Co., 86 Mich. 541, 1277 Centenary M. E. Church v. Clime, 116 Pa. St. 146, 2217 Center v. Center, 38 N. H. 127, 490 Central Ag. & M. Assn. v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 70 Ala. 120, 1434 Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305, 1832 Central Bridge Corporation v. City of Lowell, 4 Gray (Mass.), 474, 2146 Central Buildine, etc., Assn. v. Lampson (Minn. 1895), 02 N. W. Rep. 544, 1254, 1628 Central, etc., Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 2048 Central Irrigation District v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 900 Centenary Methodist Church v. Clime, 116 Pa. St. 146, 2264 Central Nat. Bank v. Seligman, 138 N. Y. 435, 1647 Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 1424, 1426, 1983, 2037, 2058, 2060 Central Pacific R. Co. v. Beal, 47 Cal. 151, 893 Central Pacific R. Co. v. Gallatin, 99 V. S. 700, 2119 Central Railroad v. Bridger, 94 Ga. 471, 266 Central R. Co. t. Collins, 40 Ga. 5x2, 1264, 1427, 2052, 2054, 2056 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Georgia, 92 TJ. S. 665, 1456,2140 Central R. Co. v. Kent, 87 Geo. 402, 276 Central R. Co. v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99, 1330, 1331, 1602 Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 31 N.J. Eq. 475, 1259, 1262, 1264 Central Shade Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 1981, 2055, 2065, 2074 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 1245, 1258, 1412, 1429, 1983 Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car. Co., 11 Sup. Ct. Hep. 478; 139 U. S. 21. 1247 Central Trust Co. » . Bridges, 57 Fed. Rep. 'j3, 1287 Central Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 Fed. Rep. 84. , m 866, 1277 Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 500, 1-Us, 1444 Central Trust Co. v. Ohio Cent. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 306^ 1895, 1983, 2062 Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 551, 1453 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., Rail- road, 29 Fed. Rep. 546, 864, 886 TABLE OF CASES. lxxiii {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1060, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., K. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 69, 1445 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 84 Fed. Hep. 259, 1436 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., Ey. Co., 84 Fed. Eep. 254, 877 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 857, 914 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash E. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 440, 273, 289 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ey. Co., 34 Fed. Eep. 254, 879 Central Vermont E. Co. v. Soper (1894), 59 Fed. Rep. 879, 1970 Chable v. Construction Co., 59 Fed. Rep. 846 1444 Ohabot v. Tucker, 39 Cal. 434, 195, 196 Chabot v. Winter Park Co., 34 Fla. 258, 1163, 1167 Cbadbonrn v. Williams, 45 Minn. 294, 1673 C'hadsey v. Guion, 97 N. Y. 333, 885 Chadwick v. Moore, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 49, 2154 Chafee v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 71 Maine, 514, 724 Chafee v. Sprague. 16 R. 1. 189, 1208 Chafee v. Aaron, 62 Miss. 29, 2152 Chaffee v. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062, 476 Chaffee v. Oliver, 33 La. Ann. 1008, 1742 Chaffee Co. v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355, 1524, 1528 Chaffee v. Thomas, 7 Cow. 358, 194 Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 TJ. S. 567, 32, 2159 Chahoon v. Hollenback, 16 S. & E. 425, 401 Chalf ant v. Williams, 35 Pa. St. 212, 899 Challoner v. Boyington, 83 Wis. 399, 457 Chalmers, Ex parte, L. R. 8 Ch. 289, 152, 2235 Chamber of Commerce v. Sollitt, 43 111. 519, 492, 496, 2220, 2221 Chamberlain v. Bagley, 11 N. H. 234, 760 Chamberlain v. Barnes, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 160, 2062 Chamberlain v. Jackson, 44 Mich. 320, 2252 Chamberlain v. Hibbard, 26 Ore. 428, 2224 Chamberlain v. Hopps, 8 Vt. 94, 17 Chamberlain v. Pacific Wool Co., -54 Cal. 103, 1304 Chamberlain T. Painesville E. Co., 15 Ohio St. 225, 153, 155, 156 Chamberlain v. Shaw, 18 Pick. 278, 165 Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. St. 431, 162 Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. &. S. 408, 287,288 Chamberlin v. Ingalls, 38 Iowa, 300, 597 Chamberlin v. Murphy, 41 Vt. 110, 542 Chamberlin v. Perkins, 55 N. H. 237, 2257 Chamberlin v. Whitford, 102 Mass. 448, 192 Chambers, Exvarte, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 289, 491 Chambers v. Chambers, 139 Ind. Ill, 235 Chambers v. Chambers, 92 Tenn. 707, 1763 Chambers v. Falkner, 65 Ala. 448, 1263 Chambers v. Ker, 6 Tex. C. App. 373, 1774 Chambers v. Le Compte, 9 Mo. 575, 622 Chambers T.Marks, 93 Ala. 412, 867 Chambers v. RingstaS, 69 Ala. 140, Chambers v. Smith, 12 M. & W. 2, 764 Chambers v. State, 85 Ga. 220, 169 Chambers v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 387, 882 Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. Car. 98, 148 Chamness v. Cox, 2 Ind. App. 485, 785 Champ v. Kendrick, 130 Ind. 549, 2273 Champion v. Joslyn, 44 N. Y. 653, 388, 412 Champion v. Plummer, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 252, 676 Champion v. Short, 1 Camp. 53, 145 Champlin v. Rowley, 13 Wend. 258, 2194 Champlin v. Rowley, 18 Wend. 187, 145 Chancellor v. Wiggins, 4 B. Mon. 201, 359 Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 294, 1878 Chandler v. Board of Education, 104 Mich. 292, 2266 Chandler v. Commonwealth, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 66. 1802 Chandler v. Glovers, 32 Pa. St. 509, 1776 Chandler v. McKinney, 6 Mich. 217, 1772 Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364, 440, 803, 2283 Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 1781, 1784, 1797, 1834 Chandler v. Thompson, 30 Fed. Eep. 232, 489 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees. & W. 399, 338, 349, 351 Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa, 156, 2026, 2046 Chapin v. Chapin (Mass.), 36 N. E. Eep. 746, 396 Chapin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 18 111. App. 47, 574 Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74, 46, 2179 Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467, 597, 601, 608, 614, 616 Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657, 596, 599, 614, 615 Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407, 1771, 1773, 1795, 1798 Chaplin v. Harbeck, 156 Mass. 339, 2251 Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192, 590, 667, 668 Chapman v. Bank, 97 Cal. 155. 1162 Chapman v. Barnes. 93 Ala. 433, 194, 195 Chapman v. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115, 429 Chapman v. Bluck, 5 Scott's Reports, 515, 875 Chapman v. Chapman (Va.) , 21 S. E. Rep. 813, 426, 427 Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 TJ. S. 348, 782, 1577, 2158 Chapman v. Currie, 51 Mo. App. 40, 1856 Chapman v. Dease, 34 Mich. 375, 840 Chapman v. Gwyther, L. R. 1 Q. B. 463, 331 Chapman v. Long, 66 Vt. 656, 1186 Chapman T. Murch, 19 Johns. 290, 321, 327, 353 Chapman v. Railroad Co. , 6 Ohio St. 119. 1097 Chapman v. Republic Ins. Co., 6 Bisseil, 238, 119 Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627, 712, 720, 730 Chapman v. Seecomb, 36 Maine, 102, 863 Chapman v. Speller, 14 Q. B. 621, 356 Chappel T. Brockway, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 167, 2032, 2078 Chappie v. Cooper, 13 Mees. & W. 252, 1800 Chard v. Hamilton, 56 Hun, 259, 823 Charles v. Byrd, 29 S. Car. 544, 631 Charles v. Hastedt (N. J. Ch. 1893), 51 N. J. Eq. 171, 1792 Charles v. People, 1 N. Y. 180, 1906 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 884, 1240, 2135 Charlotte, The Bark, 9 Bened. 1, 276 Charlton v. Mewcastle, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1097, 2053, 2054 Charlton v. Scoville. 144 N. Y. 691, 842 Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, 266, 488 Charpiot v. Sigerson, 25 Mo. 63, 844 Chartered Bank of India v. Netherlands Steam Navigation Co., 9 Q. B. Div. 521, 741 Chartiers E. Co. v. Hodgens, 85 Pa. St. 501, 1" Chase v. Bailey, 49 Vt. 71. 1632 Chase v. Boughton, 93 Mich. 285, 2256 Chase v. Bradley, 26 Maine, 531, 863 Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134, 802, 807 Chase v. East Tenn., etc., Eailroad, 5 Lea, 415, ' Chase v. Evarts, 19 N. Y. Supl. 987, 334 Chase v. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359, 618, 2170 Chase v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 33, 675, 2127 Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581, 434, 490, 1082 Chase v. Petroleum Bank, 66 Pa. St. 169, 1752 Chase v. Second Ave. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 384, 780 Chase v. Sycamore R. Co., 38 111. 215, 157 Chaska, County of, v. Hedman, 53 Minn. 525, 151,t Chatfleld v. Paxton, 2 East, 471, 798 Chatham Bank v. O'Brien, 6 Hun (N. Y.), 231, 164S lxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 990 Chattanooga E. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. Eep. 809 1396 Chat'terton v. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 768, 1750, 1751 Chavannah v. State, 49 Ala. 395, 1956 Cheddick v. Marsh, 21 N. J. Law, 463, 756 Cheale v. Kenward, 3 De G. & J. 27, 232, 1208 Cheek v. Bellows, 17 Texas, 613, 1739 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 704 Cheltenham Stone Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 23 111. App. 635, 455 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. Eep. 372, 1364 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kohner, 85 N. Y. 189, 1633 Chenango, Bank of, v. Osgood, 4 Wend. 607, 569 Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 87, 1240 Chenette v. Teehan, 63 N. H. 149, 2097 Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413, 215, 684 Cheney v. Duke, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 11, 1902 Cheney v. Eastern Transp. Line, 59 Md. 557, 97 Cheu.-'y y. Gleason, 117 Mass. 557, 2279 ClifL j'T. Libby, 134 U. S. 68, 749 Cher, v Bigelow Wire Works v. Sorrell, 1!2 Mass. 442, 99 Ch".T-y v. Clements, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 5.".:. 1699,1750 Ch. cry v. Heming, 4 Exch. Eep. 631, 655 Civ ny v. Slade, 3 Murph. 82, 1083 C1..-1 n v. Thompson, L. E. 7 Q. B. 573, 494 C. ■-. :>oake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94, 853 Chesapeake, etc.. E. Co. v. American Ex. Bank, 23 S. E. Eep. 935, 1968 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 114 V. S. 176, 2139 CI.' .i;;eake and Ohio Eailroad v. Vir- r nei, 94 U. S. 718, 1456 Ch ■ ' ■ oueh t. New York, etc., E. Co., 26 K-'K (N. Y.) 9, 2180 Che e trough v. Conover, 140 N. Y. 3S2, HIM), 1994 Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McCord (S. Car.) 241. 1773 Cheshire Banking Co., In re, L. E. 32 Ch. Div.301, 61 Chesman v. Nainby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1456, 301, 2045 Chesser v. DePrater, 20 Fla. 691, 996 Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1, 644 Chester v. Freeland, Ley R. 71, 301 Chesterfield, Earl of, v. Ganssen, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 541, 1815 Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. &38, 1853 Chestnut v. Chestnut, 15 111. App. 390, 854 Chestnut v. Harbaugb, 78 Pa. St. 473, 2102 Chew V. Bank, 14 Md. 299, 2276 Chew v. Chew, 23 N. J. Eq. 471, 559, 560 Chevacla Lime Works v. Dismukes, 87 Ala. 344, 1421 Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 50, 875, 1581, 2116, 2148 Chicago v. Bumpff, 45 111. 90, 1504 Cliir;ifc-i., City of, v. Edwards, 58 111. 252, 2127 CLiic.i-o Attachment Co. v. Davis, etc., Co., 142 111. 171, 836 Chic -go Cheese Co. v. Fogg, 53 Fed. Rep. 7.', 902 Clncj';/o Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 111. 289, 592 Chi* ,.'o, etc., Association v. Hunt, 127 1I1.LT.7, 1391 Ch;. i;o, etc., Coid Co. ». Liddell, 69 111. 639, 694 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 571, 2133 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Pullman, etc., Co., 139 U. S. 79, 2073 Chilhowie Iron Co. v. Gardiner, 79 Va. 305, 1136 Chicago Gas Light Co. v. People's Gas Light Co., 121 111. 530, 1426, 1427, 1983, 2037, 2057, 2060 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017, 1962 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Aurora, 99 111. 205, 864 Chicago, etc., K. Co. v. Ayres, 140 111. 644, 1421 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bartlett, 120 IU. 603, 870 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bell, 44 Neb. 44, 547 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Burlington E. Co., 34 Fed. Eep. 481, 297 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Coal Co., 79 111. 121, 803 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Chisholm, 79 111. 584 792 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240, 1921 Chicago, E. L, etc., E. Co. v. Denver & R. G. Co., 143 U. S. 596, 865, 875 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Graham, 3 Ind. App. 28, 2105 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. James, 22 Wis. 194, 1341 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Hoyt, 89 Wis. 314, 805, 875 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co. v. Hoyt, 149 U. S. 1, 269, 2237 Chicago, etc., Eailway Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 120, 581, 588 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Kansas City E. Co., 52 Fed. Eep. 178, 1585 Chicago and Alton E. Co. v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 24 Fed. Eep. 516, 1422 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eoss, 8 Ind. App. 188, 2245 Chicago E. Co. v. Sawyer, 69 IU. 285, 276 Chicago E. Co. v. Schewe, 45 Iowa, 79. 157 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Simms, 18 111. App. 68, 1987, 1968 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Titterington, 84 Texas, 21s, 965 Chicago k. E. E. Co. v. T'owle, 10 Ind. App. 540, U24 Chicago, E. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Union Pa- cific Ry. Co., 47 Fed. Eep. 15, 1123 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Wabash, etc., Ry. Co., 27 TJ. S. App. 1, 2071 Chicago E. Co. v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 61 Fed. Eep. 9C3, 1982, 1983 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Witty, 32 Neb. 275, 1958, 1961 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Wymore, 40 Neb. 615, 584 Chicago Title Co. v. Smyth (Iowa 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 792, 770 Chickering v. Failes, 26 IU. 507, 1033 Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502, 268, 772, 773, 2197 Child v. Pearl, 43 Vt. 224, 592, 1680 ChUd v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Sandf. 26, 932 Cliilders v. Henderson, 76 Texas, 664, 985 Chielhovich v. Krauss (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 181, 379 Childs v. O'DonneU, 84 Mich. 533, 327 Childs v. Shoemaker, 1 Wash. C. C. (TJ. S.) 494, '2184 Childs v. Wyman, 44 Maine, 433, 40 Chilhowie Iron Co. v. Gardiner, 79 Ya. 305, 1152 ChiUicothe, Bank of, v. Dodge, 8 Barb. 233, 802 Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 638, 5, 87, 97 Chipman v. MorriU, 20 Cal. 130, 826 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. TTemper, 75 Mich, mi;, 2077 Chippoua Valley E. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co 75 WK 221, 1989, 1994 Chisholm v. W lUiams, 128 IU. 115, 457 Chittenden v. French, 21 IU. 598, 871 TABLE OF CASES. lxxv [Beferewxs are to Pages, Vol-. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Chittenden v. Woodbury, 32 Vt. 562, 1633 Chittoch v. Chittoch , 101 Mich. 367, 563 Choat v. Wright, 2 Dev. 289, 122 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 1, 892 Chrisman v. State Ins. Co., 16 Ore. 283, 864, 867 Christian's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 184, 1617 Christian v. Bunker, 38 Texas, 234, 162 Christian v. Niagara Ins. Co., 101 Ala. 634, 404 Christian, etc., Grocery Co. v. Water Sup- ply Co. (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Eep. 352, 1112 Christie, Ex parte, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 242, 1814 Christie V. Keator, 49 Wis. 640, 2248 Christy v. Barnhart, 14 Pa. St. 260, 844 Christy v. Burch, 25 Fla. 942, 1737 Christy v. Stafford, 22 111. App. 430, 488 Chritcher v. Holloway, 64 N. Car. 526, 1934 Chrysler v. Canady, 90 N. Y. 272, 1879 Chubb v. Upton. 95 TJ. S. 665, 1428 Chumasero v. Gilbert, 24 111. 293, 95 Church v. Broun, 21 N. Y. 315. 867 Church v. Florence Iron Works, 45 N. J, Law, 129, 955 Church v. Oilman, 15 Wend. 656, 90, 91 Church v. Imperial Gas Co., 6 Ad. & El. 846, 51, 773, 780 Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282, 2117 Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 1328 Church v. Shanklin, 95 Cal. 626, 130 Churchill v. Bradley, 11 J. & S. 170, 465 Churchill v. Merchant's Bank, 19 Pick. 532, 768 Churchill v. Perkins, 5 Mass. 541, 1853 Churchman v. Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259, 460 Chute v. Pattee, 37 Maine, 102, 207 Chute v. Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 1131 Cicotte v. Corporation, etc., or Church of St. Anne, 60 Mich. 552, 784 Cicotte v. Wayne Co., 59 Mich. 509, 1471 Cincinnati Assurance Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 90, 1265 Cincinnati, City of, v. Cincinnati Gas Co. (Ohio 1895) , 41 N. E. Rep. 239, 879 Cincinnati Cooperage Co. (Ky. 1894), 26 S. W. Rep. 539, 1235 Cincinnati, etc.. Coke Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 268, 1530 Cincinnati Gas-Light and Coke Co. v. Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257, 1487 Cincinnati, etc., Gas Co. v. Western, etc., Co., 152 U. S. 200, 158, 502, 505 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bensley, 51 Fed. Rep. 738, 185, 186, 187, 746, 785 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Carthage, 36 Ohio St. 631, 2143 Cincinnati, etc., Railroad v. Washburn, 25 Ind. 259, 2271 Citizens' Bank v. City of Terrell, 78 Texas, 450, 1517, 1533 Citizens' Bank v. Grafnn, 31 Md. 507, 798 Citizens' Electric Light and Power Co. v. Sands, 95 Mich. 551, 1574 Citizens' Gas, etc., Co. v. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332, . 1481, 1571 Citizens', etc., Association v. Coriell, 34 N. J. Eq. 383, 1290, 2284 Citizens', etc., Insurance Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89, 858 Citizens , etc., Association v. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq. 110, 2284 Citizens' Saving and Loan Association v. Perry Co., 156 TT. S. 692, 1534 Citizens' St. R. Co. v. City of Memphis, 53 Fed. Rep. 715, 1582 City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414, 767 City Bank v. Perkins, 29 N. Y. 554, 1128 City Bank v. Press Co. (1893), 56 Fed. Rep. 260, 1355 City Building, etc., Association v. Jones, 32 S. Car. 308, 1683 City Carpet Beating Works v. Jones, 102 CaL 506, 2027 City Council of Montgomery v. Montgom- ery Water Works Co., 77 Ala. 248, 772 City, etc., Bank v. Stevens, 15 N. Y. Supl. 139 544 City 'Electric R. Co. v. First Nat. Exch. Bank (1896), 34 S. W. Rep. 89, 1341 City Hotel, Proprietors of, v. Dickinson, 6 Gray, 586, 155 City Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 68 111. 851, 725 City Loan Co. v. Cheney (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 250, 1621 City of Aberdeen t. Honey, 8 Wash. 251, 1507 City of Alma v. Guaranty Sav. Bank, 60 Fed. Rep. 203, 1531 City of Athens v. Hemerick, 89 Ga. 674, 1534 City of Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 492, 48 City of Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88, 1532, 1855 City of Baltimore v. City of New Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 526, 1469 City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76 111. 34, 1587 City of Boston v. Simmons, 9 Cush. 373. 375 City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Texas, 542, 1566 City of Bryan v. Page, 51 Texas, 532, 1500, 1588 City of Burlington v. Burlington Water Co., 86 Iowa, 266, 113 City of Burlington v. Burlington St. Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144, 1582 City of Camden v. Green, 54 N. J. Law, 591, 804 City of Carlyle v. Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co., 140 111. 445, 1519 City of Chaska v. Hedman, 53 Minn. 525, 1514 City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 111. 358, 577 City of Chicago v. Edwards, 58 111. 252, 2127 City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Gas Co. (Ohio 1895) , 41 N. E. Rep. 239, 879 City of Corpus Christi v. Central Wharf Co., 8 Texas Civ, App. Rep. 94, 1510 City of Corpus Christi v. Woessner, 58 Texas, 462, 1522, 1587 City of Council Bluffs v. Waterman, 86 Iowa, 688, 1512 City of Crawf ordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 1564, 1572 City of Dallas v. Brown (Texas Civ. App. 1895) , 31 S. W. Rep. 298, 1518 City of Detroit v. Hoser, Circuit Judge, 79 Mich. 384, 1574 City of Decorah v. Kesselmeier, 45 Io»a, 166, 872 City of Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170, 460,807 City of Detroit v. Michigan Paving Co., 36 Mich. 335, 1567 City of Detroit v. Robinson, 38 Mich. 108, 1567 City of Detroit v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281, 1512 City of Duluth v. McDonnell (Minn. 1895) , 63 N. W. Rep. 727, 1477 City of Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo. 327, 1474 City of Erie, Appeal of, 91 Pa. St. 398, 563 ; 1568 City of East St. Louis v. East St. Louis Gaslight and Coke Co., 98 111. 415, 1519, 1565 City of Evansville v. Morris, 87 Ind. 269, City of Evansville v. Summers, 108 Ind. 189, 1910 City of Findlay v. Pertz, 66 Fed. Rep. 427 1591 City of Grand Haven v. Grand Haven Waterworks Co., 99 Mich. 106, 1044 City of Grand Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367, 458,459,805 City of Guthrie v. Territory, 1 Okl. 404, 1466, 1498 lxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1081-2291.} City of Houston v. Feeser, 76 Texas, 365, 804 City of Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas, etc., Co., 140 Ind. 107, 1481, 1572 City of Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175, 1489 City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas, etc., Co., 66 Ind. 396, 1481, 1564 City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 876 City of Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587, *59 City of Indianapolis v. Skeen, 17 Ind. 628, 1931 City of Jersey City v. Lehigh Valley Ter- minal E. Co., 55 N. J. Law, 203, 1581 City of Kansas City T. Slangstrom, 53 Kan. 431, 821 City of Lake View v. MacEitchie, 134 111. 203, 897 City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 1342, 1524 Citv of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 1542 City of Litchfield v. Ballow, 114 U. S. 190, 1539 Citv of Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 1513 City of London Gas Co. v. Nichols, 2 C. & P. 365, 810 City of Louisville v. Henuing, 1 Bush, 381, 460 Citv of Louisville v. Muldoon, 94 Ky. 462, 2193 City of Louisville v. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53, 1470 City of Louisville v. President, etc., of University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 642, 2142 City of Louisville v. Zanone, 1 Mete. (Ky.)lol, 799,808 City of Macon v. Dasher, 90 Ga. 195, 1468 City of Mound City v. Snoddy, 53 Kan. 126, 1512 City of Muscatine v. Keokuk, etc., Co., 45 Iowa, 185, 460, 803, 807 City of Nashville v. Sutherland (Tenn.), 21 S. W. Eep. 674, 1513 City of New Albany v. Iron Substructure Co., 141 Ind. 500, 1585 City of New Albany v. McCullough, 127 Ind. 500, 1565 City of New Bedford v. Chace, 5 Gray (Mass.), 28, 1660 City of New Haven v. New Haven K. Co., 62 Conn. 252, ' 1585, 2209 City of New Orleans v. Fireman's Co., 43 La. Ann. 447, 373 City of New Orleans v. Wardens of St. Louis Church, 11 La. Ann. 244, 1922 City of New Orleans v. Great Southern Telephone and Telegraph Co., 40 La. Ann. 41, 1583 City of North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2166 City of Paterson v. Society, 24 N. J. Law, 385, 2142 City of Peria v. Calhoun, 29 111. 317, 1478 City of Peru v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566, 1513 City of Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ey. Co., 143 Pa. St. 444, 1584 City of Plymouth v. Schultheis, 135 Ind. 339, 1557 City of Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565, 1499 City of Quincy v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co., 94 111. 537, 1435 City of Quincy v. Warfleld, 25 111. 317, 1539 City of Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 1557 City of Rochester v. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 302, 1502 City of Roxbury v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 6 Cush. 424, 1439 City of St. Joseph v. Hamilton, etc., Rail- road Co., 39 Mo. 476, 2140 City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 1390 City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 1580 City of St. Louis v. Schoenbusch, 95 Mich. 618, 1472 City of St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247, 1434, 1452 City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1893), 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 485, 1556 City of St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 1582 City of St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41, 1478 City of Sacramento v. Dunlap, 14 Cal. 421, 172 City of San Antonio v. French, 80 Texas, 575, 1500, 1522 City of San Diego v. San Diego & L. A. E. Co., 44 Cal. 106, 1590 City of Schenectady v. Trustees of Union College, 21 N. Y. Supl. 147, 1467 City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 HI. 626, 1519, 1520 City of Tampa v. Salomonson, 35 Fla. 446, 1479, 1480 City of Taunton v. Wareham, 153 Mass. 192, 1849 City of Terrell v. Dessaint, 71 Texas, 770, 1522, 1533, 1586, 1587 City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1, 1519, 1520, 1564, 1565, 1568 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gaslight Co., 132 Ind. 114, 1564, 1565 City of Valparaiso v. Moffit, 12 Ind. App. 250 575 City 'of Vicksburg v. Butler, 56 Miss. 72, 805 City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gaslight,etc, Co., 132 Ind. 114, 876, 14SS City of Wabash v. Carver, 129 Ind. 552, 1585 City Nat. Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158, 1676 City Nat. Bank v. Kusworm, 88 Wis. 188, 1832, 1833 City Nat. Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484, 195 City Publishing Co. v. City of Jersey City, 54 N. J. Law, 437, 1550 Claflin v. Carpenter, 4 Mete. 580, 640 Claflin v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 25 N. Y. 293, 1292,1305 Claflin v. Gordon, 39 Hun, 54, 27 Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 800 Claflin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301, 949 Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y. 316, 238 Claflin v. Pfeifier, 76 Texas, 469, 1681 Clancey v. Ononadaga, etc., Manufactur- ing Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 395, 2058, 2060 Clancy v. Piggott, 4 Nev. & Man. 496, 683 Clancy v. Piggott, 2 Ad. & E. 473, 610 Clapham v. Shillito, 7 Beav. 146, 966 Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190, 1820 Clapp v. Hoffman (Pa. 1894), 28 Atl. Rep. 362, 995 Clapp v. Nordmeyer, 25 Fed. Rep. 71, 1645 Clapp v. Pawtucket Institution, 15 E. I. 489 573 Clapp v. Peterson, 104 111. 26, 1380 Clarion Bank v. Jones, 21 Wall. 325, 152 Clark v. Baker, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 186, 910 Clark v. Bowen, 22 How. 270, 527 Clark v. Busse, 82 111. 515, 2226 Clark's Case, 1 Blackf. 122, 2074 Clark v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223, 829 Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522, 251 Clark v. Olark, 10 N. H. 380, 2121 Clark v. Constantine, 3 Bush (Ky.), 652, 1988 Clark v. Cox, 32 Mich. 204, 1697 Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188, 2044 Clark v. Dales, 20 Barb. 42, 73 Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 1181 Clark v. Devoe, 124 N. Y. 120, 25 Clark v. Dickinson, 74 N. Y. 47, 242 Clark v. Draper, 19 N. H. 419, 458 Clark v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674, 800 Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 171. 2278 Clark v. Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7, ' 1758, 2010 TABLE OF CASES. lxxvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Clark v, Franklin, 7 Leigh, 1, 290, 2198, 2200, 2228, 2262 Clark V. Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 279, 286, 948 Clark v. Hagar, 22 Can. (Sup. Ct.) 510, 2017 Clark v. Hart, 57 Ala. 390, 1066 Clark v. Haughton, 12 Gray, 38, 957 Clark v. Hodge (N. Car. 1895), 21 S E. Rep. 562, 1243 Clark y. Janesville. 13 Wis. 414, 1508 Clark y. Jones, 87 Ala. 474, 606, 1407 Clark y. Lillie, 39 Vt. 405, 855 Clark y. Marbourg, 33 Kan. 471, 463 Clark y. Marsiglia, 1 Denio, 317, 280, 2213 Clark y. Montgomery, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 464, 1799 Clark y. Parr, 14 Ohio, 118, 369 Clark y. Patterson, 158 Mass. 388, 1707, 1745, 1754 Clark y. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, 227, 617, 654 Clark y. People's Co., 46 Mo. App. 248, 360 Clark y. Powers, 45 111. 283, 1176 Clark y. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 135, 1433 Clark y. Rawson, 2 Denio, 135, 816 Clark y. Reeder, 158 U. S. 505, 989 Clark y. Ricker, 14 N. H. 44, 1860 Clark y. Russell, 116 Mass. 455, 1492 Clark y. Sawyer, 121 Mass. 224, 890 Clark y. Shultz, 4 Mo. 235, 635 Clark y. Spencer, 14 Kan. 398, 1997 Clark y. Tarbell, 58 N. H. 88, 722 Clark y. Terry, 25 Conn. 395, 692 Clark y. Town of Rosedale, 70 Miss. 542, 1538 Clark y. Trindle, 52 Pa. St. 492, 1688 Clark y. Turnbull, 47 N. J. Law, 265, 213, 1831 Clark y. Tyler, 30 Gratt. 134, 32 Clark y. Van Amburgh, 14 Hun, 557, 195 Clark y. Warner, 6 Conn. 355, 557 Clark y. Weis, 87 111. 438, 115 Clark y. Westrope, 18 C. B. 765, 300 Clark y. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518, 874, 886 Clark y. Young, 1 Cranch. 181, 452 Clarke y. Clarke, 17 B. Mon. 698, 560 Clarke y. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674, 460 Clarke y. Koenig, 36 Neb. 572, 1212 Clarke y. Mayor, 111 N. Y. 621, 768 Clarke y. Meigs, 10 Bosw. 337, 203 Clarke y. Tyler, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 134, 2159 Clarke y. Watson, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 278, 129 Clarkeyille Bldg. Assn. y. Stephens, 26 N. J. Eq. 351, 1621 Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484, 215, 674, 677, 688, 1109, 1111 Clason y. Morris, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 524, 1644 Clavering y. Westley, 3 P. Wms. 402, 2185 Clay y. Allen, 63 Miss. 426, 1916 Clay y. Ricketts, 66 Iowa, 362, 68 Clay y. Walter. 79 Va. 92, nil Clay y. Yates, 25 L. J. Ex. 237, 658 Clay, County of, y. Society for Sayings, 104 U. S. 579, 1429 Claybrook y. Board, etc., of Rockingham County, 114 N. Car. 453, 1515 Claypool y. Jaqua, 135 Ind. 499, 958, 1716 Claypoole y. Houston, 12 Kan. 324, 1067 Clayton's Case, 1 Mer. 572, 468 Clayton y. Andrews, 4 Burr. 2101, 656 Clayton y. Cagle, 97 N. Car. 300, 1244 Clayton y. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353, 444 Clayton y. Rose, 87 N. Car. 106. 1741 Clearwater y. Meredith, 1 Wall. (TJ. S.) 25, 2053 Cleary y. Sohier, 120 Mass. 210, 292, 489, 2226 Cleary y. Municipal Co., 19 N. Y. Supl. 951, 554, 578, 581 Cleayes y. Foss, 4 Greenl. 1, 674 Cleaves y. Stockwell, 33 Maine, 341, 2210 Cleere v. Cleere, 82 Ala. 581, 465 Clegg y. Edmonson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 786, 1169 Clelland y. James, 33 Iowa, 571, 956 Clemans y. Supreme Assembly, etc., 131 N. Y. 485, 307 Clement y. Cash, 21 N. Y. 253, 756 Clement y. Meserole, 107 Mass. 362, 496, 498 Clement y. N. Y. Central R. Co., 9 N. Y. Supl. 601, 406 Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464, 617 Clements v. Lee, 114 Ind. 397, 1489 Clements y. Cassilly, 4 La. Ann. 380, 171, 172 Clements y. Neal, 1 Posey Unrep. Cas. (Tex.) 41, 431 Clements y. Schuylkill, etc., R. Co., 132 Pa. St. 445, 759 Clements y. Yturria, 81 N. Y. 285, 1862 Clementsou y. Williams, 8 Cranch, 72, 194 Clerk y. Blackstock, Holt (N. P.), 474, 810 Clerk v. Wright, 1 Atk. 12, 843 Cleveland v. Evans, 5 S. Dak. 53, . 621 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426, 1520 Cleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127, 451 Cleveland v. Sterrett, 70 Pa. St. 204, 388 Cleveland v. Wolff, 7 Kan. 184, 1947 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 1983 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Zider, 61 Fed. Rep. 908, 922 Cleveland Boiling Mill v. Rhodes, 121 U. S. 255, 149, 347 Cleveland Works v. Lang (N. H. 1893), 31 Atl. Rep.20, 698 Cleves y. Willoughby, 7 Hill, 83, 1102 Clifton y. Foster ^Texas App.), 20 S. W. Rep. 1005, 573 Clifton y. Litchfield, 106 Mass. 34, 518 Clifton y. Tulane, 48 N. J. Eq. 310, 208 Clinan y. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lei. 22, 843, 1178 Cline v. Jones, 111 111. 563. 1195 Cline y. Libby, 46 Wis. 123, 160 Clinton v. Fly, 10 Maine, 292, 490 Clinton y. Strong, 9 Johns. 370, 807 Clinton, etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Hum- mel. 25 N. J. Eq. 45, 1686 Clippinger y. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.)315 L 1992,1995,2082 Clipson y. Villars, 151 111. 165, 679, 1198 Clive v. Beaumont, 1 DeG. & S. 397, 73 Clodfelter v. Hulett, 72 Ind. 1, 1079 Clopper v. Union Bank, 7 Har. & J. 92, 452 Close v. Caldwell, 47 Minn. 500, 360 Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500, 354, 355, 359 Close y. Dunn, 24 Kan. 372, 1145 Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 V. S. 466, 1428, 1603 Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 111. 607, 1141 Clough v. Bowman, 15 N. H. 504, 884 Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H. 500, 2109 Clough y. Patrick, 37 Vt. 421 234 Cloud v. Moorman, 18 Ind. 40, 2210 Clow v. Borst, 6 John. 37, 441, 442, 443, 445 Clow v. Brown, 134 Ind. 287, 1374 Clowe v. Imperial Pine Product Co., 114 N. Car. 304, 1235 Clunian v. Cook, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22, 99 Clute v. Frasier, 58 Iowa, 268, 1065 Clute v. Knies, 102 N. Y. 377, 1058 Clyde v. Hubbard, 88 Pa. St. 358, 738 Clyde v. Richmond E. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 21 1436 Coal-Float y. City of Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15, 1478, 1520 Coalter v. Hurst, 97 Cal. 290, 470 Coast Line R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., City of Savannah, 30 Fed. Rep. 646, 1582, 1584 Coates v. Gerlach, 44 Pa. St. 43, 1366 Coates v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 168, 1353, 1405 Cobb v. Arnold, 8 Mete. 403, 210, 1473 Cobb y. Charter, 32 Conn. 358, 440, 2283 Cobb v. Covenant, etc., Association, 153 Mass. 176, 309, 310 Cobb v. Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 533, 412, 998 Cobb v. Lime Rock, etc., Ins. Co., 58 Maine, 326, „,„ 931 Cobb y. Malone, 86 Ala. 571 527, 544 Cobb v. Elroy, 79 Iowa, 603, 882 lxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [Heferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1031-2291.} Cobb v. PreU, 15 Fed. Eep. 774, Cobb v. PreU, 5 McCrary (U. S.), 80, Cobb v. Eeed, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 444, Cobb v. State, 100 Ala. 362, Cobb v. Tirrell, 137 Mass. 143, 2072 1926 2197 46 1632 Cobbey v. Knapp, 23 Neb. 579, 2244 Coburn v. Hartford, 38 Conn. 290, 890 Cobura v. Herrington, 114 111. 104, 1642 Coburn v. Stevens, 137 Ind. 683, 29 Cocheco, etc., Co. v. Whittier, 10 N. H. 305, 884 Cochran v. Anglo-American Dry Dock Co., 69 Hun, KM, 1367 Cochran v. People's Ey. Co., 113 Mo. 359, 759, 760 Cochran v. Pew, 159 Pa. St. 184, 959 Cochran v. Tobor, 14 Minn. 385, 746 Cochrane v. Justice Mining Co., 4 Colo. App. 234, 1213 Cock v. Honychurch, T. Bay. 203, 608 Cocker v. Cowpor, 1 Cromp. M. & E. 418, 643 Cockerell v. Aucompte, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 440, 108,306 Cockrell v. Thompson, 85 Mo. 510, 1856, 1923, 1924, 1936 Cockrell v. Warner, 14 Ark. 345, 2198 Cocks v. Nash, 9 Bing. 341, 553 Coddington v. Bispham, 36 N. J. Eq. 574, 2155 Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436, 675, 676, 692 Coddington v. Hoblit, 49 111. App. 66, 1878, 1879 Codman v. Jenkins, 11 Mass. 93, 2185 Coddington v. Paleologo, L. E. 2 Ex. 192, 150, 745 Coe v. Columbus, etc., E. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 1415, 1416 Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. 141, 12 Coe v. Smith, 4 Intl . 79, 284, 2,s6 Coev. Wager, 42 Mich. 49, 784, 7'J3 Coey y. Lehman, 79 111. 173, 897 Cofer v. Schening, 98 Ala. 338, 1722 Coffee v. Emigh, 15 Colo. TA, 209, 211 Coffee v. Builin, 4 Cold. (TVnn.), 487, 1026 Coffey v. Shuler, 112 N. Car. «22, 1702 Coffin v. Board of Kearney Co., 57 Fed. Eep. 137, 1529 Coffin v. City Council, 26 I^wa, 515, 1566 Coffin v. City of Indianapolis, 59 Fed. Eep. 221, 1532 Coffin v. Eansdell, 110 Ind. 417, 1374 Coffin v. Eeynolds, 21 Minn. 456, 408, 50U Coffing y. Hardy, 86 Ind. 309, 1726 Coffman v. Lookout Bank, 5 Lea, 232, 1039 1832 Coggill v. Hartford, etc., Co., 3 Gray, 545,' 1112 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Salk. 523, 411 Coglan v. South Car., etc., E. Co., 142 TJ. S. 101, 713, 1626 Cohee v. Baer, 134 Ind. 37:,, 1780 Cohen v. Gale, L. B. 3 Q. B. D. 371, 417 Cohen v. L'Euglo, 29 Fl ». fijo, 470, 474 Cohen v. Weinberg, N. Y. Daily Eegister, Apr. 11, 1884, 1806 Cohn v. Heimbauch, 86 Wis. 176, 2103 Cohn v. Mitchell , 115 II 1 . 124, 489 Coit v. Amalgamating Co., 119 TJ. S. 343, 1374 Coi t v. Commercial Insurance Co. , 7 Johns, 385, 926 Coit v. Planer, 4 Abb. TV. (N. S.) 140, 776 Coit v. Stewart, 50 N. V. 17, 2168 Colburn v. Averill, 30 V nine, 310, 40 Colburn v. Phillip.13 G ray, 64, 239 Colby v. Colby, 81 Hun, 221, 1150 Colby v. Sampson, 5 Mas^. 310, 1853 Colchester, Town of, v. Culver, 29 Vt. Ill, 1058 Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 1760 Coif v. Eailway Co., 87 Wis. 273, 1433 Colgrove v. Solomon, 34 Mich. 494, 843 Cole v. Bedford. 97 Mass. 326, 183 Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. Law, 308, 162 Cole v. Blake, Peake N. P. C. (239), 179, 4«0 Cole v. Cheovenda, 4 Colo. 17, 152 Cole v. Clark, 3 Pinney (Wis.), 303, 95 Cole v. Clark, 85 Maine, 336, 7st Cole v. Cunningham, 133 TJ. S. 107, 725 Cole v. Dyer, 1 Cro. & Jer. 461, 683 Cole v. Edwards (Iowa), 61 N. W. Eep. 940, 106, 2038 Cole v. Gibson, 1 Vesey Sen. 503, 525 Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 274 Cole v. Hutchinson , 34 Minn. 410, 600 Cole v. Knight, 3 Mod. Eep. 277, 565, 506 Cole v. La Grange, 113 TJ. S. 1, 2143 Cole v. Lee, 45 N. J. Eq. 779, 1661 Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 708 Cole v. Parker, 7 Iowa, 167, 2088 Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 111. 158, 215, 1773 Cole t. Potts, 10 N. J. Eq. 67, 843, S44 Cole v. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159, 1776 Colo v. Shurtleff , 41 Vt. 311, 1651 Cole v. Singerly, 60 Md. 348, 647 Cole v. Skrainka, 105 Mo. 303, 1554 Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 183, 1033 Coleman v. Burr. 93 N. Y. 17, 1687 Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81, 924 Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344, 1384 Coleman v. Ewing, 4 Humph. 240, 335 Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38, 214 Coleman v. Gibson, 1 M. & E. 168, 666 Coleman v. Grubb, 23 Pa. St. 393, 875 Coleman v. Henderson, 12 Am. Dec. 290 : Littell's Select Cases (Ky.), 171, Coleman v. Hiler, 85 Hun, 547, Colerick v. Hooper, 3 Ind. 316, Coleman v. Howe, 154 111. 458, Coleman v. Hudson, 2 Sneed, 463, Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123, 2094 2.11 1176, 1177 1372 ir>2 236, 244, 246 95 204,220 Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 3:13, 1094 Coles v. Pilkington, L. K. 19 Eq. Cas. 174, 844 Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, Coles v. Hulme, 8 Barn, and Cr. 568, Coles v. Pack, L. E. 5 C. P. 65, Coll v. Board, 83 Mich. 233, 1523 Collamer v. Day, 9 Vt. 144, 1947 Collar v. Collar, 86 Mich. 507, 267 Collar v. Collar, 75 Mich. 414, 900 Collar v. Patterson, 137 111. 403, 51, 194, 196, 789 Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 807 Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200, 42, 64. 925, 926, 2179 Colley v. Latimer, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 211, 1779 Collier v. Baptist, etc., Society, 8 B. Mon. 68, 218, 256 Collier v. Field, 1 Mont. Ter. 612, 543 Collier v. Walters, L. E. 17 Eq. 252, 416 Collier v. White, 67 Miss. 133, 393, 415 Colling, In re, L. E. 32 Ch. Div. 333, 1173 Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wills. 341, 1873, 2083 Collins v. Bristol and Exeter E. Co., 11 Exch. 790, 736 Collins v. Collins, 51 Miss. 311, 953 Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 1824 Collins v. Delaporte, 115 Mass. 159, 496, 867, 2213 Collins v. Gibbs, 2 Burr. 899, 210 Collins v. Houston, 138 Pa. St. 481, 163 Collins v. Karatopsky, 36 Ark. 316, 2170 Collins v. Life Association, 3 Mo. App. 586, 1313 Collins v. Locke, L. E. 4 App. Cas. 674, 2060,2074 Collins Co. v. Marcy,25Conn. 239, 641 Collins v. Prosser, 1 B. & C. 682, 816 Collins v. Sanger, 8 Texas Civ. App. 69, 1642 Collins v. Underwood, 33 Ark. 265, 1746 Collins v. Wilhoit, 108 Mo. 451, 168 Collyer v. Collyer, 113 N. Y. 442, 776 Colman v. Eastern Counties E. Co., 10 Beav. 1, 1257, 1421, 1430 TABLE OF CASES. lxxix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Coloma, Town of, v. Eaves, 92 TJ. S. 484, 1525, 1529, 1530 Colonial, etc., Mortgage Co. v. Bradley, 4 Dak. 158, 1654 Colonial Mortgage Co. v. Stevens, 3 N. D. 265, 1719 Colony v. Dublin, 32 N. H. 432, 2120 Colorado Water Co. v. Adams, 5 Colo. Ct. App. 190, 1239, 1311 Colson v. Meyers, 80 Ga. 490, 1948 Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336, 1115, 1117, 1129, 1197 Columbia Bldg. Assn. v. Bollinger, 12 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 124, 1620 Columbia Turnpike Road v. Haywood, 10 Wend. 422, 762 Columbus R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448, 276 Columbus, etc., E. Co. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37, 1455 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Skidmore, 69 111. 566, 1458 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Watson, 26 Ind. 50, 2271 Colvin v. Phillips, 25 S. Car. 228, 196 Colvin v. Williams, 3 H. & J. (Md.) 38, 661 Col well v. Lawrence, 38 N. Y. 71, 756, 759 Colyear v. Musgrave, 2 Keen. 81, 238 Coman T. Lakey, 80 N. Y. 345, 434 Combe v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1423, 761 Combes' Case, 9 Coke, 75, 1232, 1234 Combination Steel Co. v. St. Paul Co., 47 Minn. 207, 453 Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 497, 1279, 1350 Combs v. Scott, 76 Wis. 662, 1172 Comer v. Tabler, 44 Fed. Rep. 467, 1645 Comes v. Lamson, 16 Conn. 246, 652, 693 Comings v. Leedy, 114 Mo. 454, 1705 Comly v. Hillegass, 94 Pa. St. 132, 1945 Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 1478 Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70, 2128 Com. v. City of Boston, 97 Mass. 555, 1556 Com. v. Cochituate Bank, 3 Allen, 42, 1378 Com. v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 133, 1236 Commonwealth v. Cummins.155 Pa. 30, 519 Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 254, 1439 Commonwealth v. Fayette County R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 452 2132, 2140 Commonwealth v. Fitchburg R. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.), 180 _ 1439 Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Co., 2 Gray. 58, 1439 Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11 Gray (Mass.), 309, 2100 Commonwealth v. Has, 122 Mass. 40, 2094 Com. v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 771, 1512 Commonwealth v. Kendig, 2 Pa. St. 448, 2102 Com. v. King, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 115, 1557 Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578, 2128 Commonwealth v. Knox, 6 Mass. 76, 2099 Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 719 Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. St. 343, 1544, 1546, 1552, 1553 Commonwealth v. Nesbit, 34 Pa. St. 398, 2099 Commonwealth v.Philadelphia,etc, Rail- road, 164 Pa. St. 252, 2136 Commonwealth v. Pomerov, 117 111. 143, 1811 Commonwealth v. Pottsviile Water Co., 94 Pa. St. 516, 2136 Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray (Mass.), 339, 2130 Commonwealth v. Suffolk Trust Co., 161 Mass. 550, 1361, 1362 Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 1661 Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Berger, 42 Pa. St. 285, 896 Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 1524, 1534 Commissioners v. Bolles, 94 TJ. S. 104, 1524 Commissioners v. Clark, 94 TJ. S. 278, 1524 Commissioners v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio, 232, 1260 Commissioners v. January, 94 U. S. 278, 1524 Commissioners v. People, 138 111. 87, S >T1 Commissioners v. Perry, 5 Ohio, 57, 214 Commissioners v. Springfield, 36 Ohio St. 643, 472 Commissioners v. Walker, 8 Kan. 431, 440 Commissioners of Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 1439 Commissioners of Delaware Co. v. An- drews, 18 Ohio St. 49, 1894 Commissioners of Douglas County v. Bol- les, 94 U. S. 104, 1428 Commissioners of Wabaunsee County v. Walker, 8 Kan. 431, 806 Commercial Bank v. Burgwyn, 110 N. C. 267, 1288 Commercial Bank v. Jones, 18 Texas, 811, 1278 Commercial Bank v. Pfeiffer, 22 Hun, 32", 774, 781' i:;23 Commercial Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269, 766 Commercial, etc., Bank v. Gillett, 90 Ind. 268, 671 Commercial Telegram Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun, 494, 80 Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris v. Dres- bach, 78 Cal. 15, 447 Compton v. Bunker Hill Bank, 96 111. 301, 1830, 1831 Compton v. Jesup (1895), 68 Fed. Rep. 263, 1415 Compton v. Martin, 5 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 14, 655 Comstock v. Adams, 23 Kan. 513, 2007 Comstock v. Coon, 135 Ind. 640, 1078 Comstock v. Hopkins, 61 Hun, 189, 574 Comstock v. Morton, 36 Mich. 277, 614 Comstock v. Norton, 36 Mich. 277, 612 Comstock v. Purple, 49 111. 158. 232 Comstock v. Smith, 7 Johns. 88, 193 Conant v. National, etc., Bank, 121 Ind. 323, 331, 334 Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 83, 2165, 2168 Concordia, etc., Association v. Read, 93 "N. Y. 474, 1600, 1627 Condon v. Kemper, 47 Kan. 126, 758 Condon v. South Side R. Co., 14 Gratt. (Va.) 302, 2249 Conduitt v. Ryann, 3 Ind. App. 1, 468. 469, 470, 471, 473 Cone v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 1257 Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548, 882, 883 Congdon v. Darcy, 46 Vt. 478, 6 Conger v. Railroad Co., 120 N. Y. 29, 1123 Congregational Society v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164, 214, 255, 257 Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22, 2153 Conklin, Matter of, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 450, 1815 Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218, 1838 Conkling v. City of Springfield, 132 HI. 420, 462 Conkling v. King, 10 Barb. 372, 536 Conlan v. Roemer, 52 N. J. Law, 53, 991 Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618, 38 Conley v. Nailor, 118 U. S. 127, 578 Conley v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 109 N. Car. 692, 2174 Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373. 1495 Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. St. 92, 119 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cush- man, 108 TJ. S. 51, 2124, 2152, 2156 Connecticut R. Co. v. Bailey, 24 Vt. 465, 259, 818, 1325 Connelly v. Dunn, 73 111. 218, 1712 Conner v. Black (Mo. 1896), 33 S. W. Rep. 783, 1936 lxxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Conner v. Mackey, 20 Texas, 747, 2018 Conner v. Robertson, 37 La. Ann. 814, 1917 Conner v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594, 620 Conner v. Welch, 51 Wis. 431, 1005 Connolly v. Hull, 3 McCord (S. Car.), 6, 1798 Connor v Armstrong, 91 Ala. 265, 470 Connor v. Armstrong. 86 Ala. 262, 1054 Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126, 1856, 1923, 1936 Connor v. Donnell, 55 Texas, 167, 727 Connor v. Mayor of New York, 5 N. Y. 285, 2127 Connor v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594, 621 Conover v. Brown, 49 N. J. 156, 182 Conover v. Insurance Co., 1 N. Y. 290, 1237 Conover v. Mutual Ins. Co., 1 N. Y. 290, 1351 Conover v. Pacific Express Co., 40 Mo. App. 31, 1966 Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54, 10, 11, 198, 208, 210, 244 Conrad v. Kinzie, 105 Ind. 281, 2112 Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Ca. (N. Y.) 127, 1772 Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387, 945 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 150 111. 344, 1242 Consolidated Fire Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59, 897 Continental Bank v. National Bank, 50 N. Y. 575, 955 Continental Bank Note Co. v. United States, 154 U. S. 671, 770 Continental Ins. Co. v. Miller, 4 Ind. App. 553, 118 Continental Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, 1757 Continental Insurance Co. *. Rogers, 119 111. 474, 318 Continental Insurance Co. v. Vanlue, 126 Ind. 410, 318 Continental National Bank v. Strauss, 137 N. Y. 148, 1773 Contoocook R. Co. v. Barker, 32 N. H. 363, 154 Conway, Ex parte, 4 Ark. 302, 1392 Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82, 2120 Conway v. Case, 22 IU. 127, 338 Conyngham v. Smith. 16 Iowa, 471, 237 Cook v. Allen, 67 N. Y. 57J- 897 Cook v. Anderson, 20 Ind. 15, 688 Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460, 15 ( "ook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596, 238, 61 111 Cook v. Blake, 98 Mich. 389, 2i U Cook v. Boston, 9 Allen, 393, 438 Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, M Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460, 91 Cook v. City of Boston, 9 Allen, 393, 805 Cook v. Doggett, 2 Allen, 439, 378 Cook v. Elliott, 34 Mo. 586, 594 Cook v. Gray, 133 Mass. 106, 21S4 Cook v. Gray, 6 Ind. 335, 887 Cook v. Hawkins, 16 S. W. Rep. 8, 916 Cock v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, 2040, 2044, 2045 Cook v. Kelly, 9 Bos. 358, 401 Cook v. Kendall, 13 Minn. 324, 2158 Cook v. Lister, 32 L. J. C. P. 121, 501 Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, 290, 2228 Cookv. Moore, 18 Hun, 31, CU9 Cook v. Moseley, 13 Wend. 277, 321, 327, 553 Cook's Policy, L. R. 9 Eq. 703, 487 Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533, 641 Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332. 472 Cook v. Van Horn, 81 Wis. 291, 724 Cook v. Walton, 38 Ind. 228, 1C97 Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559, 210, 1473 Cooke v. Bremond, 27 Texas, 457, 1680, 1082 Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352, 660 Cooke v. Murphy, 70 111. 96, 956 Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, 56 Cooke v. Pardons, 2 Vern. 429, 1780 Cool v. Peters, etc., Co., 87 Hun, 531, 633, 671 Coombs v. Bristol, etc., Ry. Co., 3 H. & N. 510, 664, 672 Coombs v. MacDonald, 43 Neb. 632, 1479, 2055 Coon v. Brook, 21 Barb. 546, 1703 Coon v. Citizens' Co., 152 Pa. St. 644, 372 Coonley v. Anderson.1 Hill, 519, 537 Coonley v. Wood, 36 Hun, 559, 573 Cooper, In re, 6 Misc. R. (N. Y.) 501, 785 Cooper v. Allport, 10 Daly (N. Y.), 352, 1785 Cooper v. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722, 669 Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 781, 791 Cooper v. Farmers', etc., Ins. Co., 50 Pa, St. 299. 320 Cooper v. Gum, 152 HI. 471, 2287 Cooper v. Lee, 75 Texas, 114, 1020 Cooper v. Lovering, 106 Mass. 77, 1878 Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Mass, 227 159 Cooper v. McKee, 53 Iowa, 239, 156 Cooper v. Monroe, 77 Hun, 1, 843 Cooper v. Parker, 14 C. B. 118, 213 Cooper v. Pena, 21 Cal. 403, 1123 Cooper v. Reilly, 90 Wis. 427, 1021 Cooper v. Southgate, 10 The Reports (Eng.) 552, 47 Cooper v. Stanley, 40 Mo. App. 138, 1734 Cooper v. Wormald, 27 Beav. 266, 619 Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 4 Fed. Rep. 577, 115 Coosa, etc., Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120, 276 Coosaw Mining Co. v. State, 144 U. S. 550, 1431 Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 12, 675, 843, 833 Coover v. Johnson, 86 Mo. 533, 168 Copas t. Anglo-Am. Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541 Copeiand v. Boaz, 9 Baxter (Tenn.), 223, 2008 Copenrath v. Kienby, 83 Ind. 19, 1816, 2241 Copley v. Hyland, 46 Minn. 205, 543 Coplay Iron Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232, 340, 504, 666 Coppage v. Gregg, 127 Ind. 359, 216 Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. (U. S.J 542, 2108 Coppin v. Greeles & Ransom Co., 38 Ohio St. 275, 1259, 1260 Coppock v. Bower, 4 Mees. & W. 361, 1SS3 Corbaley v. State, 81 Ind. 62, 823 Corbett v. Clark, 45 Wis. 403, 446 Corbett v. Waterman, 11 Iowa, 86, 246 Corbiu v. Tracy, 34 Conn. 325, 1210 Corcoran v. Chess, 131 Pa. St. 356, 932 Corcoran v. Lehigh Coal Co., 138 111. 390, 1867 Corcoran v. Lehigh and Franklin Coal Co., 37 111. App. 577, 1927 Corcoran v. Snow Cattle Co., 151 Mass. 71, 1352, 1358 Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581, 7U3 Corey v. Clarke, 53 Minn. 311, 1140 Cork v. Baker, 1 Strange, 34, 227, 617 Cork R. Co., In re, 4 Ch. App. 748, 1246 Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 477, 596, 610 Corkle v. Maxwell, 3 Blatchf. 413, 803 Corley v. Williams, 1 Bailev, 5SS, 1880 Corn v. Matthews, L. R. (1893) 1 Q. B. 310, 1808 Corn Exch. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613, 1653 Cornelius v. Wash, Breese (111.), 98, 1987 Cornell v. Donovan, 14 Daly, 295, 35 Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14, 407 Cornell v. Masten, 35 Barb. 157, 543 Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Donio, 12, 763 Corner v. Sweet, L. R. 1 C. P. 456, 56S Corning, In »•<•, 51 Fed. Rep. 205 — Corning v. McCullough, IN. Y. 47, 1388 Cornish v. Suydam, 79 Ala. 620, 955 Cornthwaite v. First Nat. Bank, 57 Ind. 268, 994 Cornwall v. Gould, 4 Pick. 444, 443, 780 Cornwall, Appeal of, 11 Am. St. Rep. 893, 898 Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252, 17S3, 1796 Corporation of Liverpool v. Wright, 28 L.J.Ch.868, 2084 Corpus Christi, City of, v. Central Wharf Co., 8 Texas Civ. App. Rep. 417, 1510 TABLE OF CASES. lxxxi [Seferewes are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II,pp. 1051-2291.'] Corpus Christi City v. Woessner, 58 Texas, 462, 1518, 1522, 1587 Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. St. 88, 1147 Corson v. Neatheny, 9 Colo. 212, 1947, 1948 Cort v. Ambergate, etc., E. Co., 6 Ens. Law and Eq. 230, 2221, 2222 Cort v. Ambergate H. Co. , 17 Q. B. 127, 499 Cort v. Lassard, 18 Ore. 221, 2073 Corwin v. Wallace, 17 Iowa, 374, 139 Cory v. Board, 44 N. J. Law, 445, 1508 Cory v. Freeholders of Somerset, 44 N. J. Law, 445, 1549 Cosgrain v. Milwaukee County, 81 Wis. — 1052 Coster y. Mayor, 43 N. Y. 399, 237 Coster v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 51, 897 Cote, Ex parte, L. B. Ch. App. 27, 77 Cotheal v. Talmage, 9 N. Y. 551, 753, 759 Cothran v. Cunningham, 28 Ga. 178, 1073 Cothran v. Ellis, 125 111. 496, 1869 Cothran v. Scanlan, 34 Ga. 555, 398 Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 10, 178, 239, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260 Cotten v. McKenzle, 57 Miss. 418, 1887 Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis. 422, 238 Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481, 237, 248 Cotting v. Grant St., etc., R. Co., 65 Fed. Hep. 545, 1296 Cotton v. Cotton, 75 Ala. 345. 219 Cotton v. Godwin, 7 M. & W. 147, 382 Cottrell, Ex, parte, 2 Cow. 742, 226 Cottrell v. Citizens' Saving Bank, 53 Minn. 201, 1062 Cotulla v. Laxson, 50 Texas, 443, 2087 Cotzhausen v. Simon, 47 Wis. 103, 990 Couch v. Jeffries, 4 Burr. 2460, 2121 Couch v. Mills, 21 Wend. 424, 568 Couch v. Watson Coal Co., 46 Iowa, 17, 909 Coughran v. Bigelow, 9 Utah, 260, 868 Coulson v. Portland, Deady, 481, 1519 Coulter v. Board, 63 N. Y. 365, 464 Coulter v. Clark, 2 Ind. App. 512, 103 Coulter v. Stafford, 56 Fed. Rep. 464, 2154 Couthart v. Clementson, L. K. 5 Q. B. D. 42, 60 Council Bluffs, City of, v. Waterman, 86 Iowa, 688, 1512 Counterman v. Dublin Tp., 38 Ohio St. 515, 1540 Countess of Dunmore v. Alexander, 9 Shaw & Dunlap, 190, 77 Countess of Rutland's Case, 5 Rep. 26, 553 County Court v. Boreman, 34 W. Va. 362, 1521 County Judge of Shelby Co. v. Shelby R. Co., 5 Bush, 225, 1542 County of Clay v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579, 1429 County of Crawford v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 32 Pa. St. 141, 156 County of Leavenworth v. Barnes, 94 U. S. 70, 1428 County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, 1428, 1535 County of Morgan v. Allen, 103 U. S. 515, 858, 1400 County of Moultrie v. Rockingham Ten Cent Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 1524 County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 111. 84, 1033 County of Ralls v. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728, 1535 County of Richland v. County of Law- rence, 12 IU. 1, 2143 County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682, 1461 County of Tipton v. Locomotive Works, 103 U. S. 523, 1461 County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, 1524 Coupland v. Arrowsmith, 18 Law T. R. (H. S.) 755, 684 Coupland v. Housatonic Railroad Co., 61 Conn. 531, 1965 vi Courtenay v. Fuller, 65 Maine, 156, 344 Courtney v, Davidson, 6 La. Ann. 453, 1743 Courtright v. Burns, 13 Fed. Rep. 317, 2004 Courtright v. Deeds, 87 Iowa, 503, 378, 414 Couse v. Boyles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212, 110 Coutts v. Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558, 253, 1018 Couturier v. Hastie, 8 Exch. 40, 613 Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. St. 495, 1364 Covel T. Turner, 74 Mich. 408, 784 Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 142, 1975 Covert v. Rogers, 38 Mich. 363, 1405 Covill v. Geflery, 2 Roll. Rep. 96, 515 Cowan v. Abbott, 92 Cal. 100, 565 Cowan v. Musgrave, 73 Iowa, 384, 775, 789 Cowan v. O'Connor, L. R. 20 Q. fi. D. 640, 87 Cowan v. Radford Iron Co., 83 Va. 547, 995 Coward v. Coward, 148 111. 268, 1032 Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91, 1018, la24 Cowen v. Boyce, 6 Miss. (5 How.) 769, 2022 Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb. 42, 2242 Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 435, 1885 Cowles v. Marble, 37 Mich. 158, 409 Cowles v. Whitman, 10 Conn. 121, 1209 Cowley v. Davidson, 13 Minn. 92, 276 Cowley v. Patch, 120 Mass. 137, 829, 832 Cowper v. Green, 7 M. & W. 633, 563 Cox v. Bennet, 13 N. J. Law, 165, 955 Cox v. Bishop, 8 DeG. M. & G. 815, 2185 Cox v. Cox, 26 Pa. St. 375, 851 Cox v. Hazelip (Ky. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 1048, 1719 Cox v. Marlatt, 36 N. J. Law, 389, 2151 Cox v. Miller, 54 Texas, 16, 1755 Cox v. Reinhardt.41 Texas, 591, 385 Cox v. Stokes, 78 Hun, 331, 1444 Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 172, 695 Cox v. Wells, 7 Blackf. 410, 1738 Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 36 Coxe v. State Bank, 8 N. J. Law. 172, 393 Coxhead v. Mullis, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 439, 1806 Coxon v. Great Western Ry. Co., 5 H. & N. 274, 736 Coy v. City Council, 71 Iowa, 515, 1566 Coy v. Jones, 30 Neb. 798, 1385 Coy v. Stacker, 31 Ind. 161, 212 Coyle v. Gray (Del. 1894), 30 AtL Rep. 728, 1466 Coyne v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 386, 871, 872 Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282, 949 Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. Car. 252, 72, 1329 Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige Ch. 177, 693 Crabill v. Marsh , 38 Ohio St. 331, 842 Crabtree v. Levings, 53 111. 526, 1160 Crabtree v.. Messersmith, 19 Iowa, 179, 496, 2222 Cracknall v. Janson, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 1, 88 Craddock v. Dwight, 85 Mich. 581, 452, 453 Craft v. Baltimore, etc., Railroad Co. (Pa. Sup. ) , 8 Atl. Rep. 206, 584 Craft v. McConoughy, 79 111. 346. 1425, 1426, 1427, 1892, 2054, 2056, 2060, 2072 Craft v. Railroad Co., 150 Mass. 207, 1341 Craft v. Smith, 35 N. J. Law, 302, 1549 Craft v. South Boston B. Co., 150 Mass. 207, 1285, 1358 Crafts v. Sweeney, 18 R. I. 730, 1 373 Cragiev. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, 2281 Cragoe v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex. 81, 533 Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253, 797 Craig v. Harper, 3 Cush. 158, 57 Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, 1776, 1779, 1781, 1795, 1803 Craig v. Weitner, 33 Neb. 484, 374 Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315, 25, 52, 170 Crain v. McGoon, 86 111. 431, 382 Cramer v. Bradshaw, 10 Johns. 484, 325, 328 Cramer v. Reford, 17 N. J. Eq. 367, 1086 Crampton v. Ballard, 10 Vt. 251, 2210 Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 1438, 1521, 1545 Crandall v. Schroeppel, 1 Hun, 577, 3J9 Crane v. Ailing, 15 N. J. Law 423, 541, 508 Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y. 256, 788 Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Crane v. Gough, 4 Md. 316, 618, 592, 849 Crane v. Keck, 35 Neb. 683, 472 Crane v. McDonald, 45 Barb. 354, 456 Crane v. Patton, 57 Ark. 340, 2177 Crane v. Peer, 43 N. J. Eq. 553, 1095 Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379, 592, G93 Crane v. Stickles, 15 Vt. 252, 490 Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439, 1043, 2100, 2102, 2109, 2113 Cranston Print Works v. Dyer, 18 B. I. 526, 1069 Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610, 739 Crarv v. Bowers, 20 Cal. 85, 447 Cravens v. Eagle Cotton Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6, 864, 872, 945 Cravens v. Eagle Cotton Mills Co., 120 Ind. 600, 153 Crawford v. Crawford, 1 Bailey, 128, 366 Crawford v. King, 54 Ind. 6, 610 Crawford v. M'Elvy, 2 Speer, 225, 557 Crawford v. Millspaugh, 1 N. H. 281, 536 Crawford v. Millspaugh, 13 Johns. 87, 562 Crawford v. Morrell, 8 Johns. 253, 1111 Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 1646 Crawford v. Osmun, 94 Mich. 533, 396 Crawford v. Paine, 19 Iowa, 172, 214, 406 Crawford v. Roberts, 50 Cal. 162, 447 Crawford v. Roberts, 8 Ore. 324, 572 Crawford v. Satterfleld, 27 Ohio St. 421, 161 Crawford v. Schneider (Mich. 1895), 64 N. W. Rep. 39, 1218 Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 48, 1821 Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498, 1869, 1923, 1924, 1936 Crawford v. Whitmore, 120 Mo. 144, 1733 Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 2077 Crawfordsville, City of, v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, ' 1564, 1572 Creagh v. Tunstall, 98 Ala. 249. 1841 Crease v. Babcock, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 2130 Crecelius v. Horst, 89 Mo. 356, 1712 Cree v. Sherfy, 138 Ind. 354, 971 Creed v. Railroad Co., 86 Pa. St. 139, 1432 Creighton v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio St. 447", 779 Creighton v. Comstock, 27 Ohio St. 548, 306 Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323, 473 Crenshaw v. United States, 134 TJ. S. 99, 2126 Cresap v. Manor, 63 Texas, 485, 428 Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 100 Mo. 325, 2217 Crescent Min. Co. v. Wasatch Min. Co., 151 TJ. S. 317, 1083 Cressler v. Rees, 27 Neb. 515, 991 Cresswell v. Wood, 10 Adol. & El. 460, 599 Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 288, 186 Creswell v. Lanahan, 120 TJ. S. 256, 1359 Creutz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 429, 209, 212, 213 Crews v. State, 38 Ind. 28, 1955 Cribbs v. Sowlo, 87 Mich. 340, 1.835 Crim v. Fitch, 53 Ind. 214, 1183 Criombie v. Overholtzer, 11 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 681, 2114 Crippen v. Culver, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 424, 1814 Crippen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344, 543 Crisdee v. Bolton, 3 C. & P. 240, 757 Crisfield v. Murdock, 127 N. Y. 315, 827 Crisman v. Hodges, 75 Mo. 413, 877 Crist v. Armour, 84 Barb. 378, 495 Criswell's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 488, 1599 Crocker v. Hill, 61 N . H. 345, 853 Crocker v. Hutchinson, 1 Vt. 73, 797 Crocker v. New London, etc., R. Co., 24 Conn. 249, 55 Crockett v. Doriot, 85 Va. 240, 1746 Crockett v. Scribner, 64 Maine, 447, 658 Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. H. 258. 660 Croft v. Hanover Ins. Co. (W. Va. 1895), 31 S. E. Rep. 854, 1088, 1097 Croft v. Lumley, 5 E. & B. 648, 469 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51, 730 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 31 Cromwell v. Royal Canadian Ins. Co., 49 Md. 366, 731 Cromwell v. Wilkinson, 18 Ind. 365, 743 Cronin v. Tebo, 144 N. Y. 660, 842 Croninger v. Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151, 124, 304 Cronise v. Clark, 4 Md. Ch. 403, 1772 Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255, 2122 Crosbie v. McDoual, 13 Ves. 148, 851 Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 912 Crosby Hardwood Co. v. Trester, 90 Wis. 412, 670 Crosby v. President, etc., of Delaware Canal Co., 141 N. Y. 589, 36 Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 602, 638 Crosby v. Wood, 6 N. Y. 369, 187, 212 Croskey v. Ladd, 96 Cal. 455, 1142 Cross v. Andrews, Croke Elizabeth, 622, 1838 Cross v. Bean, 83 Maine, 61, 1157 Cross v. Cross, 58 N. H. 373, 267, 2007 Cross v. Eglin, 2 B. & Ad. 106, 109, 305, 692 Cross v. Garnet, 3 Mod. 261, 321 Cross v. Huntly, 13 Wend. 385, 233 Cross v. Johnson, 65 Ga. 717, 2208 Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581, 1838, 1839 Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 662, 670 Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co., 17 111. 54, 257 Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641, 592, 608, 609 Cross v. Sprigg, 6 Hare, 552, 515, 555 Cross v. United States Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 477. 2121 Cross v. Williams, 72 Mo. 577, 2209 Crossan v. New York R. Co., 149 Mass. 196, 1286 Crossley v. Maycock, L. R. 18 Eq. 180, 73 Crossman v. Johnson, 63 Vt. 333, 321, 333 Crossman v. Universal Rubber Co., 127 N. Y. 34, 2275 Crossman v. Wohleben, 90 111. 537, 207 Crotty v. Eagle's Adm'r, 35 W. Va. 143, 1771 Crouch v. Gutman, 45 N. Y. St. R. 470, 126, 127 Crouch v. Gutmann, 134 N. Y. 45, 140, 371, 372, 2232 Crouch v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 287, 736 Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435, 1389 Crow v. Gleason, 20 N. Y. Supl. 590, 466 Crowv. Rogers, 1 Strange, 592, 237, 238 Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1, 1853, 2082 Crowder v. Town of Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486, 1519, 1560, 1564, 1565 Crowe v. Lewin, 95 N. Y. 423, 245 Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152, 246 Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650, 246, 247, 248 Crowninsnield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray (Mass.), 524, 1811 Crowley v. Genessee Mining Co., 55 Cal. 273, 1318, 1341, 1355 Crowther v. Farrer, 15 Q. B. 677, 531 Crozier v. Ragan, 38 La. Ann. 154, 1742 Cruess v. Fessler, 39 Cal. 336. 1879 Cruickshanks v. Rose, 1 M. & Rob. 100, 471 Crumlish v. Central Imp. Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 444 Crumlish v. Wilmington R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 270, 128 Crump v. United States Mining Co., 7 Gratt. 352, 1331, 1543 Cruse v. Jones, 3 Lea, 66, 1189 Crutchfield v. Donathon, 49 Texas, 691, 1199 Cruttwell v. Lve, 17 Ves. 336, 2046 Crymble v. Mulvaney (Colo. 1895), 40 Pac. Rep. 499, 1298 Crystal Ice Mfg. Co. v. San Antonio Brew- ing Ass'n, 8 Texas Civ. App. 1, 2075 Cubberly v. Cubberly. 33 N. J. Eq. 82, 245 Cudd v. Williams, 39 S. Car. 452, 1751 Cuff v. Penn, 1 M. & S. 21, 690 Culbertson Power Co. v.Wildman, 45 Neb. 663, 961 Cullers v. James, 66 Texas, 494, 1760 Gulp v. Jones (Texas 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 1123, 1760 TABLE OP CASES. lxxxiii [Seferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426, 189, 458, 519, 520 Cumber v. Ware, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. (337) 633, 538 Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish. 42 Md. 598, 1307 Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. Baab, 9 Watts 458, 156, 1978 Cummer v. Butts, 40 Mich. 322, 98 Cumming, In re, L. E. 5 Ch. App. 72, 1173 Cumming y. Antes, 19 Pa. St. 287, - 867 Cumming v. Williamson, 1 Sandf . Ch. 17, 1369 Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. (Mass".) 486, 689, 950, 951, 954, 2274 Cummings y. Baars, 36 Minn. 350, 558 Cummings v. Hausen, 63 How. Pr. 351, 2211 Cummings v. Martin, 128 Ind. 20, 1654 Cummings v. Noyes, 10 Mass. 433, 781 Cummings v. People, 50 111. 132, 830 Cummings v. Pence, 1 In'd. App. 317, 116, 144, 148 Cummings y. Powell, 8 Texas 80, 215, 1773 Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. Ann. 207, 1425, 1853 Cummings v. Vorce, 3 Hill, 283, 782 Cummins v. Barkalow, 4 Keyes (N. Y. App.), 514, 1963 Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491, 1481 Cummins v. Kennedy, 3 Litt. 118, 364 Cundifi y. Corley (Texas App.), 27 S. W. Rep. 167, 404 Cunliffe v. Harrison, 6 Ex. 903, 304 Cunningham v. Blake, 121 Mass. 333, 1139 Cunningham v. Brown, 44 Wis. 72, 101 Cunningham v. Jones, 20 N. Y. 486, 148 Cunningham v. National Bank of Au- gusta, 71 Ga. 400, . 1923, 1930 Cunningham v. Norton, 125 TJ. S. 77, 153 Cunningham y. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538, 777 Cupp v. Campbell, 103 Ind. 213, 1725 Curnan v. Delaware R. Co., 63 Hun. 628, 943 Curnan v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 138 N. Y. 480, 1286 Curran v. Rummell, 118 Mass. 482, 511, 512, 519 Curran y. State, 15 How. (XJ. S.) 304, 1365, 1400, 2116 Curran v. Witter, 68 Wis. 16, 2248 Current v. Fulton, 10 Ind. App. 617, 945 Currie v. Anderson, 2 E. & E. 592, 667, 668 Currier v. Bilger, 24 Atl. Rep. 168, 565 Currie v. Bowman, 25 Ore. 364, 1368 Currier v. Boston and Maine R., 34 N. H. 498. 862 Currier y. Currier, 2 N. H. 75, 490 Currie v. Kennedy, 78 N. C. 91, 536 Currier t. Lebanon Slate Co., 56 N. H. 262, 1403 Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 153, 178, 230, 447 Currie v. Natchez J. & C. R. Co., 61 Miss. 725, 1976 Curry y. Board, etc.. 61 Iowa, 71, 1543 Curry Y. Curry, 10 Hun, 366, 1715 Curry v. Rogers, 21 N. Y. 247, 257 Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270, 1462 Curtin v. Patton, 11 Serg. & Raw. 305, 215, 1772, 1773 Curtis, In re, 64 Conn. 501, 881, 899, 900 Curtis v. Aspinwall. 114 Mass. 187, 2001 Curtis y. Bowrie, 2 McLean, 374, 829 Curtis y. Brown, 5 Cush. 488, 609 Curtis y. Burdick, 48 Vt. 166, 2243 Curtis y. Delaware R. Co., 74 N. Y. 116, 734 Curtis Y. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300, 872, 1225, 1906, 2047 Curtis y. Leayitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 1903, 2125 Curtis y. Mansfield, 11 Cush. 152, 822 Curtis Y. Morton, 20 111. 558, 189 Curtis y. Piedmont Co., 109 N. C. 401, 1235 Curtis Y. Portland, etc., Bank, 77 Maine, 151, 250, 252 Curtis y. Pugh, 10 Q. B. Ill, 666 Curtis y. Sage, 35 111. 22, 651, 655 | Curtis Y. Smith, 48 Vt. 116, 4 Curtis v. Watson, 64 Vt. 649, 374, 1288, 2178 Curtis y. Whitney, 13 WaU. (TJ. S.) 68, 2119 Curtiss y. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 73, 2077 Curtiss y. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154, 643 Cusack y. Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Low. Can. Jur. 97, 895 Cusack y. Robinson, 1 B. & S. 299, 662, 263 Cushing y. Inhabitants of Stoughton, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 389, 1473 Cushing y. Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393, 210 Cushing y. Wyman, 44 Maine, 121, 470 Cushman v. Burritt, 14 N. Y. Week. Dig. 59, 618, 674 Cushman y. New England F. Ins. Co., 65 Vt. 569, 1085 Cushman y. Thayer Manufacturing Co., 76 N. Y. 365, 1209 Custer y. Tompkins Co. Bank, 9 Pa. St.27, 1288 Cutter y. Babcock, 81 Wis. 195, 1201 Cutler y. Goold, 43 Hun, 516, 399, 400 Cutler y. Pope, 13 Maine, 377, 640 Cutler v. Roberts, 7 Neb. 4, 171 Cutler y. Wright, 22 N. Y. 472, 726, 729 Cutler y. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92, 1819 Cutliff y. McAnally, 88 Ala. 507, 289 Cutter y. Emery, 37 N. H. 567, 599 Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 2169 Cutter y. Powell, 2 Smith L. C. 1, 113 Cutter y. Powell, 6 T. R. 320, 285, 890 Cutter v. Whittemore, 10 Mass. 442, 172 Cutting y. Dana. 25 N. J. Eq. 265, 58 Cutting y. Lincoln, 9 Abb. Pr. (N.S.),436, 1844 Cuxon y. Chadley, 3 B. & C. 591, 535 Cuykendall y. Corning, 88 N. Y. 130, 1376 Cuyler y. Cuyler, 2 Johns. 186, 568 Cyclone Steam Co. v. Vulcan Iron Works, 52 Fed. Rep. 920, D D. M. Osborne & Co. y. Stringham, 1 S. Dak. 406, 956 Dabney Y. Steyens, 40 How. Pr. 341, 1341, 1350 Dacosta y. Hatch, 24 N. J. Law, 319 695 Dacosta y. Dayis, 24 N. J. Law, 319, 697, 712, 721 Dacosta y Jones, 2 Cowp. 729, 1914,1944 Daft y. Drew, 40 111. App. 266, 118 Daggett Y. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345, 132, 134, 160 Dahlman y. Hammel, 45 Wis. 466, 684 Dahmy. Barlow, 93 Ala. 120, 631 Dailey y. City of New Hayen, 60 Conn. 314, 2209 Daily y. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 29, 1142 Daily y. Robinson, 86 Ind. 382, 823 Dake Engine Mfg. Co. y. Hurley, 99 Mich. 16, 338 Dakin y. Dakin, 97 Mich. 284, 563, 1206 Dakin y. Dunning, 7 Hill, 30, 407 Dakin y. Rumsey (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 990, 967 Dakin y. Williams, 17 Wend. 447, 761 Dakin y. Williams, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 67, 2044 Dalby y. Pullen, 3 Sim. 29, 1156 Dale y. Hamilton, 5 Hare, 369, 644 Dale y. Lincoln, 62 111. 22, 15 Dale y. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1, 110 Dallas y. Columbia Iron Co., 158 Pa. St. 444, 1285 Dallas.City of, y. Brown (Texas Ciy. App. 1895), 31 S.W. Rep. 298, 1518 Dallas Co. y. Huidekoper, 154 TJ. S. 654, 1428 Dalton y. Murphy, 30 Miss. 59, 714 Daly y. Brennan, 87 Wis. 36, 1004 Daly y. Proetz, 20 Minn. 411, 385 Daly y. Smith, 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 150, 2073 Dalzell y. Fahys Watch Case Co., 138 N. Y. 285, 2194, 2233 Damon y. Granby, 2 Pick. 345, 1491 Dana v. Bank, 5 Watts & S. 223, 1405 lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1031-2291.] Dana v. Coombs, 6 Maine, 89, 1179 Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, 42, 870, 2179 Dana v. Hancock, 30 Vt. 616, 689 Dana v. Taylor, 150 Mass. 25, 543, 545 Danforth v. Dewey, 3 N. H. 79, 2257 Danforth v. Laney, 28 Ala. 274, 844 Danforth v. Bail-way Co., 30 N. J. Eq. 12, 1121 Danforth v. Streeter, 28 Vt. 490, 2242 Danforth v. Walker, 37 Vt. 239, 2213 Daniel v. McKae, 2 Hawk. N. Car. 590, 828 Daniel v. Collins, 57 Ala. 627, 1116, 1118 Daniels v. Bailey, 43 Wis. 566, 633, 645 Daniels v. Barney, 22 Ind. 207, 1931 Daniels v. Eisenlord, 10 Mich. 454. 490 Daniels v. Hallenbeck, 19 Wend. 408, 543 Daniels v. Hatch, 21 N. J. Law, 391, 190, 519 Daniels v. Hudson, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Cush. 416, 317,731 Daniels v. Kyle, 1 Kelly, 304, 452 Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 496, 499 Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415, 996 Dann v. Spurrier, 3 B. & P. 399, 894 Dannat v. Fuller, 120 N. Y. 554, 137, 747 Dant v. Head, 90 Ky. 255, 655 Danube & Black Sea Co. v. Xenos, 13 C. B. (N. SJ 825, 493, 494, 2222 Danville, Town of, v. Pace, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 2125 Danziger v. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 190, 464 Darby v. Berney Nat. Bank, 97 Ala. 643, 2182 Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 558 Darling v. Chapman, 14 Mass. 101, 383 Darling v. Cumming (Va. 1896), 23 S. E. Rep. 880, 633 Darling v. Hines, 5 Ind. App. 319, 1835 Darling v. Bobbins, 60 Vt. 347, 432 Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 512, 1017, 1018 Darlington's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 624, 1016 Darlington v. McCoole, 1 Leigh, 36, 1179 Darlington Iron Co. v. Foots, 16 Fed. Eep. 646, 43 Darnall v. Lyon (1892 Texas App.), 19 S. W. Hep. 506, 817 Darst v. Perfect, 42 Neb. 574, 2177 Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518, 1239 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 1348, 1481, 1581, 1583, 2122, 2124, 2127, 2130 Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 477, 2121 Daskam v. Neff , 79 Wis. 161, 1875 Dater v. Earl, 3 Gray (Mass.), 482, 1902, 1903 Daugherty v. Bach, 167 Pa. St. 429, 604 Daughdrill v. Edwards, 59 Ala. 424, 1171 Daugherty v. Fowler, 44 Kan. 628, 123 Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N. Y. 407, 140, 375 D'Autremont v. Fire Association of Phil- adelphia, 20 N. Y. Supl. 344, 3838 D.ivro v. State, 7 Ind. App. 71, 1725 Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502, 1519, 1521 Davenport v. Mason, 15 Mass. 85, 847 Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546, 163 Davey v. Prendergrass, 5 B. & Aid. 187, 553 Davey v. Shannon, L. B. 4 Ex. D. 81, 654 David v. Birchard, 53 Wis. 492, 1856 Davie v. Lumberman's Mining Co., 93 Mich. 491 2219 Davidson v. Berthoud, 1 A. K. Marsh. 353, 467 Davidson v. Burke, 143111. 139, 561 Davidson v. Carter, 55 Iowa, 117, 2290 Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. 778, 13 Davidson v. Dayidson, 13 N. J. Eq. 246, 7 Davidson v. Graves, Riley Eq. (S. Car.), 219, 620 Davidson v. Gwynne, 12 East, 381, 135 Davidson v. McGregor, 8 Mees. & W. 755, 1638 Davidson v. Mexican Nat. E. Co., 58 Fed. Bep. 653, 1442 Davidson v. Moss, 5 How. (Miss.), 673, 409 Davidson v. Provost, 35 111. App. 126, 128 Davidson v. Weschester Co., 99 N. Y. 558, 185 Davies v. Cooper, 5 M. & Cr. 270, 234 Davies v. Davies, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 359, 2034, 2047, 2050, 2051 Davies v. Davies, 9 C. & P. 87, 789 Davies v. London, etc., Insurance Co., L. R. 8 Ch. D. 469, 1828 Davies v. Second Shatham, etc., Building Society, 61 L. T. (N. S.) 680, 1616 Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208, 681 Davis, Jir parte, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 463, 492 Davis, Matter of, 7 Daily (N. Y.), 1, 674 Davis v. Badders, 95 Ala. 348, 127, 144 Davis v. Belford, 70 Mich. 120, 818, 889, 2190 Davis v. Bowker, 1 Nev. 487, 550 Davis v. Bronson, 9 N. D. 300, 2213 Davis v. Calloway, 30 Ind. 112, 246 Davis v. Cory, 15 Q. B. 418, 281 Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11, 646 Davis v. Coleman, 7 Ired. L. 424, 707 Davis v. County of Yuba, 75 Cal. 452, 33 Davis v. Davis, 1 Nott & McCord, 224, 559 Davis v. Davis, 20 Ore. 78, 194 Davis v. Davis, 119 Ind. 511 1930 Davis v. Davis, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 587 1718 Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 74, 2084 Davis v. Eppinger, 18 Cal. 381, 385 Davis v. First Nat. Bank, 5 Neb. 242, 1652, 1723 Davis v. Foreman, L. R. (1894) 3 Ch. 654, 2265 Davis v. French, 20 Maine, 21, 593 Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147, 13 Davis v. Giddings, 30 Neb. 209, 163 Davis v. Goodehow, 27 Vt, 715, 789 Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 203, 2126 Davis v. Ham, 3 Mass. 33, 563 Davis v. Hone, 2 Schoales & L. 348, 1171 Davis v. Hunt, 2 Bailey, 412, 356 Davis v. Iverson (S. Dakota), 58 N. W. Rep. 796, 332 Davis v. Jeffries (S. Dak.), 58 N. W. 815, 114 Davis v. Jenney, 1 Met. (Mass.) 221, 1228 Davis v. Jones' Admr., 94 Ky. 320, 1988 Davis v. Kenaga, 51 111. 170, 1948 Davis v. Krum, 12 Mo. App. 279, 798 Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156, 207 Davis v. Latta (Iowa 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 17, 1028 Davis v. Luster, 64 Mo. 43, 1830, 1832 Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118, 2039 Davis v. Mayor, etc., 93 N. Y. 250, 1489, 1491 Davis v. McFarlaue, 37 Cal. 634, 637 Davis v. Miller, 14 Gratt. 1, 399 Davis v. Montgomery, etc., Chemical Co. (Ala.), 8 So. Rep. 496, 1308 Davis v. Moore, 13 Maine, 424, 662 Davis v. Morton, 5 Bush, 160, 715, 719 Davis v. Munson, 43 Ver. 676, 188 Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590, 250 Davis v. Noaks, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 494, 517 Davis v. Noyes, 15 N. Y. Supl. 431, 194 Davis v. Old Colony, etc., Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258, 1257, 1203, 1285, 1421, 1430, 1576 Davis v. Parsons, 157 Mass. 584, 453 Davis v. Patrick, 141 TJ. S. 479, 602, 616 Davis v. Pollock, 36 S. C;ir. 544, 631 Davis v. Porter, 66 Cal. il.",\ 32 Davis v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258, „ . _ 1226, 1246, 1248 Davis v. Robert, 89 Ala. 402, 1108 Davis v. Rock Creek Mining Co., 55 Cal. 3 5 ?> _ 1292,1294 Davis v. Rowell, 2 Pick. 64, 674 Davis v. Rupe, 114 Ind. 588, 1496, 2152 Davis v. Saladee, 57 Texas, 326, 1739, 1760 Davis v. Seeley, 71 Mich. 209, 1885 Davis v. Sexton, 35 111. App. 407, 876 Davis v. Shaper, 60 Fed. Rep. 764, ^ • c, •-,,„„ „, 817 > 877 . 889. 2130 Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. 341, 685, 688 Davis v. Sittig, 65 Texas, 497, 1863 Davis v. Stonestreet, 4 Ind. 101, 390 TABLE OF CASES. lxxxv [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Davis v. Swanson, 54 Ala. 277, 1644 Davis v. Tift, 70 Ga. 52, 594, 683 Davis v. Town of Harrison, 46 N. J. Law, tJ 9 >- m ,r. ' 1562 Davis v. Town of Seymour, 59 Conn. 531, 773 Davis v. Van Buren, 72 N. Y. 587, 823 Davis v. Van Wyck, 64 Hun, 186, 414 Davis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159, ^ . ™ 52 . 571 Davis v. Weymouth, 80 Maine, 307, 1576 Davis v. Windsor, etc., Bank, 46 Vt. 728, 444 Davidson v. Alexander, 84 N. Car. 621, 1244 Davis, etc., Co. v. Barber, 51 Fed. Rep. 148, 817 Davis Bldg., etc., Co. v. Cupp, 89 Wis. 673, 88 Davis Bldg., etc., Co. v. Jones, 66 Fed. Rep. 124, 883 Davis Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 10 Ind. App. 364, 820, 889, 2119, 2190 Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 51 Fed. Rep. 148, 888, 889, 2190 Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. McKinney, 11 Ind. App. 696, 889 Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Murray, 60 N. W. Rep. 437, 888 Davis & Rankin Co. v. Hillsboro Co., 10 Ind. App. 42, 889 Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. McGinnis, 45 Iowa, 538, 499 Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. En. 246, 848 Davison v. Seymour, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 88, 1988 Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U. S. 40, 956 Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 1308, 2285 Dawkins v. Gill, 10 Ala. 206, 1853 Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, 60 Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa, 512, 186 Dawson v. Ewing, 16 S. & R. 371, 401 Dawson v. Kittle, 4 Hill, 107. 926, 2247 Dawson v. McFaddin, 22 Neb. 131, 850 Dawson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 76 Mo. 514, 1967 Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513, 778, 1476 Day v. Cloe. 4 Bush, 563, 611 Day v. Dwelling-House Insurance Co., 81 Maine, 244, 316 Day v. Elmore, 4 Wis. 214, 1132 Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199, 190, 208, 244 Day v. Jones, 150 Mass. 231, 1632 Day v. McAllister, 15 Gray (Mass.), 433, 2101, 2109, 2111 Day v. New York, etc., R. Co., 51 N. Y. 583, 693 Day v. New York, etc., R. Co., 31 Barb. 548, 643 Day v. Patterson, 18 Ind. 40, 2210 Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416, 340 Day v. Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn. 408 188 Day v. Strong, 29 Hun, 505, 383 Dayton v. Dean, 23 Conn. 99, 148 Dayton v. Parke, 142 N. Y. 391, 2172 Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Wis. 113, 1755 Davis v. Wabash R. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 275 Dayton, etc., Railroad Co. v. Lewton, 20 Ohio St. 401, 428 Deacon v. Gridley, 15 C. B. 295, 187, 198, 1651 Dean, Ex parte, 2 Cow. 605, 764 Dean v. American Legion of Honor, 156 Mass. *i5, 1241 Dean v. Clark, 80 Hun, 80, 862 Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480, 2040, 2044, 2046, 2049, 2051, 2052 Dean v. Everrett, 90 Iowa, 294, 912 Dean v. Lawham, 7 Ore. 422, 867 Dean v. James, 4 B. & Ad. 546, 394, 395 Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn. 438, 41 Dean v. Metropolitan Railway Co., 119 N. Y. 540, . 1736 Dean v. Morey, 33 Iowa, 120, 332 Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168, 568, 569, 574 Dean v. Williams, 17 Mass. 417, 475 Dean v. Woodbridge, 1 Root (Conn.), 191, 2197 Dearborn v. Bowman, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 155 192, 193, 784 Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. 48, 517, 951 Dearborn v. Dearborn, 9 N. H. 117, 490 Dearborn v. Parks, 5 Maine, 81, 607 Dearborn v. Raysor, 132 Pa. St. 231, 163 Dearborn Foundry Co. v. Augustine, 5 Wash. 67, 1887 Deans v. Robertson, 64 Miss. 195, 1885 Deaton v. Tenn., etc., Co., 12 Heis. 650, 653 Deaver v. Bennett, 29 Neb. 812, 1947 De Baker v. Carillo, 52 Cal. 473, 460 De Bardelaben v. Stoudenmire, 82 Ala. 574, ,, „ 1743 De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107, 1882 Debolt v. Ohio Life Insurance Co., 1 Ohio St. 591, 2130 De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Texas, 464, 431 De Bussche v. Alt, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 286, 1019 Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331, 1798 Decker v. Livingston, 15 John. 479, 543 Decorah v. Kesselmeier, 45 Iowa, 166, 860 De Cordova v. Barnum, 130 N. Y. 615, 940 Dederick v. Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500, 165 Dedham Institution v. Slack, 6 Cush. 408, 1350 Dedham v. Earle, 52 Ark. 164, 164 Deering v. Chapman, 22 Me. 488, 1896 Deering v. Porter, 42 111. App. 120, 561 De Farges v. Ryland, 87 Va. 404. 1718, 1719 Deffenbaugh v. Foster, 40 Ind. 382, 1497 De Forth v. Wisconsin, etc., Co., 52 Wis. 320, 2096 De Frece v. National Life Co., 19 N. Y. Supl. 8, 118 De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah, 488, 990 De Fremery v. Austin, 53 Cal. 380, 805 De Francesco v. Barnum, L. R. 45 Ch. Div. 430, 1808 De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Co., 65 N. Y. 232, 119 De Graff v. County of Ramsey, 46 Minn. 319, 461 De Graff, etc., Co. v. Wickham (Iowa 1892) , 52 N. W. Rep. 503, 760 Degraw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1, 554, 2165 Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253, 671 Doischer v. Price, 148 111. 385, 1071 Deitz v. Insurance Co., 33 W. Va. 526, 1088 De Kay v. Hackensack Water Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 158, 315 Delacroix v. Bulkley, 13 Wend. 71, 12, 952 Delamater v. Borland, 1 Caines, 594, 93 Deland v. Amesbury, etc., Manufactur- ing Co., 7 Pick. 244, 558 DeLano v. Wild, 6 Allen, 1, 1619 Delashmutt v. Thomas, 45 Md. 140, 99 De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284, 715 Delavina v. Hill (N. H.), 19 Atl. Rep. 1000, 1902 Delaware, The, 14 Wall. 579, 334 Delaware Co. v. Andrews, 18 Ohio St. 49, 1894 Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N. Y. 250, 2223 Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Weschester Bank, 4 Denio, 97, 237, 2210 Delaware R. Co. v. Bowns, 58 N. Y. 573, 297 Delaware Railroad Co. v. Tharp, 5 Harr. (Del.) 454, 2132 Delaware Railroad Tax, The, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 206, 2131, 2135, 2137 De Lesdernier v. De Lesdernier, 45 La. Ann. 1364, 1674 Delevan v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 485, 421 Delier v. Plymouth, etc., Society, 57 Iowa, 481, 1945 DeLoach v. Smith, 83 Geo. 210, 489 Delogny v. Mercer, 43 La. Ann. 205, 883 Demars v. Musser, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 418, 212 Demarest v. Inhabitants of New Barba- does, 40 N. J. Law, 604, 1570 Demarest v. Terhune, 18 N. J. Eq. 532, 1661 lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Demeritt v. Bickford, 58 N. H. 523, 614 Demestre v. West, L. E. (1891) A. C. 264, 224 Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 1875 Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165, 338, 350, 351 Dealings v. Supreme Lodge, 131 N. Y. 522, 1323 DeMott v. Laraway, 14 Wend. 225, 274 Dempsey v. Kipp, 62 Barb. 311, 641 Dempsey v. Tvfee, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 73, 1672 Dempster v. West. 69111.613, 2289 Den v. Shot-well, 23 N. J. L. 465, 1957 Den t. Yreelandt, 7 N. J. Law, 352, 1284 Denby v. Graff, 10 111. App. 195, 867, 808 Denham v. Walker, 93 Ga. 497, 170 Denison v. City of Columbus, 62 Fed. Eep. 775, 1161 Denison v. Crawford County, 48 Iowa, 211, 2087 Deniston v. Hoagland, 67 111. 265, 1186 Denman v. McMahin, 37 Ind. 242, 560 Donmead v. Glass, 30 Ga. 637, 662 Denn v. Eeid, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 524, 1587 Dennett v. Chick, 2 Greenl. 191, 833 Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 532, 1812 Dennie V. Hart, 2 Pick. 204, 447 Dennie v. Walker, 7 N. H. 190, 385 Dennington v. Kirk, 57 Ark. 595, Dennis v. Piper, 21 111. App. 169, Dennis v. Walsh, 16 N. Y. Supl. 257, Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, Denny v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, Denny v. Lincoln, 5 Mass. 385, 470 187 149, 372 2116 1072 1853 Denny's Estate, In re, 8 Ir. E„ Eq. Series, 427, 887 Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 6 Wash. 134, 1262 Densmore v. Mathews, 58 Mich. 616, 2252 ■ Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. St. 43, 1980 Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50, 1640 Dent v. North Am. Steamship Co., 49 N.Y. 390, 335, 854 Denton v. Davies, 18 Ves. 499, 681 Denton v. English, 2 Nott. & M. (S. Car.) 581, 2016 Denton v. Erwin, 6 La. Ann. 317, 2, 2016 Denver, etc., E. Co. v. Atchinson, etc., E. Co., 15 Fed. Eep. 650, 1425, 2054 Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo. 107, 937 Deobold v. Oppermann, 111 N. Y. 531, 1975 Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 1768 Depau v. Humphreys, 8 Mart. (N. S.) 1, 712 729 730 De Perez v. Everett, 73 Texas, 434, 1006 De Peyster v. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582, 434 De Peyster v. Pulver, 3 Barb. 284, 488 Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 615, 617, 654 Derby v. Johnson, 21 Yt. 17, 496 DeEivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 264, 2073 Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1, 144, 277, 290, 897, 2227, 2237 Dermott v. Jones, 23 How. 220, 137, 746 Derrick v. Monette, 73 Ala. 75, 1118 Derry v. Derry, 98 Ind. 319, 1690 Derry v. Peok, L. E. 14 App. Cas. 337, 990 De Euyter v. Trustees, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 119, 1392 Desha v. Holland, 12 Ala. 513, 907 Deshon v. Wood, 148 Mass. 132, 618 Des Moines County Agricultural Society v. Tubbesing, 87 Iowa, 138, 1070 Des Moines, University of, v. Polk County, etc., Co., 87 Iowa, w, Des Moines E. Co. v. Graff, 27 Iowa, 99, Des Moines Valley By. Co. v. Graff, 27 Iowa, 99, Desnoyer v. Jordan, 27 Minn. 295, De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 Harr. & J. (Md. 199, YDS De Sollar v. Hanscome, 158 U. S. 216, 1166, 1217 157 2122 Desper v. Continental, etc., Meter Co., 137 Mass. 252, 1172 Destrehan v. Louisiana Lumber Co., 45 La. Ann. 920, 930 Dethlefs v. Tomsen, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 354, 2047 Detrick v. Sharrar, 95 Pa. St. 521, 846 Detroit v. Mutual Gas Light Co., 43 Mich. 594, 1223 Detroit, City of, v. Hosmer, 79 Mich. 384, 1574 Detroit, City of, v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170, 480,807 Detroit, City of, v. Michigan Paving Co., 36 Mich. 335, 1567 Detroit, City of, v. Eobinson, 38 Mich. 108, 1567 Detroit, City of, v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281, 1512 Detroit, etc., Eailroad Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 112, 438 Detroit E. Co. v. Starnes, 38 Mich. 698, 156, 158 Detroit Schuetzen Bund v. Detroit Agita- tions Verein, 44 Mich. 313, 1337 Deutmann v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App. 624, 876, 903 Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378, 1822 Deuser v. Walkup, 43 Mo. App. 625, 544 Deux v. Jefferies, Cro. EHz. 352, 568, 5G9 Devendorf v. Emerson, 66 Iowa, 698, 1659 Devin v. Belt, 70 Md. 352, 1546 Devine v. Edwards, 101 111. 138, 800 Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8, 2218 Devlin v. United States, 12 Ct. of CI. 266, 803 Devling v. Little, 26 Pa. St. 502, 549 Devou v. Ham, 17 Ind. 472, 533 De Vries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255, 1746 Dew v. Clark, 3 Add. Eccl. 79, 1820 Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 162, 170 Dewey v. Carey, 60 Mo. 224, 829 Dewey v. Algire. 37 Neb. 6, 1821, 1837 Dewey v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. 64, 2267, 2268 Dewey v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 91 Mich. 351, 1268 Dewey v. Union School Dist.,43 Mich. 480, 272, 276, 287 Dewhurst v. Wright, 29 Fla. 223, 1104 DeWitt v. Berry, 134 U. S. "06, 41, 336, 338, 3r,2 DeWitt v. Brisbane, 16 N. Y. 503, 2072 DeWitt. etc., Co. v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 16 Daly (N. Y.), 529, 2055 De Wolf v. Cityof Chicago, 26 111. 444, 7t-'5 De Wolf v. De Wolf, 4 B . 1. 450, 1215 De Wolf v. New York, etc., Ins. Co., 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 214, 2021 Do Wolf v. Eabaud, 1 Pet. 476, 598 Dexter v. Blanchard, 11 AUen, 365, 595, 610 Dexter v. Billings, 110 Pa. St. 135, 1764 Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 9, 1837 Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 270, 295, 946. 2227 Dey, In re, 9 N. J. Eq. 181, 1846 Deyoe v. Jamieson, 33 Mich. 94, 166 Deyoe, v. Woodworth, 144 N. Y. 448, 2088 De Zeng v. Dailey, 9 Wend. 336, 819 Dial v. Crain, 10 Texas, 444, 1199 Diamond Match Co. v. Eoeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 1268, 1981, 2026, 2035, 20:!H, 2037, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2074, 2076, 2078 Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, 274 Dibble v. Morgan, 1 Wood. 406, 124 Diboll v. Minott, 9 Iowa, 403, 152 Dibrell v. Smith, 40 Texas, 447, 431 Dick v. Ireland, 130 Pa. St. 299, 885 Dice v. Irvin, 110 Ind. 561, 1397 Dickenson v. Breeden, 30 111. 279, 1033 Dickenson v. Dodds, L. E. 2 Ch. Div. 463, 88 Dicker v. Jackson, 6 C. B. 103, 114, 123 DickermanV Lord, 21 Iowa, 338, 802 Dickerson v. Gordon, 5 N. Y. Supl. 310, 1792 Dickey v. Linscott, 20 Maine, 453, 283, 236 Dickey v. Maine Telegraph Co., 46 Maine, ^ K h „ 1576 Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376, lf>"3 TABLE OF CASES. lxxxvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Dickinson v. Calahan, 19 Pa. St. 227, 287 Dickinson v. Dodds, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 463, 60 Dickinson v. Edwards, 77 N. ¥. 573, Dickinson y. Follett, 1 M. & B. 299, 332 Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 29, 167 Dickinson v. Hall, 14 Pick. 217, 233 Dickinson v. Hart, 142 N. Y. 183, 487, 501 Dickinson v. Metacomet, etc., Bank, 130 Mass. 132, 573 Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65, 783, 2241, 2247 Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1261, 2177 Dickson v. Frisbee, 52 Ala. 165, 652 Dickson v. Gourdin, 29 S. Car. 343, 196 Dickson v. Eawson, 5 Ohio St. 218, 1643 Dickson v. Thomas, 97 Pa. St. 278, 1914, 1930 Dickson v. Zizinia, 10 C. B. 602, 338 Diebold Safe Co. v. Huston, 55 Kan. 104, 40, 347 Dieckhoff v. Fox, 56 Minn. 438, 1905 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149 Diffenderfer v. Scott, 5 Ind. App. 243, 230, 233 Diefenthaler v. Mayor, etc., New York, 111 N. Y. 331, 459, 460 Diem v. Koblitz, 49 Ohio St. 41, 152 Dietert v. Friday (Texas Civ. App. 1893), 22 S. W. Bep. 291, 2219 Dietz v. Winehill, 6 Wash. 109. 1759 Dike t. Erie By. Co., 45 N. Y. 113, 735 Dike v. Eeitlinger, 23 Hun, 241, 126 Dikemanv. Dikeman, 11 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 484, 2154 Dill v. Wareham, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 438, 1895, 1949 Dillaby v. Wilcox, 69 Conn. 71, 598, 603, 604, 609 Dillingham v. Estill, 3 Dana (Ky.), 21, 550 Dillman y. Nadlehoffer, 119 HI. 567, 989, 1010 Dillon v. Allen, 46 Iowa, 299, 1890 Dillon t. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231, 172 Dillon v. Barnard, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 430, 2180 Dillon v. Brown, 11 Gray, 179, 2184 Dillon v. City of Syracuse (Sup.), 9 N. Y. SupL 98, 1559 Dillon v. Coppin, 4 M. & Cr. 647, 88 Dillon v. Eussell, 5 Neb. 584, 572 Dilly v. Barnard, 8 Gill & J. 170, 1148 Dilzer v. Building Assn. (Pa. 1892), 39 Leg. Int. 383, 801 Dilworth v. Bostwick, 1 Sweeny (N. Y.), 581, 684 Dimmitt v. Kansas City, etc., B. Co., 103 Mo. 433, 738 Dimmitt v. Bobbins, 7 Texas, 441, 1834 Dimond y. Sanderson, 103 Cat. 97, 1747 Dingeldein v. Third Ave. E. Co., 37 N. Y. 575, 238 Dingley v. Bon, 130 N. Y. 607, 416, 419 Dingley v. Oler, 11 Fed. Eep. 372, 496 Dingley v. Oler. 117 V. S. 490, 497, 2222 Dinham v. Bradford, 5 Ch. App. 519, 1094, 1212 Dinsmore v. Livingston Co., 60 Mo. 241, 126 Dintleman v. Gilbert, 140 111. 597, 1102 Dinwiddie v. Self, 145 111. 290, 1064 Dion v. St. John Baptiste Society, 82 Maine, 319, 1943 Direct Exeter E. Co., In re, 3 DeG. & Sm. 234, 260 Dirkson v. Knox, 71 Iowa, 728, 1065 Disborough v. Neilson, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 81, 1921 Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N. J. Law, 343, 790 Disbrow v. Harris, 122 N. Y. 302, 52 Dispatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manfg. Co., 12 N. H. 231, • 1349, 1350 Distilling, etc., Co. v. People, 11 Lewis's Am. E. E. & Corp. Eep. 353; 156 111. 448, District Tp. of Norway v. District Tp. of Clear Lake, 11 Iowa, 506, 1950 District of Columbia v. Gallaher, 124 U. S. 505, 876 District of Columbia v. Waggaman, 4 Mackey (D. C.) , 328, 1478 District of Columbia V.Washington, etc., Ey. Co., 1 Mackey (D. C), 361, 1584 Ditson v. Ditson, 4 E. I. 87, 2122 Dively v. City of Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 227 1519 Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. St. 106, 1764 Diversy v. Kellogg, 44 111. 114, 1759 Divine v. Divine, 58 Barb. 264, 1143 Dix v. Marcy, 116 Mass. 416, 693, 837 Dixon v. Brooklyn City Eailroad, 100 N. Y. 170, 588 Dixon v. Clarke, 5 C. B. 365, 383, 387, 395 Dixon v. Duke, 85 Ind. 434, 670 Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 1526 Dixon v. Fletcher, 3 M. & W. 146, 304 Dixon v. Oliver, 5 Watts, 509, 1163 Dixon v. Olmstead, 9 Vt. 310, 2072 Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 1529, 1530 Dixson v. Merritt, 21 Kinn. 196, 1789 Doan v. Dow, 8 Ind. App. 324, 1155 Doane v. Dunham, 79 111. 131, 913 Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. 355, 423 Dobbins v. Edmonds, 18 Mo. App. 387, 95 Dobie v. Larkan, 10 Ex. 776, 387 Dobinson v. McDonald, 92 Cal. 33, 578 Dobson v. Sotheby, 1 Moody & M. 90, 317 Dock v. Boyd. 93 Pa. St. 92, 609 Docter v. Hellberg, 65 Wis. 415, 1182 Doctor Barter Co. v. Hopkins, 83 Wis. 309, 501 Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Allen, 426, 167 Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429, 183, 193 Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss. 570, 1013 Dodge v. Favor, 15 Gray, 82, 915 Dodge v. Fearey, 19 Hun, 277, 3S1 Dodge v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441, 236, 247 Dodge v. StUes, 26 Conn. 463, 187, 188 Dodge v. Trust Co.. 93 U.S. 379, 1443 Dodge v. Walley, 22 Cal. 224, 884 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (U. S.) 331, 2117, 2131 Dodds, In re, 60 L. J. Q. B. 599, 88 Dodsley v. Varley, 12 A. & E. 632, 663 Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N. Car. 149, 793 Dodson v. Lomax, 113 Mo. 555, 1089 Dodson v. Lomax (Mo. 1893), 21 S. W. Eep. 25, 1063 Doe v. Brewer, 4 M. & S. 300, 549 Doe v. Knight, 5 B. & C. 671, 88, 89 Doe v. Lewis, 11 C. B. 1035, 89 Doe v. Martin, 4 T. E. 39, 894 Doe v. Eugeley, 6 Q, B. 107, 281 Doe v. Ulph, 13 Q. B. 204, 277 Doe v. Williams, 1 H. Bl. 25, 884 Doebling v. Loos, 45 Mo. 150, 452 Doernbecher v. Columbia, etc., Lu m ber Co., 21 Ore. 573, 1206, 1236 Doewin v. Smith, 35 Yt. 69, _ 2242 Dogge v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 501, H7 Doggett v. Eailroad Co., 99 U. S. 72, 1587 Doogood v. Eose, 9 C. B. 132, 114 Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604, 392, 400 Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 194, 2019, 2000 Doolittle v. Luzerne Co., 6 Kulp, 495, 461 Dooper v. Noelke, 5 Daly, 413, 466 Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Maine, 422, 249 Dole v. Stinson, 21 Pick. 384, 663 Dole v. Young, 24 Pick. 250, 613 Dolittle v. Eddy, 7 Barb. 74, 643 Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655, 1403 Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 127, 130, 131, 132, 2225 Doll v. State, 45 Ohio St. 445, 1592 Dollner v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86, 1700 Dolloff v. Inhabitants of Ayer, 162 Mass. 569. 1476 lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & St. 590, 751 Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91, 1786 Dolph v. Troy, etc., Machinery Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 553. 2056 Dolsen v. Arnold, 10 How. Pr. 528, 526, 527 Don v. Lippmann, 5 C. & F. 1, 710 Donahue's Appeal, 62 Conn. 370, 1181 Donahue v. McNulty, 24 Cal. 411, 853 Donalds v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 447, 1695 Donaldson y. Waters, 35 Ala. 107, 630 Donegan v. Donegan, 103 Ala. 488, 1768 Donellan v. Read, 3 Bam. & Ad. 899, 655 Donnelly v. Corbett. 7 N. Y. 500, 2125 Donham y. Hahn, 127 Mo. 439, 1280 Donnell v. State, 76 Ind. 524, 1482 Donohue v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. (Mass.) IIS, 523,525 Donovan v. Halsey, etc., Engine Co., 58 Mich. 38, 175, 783 Donovan v. McCarty, 155 Mass. 543, 2099 Donovan v. Sheridan, 21 N. Y. Supl. 116, 2211 Donovan v. Ward, 100 Mich. 601, 1794 Doran v. Smith, 49 Vt. 353, 1802 Dord v. Bonnaffee, 6 La. Ann. 563, 698 Doremus v. Dutch Reformed Church, 3 N. J. Eq. 332, 1338 Doremus v. McCormick, 7 Gill, 49, 543 Dorgan v. Weeks, 86 Ala. 329, 1117 Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451, 275 Dorr v. Munsell, 13 Johns. 430, 179 Dorrington v. Myers, 11 Neb. 388, 702 Dorris v. Sweeney, 60 N. Y. 463, 1325 Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24, 972 Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, 825 Doty v. Chicago R. Co., 49 Minn. 499, 587 Doty v. Clint, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 87, 1664 Doty v. Crawford, 39 S. Car. 1, 399, 401 Doty v. Martin, 32 Mich. 402, 2038, 2039 Doty v. Wilson, 5 Lans. 7, 562 Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378, 197, 2016 Doty v. Willson, 47 N. Y. 580, 559, 560 Dougherty v. Hitchcock, 35 Cal. 512, 1468 Dougherty v. Hunter, 54 Pa. St. 380, 1281 Dougherty v. Seymour, 16 Colo. 289, 2019 Dougherty v. Sprinkle, 88 N. Car. 300, 1703 Dougherty v. Stamps, 43 Mo. 243, 976 Dougherty v. Stone, 66 Hun, 498, 594 Douglas v. Com., 108 Pa. St. 559, 1552, 1553 Douglas v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677, 1532, 1540, 2149, 2207 Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. 150, 696 Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T. R. 683, 395 398 Douglas v. Shumway, 13 Gray, 498, 640 Douglas v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 468, 1919 Douglas v. White, 3 Barb. Ch. 621, 192 Douglas County, Commissioners of, v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, 1428 Douglass v. Com., 10< Pa. St. 559, 1544 Douglass v. Davie, 2 McCord (S. Car.), 218, 2184 Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35, 1132 Douglass v. Ireland, 73 N. Y. 100, 1372 Douglass v. Moody, 80 Ala. 61, 1065 Douglass v. Lucas, 63 Pa. St. 9, 1688 Douglass v. SattiTleo, 11 John. 16, 549 Douglasse v. Waurl, 1 Ch. Cas. 100, 226 Dounce v. Dow, 61 N. Y. 411, 348 Dow v. Clark, 7 Gray, 198, 239 Dow v. Harkin (N. H. 1893), 29 Atl. Rep. 846, 2256 Dow v. Iowa Central R. Co., 144 N. Y. 426, 1442, 1449 Dow v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 260, 1417 Dow v. Whetteu, 8 Wend. 160, 926 Dow v. Worthen, 37 Vt. 108, 672,673 Dowell v. Talbot Paving Co., 138 Ind. 675, 1495 Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478, 659 Dowling v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 168 Pa. St. 234, 319 Down v. Hatcher, 10 Ad. & El. 121, 189 Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39, 717, 728 Downey v. Farmers' and M. Bank, 12 S. & R. 288, 830 Downey v. Hinchman, 25 Ind. 453, 214 Downey v. Hicks, 14 How. 240, 452, 456 Downey v. McGinn, 1 City Ct. (N. Y.) 478, 465 Downey v. Smith, 2 Dev. Eq. 535, 22 Downie v. White, 12 Wis. 176, 156, 1325 Downing v. Funk, 5 Rawle, 69, 204 Downing t. Plate, 90 111. 268, 394, 395 Downs V. Marsh, 29 Conn. 409, 666 Downs v. Smit, 15 Mo. App. 583, 143 Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121, 2280 Dows v. Nat., etc., Bank, 91 U. S. 618, 886 Dows v. Sweet, 1.34 Mass. 140, 604 Doxey v. Miller, 2 Brad. (111. App.) 30, 1948 Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208, 6-17, 649, 654, 957 Doyle v. Glasscock, 24 Texas, 200, 1327 Doyle v. Lynn, etc., R. Co., 118 Mass. 195, 2099 Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. 109, 40, 2044 Drake v. Found Treasure Min. Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 474, 717 Drake v. Goree. 22 Ala. 409, 152 Drake V. Lanmng, 49 N. J. Eq. 452, 7, 177 Drake v. Inhabitants of Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393, U73 Drake v. Seaman, 97 N. Y. 230, 683 Drake v. Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393, 210 Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen, 141, 610 Drake v. White, 117 Mass. 10, 300 Draper v. Hitt, 43 Vt. 439, 399, 517, 1631 Draper v. Randolph, 4 Harr. (Del.) 454, 779 Draper v. Snow, 20 N. Y. 331, TO Drayton v. Chandler, 93 Mich. 383, 2256 Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407, 688, 1147 Dresser, etc., Co. v. Waterston, 3 Mete. 9, 162 Drexler v. Tyrrell, 15 Nev. 114, 1886, 1891 Drew v. Claggett, 39 N. H. 431, 2257 Drew v. Corliss, 65 Vt. 650, 1063 Drew v. Drum, 44 Mo. App. 25, 1644 Drew v. Edmunds, 60 Vt. 401, 325 Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Maine, 231, 250, 252 Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. St. 234, 642 Drew v. Smith, 59 Maine, 393, 718 Drinkwater v. Jordan, 46 Maine, 432, 541, 573, 574 D-ohan v. Lake Shore R. Co., 162 Mass. 435, 521 Drown v. Ingels, 3 Wash. St. 424, 1044 Drue v. Thome, Aleyn, 72, 1651 Drummond v. Burrell, 13 Wend. 307, 651 Drum Seed Co. v. McFarland Co. (Texas App. 1895), SOS. W. Rep. 93, 750 Druon v. Sullivan, 66 Vt. 609, 90S Drary v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299, 1401 Drury v. De Fontaine, 1 Taunt. 131, 2094 Drary v. Foster, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 24, 1740 Drury v. Henderson, 36 111. App. 521, 194 Drury v. Holden, 121 111. 130, 466 Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vernon, 412, 425 Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546, 684, 687, 688 Druse v. Wheeler, 22 Mich. 439, 641 Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87, 355, 358 Dryden v. Stephens, 19 W. Va. 1, 536 Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551, 286 Dubach v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 89 Mo. «3, 1581 Dube v. Beaudry, 150 Mass. 448, 1797 Dubois v. Delaware Canal Co., 4 Wend. (N.Y.1285, 2181 Duck v. Mayen, L. R. (1892) 2 Q. B. 511, 577 Duckworth v. Allison, 1 Mees. & W. 412, 758 Dudgeon v. Haggart, 17 Mich. 273, 868 Dudley v. Bland, 83 N. Car. 220, 542, 572 Dudley v. Danforth, 61 N. Y. 626, 1364 Dudley v. Mayhew, 2 Cornst. 9, 234 Dueber Mnfg. Co. v. Howard Clock Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 851, 1981 Duff v. Snider, 54 Miss. 245, 656 Duifield v. Barnum Wire & Iron Works, 64 Mich. 293, 1319 Duffleld v. Hue, 129 Pa. St. 94, 885 TABLE OF CASES. lxxxix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Duffy v. O'Donovan, 46 N. Y. 223, Duffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. St. 240, 763 Duffy v. Shockey, 11 Ind. 70, 2044 Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 667, 152, 887, 2222 Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill (Md.) , 138, 850 Dugan v Lewis, 79 Texas, 246, 730 Duggan v. Colorado, etc., Investment Co., 11 Colo. 113, 1434 Duggan v. Pacific Boom Co., 6 Wash. 593, „. , 1274, 1356 Dugger v. Hicks, 11 Ind. App. 374, 1494 Dula v. Cowles, 7 Jones L. (N. Car.) 290, 2191 Duke v. Brown, 96 N. Car. 127, 1516 Duke v. Markham, 105 N. Car. 138, 1231, 1244 Duke v. Taylor (Fla. 1896), 19 So. Eep. 172, 1406, 1408 Duke of Leeds v. Earl of Amherst, 2 Phil. Ch. 117, 1019 Dulin v. Prince, 124 111. 76, 489 Dullanty v. Town of Vaughn, 77 Wis. 38, 1508, 1509 Duluth, City of, v. McDonnell (Minn. 1895) , 63 N. W. Eep. 863, 1477 Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Knowl- ton, 22 Minn. 229, 190, 519, 523, 544 Dumestre, Succession of (45 La. 1892), 12 So. Eep. 123, 1762 Dumont v. Duf ore, 27 Ind. 263, 2016 Dunbar v. De Boer, 44 111. App. 615, 384, 406 Dunbarv. Foreman (S. Car. 1894), 1683, Dunbar v. Harden. 13 N. H. 311, 212, 233 Dunbar v. Smith, 66 Ala. 490, 610 Dunbar v. Tirey (Texas App.), 17 S. W. Eep. 1116, 209, 211 Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns. 249, 184, 186, 788 Duncan v. Barker, 21 Kan. 548, 135, 146, 147, 148 Duncah v. Clark, 2 Eich. Law (S. Car.), 587, 1750 Duncan v. Dixon, 44 Ch. Div. 211, 1807 Duncan v. Duncan, 1 Watts, 322, 19 Duncan v. Duncan, 93 Ky. 37, 1200 Duncan v. Sanders, 50 111. 475, 232 Dunckel v. Dunckel, 141 N. Y. 427, 1192, 1198 Dunckel v. Dunckel, 56 Hun, 25, 842 Dunckel v. Failing, 5 N. Y. Supl. 504, 209 Duncomb v. New York, etc., E. Co., 84 N. Y. 190, 1281, 1293, 1296, 1307. 1308, 1393, 1406 Duncombe v. Eichards, 46 Mich. 166, 1030 Duncultv. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189, 660 Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean (U. S. Cir.), 397, 2117 Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, 620, 1717 Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494, 593 Dunham v. Boston & A. E. Co., 46 Hun, 245, 124 Dunham t. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224, 803, 2012 Dunham v. Jackson. 6 Wend. 22, 388 Dunham v. Pettee, 8 N. Y. 508, 115 Dunham v. Steele Packing Co., 100 Mich. 75, 1062 Dunkell, Matter of, 5 Dem. (N. Y.) 188, 465 Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415, 490 Dunlap t. Montgomery, 123 Pa. St. 27, 285 Dunlap v. Petrie, 35 Miss. 590, 152 Dunlap v. Water Com'rs of Erie, 151 Pa. St. 477, 1467 Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241, 2033 Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 381, 56, 57, 58 Dunmore, Countess of, v. Alexander, 9 Shaw & Dunlap, 190, 77 Dunne v. Ferguson. Hayes, 540, 636 Dunn v. People, 40 111. 465, 1956 Dunn v. Ealyea, 6 Watts & S. 475, 1174, 1175 Dunn t. Tharp, 4 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 7, 617 Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon. 376, 615 Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 241, 245 Dunphy v. Eyan, 116 U. S. 491, 645, 692 Dunsbach v. Hollister, 49 Hun, 352, 276 Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 634, 1136 Dunton v. Dunton, 18 Victorian L. Eep. 114, 233 Dunton v. Niles, 95 Cal. 494, 2203 Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387 130, 131, 134 Duppa v. Mayo, 1 William Saund. 275d, 636 Dupre v. Eeiu, 7 Abb. (N. C.) 256. 1758 Dupre v. Thompson, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 279, 2073 Durango, Town of, v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257, 1508 Durango, City of, v. Eeinsberg, 16 Colo. 327, 1474 Durant v. Comegys, 2 Idaho, 936, 1129 Durant v. Ehener, 26 Minn. 362, 2097 Durant v. Eitchie, 4 Mason, 45, 1672 Durant v. Titley. 7 Price, 577, 2007 Durell y. Wendell, 8 N. H. 369, 574 Durfee v. O'Brien, 16 E. I. 213, 655, 056 Durfee v. Newkirk, 83 Mich. 522, 327 Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., E. Co., 5Allen, 230, 1462 Durgin v. American Express Co., 66 N. H. 277, 1961 Durham v. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211, 246 Durham v. Board of Commissioners, 95 Ind. 182, 807 Durham v. Hiatt, 127 Ind. 514, 646 Durham, etc., Land Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. Car. 381, 630 Durkin v. Cranston, 7 John. 412, 798 Durland v. Durland, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 174, 1670 Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, L. E. 6 Q. B. Div. 234, 481 Durrell v.Todd, 31 Neb. 256, , 474 Durst v. Swift, 11 Texas, 273, 756 Duryea v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 592, 25, 170 Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70, 1189 Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U. S. 630, 365 Dussol v. Bruguiere, 50 Cal. 456, 827 Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72, 388 Dutcher v. Wright, 94 V. S. 553, 153 Dutton v. Poole, 2 Levinz, 210, 231 Dutton v. Thompson, 23 Ch. Div. 278, 1018 Duval v. Wellman, 1. N. Y. Supl. 70, 1972 Duvall v. Myers, 2 Md. Ch. 401, 1105 Duvall v. Parker, 2 Duv. 182, 363 Duvall v. Eoder, 46 La. Ann. 814, 1675 Duvall v. United States, 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1162, 1537 Duvall v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 1640 Duvals v. Boss, 2 Munf. 290, 110 Duvenick v. Missouri Pac. Eailroad Co., 40 Mo. App. 31, 1966 Duvergier v. Fellows, 5 Bing. 248, 279 Dwelle v. Dwelle, 1 Kan. App. 473, 268 Dwelley v. Dwelley, 143 Mass. 509, 815, 876 Dwen v. Blake, 44 111. 135, 970 Dwenger v. Branigan, 95 Ind. 221, 1720 Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 876 Dwight v. Badgley, 27 N. Y. Supl. 107, 1926 Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50, 274 Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566, 421, 1142 Dwight v. Eckert, 117 Pa. St. 490, 102 Dwight v. Germania, etc., Insurance Co., 103 N. Y. 341, 313, 853, 902 Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175, 2039, 2049 Dwight v. Newell, 15 111. 333, 549 Dwinel v. Brown, 54 Maine, 468, 753 Dwinel v. Howard, 30 Maine, 258, 152 Dwyer v. Gulf, etc.. By. Co., 69 Texas, 707, 920 Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. E. Ired. 590, 674, 687, 688 Dycus v. Hart, 2 Texas Civ. App. 354, 1667 Dye v. Kerr, 15 Barb. 444, 792 Dye v. Dye, 11 Cal. 167, 161 Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Vesey Jr. 506, 426 Dyer v. Hunt, 5 N. H. 401, 696 Dyer v. Sutherland, 75 111. 583, 549 Dyett v. North American Coal Co., 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 570, 1703 Dygert v. Eemerschnider. 32 N. Y. 629, 222, 618 Dyke v. Spargur. 143 N. Y. 651, 1125, 1126 Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 497, 920 Dvkema v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 101 Mich. 47, 2219 Dykers v. Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57, 1916 xc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Dynen v. McCullough, 46 N. J. Eq. 11, 748, 749 Dzialynski v. Bank, 23 Fla. 346, 1737 E Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9, 1039, 1830, 1832, 1836 Eads v. Carondelet, 42 Mo. 113, 4, 6, 69 Eads v. Murphy, 52 Ala. 520, 219 Eagle v. Kohn, 84 111. 292, 1885 Eakle v. Heynolds, 54 Md. 305, 1024 Eakrigbt v. Torrent (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Eep. 293. 840 Eames v. Dorsett, 147 111. 540, 1665 Eames v. Sweetser, 101 Mass. 78, 1660 Eames Brake Co. v. Prosser, 8S Hun, 343, 523 Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596, 9, 230, 232 Earle v. Bickford, 6 Allen (Mass.), 549, 1949 Earle v. Coburn, 130 Mass. 596, 1476 Earle v. Middleton, Cheves, 127, 366 Earle v. Norfolk, etc., Hosiery Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 188, 1039, 1813 Earlo v. Oliver, 2 Ex. 71, 194 Earle v. Heed, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 387, 1801 Earle v. Seattle, etc., E. Co., 56 Fed. Bep. 909, 1422 Earley v. Law, 42 S. Car. 330, 1703 Earl of Aylesford's Case, 2 Stra. 783, 844 Earl of Chesterfield v. Ganssen, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 541, • 1815 Earl of Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 Cromp. & M. 89, 636 Earle of Milltown v. Stewart, 3 Mylne & C. 18; 8 Sun. 371, 1873 Earl of Shrewsbury v. Gould, 2 B. & Aid. 487, 883 Earp v. Tyler, 73 Mo. 617, 1 IS Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637, 184 East Anglican By. Co. v. Eastern Counties By. Co., 11 C. B. 775. 1248, 1430 Easter y. White, 12 Ohio St. 219, .616 Eastern Granite Co. v. Heim, 89 Iowa, 698, 636 Eastern Ice Co. v. King, 86 Vir. 97, 193 Eastham v. Powell, 51 Ark. 530, 14 East Hartford. Town of, v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 511, 2113 Eastin v. Ducrest, 21 La. Ann. 656, 2021 East Jordan Lumber Co. v. Tillage of East Jordan, 100 Mich. 201, 1561 East Lincoln, Town of, v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801, 1461 East Louisiana B. Co. v. City of New Or- leans, 46 La. Ann. 526, 1583 Eastman v. Batchelder, 36 N. H. 141, 490 Eastman v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387, 543 Eastman v. Provident Belief Assn., 65 N.H. 176, 1075 Eastman v. Eied, 101 Ala. 320, 1098 Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 278, 1910 East Norway Lake Church v. Froislie, 37 Minn. 447, 1434 Easton v. Easton, 112 Mass. 443, 210, 1473 Easton v. Mitchell, 21 111. App. 189, 871 Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. 307, 122 Easton v. Pickersgill, 55 N. Y. 310, 876 Easton v. Pratchett, 1 C. M. & E. 798, 11 Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. St. 442, 2137 Easton, etc., Co. v. Millington, 105 Cal. 49, 1113 East Eiver Bank v. Butterworth, 45 Barb. 476, 457 East Eiver Gas Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557, 1546 East St. Louis, City of, v. East St. Louis Gas Light and Coke Co., 98 111. 415, 1519, 1564, 1565, 1567 East Tennessee Co. v. Gammon, 5 Sneed, 537, 259 East Tennessee, etc., E. Co. v. Johnson, 75 Ala. 596, 907, 920, 931 East Tennessee E. Co. v. Wright, 76 Geo. 532, 397, 407 Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438, 183, 192, 258, 597 Easun v. Buckeye Brewing Co., 51 Fed. Eep. 156, 1260 Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119, 1323, 1326 Eaton v. Burns, 31 Ind. 390, 823 Eaton v. Eaton, 35 N. J. Law, 290, 800, 1813, 1837, 2276 Eaton v. Hill, 50 N. H. 235, 1790 Eaton v. Libbey, 42 N. E. Eep. 1127, 228 Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 Mats. 424, 534, 538, 1631 Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. 150, 903, 904 Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 1337 Eaton v. Wells, 22 Hun, 123, 379 Eaton v. Whitaker, 18 Conn. 222, 836 Eaton v. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156, 1879 Eaton v. Woolly, 28 WK 62S, 793 Eberle v. Mehrbach, 55 N. Y. 682, 2098 Ebert v. Wood, 1 Bin. 216, 628 Eccleston v. Clipsham, 1 Saund. 153, 828 Eckel v. Bostwick, 88 Wis. 493, 1197, 1217 Ecker v. Bonn, 45 Md. 290, 1997 Ecker v. McAllister, 45 Md. 290, 1997 Eckerly v. McGhee, 85 Tenn. 661, 1699 Eckman v. Scott, 34 Neb. 817, 1723 Eckman v. Township of Brady, 81 Mich. 70, 782 Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248, 1208 Eclipse Tow- Boat Co. v. Pontchartrain E. Co., 24 La. Ann. 1, _ 2054 Economy, etc., Association v. Hungerbueh- ler, 93 Pa. St. 258, 1607 Eddy, The, 5 Wall. 481, 124 Eddy v. Capron, 4 E. I. 394, 1988, 2081 Eddy v. Davis, 116 N. Y. 247, 388, 1142 Eddy v. Graves, 23 Wend. 82, 12 Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Maine 338, 1830, 1831 Eddy v. Eoberts, 17 111. 505, 594, 607 Eddy v. Winchester. 60 N. H. 63, 724 Edelen v. Gough, 5 GiU, 103, 684 Edelman v. Latshaw, 159 Pa. St. 644, 966 Eden v. Parkison, 2 Doug. 732, 354 Eden v. Smyth, 5 Ves. 341, 553, 557 Edichal Bullion Co. v. Columbia Gold Min. Co., 87 Va. 641, 1113 Edinboro' Academy v. Bobinson, 37 Pa. St. 210, 1320 Edings v. Brown, 1 Eich. Law, 255, 1189 Edgar v. Fowler, 3 East, 222, _ 1871 Edgcumbe v. Bod, 1 Smith's Bep. (Eng. K. B.) 515, 442 Edgcombe v. Eodd, 5 East, 29, 445, 518 Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199, 721, 722 Edgerly v. Shaw, 25 N. H. 514, 1771 Edgerton v. Hodge, 41 Vt. 676, 672 Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige, 352, 751 Edgerton v. State, 67 Ala. 588, 2100 Edgeware Highway Board v. Harrow Dis- trict Gas Co., L. E. 10 Q. B. 92, 204 Edling v. Bradford, 30 Neb. 593, 868 Edmondson v. Welsh, 27 Ala. 578, 1289 Edmunds v. Mister, 58 Miss. 765. 1777 Edsall v. Camden, etc., Co., 50 N. Y. 661, 882 Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641, 213 Edwards v. Bowden, 103 N. Car. 50, 1834 Edwards V. Bowden, 99 N. C. 80, 853 Edwards v. Brown, 68 Texas, 329, 1682 Edwards v. Campbell, 23 Barb. 423, 559 Edwards v. Carson Water Co., 21 Nev. 469, 1349, 1350, 1356, 1374 Edwards v. Carter, 1 The Eeports, 218, 1787 Edwards v. Carter, 1 Stra. 473, 834 Edwards v. Coombe, L. E. 7 C. P. 519, 530,534 Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281, 183 Edwards v. Dick, 4 Barn. & Aid. 212, 1885 Edwards v. Estell, 48 Cal. 194, 2080 Edwards v. Farmers', etc., Ins. Co., 21 Wend. 467, 383 TABLE OF CASES. XC1 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Edwards v. Goldsmith, 16 Pa. St. 43, 878 Edwards v. Grand Junction Railway Co., 1 Mylne & C. 650, 1314, 1316 Edwards v. Grand T.-unk Hy. Co., 48 Maine, 379, 657, 658, 662, 663 Edwards v. Handler, 1 C. P. Div. Ill, 530 Edwards v. Harvey, 2 Colo. App. 169, 453 Edwards v. Hoemnghofl\36 Fed. Eep. 635, 1926 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 35, 2116, 2152, 2153, 2157 Edwards v. Kelly, 6 M. & S. 204, 608 Edwards v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 77 Pa. St. 378, 117, 769 Edwards v. McEnhill, 51 Mich. 160, 1754 Edwards v. Hives, 17 So. Eop. 416, 1113 Edwards v. Schoeneman, 104 111. 278, 1058, 1059 Edwards v. Stevens, 3 Allen (Mass.), 315, 1754 Edwards v. Symonds, 65 Mich. 348, 165 Edwards v. Thompson, 71 N. Car. 177, 427 Edwards v. Travelers' Co. , 20 Fed. Eep. 661, 119 Edwards v. Varick, 5 Denio, 664. 819 Edwards v. West, L. E. 7 Ch. Div. 858, 302 Eells v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 52 Fed. Eep. 903, 1962 Efner v. Shaw, 2 Wend. 567, 214 Egbert v. Baker, 58 Conn. 319, 722, 724 Ege v. Koontz, 3 Pa. St. 109. 458, 801 Egerton v. Earl Browning, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, s 1128, 1952, 1954 Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East, 307, 688 Eager v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667, 69, 71, 83 Eggleston v. Bumble, 20 N. Y. Supl. 819, 1919 Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 67 Engelhorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 76, 2179 Englebertv. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 1790 Ehfe v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97, 183, 268 Ehrlich v. .Etna Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 231, 500 Ehrsam v. Mahan, 52 Kan. 245, 1513 Eichelberger v. Murdock, 10 Md. 373, • 2210 Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, 41, 2179 Eilenberger v. Protective, etc., Insurance Co., 89 Pa. St. 464, 319 Eiler v. Crull, 99 Ind. 375, 777 Einstein v. Rochester Gas Co., 146 N. Y. 46 "55 Eise'lv.Hayes,141Ind.41, 106, 2045 Eisenhart v. Slaymaker, 14 S. & K. 153, 577 Elbring v. Mullen (Idaho 1894), 38 Pac. Rep 404 2178 Elder V. Schumacher, 18 Colo. 433, 1837 Eldred v. Malloy, 2 Colo. 320, 1914 Eldred v. Peterson, 80 Iowa, 264, 819 Eldridge v. Rowe, 7 111. 91, „ „ m „ 1« Electric, etc., Co. v. Gill, etc., Co., 125 Mo. 140 1124, 1209 Ely v. Positive, 34 Law T. R. (N. S.) 190, 1310 Ellas v. Gill, 92 Ky. 569, nnr 1947 Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225, 67 Eliot, etc., Bank v. Beal, 141 Mass. 566, 294 Elizabeth City Academy v. Lindsey, 6 Ired. Law, 476, „ „„ _ . 1323 Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 23g Also, ZUo4 Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 241 \i.L^> Elkins v. Parkhurst, 17 Vt. 105, 2198 Eloit N. Bank v. Beal, 141 Mass. 566, .,2227 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Ex. 424, „SVo2 Ellerv.LacyVl37Ind.436, 820,2186 Ellerman v. Chicago, etc., Stock Yards Co., 49 N.J. Eg, 217. ^^ 2035,2077 Ellerman v. Stockyards Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 917 ZUDO Ellic'ott v. Chamberlin, 38 N. J. Eq. 604, 1040, 1884 Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476, 647, 650, 652, 655 Elliott's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 161, 2044 Elliott v. Abbot, 12 N.H. 549, 1236 Elliott v.Bell, 37 W. Va. 834 810 Elliott v. CaldVell, 43 Mmm^ ^ ^ Elliott v. Elliott, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. (N. Car.) 57, 2286 Elliott v. Espenhain, 59 Wis. 272, 144 Elliott v. Gibbons. 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 498, 1799 Elliott v. Holbrook, 33 Ala. 659, 540, 572 Elliott v. Horn, 10 Ala. 348, 1791 Elliott v. Plattor. 43 Ohio St. 198, 428 Ellioi t v. Richardson, L. R. 5 C. P. 744, 2001 Elliott v. Saufley, 89 Ky. 52, 364 Elliott v. Sleeper, 2 N . H. 525, 1738 Elliott V. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, 807 Elliott v. Wanamaker, 155 Pa. St. 67, 905 Elliott v. Weed, 44 Conn. 19, 425 Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 289, 541 Ellis v. Burden, 1 Ala. 458, 1102 Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 789, 1181 Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 389, 204 Ellis v. Deadman, 4 Bibb, 466, 680 Ellis v. Ellis, 5 Texas C. App. 46, 1013 Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138, 543 Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52, 187, 897 Ellis v. Hammond, 57 Ga. 179, 2107 Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 1063 Ellis v. Mason, 32 S. Car. 277, 468, 469, 474 Ellis v. Mortimer, 1 Bos. & P. (New R.) 257, 133 Ellis v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 144 TJ. S. 458, 30 Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 557 Ellis v. Singletary, 45 Texas, 27, 2214 Ellis v. Ward (111.), 20 N.E. Rep. 671, 2284 Ellison v. Albright, 41 Neb. 93, 467 Ellison v. Brigham, 38 Vt. 764, 639 Ellithorpe Air Co. v. Sire, 41 Fed. Rep. 662, Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts, 89, 870, 871 Ellsworth v. Fogg, 35 Vt. 355, 1631 Ellsworth v. Low, 62 Iowa, 178, 1729 Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend. 235, 237 Elmer v. Pennel, 40 Maine, 430, 234 Elmore v. Marks, 39 Vt. 538, 17, 90 Elmore v. Naugatuck R. Co., 23 Conn. 457, 735, 737 Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458, 668 Elofrson v. Lindsay, 90 Wis. 203, 1052 El Paso, etc., Association v. Lane, 81 Texas, 369, 1605, 1629 Elston v. Castor, 101 Ind. 426, 29 Elston v. Chicago, 40 111. 514, 804 Elston v. Fieldman, 57 Minn. 70, 346 Elston v. Jasper, 45 Texas, 409, 1813 Elting v. Dayton, 17 N. Y. S. 849, 2174 Elting v. Sturtevant, 41 Conn. 455, 465 Elting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. 237, 204 Elting Woolen Co. v. Martin, 5 Daly, 417, 149 Elton v. Brogdon, 4 Camp. 281, 333 Elton v. Johnson, 16 Conn. 253, 438 Elton v. Jordan, 1 Stark. 102, 333 Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336, 1286 Elwell v. Puget Sound E. Co., 7 Wash. 487 l Neb. 52, 2098 Fitzgerald v. Dressier, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 885, 596, 608 Fitzgerald v. Evans, 40 Minn. 541, 332, 333 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, etc., Construc- tion Co., 41 Neb. 374, 262, 441, 1295, 2283, 2289 Fitzgerald v. Fuller, 19 Hun, 180, 170 Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28, 13 Fitzgerald v. Hanson, 16 Mont. 474, 916 Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pacific E. Co., 45 Fed. Eep. 812. 1453 Fitzgerald v. Moran, 19 N. Y. Supl. 958, 95, 100 Fitzgerald v. Quann, 109 N. Y. 441, 1736 Fitzgerald v. Smith, 1 Ind. 310, 193 Fitzgerald v. Staples, 88 IU. 234, 854 Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148, 128 Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U S 98 1359 Fit'zhugh'v. £itzhugh, 11 Gratt. 210, 561 Fitzhughv. Franco, etc., Land Co., 81 Texas, 306, 1350 Fitzhugh v. Wilcox, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 235, 1S22 Fitzmaurice v. Bayley, 9 H. L. Cas. 78, 684 Fitzpatrick v. Jieatty, 1 Gilman, 454, 1127 Fitzpatrick v. Dorland, 27 Hun, 291, 1172 Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 441, 160 Fiyas v. Nicholls, 2 Com. B. 500, 2101, 2112 Flack v. Garland, 8 Md. 188, 526 Fleck v. Warner, 25 Kan. 492, 165 Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 319. 1926, 1930, 1931 Flagg t. Eimes, 40 Vt. 16, 853 Flagg t. Gilpin, 17 H. 1. 10, 1022 Flagg v. Manhattan Eailroad Co., 10 Fed. Eep. 413, 1295 Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486, 433 Flagg v. Millbury, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 243, 2099 Flagg v. Southern Building Assn., 113 N. Car. 361, 2205 Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382, 127, l:«, 370, 371, 2193, 2231 Flake v. Nuse, 51 Texas, U\ 308 Flanagan v. Domarest, 3 Robt. 173, 145 Flanagan v. Meyer, 41 A'.a. 1;,2, 707, 2107 Flanagan v. Mitchell, 10 N. Y. Supl. 234, 201 Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. Iu8, 16 Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305, 397, 408 Flanders v. Lamphear, 9 N. H. 201, 490 Flanders V. Wood, S3 Texas, 277, 214 Flangan v. Great Western E. Co., L. E. 7 Eq. 116, 1421 Flanigan v. Seelye, 53 Minn. 23, 401 Flanitren v. City of Philadelphia, 51 Pa. St. 4: 1, 1175 Flannagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443, 214 Flarty v. Odium, 3 T. E. 6 1, 2084, 2036 Flash T. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 13 15 Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. Car. 296, 1702 Fleetwood v. City of New York, 2 Sandf. 475, 807 Fleetwood v. Green, 15 Yes, 594, 11-13 Flege v. Garve.v, 47 Cal. 371, 1187 Fleischmann v. Miller, 38 Mo. App. 177, 136, 144 Fleischmann v. Stern, 90 N. Y. 110, 2234 Fleming v. Bills, 3 Ore. 286, 1956 Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1, 420 Fleming v. Fleming, 33 S. Car. 505, 194, 195, 196 Fleming v. Fulton, 7 Miss. 473, 767 Fleming v. Holt, 12 W. Va. 143, 1179 Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528, 517, 951 Fleming v. Ogden, 152 Pa. 418, 1021 Fleming v. Eamsey, 46 Pa. St. 253, 635 Flemming v. Prescott, 3 Eich. Law (S, Car.), 307 1750 Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 564, 618 Flenniken v. Marshall (S. Car. 1895), 20 S. E. Eep. 788, 1381 Flesh v. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1, 1707 Fletcher t. Austin, 11 Vt. 447, 171 Fletcher v. Cole, 23 Vt. 114, 123, 150 Fletcher v. Drath, 66 Mo. 126, 357 Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 T. E. 32, 758 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67, 88, 89 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 2 MacArthur, 38, 843 Fletcher v. Grover, 11 N. H. 3G8, 826 Fletcher v. New York, etc., Ins. Co., 13 Fed. Eep. 526, 733 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 18, 2121, 2123 Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413, 1468 Fletcher v. Wurgler, 97 Ind. 223, 198, 511 Fleury v. Tufts, 25 111. App. 101, 163 Flexner v. Dickerson, 72 Ala. 318, 1776, 1778 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Euss. 298, 1190 Flint v. Clinton Co., 12 N. H. 430, 1231 Flint v. Gibson, 106 Mass. 391, 1131 Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass. 68, 239 Flint v. Eogers, 3 Maine, 67, 385 Flolickstein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725, 2094 Flood v. Thomasson (Ky. 1894), 25 S. W. Eep. 108, 1188 Florida, etc., E. Co. v. State, 31 Fla. 482, 1976, 1977 Florsheim v. Brestrup, 43 Minn. 298, 474 Flower v. Cornish, 25 Minn. 473, 1645 Flower v. Lance, 59 N. Y. 603, 800 Flower v. Marten, 2 M. & C. 459, 561 Floyd Acceptance, The, 7 Wall. 666, 1342, 1430 Floyd v. Maddux, 68 Ind. 124, 2171 Floyd v. Patterson, 72 Texas, 202, 1925 Floyd v. Patterson (Texas 1891), 18 S. W. Hep. 654, 1925 Fludyer v. Cocker, 12 Ves. 25, 1148 Flummerfelt v. Flummerfelt, 51 N. J. Eq. 432, 578 Flynn v. Hatton, 43 How. Pr. 333, 2170 Flynn v. Hurd, 118 N. Y. 19, 987 Flynn v. North American Ins. Co., 115 Mass. 449, 1241, 2184 Flynn v. Van Kleek (Iowa 1894), 58 N. Y. Eep. 1091, 1205 Foakes v. Beer, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605, 189, 190, 519 Foard v. Grinter (Ky.), 18 S. W. Eep. 1034, 200, 204, 206 Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S. 534, 1396 Fogg v. Portsmouth Atheneum, 44 N. H. 115, 787 Foland v. Town of Frankton, 142 Ind. „546, 1564 Foley v. Addenbrooke, 4 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 197, 828 Foley v. Crow, 37 Md. 51, 426 Foley v. Greene, 14 E. I. 618, 1039, 1828, 1832 Foley v. Hamilton, 89 Iowa, 686, 1070 Foley T. Hotry, 41 Nob. 5S3, 2289 Foley v. Mason, 6 Md. 37, 394 Foley v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 Hun, 63, 1781 Foley v. Speir, 100 N. Y. 552, 1865 Folk v. Fonda (N. J. Eq. 1894), 29 Atl. Eep. 676, 1661, 1662 Foil's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 434, 966 Follansbee v. Adams, 86 111. 13, 492, 2220 TABLE OF CASES. XCV11 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Follette v. United States Mutual, etc., As- sociation, 110 N. Car. 377, 2206 Follett v. Hall, 16 Ohio, 111, 761 Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. 395, 132 Folsom v. Cook, 115 Pa. 539, 902 Foltz v. State, 33 Ind. 215, 2094 Fonda v. Van Home, 15 Wend. 631, 215, 1771, 1773 Fones v. Rice, 9 Gratt. 568, 224 Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553, 739 Foot v. jEtna, etc., Insurance Co., 61 N. Y. 571, 307 Foot v. New Haven, etc., Co., 23 Conn. 214, 641 Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 317, 369 Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 115, 1829 Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98, 1884, 1974 Forbes v. Petty, 37 Neb. 899, 545 Forbes v. Watt, L. E. 2 Sc. & D. 214, 876 Forbis v. Inman. 23 Ore. 68, 185, 783, 785 Forbush v. Lombard, 13 Mete. 109, 894 Force v. Batavia, 61 111. 99, 1561 Force v. Dutcher, 18 N. J. Eq. 401, 1135 Force v. Haines, 17 N. J. Law, 385, 184, 185, 186 Forchsimer v. Stewart, 65 Iowa, 593, 96 Ford, Ex parte, L. E. 16 Q. B. Div. 305, 22 Ford T. Adams, 2 Barb. 349. 962 Ford v. Ballard, 1 Texas Civ. App. 376, 1739 Ford v. Beech, 11 Q. B. 852, 568 Ford v. Buckeye, etc., Insurance Co., 6 . Bush. 133, 700 Ford v. Chicago Milk, etc., Assn., 155 111. 166, 2058, 2070 Ford v. Cotesworth, L. E. 4 Q. B. 127, 270, 946, 2172 Ford v. Cowan, 64 Texas, 129, 1760 Ford v. Euker, 86 Va. 75, 1136 Ford v. Garner, 15 Ind. 298, 198 Ford v. Harrington, 16 N. Y. 285, 1011 Ford v. Hubinger, 64 Conn. 129, 521 Ford v. Livingston, 140 N. Y. 162, 1844 Ford v. McVay, 55 111. 119, 779 Ford v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 304, 457 Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 202, 1777 Ford v. Smith, 25 Ga. 675. 898 Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. & C. 325, 488 Ford v. Tirreil, 9 Gray, 401, 48, 49, 926, 2246 Ford v. Ward, 26 Ark. 360, 785 Ford v. Williams, 3 B. Mon. 550, "1364 Fordice v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7, 671 Fordyce v. Ford, 4 Brown Ch. 494, 1148 Fordyce v. Nix, 58 Ark. 136, 2167 Foreman v. AM, 55 Pa. St. 325, 2103 Foreman v. Bigelow, 4 Cliff. 508, 321 Forepaugh v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 128 Pa. St. 217, 695 Forester v. Forester, 10 Ind. App. 680, 2171 Forest Oil Co., Appeal of, 118 Pa. St. 138, 398 Forrest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. St. 481, 162 Forrester v. Flores, 64 Cal. 24, 842, 1202 Forstall, Succession of, 39 La. Ann. 1052, 1742 Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696, 681 Forster v. Taylor, 3 Camp. 49, 810 Forster v. Winfield, 142 N. Y. 327, 1150 Forsythe v. State, 6 Ohio, 19, 2016 Fort v. Eichey, 128 111. 502, 466 Fort Edward, etc., Co. v. Payne, 15 N. Y. 583, 156, 2083 Fortenbury v. State, 47 Ark. 188, 1926 Fort Scott E. Co. v. Sparks, 55 Kan. 288, 1432 Fort St. & E. E. Co. v. Schneider, 15 Mich. 74, 1584 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore E. Co., 132 Ind. 558, 1503 Fort Wayne Light Co. v. Miller, 131 Ind. 499, 375 Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U. S. 294, 1224, 1227 Ft. Worth E. Co. v. Greathouse, 82 Texas, 104, 1969 vii Fort Worth E. Co. v. Williams, 77 Texas, 121, 375 Forth v. Stanton, 1 Wms. Saunders, 210, 598 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. E. 27, 275 Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 1436 Fosdick v. Van Husan, 21 Mich. 567, 392 Fosdyke v. Nixon, 107 Ind. 138, 535 Foss v. City of Chicago, 56 111. 354, 1546 Foss v. Cummings, 149 111. 353, 1892 Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare, 461, 1980 Foss v. Haynes, 31 Maine, 81, 1157 Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen (Mass.), 76, 1834 Foster v. Bank of New Orleans, 21 La. Ann. 338, 2021 Foster v. Bartlett, 62 N. H. 617, 2257 Foster v. Belcher Sugar Co., 118 Mo. 238. 1362 Foster v. Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176, 327, 328 Foster v. Dawber, 6 Ex. 839, 561 Foster v. Drew, 39 Vt. 51, 399 Foster v. Gressett, 29 Ala. 393, 993 Foster v. Hackett, 112 N. Car. 546, 1185 Foster v. Hill, 36 N. H. 526, 458 Foster v. Hooper, 2 Mass. 572, 821 Foster v. Kimmons, 54 Mo. 488, 94 Foster v. Leach, 160 Mass. 418, 1745 Foster v. Maginnis, 89 Cal. 264, 1201 Foster v. Mayer, 20 N. Y. Supl. 487, 415 Foster v. McO'Blenis, 18 Mo. 88, 649, 653 Foster v. Mora, 98 U. S. 425, 2277 Foster v. Mullamphy Planing Mill Co., 92 Mo, 79, 1390 Foster v. Napier, 74 Ala. 393, 606 Foster v. NeUson, 2 Pet. 253, 35 Foster v. Pettibone, 7 N. Y. 433, 502 Foster v. Powers, 64 Texas, 247, 431 Foster v. Trull, 12 John. 456, 531 Foster v. Wooten, 67 Miss. 540, 2102 Foulke v. San Diego, etc., E. Co., 51 Cal. 365, 1275, 1349, 1895 Foulkes, In re, v. Hughes, 3 The Eeports, 682, 1806 Fountain v. Caine, 1 P. Wms. 504, 1780 Fountain v. Menard, 53 Minn. 443, 644 Fournet v. Beer, 21 La. Ann. 658, 2021 Fourth Nat. Bank v. Altheimer, 91 Mo. 190 2252 Fous't v. Shoffner, Phil. Eq. 242, 630 Fowell v. Forrest, 2 Saunders, 48, 568 Fowkes v. Manchester, etc., Assurance Association, 3 B. & S. 917, 883 Fowle v. Park, 131 D. S. 88, 2035, 2044, 2050, 2075 Fowle v. Torrey, 135 Mass. 87, 1754 Fowler v. Mtn&, etc., Insurance Co., 7 Wend. 270, 926 Fowler v. Austin Mfg. Co., 5 Ind. App. 489, 1473, 1566 Fowler v. Bowery, etc., Bank, 113 N. Y. 450, 2169 Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63, 292 Fowler v. Brantly, 14 Pet. 318, 941 Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240, 270 Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 68, 1757 Fowler v. Gilman, 13 Mete. 267, 165 Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14, 1234 Fowler v. United States, 3 Ct. CI. 43, 2119 Fox v. AbeL 2 Conn. 541, 2097 Fox v. Brady, 1 Texas Civ. App. 590, 1693 Fox v. Dixon, 12 N. Y. Supl. 267, 1907, 1908 Fox v. Jones, 1 W. Va. 205, 1667 Fox v. Kitton, 19 111. 519, 492, 496, 2220, 2221 Fox v. Mackreth, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 115, 44 Fox v. Mensch, 3 W. & S. 444, 2107 Fox v. Parker, 44 Barb. 541, 916 Fox v. Pullman Co., 16 Mo. App. 122, 136 Fox v. Scard, 33 Beav. 327. 2039, 2073 Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11, 785 Fox v. Walker, 62 N. H. 419, 500 Foxcraft Academy v. Favor, 4 Maine, 382, 254 Fraker v. Little, 24 Kan. 598, 799 XCV111 TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Fraley v. Dispham, 10 Pa. St. 320, 348 Frame v. Ausust, 8S 111. 424, 594 Frame v. Felix, 107 Pa. St. 47, 1551 Frame v. Frame, 32 W. Va. 463, 1179 France v. France, 8 N. J. Eq. 650, 7 Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cow. 506, 495 Francis, The Ship, 1 Gall. (U. S. C. C.) 445, 2020 Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 108, 379, 405, 526 Francis v. Lawrence, 43 N. J. Eq. 508, 1676 Francis v. Railway Co., 108 N. Y. 93, 531 Francis v. Wilkinson, 147 111. 370, 1022, 1023 Francisco v. Smith, 143 N. Y. 488, 2040 Frank v. Anderson, 13 Lea (Tenn.), 695, 1751 Frank v. Bobbin, 155 Mass. 112, 724 Frank v. Frank (Texas 1894) , 25 S. W. Rep. 819, 1662, 1667, 1730 Frank v- Hicks (Wy. 1894), 35 Pac. Rep. 475, 1368 Frank v. Jenkins, 11 Wash. 611, 265 Frank v. Morehead (N.J. Eq. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 1016, 707 Frank v. Pickens, 69 Ala. 369, 408' Frank v. Thomas, 35 111. App. 547, 27 Frankhouser v. Ellett, 22 kan. 127, 1857, 1858 Frankfort v. Capital, etc., Light Co. (Ky. 1895) , 29 S. W. Rep. 855, 1569 Frankfort, Inhabitants of, v. Winterport, 54 Maine, 250, 1853 Frankland v. Johnson, 147 111. 520, 1360 Franklin v. Lord Brownlow, 14 Ves. 550, 2266 Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 350, 1259, 1260 Frankfort Bridge Co. v. City of Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. 41, 1508 Franklin Bldg. Assn. v. Marsh, 29 N. J. Law, 225, 1621 Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Institution for Savings, 68 Maine, 23, 1249, 1259, 1262 Franklin Co. Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467, 2123, 2124 Franklin Ins. Co. v. Colt, 20 Wall. 560, 1097 Franklin, etc, Ins. Co. V.Wallace, 93 Ind. 7, 876 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. UpdegrafE, 43 Pa. St. 350, 896 Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 459, 1103 Fransen v. Eller, 34 Neb. 664, 2208 Franz, etc., Brewing Co. v. Mielenz, 5 Dak. 136, 1643 Frary v. Sterling, 99 Mass. 461, 648, 649, 655 Fraser v. Backus, 62 Mich. 540, 200 Fraser v. Gates, 118 111. 99, 655 Fraser v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 103 Cal. 79, 1275 Fraser v. Thompson, 4 DeG. & J. 659, 223 Fratcher v. Smith (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 832, 622 Fratt v. Clark, 12 Cal. 89, 2168 Frazee v. Frazee, 79 Md. 27, 1651 Frazer v. Gates, 118 111. 99, 842 Frazer v. Tunis, 1 Binn. 254, 563 Frazior v. Lanahan, 71 Md. 131, 474 Frazier v. Miller, 16 111. 48, 1133, 2287 Fr.'izii*r v. Virginia Military Institute, 81 V.i. 59, 2127 Fit;, r v Hardeubergh, 5 Johns. 272, 186, 0S5 Freckuig v. Holland, 53 N. Y. 422, 1652, 1746, 1747, 1748 Fredenburg v. Biddlecome, 17 Weekly Di.tr. 25 (N. Y.), Frcdonall v. Taylor, 26 Wis. 286, 1385 Fredricks v. Mayer, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 5l!Ii, 2072 Frederick Co. Mut. Ins. Co. ». Deford, 38 Md. 4U4, 897 Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310, 1817, 1850 Freedley v. French, 154 Mass. 339, 578, 588 Freeland v. Ritz, 154 Mass. 257, 684, C91 Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 2150 Freelove v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318, 1041 Freeman v. Boston, 5 Mete. 56, 10 Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483, 399 Freeman v. Brehm (Ind. App.), 30 N. E. Rep. 712, 187 Freeman v. Campbell, 55 Cal. 197, 825 Freeman v. Cooke, L. R. 2 Ex. 663, 2 Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34, 7, 627, 845, 851, 2274 Freeman v. Freeman, 66 111. 53, 794 Freeman v. Foss, 145 Mass. 361, 652 Freeman v. Kiefier, 101 Cal. 254, 971 Freeman v. People, 4Denio (N. Y.), 9, 1811 Freeman v. Smalley, 38 N. J. Law, 383, 183 Freeman v. Tucker, 20 Geo. 6, 465 Freemoult v. Dedire. 1 P. Wms. 429, 226 Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492, 495, 507, 2111 Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. Law, 285, 711, 728 Freeson v. Bissel, 63 N. Y. 168, 1126, 1144 Freeth v. Burr, L. R. 9 C. P. 208, 152 Freiberg v. De Lamar, 7 Texas Civil App. 263, 1730 Freiburg v. Langfelder, 46 La. Ann. 1417, 1674 Freidline v. Board of Trustees, 23 111. App. 494, 25S Freiler v. Kear, 126 Pa. St. 470, 1655 Fremoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. 429, 222 French v. Andrews, 145 N. Y. 441, 1353 French v Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 4 Keyes (N. Y.),108, 1963 French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614, 1515 French v. French, 84 Iowa, 655, 209, 211 French v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 279, 954 French v. Hall, 9 N. H. 137, 696 French v. Merrill, 132 Mass. 525, 1153 French v. O'Brien, 52 How. Pr. 394, 1278 French v. Parker, 16 R. I. 219, 2044 French v. Stramberg, 52 Texas, 92, 1682 French v. Teschemacker, 24 Cal. 518, 1386 Fresno Canal Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 373 Fresno, etc., Irrigation Co. v. Warner, 72 Cal. 379, 1336 Frey v. Fort Worth R. Co., 6 Texas Civ. App. 29, 106, 137 Friedenwald Co. v. Ashville Tobacco Co. (N. Car. 1895), 23 S. E. Rep. 490, 1448 Friend v. Miller, 52 Kan. 139, 1855, 2013 Frierson v. Branch. 30 Ark. 453, 1643 Fries v. Griffin, 35 Fla. 212, 1114 Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455, 540, 568 Frisbee v. Seaman, 49 Iowa, 95, 196 Frisbie v. Larned, 21 Wend. 450, 537, 543 Frisby v. Ballance, 4 Scam. 287, 1127 Frith v. Barker, 2 John. 327, 167 Frith v. Sprague, 14 Mass. 455, 826 Fritschv. Heislen, 40 Mo. 555, 707 Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282, 1265 Frizzle v. Dearth, 28 Vt. 787, 490 Froman v. Froman, 13 Ind. 317, 1079 Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 258, 793 Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, 1128, 1992, 1994 Frost v. Brigham, 139 Mass. 43, 565, 957 Frost v. Flanders, 37 N. H. 549, 3s3 Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. Ill, 492, 494, 498, 945, 2213, 2221 Frost v. Parker, 65 Iowa, 178, 1720 Frost v. Plumb, 40 Conn .111, 1043 Frost v. Tarr, 53 Ind. 390, 654 Frost v. Williams, 2 S. Dak. 457, 818, 889, 2190 Frost v. Wolf, 77 Tex. 455, 182, 1232 Frost v. Yonkers, etc., Bank, 70 N. Y. 553, 410 Frost's, etc., Lumber Works v. Millers, etc., Insurance Co., 37 Minn. 300, 885 Frostburg Mining Co. v. New England Glass Co., 9 Cush. 115, 669 Frothingham v. Haley, 3 Mass. 68, 563 Frothingbam v. Seymour, 121 Mass. 409, 300 Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318, 182 Fruin v. Crystal R. Co., 89 Mo. 397, 903, 931 Fruitt v. Anderson, 12 111. App. 421, 51 Fry v. Day, 97 Ind. 348, 979, 2167 TABLE OF CASES. XC1X {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .} Fry v. Lexington R. Co., 2 Mete. (Ky.) 814, 260 Fry v. Piatt, 32 Kan. 62, 675 Frye v. Shepler, 7 Pa. St. 91, 844 Fudiokar v. East Riverside Irrigation Dist., 109 Cal. 29, 1302, 1303 Fuld v. Kahn (Com. PI.), 24 N. Y. Supi. 558, 2176 Fulkerson v. Eads, 19 Mo. App. 620, 270 Fullam v. Adams, 37 Yt. 391, 263, 609 Fullam v. Rose, 160 Pa. St. 47, 1655 Fuller v. Baltimore, etc., Association, 67 Md. 433, 584, 586 Fuller v. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120, 274 Fuller v. Brown, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 440, 286 Fuller y. Carr, 33 N. J. Law, 157, 425 Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472, 1128, 1976, 1977, 1986, 2002, 2072 Fuller v. Duren, 36 Ala. 73, 781 Fuller y. Hawkins, 60 Ark. 304, 1052 Fuller y. Heath, 89 111. 385, 1520 Fuller y. Hope, 163 Pa. St. 62, 2032 Fuller v. Hubbard, 6 Cow. 13, 411 Fuller y. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 2, 510, 512, 522, 523, 524 Fuller y. Little, 7 N. H. 535, 388, 2257 Fuller y. McHenry, 83 Wis. 573, 1754 Fuller y. Mehl, 134 Ind. 60, 1397 Fuller y. Negus, 8 N. Y. Supl. 681, 452 Fuller y. Reed, 33 Cal. 99, 12 Fuller y. Rice, 52 Mich. 473, 693 Fuller y. Robb, 26 111. 246. 831 Fuller y. Rowe, 57 N. Y. 23. 1236, 1384 Fullmer y. Poust, 155 Pa. St. 275, 888 Fullerton y. Doyle, 18 Texas, 3, 1739, 1760 Fulp y. Beaver, 136 Ind. 319. 1663 Fulmer y. Wightman, 87 Wis. 573, 2210 Fulton y. Grand Trunk R. Co., 17 TJ. C. Q. B. 428, 413 Fulton y. Jansen, 99 Cal. 587, 1202 Fulton y. Moore, 25 Pa. St. 468, 674, 2009 Fulton y. Robinson, 55 Texas, 401, 683, 1199 Fulton y. Smith, 27 Ga. 413, 2006 Fulton y. Sterling Land Co., 47 Kan. 621, 258 Fulwider y. Ingeis, 87 Ind. 414, 1816, 1820 Funk y. Galliyan, 49 Conn. 124, 1889 Funk y. Hough, 29 111. 145, 214 Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 206, 594, 602 Furlong y. Polleys, 30 Maine, 491, 2230 Furman v. Elmore, 2 Nott & McC. 189, 366 Furnival y. Weston, 7 J. B. Moore, 356, 548 Furneaux v. Esterly, 36 Kan. 539, 40 Fydell v. Clark, 1 Esp. 447, 456 G Gabel y. Houston, 29 Texas, 335, 2094 Gable y. Wetherholt, 116 111. 313, 957 Gabriel y. Dresser, 15 C. B. 622, 525, 527 Gaddis y. Richland Co., 92 111. 119, 1561 Gadsden y. Woodward, 103 N. Y. 242, 1388 Gaetano & Maria, The, L. R. 7 P. D. 137, 740 Gaffney v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 137, 1797 Gaffney y. Hicks, 131 Mass. 124, 867 Gaffney's Estate, In re, 146 Pa. St. 49, 254 Gage y. Arndt, 121 111. 491, 415 Gage y. Hampton, 127 111. 87, 1032 Gage y. Meyers, 59 Mich. 300, 144 Gage v. Wheeler, 129 111. 197, 1642 Gage Mfg. Co. v. Woodward, 17 R. I. 464, 926 Gahey y. Virginia, 135 TJ. S. 662, 35 Gaines y. Coates, 51 Miss. 335, 2135 Gair v. Auerbach, 34 N. Y. Supl. 3, 916 Galbreath v. Cook, 30 Ark. 417, 619 Gale y. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344, 1504 Gale v. Lindo, 1 Vern. 475, 223 Gale y. Morris, 29 N. J. Eq. 222, 977 Gale y. Reed, 8 East, 80, 2047 Gale, etc., Co. y. Stark, 45 Kan. 606, 343, 344 Galena, etc., Railroad y. Barrett, 95 111. 467, 867 Galena Insurance Co. v. Kupfer, 28 111. 332, 869 Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. St. 491. 959 Galgate Ship Co. v. Starr, 58 Fed. 894, 43 Gallagher y. Gallagher, 31 W. Va. 9, 847, 851, 1178, 1179 Gallagher y. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438, 298, 747 Gallagher y. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191, 456 Gallagher y. St. Patrick's Church, 45 Neb. 635, 569 Gallaher y. Herbert, 117 111. 160, 1134 Gallaudet y. Kellogg, 133 N. Y. 671, 2179 Galle y. Tode, 60 Hun, 132, 27 Gallgher v. Swan, 25 Atl. Rep. 647 ; 155 Pa. St. 15, 1652 Galliher y. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 1169 Gallini y. Laborie, 5 T. R. 242, 1912 Galloway y. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 330, 779 Gait y. Adams Express Co., McArth. & M. (D. C.) 124, 1958 Gait y. Galloway, 4 Pet. 332, 288, 444 Gait y. Swain, 9 Gratt. 633, 817 Galusha y. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 1758, 2010 Galveston Co. y. Gorham, 49 Texas, 279, 800 Galveston City Co. v. Galveston, 56 Texas, 486, 459 Galveston Hotel Co. v. Bolton, 46 Texas, 633, 1328 Galveston Hotel Co. v. Tiernan, 46 Texas, 636, 1328 Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Allison, 59 Texas, 193, 736 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Ball, 80 Texas, 602, 1962 Galveston R. Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 459, 1418 Galveston, etc., Railroad Co. v. Henry, 65 Texas, 685, 2249 Galvin v. O'Brien, 96 Mich. 483, 543 Galvin v. Prentice, 45 N. Y. 162, 115 Galway v. Shields, 1 Mo. App. 546, 1200 Gambs v. Estate of Sutherland, 101 Mich. 355, 1896 Games v. Manning, 2 Greene (Iowa), 251, 2198 Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322, 15 Gamewell, etc., Telegraph Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 2026, 2048 Gammon y. Freeman, 31 Maine, 243, 867 Gammon y. Stone, 1 Ves. Sen. 339, 381 Gammon, etc., Seminary v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 85, 216 Gann v. Free Fishers, 10 H. L. Cas. 192, 35 Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St. 4S2, 16 Gans v. Frank, 36 Barb. 320, 717 Gantly v. Ewing, 3 How. (U. S.) 707, 2154 Garberino v. Roberts, 109 Cal. 125, 963 Garcelon v. Hampden, etc., Insurance Co., 50 Maine, 580, 317 Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller, 157 111. 225, 1141, 1173, 1176 Gardner v. Black, 98 Ala. 638, 408, 415 Gardner y. Burch, 101'Mich. 261, 483 Gardner v. Butler, 30 N. J. Eq. 702, 1296, 1300, 1304, 1359, 1505 Gardner v. Gardner (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 988, 629 Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526, 559, 1653 Gardner v. Grout, 2 C. B. N. S. 340, 665 Gardner v. Joy. 9 Mete. 177, 657, 659 Gardner v. Kleinke, 46 N. J. Eq. 90, 1676 Gardner y. Leek, 52 Minn. 522, 473 Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123, 1646 Gardner v. Moore, 75 Ala. 394, 1054, 1076 Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 1173, 1308 Gardner v. Schooley, 25 N. J. Eq. 150, 792 Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 1907, 1908 Gardner y. Walsh, 95 Mich. 505, 483 Gardiner v. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155, 1812 Gardiner v. Hopkins, 5 Wend. 23, 608 Gardiner v. Morse, 25 Maine, 140, 2018 TABLE OP CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Garfield v. Paris, 96 TJ. S. 557, 665, 668, 671 Garland v. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. 408, 480 Garment v. Barrs, 2 Esp. 673, 333 Garner v. Graves, 54 Ind. 188, 1690 Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399, 616 Garner v. Lasker, 71 Texas, 431, 417 Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 151 TJ. S. 420, 1665 Garnett, In re, L. E. 31 Ch. Div. 1, 1009 Gamier v. Eenner, 51 Ind. 372, 482 Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 243, 245, 246, 247 Garretson v. Joseph, 100 Ala. 279, 439 Garrett v. Belmont Land Co. (Term. 1895) , 29 S. W. Rep. 726, 1231 Garrett v. Burlington Plow Co., 70 Io"wa, 697, 1296, 1393, 1406 Garrett v. Dillsbnrg, etc., H. Co., 78 Pa. St. 465, 1329 Garrett v. Heaston, 5 Blackf. 349, 354 Garrett v. Kansas City Coal Mining Co., 113 Mo. 330, 1238, 1247 Garretty v. Brazell, 34 Iowa, 100, 4X9 Garrey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, 787 Garrigus v. Home, etc., Society, 3 Ind. App. 91, 215 Garrisen v. Perrin, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 681, 125, 126 Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 196, 2150 Garth v. Earnshaw, 3 Y. & C. 584, 2008 Garton v. Bristol, etc., Ey. Co., 1 Best & S. 112, 804 Garver v. Daubenspeck, 22 Ind. 238, 2229 Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 69 Iowa, 202, 888 Garvey v. Fowler, 4 Sand. 665, 161 Garvey v. Jarvis, 54 Barb. 179, 517 Garvin v. Ingram, 10 Eich. Eq. 130, 1672 Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla. 151, 1699, 1737 Garza v. Scott, 5 Texas C. App. 289, 972, 1004 Gaskell v. King, 11 East, 165, 301 Gaslight, etc., Co. v. New Albany, 139 Ind. 660, 1116, 227.3 Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumner, 98, 469 Gassett v. Andover, 21 Vt. 342, 510 Gast v. Johnson, 3 St. Eep. 258, 495 Gaston v. Drake, 14 Nev. 175, 1886, 2081 Gaston v. Frankum. 2 DeG. & S. 561, 684 Gates v. Cornett, 872 Mich. 420, 2276 Gates v. National Bldg. Co., 46 Minn. 419, 489 Gates v. Steele, 58 Conn. 316, 190, 519, 521, 524 Gath v. Lees, 3 H. & C. 558, 745 Gatling v. Newell, 9 Ind. 572, 234, 969, 2167 Gatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566, 2099 Gauch v. St. Louis, etc., Ins. Co., 88 HI. 251, 870 647 676 2098, 2234 854 Gault v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183, Gault v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636, Gauthier v. Cole, 17 Fed. Eep. 716, Gavlnzel v. Crump, 22 Wall. 308, Gaw v. Bennett, 25 Atl. Eep. 1114, 1930 Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. 403, 777 Gay v. Kingsley, 11 Allen (Mass.), 345, 1745 Gay v. Parpart, 106 U. S. 679, 2016 Gay v. Eainey, 89 111. 221, 706 Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110, 1902 Gazelle, The, 128 U. S. 474, 917 Gazzam v. Kirby, 8 Port (Ala.) 253, 2181 Geary v. Page, 9 Bosw. 290, 527 Gebb v. Bose, 40 Md. 387, 1672 Gebhard v. Eastman, 7 Minn. 56, 1386 Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420, 183, 187, 268 Geib v. Eeynolds, 35 Minn. 331, 2268 Geiger v. Cook, 3 W. & S. 266, 233, 234 geiger v. Green, 4 Hill, 472, 1146 eiser v. Kershner, 4 Gill & Johns. 305. 519 Geismer v. Lake Shore E. Co., 102 N. Y. 563, 296 Gelpcke v. Blake, 15 Iowa, 387, 1065 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 862, 1342, 1537, 1970, 2148, 2207 Geleton v. Sigmund, 27 Md. 334, 95, 101 Gemberling v. Spaulding (Mich.) , 62 N. W. Eep. 342, 263 Genereux v. Sibley, 18 E. I. 42, 1798 Gent v. Manufacturers', etc., Insurance Co., 107 111. 652, 1314 Gentilli v. Starace, 14 N. Y. Supl. 764, 326 Gentry v. Hamilton, 3 Ired. (Eq.) 376, 110 Gentry v. Rogers, 40 Ala. 442, 1102, 1164, 1165 George v. Baker, 3 Allen, 326, George v. Central E. Co., 101 Ala. 607, 1410 George v. Chicago, etc., Co., 85 Iowa, 590, 544 George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434, 2118 George v. Conhaim, 38 Minn. 338, 418 George v. Edney, 36 Neb. 604, 1720 George v. George, 47 N. H. 27, 2096 George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533, 214, 255, 257 George v. Hoskins (Ky. 1895) , 30 S. W. Sep. 406, 615 George v. Taylor, 55 Texas, 97, 480 George v. Wyandotte Electric Light Co., 106 Mich. 11, 2256 George's Creek, etc., Co. v. County Com- missioners, 59 Md. 255, 797 Georgetown College v. Perkins, 74 Md. 72, 194 Georgia, etc., E. Co. v. Macon Construc- tion Co., 94 Ga. 306, 1434, 1435 Georgia Ice Co. v. Porter, 70 Ga. 637, 1435 Georgia Eailroad, etc., Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 2133 Gerecke v. Campbell, 24 Neb. 306, 440, 460 Gerlach v. Skinner, 34 Kan. 86, 2013 Gerli v. Poidebard Mfg. Co. (N. J. Err. 1895) , 31 Atl. Eep. 401, 1049 German-American Ins. Co. v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 95 Ala. 4G9, 90S, 931 German Bank v. Mulhall, 8 Mo. App. 558, 525 German, etc., Insurance Co. v. Grim, 32 Ind. 249, 1079 German National Bank v. Louisville Tal- low Co. (1895), 29 S. W. Eep. 882, 1073 German Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 60, 1332 Germania Ins. Co. v. Deckard, 3 Ind. App. 361, 118, 896 Gerner v. Church, 43 Neb. 690, 702 Gerrens v. Huhn, 10 Nev. 139, 110 Gerrish v. New Bedford Institution, 128 Mass. 159, 250 Getchell v. Chase, 124 Mass. 366, 447 Getty v. Binsse, 49 N. Y. 385, 823 Gibbes v. Greenville, etc., E. Co., 13 S. Car. 228, 1151 Gibbons v. Bell, 45 Texas, 417, 644 Gibbons v. Bente, 51 Minn. 499, 817, 2213 Gibbons v. Dunn, 46 Mich. 146, 969 Gibbons v. Gouverneur, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 170, 1939, 1944 Gibbons v. Grinsel, 79 Wis. 365, 817, 888, 889, 2190 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (TJ. S.) 1, 2118 Gibbons v. Bussell, 13 N. Y. Supl. 879, 2252 Gibbons v. Surber, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 155, 830,831 Gibbons v. Youillon, 8 C. B. 483, 567 Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124, 662 Gibbs v. Bryant, 1 Pick. 118, 780 Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 TJ. S. 396, 1424, 1427, 185:1, 1983, 1984, 2026, 2058, 2060,2075 Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Ex. 25, 696 Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, 1252 Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592, 2001, 2002 Giberson v. Jolley, 120 Ind. 301, 1855 Gibert v. Peteler, 38 Barb. 488, 2077 Giboney v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. /^■¥ 5, t, ™ 384,525 Gibson v. Brown (Texas C. App. 1893), 24 S. W. Eep. 574, 1006 Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, 130, 131, 160 Gibson v. Donnelly, 13 N. Y. Supl. 808, 944 Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 106, 453 Gibson v. Holland, L. E. 1 C. P. 1, 675 TABLE OF CASES. CI {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Gibson v. Jetes, 6 Ves. 266, 1017 Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, 1018, 1030 Gibson v. Owens, 115 Mo. 258, 1554 Gibson v. Eenne, 19 Wend. 389, 189, 202 Gibson y. Smith , 31 Neb. 854, 2253 Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.), 279, 1821, 1837 Gibson v. Taylor, 6 Gray, 310, 490 Gibson v. Toby, 53 Barb. 191, 455, 456 Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts, 34, 893 Gibson v. Woodworth, 8 Paige, 132, 234 Giddey v. Altman, 27 Mich. 206, 166 Giddings v. Crosby, 24 Texas, 295, 431 Giddings v. Land and Water Co., 109 Cal. 116, 1218 Giffert v. West, S3 Wis. 617, 364 Gifford v. Carvill, 29 Cal. 589, 974 Gifford v. Thomas, 62 Vt. 34, 474 Gifford v. Whittaker, 6 C. B. 249, 527 Gilbert v. Baxter, 71 Iowa, 327, 71 Gilbert v. Coons, 37 111. App. 448, 953 Gilbert v. Hunnewell, 12 Heisk. 289, 998 Gilbert v, Moline Co., 119 U. S. 491, 334 Gilbert v. North American Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 43, 15 Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa, 349, 246 Gilbert v. Stockman, 76 Wis. 62, 885 Gilbert v. Wetherell, 2 Sim. & Stu. 254, 559 Gilbert Manufacturing Co. v. Butler, 146 Mass. 82, 294, 489, 2227 Gilbreath v. Dilday, 152 III. 207, 1052 Giles, In re, 11 Paige (N. Y.), 638, 1815 Giles v. Giles, 9 Q. B. 164, 114 Giles v. Halstead, 24 N. J. Law, 366, 95 Giles v. San Antonio Foundry Co. (Texas App.), 24 S. W. Bep. 546, 323 Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray, 441, 640 Giles v. Williams, 3 Ala. 316, 2182 Gilighan v. Boardman, 29 Maine, 79, 594 Gilkes v. Leonino, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 485, 126 Gilkeson v. Smith, 15 W. Va. 44, 383 Gil v. Williams, 12 La. Ann. 219, 1992 Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15, 405 Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156, 2045 Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270, 1366 Gill v. Herrick, 111 Mass. 140, 604 Gill v. Vogler, 52 Md. 663, 139 Gillan v. Dixon, 65 Pa. St. 395, 1763 Gillen v. Babcock, 14 N. Y. Supl. 941, 376 Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 1774 Gillespie v. Battle, 15 Ala. 276, 630 Gillespie v. White, 16 John. 117. 764 Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. St. 19, 140, 373 Gillet v. Campbell, 1 Demo, 520, 1318 Gillet t. Phillips, 13 N. Y. 114, 1886 Gillett v. Boara, 67 111. 256, 1853, 1997, 1998 Gillett v. Whiting, 120 N. Y. 402, 203 Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351. 462 Gillfannin v. Farrington, 12 111. App. 101, 515 Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641, 1895 Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. St. 19, 148 Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brews. (Pa.) 342, 2038 Gilman v. Brown, -. Mason, 191, 120 Gilman v. Cunningham, 42 Maine, 98, 1950 Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray (Mass.), 356, 2033, 2049 Gilman v. Healy, 55 Maine, 120, • 549 Gilman v. Hill. 36 N. H. 311, 664 Gilman, etc., E. Co. v. Kelly, 77 111. 426, 1048, 1979 Gilmore v. Bangs, 55 Ga. 403, 2208 Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio St. 281, 188, 1853 Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120, 781 Gilmore v. Woodcock, 69 Maine, 118, 791 Gilpatrick v. Foster, 12 111. 355, 95 Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 82 Maine, 201, 31 Gilpatrick v. Hunter, 24 Maine, 18, 542 Gilpatrick v. Bicker, 82 Maine, 185, 414 Gilson v. Gilson, 2 Allen, 115, 490 Gilson v. Spear, 38 Vt. 311, 1802 Ginnuth v. Blackenship (Texas App. 1894) , 28 S. W. Rep. 828, 903, 2252 Gipps v. Hume, 2 Johns. & Hem. (Md.) 517, 2008 Gipps Brewing Co. v. De France, 91 Iowa, 108, 1861 Girard v. Richmond, 2 C. B. 835, 652 Girard v. St. Louis Co., 46 Mo. App. 79, 578,588 Girard v. St. Louis Car Co., 123 Mo. 358, 3, 579 Giselman v. Starr (Cal. 1895), 40 Pac. Bep. 8 1089 Given v. Charron, 15 Md. 502, 909 Given v. Driggs, 1 Cai. Cases (N. Y.) 450, 2016 Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 2017 Givhan v. Dailay, 4 Ala. 336, 283, 286 Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 145, 138, 140, 370, 372, 2194, 2231 Glacken v. Brown, 39 Hun, 294, 434 Glaessner v. Anheuser, etc., Association, 100 Mo. 508, 1581 Glaholm v. Hays, 2 M. & G. 257, 135 Glasgow v. Hobbs, 32 Ind. 440, 233 Glass v. Hurlbert, 102 Mass. 24, 843 Glasscock v. Hamilton, 62 Texas, 143, 2189 Glasscock v. Hazell, 109 N. C. 145, 124 Glasscock v. Wells, 23 La. Ann. 517, 1425 Glassell v. Coleman, 94 Cal. 260, 1143 Glastenbury, Town of, v. McDonald, 44 Ore. 450. 968 Glaze v. Duson,40La. Ann. 692, 190 Glaze v. Three Kivers, etc., Ins. Co., 87 Mich. 349, 14 Gleason v. Chicago, etc., H. Co. (Iowa), 43 N. W. Eep. 517, 1996 Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390, 197 Gleason v. Fitzgerald (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Eep. 512, 611 Gleason v. Smith, 9 Cush. 484, 146 G leason v. Walsh, 43 Maine, 397, 910 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 273, 274, 275 Glen v. Hope Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379, 238 Glencross v. Evans (Ariz. 1894) , 36 Pac. Eep. 212, 2235 Glenn v. Burrows, 37 Hun, 602, 456 Glenn v. Hunt, 120 Mo. 330, 1331 Glenn v. Mathews, 44 Texas, 400, 1038 Glenn v. Porter, 72 Ind. 525, 1726 Glenn v. Porter, 49 Ind. 500, 2244 Glenn v. Savage, 14 Ore. 567, 185 Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill & J. 92, 452 Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill & J. 493, 447 Glenn v. Southern Express Co., 86 Tenn. 594, 1967, 1968 Glidden v. Strupler. 52 Pa. St. 400, 1655, 1656 Glinski v. Zawadski, 8 Fla. 405, 1167 Globe Light Co. v. Doud, 47 Mo. App. 439, 149 Globe Milling Co. v. Minneapolis Eleva- tor Co., 44 Minn. 153, 167, 917, 932 Globe Publishing Co. v. State Bank, 41 Neb. 175, 1385 Globe Works v. Wright, 106 Mass. 207, 904 Gloninger v. Pittsburgh E. Co., 139 Pa. St. 13, . „ 1367 Gloucester, etc., Glue Co. v. Eussia Ce- ment Co., 154 Mass. 92, 1981, 2048, 2055, 2063 Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470, 1678 Glover v. Cheatham, 19 Mo. App. 656, 2098, 2112 Glover v. Eochester, etc., Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 143, 1283 Glover v. Tousley. 101 Mich. 229, 209 Glover v. Taylor, 38 La. Ann. 634, 2080 Gobomey v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 185, 527 Gockley v. Miller, 162 Pa. St. 271, 1688 Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123, 874, 903 Goddard v. Fulton, 21 Cal. 430, 2184 Goddard v. Hodges, 1 Cromp. & M. 33, 471 Goddard v. O'Brien, L. E. 9 Q. B. D. 37, 189, 190, 519 Cll TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Godcharles v. Wiseman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 2161 Goddenv. Kimmell,99U.S.201, 417, 1162, 1169 Godfrey v. Crisler, 121 Ind. 203, 457 Godfrey v. Haynes, 74 Maine, 96, 778 Godfrey v. Megahan. 38 Neb. 748, 1652 Godine v. Kidd, 64 Him, 585, 1211 Godson v. Good, 6 Taunt. 587, 821 Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 199 Goetting v. Biehler, 21 Wkly. Dig. 100, 1664 Goetz v. Foos, 14 Minn. 265, 597, 616 Goetz v. Goldbaum (Cal.), 37 Pac. Rep. 646, 1275 Goff v. Hankins, 11 Ind. App. 456, 1724 Goff v. Mulholland, 28 Mo. 397, 525 Goff v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 9 Wash. 386, 2201 Goff v. Behobotb, 2 Cush. 475, 398 Goff v. Winchester College, 6 Bush, 443, 260, 1320 Gogebic Inv. Co. v. Iron Chief Min. Co., 78 Wis. 427, 1374 Goggans v. Tnrrdpseed, 1 S. Car. (N. S.) 80, 2124 Goggin v. Railroad Co., 12 Kan. 416, 1432 Gold v. PhiHips.10 Johns. 412, 237, 607 Goldenbergh v. Hoffman, 69 N. Y. 322, 533 Golden Gate Lumber Co. v. Sahrbacher, 105 Cal. 114, 2231 Goldman v. Blum, 58 Texas, 630, 1925 Gold Mining Co. v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 640, 1265, 1536 Goldsborough v. Gable, 140 111. 269, 8 Goldsby v. Robertson, 1 Blackf. 247, 194, 1079 Goldsmith v. Fuller, 30 Neb. 563. 1666 Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 2260 Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen, 239, 753 Goldsmith v. Hand, 26 Ohio St. 101, 138, 898 Goldsmith v. Sachs, 17 Fed. Rep. 726, 814 Goldstein v. Railway Co., 46 Wis. 404, 1432 Goldstein v. White, 16 N. Y. Supl. 860, 148 Goklwin v. Cremer, 83 E. C. L. 757, 543 Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St. 194, 180 Gooch v. Holmes, 41 Maine, 523, 661 Good, Ex parte, 5 Ch. Div. 46, 819 Good v. Chessman, 2 B. & Ad. 328, 525, 532, 535, 1631 Good v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 60 N. W. Rep. 631, 914 Good v. Daland, 121 N. Y. 1, 1982 Good v. Elliott, 3 T. R. 693, 1913, 1944 Good v. Good, 39 W. Va. 357, 1670 Good v. Singleton, 39 Minn. 340, 447 Goodale v. Hill, 42 Conn. 311, 1107 Good ay v. Colchester, etc., R. Co., 15 Eng. Law & Eq. 596, 1316 Goode v. United States, 25 Ct. CI. 261, 785 Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36, 937 Goodin v. Cincinnati, etc., Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 1300 Goodkind v. Bartlett, 153 111. 419, 1138 Goodland v. Blewith, 1 Camp. 477, 401 Goodlittle v. Bailey, Cowp. 597, 553 Goodman v. Cohen, 132 N. Y. 205, 597 Goodman v. Durant, etc., Loan Associa- tion, 71 Miss. 310, 1607 Goodman v. Gordan, 87 Ind. 126, 2171 Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567, 2039, 2044 Goodnow v. Hill, 125 Mass. 587, 1753 Goodnow v. Smith, 18 Pick. 414, 536, SIS Goodrich v. Atlanta, etc., Loan Assn., 96 Ga. 8(13, 1626 Goodrich v. Gordan, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 6, WJ) Goodrich v. Houghton, 134 N. Y. 115, 1939 Goodrich v. Johnson, 66 Ind. 258, 652, 1192 Goodrich v. Lafflin, 1 Pick. 57, 780 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 111. 490, 1452 Goodrich v. Stanley, 24 Conn. 613, 508, 528, 532 Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 111. 422, 1852, 1871 Goodrich v. "Van Nortwick, 43 111. 445, 133 Goodsell T. Myers, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 497, 1777 Goodw.ll v. Western Union Tel. Co., 130 N. Y. 130, 495 Goosey v. Goosey, 48 Miss. 210, Goodson v. Whitfield, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. Car. 163, Goodwin v. Cremer, 83 E. C. L. 757, Goodwin v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629, 782, 2168, Goodwin v. Lyon, 4 Port. (Ala.) 297, 1102, Goodwin v. May, 23 Ga. 205, Goodwin v. Union Screw Co., 34 N. H. 878, Goodwin v. Wr-rthheimer, 99 N. Y. 149, Goodwine v. Morey, 111 Ind. 68, Goodwin Gas. Stove and Meter Co., Ap- peal of, 117 Pa. St. 514, 966, Goodyear v. Adams, 5 N. Y. Supl. 275, Gordan v. Preston, 1 Watts, 385, Gorder v. Plattsmouth Canning Co., 36 Neb. 548, 1225, 1228, Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3How. (U.S. 1133, Gordon v. Butler, 105 U. S. 553, 982 Gordon v. Clapp, 111 Mass. 22, Gordon v. Dalby, 30 Iowa, 223, Gordon v. Gordon, 96 Ind. 134, Gordon v. Madden, 90 Mo. 310, Gordon v. Mitchell, 68 Geo. 11, Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen (Mass.), 212, Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts, 385, Gordon v. Price, 10 Ired. Law, 385, Gordon v. Stockdale, 89 Ind. 240, Gore v. Lewis, 109 N. Car. 539, Gorham v. Fisher, 30 Vt. 428, Gorhara v. Keves, 137 Mass. 583, Gorman v. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441, Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, Goshen Nat. Bank v. State, 141 N. Y. 379, Gosman v. Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87, Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503, Goss v. Lord Nugent, 2 Nev. & Man. 28, Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58, 689, 690, Goss t. Peters (1893), 98 Mich. 112, Gossard v. Lea, 3 Texas Civ. App. 3, Gosselin v. Womack, 21 La. Ann. 193, Gossler v. Eagle, etc., Refinery, 103 Mass, 331, Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521, Gottleib v. Thatcher. 151 U. S. 271, Gough v. Crane, 3 Md. Ch. 119, Gould v. Armstrong, 2 Hall, 266, Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend. 562, Gould v. City of Paris, 68 Texas, 511, Gould v. Cayuga, etc., Bank, 86 N. Y. 75, Gould v. Gould, 4 N. H. 173, Gould v. Head, 38 Fed. Rep. 886, Gould v. Little Rock R. Co., 52 Fed Rep, 863 680, 1393, 1727 445 2169 1168 664 783 1001 1144 1208 1 -23 1289 1295 ) 2138 989 383 2080 3183 094 518 3878 1236 156 1818 921 664 1 53 2133 2120 1305 1704 542 2274 950 1245 1722 2022 ' 348 1231 1684 849 212 214 1533 972 572 2058 1405 1181 Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408, Gould v. Murch, 70 Maine, 288, 167, Gould v. Stein, 149 Mass. 570, 325, 328 Gould v. Sternburg, 69 111. 531, 831 Goulds v. Brophy, 42 Minn. 109, 319, 350, 351 Gouverneur v. Tillotson, 3 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 348, 746 Gove v. City of Biddeford, 85 Maine, 393, 1098, 1099 Gove v. Downer, 59 Yt. 139, 868 Gove v. Island City, etc., Co., 19 Ore. 363, 136 Gower v. Stewart, 40 Mich. 747, 594 Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505, 64 Grace v. Lynch, 80 Wis. 166, 6J5 Grace v. Wade, 45 Texas, 522, 1680, 1682 Grade's Estate, In re, 158 Pa. St. 521, 1669, 1769 Gracy v. Potts, 4 Baxter, 395, 407 Gradle v. Warner, 140 111. 123, 394 Uraeme v. Wroughton, 11 Exch. 146, 2081 Graff v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 31 Pa. St. 489, Graff am v. Pierce, 143 Mass. 386, ' ijii 1 Graft v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (Pa.), 8 Atl. Rep. 237, 586 Grafton v. City of Sellwood, 24 Ore. 118, 1180 TABLE OF CASES. CHI [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291, .] Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100, 676, 678, 684, 686 Grafton v. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465, 25 Graham v. Andrews, 11 N. Y. Misc. 649, 42 Graham v. Berryman, 19 N. J. Eq. 29, 1063 Graham v. Connersville R. Co., 36 Ind. 463, 187 Graham v. Dyer (Ky.), 29 S. W. Eep. 346, 364 Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. St. 475, 786 Graham v. Graham, 67 Hun, 329, 1714, 1715 Graham v. Machado, 6 Duer, 514, 161 Graham v. Negus, 8 N. Y. Supl. 679, 452 Graham v. Negus, 55 Hun, 440, 202 Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, 1396 Graham v. Railroad Co., 118 TJ. S. 761, 1453 Graham v. Theis, 47 Ga. 479, 843 Granby, etc., Smelting Co. v. Richards, 95 Mo. 106, 1336 Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355, 1524 Grand Haven, City of , v. Grand Haven Waterworks Co., 99 Mich. 106, 1044 Grandin v. Grandin, 49 N. J. Law, 508, 213 Grandin v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 107 Pa. St. 26, 896 Grand Lodge v. City of New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 659, 2140 Grand Lodge v. Farnham, 70 Cal. 158, 258, 259 Grand Rapids, City of, v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367, 805 Grand River Bridge Co. v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 4, 1314 Grand Tower R. Co. v. Walton, 150 HI. 428, 979 Granger v. Collins, 6 Mes. & Wels. 458, 193, 194 Granger v. Original, etc., Mining Co., 59 Cal. 678, 1866 Granger v. Worms, 4 Camp. 83, 423 Granger's, etc., Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 73 Ala. 325 1644 Gran'giac v. Arden, 10 John. 292, 559 Granite State, etc.. Assn. v. Monk (N. J. Eq. 1895) , 30 Atl. Rep. 872, 1623 Grannis v. Brandon, 5 Day, 260, 797 Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396, 1519, 1565 Grant v. Diebold Lock Co., 77 Wis. 72, 2210 Grant v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (Minn.), 63 N. W. Rep. 1026, 264 Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 436, 685 Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 1181 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109, 576 Grant v. Johnson, 5 N. Y. 247, 115 Grant v. Law, 29 Wis. 99, 990 Grant v. Lexington, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Ind. 23, 896 Grant v. Maddox, 15 Mees. & W. 737, 919 Grant v. Morris, 81 N. Car. 150, 2124 Grant v. Sutton, 90 Va. 771, 1678, 1687 Grant v. Wallis, 60 Texas, 350, 2087 Grant v. Walsh, 145 N. Y. 502, 2281 Grape Sugar Manufacturing Co. v. Small, 40 Md. 305, 1316 Grant v. Wolf, 34 Minn. 32, 600 Grapel v. Hodges, 112 N. Y. 419, 949 Grase v. McElroy, 1 Allen (Mass.) , 563, 1949 Grasselli v. Lowden. 11 Ohio St. 349, 2032 Grath v. Barnes, 13 S. Car. 328, 1880 Gravely v. Barnard, 43 L. J. Ch. 659, 2039 Graves v. Glass, 86 Iowa, 261, 2213 Graves v. Hartford Steamboat Co., 38 Conn. 143, 124 Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313, 463 Graves v. Key City Gas Co. (Iowa 1895), 61 N. W. Rep. 937, 857 Graves v. Legg, 2 Hurl. & N. 210, 937 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709, 126, 135 Graves v. Mono, etc., Min in g Co., 81 Cal. 303 13°°> I 3 " 3 Grapes V. Waite, 59 N. Y. 156, 2165 Sravier ... Carraby, 17 La. 132, 1869 GrayV Angier, 62 Geo. 596, 382 Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284, 977 Gray v. Brown, 22 Ala. 262, 543, 577 Gray v. Central R. Co., 11 Hun, 70, 131, 133 Gray v. Clark, 11 Vt. 583, 853, 875, 878, 886 Gray v. Crosby, 18 John. 219, Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 285, Gray v. Davis, 1 Woods (U. S.),420, Gray v. Gannon, 4 Hun, 57, Gray v. Green, 9 Hun, 334, Gray v. Herman, 75 Wis. 453, Gray v. Hill, Ryan & Moody, 420, Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449, 1988, Gray v. Journal Pub. Co., 21 N. Y. 967, Gray v. McClune, 23 Pa. St. 447, Gray v. Murray, 3 John. Ch. 167, _. Gray v. National, etc., Association, 111 Ind. 531, Gray v. Paine, 5 How. Pr. 107, Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616, Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, Gray v. Roberts, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 208, 757 671 2117 376 2211 445 692 2080, 2081 Supl. 501 551 285, 948, 2206 321 161 644 W) 1873 Gray v. Seigler. 2 Strob. 117, 1880 Gray v. Shaw (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 402, 1010 Gray v. Shepard, 147 N. Y. 177, 855 Gray v. Smith, L. R. 43 Ch. Div. 208, 644, 645 Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895, 1136 Gray Co. v. Taylor Iron Works Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 686, . 701 Grayville v. Gray, 19 111. App. 210, 1521 Great Western R. Co. v. Braid, 1 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 101, 275 Great West Mining Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Mining Co., 14 Colo. 90, 1169 Greaves v. Legg, 11 Ex. 642, 117, 940 Greeley v. Thurston, 4 Maine, 479, 385 Green v. Armstrong, 1 Denio, 550, 638 Green v. Barney (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 1026, 380, 397 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 2116, 2126 Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48, 616, 661 Green v. Brooks, 81 Cal. 328, 1977 Green v. Carlill, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 882, 1671 Green v. City of Cape May, 41 N. J. Law, 45, 1564 Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70, 4, 69 Green v. Cole, 127 Mo. 587, 4 Green v. Collins, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 494, 1902 Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317, 752, 1162 Green v. Cresswell, 10 Ad. & E. 453, 596, 614, 616 Green v. Finin, 35 Conn. 178, 846 Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395, 283, 286 Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553, 1780, 1781, 1792, 1796, 1798, 1803 411 1760 496 626 59 438 844 547, 555 2171 Green v. Green, 9 Cow. 47. Green v. Grissom, 53 Texas, 432, Green v. Haley, 5 R. I. 260, Green v. Hart, 1 Johns. 580, Green v. Hughitt Township (S. Dak.) N. W. Rep. 224, Green v. Jones, 76 Maine, 563, Green v. Langdon, 28 Mich. 221, Green v. Louthain, 49 Ind. 139, Green v. Merriam, 28 Vt. 801, 668 Green v. Moffett, 22 Mo. 529, 870 Green v. North Car., etc., Railroad, 77 N. C. 95, 630, 640 Green v. Paul, 155 Pa. St. 126, 950 Green v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 75 Md. 109, 646 Green v. People (111.) , 21 N. E. Rep. 605, 2058 Green v. Price, 13 M. & W. 694, 756, 1860, 2047 Green ¥. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32, 843, 1111 Green v. Rochester, etc., Co., 1 T. & C. (N. Y.) 5, Green v. Scranage, 19 Iowa, 461, 1723 Green v. Smith, 29 Hun, 166, 39? Green v. Tantum, 19 N. J. Eq. 364, 1662 CIV TABLE OF CASES. {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Green v. Town of Dyersburg, 2 Flip. 472, 854 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 722, 723 Green v. Vardiman, 2 Blackf. 324, 475 Green v. Wilding, 2 Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 96, 1786 Green County v. Conness (1883), 109 U. S. 104, 2149 Greenabautn v. Elliott, 60 Mo. 25, 184 Green Bay K. Co. v. Steamboat Co., 147 U. S. 598, 1226 Green Bay & M. H. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co., 107 U. S. 98, 1225, 1252, 1576 Greenblatt v. Hermann, 144 N. Y. 13, 420 Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 36 W. Va. 573, 149 Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104, 1456 Greene, In re, 52 Fed. Rep. 104, 1982, 2036 Greene v. Burton, 59 Vt. 423, 602 Greene v. Day, 34 Iowa. 328, 854 Greene v. Godfrey, 44 Maine, 25, 2108 Greene v. Harris, 9 R. I. 401, 653 Greene v. Railway Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44, 1097, 1101 Greenbow v. Coutts, 4 Hen. & Mun. 485, 224 Greenhow v. Vashon, SI Va. 336, 2159 Greeley v. De Cottes, 24 Fla. 475, 1076 Greeley-Burnbam Grocer Co. v. Capen, 23 Mo. App. 301, 83, 685 Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. St. 489, 1006, 1015 Greenfield v. Getman, 40 N. Y. 168, 2031 Greenfield v. Oilman, 140 N. Y. 168, 2046 Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583, 2165 Greenville Compress Co. v. Planters' Com- press Co., 70 Miss. 669, 1246 Greenwald v. Kaster, 86 Pa. St. 45, 576 Greenwich v. Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 217, 1570 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman, 54 Fed. Rep. 839, 935, 937, 938 Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358, 708, 717, 2198 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, 1581, 2132, 2133, 2146 Greenwood v. Lidbetter, 12 Price, 183, 535 Greenwood v. Sutcliffe, L. R. (1892) 1 Ch. 1, 405 Greer v. Herren 99 N. Car. 492, 2173 Greer v. Laws, 56 Ark. 37, 447, 452 Greer v. N utt, 54 Mo. App. 4, 1988 Greer v. People's Co., 18 J. & S. 110, 465 Greer v. Shriver, 53 Pa. St. 259, 1632 Greer v. Tweed. 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 427, 755 Gregg V. James, 1 111. 143, 543 Gregg v. Pierce, 53 Barb. 387, 188 Gregor v. Hyde (C. C. App. 1894), 62 Fed. Rep. 107, 1829 Gregory v. Gleed, 33 Vt. 405, 2242 Gregory v. Lee, 04 Conn. 407, 1800 Gregory v. Marks, Fed. Cas. No. 5802; 8 B»±. 44, 867 Gregory y. Mighell, 18 Ves. 326, 845, 1212 Gregory v. Wabash R. Co., 46 Mo. App. 571, 273 Gregory v. Wendell, 40 Mich. 432, 1914, 1917 Gregory v. Wendell, 39 Mich. 337, 1917, 1919, 1920, 1922 Gregson v. Ruck, 4 Q. B. 737, 685 Greig v. Smith, 29 S. Car. 426, 1683 Grey v. Pearson, 6 H. L. C. 61, 8S4 Grey v. Tubbs, 43 Cal. 359, 749, 1059 Gribben v. Maxwell, 34 Kan. 8, 1821 Gribble v. Columbus Brewing Co., 100 Cal. 67, 1275, 1276 Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397, ::21 Griel v. Lomax, 94 Ala. 641, 992, 1S77 Grirsemer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 202, „ 713 Grip«emer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 38 Pac. Rep. 1034, 713 Griffen v. Ransdell, 71 Ind. 440, 043 Griffon v. West Ford, 60 Texas, 501, 1760 Griffin v. Clay County, 63 Iowa, 413, 1512, 2088 Griffin v. Farrier, 32 Minn. 474, 1879 Griffin v. Petty, 101 N. Car. 380, 190 Griffith v. Crocker, 18 Ont. App. 370, 476 Griffith v. Grogan, 12 Cal. 317, 447, 455 Griffith v. Happersberger, 86 Cal. 605, 138, 149, 375 Griffith v. Wells, 3 Denio (N. Y.l. 226, 1891 Griffiths v. Hardenbergh, 41 N. Y. 464, 874, 1975 Griffiths t. Sears, 112 Pa. St. 523, 1929, 1930 Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 20, 2228 Grigsby v. Combs (Ky.), 21 S. W. Rep. 37, 625, 635 Grim's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 375. 1655 Grim v. Byrd, 32 Graft. (Va.) 293, 1876 Grim y. Weissenberg School District, 57 Pa. St. 434, 806 Grimes v. French, 2 Atk. 141, 1013 Grimes y. Shaw, 2 Texas Civ. App. 20, 1813 Grimley v. Santa Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575, 805 Grimoldy v. Wells, L. R. 10 C. P. 391, 347 Grindle v. Stone, 78 Maine, 176, 1319 Grinnellv. Spink, 128 Ml-s. 25, 437 Grinstead v. Fonte, 32 Miss. 120, 549 Grissell v. Housatonic R. Co., 54 Conn. 447, 2133 Griswold v. Board of Trustees, 58 111. 290, 257 Griswold v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 90 Iowa, 265, 1971 Griswold v. Miller, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 520, 1814 Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N. Y. 581, 170, 1646 Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 438, 2020 Grizzle y. Sutherland, 88 Va. 584, 1136 Groesbeck v. Marshall (S. Car. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 743, 1880 Groetzinger v. Kami, 165 Pa. St. 578, 326 Grogan y. Express Co., 114 Pa. St. 523, 1958 Grogan v. San Francisco.18 Cal. 590, 783 Gronstadt v. Withoff , 21 Fed. Rep. 253, 876 Groppengiesser y. Lake, 103 Cal. 37, 991 Grose v. Hennessey, 95 Mass. 389, 359 Gross v. Davis, 87 Term. 226, 827 Gross v. Jordan, 83 Maine, 380, 163 Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. Ill, 354, 358 Grossman y. Dodd, 137 N. Y. 599, 1964 Grosvender v. Magill, 37 111. 239, 761 Grotenkemper v. Carver, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 281, 1698 Grove y. Hodges, 55 Pa. St. 504, 214 Grove v. Jeager, 60 111. 249, 1672 Grover, etc., Co. y. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 70 Mo. 672, 738 Groves v. Clark, 21 La. Ann. 567, 1885 Groves v. Nutt, 13 La. Ann. 117, 708 Groves v. Sentell, 153 U. S. 465, 812 Grow v. Seligman, 47 Mich. 607, 2039 Grubb v. Starkey, 90 Va. 831. 1096 Grube v. Schultheiss, 57 N. Y. 669, 747 Gruetzner v. Aude Co., 28 Mo. App. 263, 136 Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 25, 1920 G rymes v. Blofield, Cro. Eliz. (2 Croke) 541, 543, 445 Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 1009, 1037 Guaranty, etc., Association v. Rutan, 6 Ind. App. 83, 866 Guardian, etc., Building Soc, Inre, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 440, 1604 Guengerich v. Smith, 36 Iowa, 587, 395 Guenther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439, 791 Guenther y. Dewien, 11 Iowa, 133, 1890 Querand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 63, 2040, 2044 Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501, 872, 1880, 1986, 2001 Guernsey v. Wilson, 134 Mass. 482, isa Guest y. Homfray, 5 Ves. 818, 1165 Guffin v. First Nat. Bank, 74 111. 259, V.Z Guignon v. Union Trust Co., 156 111. 135, 714 Guild v. Butler, 127 Mass. 386, 537 Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. 129, 795 Guild y. Hull, 127 111. 523, Guillander v. Howell, 34 N. Y. 657, 1022, 1023 720, 723 TABLE OF CASES. CV [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. St. 463, 916 Guilmartin v. Urquhart, 82 Ala. 570, 1054, 1068 Guinault v. Kailroad Co., 42 La. Ann. 52, 1453 Guion v. Doherty, 43 Miss. 538, 532 Guldager v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. Rep. 459, 465 Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Eddins, 7 Tex. C. App. 116, 1968 Gulf, Colorado R. Co. v. Gate-wood, 89 Texas, 89, 297 Gulf R. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Texas, 73, 528, 651 Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hume (Tex. 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 110, 1969 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Levy, 59 Texas, 542, 2104 Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. McGown (Texas 1894), 25 S. W. Eep. 435, 920 Gulf, etc., R. Co. t. Pittman, 4 Texas C. App. 167, 1279 Gulf C. & S. P. R. Co. v. State, 72 Texas, 404, 1983 Gulf Railway Co. v. Trawick, 80 Texas, . 270, 1969 Gvdick t. Ward, 10 N. J. Law, 87, 1128, 1883, 2019 Gulledge v. Berry, 31 Miss. 346, 549 Gum Elastic Roofing Co. t. Mexico Pub. Co., 140 Ind. 158, 1566 Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 610, 2117, 2153, 2157 Gunning Gravel, etc., Co. v. City of New Orleans, 45 La. Ann. 911, 1548 Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Ala. 591, 1897 Gunnison v. Bancroft, 11 Vt. 490, 859 Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60, 541, 574 Gunther v. Mayer, 67 Hun, 116, 1366 Guptill v. Damon, 42 Maine, 271, 904 Gupton v. Gupton, 62 Mo. 101, 1133 Gurney v. Atlaatic R. Co., 58 N. Y. 358, 331 Gurvin v. Cromartie, 11 Ired. (Law) 174, 225 Gushee v. Leavitt, 5 Cal. 160, 1294 Guthman v. Kearn, 8 Neb. 502, 390 Guthrie v. Kerr, 85 Pa. St. 303, 239 Guthrie v. Territory, 1 Okl. 404, 1466, 1498 Gutta Percha, etc.. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Houston, 108 N. Y. 276, 2151 Gutta Percha Mfg. Co. v. Ogalalla Vil- lage, 40 Neb. 775, 1509 Guy v. Barnes, 29 Ind. 103, 1176 Guyer v. Guyer, 6 Houst. (Del.) 430, 28 Guyette v. Town of Bolton, 46 Vt. 228, 465 Guynn v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97, 694, 850 Gwaltney v. Cannon, 31 Ind. 227, 1841 Gwaltney v. Wheeler, 26 Ind. 415, 1184 Gwillim v. Daniell, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 61, HI, 306 Gwyn v. Gwyn, 27 S. Car. 525, 1749 Gwynn v. Dierssen, 101 Cal. 563, 1761 Gwynn v. Gwynn, 27 S. Car. 525, 1749 Gwynn v. Gwynn, 31 S. Car. 482, 1683 H Haacke v. Knights of Liberty, etc., Club, 76 Md. 429, 2102 Haas v. Fenlon, 8 Kan. 601, 2080 Haas v. Hudmon, 83 Ala. 174, 907 Haas v. Kansas City R. Co., 81 Ga. 792, 296 Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499, 162 Haas v. Myers, 111 111. 429, 76 Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 1754 Haase v. Mitchel, 58 Ind. 213, 969, 2167 Habehicht v. Rawls, 24 S. Car. 461, 1746 Hackensack Water Co. v. DeKay, 36 N. J. Eq. 548, 1338, 1438 Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 192, 19, 180 Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 803 Hackett v. Moxley, 65 Vt. 71, 1680 Hackettv. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86, 1527 Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. Ming, 52 N. J. Eq. 156, 1748 Hadley v. Bordo, 62 Vt. 285, 452, 453 Hadley v. Latimer. 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 537, 1026 Hadlock v. Hadlock, 22 111. 384, 13 Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 1713 Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 1159 Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297, 1496 Hagar v. Cleveland, 36 Md. 476, 155 Hagerman v. Bates, 5 Colo. App. 391, 1169 Hagermau v. Buchanan, 45 N. J. Eq. 292, 1676, 1711 Hagerman v. Ohio Bldg. Ass'n, 25 Ohio St. 186, 1621 Hagerty v. Bryne, 75 Ind. 499, 29 Hagerty v. Nashua Lock Co., 62 N. H. 576, 1797 Hagerty v. White, 69 Wis. 317, 867 Haggard v. Holmes, 90 Iowa, 308, 1658 Haggerty v. Johnston, 48 Ind. 41, 1183 Haggerty v. Palmer, 6 John. Ch. 437, 123 Hahn v. Concordia Society, 42 Md. 460, 2073 Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & E. 30, 610 Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469, 681 Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435, 1211 Haines v. Lewis, 54 Iowa, 301, 1883 Haines v. Tucker, 50 N. Y. 307, 150, 496, 498 Hakes v. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 231, 204 Haldane v. Johnson, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 498, 406 Haldeman v. Jennings, 14 Ark. 329, 757 Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa, 144, 2039 Halderman's App.. 104 Pa. 251 , 1815 Hale v. Cheshire Ry. Co., 161 Mass. 443, 1462 Hale v. Christy, 8 Neb. 264, 1652, 1723, 1741 Hale v. Cravener. 123 111. 408, 416, 419 Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374, 1771, 1777, 1778 Hale v. Gladfelder, 52 111. 91, _ 1032 Hale v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 733 Hale v. Rawson. 4 C. B. (N. S.) 85, 126 Hale v. Rice, 124 Mass. 292, 183 Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. 482, 573, 576, 818 Hale v. Sharp, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 275, 2021 Haley v. City of Alton, 152 111. 113, 1498 Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45, 2121 Hall's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 458, 2044, 2261, 2264 Hall v. Arnott, 80 Cal. 348, 422 Hall v. Banks, 79 Wis. 229, 2120 Hall v. Bergen, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 122, 1935 Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 408, 1790, 1797 Hall v. Callhan, 66 Mo. 316, 1707 Hall v. Cannon, 4 Harr. 300, 795 Hall v. Cazenove, 4 East, 477, 277 Hall v. Center. 40 Cal. 63, 1108, 1109 Hall v. City of Virginia, 91 111. 535, 257 Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, 1043 Hall v. Dyson, 16 Jur. 270, 1882 Hall v. Eccleston, 37 Md. 510, 1185 Hall v. Finch, 29 Wis. 278, 789, 792 Hall v. Gray, 54 Maine, 230, 573 Hall v. Gutnridge, 52 Iowa, 408, 1729 Hall v. Huntoon, 17 Vt. 244, 240 Hall v. Jones, 32 111. 38, 27 Hall v. Klinck, 25 S. Car. 348, 1381 Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 834, 835 Hall v. Leigh, 8 Cranch, 50, 820 Hall v. Levy, L. R. 10 C. P. 154, 568 Hall v. Loomis, 63 Mich. 709, 1155 Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 575, 237 Hall v. Merrill, 5 Bosw. 266, 534, 1633 Hall v. Norwalk Co., 57 Conn. 105, 391 Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522, 1008, 1009, 1017, 1019 Hall v. Palmer, 3 Hare, 532. 88, 89 Hall v. Parker, 37 Mich. 590, 171, 2107 Hall v. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417, 231, 248 Hall v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213, 292 Hall v. Sheehan, 69 N. Y. 618, 553 Hall v. Smith, 15 Iowa, 584, 632 Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 646 Hall v. Stevens, 116 N. Y. 201, 447, 457 Hall v. Storrs, 7 Wis. 253, 932 CV1 TABLE OF CASES. [Meferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Hall v. Thompson, 1 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 443, 2281 Hall v. Vermont, etc., E. Co., 28 Vt. 401, 1315 Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 IT. S. 5, 2127 Hall v. Wright, E. B. & E. 746, 283 Hallam v. Indianola Hotel Co., 56 Iowa, 178, 1296, 1393, 1406 Halle v. Einstein, 34 Fla. 589, 1699, 1700 Halleck v. Guy, 9 Cal. 181. 674 Hallen v. Bunder, 1 Cr. M. & E. 266, 635 Hallenbeck v. Dewitt, 2 John. 404, 1006 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1, 722 Hallett, In re , L. E. 13 Ch. Div. 696, 2279 Hallett v. Hallett (Pa. 1893), 26 Atl. Eep. 101, 1711 Hallett v. Oakes, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 296, 2276 Halliday v. St. Louis, etc., By. Co., 74 Mo. 159, 738 Halliday v. White, 21 N. ¥. Supl. 878, 1055 Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. Law, 268, 76 Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. ¥. 165, 383, 399, 400 Halsey v. Peters, 79 Va. 60, 850 Halsey v. Beed, 9 Paige, 446, 236 Halstead v. lyes, 73 Hun, 56, 1633 Halstead v. Mayor of New York, 3 N. Y. 430, 2242 Halstead v. Straus, 32 Fed. Eep. 279, 724 Halstead Lumber Co. v. Sutton, 46 Kan. 192 2216 Hals'ted v. Francis, 31 Mich. 113, 239 Halthaus v. Kuntz, 17 111. App. 434, 1853 Ham v. Goodrich, 33 N. H. 32, S44 Ham v. Johnson, 55 Minn. 115, 679, 1120 Ham v. Kendall, 111 Mass. 297, 643 Ham t. Van Orden, 4 Hnn, 709, 6G3 Hambel v. Tower, 14 Iowa, 530, 2197 Hambley v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 21 Fed. Eep. 541, 748 Hamburger v. Rottenberg, 61 N. Y. St. Rep. 102, 141 Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 206, 230, 693 Hamil v. Henry, 69 Iowa, 725, 1685, 1686 Hamill v. German Nat. Bank, 13 Colo. 203, 438 Hamilton v. Bates (Cal. 1893), 35 Pac. Eep. 304, 1349 Hamilton y. City of Shelbyville, 6 Ind. App. 538, 1513 Hamilton v. Chopard, 9 Wash. 352, 1645 Hamilton v. England, 95 Ga. 693, 1106, 11G5 Hamilton v. Gray, 67 Vt. 233, 2242 Hamilton v. Gridley, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 542, 2098 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 111. 349, 2007 Hamilton v. Haryey, 121 111. 469, 1107, 1197. 1198, 2273 Hamilton y. Home Ins. Co., 137 TJ. S. 370, 121 Hamilton v. Hulett, 57 Minn. 208, 418 Hamilton y. Jones, 3 Gill & J. 127, 847 Hamilton y. Liverpool Ins. Co., 136 V. S. 242, 121 Hamilton y. Lockhart, 158 Pa. St. 452, 1828 Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 615, 1806 Hamilton y. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Pa. St. 339, 76, 82, 700 Hamilton y. McLaughlin, 145 Mass. 20, 1228 Hamilton v. Nickerson, 13 Allen, 351, 935 Hamilton y. Taylor, 18 N. Y. 358, 863, 867 Hamilton v. Vaugham, etc., Elec. Co., 8 The Reports (Ene.) 750, 1796 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Whitaker, 4 Texas Civ. App. 3'<0, 1690 Hamilton College y. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581, 256 Hamilton County, Board, etc., of, y. New- lin, 132 Ind. 27, 2248 Hamilton, etc., Co. y. Cincinnati, etc., E. (1896), 29 Ohio St. 341, 635 Hamilton, etc., Co. y. Eice, 7 Barb. 157, 260 Hamilton Gas Light and Coke Co. v. City of Hamilton, 37" Fed. Eep. 832, 1564 Hamilton Gas Light and Coke Co. v. City of Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 1564 Hamlett v. Tallman,30 Ark. 505, 383 Hamlyn y. Talisker Distillery, L. E. A. C. 202 ; 6 The Eeports, 188, 709 Hammerquist v. Swensson, 44 HI. App. 627, 863, 875 Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 C. & F. 45, 223, 224, 228, 618, 619, 849, 1717, 1718 Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 1417 Hammond v. American Mutual, etc., Co., 10 Gray, 306, 766 Hammond y. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145, 975, 2280 Hammond y. Slocum, 50 How. Pr. 415, 465 Hampe v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., 165 Pa. St. 468, 1413, 1414 Hampton y. Speckenagle, 9 Serg. & E. 212, 397, 1163 Hanauer y. Doane, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 342, 1862, 1902, 1953, 2019 Hanauer v. Gray, 25 Ark. 350, 2024 Hanehett v. Briscoe, 22 Beay. 496, 1153 Hanchett y. Weber, 17 111. App. 114, 1551 Hancke v. Hooper, 7 Car. & P. 81, 797 Hancock y. Kelly, 81 Ala. 368, 2250 Hancock v. Louisyille and Nashville B. Co., 145 U. S. 409, 1411, 1542 Hancock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 13 Am. Law Eeg. 103, 496 Hancock v. Watson, 18 Cal. 137, 894 Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 2162 Hancock Ins. Co. y. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 149 Mass. 214, 1454 Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324, 1575 Hand y. Weidner, 151 Pa. St. 362, 1067 Hanel y. Freund, 17 Mo. App. 618, 148 Handforth y. Jackson, 150 Mass. 149, 2042,2288 Handforth v. Jackson, 150 Mass. 149, 2049 Handley v. Stutz, 139 TJ. S. 417, 1298, 1375, 1398 Handley v. Tibbetts (Ky.), 16 S. W. Eep. 131, 418 Handy v. Draper, 89 N. Y. 335, 1376, 1388 Handy v. Munsell, 109 111. 362, 379 Handy y. St. Paul Globe Pub. Co., 41 Minn. 188, 2098 Handy y. Waldron, 18 E. I. 567, 1875, 1879 Hanel y. Freund, 17 Mo. App. 618, 146 Haney v. Manning, 21 La. Ann. 166, 2021 Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442, 724, 725 Hangen y. Hachmeister, 49 N. Y, Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, 1795 Hanks v. Brown, 79 Iowa, 560, 1935 Hanlon y. Doherty, 109 Ind. 37, 29 Hanna v. Shields, 34 Ind. 84, 969, 2167 Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 172, 1426, 1985 Hannan v. Englemann, 49 Wis. 278, 470 Hannem y. Pence, 40 Minn. 127, 275 Hannig y. Mueller, 82 Wis. 235, 867 Hannon y. Hounihan, 85 Va. 429, 223, 619 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 28 Fla. 209, 2223 Hanover Junction R. Co. v. Grubb, 82 Pa. St. 36, 155 Hanover Nat. Bank y. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404, _ 1635, 1637, 1638 Hansard y. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 90, 399 Hanselman v. Doyle, 90 Mich. 142, 518 Hanson y. Armitage, 5 B. & Aid. 557, 663, 672 Hanson y. Cordano, 96 Cal. 441, 469 Hanson v. Donkersley, 37 Mich. 184, 1373 Hanson v. Jones, 20 Mo. App. 595, 798 Hanson y. Meyer, 6 East, 614, 491 Hanson v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 670 Hans v. State, 24 Fed. Rep. 55, 2126 Hanson y. Tarbox, 47 Minn. 433, 453 Hanson v. Todd, 95 Ala. 328, 397 407 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 D. S. 226. 1136 Hapgood y. Rosenstock, 23 Fed. Eep. 86, 1203 TABLE OF CASES. CV11 [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Jlappe v. Stout, 2 Cal. 460, 684 Harang v. Blauc, 34 La. Ann. 632, 1472 Harbach v. Elder, 18 Pa. St. 33, 826 Harbeck v. Craft, 4 Duer, 122, 452 Harbeckv. Pupin, 145 N. ¥. 70, 575 Harbeck v. Pupin, 23 Abb. New Cas. 190, 819 Harbeck v. Vanderbilt, 20 N. Y. 395. 819, 1443 Harbinger, The, 50 Fed. Eop. 941, 936 Hard v. Seeley, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 428, 2033 Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. St. 151, 2278 Hardenbrook v. Sherwood, 72 Ind. 403, 1817, 1850 Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39, 234 Hardey v. Coe, 5 Gill, 189, 519 Hardin v. Construction Co., 78 Iowa, 726, 1276 Hardin v. Jordan, 140 TJ. S. 371, 35, 36 Harding v. Commercial Loan Co., 84 111. 251, 394, 854 Harding v. Davies, 2 C. & P. 77, 390, 404 Harding v. Parshall, 56 111. 219, 1160 Hardiugham v. Allen, 5 C. B. 793, 397 Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 596, 526 Hardman v. Sage, 124 N. Y. 25, 1370, 1377, 1378 Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. Car. 661, 1741 Hardy v. Hunt, 11 Cal. 343, 1942 Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 121, 901 Hardy v. Van Harlingen, 7 Ohio St. 208, 1671, 1747 Hare v. London, etc., H. Co., 2 Johns. & H. 80, 2054, 2063 Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375, 1391 Harger v. McCullough, 2 Denio, 119, 1373 Hargrave v. Conroy, 19 N. J. Eq. 281, 2226 Hargrave v. Melbourne, 86 Ala. 270, 14 Harkness v. Bussell, 118 U. S. 663, 162 Harkrader v. Leiby, 4 Ohio St. 602, 1643 Harkreader v. Eubanks (Miss.), 12 So. Eep. 210, 496 Harlan y. Stufflebeem, 87 Cal. 508, 138, 139, 371 Harlem Gas Light Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 3 Eobt. 100, 782 Harless v. Petty, 98 Ind. 53, 1195 Harley v. Harley, 54 Md. 340, 559 Harley v. Heist, 86 Ind. 196, 1757 Harloe v. Foster, 53 N. Y. 385, 1636, 1G38 Harlow v. Curtis, 121 Mass. 320, 2, 67 Harman v. Moore, 112 Ind. 221, 116, 2171 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 111. 122, 2149 Harmon t. Harmon, 61 Maine, 227, 803, 1830, 1831 Harmon v. Harmon, 63 111. 512, 1023 Harmon v. Hunt, 116 N. C. 678, 1382 Harmon v. Magee, 57 Miss. 410, 391 Harmon v. Siler, 99 Ala. 306, 1658 Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 270, 276, 946, 2283 Harms v. Parsons, 32 Beav. 328, 2264 Harned v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 51 Mo. App. 482, 1968 Harner v. Dipple, 31 Ohio St. 72, 1772, 1773 Harney v. Indianapolis, 32 Ind. 244, 1521 Harper v. Alb. Mut. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 194, 885 Harper v. Dotson, 43 Iowa, 232, 359, 360 Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky. 160, 2290 Harper v. Harper, 57 Ind. 547, 652 Harper v. New York City Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 4a, 869, 872, 885 Harper v. Terry, 70 Ind. 264, 483 Harper v. Union Manfg. Co., 100 111. 225, 1:382 Harper v. Young, 112 Pa. St. 419, 1930 Harpold v. Stobart, 46 Ohio St. 397, 1373 Harralson v. Barrett. 99 Cal. 607, 482 Harrell v. Godwin, 102 N. C. 330, 109 Harrell v. Hill, 19 Ark. 102, 110, 424 Harrell v. Miller, 35 Miss. 700, 639 Harrell v. Watson, 63 N. Car. 454, 182, 231, 235 Harrell v. Zimpleman, 66 Texas, 292, 942 Harrett v. Kinney, 44 Mich. 457, 2277 Harrer v. Wallner, 80 111. 197, 1768 Harrhy v. Wall, 1 B. & Aid. 103, 567 Harriman y. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341, 190, 534 Harriman v. Park, 55 N. H. 471, 2256 Harrington v. Dcnnie, 13 Mass. 93, 281 Harrington v. Dill, 1 Houst. (Del.) 410, 1524 Harrington v. Fall River Works, 119 Mass. 82, 285 Harrington v. Fitchburg Ins. Co., 124 Mass. 126, 117 Harrington v. Rich, 6 Vt. 666, 5:4 Harrington v. Smith, 138 Mass. 92, 324 Harrington v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 549, I860, 1973 Harris's Case, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 587, 50 Harris v. Brain, 33 111. App. 510, :?J7 Harris v. Brooks. 2 Am. L. C. 425, 571 Harris v. Carmody, 131 Mass. 51, 1827, 1S:>2 Harris v. Central R. Co. , 91 Ga. 317, 12 18 Harris v. Clark (Iowa), 62 N. W. Rep. 854, 206 Harris v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 15 R. I. 371, 738 Harris v. Great Western Ry. Co., L. R, 1 Q. B. D. 515, 64 Harris v. Harris, 89 Va. 762, 544 Harris v. Harris, 23 Gratt. 737, 182, 231, 234 Harris v. Harris, 69 Ind. 181, 501 Harris v. Huntbach, 1 Burr. 373, 608 Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 Wend. 638, 693, 845 Harris v. More, 70 Cal. 502, 1999 Harris v. Roofs Exrs., 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 489, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994 Harris v. Ross, 86 Mo. 89, 1795 Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. (U. S.) 79, 1891, 1897 Harris v. Scott (N. H.) , 32 Atl. Rep. 770, 69 Harris v. Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 791 Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532, 1945, 2205 Harris v. Woodruff, 124 Mass. 205, 1043 Harrison v. Cage, 1 L. Raym. 386, 227, 617 Harrison v. Close, 2 J ohns. 44H, 520, 562, 819 Harrison v. Cooley, 34 N. J. Eq. 283, 1602 Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648, 710, 711, 715 Harrison v. Guest, 6 D. M. & G. 424, 234 Harrison v. Handley, 1 Bibb, 443, 194 Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 1179 Harrison v. Hicks, 1 Port. (Ala.) 423, 445 Harrison v. Johnson, 27 Ala. 445, 470 Harrison v. Lockhart, 25 Ind. 112, 2044 Harrison v. McCormick, 89 Cal. 327, 2202 Harrison v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 247, 460 Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 74 Mo. 364, 270 Harrison v. Moran, 163 Mass. 495, 443 Harrison v. Polar Star Lodge, 116 HI. 279, 1198 Harrison v. Sawtel, 10 John. 242, 596 Harrison v. Simons, 55 Ala. 510, 1738 Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289, 725 Harrison v. Trustees Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 456, 90 Harrod v. Mamer, 32 Wis. 162, 1384 Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469, 2148 Harshbarger v. Foreman, 81 111. 364, 429 Hart v. Alexander. 2 M. & W. 484, 537 Hart v. Boiler, 15 S. & R. 162, 779 Hart v. Carpenter, 24 Conn. 427, 162 Hart v. Deamer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 497, 1814 Hart v. Gould, 62 Mich. 262, 513 Hart v. Grigsby, 14 Bush (Ky.), 542, 1724, 1754 Hart v. Hammett, 18 Vt. 127, 692 Hart v. Handlin, 43 Mo. 171, 976 Hart v. Hart, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 670, 2009 Hart v. Hart's Admr., 41 Mo. 441, 778, 794, 795 Hart v. Hart, 109 N. Car. 368, 1740 Hart v. Hart, 22 Barb. 606, 133 Hart v. Kendall, 82 Ala. 144, 2250 Hartv. Livermore Mach. Co., 72 Miss. 809, 714 Hart v. Mayor, etc., 3 Paige, 213, 1557 Hart v. Mills, 15 M. & W. 85, 304 Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 1965, 1966 Hart v. Taylor, 70 Miss. 665, 565 Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562, 1461 cvm TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Harter Medicine Co. v. Hopkins, S3 Wis. 309, 2174 Hartfleld v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 1838 Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 04, 705 Hartford, etc., Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528, 132 Hartford, etc., Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 499, 260 Hartford, etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528, 130, 134 Hartford, etc., E. Co. v. Crosswell, 5 Hill, 383, 1254 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. Co.. 62 Fed. Eep. 904, 1954, 1955 Hartley v. Frosh, 6 Texas, 216, 1730 Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170, 238 Hartley v. James, 50 N. Y. 38, 411 Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & E. 934, 692 Hartman's Appeal, 3 Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 271, 786 Hartman v. Blackburn, 7 Pittsburgh Leg. Jour. 140, 131 Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 32, 2159 Hartman v. Ogborn, 54 Pa. St. 120, 1779 Hartman v. Sogers, 69 Cal. 643, 148 Harts v. Brown, 77 111. 226, 1290, 1298, 1359, 1406 Hartsfleld v. Chamblin (S. C), 21 S. E. Eep. 798, 43 Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211, 579 Hartshorn v. Hartshorn (N. H.), 29 Atl. Eep. 406, 454 Hartshorn v. Hubbard, 2 N. H. 433, 490 Hartsock v. Mnrt, 76 Md. 2bl, 389 Hartupee v. City of Pittsburgh, 131 Pa. St. 535, SSI Hartwell v. Jackson, 7 Texas, 576, 11M7 Hartwell v. Kelly, 117 Mass. 235, 643 Hartwell v. Eice, 1 Gray, 587, 557 Hartwell v. Young, 67 Hun, 472, 651, 692 Harvey v. Alexander, 1 Rand. (Va.) 219, 1718 Harvey v. Coffin, 44 N. H. 563, 280 Harvey v. Gibbons, 2 Lev. 161, Harvey v. Grabham, 5 Ad. & El. 61, 690, 951 Harvey v. Hunt, 119 Mass. 279, 1640 Harvey v. Irvine, 11 Iowa, 82, 811 Harvey v. Johnson, 6 C. B. 295, 54 Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 1869, 1917, 1931 Harvey v. Million, 67 Ind. 90, 637 Harvey v. Eailroad Co., 74 Mo. 538, 1904 Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147, 1022 Harvey v.Tama Co., 53 Iowa, 228, 445 Harwood v. Eoot, 20 Fla. 940, 1701, 1737 Hasbrouck v. Winkler, 48 N. J. Law, 431, 11 Haskell v. Brewer, 11 Maine, 258, 379, 414 Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208, 14B2 Haskell v. Worthington, 94 Mo. 560, 154, 155 Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 2207, 2208 Haskin v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 78 Va. 700, 1136 Haskins v. Alcott, 13 Ohio St. 210, 1643 Haskins v. Lombard, 16 Maine, 140, 172 Haskins v. Newcomb, 2 John. 405, 532 Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514, 934 Haslack v. Mavm -, 28 N. J. Law, 284, 146 Haslet v. HuJpt, 6 Watts, 464, 814 Hasselman v. Carroll, 102 Ind. 153, 2174 Hasselmna v. United States Mortgage Co., 97 Ind. 305, 1434 Hastelow v. Jackson, 8 Barn. & Cress. 221, 1S69 Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473, 1237 Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195, 1775 Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261, 10, 11, 954 Hastings v. Lovcring, 2 Pirk. 214, 325, 327 Hastings v. Whillev, 2 Exch. 611, 2043, 2044 Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J. Eq. 697, 1711 Hatch v. Barr, 1 Ohio, 3U0, 1231 Hatch v. Burroughs, 1 Wodd's, 439, I'.ii f Hatch v. Cobb, 4 Johns. Ch. 559, llfis Hatch v. Coddiugton, S5 TJ. S. 48, 1759 Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, 1380 Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 292, 1293, 1308 Hatch v. Kelly, 63 N. H. 29, 2289 Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44, 188 Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124, 96 Hatch v. Spooner, 37 N. Y. Supl. 296, 335 Hatcher v. Andrews, 5 Bush (Ky.), 561, 2044 Hatchett v. Blanton, 72 Ala. 423, 1644 Hathaway v. Moran, 44 Maine, 67, 1902 Hathaway v. Noble, 55 N. H. 508, 2289 Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 92, 17 Hathaway v. Sabin, 63 Vt. 527, 302 Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557, 797 Hatton, In re, L. E. 7 Ch. App. 723, 530, 533 Hatton v. Gray. 2 Cas. in Ch. 164, 1108 Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts (Pa.), 153, 1883 Hauer's Estate, In re, 140 Pa. St. 420, 1673 Hauerwas v. Goodloe, 101 Ala. 162, 2112 Haughton v. Maurer, 55 Mich. 32% 1278 Havana Drill Co. v. Ashurst, 148 111. 115, 198 Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555, 135 Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3Wall. (TJ. S.) 294, 2149, 2207 Haven v. Adams, 4 Allen, 80, 1232 Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112, 801 Havens v. American Ins. Co., 11 Ind. App. 315, 80 Havens v. Havens, 3 N. Y. Supl. 219, 789 Haverly v. Becker, 4 N. Y. 1C9, 434 Haviland v. Halstead, 34 N. Y. 643, 678 Haviland v. Willetts, 21 N. Y. Supl. 1112, 578, 987, 988 Haverstock v. Sarbach, 1 Watts & Serg. 390, 560 Hawes v. Armstrong, 1 Bing. N. C. 761, 683 Hawes v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa, 315, 1784 Hawes v. Dunton, 1 Bailey L. (S. Car.) 146, 1750 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 TJ. S. 450, 1450 Hawes v. Smith, 12 Maine, 429, 853, 871 Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629, 214, 255 Hawken v. Bourne, 8 M. & W. 703, 1359 Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560, 67, 90, 91 Hawkes v. Saunders, 183 Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. Brainard, 72 Iowa, 120, 1996 Hawkins, Ex parte, 25 L. J. Ch. 221, 260 Hawkins v. Arnericus, etc., Loan Assn., 96 Ga. 206, 1625 Hawkins v. Ball's Admrs., 18 B. Mon. 816, 821 Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. (TJ. S.) 457 2158 Hawkins v. Berry, 5 Gilman (111.), 36, 327, 353 Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502, 675, 692 Hawkins v. Clermont, 15 Mich. 511, 490 Hawkins v. Gilbert, 19 Ala. 54, 2181 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558, 1056 Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198, 325, 328, 345 Hawkshaw v. Parkins, 2 Swanst, 539, 548 Hawkshaw v. Eawlings, 1 Strange, 23, 445 Hawley v. Bibb, 69 Ala. 52, 1916, 1918, 1923 Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717, 1289 Hawley v. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420, 183 Hawley v. Gray, etc., Paving Co., 106 Cal. 337, 1272 Hawley v. James, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 318, 1715 Hawley v. Kansas Coal Co., 4S Kan. 593, 1984 Hawley v. Screven, 62 Ga. 347, 737 Hawley v. Upton, 102 U. S. 314, 1400 Haworth v. Montgomery, 91 Tenn. 16, 1909 Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N. J. Eq. 124, 1105, 110S, 1109, 1113 Hawthorne v. Calef , 2 Wall. 10, . 1385 Haxtun v. Bishop, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 13, 2196 Hay's Case, L. E. 10 Ch. App. 593, 1980 Hayden v. Cook, 34 Neb. 670, 960 Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426, 388 Hayden v. Directory Co., 42 Fed. Eep. 875, „ , 1445 Hayden v. Lincoln Elec. E. Co., 43 Neb. 680, 1273 TABLE OF CASES. C1X [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La. Ann. 65, 1674 Hayden v. Westcott, 11 Conn. 129, 104a Haydon v. Haydon (Ky. 1894), 27 S. W. Eep. 975, 1131 Hayes v. Allen, 160 Mass. 286, 453 Hayes v. Boylan, 141 111. 400, 1194 Hayes v. Davidson, 70 N. C. 573, 190, 518, 624 Hayes v. Fenn, 89 Ga. 264, 544 Hayes v. Harmony, etc., Cemetery, 108 Mass. 400, 1141 Hayes v. Hayes, 8 La. Ann. 468, 1899 Hayes v. Morrison, 33 N. H. 90, 2197 Hayes v. Moynahan, 60111. 409, 635 Hayes v. Warren, 2 Strange, 933, 192 Hayes v. Willio, 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 167, 2072 Haynard v. Board, etc., of Red Cliff, 20 Colo. 33, 1474 Haynes v. Farley, 4 Port. (Ala.) 528, 219 Haynes v. Nice, 100 Mass. 327, 471, 592 Haynes v. Eudd, 83 N. Y. 251, 1940, 2012, 2013 Haynes v. Second Baptist Church, 12 Mo. App. 536, 285 Haynes v. Thorn, 29 N. H. 386, 212, 214 Hays v. City of Oil City (Pa. Sup.), 11 Atl. Eep. 63, 1512 Hays v. Gas Light, etc., Co., 29 Ohio, St. 330, 1223 Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga. 741, 163 Hays v. Kennedy, 3 Grant (Pa.) , 357, 276 Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 378, 275, 276 Hays v. Leonard, 155 Pa. St. 474, 1728 Hays v. McConnell, 42 Ind. 285, 789 Hays v. Midas, 104 N. Y. 602, 945 Hays v. Ottawa, etc., E. Co., 68 111. 422, 1426 Hays T. Richardson, 1 Gill & J. 366, 643 Hayton v. Irwin, L. E. 5 C. P. D. 130, 917 Hayward v. Barker, 52 Vt. 429, 1651 Hay ward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181, 139, 146, 897, 2232 Hayward v. Munger, 14 Iowa, 516, 395 Hayward v. Young, 2 Chit. 407, 2044 Haywood v. School District, 2 Cush. 419, 1492 Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co., 64 Wis., 639, 1365, 1392 Hazard v. Day, 14 Allen (Mass.), 487, 2098 Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. 2G7, 343, 390, 886 Hazel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 82 Iowa, 477, 734 Hazlehurst v. Savannah, etc., E. Co., 43 Ga. 13, 1262, 1427, 2054, 2056 Hazlehurst Compress Co. v. Boomer Com- press Co., 48 Fed. Eep. 803, 330 Hazleton v. Putnam, 3 Pinney (Wis.) , 107, 641,642 Hazleton Boiler Co. v. Fargo Gas Co., 4 N. Dakota, 365, 96, 329 Hazleton, etc., Coal Co. v. Buck Moun- tain Coal Co., 57 Pa. St. 301, 864 Hazard v. Hoxsie, 53 Hun. 417, 292 Head v. Meloney, 111 Pa. St. 99, 2263 Head v. Tattersall, L. E. 7 Ex. 7, 294 Head v. University, 19 Wall. (IT. S.) 526, 2127 Headley v. Hackley, 50 Mich. 43, 520, 543 Heady v. Bexar Building Assn. (Texas 1894), 26 S. W. Eep. 468, 1604, 1619 Healyv. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 517, 422 Heane v. Sogers. 9 B. & C. 586, 463 Heaphy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & S. 29, 1165 Heard v. Bowers, 23 Pick. 455, 487, 488, 496 Heard v. Wadham, 1 East, 619, 120 Hearu v. Griffin, 2 Chitty, 407, 2063 Heara v. Kiehl, 33 Pa. St. 146, 525, 527 Hearne v. Chadbourne, 65 Maine, 302, 653 Hearst v. Sybert, Cheves, 177, 1880 Heaston v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 16 Ind. 275, 1337 Heath v. Doyle, 18 R. I. 252, 545 Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis. 223, 649, 652 Heath v. Mahoney, 12 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 404, 1796 Heath v. Stevens. 48 N. H. 251, 1799 Heath v. West, 20 N. H. 101, 1779,1791 Heavenrich v. Steele, 57 Minn. 221, 543 Heaver v. Lanahan, 74 Md. 49IJ, 280, 282 Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54, 465 Hebburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 2G2, 75a Heckman v. Manning, 4 Colo. 543, 540 Heckman v. Swartz, 50 Wis. 207, 2014 Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211, 138, 140, 370 Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa, 137, 2030, 2039, 2040 Hedges v. Dixon Co., 150 U. S. 182. 1516, 1526, 1527, 1538, 1885 Hedges v. Hudson E. Co., 6 Eobt. 119, 124 Hedges v. Strong, 3 Ore. 18, 654 Heebner v. Eagle Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 131, 732 Heffelflnger v. Shutz, 16 Serg. & E. 44, 1656 Hefferlin v. Sinsinderfer, 2 Kan. 401, 715 Heffron v. Brown, 155 111. 322, 23, 51 Heffron v. Flanigan, 37 Mich. 274, 90, 91 Heflin v. Milton, 69 Ala. 354, 628, 646 Hegeman v. City of Passaic, 51 N. J. Law, 109, 1519 Hegeman v. Johnson, 35 Barb. 200, 674 Heggie v. People's, etc., Assn., 107 N. C. 581, 1383 Heichew v. Hamilton, 3 Greene (Iowa) 596, 2032, 2040, 2044 Heidenheimer v. Baumgarten (Texas 1894), 29 S. W. Eep. 208, 2252 Heidenheimer v. Cleveland (Texas Sup. 1891) , 17 S. W. Eep. 524. 1924 Heidenrich v. Leonard, 21 La. Ann. 628, 2021 Heilman v. Lebanon B. Co., 145 Pa. St. 23, 528 Heimv. Butin (Cal.), 40 Pac. Rep. 2G4 Heim v. Vogel, 69 Mo. 529, 75 Heindockle v. Zugbaum, 5 Mont. 344, 164, 165 Heindokel v. National, etc., Association, 58 Minn. 340, 175, 1616 Heine v. Mayor, 61 N. Y. 171, 280, 282 Heine v. Mechanic's Ins. Co., 45 La. Ann. 770, 1675 Heineman v. Newhan, 55 Ga. 262, 1889 Heinricbs v. Woods. 7 Mo. App. 236, 1044 Heirn v. Carron, 11 S. & M. 301, 532 Heirs of Watrous v. McKie, 54 Texas, 65, 854 Heisch v. Adams, 81 Texas, 94, 187 Heisen v. Heisen, 145 111. 658, 952 Heisley v. Swanstron, 40 Minn. 196, 689, 1182 Heitschv. Cole, 47 Minn. 320, 201,203 Hekelnkaemper v. German Bldg. Ass'n, 22 Kan. 549, 1621 Helbreg v. Schumann, 150 111. 12, 1815 Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. St. 328, 258 Helfenstein's Estate, 26 W. N. C. 194, 32 Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S. Car. 110, 2108 Heller, In re, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 199, 1814 Heli, In re, 3 Atk. 635, 1846 Helling v. United Order, 29 Mo. App. 309, 190, 519 Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56, 417 Helms v. Chadbourne, 45 Wis. 61, 11:156 Helms v. Kearns, 40 Ind. 124, 1184 Helphrey v. Chicago, Rock Island Co., 29 Iowa, 480, 396 Helshaw v. Langley, 11 L. J. Ch. 17, 687 Hemkleman v. Peterson, 154 111. 419, 1057 Hemmenway v. Stone, 7 Mass. 58, 811 Hemminger v. Western Assurance Co., 95 Mich. 355, 840, 2212 Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. St. 545, 447 Hemstead v. Beed, 6 Conn. 481), 2125 Henas v. Henas, 5 Ind. App. 100, 565 Henderson v. Cass County. 107 Mo. 50, 398 Henderson v. Hudson (1810), 1 Munf. 510, 1179 Henderson v. Indiana Trust Co. (Ind. 1895), 40 N. E. Eep. 516, 1397 Henderson v. McDuffe, 5 N. H. 38, 826 Henderson v. Moss, 82 Texas, 69, 30 Henderson v. Palmer, 71 111. 579, 1853 ex TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Henderson v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 17 Texas, 560, 15+3 Henderson v. Schaas, 35 111. App. 155, 725 Henderson v. Stevenson, L. K. 2 H. L. Sc. 470. 65 Henderson v. Stobart, 5 Ex. 99, 532, 535 Henderson v. Stokes, 42 N. J. Eq. 586, 465 Henderson v. Waggoner, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 133. 1902 Henderson v. Warmack, 27 Miss. 830, 1678 Henderson v. Wheaton 1X1 111. 581, 2183 Henderson and Nashville R. Co. v. Dicker- son, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 173, 2121 Henderson, etc., Association v. Johnson, 88 Kv. 191, 1598, 1600 Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 TJ. S. 143, 178 237 1113 2210 Hendricks v. Gilchrist, 76 Ind. 369, ' ' 2273 Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N. Y. 411, 1052, 1653, 1659, 1754 Hendricks v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143, 247 Hendrix v. Gore, 8 Ore. 407, 1363 Henke v. Eureka Endowment Assn., 100 Cal. 429, 2201, 2183 Henkle v. Assurance Co., 1 Ves. Sr. 317, 1066, 1080 Henkleman v. Peterson, 154 111. 419, 1051, 1058 Hennel v. Vanderburgh County, 132 Ind. 32, 1823 Hennessey v. Hill, 52 111. 281, 198 Hennessey v. Manhattan, etc., Co., 28 Hun, 98, 897 Hennessey v. Gore, 35 111. App. 594, 868 Hennessey v. Woolworth, 128 TJ. S. 438, 1129, 1166 Henrici v. Davidson, 149 Pa. St. 323, 234 Henrizi v. Kehr, 90 Wis. 344, 1028 Henry v. Allen, 93 Ala. 197, 992 Henry v. Carson, 96 Ind. 412, 13 Henry v. Dietrich, 7 N. Y. Supl. 505, 471, 477 Henry v. Gibson, 55 Mo. 570, 832 Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio St. 121, 618 Henry v. Henry, 29 Ind. 564, 618 Henry v. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 70 Mo. 500, 829 Henry v. Patterson, 57 Pa. St. 346, 533, 1C33 Henry v. Ritenour. 31 Ind. 136, 1826 Henry v. Root. 33 N. Y. 526, 1773, 1777, 1793 Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407, 1707 Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358, 490 Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Utley, 155 Mass. 366, 470 Henschel v. Mabler, 3 Hill, 132, 873 Henschel v. Mamero, 120 111. 660, 1134 Heubhaw v. Robins, 9 Mete. 83, 323, 324, 327, 345, 353 Hensley v. Baker, 10 Mo. 157, 356, 360 Hensley v. Hensley (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep- 613, 1045 Henthorn v. Fraser, L. R. (1892), 2 Ch. 27, 56, 57, 58, 79, 80 Hentig v. James, 22 Kan. 326, 1332 Hen-wood v. Oliver, 1 Q. B. 409, 309 Hepburn v. Auld, 1 Cranch, 321, 398 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (TJ. S.) 603, 392, 2118 Herald v. Harper, S Blackf. 170, 549 Herberger v. Ilusman, 90 Cal. 583, 380 Herbert v. Kenton Bldg. Assn., 11 Bush (Ivy.), 296, 1620 Herbst v. Lowe, 65 Wis. 316, 699, 868, 2244 Hernrion v. Henderson, 41 Miss. 584, 2097 Herndon v. The Triple Alliance, 45 Mo. App. 426, 117 Heron v. Davis, 3 Bosw. 336, 132 Herreshotr v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 2030, 2045 Herrin v. Butters, 20 Maine, 119, 6.">1 Herrin v. Libbey, 36 Maine, 357, 974, 2282 Herring v. Peaslee (Iowa 1895), 60 N. W. Rep. 650, 1064, 1068 Herri ng v. Skaggs, 73 Ala. 446, 907, 932 Herring v. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628, 221, 223, 224, 1711 Herrman v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184, 896 Herrmann v. Orcutt, 152 Mass. 405, 530 Hersh v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 74 Pa. St. 181, 1420 Herron v. Dibrell, 87 Va. 289, 326 Horsey v. Bennett, 28 Minn. 86, 470 Herson v. Henderson, 1 Foster (N. H.) , 224, 343 Hertz v. Wilder, 10 La. Ann. 199, 2016 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465, 772, 791 Hervey v. Rhode Island L. Works, 93 U. S. 664, 163, 722 Hervey v. Savery, 48 Iowa, 313, 1065 Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 134, 1507 Hesketh v. Fawcett, 11 M. & W. 356, 397 Hess's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 346, 594 Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225, 2169, 2170 Hess v. Powell, 29 Mo. App. 411, 2198 Hess v. Rau, 95 N. Y. 359, 203 Hester v. Sample (Iowa 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 403, 1021 Hester v. Thomson, 58 Miss. 108, 1708 Hestonville, etc., R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 210, 2143 Hetfleld v. Dow, 27 N. J. Law, 440, 598 Heth v. Wooldridge (1828), 6 Rand. (Va.) 605, 1179 Hewes v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472, 666 Hewitt v. Brown, 21 Minn. 163, 689 Hewitt v. Wheeler, 22 Conn. 557, 863 Hewlins v. Shippam, 5 Barn. & C. 221, 643 Hewitt v. Warren, 10 Hun, 560, 1801 Hewson v. Puxson, 38 Leg. Int. 308, 75 Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. St. 52, 990 Heywood v. Heywood, 42 Maine, 229, 864 Heyman v. Neale, 2 Camp. 337, 685 Heywood v. Porrin, 10 Pick. 225, 99, 863 Heyward v. Wallace, 4 Strob. 181, 343 Hiatt v. Harris, 28 Ind. 379, 387 Hiatt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 214, 848 Hibbard v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558, 1961 Hibbard v. Whitney, 13 Vt. 21, 836 Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200, 13 Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367, 725, 728 Hibernia, etc., Institution v. Luhn, 34 S. Car. 175, 1683 Hibbert v. MacKinnon, 79 Wis. 673, 234, 1197 Hick v. Rodocanachi, 65 L. T. E. N. S. 300, 297 Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8, 1937 Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454, 348 Hickling v. Wilson, 104 111. 54, 1380 Hickman v. Green, 133 Mo. 165, 345 Hickman v. Haynes, L. R. 10 C. P. 598, 690 Hickman v. Hickman, 1 Wash. 257, 1840 Hickman v. Macon County, 42 Fed. Rep. 759, 26 Hick-ox v. Elliott, 27 Fed. Rep. 830, 1856 Hickmott's Case, 9 Rep. 52 b, 550 Hicks v. Brown, 12 John. 142. 728 Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. 243, 186 Hicks v. Skinner, 71 N. Car. 539, 360, 361 Hicks v. Whitmore, 12 Wend. 548, 674 Hiem v. Mill, 13 Ves. Jr. 114, 1135 Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. V. 563, 1031 Higby v. New York R. Co., 3 Bos. 497, 435 Higdon v. Thomas, 1 H & G. 152, 688 Higgins v. Brown, 78 Maine, 473, 803, 804, 1828. 1830, 1831 Higgins v. Delaware R. Co., 60 N. Y. 553, 747 Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 111. 301, 1047, 1290, 1292 Higgins v. Lessig, 49 111. App. 459, 7 Higgins v. Miner, 13 Ind. 346, 1956 Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417, 919, 932, 2247 Higgins v. Wortell, 18 Cal. 330, 447 Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516, 684 High's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 283, 557 High v. Board, 92 Ind. 580, 148J Higham v. Harris, 108 Ind. 246, 1834 TABLE OF CASES. CXI [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291, .] Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 338, 1824 Highland Co. v. McKean, 11 Johns. 98, 156 Highlands Chemical Co., The, v. Mat- thews, 76 N. Y. 145, 805 Highley v. Barron, 49 Mo. 103, 1781 Higman v. Hood, 3 Ind. App. 456, 2214 Hight v. Ripley, 19 Maine, 137, 657 Hight v. Taylor, 97 Ind. 392, 553, 2245 Highton v. Dessau, 19 N. Y. SupL 395, „ 127, 140, 299 Hilbish v. Hilbish, 71 Ind. 27, 794 Hilborn v. Bucknam, 78 Maine, 482, 803, 1830 Hildreth v. O'Brien, 10 Allen, 104, 343 Hileman v. Hileman, 85 Ind. 1, 1672 Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 1765 Hill v. Beach, 12 N. J. Eq. 31, 1335, 1384 Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216, 149, 951, 956, 2192 Hill v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 60 Iowa, 196, 738 Hill v. Bush, 19 Ark. 522, 1877 Hill v. Carter, 101 Mich. 158, 397, 403, 410 Hill v. Cheatam, 129 Mo. 71, 1124, 1168 Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 1497 Hill v. Davis, 3 N. H. 384, 2168 Hill v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150, 1813 Hill v. Duluth City, 57 Minn. 231, 831 Hill v. Dunham, 7 Gray (Mass.), 543, 2113 Hill v. Gomme, 1 Beav. 540, 248, 1128 Hill v. Gould, 129 Mo. 106, 1290, 1311 Hill v. Grigsby, 35 Cal. 656, 1143 Hill v. Heller, 27 Hun, 416, 146 Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9, 196 Hill t. Hobart, 16 Maine, 164, 2260 Hill v. Hooper, 1 Gray, 131, 651 Hill v. Huntress, 43 N. H. 480, 867 Hill v. Jamieson. 16 Ind. 125, 649, 652 Hill v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 79 Ga. 105, 859 Hill v. Johnson, 38 Mo. App. 383, 1924 Hill v. Lord, 48 Maine, 83. 642 Hill v. McLaughlin, 158 Mass. 307, 474 Hill v. Miller, 76 N. Y. 32, 885 Hill v. Nisbet, 100 Ind. 341, 1226 Hill v. Palmer, 56 Wis. 123, 645 Hill v. Parker, 10 111. App. 323, 854 Hill v. Paul, 8 Clark & F. 295, 2084 Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N. Car. 173 1379 Hill v. Place, 7 Eobt. 389, 402 Hill v. Eich Hill Coal Co., 119 Mo. 9, 1155, 1206 Hill v. School District, 17 Maine, 316, 746 Hill v. Sherwood, 3 Wis. 343. 2100 Hill v. Smith, Morris (Iowa) , 70, 1890, 1891 Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, 708, 709, 1901 Hill v. Taylor, 125 Mo. 331. 1773 Hill v. Townsend, 69 Ala. 286, 166 Hill y. Webb, 43 Minn. 545, 55 Hill v. Wilson, 88 Cal. 92, 381 Hillebert y. Porter, 28 Minn. 496. 2154, 2155 Hillebrant v. Brewer, 6 Texas, 45, 559 Hillegas v. Stephenson, 75 Mo. 118, 828 Hilliard v. Cagle, 46 Miss. 309, 1366 Hilliard v. Noyse, 58 N. H. 312, 523 Hillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. 56, 821 Hills t. Chicago, 60 111. 86, 1587 Hills v. Mitson, 8 Exch. 751, 1882 Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520, 2196 Hills v. Eix, 43 Minn. 543, 898 Hills v. Sommer, 6 N. Y. Supl. 469, 190, 512, 518, 522, 544 Hillyard v. Crabtree, 11 Texas, 264, 136 Hilton v. Dinsmore, 21 Maine, 410, 607 Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, 1953, 2060 Hilton v. Houghton, 35 Maine, 143, 2112, 2113 Hilton v. Southwick, 17 Maine, 303, 74 Hilton v. Woods, L. E. 4 Eq. 432, 2005 Himmelman v. Danos, 35 Cal. 441, 161 flmchliff t. Hinman, 18 Wis. 130, 92 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38, 663, 671 Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 121 TJ. S. 264, 2213,2218 Hinckley v. Southgate, 11 Tt. 428, 651 Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558, 662, 665 Hiue v. Eoberta, 48 Cenn. 267, 165 Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Pa. St. 428, _. 215, 1772, 1777 Hineman v. Matthews, 138 Pa. St. 204, „. 165, 168 Hines v. Board, 93 Ind. 266, 1835 Hinkle v. Fisher, 104 Ind. 84, 046 Hinkle v. Higgins, 83 Texas, 615, 468 Hinkle v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 31 Minn. 434, 523 Hinnen y. Newman, 35 Kan. 709, „. 1128, 1984, 2013 Hmson v. Bush, 84 Ala. 368, 1768 Hinton v. Insurance Co., 63 Ala. 488, 1069 Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. Car. 28, 1778 Hinton v. Locke, 5 Hill, 437, 48, 918, 926 Hintze v. Taylor, 57 N. J. Law, 239. 1870 Hipwellv. Knight, 1 You. & C. (Exch.) 401, 749, 751 Hirn y. State, 1 Ohio St. 15, 2128 Hirshfeld y. Bopp, 145 N. Y. 84, „ 1370, 1375, 1376, 1378 Hirshfleld v. Fort Worth National Bank, 83 Texas, 452, 766, 767 Hirschman v. Iron Eange E. Co., 97 Mich. 384, 1277 Hirschfeld v. London, etc., Eailway Co., L. E. 2 Q. B. Div. 1, , 581 Hirshhorn v. Stewart, 49 Iowa, 418, 666 Hiscock v. Norton, 42 Mich. 320, 429 Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 439, 1024 Hitchcock y. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438, 180, 231, 2043, 2044, 2045 Hitchcock v. Davis, 87 Mich. 629, 565 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 783 Hitchcock v. Taylor, Genessee Probate Judge, 99 Mich. 128, 1714 Hitchcock v. Watson, 18 111. 289, 4:30 Hitchens v. Congreve, 1 Euss. & M. 150, 1980 Hitchens v. Shaller, 32 Mich. 496, 641 Hitchin v. Groom, 17 L. J. C. P. 145, 902 Hitchings v. St. Louis, etc., Transp. Co., 68 Hun. 33, 1355 Hitt v. Allen, 13 III. 592, 1948 Hix v. Whittemore, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 545, 1812 2278 Hoad v. Grace, 7 H. & N. 494, ' 220 Hoadley y. Northern Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304, 717 Hoadly v. McLaine, 10 Bine. 482, 677, 776 Hoag, Ex parte. 7 Paige (N. Y.), 312, 1844 Hoag v. Town of Greenwich, 133 N. Y. 152, 434 Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230, 2038, 2044 Hoare v. Niblett, L. E. 1 Q. B. 781, 833 Hoare v. Parker, 2 Term. E. 376, 1706 Hoare v. Eennie, 5 H. & N. 19, 150 Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363, 193, 325, 327, 333, 334, 363 Hobbs v. Columbia Falls Brick Co., 157 Mass. 109, 2235 Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 700, 871 Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. Law, 265, 2127 Hoboken, etc., Bank v. Phelps, 34 Conn. 92, 15 Hoch v. Cocks, 78 Hun, 253, 1106 Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 492, 494, 2213 Hochster v. De Latour, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 157, 2221 Hocking y. Hamilton, 158 Pa. St. 107, 102 Hockenbury v. Meyers, 34 N. J. Law, 346, 200 Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 244, 2036, 2074, 2076, 2078 Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4 CI. & F. 323, 1659 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 110, 1515, 2242 Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala. 103, 1364 Hodges v. Hodges, 9 E. I. 32, 1665 CX11 TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, 1200, 2284 Hodges y. Richmond Mfg. Co., 9 R. I. 482, 640 Hodges v. Taylor, 57 Texas, 196, 1662 Hodges v. Thompson (Ala. 1893), 13 So. Rep. 679, 1156 Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N. Car. B6, 354, 355, 358, 359 Hodsdon v. Wilkins, 7 Greenl. (Maine) 113, 1853 Hodson v. Carter, 2 Pinney, 212. 215 Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co. (111. 1895), 40 N. E. Rep. 9711, 1048 Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co., 156 111. 397, 1321 Hodgson t. Temple, 5 Taunton, 181, 1862 Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 349 Hoeflinger v. Wells, 47 Wis. 628, 457 Hoeser v. Kraeka, 29 Texas, 450, 1662 Hoffman v. .Etna Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 405, 869,883 Hoffman v. Bloomsburg R. Co., 157 Pa. St. 174, 75 Hoffman v. Brooks, 11 Week. Law B. 258, 2060 Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. 285, 721 Hoffman v. Fett, 39 Cal. 109, 846 Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly, 42, 131 Hoffman v. John Hancock, etc., Ins. Co., 92 D. S. 161, 1349 Hoffman v. Johnson, 2 Bland, 103, 110 Hogan v. Burns (Cal.), 33 Pac. Rep. 631, 525, 544 Hogan v. Hogan, 89 111. 427, 1731 Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash. 595, 1137, 1143, 1144, 1145 Hogg v. Laster, 56 Ark. 382, 793 Hogan v. Weyer, 5 Hill, 389, 554 Hogev. Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 348, 2140 Hogg's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 479, 884 Hoggatt v. Thomas, 35 La. Ann. 298, 614 Hoghton v. Hoghton, 11 Eng. Law and Eq. 134, 1030 Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278, 1018 Hogins v. Plympton, 11 Pick. 97, 193 Hoitt t. Holcomb, 23 N. H. 535, 588 Hoitt v. Moulton, 21 N. H. 586, 617 Hoke v. Fleming, 10 Ired. L. 263, 549 Hoker v. Boggs, 63 111. 161, 1731, 1746 Holbrook v. Armstrong, 10 Maine, 31, G55 Holbrook v. Blodget, 5 Vt. 520, 465 Holbrook v. Chamberlain, 116 Mass. 155, 2185 Holbrook v. Waters, 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 335, 2039 Holcomb T. Thompson, 50 Kan. 598, 1067 Holcombe v. Richards, 38 Minn. 38, 14 Holdeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa, 144, 2039 Holder v. Curry, 85 Wis. 504, 1804 Holden C». v. Westervelt, 67 Me. 446, 146 Holder v. LaFayetto, etc., Railroad Co., 71 111. 10G. 1300 Holderbaugh v. Turpin, 75 Ind. 84, 933 Holdich's Case, L. R. 14 Eq. 72, 4S7 Holladay v. Patterson, 5 Ore. 177, 1977 Holland v. Long, 57Ga.3li, 903 Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 218, 108, 109 Holland v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 434, 2222 Holley y. Haldeman, 78 Uro. 328, 474 Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 1). l Holloway Y. Jacoby, 120 Pa. St, 533, 326 Holloway v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 23 Texas, 465, 1407 Holloway y. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282, 2155 Hollowbush's Estate, 13 Phila, 217, 614 Hollowell, etc., Bank y. Hamlin, 14 Mass. 178, 1341 Holm y. Colman, 89 Wis. 233, 858 Holme Y. Guppy, 3 M. & W. 387, 299 Holman v. Johnson, Cowper, 341, 1872, 1889, 2062, 2101 Holmes y. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, 1782, 1783 Holmes y. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233, 446, 447, 448, 452, 455 Holmes y. Chartiers Oil Co., 138 Pa. St. 546, 373, 905, 2253 Holmes y. Corthell, 80 Maine, 31, 1576 Holmes y. Durkee, 1 Cababe & E. 23, 683 Holmes y. Evans, 48 Miss. 247, 677 Holmes v. Fisher, 13 N. H. 9, 490 Holmes v. Fresh, 9 Mo. 201, 1065 Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 1002, 2279 Holmes Y. Hall, 8 Mich. 66, 858 Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295, 2123 Holmes Y. Hoskins. 9 Ex. 753, 663, 672 Holmes y. Hubbard, 60 N. Y. 183, 872 Holmes y. Laraway, 64 Vt. 175, 446 Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503, 869, 2032 Holmes y. McCray, 51 Ind. 538, 644 Holmes y. Parker, 25 111. App. 225, 872, 885 Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I. 242, 797 Holmes y. Powell, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 572, 426 Holmes Y. Remsen, 26 John. 229, 725 Holmes y. Reynolds, 55 Vt. 39, 1752 Holmes y. Richet, 56 Cal. 307, 2224 Holmes v. Smythe, 100 111. 413, 1600 Holmes y. Tyson, 147 Pa. St. 305, 321, 328 Holmes y. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75, 1237, 1264 Holmes v. Whitaker, 23 Ore. 319, 928, 932, 935 Holmes y. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503, 575 Holmes, etc., Manufacturing Co. y. Holmes, etc., Metal Co., 127 N. Y. 252, 1264 Holt y. Bennett, 146 Mass. 437, 1296 Holt Y. Clarencieux, 2 Str. 937, 1772 Holt y. Collyer, L. R. 16 Ch. Diy. 718, 869 Holt y. Creamer, 34 N. J. Eq. 181, 1662 Holt y. Green, 17 Mass. 258, 2101 HoltY. Holt, 58 N. H. 276, 699 Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191, 1435 Holt Y. Pie, 120 Pa. St. 425, 326 Holt y. Rogers, 8 Pet. 420, 1166 Holsapple v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 86 N. Y. 275, 1963 Holt y. Wilson, 75 Ala. 58, 1768 Holton y. Brown, 18 Vt. 224, 398 Holton y. Noble, 83 Cal. 7, 190, 527 Holyoke y. Loud, 69 Maine, 59, 829 Holtz y. Schmidt, 59 N. Y. 253, 18 Homan Y. Stewart, 103 Ala. 644, 1103, 1116 Home Bank y. Drumgoole, 109 N. Y. 63, 299 Home Benefit Assn. v. Sargent, 142 U. S. 691, 119 Home Ins. Co. y. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530, 2128 Home Ins. Co. v. Favorite, 46 111. 233, 913 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 430, 2138, 2139, 2140 Homer y. Ashford, 11 Moore 91, 47 Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322, 180 Homer v. Perkins, 124 Mass. 431, SSI Homestead Cases, 22 Graft. (Va.) 266, 2157 Homuth y. Metropolitan R. Co., 129 Mo. 629, 581 Honegger v. Wettstein, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct, 125, 541,1874 Honeyman v. Marratt, 6 H. L. C. 112, 68 Hood v. Hayward, 124 N. Y. 1, 819, 1975 Hood y. League, 102 Ala. 22S, 775 Hood y. Mayor, etc., 1 Allen (Mass.), 103, 1588 Hock y. Donaldson, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 56, 1776 Hook y. Philbrick, 23 N. H. 288, 946 Hook y. Turner, 22 Mo. 333, 631 Hook Y.White, 36 Cal. 299, 2178 Hooker v. De Palos, 28 Ohio St. 251, 1894, 2014 Hooker v. Russell, 67 Wis. 257, 604 TABLE OP CASES. CX111 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 849, 1426, 1983, 2020, 2037, 2060, 2069 Hooks v. Browns, 62 Ala. 258, 1728 Hooks v. Lee, 8 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.)157, 1713 Hooksett v. Concord R. Co., 38 N. H. 242, 2133 Hoole v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 217, 1546 Hooper v, Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 52, 571 Hooper v. Soheimer, 23 How. (U. S.) 235, 2277 Hooser v. Hunt, 65 Wis. 71, 1856 Hoover v. Buck (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 474, 1136 Hoover v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 Pa. St. 220, 1420 Hope v. Balen, 58 N. Y. 380, 47 Hope v. Hope, 8 DeG., M. St. G. 731, 696 Hopkins v. Alvis, 2 A. K. Marsh. 374, 681 Hopkins v. Appleby, 1 Stark. 388, 666 Hopkins V. City of Butte, 40 Pac. Rep. 171, 461 Hopkins v. Detwiler, 25 W. Va. 734, 456 Hopkins v. Ensign, 122 N. Y. 144, 201 Hopkins v. Grinnell, 28 Barb. 533, 356 Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379, 1856 Hopkins v. Mazyck, 1 Hill (S. Car.), 250, 1071 Hopkins v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 29 Kan. 544, 40 Hopkins v. Upshur, 20 Texas, 89, 1327 Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 964, 828 Hopkinson v. Leeds, 78 Pa. St. 396, 1853 Hopper, In re, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 489, 1814 Hopper v. Callahan, 78 Md. 529, 1705, 1706 Hopper v. Lovejoy, 47 N. J. Eq. 573, 1229 Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 932 Hopwood v. Patterson, 2 Ore. 49, 2224 Hord v. Taubman, 79 Mo. 101, 1707 Horgaav. McKenzie, 17 N. Y. Supl. 174, 374 Horan v. Strachan, 86 Ga. 408, 915 Horn v. Bray, 51 Ind. 555, 616 Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73, 26 Horn Mining Co. v. Ryan, 42 Minn. 196, 2284 Home v. Railroad Co v 62 N. H. 454, 1453 Home v, Rouquette, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 514, 728 Horner v. Frazier, 65 Md. 1, 655 Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 2026, 2033, 2044, 2047, 2264 Homer v. Webster, 33 N. J. Law, 387, 790 Hornor v. Henning, 93 U. S. 228, 1388 Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet. 232, 433 Horsey v. Graham, L. R. 5 C. P. 9, 645 Horsley v. Moss, 5 Texas Civ. App. 341, 575 Horstman v. Milla r 3 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 29 1631 Hor't v. Norton, 1 McCord (S. C.) , 22, 784 Horton v. Buffington, 105 Mass. 399, 2102 'Horton v. Mayor, etc., 4 Lea, 39, 1099 Horton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. 170, 412 Horton v. Nashville, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 39, 1513 Horton v. Town of Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513, 1532, 1535 Hortsman v. Miller, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 29, 534 Hosack v. Rogers, 25 Wend. 313, _ 819 Hoskins v. Mechanics', etc., Association, 84 N. Car. 838, 1609 Hoskins v. White, 13 Mont. 70, 1805 Hosier v. Hursh, 151 Pa. St. 415, 515 Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438, 161 Hosmer v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 299. 496, 2212 Hospes v. Northwestern Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 1375, 1384, 1393, 1398, 1404 Hospital v. Philadelphia County, 24 Pa. St;229, 2140 Hostetter v. Gray, 11 Fed. Rep. 179, 933 Hostetter v. Park, 137 U. S. 30, 913 Hotchin v. Kent, 8 Mich. 527, 1350 Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27, 882, 899 Hotchkiss v. Olmstead, 37 Ind. 74, 15 Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 1296, 1429, 1446, 1448 Hotel Co. v. West, 13 La. Ann. 545, 1326 Hough v. Brown, 19 N. Y. Ill, 67 viii Hough v. May, 4 A. & E. 954, 394 Hough v. People's Ins. Co., 36 Md. 398, 895 Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659, 1602 Houghton v. City of Boston, 159 Mass. 138, 451 Houghkirk v. President, etc., of Canal Co., 92 N. Y. 219, 365 Houghton v. Houghton, 14 Ind. 505, 1716 Houghwout v. Boisaubin, 18 N. J. Eq. 315, 57,58 Houlditch v. Milne, 3 Esp. 86, 610 Houliston v. Parsons, 9 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 681, 2114 Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 1991 House v. Fowle, 20 Ore. 163, 1735 House v. Houston Water- Works Co. (Texas Civ. App. 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 277 1575 House v. Walch, 144 N. Y. 418, 41, 42, 2178 Household Fire, etc., Co. v. Grant, L. R. 4 Exch. D. 216, 57 Houser v. Reynolds, 1 Hay. (N. Car.) 143, 1778 Houston v. Darling, 16 Maine, 413, 573 Houston v. Evans (Texas), 17 S. W. Rep. 925, 456 Houston v. Faul, 86 Ala. 232, 1066 Houston v. Feeser, 76 Texas, 365, 804 Houston v. Houston (Texas 1891), 18 S. W. Rep. 688, 1791 Houston v. Williamson, 81 Ala. 482, 1768 Houghton v. Manufacturers', etc., Insur- ance Co., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 115, 317 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Texas, 125, 1458 Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Maine, 451, 1821, 2276 Hovey v. McDonald, 109 V. S. 150, 2267 Howard, Appeal of, 162 Pa. St. 374, 1577 Howard v. Burgen, 4 Dana, 137, 649, 652 Howard v. Digby, 2 CI. & F. 634, 1841 Howard v. Brower, 37 Ohio St. 402, 622 Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. (D. S.) 461, 2155 Howard v. Burgen, 4 Dana (Ky.), 137, 647 Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 66, 76, 495, 507, 2211, 2215, 2222 Howard v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 268, 106 Howard v. Gresham, 27 Ga. 347, 626 Howard v. Hopkyns, 2 Atk. 371, 2073 Howard v. Howard, 11 How. Pr. 80, 42 Howard v. Howard (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 285, 633 Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263, 766 Howard v. Kirwin, 19 La. Ann. 432, 2021 Howard v. Kitchens, 31 S. Car. 490, 1683, 1742 Howard v. Matthews, 19 La. Ann. 432, 2021 Howard v. Pensacola, etc., R. Co., 24 Fla. 560, 2223 Howard v. Rohlflng, 36 Kan. 357. 1859 Howard v. Smedley, 140 Pa. St. 81, 133 Howard v. Smith, 56 Mo. 314, 1856 Howard v. Stillwell Manufacturing Co., 139 U. S. 199, 506 Howard v. Walker, 92 Tenn. 452, 914, 922 Howard v. Yale, 20 La. Ann. 451, 2021 Howard County v. Baker, 119 Mo. 397, 960 Howe v. Boston Carpet Co., 16 Gray (Mass.), 493, 1260 Howe v. Carpenter, 49 Wis. 697, 422 Howe v. Hay ward, 108 Mass. 54, 673 Howe v. Howe, 99 Mass. 88, 1811 Howe v. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538, 1276 Howe v. Lewis, 121 Ind. 110, 32 Howe, Matter of, 1 Paige, 125, 434 Howe v. Moore, 14 N. Y. Supl. 236, 388 Howe v. O'Mally, 1 Murphy, 287, 214 Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321, 663, 672 Howe v. Bachelder, 49 N. H. 204,' 639 Howe v. Richards, 102 Mass. 64, 234 Howe v. Rogers, 32 Texas, 218, 645 Howe v. Smith, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 89, 672, 673 Howe v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284, 200, 204, 205 Howe v. Wildes, 34 Maine, 566, 1746 Howe v. Woodruff, 12 Ind. 214, 29 CX1V TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Howell v. Coupland, L. E. 1 Q. B. D. 258, 295 Howell v. Fountain, 3 Ga. 176, 2016 Howell t. Knight, 100 N. C. 254, 856 Howell v. McCrie, 36 Kan. 636, 1350 Howell t. Peoria, 90 111. 104, 1521 Howell v. Roberts, 29 Neb. 483, 1385 Howden v. Haigh, 11 Ad. & E. 1033, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640 Howland v. Inhabitants of Maynard, 159 Mass. 434, 1497 Howlands v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604, 60 Howorth v. Scarce, 29 Ind. 278, 2171 Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber Co., 41 Minn. 548, 525 Hoyle, In re, L. R. 1 Ch. 84, 675 Hoyle v. Bush, 40 Mo. App. 408, 655 Hoyle v. Hoyle, L. R. (1893), 1 Ch. 84, 597, 598 Hoyle v. Pittsburgh Railroad, 54 N. Y. 314, 1307, 1417 Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & Bat. L. (N. Car.) 320, 1778 Hoyt v. Bradley, 27 Maine, 242, 490 Hoyt v. Brynes, 11 Maine, 475, 393, 402, 403 Hoyt t. Clarkson, 23 Ore. 51, 644 Hoyt v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 76, 1933 Hoyt v. Gooding, 99 Mich. 71, 1076 Hoyt v. Hall, 3 Bosw. 42, 381 Hoyt v. Interocean Building: Assn., 58 Minn. 345, 1616 Hoyt v. Smith, 4 Wash. St. 440, 396 Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320, 725 Hoyt y. Tuxbury, 70 111. 331, 1161 Hubbard v. Belden, 27 Vt. 645, 286 Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563, 805 Hubbard v. Bugbee, 58 Vt. 172, 1651 Hubbard y. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524, 2124 Hubbard y. Camperdown Mills, 26 S. Car. 581, 32 Hubbard, Inhabitants of, y. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563, 2120 Hubbard v. Long (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 644, 596 Hubbard y. Miller, 27 Mich. 15, 2047, 2069 Hubbard y. President Chenango Bank, 8 Cow. 88, 394 Hubbell y. M»igs, 50 N. Y. 580, 982 Hubbell y. Von Scboening, 49 N. Y. 326, 753 Hubbell y. Woolf, 15 Ind. 204, 835 Hubble y. Cole, 85 Va. 87, 43 Huber y. United, etc., Ger. Con., 1G Ohio, St. 371, 1894 Hubert y. Aitken, 5 N. Y. Supl. S29, 371 Hubert y. Moreau, 2 Car. & P. 528, GS7 Hutchting y. Engel, 17 Wis. 230, 1838 Huckins y. Hunt, 138 Mass. 366, 1640 Hudelson y. Armstrong, 70 Ind. 99, 824 Hudelsony. State, 94 Ind. 426, I'.i.Ti Hudson y. Archer, 4 S. D. 128, 2204 Hudson Y. Green Hill Seminary, 113 111. 618, 257, 1434 Hudson y. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678, 7:i3 Hudson Y. Hudson, 5 Bac. Ab. 700, 5 19 Hudson y. Swift, 20 Johns. 24, 411 Hudson Canal Co. y, Pennsylvania Coal Co., 8 Wall. 276, 863 Hudson Electric Co. v. Hudson, 163 Mass. 346, 1569 Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower, 156 Mass. 82, 1327 Hudson Real Estate Co. v. Tower, 161 Mass. 10, 1328 Hudson Tel. Co. y. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303, 1556 Huebler y. Smith, 62 Conn. 186, 1002 Huey v. Grinnell, 50 111. 179, 890 Huey y. Huey, 65 Mo. 689, 14 Huff y. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206, 642 Huffman v. Hendry, 9 Ind. App. 324, 993, 994 Huffman y. Hummer, 18 N. J. Eq. 83, 955, 1170 Huffman v. Wyrick, 5 Ind. App. 183, 790 Hug v. Van Burkleo, 58 Mo. 202, 1212 Hughes v. Antietam Co., 34 Md. 316, 155 Hughes v. Davis, 40 Cal. 117, 281 Hughes v. Eschback, 7 D. C. 66, 381, 414 Hughes y. Fisher, 10 Colo. 383, 609, 612 Hughes y. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 1814 Hughes y. Klingender, 14 La. Ann. 52, 708 Hughes v. Lane, 11 111. 123. 872 Hughes v. Morris, 2 De G. M., & G. 349, 843 Hughes v. Patton, 12 Wend. 234, 762 Hughes Y. Prewitt, 5 Texas, 264, 2197 Hughes v. Shull, 33 Kan. 127, 1859 Hughes y. Tinsley, 80 Va. 259, 43 Hughes y. Wells, 9 Hare, 749, 1671 Hughs y. Matson, Scotland (1846) (Not re- ported), 1293 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273, 1015, 1018, 1030, 1747, 1824 Huguenin v. Basely, 2 White & T. Lead Cas. Eg.. (Text Book Series) 597, 1018 Huguenin v. Baseley, 2 White & Tudor's Lead Cas. in Eq., pt. 2, pp. 1156, 1215, 1747 Huguley v. Lanier, 86 Ga. 636, 2006 Hugus v. Walker, 12 Pa. St. 173, 851 Hull v. Caldwell, 3 South Dakota, 451, 358, 359, 360 Hull y. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 510, 1958 Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174, 704 Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 1850 Hull v. Pitrat, 45 Fed. Rep. 94, 123 Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424, 1956 Hull y. State, 29 Fla. 79, 2154 Hullhorst v. Scharner, 15 Neb. 57, 2014 Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16, 1703 Hulme y. Tenant, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. (*481),679, 1699,1703 Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 864, 235 Hulse y. Hulse, 17 C. B. 711, 10 Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506, 842 Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, 2184 Humble v. Mitchell, 11 A. & E. 205, 660 Humbolt Min. Co. v. American Mfg. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 356, 1258, 1259 Hume v. Beale's Executrix, 17 Wall. 336, 1162 Hume Y. Flint Co., 11 N. Y. Supl. 431, 376 Hume y. Peploe, 8 East, 168, 387 Hume v. Taylor, 63 111. 43, 12 952 Humes y. Decatur, etc., Co., 98 Ala. 461, 776, 1317 Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. (Tenn.), 403, 1513 Humes v. Scruggs, 94 TT. S. 22, 1666, 1676, lfix9 Hummel v. Bank, 75 Iowa, 689, 1288 Hummel v. Seventh Street Co., 20 Ore. 401, 276 Humphreston's Case, 2 Leon 216, 1772 Humphrey v. Douglas, 10 Vt. 71, 1838 Humphrey v. Merriam, 46 Minn. 413, 334, 335 Humphrey v. Ringler (Iowa 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 685, 2255 Humphieys y. Magee, 13 Mo. 435, 1937 Humphreys v. Reed, 6 Whart. 435, 274 Humphreys v. St. Louis, etc., Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 307, 1413 Humphries v. Bicknell, 2 Litt. 296, 452 Humphries v. Green, L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 148, 842 Hunrt y. Peake, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 1807 Hungerford v. Rosenstein, 19 N. Y. Supl. 471, 334, 335 Huukins v. Hunkins, 65 N. H. 95, 846 Hunneman v. Inhabitants of Grafton, 10 Met. (Mass.) 454, 2218 Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 290, 2207 Hunsaker v. Sturgis, 29 Cal. 142, 1294 Hunstock v. Palmer, 4 Texas Civ. App. 459, 2017 Hunt v. Amidown, 4 Hill, 345, 777 Hunt Y. Brown, 146 Mass. 253, 454 Hunt v. City of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 250, 1514 TABLE OF CASES. CXV [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] .4- *r f*H-„ ^t TT*:— -. io XT V an teco tt._j._v.: if n XT v tee Hunt v. City of Utica, 18 N. Y. 442, 1558 Hunt v. Coe, 15 Iowa, 197, 836 Hunt v. Elliott, 80 Ind. 245, 872 Hunt v. Elliott, 77 Cal. 588. 876 Hunt v. Gleason, 22 N. Y. Supl. 366, 466 Hunt v. Hecht, 8 Ex. 814, 664, 672 Hunt v. Higman, 70 Iowa, 406, 456 Hunt v. Hunt, 13 N. J. Eq. 161, 1813 Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv (Appendix), 2122 Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27, 1736 Hunt v. Jones, 12 E. I. 265, 717 Hunt v. Le Grand, etc., Kink Co., 143 111. 118 1391 Hunt v. Maynard , 6 Pick. 489. 626 Hunt v. McConnell, 1 T. B. Mon. 219, 409 Hunt t. Memphis Gas Light Co. (Tenn.) (1895), 31 S.W. Rep. 1006, 1222 Hunt v. Robinson, 1 Texas, 748, 2087 Hunt v. Bousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, 822, 949 Hunt t. Rousmainere's Admrs., 1 Pet. 16, 822,1071,1074,1092,1701 Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich. 18, 355, 360 Hunt v. Silk, 5 East, 449, 2288 Hunt v. Stearns, 5 Wash. 167, 1760 Hunt v. Turner, 9 Texas, 385, 1038 Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 196, 905, 906 Hunter, In re, 1 Edw. Ch. 1, 1108 Hunter v. Agee, 5 Humph. (Tenn.), 57. 2091 Hunter v. Caldwell, 16 L. Jour. Q. B. 274, 797 Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Hare 420-432, 397 Hunter v. Holmes, 60 Minn. 496, 2288 Hunter v. Jameson, 6 Ired. 252, 345 Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677, 209 Hunter v. Leavitt, 36 Ind. 141, 138 Hunter v. Le Conte, 6 Cow. 728, 406 Hunter v. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 38, 234 Hunter v.Mills, 29 8. C. 72, 234,235,850 Hunter v. Moul, 98 Pa. St. 13, 455,536 Hunter v. Noll, 71 Pa. St. 282. 2080 Hunter v. Pfeiffer, 108 Ind. 197, 2000 Hunter v. Southern, etc., By. Co., 76 Tex. 195, 738 Hunter v. Stuge, 12 N. Y. Supl. 557, 326 Hunter v. Walters, L. E. 7 Ch. App. 75, 466 Hunter v. Warner, 1 Wis. 141, 398 Hunter v. Wetsell, 17 Hun, 135, 673 Hunting v. Blun, 143 N. Y. 511, 1376, 1377, 1378 Hunting v. Damon, 160 Mass. 441, 1139 Huntingdon v. Hall, 36 Maine, 501, 354, 355, 357, 358 Huntington v. Attril, 118 N. Y. 365, 1352 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 1370 Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 1636 Huntington v. Harvey, 4 Conn. 124, 2197 Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 371, 2184 Huntington v. Wellington, 12 Mich. 10, 601 Huntley v. Merrill, 32 Barb. 626, 732 Huntsman v. Fish, 36 Minn. 148, 1804 Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68, 831 Hurlbutt v. Spaulding, etc., Co., 93 Cal. 55, 831 Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 676, 691, 1118, 1176 Hurley v. Mclver, 119 Ind. 58, 1716 Hurley v. Watson. 68 Mich. 531, 449 Huron Printing Co. v. Kittleson, 4 S. D. 520, 1289 Huron Water-Works Co. v. Huron City (S. Dak. 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 975, 1501 Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351, 559 Hurst v. Hite, 20 W. Va. 183, 475 Hurst v. Trow's Printing Co., 30 Abb. N. C. 1, 945 Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310, 1310, 1336 Huson v. Pitman, 2 Hayw. (N. Car.) 331, 1058 Hussey v. Horne-Payne, L. E. 4 App. Ca. 311, 55 Hussey v. Thornton, 4 Mass. 405, 664 Husted y. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. 251, 434 Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 136, 224 Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 80, 76 Hutchings v. Miner, 46 N. Y. 456, 238 Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y, 155, 166 Hutchins v. Brines, 9 Gray, 367, 1232 Hutchins v. Brynes, 9 Gray. 367, 1231 Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 29, 1713 Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 380, 47 Hutchins v. Weldin, 114 Ind. 80, 1899 Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535, 68, 903, 904 Hutchinson v. First Nat. Bank, 133 Ind. 271, , 1397 Hutchinson v. Green, 91 Mo. 367, 1389 Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 46 Maine, 154, 649, 652 Hutchinson v. Tatham, L. E. 8 C. P. 482, 891 Hutchinson v. Tindall, 3 N. J. Eq. 357, 1668 Hutchison t. Cullum, 23 Ala. 622, 2181 Huth v. Carondelet, etc., Dock Co., 56 Mo. 202, 1794 Hutt v. Hickey (N. H.) , 29 Atl. Eep. 456, 263 Hutt v. Zimmer, 78 Hun, 23, 885 Huttig Bros. Manfg. Co. v. Denny Hotel Co., 6 Wash. 122, 1888 Hutton v. Eyre, 6 Taunt. 289, 558 Hutton v. Padgett, 26 Md. 228, 683 Hutton v. Parker, 7 Dow. Pr. C. 739, 47 Hutton v. Stoddart, 83 Ind. 539, 511 Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah, 3, 379, 411 Hyatt y. McBurney, 18 S. C. 199, 495 Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303, 558 Hyde v. Cookson, 21 Barb. 92, 165, 707, 711, 716, 732 Hyde v. Larkin, 35 Mo. App. 365, 1344 Hyde Park, Village of, v. Oakwoods Cem- etery Assn., 119 111. 141, 2146 Hyde Park, Village of, v. Carton, 132 111. 100, 1546 Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, L. E. 4 Q. B. Div. 670, 769 Hyer v. Hyatt, 3 Cranch C. C. 276, 1789 Hyland v. Anderson, 20 N. Y. Supl. 707, 544 Hyland v. Hyland, 19 Ore. 51, 1086 Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones L. (N. Car.) Ill, 1801 Hynds v. Hays, 25 Ind. 1, 1155, 1860, 1970 Iddo Kimball, The Barque, 8 Ben. 297, 124 Ide v. Sayer, 129 111. 230, 1617 Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 657, 677 Idle v. Thornton, 3 Camp. 274, 125 Iasigi y. Eosenstein, 141 N. Y. 414, 910 Iasigi v. Eosenstein, 20 N. Y. Supl. 491, 2191 Iglehart v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 109 N. Y. 454, 1290 Iiams v. Hoffman, 1 Md. 423, 682 Ikerd v. Beavers, 106 Ind. 483, 1827, 2270, 2271, 2272 Ikard v. Thompson, 81 Texas, 291, 1730 lies v. Elledge, 18 Kan. 296, 1144 Illges v. Dexter, 77 Ga. 36, 873 IUrngsworth v. Slosson, 19 111. App. 612, 138 Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 23 111. App. 531, 952 Illinois Central R. Co. v. FTankenberg, 54 111. 83, 737 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 35, 36 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 34 111. 389, 737 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Johnson, 40 111. 35, 21, 1243 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Kerr, 68 Miss. 14, 738 Illinois Paper Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 43 111. App. 499, 1643 Illinois River Co. v. Zimmer, 20 111. 654, 261 Illinois E. Co. v. Bead, 37 ID. 484, 550 Illinois E. Co. v. Welch, 52 111. 183, 465 Illinois Savings Bank v. Arkansas Water Co., 67 Fed. Sep. 196, 1504 CXV1 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Imboden v. Etowah, etc., Mining Co., 70 Ga. 86, 1435 Imhof v. Imhof, 45 La. Ann. 706, 1674 Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. St. 243, 1812 Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146, 1695 Imperial Laud Company (Harris's Case), In re, L. B. 7 Ch. App. 587, 56 Imperial Wine Co., In re, 42 L. J. C. 5, 488 Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 272, 1002 Independent Bldg. Assn. v. Real Est. Title Co., 156 Pa. St. 181, 452 India Bagging Assn. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 168, 1425, 1869, 2037, 2058, 2060 Indiana Insurance Co. v. Capehart, 108 Ind. 270, 138 Indiana, etc., Ins. Co. v. Byrkett, 36 N. E. Eep. 779, 315 Indiana, etc., Insurance Co. v. Kundell, 7 Ind. App. 426, 315, 318 Indiana E. Co. v. Adamson, 114 Ind. 282, 270 Indianola E. Co. v. Fryer, 56 Texas, 609, 1458 Indianapolis, City of, v. Consumers' Gas, etc., Co., 140 Ind. 107, 1481, 1572 Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175, 1489 Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas, etc., Co., 66 Ind. 396, 1481, 1564 Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 876 Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587, 459 Indianapolis v. Skeen, 17 Ind. 628, 1931 Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herrman, 7 Ind. 462, 107, 865 Indianapolis, etc., Mining Co. v. Herki- mer, 46 Ind. 142, 1325 Indianapolis Gas Light and Coke Co., 66 Ind. 396, 1482 Indianapolis E. Co. v. Hyde, 122 Ind. 188, 190 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Ind. 465, 1455 Indianapolis Rolling Mill v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 120 U. S. 256, 1277, 1282, 1359, 1448 Ingalls v. Hahn, 47 Hun, 104, 410 Ingalls v. Eowell, 149 111. 163, 1033 Ingersoll v. Knights of the Golden Rule, 47 Fed. Rep. 272, 119 Ingersoll v. Randall, 14 Minn. 400, 1890 Ingles v. Patterson, 36 Wis. 373, 846 Inglish v. Ayer, 92 Mich. 370. 2233 Ingraham v. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45, 1822, 2276 Ingraham v. Gilbert, 20 Barb. 151, 784 Ingram v. Illges, 98 Ala. 611, 1694 Ingram t. Stiff, 5 Jur. N. S. 947, 2044 Inhabitants, etc., v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 1473 Inhabitants of Amherst v. Shelbume, 11 Gray (Mass.), 107, 1849 Inhabitants of Berlin v. New Britain, 9 Conn. 180, 1249 Inhabitants of Brookfleld v. Allen, 6 Al- len (Mass.), 585, 1660 Inhabitants of First Parish, etc., v. Jones, 8 Cush. 184, 186 Inhabitants of Frankfort v. Winterport, 64 Maine, 250, 1853 Inhabitants of Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 2120 Inhabitants of Greenwich v. Easton, etc., R. Co., 25 N.J. Eq. 505, 1570 Inhabitants of Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563, 2120 Inhabitants of Medway v. Milford, 21 Pick. 349, 210, 1473 Inhabitants of Milford v. Common wealth , 144 Mass. 64, 773 Inhabitants of Monson v. WUliams, 6 Gray (Mass.), 416, 1660 Inhabitants of Nobleboro v. Clark, 68 Maine, 87, 893 Inhabitants of Otisfleld v. Mayberry, 63 Maine, 107, 399 Inhabitants of the Town of Montville v. Haughton, 7 Conn. 543, 1057 Inhabitants of Township of Montclair v. New York & G. L. E. Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 436 1439 Inhabitants of Waltham y. Brookline, 119 Mass. 479, 1849 Inhabitants of West Cambridge v. Lex- ington, 1 Pick. 506, 708 Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368, 1827, 2016 Inhabitants of Yarmouth v. North Yar- mouth, 34 Maine, 411, 2142 Inman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452, 743, 744, 765 In re Agra Bank, L. R. 5 Eq. Cas. 160, 491 In re Agra and Masterman's Bank, L. R. 2 Ch. 391, 51 In re Andrew, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 358, 398 In re Appeal of Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 1764, 1769 Jra re Argus Co., 138 N. Y. 557, 944 In re Axtell's Petition, 95 Mich. 244, 2256 In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 32 In re Badcock, L. R. 17 C. D. 361, 226 In re Barker, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 241, 1844 In re Bininger, 7 Blatch.,262, 153 In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. St. 628, 1763, 1764 In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 467, 1980 In re Campbell's Estate, 7 Pa. St. 100, 559 In re Cheshire Banking Co., L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 301, 61 In re City of Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 1239 In re City of Northampton, 158 Mass. 299, 1439 In re Clarke, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 348, 95 In re Colling, L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 333, 1173 In re Cooper, 6 Misc. R. (N. Y.) 501, 785 In re Cork R. Co., 4 Ch. App. 748, 1246 In re Corning, 51 Fed. Rep. 205, 1982 In re County Life Assur. Co., L. R. 5 Ch, App. 288, 1339 In re Cumming, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 72, 1173 In re Curtis, 64 Conn. 501, 881, 899, 900 In re Denny's Estate, 8 Ir. R. Eq. Series, 427, 887 In re Dey, 9 N. J. Eq. 181, 1S46 In re Dodds, 60 L. J. Q. B. 599, 88 In re Direct. Exeter R. Co., 3 De G. & Sm. 234, 260 In re Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank, 75 N. Y. 388, 1551 In re Foulkes v. Hughes, 3 The Reports, 682, 1806 In re Gaffney's Estate, 146 Pa. St. 49, 254 In re Garnet, L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 1, 1009 In re Giles, 11 Paige (N. Y-), 638, 1815 In re Oracle's Estate, 158 Pa. St. 521, 1669, 1769 In re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104, 1982, 2036 In re Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696, 2279 In re Harris (Del. 1893), 28 Atl. Rep. 329, 1846 In re Hatton, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 723, 530, 533 In re Hauer's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 420, 1673 In re Heli, 3 Atk. 635, 1846 In re Heller, 3 Paige (N. Y.) , 199, 1814 la re Hopper, 5 Paige (N. Y.), 489, 1814 In re Hoyfe, L. R. 1 Ch. 84, 675 In re Hunter, 1 Edw. Ch. 1, 1108 In re Imperial Land Company (Harris's In Case) , L. R. 7 Ch. App. 587, 56 i re imperial Wine Co.. 42 L. J. C. 5, 488 In re Insurance Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 109, 732 J/i re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 1478,2148 In re James Estate, 78 Hun, 121, 227 In re Karstorp's Estate, 158 Pa. St. 30, 1689 In re King, 46 Fed. Eep. 903, 2094 In re Kinmer, 14 N. Y. St. Eep. 618, 1659 In re Klein, 1 How. (IT. S.) 277, 2118 In re Kurtz, 68 Cal. 412, 1478 In re Mahan, 20 Hun, 301, 1552 In re Marsh, 27 Ch. Div. 168, 1766 TABLE OF CASES. CXV11 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ] In re Mauger, 23 Hun, 658, 1553 In re Missouri Steamship Co., L. B. 42 Ch. Div. 321, 700, 741 In re Naglee's Estate, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 525, 565 In re Newman, Ex parte Capper, L. E. 4 Ch.D. 724, 759 In re North Australian Territory Co., Archer's Case L. E. (1892) , 1 Ch. 322, 1979 In re Oliver Lee, etc., Ek., 21 N. Y. 1, 1378 In re Oriental Bank, L. E. 32 Ch. Div. 366, 487 In re Otis, 101 N. Y. 580, 1814, 1844 In re Owens, 18 N. Y. Supl. 850, 1814 In re Paige, 31 Minn. 136, 724 In re Paine, 26 Hun, 431, 1552 In re Parrott, 6 Sawyer (TJ. S. Cir.) , 349, 2161 In re Pendleton Hardware and Imp. Co., 24 Ore. 830, 1355 In re Perris Estate, 5 Misc. (N. Y.) 149, 788 In re Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., L. B. 4 Ch. Div. 108, 153, 492 2235 In re Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 44 L. J. Ch. 683, 867 In re Protestant Episcopal School, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 161, 2120 In re Railway, etc., Co., L. E. 29 Ch. Div. 204, 761, 764 In re Reynolds, 21 N. C. Supl. 592, 665 In re Eiver Steamer Co., L. E. 6 Ch. App. 822 196 In re Eockey's Estate, 155 Pa. St. 453, 578 In re Rotherham, etc., Co., 50 L. T. R. (N. S.) 190, 1309, 1310 In re St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., 44 N. J. Law, 529, 1460 In re Smith, 95 N. Y. 522, 1018 In re Schmidt's Estate, 16 Minn. 256, 1673 In re Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 428, 253 In re Spott's Estate, 156 Pa. St. 281, 1751 In re State Steamship Co., 60 Fed. Hep. 1018, 711 In re Steam Stoker Co., L. E. 19 Eq. 416, 304 In re Terrell, 61 Fed. Sep. 213, 1982 In re Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. St. 216, 2146 In re Vandine, 6 Pick. (Miss.) 187, 1479 Jrn-e Weaver. L.B.21Ch. D. 615, 1842 In re Wendell, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 600, 1846 In re Wharton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 33, 1844 In re Willock's Estate, 165 Pa. St. 522, 1705 In re Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257, 618 In re Worthington, 141 N. Y. 9, 1971 In Matter of Oliver Lee and Company's Bank, 21 N. Y. 9, 2131 Inskoe v. Proctor, 6 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 311, 1074 Instone v. Frankfort Bridge Co., 2 Bibb, 576, 259 Insurance Co., In re, 22 Fed. Eep. 109, 732 Insurance Co. v. Buck, 88 Va. 517, 312 Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 269, 876 Insurance Co. v. Garland, 108 111. 220, 895 Insurance Co. v. Haven, 95 U. S. 242, 119 Insurance Co. v. Hicks, 3 Jonas (N. Car.), 68, 1244 Insurance Co. of v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 17 Fed. Eep. 377, 740 Insurance Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall. 152, 320 Insurance Co. v. McDowell, 50 111. 120, 317 Insurance Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 1539 Insurance Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. 404, 895 Inter-Mountain Publishing Co. v. Jack, 5 Mont. 568, 1322 International Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Biering, 86 Texas, 476, 1629 International Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Hardy, 86 Texas, 610, 2155 International, etc., Assn. v. Abbott, 85 Texas, 220, 1605, 1619 International, etc., Assn. v. Walker, 83 Mich. 386, 1329 International, etc., E. Co. v. Folts, 3 Texas Civ. App. 644, 1962 International E. Co. v. Garrett, 5 Texas Civ. App. 540, 1969 International K. Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Texas, 8, 296 Interstate, etc., Paving Co. v. Philadel- phia, 164 Pa. St. 477, 1552, 1553 loer v. v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 2166 Ionia Savings Bank v. McLean, 84 Mich. 625, 793 Iowa Savings Bank v. Black, 91 Iowa, 490, 1356 Ireland v. Webber, 27 Ind. 256, 1690 Irick v. Fulton's Exrs., 3 Gratt. 193, 995 Iron Age Publishing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498, 1121, 1123 Iron City Bank v. City of Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. St. 340, 2136 Ironwood Water-works Co. v. Ironwood City, 99 Mich. 455, 1516 Irons v. Woodfill, 32 Ind. 40, 2240 Irvin v. Garner, 50 Texas, 48, 431 Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. (TJ. S.) 617, 1779, 1789 Irvine v. Milbank, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 378, 576 Irvine v. Millbank, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 264, 543 Irwin v. Bailey, 72 Ala. 467, 1102 Irwin v. Brown, 2 Cranch C. C. 314, 767 Irwin v. Dyke, 71 Ga. 818, 850 Irwin v. Gregory, 13 Gray, 215, 378, 398, 1126 Irwin v. Johnson, 36 N. J. Eq. 347, 560 Irwin v. Locke, 20 Colo. 148, 261 Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583, 543, 572 Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 922, 1868, 1913, 1914, 1916, 1917, 1919, 1923, 1925 Isaacs v. Hardy, 1 Cabebe & E. 287, 658 Isaacs v. Hermann, 49 Miss. 449, 781 Isaacs v. Holland, 4 Wash. 54, 1760 Isaacs v. Eoyal Insurance Co., 5 L. E. Ex. 296. ' 768 Isbell v. Lewis, 98 Ala. 550, 921 Isham v. Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230, 1231 • Isham v. Morgan, 9 Conn. 374, 894 Isham v. Therasson (N. J. Eq.), 30 AtL Eep. 969, 57, 208 Isherwood v. Whitmore, 11 M. & W. 347, 124 Isherwood v. Whitmore, 10 M. & W. 757, 380 Island Coal Co. v. Streitlemier, 139 Ind. 83, 1177 Iverson v. Cirkel, 56 Minn. 299, 1192 Ives v. Smith, 8 N. Y. Supl. 46, 1422 Ives v. Van Auken, 34 Barb. 566, 25 Ivey v. Harrell, 1 Texas Civ. App. 226, 1780 Ivey v. Lolland. 42 Miss. 444, 715 Izard v. Izard, Bailey Eq. (S. Car.) 228, 620 Jacks v. Helena, 41 Ark. 213, 156 Jackson v. Allaway, 6 C. B. 942, 123 Jackson v. Barringer, 15 John. 472, 425 Jackson v. Brown, 76 Hun, 41, 1782 Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 124, 1778, 1780 Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 539, 1778, 1780 Jackson v. Cassidy, 68 Texas, 282, 1629 Jackson v. Castle, 82 Maine, 579, 1576 Jackson v. Castle, 80 Maine, 119, 1576 Jackson v. City Nat. Bank, 125 Ind. 347, 1932 Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 L. R. Q. B. D. 589, 697 Jackson v. Cresswell (Iowa 1894), 61 N. W. Eep. 383, 842 Jackson v. Crysler, 1 John. Cas. 125, 747 Jackson v. Cutright, 5 Munf. 308, 1178, 1179 Jackson v. Davidson, 4 Barn. & Aid. 691, 1882 Jackson v. Evans, 44 Mich. 510, 639 Jackson v. Executors of McLean, 100 Mo. 130, 1974 Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. 394, 25, 895 Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Johns. 375, 25, 894 CXV111 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Jackson v. Hunt, 6 Johns. 16, m 194 Jackson v. Ivory (Tex. App.), 30 S. W. Hep. 716, 431 Jackson v. Jackson, 94 Cal. 446, 1747 Jackson v. Jackson, 105 N. Car. 433, 2205 Jackson v. Krafts, 18 Johns. 110, 411 Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend. 105, 15 Jackson v. Lever, 3 Brown Ch. 605, 1103 Jackson v. Litch, 62 Pa. St. 451, 635 Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 1401 Jackson v. Lynn (Iowa 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 704, 1046 Jackson v. McChesney, 7 Cow. 360, 466 Jackson v. McConnell, 19 Wend. 75. 424 Jackson v. McConnell, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 175. 1766, 1768 Jackson v. McLean, 36 Fed. Hep. 213, 1425 Jackson v. Meek, 87 Tenn. 69, 1373, 1382 Jackson v. Miner, 101 111. 550, 1665 Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cowen, 706, 424, 425 Jackson v. Myers, 43 Md. 452, 22 Jackson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 2 Thompson & C. 653, 1316 Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N. J. Law, 137, 876 Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. 418, 90 Jackson v. Pierce, 2 Johns. 222, 836 Jackson v. Richards, 2 Cai. E. 343, 767 Jackson v. Eutledge, 3 Lea (Tenn.), 626, 1750 Jackson v. Shawl, 29 Cal. 267, 1866 Jackson v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 82, 1763 Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201, 801 Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cow. 122, 566, 568 Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 109, 1672 Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. 388, 894 Jackson v. Torrence, 83 Cal. 521, 1187 Jackson v. Traer, 64 Iowa, 469, 1400 Jackson v. Union, etc., Ins. Co., L. E. 10 C. P. 125, 284 Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 167 1731 Jackson v. Van Dusen. 5 Johns. 144, 12 Jackson v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76, 969 Jackson County Horse E. Co. v. Interstate Eapid Transit Ey. Co., 24 Fed. Eep. 306, 1504 Jackson Iron Co. v. Negaunee Co., 65 Fed. Eep. 298, 647, 960 Jackson Sharp Co. v. Holland, 14 Fla. 384, 1408 Jacksonville, etc., E. Co. v. Woodworth, 26 Fla. 368, 956 Jacob v. Carter (Cal.), 36 Pac. 381, 158 Jacobs, In re, 98 N. Y. 98, 1478, 2148 Jacobs v. Ballenger, 130 Ind. 231, 475 Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, L. E. 12 Q. B. Div. 589, 711 Jacobs v. Daugherty, 78 Texas, 682, 182 Jacobs v. Hesler, 113 Mass. 157, 1677, 1707 Jacobs v. Mitchell, 46 Ohio St. 601, 2241 Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287, 1950 Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. Car. 112, 2153 Jacobs v. Spalding, 71 Wis. 177, 815 Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 90, 2233 Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 Law T. E. (N. S.) 335, 2046 Jacomb v. Harwood, 2 Ves. Sen. 265, 549 Jacox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473, 1030 Jacques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 548, 1659 Jaffee v. Jacobson, 1 C. C. A. 11 ; 48 Eep. 21, 1211 Jaffrey v. Cornish, 10 N. H. 505, 455, 458 Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 189, 190, 192, 519, 520, 538 Jaffray v. Mathews, 120 Mo. 317, 1391, 1643 Jagger Iron Co., The, v. Walker, 76 N. Y. 521, 452 James Estate, In re, 78 Hun, 121, 227 James v. Adams, 16 W. Va. 245, 496 James v. David, 5 T. H. 141, 525 James v. Emery, 8 Taunt. 245, 814 James v. Fulcod, 5 Texas, 512, 214 James v. Hackley, 16 Johns. 273, 455 James v. James, 81 Texas, 373, 30 James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. Ill, 270 James v. O'Driscoll, 2 Bay. 101, 186 James v. Williams, 3 Nev. & Man. 196, 683 Jamison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. St. 52, 842, 844 Jamison v. Houston (Miss. 1894), 15 So. Eep. 114, 1525 Janes v , Scott. 59 Pa. St. 178, 2237 Janin v. Browne, 59 Cal. 37, 288, 2217 Janson v. Paxton, 22 Up. Can. (C. P.) 505, S28 Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238, 2250 Jaques v. The Public Administrator, Brad- ford's Surrogates' Eep. 499, 1840 Jarchow v. Pickens, 51 Iowa, 381, 1418 Jarrett v. Cope, 68 Pa. St. 67, 1597 Jarrett v. Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602, 356 Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 584, 1031 Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652, 1344 Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige (N. Y.), 118, 2033 Jarvis v. Sutton, 3 Ind. 289, 211 Jassoy v. Horn, 64 111. 379, 1948 Jeansch v. Lewis, 1 S. Dak. 609, 1643 Jeffers v. Philo, 35 O. S. 173, 92 Jefferson v. Jefferson, 96 111. 551, 844 Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (U.S.), 436, 2117,2136 Jeffersonville, etc., E. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48, 1455 Jeffery v. Walton. 1 Stark. 213, 46, 313 Jefford v. Ringgold, 6 Ala. 544, 1778 Jeffrey v. Ficklin, 3 Ark. 227, 1942 Jeffrey v. Fleming, 26 Neb. 685, 1723 Jeffrey v. Grant, 37 Maine, 236, 854 Jeffrey v. Owen, 41 N. J. Law, 260, 1549 Jeffries v. Life Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 47, 311, 320 Jemmison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537, 135 Jenkins v. Cain, 72 Texas. 88, 431 Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532, 2170 Jenkins v. Hall, 26 Ore. 79, 1734, 1759 Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345, 622, 623, 1117, 1163 Jenkins v. Hiles, 6 Ves. 646, 1143 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Iowa, 195, 1789, 1803 Jenkins v. Morris, L. E. 14 Ch. Div. 674, 1819 Jenkins v, Eeynolds. 3 Brod. & Bing. 14, 683 Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128, 487 Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655, 2038 Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 Hen. Bl. 90, 184, 186 Jenks v, Pawlowski, 98 Mich. 110, 2077 Jenne v. Marble, 37 Mich. 319, 1207 Jenners v. Howard, 6 Blkf. (Ind.) 240, 1826 Jenness v. Mount Hope Iron Co., 53 Maine, 20, 67, 68, 71 Jenning v. Atkins, 1 Hump. 294, 444 Jennings v. Blocker, 25 Ala. 518, 557 Jennings v. Broughton, 17 Beav. 234, 982 Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94, 897 Jennings v. Chenango, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Denio, 75, 320 Jennings v. City of Fort Worth, 7 Texas Civ. App. 32'.), 651 Jennings v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 127 N. Y. 438, 735, 1967 Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553, 284 Jennings v. Beeves, 101 N. C. 447, 417 Jennings v. Rundail, 8 T. R. 335, 1838 Jennings v. Whitehead, etc., Co., 138 Mass. 594, 874 Jennings v. Wilier (Tex. App.), 32 S. W. Eep. 24 and 375, Jelliff v. Newark, 48 N. J. Law, 101, 1549 Jernigan v. Flowers, 94 Ala. 508, 1744 Jerome v. Bigelow, 66 111. 452, 1986 I Jerome v. Ortman, 66 Mich. 668, 179 TABLE OF CASES. CX1X [RefermKes are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Jersey City v, Lehigh Valley Terminal E. Co., 55 N. J. Law, 203, 1581 Jersey City v. Eiker, 38 N. J. Law, 225, 458 Jersey City v. State, 30 N. J. Law, 521, 1477 Jersey City R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. Law, 60, 413 Jervis v. Berridge, L. E. 8 Ch. Ap. 360, 55 Jesserich v. WalrufT, 51 Mo. App. 270, 788 Jesson v. Solly, 4 Taunt. 52, 2172 Jeter v. Glenn, 9 Rich. Law, 374, 367 Jeudwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572, 324 Jewelers' League v. De Forest, 80 Hun, 376, 1836 Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 723, 1666 Jewell v. Rock River Co., 101 111. 57, 156 Jewett v. Earle, 21 Jones & Spencer, 349, 400 Jewett v. Lawrenceburgh R. Co., 10 Ind. 589, 156 Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402, 1293, 1307 Jewett y. Perrette, 127 Ind. 97, 94 Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich. 508, 520, 5-13 Jewett v. Tomlinson. 137 Ind. 326, 29 Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 259, 731 Jewsbury v. Mummery, L. R. 8 C. P. 56, 30 ■J. I. Case, etc., Co. v. Campbell, 14 Ore. 460, 1644 Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 1829 Jockusch v. Towsey, 51 Texas, 129, 941 Johansson v. Stephanson, 154 U. S. 625, 979 John v. Sabattis, 69 Maine, 473, 621 Ciohn v. The Frank S. Hall, 38 Fed. Rep. 258, 775 fohn Shillito Co. v. McConnell, 130 Ind. 41, 1397 fchns v. Bailey, 45 Iowa, 241, 2101, 2113 Johns v. Norris, 27 N. J. Eq. 485, 1041 Johnson v. Armstrong, 97 Ala. 731, 2277 Johnson v. Bailey, 17 Colo. 59, 124 Johnson v. Baird, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 153, 2197 fohnson v. Baker, 4 Barn. & Aid. 440, 172 Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322, 560 Johnson v. Blazer, 33 Neb. 841, 476 Johnson v. Board of Commissioners, 107 Ind. 15, 1496 Johnson v. Bowden, 87 Texas, 621, 846 Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337, 1208, 1209 Johnson v. Brown, 13 Kan. 529, 2098 Johnson v. Bucklen, 9 Ind. App. 154, 137 Johnson v. Butler, 2 Iowa, 535, 2151 Johnson v. Clarkson (Texas App. 1894), 30 S. W. Rep. 71, 628 Johnson v. Cleaves, 15 N. H. 332, 458 Johnson v. Common Council, 16 Ind. 227, 1489 Johnson y. Corser, 34 Minn. 355. 1384 Johnson v. Cowan, 59 Pa. St. 275, 688 Johnson v. Cranage, £5 Mich. 14, 340 Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass. 447, 669 Johnson v. De Peyster, 50 N. Y. 666, 131, 934, 2194 Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653, 675 Johnson v. Buer, 115 Mo. 366, 1554 Johnson y. Filkington. 39 Wis. 62, 57 Johnson y. Gibson, 78 Ind. 282, 876 Johnson y. Gilmore (S. D. 1894), 60 N. W. Rep. 1070, 2218 Johnson v. Granger, 51 Texas, 42, 676, 679 Johnson v. Gwinn, 100 Ind. 466, 2077 Johnson y. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363, 777, 821, 827 Johnson v. Howard, 20 Minn. 370 (Gil. 322), 840 Johnson V. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 7, 1211, 1212, 2006 Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East, 180, 1891 Johnson v. Hunt, 81 Ky. 321, 525 Johnson v. Johnson, 6 Watts, 370, 632 Johnson v. Johnson (Ky. 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 628, 1702 Johnson v. Jouchert, 124 Ind. 105, 1720, 1724, 1725 Johnson v. Kincade, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 470, 1840 Johnson v. Knapp, 36 Iowa, 616, 602 Johnson v. Laflin, 9 Cent. Law J. 124, 13:33 Johnson v. Laybourn, 56 Minn. 332, 356 Johnson v. Legard, 6 M. & S. 60, 224 Johnson v. Maine, etc., Insurance Co., 83 Maine, 182, 310 Johnson v. McCabe, 37 Ind. 535, 234 Johnson y. McDonald, 9 M. & W. 600, 125 Johnson v. Mercantile Trust Co., 94 Ga. 324, 1253, 1268 Johnson v. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 460, 493 Johnson v. Mount Merry Granite Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 569, 577, 578 Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 1782, 1785 Johnson v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 87, 895 Johnson v. People, 42 111. App. 594, 2099 Johnson v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 229, 568 Johnson v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 63 Md. 106, 2234 Johnson y. Pontions, 118 Ind. 270, 629 Johnson v. Railroad Co., 163 Pa. St. 127, 587 Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray, 107, 894 Johnson v. Runyon, 21 Ind. 115, 1690 Johnson v. Skillman, 29 Minn. 95, 640 Johnson v. Standard Mining Co., 148 tj. S. 360 998 Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 111. 75, 1539 Johnson v. State, 73 Ala. 523, 46 Johnson v. Stevenson, 26 Mich. 63, 67 Johnson v. Stone, 35 Hun, 380, 1823 Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610, 1790 Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579, 1696 Johnson v. Taylor, 43 Texas, 121, 1760 Johnson v Thomas, 77 Ala. 367, 477 Johnson y. Titus, 2 Hill, 606, 232 Johnson v. Townsend, 77 Texas, 639, 431 Johnson v. Trinity Church Soc, 11 Allen, 123, 675 Johnson y. Trippe, 33 Fed. Rep. 530, 1111 Johnson v. Union Switch Co., 129 N. Y. 653, 944, 1349 Johnson v. Wabash, etc., Plank Road Co., 16 Ind. 389, 153 Johnson v. Watson, 1 Ga. 348, 655 Johnson v. Weatherwax, 9 Kan. 75, 172 Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns. 310, 455 Johnson v. Willis, 7 Gray (Mass.), 164, 2096 Johnson Harvester Co. v. Bartley, 81 Ind, 406, 2174 Johnston v. Board of County Comrs., 27 Minn. 64, 1574 Johnston v. Eichelberger. 13 Fla. 230, 162 Johnston y. Griest, 85 Ind. 503, 2174 Johnston v. Jones, 1 Black (U. S.), 425, 2277 Johnston v. Nicholl, 1 C. B 251, 220 Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185, 1713 Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U. S. 360, 1010, 1170 Johnston v. Trask, 40 Hun, 415, 160, 161 Johnston v. Trippe, 33 Fed. Rep. 530, 1109 Johnston v. Wabash College, 2 Ind. 555, 215 Johnston v. Wadsworth, 24 Ore. 494, 1109, 1131. 1137, 1143, 1173 Johnston v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 463, 166 Johnstone v. Marks, L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 509, 1799 Johnstone v. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 460, 497, 498, 945 Johnstone v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 39 S. Car. 55, 1962 Joliff v. Bendell, Ry. & Moo. 136, 333 Jolliffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338, 234 Jonassohn y. Young, 4 B. & S. 296, 150 Jones' Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 324, 224 Jones, Ex parte, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 109, 1807 Jones, Matter of, 10 St. Rep. (N. Y.) 176, 465 Jones v. Alabama B. Co., 72 Miss. 32, 582 Jones v. Anderson, 82 Ala. 302, 296, 491 Jones V. Arthur, 8 Dowl. Prac. Cas. 442, 400 Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455, 192, 212, 221 cxx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ] Jones v. Bacon, 72 Hun, 506, 613 Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 615 Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684, 113, 1870 Jones v. Beach, 2 De G., M. & G. 886, 823 Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 331 Jones v. Brittan, 1 Woods, 667, 1066 Jones v. Broadhurst, 67 E. C. L. 173, 445, 543 Jones v. Butler, 146 N. Y. 55, 1378, 1379 Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y. ) 29, 2000 Jones v. Cavanaugh, 149 Mass. 124, 1949 Jones T. Cincinnati, etc., Foundry Co., 14 Ind. 89, 1336 Jones v. Clark, 42 Cal. 180, 1275 Jones v. Concord, etc., B. Co. (1892 N. H.), 30 Atl. Hep. 614. 1414 Jones v. Craigmiles, 44 N. Car. 613, 1703 Jones t. Crosthwaite, 17 Iowa, 393, 1746 Jones v. Daniel, L. R. (1894) 2 Ch. 332, 72 Jones v. Davenport, 44 N. J. Eq. 33, 1671 Jones v. Dunn, 3 Watts & S. 109, 887 Jones v. Flint, 10 A. & E. 753, 636 Jones v. George, 61 Texas, 345, 345 Jones v. Graham etc., Transportation Co., 51 Mich. 539, 160 Jones v. Grantham, 80 Ga. 472, 190 Jones v. Green (Texas App. 1895), 31 S. W. Bep. 1087, 647 Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441, 411 Jones v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 14, 1037 Jones v. Heavens, L. E. 4 Ch. Div. 636, 2073 Jones v. Higgins, 80 Ky. 409, 246 Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285, 781 Jones v. Hopkins, 26 Ind. 450, 1496 Jones v. Hughes, 15 Abb. N. Car. (N. Y.) 141, 1820 Jones v. Hurlburt, 13 Neb. 125, 1543 Jones v. Jincey, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 708, 786 Jones v. Jones, 17 N. Y. Supl. 905, 1810 Jones v. Jones, 1 Colo. App. 28, 2010 Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. 248, 716 Jones v. Jones, 13 N. J. Eq. 236, 1524 Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 705 Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412, 271, 281, 282, 947, 948, 2226 Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 349, 351, 365 Jones v. Kent, 80 N. Y. 585, 863 Jones v. Lees, 1 Hurl. & N. 189, 2056 Jones v. Letcher. 13 B. Mon. 363, 614, 615 Jones v. Mechanics' Bank, 29 Md. 287, 662 Jones v. Merionethshire Building Society, L. E. (1X91) 2 Ch. 587, 2012 Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518, 1S1 Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 1300 Jones v. National Building Assn., 94 Pa. St. 215, 1603 Jones v. Nebraska City, 1 Neb. 176, 702 Jones v. Neelny, 72 111. 449, 1134, 2287 Jones v. Newport News, etc., Co., 65 Fed. Bep. 736, 860 Jones v. Noble, 3 Bush (Ky.), 694, 1108 Jones v. Orton, 65 Wis. 9, 2248 Jones v. Owen, 5 A. & E. 222, 3!I7 Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 1101 Jones v. Pinchoon, 6 Ind. App. 460, 2186 Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 37, 1883, 1913 Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327, 537 Jones v. R ire, 92 Ga. 236, 1695 Jones v. R icki'tts, 7 Md. 108, 519 Jones v. Robinson, 17 L. J. Ex. 36, 1X2 Jones v. Shorter, 1 Ga. 294, 596, 614 Jones v. Kikes, Kfi Ga. 546, 201 Jones v. Singer Mfg. Co., 38 W. Va. 147, 2198, 2199 Jones v. Smoot, 2 Cranch C. Ct. (U. S.)' 207, 2210 Jones v. State, 31 Texas Cr. App. 177, 1795 Jones v. Sw.-iyze, 42 N. J. Law, 279, 15 Jones v. Tilton, 139 Mass. 418, 164 1 Jones v.Turner, 80 Hun, 157, 862 Jones v. Turnpike Co., 7 Ind. 547, 1452 Jones v. United States, 96 U. S. 24, 270, 745, 746, 946 Jones v. Walker, 13 B. Mon. 356, 615 Jones v. Western, etc., Gas Co., 146 Pa. St. 204, 9^9 Jones v. Whitworth, 94 Tenn. 602, 1374, 1375 Jones v. Williams, 41 Texas, 390, 1038 Jones v. Wilson, 3 Johns. 434, 186 Jones v. Wilson, 104 N. Car. 9, 190, 518 Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. St. 408, 784 Jordan v. Collins (Ala. 1895), 18 So. Rep. 137, 1274 Jordan v. Elliott (Pa.), 15 Cent. Law J. 232, 1039 Jordan v. Elliott, 12 Wkly. Notes Cas. 56, 1832 Jordan v. Everett, 93 Tenn. 390, 1698 Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264, 1761 Jordan v. Garner, 101 Ala. 411, 1156 Jordan v. Keeble, 85 Tenn. 412, 1699, 1750 Jordan v. Miller, 75 Va. 442, 653 Jordan v. Smith, 83 Ala. 299, 1744 Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Maine, 78, 985 Jordan v. Money, 5 H. L. C. 185, 223 Joseph v. Decatur Land Imp. Co., 102 Ala. 346, 979, 1742 Joseph v. Holt, 37 Cal. 250, 679 Joslin v. New Jersey Car Spring Co., 36 N. J. Law, 141, 245 Joslyn v. Capron, 64 Barb. 598, 464 Jourdan v. Long Island, etc., E. Co., 115 N. Y. 380, 1269 Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Geo. 379, 162 Joy v. Bitzer, 77 Iowa, 73, 333 Joy v. Metcalf, 161 Mass. 514, 2005 Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 883, 886, 1101, 1113, 1122, 1212 Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291, 295 Joyce v. Shafer, 97 Cal. 335, 963 Joyner v. Third School District, 3 Cush. 567, 459 Judah v. Insurance Co., 4 Ind. 333, 1452 Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117, 762 Judd v. Harrington, 139 N. Y. 105, 2068 Judeflnd v. Maryland, 78 Md. 510, 2094 Judd v. Day, 50 Iowa, 247, 71 Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96, 629, 844, 1193 Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio St. 562, 181, 231 Judson v. Bowden, 1 Ex. 162, 114 Jugla v. Trouttet, 120 N. Y. 21, 860, 1271 Juillard v. Rogay, 21 La. Ann. 259, 2021 Juilliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 529, 46 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 392, 393, 2118 Julia Bldg. Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. , 258, 1580 Juniata, etc., Association v. Mixell, 84 Pa. St. 313. 1601, 1605 Junkins v. Lovelace, 72 Ala. 303, 842 Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 493, 215 K Kabus v. Frost, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 72, 2170 Kadish v. Garden City, etc., Association, 47 111. App. 602, 1601, 1604 Kadish v. Young, 108 111. 170, 498, 2220 Kahn v. Gumberts, 9 Ind. 430, 533, 1634 Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 1869. 2014 Kahnweiler v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 562, 121 Kain v. Postley, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) ,!•'-. T 1771 Kaiser v. Lawrence, etc., Bank, 56 Iowa, l? 4 ' , , „ 1335,1384 Kalamazoo Axle Co. ?. Winans (Mich. 1895) , 64 N. W. Rep. 23, 1273 Kalfus v. Kalfus, 92 Ky. 542, 1753 Kalklosh v. Haney, 4 Texas C. App. 118, 1126 Kallander v. Neidhold, 98 Mich. 517, 479 Kammerling v. Grover, 9 Ind. 628, 2203 TABLE OF CASES. CXX1 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ] Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, 715 Kanawha, etc., Bank v. Atkinson, 32 W. Va. 203, 1677 Kane v. Bloodgood. 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 1019 Kane v. Hood, 13 Pick. 281, 115 Kansas City v. Slangstrom, 53 Kan. 431, 821 Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645, 1962 Kansas, etc., E. Co. v. Wyandotte Co., 16 Kan. 587, 807 Kansas Pacific Land Co. v. Commission- ers, 16 Kan. 587, 460 Kansas Pacific E. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573, 2133 Kansas Transfer Co. v. Neiswanger, 27 Mo. App. 356, 407 Kaphan v. Eyan, 16 S. Car. 352, 2178 Karnak, The, L. E. 2 P. C. 505, 740 Karow v. Continental Insurance Co., 57 Wis. 56, 1833, 1839 Karstorp's Estate, In re. 158 Pa. St. 30, 1689 Karwisch v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 204, 2094 Kaufman v. Bank, 31 Neb. 661, 244 Kaufman v. Farley Mfg. Co., 78 Iowa, 679, 99 Kaufman v. United States, etc., Bank, 31 Neb. 661, 237 Kauffman v. Harstock, 31 Iowa, 472, 595 Kaye v. Waghorne, 1 Taunt. 428, 515, 952 Kayser v. Maugham, 8 Colo. 232, , 681 Keanv. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 1255 Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511, 1772, 1795 Kearly v. Duncan, 1 Head (Tenn.), 397, 325, 328 Kearney v. Doyle, 22 Mich. 294, 2211, 2212 Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. 494, 2001 Kearney v. Vaughan, 50 Mo. 284, 19 Kearon v. Pearson, 7 Hurl. & N. 386, 939 Keates v. Lyon, L. E. 4 Ch. App. 218, 1154 Keating v. Hyde, 23 Mo. App. 555, 1884 Keating v. Nelson, 33 111. App. 357. 127 Keatorv. St. John, 42 Fed. Eep. 585, 32 Keck v. Bieber, 148 Pa. St. 645, 754 Keckmann y. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211, 2231 Keefe v. Chafee, 11 Wash. 292, 85 Keegan v. Estate of Malone, 62 Iowa, 208, 789 Keegan v. Kinnaire', 12 111. App. 484, 362 Keel v. Larkin, 72 Ala. 493, 772, 778 Keeler v. Bartine, 12 Wend. 110, 561 Keeler v. Field, 1 Paige, 312, 123 Keeler v. Neal, 2 Watts (Pa.), 424, 517 Keeler v. Niagara, etc., Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523, 238 Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. St. 467, 2045, 2046, 2073 Keen v. Coleman, 39 Pa. St. 299, 1793 Keenan v. Handley, 2 D. J. & S. 283, 210 Keene v. Kent, 4 N. Y. St. E. 431, 2060 Keeney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 445, 1508 Keep v. Goodrich, 12 Johns. 397, 214 Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. ( U. S. ) 31, 1758 Keifer v. Summers. 137 Ind. 106, 443 Keim v. Lindley (N. J. Eq. 1895), 30 Ad. Eep. 1063, 1170 Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 550, 146 Keith v. Fountain, 3 Texas Civ. App. 391, 1887, 2087 Keith v. Keith, 26 Kan. 26, 2158 Keith v. Kellogg, 97 111. 147, 27 Keith v. Eeynolds, 3 Greenl. 393, 1175 Keitt v. Andrews, 4 Eich. Eq. 349, 1061, 1071 Keiwert v. Meyer, 62 Ind. 587. 669 KeUam v. McKinstry, 69 N. Y. 264, 745 Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104, 443 Keller v. Mayer, 55 Ga. 406, 1678 Keller v. Eeynolds (Ind. App.), 40 N. E. Eep. 76 and 280, 115 Kellerman v. Kansas City E. Co. (Mo.), 34 S. W. Eep. 41, 1964, 1966 Kelley v. Cosgrove, 83 Iowa, 229, 2104 Kelley v. Fletcher, 94 Tenn. 1, 1374 Kelley v. JeBeris, 13 Mont. 170, 1732 Kelley v. Newburyport, etc., Ey. Co., 141 Mass. 496, 1276 Kelley v. EUey, 106 Mass. 339, 278 Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 76, 912 Kelley v. Stanberry, 13 Ohio St. 408, 620 Kelley v. Upton, 5 Duor, 336, 869 Kelner v. Baxter, L. E. 2 C. P. 174, 1309, 1314 Kellogg v. Clark, 23 Hun, 393, 651, 655 Kellogg v. Howes, 81 Cal. 170, 2222 Kellogg v. Kellogg, 21 Colo. 11, 1020 Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. (Wis.) 123, 1952 2026 2065 Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 133, '2030 Kellogg v. Eichards, 14 Wend. 116, 190 Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108, 346 Kelsey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St. 340, 616 Kelsey v. National Bank, 69 Pa. St. 426, 1269 1369 Kelly v. Bradford. 33 Vt. 35, ' 2232 Kelly v. City of Chicago, 62 111. 279, 1544 Kelly v. Devlin, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 487, 1985 Kelly v. Gould, 141 N. Y. 596. 1876 Kelly v. Eoberts, 40 N. Y. 432, 243, 246, 247 Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54, 799 Kelly v. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522, 1063 Kelly v. Town of Bradford, 33 Vt. 35, 139 Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, 756, 701 Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333, 2073 Kemp v. Balls, 28 Eng. Law and Eq. 498, 445 Kemp v. Balls, 10 Exch. 607, 513 Kemp. v. Kemp, 85 N. Car. 491, 1741 Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N. Y. 45, 296, 755 Kemp v. Wright, L. E. (1894) 2 Ch. 462, 175 Kempshall v. East, 127 Ind. 320, 2216 Kempton v. Bray, 99 Mass. 350, 234 Kendall, Ex parte, 17 Ves. 514, 822 Kendall v. Bishop, 76 Mich. 634, 1404 Kendall v. Frey, 74 Wis. 26, 1099 Kendall v. Hamilton, L. E. 4 App. Cas. 504 833 Kendall v. Lawrence, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 540, 1789 Kendrick, Matter of, 107 N. Y. 104, 196 Kendrick v. Niesz, 17 Colo. 506, 1775, 1776 Kendrick v. O'Neil, 48 Geo. 631, 543 Kenedy v. Schultz, 6 Texas C. App. 461, 1908 Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. 498, 54, 182 Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 204, 954 Kennebec E. Co. v. Jarvis, 34 Maine, 360, 155 Kennebec H. Co. v. Palmer, 34 Maine, 366, 261 Kennebrew v. Southern, etc., Machine Co. (Ala.), 17 So. Eep. 545, 349 Kennedy v. Baker, 159 Pa. St. 146, 1779 Kennedy v. Cochrane, 65 Maine, 594, 1897 Kennedy v. California, etc., Bank, 101 Cal. 495, 1261, 1262 Kennedy v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83, 1471 Kennedy v. Green, 3 M. & K. 699, 466 Kennedy v. Howell, 20 Conn. 349, 182, 231, 234 Kennedy v. Knight, 21 Wis. 340, 730 Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441, 68, 87 Kennedy v. Eobinson, 2 Craw. & D. 113, 638 Kennedy v. Shaw, 43 Mich. 359, 201 Kennedy v. Siemers. 120 Mo. 73, 75 Kennedy v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 122, 128 Kenner v. Bitely, 45 Fed. Eep. 133, 1156 Kenneth v. South Carolina E. Co., 15 Eich. 284, 804 Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Pa. St. 34, 1759 Kenney v. New York, etc., E. Co., 125 N. Y. 422, 1962 Kent v. Bornstein, 12 Allen (Mass.), 342, 1834 Kent v. Cantrall, 44 Ind. 452, 2171 Kent v. Freehold, etc., Brickmaking Co., 17LawT.E. (N. S.) 77, 1980 Kent v. Huskinson, 3 B. & P. 233, 664 Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560, 647, 653 Kent v. Kent, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 840, 2124 Kent v. Miltenberger, 13 Mo. App. 503, 1856, 1923, 1924 Kent v. Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 1253 Kent v. Eeynolds, 8 Hun, 559, 562 CXX11 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Kent, etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Ransom, 46 Mich. 416, 102 Kenton Insurance Co. v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564, 1746 Kentucky Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96, 76 Kenworthy v. Sawyer, 125 Mass. 28, 1745, 1754 Kenworthy v. Schofleld, 2 B. & C. 945, 674, 677 Kenworthy v. Stringer, 27 Ind. 498, 1853 Kenyon v. Nichols, 1 R. I. 411, 867 Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 1802 Kenyon v. Wilson, 78 Iowa, 408, 32 Keokuk Railroad Co. v, Missouri, 152 U. S. 301, 1456 Kepler v. Jessupp, 11 Ind. App. 241, 468 Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts (Pa.), 231, 2096 Kercheval v. King, 44 Mo. 401, 2190 Kerkhof v. Paper Co., 68 Wis. 674, 670 Kern v. Zeigler, 13 W. Va. 707. 2199, 2200, 2201 Kernodle v. Hunt, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 57, 234 Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 120, 1781 Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. St. 112, 1182 Kerr v. Hill, 27 W. Va. 576, 637 Kerr v. Lucas, 1 Allen. 279, 210, 1473 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 661, 1031, 1032 Kerr v. Watts, 6 Wheat. 550. 1214 Kerridge v. Hesse, 9 Car. & P. 200, 1309, 1314 Kershaw v. Wright, 115 Mass. 361, 936 Kerstetter v. Raymond, 10 Ind. 199, 2229 Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596, 162 Ketchumv. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659, 1443 Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356, 1348, 1474, 1564 Ketchum v. Spurlock, 34 W. Va. 597, 887 Ketchum v. Stout, 20 Ohio, 453, 110, 425 Ketchum v. Zeilsdorff, 26 Wis. 514, 299 Kevan v. Crawford, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 29, 224 Key ¥. Jennings, 66 Mo. 356, 976 Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio, 132, 2005 Keyes v. Allen, 65 Vt. 667, 262 Keyes v. Stone, 5 Mass. 391, 146 Keyes v. Westford, 17 Pick. 273, 1491, 1492 Keyser v. District No. 8, 35 N. H. 473, 643 Keystone, etc., Co. v. Dole, 43 Mich. 370, 276 Kibble v. Gough, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 204, 665, 666 Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 188, 1988 Kidder v. Blake, 45 N. H. 530, 212, 214 Kidder v. Hunt, 1 Pick. 328, 836 Kidder v. Kidder, 33 Pa. St. 268. 562 Kidwelly Canal Co. v. Raby, 2 Price, 93, 1328 Kiehne v. Wessell, 53 Mo. App. 667, 1812 Kiff v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32 Kan. 263, 1961 Kiichli v. Minnesota, etc., Co., 58 Minn. 418, 1574 Kilbom v. Field, 78 Pa. St. 194, 2007 Kilbourn v. Latta, 5 Mack (D. C), 304, 644 Kilbourn y. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 2256 Kilcrease y. Johnson, 85 Ga. 600, 730 Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo. 390, 1271 Kilgore y. Buckley, 14 Conn. 362, 731 Kilgore y. Dempsey, 25 Ohio St. 413, 730 Kilgour y. Miles, 6 Gill & J. 268, 386, 766 Killian v. Ashley, 24 Ark. 511, 594 Killough y. Payne, 52 Ark. 174, 187 Kilvington v. City of Superior, 83 Wis. 222, 1479 Kimball, The, 3 Wall. 37, 452, 1929 Kimball v. Atchinson, etc., R. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 888, 1425 Kimball y. Bangs, 144 Mass. 321, 1875 Kimball v. Brawnor, 47 Mo. 398, 930, 940 Kimball v. Oocheco Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 579, 280 Kimball v. Comstock, 14 Gray, 508, 592 Kimball v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 1 Brad. (111. App.) 209, 805 Kimball y. Hewitt, 2 N. Y. Supl. 697, 1544 Kimball y. Morton, 5 N. J. Eq. 26, 1209 Kimball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695, 238 K imball v. Tooke, 70 111. 553, 752 Kimball y. Wilson. 3 N. H. 96, 543, 577 Kimball Co. y. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133, 162, 164, 168 Kimberley v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340, 2073 Kimberly y. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, 660 Kimbro y. Bullitt, 22 How. (U. S.) 256, 1933 Kimmerle y. Hass, 53 Mich. 341, 950 Kimmons y. Oldham, 27 W. Va. 258, 1179 Kimpton y. Bronson. 45 Barb. 618, 563 Kincaid y. Archibald, 73 N. Y. 189, 195 Kincaid y. Dwinelle, 59 N. Y. 548, 1377, 1378 Kincaid y. School District, 11 Maine, 188, 404 King, In re, 46 Fed. Rep. 905, 2094 King's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 143, 8 King y. Barnes, 109 N. Y. 267, 442 King v. Bates, 57 N. H. 446, 162 King y. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447, 2117 King v. Despard, 5 Wend. 277, 608 King v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (Minn.), 63 N. W. Rep. 1105, 199 King y. Faist, 161 Mass. 449, 953, 1044 King y. Finch, 60 Ind. 420, 381, 402, 405 King y. Fleming, 72 111. 21, 707, 2112 King y. Gilleland, 60 Texas, 271, 1682 King v. Greene, 6 Allen, 139, 1043 King v. Gunnison, 4 Pa. St. 171, 674 King y. Hawkins (Ariz.), 16 Pac. Rep. 434, 2085 King y. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, 29, 816, 832 King y. Huston, 19 L. Ann. 288, 2021 King y. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190, 296 King y. Kerr, 5 Ohio, 154, 369 King y. Lamoille, etc., R. Co., 51 Vt. 369, 2185 King y. Lucas, L. R. 23 Ch. D. 712, 1653 King y. Morford, 1 N. J. Eq. 274, 955 King y. Steyens, 5 East, 244, 768 King y. Upton, 4 Johns. 237, 204 King y. Welcome, 5 Gray, 41, 693 King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465, 236 King y. Whitnash, 7 B. & C. 596, 2095 King Brick Co. y. Phoenix Insurance Co., 164 Mass. 291, 316 King Iron Bridge, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 43 Fed. Rep. 768, 754 King Phillip Mills y. Slater, 12 R. I. 82, 150 Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., 18 "Upper Canada (Q. B.), 60, 55, 684 Kingman County v. Cornell University, 57 Fed. Rop. 149, 1535 Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 111. 310, 15 Kingsbury v. Kirwan, 77 N. Y. 612, 1914, 1921 Kingsbury v. Tharp, 61 Mich. 216, 2252 Kingsland y. Forrest, 18 Ala. 519, 26 Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313, 638, 639 Kingsley v. Johnson, 49 Conn. 462, 331 Kingston Bank y. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391, 480 481 799 Kinner, In re, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 618, ' 1659 Kinnard v. Daniel, 13 B. Mon. 496, 618 Kinne v. Town of East Haven, 32 Conn. 210, 2209 Kinne v. Webb, 54 Fed. Rep. 34, 1712 Kinnersley v. Mussen, 5 Taut. 264, 27 Kinney v. Baltimore, etc., Association, 35 W. Va. 385, 2224 Kinney y. McDermot, 55 Iowa, 674, 2104 Kinsley v. Charnley, 33 111. App. 553, 952 Kinsley v. International, etc., Co., 41 111. App. 259, 258 Kinsler y. Pope, 5 Strobhart, 126, 531 Kinsman y. Parkhurst, 18 How. (U. S.) 289, 2032 Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326, 1164 Kirby y. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354, 663 Kirby y. Miller, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 3, 1699, 1750 Kirby v. Taylor, 6 John. Ch. 242, 819 Kirby v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 109 111. 412. 869 Kirchner v. New Home Co., 16 N. Y. Supl. 761, 565 Kirchner v. New Home Co., 135 N. Y. 182, 554, 566 TABLE OF CASES. CXX111 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Kirk, Ex parte, L. E. 5 Ch. D. 800, 567 Kirkham v. Marter, 2 B. & Aid. 613, 594 Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 171, 64 Kirkland v. Oates, 25 Ala. 465, 2181 Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. E. 14, 50 Kirkpatrick v. Adams, 20 Fed. Eep. 287, 1925 Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. St. 155, 1930, 1946 Kirk v. Clark, 59 Pa. St. 479, 1655 Kirkpatrick v. McElroy, 41 N. J. Eq. 555, 1019 Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Term. 409, 448 Kirksey v. Keith, 11 Eich. Eq. 33, 1020 Kirton v. Braithwaite, 1 M. & W. 310, 403 Kistner v. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 88 Ind. 460, 2249 Kister v, Lebanon, etc., Insurance Co., 128 Pa. St. 553, 319 Kitchen v. Greenabaum, 61 Mo. 110, 1039 Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige (N. Y.J, 107 1793 Kitchen v. St. Louis, etc., Eailroad Co., 69 Mo. 224, 1295, 1390, 1446, 1447 Kizer v. Lock, 9 Ala. 269, 688 Klauber v. Vigneron (Cal. 1893), 32 Pac. Eep. 248, 1714 Kleckka v. Ziegler, 81 Md. 482, 1185 Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush, 460, 652, 717 Klein, In re, 1 How. ( U. S.) 277, 2118 Klein v. Gantner, 135 Ind. 699, 1693 Klein v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 88, 1611 Kleinsorge v. Bohse. 25 Ore. 521, 1056 Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4, 721 Kline's Estate, 64 Pa. St. 122, 1713, 1714 Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253, 1939 Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494. 1786 Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. St. 120, 1714 Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 419, 1798, 1799 Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239, 414 Klinitz v. Surry, 5 Esp. 267, 665 Knaggs v. Green, 48 Wis. 601, 1787 Knapp v. Hyde, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 80, 1828, 1835 Knapp v. Knapp, 95 Mich. 474, 1758 Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277, 1677, 1689 Knapp, etc., Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Ey. Co., 126 Mo. 26, 1581 Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. E. 13 Ch. Div. 696, 1002 Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. 9, 233 Kneedler v. Anderson, 43 111. App. 317, 953 Kneeland v. Eogers, 2 Hall (N. Y.), 579, 2016 Kneffler v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 359, 1914 Kneil v. Egleston, 140 Mass. 202, 1754 Kneller v. Lang, 63 Hun, 48, 417 Knickerbacker v. Colver, 8 Cow. Ill, 543, 574 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 87 111. 70, 769 Knight v. Abbot, 30 Vt. 577, 390 Knight v. Crawford, 1 Esp. 190, 688 Knight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537. 662 Knight v. Glasscock, 51 Ark. 390, 1052 Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432, 1637 Knight v. Knotts, 8 Eich. L. (S. Car.) 35, 2178 Knight v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143, 664 Knight v. Mann, 120 Mass. 219, 663 Knights Templar, etc., Co. v. Berry, 50 Fed. Eep. 511, 119, 733 Knittel v. Cushing, 55 Tex. 354, 165 Knoll v. Harvey, 19 Wis. 99, 1197 Knopf y. Morel, 111 Ind. 570, . 2203 Knoup v. Piqua Branch Bank, 1 Ohio St. 603, 2130 Knott v. Burleson, 2 Greene (Iowa) ,600, 552 Knott t. Ealeigh, etc., E. Co., 98 N. C. 73, 738 Knott v. Tidyman, 86 Wis. 164, 1826 Knowles v. Erwin, 43 Hun, 152, 231 Knowles v. McCamly, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 342, Knowles v. Michel, 13 East, 249, 636 Knowles y. Sandercock, 107 Cat 629, 1261 Knowles v. Toone, 96 N. Y. 534, , 867, 868 Knowlton v. Amy, 47 Mich. 204, 990 Knowlton v. Congress, etc., Spring Co., 57 N. Y. 518, 1864, 1940 Knowlton v. Oliver, 28 Fed. Eep. 516, 868 Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis. 651, 2113 Knox v. Eden Musee, etc., 148 N. Y. 441, 1344 1345 Knox v. King, 36 Ala. 367, 622, 623 Knox v. Knox, 30 S. Car. 377, 1851 Knox v. McFarran, 4 Colo. 440, 681 Knox v. Nobel, 77 Hun (N. Y.) , 230, 1773 Knox v. Spratt, 23 Fla. 64, 1102, 1104, 1104 Knox v. Webster, 18 Wis. 406, 203 Knoxville v. Acuff, 92 Tenn. 26, 545 Knoxville, etc., Ins. Co. v. Hird, 4 Texas Civ. App. 82, 348 Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. (U. S.) 539, 1516 Knox Co. v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 147 TJ. S. 91, 865, 875 Koch v. Dunkel, 90 Pa. St. 264, 1174 Koch v. Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 220, 1509 Koch v. Both, 150 111. 212, 429, 466, 478, 479 Koechling v. Henkel, 144 Pa. St. 215, 1695, 1752 Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496. 392 Koehler v. Dodge, 31 Neb. 328, 1288 Koehler v. Black Eiver Falls Iron Co., 2 Black, 715, 1231, 1292 1304, 1307 Koehler v. Farmers' Bank, 5 N. Y. Supl. 745, 414 Koenig v. Nott, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 323, 2192 Koerper v. Jung, 33 111. App. 144, 41, 362 Kofka v. Bosicky, 41 Neb. 328, 1115, 1210, 1211 Kohl v. United States, 91 V. S. 367, 2145 Kohn v. Collison (Del. 1893), 27 Atl. Eep. 834, 1746 Kohn v. Fandel, 29 Minn. 470, 148 Kolsky v. Enslen, 103 Ala. 97, 2181, 2182 Konitzky v. Meyer. 49 N. Y. 571, 777 Konnerup v. Frandsen, 8 Wash. 551, 1100, 1188 Kooker v. Hyde, 6 Wis. 204, 190 Koons v. Hendricks, 6 Kulp. (Pa.) 165, 28 Koontz v. Central Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275, 799,800 Kopp v. Eeiter, 146 111. 437, 1195 Koppikus v. Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248, 1519 Korminsky v. Korminsky, 21 N. Y. Supl. 611, 1211 Korn v. Browne, 64 Pa. St. 55, -2158 Kornegay v. Carroway, 2 Dev. Eq. 403, 1013 Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. Car. 188, 162, 168 Kornegay v. White, 10 Ala. 255, 333 Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343, 383, 408, 410, 411 Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 V. S. 668, 2158 Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235, 239, 962 Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Pa. St. 376, 2060 Kountz v. Price, 40 Miss. 341, 2108 Kountze v. Helmuth, 67 Hun, 343, 422 Kraemer v. Adelsberger, 122 N. Y. 467, 171 Kraft v. City of Keokuk, 17 Iowa, 86, 460 Kramer v. Williamson, 135 Ind. 655, 1036 Kraner v. Chambers (Iowa 1894), 61 N. W. Eep. 373, 1045 Kraushaar v. Hauk, 27 Ore. 92, 1089 Kreider v. Boyer, 10 Watts, 54, 560 Kreiger v. Eailroad Co., 84 Ky. 66, 1542 Kreiss v. Seligman, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 439, 1902 1903 Kretschmer v. Hard, 18 Colo. 223, ' 901 Kribben v. Haycraf t, 26 Mo. 396, 1883, 1988 Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 149, 592 Krohn v. Heyn, 77 Texas, 319, 2180 Krohn v. Krohn, 5 Texas Civ. App. 125, 2098 Krohn v. Williamson, 62 Fed. Eep. 869, 1209 Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647, 1838 Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574, 508, 517, 526, 531, 532, 951 Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 1753, 1755 Kroy v. Eailroad Co., 32 Iowa, 357, 1433 CXX1V TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Krumb y. Campbell, 102 Cal. 370, 2187 Krumbhaar v. Birch, 83 Pa. St. 426, 358 Kratz v. Craig, 53 Ind. 561, 463 Kuecht v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 90 Pa. St. 118, 308 Kuelkamp y. Hidding, 31 Wis. 503, 1826 Kugelman Y. Levy, 24 N. Y. Supl. 559, 936 Kuhl t. Pierce County, 44 Neb. 584, 2255, 2258 Kuhls y. City of Laredo (Texas, 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 791, 1522 Kuhn v. Mvers, 37 Iowa, 351, 757 Kuhns t. Gates, 92 Ind. 66, 2109 Kunkle t. Mitchell, 56 Pa. St. 100, . 102 Kuser v. Wright (N. J. 1895), 31 Atl. Kep. 397, 1338 Kuntz y. Tempel, 48 Mo. 71, 385, 767 Kunzler y. Kohaus, 5 Hill (N. Y. ) , 317, 2118 Kupfert v. Guttenburg, etc., Association, 30 Pa. St. 465, 1597, 1680, 1620 Kurtz, In re, 68 Cal. 412, 1478 Kusch v. Kusch, 143 111. 353, 2287 Kyle y. Perdue, 95 Ala. 579, 1014 K. X. v. A. Y., 34 W. N. C. (Pa.) 145, 184 L La Amistad de Eues,5 Wheat. 385, 506 Labbe v. Corbett, 69 Texas, 503, 2018 Labourchere v. Dawson, L. E. 13 Eq. 322, 2046 LaboyTeaux y. Swigart, 103 Ind. 596, 198 Lacey v. Cent. Nat. Bank, 4 Neb. 179, 248 Lachman v. Block (La. Ann.), 17 So. Rep. 153, 714 Lackland v. Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 183, 1506 Lacon y. Hooper. 6 T. R. 224, 768 Lacustrine Fertilizer Co, v. Lake Guano, etc., Co., 82 N. Y. 476, 466 Lacy T. Getman, 35 Hun, 46, 948 Lacy v. Kynaston, 2 Salk. 575, 569, 574 Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 383, 1781, 1792, 1794 Lacy v. Wilson, 24 Mich. 479, 392 Ladd v. Cartwright, 7 Ore. 329, 1382 Ladd t. King, 1 E. I. 224, 689 Ladd y. Rogers, 11 Allen, 209, 1476 Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press, etc., Co., 53 Texas, 172 807 Ladies', etc., Institute v. French, 16 Gray, 196, 256 Ladue v. Seymour, 24 Wend. 60, 780 La Du-King Mfg. Co. v. La Du, 36 Minn. 473, 592, 652, 693 La Farge, etc., Ins. Co. v. Bell, 22 Barb. 54, 1288 Lafayette County Monument Co. v. Ma- goon, 73 Wis. 627, 258,448 Laffoon v. Fretwell, 24 Mo. App. 258, 32 Lafollet y. Kyle, 51 Ind. 446, 1195 La France Fire Engine Co. v. Town of Mount Vernon, 9 Wash. 142, 1514, 1887 Lagonda Nat. Bank v. Portner, 46 Ohio St. 381, 1943 La Grange Butter Tub Co. v. National Bank of Commerce. 122 Mo. 154, 1390, 1404 Laidlaw Y. Organ, 2 Wheat. 3 78, 1879 Laider y. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738, 797 Laird y. Allen, 82 111. 43, 846 Laird y. Campbell, 100 Pa. St. 159, 1632 Laird y. Pim, 7 M. & W. 474, 120, 122, 2213 Lake Y. Trustees, 4 Denio, 520, li'iS Lake Y. Tyree, 90 Va. 719, 1870 Lake Co. y. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 1326, 1527, 1530, 1539 Lake Co. y. Rollins, 130 TJ. S. 662, 1527, 1539, 1586 Lakeman y. Mountstephen, L. R. 7 H. L. 17, 598 Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Maine, 463, 285, 473 Lake Ontario E. Co. y. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219, 242, 258, 259, 260, 1320 Lake Ontario, etc., E. Co. y. Mason, 16 N. Y. 451, 153, 260 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 97 111. 506, 2145 Lake Shore E. Co. y. City of Chicago, 144 111. 391, 1546 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Eichards, 152 111. 591, 2220 Lake View, City of, y. MacEitchie, 134 111. 203, 897 Lake View, Town of, v. Eose Hill Cem- etery Co., 70 111. 91, 2147 Lakeside Land Co. y. Dromgoole, 89 Ala. 505, 628 Lamar y. Micon, 114 TJ. S. 218, 695 Lamar Milling Co. y. Craddock, 5 Colo. App. 203, 67 Lamar Water Co. y. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 1562, 1563 Lamb y. Crafts, 12 Mete. 353, 41, 658 Lamb y. Bayenport, 18 Wall. 307, 201 Lamb Y. Donoyan, 19 Ind. 40, 2210 Lamb y. Foss, 21 Maine, 240, 490 Lamb y. Gregory, 12 Neb. 506, 540 Lamb y. Henderson, 63 Mich. 302, 935 Lamb y. Hinman, 46 Mich. 112, 844 Lamp y. Weed, 27 Ala. 621, 404 Lambert y. Alcorn. 144 111. 313, 565 Lambert y. Seely, 2 Hilt. 429, 464 Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22, 2121 Lamborn Y. County Commissioners, 97 TJ. S. 181, 440, 458, 459, 806 Lamme y. Bodson, 4 Mont. 560, 845 L'Amoreaux y. Crosby, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 422, 1814 L'Amoreux y. Gould, 7 N. Y. 349, 74 Lampkin y. Chisom, 10 Ohio St. 450, 835 Lampleigh y. Braithwait, Hobart, 105, 193 783 Lampon y. Corke, 5B.4 Aid. 606, 466', 567 Lampson Y. Hobart, 28 Vt. 697, 608 Lamson Consolidated Co. y. Hartung, 18 N. Y. Supl. 143, 334 Lamson Consolidated Co. v. Hartung, 19 N. Y. Supl. 233, 335 Lanahan y. Pattison, 1 Flip. (TJ. S.) 410, 1904 Lancaster y. Dolan, 1 Eawle (Pa.), 231, 1728 Lancaster y. Elliott, 42 Mo. App. 503, 83 Lancaster y. Elliott, 28 Mo. App. 86, 66 Lancaster y. Eoberts, 144 111. 213, 1160 Lancaster, etc., Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, 1025 Lance y. Lance, 5 Jones L. 413, 559 Landa y. Obert, 5 Texas, 620, 1829 Landa v. Obert, 45 Texas, 539, 1830 Landauer y. Conklin, 3 S. D. 462, 1641 Land Co. y. Dromgoole. 89 Ala. 508, 1117 Landers y. Barlow, 21 Fed. Eep. 836, 683 Landers v. Mclntyre, 8 Wash. 203, 1138 Landis y. Saxton, 89 Mo. 375, 409 Landon y. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209, 797 Landon y. Hutton, 50 N. J. Eq. 500, 561 Landwerlen y. Wheeler, 106 Ind. 523, 815, 817, 2190 Lane's Appeal, 82 Pa. St. 289, 1632 Lane y. Bishop, 65 Vt. 575, 1752, 1753 Lane y. Doty, 4 Barb. 530, 821 Laney. Shackford, 5N.H. 130, 630, S36 Lane y. Shears, 1 Wend. 433, 422 Lane y. Traders' Deposit Bank (Ky. 1892), 21 S. W. Rep. 756, 1719, 1722 Lanes y. Squyres, 45 Texas, 382, 535 Lanfair y. Lanfair, 18 Pick. 398, 490 Lang y. Gale, 1 M. & S. Ill, 384 Lang y. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519, 2026 Langabier y. Fairbury, etc., E., 64 111. 243, 2094 Langbein v. Schneider, 16 N. Y. Supl. 943, 1697 Langan y. Sankey, 55 Iowa, 52, 1935 Langdon y. Branch, 37 Fed. Eep. 449, 1431 Langdon y. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285, 1588 TABLE OF CASES. CXXV [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Langdon v. DeGroot.l Paine, 203, Langdon v. Goole, 3 Lev. 21, 95 Langdon v. Mayor, etc., 93 N. Y. 129, 36 Langdon v. Northfleld, 42 Minn. 464, 128 Langdon v. Richardson, 58 Iowa, 610, 601 Lange v. Dammier, 119 Ind. 567, 1817 Lange v. Kaiser, 84 Mich. 317, 784 Lange v. Work, 2 Ohio St. 519, 2047 Langelier v. Schaefer, 36 Minn. 361, 71 Langford v. Freeman, 60 Ind. 46, 1192 Langhorne v. Richmond E. Co. (Va. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 159, 1458 Langley v. Mayhew, 107 Ind. 198, 1716 Langston v. Bates, 84 111. 524, 1191, 1194 Langston v. Smyley, 38 S. Car. 121, 1732 Langston v. Hughes, 1 Maule & S. 593, 1862 Langworthy v. Woodworm, 13 Iowa, 530, 552 Lanier v. Adams, 72 Ga. 145, 1048 Lanier v. Huguley, 91 Ga. 791, 483, 484 Lanier v. Wallace.116 Ind. 317, 1397 Lank v. Kinder, 4 Harr. (Del.) 457. 549 Lanning v. Tompkins, 45 Barb. 308, 434 Lansing v. Dodd, 45 N. J. Law, 525, 1760 Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 Car. & P. 475, 797 Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cow. 63, 147 Lantz v. Frey and Wife, 19 Pa. 366. 789 Lanyon v. Martin, L. R. 13 Ir. Ch. 297, 1183 Lanz v. McLaughlin, 14 Minn. 72, 1120 Lanzer v. Unterberg, 29 N. Y. Supl. 683, 1907 Lapeyre v. United States. 17 Wall. 191, 761 Laphan v. Barrett, 1 Vt. 247, 634 Laphan v. Dreisvoght, 36 Mo. App. 275, 94 Laphan v. Head, 21 Kan. 332, 201 La Point v. Cady, 2 Pin. 515, 2205 Lapping v. Duffy, 65 Ind. 229, 48 Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, 1465 424 646 387 Large v. Penn, 6 S. & R. 488, Larimer v. Kelley, 10 Kan. 298, Larimore v. Hornbaker, 21 Ind. 430, Larisow v. Hager, 44 Fed. Rep. 49, 833 Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561, 148 Larkin v. Butteriield, 29 Mich. 254, 815 Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y. 333, 562 Larkin v. Hecksher, 51 N. J. Law, 133, 890 Larmon v. Jordan, 56 111. 204, 61 Lamed v. City, 86 Iowa, 166, 544 Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 Maine, 376, 578 Larsen v. Breene, 12 Colo. 480. 451 Larsen v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 300, 222 Larson v. Altaian Co., 86 Wis. 281, 936 Lash v. Edgerton, 13 Minn. 210, 475 Lash v. Lash, 58 ind. 526, 1768 Lash v. Rendell, 72 Ind. 475, 48, 553 Lassence v. Tierney, 1 McN. & G. 551, 618, 1717 Lassiter v. Hoes, 31 N. Y. Supl. 850, 1664 Latchford, Succession of, 42 La. Ann. 529, 1618 Latham v. Shipley, 86 Iowa, 543, 323, 324 Latham v. Sumner, 89 111. 233, 165 Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214, 255 Lathrop v. O'Brien. 57 Minn. 175, 397 Lathrope v. McBride, 31 Neb. 289, 461 Latrobe, etc., Ass'n v. Fritz, 152 Pa. St. 224, 1679, 1688, 1695 Latta t. Miller, 109 Ind. 302, 2203 Lattimore v. Hansen, 14 Johns. 330, 517, 951, 955 Laubenheimer v. Mann, 17 Wis. 542, 2026 Laude v. Seymour, 24 Wend. 60, 785 Lauer v. Bandow, 48 Wis. 638, 832 Laughlin v. President, etc., 6 Ind. 223, 2273 Langhlin v. Dean, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 20, 2021 Laughter's Case, Coke's Rep., pt. 5, 22, 301 Lauman v. County of Des Moines, 29 Iowa, 310, 805 Lauman v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 42, 1254 Laurel, etc., Assn. v. Sperring, 106 Pa. St. 334, 1599 Lavell v. Frost, 16 Mont. 93, 596 Laver v. Fielder, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 190, 1008 Lavery v. Pursell, L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 508, 639, 643 Lavery v. Turley, 6 H. & N. 239, 526 Law v. Henry, 39 Ind. 414, • 1192 Law v. Liscomb, 31 S. Car. 504, 1683 Law v. Local Board, L. R. (1892) 1 Q. B. 127, 758, 760 Lawler v. Murphy, 58 Conn. 294, 862, 1384 Law v. People, 87 111. 385, 1515, 1519, 1520, 1521 Lawrence v. American Nat. Bank, 54 N. Y. 432, 800 Lawrence v. Bassett, 5 Allen, 140, 706 Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey, 623, 1071 Lawrence v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13, 1105 Lawrence v. Carter, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 12, 1949 Lawrence v. Chase, 54 Maine, 196, 694 Lawrence v. Clark, 36 N. Y. 128, 1640 Lawrence v. Cooke, 56 Maine, 187, 654 Lawrence v. Dale, 3 John. Ch. 23, 166, 998 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, 236, 242, 243, 607 Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 641, 2030 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426, 9, 233, 871 Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131, 148 Lawrence v. Railway Co., 36 Hun, 467, 1101 Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Ed. 289, 643 Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13, 1108, 1111 Lawson v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 64 Wis. 447, 1960 Lay v. Austin, 25 Fla. 933, 1286 Laycock v. City of Baton Rouge, 35 La. Ann. 475, 1565, 1566 Layman v. Minneapolis Realty Co., 60 Minn. 136, 2268 Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Pa. St. 492, 2101 Leach v. Fobes, 11 Gray, 506, 210, 1473 Leach v. Francis, 41 Vt. 670, 1663 Leach v. Keach, 7 Iowa, 232, 214 Leacox v. Griffith, 76 Iowa, 89, 1797 League v. Waring, 85 Pa. St. 244, 455, 456 Leamans v. Knap, Stout & Co., 89 Wis. 171, 699 Learned v. Ayres, 41 Mich. 677, 829 Learned v. Tritch, 6 Colo. 440, ■ 681 Lease v. Pennsylvania Co., 10 Ind. App. 47, 586 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345, • 2033, 2039, 2041, 2075 Leatherman v. Oliver, 151 Pa. St. 646, 959 Leatherwood v. Arnold, 66 Texas, 414, 1760 Leavans v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 50 Ohio St. 591, 1997 Leavenworth, County of, v. Barnes, 94 U. S. 579, 1428 Leavenworth County Commissioners v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 134 U. S. 688, 1296, 1446 Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. 1, 1695 Leavitt v. Dodge, 16 N. Y. Supl. 309, 209 Leavitt v. Dover (N. H. 1892), 32 Atl. Rep. 156, 2238 Leavitt v. Files, 38 Kan. 26, 1821 Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71, 445, 542 Leavitt" v. Pratt, 53 Maine, 147, 626 Leavitt v. Windsor, etc., Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 439, 877 Lebanon Bank v. Hollenbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 1082 Lecomte v. Toudouze, 82 Texas, 208, 1730 Leddel v. Starr, 20 N. J. Eq. 274, 555, 556, 560 Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, 2165 Lee v. Basey, 85 Ind. 543, 831 Lee v. Boak, 11 Grat. 182, 559 Lee v. Briggs, 99 Mich. 487, 506 Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 4S2, 52, 871 Lee v. Fletcher, 46 Minn. 49, 15 Lee v. Fountaine, 10 Ala. 755, 446, 609 Lee v. Gaskell, 1 Q. B. D. 700, 635 Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, 658, 659, 660 Lee v. Hennick (Ohio 1894), 39 N. E. Rep. 473, 1643 CXXV1 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ] Lee v. Hill, 87 Va. 497, 652 Lee v. Hills, 66 Ind. 474, 679, 1484, 2269 Lee v. Horton, 104 N. Y. 538, 1975 Lee v. Ki.-by, 104.Mass. 420, 1131 Lee v. Kirkpa trick, 14 N. J. Eg. 264, 955 Lee v. Lancashire It. Co., L. R. 6 Ch. App. 527, 463, 581 Lee v. Mahoney, 8 Iowa, 344, 686 Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 32, 183 Lee v. Nixon, 1 A. & E. 201, 809, 828 Lee v. Oppenheimer, 32 Me. 253, 536 Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615, 728 Lee t. Sellers, 8iy 2 Pa. St. 473, 1640 Lee v. Supervisors, 68 Mich. 330, 1471 Lee v. West, 47 Ga. 311, 2177 Lee Co. v. Eogers, 7 Wall. 181, 1524 Lee and Company's Bank, In the Matter of, 21 N. Y. 9, 2131 Leeds, Luke of, v. Earl of Amherst, 2 Phil. Ch. 117, 1019 Leeds T. Little, 42 Minn. 414, 143, 2230 Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co., 90 N. Y. 26, 365 Leedy v. Nash, 67 Ind. 311, 1076 Leeming v. Snaith, 16 Q. B. 275, 111 Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich, 247, 520 Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 1707 Le Fevre v. Le Fevre, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 241, 635 Lefever v. Lefever, 30 N. Y. 27, 1334 Leftwich v. Berkeley, 1 H. & M. 61, 830 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 392, 2118 Legard v. Hodges, 1 Vos. Jur. 477, 1631 Leggat v. Sands Brewing Co., 60 111. 158, 348 Leggate v. Clark, 111 Mass. 308, 1812 Leggatt v. Leggatt, 14 Mont. 104, 1031 Legge v. Harlock, 12 Q. B. 1015, 75S Leggett t. Banking, Co., 1 Saxton Ch. — ; 23 Am. Dec. 746, note, 1231 Le Grand v. Eufaula Nat. Bank, 81 Ala. 123, 1749 Lehigh, etc., Iron Co. v. Bamford, 150 U. S. 665, 989 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. 706, 2117 Lehigh Valley, etc., Co. v. Miller, 59 Fed. Rep. 483, 548, 558 Lehigh Water Co.'s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 515, 1577 Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 2116 Lehman v. Collins, 69 Ala. 127, 415 Lehman v. Marshall, 47 Ala. 362, 922 Lehman v. Schmidt, 87 Cal. 15, 781 Lehiy lorf v. Cope, 122 111. 317, 430 Leicester v. Rose, 4 East, 372, 1637, 1638 Leichtweiss v. Treskow, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 487, 1807 Leigh v. Patterson, 8 Taunt. 540, 498, 2221 Leigh v. Mobile R. Co., 58 Ala. 165, 170 Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. Y. 460, 796, 797 Leiper's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 377, 1755 Lemmon v. Hanley, 28 Texas, 219, 965 Lemon v. Graham, 131 Pa. St. 447, 180 Lemon v. Grosskopf, 22 Wis. 447, 1931 Lemonius v. Mayer, 71 Miss. 514, 1927 Lempriere v. Lange, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 675, 1805 Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq.. pt. 1, p. 109, Lengle v. Smith, 48 Mo. 276, 2252 Lenhart v. Roam, 74 Pa. St. 59, 1786 Lenoir v. Moore, 61 Miss. 400, 400, SIB Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. 230, 2210 Leonard v. Boaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 506 Leonard v. Burlington, etc., Loan Assn., 55 Iowa, 594, 1314 Leonard v. Canton, I-.5 Miss. 189, 460 Leonard v. Carter, 16 Wis. 607, 95 Leonard v. City of Canton, 35 Miss. 189, 1499 Leonard v. Crane, 147 111. 52, 1127 Leonard v. Keblar, 50 Ohio St. 444, 16 Leonis v. Lazzavich, 55 Cal. 52, 1187 Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 1813 Leonard v. Poole, 114 N. Y. 371, 2069, 2072 Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John. 29, 594, 596, 603 Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 201, 1587 Le Page v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 164, 537 Lerch v. Bard, 153 Pa. St. 573, 2253 Lerned v. Wannemacher, 9 Allen, 412, 954 Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801, 592, 718, 719 Le Roy v. Crowinshield, 2 Mason, 151, 716 Le Roy, etc., R. Co. v. Sidell, 66 Fed. Rep. 27 1282 Leser v. Glaser, 32 Kan. 546, 1857, 1858 Lesley v. Rosson, 39 Miss. 368, 635 Leslie v. Conway, 59 Cal. 442, 2240 Leslie v. Fitzpatrick, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 229, 1807 Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519, 1237, 1248, 1268, 1981, 2029, 2036, 2037, 2065, 2074, 2076 Leslie v. Smith, 32 Mich. 64, 99 Lessee of Syler v. Eckhart, 1 Binney, 378, 850 Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790, 871, 891, 2157 Lesson v. Mass. Assn., 23 N. Y. Supl. 294, 544, 578 Les Successeurs D'Arles v. Freedman, 53 N. Y. Superior, 518, 161 Lester v. Bowman, 39 Iowa, 611, 597 Lester v. Connelly, 46 La. 340, 1742 Lester v. Foxcroft, 1 White & Tudor' s Lead. Cas. Eq. 1038, 1103 Lester v. Foxcroft, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1027, 834, 837 Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248, 761, 764 Lester v. Georgia, etc., R. Co., 90 Ga. 802, 1435 Lester v. Jewett, 11 N. Y. 453, 115, 2182 Lester v. Jewett, 12 Barb. 502, 214 Lester v. Mayor, 29 Md. 415, 440, 804 Lester v. Palmer, 4 Allen, 145, 233 Lester v. Union Manufacturing Co. 1 Hun, 288, 554 Lester v. Webb, 1 Allen (Mass.) , 34, 1351, 1358 Letcher v. Bank, 1 Dana (Ky.) , 82, 537 Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bing. N. Car. 99, 922 Levan v. Milholland, 114 Pa. St. 49, 1779 Levan v. Sternfeld, 55 N. J. Law, 41, 384, 414 Lcvene v. Rabitte, 2 N. Y. Supl. 389, 145 Levering v. Shockey, 100 Ind. 558, 48 Li-vey v. New York Cent., etc., Co., 24 N. Y. Supl. 124, 1270 Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 1706 Levi v. Karrick, 13 Iowa, 344, 532 Levi v. Lynn, etc.. R. Co., 11 Allen, 300, 274 Levi v. Welsh, 45 N. J. Eq. 867, 1661 Levick v. Brotherline, 74 Pa. St. 149, 997 Leviston v. Junction R. Co., 7 Ind. 597, 550 Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589, 645 Levy v. Green, 8 E. & B. 575, 304 Levy v. Spencer, 18 Colo. 532, 1976 Levy v. Walker, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 436, 2046 Lew v. Yates, 8 A. & E. 129, 1912 Lovystein v. Whitman, 59 Ala. 345, 477 Le Warne v. Meyer, 38 Fed. 191, 1246 Lewis, In re, Appeal of, 85 Mich. 340, 1764,1769 Lewis, Succession of, 45 La. Ann. 833, 1692 Lewis v. Alexander, 51 Texas, 578, 1895 Lewis v. Burr, 2 Car. Cas. 195, 767 Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 466, 2256 Lewis v. Davison, 29 Gratt. 216, 452 Lewis v. Great Western R. Co., 5 HurL & N. 867, 1967 Lewis v. Greider, 49 Barb. 606, 3S8 Lewis v. Grimes, 7 J. J. Mash. 336, 680 Lewis v. Hadley, 36 111. 433, 695 Lewis v. Headley, 36 111. 433, 710 Lewis v. Kerr, 17 Iowa, 73, 444 TABLE OF CASES. CXXV11 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Lewis y. Latham, 7-1 N. Car. 283, 1902 Lewis v. Lewis, 5 Ore. 169, 1085 Lewis v. Lewis, 5 Rich. Law, 12, 361 Lewis v. Lewis, 3 Strobh. 530, 186 Lewis v. Lewis Lumber Co., 156 Pa. St. 217, 595, 602 Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn. 141, 170 Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347, 2120 Lewis v. McEeavy, 7 Wash. 294, 266 Lewis v. Overby, 28 Gratt. 627, 20 Lewis v. Pima County, 155 U. S. 54, 1541 Lewis v. Prendergast, 39 Minn. 302, 1126, 1144 Lewis v. Relchey, 27 N. J. Eq. 240, 1175 Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. Car. 323, 345 Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220, 1385 Lewis v. Trickey, 20 Barb. 387, 775 Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418, 1167 Lewisyille Natural Gas Co. v. State, 135 Ind. 49, 1483, 1573 Lewy v. Crawford, 5 Texas Civil App. 293 1940 Lexington, City of, v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282, 1342, 1524 Lexington, City of, v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, , 1542 Lexington R. Co. v. Chandler, 13 Mete. 311, 155 Libbey v. Elsworth. 97 Cal. 316, 1468 Libby v. Hopkins, 104 TJ. S. 303, 438 Lidderdale v. Duke of Montrose, 4 T. R. 248, 2084 Lide v. Hadley, 36 Ala. 627, 1122 Liebes v. Stefiy (Ariz.), 32 Pac. Rep. 261, 1683, 1690 Liening v. Gould, 13 Cal. 598, 189 Liesemer v. Burg (Mich.), 63 N. W. Rep. 999, 468 Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Mechanic Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 31, 1343, 1344 Life Association v. Goode, 71 Texas, 90, 970 Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 119 Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 111. 46, 1557 Liggett v. Shira, 159 Pa. St. 350, 1084 Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 682, 641 Lightf oot v. Bass, 8 Lea (Tenn. ) , 350, 1698 Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & P. 551, 1862 Lightly T. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112, 781 Ligonier, Town of, v. Ackennan, 46 Ind. 552, 804 Lilly v. Hays, 5 A. & E. 548, 237, 240 Lilly v. Person, 168 Pa. St. 219, 142 Lime Works v. Dismukes, 87 Ala. 344, 1402 Linch v. Paris Lumber Co., 80 Tex. 23, 127, 136, 144, 372 Lincoln v. Field, 54 Ark. 471, 872 Lincoln v. Iron Co., 103 U. S. 412, 1499 Lincoln v. Little Rock Granite Co., 56 Ark. 405, 2189 Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299, 165 Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Maine, 169, 884 Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De Gex & J. 681 Lincoln, etc., Associations v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173, 1612 Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. Law, 358, 519, 541 Linehan v. City of Cambridge, 109 Mass. 212, 1473 Liness v. Hessing, 44 1)1. 113, 2081 Linde t. Budd, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 191, 1779 Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 548, 2094 Linder v. Carpenter, 62 111. 309, 2083 Linderman v. Farquharson, 101 N. Y. 434, 1653 Linderman v. Pomeroy, 142 Pa. St. 168, 194 Lindersmith v. South Missouri Land Co., 31 Mo. App. 258, 779 Lindley t. Grofl , 37 Minn. 338, 893 Lindley v. Kelley, 42 Ind. 294, 637 Lindley v. Lacey, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 578, 46 Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. Law, 636, 720 Lindo v. Lindo, 1 Beav. 496, 566 Lindon v. Hooper, Cowp. 414, 781 Lindsay v. Cusimano, 10 Fed. Rep. 302, 938,939 Lindsay v. Glass, 119 Ind. 301, 972 Lindsay v. McCormack, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 229, 1524 Lindsay v. Pettigrew, 5 S. D. 500, 2206 Lindsay v. Warnock, 93 Ga. 619, 1112 Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L. R. 5 C. P. 221, 1009, 1020 Lindsey v. City of Philadelphia, 2 Phila. 212, 1984 Lindsey v. Rutherford, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 245, 1891 Lindsey v. Stone, 123 Mass. 332, 709 Lindsey v. Van Cortlandt, 67 Hun, 145, 1664 Lindsley v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 539, 1958 Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 187, 199 Link v. Clemmens, 7 Blkf. (Ind.) 479, 2098 Link v. Germantown Building Associa- tion, 89 Pa. St. 15, 1608, 1620 Link v. Page, 72 Texas, 592, 1006 Linkauf v. Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417, 1248, 1264 Linn v. Bruce, 2 H. Bl. 317. 526 Linn v. Linderoth, 40 111. App. 320, 785 Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 111. 75, 2031, 2039 Linney v. Wood, 66 Texas, 22, 901, 1925 Lins v. Lendhardt, 127 Mo. 271, 2286 Linscott v. Buck, 33 Maine, 530, 1157 Linton y. Crosby, 54 Iowa, 478, 1735 Linton y. Porter, 31 111. 107, 354, 358 Linton y. Williams, 25 Ga. 391, 688 Linyille y. State, 130 Ind. 210, 2248 Lion y. McGlory, 106 Cal. 623, 1005 Lippincott y. Shaw Carriage Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 577, 1366 Liscomb y. Nichols. 6 Colo. 290, 681 List y. Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 501, 1621 Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30, 253 Lister, etc., Works v. Pender, 74 Md. 15, 544 Lillie v. Dunbar. 62 Wis. 198, 638 Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 361, 1516, 1539 Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195, 990 Littell y. Nichols, Hardin, 66, 381, 405 Little y. Banks, 77 Hun, 511, 860 Little y. Bowers, 134 U. S. 547, 463 Little v. Paddleford, 13 N. H. 167, 421 Little y. Phoenix Bank, 2Hill (N. Y.), 425, 451 Little v. Thurston, 58 Maine, 86, 1146 Little Rock y. National Bank, 98 U. S. 308, 2121 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 10, 1432 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Perry, 37 Ark. 164, 1316 Littleton v. Smith, 119 Ind. 230, 1780 Litton y. Baldwin, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 210, 1699, 1750 Litzv. Goosling (Ky.), 19 S. W. Rep. 527, 1108 Lively, The, 1 Gall, 315, 506 Liverpool v. Wright, 28 Law J. Ch. 868, 2084 Liverpool Borough Bank v. Eccles, 4 H. & N. 138, „ 688 Liverpool, etc., Insurance Co. v. Hunt, 11 La. Ann. 623, 1326 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (TJ. S.) 566, 2058 Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 696, 713, 740, 1958 Liverpool, etc., Steam Co. v. Suitter, 17 Fed. Rep. 695, 938 Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb. 50, 1322 Live Stock Assn. v. Levy, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 32, 2076 Livingstone v. Ackeston, 5 Cow. 531, 268 Livingston v. Anderson, 30 Fla. 117, 2215 Livingston v. Bishop, 1 John. 290, 574, 575 Livingston Co. v. First National Bank, 128 U. S. 102, 1461 CXXV111 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 237, 1207,1653 Livingston v. Lynch, 4 Johns. 573, 1254 Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Caines, 583, 214 Livingston v. Stickles, 7 Hill, 255, 869 Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. 351, 867 Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 415, 433 Llano Improvement Co. v. Cross, 5 Texas Civ. App. 175, 1762 Lloyd v. Conover, 25 N. J. Law, 47, 621 Lloyd V. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479, 618 Lloyd v. Guibert, L.E.1Q.B. 115, 695, 739 Lloyd v. Gurdon, 2 Swanst. 180, 1872 Lloyds v. Harler, L. E. 16 Ch. 290, 2184 Lloyd v. Hollenback, 98 Mich. 203, 848 Llovd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. St. 419, 467 Lloyd v. Preston, 146 TJ. S. 630, 1916 Loach v. Farnum, 90 111. 367, 951 Loaiza v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. 11, 2 Loan, etc., Bank v. Miller, 39 S. Car. 175, 518 Loan Association v. Topeka, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 2143 Lobdell v. Hopkins, 5 Cowen, 516, 500, 219S Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 327, 232, 627 Lobdell v. Merchants', etc., Bank, 33 Mich. 408, 2233 Lock v. Etherington, 1 Sid. 265, 550 Lock v. Furze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96, 369 Locke v. Sioux City & P. E„ 46 Iowa, 109, 855 Locke v. Towler, 41 111. App. 66, 1927 Lockett v. Usry, 28 Ga. 345, 2152 Lockwood v. Barnes, 3 Hill, 128, 648 Lockwood v. Doane, 107 111. 235, 2252 Lockwood v. Bobbins, 125 Ind. 398, 785 Lockwood v. Wabash K. Co., 122 Mo. 86, 1506, 1507, 1581 Lockwood v. White, 65 Yt. 466, 1089 Lodge v. Lee, 6Crauch,237, 1174 Loeb v. McCullough, 78 Ala. 533, 1744 Lofgren v. Peterson, 54 Minn. 343, 1005 Loftin v. Crossland, 94 N. Car. 137, 1741 Lof tus v. Fischer, 106 Cal. 616, 1053 Logan v. Austin, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 476, 517 Logan v. Berkshire Apartment Co., 20 N. Y. Supl. 368, 374 Logan v. Berkshire Assn., 19 N. Y. Supl. 164, 132 Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524, 1504 Logan v. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 487, 1727 Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. Car. 416, 781 Logan v. Wienholt, 1 CI. & Fin. 611, 618 Logansport, City of, v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 1513 Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343, 1498 Lomax v. Smyth, 50 Iowa, 223, 206 Lombard v. Ruggles, 9 Maine, 62, 635 Lomerson v. Johnson, 13 Atl. Rep. 8, 1830 Lomorson v. Johnston, 47 N. J. Eq. 312, 1830 London Gas Co. v. Chelsea, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 215, 117 London Gas Co. v. NirhoN, 2 C. & P. 365, 810 Lonergan v. Buford, 1(8 U. S. 581, 22S3 Lonergan v. Stewart, 46 111. 233, 913 Loney v. Bailey, 43 Md. 10, 519, 524 Long's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 151, 621 Long v. City of Duluth, 49 Minn. 280, 1504 Long v. Crosson, 119 Ind. 3, 1724 Long v. Hartwell, 34 N. J. Law, 116, 691 Long v. Hickingbottom, 28 Miss. 772, 354, 357, 358 Long v. Long, 142 N. Y. 545, 1781 Long v. Long, 118 111. 638, 1191 Long v. Long, 57 Iowa, 497, 543, 57 1 Long v. Miller, 93 N. Car. 233. 47S Longv. Millar, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 450, 684, ffiil Long v. New York, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. 76, 64 Long v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 343, 275, 276 Long v. Ramsay, 1 Serg. & R. 72, 10 Long v. Straus, 124 Ind. 84, 482 Long v. Thayer, 150 TJ. S. 520, 444 Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 2035 Long v. Walker, 105 N. Car. 90, 2152 Long v. White, 42 Ohio St. 59, 643 Long v. Williams, 74 Ind. 115, 1817 Longfellow v. McGregor (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1032, 570 Longnecker v. Shields, 1 Colo. App. 264, 461 Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Al. 117, 213 Longstreet v. Rea, 52 Ala. 195, 835 Longworth v. Higham, 89 Ind. 352, 475 Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 395, 1151 Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 148, 204 Looby v. West Troy, 24 Hun, 78, 522 Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Conn. 228, 165 Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159, 183, 192, 193, 221, 262 Loomis v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 462, 1653 Loper v. United States, 13 Ct. of CI. 269, 868 Lorah v. Nissley, 156 Pa. St. 329, 19 Loranger v. Jardine, 56 Mich. 518, 1896 Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen ( Mass.) , 127, 1754 Lord v. Underdunck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 46, 845 Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray, 282, 294, 489, 2226, 2227 Lord Say and Sele's Case, 10 Mod. 40, 95, 892 Lord Walpole v. Lord Orford, 3 Yes. Jr. 402, 1197 Loredo v. Loury (Texas App.), 20 S. W. Rep. 89, 461 Lorents v. Lorentz, 14 W. Ya. 637, 1179 Lorie v. Adams, 51 Kan. 698. 1859 Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498, 236, 240, 270, 271, 872, 946, 948 Lorillard v. Silver, 36 N. Y. 578, 170 Loring v. Alden, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 576, 954 Loring v. Blake, 106 Mass. 592, 557 Loring v. Boston, 7 Mete. 409, 61, 1329 Loring v. Cooke, 3 Pick. 48, 399 Loring v. Hailing, 15 Johns. 120,, _ 765 Los Angeles Association v. Phillips, 56 Cal. 539, 2216 Losey v. Bond, 94 Ind. 67, 1779 Loth v. Friedrick, 95 Mich. 598, 565 Loth v. Mothner, 53 Ark. 116, 457 Loucheim v. First Nat. Bank, 98 Ala. 521, 1003 Loud v. Citizens', etc., Insurance Co., 2 Gray, 221, 317 Loud v. Loud, 4 Bush (Ky.), 453, 2010 Loud v. Pomona, etc., Co., 153 U. S. 564, 1148, 1166 Lough v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 679, 1062 Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250, 411 Loughbridge v. Iowa Life Ins Co., 84 Iowa, 141, 381 Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 TJ. S. 711, 2092 Louisiana v. Mayor, 109 TJ. S. 285, 774 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 2153 Louisiana v. Wood, 102 TJ. S. 294, 361, 782, 1539 Louisville, City of. v. Hennig, 1 Bush, 381, 450 Louisville, City or, v. Muldoon, 94 Ky. 462, 2193 Louisville, City of, v. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53, 1470 Louisvillo v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 104 TJ. S. 469, 762 Louisville, City of, v. President, etc., of University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 642, 2142 Louisville, City of, v. Zanone, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 151, 799, 808 Louisville Asphalt, etc., Co. v. Lorick, 29 S. C. 533, 684 Louisville Gas Co. v. Clay, 65 Ky. 363, 1756 Louisville R. Co. v. Alexander (Ky. 1894), 27 S. W. Eep. 981, 1724, 1748, 1753 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Barkhouse, 100 Ala. 543, 921 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bodenschatz, etc., Stone Co., 141 Ind. 251, 1115, 2272 Louisville, etc., B. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501, 1455 TABLE OF CASES. CXX1X [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Louisville & N. K. Co. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560, 1117 Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ey. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 1976 Louisville K. Co. v. Carson. 151 111. 444, 1276 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1895) , 31 S. W. Rep. 476, 1431, 1432 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Donnegan, 111 Ind. 179, 2249 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126, 1962 Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Herr, 135 Ind. 591, 1S16, 1850 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hopkins Co., 87 Ky. 605, 986 Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. McVay, 98 Ind. 391, 1281 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, etc., Con- tract Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 42, 2257 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, etc., Imp. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 431, ' 1429 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 2140 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Power, 119 Ind. 269, 900 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, 2166 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Steele, 6 Ind. App. 183, 1968 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 38, . 737 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Widman, 9 Ind. App. 190, 1967 Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, 2132, 2136 Lovatrt v. Hamilton, 5 M. & W. 639, 125 Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80, 1914 Love v. Mabury, 59 Cal. 484, 2213 Love v. Mayor, 40 N. J. Law, 456, 2126 Love v. Miller, 104 N. C. 582, 345 Love v. Mining Co., 32 Cal. 639, 1058 Love v. Palmer, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 159, 1975 Love v. Sortwell, 124 Mass. 446, 1119 Love v. Welch, 97 N. C. 254, 630 Love v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503, 2108 Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1, 543 Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379, 2096, 2112 Lovell v. St. Louis Ins. Co., Ill U. S. 264, 487 Lovelock v. Franklyn, 8 Q. B. 371, 486, 488 Lovett v. Adams, 3 Wend. 380, 171 Lovett v. Steam Saw Mill Association, 6 Paige, 54, 1229 Low v. Anderson, 61 Iowa, 476, 1723 Low v. Connecticut, etc., Railroad, 45 N. H. 370, 782, 1315 Low v. Foss, 121 Mass. 531, 8 Low v. Railroad Co., 52 Cal. 53, 1227 Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728. 956 Lowber v. Connit. 36 Wis. 176, 92 Lowe v. Brown, 22 Ohio St. 463, 1094 Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. Car. 472, 2121 Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133, 487, 488, 492 Lowe v. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 179, 48, 926, 928 Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225, 179 Lowe v. Trundle, 78 Va. 65, 1876 Lowe v. Waller, Doug. (Eng.) 736, 1944 Lowell v. Gage, 38 Maine, 35, 40 Lowell v. Lewis, 1 Mason, 182, 233 Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank v. Win- chester, 8 Allen (Mass.), 109, 1358, 1491, 1515 Lower v. United States, 91 U. S. 536, 34 Lower v. Winters, 7 Cow. 263, 635 Lowey v. Granite State Assn., 28 N. Y. Supl. 560, 1894 Lowman v. Sheets, 124 Ind. 416, 592, 655 Lowndes v. Chisholm, 2 McCord Eq. 455, 1071 Lowrance v. Robertson, 10 S. Car. 8, 366 Lowrey v. Murrell, 2 Port. (Ala.) 280, 446 Lowrey v. Robertson, 141 Pa. St. 189, 194 Lowry v. Bourdieu, Doug. 467, 800, 1870 Lowry v. Buffington, 6 W. Va. 249, 846 ix Lowry v. Dillman, 59 Wis. 197, 1869, 1930 Lowry v. Russell, 8 Pick. 360, 933 Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407, 844 Loyd v. Lee, 1 Strange, 94, 214 Loyd v. Malone, 23 111. 43, 1034 Lucas v. Allen, 80 Ky. 681, 2004, 2079 Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276, 615 Lucas v. Commerford, 3 Brown Ch. 166, 1101, 1203 Lucas v. Godwin, 3 Bing. (N. Car.) 737, 139 Lucas v. Smith, 42 Ind. 103, 2244 Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 1861 Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer, 66 Pa. St. 351, 150, 887 Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 388, 688 Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650, 170 Luders v. Anstrey, 4 Ves. 501, 226 Luddington v. Bell, 77 N. Y. 138, 192, 543 Luddington v. Miller, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. 478, 554 Luddington v. North, 141 Pa. St. 184, 528 Ludlow v. Bowne, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 2021 Ludlow v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 228, 815, 818 Ludlow v. O'Neil, 29 Ohio St. 181, 417 Luebe v. Thorpe, 54 N. W. Rep. 41, 1709 Luey v. Bundy,9N. H.298, 2257 Lugar v. Swayze, 21 N. Y. Supl. 1101, 1658, 1705 Lukens' Appeal, 143 Pa. St. 386, 209 Lukens v. Freiund, 27 Kan. 664, 347 Lum v. McEwen, 56 Minn. 278, 1973 Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG., M. & G. 604, 2073, 2265 Lumley v. Wagner, 5 DeGex & S. 485, 2072 Lundahl v. Hansen, 147 111. 504, 996 Lundberg v. Northwestern Elevator Co., 42 Minn. 37, 201 Lunday v. Pierson, 67 Texas, 233, 431 Lungerhausen v. Crittenden (Mich.), 61 N. W. Rep. 270, 101 Lungstrass v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. 201, 66,76 Lupin v. Marie, 6 Wend. 77, 166 Lupton v. Freeman, 82 Mich. 638, 446 Lurch v. Holder (N. J. Eq. 1893), 27 Atl. Rep. 81, 973, 992 Luse v. Deitz, 46 Iowa, 205, 1190 Luse v. Ismuths Railway Co., 6 Ore. 125, 1368 Lush v. Foster, 44 N. J. Law, 378, 1549 Lusted v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 71 Wis. 391, 588 Luthy v. Waterbury, 140 111. 664, 354 Luttrel v. Martin. 112 N. C. 593, 1283 Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 1585 Luzander v. Richmond, 128 Ind. 344, 1114 Lyde v. Railroad Co., 36 Beav. 10, 1254 Lydick v. Holland, 83 Mo. 703, 842 Lydick v. Railroad Co., 17 W. Va. 427, 1179 Lyle, The Tom, 48 Fed. Rep. 690, 470 Lyle v. Jackson County, 23 Ark. 63, 98 Lyles v. Lescher, 108 Ind. 882, 877 Lyle v. Shinnebarger, 17 Mo. App. 66, 639, 802 Lyman v. Babcock, 40 Wis. 503, 754 Lyman v. City of Lincoln, 38 Neb. 794, 1493 Lyman v. Clarke, 9 Mass. 235, 566 Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111. 388, 120, 397, 489, 1163 Lyman v. Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 630, 1080 Lyman v. Lauderbaugh, 75 Iowa, 481, 461 Lyman v. Rasmussen, 27 Minn. 384, 438 Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen, 242, 55 Lynch v. Bogy, 19 Mo. 170, 186 Lynch v. Henry, 75 Wis. 631, 12 Lynch v. Jennings, 43 Ind. 276, 120, 378 Lynch v. Onondaga Salt Co., 64 Barb. 558, 779 Lynch v. Rosenthal (Ind. 1896), 42 N. E. Rep. 1103, 1955 Lynch v. Postlethwaite, 7 Martin (La.), cxxx TABLE OF CASES. [Meferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Lynchburgh Insurance Co. v. West, 76 Va. 575 311 313 Lynchburg & D. E. Co. v. Board, etc., 109 N. Car. 159, 1516 Lynde v. Budd, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 191, 17.« Lynde v. Winnebago Co., 16 Wall. 6, 1524 Lyndon Mill Co. v. Lyndon Literary and Biblical Inst., 63 Yt. 581, 1349, 1350 Lynn v. Baltimore, etc., B. Co., 60 Md. 404, 134 Lynn v. Brace, 2 H. Bl. 317, 508, 525 Lynn v. Smith, 35 Hun, 275, 789 Lyon v. Culberteon, S3 111. 33, 913, 1914 Lyon v. George, 44 Md. 295, 909 Lyon v. Hersey, 103 N. Y. 264, 170 Lyon v. Hussey, 82 Hun (N. Y.), 15, 1999 Lyon v. King, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 411, 649, 654 Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235, 1852, 1993 Lyon y. Hood, 12 Vt. 233, 1663 Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt, 219, 2094, 2097 Lyons v. Hodgen & Miller, 90 Ky. 280, 1915 Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Texas, 143, 1390 Lysaght v. Phillips, 5 Duer. 106, 569 Lyth v. Ault, 7 Exch. 669, 537 Lytle v. Whicher, 21 La Ann. 182, 2022 Lytton v. Railway Co., 2 Kay & J. 394, 1122 Mc McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272, 2122, 2149 McAfee v. Fisher, 64 Cal. 246, 438 McAfee v. Glen, etc., Coke Co., 97 Ala. 709, 2182 McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 1UU7 McAlfc-ter v. Haden, 2 Camp. 438, 1944 McAllester v. Sprague, 34 Me. 296, 544, 573, 574 McAllister v. Dennin, 27 Mo. 40, 542 McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & E. (Pa.) 147, 1942, 1948 McAllister v. Howell, 42 Ind. 15, 2044 McAllister v. Smith, 17 111. 328, 730 McAlpin v. Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120, 369 McAnally v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 299, 1685 McAninch v. Laughlin, 13 Pa. St. 370, 995 McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, 120 111. 26, 619, 958, 1712, 1716 McArdle v. Irish Iodine and Marine Salts Mfg. Co., 15 Ir. C. L. 146, 2184 McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 1310, 1312, 1313, 1316 McAuley v. Billenger, 20 Johns. 89, 2j5 McBlain v. Cross, 25 Law T. E. (N. S.) 804, 684 McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 Howe, 232, 1306, 1854, 1904 McBrian v. Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95, 151)8 McBride v. Banguss, 65 Texas, 174, 16sl McBride y. Grand Rapids, 47 Mich. 236, 151)5 McBride V. Grand Rapids, 49 Mich. 239, 1505 McBratney y. Chandler, 22 Kan. 092, 1852, 1994 McBryde v. Sayre, 86 Ala. 458, 1123 McCabe v. Cancr, 68 Mich. 182, 201 McCabe v. Matthews, 155 IT. S. 550, 1 1 ( '.<> McCabe T. Shayer, 69 Mich. 25, 440 McCagg v. Heacock, 31 111. 476, 1033 McCall y. American Land Mortg. Co., 99 Ala. 427, 1654, 1740 McCall y. Bushnell, 41 Minn. 37, 1007 McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. 302, 197 McCalley v. Otey, 90 Ala. 302, 383, 396, 415, 457 McCammon v. Cunningham, 108 Ind. 545, 1810 McCampbell v. McCampbell, 2 Lea (Tenn.),6Sl, 1680 McCandless y. Alleghany Bessemer Steel Co., 152 Pa. St. 139, 1953, 2090 McCandless v. Richmond, etc., E. Co., 38 S. Car. 103, 2133 McCandlish v. Keen, 13 Gratt. 615, 430, 479 McCann y. McLennan, 3 Neb. 25, 1861 McCann v. Pennie, 100 Cal. 547, 2177, 2216 McCann y. Preston, 79 Md. 223, 1006, 1007 McCants v. Bee, 1 McCord Eq. (S. Car.) 383, 2284 McCarger y. Eood, 47 Cal. 138, 844 McCarn v. Wilcox (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Eep. 978, 1035 McCarren y. McNulty, 7 Gray, 139, 131, 160 McCartee v. Orphan, etc., Society, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 437, 1672 McCartee v. Teller, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 511, 1715 McCarthy t. Henderson, 138 Mass. 310, 1797 McCarthy v. Layasche, 89 111. 270, 1434 McCarthy v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 1, 268 McCarthy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 Mass. 254, 1241 McCartney v. Glassford, 1 Wash. St. 579, 299 McCarty, Estate of, 58 Cal. 335, 2235 McCarty v. Beach, 10 Cal. 461. 2183 McCarty v. Hamilton, etc., Association, 61 Iowa, 287, 199 McCarty v. Roots, 21 How. (TJ. S.) 432, 828 McCaughrin v. Williams, 15 S. Car. 505, 3151 McCaull ¥. Braham, 10 Fed. Eep. 37, 2072 McCelvy v. Noble, 13 Rich. (S. Car.) 330, 594 McChesney v. Syracuse (Sup. 1883), 32 N. Y. Supl. 507, 1555 McClain y. Davis, 77 Ind. 419, 1816 McClanahan y. Williams, 136 Ind. 30, 1787 McClary v. Lowell, 14 Vt. 116, 2099 McClatchie v. Haslam, 63 Law T. E. (N.S.) 376 1832 McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561, 8 McClavo y. Thompson, 36 Hun, 365, 1388 McClay y. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66, 135, 147, 148 McClellan v. Sanford, 26 Wis. 595, 238, 655 McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 81, 1879 McClintock's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 365. 640 McClintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160. 322, 328, 333 McCloskey v. City of Albany, 7 Hun, 472, 782 McCloskey v. McCormick, 37 111. 66, 466 McCluer v. Eailroad Co., 13 Gray, 124, 1249 McCluney v. Jackson, 6 Gratt. 96, 452 McClure v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 131, 134 McClure v. Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79. 233 McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561, 978 McClure v. Missouri Biver, etc., R. Co., 9 Kan. 373, 1978 McClure v. Otrich, 118 111. 320, 489, 694 McClure v. People's, etc., R. Co., 90 Pa. St. 209, 153, 260 McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 235 McClure v. Secrist, 5 Ind. 31, 2229 McClure v. Township of Osgood, 94 TJ. S. 429, 1526 McClure v. Tp. of Oxford, 94 U. S. 429, 1516, 1529 McClure v. Watertown Ins. Co., 90 Pa. St. 277 896 McClure v. Wilson, 43 111. 356, 257 McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 51, 2039, 2261, 2264 McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, 1135 McCollum v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 55 Hun, 103, 313 McComb v. Donald, 82 Va. 903, 163 McCombv. Kittredge, 14 Ohio, 348, 207 McComb v. Wright, 4 John. Ch. 659, 674 McCombs y. Megratten, 3 Houst. 35, 796 McConahey v. Griffey, 82 Iowa, 564, 654 McCone y. Williams, 37 111. App. 591, 126, 127 McConihe v. New York E. Co., 20 N. Y. 495, 295 McConnel T. Murphy, L. E. 5 Priy. C. App. 203, 111, 853 McConnell's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 31, 1685. McConnell v. Brayner, 63 Mo. 461, 110, 631 McConnell v. Jones, 19 Ind. 328, 340 TABLE OF CASES. CXXX1 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} McConnell v. Murphy, 20 Weekly Eep, 603, 308 McConnell v. New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 273, 853 McConnell t. Street, 17 111. 253, 1033 McConnell v. Norfolk, etc., E. Co., 86 Va. 248, 738 McConoughey v. Jackson, 101 Cal. 265, 1477 McCord v. Blackwell, 31 S. Car. 125, 1683 McCord v. Durant, 134 Pa. St. 184, 457 McCorkell v. Karhoff, 90 Iowa, 545, 332 McCormio v. Leggett, 8 Jones L. (N. Car.) 425, 'l778 McCornuck's Appeal, 98 Am. Dec. 197, 644 McCormlck y. Basal, 46 Iowa, 235, 496 McCormick v. Blum, 4 Texas Civ. App. 9, 1741 McCormick y. Bottorf, 155 Pa. St. 334, 1679, 1695 McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 434, 196 McCormick v. Cbeevers, 124 Mass. 262, 635 McCormick v. Connoly, 2 Bay. (S. Car.) 401, 2181 McCormick v. Elston, 16 111. 204, 1948 McCormick v. Hartley, 107 Ind. 248, 1048 McCormick v. McCormick, 1 Ind. App. 594, 792 McCormick v. Mitchell, 57 Ind. 248, 475 McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127, 2154 McCormick Co. v. Martin, 32 Neb. 723, 343 McCormick, etc., Co. v. Wilson, 39 Minn. 467, S97 McCormick, etc., Machine Co. v. Ches- rown, 33 Minn. 32, 132, 133 McCormick, etc., Machine Co. v. Richard- son, 89 Iowa, 525, 687 McCormick Harvesting Co v. Brower, 88 Iowa, 607, 330 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Russell, 86 Iowa, 556, 330 McCormick Machine Co. v. Watson (S. Dak.), 54 N. W. Rep. 945. 353 McCoun v. Delaney. 3 Bibb. 46, 110 McCoun v. New York, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176, 773. 774 McCoy v. Able, 131 Ind. 417, 2248 McCoy v. Artcher, 3 Barb. 323, 355, 356 McCoy v. Barnes, 136 Ind. 378, 1720 McCoy v. Cassiday, 96 Mo. 429, 182 McCoy v. Erie & Western Trans. Co., 42 Md. 498, 870 McCracken v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 1508 McCracken v. Hay ward, 2 How. (TT. S.) 608, 2116, 2154 McCracken v. Pool, 19 La. Ann. 288, 2021 McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 783 McCrae v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460, 335 McCraith v. National, etc., Bank, 104 N. Y. 414, 596 McCrary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa, 521, 787 McCray Refrig. Co. v. Woods, 99 Mich. 269, 336, 340 McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray, 211, 642 McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460, 196 McCreery v. Davis (S. Car.), 22 S. E. Rep. 178, 227, 704 McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 516, 532, 951, 952 McCreery v. Garvin, 39 S. Car. 375, 1272 McCreery v. Green, 38 Mich. 172, 299 McCreikart v. Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 133, 460 McCrillis v. Copp, 31 Fla. 100, 1104 McCrillis v. Hawes, 38 Maine, 566, 541 McCrimmin v. Cooper, 27 Texas, 113, 1327 McCrory v. Grandy, 92 Ga. 319, 1726 McCroskey v. Ladd (Cal.), 28Pac. Rep. 216, 418 McCroskey v. Ladd, 96 Cal. 455, 1143 McCullis v. Thurston, 27 Vt. 596, 810 McCullough v. Ashbridge, 155 Pa. St. 166, 928 McCullough v. Barr, 145 Pa. St. 459, 201 McCullough v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278, 76 McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 567, 1343 McCullough v. State, 4 Wheat. 316. 392 McCully v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 32 Pa. St. 25, 261 McCune v. Belt, 45 Mo. 174, 828 McCurdy v. Breathitt, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 234, 'l074 McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. St. 39, 1767 McCurdy v. Middleton, 82 Ala. 131, 478 McDaniel v. Chicago, etc., R., 24 Iowa, 412, 734 McDaniel v. Springfield, etc., Co., 48 Mo. App. 273, 407 McDanieis v. Bank, 29 Vt, 230, 438 McDaniels v. Lapham, 21 Vt. 222, 522 McDanieis v. Whitney, 38 Iowa, 60, 890 McDermott's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 358, 1669 McDermott v. French, 15 N. J. Eg. 78, 1766 McDermott v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 12 J. & S. 221, 117 McDermott v. Miners', etc., Bank, 100 Pa. St. 285, 1769 McDill v. Gunn, 43 Ind. 315, 1183 McDill's Lessee v. McDill, 1 Dall. 63, 19 McDole v. Purdy, 23 Iowa, 277, 120 McDonald v. Chisholm. 131 111. 273, 1354 McDonald v. Gray, 11 Iowa, 508, 2198 McDonald v. Kellogg, 30 Kan. 170, 1066 McDonald v. Liggett, 146 Pa. St. 460, 501 McDonald v. Matoey, 21 Hun (N. Y.) , 210, 2252 McDonald v. Mayor, etc., 68 N. Y. 23, 1508, 2242 McDonald v. Mezes, 107 Cal. 492, 1468 McDonald v. McDonald, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 211, 1185 McDonald v. Minnick, 147 111. 651, 1105, 1140 McDonald v. Ortman, 98 Mich. 40, 2173 McDonald v. Unaka Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38, 900 McDonough v. Hennepen, etc., Associa- tion (Minn. 1895), 64 N. W. Rep. 106, 1600 McDonough v. Jolly, 165 Pa. St. 542, 2247 McDougald v. Bellamy, 18 Ga. 411, 1435 McDougall v. Provident, etc., Co., 64 Hun, 515, 118 McDowell v. Delap, 2 A. K. Marsh. 33, 680 McDowell v. Lev, 35 Wis. 171, 237, 238 McDowell v. Lucas, 98 111. 489, 846, 1192 McDuffee v. Sinnott, 119 111. 449, 1032 McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224, 563 McElhanny's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 188, 1980 McElroy v. Hiner, 133 111. 156, 1023 McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N. J. Eq. 828, 652, 838 McElwain v. Willis, 9 Wend. 549, 27 McEvoy v. Loyd, 31 Wis. 142, 424 McEwen v. Shannon, 64 Vt. 583, , 1128 McFadden v. Compagnie Generale Tra'ns- atlantique (1887) , — Fed. Rep. — , 297 McFadden v. Fritz, 90 Ind. 590, 1859 McFadden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 343, 1958, 1966 McFadden v. Wilson, 96 Ind. 253, 1817 McFarland v. Farmer, 42 N. H. 386, 699 McFarland v. Pico, 8 Cal. 626, 385 McFarlan v. Township, 93 Mich. 558, 461 McFarlan v. Garber, 10 Ind. 151, 1634 McFarland v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 125 Mo. 253, 580 McFarson's Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 503, 687 McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 32, 2152, 2158, 2159 McGarvy v. Roods. 73 Iowa, 363, 775, 793 McGaughey v. Richardson, 14S Mass. 608, 193 McGavock v. Puryear, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 34, 1933 McGee v. McGee (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 763, 1021 McGee v. McManus, 70 Cal. 553, 1129 McGehee v. Jones, 10 Geo. 127, 383 McGehee v. Lindsay, 6 Ala. 16, 1898 CXXX11 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] McGeorge v. Improvement Co., 57 Fed. Hep. 262, 1447 McGeragle v. Broemel, 53 N. J. Law, 59, S9S McGhee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. (D. S.) 143, 2123 McGiffin v. Baird, 62 N. Y. 329, 360 McGill v. Hall (Texas 1894), 26 S.W. Eep. 132, 2195, 2233 McGUvery v. Capen, 7 Gray, 523, 192 McGinness v. Barton, 21 Iowa, 644, 266 McGinniss v. Curry, 13 W. Va. 29, 1677 McGirr v. Sell, 60 Ind. 249, 162 McGivern v. Fleming, 12 Daly, 289, 688 McGlynn v. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 93 N. Y. 655, 554 McGoon v. Shirk, 54 111. 408, 394 McGourkey v. Toledo, etc., Ey. Co., 146 U. S. 536, 1979 McGovern v. Board of Public Works (N. J. 1895), 31 Atl. Eep. 613, 1547 McGowan T.Brooks (Miss. 1895), 16 So. Eep. 1436, 1029 McGowan v. Remington, 12 Pa. St. 56, 966 McGrath v. Barnes, 13 S. Car. 328, 2178 McGrath v. Gegner, 77 Md. 331, 394 McGrath v. Hamilton, etc., Association, 44 Pa. St. 383, 1599 McGrath v. Kennedy, 15 R. I. 209, 1949 McGraw v. Solomon. 83 Mich. 449, 1063 McGreggor v. Donelly, 67 Cal. 149, 1887 McGregor v. Brown, 10 N. Y. 114, 638 McGregor v. Estate of Ross, 96 Mich. 103, 496 McGregor v. McGregor, L. B. 21 Q. B. Div. 424, 653, 654 McGregor v. Penn, 9 Yerger, 74, 327, 353 McGregor v. Boss, 96 Mich. 103, 840 McGuinness v. Shannon, 154 Mass. 86, 957 McGuire v. Adams, 8 Pa. St. 286, 560 McGuire v. Gadsby, 3 Call, S34, 452 McGuire v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co., 156 Mass. 324, 521 McGuirk v. Marchand, 45 La. Ann. 732, 1743 McGurk v. Huggett. 56 Mich. 187, 828 McHenry R. Co. v. Philadelphia R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 448, 276 Mcllhenny v. Blum, 68 Texas, 197, 573 Mcllvaine v. Legare, 36 La. Ann. 359, 701 Mclnerney v. Lindsay, 97 Mich. 238, 380 Mclniffe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray, 600, 402 Mclntire v. C'agley, 37 Iowa, 676, 760 Mcintosh v. Hambleton, 35 Ga. 94, 484 Mcintosh v. Lee, 89 Iowa, 488, 1692 Mcintosh v. Smith, 2 La. Ann. 756, 1742 Mclntyre v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. St. 448, 455 Mclntyre v. Parks, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 207, 698 McKamey v. Thorp, 61 Texas, 648, 1681 McKay v. Darling, 65 Vt. 639, 2185 McKay y. Williams, 67 Mich. 547, 2276, 2277 McKee v. Cheney, 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 144, 1852, 1993 McKee y. Manice, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 357, 1949 McKoe y. Reynolds, 26 Iowa, 578, 1735 McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 212, 922, 932 McKeen y. Morse, 1 U. S. App. 7, 518 McKeen y. Read, Littell's Select Cases, 395, 526 McKellip v. Mcllhenny, 4 Watts (Pa.), 317, 641 McKclvain y. Allen, 58 Texas, 383, 431 McKenney v. Diamond Loan Assn., 8 Houst. (Del.) 557, 1615 McKcnsie v. Farrell, 4 Bosw. 192, 1132 McKenzie v. Culbreth, 66 N. Car. 534, 624 McKenzie y. Durant, 9 Rich. L. 61, 385 McKenzio y. McKenzie, 52 Vt. 271, 1187 McKenzie y. Ohio River Railroad Co., 27 W. Va. 306, 1667 McKibben v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq. 13, 1212 McKillip v. McKillip, 8 Barb. 552, 430 McKinney v. Andrews, 41 Texas, 363, 2018 McKinney y. Demby, 44 Ark. 74, 2110 McKinney v. Hamilton, 51 Pa. St. 63, 1764 McKinney v. Hotel Co., 12 Heisk. 104, 1221 McKinney v. McCloskey, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 368, 652 McKinney v. Springer, 3 Ind. 59, 898 McKinster y. Hitchcock, 19 Neb. 100, 514 McKinnon v. Gates, 102 Mich. 618, 2173 McKinnon v. Mcintosh, 98 N. Car. 323, 345 McKinnon v. McKinnon, 5 C. C. A. 530; 56 Fed. Eep. 409, 1211 McKittrick v. Arkansas Central E. Co., 152 U. S. 473, 1538 McKone v. Williams, 37 111. App. 591, 128 McLane v. His Creditors, 47 La Ann. — ; 16 So. Eep. 764, 701 McLane y. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48, 1663 McLane v. Paschal, 47 Texas, 365, 431 McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa, 297, 452 McLaughlin y. Austin (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 719, 596 McLaughlin v. Citizens', etc., Assn., 62 Iud. 264, 1600 McLaughlin v. Hess, 164 Pa. St. 570, 889 McLaughlin v. Horton, 1 Hill (S. Car.), 383, 343 McLaughlin v. Wheeler, 1 S. Dak. 497, 621 McLaurin v. Cronly, 90 N. Car. 50, 2173 McLaurine v. Monroe.30 Mo. 462, 540 McLean v. Clapp, 141 U. S. 429, 1037 McLellan v. Cumberland Bank, 24 Maine, 566, 573, 854 McLellan v. Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579, 1257, 1357 McLelland v. Cook, 94 Mich. 528, 311 McLennan y. Ohmen, 75 Cal. 55s, 323, 328 McLennan v. Hopkins (Kan. Oct. 1895), 41 Pac. Eep. 1061, 1335, 1337 McLennan v. McDermid, 50 Mich. 379, 2173 McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213, 2121 McLeod y. Free, 96 Mich. 57, 1057 McLeod v. Genins, 31 Neb. 1, 296, 950 McLeod y. Tarrant, 39 S. Car. 271, 1763 McLughan v. Bovard, 4 Watts, 308, 456 McLure v. Lancaster, 24 S. Car. 273, 1677 McMahan v. McMahan, 13 Pa. St. 376, 628 McMahan y. Morrison, 16 Ind. 172, 1457 McMahan v. Stewart, 23 Ind. 590, 48 McMahon y. Jacoway (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Eep. 3D, 630 McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn. 221, 1832, 1853, 2011 McManus v. Bark, L. R. 5 Ex. 65, 527, 532 McManus v. Cooke, L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 681, 838 McMaster y. Ins. Co. of North America, 53 N. Y. 222, 897 McMaster y. Smith, 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 481, 322 McMaster y. State, 108 N. Y. 542, 372 McMerty y. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140, 717 McMichael v. Kilmer, 76 N. Y. 36, 554 McMillen v. Pratt, 89 Wis. 612, 874 McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 807 McMorris v. Herndon, 2 Bailey L. (S. C.) 56, 684 McMullan v. Deckinson Co. (Minn.), 65 N. W. Rep. 661, 92 McMillan y. Maysville R. Co., 15 B. Mon- roe, 218, 155 McMullen v. Carson, IS Kan. 263, 334 McMullon v. MacKenzie, 2 G. Greene (Iowa), 368, 2252 McMillen y. Pratt, 89 Wis. 612, 645 McMurchey y. Robinson, 10 Ohio, 496, 384 McMurray y. Taylor, 30 Mo. 263, 447 McNally v. Gradweil, 16 Ir. Ch. 512, 2266 McNally v. Weld, 30 Minn. 209, 1671 McNamara v. Babcock, 50 Hun, 602, 545 McNamara v. McEntee, 4 N. Y. Supl. 620, 544 McNamee v. Tenny, 41 Barb. 495, 194 McNaught y. McClaughrv, 42 N. Y. 22, 594 McNeal v. Blackburn, 7 Dana (Ky.). 170, 573 McNeal y. Braun, 53 N. J. Law, 617, 124 McNeer y. McNeer, 142 111. 388, 2122 TABLE OF CASES. CXXX111 [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 McNeill V. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 1351 McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. ¥. 325, 1034, 1346 McNish v. Coon, 13 Wend. 26, 488 McNulty v. Prentice, 25 Barb. 204, 2 McNutt v. Loney, 153 Pa. St. 281, 560 McNutt V. McEwen, 1 W. N. Cas. (Pa.) 652, 2039 McNutt y. McNutt, 116 Ind. 545, 1713 McParland v. Larkin, 155 111. 84, 2285, 2286 McPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472, 2012 McPherson v. Cox, 96 TJ. S. 404, 646 McPherson v. Walker, 40 111. 371, 496, 2220, 2221 McQuaid v. Boss, 77 Wis. 470, 41, 334, 335, 336 McQuaid v. Ross, 85 Wis. 492, 352 McQueen v. Bank, 2 Ind. 413, 1818 McQueen v. Gamble, 33 Mich. 344, 145 McQueen v. Wilson, 51 Mo. App. 138, 776, 785 McEae v. Battle, 69 N. Car. 98, 1017 McRee v. Means, 34 Ala. 349, 1524 McEeynolds v. Gentry, 14 Mo. 495, 1712 McEoberts v. Copeland, 85 Tenn. 211, 1763 McSorley v. Faulkner, 18 N. Y. Supl. 460, 776 McSpedon v. Mayor or New York, 7 Bosw. (NT Y.) 601, 783 McTucker v. Taggart, 29 Iowa, 478, 1065 McWhinne v. Martin, 77 Wis. 182, 1183 Mc Williams v. Bryan, 21 La. Ann. 211, 2021 McWiUiams y. Phillips, 51 Miss. 196, 1887 M Maber v. Maber, L. R. 2 Exch. 153, 464 Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99, 664, 668 Mabry v. Ward, 50 Texas, 404, 431 MacAndrews v. Mignano, 14 U. S. App. 10, 883 Macbryde v. Weekes, 22 Beav. 533, 751 MacConneU v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. St. 476, 1728 MacConneU v. Wright, 150 Pa. 275, 1728 Maccord v. Osborne, 1 L. E. C. P. D. 568, 1776 MacDonald v. Longbottom, 1 El. & El. 977. 741, 874, 882, 899 MacDonald v. Wolff, 40 Mo. App. 302, 414 Macedon, etc., Plank Eoad Co. v. Sned- iker, 18 Barb. 317, 156 Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438, 614 Machias Hotel Co. v. Coyle, 35 Maine, 405, 1320 Macintosh v. Benton, 2 Wash. Ter. 121, 1883, 1887 Mack y. Adler, 22 Fed. Rep. 570, 470 Mack v. Colleran, 18 N. Y. Supl. 104, 476 Mack v. De Bardeleban, etc., Iron Co., 90 Ala. 396, 1410 Mack v. Snell, 140 N. Y. 193, 503 Mackay v. St. Mary's Church, 15 R. 1. 121, 549 Mackbee v. Griffith, 2 Cranch C. Ct. (U. S.) 336, 2017 Mackeller v. Pillsbury, 48 Minn. 396, 1641 Mackey y. Mackey, 29 Gratt. 158, 4 MacKinnon Pen Co. v. Fountain Ink Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 442, 2044, 2047 Mackintosh y. Tracy, 4 Brewst. 59, 967 Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329, 428 Maclay v. Haryey, 90 111. 525, 83 Maclure, Ex parte, L. R. 5 Ch. 737, 488 Macomber v. Doane, 2 Allen (Mass.), 541, 2085 Macomber y. Macomber (R. I.), 31 Atl. Rep. 753, 754 Macon, City of, y. Dasher, 90 Ga. 195, 1468 Macon, County of, v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, 1535 Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 66, 76, 82, 700 Madam y. Sherard, 73 N. Y. 329, 64, 1904 Madden y. Oestrich, 46 Minn. 538, 373 Maddison y. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467. 592, 837 Maddox v. Bramlet, 84 Geo. 84, 466 Maddox y. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512, 1031 Madeira's Heirs y. Hopkins, 12 B. Mon. 595, 1113 Madigan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 376, 186 Madison v. Harbor Board, 76 Md. 395, 1544, 1547 Madison v. Zabriskie, 11 La. 247, 12 Madison Ayenue Baptist Church y. Baptist Church, 73 N. Y. 82, 1895 Madison, etc., Plank-Road Co. y. Water- town Co., 7 Wis. 59, 1257 Madison Tp., Overseer of Poor of, v. Over- seer of Poor of Monroe Tp., 42 N. J. Law, 493, 1549 Magarity v. Shipman, 82 Ta. 784, 1712 Magee v. Blenkenship, 95 N. C. 563, 592 Magee v. Lavell, L. E. 9 C. P. 107, 760, 889 Magee v. Magee, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 487, 1758 Magee v. Pacific Imp. Co., 98 Cal. 678, 1264 Maggart v. Chester, 4 Ind. 124, 1176 Magnay v. Edwards, 13 C. B. 479, 814 Magniac v. Thompson, 1 Baldwin, 344, 224 Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. (TJ. S.) 348, 1665 Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Peters, 367, 224 Magniac y. Thomson, 15 How. 281, 1539 Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168, 64, 1963 Magnusson v. Williams, 111 111. 450, 379 Maguire v. Heraty, 163 Pa. St. 381, 1193 Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana (Ky.), 181, 2122 Maguire y. Smock, 42 Ind. 1, 1987 Mahaffey v. Ferguson, 156 Pa. St. 156, 352 Mahan, In re, 20 Hun, 301, 1552 Mahan y. Smitherman, 71 Ala. 563, 477 Mahana v. Blunt, 20 Iowa, 142, 846 Maher v. Davis Lumber Co., 86 Wis. 530, 142 Mahoney v. Bland, 14 Ind. 176, 1690 Mahoney v. Eector, etc., of St. Paul's Church, 47 La. Ann. — ; 17 So. Eep. 484, 751 Mahood v. Tealza, 26 La. Ann. 108, 1902 Maiden y. Webster, 30 Ind. 347, 811 Main y. Casserly, 67 Cal. 127, 1275 Main v. Johnson, 7 Wash. 321, 2112 Maine y. Gilman, 11 Fed. Eep. 214, 762 Maine, etc., Institute v. Haskell, 73 Maine, 140, 218 Mains v. Haight, 14 Barb. 76, 466 Mains v. Mintle, 86 Iowa, 742, 518 Maize y. Bowman, 14 Ky. L. Eep. 121, 31 Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108, 1753 Major v. Major, 1 Drewry, 165, 556 Makepeace v. Harvard College, 10 Pick. 298, 867 Makin v. Watkinson, L. E. 6 Ex. 31, 270 Malbon v. Southard, 36 Maine, 147, 40 Male v. Eoberts, 3 Esp. 163, 87 Mallack v. Galton, 3 P. Wms. 352, 1780 Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16 Q. B. 689, 1631, 1638 Mailan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653, 301, 1860, 2026, 2030, 2043, 2044 Mailan v. May, 13 M. & W. 511, 869 Mallet v. Bateman, L. E. 1 C. P. 163, 605 MaUett y. Lewis, 61 Miss. 105, 649 Mallett v. Page, 8 Ind. 364, 15, 557 Malli y. Willett, 57 Iowa, 705, 2011 Mallins v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 403, 843 Malone v. Gates, 87 Mich. 332, 840, 841 Malone v. Harris, 6 Mo. 451, 2198 Malone v. Keener, 44 Pa. St. 107, 597 Malone v. Philadelphia, 147 Pa. St. 416, 758 Malone v. Philadelphia E. Co., 157 Pa. St, 430, 953 Malone v. Plato, 22 Cal. 103, 633 Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, 596, 599, 603, 615 Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 2053 Mallory v. Mallory,'92 Ky. 316, 223, 619 Mallory v. Mallory Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 131, 1292, 1350, 1979 Mallory v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 47 N.Y. 52, 119 Mallory v. Vanderheyden, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 9, 1703 Mallory v. Willis, 4 N. Y. 76, 502 CXXX1V TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ~\ Malpas v. Lowenstine, 46 Ark. 552, 456 Malpica v. McKown, 1 La. 248, 710 Mamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415, 1005 Manby y. Cremonini, 6 Ex. 808, 120 Manchester y. Sahler, 47 Barb. 155, 1746 Manchester y. Van Brunt, 19 N. Y. Supl. 685, 202 Manchester Co. y. Concord R. Co., 66 N. H. 100, 1895, 2062 Manchester Assur. Co. v. Koerner (Ind.), 40 N. E. Eep. 1110, 121 Mandlebaum y. Gregovich, 17 Ney. 87, 1891 Mandeyille y. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185, 2015 Maness v. Henry, 96 Ala. 451, 550, 5X8 Mangam y. Peck, 111 N. Y. 101, 1736 Manhattan Ins. Co. y. Bronghton, 109 U. S. 121, 119 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. y. Forty-second St., etc., E. Co., 19 N. Y. Supl. 90, 1351 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Forty-second & G. St. Ferry Co., 139 N. Y. 146, 1305, 1344, 1346 Manhattan Say. Inst. Re, 82 N. Y. 142, 1553 Manhattan Trust Co. y. City of Dayton, 59 Fed. Eep. 327, 1487 Manhattan Trust Co. y. Dayton Natural Gas Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 181, 1488, 1530 Manhattan Trust Co. y. Sioux City Rail- road Co., 68 Fed. Eep. 72, 1418 Mankel y. Belscamper, 84 Wis. 218, 384 Mann y. Bowen, 85 Ga. 616, 2202 Mann y. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178, 1325 Mann y. Eyertson, 32 Ind. 355, 348 Mann y. Pearson, 2 John. 37, 424 Mann y. Richardson, 66 111. 481, 1189 Mann y. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377, 1154 Mann y. Thompson, 86 Ga. 347, 168 Manning y. Albee, 11 Allen (Mass.), 520, 1834 Manning y. Beck, 129 N. Y. 1, 1664 Manning y. Riley, 52 N. J. Eq. 39, 1710, 1716 Manning y. Sprague, 148 Mass. 18, 2006 Manny y. Glendinning, 15 Wis. 50, 132 Mansell y. Burredgo, 7 T. E. 348, 809 Mansfield, Br parte, 19 L. 3. Ch. 258, 260 Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass. 304, 521 Mansfield y. New York Cent. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 205, 137, 1271 Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Veeder, 17 Ohio, 385, 870 Manter y. Churchill, 127 Mass. 31, 204, 21 Hi Manton y. Ray, 18 R. I. 672, 1208 Manufacturers', etc., Co. y. Conoyer, 5 Phila. 18, 1603 Manufacturing Co. v. Goddard, 14 How- ard, 446, 686 Manwaringy. Powell, 40 Mich. 371, 17IJ4 Maples y. Wightman, 4 Conn. 376, 1772 Mapleson y. Del Puente, 13 Abb. N. Car. (N. Y.) 144, 2073 Marble y. Marble, 5 N. H. 374, 620 Marble Co. y. Haryey, 92 Tenn. 115, 1258, 1259, 1264, 1266, 1430 Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 1103, 1120, 1121, 2271, 2272 Marbury y. Kentucky Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335, 1226, 1258, 1430 March, In re, 27 Ch. Diy. 166, 1766 March y. AUabough, 103 Pa. St. 335, 759 March y. Railroad Co., 43 N. H. 515, 1251 Marcy y. Amazeen, 61 N. H. 131, 251 Marcy y. Crawford, 16 Conn. 549, 617, VXD Marcy y. Marcy, 9 Allen, 8, 591, 651, 653 Marcy y. 0-wego, 92 II. S. 037, 1525 Marcy y. Township of Oswego, 92 TJ. S. 637, 1524 Marden y. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. IS, 2127 Margraf y. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155, 1106, 1159 Margrett, Ex parte, L. R. (1891) 1 Q. B. 413, 1799 Marian y. Deylin, 132 Mass. 87, is: is Maricle y. Brooks, 5 N. Y. Supl. 210, 1X28 Marie y. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14, 10, 74, 2000 Marietta, Town of, v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427, 2142 Marine Bank y. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252, 941 Marine Bank y. Ogden, 29 IB. 248, 2053 Marine Bank y. Rushmore, 28 111. 463, 941 Mariner y. Collins, 5 Harr. 290, 784, 790 Marion y. Farnan, 68 Hun, 383, 794 Marion School Township v. Carpenter, 12 Ind. App. 191, 104 Marion Savings Bank y. Dunkin, 54 Ala. 471, 1263 Marion Tp., etc., Drainage Co. v. Norris, 37 Ind. 424, 1382 Mariposa Co. v. Bowman, Deady (U. S. C. 0.1,228, 440,1829 Markel y. Spitler, 28 Ind. 488, 48, 198, 468, 475 Markham y. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 135, 203 Markley v. Stevens, 89 Pa. St. 279, 800 Marksbury y. Taylor, 10 Bush (Ky.), 519, 2016 Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.) , 287, 1329 Marley v. Noblett, 42 Ind. 85, 646 Marlin v. Kosmyroski (Texas 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 1042, 1761, 1773 Marlow v. Barlew, 53 Cal. 456, 1719 Marmet Co. v. Archibald, 37 W. Va. 778, 1236 Marmon y. Harwood, 124 IB. 104, 1664 Marquette Co. v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283, 162 Marqueze v. Caldwell, 48 Miss. 23, 688, 1112 Marquis v. Lauretson, 76 Iowa, 23, 374, 898 Marquis of Bute v. Thimpson, 13 M. & W. 487, 301 Marr v. Bank, 4 Lea, 578, 1375 Marrett v. Babb, 91 Ky. 88, 543 Marriam y. United States, 14 Ct. CI. 289, 307 Marriot v. Hampton, 3 Smith's Leading Cases (9th Am. ed.), 1686, 480,798 Marriott v. Brune, 9 Howe, 619, 807 Marsden y. Moore, 4 H. & N. 500, 120 Marsh v. Austin, 1 Allen, 235, 490 Marsh v. Bellew, 45 Wis. 36, 689 Marsh y. Davis, 33 Kan. 326, 644 Marsh v. Dodge, 66 N. Y. 533, 867 Marsh v. Fairbury, etc., R. Co., 64 IB. 414, 1976, 1977 Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562, 989 Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 WaB. (TJ. S.) 676, 1430, 1529 Marsh y. Hyde, 3 Gray, 331, 662 Marsh v. Low, 55 Ind. 271, 305 Marsh v. McNair, 99 N. Y. 174, 41, 2179 Marsh v. Rouse, 44 N. Y. 643, 663 Marsh v. EusseB, 66 N. Y. 288, 2000, 2019, 2056, 2063 Marsh v. Tunis' Estate, 39 Mich. 100, 2173 Marsh v. Ward, Peake (N. P.) Cas. 177, 810 Marsh v. Webber, 16 Minn. 418, 333 Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 WaU. 17S, 1292, 1307 Marshall's Estate, 138 Pa. St. 285, 194 Marshall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 16 How. [TJ. S.) 314, 1852, 1992, 1998, 2001 Marshall v. Broadhurst, 1 Tyr. 348, 283, 2S8 Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463, 260 MarshaB v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 85 Va. 676, 2284 MarshaB v. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 65, 037 MarshaB y. Green, L. E. 1 C. P. Div. 35, 636, 639, 668 MarshaB v. Jamieson,12TJp. Can. Q. B. 115, S3 Marshall v. Jaquith, 134 Mass. 138, 10J9 Marshall y. Lynn, 6 M. & W. 109, 690 MarshaB v. Niles, 8 Conn. 369, SX4 Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146, 433 Ma rshall Foundry Co. y. KUliau, 99 N. Car. 501, 1323 Mai'steiler v, Marsteller, 93 Pa. St. 350, i 169 Marston \. Diesen, 76 Wis. 418, 1-.74 Marston v. Singapore Rattan Co., 163 Mass. 206, 22x8 Marston v. Swett, 66 N. Y. 206, i.:>3 Martenson v. Railroad Co., 60 Iowa, 705, 1 132 Martin y. Adams, 81 Hun, 9, 1636, 1639 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXV [Beferenees are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2201.'] Martin v. Baltimore, etc., Railroad Co., 41 Fed. Eep. 125, 584, 586 Martin v. Bartow Iron Works, 35 Ga. 820, 2021 Martin y. Baugh, 1 Ind. App. 20, 832 Martin v. Black's Executors, 20 Ala. 309, 594 Martin v. Blanchett, 77 Ala. 288, 694 Martin v. Clarke, 8 E. I. 389, 1855 Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30, 334 Martin v. Dwelly, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 1731 Martin v. Ellerbe's Admr., 70 Ala. 326, 777 Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401, 1311 Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 250, 253 Martin v. Hunt, 1 Allen, 418, 948 Martin v. Johnson, 84 Ga. 481, 1627 Martin v. Martin (Com. PI. 1892), 20 N. Y. Supl. 685, 2186 Martin v. Martin, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 644, 1824 Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214, 162 Martin v. Morgan, 1 Brod. & B. 289, 480 Martin v. Murphy, 129 Ind. 464, 95, 2039, 2045 Martin v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 122 N. Y. 165, 1279 Martin v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 22 Fed. Eep. 596, 83 Martin y. Quinn, 37 Cal. 55, 445 Martin y. Bighter, 10 N. J. Eq. 510, 955 Martin y. Schichtl, 60 Ark. 595, 432 Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371. 2128 Martin y. Santa Cruz Co. (Ariz. 1894), 36 Pac. Eep. 36, 1299 Martin y. Webb, 110 tr. S. 7, 1269, 1271, 1281, 1287 Martin y. White, 40 111. App. 281, 544 Martin-Brown Co. y. Siebe, 6 Texas Ciy. App. 232, 1642 Martindale y. Waas, 8 Fed. Eep. 854, 752 Martine v. Christenson (Minn. 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 1127, 1065 Martineau y. Kitching, L. E. 7 Q. B. 436, 906 Martineauy. May, 18 Wis. 54, 1201 Martini y. Christensen, 60 Minn. 491. 2268 Martinsburgh, etc., E. Co. y. March, 114 TJ. S. 549, 121, 159, 1131 Maryin y. Bennett, 8 Paige, 312, 110 Marvin v. Brewster Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 538, 52 Maryin v. Maryin, 75 N. Y. 240, 762 Maryin v. Prentice, 49 How. Pr. 385, 1157 Maryin y. Wallis, 6 E. & B. 726, 668 Marx y. Bell, 48 Ala. 497. 606 Marx y. Gross (Super. N. Y.) , 22 N. Y. Supl. 393 2234 Maryland v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 105, 392 Maryland Fertilizing, etc., Co. y. Lorenz, 44Md.218, 890 Maryon y. Carter, 4 Car. & P. 295, 2237 Maryatts y. White, 2 Stark. 91, 469, 473 Maryott v. Benton, 21 N. J. Eq. 381, 954 Marysyille Electric, etc., Co. y. Johnson, 109 Cal. 192, 1320 Marysyille, etc., Power Co. v. Johnson, 93 Cal. 538, 1320 Marzetti y. Williams, 1 Barn. &, Adol. 415, 22 772 Maslin y. Hiett, 37 W. Va. 15, 572| 818 Mason y. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 572, 326, 356 Mason y. Clough, 155 Mass. 389, 1634 Mason y. Decker, 72 N. Y. 595, 335, 388 Mason y. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 825, 830, 832 Mason y. HaDe, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 370, 2153 Mason v. Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50, 1255 Mason y. Moulden, 58 Ind. 1, 1079 Mason y. Railway Co., 27 Kan. 83, 1433 Mason v. Smith, 130 N. Y. 474, 504 Mason y. Waite, 17 Mass. 560, 1950 Mason y. White, 17 Mass. 560, 1818 Mason y. Wilson, 84 N. C. 51, 609 Masonic, etc., Association y. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 138, 144, 148 Masonic Association v. Channell, 43 Minn. 353, 154 Mass. General Hospital v. Fairbanks, 129 Mass. 78, 779 Massey y. Belisle, 2 Ired. L. 170, 878 Massey y. Citizens', etc., Building Assn., 22 Kan. 624, 1336, 1601 Massey y. Johnson, 1 Exch. 241, 516, 526 Massey y. Womble, 69 Miss. 347. 1012 Massey v. Yancey, 90 W. Va. 626, 1757 Massie y. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 1173 Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio, 69, 975 Mast y. Pearce, 58 Iowa, 579, 334, B57 Master v. Hansard, L. R. 4 Ch. Diy. 718, 1154 Mastin v. Halley, 61 Mo. 196, 1082 Mastin y. Marlow, 65 N. C. 695, 1185 Matchette v. Colburn, 160 Pa. St. 265, 881 Materne v. Horwitz, 101 N. Y. 469, 2024 Matheny y. Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361, 32 Matheny y. Mason, 73 Mo. 677, 359 Mathes y. Dobschuetz, 72 111. 438, 1798 Matheson y. Kelly, 24 Up. Can. C. P. 598, 389 Mathews y. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 147, 1486 Mathews y. Danahy, 26 Mo. App. 660, 876 Mathews y. Davis, 102 Cal. 202, 1187 Mathews v. Inhabitants of Westborough, 131 Mass. 521 ; 134 Mass. 555, 1473 Mathews v. Phelps, 61 Mich. 327, 853, 873 Mathews v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 121 Mo. 298, 2133 Mathews v. Sharp, 99 Pa. St. 560, 761 Mathis v. Thomas, 101 Ind. 119. 2171 Mathison y. Hanks, 2 Hill (S. Car.), 625, 1880 Mathison v. Wilson, 87 111. 51, 1186 Matlock y. Glover, 63 Texas, 231, 1681 Matson v. Blossom, 2 N. Y. Supl. 551, 1935, 1936 Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477, 2280 Matson v. Wharam, 2 T. R. 80, 601 Matter of Accounting of Waite, 99 N. Y. 433, 726 Matter of Anderson, 109 N. Y. 554, 1484 Matter of Beckwith, 3 Hun (N. Y.), 443, 1822 Matter of Conklin, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 450, 1815 Matter of Davis, 7 Daly (N. Y.) , 1, 674 Matter of Dunkell, 5 Dem. (N. Y.) 188, 465 Matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 125, 434 Matter of Jones, 10 St. Rep. (N. Y.) 176, 465 Matter of Kendrick, 107 N. Y. 104, 196 Matter of New York, etc., E. Co., 49 N. Y. 414, 873 Matter of Pruyn, 141 N. Y. 544, 564 Matter of Richardson, In the, 2 Story C. C. 571, 762 Matter of Swonford, 6 M. & S. 226, 384 Matter of Van Duzer's Estate, 51 How. Pr. 410, 472 Matter of Welman, 20 Vt. 653, 762 Matter of Wing, 83 Hun, 284, 1845 Matter of Cayin y. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 1002 Matteson v. Scofield, 27 Wis. 671, 73 Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333, 2036, 2050, 2076 Matthews v. Chicopee, etc., Co., 3 Robt. 712, ' 543, 576 Matthews v. Murchison, 15 Fed. Eep. 691, 1447 Matthews v. Smith, 67 N. C. 374, 803 Matthews v. Westborough, 131 Mass. 521, 210 Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. Law, 536, 672 Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon's Ad- ministrator, 38 N. J. Law, 541, 663 Mattison v. Childs, 5 Colo. 78, 821 Mattison v. State, 55 Ala. 224, 46 Mauger, In re, 23 Hun, 658, MaughLn y. Perry, 35 Md. 352, 1163 Maule y. Bucknell, 50 Pa. St. 39, 604, 609 Mauran v. Bullus, 16 Pet. 528, 52, 853 Maxcy 207, v. Williamson Company, 72 111. 1526 CXXXV1 TABLB OF CASES. {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Maxim, etc., Co. v. Nordenfelt, L. E. (1893) 1 Ch. 630, 2030, 2033, 2041 Mason v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247, 1704 Maxton v. Gheen, 75 Pa. St. 166, 1946 Maxwell v. Brown, 39 Maine, 98, 662, 669 Maxwell v. Grace, 85 Ala. 577. 1744 Maxwell v. Hanshaw, 24 W. Va. 405, 1677 Maxwell v. Lee, 34 Minn. 511, 351 May v. Adams, 58 Vt. 74, 1076 May v. LeClaire, 18 Fed. Kep. 164, 153 May v. May, 7 Fla. 207, 1713 May v. May, 9 Neb. 16, 1680 May v. Wannemacher, 111 Mass. 202, 1644 May v. Williams, 61 Miss. 125, 614 May v. Sloan, 101 U. S. 231, 694 Maybee v. Moore, 90 Mo. 340, 694 Mayer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 605, 883 Mayer v. Mayor, etc., 63 N. Y. 455, 480, 800 Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434, 98 Mayer x. Swift, 73 Texas, 367, 965 Mayfleld v. Wadsley, 3B.4C. 357, 636 Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray (Mass.), 172, 1660 Maynard v. Brown, 41 Mich. 298, 1110 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 704, 1840, 2123 Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456, 15, 90 Maynard v. Tidball, 2 Wis. 34, 780 Maynard v. Valentine, 2 Wash. T. 3, 1840 Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116, 1496 Mayo v. Farrar, 112 N. Car. 66, 1741 Mayo v. Knowlton, 134 N. Y. 250, 412 Mayor v. Feig, 114 Ind. 577, 1859 Mayor v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 1516 Mayor v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221, 2080 Mayor v. N. Y. Refrigerating Construc- tion Co. (N. Y.), 8 Misc. 61, 875 Mayor, etc., v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612, 34 Mayor, etc., v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106, ' 1545 Mayor, etc., v. Lefferman, 4 Gill (Md.), 425, 802 Mayor, etc., v. Patton, 4 Cranch, 317. 477, 478 Mayor, etc., v. Second Aye. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261, 1481 Mayor of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 563 Mayor of Berwick v. Oswald, 1 E. & B. 295, 515 Mayor of Berwick-on-Tweed v. Oswald, 3 E. & B. 653, 273 Mayor of Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. Law, 265, 2127 Mayor of Jersey City v. O'Callahan, 41 N. J. Law, 349, 459 Mayor of Jersey City v. Eiker, 38 N. J. Law, 225, 458 Mayor of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221, 1506 Mayor of Nashville v. Bay, 19 Wall. 468, 782 Mayor of Nashville v. Toney, 10 Lea, 643, 782 Mayor of New Orleans v. Ripley, 5 La. 121, 810 Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 40, 30 Mayor of New York v. Huntington, 114 N. Y. 631, 2245 Mayor of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 31 Hun, 241, 1584 Mayor of Niles v. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61, 1506 Mayor of Richmond v. Judah, 5 Leigh (Va.), 305, 460 Mayor of Worcester v. Norwich & W. E. Co., 109 Mass. 103, 1439 Mayrant v. Dickerson, Rich. Eq. Cas. 199, 10 IS Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268, 803, 805 Mazet v. City of Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. St. 548, 1544, 1552 Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721, 1853, 1883, 2081 Mead v. Altgeld, 33 111. App. 373, 416, 417 Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y. 275, 1037, 1602 Mead v. Case, 33 Barb. 202, 660 Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413, 691, 1117, 1118, 1176 Mead v. Stevens, 22 111. App. 298, 446 Mead v. Watson, 57 Vt. 426, 594 Meade v. Clarke, 159 Pa. St. 159, 1655 Meader v. White, 66 Maine, 90, 2106 Meageley v. Hoyt, 125 N. Y. 771, 365 Meager v. Reed, 14 Colo. 335, 681 Meagley v. Hoyt, 88 Hun, 328, 341 Meakin v. Morris (1884), L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 352, 1807 Means v. Hapgood, 19 Pick. 105, 723 Means v. Williamson 37 Maine, 556, 668 Mease v. Wagner, 1 McCord (S. C), 395, 598 Measurall v. Pearce (N. J. Eq.), 3 Atl. Rep. 92, 955 Mechanics', etc., Assn. v. Meriden Agency Co., 24 Conn. 159, 1249, 1259 Mechanics' Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Cono- ver, 14 N. J. Eq. 219, 1629 Mechanics', etc., Association v. Dorsey, 15 S. Car. 462, 1623 Mechanics', etc., Building Assn. v. Wil- cox, 24 Conn. 147, 1620, 1621 Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. 299, 1214, 1215 Mechanics' etc., Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 115, 1270 Mechanics' etc., Savings Hank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97, 2120, 2125 Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. H. C. Burnet Manfg. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 236, 1338 Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Deboldt, 1 Ohio St. 591, 2130 Mechanics', etc., Insurance Co. v. Thomp- son, 57 Ark. 279, 310 Mecklem v. Blake, 19 Wis. 397, 1176 Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85, 204, 206 Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 110, 1785 Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 246, 365, 981 Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215, 2120 Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Raymond, 593, 322 Medlin v. Steel, 75 N. Car. 154, 621 Medloch v. Cogburn, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. Car.) 477, 1814 Medway, Inhabitants of, v. Inhabitants of Milford, 21 Pick. 349, 1473 Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198, 200 Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274, 1039, 1832 Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 317, 608 Meehan v. Sharp, lr.l Mass. 564, 661 Meehan v. Vanentine, 29 Fed. Rep. 276, 2252 Meeker v. Dalton, 75 Cal. 154, 158 Meeker v. Wright, 70 N. Y. 262, 1766 Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 108, 1852, 1853, 1884, 1986, 2081 Mehan v. Thompson, 71 Mo. 492, 536 Mohlbers v. Tisher, 24 Wis. 607, 446 Mehlhop v. Rae, 90 Iowa, 30, 1796 Meikel v. German, etc., Fund Soc, 16 Ind. 89, 1336 Meincke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 127. 659 Meinhardt. v. Mode, 22 Fla. 279, 854 Meisenbach v. Southern Cooperage Co., 45 Mo. App. 232, 788 Meka v. Brown, 84 Iowa, 711, 587 Melan v. De Fitz Fames, 1 Bos. & P. 138, 715 Melchertv. American Union Tel. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 193, 1923 Melchcrt v. American Union Telegraph Co., 3 McCrary (U. S.), 521, 1914 Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 343, 2100, 2110 Melhado v. Porto Algre, etc., R. Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 503, 1309, 1314 Melhop v. Tathwell, 74 Iowa, 571, 1633 Melick v. Pidcock, 44 N. J. Eq. 525, 853 Melick v. Varney, 41 Neb. 105, 1666, 1745 Mell v. Moony, 30 Ga. 413, 2039 Melledge v. Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. 158, 1277 > 1317 Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317, 237, 239 Melliek v. Mellick, 47 N. J. Eq. 86, 221 Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416, 746 Mellon v. Webster, 5 Mo. App. 449, 554 TABLE OF CASES. CXXXV11 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Melman, Matter of, 20 Vt. 653, 762 Melton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487, 1842 Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. 815, 975, 976 Melville v. De Wolf, 4 E. & B. 844, 280 Melvin v. Lamar Co., 80 111. 446, 157 Melvin v. Proprietors of the Locks, etc., 5 Meto. 15, 894 Memphis Gayoso Gas Co. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk. 314, 1222 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 112 U S. 609, 1441 Memphis, etc., K. Co. v. Grayson, 88 Ala. 572, 1410 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Com- missioners, 112 U. S. 609, 2131 Memphis R. Co. v. Sullivan, 57 Geo. 240, 154 Memphis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan. 170, 747 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630, 1410, 1906 Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81, 1461 Mendell v. Delano, 7 Mete. 176, 26 Menees v. Johnson, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 561, 1698, 1699 Menne v. Menne (Ky. 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 592, 1012 Merced Mining Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 130, 2268 Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jayns, 87 111. 199, 873 Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 54 Minn. 56, 1289 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 910, 2052 Mercer v. Kelso, 4 Gratt. 106, 1031 Mercer's Lessee v. Selden, 1 How. (U. S.) 37, 1789 Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 64 N. Y. 173, 1388 Merchant's Bank v. Curtiss, 37 Barb. 317, 540 Merchants' Bank v. Livingston, 74 N. Y. 223, 1369 Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443, 451 Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604 1341 1343, 1355 Merchants' Bank v. Stevenson, 10 Gray, 232, ^ 1388 Merchant Banking Co. v. Phcenix, etc., Steel Co., L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 205, 888 Merchants , etc., Bank v. Bangs, 102 Mass. 295, 96 Merchants', etc., Bank v. Fraze, 9 Ind. App. 161, 331 Merchants', etc., Bank v. Northup, 22 N. J. Eg.. 58, 1661 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Citizens Gas Light Co., 159 Mass. 505, 1351, 1358 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Lovitt, 114 Mo. 518, 1288 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. National Eagle Bank, 101 Mass. 281, 799 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Newton Cotton Mills, 115 N. Car. 507, 1399 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Raymond, 27 Wis. 567, 1754 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Edmond, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 138, 895 Merchants Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 62 111. 242, 854 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Prince, 52 N. W. Rep. 131, , 923 Merchants' and Planters' Line v. Wag- aner, 71 Ala. 581, 1452 Meredith v. Meigh, 2 E. & B. 364, 667 Meredith v. Short, 1 Salk. 25, 610 Meriam v. Harsen, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 232, 1673 Meriam v. Harsen, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 70, 1672 Meriam v. Piner City Lumber Co., 23 Minn. 314, 855 Meriden, etc., Bank v. Gallaudet, 120 N. Y. 298, 2252 Meriden Britannia Co. v. Zingsen, 48 N. Y. 247, 867 Meridian, etc., Co. v. Schulberr (Miss. 1892), 17 So. Rep. 167, 2255 Meritt v. Millard, 4 Keyes (N. Y.), 208, 1870 Meriweather v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 1501, 2145 Meriwether v. Lowndes County, 89 Ala. 362, 289 Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572, 556 Meriwether v. Smith, 44 Ga. 541, 2102 Meroney v. Atlanta Loan Assn. (N. C. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 924, 714 Meroney v. Atlanta, etc., Loan Associa- tion, 116 N. Car. 882, 714, 1594, 1597, 1622, 1627 Merriam, JBe, 84 N. Y. 596, 1553 Merriam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391, 186 Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640, 336, 338, 352 Merriam v. Stearns, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 257, 2101 Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S. 437, 873, 874, 875 Merrick v. Peru Coal Co., 61 111. 472, 1290, 1307, 2070 Merrick v. Giddings, 1 Mackey (D. C), 394, 194 Merrick v. Road Co., 11 Iowa. 74, 1231 Merrick v. Trustees, 8 Gill (Md.) , 59, 2016 Merrill v. American Express Co., 62 N. H. 514, 1968 Merrill v. Beckwith, 163 Mass. 503, 1172 Merrill v. Englesby, 28 Vt. 150, 608 Merrill v. Gore, 29 Maine, 346, 863 Merrill v. Hurley (S. Dak. 1895), 62 S. W. Rep. 958, 1230, 1286 Merrill v. Melchior, 30 Miss. 516, 871 Merrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 73, 1229 Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673, 1532 Merrill v. Nightingale, 39 Wis. 247, 364 Merrill v. Packer, SO Iowa, 542, 1935 Merrill v. Pease, 51 Vt. 556, 626 Merrill v. Peaslee, 146 Mass. 460, 2008 Merrill v. President, etc., of Kalamazoo, 35 Mich. 211, 1361 Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257, 90, 91 Merrimack River Savings Bank v. City of Lowell, 152 Mass. 556, 1575 Merriman v. Barker, l'^l Ind. 74, "833 Merritt v. Brown, 19 N. J. Eg.. 286, 1172 Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115, 274, 276, 2098, 2105 Merritt v. Gumaer, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 552, 1822 Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns. 473, 502 Merritt v. Seaman, 6 N. Y. 168, 2246 Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28, 9 Merriwether v. Taylor, 15 Ala. 735, 2181 Merryweather v. Jones, 4 Giff. 509, 2007 Mersereau v. Lewis, 25 Wens. 243, 597 Mersey, etc., Iron Co. v. Naylor, 9 Q. B. Div. 648, 2221 Mersey Steel Company v. Naylor, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 434, 150, 497, 2222 Mershon v. Moore, 76 Wis. 502, 168 Merson v. Merson, 101 Mich. 55, 625 Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 W. & S. 376, 797 Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N. Car. 398, 2120 Mescall v. Tully, 61 Ind. 96, 2166 Metcalf v. Clark, 8 La. Ann. 286, 1675 Metcalf v. Taylor, 36 Maine, 28, 864 Metcalf v. Weld, 11 Gray, 210, 924 Metcalfe v. Rycroft, 6 M. & S. 75, 548 Methudy v. Ross, 10 Mo. App. 101, 6 Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400, 2118 Metropolitan Bldg. Assn. v. Van Pelt, 36 Neb. 3, 1362 Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657, 2128, 2147 Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. Rep. 198, 871, 2073 Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 393, 2073 CXXXV111 TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Metropolitan Gaslight Co., Be, 85 N. Y. 526, 1553 Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 79 Md. 375, 22 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Drach, 101 Pa. St. 278, 896 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 85 N. ¥. 614, 2012 Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd, 90 N. Y. 530, 2281 Metropolitan, etc., Tel. Co. v. Domestic, etc., Tel. Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 568, 1206, 1236 Mette v. Feltgen, 148 111. 357, 1786 Metz v. Soule, 40 Iowa, 236, 543 Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare. 73, 427 Mexia v. Oliver, 148 U. S. 664, 1710, 1729 Mexican, etc., Banking Co. v. Lich ten- stein, 10 Utah, 338, 1903 Meyer v. Berlandi, 53 Minn. 59, 897 Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600, 156, 157, 1636, 1638 Meyer v. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 1524 Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457, 2074 Meyer v. Hartman, 72 111. 442, 597, 601 Meyer v. Houck, 85 Iowa, 319, 265 Meyer v. Meyer, 40 111. App. 94, 30 Meyer v. Mitchell, 75 Ala. 475, 1117 Meyer v. Richards, 46 Fed. Bep. 727, 361 Meyer T. Eoberts, 46 Ark. 80, 652 Meyer v. Stitz, 9 N. Y. Supl. 805, 527 Meyers v. Lebanon Insurance Co., 156 Pa. St. 240, 319 Meyers v. Pacific Construction Co., 20 Ore. 603, 2192, 2224 Meyers v. Schemp, 67 111. 469, 1181 Meylert y. Gas, etc., Co., 14 N. Y. Supl. 148, 956 Meylette v. Brennan, 20 Colo. 242, 1216 Meynell v. Surtees, 25 L. J. C. 257, 61 Mhoon v. "Wilkerson, 47 Miss. 633, 1013 Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474, 1902 Michael v. St. Louis, etc., Insurance Co., 17 Mo. App. 23, 877 Michaelis v. Wolf, 136 111. 68, 126, 127, 128 Michaels v. New York Cent. E. Co., 30 N. Y. 564, 276 Michel v. Colegrove, 19 N. Y. Supl. 715, 2222 Michel v. Tinsley, 69 Mo. 442, 1058 Michener v. Springfield, etc., T. Co., 142 Ind. 130, 2256 Michaud v. McGregor, 63 N. W. Eep. 479, 200 Michigan, etc., Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 119 Michigan Ins. Co. v. Bowes, 42 Mich. 19, 118 Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11. 444 Michigan , etc., Iron Co. v. Thoney, 89 Mich. 226, 2277 Michigan E. Co. v. Bacon, 33 Mich. 466, 158 Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225, 2130 Mickey v. Burlington, etc., Ins. Co., 35 Iowa, 174, 317 Micou v. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607, 217 Middletou v. Arnolds, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 489, 1891 Middleton v. Selby, 19 W. Va. 167, 1179 Middl.-ion v. Stone, 111 Pa. St. 589, 906 Middlesex v. Thomas, 5 C. E. Green, 39, 452 Middlesex Turnpike Co. v. Locke, 8 Mass. 268 293 Midkiff v. Lusher, 27 W. Va. 439, 831 Midland, etc., Co. v. Johnson, 6 H. L. C. 798, 858 Midland, Township of, v. County Board Gage County, 37 Neb. 582, 1543 Mignano v. McAndrews, 56 Fed. Eep. 300, 411 Milan v. Malloy, 10 Neb. 228, 146,148 Milburn v. Thirty .etc., Boxes Oranges and Lemons, 57 Fed. Eep. 236, 938 Milburn Wagon Co. v. Nlsewarner (Va.), 19 S. E. Kep. 846, 325 Millard v. Baldwin, 3 Gray, 116, 239 Miles v. New Zealand Co., L. E. 32 Ch. Div. 266, 210, 655, 1473 Miles v. Williams, 1 P. Wms. 249, 548 Miles Planting, etc., Co. v. Carlisle (D. C. App. Cas.) 23 Washington Law Eep. 133, 2129 Mili'ord, Borough of, v. Miiford Water Co., 124 Pa. St. 610, 1578 Miiford, etc., Co. v. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111, 259 Miiford, Inhabitants of, v. Common- wealth, 144 Mass. 64, 773 Miliani v. Tognini, 19 Nev. 135, 236 Mill v. Blackall, 11 Q. B. 358, 182 Millan v. Page, 71 Wis. 655, 775 Millar v. Babcock, 29 Mich. 526, 1794 Millard v. Harvey, 34 Beav. 237, 845 Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 417, 281 Miller v. American Mut. Ace. Ins. Co. (1892),92Tenn. 167, 1263 Miller v. Ammon, 145 TJ. S. 421, 1897. 1898, 2071 Miller v. Auburn, etc., By. Co., 6 Hill, 61, 643 Miller v. Baker, 160 Pa. 172, 1687 Miller v. Ball, 64 N. Y. 286, 844, 2274 Miller v. Bealer, 100 Pa. St. 583, 2253 Miller v. Benjamin, 142 N. Y. 613, 140 Miller v. Billingsly, 41 Ind. 489, 216 Miller v. Bronham, 68 N. Y. 83, 716 Miller v. Campbell, 140 N. Y. 457, 1758 Miller v. Campbell, 52 Ind. 125, 1177 Miller v. Cliitwood , 2 N. J. Eq. 199, 955 Miller v. Church, 112 N. Car. 626, 1732 Miller v. Coatos, 66 N. Y. 610, 190, 465 Miller v. Collyer, 36 Barb. 250, 674 Miller v. Cook, 23 N. Y. 495, 684,1132 Miller v. Craig, 6 Beav. 433, 566 Miller v. Craig, 36 111. 109, 1031 MiUer v. Dunlap, 22 Mo. App. 27, 877, 902 Miller v. Eldridge, 126 Ind. 461, 190, 198 Miller v. Elliott, 1 Iud. 484, 2039 Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18, 568, 569, 827 Miller v. Florer, 15 Ohio St. 148, 244, 248 Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 119, 1656 Miller v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 90 N. Y. 430, 872, 885 Miller v. Hanover E. Co., ,87 Pa. St. 95, 157 Miller v. Holbrcok, 1 Wend. 318, 202 Miller v. Holden, 18 Vt. 337, 509 Miller v. Hughes, 33 S. C. 530, 1045 Miller v. Ins. Co., 12 W. Va. 116, 895 Miller v. Lorenz, 39 W. Va. 160, 1093, 1178, 1179, 1180 Miller v. Lullman, 81 Mo. 311, 13 Miller v. Marckle, 21 111. 152, 1023 Miller v. Marckle, 27 111. 402, 1061 Miller v. McCarty, 47 Minn. 321, 453 Miller v. McKenzie. 95 N. Y. 575, 10 Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa, 177, 2006, 2008 Miller v. M inor Lum I >n- Co. , fts Mich. 163, 1834 Miller v. Nugent, 12 Iud. App. 348, 83 Miller v. Preston, 4 N. M. Ml !, 258 Miller v. Proctor, 20 Ohio SI. 442, 646 Miller v. Purchase, 5 Dak-. 2s2, 1654 Miller v. Eoberts, 18 Texas, 16, 650 Miller v. Sims. 2 Hdl (tf. Car.), 479, 1797 Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 2is, 1784 Miller v. South Carolina K. Co., 9 Law- yers' Een. Ann. 833,. 733 Miller v. State, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 478, 2132 Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y. 431, 124, 275 Miller v. Stepper, 32 Mich. 194, 2256 Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 298, 712, 730, 731 Miller v. Union Switch Co., 132 N. Y. 502, 944 Miller v. Washington, etc., E. Co., 11 Wash. 414, 1273 Miller v. Wild Cat Co., 52 Ind. 51, 261 Millar V. Wmchell, 70 N. Y. 437, 242 Wilier v. Zoir.ier, 111 N. Y. 441, 1825 Millett v. People, 117 111. 294, 1478 MUlhiser v. Erdman, 98 N. C. 298, 22 TABLE OP CASES. CXXX1X [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Milligan v. Phipps, 153 Pa. St. 208, 1679, 1688, 1752 Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 696, 700 Milliken v. Tufts, 31 Maine, 497, 473 Milliman v. Huntington, 68 Hun, 258, 98 Millner v. Patton, 49 Ala. 423, 1902 Mills v. Brown, 11 Iowa, 314, 614, 616 Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98, 884 Mills v. Central Railroad Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 1, 1415 Mills v. City of Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489, 1099 Mills v. Dunham, L. B. (1891) 1 Ch. 576, 872, 2045 Mills v. East London Union, L. E. 8 C. P. 79, 281 Mills v. Fowkes, 77 Scott, 444, 472 Mills v. Fowkes, 5 Bine;. (N. C.) 455, 468, 471 Mills v. Fox, L. E. 37 Ch. Div. 153, 223 Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470, 1509 Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28, 16 Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend. 431, 355 Mills T. Hyde, 19 Vt. 59, 826 Mills v. Joiner, 20 Fla. 479, 24 Mills v. Kuykendall, 2 Blackf. 47, 994 Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 1852, 1985, 1993, 2082 Mills v. Mills, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 474, 1992 Mills y. Norfolk & N. E. Co., 90 Va. 523, 2248 Mills v. Parkhurst, 126 N. Y. 89, 2275 Mills v. St. Clair Co., 8 How. (U. S.) 569, 2146 Mills v. Salisbury, etc., Association, 75 N. Car. 292. 1614, 1620, 1622 Mills v. Todd, 83 Ind. 25, 2240 Mills v. United States Bank, 11 Wheat. 431, 941 Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207, 183, 192, 193, 784 Millsaps v. City of Terrell, 60 Fed. Rep. 192, 1533 Milltown, Earl of, v. Stewart, 3 Mylne & C. 18; 18 Sim. 371, 1873 Millville Traction Co. v. Goodwin (N. J. Eq. 1895), 32 Atl. Eep. 263, 1433 Millward v. Littlewood, 5 Ex. 775, 278 Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (La.) (N. S.) 410, • 1478 Milne v. Huber, 3 McLean (U. S.), 212, 1902 Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn. 353, 721 Milner v. Patton, 49 Ala. 423, 1906 Manes v. Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671, 798, 799 Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 335, 349 Milwaukee Invest. Co. v. Johnson, 35 Neb. 554, 932 Milwaukee E. Co. v. Field, 12 Wis. 340, 155, 156 Mims v. Chandler, 21 S. Car. 480, 842 Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. (Mich.) 53 N. W. Rep. 222, 1349 Miner v. Brown,133 N. Y. 308, 1766 Mineral Point R. Co. v. Barron, 83 111. Qfte 71fi Miner's Ditch Co. v. Zellerback, 37 Cal. 543, 1231, 1264, 1514, 1536 Minick v. Huff, 41 Neb. 516, 616 Mining Co. v. Anglo, etc., Bank, 104 U. S. 192, 1271, 1287, 1339, 1351, 1602 Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46, 830, 831, 1384 Minor v. Rogers, 40 Con. 512, _ 253 Minneapolis, etc., Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 1101, 153 Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 626, 2147 Minneapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Chisholm, 55 Minn. 374. 1007, 1126, 1144 Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Crevier, 39 Minn. 417, 260 Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Collier White Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431, 62, 83, 103 Minnesota Thresher Co. v. Hanson, 3 N. Dak. 81, ,330 Mintier v. Mintier, 28 Ohio St. 307, 1713 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, 1499, 1504 Minturn v. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 497, 1132 Misner v. Knapp, 13 Ore. 135, 1945 Missisquoi Bank v. Sabin, 48 Vt. 239, 214 Mississippi, etc., Steamship Co. v. Swift, 6 Maine, 248, 5 Missouri Lead Mining and Smelting Co. v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 218, 1297 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Brickley, 21 Kan. 275, 749 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fagan, 72 Texas, 127, 920, 1969 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 67 Texas, 166, 1959, 1968 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Levi (Texas), 14 S. W. Rep. 1062, 296 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sidell, 67 Fed. Rep. 464, 1283 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 267, 736 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Tygard, 84 Mo. 263, 157 Missouri Steamship Co., In re, L. R., 42 Ch. Div. 321, 700, 741 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 180, 2033, 2039, 2040, 2042, 2043, 2066, 2075, 2078 Mitchell v. Allen, 69 Texas, 70, 419, 543, 577 Mitchell v. Brewster, 28 111. 163, 832 Mitchell v. Burnham, 44 Maine, 286, 626 Mitchell v. Capital City Ins. Co. (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Rep. 678, 1068 Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 2118, 2158 Mitchell v. Colby (Iowa 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 769, 632 Mitchell v. Griffin, 58 Ind. 559, C04 Mitchell v. Hawley, 4 Denio, 414, 517, 527 Mitchell v. Hockett, 25 Cal. 538, 447 Mitchell v. Knight. 7 Ohio Ct. Ct. 204, 518 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 84 Texas, 303, 1683 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Texas, 101, 1680, 1683 Mitchell v. Parker, 25 Mo. 31, 19 MitcheU v. Roberta 17 Fed. Rep. 776, 383, 411 Mitchell v. Rome R. Co., 17 Ga. 574, 155 Mitchell v. Sawyer, 71 N. Car. 70, 519, 524 Mitchell v. Schoonover, 16 Ore. 211, 761 MitcheU v. Scott, 41 Mich. 108, 144, 2211 Mitchell v. Seitz, 1 McArthur, 480, 1685 MitcheU v. Smith, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 110, 1883 Mitchell v. Vance, T. B. Mon. 528, 188 Mitchinson v. Hewson, 7 Term R. 344, 1651 Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 87, 1644 Mitts v. McMorran, 64 Mich. 664, 612 Mix v. Baldwin, 156 111. 313, 1186 Mix v. Beach, 46 111. 311, 1163 Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205, 659 Mixer v. Supervisors, 26 Mich. 422, 1471 MizeU v. Burnett, 4 Jones Law (N. Car.), 249, 639, 688 MobUe, etc., R. Co. v. Copeland, 63 Ala. 219, 737 Mobile & O. R. Co. v. People, 132 IU. 559, 1976 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Jay, 61 Ala. 247, 907 Mobile, etc., Assn. v. Robertson, 65 Ala. 382, 1620 Mobile, etc., Ry. Co. v. Steiner, 61 Ala. 559, 803 Mobile R. Co. v. Yandal, 5 Sneed, 294, 259 Mobley v. Letts, 61 Ind. 11, 1859 Modisett v. Johnson, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 431, 2270 MoeUer v. American Fire Ins. Co., 52 Minn. 336, 1085 Moenich v. Fenestre, 2 The Reports, 102, 2041, 2045 Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307, 403 Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. 11, 275 Moffatt v. Bulson, 96 Cal. 106, 1866 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 476, 2060 Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 6 Paige (N. Y.), 554, 2135 Mohney v. Reed, 40 Mo. App. 99, 2236 cxl TABLE QF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Mokelumne, etc., Mining Co. v. Wood- bury, 14 Cal. 424, 1335 Mollyneaux v. Wittenberg, 39 Neb. 547, 2243 Molyneaux v. Collier, 13 Geo. 406, 532 Monadnock Ey. Co. v. Felt, 52 N. H. 379, 157, 902 Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 53 Mich. 238, 829 Monahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 8, 415 Monmouth Park Assn. v. Wallis Iron Works, 55 N. J. Law, 132, 757, 758, 863 Monocacv Co. v. American, etc., Co., 83 Pa. St. 517, 370 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Fenlon, 4 Watts & S. 205, 881 Monopolies, Case of the, 11 Coke 84, 2052 Monroe v. Hoff, 5 Den. 360, 456 Monroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298. 199 Monroe v. Skelton, 36 Ind. 302, 1076 Monroe v. Smelly, 25 Texas, 586, 2018 Monroe v. Williams, 37 S. C. 81, 165 Monroe, Bank of, v. Gifford, 79 Iowa, 300, 452 Monson v. Drakeley, 40 Conn. 552, 811 Monson, Inhabitants of, v. Williams, 6 Gray (Mass.), 416, 1660 Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618, 227, 618, 619, 843, 1717 Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 189, 2072 Montague v. Smith, 13 Mass. 396, 2184 Montague v. Weil, 30 La. Ann. 50, 4 Montciair, Inhabitants of Township of, v. New York & G. L. H. Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 436, 439 Montefiori v. Montefiori, 1 W. Bl. 363, 223 Monterey County v. Seegleken (Cal. 1894) , 36 Pac. Eep. 515, 1066 Monterey, etc., R. Co. v. Hildreth, 53 Cal. 123 1320 Montgomery v. Edwards, 46 Vt. 151, 592 Montgomery v. Gibbs, 40 Iowa, 652, 264 Montgomery v. Phillips (N. J.), 31 Atl. Rep. 622, 1364, 1366 Montgomery v. Pickering, 116 Mass. 227, 2289 Montgomery, City Council of, v. Mont- gomery Water Works Co., 77 Ala. 248, 772 Montgomery Mutual Building Assn. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413, 1620 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Boring, 51 Ga. 582, 1458 Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. 395, 2142 Montpelier R. Co. v. Langdon, 46 Vt. 284, 157 Montville, Inhabitants of the Town of, v. Haughton, 7 Conn. 543, 1057 Monumental National Bank y. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 58, 1230, 1248, 1285, 1358 Monvhan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9, 403 Moody v. Malmrin, 4 N. H. 296, 393 Moody v. Moody, 14 Maine, 307, 2210 Moog v. Hannon, 93 Ala. 503, 1888, 1898 Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79, 1102 Moon v. Harder, 38 Mich. 566, 145 Moon y. Martin, 122 Ind. 211, 211, 213 Mooney v. Howard Insurance Co., 138 Mass. 375, 915 Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217, 989, 1878 Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633, 827 Moore v. Butler, 90 Va. 683, 1711, 1712 Moore v. Campbell, 10 Exch. 323, 109, 306, 685, fir.2 Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492, lis, 149, 370 Moore v. Chenault (Ky. App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 140, 680 Mooro v. City of Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 433, 2128 Moore y. City of Waco, 85 Texas, 206, 1851 Moore v. Colt, 127 Pa. St. 289, 22l>2 Moore v. Copewell, etc., Nail Co., 76 Mich. 606, 2211 Moore, v. Copley, 165 Pa. St. 294, 1656 Moore v. Cross, 87 Texas, 557, 905, 1027 Moore v. Darton, 7 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 134, 557 Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266, 199 Moore v. Eastman, 1 Hun, 578, 1801 Moore v. Eddowes. 2 Ad. & E. 133, 798 Moore v. Estes, 79 Ky. 282, 831 Moore v. Evans, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 524, 1963 Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74, 15 Moore v. Fox, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 244, 653 Moore v. Garwood, i Exch. 681, 904 Moore v. Gaus Mfg. Co., 113 Mo. 98, 1287 Moore v. Giesecke, 76 Texas, 543, 116 Moore v. Goodwin, 43 Hun, 534, 131 Moore v. Gordon, 44 Ark. 334, 843 Moore v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co., 80 Mo. 86, 2184 Moore v. Griff™, 22 Maine, 350, 872 Moore v. Hanover R. Co., 94 Pa. St. 324, 156, 157 Moore v. Hays, 12 Ind. App. 476, 670 Moore T. Higbee, 45 Ind. 487, 629, 854, 1193 Moore v. Hollaman, 25 Texas. Supl. 81, 3*5 Moore v. Joyce, 161 Pa. St. 138, 1676 Moore v. Kennedy, 81 Texas, 144, 942 Moore v. Kerr, 46 Ind. 468, 621 Moore v. King, 134 N. Y. 596, 327 Moore v. Norman, 52 Minn. 83, 400 Moore v. Ligou, 22 W. Va. 292, 445 Moore v. Magrath, Cowp. 9, 862, 892 Moore v. Mahaska County, 61 Iowa, 177, 2088 Moore v. Biglow, 158 Mass. 60, 1056 Moore v. Marks, 116 N. Car. 785, 478 Moore v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 73 N. Y. 238, 7,83 Moore v. Mcintosh, 6 Kan. 39, 201 Moore v. McKenney; 83 Me. 80, 40 Moore v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41, 1034 Moore v. Moore, 127 Mass. 22, 239 Moore v. Moore, 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 303, 186 Moore v. Mourgue, Cowp. 479, 797 Moore v. Murdock, 26 Cal. 514, 2098, 2102 Moore v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726, 2142 Moore v. Norman, 43 Minn. 428, 408 Moore v. Norman, 52 Minn. 83, 400, 468 Moore v. Nowell, 94 N. Car. 265, 2150 Moore v. Page. Ill U. S. 117, 1733 Mooro v. Phillips, 7 M. & W. 536, 2121 Moore v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 N. H. 240, 895 Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa, 279, 57 Moore v. Powell, 6 Texas C. App. 43, 1198, 1199 Moore v. Redding, 69 Miss. 811, 205 Moore v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267, 1818 Moore v. Small, 19 Pa. St. 401, 844 Moore v. Smith, 19 Ala. 771, 99 Moore v. Tate, 102 Ala. 320, 1086 Moore v. Taylor, 81 Md. 644, 682 Moore v. Taylor, 42 Hun, 45. 2193 Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 420, 1159 Moore v. Williamson, 44 N. J. Eq. 496, 1662 Moore Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co., 87 Ala. 206, 2042, 2047 Moorehouse v. Colvin, 15 Beav. 341, 618 Moorehouse v. Crangle, 36 Ohio St. 130, 608 Moores v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 111 U. S. 156, 1305, 1351 Moran y. Commissioners, 2 Black, 722, 1524, 1527 Moran v. Moran (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 989, 2276 Morange y. Morris, 3 Keves, 48, 410 Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall. 492, 869, 892 Mordecai y. Jacobi, 12 Rich. 547, 917 Mordocai y. Pearl, 63 Hun (N. Y.), 553, 1796 More v. Bennett, 140 111. 69, 2037, 2061 More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251, 152, 887, 1866, 2029 More v. Freeman, Bumb, 205, 1207, 1653 Moreau v. Saffarans, 3 Snood, 596, 646 Morehouse v. Comstock,42 Wis. 626. 193 Moroland Township y. Davidson Town- ship, 71 Pa. St. 371, 785 TABLE OF CASES. cxli [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Moray v. Town of Newf aner, 8 Barb. 645, 213 Morford v. White, 53 Ind. 547. 781 Morgan v. Bain, L. E. 10 C. P. 15, 152 492 2235 Morgan v. Beaumont, 121 Mass. 7, ' 1949 Morgan v. Boll, 3 Wash. St. 554, 1100 Morgan v. East, 126 Ind. 42, 123 Morgan v. Fencher, 1 Blackf . 10, 356 Morgan v. Griffith, L. B. 6 Exch. 70, 263 Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 TJ. S. 217, 2139 Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 475, 557 Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. St. 228, 150 Morgan y. Porhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517, 2044 Morgan v. Powers, 66 Barb. 35, 322 Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716, 1833 Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537, 819 Morgan v. Struthers, 313 TJ. S. 246, 157 Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 617 Morgan, County of, v. Allen, 103 TJ. S. 515, 858, 1400 Moritz t. Hoffman, 35 111. 553, 1661 Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500, 362 Morley v. Boothby, 3 Bing. 107, 179, 683 Morley t. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 146 TT. S. 162, 2150, 2151 Morphett v. Jones, 1 Swans. 172, 84 1 Morrell v. Fisher, 4 Exch. 591, 862 Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402. 903, 904 Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640, 41 Morrill t. Aden, 19 Vt. 505, 1802 Morrill v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 55 N. H. 531, 1425 Morrill v. Everson, 77 Cal. 114, 234, 245 Morrill v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 288, 551 Morrill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452, 2, 1828, 2012 Morrill v. Tehama, etc., Mining Co., 10 Nev. 135, 6 Morris v. Cleasby, 1 M. & Sel. 576, 612 Morris v. Gaines, 82 Texas, 255, 1198 Morris v. Hoyt, 11 Mich. 8, 1126 Morris v. Kasling, 79 Texas, 141, 1774 Morris v. Keil, 20 Minn. 531, 1228 Morris v. Lagerfelt, 103 Ala. 608, 218 Morris v. Levison, L. R. I. C. P. D. 155, 95, 108, 111 Morris v. Moss, 25 L. J. Eq. 194, 2044 Morris v. Peckham, 51 Conn. 128, 651 Morris v. Rexford, 18 N. Y. 552, 123 Morris v. Simpson, Executor, 3 Houst. 568 789 Morns v. Summed, 2 Wash. (C. C. TJ. S.) 203, 2206 Morris v. Tuscaloosa Manufacturing Co., 83 Ala. 565, 2077 Morris y. Woodward, 25 N. J. Eq. 32, 2000 Morris Canal Co. v. Emmett, 9 Paige, 168, 110 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1983, 2037, 2054, 2057, 2060, 2061, 2062 Morris v. Haryeys, 75 Va. 726, 448 Morrison v. Berry, 42 Mich. 393, 1709 Morrison v. Collier, 79 Ind. 417, 670 Morrison y. Darling, 47 Vt. 67, 2002 Morrison v. Gold, etc., Mining Co., 52 Cal. 306, 1314 Morrison v. Insurance Co., 69 Texas, 353, 2214 Morrison v. Phillips, etc., Construction Co., 44 Wis. 405, 1960, 1961, 1962 Morrison v. Poyntz, 7 Dana, 307, 7827 Morrison v. Terrell, 27 Kan. 326, 1145 Morrison v. Wells, 48 Kan. 494, 744 Morrissey v. Broomal, 37 Neb. 766, 1919, 1920 Morrow v. DesMoines Co., 84 Iowa, 256, 118 Morrow v. Goudchaux, 41 La. Ann. 711, 1743, 1835 Morrow v. Iron and Steel Co., 87 Tenn. 262 155 Morrow v. Jones, 41 Neb. 867. 219 Morrow v. Morrow, 12 Hun, 386, 194, 195 Morrow v. Norton (Cal. 1894), 38 Pac. Rep. 953, 2177, 218S Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 549, 577 Morse v. Crawford. 17 Vt. 499, 1838 Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281, 2152, 2157 Morse v. Moore, 83 Maine, 473, 22180 Morse T. Rathburn, 42 Mo. 594, 755, 757 Morse v. St. Paul, etc., Insurance Co., 21 Minn. 407, 935 Morse v. Siebold, 147 111. 318, 1160 Morse v. Toppan, 3 Gray (Mass.), 411, 2150 Morse v. Westport, 110 Mo. 502, ] 554 Morse v. Wheeler, 4 Allen (Mass.). 570, 1778 Morse v. Wilcoxson (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 612, 962 Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 1834 Morse Twist, etc., Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73, 2041, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2051, 2074 Morss v. Elmendorf, 11 Paige, 277, 1158 Morten v. Frick, 87 Ga. 230, 168 Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292, 234 Mortlock v. Williams, 76 Mich. 568, 514 Morton v. Burn, 7 Ad. & El. 19, 74, 182, 192, 220 Morton v. Dean, 13 Mete. 385, 674 Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. R. 121, 149, 378 Morton v. Nelson, 145 111. 586, 645 Morton y. Rainey, 82 111. 215, 19 Morton y. Stewart, 5 Bradw. (111.) 533, 1772 Morton y. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428, 663, 665, 669, 671 Morville v. American Tract Soc, 123 Mass. 129, 1577 Moseley y. Mastin,37 Ala. 216, 925 Moser v. Claes, 23 Mo. App. 420, 1644 Moser y. Cochrane, 107 Mass. 400, 1141 Moses y. Boston & M. R. Co., 32 N. H. 23, 124 Moses v. Hatneld, 27 S. Car. 324, 900 Moses y. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 30 Moses y. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea, 398, 1375 Moses y. Trice, 21 Gratt. 556, 399, 457 Mosher v. Griffin, 51 111. 184, 1946 Mosher y. Kittle. 101 Mich. 345, 1694 Mosher y. Post, 89 Wis. 602, 1022 Moshier y. Meek, 80 111. 79, 429 Moss v. Ayerell, 10 N. Y. 449, 1225 Moss v. Cohen, 11 N. Y. Misc. 184, 1975 Moss y. Culyer, 64 Pa. St. 414, 621, 632, 846 Moss v. Jerome, 10 Bosw. 220, 834 Moss y. Smith, 9 C. B. 94, 269 Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493, 906 Moss v. Wilson, 40 Cal. 159, 817 Mossop v. Mason, 16 Grant's Ch. (Can.) 302, 2044 Mostseller's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 473, 792 Motley y. Head, 43 Vt. 633, 1843 Mott y. Mott, 49 N. J. Eq. 192, 1813, 1818, 1824 Mott v. Mott, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 127, 2039 Motts y. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513, 1360 Mound City, City of, v. Snoddy, 53 Kan. 126, 1512 Moulor v. American, etc., Insurance Co., Ill TJ. S. 335, 307, 313 Moulton y. Faught, 41 Maine, 298, 641 Moulton y. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, 55 Moulton y. McOwen, 103 Mass. 587, 139 Moultrie, County of, v. Rockingham Ten Cent Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 1524 Mounsey v. Drake, 10 John. 27, 280 Mount v. White, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 434, 1946 Mountain y. Fisher, 22 Wis. 93, 793 Mountjoy v. Metzger, 9 Phila. 10, 2222 Mountjoy y. Metzger, 12 Am. Law Reg. 442, 496 Mount Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 2142 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 TJ. S. 514, 1456 Mount Sterling, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Looney, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 550, 1341 Mt. Sterling Coal Road Co. y. Little, 14 Bush, 429. 259, 260 Mowatt y. Wright, 1 Wend. 355, 798, 802 Mowrey y. Dayis, 12 Ind. App. 681, 637 Mowrey y. Vandling, 9 Mich. 39, 629 Mowry y. Kirk, 19 Ohio St. 375, 496, 499 cxlii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Moxon v. Payne, L. E. 8 Ch. 881, 2289 Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9, 380, 398, 411 Muckenburg y. Holler, 29 Ind. 139, 2007 Mudsill Min. Co. v. Watrous, 61 Fed. Eep. 163, 982, 998, 999, 1010 Mueller v. State, 76 Ind. 310, 2096, 2100, 2102 Mugler y. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 2147 Muhlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. Law, 364, 2128 Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank, 4 L. R. 4 App. Cas. 337, 872 Muirheid v. Smith, 35 N. J. Eq. 303. 1661 Mulcrone v. American Lumber Co., 55 Mich. 622, 609, 611 Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cow. 290, 447 Muldoon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 758 Mulford y. Ccesar, 53 Mo. App. 263, 1924 Mulhall y. Berg (Iowa), 63 N. W. Eep. 573, 483 Mulhall y. Quinn, 1 Gray, 105, 2086 Mulholland y. Mayor, etc., of New York, 113 N. Y. 631, 1559, 2175 Mullanphy Sayings Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655, 1362 Mullen y. Morris. 43 Neb. 596, 171 Mullen v. Old Colony B. Co., 127 Mass. 86, 577 Muller y. Balke, 154 111. 110, 2291 Muller y. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 1453 Muller y. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597, 365, 442 Mulligan y. Illinois Central B. Co., 107 IT. S. 102, 737 Mullins y. Smith, 1 Drew & S. 204, 1523 Mulloy y. Ingalls, 4 Neb. 115, 1818 Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N. J. Eq. 594, 1018 Mulvey v. King, 39 Ohio St. 491, 9C0 Mumford y. Brown, 6 Cowen, 475, 186 Mumford y. Gething, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 305, 2045 Mumford v. Hawkins, 5 Denio, 355, 1318 Mumford y. McPherson, 1 Johns. 363, 854 Mumford y. Murray, 6 Johns. Ch. 452, 566 Mumford y. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380, 635, 641 Munchus y. Harris, 69 Ala. 86, 1003 Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. De La Green (Pa.) , 13 Atl. Eep. 747, 259 Muncy Engine Co. y. De La Green, 143 Pa. St. 269 1329 Mun'ds v. Cassidey, 98 N. Car. 558, 22 Mundy y. Whittemore, 15 Neb. 647, 1831 Munger y. Hunger, 33 N. H. 581, 792 Munhall y. Pennsylvania E. Co., 92 Pa. St. 150, 1420 Munk y. Weidner (Texas App. 1895), 29 S. W. Eep. 409, 680 Munro y. Butt, 8 E. & B. 738, 187 Munro y. Long, 35 S. Car. 360, 1061, 1071 Munsell v. Baldwin, 56 Conn. 522, 140 Munson y. Syracuse, etc., B. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 1205, 1291, 1311, 1314 Munson v. Washband, 31 Conn. 303, 1800 Munson y. Wray, 7 Blackf. 403, 48 Munt y. Stokes, 4 T. E. 561, 1870 Muolor v. American, etc., Insurance Co., Ill TT. S. 335, 318 Murchie y. Cornell, 155 Mass. 60, 347 Murchie v. Mclntire, 40 Minn. 331, 1633 Murdfeldt y. New York, etc., E. Co., 102 N. Y. 703, 2271 Murdock v. Clarke, 90 Cal. 427, 422 Murdock y. Gilchrist, 52 N. Y. 242, 52 Murdock y. Lewis, 26 Mo. App. 234, 201 Murdy y. McCutcheon, 95 Pa. St. 435, 831 Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 300, 635 Murphy v. First Nat. Bank (Iowa 1895), 63 N. W. Eep. 702, 1065 Murphy y. Hanrahan, 50 Wis. 4485, 962 Murphy y. Kastner, 24 Atl. Bep. 565, 565 Murphy y. McGraw, 74 Mich. 318, 322 Murphy y. Murphy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 792 Murphy y. O'Sulliyan, 18 Ir. Jur. (11 N.S.) Ill, 652, 653 Murphy y. Ottenheimer, 84 IB. 39, 1759 Murphy y. St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 482, 890 Murphy y. Thompson, 28 U. C. C. P. 233, 684 Murphy y. Welch, 128 Mass. 489. 1228 Murphy y. Whitney, 69 Hun, 573, 839 Murray y. Bogart, 14 Johns. 318, 826 Murray y. Coster, 20 Johns. 576, 194 Murray y. Ellis, 112 Pa. St. 485, 417 Murray y. Gouyerneur, 2 Johns. Cas. 438, 447 Murray y. Harway, 56 N. Y. 337, 417 Murray Y. Judah, 6 Cow. 484, 451 Murray y. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 441, 1644 Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217, 275 Murray y. Nelson Lumber Co., 143 Mass. 250, 1350 Murray PiUsbury, 59 Minn. 85, 886 Murray v. Eeeyes, 8 Barn. & 0. 425, 1882 Murray y. Eoberts, 150 Mass. 353, 1634 Murray y. Scott, L. E. 9 App. Cas. 526, 1604 Murray v. Snow, 37 Iowa, 410, Murray y. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 110, 2060 Murrell Y. Goodyear, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 432, 1148 Murtha y. Curley, 90 N. Y. 372, 1064 Muscatine v. Keokuk, etc., Co., 45 Iowa, 185, 460, 803, 807 Muscatine Water-works Co. v. Muscatine Lumber Co., 85 Iowa, 112, 1231 Muschamp v. Lancaster, etc., Ry. Co., 8 M. & W. 421, 736 Musgraye y. Morrison, 54 Md. 161, 154 Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624, 184, 1697 Musselman y. Crayens, 47 Ind. 1, 1816, 1817, 1850, 2241 Musser v. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74, 1228 Musser y. Meears, 8 Utah, 367, 2201 Mussey Y. Bates, 65 Vt. 449, 625 Mussey y. Eagle Bank, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 306, 1343 Mussey y. Bayner, 22 Pick. 223, 52 Mustard v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt. 329, 215, 1772 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. y. Robison, 54 Fed. Rep. 580, 733 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Arhelger (Ariz.), 36 Pac. Rep. 895, 313 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leubrie, 71 Fed. Eep. 843, 118, 119 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 23 Hun, 535, 204 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 30 Fed. Eep. 653, 1923 Mutual National Bank y. Eotge, 28 La. Ann. 933, 451 Myer y. Fruin (Texas 1891), 2225 Myer y. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, 755 Myers y. Croft, 13 Wall. 291, 201 Myers y. Dean, 132 N. Y. 65, 7 Myers v. Dean, 11 Misc. B. 368, 268 Myers Y. De Mier, 52 N. Y. 647, 753 Myers v. Forbes, 24 Md. 598, 95 Myers y. Kingston Coal Co., 126 Pa. St. 582, 1775 Myers v. Knabe, 51 Kan. 720, 1821 Myers y. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366, 1889, 2103 Myers y. Munson, 65 Iowa, 423, 686 Myers v. O'Neal, 130 Ind. 370, 29, 30 Myers y. Boss, 3 Head, 59, 427 Myers v. Smith, 48 Barb. 615, 81, 83 Myers Y. Turner, 17 111. 179, 234 Mygalt y. Tarbeil, 78 Wis. 351, 201, 203 Myles y. Myles, 6 Bush, 237, 611 Mynard y. Syracuse, etc., B. Co., 71 N. Y. 180, 1963 Myrick v. Battle, 5 Fla. 345, 2124 Myrick v. Dame, 9 Cush. 248, 543, 577 Myrick y. French, 2 Gray, 420, 255, 256 Myrick v. Michigan Central B. Co., 107 tT. S. 102, 737 Myrick y. Slason, 19 Vt. 121, 2185 Mytinger v. Springer, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 405, 1946 Mytton y. Midland Ey. Co., 4 H. & N. 615, 736 TABLE OF CASES. cxliii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] N Nace V. Hollenbeck, 1 Serg. & E. (Pa.) 540, 1779 Nagel v. Loomis, 33 Neb. 499, 30 Nagle v. Newton, 22 Gratt. 814, 1096, 2263 Naglee's Estate, In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 525, 565 Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. Jr. 752, 221, 223 Naldred v. Gilham. 1 Pr. Wins. 577, 89 Nan v. Jackman, 58 Iowa, 359, 843 Napier v. Union Cotton Mills, 93 Ga. 587, 1216 Narragansett Bank v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Met. 282, 1358 Nash v. Baker, 37 Neb. 713, 1543 Nash v. Drisco, 51 Maine. 417, 869, 902 Nash v. Hodgson, 6 D. M. & G. 474, 469 Nash v. Jewett, 61 Vt. 501, 1802 Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60, 9, 233, 234, 235 Nash v. Minnesota, etc., Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437, 1878 Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 689, 873, 874 Nashua, etc.,R. Co. v. Boston & Lowell E. Co., 136 U. S. 356, 1453 Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 48 N. H. 339, 736, 737 Nashville v. Brown, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 1, 1513 Nashville, City of, v. Sutherland (Tenn.), 21 S. W. Rep. 674, 1513 Nashville, Mayor, etc., of, v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 782 Nashville, Mayor of, v. Toney, 10 Lea, 643, 782 Nashville Trust Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 91 Tenn. 336, 1644 Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 65 Hun, 491, 518 Natcher v. Natcher, 47 Pa. St. 496, 800 Natchez Building Association v. Shields, 71 Miss. 630, 1624 Nathan v. Tompkins, 82 Ala. 437, 1906 National Bank v. Atkinson, 55 Fed. Rep. 465, 1344 National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686, 920 National Bank v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 25, 1436 National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628, 1262 National Bank v. Dean, 86 Iowa, 656, 474 National Bank v. Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49, 458 National Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 100 Mich. 485, 1643 National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123, 248. 2184 National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43, 62, 71 National Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673, 313, 317 National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 1280 National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673, 318 National Bank v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 49, 1832 National Bank v. Law, 127 Mass. 72, 1285 National Bank v. Levy, 17 R. I. 746, 447 National Bank v. Matthews, 93 U. S. 621, 1249, 1265, 1428, 1836 National Bank v. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. 159, 2000 National Bank v. Taylor, 5 S. D. 99, 2282 National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99, 1249, 1265 National Bank v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531, 1342 National Bank of Auburn v. Dillingham, 147 N. Y, 603, . 1387 National Bank of Commerce v. National Mech. Bank Assn., 55 N. Y. 211 481 National Bank of Commerce v. Town of Grenada. 54 Fed. Rep. 100, 1530, 1531 National Bank of El Paso v. Fink, 86 Texas, 303, 2084, 2086 National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272, 2036, 2041 National Cordage Co. v. Pearson Cordage Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 812, 812 National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Im- porting Co., 86 Wis. 352, 2066 National, etc., Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 371, 40 National, etc., Bank v. Porter, 125 Mass. 333, 1249 National, etc., Loan Assn. v. Ashworth (Va. 1895) , 22 S. E. Rep. 521, 1626 National, etc., Register Co. v. Blumenthal, 85 Mich. 464, 337 National Fire Insurance Co. v. Loomis, 11 Paige, 431, 688 National Gold Bank v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64, 448 National Investment Co. v. National Sav- ings Assn., 49 Minn. 517, 1604 National, etc., Ins. Co. v. Pursell, 10 Allen, 232, 1265 Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Huron Board, etc., 62 Fed. Rep. 778, 1525, 1526, 1527 National Park Bank v. German-American, etc., Security Co., 116 N. Y. 281, 1256 National Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28, 470, 478 National Provincial Bank v. Marshall, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 112, 2045 National State Bank v. Vigo Nat. Bank, 141 Ind. 352, 1281 Nattan v. Eiley, 54 Ark. 30, 164 Natusch v. Irving, 2 Coop. T. Cott. 358, 1254 Naugatuck R. Co. v. Waterbury Button Co., 23 Conn. 457, 735 Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. Law, 331, 334 Nave v. Adams, 107 Mo. 414, 30 Nave v. Wilson, 12 Ind. App. 38, 1930 Naylor v. McSwegan, 21 N. Y. Supl. 930, 321 323 Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 1765 Neal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind. 451, 360, 361 Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 1838 Neal v. Gregory, 19 Fla. 356, 842 Neal v. Neal, 69 Ind. 419, 629 Neal v. Sheaffield, Cro. Jac. 254, 515 Neal's Executors v. Gilmore, 79 Pa. St. 421, 1128 Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1, 839, 846, 849 Nealley v. Greenough, 25 N. H. 325, 1831 Nebraska Railroad Co. v. Lett, 8 Neb. 251 2253 Neef'v. Redmon, 76 Mo. 195, 8 Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625, 445, 446 Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo. 493, 126 Neff v. Inhabitants of Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487, 1575 Neftel v. Lightstone, 77 N. Y. 96, 2168 Negley v. Jeffers, 28 Ohio St. 90, 689 Neill v. Chessen, 15 111. App. 266, 868 Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. St. 263, 1012 Neilsen v. United States, etc., Co., 37 111. App. 283, 466 Neilson v. Hartford, 8 M. & W. 823, 903 Neininger v. State, 50 Ohio St. 394, 1058 Nelicnka v. Esterly, 29 Minn. 146, 148 Neligh v. Bradford, 1 Neb. 451, 540 Nelligan v. Campbell, SO N. Y. Supl. 234, 1349 Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 24, 1940 Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99, 194 Nelson v. Bevins, 19 Neb. 715, 1741 Nelson v. Bostwick, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 37, 2196 Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 396, 591, 596, 597, 599, 601, 610 Nelson v. Bridges, 2 Beav. 239, 1097 Nelson v. Cartmel, 6 Dana (Ky.), 7, 559 Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211, 1815 Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 48 111. 36, 597 Nelson v. Loder, 132 N. Y. 288, 415 Nelson v. Matthews, 2 Hen. & W. 164, 110 Nelson v. Mayor, etc., 63 N. Y. 535, 783 cxliv TABLE OF CASES. IBeferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Nelson v. Mayor.etc., New York City, 131 N. Y. 4, 148* Nelson v. Robson, 17 Minn. 285, 407, 409 Nelson v. Shelby, etc., Improvement Co., 96 Ala. 515, 628,630 Nelson v. Smith, 36 N. J. Law, 148, 125 Nelson v. Spaulding, 11 Ind. App. 453, 1660 Nelson v. Wilson, 75 Iowa, 710, 409, 414 Nelson Manufacturing Co. v. Mitchell, 38 Mo. App. 321, 136 Nenny v. Waddill, 6 Texas C. App. 244, 1401 Nesbit v. Hanway, 87 Ind. 400, 394, 395 Nesbit v. Riverside District, 144 TJ. S. 610, 30, 31, 1526, 1530 Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. St. 429, 1656 Neslin v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 428, 1366 Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812, 1532 Nessle v. Reese, 29 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 382, 2073 Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473, 2037, 2061, 2063 Netso v. Foss, 21 Fla. 143, 831 Nettletonv. Billings, 13 N.H. 446, 886 Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete. 34. 640 Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 N. Y. 557, 2094 Neuendorff v. World, etc., Insurance Co., 69 N. Y. 389, 1305, 1351 Neurenberger v. Neurenberger (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 617, 1072 Neustadt v. Hall.58 111. 172, 1871 Neves v. Scott, 9 How. (U. S.) 196, 1713 Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. C. C. 543, 223 Nevius v. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676, 1080 New v. Sailors, 114 Ind. 407, 1859 New Albany, City of. v. Iron Substruc- ture Co., 141 Ind. 500, 1585 New Albany v. McCullough, 127 Ind. 500, 1564 1565 New Albany R. Co. v. Fields, 10 Ind. 187, 260 New Albany R. Co. v. McCormick, 10 Ind. 499, 155, 259 New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Pickens, u Ind. 247, 153 New Bedford, City of, v. Chace, 5 Gray (Mass.), 28, 1660 New Bedford R. Co. v. Old Colony R. Co., 120 Mass. 397, 1458 Newberry v. Slafter, 98 Mich. 468, 1189 Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md. 493, 1153 Newbold v. Wright, 4 Rawle, 195, 922 New Brunswick, etc., Co. v. Tiers, 24N. J. Law, 697, 275 New Brunswick, etc.. Land Co. v. Mug- geridge, 1 Drew & S. 363, 1330 Newburgn, etc., Road Co. v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 101, 1240 Newburgerv. Adams, 92 Ky. 26, 1200 New Castle, etc., R. Co. v. Simpson, 23 Fed. Rep. 214, 1296 New Castle Ry. v. Simpson, 21 Fed. Rep. 533, 1412 Newcomb v. Andrews, 41 Mich. 518, 1709 Newcomb v. Brackett, 16 Mass. 161, 487, 488, 1164 Newcomb v. City of Davenport, 86 Iowa, 291, 460 Newcomb v. Davenport, 86 Iowa, 291, 804 Newcomb v. Ramer, 2*John. 421, n., 637 Newell v. Higgins, 55 Minn. 82, 1640 Newell v. Mayor of New York, 61 Hun, 356, 578 Newell v. Meyendorff, Mont. 254, 2076 Newell v. Newell, 13 Vt. 24, 1111 Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 1587, 2126 Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 255, 736 Newell v. Wood, 1 Munf. 555, 830 New England Bank v. Lewis, 2 Pick. 125, 385 New England Dredging Co. v. Rockport Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 2184, 2185 New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert R. Co., 91 N. Y. 153, 152, 897, 2171 New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 1131, 1209 Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. Y. 140, 42, 892, 2179 Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. 445, 167 New Hampshire R. Co. v. Johnson, 30 N. H. 390, 157 New Haven, City of, v. New Haven R. Co., 62 Conn. 252, 1585, 2209 New Haven, etc., R. Co. v. Chatham, 42 Conn. 465, 1510 New Haven, etc., Co. v. Fowler, 28 Conn. 103, 563 New Haven, etc., Co. v. Hayden, 119 Mass. 361, 821 Newkirk v. Marshall, 35 Kan. 77, 850 Newington v. Levy, L. R. 6 C. P. 180, 30, 568 New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104, 1581 New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 37 N. J. Law, 382, 563 Newlan v. Shafer, 38 111. 378, 1948 Newlin v. Duncan, 1 Harr. (Del.) 204, 780 Newman, In re, Ex parte Capper, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 724, 759 Newman v. Board of Supervisors, 45 N. Y. 676, 462 Newman v. City of Emporia, 32 Kan. 456, 1508 Newman v. Fowler, 37 N. J. Law, 89, 128 Newman v. Graham, 3 Munf. 187, 828 Newman v. Moore, 94 Ky. 147, 1733 Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285, 2274 Newmarch v. Clay, 14 East, 240, 469 New Marlet, etc., Bank v. Gillet, 100 HI. 254, 1360 Newmeyer v. Missouri R. Co., 52 Mo. 81, 1521 New Orleans, City of, v. Fireman's Co., 43 La. Ann. 447, 373 New Orleans, City of, v. Great Southern Telephone and Telegraph Co., 40 La. Ann. 41, 1583 New Orleans v. Houston, 119 TJ. S. 265, 2136 New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600, 1502 New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Co., 142 TJ. S. 79, 1465, 2142 New Orleans, City of, v. Wardens of St. Louis Church, 11 La. Ann. 244, 1922 New Orleans, etc., Assn. v. Magnier, 16 La. Ann. 338, 2210 New Orleans, etc., Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 2167 New Orleans, etc., Co. v. State of Louisi- ana, 157 TJ. S. 219, 2152 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501, 1581 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Turcan, 46 La. 155, 784 New Orleans F. & H. S. S. Co. v. Ocean Dry Dock Co., 28 La. Ann. 173, 1259 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 TJ. S. 650, 1482, 1560, 1581, 2133, 2134, 2147 New Orleans Water-Works v. Louisiana, etc., Co., 125 U. S. IS, 2143, 2149 New Orleans Water- Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 1582, 2134 Newportv. Railway Co., 58Ark.270, 1484, 1500 Newsom v. Thighen, 30 Miss. 414, 1853 Newsome v. Graham, 10 B. & C. 234, 797 Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133, 2279 Newton v. Wales, 8 Robt. (N. Y.) 453, 2197 Newton v. Wilson, 31 Ark. 484, 2124 Newton Manufacturing Co. v. White, 53 Ga. 395. 781 New York Bank v. Fletcher, 5 Wend. 85, 536 New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton, etc.. Engraving Co., 31 N. Y. Supl. 1060, 2032 New York Belting and Packing Co. v. Washington Fire Ins. Co., lOBosw. 428, 896 New York, etc.. Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 412, 2053 TABLE OP CASES. cxlv [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. New York, etc., Exchange v. Mellen, 27 ILL. App. 556, 1927 New York, etc., Ferry Co. v. New York, 146 N. Y. 145, 1582 New York Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, 89 Mich. 644, 1357 New York, etc., Insurance Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn. 560 1249 New York-Central Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468, 769 New York, etc., Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 IT. S. 519, 320, 733 New York, etc., Ins. Co. v. Tooker, 35 N. J. Eq. 408, 1662 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 744, 1611 New York, etc., E. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 2133 New York, etc., E. Co. v. Dixon, 114 N. Y. 80, 1238 New York, etc., K. Co. v. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 170, 1314 New York, etc., E. Co., Matter of the, 49 N. Y. 414, 873 New York, etc., E. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30, 1344, 1602 New York, etc., E. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473, 2120 New York Eubber Co. v. Eothery, 107, N. Y. 310, 2186 Niagara Falls Brewing Co. v. Wall, 98 Mich. 158, 1896 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 111. 644, 895 Niagara Ins. Co. v. DeGraff, 12 Mich. 124, 897 Nibert v. Baghurst, 47 N. J. Eq. 201, 842, 844 Niblo v. Binsee, 1 Keyes (N. Y.), 476, 489 Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42, 1817, 1820, 1850, 2276 Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251, 1032 Nicholas v. New York Central E. Co., 89 N. Y. 370, 1963 Nicholes v. Stretton, 10 A. & E. (N.S.) 346, 301 Nicboll v. Plume, 1 C. & P. 272, 663 Nicholls y. Stretton, 10 Q. B. 346, 2045 Nichols v. Allen, 23 Minn. 542, 683 Nichols v. Ashton, 155 Mass. 205, 162, 163 Nichols v. Briggs, 18 S. C. 473, 1151 Nichols v. Burlington Ey. Co., 4 Greene, 42, 157 Nichols v. Marsland, L. E. 2 Ex. D. 1, 273 Nichols v. Mase, 94 N. Y. 160, 721 Nichols v. McCarthy, 53 Conn. 299, 1041 Nichols v. Michael, 23 N. Y. 264, 1334 Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546, 1853, 1884 Nichols v. Oppermann. 6 Wash. 618, 646 Nichols v. Pinner, 18 N. Y. 295, 1334 Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 507, 1284 Nichols, Shepard & Co. v. Crandall, 77 Mich. 401, 336 Nichols v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 373, 617, 654 Nichols, etc., Co. v. Dedrick (Minn.), 63 N. W. Rep. 1110, 206, 616 Nicholson v. Bower, 1 E. & E. 172, 669 Nicholson v. Bradfield Union, L. R. 1 Q. B. 620, 304 Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Black, 254, 784 Nicholson v. Eevill, 4 A. & E. 675, 515, 540, 819 Nicholson v. Spencer, 11 Ga. 607, 1841 Nickelson v. Wilson, 60 N. Y. 362, 2015 Nickerson v. Atchinson, etc., E. Co., 3 McCrary U. S. 455, 876 Nickerson v. Nickerson, 127 U. S. 668, 223 Nicklin v. Betts Spring Co., 11 Ore. 406, 1363 Nicoll v. Sands, 131 N. Y. 19, 863, 876 Nielsen v. United States, etc., Co., 37 111. App. 283, 463 Niemeyer v. Wright, 75 Va. 239, 1891 Niggli v. Foehry, 31 N. Y. Supl. 931, 544 Nightingale v. Chafee, 11 E. I. 609, 454 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Nightingale V. Eiseman, 121 N. Y. 288, 145 296 Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272, ' 229 Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289, 1495, 1584 Niles Waterworks Co. v. City of Niles, 59 Mich. 311, 1519 1337 Nilles v. Welsh, 89 Iowa. 491, ' 1106 Nilson v. Jonesboro, 57 Ark. 168, 757 Nilson v. Morse, 52 Wis. 240, 2218 Nimick v. Mingo Iron Works Co., 25 W.Va. 184, 1382 Nimmo v. Walker, 14 La. Ann. 581, 785 Nims v. Ford, 13!) Mass. 575, 1242 Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177, 1248 Nippolt v. Kammon, 39 Minn. 372, 1120 Niver v. Eossman, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 50, 2039 Nixon v. Beard, 111 Ind. 137, 452 Nixon v. Green, 11 Exch. 549, nn Nixon v. State, 76 Ind. 524, ii,x2 Nixon v. Zuricalday, 24 N. Y. Supl. 121, 1271 Nixon v. Zuricalday, 144 N. Y. 300, 889 Noah v. Webb, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) 600, 2033, 2044 Noakes v. Morey, 30 Ind. 103, Noble v. Goggins, 99 Mass. 231, 110 4*>1 Noble v. Ward, L. E. 1 Ex. 117, 690 952 Nobleboro, Inhabitants of, v. Clark, 68 Maine, 87, 393 Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 307, 2033 2047 Noe v. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270, 526 527 Noe v. Hodges, 3 Humph. 162, ' 393 Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265, 1884, 1985 Noel v. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74, 1748, 1753 Noel v. Murray, 13 N. Y. 167, 456 Noel v. Murray, 1 Duer, 388, 435 Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648, 127, 129, 130, 131, 138, 370, 371, 372, 897, 2231 Nolan County v. State, 83 Texas, 182, 1533 Nolan v. Bull, 24 Ore. 479, 104 Noland v. State. 115 Ind. 529, 1176 Norbeck v. Davis, 157 Pa. St. 399, 1663 Nordaas v. Hubbard, 4S Fed. Eep. 921, 939 Norden v. Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 781, 2168 Nordenfelt v. Maxim, etc., Co., L. E. (1894) App. Cas. 535, 106, 2033 Nordhelt v. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552, 1791, 1792 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Harman, 91 Va. 601, 1968 Norfolk & Western E. v. Pendleton, 156 U. S. 667, 2139 Nonantum Worsted Co. v. North Adams Mfg. Co., 156 Mass. 331, 932 Nonnemacher v. Nonnemacher, 159 Pa. St. 634, 1839 Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, 499, 122 Norling v. Allee, 37 N. Y. S. E. 409, 276 Norman v. Molett, 8 Ala. 546, 591 Norman v. Phillips, 14 M. & W. 277, 669, 672 Norman v. Thompson, 4 Ex. 755, 532, 533 Normandin v. Mackey, 38 Minn. 417, 1048 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 149, 151, 152, 744, 956, 1049 Norris v. Androscoggin E. Co., 39 Maine, 273 21 * >- i Norris v. Blair, 39 Ind. 90, 1484 Norris v. Blethen, 19 Maine, 348. 800 Norris v. Dains (Ohio 1894), 39 N. E. Eep. 660, 1232 Norris v. Savannah E. Co., 23 Fla. 182, 275 Norris v. Vosburgh, 98 Mich. 426, 2G2 North v. Forrest, 15 Conn. 400, 212, 6U1 North v. Kizer, 72 111. 172, 634 North v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400, 674 North v. Nichols, 37 Conn. 375, 779 North v. Phillips, 89 Pa. St. 250, 1922, 1930 North v. Eobinson, 1 Duv. 71, 615 North v. Wakefield, 13 Q. B. 536, 576 North v. Wakefield, 13 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 536, 819 Northampton, In re City of, 158 Mass. 299, 1439 cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Northampton Bant v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288, 1286 North American, etc., Association v. Sut- ton, 35 Pa. St. 463, 1607, 1608, 1609 North Australian Territory Co., In re, L. H. (1892) 1 Ch. 322, 1979 Northern Assur, Co. v. HotchMss, 90 Wis. 415 9 Northcote v. Doughty, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 385, 1806 Northern Bank v. Lewis, 78 Wis. 475, 471 Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter Tp. Trustees, 110 U. S. 608, 1526, 1529 Northern Central Co. v. Eslow, 40 Mich. 222, 260 Northern Cent. H. Co. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494, 1281 Northern Ins. Co. v. Potter, 63 Cal. 157, 541, 576 Northern Pac. K. Co. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458. 30 Northern Trust Co. v. Markell (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 735, 1208, 2274 North Hudson Building Assn. v. First Nat. Bank, 79 Wis. 31, 1603 Northrop t. Hale, 72 Maine, 275, 251 Northrop v. Hale, 73 Maine, 66, 249, 252 Northrup v. Smothers, 39 111. App. 588, 886 Northrup v. Standifer (Ky. 1893), 23 S. W. Hep. 348, 1130 Northrup v. Ward (Ky.), 15 S. W. Eep. 247, 1130 North Side B. Co. v. Worthington (Texas 1M.~>) ,30 S. W. Rep. 1055, 1223, 1224, 1421 North Vernon, City of, v.Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2166 Northwestern Conference v. Myers, 36 Ind. 375, 137 Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Blanken- ship, 94 Ind. 535, 1817 Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212, 119, 896 Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Park Hotel Co., 37 Wis. 125, 1508 North Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Ameri- can Express Co., 73 Wis. 656, 476 Norton v. Baxter, 41 Minn. 146, 408, 411 Norton v. Dawson, 19 La. Ann. 464, 2021 Norton v. Dreyfuss. 106 N. Y. 90, 504, 505 Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461, 386 Norton v. Gale, 95 111. 5331. 677 Norton v. Higbee, 38 Mo. App. 467, 905 Norton v. Kearney, 10 Wis. 443, 867 Norton v. Pilger, 30 Neb. 860, 164, 168 Norton v. Preston, 15 Maine, 14, 836 Norton y. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 1337 Norton v. Webb, 35 Maine, 218, 490 Norton v. Young, 3 Greenl. 30, 970 Nostrum t. Halliday, 39 Neb. 828, 982 Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Borough of Nor- walk, 63 Conn. 495, 1510 Norway Sav. Bank v. Merriam, 88 Maine, — , 33 Atl. Rep. 810, 249 Norwich, etc., Manfg. Co. v. Hockaday, 89 Ya. 557, la32 Norwood v. Read, Plowd. 180, 378 Nott v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 270, 214 Nottidge v. Prichard, 2 CI. & Fin. 379, 549 Nottingham, etc., Tile Co. v. Butler, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 261, 1154 Nourse v. Prime, 4 Johns. Ch. 490, 412 Nourse v. United States, 25 Ct. Claims, 7, 281, 282 Noyes v. Chapman-Drake Co., 60 Minn. 88, 1635 Noyes v. Johnson, 139 Mass. 436, 419 Noyes v. New Haven R. Co., 30 Conn. 1, 543 Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Yt. 159, 853 Noyes v. Wyckoff, 114 N. Y. 204, 408 Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 Hun, 466. 408 Nugent v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 423, 274, 276 ' Nugnent v. Smith, 85 Maine, 433, 681, 1118 Nugent v. The Supervisors, 19 Wall. 241, 1461, 1462 Nugent v. Wolfe, HI Pa. St. 471, 598, 604, 614, 616 Nunn v. Townes (Texas 1893), 23 S. W. Rep. 1117, 2180 Nurnberger v. Town of Barnwall, 42 S. Car. 158, 1475 Nurney v. Fireman's, etc., Ins. Co., 63 Mich. 633, 121 Nute v. American Glucose Co., 55 Kan. 225 860 Nutt'v. Codington, 34 Fla. 77, 1737 Nutter v. King, 152 Mass. 355, 1643 Nutting v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 1 Gray, 502, 738 Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484, 2041 Oakden v. Pike, 34 N. J. Ch. (N. S.) 620, 749 Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N. Y. 430, 1268, 1981, 2066 Oak Grove Cattle Co. v. Foster (N. Mexico 1895), 41 Pac. Rep. 522, 1285 Oakland Bank v. Applegarth, 67 Cal. 86, 407 Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 514, 835 Oakley v. Boorman, 21 Wend. 588, 232 Oakley v. Morton, 11 N. Y. 25, 161, 2225 Oakley v. Workingmen's Benevolent Society, 2 Hilt. 4S7, 1282 Oakman v. Dorchester, 98 Mass. 57, 186 Oaks v. Cattaraugus Water Co. (Sup.), 1N94, 1237 Oaks v. Turquand, L. R. 2 H. L. 325, 998 Oard v. Oard, 59 111. 46, 1134, 2287 Oatfield v. Waring, 14 John. 188. 779 O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Yolfer (Ala.), 17 So. Rep. 525, 1406 Ober v. Blalock, 40 S. Car. 81, 342 Oberf elder v. Kavanaugh, 29 Neb. 427, 1706 Oberlies v. Bullinger, 132 N. Y. 598, 140, 149, 370, 371 Oberthier v. Stroud, 33 Texas, 225, 1682 O'Brien v. Bound, 2 Speer Law (S. Car.), 495, • 816 O'Brien v. Commercial, etc., Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 108, 117 O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347, 1790 O'Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136, 2154 O'Brien v. Luques, 81 Maine, 46, 1950 O'Brien v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 47 N. Y. St. R. 258, 126 O'Brien v. New York, 15 N. Y. Supl. 520, 127 O'Brien v. New York City, 139 N. Y. 543, 1493, 2175 O'Brien v. Weiler, 68 Hun, 64, 936 O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428, 2151 O'Bryan v. Fitzgerald, 48 Ark. 487, 1870 O'Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90, 456 O'Callaghan v. Barrett, 21 N. Y. Supl. 368, 476 O'Callaghan v. Lowndes, 66 Fed. Rep. 356, 970 Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. 474, 399, 409 Oceanic Steamship Co. v. Tappan, 16 Blatchf. (U. S. C. C.) 296, 1829 Och v. Missouri, etc., E. Co. (Mo.), 31 S. W. Rep. 962, 18, 581 Ochoa v. Miller, 59 Texas, 460, 1738 Ockenden v. Henley, E. B. & E. 485, 673 Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, 724 O'Conner v. Chamberlain, 59 Ala. 431, 1658 O'Conner v. Huggins, 1 N. Y. Supl. 377, 417 O'Conner v. Hurley, 147 Mass. 145, 453, 457 O'Conner v. Tyrrell (N. J. Eq. 1895), 30 Atl. Rep. 1061, 1095 O'Conner Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614, 1289 TABLE OF CASES. cxlvii [Seferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] O'Connor v. Dingley, 26 Cal. 11, 2198 O'Connor v. Henderson Bridge Co., 95 Ky. 633, 2259 O'Daily v. Morris, 31 Ind. Ill, 1746 Odd Fellows' Association v. Hegele, 24 Ore. 16, 1225 O'Dea v. Winona, 41 Minn. 424, 376 Odell v. Montross, 68 N. Y. 499, 422 O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136, , 1787 Odineal v. Barry, 24 Miss. 9, 1853 O'Donnell v. Bray, 99 Mich. 534, 1657 O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 521, 588 O'Donnell v. Henry, 44 La. Ann. 845, 959 O'Donnell v. Jackson, 69 Cal. 622, 1162 O'Donnell v. Leeman, 43 Maine, 158, 674, 684 O'Donnell v. Eailroad Co., 59 Pa. St. 239, 1432 O'Donnell v. Eodiger, 76 Ala. 222, 2278 O'Donnell v. Rosenberg, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 59, 758 O'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 467, 2096, 2103 O'Donohue v. Leggett, 134 N. Y. 40, 917 Odum v. Eutlege, etc., E. Co., 94 Ala. 488, 381, 398, 413 O'Fallon v. Kennerly, 45 Mo. 124, 752 O'Ferrall v. Van Camp, 121 Ind. 336, 108 Offut v. Flagg, 10 N. H. 46, 699 Ogborn v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439, 468 Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch, 150, 1240 Ogden v. Hatry, 145 Pa. St. 640, 959 Ogden v. Kirby, 79 111. 555, 743 Ogden v. Murray, 39 N. Y. 202, 1292 Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland. 284, 227, 617 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 24, 772, 2125 Ogden Clay Co. v. Harvey, 9 Utah, 497, 1322 Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 TJ. S. 605, 1092 Oglesby v. Bingham, 13 So. Eep. 852 ; 69 Miss. 795, 1763 Oglesby's Sureties v. State, 77 Texas, 642, 2258 Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 52, 691 Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Co., 22 How. (U. S.) 380, 1322 O'Hara v. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410. 1985, 2097 O'Herlihy v. Hedges, 1 Sch. & Lef. 123, 836 Ohio v. Board of Education, 35 Ohio St. 519, 1970 Ohio L. I. & T. Co. v. Merchants' I. & T. Co., 11 Hump. 1, 1128. 1166 Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Deboit, 16 How. (U. S.) 416, 2131, 2135, 2148, 2207 Ohio & Mississippi E. Co. v. Crumbo, 4 Ind. App. 456, 126, 565 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 TJ. S. 258, 1225, 1603 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. McCleUand, 25 HI. 140, 2133 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13, 1298 Ohio, etc., Eailway Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471, 1966 Ohio Thresher Co. v. Hensel, 9 Ind. App. 328, 366 Ohlander v. Doxter, 97 Ala. 476, 1054, 1066, 1068 Ohnsorg v. Turner, 33 Mo. App. 486, 829 Oil Creek, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Transp. Co., 83 Pa. St. 160, 1249 O'Kelly v. Faulkner, 92 Ga. 521, 792 Olcottt v. Dundee, 16 Vt. 478, 490 Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 678, 2148, 2207 Olcott v. Tioga E. Co., 27 N. Y. 546, 1277, 1278 Old Colony E. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.), 25, 215 Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Eep. 48, 296 Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. & N. 517, 204 Olds v. Marshall, 93 Ala. 138, 1156 Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Texas, 543, '1925 Olivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 197, - 351 Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. Eep. 562, 2050 Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. Div. 205, 684 Oliver-Finnie Grocer Co. v. Miller, 53 Mo. App. 107, 1645 Oliver, Lee, etc., Bk., In re, 21 N. Y. 1, 1378 Oiler v. Bonebrake, 65 Pa. St. 338, 557 Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288, 349 Olmstead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 890 Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 528, 2231 Olmstead v. Greenly, 18 John. 12, 608 Olmstead v. Mattison, 45 Mich. 617, 1364 Olmsted v. Olmsted, 38 Conn. 309, 1057 Olson v. Orton, 28 Minn. 36, 201 Olson v. Sharpless, 53 Minn. 91, 686 Omaha, etc., E. Co. v. Brady, 39 Neb. 27, 2003 Omaha Horse E. Co. v. Cable Tramway Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 324, 1504 Omaha Bridge Cases, 51 Fed. Eep. 309, 1527 Omaha Bridge Cases, 10 U. S. App. 98, 1499, 1527 O'Neal v. Hines (Ind.), 43 N. E. Eep. 946, 2044 O'Neal v. Seixas, 85 Ala. 80, 1117 O'Neale v. Lodge, 3 Harris & McHenry, 433, 895 Oneida, Village of, v. Madison County, 136 N. Y. 269, 1533 Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490, 1895 Oneida Society v. Lawrence, 4 Cowen, 440, 327, 353 O'Neil v. Birmingham Bowing Co., 101 Ala. 383, 1749 O'Neil v. Lake, etc., Co., 63 Mich. 690, 465, 581 O'Neil v. Percival, 25 Fla. 118, 1699, 1737 O'Neill v. Hamill, Beat. 618, 1009 O'Neill v. Nolan, 21 N. Y. SupL 222, 1825 Oneto v. Eestano, 89 Cal. 63, 17 Onslow v. Earns, 2 Stark, 72, 333 Ontario Bank v. Petrie, 3 Wend. 456, 767 Ontario Salt Co. v. Merchants' Salt Co., 18 Grant Ch. 540, 2062 Opdyke v. Pacific Railroad, 3 Dill. (U. S.) 55, 2210 Opdyke v. Stephens, 28 N. J. Law, 83, 425 Oppenheimer v. Clemmons, 18 Fed. Rep. 276, 2252 Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray, 536, 708 Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74, 1524, 1528 Oregon, The, v. Pittsburgh Iron Co., 55 Fed. Eep. 666, 917 Oregon Improvement Co. v. Roach, 117 N. Y. 527, 372 Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 1760 Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1, 1252, 1412 Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 51 Fed. Eep. 465, 936 Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 64, 2026, 2031, 2041, 2042, 2044, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2075 Organ v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 51 Ark. 235, 2167 Organ v. Stewart, 60 N. Y. 413, 2274, Oriental Bank, In re, L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 366, 48T Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676, 362 Ormerod v. Dearman, 100 Pa. St. 661, 2011 Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. 443, 872, 1906 Oroville, etc., E. Co. v. Plumas Co., 37 Cal. 361, 1335 Orr v. Meek, 111 Ind. 40, 1910 O'Eourke v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y. 541, 166 O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 43 Mich. 58, 2096, 2112 Ortman v. Chute, 57 Minn. 452, 1729 Osborn v. Farwell, 87 111. 89, 886 Osborn v. Governors of Guy's Hospital, 2 Str. 728, 786 Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wis. 573, 2158 Osborn v. Ketchum, 25 Ore. 352, 1086 Osborn v. Kistler, 35 Ohio St. 99, 181 Osborn v. Martha's Vineyard B. Co.. 140 Mass. 549, 539 cxlviii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Osborn y. Moncure, 3 Wend. 170, 385 Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 2122 Osborn v. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63, 1059 Osborn v. Eobbins, 36 N. Y. 365, 1833 Osborne v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307, 613, 683, 684, 1132 Osborne v. Hubbard, 20 Ore. 318, 182 Osborne v. Monks (Ky.) , 21 S. W. Hep. 101, 1446 ■, 833 647 167 ,783 956 956 1231 2080 1701 Osborne v. Kimball, 41 Kan. 187, Osment v. McElrath, 68 Cal. 466, Osborne v. Nelson Lumber Co., 33 Minn. 285, Osborne v. Rogers, 1 Saund. 264, 193, 197, Osborne, D. M. & Co. v. Stringham, 1 S. Dak. 406, Osborne v. Stringham, 4 S. D. 593, Osborne v. Tunis, 1 Dutch. 633, 1229, Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 379, Osburn v. Throckmorton, 90 Va. 311, Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 1591, 18S5, 1887, 1907, 1986, 1992, 1995, 2079, 2082 Osgood v. Bauder, 75 Iowa, 550, 714, 1927 Osgood v. Bauder, S2 Iowa, 171, 1867 Osgood v. Dewey, 13 Johns. 240, ,776 Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 1, 1130 Osgood v. King, 42 Iowa, 478, 1372 Osgood y. Lewis, 2 Harris & Gill (Md.), 495, 325, 327, 328 Osmundson v. Thompson, 90 Iowa, 755, 262, Otis, In re, 101 N. Y. 580, Otis y. Adams, 56 N. J. Law, 38, Otis y. Beckwith, 49 111. 121, Otis y. Cullom, 92 TJ. S. 447, Otis y. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504, Otis y. Jones, 21 Wend. 394, 1065 1814, 1844 1049 556 361 1720 784 Otisficld, Inhabitants of, y. Mayberry, 63 Maine, 197, 399 Ottawa y. National Bank, 105 U. S. 342, 1527 Ottawa, etc., Flint-Glass Co. v. Gunther, 31 Fed. Rep. 21)8, 340 Ottawa Plank-Boad Co. v. Murray, 15 111. a36, 1253 Ottinger y. Strasburger, 33 Hun, 466, 417 Ottman y. Moak, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 431, 1779 Otto y. Klauber, 23 Wis. 471, 189 Otts y. Alderson, 10 S. & M. 476, 327, 353 Oughton y. Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241, 781 Outterson y. Fonda Lake Paper Co., 20 N. Y. Supl. 980, 1316, 1317 Overall v. Euenzi, 67 Mo. 203, 407 Overby y. Fayetteville, etc., Association, 81 N. Car. 56, 1609, 1614 Overby v. Overby, 21 La. Ann. 493, 2021 Overseer of Poor v. Overseer of Poor, 42 N. J. Law, 493, 1549 Overseer of Poor v. Overseer of Poor, 44 N. J. Law, 595, 1548 Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind. 452, 14X3 Overton y. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 762, 706 Overton v. Harvey, 9 C. B. 324, 30 Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600, 1696 Owen y. Davis, 1 Bailey (S. Car.), 315, 1895 Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90, 642 Owen y. Hall, 70 Md. 97, 447 Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403, 1772 Owen v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 87 Ky. 626, 1967, 1968 Owen y. Smith, 91 Ga. 564, 1012 Owens, In ,-r, 18 N. Y. Supl. 850, 1814 Owens v. Baltimore, etc., Railroad Co., 35 Fed. Eep. 715, 584 Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488, 638, 671 Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 1350 Oxendale v. Wothorell, 9 B. & C. 386, 145 Oxford v. Provand, L. R. 2 P. C. 135, 135 Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 51 Ala. 171, 1906 Pabodie v. King, 12 Johns. 426, 202 Pace y. Grove, 26 Ind. 26, 2171 Pacific Express Co. v. Darnell (Texas Sup.), 6 S. W. Rep. 765, 1968, 1969 Pacific Express Co. v. Foley, 46 Kan. 457, 1432 Pacific, etc., Ins. Co. v. Frank, 44 Neb. 320, 2269 Pacific Postal, etc., Co. v. Western Union, etc., Co., 50 Fed. Eep. 493, 2052 Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 23 Fed. Eep. 565, 1453 Pacific, etc., Co. v. Riverside, etc., Ry. Co., 90 Cal. 627, 87 Pacific R. Co. v. Seely, 45 Mo. 212, 1976, 1977, 1978, 2083 Pack v. Hansbarger, 17 W. Va. 427, 1179 Packard v. First Universalist Society in Quincy, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 427, 1358 Packard v. Putnam, 57 N. H. 43, 684 Packard v. Slack, 32 Vt. 10, 333 Packard y. Taylor, 35 Ark. 402, 738 Packer v. Belton, 35 Conn. 343, 609 Packer v. Roberts, 140 111. 671, 28 Packer v. Steward, 34 Vt. 127, 2274 Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, 652 Paddleford v. Thacher, 48 Vt. 574, 535, 1633 Paddock v. Fletcher, 42 Vt. 389, 1128 Paddock v. Robinson, 63 111. 99, 278 Paden v. Goldbaum (Cal. 1894), 37 Pac. Rep. 759, 1691 Page v. Allen, 53 Pa. St. 345, 1521 Page v. Cole, 120 Mass. 37, 918 Page y. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124, 162, 163 Page v. Marsh, 36 N. H. 305, 776 Page y. Morgan, L. E. 15 Q. B. D. 228, 666 Paige, In re, 31 Minn. 136, 724 Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray, 211, 179 Paine, In re, 26 Hun, 431, 1552 Paine v. Drew, 44 N. H. 306, 716 Paine v. Fulton, 34 Wis. 83, 670 Paine v. Hutchinson, L. R. 3 Eq.. 257, 1103 Paine v. Jones, 75 N. Y. 593, 1063 Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196, 725 Paine v. McClinchv, 56 Maine, 50, 781 Paine v. Meller, 6 Vesey, 349, 423 Paine y. Ringold, 43 Mich. 341, 903 Paine v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 451, 1026 Paine v. Smith, 33 Minn. 495, 167, 932 Paine v. Wilcox, 16 Wis. 202, 1201 Painter y. Polk County, 81 Iowa, 242- 460, 461 Pakas y. Racy, 13 Daly (N. Y.), 227, 1790 Paldi y. Paldi, 95 Mich. 410, 2277 Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48, 1013 Palmer v. Albee, 50 Iowa, 429 99 Palmer v. Bate, 2 Brod. & B. 673, 2084 Palmer v. Blain, 55 Ind. 11, 604 Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373 1131 Palmer v. Continental Ins. Co., 31 Mo. App. 467, 117 Palmer y. Graham, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 476, 2265 Palmer y. Hand, 13 John. 434, 123 Palmer v. Mayor, 2 Sand. (N. Y.) 318, 2098 Palmer y. Miller, 25 Barb. 399, 1773, 1779 Palmer y. Stebbins, 3 Pick. 188, 180, 203'3, 2043, 2049, 2075 Palmer y. Stevens, 1 Denio, 471, 687 Palmer y. Stockwell, 9 Gray, 237, 954 Palmerton v. Huxford, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 166, 522 Pana v. Bowler, 107 TJ. S. 529, 1524, 1528 Panama Telegraph Co. v. India Rubber Co., L. R. 10 Ch. App. 515, 297 Pangborn v. Continental Insurance Co., 67 Mich. 683, 520, 543 Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iown, 546, 1890,1897 Panill v. McKinley, 9 Graft. 1, 1136 Panton v. Duluth Gas & W. Co., 50 Minn. 175, 806 TABLE OF CASES. cxlix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26, 280 Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209, 146 Parcels v. Gohegan, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 133, 1074 Parcher v. Marathon Co., 52 Wis. 388, 806 Parcher v. Saco, etc., Institution, 78 Maine, 470, 250, 251 Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N. Y. 121, 152 Pardee v. Markle, 111 Pa. St. 548, 470 Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. ¥. 885, 241 Pardee v. Wood, 8 Hun, 584, 192 Pardlne v. Jane, Aleyn, 26, 270 Pardridge v. Eyan, 14 111. App. 598, 2252 Paris v. Strong, 57 Ind. 339, 654 Paris E. Co. v. Henderson, 89 111. 86, 156, 157 Parish v. Foss, 75 Ga. 439, 1910 Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 198, 1860 Parish v. United States, 100 U. S. 500, 506 Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494, 1249 Parish of St. James v. Newburyport & A. H. E. Co., 141 Mass. 500, 1269 Park V. Johnson, 4 Allen, 259, 1131 Park v. Lide, 90 Ala. 246, 1004 Park v. Preston, 108 N. Y. 434, 274 Parke v. Franco-American Trading Co., 120 N. Y. 51, 2233 Parken v. Whitby (Eng. Ch.), Turner & E. 366, 1887 Parker v. Bradley, 2 Hill, 584, 172 Parker v. Canfleld, 37 Conn. 250, 2252 Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf . 273, 183 Parker v. Collins, 32 N. Y. S. E. 1107, 544 Parker v. Coop, 60 Texas, 111, 1682 Parker v. Ellis, 2 Sand. 223, 826 Parker v. Fogarty, 4 Texas Civ. App. 615, 1680 Parker v. Pulton, etc., Association, 46 Ga. 166, 1619, 1625 Parker v. Great Western E. Co., 7 Man. & G. 253, 803 Parker v. Jameson, 32 N. J. Eq. 222, 954 Parker v. Kane, 4 Allen, 346, 1753 Parker v.Kane, 4 Wis. 1, 92 Parker v. Lancaster, 84 Maine, 512, 800 Parker v. Macomber, 17 E. I. 674, 285 Parker v. Macomber. L. E. 6 C. P. 78, 284 Parker v. Northern E. Co., 33 Mich. 23, 260 Parker v. Parker, 88 Ala. 362, 1054, 1076, 1078 Parker v. Parker, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 392, 1698 Parker v. Parmele, 20 Johns. 130, 115, 179 Parker v. Pitts, 73 Ind. 597, 2096 Parker v. Piatt, 74 111. 430, 796 Parker v. Scott, 82 Iowa, 266, 291 Parker v. South Eastern By. Co., L. E. 2 C. P. D. 416, 64 Parker v. Staniland, 11 East, 362, 636 Parker v. Starr, 21 Neb. 680, 1076 Parker v. Taswell, 2 De Gex & J. 559, 1197 Parker v. United States, etc., Associa- tion, 19 W. Va. 769, 1599 Parker v. Wallis, 5 E. & B. 21, 666, 668 Parker v. Washoe Mfg. Co., 49 N. J. Law, 465, 1284 Parker County v. Sewall, 24 Texas, 238, 428 Parkerson v. Sessions, 40 Geo. 171, 535 Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 2 Halst. Ch. 600, 234 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 John. Ch. 273, 676, 677, 679, 1108 Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59, 749 Parkman v. Suffolk, etc., Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 252 Parks v. Allen, 42 Mich. 482, 382 Parks v. Francis, 50 Vt. 626, 229, 649, 651 Parks v. Jack Dold Packing Co., 27 N. Y. Supl. 289, 1894 Parmelee v. Lawrence, 44 111. 405, 543, 574, 576 Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 III. 331, 2125 Parmelee v. Lowitz, 75 111. 116, 274 Parmelee v. McNulty, 19 111. 556, 274 Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 81, 90, 91 Parmelee v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. 58, 189, 202 Parmenter v. Fitzpatrick, 14 N. Y. Supl. 748, 381 Parmer v. Mangham, 31 La. Ann. 348, 1742 Parmly v. Head, 33 111. App. 134, 416, 417, 419 Parr v. State, 71 Md. 220, 2234 Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 112 N. Y. 246, 495, 545 Parrett v. Palmer, 8 Ind. App. 356, 1672, 1689 Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1, 1179 Parrill v. McKinley, 6 W. Va. 67, 1179 Parrott, In re, 6 Sawyer (U. S. Cir.), 349, 2101 Parson v. Clark, 76 Maine, 476, 1576 Parson v. Hughes, 9 Paige, 591, 566 Parson v. Phelan, 134 Mass. 109, 645 Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215, 274 Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 1452 Parsons v. Keys, 43 Texas, 557, 777 Parsons v. Little, 66 N. H. 339, 1721 Parsons v. Loucks, 48 N. Y. 17, 660 Parsons v. McLane, 64 N. H. 472, 1721 Parsons v. Phelan, 134 Mass. 109, 645 Parsons x. Eobinson, 15 N. Y. Supl. 138, 192 Parsons v. Eolfe, 66 N. H. 620, 1721 Parsons v. Thompson, 1 H. Bl. 322, 1883 Parsons v. Trask, 7 Gray, 473, 708 Parton v. Crofts, 33 L. J. C. P. 675, 685 Parton v. Crofts, 16 C. B. N. S. 11, 215 Partridge v. Colby, 19 Barb. 248, 811 Partridge v. Messer, 14 Gray (Mass.), 180, 1632 Paschall v. Hall, 5 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 108, 2286 Pasewalk v. Bollman, 29 Neb. 519, 190 Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. E. 51, 322, 1879 Pass v. Granada County, 71 Miss. 426, 482 Patch v. Collins, 158 Mass. 468, 379 Patchin v. Cromach, 13 Ver. 330, 215, 1772 Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292, 218, 683 Pate v. Oliver, 104 N. Car. 458, 163 Patee v. Pelton, 48 Vt. 182, 355 Pate v. Wright, 30 Ind. 476, 2098 Patnote v. Sanders, 41 Vt. 66, 395 Patrick v. Colorado Smelting Co., 20 Colo. 268, 2180,2195 Patrick v. Faulke, 45 Mo. 312, 766 Patrick t. Horton, 3 W. Va. 23, 1179 Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N. Car. 62, 856 Patrick v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759, 286 Patrick v. Smith, 165 Pa. St. 526, 1720 Patrick v. Sears, 19 Fla. 856, 1113 Patee v. Greely, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 284, 2097, 2101 Patten v. Hicks, 43 Cal. 509, 692 Patten v. Pearson, 57 Maine, 428, 39 Patterson v. Ackerson, 2 Edw. Ch. 427, 464 Patterson v. Boehm, 4 Pa. St. 507, 1640 Patterson v. Camden, 25 Mo. 13, 95 Patterson v. Clark, 126 Mass. 531, 1949 Patterson v. Cox, 25 Ind. 261, 394, 807 Patterson v. Cunningham, 12 Maine, 506, 620 Patterson v. Donner, 48 Cal. 369, 1853, 1998, 1999 Patterson v. Edwards, 29 Miss. 67, 429 Patterson v. Gage, 11 Colo. 50, 883 Patterson v. Galusha, 53 Kan. 367, 1005 Patterson v. Glassmire, 166 Pa. St. 230, 2263 Patterson v. Graham, 140 111. 531, 544 Patterson v. Kreig, 29 111. 514, 1061 Patterson v. Lynde, 112 111. 196, 1380 Patterson v. McKinney, 97 111. 41, 1664 Patterson v. Eobinson, 116 N. Y. 193, 1237, 1282 Pattinson v. Luckley, L. E. 10 Ex. 330, 187 Pattison v. Albany, etc., Association, 63 Ga. 373, 1619 Pattison v. Association, 63 Ga. 373, 1599 Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cowen, 747, 469 Patton v. Asheville, 109 N. Car. 685, 2123, 2152 Patton v. Garrett, 116 N. Car. 847, 209 Patton v. Hassinger, 69 Pa. St. 311, 196 Patton v. McCane, 15 B. Mon. 355, 162, 664 Patton v. Taylor, 7 How. 132, 122 cl TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Patty v. HiUsboro Mill Co., 4 Texas C. App. 224, 1327 Paul v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 44 Fed. Eep. B13, 1453 Patd v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 883 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 2161 Paulding v. Chrome Steel Co., 94 N. Y. 334, 1366 Paulmier v. Howland, 49 N. J. Eq. 364, 422 Pauly v. Coronado Beach Co., 50 Fed. Eep. 428, 1245 Pauly v. Pauly, 107 Cal. 8, 1296 Pavement Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. St. 623, 1553 Pavisch v. Bean, 48 Cal. 364, 2195 Paxson v. Brown, 61 Fed. Hop. 874, 1527 Paxon v. Courtnay, 2 Foster & T. 131, 924 Paxton v. Smith, 41 Neb. 56, 881 Paxton Cattle Co. v. First National Bank, 21 Neb. 621, 1314, 1316 Payler v. Homersham, 4 Maule & Sel. 423, 566 Payne v. Avery, 21 Mich. 524, 475 Payne v. Cave, 3 T. R. 148, 54 Payne v. Echols (Pa. St.), 15 Atl. Eep. 895, 14 Payne v. Graves, 5 Leigh, 561, 1179 Payne v. Still, 10 Wash. 433, 1094 Payne v. Thompson, 44 Ohio St. 192, 1754 Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348, 434 Paynter v. Williams, 1 C. & M. 810, 197 Payton v. Wight, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 77, 2190 Peabody v. Dewey, 153 111. 657, 861 Peabody v. Hewett, 52 Maine, 33, 1738 Peabody v. Peabody, 59 Ind. 556, 561 Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230, 661, 675, 684 Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson (Md. 1895) , 32 Atl. Eep. 386, 1117, 1153 Peace v. Haines, 11 Hare, 151, 556 Peacock v. Dewoe.be, 73 Ga. 570, 1112 Peacock v. Dickerson, 2 Car. & P. 51, 401 Peacock v. Williams, 7 E. I. 295, 238 Peak v. Brinson, 71 Texas, 310, 1729 Peake v. Young, 40 S. Car. 41, 1092, 1149, 1151 Pearce v. Brooks, Law Eep. 1 Ex. 213, 1874 Pearce v. Foote, 113 111. 228, 1927, 1931 Pearce v. Madison, etc., E. Co., 21 How. (U. S.) 411, 1421, 1429 Pearce v. Eailroad, 21 How. 441, 1246, 1403 Pearce v. Walker, 103 Ala. 250, 477, 4S3 Pearsall v. Dwight '2 Mass. 84, 696 Pearson's Case, L. E. 5 Ch. Div. 336, 1980 Pearson v. Concord Eailroad Corp., 62 N. H. 537, 1202, 1264, 1292, 1307 Pearson v. Henry, 5 T. E. 340, 593 Pearson v. Thomason, 15 Ala. 700, 446, 518 Pearson v. Williams, 20 Wend. 630, 758 Pease v. Baxter, 12 Wash. 567, 976 Pease v. Sabin, 38 Vt. 432, 340 Peaslee v. Breed, 10 N. H. 489, 826 Peaslee v. Glass, 61 111. 94, 463 Peasley v. Boatwright, 2 Leigh, 195, 818 Peckham v. Barker, 8 E. 1. 17, 844 Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 294, 1864, 1912 Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131, f>27 Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698, 720, 7Lli Pecker v. Kennison, 46 N. H. 488, 4r,4 Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33, 729, 730 Peck v. Peck, 20 Weekly Digest, 83, 465 Peck v. Stanficld, 12 Wash. 101, 1193 Peckham v. Stowart, 97 Cal. 147, 378 Peck v. Vandermark, 99 N. Y. 29, 618, 619, 684 Peden v. Owens, Eice (Eq.), 55, 111) Pederson v. Seattle, etc., Co.,33Pac. Eep. 351, 84 Pac. Eep. 603, 6 Wash. 202, 578 Pedrick v. Po^t, 85 Ind. 255, 103 Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233, 345 Peebles v. Pittsburgh, 101 Pa. St. 304, 807 Peed v. McKee, 42 Iowa, 689, 1855 Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106, 819 Peel v. Blank, 16 Ves. 157, 1039 Peel v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. 478, 012 Peelman v. Peelman, 4 Ind. 612, 198 Peeples v. McTeor, 355 S. C. 610, 943 Peers v. Lambert, 7 Beav. 546, 423 Peers v. McLaughlin, 88 Cal. 294, 1791 Peeters v. Opie, 2 Wms. Saund. 350, 114, 149 Peevy v. Houghton (Miss. 1855), 17 So. Eep. 378, 1111 Pegg v. Bidleman, 5 Mich. 26, 2233 Peine v. Webber, 47 111. 41, 757 Pemberton v. Williams, 87 111. 15, 1829 Pembroke Iron Co. v. Parsons, 5 Gray, 589, 109 Pelham v. Service, 45 Kan. 614, 201 Pelham v. State, 30 Texas, 422, 18 Pell v. Chandos (Texas App.), 27 S. W. Eep. 48, 116, 403 Pellage v. Pillage, 32 Wis. 136, 792 Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. 459, 336, 685 Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 998, 1010, 2289 Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 1757 Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297, 1524 Pendleton v. Stewart, 5 Call. 1, 110 Penfold v. Universal Ins. Co., 85 N.Y. 317, 119 Pengra v. Wheeler, 24 Ore. 532, 2236 Peninsular, etc., Co. v. Shand, 3 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 272, 696, 740 Peninsular Iron Co. v. Eells, 68 Fed. Eep. 24, 1419 Penley v. City of Auburn, 85 Maine, 278, 1576 Penn v. Bornman, 102 111. 523, 1897, 2070, 2071 Penn v. City of Laredo (Texas Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Eep. 636. 1500 Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 503, 1678 Pennellv. Bucki, 84 Hun, 432, 509 Pennell v. Deffell, 4 D. M. & G. 372, 472, 2279 Pennell v. Delta Trans. Co., 94 Mich. 247, 53 N. W. Eep. 1049, 932 Pennell v. Mayor, etc., 14 N. Y. Supl. 376, 500 Penniman's Case, 103 IT. S. 714, 2153 Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208, 556 Pennington v. Stanton, 125 Mo. 658, 1028 Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276, 1888 Penuock v. Coe, 23 How. (U. S.) 117, 1415. 1416, 1418 Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 60 111. 260, 734 Pennsylvania Co. v. Lombardo, 49 Ohio St. 1, 2005 Pennsylvania Oil Co. -v. American Oil Works, 120 Pa. St. 483, 50 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Berry, 68 Pa. St. 272, 835 Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109, 548, 550 653, 1986 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 1436 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 131 IT. S. 371, 1277, 1283, 1403 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75, 1462 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Eiblet, 66 Pa. St. 164, 2133 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 12 10, 1237, 1412, 142!', 1453 Pennsylvania E.Co. v. Trimmer (N. J. Eq. 1895), 31 Atl. Eep. 310, 2255 Pennypacker v. Learv, 05 Iowa, 220, 644 Pennypacker v. Jones, 100 Pa. St. 237, 761 Pennybacker v. TJmhorger, 22 Pa. St. 492, 379 Penobscot E. Co. v. Bartlett, 12 Gray, 244, 155 Penobscot E. Co. v. Dummer, 40 Maine, 172, 259 Penobscot E. Co. v. Dunn, 39 Maine, 587, 155 Penobscot E. Co. v. White, 41 Maine, 512, 259 Penocook, etc., Bank v. Sanborn, 60 N. H. 558, 1721 Pensacola Gas Co. v. Lotze's Sons, 23 Fla. 308, 853, 864 Pensacola Gas Co. v. Municipality, 33 Fla. 322, 1104 Pensacola Gas Co. v. Provisional Munici- pality. :i3Fl.i. 3.2, 1125 Pen. aeola. 'JVlcgraph Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 2052,2134 TABLE OF CASES. cli [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Penter v. Eoberts, 51 Mo. App. 222. 793 Pen-well v. Wilkinson, 97 Mien. 110. 2191 People v. Albany & V. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261, 1439 People v. Alemeda Co., 45 Cal. 395, 132 People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 524, 563 People v. Auditors, 13 Mich. 233, 1471, 1523 People v. Baker, 20 Wend. 602, 447 People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 705 People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 136 N. Y. 639, 1264 People v. Bartiett, 3 Hill, 570, 2S0 People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128, 1206, 1236 People v. Bellett, 99 Mich. 151, 1600 People v. Bennett, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 343, 772 People v. Board, 84 N. Y. 610, 2140 People v. Board, 68 N. Y. 114, 34 People v. Board, 51 N. Y. 401, 34 People v. Board, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 83, 2120 People v. Board, 96 N. Y. 640, 464 People v. Board, 17 N. Y. Snpl. 314, 190 People y. Board, 63 Hun, 625, 518 People v. Boston & A. E. Co., 70 N. Y. 569, 1439 People v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 445, 172 People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198, 2161 People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 2147 People v. Butler, 74 Mich. 643, 830 People v. Campbell, 72 N. Y. 496, 2267 People v. Chambers, 42 Cal. 201, 155 People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 111. 268 1251 1252 1268, 1427, 1571, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2056, 2705, 2058 People v. City of Rochester, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 11, 1477 People v. Civil Service, etc., Boards, 103 N. Y. 657, * 2175 People v. Chicago & A. E. Co., 130 111. 175, 1976 People v. Commissioner of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 721 People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501, 2138 People v. Common Council, 140 N. Y. 300, 34 People v. Common Council, 78 N. Y. 56, 34 People v. Contracting Board, 27 N. Y. 378, 1546 People v. Contracting Board, 33 N. Y. 382, 1546 People v. Cook, 148 TJ. S. 397, 1441 People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524, 1557 People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574, 2136 People v. Dayton, 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 143, 2085 People v. De Fore, 64 Mich. 693, 1802 People v. Dwyer, 90 N. Y. 402, 1545 People v. Bel Eiver E. Co., 98 Cal. 665, 1272 People v. Farrell, 31 Cal. 576, 1811 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 2054, 2060, 2069, 2072 People v. Gilon, 126 N. Y. 147, 1584 People v. Gleason, 121 N. Y. 631, 1548 People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174, 270, 946 People v. Gordon, 81 Mich. 306, 1479 People V. Goss, 99 111. 355, 203 People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 1802 People v. Harrison. 82 111. 84, 830 People v. Hartley, 21 Cal. 585, 172, 811 People v. Holden, 82 111. 93, 158 People v. Holladay, 93 Cal. 241, 30 People v. Jackson, etc., Co., 9 Mich. 284, 2132 People v. Johnson, 24 Cal. 630, 161 People v. Johnson, 38 N. Y. 63, 30 People v. Kelly, 37 Hun, 160, 1798 People v. Kendall, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 399, 1785 People v. Lee Wah, 71 Cal. 80, 1911 People v. Louisville & N. E. Co., 120 IE. 48; 1439 People v. Love, 25 Cal. 520, 811, 831 People v. Lowe, 117 N. Y. 175, 1599 People v. Manning, 8 Cow. 297, People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 1515 People v. Mayor, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 102, 2146 People v. Milk Exchange, Limited, 145 N. Y. 267, 2058 People v. Millspaugh, 11 Mich. 278, 1802 People v. Moores, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 518, 1802 People v. New York, etc., E. Co., 28 Hun, 543, 296, 297 People v. New York, etc., E. Co., 104 N. Y. 58, 1439 People v. Noelke,94N. Y. 137 1940 People v. North Eiver Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.),334, 2059 People v. North River Sugar Eefining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 1251, 1451, 2053, 2058 People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 34, 1563, 2132 People v. O'Brien, 53 Hun, 580, 2136 People v. Pacheco, 27 Cal. 175, 1519 People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375, 1587 People v. Power, 25 111. 187. 2141 People v. Preston, 140 N. Y. 549, 1603 People v. Purdy, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 31, 1587 People v. Eome, etc., E. Co., 103 N. Y. 95, 1439 People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629. 2139 People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 1536 People v. Sargeant, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 139, 1945 People v. Sheldon et al., 139 N. Y. 251, 2068 People v. Spier, 77 N. Y. 144, 24, 773, 780 People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 36 People v. Stanford, 77 Cal. 360, 1560 People v. Stephens, 71 N. Y. 527, 1559, 2001 People v. Superintendents of the Poor, 20 N. Y. Supl. 10, 1849 People v. Supervisors, 121 N. Y. 345, 1850 People v. Supervisors of Macomb Co., 3 Mich. 475, 1471, 1523 People v. Supervisors, 7 Hill. 171, 1850 People v. Township of Overyssel, 11 Mich. 222^ 1985 People v. U tica Cement Co., 22 111. App. 159, 275 People v. Walker, 17 N. Y. 502, 768 People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 707, 2015 People v. Wilmerding, 136 N. Y. 363, 440 People, etc., v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144, 772 People, ex rrh, v. Syracuse, 144 N. Y. 63, 1558 People, ex rel. Schurz, v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 2131 People, ex rel. Smith, v. Commissioners, 100 N. Y. 215, 1814 People, ex rel. Winchester, v. Coleman, 133 N, Y. 279, 1370 People's, etc., Bank v. Norwalk, 56 Conn. 547, 379 People's, etc., Co. v. Chicago, etc., Co., 20 111. App. 473, 2057, 2060 People's Building, etc., Association v. Billing (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 373, 1599, 1601 People's Building and Loan Association v. Furey, 47 N. J. Eq. 410, 1608 People's Building, etc., Assn. v. McElroy, 72 Miss. 434, 1618 People's Ferry Co. v. Balch, 8 Gray, 303, 1320 People's, etc., Insurance Co. v. Wescott, 14 Gray, 440, 1236 People's Savings Bank v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 621, 2116 Peoria, City of, v. Calhoun, 29 111. 317, 1478 Peoria and Rock Island E. Co. v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 68 111. 489, 1426 Peoria, etc., Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 16 Mich. 380 2233 Peoria, etc., E. Co. v. Preston, 6 Pick. 23, 1321 Peoria R. Co. v. Preston, 35 Iowa, 115, 154 Peoria Sugar Co. v. Babcock Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 892, 678 Pepe v. City and Suburban Building So- ciety (1893), L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 311, 1615 Pepper v. Haight, 20 Barb. 429, 867 Perdue v. Brooks, 85 Ala. 459, 476 Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H. 518, 648, 653, 655 clii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ] Perkins v. Cummings, 2 Gray (Mass.) , 258, 1867 Perkins v. Dickinson, 3 Gratt. 335, 1062 Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N. H. 152, 1947, 1918 Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 313, 553 Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153, 717 Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 111. 216, 183, 688 Perkins v. Hasbrouck, 155 Pa. St, 494, 793 Perkins v. Headley, 49 Mo. App. 556, 523 Perkins v. Hinsdale, 97 Mass. 157, 599 Perkins v. Jones, 26 Ind. 499, 2109, 2111 Perkins v. Jordan, 35 Maine, 23, 910 Perkins v. Littlefield, 5 Allen, 370, 597 Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249, 532, 534, 1631 Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522, 2033, 2049, 2056 Perkins v. Proud, 62 Barb. 420, 200 Perkins v. Wakeham, 86 Cal. 580, 1161 Perkins v. Washington Insurance Co., 4 Cow. 645, 1277, 2206 Perkins v. Whelan, 116 Mass. 542. 359 Perkins v. Wright, 3 Har. & McH. 324, 1171 Perley v. Balch, 23 Pick. 283, 970 Perley v. Spring, 12 Mass. 297, 616 Perls v. Saalfeld, L. H. (1892) 2 Ch. 149, 2045 Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80, 468, 469 Perry, Matter of, 5 Misc. (N. Y). 149, 788 Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 785 Perry v. Board of Missions, 102 N. Y. 99, 434 Perry v. Carr, 41 N. H. 371, 1157 Perry v. Council Bluffs City Waterworks Co., 67 Hun, 456, 1357 Perry v. Knight, 85 Maine, 184, 1070 Perry v. Manufacturing Co., 37 Conn. 520, 1510 Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co., 15 R. I. 380, 83, 87 Perry v. Provident Life Insurance, etc., Co., 99 Mass. 162, Perry v. Quackenbush, 105 Cal. 299, 1044, 2223 Perry v. Ruby, 81 Va. 317, 1718 Perrv v. Waggoner.68 Iowa, 403, 1419 Perry v. Young, 80 Wis. 1:33, 164 Perryman v. Wolffe, 93 Ala. 290, 1916, 1918 Personette v. Pryme, 34 N. J. Eq. 26, 644 Perth Amboy Manufacturing Co. v. Condit, 21 N. J. Law, 659, 904 Peru, City of, v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566, 1513 Peter v. Beverley, 10 Pet. 532, 452, 455, 1929 Peter v. Compton, Skinner, 353, 647, 650 Peter v. Wright, 6 Ind. 183, 1000 Peterborough v. Lancaster, 14 N. H. 382, 799, 801 Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670, 1393 Peters v. Compton, Skin. 353, 656 Peters v. Delaplaine, 49 N. Y. 362, 1172 Peters v. Ft. Madison Construction Co., 72 Iowa, 405, 1689 Peters v. Gallagher, 37 Mich. 407, 2173 Peters v. Peters, 101 Mich. 291, 1S27 Peters v. Phillips, 19 Texas, 70, 679, 1199 Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern. 428, 1644 Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364, 649, 650, 652 Petersburg, Town of, v. Mappin, 14 111. 193, 1473 Peterson v. Brabrook Tailoring Co., 150 111. 290, 1391, 1404 Peterson v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 38 Minn. 511, 588 Peterson v. Emmerson, 135 111. 55, 1160 Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541, 1794 Peterson v. Mayer, 46 Minn. 463, 118 Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, 7782 Peterson v. Mille Lacs Lumber Co., 51 Minn. 90, 2245 Peterson v. Society, 24 N. J. L. 385, 2142 Petition v. Noble, 73 111. 567, 1048 Petit v. Woodlief, 115 N. Cas. 120, 512 Peto v. Brighton R. Co., 1 Hem. & M. 468, 1212 Petrel Guano Co. v. Jarnette, 25 Fed. Rep. 675, 1886 Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353, 814 Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T. R. 418, 1S54, 1872, 1929 Petrie v. Williams, 68 Hun, 589, 1771 Petrie v. Williams, 23 N. Y. Supl. 237, 1781, 1800 Pettee v. Case, 2 Allen, 546, 490 Pettigrew Machine Co. v. Harmon, 45 Ark. 290, 57T Pettingell v. City of Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368, 1476 Pettis v. Atkins, 60 111. 454, 1384 Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139, 1556 Pettit, Ex parte, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 596, 1844 Pettit v. Parsons, 9 Utah, 223, 1646 Pettit v. Pettit, 32 Ala. 288, 1898 Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677, 1758, 2010 Pettit v. Shepard, 32 N. Y. 97, 110 Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. S. 332, 422 Peyser v. Mayor, etc., New York, 70 N. Y. 497, 459, 2283 Peyser v. Myers, 135 N. Y. 599, 1648 Peytoe's Case, 9 Coke, 78, 508, 525 Peyton v. Scott, 2 How. (Miss.) 870, 832 Pfaff v. Cummings, 67 Mich. 143, 612 Pfafi v. Prag, 79 Md. 369, 1641 Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 111. 212, 1557 Pfeifferv. Adler, 37 N. Y. 164. 603 Pfeiffer v. Campbell, 111 N. Y. 631, 189 Pfleger v. Browne, 23 Beav. 391, 535 Pfluger v. Wilshusen, 17 N. Y. Supl. 516, 8 Phadenhauer v. Germania Ins. Co., 7 Heisk. 567, 119 Pharis v. Gere, 110 N. Y. 336, 1844 Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587, 427 Phelan v. City of New York, 119 N. Y. 86, 1497 Phelan v. Douglas, 11 How. Pr. 193, 763 Phelan v. Hazard, 5 Dill. 45, 1374 Phelps v. Beebe, 71 Mich. 554, 372 Phelps v. Clasen, 3 Nat. Bank Reg. 22, 900 Phelps y. Holderness, 56 Ark. 300, 1926 Phelps v. Hubbard, 51 Vt. 489, 388 Phelps v. Johnson, 8 John. 54, 569 Phelps v. Mayor, 112 N. Y. 216, 458, 459, 460 Phelps v. Reeder, 39 111. 172, 430 Phelps V. Stillings, 60 N. H. 505, 677 Phelps v. Whitaker, 37 Mich. 72, 336 Phelps v. Zuschlag, 34 Texas, 371, 1832 Phelps-Biglow Windmill Co. v. Piercy, 41 Kan. 763, 40 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 715, 740 Phetteplace v. Bucklin, 18 R. I. 297, 480 Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720, 807 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169, 2142 Philadelphia, City of, v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., 143 Pa. St. 444, 1584 Philadelphia Iron Co. v. Hoffman (Pa. Supl. ) , 4 Atl. Rep. 848, 326 Philadelphia Loan Co. v. Towner, 13 Conn. 219, 1895 Philadelphia Mercantile Loan Assn. v. Moore, 47 Pa. St. 233, 1606 Philadelphia R. Co. v. Hickman, 28 Pa. St. 318, 157 Philadelphia R. Co. v. Snowden, 166 Pa. St. 263, 942 Philadelphia & E. R. Co. v. Catawissa R. Co., 53 Pa. St. 20, 1414 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. River Front R. Co., 168 Pa. St. 357, 1410 Philadelphia, Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209, 2095, 2106 Philanthropic Association v. McKnight, 35 Pa. St. 472, 1608 Philbrook v. Burgess, 52 Maine, 271, 490 Philips v. Peters, 21 Barb. 351, 196 Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256, 131, 140, 372, 2194 Phillip Best Brewing Co. v. Pillsbury Elevator Co., 5 Dak. 62, 1643 Phillips, The Enos B., 53 Fed. Rep. 153, 396 Phillips v. Adams, 70 Ala. 373, 728 Phillips v. Aflalo, 43 Eng. C. L. R. 436, 902 TABLE OF CASES. cliii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Phillips v. Batsman, 16 East, 356, 221 Phillips v. Bistolli, 2 B. & C. 511, 662, 1578 Phillips v. Breck, 79 Ky. 465, 421 Phillips v. Claeett, 11 M. & S. 84, 548 Phillips v. Coffee, 17 111. 154, 1243 Phi l lips v. Cooley, 2 Greene (Iowa) , 456, 2198 Phillips v. Edwards, 33 Beav. 440, 843 Phillips v. Hall, 160 Pa. St. 60, 1684 Phillips v. Innes, 4 C. & P. 234, 2098 Phillips v. Jefferson Co., 5 Kan. 412, 804 Phillips v. Leavitt, 54 Maine, 405, 626 Phillips v. Lloyd, 18 E. I. 99, 1799 Phillips v. Louisiana Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 404 119 Phillips v. Moor, 71 Maine, 78, 296 Phillips v. Mullings,? Ch. App. 244, 253 Phillips v. Plato, 42 Hun, 189, 828 Phillips v. Porter, 3 Ark. 18, 424 Phillips v. Pullen, 50 N. J. Law, 439, 209, 210 Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. St. 529, 1066, 1084 Phillips v. Skinner, 6 Bush, 662, 120 Phillips v. South Park Commissioners, 119 111. 626, 2003 Phillips T. Stauch, 20 Mich. 369, 1155 Phillips T. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238, 270, 2237 Phillips v. Thompson, 1 John. Ch. 131, 620, 641, 1096 Phillips v. Thorp, 10 Ore. 494, 2007 Phillips v. Towles, 73 Ala. 406, 396 Phillips v. Vandergrift, 146 Pa. St. 357, 959 Phillips, etc., Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass. 113, 254 Phillips Construction Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646, 144, 745, 747, 956, 2193 Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435, 1778 Philpot v. Briant, 4 Bing. 717, 594 Philpot V. Gruninger, 14 Wall. 570, 178 Philpot v. Sandwich Manufacturing Co., 18 Neb. 54, 1783, 1789 Philpott v. Jones, 2 A. & E. 41. 471 Philpott v. St. George's Hospital, 6 H. L. Cas. 338, 1882 Philpott v. Wallet, 3 Lev. 65. 227, 617 Philfpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475, 497, 498, 499, 2221 Phinizy v. Augusta, etc., E. Co., 62 Fed. Eep. 678, 1428, 1437, 1457 Phinney v. Mnt. Life Ins. Co., 67 Fed. Eep. 493, Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Maine, 450, 2154 Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 384, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2020 Phippsv. Hope, 16 Ohio St. 586, 16 Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. St. 260, 258, 1329 Phipps v. Tarpley, 24 Miss. 597, 110 Phoenix Bank v. Bumstead, 18 Pick. 77, 543 Phoenix Co. v. Badger, 6 Hun, 293, 156 Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., In re. L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 108, 153, 492, 2235 Phcenix Bessemer Steel Co., In re, 44 L. J. Ch. 683, 867 Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Keystone Bridge Co., 142 N. Y. 425, 1980, 2071 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 1 Ind. App. 329, lis Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 Wis. 283, 121 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 81 N. Y. 218, 458 Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Hinesley, 75 Ind. 1, 2171 Phcenix Insurance Co. v. Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 2182 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Readinger, 28 Neb. 587, 407, 415 Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Eaddin, 120 U. S. 183, 177, 320 Phcenix Warehousing Co. v. Badger, 67 N. Y. 294, 153, 1323, 1325 Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hartmont, L. E. 5 Ch. Div. 394, 1980 Piatt v. Oliver, 3 McLean, 27, 646 Piatt v. Oliver, 1 McLean C. C. R. 295, 2001 Piatt v. United States, 22 Wall. 496, 178 Piatt, County of, v. Goodell, 97 111. 84, 1033 Picard v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 130 U. S. 637, 2139 Picard v. Hine, L. E. 5 Ch. App. 274, 1653 Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. 68, 1878 Pickaway County Bank v. Prather, 12 Ohio St. 497, 1914 Pickens v. Bozell, 11 Ind. 275, 116, 148 Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102, 697 Pickering v. Greenwood, 114 Mass. 479, 744 Pickering v. Hfracombe E. Co., L. E. 3 C. P. 235, 1639, 1860 Pickering v. Stevenson, L. E. 14 Eq. 322. 1254 Pickersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140, 822, 823 Pickert v. Marsten, 68 Wis. 465, 932 Pickett v. Ferguson, 86 Tenn. 642, 900 Pickett v. Green, 120 Ind. 584, 48 Pickett v. School District, 25 Wis. 551, „. , 1505, 1506, 1589 Pickney v. Pickney, 2 Eich. Eq. (S. Car.) . 219 1780 Piedmont & A. Ins. Co. v. Young, 58 Ala! * 7 *>' T 769,895 Piedmont Land Co. v. Thomson Co. (Ala.), 12 So. Eep. 768, 162 Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia, etc., Bail- road, 19 S. Car. 353, 738 Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356, 165 Pierce v. Bryant, 5 Allen, 91, 1385 Pierce v. Corf, L. E. 9 Q. B. 210, 677 Pierce v. Estate of Payne, 28 Vt. 34, 648, 649, 655, 656 Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, 180, 2033, 2043, 2049 Pierce v. Jones, 8 S. Car. 273, 535 Pierce v. O'Brien, 129 Mass. 314, 1644 Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154, 619, 1713, 1714 Pierce v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 28, 502 Pierce v. Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 121, 565 Pierce v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389, „ 118, 119 Pierce v. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206, 2075 Piercy, Ex parte, L. R. 9 Ch. 33, 239 Pierrepont v. Barnard, 6 N. Y. 279, 638, 641 Pierrepont v. Barnard, 5 Barb. 371, 638 Pierson v. Ballard, 32 Minn. 263, 676, 1120 Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539, 340, 504, 565, 566, 569, 1578 Pierson v. Fuhrmann, 1 Colo. App. 187, 1950 Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68, 566, 577 Pierson v. McCahill, 21 Cal. 122, 261, 533 Pierson v. Morch, 82 N. Y. 503, 335 Pierson v. Thompson, 1 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 212, '1975 Pigg v. Corder, 12 Leigh, 69, 1179 Pike v. Baker, 53 111. 163, 1731 Pike v. Balch, 38 Maine, 302, 674 Pike v. Bangor, etc., R. Co., 68 Maine, 445, 154 Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133, 607 Pike v. Butler, 4 N. Y. 360, 2194 Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. E. 17 Ch. D. 454, 1653 Pike v. King, 16 Iowa, 49, 1890, 2103 Pike v. Munroe, 36 Maine, 309, 884 Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 2277, 2278 Pike v. Pettis, 71 Ala. 98, 1118 Pike v. Van Riper (N. J. ) , 30 Atl. Rep. 529, 209 Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky. 308, 1840 Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657, 231 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 11, 177, 178 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 7 T. R. 346, 179 Pillsbury v. Willoughby, 61 Maine, 274, 414 Pilmer v. Branch of State Bank, 16 Iowa, 321, 914 Pimental v. Marques, 109 Cal. 406, 960 Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351, 783 Pinches v. The Swedish Church, 55 Conn. 183, 139 Pinckard v. Pinckard, 23 Ala. 649, 850 Pinckney v. Burrage, 31 N. J. Law, 21, 1642 Pinckston v. Brown, 3 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 494, 1039, 1041 cliv TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Pindall v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249, 844 Pinkham v. Appleton, 82 Maine, 574, 1G2 Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600, 664, 672 Pinkston v. Taliaferro, 9 Ala. 547, 413 Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke, 117, 189, 519, 538 Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631, 329, 333 Pinney v. Bugbee, 13 Vt. 623, 573 Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525, 1680 Pinney v. First Div., etc., E. Co., 19 Minn. 251, 746 Piper v. Kingsbury, 48 Vt. 480, 525 Piper v. True, 36 Cal. 606, 901 Pipes v. Buckner, 51 Miss. 848, 621 Pipkin v. James, 1 Humph. 327, 679 Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369, 2130 Piscataqua Bridge, Proprietors of, v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 2134 Pitcher v. Wilson, 5 Mo. 46, 631 Pitkin v. Harris, 69 Mich. 133, 4449 Pitkin v. Long Island E. Co., 2 Barb. Ch. • 221, 643 Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, 212, 657 Pitkins t. Peet, 87 Iowa, 268, 1714 Pitman v. Poor, 33 Maine,237, 635 Pitney v. Bolton, 45 N. J. Eq. 871, Pitney v. Glen's Falls Ins. Co., 65 N. ¥. 6, 904 Pitt v. Coomes, 2 A. & E. 459, 803 Pitt v. Purssord, 8 Mees. & W. 538, 826 Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 797 Pitts v. Beckett, 13 M. & W. 743, 692 Pitts v. Mangum, 2 Bailey, 588, 559 Pittsburgh Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46, 2057, 2058 Pittsburgh Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 1979, 1980 Pittsburgh and C. E. Co. v. Bedford and B. E. Co., 8iy 8 Pa. St. 104, 1414 Pittsburgh, etc., Ey. Co. v. Columbus, etc., Ey. Co., 8 Biss. 456, 873 Pittsburgh E. Co. v. Gilleland, 56 Pa. St. 415, 275 Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371, 1251, 1263 Pittsburgh, etc., E. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 155 V. S. 156, 1457 Pittsburgh, etc., Ey. Co. v. Morton, 61 Ind. 539, 737 Pixler t. Nichols, 8 Iowa, 106, 135, 148, 291 Pixley v. Boynton, 79 111. 351, 1917, 1919 Pixley v. Western Pac. E. Co., 33 Cal. 183, 1275, 1318 Place v. Hayward, 117 N. Y. 487, 1975 Place v. Proctor, 2 Penny. (Pa.), 264, 2247 Plaisted v. Boston, etc., Navigation, 27 Maine, 132, 275 Plaisted v. Palmer, 63 Maine, 576, 2108 Planche v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14, 297, 299, 2222 Plank v. Jackson, 128 Ind. 424, l.sii.s, 1932 Plank Tavern Co. v. Burkhard, 87 Midi. 182, 1329 Piano Manufacturing Co. v. Ellis, 68 Mich. 101, 133 Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. (U. S.) 301, 2130 Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483, 1308, 1854, 1895, 1904, 1933 Planters' Bank v. Whittle, 7S Va. 737, 1393, 1406 Planters', etc., Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 159, 1135 Plath v. Minnesota, etc., Association, 23 Minn. 479, 888 Piatt v. Brand, 26 Mich. 173, 496 Plal t v. Broderick, 70 Mich. 577, 133 Piatt v. Phila. E. Co., 65 Fed. Eep. 872, 1444 Player v. Railway Co., 62 Iowa, 723, Un- pleasant Tp. v. .Etna Life Ins. Co., 13S U. S. 67, 1510 Plemmons v. Southern Improvement Co., 108 N. Car. 614, 1241 Plevins v. Downing, L. E. 1 C. P. D. 220, 5:;2 Plumer v. Lord, 5 Allen (Mass.) , 460, 1754 Plumer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 553, 1934 Plummer v. Christmas, 11 Tayl. (N. Car.) 67, 2197 Plump v. Bank, 48 Kan. 434, 1332 Plymouth, City of, v. Schultheis, 135 Ind. 339, 1557 Plymouth E. Co. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. St. 337, 1421 Poague v. Allen, 2 J. J. Marsh. 421, 110 Pogel v. Meilke, 60 Wis. 248, 574 Pogue v. Clark, 25 111. 333, 811 Poirier v. Gravel, 88 Cal. 79, 2212 Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138, 1877 Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573, 144, 321 Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87, 1532 Pollak v. Graves, 72 Ala. 347, 1743 Pollard, Ex parte, 40 Ala. 77, 2151 Pollard v. Clayton, 1 K. & J. 462, 751 Pollen v. LeEoy, 30 N. Y. 549. 388 Pollitz v. Trust Co., 53 Fed. Eep. 210, 1445 Pollock v. Meyer, 96 Ala. 172, 1364 Pollock v. Wilson, 3 Dana, 25, 110 Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118, 405, 711 Pomfret v. Windsor, 2 Ves. Sr. 472, 1780 Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279, 642 Ponce v. Smith, 84 Maine, 266, 149, 2229 Pond v. Harwood, 139 N. Y. Ill, 29, 46, 171, 478 Pond v. Sheean, 132 111. 312, 849, 1181 Pond v. Williams, 1 Gray, 360, 542, 574 Pond Machine Co. v. Eobinson, 38 Minn. 272, 167 Pondville Co. v. Clark, 25 Conn. 97, 1404 Ponton v. Griffin, 72 N. Car. 362, 22 Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219, 188 Pool v. Homer, 64 Md. 131, 193, 194 Poole v. Hayes, 14 N. Y. St. Eep. 585, 693 Poole v. Shergold, 2 Bro. C. C. 118, 426 Poole v. Tumbridge, 2 M. & W. 223, 387, 406 Pooler v. Cristman, 145 111. 405. 1022 Pooley v. Buffalo, 4 N. Y. Supl. 450, 461 Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass. 309, 640 Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. St. 365, 851 Poots v. Plaisted,30 Mich. 149, 411 Pope v. Allis, 115 tJ. S. 363, 347, 665, 701 Pope v. Burlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt. 284 251 Pope v. Capital Bank, 20 Kan. 440, 1335 Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, 822, 825 Pope v. Lewyns, Cro. Jac. 630, 192 Pope v. Linn, 50 Maine, 83, 2101, 2108, 2112 Pope v. Nickerson,3 Story, 365, 740 Pope v. Porter, 33 Fed. Eep. 7, 238, 244 Pope v. Porter, 102 N. Y. 366, 149, 744 Pope v. Terre Haute, etc., Manufacturing Co., 107 N. Y. 61, 2182 Pope Iron Co. v. Best, 14 Mo. App. 502, 132, 134 Poppers v. Meager, 33 IB. 147, 27 Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. 320, 113, 114, 123 Porter v. Arrowhead Eeservoir Co., 100 Cal. 500, 2231 Porter v. Briggs, 38 Iowa, 166, 1697 Port Clinton E. Co. v. Cleveland E. T. E. Co., 13 Ohio St. 544, 2271 Porter v. Collins, 90 Ala. 510, 1003 Porter v. Day, 71 Wis. 296, 1944 Porter v. Dougherty. 25 Pa. St. 405, 1102 Porter v. Fisher (Cal. 1893), 34 Pac. Rep. 700, 1866 Porter v. Goble, 88 Iowa, 565, 1769 Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 33, 621 Porter v. Jefferies, 40 S. Car. 92, 1061 Porter v. Jones, 52 Mo. 399, 1987, 1988 Porter v. Kingsbury, 5 Hun, 597, 161 Porter v. Land and Water Co., 84 Maine, 195, 1099 Porter v. Pierce, 120 N. Y. 217, 765 Porter v. Swan, 17 N. Y. Supl. 351, 943 Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568, 14, 15 Porter v. Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431, 693 TABLE OF CASES. civ [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Porter v. Young, 85 Va. 49, 1712 Port Huron, City of, v. MoCall, 46 Mich. 565. 1499 Portland Bank v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass. 205. 764 Portland Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. State, 135 Ind. 54, 1222 Posner v. Bay, 79 Md. 30, 1140 Post v. .Etna Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 251, 566 Post T. Pulaski Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 628, 1537 Postel v. Oard, 1 Ind. App. 252, 333, 354 Poston v. Balch, 69 Mo. 115, 2290 Poston v. Gillespie, 5 Jones Eq. (N. Car.) 258, 1727 Potomac Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal Co., 38 Md. 226, 440, 801 Potter v. Brown, 5 East, 124, 728 Potter y. Brown, 35 Mich. 274, 614, 616 Potter v. Carpenter, 76 N. Y. 157, 784 Potter v. Douglass, 44 Conn. 541, 438, 523 Potter v. Earnest, 51 Ind. 384, 2244 Potter v. Green, 6 Allen, 442, 573 Potter v. Lee, 94 Mich. 140, 351 Potter v. Majestic, 60 Fed. Bep. 624, ■ 739 Potter v. Phenix Ins. Co., 63 Fed. Eep. 382, 870, 905 Potter v. Potter, 3 N. J. Law, 9, 186 Potter t. Sheets, 5 Ind. App. 506, 1726 Potter v. Smith, 36 Ind. 231, 483, 1817 Potter v. Tuttle, 22 Conn. 512, 749 Pottlitzer v. Wesson, 8 Ind. App. 472, 340, 511 Potts v. Blanchard, 19 La. Ann. 167, 814 Potts v. Hart. 99 N. Y. 168, 1646 Potts y. Merritt, 14 B. Mon. 406, 222, 619 Potts y. Plaisted, 30 Mich. 149, 391 Potts y. Polk County, 80 Iowa, 401, 209, 212 Potts y. Whitehead, 23 N. J. Eq. 512, 67, 68 Potts y. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55, 57 Powder Co. y. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110, 906 Powder Riyer Stock Co. y. Lamb, 38 Neb. 339, 1284 Powell y. Berry (VaJ, 22 S. E. Rep. 365, 634 Powell y. Board, 46 Wis. 210, 440, 461, 804 Powell y. Bradlee, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 220, 912 Powell y. Chittick, 89 Iowa, 513, 337 Powell y. Clark, 5 Mass. 355, 424, 425 Powell y. Madison, 107 Ind. 106, 2116 Powell y. Maguire, 43 Cal. 11, 2216 Powell y. Mcishan, 28 Mo. 70, 635 Powell y. Mills, 30 Miss. 231, 274 Powell y. Newell, 59 Mich. 406, 271 Powell y. New England, etc., Security Co., 87 Ala. 602, 1728 Powell y. Thompson, 80 Ala. 51, 907 Power y. Barham, 4 A. & E. 473, 324 Power y. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671, 1988 Power y. Hathaway, 43 Barb. 214, ',16 Power y. Kane, 5 Wis. 265, 932 Power y. Rankin, 114 111. 52, 610 Power v. Reeder, 9 Dana (Ky.), 6, 2259 Power y. Sheil, 1 Moll, 296, 1715 Power y. Village of Athens, 26 Hun, 282, 876 Power y. Village of Athens, 99 N. Y. 592, 1240 Powers y. Benedict, 88 N. Y. 605, 1001 Powers y. Clarke, 127 N. Y. 417, 872 Powers y. Fowler, 4 E. & B. 511, 61 Powers y. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77, 728 Powers y. Provident Institution, 124 Mass. 377, 251 Powers y. Russell, 26 Mich. 179, 1748 Powers y. Russell, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 69, 1811 Powers y. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, 1852, 1992 Powers y. Strout, 67 Iowa, 341, 2039 Poullaiu v. Brown, 80 Ga. 27, 830 Pounds y. Clarke, 70 Miss. 263, 1012 Poussard v. Spiers, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 410, 117, 151 Poynter v. Poynter, Cro. Car. 194, 226 Prater y. Miller, 25 Ala. 320, 204 Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495, 903 Pratt, The David, 1 Ware, 509, 552 Pratt y. Adams, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 615, 1972 Pratt y. Carroll, 8 Cranch, 471, 1166 Pratt v. Castle, 91 Mich. 484, 558, 565 Pratt y. Chase, 40 Maine, 269, 672 Pratt y. Chase, 44 N. Y. 597, 2125 Pratt y. Draughon, 21 La. Ann. 194, 2021 Pratt y. Dwelling House Insurance Co., 53 Hun, 101, 1351 Pratt y. Dwelling House, etc., Insurance Co., 130 N. Y. 206. 1305 Pratt y. Eaton, 65 Mo. 157, 428 Pratt y. Eby, 67 Pa. St. 396, 417, 418, 422 Pratt y. Hedden, 121 Mass. 116, 204 Pratt y. Hudson River, etc., R. Co., 21 N. Y. 305, 3, 305 Pratt y. Morrow, 45 Mo. 404, 550 Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co., 89 Wis. 406, 1310 Pratt y. Paris Gaslight Co., 155 111. 531, 983 Pratt y. Parkman, 24 Pick. 42, 667 Pratt y. Paules (Pa. Supl.), 4 Atl. Rep. 751, 326 Pratt y. Telephone Co.. 141 Mass. 225, 1102 Pratt y. Trustees, 93 111. 475, 257, 1329 Pratt y. Short, 79 N. Y. 437, 1893, 1895 Pray v. Mitchell, 60 Maine, 430, 661 Pray y. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 1766 Preble v. Baldwin, 6 Cush. 549, 607, 635 Prentiss v. Brimhall, 123 Mass. 291, 2184 Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20, 728 Prentiss v. Wood, 132 Mass. 486, 575 Presbrey v. Kline, 20 D. C. 513, 419 Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo. 50, 1970, 2044 Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 255, 256, 25S, 268 Presbyterian Church, Trustees of, v. Na- tional State Bank (N. J. 1894), 29 Atl. Rep. 320, 2239 Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94, 657 President, etc., v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 123, 543 President, etc., v. Hagner, 1 Pet. 455, 114 President, etc., City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414, 385 President, etc., of Bank v. Messenger, 9 Cow. 37, 543 President of Bank y. Treat, 6 Greenl. 207, S31 Prescott v. Everts, 4 Wis. 314, 401 Prescott v. Holmes, 7 Rich. Eq. 9, 360 Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94, 657 Prescott, etc., Bank v. Butler, 157 Mass. 548, 1249, 2113 Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7, 459, 806, 1835 Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt. 201, 438, 510, 512, 522 Preston v. Liverpool, etc., R. Co., 7 Eng. Law & Eq. 124, 1316 Preston v. Liverpool, etc., R. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 605, 1315 Preston v. Luck, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 497, 87 Preston y. Smith, 156 111. 359, 855 Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260, 166 Preston v. Yates, 24 Hun, 534, 779 Preston National Bank v. George T. Smith Middlings Purifier Co., 84 Mich. 364, 1282 Prewitt v. Garrett, 6 Ala. 128, 2091 Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22, 221, 223, 1714 Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush (Ky.), 61, 1742 Price v. Andrew, 51 Ohio St. 405, 1011 Price v. Assheton, 1 Younge & C. Ex. 441, 2266 Price v. Barnes, 9 Ind. App. 1, 452 Price v. Dyer, 17 Ves. 356, 690 Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433, 237 Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 1781, 1803 Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346, 301, 1860, 2044, 2047 Price y. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 18 Ind. 137, 818, 2190 Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318, 2158 Price v. Laing, 152 111. 380. 1641 Price v. Livingstone, L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 679, 869 Price v. Page, 4 Ves. Jr. 680, 692 Price v. Pepper, 13 Bush, 42, 292 Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322, 124 Price v. Rhea (Iowa), 60 N. W. Rep. 208, 267 Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310, 1798, 1799 clvi TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Price v. Winter, 15 Fla. 66, 2285 Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 433, 253 Priest v. Chouteau, 85 Mo. 398, 1280 Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. (N. ¥.) 318, 1715 Priest v. Watkins, 2 Hill, 225, 514, 543 Prignon v. Daussat, 4 Wash. 199, 222 Primm v. Lege, 67 111. 500. 466 Prince v. Lynch, 38 Cal. 528, 540 Prince v. Overholser, 75 Wis. 646, 1022 Prince v. City of Quincy, 105 111. 138, 1519 Prince v. Quincy, 128 111. 443, 1521 Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Ind. 340, 458, 159 Princeton, etc., Turnpike Co. v. GuBck, 16 N. J. Law, 161, W0 Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 502, 1323 Prior v. Williams, 3 Abb. Dec. 624, 1058 Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 1128, 1936, 1953, 2035 Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 695, 713, 714, 715, 717 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 69 Wis. 373, 792 Probate Court v. May, 52 Vt. 182, 1057, 105s Proctor v. Jones, 2 Carr. & P. 532, 007 Proctor t. Lewis, 50 Mich. 329, N31 Proctor v. Pool, 4 Dev. 370, 1 1 183 Proctor v. Robinson, 35 Mich. 284, 380 Proctor t. Thompson, 13 Abb. N. C. 340, 950, 951 Proctor t. Thrall, 22 Vt. 262, 1701 Prole t. Soady, 2 Giffard, 1, 223 Prole v. Wiggins, 3 Bine. N. Cas. 230, 1S73 Propeller Mohawk, 8 Wall. 158, 275 Proprietors of City Hotel v. Dickinson, 6 Gray, 588, 155 Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, 2134 Prospect Park, etc., Co. v. Coney Island, etc., B. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 1101, 1103, 2271 Protestant Episcopal School, In re, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 161, 2120 Proudfoot v. Wightman, 78 IB. 553, 1127 Prout v. Pittsfield Fire Dist., 154 Mass. 450, 209, 219, 1473 Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164, 179 1 Prouty v. Edgar, 6 Iowa, 3o3, 1791 Prouty v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 297, 204, 205 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pot. 514, 1348, 2130, 2137 Providence, etc., Assur. Soc. v. Reutlin- ger, 58 Ark. 528. 309, 315 Provident, etc., Assur. Soc. v. Llewellyn, 58 Fed. Rep. 940, 307, 313 Provost v. Calder, 2 Wend. 517, 25 Pruitt v. Hannibal, etc., B. Co., 62 Mo. 527, 275 Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 14 Pruyn, Matter of, 141 N. Y. 544, 564 Pryor v. Cain, 25 IB. 292, 257 Pryor v. Foster, 130 N. Y. 171, 2275 Prvor v. Hunter, 31 Nob. 678, 214 Pryse v. McGuira, 81 Ky. 608, 362 Public Ledger Co. v. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 77 1555 Puc'ci v. Barney, 21 N. Y. Supl. 1099, 923, 2246 Puckett v. Alexander, 102 N. Car. 95, 1909 Pugh v. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 714, 763 Pugh v. Stringfield. 3 C. B. N. S. 2, 814 Pulliam v. Schimpf (Ala.), 19 So. Bep. 428, 105 Pulliam v. Taylor, 50 Miss. 251, 509, 532 Pullman v. Alley, 53 N. Y. 637, 554 Pullman v. Corning, 9 N. Y. 93, 2191 Pullman v. Upton, 96 D. S. 328, 1385 Pullman Car Co. v. Booth (Texas App.), 28 S. W. Bep. 719, 218 Pullman Car Co. v. Missouri, 152 TJ. S. 301, 1456 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Metropolitan E. Co., 157 U. S. 04, 342 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pa- cific Railway, 115 TJ. S. 587, 1455 Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Maine, 404, 502 Pulse v. MiBer, 81 Ind. 190, 17, 1177, 1483 Pulvertoft v. Pulvertof t, 18 Ves. 84, 178 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 WaU. (U. S.) 166, 2145 Purcell v. Goshorn, 17 Ohio, 105, 1738 PurceB v. Miner, 4 WaB. 513, 620, 621, 845, 1129, 1191 Purdy v. City of Independence, 75 Iowa, 356, 1512 Purmont v. McCrea, 5 Paige, 620, 465 Purner v. Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 637, 640 Purple v. Farrington, 119 Ind. 164, 1397 Pursley v. Hayes, 22 Iowa, 11, 1176 Purves v. Landell, 12 C. & Fin. 91, 797 Purvis v. Butler, 87 Mich. 248, 829 Pust v. Dowie, 5 B. & S. 20, 135 Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, 7 Ind. App. 280, 2172 Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. 288, 844, 1192, 1196 Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray, 535, 717 Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 287, 667 Putnam v. Grace, 161 Mass. 237, 70, 1119 Putnam v. Grand Bapids, 58 Mich. 416, 1519 Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456, 1697 Putnam v. Town, 34 Vt. 429, 792 Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 234, 781 Putnam v. Woodbury, 68 Maine, 58, 192 Putney v. Day, 6 N. H. 430, 641 Putney v. Farnham, 27 Wis. 187, 238, 597, 2210 Pykev. Thomas, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 486, 2033 Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. & B. 370, 691 Q Quain's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 510, 288 Quantock v. England, 5 Burr. 2628, 716 Quarles v. Lacy, 4 Munf. (Va.1 251, 1718 Quarles v. State, 14 L. B. A. 192, 2098 Queen v. Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E. 273, 764 Queen v. Lords of the Treasury, 16 Q. B. 357, 988 Queen v. St. Mary, 1 El. & Bl. 816, 761 Queen Cit j , etc., Co. v. Crawford, 127 Mo. 356, 1311 Queen Ins. Co. v. State, ex rel. (Tex. Civ. App.),22S.W. Bep. 1048, 2060 Queen Insurance Co. v. State, ex rel., 86 Texas, 250, 2056, 2060, 2063 Quertermous v. Hatfield, 54 Ark. 16, 432 Quick v. Lemon, 105 IB. 578, 259, 260 Quick v. Ludburrow, 3 Bulst. 29, Quick v. Wheeler, 78 N. Y. 300, Quigley v. DeHaas, 82 Pa. St. 267, Quigly v. Harold, 22 111. App. 269, Quimby v. Shearer, 56 Minn. 434, Quinby v. Strauss, 90 N. Y. 664, Quincy, City of, v. Chicago B. & Q. B. Co., 94 111. 537, 1435 Quincy, City of, v. Warfield, 25 HI. 317, 1539 Quincy B. Co. v. Adams Co., 88 111. Bep. 615, 1453 Quincy, etc., B. Co. >. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 1436 Quinlan v. Providence Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 356, 117 Quinn v. Eoath, 37 Conn. 16, 749 Quinu v. Stockton, 2 Lit. 343, 549 Quintard v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 185, 669 Quirk v. MuHer, 14 Mont. 467, 1997 R Babbermann v. Wiskamgj 54 111. 179, 597 Babe v. Dunlap, 51 N. J. Eq. 40, 1447 Rabitte v. Orr, 83 Ala. 185, 1744 Bace v. Weston, 86 111. 92, 980, 1127 57 890 789 1006 2246 TABLE OF CASES. clvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291 .] Racine County Bank y. Ayres, 12 Wis. 512, 2083 Bacine, etc., B. Co. v. Farmers' Loan Co., 49 111. 831, 1453 Badebaugh v. Tacoma, etc., B. Co., 8 Wash. 570, 1416 Eader v. Southeasterly, etc., District, 36 N. J. Law. 273, 2141, 2145 Eadich v. Hutchins, 95 TJ. S. 210, 803 Eadley v. Kenedy. 14 N. Y. Supl. 268, 1785 Baffensberger v. Cullison, 28 Pa. St. 426, 951 Eagland v. McFall, 137 111. 81, 1391 Eagsdale v. Burnett, 10 Ind. 478, 1713 Eagsdale v. Gossett, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 729, 1699, 1750 Bailees v. Todd, 8 Adol. & Ell. 846, 683 Bailroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, • 2133 Bailroad Commissioners v. Portland & O. C. E. Co.. 63 Maine, 269, 1439 Bailroad Co. v. Bartlett, 120 111. 603, 864 Bailroad Co. v. Bowser, 48 Pa. St. 29, 1400 Bailroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. (D. S.) 445, 1436 Bailroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541, 458, 459, 460, 461, 463, 806, 807 Bailroad Co. v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576, 1306 Bailroad Co. v. Estes, 37 Kan. 715, 1433 Bailroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697. 2132 Bailroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 1456, 2132, 2140 Bailroad Co. v. Ham, 114 XT. S. 587, 1454 Bailroad Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48, 1454 Bailroad Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195, 392 Bailroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1966, 1969 Bailroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318, 737 Bailroad Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, 417 Bailroad Company v. McClure, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 411, 2117 Bailroad Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499, 1456, 2140 Bailroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14, 178 Bailroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 2141 Bailroad Co. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37, 1454 Bailroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123, 735, 737 Bailroad Co. v. Eailway Co., 44 Ohio St., 287,864 Bailroad Co. v. Eichmond, 96 TJ. S. 521, 1581 Bailroad Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125, 1454 Bailroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 367, 858, 877 Bailroad Co. v. United States, 101 U. S. 543, 775 Bailroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 1453 Bailroad Co. v. Winans, 17 How. 30, 1252 Bailroad Co. v. Womack, 84 Ala. 149, 1433 Bailroad Co. v. Wynn, 83 Tenn. 330, 1966 Bailroad Companies v. Schutte, 103 TJ. S. 118, 869 Eailway Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501, 1454 Eailway Co. v. Langdon. 92 Pa. St. 21, 1432 Eailway Co. v. Marshall, 136 TJ. S. 393, 1123 Eailway Co. v. Mayes, 58 Ark. 397, 1967 Eailway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 TJ. S. 258, 2073 Eailway Co. v. Eedmond, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 675, 1224 Eailway Co. v. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471, 1962 Eailway Co. v. Stevens, 95 TJ. S. 655, 1961 Eailway Co. v. Whitley, 54 Ark. 199, 646 Eailway Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 320, 1958, 1969 Eailway, etc., Co., In re, L. E. 29 Ch. Div. 204, 761 Eailway, etc., Co. v. Burwell, 44 Ind. 460, 117 Bailway Sleepers Supply Co., In re, L. E. 29 Ch. Div. 204, 764 Bainbolt v. East, 56 Ind. 538, 618, 619 Eainey v. Capps, 22 Ala. 288, 2104 Bainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310, 829 Baisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158, 932 Eaisler v. Athens, 66 Ala. 194, 460 Eake v. Pope, 7 Ala. 161, 655 Balls, County of, v. Douglas, 105 TJ. S. 728, 1535 Ealston v. Aultman (Texas App.), 26 S.W. Eep. 746, 454 Ealston v. Wood, 15 111. 159, 443 Eamey v. Allison, 64 Texas, 697, 985 Bamsdell v. Edgarton, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 227, 1640 Bamsdell v. Fuller, 28 Cal. 37, 1761 Eamsey v. Eamsoy, 121 Ind. 215, 1848 Eamsgate Victoria Hotel Co. v. Monteri- ore.L. E. 1 Exch. 109, 61 Band v. Mather, 11 Cush. 1, 690, 1155, 1859 Band v. Band, 4 N. H. 267, 763 Bandal v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390, 410 Eandall v. Ghent, 19 Ind. 271, 1079 Eandall v. Howard, 2 Black, 585, 622 Eandall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 67, 227, 619 Eandall v. National Building Association, 42 Neb. 809, ' 1611, 1624 Eandall v. Nat. Building, etc., Union, 43 Neb. 876, 1606 Eandall v. Newson, L. E. 2 Q. B. Div. 102, 349 Eandall v. Eandall, 37 Mich. 563, 1207 Eandall v. Sackett, 77 N. Y. 480, 823 Eandle v. Stone, 77 Geo. 501, 167 Eandolph v. Daly, 16 N. J. Eq. 313, 821, 2188 Eandon v. Toby, 11 How. (U. S.) 493, 1854 Banger v. Great Western E. Co., 5 H. L. C. 72, 187, 1131 Eankin v. Montimere, 7 Watts, 371, 995 Eankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195, 1748 Eankin v. Woodworth, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 48, 769 Eann v. Hughes, 7 T. E. 346, 8 11 177 179 593 594 Eannels v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474', 1657, 1812 Bansom v. Brown, 63 Texas, 188, 120 Eansome v. State, 91 Tenn. 716, 1946 Eaphael v. Thames Valley Eailway, L. E. 2 Eq. 37, 1212 Eapid v. The Schooner, 1 Gall. (U. S. C.C.)295, 2020 Eapid Transit Land Co. v. Sanford (Texas 1893), 24 S. W. Eep. 587, 1776 Eapier v. Gulf City Co., 64 Ala. 330, 1645 Eapley v. Klugh, 40 S. Car. 134, 2178 Eapps v. Gottlieb, 142 N. Y. 164, 1034 Easmussen v. State Nat. Bank, 11 Colo. 301, 1633 Eatcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 716, 2150 Eatcliff v. Davies, Cro. Jac. 244, 411 Batcliff v. Davis, Yelv. 178, 411 Eathbum v. McConnell, 27 Neb. 239, 881 Eathbun v. Snow, 123 N. Y. 343, 1238, 1359 Buthbun v. Thurston County, 8 Wash. 238, 2235 Battoon v. Overacker, 8 Johns. 126, 514 Eau v. Union Paper Mill Co., 95 Ga. 208, 1393 Eau v. Van Zedlitz, 132 Mass. 164, 1827 Eaub v. Blairstown Creamery, 56 N. J. Law, 262, 1284 Eaub v. Smith, 61 Mich. 543, 645 Eaubitschek v. Blank, 80 N. Y. 478, 684 Bawdon v. Eawdon, 28 Ala. 565, 2278 Eawley v. Stoddard, 7 John. 206, 577 Eawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19, 847 Bawson v. Clark, 70 111. 656, 290, 489, 2226 Eawson v. Fox, 65 111. 200, 1023 Eawson v. Johnson, 1 East, 203, 123, 378 Eawson Co. v. Eichards, 69 Wis. 643, 170 Eawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40, 2142 Bay v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 B. Mon. 510, 800, 986 Bay v. Eood, 62 Vt. 293, 194, 195, 196, 197 Eay v. Simmons, 11 E. I. 266, 253 Bay v. Tubbs, 50 Vt. 688, 1802 Eay v. West, etc., Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 576, 659 Eay v. Wilcoxon, 107 N. Car. 514, 1732 Bay v. Young, 13 Texas, 550, 692 clviii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Rayburn v. Comstock, 80 Mich. 448, 299, 506 Raymond v. Borough of Rutherford, 55 N. J. Law, 441, 1549 Raymond v. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219, 804 Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, 2080 Raymond v. Rhodes, 135 Mass. a37, 100 Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 1, 6, 10, 13, 1173 Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424, 1660 Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307, 422 Re Manhattan Sav. Inst., 82 N. Y. 142, 1553 Re Merriam, 84 N. Y. 596, 1553 Re Metropolitan Gas Light Co., 85 N. Y. 526, 1553 Re Paine, 26 Hun. 431, 1553 Re Rhodes, 62 L. T. R. N. S. 22, 1843 Re Sherry. L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 692, 60 Rea v. Bishop, 41 Neb. 202, 1837 Read v. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L. 558, 1519 Read y. Buffum, 79 Cal. 77, 1276 Read v. Bullocke, Dyer, 56 b, 564 Read v. City of Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568, 1539 Read v. Dingess.60 Fed. Rep. 21, 978 Read v. Nash, 1 Wils. 305, 610 Read v. Smith, 60 Texas, 379, 2087 Read v. Taft, 3 R. 1. 175, 1902 Reade v. Livingstone, 3 Johns. Ch. 471, 620, 1653, 1710 Reader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. (N. S.), 344, 596, 614, 615 Reading Railroad v. Johnson, 7 Watts & S. 317, 562 Real Estate Invesment Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa. St. 496, 1720 Real Estate Savings Institution v. Linder, 74 Pa. St. 371, 800 Rearich v. Swinehart, 11 Pa. St. 233, 899 Rebman v. San Gabriel Land Co., 95 Cal. 390, 2222 Reoknagle v. Schmaltz, 72 Iowa, 63, 846 Rector v. Collins, 46 Ark. 167. 1065 Rector v. McDermott (Ark.), 13 S. W. Rep. 334, 488 Rector, etc., v. County of Philadelphia, 24 How. (U. S.) 300, 2138, 2140 Rector of St. David's v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396, 1203 Redding v. Wilkes, 3 Brown Ch. R. 400, 618, 843, 1717 Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 976, 1044 Redfleld v. Holland, etc., Co., 56 N. Y. 354, 190, 465 Redman v. Thomas, 89 Mo. App. 143 415 Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. Sen. 123 593 Reed v. Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273, 538 Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick. 441, 469, 523 Reed v. Brewer (Miss.), 16 So. Rep. 350, 266 Reed v. Dougan, 54 Ind. 306, 1932 Reed v. Evans, 17 Ohio, 128, 6S3 Rood v. Field, 15 Vt. 672. 867 Roed v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86, 404 Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360, 598, 611, 617 Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 23, Ml), 873 Reed v. Lane, 61 Tt. 481, 1772, 1773 Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah, 39, 95 Reed v. Newcomb, 64 Vt. 49, 1753 Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358, 501 Reed v. Reed, 135 111. 482, 1677 Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 39, 3*5 Reod v. Wood, 9 Vt. 285, 41, 193, 236 Reod v. Woodman, 17 Maine, 43, 411 Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 94 Ala. 626, 1749 Reeder v. Gorsuch, 55 Kan. 553, 1065 Reedy v. Smith, 42 Cal. 245. 67 Rees v. Rees, 11 Rich. Eq. 86, 559 Reese v. Berrington, 2 Ves. Jr. 540, 207 Reese v. Medlock, 27 Texas, 120, 2180 Reese v. Reese, 157 Pa. St. 200, 1670 Reeside, The, 2 Sumn. 567, 926 Reeve v. Ladies' Building Assn., 56 Ark. 335, 1618, 1619 Reeves v. Brymer, 6 Ves. 516, 553 Reeves v. Butcher, 31 N. J. Law, 224, 2108 Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. Rep. 774, 990 Reeves v. Hearne, 1 M. & W. 323, 526 Reeves v. Linam, 57 Ala. 564, 1743 Reeves v. Morgan, 48 N. J. Eq. 415, 1813, 1722 Refeld v. Woodfolk, 22 How. 318, 122 Regan v. Baldwin, 126 Mass. 485, 800 Regents of University v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 365, 2141 Reg. v. Lord, 12 Q. B. 757, 1807 Register v. Dodge, 19 Blatchf. 79, 962 Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq, 465, 235 Reichart v. Wilhelm, 83 Iowa, 510, 14 Reichel v. Jeffrey, 9 Wash. 250, 513 Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., 106 111. 439, . 1391, 1406 Reicke v. Saunders, 3 Mo. App. 566, 288 Reid v. Cook, 88 Iowa, 717, 1055 Reid v. Explosives Co., L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 264, 488 Reid v. Hoskins, 6 E. & B. 953, 498 Reid v. Stevens, 38 S. Car. 519, 1693, 1742 Reigart v. Ellmaker, 14 S. & R. 121, 543 Keigart v. White, 52 Pa. St. 438, 1720 Reigne v. Desportes, Dud. Law (S. Car.), 118, 196 Reilly v. Daly, 159 Pa. St. 605, 2238 Reilly v. Jones, 1 Bing. 302, 756 Reiman v. Hamilton, 111 Mass. 245, 1753 Reimensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. St. 17, 258 Reinheimer v. Carter, 31 Ohio St. 579, 648, 649, 656 Reinskoff v. Rogge, 37 Ind. 207, 1816, 1826, 2241 Reisan v. Mott, 42 Minn. 49, 408 Reissner v. Oxley, 80 Ind. 580, 865 Remick v. Sanford, 120 Mass. 300, 665, 672 Remington v. Palmer, 62 N. Y. 31, 635 Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537, 299 Renard v. Tuller, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 107, 532, 533, 535, 1633 Renals v. Cowlishaw, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 1154 Rendleman v. Rendleman, 156 111. 568, 9 Renick v. Ludington, 20 W. Va. 511, 1179 Reniger v. Fogassa, Plowden, 1, 526 Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 511, 544 Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581, 941 Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587, 186 Renwick v. Wheeler, 48 Fed. Rep. 431, 209, 211 Requa v. Snow, 76 Cal. 535, 1162 Resolution, The, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 10, 2020 Resseter v. Waterman, 151 111. 169, 205, S07 Rex v. Adderley, Doug. 462, 768 Rex v. Cross, 3 Camp, "224, 1506 Rex v. Hucks, 1 Stark, 424, 902 Rex v, Inhabitants of Horndon-on-thft- Hill, 4 M. & Sel. 562, 641 Roxford t. Marquis, 7 Lans. 249, 26 Rex v. Peckham, Carth. 406, 768 Rex v. Younger, 5 T. R. 449, 2099 Reynolds, In re, 21 N. Y. Supl. 592, 565 Reynolds v. Barnard, 36 111. App. 218, 207 Reynolds v. Bridge, 6 E. & B. 528, 757 Reynolds v. Bridge, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 122, 759 Reynolds v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 11 Neb. 186, 749 Reynolds v. Continental Insurance Co., 36 Mich. 132, 932, 935 Reynolds v. Excelsior Coal Co. (Ala. 1893), 14 So. Rep. 573, 1003 Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, 2147 Reynolds v. Hewett, 27 Pa. St. 176, 632 Reynolds v. Kingsbury, 15 Iowa, 238, 1642 Reynolds v. Kirk (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Rep. 95, 628 Reynolds v. Lansford, 16 Texas, 256, 1733 Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 111. 356, 1781, 1784, 1803 TABLE OF CASES. clix [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] County of Grant, 27 Fed. Reynolds v. McKinney, 4 Kan. 94, 1942 Reynolds v. Necessary. 88 Va. 125, 1136 Reynolds v. Nichols, 12 Iowa, 398, 1861 Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328, 187, 198, 199 Reynolds v. O'Neil, 26 N. J. Eq. 223, 1111 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 55 Ark. 369, 190, 519 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 92 Ky. 556, 793 Reynolds v. Stevenson, 4 Ind. 619, 2098, 2112 Reynolds v. Ward, 5 Wend. 502, 189 Reynolds & Henry Const. Co. v. Police Jury, 44 La. Ann. 863, 1349 Rhodes, Appeal of ,156 Pa. St. 337, 1685 Rhodes, Re, 62 L. T. R. (N. S.) 22, 1843 Rhoda v. Alameda Co., 52 Cal. 350, 161 Rhodes v. Andrews (Ark.), 13 S. W. Rep. 422, 407 Rhodes v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 426, 899 Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306, 1207 Rhey v. Ebensburg, etc., Co., 27 Pa. St. 261, , 260 Rhodes v. Forwood. L. R. 1 App. Cas. 256, 488 Rheel v. Hicks, 25 N. Y. 289, 481 Rhoads v. Hoernerstown, etc., Assn., 82 Pa. St. 180, 1597 Rhoades v. Parker, 10 N. H. 83, 490 Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf . Ch. 279, 848, 1211 Rhodes v. Rhodes, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 94, 777 Rhodes v. Storr, 7 Ala. 814, 630 Rhodes v. Wilson, 12 Colo. 65, 900 Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197, 668 Rice v. Carter, 11 Ired. 298, 122 Rice v. Churchill, 2 Denio, 145, 500 Rice v. D'Arville, 162 Mass. 559, 2265 Rice v. Dudley, 34 Mo. App. 383, 447 Rice v. Ege, 42 Fed. Rep. 661, 373 Rice v. Frayser, 24 Fed. Rep. 460, 1645 Rice v. GIbbs, 40 Neb. 264, 1059 Rice v. Gibbs, 33 Neb. 460, 234, 235 Rice v. Gist, 1 Strobh. (S. Car.) 82, 1914 Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns. 503, 632 Rice v. Roberts, 24 Wis. 461, 635 Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y. 174, 1425 Rice v. Rockefeller, 56 Hun (N. Y.), 516, 2058 Rice v. Rock Island, etc., R. Co., 21 111. 93, 1335 237,248 214 1517 576 2002 Rice v. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470, Rice v. Sims, 8 Rich. L. 416, Rice v. Town of Haywards, 107 Cal. 398, Rice v. Webster, 18 111. 331, Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, Rich v. Calhoun (Miss. 1893), 12 So. Rep. 707, 2211 Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 369, 1671 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304, 2152 Rich v. Hotchkiss, 16 Conn. 409, 234 Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 322, 566, 567 Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179, 237 Richards v. American Desk Co., 87 Wis. 503, 2027, 2030 Richards v. Angell, 21 N. Y. Supl. 646, 565 Richards v. Fuller, 37 Mich. 161, 336 Richards v. Green, 23 N. J. Eq. 536, 1105 Richards v. Grinnell, 63 Iowa, 44, 644 Richards v. May, L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 400, 1131 Richards v. Merrill, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 405, 1524 Richards v. New Hamp. Insurance Co., 43 N. H. 263, 1366 Richards v. Shaw. 67 111. 222, 144 Richards v. Warring, 39 Barb. 42, 863 Richardson, In the Matter of, 2 Story, C. C571, '62 Richardson v. Akin, 87 111. 138, 2122 Richardson v. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257, 231 Richardson v. Boright, 9 Vt. 368, 1779 Richardson v. Boston, etc., 9 Mete. 42, 399 Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 1426, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058 Richardson v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 61 Wis. 596, , „„ I960 Richardson v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 398, 459, 462 Richardson v. Cook, 37 Vt. 599, 2151 Richardson v. Rep. 495, Richardson v. Richardson v. Richardson v. Houst. (Del. Richardson v. Richardson v. Richardson v. Richardson v. Richardson v. Richardson v. 783 1853 720 Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, Delaware Loan Assn., 9 ) 354, 1602 Draper, 87 N. Y. 337, 824 Duncan, 3 N. H. 508. 1830 Estate of Merrill, 32 Vt. 27, 1680 Goddard, 23 How. 28, 124 Green, 133 U. S. 30, 1301, 1396 Harris, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. Richardson v. Horn, 8 Houst. (Del. ) 26, 997 Richardson v. Jackson, 8 M. & W. 298, 400 Richardson v. Jones (Kan.), 43 Pac. Rep. 1127, 1857 Richardson v. Jones, 58 Ind. 240, 835 Richardson v. Lawrence County, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1157, 1537 Richardson v. McLemore, 5 Baxter, 586, 543 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Ring. 229, 1952 Richardson v. Pate, 93 Ind. 423, 1787 Richardson v. Peacock, 26 N. J. Eq. 40, 2043, 2047 Richardson v. Peacock, 33 N. J. Eq. 597, 2040,2046 Richardson v. Pierce, 7 R. I. 330, 654 Richardson v. Pitts, 71 Mo. 128, 1311 Richardson v. Richardson, 148 111. 563, 1712 Richardson v. Shaw, 1 Mo. App. 234, 291 Richardson v. Sibley, 11 Allen, 65, 1403 Richardson v. Squires, 37 Vt. 640, 662 Richardson v. Watson, 4 B. & Ad. 787, 901 Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Mil. Encampment Co., 141 111. 248, 256, 258, 518, 1329, 1878 Richey v. Branson, 33 Mo. App. 418, 2209 Richcv v. Carpenter, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 106, 28 Richey v. Daemicke, 86 Mich. 647, 324, 343, 344 Richie v. Atkinson, 10 East, 306, 117 Richland, County of, v. County of Law- rence, 12 111. 1, 2143 Richlands Glass Co. v. Hiltebeitel (Va.), 22 S. E. Rep. 806, 48, 926 Richmond, City of, v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 118, 1557 Richmond v. Dubuque R. Co., 26 Iowa, 191, - 1952, 2073 Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 25, 753 Richmond v. Koenig, 43 Minn. 480, 1140 Richmond, Mayor of, v. Judah, 5 Leigh (Va.), 305, 460 Richmond v. Moore, 107 111. 429, 2098 Richmond v. Roberts, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 319, 1975 Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193, 748 Richmond v. Voorhees, 10 Wash. 316, 1708 Richmond v. Woodard, 32 Vt. 833, 859 Richmond, etc., Co. v. Shomo, 90 Ga. 496, 868 Richmond Gas Light Co. v. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228, 1504 Richmond Const. Co. v. Richmond R. Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 105, 1221 Richmond and Danville R. Co. v. Bedell, 88 Ga. 591, 2208 Richmond, etc., R. Co. Hissong, 99 Ala. 187, 920 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 71, 2146 Richmond, etc., Railroad Co. v. Payne, 86 Va. 481, 1967 Richmond R. Co. v. Walker, 92 Geo. 485, 550 Richter v. Poffenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373, 821, 825 Richter v. Richter, 111 Ind. 456, 972 Rick v. Gilson, 1 Pa. St. 54, 549 Rickard v. Moore, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 841, 666 Rickard v. Stanton, 16 Wend. 25, 785 Ricker v. Cross, 5 N. H. 570, 667 Ricker v. Fairbanks, 40 Maine, 43, 869 Ricker v. Moore, 77 Maine, 292, 1157 clx TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Eicketts v. Harvey, 106 Ind. 564, 1853 Eicketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371, 2273 Eicketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 111. 110, 1498 Eico v. Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465, 1735 Eiddle y. Hall, 99 Pa. St. 116, 2011, 2062 Eiddle v. Perry, 19 Neb. 505, 1947 Eider v. Morrison,. 54 Md. 429, 1400 Eider v. Union India Bubber Co., 28 N. Y. 379, 782 Eiddle y. Backus, 38 Iowa, 81, 654 Bidgewav v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 66, 1846 Eidgway v. English, 22 N. J. Law, 409, 794 Eidgway v. Ingram, 50 Ind. 145, 678, 1484 Eidgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238, 6, 684, 691 Eiehl y. City of San Jose, 101 Cal. 442, 1545 Eife y. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422, 416, 417, 418, 419 Eigdon y. Conley, 141 111. 568, 501 Eigdon v. Conley, 43 111. App. 593, 375 Biggies v. Ernev, 154 U. S. 244, 839 Eiggs v. Adams, 12 Ind. 199, 1955, 1956 Biggs v. American Tract Society, 95 N. Y. 503, 1819, 1820, lb23 Biggs v. American, etc., Society, 84 N. Y. 330, 1818, 1819, 1823, 1825 Eiggs y. Hawley, 116 Mass. 596, 210, 1475 Eiggs v. Magmder, 2 Cr. C. C. 143, 661 Eiggs y. Weise, 24 Wis. 545, 2248 Bikhoff. v. Brown's, etc., Machine Co., 68 Ind. 388, 1325 Eiley y. Hartford, etc., Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Eep. 315, 119 Biley y. Kepler, 94 Ind. 308. 993 Eiley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201, 1771, 1783 Eiley v. McNamara, 83 Texas, 11, 396 Eiley v. Norman, 39 Ark. 158, 2167 Eiley v. Eiley, 25 Conn. 154, 618 Eiley v. Vaughn, 116 Mo. 169, 1675 Eiley v. Walker, 6 Ind. App. 622, 2171 Eiley y. White, 6 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 272, 465 Eiley v. Wilson, 86 Texas, 245, 1672 Eindge y. Baker, 57 N. Y. 209, 827, 847, 1143 Eindge VrColeraine, 11 Gray, 157, 542 Bind™ y. Society, 146 Mass. 2S6, 1241 Bindskoff y. Barrett, 14 Iowa, 101, 914 Eindskopf y. Myers, 87- Wis. 80, 1856 Eingle v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 164 Pa. St. 529, 587 Eingo v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 563, 1392 Bio Grande Cattle Co. v. Burns, 82 Texas, 50, 1452 Eipiey v. .Etna Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136, 869 Bipley v. Case, 86 Mich. 261, 362 Eipiey v. Crooker, 47 Maine, 370, 816, 819 Bipley v. Greenleaf, 2 Vt. 129, 765 Bipley v. McClure, 4 Exch. 345, 498, 500, 2221 Eishton v. Whatmore, L. E. 8 Ch. Dlv. 467, 677 Eising v. Curnmings, 47 Vt. 345, 518, 527 Eisloy v. Brown, 67 N. Y. 160, MS Eisley v. Smith, 64 N. Y. 576, 298 Eisley v. Village of Howell, 57 Fed. Eep. 514, 1536 Eison v. Newberry, 90 Va. 513, 981, 1059, 1092, 1136, 1152 Eistine v. State, 20 Ind. 328, 2126 Eitchie v. Atkinson, 10 East, 295, 135 Ritenour y. Mathews, 42 Ind. 7, 198 Ritger v. Parker, 8 Cush. 145, 642 Eiver Rendering Co. v. Behr, 7 Mo. App. 345, 1479 Eiver Steamer Co., In re, L. E. 6 Ch. App. 822. 196 Eivers v. Thayer, 7 Rich. Eq. 136, 227 Eives v. Duke, 105 U. S. 132, 874 Rives y. Lamar, 94 Ga. 186, 1216 Roach v. Dickinsons, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 154, 2200 Ron t y. Puff, 3 Barb. 353, 424, 425 ll.iub y. Bancroft, 13 Kan. 123; 854 Eobbins v. Alton, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Mo. 380, 1950 Eobbins v. Armstrong, 84 Va. 810, 1718 Eobbins v. Board, etc., Morgan Co., 91 Ind. 537, 1485 Eobbins v. Clark, 129 Mass. 145, 1131 Eobbins v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142, 2244 Eobbins v. Kimball, 55 Ark. 414, 878 Robbins v. Morgan, 56 Minn. 304, 1127 Eobbins v. Webb, 68 Ala. 393, 2077 Eoberge v. Winne, 144 N. Y. 709, 144, 2274, 2275 Boberts v. Blair, 11 Colo. 64, 1933 Eoberts v. Brett, IS C. B. 561, 116 Roberts v. Brett, 11 H. L. C. 337, 769 Eoberts y. Brett, 34 L. J. C. P. 241, 869 Boberts v. Bury Commissioners, L. R. 4 C P 755 299 Eoberts v.'Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600, 258 Eoberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 207, 211i4 Eoberts v. Columbet, 63 Cal. 22, 153 Eoberts v. Deming Wood Working Co., Ill N. C. 432, 1234 Eoberts v. Derby, 23 N. Y. Supl. 34, 1055 Eoberts v. Derby, 68 Hun, 299, 969 Eoberts v. EUwood, 116 N. Y. 651, 545 Eoberts v. Frisby, 38 Texas, 219, 2008 Eoberts v. Griswold, 35 Vt. 496, 220, 262 Eoberts v. Hartford, b6 Maine, 460, 1709 Eoberts v. Jenkins, 21 N. H. 116, 333 Eoberts v. Levy (Cal. 1*92) , 31 Pac. Eep. 570, 1907, 1908 Boberts v. Morgan, 2 Cow. 438, 231 Eoberts v. Eockbottom Co., 7 Mete. 46, 654 Roberts v. Summit Park Co., 72 Hun, 458, 646 Eoberts v. Ward. 4 McLean, 565, 233 Eoberts v. Washington Nat. Bank, 11 Wash 550 1297 Eoberts y. Watkins, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 592, 127 Robertson v. American, etc., Association, 69 Am. Dec. 150, 1599, 1611 Robertson v. French, 4 East, 135, 870 Robertson v. Hayes, 83 Ala. 290, 1898 Robertson v. Hogsheads, 3 Leigh, 667, 1136 Robertson v. Homestead, etc., Associa- tion, 69 Am. Doc. 163, 1610 Robertson y. March, 4 111. 198, 817 Robertson v. Marsh, 42 Texas, 149, 1038 Robertson y. Maxcey, 6 Dana, 101, 443 Robertson v. National Steamship Co., 139 N. Y. 416, 933 Eobertson v. Paul, 16 Texas, 472, 431 Eobertson v. Robertson, 25 Iowa, 350, 1735 Robertson v. Smith, 13 Johns. 459, 828 Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 1496, 2156 Robeson v. Whitesldes, 16 S. & E. 320, 755 Robinson v. Appleton, 124 111. 276, 1107 Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379, 1386 Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 710, 1893 RobiDSon v. Bland, 1 W. Bl. 234, 696 Robinson v. Bullock, 66 Ala. 548, 955 Robinson v. Bullock, 58 Ala. 618, 859, 863 Robinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa, 240, 460 Robinson v. Charleston, 2 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 317, 460 Eobinson v. Cook, 6 Taunt. 336, 394 Eobinson v. Cushman, 2 Denio, 10, 790 Eobinson v. Davison, L. E. 6 Ex. 269, 283 Eobinson v. Detroit, 84 Mich. 658, 527 Eobinson v. Doolittle, 12 Vt. 246, 473 Eobinson v. Gilman, 43 N. H. 485, 594, 597, 598, 607 Eobinson v. Godfrey, 2 Mich. 408, 2239 Eobinson v. Gordon, 23 Up. Can. Q. B. 143, 668 Eobinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55, 204, 205, 206 Eobinson v. Green, 3 Met. (Mass.) 159, 1859, 1901 Eobinson v. Harris, 5 Ky. Law Eep. 928, 1236 Eobinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341, 2154 Eobinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544, 9, 10, 11, 41 Eobinson v. Jarvis, 25 Mo. App. 421, 117 Eobinson v. Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40, 187, 188, 199 TABLE OF CASES. clxi [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81, 2116 Robinson v. McAfee, 59 Mich. 375, 183 Robinson v. McCracken, 52 Fed. Rep. 726, 1304 Robinson v. McFaul, 19 Mo. 549, 565 Robinson v. McNeill, 51 111. 225, 334 Robinson v. Miller, 2 Bush, 179, 207 Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. L. 802, 922 Robinson v. Neill, 34 W. Va. 128, 1677 Robinson v. Page, 3 Russ. 114, 691 Robinson v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 32 Pa. St. 334, 156, 157 Robinson v. Haynor, 28 N. Y. 494, 186 Robinson v. Reiuhart, 137 Ind. 674, 1000 Robinson v. Ring, 72 Maine, 140, 249, 250, 252 Robinson v. Robinson, 9 Gray, 447, 490 Robinson v. Sanders, 24 Miss. 391, 2188 Robinson v. Siple, 129 Mo. 208, 975 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222, 1307, 2284 Robinson v. Stow, 39 111. 568, 854 Robinson v. United States, 13 Wall. 363, 879, 891, 931 Robinson v. Ward, 8 Q. B. 920, 397 Robinson v. Woodford, 37 W. Va. 377, 1667 Robison v. McCracken, 52 Fed. Rep. 726, 1306 Robnett v. Robnett, 43 111. App. 191, 794 Robson v. Mississippi Logging Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 893, 220, 2237 Roby v. Carter, 6 Texas C. App. 295, 1990 Roby v. Phelon, 118 Mass. 541, 1745 Roby v. West, 4 N. H. 285, 1902 Roche v. Roanoke, etc., Seminary, 56 Ind. 198, 215 Rochester, City of, v. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 302, 1502 Rochester Land Co. v. Davis, 79 Hun, 69, 1060 Rockafellow v. Baker, 41 Pa. St. 319, 981 Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 111. 186, 1713, 2287 Rockebrandt v. City of Madison, 9 Ind. App. 227, 1573 Rockey's Estate. In re, 155 Pa. St. 453, 578 Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Sage, 65 111. 328, 1314 Rockhill v. Spraggs, 9 Ind. 30, 48 Rock Island Lumber Co., etc., v. Fair- mount Town Co., 51 Kan. 394, 1143 Rockland, etc., Steamboat Co. v. Sewall, 80 Maine, 400, 154, 1321 Rockwell v. Charles, 2 Hill, 499, 2114 Rockwell v. Elkhorn Bank, 13 Wis. 653, 1348 Rockwell v. Newton, 44 Conn. 333, 890 Rockwood v. Walcott, 3 Allen, 458, 954 Roddy v. Fitzgerald, 6 H. L. C. 823, 884 Rodemacher v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 41 Iowa, 297, 2133 Rodgers v. Brazeale, 34 Ala. 512, 1658 Rodgers V. Jones, 129 Mass. 420, 668 Rodgers v. Maw, 15 M. & W. 444, 781 Rodgers v. Olshoffsky, 110 Pa. St. 147, 1174 Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519, 663, 669 Rodgers v. Smith, 2 Ind. 526, 356 Rodman v. Rodman, 54 Ind. 444, 993 Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 501, 636 Roe v. Conneley, 74 N. Y. 201, 952 Roe v. Moore, 35 N. J. Eq. 526, 1661 Roe v. Taylor, 45 111. 4S5, 1026 Roe v. Vernon, 5 East, 51, 862 Roehers v. Remhoff, 55 N. J. Law, 475, 1549 Roehl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311, 1177 Roehner v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 160, 764, 765 Roesner v. Hermann, 8 Fed. Rep. 782, 584 Rogan v. Wabash Railway Co., 51 Mo. App. 665, 1966 Roger Williams Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 43 Mich. 252, 950 Rogers v. Adams, 66 Ala. 600, 1642 Rogers v. Atkinson, 1 Ga. 12, 854 Rogers v. Ball, 54 Geo. 15, 518 Rogers v. Brightman, 10 Wis. 55, 651, 655 Rogers v. City of Spokane, 9 Wash. 168, 528 Rogers v. Colt, 21 N. J. Law, 704, 904 xi Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 643 Rogers v. De Bardeleban Coal and Iron Co., 97 Ala. 154, 1804 Rogers v. Decker, 131 N. Y. 490, 1370, 1388 Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589, 236, 244 Rogers v. Hadloy, 2 H. & C. 227, 691 Rogers V. Hargo, 92 Tenn. 35, 1611, 1624 Rogers v. Ingham, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 351, 800 Rogers v. Inhabitants of Greenbush, 58 Maine, 90, 462 Rogers v. Kingston, 10 Moore, 97, 1882 Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114, 802 Rogers v. Le Sueur County, 57 Minn. 434, 1574 Rogers v. Maddocks, L. R. (1892) 3 Ch. 346, 2034, 2045 Rogers v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 121 Ind. 570, 896 Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Wis. 36, 92 Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 440, 199, 954 Rogers v. Saunders, 16 Maine, 92, 753 Rogers v. Sheerer, 77 Maine, 323, 863 Rogers v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 324, 883 Rogers v. Stephens, 86 N. Y. 623, 1535 Rogers v. Torbut, 58 Ala. 523, 1157 Rogers v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Ind. 169, 2105 Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Maine, 222, 170 Rogers v. Wiley, 131 N. Y. 527. 200, 203 Rogers v. Woodruff, 23 Ohio St. 632, 125 Rogers v. Yarnell, 51 Ark. 198, 475 Rogers Mach, Works v. Helm, 154 U. S. 610, 1124,1190 Rohr v. Baker, 13 Ore. 350, 186 Rollin v. Pickett, 2 Hill, 552, 99 Rolph v. Crouch, L. R. 3 Exch. 44, 370 Rolt v. Cozens, 18 C. B. 673, 1J4 Roll v. Raguet, 4 Ohio, 400, 1853, 1863 Roller v. Ott, 14 Kan. 609, 2047 Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513, 1040 Rome R. Co. v. Chattanooga Co., 94 Ga. 422, 1413 Romeyn v. Sickles, 108 N. Y. 650, 2176 Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327, 304, 745 Ronanye v. Sherrard, 11 Irish Rep. (C. L.) 146, 635 Rondeau v. Wyatt, 2 N. Bl. R. 63, 656 Roof v. Stafford, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 179, 1789 Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 589, 1744 Roop, Appeal of, v. Real Estate, etc., Co., 132 Pa. St. 496, 1746 Roosa v. Crist, 17 111. 450, 715 Roosevelt v. Bull's Head Bank, 45 Barb. 579 381 399 Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 1002 Root v. Great Western R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524, 735, 738 Root v. Johnson, 99 Ala. 90, 1430 Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 2263 Root v. Reynolds, 32 Vt. 139, 1663 Root v. Sinnock, 120 111. 350, 1399 Root v. Stevenson, 24 Ind. 115, 1930 Roper v. Johnson, L. R. 8 C. P. 167, 150, 492, 494, 2213, 2221, 2222 Ropes v. Upton, 125 Mass. 258, 2049 Roquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525, 727 Rorer Iron Co. t. Trout, 83 Va. 397, 995 Roscorla v.Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234, 192 Rose v. Bunn, 21 N. Y. 275, 432 Rose v. Cash, 58 Ind. 278, 993 Rose v. Daniels, 8 R. I. 381, 519 Rose v. Duncan, 49 Ind. 269, 398 Rose v. Foord, 96 Cal. 152, 194 Rose v. Meeks (Iowa), 59 N. W. Rep. 30, ,352 Rose v. Mitchell, 6 Colo. 102, 1902 Rose v. Nicholas (1794), Wythe R.59 (new ed. 268), 1093, 1179 Rose v. O'Riley, 111 Mass. 57, 371 Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. St. 190, 162 Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 361. 1972, 1992, 1993 Roseboom v. Whittaker, 132 111. 81, 1354, 1403 Rosenberg v. Doe, 146 Mass. 191, 521 clxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Rosenberger v. Jones, 118 Mo. 559, 1197 Rosenburg v. Northumberland Building Society. L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 373, 174, 1616 Hosenfeld y. New, 10 N. Y. Supl. 232, 514 Rosepaugh v. Vredenburgh, 16 Hun, 60, 693 Rosenthal y. Freeburger, 26 Md. 75, 846 Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 382, 58 Ross v. Baker, 72 Pa. St. 186, 1171 Ross v. Espy, 66 Pa. St. 481, 599 Ross v. Hannan, 19 Can. S. C. R. 227, 124 Ross v. Hawkeys Ins. Co., 83 Iowa, 586, 118 Ross y. Kennison, 38 Iowa, 396, 246 Boss v. Milne, 12 Leigh, 201, 239 Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 1112 Ross t. Ross, 47 Mich. 185, 1697 Ross v. Ross, 6 Hun, 80, 194 Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166, 180, 2030, 2078 Ross v. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200, 1551 Ross t. Union Pac. R. Co., 1 Woolw. 26, 1101, 1203 Ross v. Worthington, 11 Minn. 438, 1082 Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512, 847 Rossiter v. Cooper, 23 Vt. 522, 133 Rossiter v. Miller, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 648, 5 Roswell v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196, 192 Roth v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 2251 Roth v. Goerger, 113 Mo. 556, 1200 Rotherham, etc., Co., In re, 50 Law T. R. (N. S.) 219, 1309, 1310 Rothmiller v. Stein, 143 N. Y. 581, 1331 Rothrock y. Perkinson, 61 Ind. 39, 1955, 1956 Rothschild v. Brookman, 5 Bligh, 165, 1856 Rothschild y. Frensdorf, 21 Mo. App. 318, 117 Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Greenl. 454, 165 Rounds v. Smith, 42 111. 245, 451 Roundtree v. Smith, 108 U. S. 269, 1916, 1917 Rouse v. Manchester, etc., Bank, 46 Ohio St. 193, 1390 Rousillon v. RousOlon, L. R. 14 Ch. Diy. 351, 2041, 2046, 2075 Routledge v. Worthington Co., 119 N. Y. 592, 46, 47 Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 Ellis & B. 123, 642 Rowe y. Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. 165, 402 Rowland y. Old Dom. Building Associa- tion, 116 N. Car. 877, 1622 Rowland y. Old Dominion, etc., Associa- tion, 115 N. Car. 825, 1606, 1612, 1622 Rowland y. Phalen, 1 Bosw. 43, 161 Rowland y. State, 12 Texas App. 418, 2147 Rowley y. Ball, 3 Cow. 303, 400 Rowley y. Stoddart, 7 Johns. 207, 540, 572, 818, 819 Rownetree y. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141, 552 Rowton v. Rowton, 1 Henning and Mun- ford s, 92, 1179 Roxbury, City of, v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 6Cush. 424, 1(39 Roy y. Boteler, 40 Mo. App. 213, 126, 127, 2236 Roy Co. y. Hartley Co., 11 Wash. 399, 1289, 1290 Roynl Ins. Co. y. Dayies, 40 Iowa, 469, 824 Royall v. Virginia, 121 IT. S. 102, 32 Royall y. Virginia, 116 U. S. 572, 2159 RozeU y. Vansyckle, 11 Wa^h. 79, 624, 2291 Ruble v. Turner, 2 Hen. & Mj inf. 38, 574 Ruby y. Railroad Co., 8 W. Va. 269, 465 Ruchizky t. De Hayen, '.17 Pa. St. 202, 1931 Eucker y. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396, 629, 844 Ruckmaboye y. Mottichund, 8 Moore P. C.4, 716 Ruckman v. Bryan, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 340, 19:38 Ruckman y. Pitcher, 1 N. Y. 392, 1939 Rude y. Mitchell, 97 Mo. 365, 960 Hudolh T. Winters, 7 Neb. 15, 1920, 1922, 1930 Rue y. Miers, 43 N. J. Eq. 377, 206 Rue y. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 74 Texas, 474, 2086 Rue y. Rue, 21 N. J. Law, 369, 95, 100 Ruege y. Gates, 71 Wis. 634, 12 Ruesens v. Mexican Co., 20 Central Law Jour. 34. 488 Rugan y. Sabin, 53 Fed. Rep. 415, 1010 Rugg y. Minett, 11 East, 210, 295 Ruggles y. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 2133 Ruggles y. Keeler, 3 John. 263, 716 Rulon v. Inhabitants of Woolwich, 55 N. J. Law, 489, 1571 Rumely v. Emmons, 85 Mich. 511, 334, 335, 337, 345 Rumsey y. Berry, 65 Maine, 570, 1869, 1918, 1922 Rumsey Strange y. Crowley, 91 Mo. 287, 70 Rush y. Vought, 55 Pa. St. 437, 1684 Hushing y. Clancey, 92 Ga. 769, 1658 Rushton y. Burke, 6 Dakota, 478, 460 Rushyille Gas Co. v. City of Rushvffle, 121 Ind. 206, 1532, 1573 Rusk y. Gray, 83 Ind. 589, 518 Rusk y. Soutter, 67 Barb. 371, 542 Ruppe y. Peterson, 67 Mich. 437, 604 Russel y. Palmer, 2 Wils. 325, 797 Russell y. Alabama Midland R. Co., 94 Ga..510, 1432 Russell y. Allerton, 10s N. Y. 288, 130, 131, 860 RusseU y. Annable, 109 Mass. 72, 2184 Russell y. Burton, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 539, 1887 Russell y. Cook, 3 Hill, 504, 213 Russell y. Failor, 1 Ohio St. 327, 826 Russell y. Hadduck, 3 Gilm. 233, 375 Russell y. Lea, 1 Ley. 86, 1772 RusseU y. Lytle, 6 Wend. 390, 526 Russell y. Merrifield, 131 Ind. 148, 860 Russell y. Murdock, 79 Iowa, 101, 2109 Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112, 125, 149 Russell y. People's, etc., Bank, 39 Mich. 671, 1696, 1746 Russell y. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171, 238 Russell y. Place, 94 TJ. S. 606, 1217 Russell y. Richards, 10 Maine, 429, 643 Russell y. Rogers, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 474, 1637 Russell y. Sa da Bandeira, 13 C. B. N. S. 149, 299 Russell y. Slade, 12 Conn. 455, 653 Russell y. Stewart, 64 N. Car. 487, 2191 Russell y. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170, 60, 188 Russell y. Sweezey, 22 Mich. 235, 1176 Russell y. Winne, 37 N. Y. 591, 1646 Rust y. Strickland (Colo. 1895), 40 Pac. Rep. 350, 1124 Rutherford y. Hill, 22 Ore. 218, 1407 Rutherford y. Morris, 77 111. 397, 1022 Rutherford y. Stoyel, 12 Up. Can. C. P. 9, 757 Rutherford y. Tracy, 43 Mo. 325, 892, 1174 Ruthrauff y. Hagenbuch, 58 Pa. St. 103, 296 Rutland's Case, 5 Coke, 26, 517, 553 Rutland, Town of, y. Paige, 24 Vt. 181, 1058 Rutland R. Co. y. Central Vermont R. Co., 63 Vt. 1, 2149 Rutlege y. Price Co., 66 Wis. 35, 460 Rutter y. Kilpatrick, 63 N. Y. 604, 1462 Ryan y. Goodwyn, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 451, 1071 Ryan v. Gross, 68 Md. 377, 581, 588 Ryan y. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 74, 1937 Ryan y. Price (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Rep. 734, 1015 Ryan y. Railway Co., 21 Kan. 365, 1226 Ryan v. Riddle, 78 Mo. 521, 829 Ryan v. Rogers, 96 Cal. 349, 2211 Ryan v. Ryan, 61 Texas, 173, 1739 Ryan v. Ulmer, 108 Pa. St. 332, 348, 352 Ryan y. United States, 136 U. S. 68, 684 Ryan y. Ward, 48 N. Y. 204, 190, 465, 520 Ryce y. City of Osage, 88 Iowa, 558, 1511 Ryder y. Hathaway, 21 Pick. 298, 123 Ryder y. Loomis, 161 Mass. 161, 1152 Ryder y. Wombwell, L. R. 23 Ex. 90, 1799 Ryer y. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 134, 60 Ryno y. Darby, 20 N. J. Eq. 231, 951, 2108 TABLE OF CASES. clxiii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. s Saalfleld v. Maniw, 165 Pa. 114, 208 Sabin v. Columbia River Co., 25 Ore. 15, 1363 Sabin v. The Senate, 90 Mich. 177, 118 Sackett v. Sackett, 14 N. Y. St. Sep. 251, 231 Sacketts, etc., Bank v. Codd, 18 N. Y. 240, 1895 Sacramento, City of, v. Dunlap, 14 Cal. 421, 172 Sadler v. Niesz, 5 Wash. 182, 1762 Sadler v. Nixon, 5 Barn. & Ad. 936, 826 Safety, etc., Sable Co. v. Baltimore, 66 Fed. Rep. 140, 1584 Safford v. McDonough, 120 Mass. 290, 668 Sage v. Ranney, 2 Wend. 532, 406 Sage v. Valentine, 23 Minn. 102, 532, 535 Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81, 593, 594, 683 Saginaw Gas Light Co. v. City of Sagi- naw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529, 1504, 1582 Sainsbury v. Matthews, 4 M. & W. 343, 636 Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716, 757, 2039, 2045 Salazar v. Taylor, 18 Colo. 538, 486 Salem Milldam Corp. v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23, 1321 Saleno v. Neosho City (Mo. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 190, 1518 Salfield v. Sutter Co., etc., Reclamation Co., 94 Cal. 546. 1275 Salinas v. Ellis, 26 So. Car. 337, 401 Salinas v. Stillman, 66 Fed. Rep. 677, 985 Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458, 275 Salmon v. Davis, 4 Binney (Pa.), 375, 543 Salmon, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446, 686, 692 Salmon Falls Co. v. Bark Tangier, 1 Clif- ford, 396, 124 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Portsmouth Co., 46 N. H. 249, 863 Saloy v. City of New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 79, 2145 Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 373, 2129 Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205, 385, 386, 766 Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 1577 Saltmarsh v. Spaulding, 147 Mass. 224, 1296 Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390. 2114 Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 1706 Sammis v. Clark. 13 111. 544, 1948 Sample v. Bridgforth, 72 Miss. 293, 2280 Sample v. Hale, 34 Neb. 220, 1493 Sampson v. Burnside, 13 N. H. 264, 640 Sampson v. Camperdown, etc., Mills, 64 Fed. 939, 631 Sampson v. City of Boston, 161 Mass. 288, 1496 Sampson v. Gazzam, 6 Port. 123, 915 Sampson v. Jackson, 103 Ala. 550, 1644, 1645 Sampson v. Sampson, 63 Maine, 328, 2158 Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145, 822, 2060, 2072 Samson v. Thornton, 3 Mete. 275, 15 Samuels v. Oliver, 130 HI. 73, 913, 1892, 2060, 2072 San Antonio v. French, 80 Texas, 575, 1500, 1522 San Antonio Brewing Association v. Arc- tic Ice Co., 81 Texas, 99, 164, 168, 169 Sanborn v. Benedict, 78 111. 309, 1919 Sanborn v. Clough, 40 N. H. 316, 884 Sanborn v. Cole, 63 Tt. 590, 476 Sanbom v. Doe, 92 Cal. 152, 1302 Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen, 474, 678, 687 Sanborn v. Sarnborn (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 371, 1006 Sanders v. Bagwell, 32 S. Car. 238, 180 Sanders v. Branch Bank, 13 Ala. 353, 536 Sanders v. Bryer, 152 Mass. 141, 381 Sanders v. Carter, 91 Ga. 450, 755, 761 Sanders v. Clason, 13 Minn. 379, 1459 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250, _ , _ , 596,614,615,616 Sanders v. Hutchmson,26 111. App. 633, 128 Sanders v. Ochiltree, 5 Porter, 73, 766 Sanders v. Pottlitzer, 144 N. Y. 209, 3, 83 Sanders v. Smith, 5 Misc. Rep. 1, 2170 Sanders v. Wilson, 19 D. C. 555, 163 Sanderson v. Railway Co., 11 Beav. 497, 1122 Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 1792 Sandidge v. Sanderson, 21 La. Ann. 757, 2022 San Diego v. San Diego, etc., R. Co., 44 Cah 106, 1304, 1590 ban Diego Water Co. v. San Diego Flume Co., 108 Cal. 549, 1215 San Diego Water Co. v. City of San Diego, 59 Cal. 517, 1508 Sandilands v. Marsh, 2 Barn. & Aid. 673, 684 Sands v. Crooke, 46 N. Y. 564, 10, 74, 335 Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 585, 32, 2159 Sands v. Gelton, 15 Johns. 511, 194 Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 18, 386, 389, 763 Sands v. Smith, 1 Neb. 108, 721 Sands v. Sparling, 63 N. Y. St. Rep. 558, 1659 Sands v. Thompson, 43 Ind. 18, 843 Sanford v. Abrams, 24 Fla. 181, 525 Sanford v. Bartholomew, 10 Wash. St. 35, 1145 Sanford v. Bulkley, 30 Conn. 344, 399, 401 Sanford v. Claflin, 18 N. Y. Supl. 295, 2180 Sandford v. Sornborger, 26 Neb. 295, 1830, 1831 Sandford Fork and Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312, 1303, 1396 San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453, 782, 1508 Sang v. City of Duluth, 58 Minn. 81, 1490 Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 1322, 1325, 1371, 1398, 1400 San Joaquin, etc., Water Co. v. Beecher, 101 Cal. 70, 1320 San Joaquin Water Co. v. West, 94 Cal. „ 399 1320 San Jose Sav. Bank v. Sierra Lumber Co., 63 Cal. 179, 1339 Sankey v. Cook, 78 Iowa, 419, 476 Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 315, 2073 Santa Ana Water Co. v. Buenaventura, 56 Fed. Rep. 339, 1560, 1578, 1590 Santa Clara, etc., Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 1425, 2029, 2058, 2060 Santa Cruz R. Co. v. Spreckles, 65 Cal. 193, 1296 Saratoga County Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87, 1867, 2069 Saratoga, etc., Bank v. Pruyn, 90 N. Y. 250, 1696 Sargeant v. Butts, 21 Vt. 99, 2109 Sargent v. Graham, 5 N. H. 440, 390 Sargent v. Metcalf , 5 Gray, 306, 170 Sargent v. Webster, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 497, 1406 Sarmiento v. Davis Boat Co. (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 205, 1282 Satterfield v. Spurlock, 21 La. Ann. 771, 2022 Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (TJ. S.) 380, 2119 Satterthwaite v. Emley, 4 N. J. Eq. 489, 620, 171T Saul v. His Creditors, 17 Martin (5 N. S.), 569, 708 Sauls v. Freeman, 24 Fla. 209, 32 Saunders v. Brock, 30 Texas, 421, 2179 Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259, 387, 398, 399, 401 Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238, 675 Saunders v. Kastenbine, 6 B. Mon. 17, 651 Saunders v. New York, etc., R. Co., 144 N. Y. 75, 35, 36 Saunders v. Richard, 35 Fla. 28, 996, 2284, 2285 Saum v. Shell, 45 Kan. 205, 415 Saunders v. Topp, 4 Ex. 390, 662 Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 Barn. & Aid. 595, 591,683 Saunders v. Wood, 1 Munf. 406, 830 clxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Saunderson v. JacKson, 2 Bos. & Pul. 238, 688 Sauner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 41 Mo. App. 480, 270 Savage v. Bartlott, 78 Md. 561, 1330 Savage v. Blanchard, 148 Mass. 348, 545, 1492 Snvage T. City of Salem, 23 Ore. 381, 1556 Savage v. Everman, 70 Pa. St. 315, 538 8i vace v. Foster, 9 Mod. 35, 223 Savage v. Lichlyter, 59 Ark. 1, 1771 S;,\ LLUuali, etc., R. Co. v. Atkinson, 94 Ga. 7S0, 978 S , vf-rv y. Kins, 5 H. L. 627, 1009 ba\ die •, . Welch, 58 Yt. 683, 781 S.i\ Lugs Bank v. Benton, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 240, 1282 Savings Bank of San Diego County v. Bums, 104 Cal. 473, 1873 Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 289, 831 Sawtells v. Howard (Mich. 1885), 62 N.W. Hep. 156, 1217 Sawyer v. Brossart, 67 Iowa, 678, 68, 71 Sawyer v. Colgan, 102 Cal. 283, 33 Sawyer v. Cox, 63 111. 130, 1243 Sawyer v. Haley, 6 Gray, 243, 552 Sawyer v. Hebard's Estate, 58 Vt. 375, 793 Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, 1375, 1398, 1400 Sawyer v. McLouth, 46 Barb. 350, 232 Sawyer v. Menominee Loan Association (Mich. 1894), 61 N. W. Bep. 521, 1602 Saxon v. Whitaker, 30 Ala. 237, 2278 Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488, 1520 Sayles v. Sayles, 21 N. H. 312, 2007 Sayles v. Wellman, 10 E. I. 465, 2111 Saylor's Case, 14 Ct. CI. 453, 496 Sayre v. Harpold, 33 W. Va. 553, 32 Savre v. Louisville, etc., Association, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 143, 19S3 Savre v. Wheeler, 32 Iowa, 559, 2100 Scales v. Ashbrook, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 358, 1074 Scales v. Maude, 6 De G., M. & G. 43, 557 Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 2094 Scammon v. Denio, 72 Cal. 393, 2224 Scanlan v. Hodges, 52 Fed. Eep. 354, 9U5 Scanlan v. Keith, 102 111. 634, 1360 Scarborough v. Watkins, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540. 1672 Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 Mees. & W. 270, 1042, 2095 Scarlett v. Snodgrass, 92 Ind. 262, 1755 Scarman v. Castell, 1 Esp. 270, 184 Scarritt v. St. John's Church, 7 Mo. App. 174, 676 Scarth v. Security, etc., Society, 75 Iowa, 346, 119 Sceva v. True, 53 N. H. 627, 775 Schaben v. Brunning, 74 Iowa, 102, 209 Schallard v. Eel River, etc., Navigation Co.. 70 Cal. 144. 1276 Schallert-Ganahl L. Co. v. Neal, 90 Cal. 213 22°2 Schallert-Ganahl Co. v. Neal, 91 Cal. 362, 476 Schaps v. Lehner, 54 Minn. 208, 1(125 Scharf v. Moore, 102 Ala. 468, 1744 Scharffbillig v. Scharfbillig, 51 Minn. 359, 461 Scheftel v. Hays, 58 Fed. Rep. 457, 1010 Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 138, 372 Scheik v. Trustees, 24 111. App. 369, 473 Scheland v. Erpelding, 6 Ore. 258, 890 Schell v. Stephens, 50 Mo. 375, 355 ScliemerUorn v. Yanderheyden, 3 Am. Dec. 304, 895 Sciienck v. Saunders, 13 Gray, 37, 885, 886 Schenectady, City of, v. Trustees of Union College, 21 N. Y. Supl. 147, 1467, 1488 Schenectady, etc., Plank R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102, 260 Schepp v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 6. 1742, 1743 Scherer v. Ingerman, 110 Ind. 428, 483 Scherff v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 81 Texas, 471, 31 Schermerhorn v. Niblo, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 161, Ull Schermerhorn v. Talman, 14 N. Y. 94, 1972 Schetter v. Southern Oregon Co., 19 Ore. 192, 1247 Schettler v. Jones, 20 Wis. 412, 2248 Schewsbury, Earl of, v. Gould, 2 B. & Aid. 487 883 Schields v. Horback, 30 Neb. 536, 120, 1111 Schiffer v. Dietz, 83 N. Y. 300, 998, 1009 Schierl v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 69, 446, 457 Schilling v. Durst, 42 Pa. St. 126, 527 Schillinger v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 278, 776 Schipper v. City of Aurora, 121 Ind. 154, 1511 Schley v. Pullman's, etc., Car Co., 120 U. S. 575, 1642 Schlitz Brewing Co. v. McCann, 118 Pa. St. 314, 2262 Schloss v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2089 Schloss v. Montgomery Co., 87 Ala. 411, 154 Schlosser v. State, 55 Ind. 82, 2244 Schmaltz v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655, 2184 Schmerhorn v. Vanderneyden, 1 Johns. 139, 236 Schmid v. Schmid, 37 Neb. 629, 1235 Schmidt v. Barker, 17 La. Ann. 261, 1128 Schmidt v. Dean, 31 S. Car. 498, 1683 Schmidt v. Opie, 33 N. J. Eq. 138, 1662 Schmidt v. Reed, 132 N. Y. 108, 753 Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41, 1910 Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529, 662 Schmidt's Estate, In re, 56 Minn. 256, 1673 Schmueckle v. Waters, 125 Ind. 265, 1855 Schnabel v. Betts, 23 Fla. 178, 1699, 1737 Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 211 Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286, 13, 687 Schneider v. Turner, 130 IB. 28, 854, 869, 1927, 2072 Schneider v. Turner, 27 IB. App. 220, 1927 Schoener v. Lessauer, 107 N. Y. Ill, 1828, 1832 Scholefleld v. Robb, 2 Moo. & R. 210, Schofield v. Tompkins, 95 HI. 190, 754 SchoU v. Albany, etc., Steel Co., 101 N. Y. 602, 2172 School Directors v. Kline, 1 Pitts. R. (de- cided last term) , 1487 School Directors v. McBride, 22 Pa. St. 215, 1486 School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, 289 School Dist. v. Estes, 13 Neb. 52, 881 School District v. Rogers, 8 Iowa, 316, 378 School District No. 2 v. Boyer, 46 Kan. 54, 135, 144 School Town of Carthage v. Gray, 10 Ind. App. 428, 272 School Trustees v. Bennett, 27 N. J. Law, 513, 139, 289, 2227, 2237 Schoonmaker v. Hoyt, 148 N. Y. 425, 52 Schopp v. City of St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 1506, 1580, 1581 Schreyerv. Turner Mills Co. (Ore. 1896), 43 Pac. Rep. 719, 1312, 1313, 1314 Schrieber v. Butler, 84 Ind. 576, 107 Schrimpf v. Settegast, 36 Texas, 296, 793 Schriner v. Peters, 39 111. App. 309, 500 Schroder v. Neilson, 39 Neb. 335, 268 Schroeder v. Gemeinder, 10 Nev. 355, 1109 Schroeder v. Stock, etc., Ins. Co., 46 Mo. 174, 897 Schroeder v. Trade Ins. Co. of Camden, 109 111. 157, 895 Schuelenburg v. Martin, 2 Fed. Rep. 747, 470 Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458, 1817, 1818 Schuler v. Myton, 48 Kan. 282, 187, 258 Schultz v. Catlin, 78 Wis. 611, 1833 Schultz v. Culbertson, 46 Wis. 313, 1833 Schultz v. Culbertson, 49 Wis. 122, 1833 Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217, 119 Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143, 1484 Schurman v. Marley, 29 Ind. 458, 1690 Schurr v. Savigny, 85 Mich. 144, 780, 935 Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co., 79 Tex- as, 179, 16S1 TABLE OF CASES. clxv [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.} Schwab v. Coghlan, Daily Beg. (N. Y.) Deo. 4th, 1883, 495 Schwab v. Rigby, 88 Minn. 395, 14, 2108 Schwabacher v. Van Reypen, 6 Wash. 154, 1762 Schwalm v. Holmes, 49 Cal. 665, 2038 Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 111. 18, 289, 2226 Schwarzenbach v. Odorless Excavating Apparatus Co., 65 Md. 34, 801 Schwenk v. Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 1884, 2085 Scipio v. Wright, 101 U. S. 665, 1532 Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572, 2153 Scobey v. Waters, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 563, 1698 Scofleld v. Day, 20 John. 102, 730 Scofleld v. Jones, 85 Ga. 816, 1753 Scofleld v. Parlin, etc., Co., 61 Fed. Eep. 804, 1236 Scofleld v. Quirin, 54 Minn. 9, 1082, 1083 Scoggin v. Slater, 22 Ala. 687, 635 Scollans v. Flynn, 120 Mass. 271, 1949 Scorell v. Boxall, 1 Y. & J. 396, 638 Scothorn v. South Staffordshire Ry. Co., 8Exch. 341, 736 Scotland, County of, ». Thomas, 103 U. S. 523, 1461 Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295, 192 Scott v. Alexander, 1 Wash. (Va.) 77, 543 Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 2224 Scott v. Battle, 85 N. Car. 184, 1740 Scott v. Bourdillion, 5 B. & B. (2 New E.) 213 869 Scott v. Brown, L. E. (1892) 2 Q. B. 724, 1874 Scott v. Brown, 54 Mo. App. 606, 1920, 1924 Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Humph. 467, 215, 1779 Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418. 688 Scott v. Colburn, 26 Beav. 276, 1362 Scott v. Eastern, etc., Ey. Co., 12 M. & W. 33, 662 Scott v. Edes, 3 Minn. 377, 1643 Scott v. Frink, 54 N. Y. 635, 232 Scott v. Godwin, 1 B. & P. 67, 814 Scott v. Hix, 2 Sneed, 192, 340 Scott v. Hix, 62 Am. Dec. 460, 356 Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co., 89 Pa. St. 231, 150, 890 Scott v. Liverpool, 5 Jur. N. S. 105, 858 Scott v. Manchester Print Works, 44 N. H. 507 699 Scott v. Norfolk E. Co. -fVa.) , 17 S. E. Eep. 882, 43 Scott v. Pilkington, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. , 2210 Scott v. School Dist., 67 Vt. 150, 1588 Scott v. Scott, 89 Wis. 93, 1045 Scott v. Scott, 105 Ind. 584, 553 Scott v. Scott, 95 Mo. 300, 13 Scott v. Uxbridge E. Co., L. E. 1 C. P. 596, 405 Scott v. White, 71 IU. 287, 610 Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U. S. 143, 1337, 1375, 1401, 1504 Scranton v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220, 357 Scroggin v. Wood, 87 Iowa, 437, 333 Scrutchfield v. Sauter, 119 Mo. 615, 1S57 Scudder v. Anderson, 54 Mich. 122, 1359 Scudder v. Howe, 44 La. Ann. 1103, 1674 Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 tf. S. 406, 695, 697, 712, 715 Scully v. Kirkpa trick, 79 Pa. St. 324, 303 Scully v.Scully, 28 Iowa, 548, 24,7X9 Seabury v. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 2252 Seagraves v. Alton , 13 IU. 366, 782 Sea Isle City, etc., Association v. McTague (N.J. Err. 1895) , 31 Atl. Rep. 727, 997 Seal v. Puget Sound Loan and Invest. Co., 5 Wash. 422, 1363 Seal v. Puget Sound E. Co., 7 Wash. 487, 1274 Seals v. Martinnant, 2 T. R. 100, 779 Seaman v. Ascherman, 51 Wis. 678, 844, 1201 Seaman v. O'Hara, 29 Mich. 66, 950 Seaman v. Slater, 18 Fed. Rep. 485, 821 Seare v. Prentice, 8 East, 347, 797 Searight v. Calbraith, 4 Dall. 324, 393 Seargeant v. Dwyer, 44 Minn. 309, 101 Searight v. Payne, 6 Lea, 283, 1225, 1421 Searle v. Keeves, 2 Esp. 598, 668 Searles v. Sadgrave, 5 E. & B. 639, 397 Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268, 1824 Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243, 429, 430 Seat v. McWhirter, 93 Tenn. 542, 1026 Seaver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620, 285 Seavey v. Drake, 62 N . H. 393, 851 Seavey v. Seavey, 37 N. H. 125, 794 Seawell v. Berry, 55 Fed. Rep. 731, Seawell v. Henry, 6 Ala. 226, 393 Sebastian Co. v. Codd, 77 Md. 293, 456 Seckel v. Scott, 66 111. 106, 296 Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. 94, 749 Second Nat. Bank v. Heminway, 31 Ohio St. 168, 720 Second Nat. Bank v. O'Rourke, 40 N. J. Eq. 92, 1662 Seculovich v. Morton, 101 Cal. 673, 1161 Security, etc., Association v. Lake, 69 Ala. 456, 157 Sedalia Brewing Co. v. Sedalia Water- works Co. , 34 Mo. App. 49, 876 Sedalia R. Co. v. Abell, 17 Mo. App. 645, 155 Sedalia R. Co. v. Wilkerson, 83 Mo. 235, 259 1329 Seddon v. Rosenbaum, 85 Va. 928, 647, 655 Sedgwick v. Railroad Co., 73 Iowa, 158, 1432 Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289, 1972 1989 1994 Seear v. Cohen, 45 L. T. R. (N. S.) 589, ' 1832 Seeds v. Kahler, 76 Pa. St. 262, 1684 Seeger v. Duthie, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 45, 117 Seeley v. Price, 14 Mich. 541, 1030 Seeley v. San Jose, etc., Lumber Co., 59 Cal. 22, 1296 Seeligson v. Lewis, 65 Texas, 215, 1862, 1863, 1925 Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287, 162 Seibel v. Eapp, 85 Va. 28, 15, 16 Seiber v. Price, 26 Mich. 518, 1832 Seither v. Philadelphia Co., 125 Pa. St. 397, 577 Seitz v. Brewers' Eefrigerating Co., 141 U. S. 510, 334, 335, 342, 344, 350 Seitz v. Machine Co., 141 U. S. Rep. 510, 351 Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580, 1685 Selby v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 490, 314,320 Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2, 687 Selby v. Wilmington, etc., R. E. Co., 113 N. Car. 588, , 1967 Seldonridge v. Connable, 32 Ind. 375, 2171 Self v. Cordell, 45 Mo. 345, 631, 655 Seligman v. Pinet, 78 Mich. 50, 577, 818, 819 Sell v. Steller (N. J. Eq.), 32 Atl. Eep. 211, 244 Sellars v. Johnson, 65 N. Car. 104, 903 Sellers v. Stevenson, 163 Pa. 262, 352 Sells v. Eosedale Grocery Co., 72 Miss. 590, 1389 Selma E. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787, 259, 260 Seminary v. Mott, 136 111. 289, 1234 Semmes v. Worthington. 38 Md. 298, 1191 Semple v. Cook, 50 Cal. 26, 158 Senter v. Williams (Ark.), 17 S. W. Rep. 1029, 471 Serat v. Smith, 40 N. Y. St. Eep. 45, 464 Serrell v. Eothstein, 49 N. J. Eq. 385, 765 Servante v. James, 10 B. & C. 410, 814 Sessions v. Irwin, 8 Neb. 5, 702 Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347, 830 Sessions v. Little, 9 N. H. 271, 696, 699 Setter v. Alvey, 15 Kan. 157, 1040, 2023 Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 749, 1164 Sewall v. Corp, 1 Car. & P. 392, 909 Sewall v. Eastern E. Co., 9 Cush. 5, 260 Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215, 660 Seward v. Havden, 150 Mass. 158, 763 Seward v. Huntington, 94 N. Y. 104, 241 Sewell v. Mead, 85 Iowa, 343, 544 clxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Sewing Machine Co. v. Eadcliff, 63 Md. 496, 1677 Severin v. Rueckerick, 62 Wis. 1, 1S74 Sexton y. Fleet, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 8, 1703 Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 229, 1666 Seyk v. Millers Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 67, 117 Seymour v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 25 Barb. 284, 1435 Seymour v. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239, 536 Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 222 2270 Seymour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292, 165 Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn. 481, 2136 Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 505 Seymour v. Minturn, 17 John. 169, 549 Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Assn., 144 N. Y. 333, 1280, 1291 Shaaber, Appeal of (Pa. Sup.), 17 Atl. Rep. 209, 1446 Shackelford v. New Orleans, etc., Co., 37 Miss. 202, 915 Shackle v. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, 2044 Shackleford v. Ward, 3 Ala. 37, 1942 Shacklett v. Polk, 51 Miss. 378, 714 Shacklett v. Polk, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 104, 1699, 1750 Shadburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355, 200. 204, 206 Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 159, 192, 226 Shaffer v. Kugler, 107 Mo. 58, 1017 Shaffer v. Ryan, 84 Ind. 140, 609 Shaffer v. Union M. Co., 55 Md. 74, 2161 Shaflner v. Pinchback, 133 111. 410, 1871, 1946 Shahan v. Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25, 1181, 1182, 1210 Shakespeare v. Alba, 76 Ala. 351, 631 Shakespeare v. Markham, 10 Hun, 311, 786 Shamp T. Meyer, 20 Neb. 223, 236 Shane v. St. Paul, 26 Minn. 543, 807 Shannon v. Dunn, 43 N. H. 194, 1619 Shardlow v. Cotterell, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 280, 684 Share v. Anderson, 7 S. & R. 43, 2009 Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo. 647, 848, 1210, 1133 Sharlow v. Cotterell, 20 L. R. Ch. Div. 90, 676 Sharon v. Gager, 46 Conn. 189, 1038, 1828, 1832 Sharp v. Bonner, 36 Ga. 418, 485 Sharp v. Carthage. 48 Mo. App. 26, 805 Sharp v. County of Contra Costa, 34 Cal. 284, 2207 Sharp v. Farmer, 4 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 122, 1909 Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 491, 253 Sharp v. San Paulo R. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. 597, 128 Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. 801, 2IM Sharp v. United States, 4 Watts, 21, 171, 172 Sharp v. Wyckoff, 39 N. J. Eq. 376, 955 Sharpe v. Railway Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 597, 1131 Sharpe v. Robertson, 76 Ala. 343, 177 s Sharpe v. Williams, 41 Kan. 56, 574, 821 Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147, 862 Sharringtou v. Strotton, 1 Plowden, 298, 179 Shattock v. Cunningham, 166 Pa. St. Mis, ma, ii7 1 Shattuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42, 355, 357 Shaul v. Rinker, 139 lnd. 163, 1793 Shaver v. Hardin, 82 Iowa, 378, 1367 Shaver v. Mining Co., 10 Cal. 396, 151 1 Shaw v. Barnhart, 17 Ind. 183, 969, 1014, 2167 Shaw v. Beery, 35 Maine, 279, 549 Shaw v. Broadbent, 129 N. Y. 114, 30 Shaw v. Bryant, 19 N. Y. Supl. 018, 1799 Shaw v. Burton, 5 Mo. 478, 525 Shaw v. Campbell Turnpike Road Co. (Ky. 1891), 15 S. W. Rep. 245, 1247 Shaw v. Carbrey, 13 Allen, 462, HI 3 Shaw v. Chicago R. Co., 82 Iowa, 199, 209 Shaw v. Jacobs (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. Y. Rep. 333, 921 Shaw v. Picton, 4 B. & C. 715, 469 Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305, 540, 574, 818 Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605, 1445 Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557, 1346 Shaw v. Republic Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 286, 495 Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Adol. & E. 75, 317 Shaw v. Saranac Horse-Nail Co., 144 N.Y. 220, 1369 Shaw v. Schoonover, 130 111. 448, 1102 Shaw v. Sears, 3 Kan. 242, 398 Shaw v. Smith, 45 Kan. 334, 346 Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197, 454 Shaw v. Trenton, 49 N. J. Law, 399, 1550, 1551 Shaw v. Turnpike Ccx, 2 Pen. & W. 454, 57 Shaw v. Webber, 79 Hun, 307, 581 Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barn. & C. 73, 2283 Shaw Lumber Co. v. Manville (Idaho, 1895),39Pac. Rep. 559, 670 Shawhan v. Zinn, 79 Ky. 300, 1450 Shawmut Bank v. Platsburg & M. R. Co., 31 Vt. 491, 1225 Shay v. Milford, 145 Mass. 528, 1491 Shealy v. Toole, 56 Ga. 210, 192, 193 Sheanon v. Pacific, etc., Co., 83 Wis. 507, 578, 581 Shear v. Wright, 60 Mich. 159, 292 Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315, 32, 1335 Sheehan v. Davis, 17 Ohio St. 571, 1232 Sheehan v. Owen, 82 Mo. 459, 1554 Sheehy v. Adarene, 41 Vt. 541, 649 Sheehy v. Chalmers (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 514, 442 Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 254, 452, 832, 1929 Sheehy v. Miles, 93 Cal. 288, 418, 423 Sheehy v. Shinn, 103 Cal. 325, 1928 Sheet v. Russell, 12 Ind. App. 677, 511 Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 177, 763, 768 Sheid v. Stamps, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 172, 688 Sheffield Canal Co. v. Sheffield, etc., R. Co., 3 Eng. Ry. & C. Cas. 121, 63 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Hull Coke Co., 101 Ala. 416, 115, 924 Sheffield, etc., Iron Co. v. Gordon, 151 U. S. 285, 158, 323 Sheffler v. Nadelhoffer, 133 111. 536, 872 Sheldon v. Benham, 4. Hill, 129, 767 Sheldon v. Hat-Blocking Machine Co., 90 N. Y. 607, 1253 Sheldon v. Haxtun, 91 N. Y. 134, 727 Sheldon v. Mann, 85 Mich. 265, 1642 Sheldon v. Mayers, 81 Wi*. 627, 168 Shelby v. Mikkelson (N. D. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 210, H42 Sheldon v. Pruessner, 52 Kan. 579, 1884, 2240 Sheldon v. Purple, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 405, 1524 Sheldon v. Williams, 11 Neb. 272, 572 Sheldon Axle Company v. Scofield, 85 Mich. 577, 452 Shell v. Duncan, 31 S. Car. 547, 227 Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74, 1364 Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371, ™ , . „, „ ' 1376 ' I 378 Shelrmre v. Williams and Clark Fertilizer Co., 68 Hun, 196, 808 Shelthar v. Gregory, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 422, 1758 Shclton v. Hadlock, 62 Conn. 143, 13S5 Shelton v. Holderness, 94 Ga. 671, 1710 Shelton v. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 84, 7x5 Shelton v. Marshall, 16 Texas, 344, 21)37 Shenandoah, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, 76 Va. 833, 1136 Shopnrd v. Carpenter, 54 Minn. 153, 97, 98 Shopard v. Kain, 5 B. & Al. 240, 328 Shepard v. Little, 14 Johnson, 210, 465 Shcpard v. Rhodes, 7 R. I. 470, 1633 Shepard v. Rinks, 78 111. 183, 621 Shopard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) „ 57 > 1736 blK-mrd v. Weiss (Texas 1894), 28 S. W. Rep. 355, 29 S. W. Rep. 199, 2194 TABLE OF CASES. clxvii [Seferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.1 Sheperd v. Busch, 154 Pa. St. 149, 466 Sheperd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49, 668, 672 Shephard v. Shephard, 7 Johns. Ch. 57, 231 Shepherd v. Buseh, 154 Pa. St. 149, 455, 456, 568 Shepherd v. Gilroy, 46 Iowa, 193, 338 Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Al. 250, 325 Shepherd v. Pressey, 35 Wis. 615, 662 Shepherd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455, 970 Shepherd v. Young, 8 Gray, 152, 183 Sheplar v. Green, 96 Cal. 218, 397 Sheppard v. Earles, 13 Hun, 651, 362 Sheppard v. Spates, 4 Md. 400, 767 Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52, 470 Shepperson v. Shepperson, 2 Gratt. (Ya.) 501, 1672 Sherburne v. Fuller, 5 Mass. 342, 837, 1111 Sherburne v. Goodwin, 44 N. H. 271, 552, 558 Sherburne v. Shaw, 1 N. H. 157, 676 Sheredine v. Gaul, 2 Dall. 190, 391 Sherer v. Trowbridge, 135 Mass. 500, 676 Sheridan Electric Light Co. v. Chatham Nat. Bank, Sup., 5 N. Y. Supl. 529, 1317 Sheriff v. Hull, 37 Iowa, 174, 395 Sherk v. Endress, S. W. & S. (Pa.) 255, 182, 231, 235 Sherman v. Barrett, 1 McMullen L. (S. Car.) 147, 2015 Sherman v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31 Yt. 162, 234, 653 Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59, 1369 Sherman v. New Bedford Bank, 138 Mass. 581, 251 Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Ind. 337, 559 Sherman v. Supervisors, 84 Mich. 1471, Sherman v. Thompson, 11 A. & E. 1027, 301 Sherman v. Wright, 49 N. Y. 227, 1804 Sherman Town Co. v. Swigert, 43 Kan. 292, 1352 Sherrod v. Rhodes, 5 Ala. 683, 828 Sherry, In re, 25 Ch. Div. 692, 60 Sherwin v. Cash Register Co., 5 Colo. App. 162, 58 Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. 516, 556 Sherwood v. Stone, 14 N. Y. 267, 613 Sherwood v. Whiting, 54 Conn. 330, 1175 Shickle v. Chouteau, etc., Co., 10 Mo. App. 241, 903 Shields v. Casey, 155 Pa. St. 253, 1756 Shields v. Clifton, etc., Land Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 1374, 1375, 1398 Shields v. Keys, 24 Iowa, 298, 1677 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 1456, 1581 Shields v. Pattee, 2 Sand. 262, 125, 145 Shiell v. McNitt, 9 Paige, 101, 756 Shimp v. Siedel, 6 Houston (Del.) , 421, 144 Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. (1 Com.) 261, 663 Shiner v. Abbey, 77 Texas, 1, 2180 Shiner v. Jacobs, 62 Iowa, 392, — Shinkle v. Shearman, 7 Ind. App. 399, 1634 Shinn v. Bodine, 60 Pa. St. 182, 150, 890, Shinn v. Roberts, 1 Spencer (N. Y.), 435, 749 Ship v. Crosskill, L. R. 10 Eq. 73, 990 Ship, etc., Building Co. v. Sloan, 21 Fed. Rep. 561, 854 Shipley V. Bunn, 125 Mo. 445, 1794, 1795 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251, 275 Shipley v. Reasoner, 80 Iowa, 548, 1935 Shipman v. Keys, 127 Ind. 353, 1716 Shipman v. Straitsville Co., 158 U. S. 356, 820 Shipp v. Swann, 2 Bibb, 82, 110 Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U. S. 575, 327, 353 Shippy v. Eastwood, 9 Ala. 198, 1898 Shipton v. Casson, 5 B. & C. 378, 145 Shireman v. Jackson, 14 Ind. 459, 664 Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452, 215 Shisler v. Baxter, 109 Pa. St. 443, 348, 352 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 35, 36 Shively v. Semi-Tropic, etc., Water Co., 99 Cal. 259, 963 Shober v. Dutton, 6 Phila. 185, 417 Shober v. Lancaster, etc., Association, 68 Pa. St. 429, 1329 Shoe, etc., Bank v. Wood, 142 Mass. 563, 727 Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111. 404, 2206 Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. St. 9, 2118 Shook v. Vanmater, 22 Wis. 532, 697 Shore v. Wilson, 9 CI. & F. 355, 45, 871, 874, 882, 899 Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 546, 1744 Short y. Short, 8 Q. B. 358, 488 Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29, 227, 617 Shortle v. Terre Haute R. Co., 131 Ind. 338, 8 Shotwell v. Denman, Coxe, 174, 381 Shoshonctz v. Campbell, 7 Utah, 46, 163 Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich. 410, 629 Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho, 108, 462 Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259, 2094 Shovers v. Warrick, 152 111. 355, 1194 Showers v. Robinson, 43 Mich. 502, 1794 Shrewsbury & B. R. Co. v. London & N. W. R. Co., 16 Beav. 441, 1603 Shrewsbury, etc., Co. v. London, etc., Co., 17 Q. B. 652, 2030 Shrewsbury, etc., Railroad Co. v. London, etc., R. Co., 20 L.J. Ch. 90, 2060 Shriner y. Keller, 25 Pa. St. 61, 456 Shriver y. Garrison, 30 W. Ya. 456, 801 Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575, 417, 418, 419 Shriver v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 24 Minn. 506, 1961 Shropshire v. Burns, 46 Ala. 108, 215, 1778 Shropshire v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536, 1948 Shubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665, 1319 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73, 60, 1329 Shugart v. Pattee, 37 Iowa, 429, 380 Staler y. Eckert, 90 Mich. 165, 127 Staler v. Israel, 27 Fed. Rep. 851, 724 Shulters v. Searls, 48 Mich. 550, 2211, 2212 Shultzv. Johnson, 5 B. Monroe, 497, 288 Shultz v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 672, 308 Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa. St. 90, 2108 Shumate v. Farlow, 1113 Ind. 359, 652, 693 Shupe v. Collender, 56 Conn. 489, 334 Shurtz y. Johnson, 28 Gratt. 657, 427 Shuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co., 79 Texas, 179, 1683 Shuster v. Kaiser. Ill Pa. St. 215, 1684 State y. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204, 653, 692 State v. Johnson, 25 Ore. 59, 980 Shutts y. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 9 Sibbald v. Bethelem Iron Co. , 83 N. Y. 378, 8 Siboni v. Kirkman, 1 Mees. & W. 418, 2217 Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23, 190 Sicotte v. Barber, 83 Wis. 431, 518 Siddall v. Clark, 89 Colo. 321, 214 Sidley v. Rider, 54 Maine, 463, 490 Sidney Furniture Co. v. School Dist., 158 Pa. St. 35, I486 Sidwell y. Evans, 1 Penn. & W. (Pa.) 383, 204 Sieber v. Amunson, 78 Wis. 679, 544 Sieffer v. McLean, 7 Texas C. App. 158, 1872 Sieger y. Abbott, 61 Md. 276, 1458 Siemony. Wilson, 3 Edw. Ch. 36, 1018 Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 102, 675, 685 Sievewright v. Archibald, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 286, 685 Sigal y. Miller (Texas 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 1012, 1705 Sigsworth v. Coulter, 18 111. 204, 213 Sikes v. Shows, 74 Ala. 385, 1117 Sikes y. Truitt, 4 Jones Eq. 361, 1058 Silberman v. Clark, 96 N. Y. 522, 869 Siler v. Gray, 86 N. Car. 566, 288 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black, 665, 721 Silliman v. Wing, 7 Hill, 159, 987 Silsby v. Trotter, 29 N. J. Eq. 228, 640 Silsby Mfg. Co. v. City of Allentown, 153 Pa. St. 319, I486 clxviii TABLE OF CASES. {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. Rep. 893, 131, 1.5Z, lo4 Silver v. Barnes, 6 Bing. N. Car. 180, 1619 Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370, 1536 Silvemail v. Cole, 12 Barb. 685, 1)38 Silvers v. Reynolds, 19 N. J. Eq. 275, 559 Silveus v. Porter, 74 Pa. St. 448, 1684 Simmonds v. Humble, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 258, 668 Simmons v. Brooks, 159 Mass. 219, 2236 Simmons v. Green, 35 Ohio St. 104, 388, 496 Simmons v. Law, 3 Keyes (N. Y.), 217, 916 Simmons v. Putnam, 11 Wis. 193, 2197, 2288 Simmons v. Wilmott, 3 Esp. N. P. 91, 184 Simms v. Greer, 83 Ala. 263, 1003 Simon v. Albright, 12 S. & R. 429, 549 Simon v. Association (Ark.), 14 S. W. Rep. 1101, 1236 Simon v. Edmundson, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 315, 165 Simon v. Johnson, 100 Ala. 368, 908 Simon v. Metivier, 1 Wm. Bl. 599, 674 Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. 120, 1491 Simonds v. Henry, 39 Maine, 155, 796 Simons v. Johnson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 175, 558, 566 Simons v. Steele, 30 N. H. 73, 594 Simons v. Vulcan, etc., Mining Co., 61 Pa. St. 202, 1980 Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355, 242, 246 Simson v. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65, 468, 473 Simpson v. Cochran, 23 Iowa, 81, 26 Simpson v. Commissioners, 84 N. Car. 158, 1516 Simpson v. Crippin, L. R. 8 Q. B. 14, 150 Simpson v. Eggincton, 10 Ex. 845, 543, 545 Simpson v. Hall, 47 Conn. 417, 2124 Simpson v. Hawkins, 1 Dana, 303, 363 Simpson v. Hotel Co., 8 H. L. Cas. 712, 1254 Simpson v. King, 1 Ired. Eq. 11, 1083 Simpson v. Margitson, 11 Q. B. 23, 768, 902, 903 Simpson v. Montgomery, 25 Ark. 365, 1052 Simpson v. Mooro, 6 Baxter, 371, 543 Simpson v. Nance, 1 Spears (S. C), 4, 614 Simpson v. Nicholls 3 M. & W. 240, 2111 Simpson v. Potts, Oliphant on the Law ot Horses, 224, 332 Simpson v. Simpson's Ex'rs, 94 Ky. 586, 1715 Simpson v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31. 810, 821, 822, 823 Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87, 1787 Sims v. Hinos, 121 Ind. 534, 1497 Sims v. Lide, 94 Ga. 553, 1107 Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 1774, 1787, 1788, 1789, 1794 Sims v. Street R. Co., 37 Ohio St. 556, 1296 Sims v. United States Trust Co., 35 Hun, 533, 2246 Simrall v. Covington (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 880, 1589 Siuard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf. 353, 12 Sinclair v. Hicks, 116 N. Car. 606, 8515 Sinclair v. Tallmadge, 35 Bard. 602, 131 Singer Co. v. Treadway, 4 Bradw. (111.) 57, 165 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Forsyth, WS Ind. 331, ,S9S Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Lamb, 81 iVo. 221, 1789,1795 Sin-er Sewing, etc., Co. v. Union Button- Hole Co., 1 Holmes, 253, 1422 Singer! y v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 291 , 1 31 , 132, 133 Singleton v. Bremar, Harp. L. (S. Car.) 201, 2015 Siiicluff v. Tindal, 10 S. Car. 504, 1728 Singstack's Ex'rs v. Harding, 4 Har. & J. IKS, 682 Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 2119, 2132 Sinnett v. Molov, 33 Iowa, 25, 1543 Sinsheimer v. Kaho, 6 Texas Civil App. 143, 16X2 Sinton v. Carter Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 535, 2142 Sioux City St. By. Co. v. Sioux City, 78 Iowa, 742, 1584 Sioux City St. Ry. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98, 1582, 2132 Sires v. Sires, 43 S. Car. 256, 1045 Sirk v. Ela, 163 Mass. 394, 855 Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N. J. Law, 432, 892 Sivers v. Sivers, 32 Pac. Rep. 571 (Cal.), Sixbeev. Bowen, 91 Pa. St. 119, 1684 Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983, 211 Skehan v. Rummel, 124 Ind. 347, 2171 Skelsey v. United States, 23 Ct. CI. 61, 299 Skelton v. Brewster, 8 John. 376, 607, 609 Skelton v. Manchester, 12 R. I. 326, 162 Skillman v. Skillman, 13 N. J. Eq. 403, 1668 Skowhegan R. Co. v. Kinsman, 77 Maine, 370, 155, 1322 Skrainka v. Allen, 76 Mo. 384, 1333 Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 2062 Slack v. Brown, 13 Wend. 390, 407 Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1, 1537 Slade v. Swede burg El. Co., 39 Neb. 600, 520 Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21, 1291 Slagle v. Pow, 41 Ohio St. 603, 1372 Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359, 797 Slater V. Emerson, 19 How. 224, 746, 747 Slater v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex. 186, 534 Slater v. South Car. H. Co., 29 S. Car. 96, 276 Slater Woolen Co. v. Lamb, 143 Mass. 420, 1249 Slator v. Neal, 61 Texas, 222, 1739 Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 379, 989, 1875 Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 273, 2267 Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 2055, 2134, 2160 Slevin v. Wallace, 64 Hun, 288, 645 Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen (Mass.), 340, 1745 Slaymaker v. Gundacker, 10 S. ic R. 75, 458 Sleed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401, 385 Sleeper v. Wood, 60 Fed. Rep. 888, 329 Slegel v. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 236, 1551 Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 155, 234, 1135 Slingerland v. Morse, 8 John. 474, 406 Slingerland v. Morse, 7 John. 463, 608 Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197, 839,848 Slipper v. Tottenham R. Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 112, 280 Sloan v. rrolhingham, 72 Ala. 589, 1768 Sloan t. Heirick, 49 Vt. 3J7, 542 Sloan v. Will!-, -I ( N. J. Law, 584, 1549 Slocum v. Fiiirchild, 7 UiiL, 292, 816 Slocum v. Hooker, 13 Barb. IN. Y.) 536, 1773 Slocum v. Seymour, 36 N. J. Law, 138, 638 Slocum v. Wooloy, 13 N. J. Eq. 451, 1041 Sloman v. Great Western R. Co., 67 N. Y. 208, — Small v. Franklin Mining Co., 99 Mass. 277, 447 Small v. Jones, 1 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 129, 2000 Small v. Older, 57 Iowa, 326, 573 Small v. Williams, 87 Ga. 681, 2012 Smalley v. Greene, 52 low a, 241, 655, 2030, 2039, 2044 Smallwood v. Hatton, 4 Md. Ch. 95, 110 Smallwood v. Newbern, 90 N. Car. 36, 1516 Smart v. Guardians of the Poor, 36 E. L. & E. 496, 784 Smart v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 717, 640 Smead v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 104, 1226 Smee v. Smee, L. R. 5 P. D. 84, 1812 Smiley v. McDonald, 42 Neb. 5, 1478, 1479, 2055 Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 474, 1147 Smith's Appeal, 104 Pa. 381, 724 Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 579, 2047. 2261 Smith's Appeal, 117 Pa. 30, 724 TABLE OF CASES. clxix [Seferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.~] Smith's Case, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 604, 1319 Smith, In re, 95 N. Y. 522, 1018 Smith's Estate, In re, 144 Pa. St. 428, Smith, Ex parte ,17 W. E. 491, 260 Smith v. Alger, 1 B. & Ad. 603, 212 Smith v. Alker, 102 N. Y. 87, 127 131 Smith v. Allen, 1 N. J. Eq. 43, 1058 Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen. 454, 222, 224 Smith v. Allen (Ala. 1894), 14 So. Rep. 160 l 1069 Smith v. Anders, 21 Ala. 782, 395 Smith v. Applegate, 23 N. J. Law, 352, o ... „ , 1853,1884 Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mas. C. C. 414, 674 Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. Car. 400, 122 Smith v. Aykwell, 3 Atk. 466, 1873 Smith v. Aylesworth, 40 Barb. 104, 385 Smith v. Baker, L. R. 8 C. P. 350, 7X1 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 2077 Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 Mete. (Mass.), „ 27 . 6 i „ 540, 562, 573 Smith v. Bean, 15 N. H. 577, 2103 Smith v. Berry, 18 Maine, 122, 2230 Smith v. Bettger, 68 Ind. 254, 536 Smith v. Bibber, 82 Maine, 34, 201 Smith v. Bickmore, 4 Taunt. 474, 1870 Smith v. Black, 9 S. & R. 142, 832, 833 Smith v. Boquet, 27 Texas, 507, 1662, 1733 Smith v. Boruff, 75 Ind. 412, 48, 211, 212 Smith v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 36 N. H. 458, 2223 2224 Smith v. Bouvier, 70 Pa. St. 325, " ' 1930 Smith v. Bradley, 6 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 485, 1779 Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, „ . , „ 131, 146, 148, 503, 2194 Smith v. Bromley, 2 Doug. 696, 1870 Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141, 640 Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sum. 435, 644 Smith v. Butler, 25 N. H. 521, 21 Smith v. Caldwell, 15 Rich. 365, 196 Smith v. Case, 2 Ore. 190, 2109 Smith v. Chadwick, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 27, 875 Smith v. Cherrill, L. R. 4 Eq. Ca. 390, 224 Smith v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 Wis. „ 271, 2097 Smith v. City of Albany, 61 N. Y. 444, 1590 Smith v. City of Newburgh, 77 N. Y. 130, 1508 Smith v. Clews, 144 N. Y. 190, 42, 915, 2179, 2246 Smith v. Clifford, 99 Ind. 113, 1176 Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394, 153 Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 28, 506 Smith v. Co-operative Association, 12 Daly, 304, 1350 Smith v. Cuddy, 96 Mich. 562, 1029 Smith v. Davenport, 31 Maine, 520, 863 Smith v. Dedham, 144 Mass. 177, 1519 Smith v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264, 616, 1899 Smith v. Denman, 48 Ind. 65, 794 Smith v. Dickenson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 630, 761 Smith v. Dicky, 74 Texas, 61, 374 Smith v. Dinkelspiel, 91 Ala. 528, 1854 Smith v. Eastern, etc., Loan Assn., 116 N. Car. 102, 2173 Smith v. Estate of Rogers, 35 Vt. 140, 608 Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 102, 110, 424 Smith v. Farmers', etc., Insurance Co., 89 Pa. St. 464, 319 Smith v. Farra, 21 Ore. 395, 209, 211 Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 251, 903 Smith v. First Congregational Meeting- house, 8 Pick. 178, 139 Smith v. Flanders, 129 Mass. 322, 897 Smith v. Fly, 24 Texas.345, 110 Smith v. Foster, 41 N. H. 215, 2096 Smith v. Garden, 28 Wis. 685, 1642 Smith v. Garth, 32 Ala. 368, 1620 Smith v. Gayle, 58 Ala. 600, 543 Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379, 699, 708, 709, 1903 Smith v. Goodknight, 121 Ind. 312, 2273 Smith v. Gould, 84 Hun, 325, 261 Smith v. Grable, 14 Iowa, 429, 525 Smith v. Green, 45 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 28, 333 Smith v. Greer, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 118, 620 Smith v. Hale. 158 Mass. 178, 347 Smith v. Hatch, 46 N. H. 146, 2257 Smith v. Hightower, 76 Ga. 629, 1705 Smith v. Hilton (Sup.), 2 N.Y. Supl. 820, 2180 Smith v. Holland, 61 N. Y. 635, 956 Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431, 662, 664 Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597, 2 Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290, 683 Smith v. Iiams, 70 Hun, 155, 561 Smith v. Iliffe, L. R. 20 Eq. 666, 253 Smith v. Jeffryes, 15 Mees. & W. 561, 901 Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H. 530, 433 Smith v. Johnson, 45 Iowa, 308, 24 Smith v. Jones (Ky. App.), 31 S. W. Rep. i15 t 362 Smithy. Jordan, 13 Minn. 264, 2198 Smith v. Keith, 36 Mo. App. 567, 144 Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 31, 853, 873 Smith v. Kerr, 33 Hun, 567, 12 Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 478 Smith v. Kimball, 153 HI. 368, 1217 Smith v. King, L. R. (1892), 2 Q. B. 543, 1806 Smith v. Lansing, 22 N. Y. 520, 1296 Smith v. Leavensworth, 1 Boot (Conn.), o 2 ^! r . 2197 Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624, 498, 498, 2222 Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110, 115, 378, 496 Smith v. Lewis, 40 Ind. 518, 305 Smith v. Los Angeles, etc., Association, 78 Cal. 289, 1292, 1293 Smith v. Luse, 30 111. App. 37, 32 Smith v. Lynes, 5 N. Y. 41, 166 Smith v. Mapleback, 1 T. R. 441, 568, 569 Smith v. Mariner, 5 Wis. 551, 896 Smith v. Martin, 80 Ind. 260, 2046 Smith v. Mason, 44 Neb. 610, 443, 572 Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139, 681 Smith v. Mawhood, 14 Mees. & W. 452, „ . , 1886, 1891 Smith v. McCann, 24 How. (TJ. S.) 398, 2277 Smith v. McDowell, 148 111. 51, 1556 Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253, 726 Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. St. 107, 793 Smith v. Mohn, 87 Cal. 489, 120, 161 Smith v. Molleson, 74 Hun, 606, 898 Smith v. Moore, 5 Rawle, 348, 1174, 1175 Smith v. Moore, 11 N. H. 55, 699 Smith v. Moore, 4 N. J. Eq. 485, 1713 Smith v. Morrill, 54 Maine, 48, 39, 40 Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 430, 2158 Smith v. Myers, 19 Mo. 433, 789 Smith v. Myers, 109 Ind. 1, 2126 Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 67, 655 Smith v. Negbauer, 42 N. J. Law, 305, 425 Smith v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 4 Keyes, 180, 658 Smith v. Occidental, etc., Steamship Co., 99 Cal. 462, 581 Smith v. Ostermyer, 68 Ind. 432, 29 Smith v. Owens, 21 Cal. 11, 447 Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13, 388 Smith v. Phillips, 77 Va. 548, 190 Smith v. Phipps, 65 Conn. 302, 912, 913 Smith v. Provident Assurance Society, 65 Fed. Rcr>. 765, 938 Smith v. Redfield, 27 Maine, 145, 804 Smith v. Rice, 56 Ala. 417, 907, 932 Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26, 990, 1000, 1876 Smith v. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463, 35 Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill, 482, 399, 400 Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I. 464, 2097 Smith v. Sayward, 5 Maine, 504, 596, 614 Smith v. Schulenberg, 34 Wis. 41, 520, 2248 Smith v. Scott, 20 Conn. 312, 139 Smith v. Shell, 82 Mo. 215, 676 Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. 408, 2170 Smith v. Sipperley, 9 Utah, 267, 1646 Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47, 1393, 1406 clxx TABLE OP CASKS. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Smith v. Smith, 80 Cal. 323. 422 Smith v. Smith, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 233, — Smith v. Smith, 2 Cromp. & M. 230, 427 Smith v. Smith, 62 111. 493, 1270 Smith v. Smith, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 350, 405 Smith v. Smith, 2 John. 235, 696,711 Smith v. Smith, 50 Mo. 262, 2287 Smith v. Smith, 27 N. H. 244, 458 Smith v. Smith, 43 N. H. 536, 781 Smith v. Smith's Admr.. 30 N. J. Eg.. 564, 793 Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 434, 435 Smith v. Smith, 136 N. Y. 313, 1647 Smith v. Smith, 1 Rich. Eq. 130, 843 Smith v. Smith, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 468, 2039 Smith v. Smith, 34 Wis. 320, 490, 491 Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 84, 2095, 2107 Smith v. Spaulding. 40 Neb. 339, 1723 Smith v. State, 66 Md. 215, 1185 Smith v. St. Paul B. Co. (Minn. 1895), 62 N. W. Bep. 392, 547 Smith v. Stevens, 81 Texas, 461, 474 Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671, 665, 671 Smith t. Surman, 9 Barn. & Cres. 561, 638, 663 Smith v. Tallahassee, etc., Co., 30 Ala 650, 155 Smith v. Taylor, 82 Cal. 533, 41 Smith v. Tebbitt, L. E. 1 P. & D. 398, 1812, 2278 Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 652 Smith v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 500, 2001 Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y. 79, 1278 Smith v. Trowsdale, 3 E. & B. 83, 515 Smith's Trusts, 25 L. R. Ir. 439, 181)7 Smith v. Tyler, 51 Ind. 512, 198, 511 Smith v. Ullman, 5s Md. 1S3, 2000 Smith, Administrator, v. Wainwright, 24 Vt. 97, 757 Smith v. Walton, 5 Houst. 141, 380 Smith T. Warden, SM Mo. 382, 1311 Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. 258, 183, 268 Smith v. Warden, 19 Pa. St. 424, 2009 Smith v. Washington Gas Co., 154 U. S. 559, 1093 Smith v. Watson, It Vt. 332, 7X8 Smith v. Weaver, VI) 111. 392, 57 Smith v. Weguelin, 8 Eq. 198, 698 Smith v. Western B. Co., 91 Ala. 455, 270 Smith t. Westall, 1 Lord Bay. 316, 616 Smith v. Whildin, 10 Pa. St. 39, IMS Smith v. Wilmington Coal Co., 83 111. 498, 2;« Smith v. Wilcox, 24 N. Y. 353, 21)95 Smith v. Wilson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 728, 918 Smith v. Wood, 42 N. J. Eq. 563, 11)19 Smith v. Wright, 1 Caines, 43, 912 Smith, etc., Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U. S. 237, 1396 Smith's Lessee v. Hunt, 13 Ohio, 260, 1C12 Smithwick v. Ward, 7 Jones' Law, 64, 550 Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. 36, 278, 496, 497, 2222 Smout v. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1, 2SS Smyley t. Beese, 53 Ala. 89, 11)17 Smyrl v. Niolin, 2 Bail. L. 421, 275 Smyth v. Fitzsimmons, 97 Ala. 451, 1728 Smyth v. Spalding, 13 Mo. 529, 355 Snell v. Rogers, 70 Hun, 462, 597 Snell v. Stone, 23 Ore. 327, 1759 Snell v. Trustees, 58 111. 290, 257 Snevily v. Bead, 9 Watts, 396, 183, 1633 Snider v. Adams Express Co., 77 Mo. 523, 1063 Snider v. Adams Express Co., 63 Mo. 376, 117 Snider's Sods Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, 1337, 1107 Snith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110, 2222 Snock v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251, 165 Snook t. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251, 161, 166 Snow v. Allen, 144 Mass. 546, 970, 2 "88 Snow v. Chandler, 10 N. H. 92, 540 Snow v. Franklin, 1 Lutw. 358, 515 Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick. 539, 393 Snow v. Prescott, 12 N. H. 535, 2257 Snow v. Schomacker Manufacturing Co., 69 Ala. Ill, 3J9 28 643 1179 167 Snow v. Ware, 13 Mete. 42, 146 Snow v. Warner, 10 Mete. 132, 669 Snowden v. Preston, 73 Md. 261, Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10, Snyder v. Kirtley, 35 Mo. 423, Snyder v. Martin, 17 W. Va. 276, Snyder v. Murdock, 51 Mo. 175, Snyder v. Pharo, 25 Fed. Bep. 398, 543 Snyder v. Bobinson, 35 Ind. 311, 1184 Snyder v. Snyder, 142 111. 60, 1810 Snyder v. Studebaker, 19 Ind. 462, 1337 Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow. 518, 763 Soberanes v. Soberanes, 106 Cal. 1, 1027 Sobieski v. St. Paul, etc., Railroad Co., 41 Minn. 169, Societe, etc., v. Old Jordan Mining Co., 9 Utah, 483, 70 Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 1335 Soderberg v. Crockett, 17 Nev. 409, 489 Soell v. Hadden, 85 Texas, 182, 414 Sofle v. Gallgher, 3 E. D. Smith, 507, 456 Sohier v. Lohring, 6 Cush. 537, 573 Sohn v. Gantner, 134 Ind. 31, 1693 Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 596, 2158 Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. St. 180, 689 Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393, 1636 Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & Bing. 38, 566, 819 Solomon v. Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47, 811 Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342, 1135 Solon, Town of, v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N. Y. 122, 21,1064 Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 646, 652, 661 Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231, 15 Somerville's Case, L. R. 6 Ch. 266, 63 Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 1930 Soper v. Gabe, 55 Kan. 646, 1144, 1148 Soper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. St. 219, 490 Souch v. Strawbridge, 2 C. B. 808, 652 Souder v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 156 Pa. St. 374, 1755 Souff rain v. McDonald, 27 Ind. 269, 1108 Soulden v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Wend. 293, 196 Sourwine v. Truscott, 17 Hun (N. Y.), 432, 2245 Souter v. Drake, 5 Barn. & Adol. 992, 368 South Boulder, etc., B. C. Ditch Co. v. MarfeU, 15 Colo. 302, 104 Southgate v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 89, 1318 Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424, 1646 Southard v. Boyd, 51 N. Y. 177, 1987, 1993 Southard v. Pope, 9 B. Mon. 261, 401 South, etc., Ala. R. Co. v. Highland Ave. R. Co., 98 Ala. 400 1110, 1121, 1130 South Bend Iron Works v. CottreU, 31 Fed. Bep. 254, 891, 892 South Joplin Land Co. v. Case, 104 Mo. 572, 1930 South Mo. Land Co. v. Rhodes, 54 Mo. App. 129 714 South Wales R. Co. v. Redmond, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 675, H21 South Wales B. Co. v. Wythes, 1 Kay & J. 186, 2271 Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N. H. 420, 626 Southerland v. Southerland, 5 Bush, 591, 223 Southern California Assn. v. Bustamente 52 Cal. 192, '1276 Southern Development Co. v. Silva 125 U. S. 247, 982, 989, 1876 Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101, iggg Southern Express Co. v . Duffey, 48 Ga. 358, 1832 Southern Express Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19, 738 Southern Ins. Co. v. White, 58 Ark. 277, 310 Southern, etc., Loan Association v. Har- ris (Ky. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep. 261, 1622 Southern Building & Loan Association v. Anniston Loan and Trust Co., 101 Ala. r ' x2 . 1607, 1609 TABLE OF CASES. clxxi [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson (Texas) ,15 S. W. Hep. 121, 296 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 28 Ct. CI. 77, 2119 Southern R. Co. v. Maddox, 75 Texas, 300, „ , 1968 Southern, etc., Trust Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla. 110, 996 Southsea, etc., Co. v. London, etc., R. Co., 2 Nev. & McN. (Ry. Cas.) 341, 2054 Southwell v. Beezley, 5 Ore. 458, 887 Southwestern Cotton Press Co. v. Stanard, 44 Mo. 71, 123 Southwestern Stage Co. v. Peck, 17 Kan. 271, 499 Southwick v. First Nat. Bank, 84 N. Y. 420, 798 Soutier v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 5139, 930 Sower's Admr. v. Weaver, 84 Pa. St. 262, 632 Sowles v. Soule, 59 Vt. 131, 804 Sowles v. Welden Nat. Bank, 61 Tt. 375, 1871 Spadone v. Reed, 7 Bush, 455, 615 Spahr v. Hollingshead, 8 Blackf. 415, 211 Spaids v. Barrett, 57 111. 2S9, 440, 22S8 Spalding v. Couzelman, 30 Mo. 177, 846 Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. St. 375, 1989, 1992 Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9, 1905 Spalding y. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, 283, 889, 948 Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 30, 11 Spann v. Stearns, 18 Texas, 556, 1126 Sparks y. Clapper, 30 Ind. 204, 1496 Sparks v. Despatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 1271, 1287 Sparks v. Pittsburgh Co., 159 Pa. St. 295, 70 Sparman v. Keim, 83 N. Y. 245, 1771, 1773, 1785, 2165 Sparrow v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 369, 1462 Sparta School Tp. y. Mendell, 138 Ind. 188, 1075 Spartanburg R. Co. v. DeGraffenreid, 12 Eich. L. 675, 157 Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 71. 1499, 1500 Spaulding v. Putnam, 128 Mass. 363, 40 Speake v. United States, 9 Cranch, 28, 953 Spear v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20, 259, 260, 1463 Spear v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 156 111. 555, 607 Spear v. Orendorf, 26 Md. 37, 1147 Spearman v. City of Texarkana, 58 Ark. 348, 1505 Spearman v. Ward, 114 Pa. St. 634, 1746 Specht y. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 312, 2094 Speck y. Dausman, 7 Mo. App. 165, 2007 Speier v. Opfer, 73 Mich. 35, 1746 Spell man v. Bannigan, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 174, 2170 Spelman v. Aldrich, 126 Mass. 113, 1669 Spence y. Geilfuss, 89 Wis. 499, 980 Spence v. Healey, 8 Exch. 668, 515, 516 Spencer y. Hales, 30 Vt. 314, 666 Spencer v. Reese, 165 Pa. St. 158, 1067 Spencer v. Reynolds, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 249, 27 Spencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones' Eq. (N. Car.) 404, 1727 Spencer v. Williams, 2 Vt. 209, 540 Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 1446 Sperry v. Miller, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 632, 2189 Speyer v. Desjardins, 144 111. 641, 644 Spicer v. Hoop, 51 Ind. 365, 2044 Spier v. Lambdin, 45 Ga. 319, 2044 Spiller y. Paris Skating Rink Co., L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 368, 1310, 1314 Spilman v. Mendenhall (1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 468, 1374 Spilman y. City of Parkersburgh, 35 W. Va. 605, 1519, 1521 Spitze v. Baltimore, 75 Md. 162, 587 Spitzer v. Village or Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234, 1507 Spitzmiller v. Fisher, 77 Iowa, 289, 793 Spooner v. Reynolds, 50 Vt. 437, 1689 Spoor y. Newell, 3 Hill, 307, Spoor y. Phillips, 27 Ala. 193, 415 Spott's Estate, In re, 156 Pa. St. 281, 1751 Spragins v. White, 108 N. Car. 449, 905 Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. 61, 504, 662 Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 434, 2274 Sprague y. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 34 Kan. „ 3*7, 1967 Sprague v. Railway, 34 Kan. 347, 1432 Sprague v. Rooney, 104 Mo. 346, 189 Sprague y. Rosenbaum, 38 Fed. Rep. 386, 355 Sprague v. Waldo, 38 Vt. 139, 791 Sprague y. Warren, 26 Neb. 326, 1920 Sparker y. Jenners, 140 Ind. 688, 1139 Sprayberry y. Merk, 30 Ga. 81, 1697 Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co., 24 Hun, 175, 130,133 Sprigg y. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 201, 2184 Spring v. Sandford, 7 Paige (N. Y.), 550, 1141 Spring Co. y. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49, 1870, 1912 Spring Valley Waterworks y. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 1560 Springer v. Borden, 154 111. 668, 1093 Springfield y. Edwards, 84 111. 626, 1519, 1520, 1521 Springfield v. Green, 7 Baxt. 301, 448 Springfield Bank v. Merrick, 14 Mass. 324, 1265 Springfield Co. v. Allen, 46 Ark. 217, 452 Springfield, etc., Co. v. Van Brunt, 77 Iowa, 82, 544 Springfield, etc., Ins. Co. v. Hull, 51 Ohio St. 270, 2013 Springfield R. Co. v. Sleeper, 121 Mass. 29, 157 Springhead Spinning Co. y. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, 2074 Springsteen v. Samson, 32 N. Y. 703, 873 Sproessig v. Keutl, 17 N. Y. Supl. 839, 31 Sprott y. Reid, 3 Greene (Iowa), 489, 2149 Spurck v. Lincoln, etc., R. Co., 14 Neb. 293, 1543 Spurgeon v. Collier, 1 Eden, 55, 1711 Spurgeon y. McEiwain, 6 Ohio, 442, 1894 Spurlock y. Brown, 91 Tenn. 241, 1714 Spurlock v. Mainer, 1 La. Ann. 301, 1675 Spun- v. North Hudson R. Co., 56 N. J. Law, 346, 575 Spurr y. Scoville, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 578, 1172 Spurrier y. Hancock, 4 Vesey, 667, 423 Spybey v. Hide, 1 Camp. 181, 383 Squire y. Cartwright, 22 N. Y. Supl. 899, 1561 Squire v. New York, etc., Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 239, 1967 St. David's Church v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396, 1132 St. George's Church Society v. Branch, 120 Mo. 226, 1875 St. John v. American, etc., Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31, 895 St. John y. St. John, 11 Ves. 526, 2007 St. John's Manfg. Co. y. Munger (Mich. 1895) , 64 N. W. Rep. 3, 1324 St. Joseph, City of, v. Hamilton, etc., Railroad Co., 39 Mo. 476, 2140 St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wolpert, 80 Ky. 86, 1848 St. Joseph, etc., Railroad Co. v. Ryan, 11 Kan. 602, 1970, 1976 St. Jude's Church v. VanDenberg, 31 Mich. 287, 784 St. Lawrence Steamboat Co., In re, 44 N. J. Law, 529, 1460 St. Louis, City of, v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 1390 St. Louis, City of, v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 1580 St. Louis, City of, v. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 1472 St. Louis, City of, .. Shields, 62 Mo. 247, 1434, 1452 St. Louis, City of, v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 1582 clxxii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] St. Louis, City of, v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1893), 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 485, 1556 St. Louis Association v. Hennessy, 11 Mo. App. 555, 1337 St. Louis, etc., Coal and Mining Co. v. Sandoval, etc., Coal and Mining Co., Ill 111. 32, 1391 St. Louis Gas Light Co. v . St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121, 875 St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 Mo. 278, 7*1 St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Railway v. Bern , 113 U. S. 465, 1456 St. Louis & S. C. & M. Co. v. Sandoval C. 6z M. Co., 116 111. 170, 1391 St. Louis, etc., Mining Co. v. Edwards, 103 111. 472, 1391 St. Louis, etc., H. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 2140 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Chenault, 36 Kan. 57, 1290 St. Louis, etc., K. Co. ». Clark, 10 U. S. App. 66, 544 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 9 Biss. 144, 1453 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kerr, 153 111. 182, 2251) St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 52 Kan. 104, 1317 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mathers, 71 111. 592, 2083 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 145 U. S. 31)3, 125,x, 1412 St. Louis R. Co. v. Davis, 35 Kan. 464, 1-ii, 403, 101 St. Louis R. Co. v. Eakins, 30 Iowa . 279, 157 St. Louis R. Co. v. Hopkins. 54 Ark. 209, 275 St. Mary's Church v. Stockton, 8 N. J. Eq. 520, 1095 St. Paul, City of, v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41, 1478 St. Paul, etc., R. v. Blackmar, 44 Minn. 514, 877 St. Paul R, Co. v. Bradbury, 42 Minn. 222, 128 St. Paul R. Co. v. Robbins, 23 Minn. 439, 260 St. Strian Stone Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 18 Colo. 211, 957 Stack v. Cavanaugh (N. H.), 30 Atl. Rep. 350, 1785, 1790, 1801 Stackhouse v. Bamston, 10 Ves. Jr. 453, 555 Stack pole v. Robbins, 47 Barb. 12. 466 St.ic\ v. Fns-, 1!) Maine, 335, 1870, 1941, 1917 Stacv v. Konip, 97 Mass. 166, 313 Stailtel.l v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. St. 53, 163 Station! v. Azbcll, 26 N. Y. Supl. 41, 2165 Sfaflord v. Ilicon, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 532, 1033 Sta lb .rd v. EH ters, 55 Iowa, 484, 1(185 Stafford v. i\ui.t, 51 lnd. 5:15, 835 :il V. Roof, 9 Cow. (N.Y.)626, 1771,17115 -'.(all St i fiord v. Slice treed, 62 Iowa, 524, 2039 Stagg V. Alexander, I Hill, 519, 537 Staines V. Wainwrigbt, 6 King. N. C. 174, 1882 Staler v. Hamilton, 19 Fla. 275, 1700 Stallings v. Fiuch, 25 Ala. 51S, 557 Sfalliugs v. Johnson, 27 Gn. 564, 207 Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 5St, 368 Stamm v. Kuhlmaun, 1 Mo. App. 296, 354 Sl„mp v. Franklin, 144 N. Y. 607, 1687 Stanaid Milling Co. v. Flower, 46 La. Ann. 315, Standard Gas Co. v. Wood, 61 Fed. Rep 74, 137, 747 Standard Implement Co. v. Parlin & OrendorffCo., 51 Kan. 632, Standard L. & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Lauder- dak', 94 Tenn. 635, Standard Oil Co. v. Schofleld, 16 Abb. N Cas. (N. Y.) 372 Standard Sugar Refinery v. Caxfano, 43 Fed. Rep. 279, Stand ish v. Ross, 3 Exch. 527, Stannard v. Burns, 63 Vt. 211, Stanley v. Darnes, 1 Hagg. 221, 1921 1859 872 126 181 1843 549 Stanley v. Chester, etc., R. Co., 3Mylne & C. 773, 1316 Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369, 1998, 1999 Stanley v. National, etc., Bank, 115 N. Y. 122, 1664 Stanley v. Smith, 15 Ore. 505, 179 Stanley v. Valentine, 79 111. 544, 13 Stanley v. Western Ins. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 71, 869 Stanley Rule, etc., Co. v. Bailey, 45 Conn. 464, 798 Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, 1426, 1983, 2020, 2037, 2060, 2069 Stanton v. Maynard, 7 Allen, 335, 453 Stanton v. New York, etc., R. Co., 59 Conn. 272, 1308 Stanton v. Percival, 5 X. L. Cas. 257, 1209 Stanton v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 272, 1313 Stanton v. Small, 3 Sand. 230, 1921 Stanton v. Tattersall, 1 Sm. & G. 529, 423 Stanton v. Wilson, 2 Hill, 153, 259, 260 Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass. 72, 575 Staples v. Franklin Bank, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 43, 385 Staples v. Nott, 128 N. Y. 403, 727 Staples v. Wellington, 58 Maine, 453, 1811, 1812 Stapleton, Mtjturle.'L. R. 10 Ch. Div.586, 492, 2222, 2235 Star Cash Car Co. v. Reinhardt (Com. PI. N. Y.),20N. Y. Supl. 872, 2168 Stark v. Coffin, 105 Mass. 328, 1296 Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 148 Stark T. Thompson, 3 T. B. Mon. 296, 445 Stark Bank v. United States Pottery Co., 34 Vt. 144 1278 Starkey v. Starkey, 136 lnd. 349, 1192, 1195 Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. Car. 1, 1185 Starr v. Earle, 43 lnd. 478, 594 Starr v. Stiles, — Ariz. — , 19 Pac. Rep. 225, 576 Starr v. Wright, 20 Ohio St. 97, 1791 Starr Glass Co. v. Morey, 108 Mass. 570, 150 Startup v. McDonald, 6 C. B. 593, 124, 379, 380, 387, 388, 405 Stats v. Allen, 43 111. 456, 1539 State v. American Cotton Oil Trust, 40 La. Ann. 8, 2058 State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422, 2120 State v. Auditor, 33 Mo. 2s7, 2121 State v. Baltimore & L. R. Co., 81 Md. 222, 1458 State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 635, 585, 586 State v. Birkhauser, 37 Neb. 521, 1555 State v. Board, 24 Wis. 083, 1544 State v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, etc., 37 N. J. Law, 254, 1551 State v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 39 N. J. Law, 632, 1433 State v. Board of Education, 24 Wis. 6X1, 1546, 2206. 2267 State v. Board of Police Comrs. of Cam- den, 56 N. J. Law, 258. 1549 State v. Board of Street Comrs., 55 N. J. Law, 230, 1407 State v. Burke, 33 La. Ann. 498, 2092 State v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 90 Iowa, 594, ),123 State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 2258 State v. Cincinnati Gas Light and Coke Co., 18 Ohio St. 262, 1504 State v. City of Bayonne, 55 N. J. Law, 241, 1523 State v. City of Bayonne, 56 N. J. 268, 1551 State v. City of Hiawatha, 53 Kan. 477, 1564 State v. City of Hamilton, 47 Ohio St. 52, 1564 State v. Clarke, 33 N. H. 329, 1057 State v. Clinton, 27 La. Ann. 429, 2092 State v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13, 1996 Stale v. Commissioners of Haskell < 'ounM , 40 Kan. 65, 'x-529 TABLE OF CASES. clxxiii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413, 1789, 1795 State T. Prime, 54 Ind. 450, 360, 361 State v. Eoggon, 22 Neb. 118, 1543 State v. Silver, 9 Neb. 85, 151S State v. Smith, 58 Minn. 35, 2147 State v. Smith, 38 Conn. 397, 2120 State v. South Orange, 55 N. J. Law, 254, 2142 State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 19SS State v. Thompson, 64 Texas, 690, 2087 State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. (Ala. ) 30, 2132 State v. Town of Harrison, 39 N. J. Law, 51, 1733 State v. Trenton (Feb. 7, 1895) , 31 Atl. Hep. 631, 1551 State v. Trenton City Board (N. J. 1894), 29 Atl. Eep. 158, 1488 State v. Tumey, 81 Ind. 559, 1932 State v. Tutty, 11 Fed. Kep. 753, 2122 State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 1472 State v. Worthington, 7 Ohio, 171, 300 State v. Young, 23 Minn. 551, 2107 Staton v. Mullis, 92 N. Car. 623, 893 Staver v. Missimer (Wash. 1893), 32 Pac. Eep. 995, 2239 Stavers v. Curling, 3 Bins. (N. C.) 355, 113, 117 State Bank v. Bryne, 97 Mich. 178, 449 State Bank v. Evans, 15 N. J. Law, 155, 177 State, etc., v. Michigan City, 138 Ind. 455, 1490 (State v. Commissioners of Nemaha Co., 10 Kan. 569, 1543 State v. Comrs. of Shelby Co., 36 Ohio St. 326, 1546 State v. Commissioners of Railroad Taxa- tion, 37 N. J. Law, 228, 2132 State v. Corrigan Consol St. Ey. Co., 85 Mo. 263, 1582 State v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696, 1984 State v. Council, 30 N. J. Law, 365, 1554 State v. Dulle, 48 Mo. 282, 2140 State v. Dunbar Estate, 99 Mich. 99, 1850 State v. Emery, 98 N. Car. 768, 1516 State v. Ferguson, 62 Mo. 77, 2120 State v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 51, 1894 State v. Fire Creek Coal, etc., Co., 33 W. Va. 188, 2161 State v. Fort, 24 S. Car. 510, 902 State v. Frank, 51 Mo. 98, 1058 State v. Furguson, 31 N. J. Law, 123, 1236 State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. wui ,, State v. Gas Co., 37 Ohio St. 45, State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, State v. Green, 112 Ind. 462, 1466 1487, 1530 2148 2160, 2161 1910 State v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 60 Mo 143, 2140 State v. Hartford & N. H. E. Co., 29 Conn. 538, 1439, 2054, 2060 State v. Hastings, 15 Wis. 75, 2085 State v. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155, 1532 State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199, 2128 State v. Hornbacker, 42 N: J. Law, 635, 1610 State v. Hoshaw, 98 Mo. 358, 898 State v. Hoskins, 25 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 759, 2147 State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 73 Maine, 278, 925 State v. Iowa Central R. Co., 83 Iowa, 720, 1439 State v. Jacksonville St. R. Co., 29 Fla. 590, 1584 State v. Jersey City Board, 56 N. J. Law, 273, 1549 State v. Johnson, 52 Ind. 197, 1883, 1995 State v. Judge, 39 La. Ann. 132, 2094 State v. Jumel, 38 La. Ann. 337, 2092 State v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722, 2148 State v. Kearney Township (N. J. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 454, 1550, 1570 State v. Lanier, 47 La. Ann. 110, 2092 State v. Lefaivre, 53 Mo. 470, 902 State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 2161 State v. Lowery, 49 N. J. Law, 391, 1479 State v. Manchester L. E. Co., 52 N. H. 528, 937 State v. Mayor, 109 U. S. 285, 2150 State v. Mayor, 32 La. Ann. 709, 2122 State v. Mayor, etc., 30 N. J. Law, 225, 1584 State v. Mayor, etc., of City of Bayonne, 55 N. J. Law, 241, 1562 State v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 29 N. J. Law, 441, 1498 State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429, 1519 State v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 1544, 1546 State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266, 1473 State v. Milk, 11 Biss. 197, 884 State v. Milligan, 3 Wash. St. 144, 1545, 1546 State v. Mueller, 10 Mo. App. 87, 1645 State v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 1504 State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 2053, 2054, 2056, 2057, 2058 State v. Nelson, 41 Minn. 85, 1829 State v. Noyes. 47 Maine, 189, 2135 State v. Paul, 5 E. 1. 185, 2147 State v. Payssan, 47 La. Ann. 1029, 1477 State v. Pepper, 31 Ind. 76, — — State v. Person, 32 N. J. Law, 134, 2132 State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. (Del.) 441, 2128 State v. Pickett, 46 La. Ann. 7, 32 State v. Pilsbm-y, 31 La. Ann. 1, 2143 State, etc., Bank v. Scott, 10 Neb. 83, 1652, 1723, 1746 State, etc., Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 69, 2113 State, ex rel., etc., v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 1503 State, ex rel. Folsom Bros., v. Mayor, 32 La. Ann. 709, 2149 State, ex rel. Shaw, v. Trenton, 49 N. J. Law. 339, 1548 State Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 10 Lea, 461, 895 State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brinkley, etc., Co. (Ark. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 157, 698 Stale Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 8 Ind. App. (',79, 18">5 State Nat. Bank v. Flathers, 45 La. Ann. 75, 1742, 1743 State Steamship Co., In re, 60 Fed. Rep. 1018, 741 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, 806 State Treasurer v. Cross, 9 Vt. 289, 256 St»ad v. Dawber, 10 Ad. & El. 57, 690, 951 Stead v. Dawber, 2 Per. & Dav. 447, 690, 691 Stead v. Nelson, 2 Beav. 245, 1699 Stead v. Poyer, 1 C. B. 782, 517 Steadham v. Parrish, 93 Ala. 465, 631 Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 E. I. 481, 1665 Steamboat v. Hammond, 9 Mo. 64, 452 Steamboat Keystone v. Moies, 28 Mo. 243, 932 Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 774, 2121 Steam Stoker Co., In re, L. E. 19 Eq. 416, 394 Stearns v. Barrett, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 443, 2033,2049 Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31, 344, 689, 690, 951, 954 Stearns v. Sopris, 5 Colo. App. 191, 1321 Stearns v. Sweet, 78 111. 446, 868 Stearns v. Tappin, 5 Duer, 294, 552, 558 Stearns v. Washburn, 7 Gray, 187, 638 Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 414, 109, 110, 424 Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172, 1473 Stebbins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 71, 2170 Stebbins v. Smith, 4 Pick. 97, 593 Stedeker v. Bernard, 102 N. Y. 327, 831 Steeds v. Steeds, L. E. 22 Q. B. D. 537, 515 Steel v. Jennings, Cheves (S. Car.), 183, 1750, 1751 Steele v. Branch, 40 Cal. 3, 751 Steele v. Buck, 61 111. 343, 2237 Steele v. Curie, 4 Dana (Ky.), 381, 1902 Sti^lra v. McTyer, 31 Ala. 667, 932 St i-.jlman, The D. B., 48 Fed. Rep. 5X0, 470 clxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Steenrod's Admr. v. Railroad Co., 27 W. Va. 1, 1179 Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. E. 61, 1929 Steers v. Liverpool, etc., Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1, 1963 Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494, 290, 897 Steever v. Illinois Railway Co., 62 Iowa, orl 1935 Steffen v. Smith, 159 Pa. St. 207, 1654, 1688, 1704 Steffens y. Earl, 40 N. J. Law, 128, 2097 Stegman v. Hollingsworth, 14 N. Y. Supl. 465, 182 Steifel v. Clark, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 466, 1098 Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 141 U. S. 67, 1240, 1241 Stein v. City of LaFayette, 6 Ind. App. 21 (, 575 Steiner v. Tranum, 98 Ala. 315, 1702, 1743, 1744 Steinhardt v. Buel ( Com. PI. 1892) , 20 N. Y . Supl. 706, 2245 Steinman v. Magnus, 11 East, 390, 534, 535, 1031 Steinsvjring v. Bennett, 16 La. Ann. 201, S72 Steinweg v. Erie B. Co., 43 N. Y. 123, 1903 Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263, 1708 Stem v. Nysonger, 69 Iowa, 512, 843 Stengel v. Preston, 89 Ky. 616, 5J4 Stenton y. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480, 2283 Stephani v. Catholic Bishop, 2 111. App. 249, 869 Stephens v. Capital Ins. Co., 87 Iowa, 283, 1088 Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. St. 219, 103 Stephens v. Pell, 2 C. & M. 710, 608, 610 Stephenson y. Boody, 139 Ind. 60, 2207 Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6, 150 Stephensen v. Elliott, 53 Kan. 550, 1067 Sterling v. Baldwin, 42 Vt. 306, 638 Sterling v. Sinnickson, 5 N. J. Law, 756, 1883 Sterling v. Sterling, 12 Ga. 201, 2009 Sterling Wrench Co. v. Amstutz, 50 Ohio St. HA, 107 Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 2045 Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12, 1158 Stemburg v. Callanan, 14 Iowa, 251, 51)5 Sterry y. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261, 221, 224 Stettauer v. Hamlin, 97 111. 312, 863 Steuben Co. Bank v. Mathewson, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 249, 1863 Stevens v. Adams, 45 Maine, 611, 2198 Stevens v. Benning, 1 Kay & J. 168, 889 Stevens v. Catlin, 44 111. App. 114, 821 Stevens v. Cooper, 1 John. Ch. 425, 689, 690 Stevens v. Corbitt, 33 Mich. 458, 157 Stevens v. Norris, 30 N. H. 466, 699 Stevens v. Parsons, 80 Maine, 351, 40 Stevens v. Philadelphia Ball Club, 142 Pa. St. 52, 1X2 Stovens v. Webb, 7 C. & P. 60, 300 Stevens v. Witter, 88 Iowa, 636, 2177 Stevenson v. Craig, 12 Neb. 404, 1723, 1741 Stevenson v. Maxwell, 2 N. Y. 408, 1126 Stevenson v. McLean, L. E. 5 Q. B. D. 346, 57,62 Stevenson v. Michigan Log-Towing Co. (Mich. 1894), 61 N. W. Eep. 536, 904 Stevenson v. Watson, L. E. 4 C. P. Div. 148, 1131 SteviT v. Torrent, 99 Mich. 6.S, 1190 Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 139, 212, 213 Stewart v. Armel, 62 Ind. 593, 4S Stewart v. Babbs, 120 Ind. 568, 1721 Stewart v. Brown, 48 Mich. 383, 403 Stewart v. Buard, 23 La. Ann. 411, 814 Stewart v. Campbell, 58 Maine, 439, 594, 604 Stewart v. Cauty, 8 M. & W. 160, 498 Stewart v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 141 Inch 55, 48, 547 Stewart v. Erie, etc., Transportation Co., 17 Minn. 372, 2054, 2060 Stewart v. Gordan, 65 Texas, 344, 1199 Stewart v. Gould, 8 Wash. 367, 1401 Stewart v. Great Western E. Co., 2 D. J. & S. 319, 463 Stewart v. Huntington, 124 N. Y. 127, 501 Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388, 298, 956 Stewart v. Lang, 37 Pa. St. 201, 863, 872 Stewart v. McFarland, 84 Iowa, 55, 194 Stewart v. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177, 702 Stewart v. Parnell, 117 Pa. St. 523, 1918 Stewart v. Petree, 55 N. Y. 621, 1047 Stewart v. Stewart, 3 Watts, 253, 850 Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 294 Stewart v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. 543, 2267 Stewart v. Trustees Hamilton College, 2 Denio, 403, 254 Stewart v. Welsh, 41 Ohio St. 483, 2005 Stewart Manufacturing Co. v. Rau, 92 Ga. 511, 452, 1395 Stewarts v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. (N. Y.J 303, 1818 Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. St. 446, 870 Stickler v. Giles, 9 Wash. 147, 107, 205 Stickney v. Goudy, 132 111. 213, 32 Stickney v. Stickney, 131 TJ. S. 227, 1666 Stillwell v. Hubbard, 20 Wend. 14, 90, 91 Stimpson v. Achorn, 158 Mass. 342, 1669 Stimpson v. Poole, 141 Mass. 502, 543 Stimpson v. Spraguo, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 470, 797 Stinchfield v. Little, 1 Greenlf. 231, 1234 Stines v. Dorman, 25 Ohio St. 580, 2044 Stirling t. Maitland, 5 B. & S. 840, 488 Stitt v. Huidekopers. 17 Wall. 384, 56 Stock v. City of Boston, 149 Mass. 419, 1575 Stock v. Stoltz, 137 111. 349, 792 Stock y. Stoltz, 34 111. App. 645, 234, 235 Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass. 45, 1066 Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290, 1153 Stockdale v. School District, 47 Mich. 226, 1539 Stockett v. Watkins, 2 Gil. & J. (Md.) 326, 2168 Stockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196, 76 Stocking v. Sage, 1 Conn. 519, 617 Stockdale v. Schuyler, 8 N. Y. Supl. 813, 150 Stockton v. Central E. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52, 1411, 1431 Stockton v. Eailroad Co., 24 Atl. Rep. 964, 1250 Stockton, etc., E. Co. v. Stockton, 51 Cal. 328, 132 Stockton v. Turner, 7 J. J. Marsh. 192, 860 Stockwell v. Baird (Del. 1895), 31 Atl. Eep. 811, 671 Stockwell v. State, 101 Ind. 1, 1175 Stodalka v. Novotny, 144 111. 125, 1069, 1061 Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 239 Stoddard v. Hart, 23 N. Y. 556, 1059 Stoddard v. Nelson, 17 Ore. 417, 855 Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 355, 426 Stofflet v. Stofflet, 160 Pa. St. 529, 2261 StofHot v. Strome, 101 Mich. 197, 1361 Stokell v. Kimball, 59 N. H. 13, 1722 Stokes v. Cox, 1 H. & N. 533, 897 Stokes v. New Jersey Pottery Co., 46 N. J. Law, 237, 1271, 1281, 1284 Stokes v. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20, 186 Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593, 251 Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211, 662 Stone v. Browning, 68 N. Y. 598, 671 Stone v. Chisholm, 113 U. S. 302, 1388 Stone v. City, etc., Bank, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 283, 1319 Stone y. Clark, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 378, 876 Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29, 543 Stone v. Farmers', etc., Co., 116 U, e. 307. 2133 Stone v. French, 37 Kan. 145, 15 Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227, 250 Stone y. Hale, 17 Ala. 557, 1062 Stondt y. Hine, 45 Pa. St. 30, 597 Stone v. Jenks, 142 Mass. 519, 383 Stone v. Lewman, 28 Ind. 97, 198 TABLE OF CASES. clxxv [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Stone y. Lidderdale, 2 Anstr. 533, 2084 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 2130, 2147 Stone y. Montgomery, 35 Miss. 83, 1739 Stone y. Pointer, 5 Munf. 287, 356 Stone y. Porter, 4 Dana, 207, 443 Stone y. Sledge, 87 Texas, 49, 1738 Stone y. Waite, 88 Ala. 599, 296 Stone y. Werts, 3 Bush (Ky.), 486, 1748 Stone y. Wilbern, 83 111. 105, 1026 Stoneham, etc., Railroad y. Gould, 2 Gray, 277, 155 Stoops y. Smith, 100 Mass. 63, 692, 2225 Storer y. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 901 Storer y. Gordon, 3 M. & S. 308, 550 Storer y. Railway Co., 2 Younge & C. Ch. 48, 1097, 1101 Storer y. Taber, 83 Maine, 387, 343, 344 Storey y. Brennan, 15 N. Y. 524, 1941 Storey y. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397, 400, 401, 409 Storm y. United States, 94 U. S. 76, 74, 179 Storrs & Bement Co. y. Wingate (N. H. 1892) , 29 Atl. Rep. 413, 1722 Story y. Liyingstoh, 13 Pet. 359, 475 Story y. Marshall, 24 Texas, 305, 1662, 1733 Story y. Salmon, 11 Hun. 471, 1935 Story y. Salomon, 71 N. Y. 420, 1914, 1921 Story y. Story, 1 Ind. App. 284, 794 Stotesbury y. Smith, 2 Burrow, 924, 188 Stoudenmire y. Harper, 81 Ala. 242, 2250 Stout y. City, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Iowa, 371, 312 Stout y. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 554, 895 Stout y. Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232, 463 Stout y. Whitney, 12 111. 218, 854, 864 Stout y. Zulick, 48 N. J. Law, 599, 1335, 1337, 1434 Stoutenburg y. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St. 228, 2007 Stoutenburgh y. Tompkins, 9 N. J. Eq. 332 955 Stoyall y. Border, etc., Bank, 78 Va. 188, 828 Stoveld y. Eade, 4 Bing. 154, 469 Stow y. Russell, 36 111. 18, 749 Stow y. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214, 1236 Stowell y. Jackson Co., 57 Mich. 31, 1471 Stowell y. Robinson, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 928, 689, 690, 743, 951 Stowell y. Stowell, 45 Mich. 364, 483 Stowers y. Hollis, 83 Ky. 544, 1802 Stracy y. Bank, 6 Bing. 754, 210, 2240 Strafford y. Welch, 59 N. H. 46, 401 Straight y. Wight (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 195, 595 Strait y. National Harrow Co., 18 N. Y. Supl. 224, 1886 Strang y. Holmes, 7 Cow. 224, 538 Strange v. Crowley, 91 Mo. 289, 1118, 1129 Strasburg R. Co. y. Echternacht, 21 Pa. St. 220, 259, 1329 Straton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366, 463 Stratton y. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229, 1296, 1406 Stratton y. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 380, 1713 Straus y. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 59, 1259 Strauss v. Carolina, etc., Association (N. Car. 1895), 23 S. E. Rep. 450, 1622 Strauton y. Wood, 16 Q. B. 638, 769 Strayer y. Leonard, 13 Mont. 435, 1686 Streatfleld v. Halliday, 3 T. R. 779, 831 Streeter y. Streeter, 43 111. 155, 854 Streeter y. Western, etc., Society, 65 Mich. 199, 118 Streeter v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450, 760 Streetin y. Robinson, 1«2 Cal. 542, 1318 Strehl y. D'Eyers, 66 111. 77, 957 Straight y. Junk, 8 Fed. Rep. 321, 1447 Streppone y. Lennon, 143 N. Y. 626, 880 Strieker v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176, 711 Strickland v. Hardie, 82 Ala. 412, 477 Strickland y. Harger, 81 N. Y. 623, 1631 Stringer y. Northwestern Insurance Co., 82 Ind. ISO, 1787, W Striugfellow v. Iyie, 73 Ala. 209, 479 StringHeld y. Viyian, 63 Mich. 681, 935 Strodder v. Stone, etc., Granite Co. (Ga. 1894), 19 S. E. Rep. 1022, 544 Strohen v. Franklin, etc., Assn. (Pa. Sup. ), 8 Atl. Rep. 843, 1624 Strohen v. Franklin, etc., Association, 115 Pa. St. 273, 1599 Strohmaier y. Zeppenfeld, 3 Mo. App. 429, 1094 Strong y. Barnes, 11 Vt. 221, 567 Strong y. Birchard, 5 Conn. 357, 768 Strong y. Bird, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 315, 561 Strong y. Blake, 46 Barb. 227, 389, 390, 398 Strong y. Cromer, 48 Minn. 66, 518 Strong y. Doan, 55 Barb. 337, 551 Strong y. Dodds, 47 Vt. 348, 666 Strong y. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392, 9 Strodder y. Southern Granite Co. (1894), 19 S. E. Rep. 1022, 970 Stropes y. Board, 72 Ind. 42. 2084 Stroud y. Smith, 4 Houst. (Del.) 448, 2080 Strasguth y. Pollard, 62 Vt. 157, 379 Stryker y. Vanderbilt, 25 N. J. Law, 482, 955 Stuart y. Baker, 17 Texas, 417, 621, 1773 Stuart y. Blum, 28 Pa. St. 225, 1632 Stuart y. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102, 897, 1492 Stuart y. Presbyterian Church, 84 Pa. St. 388, 258 Stuart y. Railway Co., 15 Beay. 513, 1103 Stuart v. Rector, 1 Mo. 361, 19 Stuart y. Valley R. Co., 32 Gratt. 146, 260 Stubbings y. Dockery, 80 Wis. 618, 2248 Stubbins y. Mitchell, 82 Ky. 535, 443 Stubblefield y. Borders, 92 111. 279, 1033 Stubbs y. Holywell Railway Co., L. R. 2 Ex. 3311, 2228 Stuber y. McEntee, 19 N. Y. Supl. 900, 544 Stuber y. McEntee, 142 N. Y. 200, 514 Stuckey y. Keefe, 20 Pa. St. 397, 1764 Stuckey y. Mathes (1881), 24 B:un, 461, 1822 1839 Studabaker y. White, 31 Ind. 211, " ' 2044 Studds y. Watson, 28 Ch. Diy. 305, 684 Studer y. Bleistein, 115 N. Y. 316, 340, 504 Studwell y. Shapter, 54 N. Y. 249, 1785, 1801 Stuebben y. Granger, 63 Mich. 306, 855 Stull y. Hurt, 9 Gill, 446, 110 Stults v. Newhall, 118 Mass. 98, 954 Sturbridge, Town of, y. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 1660 Sturdy y. Henderson, 4 B. & Aid. 592, 765 Sturges y. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215, 195, 196 Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 2 2125 2158 Sturges y. Fourth Nat. Bank, 75 111.' 595, ' 612 Sturlyn y. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67, 221 Sturm y. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 885, 886, 905 Sturteyant y. Randall, 53 Maine, 149, 39, 40 Stuyyesant t. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151, 549 Suau y. Caffe, 122 N. Y. 308, 1754 Succession of Dumestre (45 La. 1892), 12 So. Rep. 123, 1762 Succession of Forstall, 39 La. Ann. 1052, 1742 Succession of Lewis, 45 La. Ann. 833, 1692 Succession y. Latchford, 42 La. Ann. 529, 1618 Sudlow y. Mead, 109 N. Y. 643, 5S1 Suffolk Bank y. Kidder, 12 Vt. 464, 715 Suffolk Bank y. Worcester Bank, 5 Pick. 106, 407 Sugar Riyer Bank y. Fairbank, 49 N. H. 131, 2289 Suggett y. Cason, 26 Mo. 221, 631 Sullings v. Goodyear, etc., Co., 36 Mich. 313, 496 Sullivan v. Collins, 18 Iowa, 228, 212 Sulliyan y. Ferguson, 40 Mo. 79, 110 Sullivan y. Jackson Loan Association, 70 Miss. 94, 1608, 1618 Sulliyan y. Latimer, 43 S. C. 262, 1082 Sulliyan v. O'Neal, 66 Texas, 433, 839 Sulliyan y. Sulliyan, 99 Cal. 187, 187 Suman y. Inman, 6 Mo. App. 384, 613 clxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Suman v. Springate, 67 Ind. 115, 842 Sumor v. Cottey, 71 Mo. 121, 182 Sumer v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139, 164 Summerlin v. Livingston, 15 La. Ann. 519 Snmmerson v. Hicks, 142 Pa. St. 344, Summerson v. Hicks, 134 Pa. St. 566, 163, 165, 169 Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt, 317, Sumner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M. 105, 2016 415 2110 1249, 1259 823 1894 95 Sumner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 30, Sumner v. Sumners, 54 Mo. 1540, Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162, Sumter, etc., Loan Assn. v. Winn (S. Car. 1895) , 23 S. E. Rep. 29, 1623 Supervisors v. Morgan, 4 Abb. App. (N. Y.) 335, ixr.0 Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772, 1:342, 142'.) Supervisors of Chenango v. Birdsall, 4 Wend. 453, 210, 1173 Supervisors of Orleans Co. v. Bowen, 4 Lans. 24, 1473 Supreme Council v. Curd, 111 111. 284, 869, 895 Surcome v. Pinniger, 3 De G., M. & G. 571, 619, 850 Susong v. Vaiden, 10 S. Car. 247, 824 Susquehanna, etc., Ins. Co. v. Cusick, 109 Pa. St. 157, 319 Sussdorfi v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319, 8 Sussex E. Co. v. Morris & E. R. Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 13, 1603 Sutclifle v. Atlantic Mills, 13 R. I. 480, 652 Suter v. Sheeler, 22 Pa. St. 284, 196 Sutherland v. Sutherland, 5 Bush, 591, 619 Sutliff v. Commissioners, 147 U. S. 230, 1526, 1527, 1530, 1539 Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 280, 1173 Sutphen v. Sutphen, 30 Kan. 510, 647 Sutro v. Rhodes, 92 Cal. 117, 361 Sutro Tunnel Co. v. Mining Co., 19 Nev. 121, 1225 Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101, 848, 1210 Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. St. 204, 1011 Sutton v. Tatham, 10 Ad. & El. 27, 940 Sutton v. The Albatross, 2 Wall., Jr. 327, 465 Sutton Manufacturing Co. v. Hutchinson, 63 Fed. Rep. 496, 1302 Sutton's Ex. v. Hollowell, 2 Dev. 185, 559 Suydam v. Clark, 2 Sandf. 133, 685 Suydam v. Dunton, 84 Hun, 506, 115 Suydam v. Jones, 10 Wend. 181, 952 Swain v. Bussell, 10 Ind. 438, 1955, 1957 Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254, 690, 846 Swales v. Jackson, 126 Ind. 282, 629, 637, 846, 1193 Swallow v. Bain (N. M.), 32 Pac. Rep. 501, 501 167 1531 115 613 Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355, Swan v. Arkansas City, 61 Fed. Rep. 478, Swan v. Drury, 22 Pick. 485, Swan v. Nosmith, 7 Pick. 220, Swan v. North British Australasian Co, 7 Hurl. & N. 602, 18133 Swan v. Scott, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 155, 2062 Swan v. Watertown, etc., Insurance Co., 96 Pa. St. 37, 319 Swank v. Nichols, 20 Ind. 198, 138 Swank v. Nichols, 24 Ind. 199, 138 Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268, 2127 Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. Hop. 299 1954 Swartwout v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 24 Mich. 389, 1335, 1452 Swatara R. Co. v. Brane, 6 Gill, 41, 155 Swatts v. Bowen, 141 Ind. 322, 29, 4s2 Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436, 421 Sweany v. Hunter, 1 Murphey (N. C), 187, Swearingen v. Buckley, 1 Texas Unrep. Cas. 421, 454 Swearingen v. Reed, 2 Texas Civ. App. 302, 1063 Sweed Iron Works v. Jefferson (Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 883, 265 Sweeney v. El Paso, etc.. Association (Texas Civ. App.), 26 S. W. Rep. 290, 1601, 1605 Sweeney v. Owsley, 14 B. Mon. 413, 296 Sweeney v. St. John, 28 Hun, 634, 643 Sweet v. Colleton, 96 Mich. 391, 599 Sweet v. Harding, 19 Vt. 587, 387 Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & Gr. 452, 682, 683 Sweet v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 19, 128 Sweeting v. Turner, L. R. 7 Q. B. 310, 54 Sweetman v. Prince, 62 Barb. 256, 358 Sweetman v. Prince, 26 N. Y. 224, 358 Sweigart v. Berk, 8 S. & R. 308, 829 Sweny v. Smith, L. R. 7 Eq. Cas. 324, 405 Swett v. Colgate, 20 Johns. 196, 324 Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511, 462 Swift v. Holdridge, 10 Ohio, 230, 1042 Swift v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 106 N. Y. 206, 735 Swift v. Shepard, 64 Cal. 423, 2267 Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 266, 651 Swires v. Parsons, 5 W. & S. 357, 786 Swisher v. Williams, Wright (Ohio), 754, 2107 Switzer v. Kee, 146 111. 577, 51 Switzer v. Pinconning Co., 59 Mich. 488, 269 Swonford, Matter of, 6 M. & S. 226, 384 Swope v. Bier, 10 Ind. App. 613, 511 Swope v. Jefferson Fire Ins. Co., 93 Pa. St. 251, 2011 Swope v. Leffingwell, 72 Mo. 348, 197 Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247, 654 Sykes v. Beadon, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 170, 1905 Sykes v. Chadwick, 18 Wall. 141, 232 Sykes v. City of St. Cloud (Minn. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 613, 1579 Syler, Lessee of, v. Eckhart, 1 Binney, 378, 850 Symmes v. Union Trust Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 830, 1445, 1447 Syms v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 153, 875 Synge v. Synge, L. R. (1894) 1 Q. B. 466, 228 Sypert v. Harrison, 88 Ky. 461, 1724, 1754 Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 1240, 1241 T Taber v. Ferguson, 109 Ind. 227, 1489 Taff Vale By. Co. v. Macnabb, 22 W. E. 65, 2030 Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt. 405, 1772 Taf t v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. 320, 1773 Tagiasco v. Molinari, 9 La. 512, 12 Taggart v. Tevanny, 1 Ind. App. 339, 2172 Targus v. Puget, 2 Ves. Sr. 194, 95 Talbot v. National Bank of the Common- wealth, 129 Mass. 67, 798 Talbot Paving Co. v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 91 Mich. 262. 2266 Talbot Paving Co. v. Gorman (Mich.), 61 N. W. Rep. 655, 350 Talbot v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 41 Iowa, 247, 734 Talburt v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 80 Ind. 434, 246 Talcott v. Harder, 119 N. Y. 536, 1664 Talcott v. Olcott Manufacturing Co., 11 Wkly. Dig. 141, 1316 Taliaferro v. Cundiff . 33 Texas, 415, 904 Tallinger v. Mandeville, 113 N. Y. 427, 1736 Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & Bl. 391. 2044, 2047 TaUmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105, 2077 Talmadge v. Arrowhead Reservoir Co., 101 Cal. 367, 2216 Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. Car. 522, 162 Talmadge v. Wallis, 25 Wend. 107, 181, 1132 Tallman v. Cooke, 39 Iowa, 402, 15 TABLE OF CASES. clxxvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Tallman v. Earle, 13 N. Y. Supl. 805, 944 Tallman v. Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584, 863, 1174 Taloe v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 76,83 Taloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 756 Talver v. West, Holt (N. P.) , 178, 665 Tampa, City or, v. Salomonson, 35 Fla. 446, 1479, 1480, 1521 Tamplin v. Still, 77 Ala. 374, 2107 Tamsen v. Schaefer, 108 N. Y. 604, 411 Tanner v. Smith, 10 Sim. 410, 998 Tanner v. Valentine, 75 111. 624, 641 Tanneret v. Marshall, 21 La. Ann. 619, 2021 Tansley v. Turner, 2 Bine. N. C. 151, 669 Tantum v. Green, 21 N. J. Eq. 364, 1661, 1662 Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Minn. 448, 1832 Tappau v. Albany Brewing Co., 80 Cal. 570, 1996 Tappan v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 2089 Tappan v. Poor, 15 Mass. 419, 708 Tappenden v. Randall, 2 Bos. & Pul. 467, 1870 Tarbell v. The Central Pacific, 34 Cal. 616, 413 Tarkington v. Purvis, 128 Ind. 182, 381, 2282, 2289 Tarleton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9, 1947, 1948 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360, 685 Tamer v. Walker, L. H. 2 Q. B. 301, 54, 60 Terrell, City of, v. Dessaint, 71 Texas, 770, 1522 Tar River Nav. Co. v. Neal, 3 Hawks (N. C), 520, 1323, 1434 Tascott v. Grace, 12 111. App. 639, 778, 784 Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359, 405 Tassell v. Lewis, 1 Lord Ray. 743, 767 Tate v. Citizens' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 79, 829 Tate v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216, 846 Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 1 Eg.. 528, 1024 Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 55, 1024 Tatlock v. Smith, 6 Bing. 339, 2240 Tatum v. Strader, 23 111. 493, 1946, 1948 Tatum v. Kelley, 25 Ark. 209, 1128, 1902, 2023 Taul v. Campbell, 7 Yerg, 319, 1763 Taunton, City of, v. Wareham, 153 Mass. 192, 1849 Tauziede v. Jnmel, 133 N. Y. 614, 30 Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 57, 698 Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 748 Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279, 237 Taylor v. Allen, 40 Minn. 433, 676 Taylor v. Beck, 3 Rand. (Va.) 316, 1944 Taylor v. Beech, 1 Ves. Sen. 297, 619 Taylor v. Blackman (Miss.). 12 So. Rep. 458, 545 Taylor v. Blair (Sup.), 13 N. Y. Supl. 154, 2182 Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen (Mass.), 370, 2026, 2032, 2046, 2049, 2051 Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73, 460, 803, 805, 1829 Taylor v. Bowker, 111 TJ. S. 110. 1400 Taylor v. Brewer, 1 Maule &. Selw. 290, 132 133 Taylor v. Brooklyn R. Co., 119 N. Y. 561, 406, 407 Taylor v. Caldwell, 113 E. C. L. 826, 270, 283, 291, 292, 846 Taylor v. Carpenter, 11 Paige, 292, 1987 Taylor v. Chester, L. R. 4 Q. B. 309, 1042 Taylor v. Corporation of St. Helens, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 264, 884 Taylor v. Davis, 82 Wis. 455, 2244, 2248 Taylor v. Fox, 16 Mo. App. 527, 117, 897 Taylor v. Fulks (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 349, 997 Taylor v. Galland, 3 Greene (Iowa), 1, 572 Taylor v. Glaser, 2 Sere. & R. 502, 19 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, 251 Taylor v. Hoey, 4 J. & S. 402, 466 Taylor v. Horst, 52 Minn. 300, 565 Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291, 1830, 1832 xii Taylor v. Jones, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 87, 87 Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172, 751 Taylor v. Lyon, 2 Dana, 276, 363 Taylor v. Manners, L. R. 1 Ch. 48, 515, 554 Taylor v. McClure, 28 Ind. 39, 15 Taylor v. McLain, 64 Cal. 513, 422 Taylor v. McNutt, 58 Texas, 71, 1925 Taylor v. Mueller, 30 Minn. 343, 671 Taylor v. National Bank (S. D. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 99, 996, 2288. 2289 Taylor v. Netherwood (Va. 1895), 20 S. E. Rep. 888, 750 Taylor v. Penquite, 35 Mo. App. 389, 1856. 1923 Taylor v. People, 66 111. 322, 459 Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562, 2279 Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436, 605 Taylor v. Rhea, 10 Miner (Ala.), 414, 378 Taylor v. Savage, 12 Mass. 98, 599 Taylor v. Shelton, 30 Conn. 122, 1695 Taylor v. Short, 107 Mo. 384, 976 Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. Car. 531. 856 Taylor v. Smith (1893), L. R. 2 Q. B. 65, 664, 666 Taylor v. Stockwell, 66 Ind. 505, 2156 Taylor v. Taylor, 64 Ind. 356, Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183, 1021 Taylor v. Taylor, 144 111. 436, 1714 Taylor v. Van Buren Association, 56 Ark. 340, 1619 Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374, 641 Taylor v. West, etc., Wheel Co., 9 Am. Law Rec. 28, 1373 Taylor v. Williams, 45 Mo. 80, 1118 Taylor v. Williams, 6 Wis. 363, 144, 146 Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60, 2207 Teague v. Irwin, 127 Mass. 217, 1875 Teague v. Williams, 6 Texas App. 468, 1038 Teal v. Auty, 2 Brod. & Bing. 99, 638 Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242, 2082 Teall v. Consolidated Co., 119 N. Y. 654, 501 Teasdale v. McPike, 25 Mo. App. 341, 1916. 1924 Teats v. Flanders, 118 Mo. 660, 1133 Tebo v. Robinson, 100 N. Y. 27, 2199 Teegarden v. Lewis (Ind. 1893), 35 N. E. Rep. 24, 1817, 1826 Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387, 28 Teirnan v. Roland, 15 Pa. St. 429, 397 Telegraph Dispatch Co. v. McLean, L. R. 8 Ch. 658, 300 Telford v. Frost, 76 Wis. 172, 1182 Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Aid. 680, 663 Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Aid. 321, 672 Tempest v. Kilner, 3 C. B. 249, 660 Temple v. Johnson, 71 111. 13, 842 Temple v. Lemon, 112 111. 51, 154, 259, 1321 Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 1680 Templeton v. Green (Texas C. App. 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 1073, 970 Ten Eyck v. Manning, 52 N. J. Eq. 47, 1104, 1189 Ten Eyck v. Vanderpoel, 8 John. 120, 593 Tennant v. Crocker, 85 Mich. 328, 1522 Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 1496, 2153 Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129, 853, 1456, 1457 Tennessee R. Co. v. Danforth, 99 Ala. 331, 2250 Tennessee River, etc., Co. v. Kavanaugh, 93 Ala. 324, 1272 Tennessee River Trans. Co. v. Kavanaugh, 1272 WW 1231 890 14 i 1911 1982 101 Ala. 1, Tenney v. Foote, 95 111. 99, Tenney v. Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343, Tenny v. Mulvaney, 8 Ore. 129, Terhune v. Oldis, 44 N. J. Eq. 146, Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. McMurray, S Ind. 358, Terrell, In re, 51 Fed. Rep. 213, cl XXV111 TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Terrell, City of, v. Dessaint, 71 Texas, 770, 1533, 1586, 1587 Terrell v. Frazier, 79 Ind. 473, 638 Terrell y. Weymouth, 32 Fla. 255, 996 Terrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105, 1521 Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.), 43, 2124 Ten-ill v. Auchauer, 14 Ohio St. 85, 178 Territory v. Carson, 7 Mont. 417, 1512 Territory v. Citv of Oklahoma (Okla. 1894) , 37 Pae. Sep. 1094, 1567 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 2158 Terry v. Bale, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 452, 788 Terry v. Duntze, 2 H. Bl. 389, 114 Terry v. Life Ins. Co., 1 Dillon, 403, 119 Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216, 1381, 1384 Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161, 781, 2168, 2169, 2275 Terry v. Rosell, 32 Ark. 478, 2167 Terry v. Shively, 64 Ind. 1U6, 902 Terry v. Tubman, 92 U. S. 156, 1382 Tescher v. Merea, 118 Ind. 586, 1855 Tessier v. Roussel, 41 La. Ann. 474, 1675 Tetley v. Wanless, L. E. 2 Ex. 275. 564 Texas, etc., Association v. Kerr (Texas Sup. ) , 13 S. W. Hep. 1020, 175 Texas, etc., Co. v. Hobards, 60 Texas, 545, 2073 Texas, etc., Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Texas, 650, 2037, 2058 Texas, etc., Ey. Co. v. Bust, 19 Fed. Bep. 239 753 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Marshall, 136 TJ. S. 303 375 1974 1977 Texas & P. Ey. Co. v. City of Marshall, ' 136 U. S. 393, 860 Texas & P. Ey. Co. v. Southern Pac. Ey. Co., 41 La. Ann. 970, 1983 Texas Railway Co. v. Southern Pac. E. Co., 41 La. Ann. 970, 1424 Teucher v. Hiatt, 23 Iowa, 527. 763 Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Mund, 102 Pa. St. 89, 896 Tewkesbury v. Bennett, 31 Iowa, 83, 328 Tewksbury v. Hayes, 41 Maine, 123, 2210 Tewksbury v. Howard, 138 Ind. 103, 959, 1176 Tewksbury Tp., Overseer of Poor of, y. Overseer of Poor of Branchburg Tp., 44 N. J. Law, 595, 1548 Thacher v. Churchill, 118 Mass. 108, 1707 Thacker v. Booth (Kj .), 6 S. W. Eep. 460, 417 Thacker v. Tl 1 acker, 125 In d. 489, 1725 Thackrah v. Haas, 119 U. S. 499, 974 Thalimer v. BrinkerhofE, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 386. 1865 Thallhimer y. Brinckerhoff, 6 Cow. 90, 466 Thatcher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299, 1189 Thatcher v. Dudley, 2 Boot. 169, 531 Thatcher v. England, 3 C. B. 254, 54 Thatcher v. Humble, 67 Ind. 444, 2256 Thatcher v. Morris, 11 N. Y. 437, 1956 Thatcher v. Omans, 3 Pick. 521, 1672 Thatcher v. Wardens, etc., 37 Mich. 264, 15, 67 Thaxton v. Edwards, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 524, 2197 Thayer v. Brackett, 12 Mass. 450, 399 Thayer v. Meeker, 86 111. 470, 382, 384 Thayer v. Richards, 1'J Pick. 398, 490 Thayer v. Seavey, 11 Maine, 284, 2150 Thayer v'. Seep, 168 Pa. St. 414, 1064 The Mtna Iron Works Co. v. Kossuth County, 79 Iowa, 40, 135 The Amiable Naucy, 3 Wheat. 546, 506 The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327, 503 The Bark Charlotte, 9 Ben. 1, 276 The Barque Idrio KimbalL 8 Ben. 297, 124 The Barque Woodland, 7 Ben. 110, 740 The Blair, etc., Co. v. Walker, 39 Iowa, 406, 647 The Cargo of Ship Emulous, Gall (U. S. C. C.),562, 2020 The City of Rome, 49 Fed. Rep. 392, 31 The Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548, 899 The D. B. Steelman, 48 Fed. 580, 470 The David Pratt, 1 Ware, 509, 652 The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579, 334 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 WaU. (TJ. S.) 206, 2131 The Eddy, 5 WaU. 481, 124 The Energia, 56 Fed. Eep. 124, 741 The Enos B. Phillips, 53 Fed. Eep. 153, 396 The Floyd Acceptance, 7 WaU. 666, 1342, 1430 The Gaetano & Maria, L. E. 7 P. D. 137, 740 The GazeUe, 128 U. S. 474, 917 The Harbinger, 50 Fed. Eep. 941, 936 The Highlands Chemical Co. v. Mat- thews, 76 N. Y. 145, 305 The Jagger Iron Co. v. Walker, 76 N. Y. 521, 552 The Karnak. L. R. 2 P. C. 505, 740 The Kimball, 3 WaU. 37, 452, 1929 The Lake Ontario Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219 242 The Lively, 1 GaU, 315, 506 The Monte AUegre, 9 Wheat. 516, 356 The Omaha Bridge Cases, 10 TJ. S. App. 98, 189, 1499 The Oregon v. Pittsburgh Iron Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 666, 917 The Queen v. Justices of Shropshire. 8 Ad. & E. 173, 764 The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567, 926 The Resolution, 2 DaU. (U. S.J 10, 2020 The Schooner Rapid, 1 GaU (U. S. C. C), 295, 2020 The Ship Francis, 1 GaU (TJ. S. C. C), 445, 2020 The Tom Lyle, 48 Fed. Eep. 690, 470 The Tybee, 1 Wood, 358, 124 The Woodland, 14 Blatchford, 499, 740 Thedford v. McClintock, 47 Ala. 647, 1906 Theiss v. Weiss, 66 Pa. St. 9, 856 Theus v. Dugger, 93 Tenn. 41, 1750 Thiemann v. Heinze, 120 Mo. 630, 1039 Thigpen v. Mississippi E. Co., 32 Miss, 347, 259, 260 Thimble v. Eeis, 37 Pa. St. 448, 1764 Thimbleby v. Barron, 3 M. & W. 210, 569 Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 55, 1777 Third Nat. Bank v. Harrison, 10 Fed. Rep. 243, 1923 Third Nat. Bank v. Humphreys, 66 Fed. Eep. 872, 530 Third Nat. Bank v. Marine Lumber Co., 44 Minn. 65, 1352 Thomas v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581, 344 Thomas v. BrownvUle, etc., E. Co., 109 TJ. S. 522, 1304, 1306 Thomas v. CaldweU, 50 111. 138, 2255 Thomas v. Caulkett, 57 Mich. 392, 1999 Thomas v. City of Eichmond, 12 WaU. (TJ. S.) 349, 1912 Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & Cres. 728, 596, 599, 613, 615, 616, 617 Thomas v. Corey, 74 Mich. 216, 488 Thomas v. Cronise, 16 Ohio, 54, 2014 Thomas v. Dale, 86 Ind. 435, 2174 Thomas v. Dickinson, 14 Barb. 90, 836 Thomas v. Edwards, 2 Mees. & W. 215, 1883 Thomas v. Evans, 10 East, 101, 388, 389 Thomas v. Fleury, 26 N. Y. 26, 127, 2225 Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Texas, 42, 647 Thomas v. McDaniel, 14 Johns. 185, 465 Thomas v. Miles' Admr., 3 Ohio St. 274, 2047 Thomas v. Perry, Pet. C. C. 49, 110 Thomas v. Pullis, 56 Mo. 211, 1774 Thomas v. Eailroad Co., 101 TJ. S. 71, 1226, 1227, 1248, 1252, 1412, 1429, 1431, 1576, 1970 Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 41, 2179 Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6 Watts & S. 179, 384, 1870 Thomas v. Simpson, 80 N. Car. 4, 345 Thomas v. SorreU, Vaughan, 330, 643 Thomas v. Stewart, 132 N. Y. 580, 127, 476 Thomas v. Walnut Land, etc., Co., 43 Mo. App. 653, 786 Thomas v. Weaver, 52 N. J. Eq. 580, 1722 Thomas v. WiUiams, 10 B. & C. 664, 60S TA1SLK OF CASES. ;;ax [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. J Thomas Mnfg. Co. v. Watson, 85 Maine, BOO, 2218 Thomason v. Capital Ins. Co. (Iowa 1894), 61 N. W. Rep. 843, 1080, 1081 Thomason v. De Greayer (Cal. 1892), 31 Pao. Rep. 567, 2216 Thomason v. Dill, 80 Ala. 444, 550 Thomasson v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 419, 1778 Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176, 1456 Thompson v. Andrus, 73 Mich. 551, 878 Thompson v. Ashton, 14 Johns. 316, 167 Thompson v. Bertrand, 23 Ark. 730, 332 Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 40 111. 879, 257 Thompson v. Brannin, 94 Ky. 490, 927 Thompson v. Brown, 1 Moody & M. 40, 472 Thompson v. City of Sumner, 9 Wash. 310, 1561 Thompson v. Cohen, 127 Mo. 215, 996 Thompson v. Cummings & Co., 68 Ga. 124, 1926 Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 112, 2000 Thompson v. Ela, 58 N. H. 419, 1721 Thompson v. Faussat, Pet. C. C. 182, 579 Thompson v. First Nat. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 1385 Thompson v. Foerstel, 10 Mo. App. 87, 1645 Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strobh. Law (S. Car.), 196, 654, 2210 Thompson v. Gregory, 4 John. 81, 643 Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134, 167, 168, 836, 837 Thompson v. Hamilton, 12 Pick. 426, 910 Thompson v. Hanson, 28 Minn. 484, 201 Thompson v. Harrison, 2 Bro. C. C. 164, 564 Thompson v. Irwin, 42 Mo. App. 403, 354, 355, 357 Thompson v. Johnson, 40 N. J. Law, 220, 822 Thompson v. Ketcham, 4 John. 285, 711 Thompson v. Lack, 3 M. G. & S. 540, 568 Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 48, 1776, 1777 Thompson v. Leslie, 14 N. Y. Supl. 472, 123 Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn. 443, 351 Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 334 Thompson v. Longan, 42 Mo. App. 146, 197 Thompson v. Maceroni, 3 B. & C. 1, 672 Thompson v. Means, 11 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 2039, Thompson v. Munger, 15 Texas, 523, 2214 Thompson v. Niggley, 53 Kan. 664, 1831 Thompson v. Paige, 1 Mete. 565, 217, 256 Thompson v. Percival, 5 B. & Adol. 925, 192, 537 Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 V. S. 287, 1088 Thompson v. Powles, 2 Simons, 194, 729 Thompson v. Proutv, 27 Vt. 14, 876, 878, 879 Thompson v. Purcell, 10 Allen, 426, 146 Thompson v. Reno, etc., Bank, 19 Nev. 171, 1375 Thompson v. Reno, etc., Bank, 19 Nev. 103, 1375 Thompson v. Eiggs, 5 Wall. 663, 920 Thompson v. St. Nicholas Bank, 113 N. Y. 325, 470, 478 Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. 161, 786 Thompson v. Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333, 244 Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 48 Thompson v. Western Tel. Co., 32 Mo. App. 191, „, , , 2105 Thompson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 64 Wis. 531, 1961 Thompson v. Williams, 58 N. H. 248, 2102 Thompson, etc., Light Co. v. Henderson, etc., Light Co. (if. Car.), 21 S. E. Rep. 951, 1399, 1406 Thomson v. Advocate General, 12 C. & F. 1, 721 Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474, 95 Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327, 1499 Thomson v. Thomson, 7 Ves. 470, 1864 Thormaehlen v. Kaeppel, 86 Wis. 378, 1786, 1793 Thorn v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84, 2206 Thorn v. Pinkham, 84 Maine, 101, 1828 Thornborow v. Wnitacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164, 270 Thornburg v. Harris, 3 Cold. (Term.) 157, 1854 Thornburg v. Masten, 88 N. C. 293, 683 Thornburg v. Wiggins.135 Ind. 178. 1765 Thome v. Barwick, 16 Up. Can. C. P. 369, 83 Thornhill v. Neats, 8 C. B. N. S. 831, 299 Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1 882, 899, 2225 Thornton v. Jenvns, 1 Man. & G. 166, 192 Thornton v. Railway Co., 81 N. Y. 462, 1447 Thornton v. Sheffield, etc., R., 84 Ala. 109, 885 Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253, 237 Thorp v. Pettit, 16 N. J. Eq. 488, 1125 Thorp v. Stewart, 44 Hun, 232, 652 Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., Co., 27 Vt. 140, 2133, 2147 Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 L. Raym. 662, 114 Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Ld. Raym. 235, 862, 892 Thouvenin v. Lea, 26 Texas, 612, 635 Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202, 872 Thrasher v. Doig, 18 Fla. 809, 1737 Thrasher v. Pike County R. Co., 25 111. 393, 255, 260 Thrift v. Payne. 71 111. 408, 148 Throop v. Hatch Lithographic Co., 125 N. YT530, 1353 Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp. 628, 1777 Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. Car. 301, 1741 Thurber v. Sprague, 17 R. I. 634, 544 Thurman v. Wild, 39 E. C. L. 252, 445 Thurston v. Blaisdell, 8 N. H. 367, 402 Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474, 724 Thygesen v. Newfelder, 9 Wash. 455, 1760 Thynne v. Earl of Glengall, 2 H. L. Cas. 131, 843 Tibbals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428, 90, 91 Tibbetts v. Gerrish, 25 N. H. 41, 1777 Tibbetts v. Sartwell (N. H. 1893), 29 Aid. Rep. 411, 946 Ticonic R. Co. v. Lang, 63 Maine, 480, 155 Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. Car. 589, 451, 545 Tielens v. Hooper, 5 Exch. 830, 869 Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt. 179, 1759 Tiernan v. Binns, 92 Pa. St. 248, 1714 Tiernan v. Granger, 65 111. 351, 651 Tiernan v. Poor, 1 Gill & J. 216, 1186 Tiffany v. Glasgow, b2 Minn. 266, 456 Tiffany v. St. John, 65 N. Y. 314, 410- Tift v. Quaker City Nat. Bank, 141 Pa. St. 550, 1314 Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263, 596, 603, 615 Tightmeyer v. Mongold, 20 Kan. 90, 781 Tilden v. Blair, 21 Wall. 241, 728 Tilden v. Rosenthal, 41 111. 385, 109 Tillett v. Charing Cross Bridge Co., 26 Beav. 419, 1212 Tilley v. American B. & L. Assn., 52 Fed. Rep. 618, 1619 Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 TJ. S. 155, 891 920 923 Tilley v. Thomas, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 61,' ' 749 Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447, 1748 Tillis v. Smith (Ala. 1896), 19 So. Rep. 374, 1076 Tillison v. Tillison, 63 Vt. 411, 31 Tilton v. Alcott, 16 Barb. 598, 526 Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 1544 Timmerman v. Dever, 52 Mich. 34, 2039 Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 1497 Tingley v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 5 Wash. 644, 1279 Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34, 950 Tingue v. The Village of Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 294, 459 Tinkham v. Heyworfch, 31 111. 519, 941 Tipper v. BickneU, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 710, 192 clxxx TABLE OF CASES. {References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'} Tippin v. Brockwell, 89 Ga. 467, 483 Tipton, County of, v. Locomotive Works, 103 U. S. 523, 1461 Tischler v. Kurtz, 35 Fla. 323, 11 Tisdale ?. Bailey, 6 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 487, 1727 Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9, 660 Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55, 13 Titcomb v. McAllister, 81 Maine, 399, 457 Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480, 792 Titus v. Cairo, etc., E. Co., 37 N. J. Law, 98, 1344 Titus v. Poole, 145 N. Y. 414, 353 Titus v. President, etc., 5 Lans. 250, 1351 Titus v. President, etc., of Turnpike Road, 61 N. Y. 237 1305 Titus v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (Ky. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 127, 986 Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68, 447, 455, 465 Tobey v. Robinson, 99 111. 222, 1246 Tobey v. Wood, 123 Mass. 88, 1771 Tobias v. Rogers, 13 N. Y. 59, 777 Tod v. Kentucky, etc., Land Co., 57 Fed. Rep. 47, 1342 Todd v. Crumb, 5 McLean (U. S.) 172, 2150 Todd v. Maxfield, 6 B. & C. 105, 30 Todd v. Parker, 1 N. J. Law, 45, 401 Todd v. Taft, 7 Allen, 371, 1208 Todd v. Tobey, 29 Maine, 219, 607 Todd y. Union Dime Co., 118 N. Y. 337, 182 Todd v. Union Dime Co., 128 N. Y. 636, 416, 419 Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 231, 238 Todd's Heirs v. Wickliffe, 19 B. Mon. (Ky.) 866, 1672 Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 1268, 1981, 2027, 2074 Todhunter v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 58 Iowa, 205, 1256 Toher v. Lappine, 60 N. Y. St. Rep. 853, 141 Toker v. Toker, 31 Beav. 629, 253 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Chew, 67 111. 378, 781 Toledo R. Co. v. Johnson, 49 Mich. 148, 157 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Levy, 127 Ind. 168, 949 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Mylott, 6 Ind. App. 438, 1911 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 746, 1212 Toledo Sav. Bank v. Johnston (Iowa 1895) , 62 N. W. Rep. 748, 2284 Tolhurst v. Powers, 133 N. Y. 460, 7 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 55 Mich. 456, 483 Toley v. Armstrong, 4 Wash. (C. C.) 297, 2016 Toll v. Wright, 37 Mich. 93, 1794 Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 280, 1761 Tombler y. Reitz, 134 Ind. 9, 1721 Tomlin v. Hilyard, 43 111. 300, 628 Tomlinson v. Bentall, 5 Barn. & Cress. 738, 782 Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 460, 1457, 2140 Tomlinson v. Gell, 6 Ad. & E. 564, 610 Tomlinson v. Gill, Ambler, 330, 608 Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 2140 Tompkins v. Batie, 11 Neb. 147, 398 Tompkins v. Clay St. R. Co., 66 Cal. 163, 577 Tompkins v. Compton, 93 Ga. 520, 1906 Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272, 289, 2227 Tompkins v. Hunter, U N. Y. Supl. 8, 1S64 Tompkins v. Hunter, 20 N. Y. Supl. 355, 1647 Tompkins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. 338, 954 Tompkinson v. South Eastern R. Co., L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 675, 1421 Toner v. Fulkerson, 125 Ind. 224, 1381, 1382 Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40, 152 Toohey v. Comstock, 45 Mich. 603, 239 Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 1301, 1591, 1853, 19X5, 1992, 1995, 2079, 2081, 2082 Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N. Y. 168, 2246 Toole v. Baer, 91 Ga. 113, 2176 Tooley v. Chase, 26 Ore. 600, 1057 Tooley v. Windham, Cro. Eliz. (1 Croke) 20b, 192, 214 Tootle v. First National Bank, 6 Wash. 181, 1274 Tootle v. Jenkins, 82 Texas, 29, 474 Topeka Bridge Co. v. Cummings, 3 Kan. 55, 155 Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U. S. 121, 875 Toppan v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 1 Flip. (XI. S.) 74, 1430 Torr v. Torr, 20 Ind. 118, 1176 Torrens v. Campbell, 74 Pa. St. 235, 239 Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Maine, 553, 708, 2120 Torrev v. Dustin Monument Association, 5 Allen (Mass.), 327, 1358 Torry v. Black, 58 N. Y. 185, 553 Toucey v. Bowen, 1 Biss. 81, 1382 Touche v. Metropolitan Warehousing Co., L. R. 6 Ch. App. 671, 1308 Tousey v. Moore, 79 Mich. 574, 201 Towanda Bridge Co., In re, 91 Pa. St. 216, 2146 Towell v. Gatewood, 2 Scam. (111.) 22, 348 Tower v. Tudhope, 37 U. C. Q. B. 200, 666 Towers v. Moor, 2 Vern. 98, 821, 823 Towers of Osborne, 1 Stra. 506, 656 Towers, etc., Ginning Co. v. Inman, 96 Ga. 506, 1266 Towle v. American Bldg. and Loan Assn., 61 Fed. Rep. 446, 1617, 1624 Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Maine, 464, 2101 Towles v. Fisher, 77 N. Car. 437, 1740 Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67, 1885 Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355, 1802 Town v. Bank, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 530, 1404 Town v. Trow, 24 Pick. 168, 382 Town Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400, 804, 805, 1835 Towner v. Tickner, 112 111. 217. 489 Town of Andes v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312, 1534 Town of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400, 1835 Town of Colchester v. Culver.29 Vt. Ill, 1058 Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484, 1524, 1525, 1529, 1530 Town of Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1, 2125 Town of Douglasville v. Johns, 62 Geo. 423, 458, 459 Town of Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257, 1508 Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 IU. 292, 1885 Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 511, 2143 Town of East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801, 1461 Town of Essex v. New York, etc., R. Co., 8 Hun (N. Y.),361, 2180 Town of Fowler v. Austin Mfg. Co., 5 Ind. App. 489, 1473, 1566 Town of Glastonbury v. McDonald, 44 Vt. 450, 968 Town of Hamden v. Merwin, 54 Conn. 418, 101 Town of Hamilton v. Chopard, 9 Wash. 352, 1545 Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 IU. 191, 2147 Town of Ligomer v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552, 804 Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427, 2142 Town of Petersburgh v. Mappin, 14 111. 193, 210, 1473 Town of Princeton v. Vierling, 40 Ind. 340, 459 Town of Rutland v. Paige, 24 Vt. 181, 1058 Town of Sharon v. Gager, 46 Conn. 189, 1828, 1832 Town of Solon v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N. Y. 122, 21, 1064 Town of Sturbridge v. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 1660 Town of Thetford v. Hubbard, 22 Vt. 440, 395, 398 Town of West Hartford v. Board of Wa- ' ter Comrs., 44 Conn. 360, 1502 TABLE OF CASES. clxxxi [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291."] Town of Woodstock y. Town of Barnard, 67 Vt. 97, 1849 Townsend v. Fenton, 32 Minn. 482, 842 Townsend v. Fisher, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 37, 214 Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 296 591 593 Townsend v. Houston, 1 Hair. 532, ' 843 Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407, 717 Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. St. 143, 605 Townsend v. Pepperell, 99 Mass. 40, 1812 Townsend v. Stearns, 32 N. Y. 209, 1641 Townsend v. Townsend, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 319, 1111 Townshend v. Goodfellow, 40 Minn. 312, 418 Township of Midland v. County Board Gage County, 87 Neb. 582, 1543 Township of Union v. Smith, 39 Iowa, 9, 2237 Townsley v. Chapin, 12 Allen, 476, 1186 Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 169, 594, 597 Towslee v. Healey, 39 Vt. 522, 510, 512, 522 Towson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 H. & J. 47, 394 Trabant v. Rummell, 14 Ore. 17, 1734 Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257, * 728 Tracy v. Chicago, 24 111. 500, 854, 863 Tracy v. Colby, 55 Cal. 67, 1304 Tracy v. Jenks, 15 Pick. 465, 2107 Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659, 394 Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162, 1895, 1901, 1903, 1912, 1972 Tracy v. Tracy's Heirs, 14 W. Va. 243, 1179 Traders' Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415, 200,204 Traill v. Baring, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 318, 990 Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366, 724 Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 777, 1801 Trambly v. Bicard, 130 Mass. 259, 578 Traphagenv. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30, 644 Traphagen's Ex'r v. Voorhees, 44 N. J. Eq. 21, 244, 553 Trapnell v. Conklyn, 37 W. Va. 242, 1677, 1678, 1691, 1692 Trapp v. Moore, 21 Ala. 693. 1054, 1064 Trasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 234, 708, 715 Traver v. Halsted, 23 Wend. 66, 495 Traver v. Stevens, 11 Cush. 167, 453 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Eedfield (Colo. App.) , 40 Pac. Sep. 195, 409, 410, 975 Travis v. Insurance Co., 28 W. Va. 583, 1088 Treadwell v. Davis, 34 Cal. 601, 1866 Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 37, 1260 Treadwell v. Union Insurance Co., 6 Cow. 270, 912 Treanor v. Houghton, 103 Cal. 53, 1494 Treasurer v. Commercial Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390, 1208 Treat v. Hiles, 68 Wis. 344, 645 Treat v. Jones, 28 Conn. 334, 1899 Treat v. Shoninger Melodeon Co., 35 Conn. 543, 2038 Treat v. Stanton, 14 Conn. 445, 239, 475 Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 394 Treleaven v. Dixon, 119 111. 548, 1712 Trenor v. Jackson, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 389, 2073 Trentman v. Eldridge, 98 Ind. 525, 1725 Trenton, School Trustees of City of, v. Bennett, 27 N. J. Law, 513, 2237 Trester v. City of Sheboygan, 87 Wis. 496, 1508, 1509 Trevelyan v. White, 1 Beav. 588, 2279 Trevidick v. Mumford, 31 Mich. 467, 336 Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 207, 66, 82, 83 Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. Car. 151, 696, 726 Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378, 243, 246, 247, 962 Trimble v. Williamson, 49 Ala. 525, 415 Tripler v. City of New York, 17 N. Y. Supl. 750, * 61 Triplett v. Graham, 58 Iowa, 135, 1686 Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 441, 1884, 1991, 1992, 1994, 2053 Troewert v. Decker, 29 Ark. 386, 2103 Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 46. 2100, 2106 Trotter v. Heckscher, 40 N. J. Eq. 612, 1049 Troup's Case, 29 Beav. 353, 1253 Troutman v. Lucas, 63 Geo. 466, 519, 524 Trovinger v. McBurney, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 253, 2015 Trow v. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446, 559 Trowbridge v. Dean, 40 Mich. 687, 869 Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 194, 217, 256 Troy, Bank of, v. Topping, 9 Wend. 273, 593 Troy Fertilizer Co. v. Logan, 96 Ala. 619, 103, 106 Troy Laundry Machine Co. v. Henry, 23 Ore. 232, 330 Troy E. Co. v. Newton, 8 Gray, 596, 155 Troy E. Co. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297, 155 Truman v. Truman, 79 Iowa, 506, Trumball v. Tilton, 21 N. H. 128, 1633 Trumbo v. Lockridge, 4 Bush. 415, 363 Trundle v. Eiley, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 396, 2090 Truscott v. King, 6 N. Y. 147, 470 Trust Co. v. Cole, 4 Fla. 359, 1163 Trustees v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440, 2077 Trustees v. McCaughy. 2 Ohio St. 152, 2120 Trustees v. Eipley, 6 Maine, 442, 256 Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506, 256, 257 Trustees v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 2271 Trustees United Brethren, etc., v. Rausch, 122 Ind. 167, 1497 Trustees, etc., v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1, 1518 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward, 4 Wheat. 518, 1583, 2122, 2127, 2130, 2142 Trustees of First Baptist Church v. Brook- lyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 305, 28 N. Y. 153, 653 Trustees of Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632, 2124 Trustees of Ky. Baptist Society v. Carter, 72 111. 247, 257 Trustees of Presbyterian Church v. Na- tional State Bank (N. J. 1894),29Atl. Eep. 320, 2239 Trustees of Schools v. Otis, 85 111. 179, 1059 Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 111. 27, 2142 Tryon v. Hart, 2 Conn. 120, 573 Tryon v. Jennings, 22 How. Pr. 421, 189 Tryon v. White & Corbin Co., 62 Conn. 161, 1317 Tscheider v. Biddle, 4 Dillon,! 55, 1212 Tuche v. Metropolitan, etc., Warehousing Co., L. E. 6 Ch. App. 671, 1314 Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe E., 11 Leigh (Va.), 42, 2135 Tucker v. Baldwin, 13 Conn. 136, 588 Tucker v. Bartle, 85 Mo. 114, 8 Tucker v. Edwards, 7 Colo. 209, 526 Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 527, 2139, 2140 Tucker v. Justice, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 434, 1477 Tucker v. Grand Eapids (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 1013, 1470 Tucker v. Madden, 44 Maine, 206, 1066 Tucker v. McKee, 1 Bailey L. (S. Car.) 344, 1841 Tucker v. Meeks, 2 Sweeny, 736, 860, 886 Tucker v. Mowrey, 12 Mich. 378, 2104 Tucker v. Murray, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 497, 517 519 Tucker v. Bonk, 43 Iowa, 80, ' 212 Tucker v. Tucker, 24 Mich. 426, 490, 1712 Tucker v. West, 29 Ark. 386, 2103. 2109 Tucker v. Woods, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 190, 92, 214 Tuckerman v. Hinkley, 9 Allen (Mass.), 452, 2111 Tuckerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581, 540, 561, 572, 573, 818 clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Tuckett v. Herdic, 5 Texas Civ. App. 690, 1937 Tufnell v. Constable, 8 Simon, 69, 556 Tufts v. Atlantic Tel. Co., 157 Mass. 269, 488 Tufts v. Copen, 16 S. E. Rep. 793, 1696 Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 164, 165 Tufts T. Grewer, 83 Maine, 407, 2230 Tufts y. Griffen, 107 N. C. 47, 167, 169 Tufts v. Lamed, 27 Iowa, 330, 1065 Tufts v. Plymouth, etc., Co., 14 Allen, 407, 675 Tufts v. Thompson, 22 Mo. App. 564, 1644 Tufts v. Wynne, 45 Mo. App. 42, 167, 168 Tubman v. National Steamship Co., 76 N. Y. 207, 2168 Tulane v. Clifton, 47 N. J. Eq. 351, 208, 376 Tuller v. Arnold, 98 Cal. 522, 1283 Tullis v. Jacson (L. H. 1892) , 3 Ch. 441, 1131 Tunison v. Chamblin, 88 111. 378, 1789 Tunno v. Trezevant, 2 Des. 264, 223 Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 559, 1799 Turley V. Edwards, IS Mo. App. 676, 1038 Turnbull v. Brock, 31 Ohio St. 649, 189 Turabull v. Farnsworth, 1 Wash. Ter. 444, 1887 Turner v. Carpenter, 83 Mo. 333, 13 Turner v. Chillocothe, etc., B. Co., 51 Mo. 501, 1318 Turner v. Comer, 6 Gray (Mass.), 530, 1632 Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. Car. 357, 1777, 1778, 1798 Turner v. Johnson, 7 Dana (Ky.), 435, 2032 Turner v. Jones, 1 Lans. 147, 772 Turner v. Kelly, 70 Ala. 85, 1069 Turner v. Mason, 65 Mich. 662, 658 Turner v. Busk, 53 Md. 65, 2278 Turner v. Turner, L. E. 14 Ch. Div. 829, 566 Turner v. Turner, 44 Mo. 535, 1020 Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336, 1711 Turner v. Whidden, 22 Maine, 121, 109 Turpen v. Board, 7 Ind. 172, 1512 Turnpike Co. v. Davidson County, 91 Tenn. 291, 2135 Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 WaU. (tJ. S.) 210, 2135 Turney v. Town of Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 1489, 1491 Tuthill v. Morris, 81 N. Y. 94, 408, 409 Tuthill Spring Co. v. Smith, 90 Iowa, 331, 1374 Tuttle v. Gilbert Manufacturing Co., 145 Mass. 169, 2170 Tuttle v. Everett, 51 Miss. 27, 458, 805 Tuttle v. Swett, 31 Maine, 555, 652 Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Mete. 551, 525 Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393, 240 Twenty-third Street Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601, 258, 268 Twin Creek, etc., Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552, 260 Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 998, 1169, 1293, 1295, 1296, 1300, 1306, 1334, 1359, 1446, 1448 Twiss v. George, 33 Mich. 253, 848 Twiss v. Port Huron, 63 Mich. 528, 1555 Twitchell v. Shaw, 10 Cush. 46, 518, 525 Twyford v. Wareup, Finch, 310, 1101 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 280, 131, 133, 160 Tyler v. Burrington, 39 Wis. 136, 792 Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Maine, 210, 709, 1933 Tyler v. Gallop's Estate, 68 Mich. 185, 1771, 1794 Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313, 13, 14 Tyler v. McCardle, 9 Smedes & M. 230, 1125 Tyler v. Onzts, 93 Ky. 331, 680 Tyrell, etc., Assn. v. Haley, 163 Pa. St. 301, • 1606 Tyrell, etc., Assn. v. Haley, 139 Pa. St. 476, 1605 Tysen v. Somerville, 35 Fla. 219, 962 Tyson v. Chestnut, 100 Ala. 571, 1066, 1069 Tyson v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 305, 110 u Udall v. Metcalf, 5 N. H. 396, 1904 Ufford v. Wilkins, 33 Iowa, 110, 424 Uhlendorf v. Kaufman, 41 IB. App. 373, 28 Uhlig v. Barnum, 43 Neb. 584, 858 Ullmann v. Jasper, 70 Texas, 446, 1681, 1682 Ulman v. Iaeger, 67 Fed. Rep. 980, 968 Ulrich v. Ulrich, 136 N. Y. 120, 794 Ulsch v. Muller, 143 Mass. 379, 437 Unckles v. Colgate 148 N. Y. 529, 1863 UnderhiU v. Van Cortlandt,2 Johns. Ch. &39, 1131 Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309, 986 Underwood v. LiUy, 10 Serg. & E. (Pa.) 97, 2119 Underwood v. Scott, 43 Kan. 714, 1908 Underwood v. Smith, 19 N. Y. Supl. 380, 2041 Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297, 1143, 1144 Underwood v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73, 255 Unger v. Boas, 13 Pa. St. 601, 1946 Ungericht v. State, 119 Ind. 379, 2100 Ungley v. Ungley, L. E. 4 C. D. 73, 227, 847, 849, 850 Union, Township of, v. Smith, 39 Iowa, 9, 2237 Union Bank v. Call, 5 Fla. 409, 550 Union Bank v. Carr, 15 Fed. Eep. 438, 1925 Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 99, 210, 1474 Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 1391 Union Bank v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 51 Barb. 159, 805 Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 489, 2136 Union Bridge Co. v. Troy and Lansin- burgh E. Co., 7 Lansing, 240, 1412 Union B. Assn. v. Chicago, 61 111. 439, 1546 Union, etc., Co. v. Erie, etc., 37 N. J. Law, 23, 210 Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Howell, 101 Mich. 332, 2252 Union Central Insurance Co. v. Huyck, 5 Ind. App. 474, 1037 Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Woods, 11 Ind. App. 335, 1757 Union Gold Min. Co. v. Eocky Mt. Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 248, 1348 Union Hardware Co. v. Plume & Atwood Mfg. Co., 58 Conn. 219, 1317 Union Hotel Co. v. Hersee, 79 N. Y. 454, 155 Union Insurance Co. v. McGookey, 33 Ohio, 555, 161 Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Frear Stone Manfg. Co., 97 111. 537, 1371 Union Nat. Bank v. Carr, 15 Fed, Eep. 438, 1919 Union Nat. Bank v. Hunt, 76 Mo. 439, 1602 Union Nat, Bank v. Mayor, etc., 51 N. Y. 638, 805 Union, etc., R. Co. v. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305, 417, 847 Union'Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, E. I. & P. By. Co., 2 C. C. A. 174, 51 Fed. Eep. 309, 1123 Union Pacific E. Co. ». DeBusk, 12 Colo. 294, 2133 Union Paciac E. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343, 1439 Union Pac. E. Co. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326, 578 Union Pac. E. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700, 2119, 2132 Union Ry. Co. v. Skinner, 9 Mo. App. 189, 805, 1174 Union Stock Yard Co. v. Mallory, etc., Co., 157 111. 554, 913 Union Stone Works v. Breidenstein, 50 Kan. 53, 561 Union Turnpike Co. v. Jenkins, 1 Caines, 381, 260 Union Water Co. v. Murphy's Flat Flum- ing Co., 22 Cal. 620, 1499, 1514, 1603 TABLE OP CASES. clxxxiii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. United Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144, 1962 United N. J. R. Co. v. National, etc., R. Co. (N. J. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 981, 1581 United States v. Ames, 99 V. S. 35, 830 Dnited States v. Archer, 1 Wall. Jr. 173, 830 United States v. Babbit, 1 Black (U. S.), 55, 1551 United States v. Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 472 United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 388, 488, 505, 2222 United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53. 864, 2119 United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343, 1639, 1970 United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83, 923 935 United States v. Carlisle (D. C. App.), 23' Wash. L. Rep. 33, 2129 United States v. Central Pac. R. Co., 118 U S 235 700 United States v. Child, 12 Wall. 232, 548 United States v. Colt, 1 Pet. C. C. 145, 563 United States v. Cushman, 2 Sumn. 426, 1057 United States v. D'Aguirre, 1 Wall. 311. 110 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch (U. S.), 358, 1587 United States v. Gibbon, 109 U. S. 200, 873, 874 United States v. Gill, 20 Wall. 517, 776 United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 385, 2127 United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73, 1364 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 473, 478 United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, 1384 United States v. Lee, 4 McLean (U. S. C.C.), 103, 2015 United States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286, 475 United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284, 2152 United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. Rep. 646, 1982 United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 33 United States v. Olney, 1 Abb. (U. S. C. C.) 275, 1955 United States v. Payne, 17 How. Prac. 407, 830 United States v. Price, 9 How. 83, 822, 823 United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 2142 United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319, 120, 121, 129, 2223 United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, 776 United States v. Speed, 8 WaU. 77, 298, 299, 2217 United States v. Trans-Missouri Associa- tion, 19 U. S. App. 36, 2037 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 7 C. C. A. 15, 2063 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 53 Fed. Rep. 440, 1982 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 58 Fed. Rep. 1953, 1955, 1983 United States v. Thompson, Gilp. (U.S.) 614, 543, 572 United States Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, „ , 1*99 United States Bank v. Homestead Bank, 18 N. Y. Supl. 758, _„ 209 United States Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Sd- verman, 85 Pa. St. 394, 174, 175, 1616 United States Chemical Co. v. Provident, etc. , Co. , 64 Fed. Rep. 946, 2034 United States Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127, „ „ . „ 1967 United States Express Co. v. Keefer, 59 Ind. 263, „ 925 United States Express Co. ». Lucas, 36 Ind 361 1895, 1931 United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381, 1,as 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Atlan- tic, etc., R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450, 1295 United StateB Trust. Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 287, 1436 United States Vinegar Co. v. Schlegel, 143 N. Y. 537, 1323 University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, 2138 University of Des Moines v. Polk County, etc., Co., 87 Iowa, 36, 374 University of Vermont v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48, 256 Unruh v. Lukens, 166 Pa. 324, 1015 Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N. J. Law, 105, 653 Updike v. Titus, 13 N. J. Eq.. 151, 790, 1661 Upham v. Clute (Mich. 1895) , 63 N. W. Rep. 317, 611 Upham Manufacturing Co. v. Sanger, 80 Wis. 34 123 Upjohn v. Ewing, 2 Ohio St. 13, 540, 577 Upton v. Gray, 2 Maine. 373, 1710 Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 274, 726 Upton v. Suffolk Co. Mills, 11 Cush. 586, 354 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 854, 998, 1325, 1371, 1400 Urban v. Grimes, 2 Grant's Cases (Pa.), 96, 1786 Urton v. Price, 57 Cal. 270, 542 Usher v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552, 1200 Usher v. Hiatt, 21 Kan. 548, 135 Usher v. Raymond Skate Co., 163 Mass. 1, 1285 Utica Ins. Co. v. Kip, 8 Cow. 20, 1870 Utica R. Co. v. Brinckerhoff, 21 Wend. 139, 214 Utica, etc., Ry. Co. v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 265, 785 Utica Waterworks Co. v. City of Utica, 31 Hun (N. Y.), 426, 1519 V Vahn v. Miller (Wash. 1892), 31 Pac. Rep. 1031, 1762 Vail v. Drexel, 9 111. App. 439, 433 Vail v. Jameson, 41 N. J. Eq. 648, 1364 Vail v. Nelson (1826), 4 Rand. (Va.) 478, 1179 Vail v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 155, 2247 Vail v. Winterstein, 94 Mich. 230, 1748 Valentine v. Bell, 66 Vt. 280, 1651 Valentine v. Foster, 1 Mete. 520, 183 Valentine v. Lunt, 115 N. Y. 496, 1823, 1825 Valentine v. Hichardt, 126 N. Y. 272, 1064 Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387, 1886 Valentine v. St. Paul 34 Minn. 446, 459 Valentini v. Canali, L. R. 24 Q. B. Div. 166, 1782, 1805 Valk v. McKeize, 16 N. Y. Supl. 741, 140 Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 615, 2114 Valley Bank, etc., Inst. v. Ladies' Cong. Sewing Soc, 28 Kan. 423, 1332 Valley R. Co. v. Lake Erie Iron Co., 46 Ohio St.. 44, 1259, 1262 Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1, 1519, 1520, 1564, 1565, 1568 Valparaiso v. Moffit, 12 Ind. App. 250, 575 Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837, 677 Van Alen v. American Bank, 52 N. Y. 1, 472 Van Alen v. Feltz, 32 Barb. 139, 196 Van Alen v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 443, 1462 Van Allen v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 Bosw. 515, 156 Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johnson's Ch. 148, 1031 Van Alstine v. Wimple, 5 Cow. 162, 1111 VanAlstynev. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489, 1403 Van Alstyne v. Van Slyck, 10 Barb. 383, 811 Vanatta v. State Bank, 9 Ohio St. 27, 1895 Van Auken v. Dammeier, 27 Ore. 150, 2258 Van Benschooten v. Lawson, 6 Johns. Ch. 313, 1047 Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 608, 1148 clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. ,] Van Brunt, v. Day, 81 N. Y. 251, 46 Van Buskirk v. Day, 32 111. 260, 980 Van Buskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 583, 721 Vance v. Bloomer, 20 Wend. 196, 500 Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 436, 884 Vance v.- Hartzell (Tex. App.), 18 S. W. Eep. 88, 501 Vance v. Lukenbill, 9 B. Mon. 249, 518 Vancleave y. Clark, 118 Ind. 61, 236, 244 Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N. Y. 571, 139 140 Vandall y. Dock Co 40 Cal. 83, 1227 Vandebeck v. City of Rochester, 46 Hun, 87, 461 Vandekarr v. Vandekarr, 11 Johns. 122, 779 Van Demark v. Barons, 52 Kan. 779, 1332 Vanderbeck v. City of Kochester, 122 N. Y. 285, 804, 987 Vanderbeck v. Vanderbeck, 30 N. J. Eq. 265, 559, 562 Vanderbilt v. Eagle Iron Works, 25 Wend. 665, 786 Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392, 187, 199, 1651 Vanderburgh v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 242, 543 Vandercook v. Williams, 106 Ind. 345, 1512 Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N. Y. 563, 724 Vanderslice y. Newton, 4 N. Y. 130, 276 Vandervelden v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 54, 579, 973 Vandervoort v. Dewey, 42 Hun, 68, 901 Vandesande v. Chapman, 48 Maine, 262, 385 Van Deusen y. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378, 1813, 1814, 1823, 1825 Vandever v. Clark, 16 Ark. 331, 540, 572 Vandine, In re, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 187, 1470 Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256, 1102, 1105, 1111 Vandoren v. Todd, 3 N. J. Eq. 397, 429 Van Duzer's Estate, Matter of, 51 How. Pr. 410, 472 Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 111. 499, 162 Van Duyne y. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142, 7, 1212 Van Dyke v. Wilder, 66 Vt. 579, 509 Van Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N. J. Eq. 371, 7, 1128, 1212 Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 63, 982 Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, 237, 1293, 1308 Van Etten v. Newton, 134 N Y. 143, 2172 Van Fleet v. Sledge, 45 Fed. Rep. 743, 1068 Van Hoesen v. Cameron, 54 Mich. 609, 932 Vanhorn v. Des Moines, 4 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 339, 1514 Van Home v. Clark, 126 Pa. St. 411, 900 Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 1 Dick. Ch. 380, 1009, 1019 Van Hoven v. Irish, 3 McCrary (U. S.), 443, 2109 Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 302, 410, 411 Van Keren v. McLaughlin, 21 N. J. Eq. 163, 1215 VanKeuren v. McLaughlin, 19 N. J. Eq. 187, 621 Vankirk y. Skillman, 34 N. J. Law, 109, 1716 Vannerson v. Cheatham, 41 S. Car. 337, 1749 Van Ness v. Corkins, 12 Wis. 186, 835 Van Order v. Van Order, 8 Hun (N. Y.), 315, 2008 Van Ostrand v. Reed, 1 Wend. 424, 41, 336 Van Pelt v. Homo, etc., Assn., 79 Ga. 439, 1625 Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 371, 717 Van Rensselaer v. Aikin, 44 N. Y. 126, ISO Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. (U. S.) 297, 1833 Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer, 113 N. Y. 207, Van Santyoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, 738 Van Schaick v. Third Aye. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 316, 237 Van Schaick v. Van Buren, 70 Hun, 575, 98 Van Schoyck v. Backus, 9 Hun, 68, 652 Van Sickle v. Belknap, 129 Ind. 558, 1494 Van Syokel v. Dalrymple, 32 N. J. Eq. 233, 691 Van Syckel v. O'Hearn, 50 N. J. Eq. 173, 954, 955 Van Tine v. Van Tine (N. J. Eq.), 15 Atl. Rep. 249, 1212 Van Valkenburg v. Gregg, 45 Neb. 654, 96 Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. (N.Y.) 252, 1944 Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 John. 480, 778 Van Winkle v. Wilkins, 81 Ga. 93, 323 Van Woert T.Albany, etc., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 538 646 Van fayck v. Read, 43 Fed. Rep. 716, 724 Van Zant y. Van Zant, 23 111. 485, 1061 Varian y. Johnston, 108 N. Y. 645, 131 Varick's Executor v. Crane, 4 N. J. Eq. 128, 697 Varner y. Noblesborough, 2 Greenl. 121, 453 Varnum v. Camp, 13 N. J. Law, 326, 724 Varnum v. Hart, 119 N. Y. 101, 1353 Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440, 797 Vary v. Shea, 36 Mich. 388, 1074 Vass y. Hicks, 3 Murphy (N. Car.), 493, 559 Vassar y. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441, 3, 76, 82, 84 Vassault v. Edwards, 43 Cal. 458, 688 Vaugh v. Smith, 65 Iowa, 579, 604 Vaughan y. Porter, 16 Vt. 266, 869 Vaughan v. Smith, 58 Iowa, 553, 686 Vaughn v. Godman, 103 Ind. 499, 15 Vaughn v. Hopson, 10 Bush, 337, 162 Vaughn v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600, 215 Vaughn v. Powell, 65 Miss. 401, 468 Vaughn v. Village of Port Chester, 60 Hun, 401, 461 Vaughn v. Village of Port Chester, 135 N. Y. 460, 459 Vaupell y. Woodward, 2 Sandf. Ch. 143, 693 Vautrain v. St. Louis, etc., Railroad, 8 Mo. App. 538, 588 Vawter v. Griffin, 40 Ind. 593, 661 Veazie v. Bangor, 51 Maine, 509, 146 Veazie v. Hosmer, 11 Gray, 396, 146 Veazie Bank y. Winn, 40 Maine, 62, 385 Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257, 465, 531 Venner v. Railroad Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 581, 1452 Vereycken y. Vandenbrooks, 102 Mich. 119, 76, 1829 Verges v. Forshee, 9 La. Ann. 294, 2033 Vermont, etc., R. Co. v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 34 Vt. 1, 875, 878 Vermont State Bank v. Porter, 5 Day, 316, 720 Vermont, etc., Trust Co. y. Whithed, 2 N. Dak. 82, 1600 Vermont St. M. E. Church y. Brose, 104 111. 206, 876 Vernede v. Weber, 1 H. & N. 311, 125 Vernon y. Keys, 12 East, 632, 967 Vernon y. Upson, 60 Wis. 418, 1646 Verona, Appeal of Borough of, 108 Pa. St. S3, 1577 Verplank y. Sterry, 12 Johns. 536, 224 Verrill y. Parker, 65 Maine, 578, 1709 Vestry of Bermondsley y. Ramsey, L. R. 6 C. P. 247, 833 Viany v. Ferran, 54 Barb. 529, 1094 Vicary v. Moore, 2 Watts (Pa.), 451, 953 Vick v. Gower, 92 Tenn. 391, 1731 Vickers y. Sisson, 10 W. Va. 12, 1179 Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 523, 2046 Vicknair v. Trosclair (La. 1893) ,45 La. Ann. 373, 1731, 1742 Vicksburg, City of, y. Butler, 56 Miss. 72, 805 Vicksburg, etc., Co. v. Gorman, 70 Miss. 360, 270 Vicksburg R. Co. y. Elmore, 46 La. Ann. 1237 1142 Vicksburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 2136 TABLE OF CASES. clxxxv [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Victoria, etc., Mining Co. v. Fraser, 2 Colo. App. 14, 1350 Tidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 How. 127, 1954 Vidal v. Thompson, 11 Mart. (La.) 23, 731 Viele v. Judson, 82 N. Y. 32, 988, 2186 Vierling v. Horton, 27 111. App. 263, 258 Vilas v. Page, 106 N. Y. 439, 1417 Viles v. City of Waltham, 157 Mass. 542, 1661 Villa Rica Lumber Co. v. Paratain, 92 Ga. 370, 1724 Village of Hyde Park v. Carton, 132 111. 100, 1546 Village of Hyde Park v. Oakwoods Ceme- tery Assn., 119 111. 141, 2146 Village of Oneida v. Madison County, 136 N Y 269 1533 Vilmar v. Schall, 61 N. Y. 564, 2165 Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 132 Ind. 114, 873, 876, 1488, 1564, 1566 Vincent v. Cornell, 13 Pick. 294, 167 Vincent v. Walker, 86 Ala. 333, 1065 Vining y. Gilbreth, 39 Maine, 496, 667 Vinton v. Beamer, 55 Mich. 559, 1764 Vinton y. Peck, 14 Mich. 287, 2114 Violett t. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142, 178, 683 Viret v. Viret, 50 L. J. C. 69, 226 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 32, 2159 Virginia, Ex parte, 100 V. S. 339, 2160 Virginia, etc., Ins. Co. y. Morgan (Va.), 18 S. E. Bep. 191, 311 Virginia Land Co. v. Haupt (Va. 1894), 19 S. E. Rep. 168, 1331 Virginia E. Co. v. County Commissioners, 6Nev.68, 139 Visalia Gas & Electric Co. v. Sims, 104 Cal. 326, 1252 Vischer t. Yates, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 23, 1941, 1942 Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267, 2007 Visscher y. Greenback, etc., Co., 11 Hun, 159, 145 Viterbo y. Friedlander. 120 V. S. 707, 812 Vittum y. Gilman, 48 N. H. 416, 2170 Vogel y. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55, 1720, 1725 Vogel y. Melms, 31 Wis. 306, 614, 616 Vogel y. Pekoe, 157 111. 339, 92 Voiers y. Stout, 4 Bush, 572, 802 Von Brandenstein y. Ebensberger, 71 Texas, 267, 200, 206 Von Hoffman y. Quincy, 4 Wall. (XT. S.) 535, 2153 Von Schmidt y. Widmer, 105 Cal. 151, 1474, 1475 Von Trotha y. Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 839 Vooght y. Winch, 2 B. & Aid. 662, 30 Voorheis y. Eiting (Ky. 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 80, 675 Voorhis y. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354, 825, 832 Vorbeck y. Roe, 50 Barb. 302, 639 Voris y. Harshbarger (Ind. 1895), 39 N. E. Rep. 521, 1816 Vosburgh y. Diefendorf, 119 N. Y. 357, 2281 Voss y. McGulre, 26 Mo. App. 452, 407 Vought y. Vought (N. J. 1884), 27 Atl. Rep. 489, 1668, 1733 Vought y. Williams, 120 N. Y. 253, 1159 Vreeland y. Bramhall, 39 N. J. Law, 1, 2120 Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 56, 14, 17 Vroom y. Van Home, 10 Paige Ch. 549, 543 Vrooman y. Phelps, 2 Johns. 177, 179 Vrooman y. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 231, 242, 245 Vulcan Powder Co. y. Hercules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 510, 1953, 2029 Vyne y. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 440 Vyse y. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 442, 160, 270 W Wabash, City of, y. Caryer, 129 Ind. 552, 1585 Wabash, etc., R. Co. y. Black, 11 111. App. 465, l™ 8 v. Ham, 114 iFed. 1396 Wabash, ete., Railway Co. U. S. 587, Wabash Western R. Co. v. Brow, Rep. 941, 547 Wabaunsee County. Commissioners of, y. Walker, 8 Kan. 431, 806 Wachendorf v. Lancaster, 61 Iowa, 509, 1065 Wack y. Sorber, 2 Wharton, 387, 847, 851 Waco Water and Light Co. y. City of Waco (Texas 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 675, 1566, 1567 Waddell y. Lanier, 62 Ala. 347, 1014 Wade's Case, 5 Co. 114, 395 Wade y. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 149 TJ. S. 327, 1435 Wade y. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282, 2122, 2170 Wade y. Oakmont Borough, 165 Pa. St. 479, 1568 Wade y. Ringo, 122 Mo. 322, 982 Wade t. Simeon, 2 C. B. 548, 212, 214 Wadesboro Mills Co. y. Burns, 114 N. Car. 353, 1323 Wadhams y. Innes, 4 111. App. 642, 362 Wadham y. Marlowe, 8 East, 314, 281 Wadhames y. Page, 1 Wash. 420, 187 Wadhams y. Swan, 109 111. 46, 362 Wadleigh y. Buckingham, 80 Wis. 230, 162, 163, 167 Wadlinger y. Washington German Loan Assn., 153 Pa. St. 622, 1606, 1615 Wadsworth y. Sharpsteen, 8 N. Y. 388, 1814 Wadsworth y. Sherman, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 169, 1822 Wadsworth y. Smith, 43 Iowa, 439, 855 Wadsworth y. Smith, L. R. 6 Q. B. 332, 128 Wadsworth y. Thomas, 7 Barb. 445, 196 Wadsworth v. Thompson, 3 Gilm. (111.) 423, 954 Wadsworth y. Wendell, 5 Johns. Ch. 224, 1058 Wagenblast v. McKean, 2 Grant's Cases, 393, 398 Wagener y. Harriott, 20 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 283, 1822 Wager y. Hall, 16 Wall. 584, 153 Waggener y. Bells, 4 T. B. Mon. 8, 611 Waggoner y. First Nat. Bank, 43 Neb. 84, 2252 Wagner y. Cheney, 16 Neb. 202, 1059 Wagner y. Ladd, 38 Neb. 161, 514 Wagner y. Lewis, 38 Neb. 329, 999 Wagner y. Union Stock Yards Co., 41 111. App. 408, 537 Wagonseller y. Snyder, 7 Watts. (Pa.) 1946 209, 651, 4138 1112 683 Wahi y. Barnum, 116 N. Y. 87, Wailes y. Howison, 93 Ala. 375, Wain y. Warlters, 5 East, 10, 590, 682, Wait y. Maxwell, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 217, 1822, 2276 Wait y. Nashua, etc., Association (N. H.), 23 Atl. 77, 1344 Wait y. Wait, 28 Vt. 350, 262, 608 Waite, Matter of Accounting of, 99 N. Y. 433, ™ Waite y. Bartlett, 53 Mo. App. 378, 1893 Waite y. Leggett, 8 Cow. 195, 798 Waite y. Merrill, 4 Greenl. 102, 780 Wakefield y. Brown, 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 209, 81* Wakefield y. Orient Ins. Co. of Hartford, 50 Wis. 532, 896 Waldo y. Martin, 4 B. & Cress. 319, 1853, 2001 Walon y. Kerby, 99 Mass. 1, 524 Walden y. Carr, 88 111. 49, 609 Walden y. Eldred, 58 Hun, 605, 149 Waldo y. Hall, 14 Mass. 486, 368 Waldron y. Alexander, 136 111. 550, 194 Waldron y. McComb, 3 Hill, 361, 1369 Walcott y. Watson, 53 Fed. Rep. 429, 1129 Wales y. Coffin, 13 Allen (Mass.) , 213, 1766 Wales y. Lawrence, 36 N. J. Eq. 207, 821, 2188 Wales y. Mellen, 1 Gray, 512, 490 Wales y. Newbould, 9 Mich. 45, 1671 clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Walker v. Boulton, 3 U. C. Q. B. (O. S.) 252, 668 ■Walker v. Brooks, 99 N. Car. 207, 1741 Walker y. Brown, 28 111. 378, . 779 Walker y. Butterick, 105 Mass. 237, 906 Walker y. Carrington, 74 111. 446, 2289 Walker y. Chicago, 62 111. 286, 1546 Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 1540, 1541 Walker y. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 1540 Walker y. Conant, fir, Mich. 194, 800 Walker y. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 2177 Walker y. Douglas, 70 111. 445, 854, 872 Walker y. Duncan, 68 Wis. 624, 781 Walker v. Gregory, 36 Ala. 180, 2015 Walker y. Henry, 38 W. Va. 100, 192, 194 Walker y. Herring, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 678, 644 Walker v. Hoisington, 43 Vt. 608, 332 Walker v. Irwin (Iowa), 62 N. W. Hep. 785, 265, 595 Walker y. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 1479 Walker y. Jeffreys, 1 Hare, 341, 1165 Walker y. Johnson, 96 U. S. 424, 646 Walker y. Locke, 5 Cush. 90, 622 Walker y. Loyell, 28 N. H. 138, 454, 1901 Walker y. Marseilles, 70 Miss. 283, 1667 Walker y. Mayo, 143 Mass. 42, 1632 Walker y. McCulIough, 4 Maine, 421, 540, 541, 573, 574 Walker v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 56 Maine, 371, 654 Walker y. Miller, 11 Ala. 1067, 1644 Walker y. Mock, 39 Ala. 568, 798 Walker y. Neyill, 3 H. & C. 403, 568 Walker y. Nussey, 16 M. & W. 302, 673 Walker y. Owen, 79 Mo. 569, 167 Walker y. Penniman, 8 Gray, 233, 609 Walker y. Bostron, 9 M. & W. 411, 240 Walker y. Sauer (Mich. 1893), 56 N. W. Eep. 855, 1662 Walker y. Sherman, 11 Mete. 170, 204, 206 Walker y. Stringfellow, 30 Texas, 570, 1739 Walker y. Taylor, 6 C. & P. 752, 608, 609, 610 Walker y. Tucker, 70 111. 527, 293, 853, 854, 864, 2227 Walker y. Tupper.152 Pa. St. 1, 456 Walker's Ex'rs y. United States, 106 U. S. 413, 1862 Walker y. Walker, 13 Ired. 335. 182, 231, 235 Walker y. Whitehead, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 314, 891, 2152 Walker y. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 26 S. Car. 80, 653 Wall's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 460, 789 Wall y. Johnson, S8 Ga. 524, 169 Wall y. Minneapolis B. Co., 86 Wis. 48, 1182, 1201 Wall y. Schneider, 59 Wis. 352, 1918 Wallace y. Bassett, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 92, 1758 Wallace y. Butts (Texas App.), 31 S. W. Hep. 687, 17 Wallace y. Chicago H. Co.. 67 Iowa, 547, 552 Wallace y.De Young, 98111. 638, 2073 Wallace y. Finberg, 46 Texas, 35, 1657 Wallace y. German-American Ins. Co., 41 Fnd. Rep. 742, 896 Wallace y. Glaser, 82 Mich. 190, 475 Wallace y. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264, 515, 539, 548 Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 2172 Wallace y. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146, 1428 Wallace y. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136, 402 Wallace y. McLaughlin, 57 111. 53, 1160 Wallace y. Rappleye, 103 111. 229, 1191, 1194 Wallace y. Talbot, 1 McCord, 466, 366 Wallace y. Townsend, 43 Ohio St. 537, 1329 Wallace y. Wallace, 63 Mich. 326, 2256 Walla Walla Water Co. y. City of Walla Walla, 60 Fed. Rep. 957, 1519 Wallingford Manfc. Co. y. Fox, 12 Vt. 304, 1320 Wallis y. Bardwell, 126 Mass. 366, 1799 Wallis y. Harrison, 4 Mees. & W. 538, 641 Wallis y. Smith, L. E. 21 Ch. Diy. 243, 756 Walls y. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, 48, 892, 915, 918, 927, 928, 935, 2246 Walls y. State, 140 Ind. 16, 1081 Walmesley y. Cooper, 11 A. & E. 216, 568 Wain y. Wain (N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 203, 182 Walpole y. Lord Orford. 3 Ves. 402, 1013, 1197 Walrath y. Abbott, 75 Hun, 445, 1844 Walrath y. Eedfleld, 18 N. Y. 457, 26 Walsh y. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28, 417 Walsh y. Fussell, 6 Bing. 163, 1952 Walsh y. Hall, 66 N. Car. 233, 1880 Walsh y. Powers, 43 N. Y. 23, 1773, 1798 Walsh y. Sisson, 49 Mich. 423, 543 Walsh y. St. Louis Exposition, 101 Mo. 534, 394 Walsh y. Taylor, 39 Md. 592, 162 Walsh y. Trevanion, 15 Ad. & El. N. S. 733, 892 Walsh y. Young, 110 Mass. 396, 1781, 1797 Walter y. Eyerrard (18911, 2 Q. B. 369, 1808 Walter y. Lacy, 1 M. & G. 53, 473 Walter A. Wood Harvester Co. v. Bob- bins, 56 Minn. 48, 1319 Waltermire y. Westoyer, 14 N. H. 16, 716 Walters v. Bank, 76 Va. 12, 1098 Walters v. Brooks, 115 Mo. 534, 922 Walters y. Kraft, 23 S. Car. 578, 196 Walters V. McGuigan, 72 Wis. 185, 871 Walters v. Meyer, 39 Ark. 560, 432 Walters v. Morrow, 1 Houst. (Del.) 527, 853 Walters y. Northern Coal Mining Co., 5 De G., M. & G. 629, 2185 Walters v. Senf, 115 Mo. 524, 922 Walters y. Texas Building Assn. (Texas Ciy. App.), 29 S. W. Bep. 51, 1S23 Walters y. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86, 708, 715, 1S28 Walthall y. Goree, 36 Ala. 728, 1768 Waltham, Inhabitants of, v. Brookline, 119 Mass. 479, 1849 Walton y. Bemiss, 16 La. 140, 452 Walton y. Lizardi, 15 La. 588, 813 Walton y. Mather, 4 Misc. K. 261, 98 Walton y. Waterhouse, 3 Sound, 420, 2237 Walworth v. Abel, 52 Pa. St. 370, 2009 Walworth County Bank v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 14 Wis. 325, 1S44 Wangerien y. Aspell, 47 Ohio St. 250, 1615 Wangler y. Swift, 90 N. Y. 38, 2196 Wann v. McNulty, 2 Gilman, 355, 832 Ward v. Anderson, 111 N. Car. 115, 1778 Ward y. Beeton, 23 Weekly Rep. 533, 2044 Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548, 2033, 2034, 2035 Ward y. Cowdrey, 5 N. Y. Supl. 282, 238 Ward y. Davidson, 89 Mo. 445, 1289, 1300 Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928, 449 Ward v. Gibbs (Texas App.), 30 S. W. Rep. 1125, 261 Ward y. Grey, 26 Beav. 485, 1523 Ward v. Hogan, 11 Abb. (N. Y.) N. Cas. 478. 2030, 2044 Ward v. Hudson River Bldg. Co., 125 N. Y. 230. 758 Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148, 542, 573, 832 Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429, 1790 Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 520, 15 Ward v. Motter, 2 Rob. (Va.) 536, 2184 Ward v. National Bank, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 755, 563 Ward v. Powell, 3 Harr. (Del.) 379, 787 Ward y. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 393, 402, 449 Ward v. Sugg, 113 N. Car. 489, 1628 Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa. St. 499, 293 Ward v. Walton, 4 Ind. 75. 949 Ward v. Waterman, 85 Cal. 488, 1066 Ward v. Whitney, 8 N. Y. 442, 872 Ward y. Worsham, 78 Texas, 180, 1126 Wardell v. McConnell, 25 Neb. 558, 542 Wardell v. Union Pacific E. Co., 103 U. S. 651, 1292, 1304, 1305, 1307, 1979, 1986 Warden v. Adams, 15 Mass. 233, 626 TABLE OF GASES. clxxxvii [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2297 .] Wardon v. Eichbaum, 14 Pa. St. 121, 1845 Warden v. Jones, 2 DeG. & J. 76, 620, 1711 Warden v. Jones, 23 Beav. 487, 1717, 1718 Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449, 212, 267 Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29, 1361 Ward-well v. Haight, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 549, 1759 Ware v. Adams, 24 Maine, 177, 594 Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274, 1854 Ware v. Hay ward Rubber Co., 3 Allen, 84, 918 Ware v. Jones, 61 Ala. 288, 1906 Waring v. Manchester, etc., B. Co., 7 Hare. 482, 2271 Waring v. Railway Co., 7 Hare, 482, 1104 Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63, 2039, 2040, 2046, 2047 Warfield v. Dorsey, 39 Md. 299, 674 Warne v. Meyer, 38 Fed. Bep. 191, 1246 Warner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487, 188, 2090 Warner v. Jaflray, 96 N. Y. 248, 722, 724 Warner v. LitUefield, 89 Mich. 329, 1642 Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385, 1405 Warner v. Smith, 8 Conn. 14, 2094 Warner t. Texas, etc., E. Co., 54 Fed. Bep, 922, 646, 837 Warner v. White, T. Jones, 95, 302 Warren v. Adams, 19 Colo. 515, 1169 Warren v. Barber Asphalt Paving Go., 115 Mo. 572, 1553 Warren v. Bean, 6 Wis. 120, 744 Warren v. Castello, 109 Mo. 338, 8 Warren v. First Nat. Bank, 149 111. 9, 1391 Warren v. Freeman, 85 Tenn. 513, 1699 Warren v. Hall, 20 Colo. 508, 2188 Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106, 189 Warren v. Leland, 2 Barb. 613, 638 Warren v. Mains, 7 Johns. 476, 392 Warren v. Mobile, etc., E. Co., 49 Ala. 582, 1458 Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 83 Pa. St. 437, 321, 352 Warren v. Eailway Co., 37 Kan. 408, 1433 Warren v. Richmond, 53 111. 52, 1146 Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559, 519 Warren v. Smith, 24 Texas, 484, 611 Warren v. Tinsley, 53 Fed. Rep. 689, 376 Warren v. Warren, 105 111. 568, 848 Warren v. Whitney, 24 Maine, 561, 183 Warren, etc., Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 587, 646 Wartembargv. Spiegel, 31 Mich. 400, 1030 Warwick v. Bruce. 2 M. & S. 205, 636 Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, 430, 332 Washburn v. Dosch, 68 Wis. 436, 2026, 2030 Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 599, 2121 Washburn v. Offut, 19 La. Ann. 269, 2021 Washburn, etc., Co. v. Salisbury, 152 Mass. 346, 867 Washington Bank v. Lewis, 22 Pick. 24, 1288 Washington Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. St. 576, 438 Washington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Mary's Seminary, 52 Mo. 480, 1271 Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 439, 2138 Wason v. Eowe, 16 Vt. 525, 325, 327 Wasserboehr v. Boulier, 84 Maine, 165, 708 Wasson v. Gould. 3 Blackf. 18, 475 Waterman v. Andrews, 14 E. 1. 589, 893 Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 56, 57, 751 Water Commissioners v. Brown, 32 N. J. Law, 504, 6 Waterbury v. Fisher, 5 Colo. App. 362, 681 Waterhouse v. Kendall, 11 Cush. 167, 453 Waterhouse v. Skinner, 2 B. & P. 447, 123, 378 Waters v. Davies, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 39, 148 Waters v. Glendenning, 87 Wis. 250, 74 Waters v. Riley, 2 Har.& G. 305 827 Waters v. Tompkins, 2 C. M. & E. 723, 472 Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. 450, 1151, 1153 Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 51 Hun, 157, 1268, 1981, 2041, 2074 Water Works v. Smith, 47 N. J. Law, 473, 1570 Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh (Va.), 522. 2196 Watkins v. De Armond, 89 Ind. 553. 777 Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537, 255, 257, 817 Watkins v. Maule. 2 Jac. & W. 237, 1073 Watkins v. Rymill, 10 Q. B. Div. 178, 50, 64, 65 Watkins v. Sands, 4 111. App. 207, 601 Watkins v. Stevens, 4 Barb. 168, 196 Watkins v. Workingmen's, etc., Associa- tion, 97 Pa. St. 514, 1607, 1615 Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 2077 Watrous v. Allen, L. R. 57 Mich. 362, 2047 Watrous v. Blair, 32 Iowa, 58, 1890 Watson v. Ambergate, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 497, 736 Watson v. Baker, 71 Texas, 739, 679 Watson v. Blaine, 12 S. & R. 131, 886 Watson v. Blaylock, 2 Const. Ct. (S. C.) 351, 186 Watson v. Brightwell, 60 Ga. 212, 635 Watson v. Boylston, 5 Mass. 411, 884 Watson v. Cambridge, 15 Mass. 286, 2210 Watson v. Denton, 7 C. & P. 85, 332, 333 Watson v. Harlem, etc., C©., 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 348, 2060 Watson v. Hetherington, 1 C. & K. 36, 403 Watson v. Jacobs, 29 Vt. 169, 609 Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557, 1132 Watson v. Mercer, 3Serg. & R. 49, 1017 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 88, 2019 Watson v. Miller, 82 Texas, 279, 466 Watson v. Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 1575 Watson v. New York Central R. Co., 47 N Y 157 2153 Watson v. Poezel, 158 Pa. St. 513, 601 Watson v. Pugh, 51 Ark. 218, 432 Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201, 204, 205 Watson v. Reid, 1 Russ. & M. 236, 1164, 1165 Watson v. Roode, 43 Neb. 348, 40, 232 Watson v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334 Watson v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525, 901 Watson v. Smith, 110 N. C. 6, 1185 Watson v. Sutherland, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 74, 2255 Watson v. Turner, Buller, Nisi Prius, 147, 197 Watson v. White, 152 111. 364, 1163 Watson Coal Co. v. Casteel, 68 Ind. 476, 2167 Watson, etc., Mining Co. v. Casteel, 68 Ind. 476, 969 Watt's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 370, 1227, 1307, 1447 Watt v. Wisconsin Cranberry Co., 63 Iowa, 730, 675, 686 Watte v. Wickersham, 27 Neb. 457, 1920 Watts v. British, etc., Mortgage Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 483, 1037 Watts v. Camars, 115 U. S. 353, 695 Watts v. Lynch, 64 N. H. 96, 1943 Watts v. Shuttleworth, 5 Hurl. & N. 233, 569 Watts v. Van Ness, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 76, 2098 Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. 422, 1930, 1933, 1934 Waugh v. Coppe, 6 M. & W. 824, 472 Wauken, etc., R. Co. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121, 259 Waverly Natl. Bank v. Hall, 150 Pa. St. 466, 710 Way v. Foster, 1 Allen, 408, 1043 Way v. Harriman, 126 111. 132, 1712 Way v. Langley, 15 Ohio St. 392, 535 Way v. Martin, 140 Pa. St. 499, 193, 327, 328 Way v. Russell, 33 Fed. Rep. 5, 508 Waydell v. Luer, 5 Hill, 448, 457 Waydell v. Luer, 3 Denio, 410, 543 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 48, 710 Waymire v. Waymire, 141 Ind. 164, 1114, 1192 Wayne v. Lewis, 1 Monaghan (Pa-.), 305, 1684 Wayne, etc., Bank v. Low, 81 N. Y. 566, 727 Wayne Township v. Cahill, 49 N. J. Law, 144, 1571 clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio, 167, 2005 Wear v. Jacksonville R. Co., 24 111. 594, 156 Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. E. 1 Q. B. D. 546, 273 Weart v. Ecse, 15 N. J. Eq. 290, 110, 425 Weatherford, etc., E. Co. v. Granger, 86 Texas, 350, 1309, 1315 Weatherford, etc., E. Co. v. Granger, (Texas Civ. App.) , 22 S. W. Hep. 70, 1308 Weatherford, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (Texas 1895 ) , 30 S. W. Rep. 859, 648 Weaver, In, re, 21 Ch. D. 615, 1842 Weaver v. Carter, 10 Leigh, 37, 424 Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420, 1772 Weaver v. Shipley, 127 Ind. 526, 1176, 1483 Weaver v. Weaver, 109 111. 225, 92 Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 555. 30 Webb v. Dickinson, 11 Wend. 62, 470 Webb v. Fairmanner, 3 M. & W. 473, 384, 764 Webb v. Fulchire, 3 Ired. L. 485, 1128 Webb v. Goldsmith, 2 Duer, 413, 536 Webb v. Hawkins Lumber Co., 101 Ala. 630, 607 Webb v. Hewitt, 3 K. & J. 438, 515 Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, 1652 Webb v. Kennedy, 20 Minn. 419, 2097 Webb v. McCauley, 4 Bush (Ky.), 8, 2085 Webb v. Moore, 25 Ind. 4, 1496, 2152, 2155 Webb v. Paternoster, Palmer, 71, 641 Webb v. Spicer, 13 6. B. 886, 568 Webb v. Steele, 13 N. H. 230, 588 Webb v. Stone, 24 N, H. 282, 150 Webb v. Webb, 29 Ala. 588, 893 Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469, 1902 Webber v. Lee, 9 Q. B. Div. 315, 641 Webber v.WiUiams College, 23 Pick. 302, 1358 Webber's Exrs. v. Blunt, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 18S, 1975, 2091 Weber v. Bridgman, 113N. Y. 600, 949 Weber v. Crouch, 134 Mass. 26, 518 Weber v. Kirkendall, 39 Neb. 193, 440 Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766, 441 Weber v. Mick, 131 111. 520, 1641 Webster v. Atkinson, 4 N. H. 21, 901 Webster v. Brown, 67 Mich. 328, 1113 Webster v. Clark, 60 N. H. 36, 676 Webster v. Clark, 34 Fla. 637, 881 Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432, 2073 Webster v. Drinkwater, 5 Maine, 319, 2168 Webster v. French, 11 111. 254, 397 Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 1698, 1725 Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 862 Webster v. Smith, 4 Ind. App. 44, 2244 Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65, 1400 Webster v. Wyser, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 184, 445, 543 Wechselberg v. Flour City Bank, 64 Fed. Rep. 90, 1383 Weed v. Black, 2 McArthur, 268, 1989, 1992 Weed v. Bond, 21 Ga. 195, 18S5 Weed v. Burt, 78 N. Y. 191, 30 Weed v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 19 Wend. 534, 735 Weed v. Snow, 3 McLean, 265, 558 Weekes v. Gallard, 21 Law T. (N. S.) 655, 1131 Weeks v. Baker, 152 Mass. 20, 383, 414 Weeks v. Barton (Tex. App.), 31 S. W. Rep. 1071, Weeks v. Haas, 3 Watts & S. 520, 1017 Weeks v. McCarty, 89 N. Y. 566, 298 Weeks v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. Supl. 720, 372 Weeks v. O'Brien, 141 N. Y. 199, 2225, 2226 Weeks v. Pike, 60 N. H. 447, 699 Weeks v. Thrasher, 52 Miss. 142, 1013 Weeks v. Zimmerman, 4 N. Y. Supl. 609, 544 Wegener v. Butler, 22 N. Y. Supl. 692, 2252 Wegner v. Biering, 65 Texas, 506, 1862 Wehrhane v. Railroad Co., 4 N. Y. St. Eep. 541, 1226 Wehrli v. Rehwoldt, 107 111. 60, 500 Weiden v. Woodruff, 38 Mich. 130, 336 Weider v. Maddox, 86 Texas, 372, 724 Weighley v. Coffman, 144 Pa. St. 489, 31 Weil v. Flowers, 109 N. Car. 212, 476 Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 165, 169 Weir v. Mosher, 19 Wis. 311, 549 Weis v. Ahrenbeck, 5 Texas Civ. App. 542, 1826 Weisiger v. Eichmond, etc., Machine Co. (Va.), 20 S. E. Eep. 7361, 713 Weir v. Hill, 2 Lans. 278, 656 Wekett v. Baby, 2 Bro. P. C. 16, 559, 561 Welch v. Allington, 23 Cal. 322, 447 Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich. 41, 781 Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 541, 2141 Welch v. Importers' and Traders' National Bank, 122 N. Y. 177, 1296, 1301 Welch v. Kline, 57 Pa. St. 428, 1684 Welch v. Lynch, 5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 20, 464 Welch v. Olmstead, 90 Mich. 492, 1785 Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 2125 Welchel v. Thompson, 39 Ga. 559, 628 Weld v. Barker, 153 Pa. St. 465, 763, 940 Weld v. Lancaster, 56 Maine, 453, 2090 Weld v. Elliott Bank, 158 Mass. 339, 396 Weiden v. Porter. 4 Houst. (Del.) 236, 688 Welford v. Beazely, 3 Atk. 503, 675 Welge v. Batty, 11 111. App. 461, 450 Weller v. Hersee, 10 Hun, 431, 180 Welles v. Cole, 6 Gratt. 645, 224 Wellington v. Kelly, 84 N. Y. 543, 445 1998 1999 Wellman v. Dickey, 78 Maine, 29, ' ' 1576 Wells v. Alexandre, 1:30 N. Y. 642, 1271 Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, 289, 489, 2226, 2227 Wells v. Evans, 20 Wend. 251, 577 Wells v. Foster, 8 Mees. i- W. 149, 2084 Wells v. Giles, 2 Gale, 200, 385 Wells v. Horton, 4 Bing. 40, 650 Wells v. Hughes, 89 Va. 543, 476 Wells v. Kingston-upon-Hull, L. E. 10 C. P. 402, 640 Wells v. Manufacturers', etc., Gas Co., 130 Pa. St 222 959 Wells v.Mc&eoch, 71 Wis. 196, 990 Wells v. Monihan, 129 N. Y.161, 694 Wells v. Rodgers, 60 Mich. 925, 1451 Wells v. Smith, 7 Paige, 22, 752 Wells v. Spears, 1 McCord, 421, 343 Wells v. Steam Nav. Co., 8 N. Y. 375, 1963 Wells v. Thomas, 72 Am. Dec. 232, 738 Wells v. Thorman, 37 Conn. 318, 1695 Wells v. Wells, 35 Miss. 6:38, 2287 Wells v. Wilson, 140 Pa. St. 645, 194 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Vansickle, 64 Fed. Rep. 944, 706 Welsh v. Bayurd, 21 N. J. Eq. 186, 844 Welsh v. Gossler, 89 N. Y. 540, 956, 2192 Welsh v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 65, 1961 Welsh v. Solenberger, 85 Va. 441, 1678 Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 1899 Welman v. Weiman, 15 Ch. Div. 570, 253 Weltonv. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, Welz v. Ehodius, 87 Ind. 1, 654, 855, 909 Walter v. Kirk, 14 111. 55, 385 Wendell, In rt>, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 600, 1846 Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 273, 199, 1118 Wenham v. Switzer, 59 Fed. Eep. 942, 1129 Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. & P. 247, 183, 184 Wenthworth v. Wenthworth, 13 Johns. 87, 536 Wentworth v. Cock, 10 A. & B. 42, 283 Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. 352, 59 Wentworth v. Tubb, 2 Y. & C. C. 537, 1841 Wentworth v. Whittemore, 1 Mass. 471, 563 Wentworth v. Woodside, 79 Maine, 156, 2106 Weseott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, 1967 Werner v. Humphreys, 2 M. & G. 853, 61 Wesner v. Stein, 97 Pa. St. 322, 196 Werner v. Tuch, 127 N. Y. 217, 383 Wessel v. Johnson Land Co., 3 N. Dak. 160, 440, 807 West v. Bundy, 78 Mo. 407, 850 TABLE OF CASKS. clxxxix [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1031-2291.] West v. Camden, 135 IT. S. 507, 1304, 1986 West v. Carter, 129 111. 249, 1947 West v. Furbish, 67 Maine, 17, 831, 833 West v. Grigg's Administrator, 1 Grant Cas. 53, 1799 West v. Holmes, 26 Vt. 530, 1949 West v. Houston, 4 Harr. 170, 799 West v. Laraway., 28 Mich. 464, 1725, 1746 West v. Lee, 50 How. Pr. 313, 767 West v. Moore, 14 Vt. 447, 1802 West v. Murph, 3 Hill (S. Car.), 284, 2197 West v. Penny, 16 Ala. 186, 1772, 1778 West v. Russell, 74 Cal. 544, 1162 West v. Stewart, 7 Pa. St. 122, 186 West v. Van Pelt, 34 Neb. 63, 144, 148 West v. Van TuyLl N. Y. Supl. 718, 296 West v. West (TexVs App. 1895), 29 S. W. Eep. 242, 984 West T. West, 90 Iowa, 41, 1065 Westbrook v. Harbeson, 2 McCord Eq. 112, 1071 Westbrook v. Mize, 35 Kan. 298, 821 Westbrook Manufacturing Co. v. Grant, 60 Maine, 88, 761, 762 West Cambridge, Inhabitants of, v. Lex- ington, 1 Pick. 506, 708 Westchester Insurance Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143, . 950 West Cornwall H. Co. v. Mowatt, 15 Q. B. 521, 156 Wescott v. Mulvane, 58 Fed. Eep. 305, 1126, 1198 Westcott v. Thompson, 18 N. Y. 367, 854 Western v. Genesee Mutual Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 258, 732 Western v. Macdermott, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 72, 1154 Western Bank v. Gilstrap, 45 Mo. 419, 1318 Western, etc., Association v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 2050 Western, etc., Co. v. Kilderhouse, 87 N. Y. 430, 727 Western.etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Cous- ley, 72 111. 531, 1314 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 81 Ga. 522, 734 Western, ete., Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444, 505 Western Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 32 Pa. St. 351, 896 Western Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 152 U.S. 346, 1342 Western Paving, etc., Oo. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 128 Ind. 525, 1481, 1584 Western R. Co. v. Babcock, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 346, 1131, 1209 Western R. Co. v. Harwell, 91 Ala. 340, 1967, 1968 Western Sash Co. v. Young, 48 Mo. App. 505, 476 Western Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, 1584 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Americani Tel. Co., 9 Biss. (U. S.) 72, 2052 Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160, 1983, 2051 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Atlantic, etc., Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 172, 2052 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Atlantic, etc., Co., 7 Biss. (U. S.) 367, 2052 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Atlantic and Pacific Tel. Co., 5 Nev. 102, 2052 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 12, 2052, 2134 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Burlington, etc., Ry. Co.. 11 Fed. Rep. 1, 2051, 2052 Western Union, etc., Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 111. 246, 2052 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eskridge, 7 Ind. App. 208, 2100 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Jones, 95 Ind. 228, 1967, 1968 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendle- ton, 122 U. S. 347, 2148 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Reed, 96 Ind. 195, 2166 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Scircle, 103 Ind. 227, 1967 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. St. Jos- eph and Western Ry., 1 McCrary (U.S.), 565, 1412, 2052 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 1 McCrary, 558, 1835 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 423, 1422 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 93 Ala. 32, 2104 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Yopst, 118 Ind. 248, 2104, 2105 Western Warehouse Co. v. Hayes (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 738. 941 Western Wooden- Ware Assn. v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 2069 Westf all v. Cottrills, 24 W. Va. 763, 1179 Westfall v. Maples, 3 Grant (Pa.) Cas. 198, 2055 Westfall v. Perry (Texas Civ. App.), 23 S. W. Rep. 740, 651 Westfield Gas, etc., Co. v. Mendenhall, 142 Ind. 538, 1571 West Hartford, Town of, v. Board of Wa- ter Comrs., 44 Conn. 360, 1502 West Haven Water Co. v. Redfield, 58 Conn. 39, 854 Westhead v. Sproson, 6 H. & N. 728, 54 Westheimer v. Craig, 76 Md. 399, 831 Westlake v. Bostwick, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 256, 499 Westlake & Button v. St. Louis, 77 Mo. Westminster v. Willard, 65 Vt. 266, 1492 Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 452, 610 Weston, Ex parte, 12 Mete. 1, 825 Weston v. City of Syracuse, 17 N. Y. 110, 1519 Weston v. Davis, 24 Maine, 374, 775 Weston v. Myers, 33 111. 424, 687 Weston v. Savage, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 736, 751 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 2146 West Virginia, etc., Oil Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 761, 1179 West Va. Trans. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 1427, 1983, 2052, 2054, 2057 West Wisconsin R. Co. v. Board of Super- visors, 93 U. S. 595, 2140 Westwood v. Secretary, 11 Weekly Rep. 261, 299 Wetherbee v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eg;. 501, 1325, 1371, 1375, 1398, 1400 Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 5U2 Wetherbee v. Potter, 99 Mass. 354, 692 Wetherel v. Jones, 3 B. & Ad. 221, 1874 Wetherell v. Thirty-first St. Building and Loan Assn., 153 ILL. 361, 1617 Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. St. 448, 325, 328 Wetherly v. Straus, 93 Cal. 283, 12C4 Wetmore v. Barrett, 103 Cal. 246, 1929 Wetmore v. City of Oakland, 99 Cal. 149, 1517 Wetmore v. Jaffray, 9 Hun, 140, 2211 Wetmore v. Porter, 92 N. Y. 76, 1975 Wetmore v. White, 2 Caine's Cas. 87, 846 Wetter Mfg. Co. v. Dinkins, 70 Miss. 835, 1648 Wetzel v. Richcreek (Ohio), 40 N. E. Rep. 1004, 367 Wetzell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309, 194 Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416, 1013 Whaley v. Hinchman, 22 Mo. App. 481, 83 Whaley Bridge, etc., Printing Co. v. Green, 28 Wkly R. (Eng.) 351, 1980 Wharton, In re, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 33, 1S14 Wharton v. Winch, 140 N. Y. 287, 507 Whatley v. Tricker, 1 Camp. 35, 561 Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sims, 196, 1154 cxc TABLE OF CASES. [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291. .] Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99, 57 Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 498, 240 WheaUey v. Abbott, 32 Miss. 843, 560 Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 1772 Wheaton v. Hibbard, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 1870 Wheaton v. Lund (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Hep. 251, 841 Wheaton v. Nelson, 11 Gray, 15, 437 Wheaton T. Trimble, 145 Mass. 345, 1709 Wheeler v. Baker, 59 Iowa, 86, 11 Wheeler v. Bank, 23 Maine, 308, 1378 Wheeler v. Biggs (Miss. 1894), 15 So. Rep. 118, 1708 Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263, 562 Wheeler v. Collier, Moo. & M. 123, 676 Wheeler v. Faurot, 37 Ohio St. 26, 1333, 1373 Wheeler v. Glasgow, 97 Ala. 700, 2096 Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. 545, 399 Wheeler v. Hatheway, 58 Mich. 77, 799 Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245, 2158 Wheeler v. Knaggs, 8 Ohio, 169, 389, 393 Wheeler v. Newbould, 16 N. Y. 392, 2247 Wheeler v. Pullman, etc., Steel Co., 143 111. 197, 1391 Wheeler y. Reed, 36 111. 81, 1360 Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258, 2066, 2072, 2101 Wheeler v. San Francisco & A. R. Co., 31 Cal. 46, 1225 Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383, 454 Wheeler v. Spencer, 15 Conn. 28, 1948 Wheeler v. Timpson, 59 Hun, 625, 544 Wheeler y. Wheeler, 47 Vt. 637, 561 Wheeler y. Wheeler, 9 Cow. 34, 549 Wheeler y. Wheeler, 11 Vt. 60, 189, 520 Wheeler v. Woodward, 66 Pa. St. 158, 379 Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs (Com. PI. 1893), 21 N. Y. Supl. 1006, Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co. v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 138 U. S. 287, Wheelock y. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481, Wheelan y. Ansonia Clock Co., 27 Hun, 557, Wheelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 N. Y. 293. 138, 2231 Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo. 565, 970 Whelan y. Sullivan, 102 Mass. 204, 676 Whelan y. Whelan, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 557, 1«4 Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230, 2097 Whelpdale v. Cookson, 1 Ves. Sr. 9, Belt's Supl. to Ves. Sr. 9, 1293, 1308 Whetstone y. University, 13 Kan. 320, 1227 Whidden v. Whidden (N. H. 1893), 32 Atl. Rep. 152, 2288 Whincup y. Hughes, L. R. 6 C. P. 78, 284, 2228 1802 2135 399 489 Whipple Case, 28 Kan. 474, 1454 Whipple v. Farrer, 3 Mich. 436, 2256 Whipple v. Foot, 2 John. 418, 637 Whipple v. Giles, 55 N. H. 139, 1697 Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369, 648, 656, 1336 Whisenant v. Gordan, 101 Ala. 250, 1119 Whiston y. Stodder, 8 Martin (La.), 95, 700, 70S 1278 Whitaker v. Kilroy, 70 Mich. 635, Whitaker y. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 534, aid Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409, Whitbeck y. Whitbeck, 9 Cow. 266, 466, 608 Whitcomb v. Gilman, 35 VI. 297, 2099 White v. Amsden, 67 Vl . 1 , 875, 878 White v. Ashton, 51 N. Y. 2S0, 2245 White v. Barber, 123 U. S. 392, 1919, 1927 White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254, 10, 74 White y. Beeton, 7 H. & N. 42, 135 White v. Bigelow, 154 Mass. 593, 223, 618 White v. Bluett, 23 L. J. Ex. 36, 233 White y. Blum, 4 Neb. 555, 1385 White y. Braddock School Disk, 159 Pa. St. 201, White v. Breen (Ala. 1896), 19 So. Rep. 59, 623 White v. Brown, 2 Jones (N. Car.), 403, 2191 White y. Buss, 3 Cush. 448, 791, 1860, 1934 White v. Carlton, 52 Ind. 371, 443 White v. Cleaver, 75 Mich. 17, 267 White y. Corlies, 46 N. Y. 467. 66 White v. Davis, 17 N. Y. Supl. 548, 1827 White y. Demilt, 2 Hall, 405, 214 White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375. 640 White y. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 181, 1640, 1870, 1895 White y. Graves, 107 Mass. 325, 1811 White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 646, 2117 White v. Hermann, 51 111. 243, 101 White v. Heylman, 34 Pa. St. 142, 1829 White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 141, 720 White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505, 883 White v. Hunter, 23 N. H. (3 Fost.) 128, 2016 White y. Jones, 14 La. Ann. 681, 543 White v. Kuntz, 107 N. Y. 518, 156, 1630, 1638, 1983 White y. Mann, 26 Maine, 361, 276 White y. Mechanics', etc., Association, 22 Gratt. 233, 1614 White v. Merrill, 82 Cal. 14, 2211 White y. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118, 345, 348, 349 White y. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 19 Mo. App. 400, 270 White v. Mooers, 86 Maine, 62, 1118, 1157 White v. Nutt, 1 P. Wms. 61, 423 White v. O'Bannon, 86 Ky. 93, 1200 White v. Oliver, 39 Maine, 92, 139, 144, 897 White v. Palmer, 4 Mass. 147, 1812 White v. Randall, 153 Mass. 394, 133 White v. Richmond, 110 N. Car. 456, 578 White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222, 596, 603, 606 White v. San Antonio Waterworks Co. (Texas App. 1895) , 29 S. W. Rep. 252, 942 White y. Schuyler, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 300, 1208 White y. Smith, 54 N. Y. 522, 203 White v. Smith, 33 Pa. St. 186, 887 White v. Soto, 82 Cal. 654, 2180, 2245 White v. Stanton, 111 Ind. 540, 1176 White v. Thomas, etc., Tire Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 178, 1257 White y. Wager, 25 N. Y. 328, 1652, 1736 White y. Waite, 47 Vt. 502, 1680 White v. Walker, 31 111. 422, 550 White v. Woodward, 5 C. B. 810, 220 White v. Wright, 16 Mo. App. 551, 148 White Mountains R. Co. v. Eastman, 34 N. H. 124, 156, 1128 White Star Line, ete., Co. v. Morange, 91 Ala. 610, 456 White Water, etc., Co. v. Vallette, 21 How. (U. S.) 414, 2121 Whitehead, Ex -parte, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 419, 619 Whitehead v. Hamilton Rubber Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 78, 1237 Whitehead v. Potter, 4 Ired. L. 257, 214 Whitehead Machine Co. v. Ryder, 139 Mass. 366, 322 Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 Utah, 419, 1113, 1115 Whitehurst v. Boyd, 8 Ala. 375, 867 Whitesides v. Hunt, 97 Ind. 191, 1869, 1918, 1919, 1931 Whitfield v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 149, 756 Whiting v. Plumas Co., 04 Cal. 65, 665 Whiting v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 60 Fed. Rep. 197, 468 Whitley v. Dunham Lumber Co., 89 Ala. 493, 452, 456 Whitlow v. Echols, 78 Ala. 206, 1768 Whitman, etc., Assoc, v. National, etc., Assoc, 45 Mo. App. 90, 123 Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 313, 640 Whitmore v. Farley, 43 Law T. R. (N. S.) 192, 1832 Whitmore v. Hay, 85 Wis. 240, 1056 Whitmore v. Nelson (Texas App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 521, 856 Whitmore y. South Boston Iron Co., 2 Allen, 52, 338, 340 TABLE OF CASES. CXC1 [References are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1060, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] Whitney's Appeal, 167 Pa. St. 609, 449 Whitney v. City of Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268, 460, 462 Whitney v. Cochran, 1 Scan. (111.) 209, 592 Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 561, 529, 532 Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 1775, 1776 Whitney v. Heywood, 6 Cush. 82, 357 Whitney T. Peay, 24 Ark. 22, 1895 Whitney v. Slayton, 40 Maine, 224, 2033, 2040, 2050 Whitney v. State, 10 Ind. 404, 1955 Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Maine, 894, 684, 1132 Whitney v. Taylor, 54 Barb. 536, 331 Whitney v. Twombley, 136 Mass. 145, 1812 Whitney v. Union Trust Co., 65 N. Y. 576, 1228 Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 1308 Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62, 1264, 1281, 1348, 1536, 1603 Whittaker v. Howe, S Beav. 383, 2041, 2047 Whitson v. Griffis, 39 Kan. 211, 1859 Whittemore v. Cope, 11 Utah. 344, 627 Whittemore v. Gibbs, 24 N. Bl. 484, 661 Whittemore v. Judd, etc., Co., 124 N. Y. 565, 819 Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10 Gray (Mass.), 582, 2053 Whittier v. Dana, 10 Allen, 326, 689, 954 Whittier Machine Co. v. Grafcam, 156 Mass. 415, 327 Whittlesey v. Delaney, 73 N. Y. 571, 2261 Whittlesey v. Frantz, 74 N. Y. 456, 818 Whitton v. Sullivan, 96 Cal. 480, 2195 Whitton v. Whitton, 38 N. H. 127, 490 Whitwell v. Carter, 4 Mich. 329, 1948 Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425, 1393, 1406 Wichita, etc., B. Co. v. Koch, 47 Kan. 753, 1967 Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 94, 2000 Wickersham v. Chicago Zinc Co., 18 Kan. 481, 1288 Wickham v. Grant, 28 Kan. 517, 1543 Wickham v. Martin, 13 Gratt. 427, 427 Wickham v. Wickham, 2 K. & J. 478, 613 Wickliffe v. Lee, 6 B. Mon. 543, 409 Widner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 47 Mich. 612, 816 Widiman v. Brown, 83 Mich. 241, 187, 501 Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431, 1894 Wiebler v. Milwaukee, etc., Ins. Co., 30 Minn. 464, 654 Wieman v. Anderson, 42 Pa. St. 311, 1684 Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106, 472 Wiggin v. Butcher, 154 Mass. 447, 324 Wiggin v. Tudor, 23 Pick. 434, 818 Wiggins v. Bush, 12 Johns. 305, 1640 Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252, 221, 262, 649, 652 Wiggins v. Lusk, 12 111. 132, 15 Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476, 164 165, 166 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 73 Mo. 389, 75 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 if. S. 365, 2128 Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Doug. 201, 916 Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 2 Smith's Lead- ing Cases (9th Am. ed.) , 842, 891, 910 Wight v. Gardner, 66 111. 94, 496 Wight v. Eindskopf . 43 Wis. 344, 1855, 2012 Wight v. Sampter, 127 HI. 167, 854 Wight v. Shelby R. Co., 16 B. Mon. 4, 259 Wightman v. Doe, 24 Miss. 675, 1289 Wightman v. United States, 23 Ct. CI. ltl, 784 Wilbur v. Cartright, 44 Barb. 536, 321 Wilbur v. Jernegan, 11 R. 1. 113, 454 Wilbur v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600, 617 Wilbur v. Lynde, 49 Cal. 290, 1304, 1590 Wilbur v. Wilbur, 17 R. I. 295, 239, 240 Wilbur v. Wilbur, 21 Atl. Rep. 497, 238 Wilcocks v. Phillips, 1 Wall. Jr. 47, 891 Wilcox v. Dodge, 12 111. App. 517, 2253 Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 688, 1886 Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. 378, 696 Wilcox v. Iowa, etc., University, 32 Iowa, 367 991 Wilcox v. McCarthy, 3 Brad. (N. Y.) 284, 465 Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550, 1777 Wilcox Silver Plate Co. v. Green, 72 N. Y. 17, 670 Wilcox v. Stephenson, 30 Fla. 377, 2223 Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388, 1707 Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. 346, 919 Wilcoxon v. Stitt, 65 Cal. 596, 120 Wilcus v. Kling, 87 111. 107, 758 Wildbahn v. Robidoux, 11 Mo. 660, 631 Wild v. Harris, 7 C. B. 999, 278 Wild v. Williams. 6 M. & W. 490, 588 Wilde v. Fox (1822), 1 Rand. (Va.) 165, 1179 Wilde v. Wilde, 37 Neb. 891, 1855, 2007, 2241 Wilder v. Seelye, 8 Barb. 408, 400, 401, 409 Wilder v. St. Johnsbury Railroad Co., 65 Vt. 43, 518 WQder v. Weakley, 34 Ind. 181, 1816, 1837, 2241 Wilder v. Whittemore, 15 Mass. 262, 490 Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Eq. 198, 596, 599, 614, 615, 617 Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 1994, 2082 Wile & Co. v. Rochester Land Co., 25 N. Y. Supl. 794, 1302 Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173, 1388 Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426, 138, 146, 148, 347, 1579 Wiley v. Holmes, 28 Mo. 286, 834 Wiley v. Seattle City, 7 Wash. 576, 1469 WUkerson v. Bruce, 37 Mo. App. 156, 525, 527 Wilkerson v. Handle (Texas App.) , 29 S. W. Rep. 431, 346 Wilkes v. Cornelius, 21 Ore. 348, 793 Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 John. 335, 667 Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N. C. 254, 630 Wilkins v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 31 Ohio St. 665, 1373 Wilkinson v. Bauerle, 41 N. J. Eq. 635, 1364, 1365, 1393, 1405, 1406 Wilkinson v. Colley, 164 Pa. St. 35, 2264 Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 58 Mich. 574, 215 Wilkinson v. Parmer, 82 Ala. 367, 479 Wilkinson v. Roper, 75 Ala. 475, 1117 Wilkinson v. Sherman, 45 N. J. Eq. 413, 1008 Wilkinson v. State, 59 Ind. 416, 2099 Wilkinson v. Tonsley, 16 Minn. 299, 1947, 1948 Wilkinson v. Williamson, 76 Ala. 163, 907 Wilks v. Railroad Co., 79 Ala. 180, 1112 Willamette S. M. Co., v. Los Angeles Col- lege Co., 94 Cal. 229, 2222 Willand v. Fenn, Selwyn N. P. 784, 549 Willard v. Bosshard, 68 Wis. 454, 604 Willard v. Dow, 54 Vt. 188, 1680 Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray (Mass.), 328, 1653 Willard v. Harvey, 24 N. H. 344, 2158 Willard v. Magoon, 30 Mich. 389, 1709 Willard v. Merritt, 45 Barb. 295, 321 Willard v. Ostrander, 46 Kan. 591, 40 Willard v. Siegel Gas Fixture Co., 47 Mo. App. 1, 905 Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 1166, 1171 Willard v. Trustees, 66 ID. 55, 1361 Willcuts v. Northwestern, etc., Ins. Co., 81 Ind. 300, 876 Willemin v. Bateson, 63 Mich. 309, 1996 Willes v. Greenhill, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 147, 427 Willett v. Porter, 42 Ind. 250, 1818 Willetts v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45, 10,74 Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 566, 387 William v. Rogan, 59 Texas, 438, 1327 William and Mary College v. Powell, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 372, 1719 William Cramp & Sons Ship, etc., Bldg. Co. v. Sloan, 21 Fed. Rep. 561, 854 William Butcher Steel Works v. Atkin- son, 68 111. 421, 652, 693 Williams v. Auerbach, 57 Ala. 90, 1743 CXC11 TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'} Williams v. Bank of Commerce, 71 Miss. 858, 1264 Williams y. Bayley, L. E. 1 H. L. 200, 1828,1832,1873 Williams v. Bemis, 108 Mass. 91, 692, 837 Williams v. Birbeck, Hofl. Ch. 359, 949 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 2117 Williams v. Burgess. 10 A. & E. 499, 666 Williams v Carr, 80 N. Car. 294, 1922 Williams v. Carrington, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 515, 535 Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621, 54, 60 Williams v. Cheney, 3 Gray, 215, 1265, 1351 Williams v. Chicago H. Co., 112 Mo. 463, 561 Williams v. Chisholm, 128 111. 115, 447 Williams v. Collins, 67 Iowa, 413, 2290 Williams v. Connoway, 3 Houston (Del.), 63, 162 Williams v. Costello, 95 Ala. 592, 446 Williams v. Evans, 87 Ala. 725, 1854 Williams V.Evans, 19 L. E. Eq. 547, 846 Williams v. Forbes, 114 111. 167, 1712 WUliams v. Ft. W„ etc., E. Co., 82 Texas, 553, 106 Williams v. Gay, 21 La. Ann. 110, 2021 Williams v. Gray, 67 Eng. C. L. E. 730, 853 Williams v. Griffith, 5 M. & W. 300, 472 Williams v. Hardie, 85 Texas, 499, 1762 Williams v. Harrison, 11 S. Car. 412, 1772 Williams v. Hastings, 59 N. H. 373, 2098 Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 1838 Williams v. Healey, 3 Denio, 363, 115 Williams v. Hedley, 8 East, 378, 1870 Williams v. Hitchings, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 326, 513 Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312, 268, 790, 792 WUliams v. Jensen, 75 Mo. 681, 233 Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 2120 Williams v. Kerr, 152 Pa. St. 560, 997 Williams v. Lane, 87 Wis. 152, 2109 Williams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886, 608, 609, 610 Williams v. Lewis (1834) , 5 Leigh, 686, 1179 Williams v. Lloyd, W. Jones, 179, 294 Williams v. Lord, 75 Va. 390, 427, 1677 Williams v. Mayor, etc., 6 Mar. & J. 529, 1148 Williams v. Mayor, 2 Mich. 560, 1554 Williams v. Montgomery, 22 N. Y. Supl. 10:S3, 1894 Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256, 215 Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444, 676, 679, 684, 691, 1129 Williams v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653, 2111 Williams v. Peinny, 25 Iowa, 436, 1521 Williams v. Porter (Ky.), 21 S. W. Eep. 0(3, 419 Williams v. Eobinson, 73 Maine, 186, 675, 676, 688, 1118 Williams v. Eogan, 59 Texas, 438, 258 Williams v. Sogers, 1 1 Bush, 776, 615 Williams v. Eorer, 7 Mo. 556, 393 Williams v. Schatz, 42 Ohio, 47, 16 Williams v. State, 92 Tonn. 275, 1946 Williams v. State, 25 FH. 7:!t, 182 Williams v. Stevens Point L. Co., 72 Wis. 187, 1603 Williams v. Stritz (Miss. 1895), 17 So. Eep. 227, 1115 Williams v. Town of Duanesburgh, 66 N. Y. 129, 1535 Williams v. Vanilerbuilt, 28 N. Y. 217, 276 Williams v. Walker, 111 N. Car. 604, 1740 Williams v. Walker, 18 S. Car. 577, 1880 Williams v. Waters, 36 Ga. 454, 902 Williams v. Wentworth, 5 Beav. 325, 1841 Williams v. Whndon, 109 N. Y. 333, 1664 Williams v. Whiteman (Mss. Jackson 1875), Williams v. Williams, 130 N. Y. 193, 706 Williams v. Winsor, 12 E. I. 9, 1435 Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220, 903 Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Pick. 541, 217, 256 Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co. v. Froth- ingham, 122 Mass. 391, 1228 Williamson v. Brandenberg, 6 Ind. App. 97, 2110 Williamson v. Clements, 1 Taunt. 523, 221 Williamson v. Collins, 17 Ohio, 354, 826 Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405, 110 Williamson v. Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 26 Up. Can. C. P. 266, 895 Williamson v. Kokomo, etc., Association, 89 Ind. 389, 1335 WiUiamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. St. 402, 853 Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189, 1456 WiEiamson v. Eees, 15 Ohio, 572, 826 Williamson v. Watts, 1 Campb. 552, 1772 Williar v. Baltimore, etc., Association, 45 Md. 546, 1596 Williard v. Williard, 56 Pa. St. 119, 1688 WUliford v. Bentley, 5 J. J. Marsh. 181, 110 Willingham v. Joyce, 3 Ves. 108, 2266 Willington v. West Boylston, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 101, 284 Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 223. 884 Willis v. Branch, 94 N. Car. 142, 2174 Willis v. Hammond, 141 S. Car. 153, 2178 WiUis v. Hodson, 79 Md. 327, 1845 WiUis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co. (1893), 53 Minn. 370, 1264 Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, 725 WUlock's Estate, In re, 165 Pa. St. 522, 1705 Willoughby, In re, 11 Paige Ch. 257, 618 WiUoughby, etc., v. Motley, 83 Ky. 297, 1988 WiUs v. Abbey, 27 Texas, 202, 2086, 2087 WiUs v. Brown, 118 Mass. 137, 610 Wills v. Carpenter, 75 Mo. 80, 97 WiEs v. Kempt, 17 Cal. 98, 2183 WiUs v. Boss, 77 Ind. 1, 684, 1079 WiUs v. Simmonds, 8 Hun, 189, 495 WiUwerth v. Leonard, 156 Mass. 277, 1812 WiUyams v. BuUmore, 33 Law J. Ch. 461, 1873 Wilmarth v. Mountford, 4 Wash. C. C. 79, 394 Wiimering v. McGaughey, 30 Iowa, 205, 869 Wilmington, etc., E. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 2136 Wilmington Railroad v. Eeid, 13 WaU. (U. S.) 264, 2136, 2140 Wilmington, etc., E. Co. v. Thompson, 7 Jones (N.C.), 387, 1323 Wilmot v. Smith, 3 C. & P. 453, 403 Wilmott v. Hurd, 11 Wend. 586, 193 Wilmshurst v. Bowker/7 M. & G. 882, 685 WUsey v. Franklin, 57 Hun, 382, 794 WUson v. Barker, 50 Maine, 447, 800 Wilson v. Bevans, 58 IU. 232, 601 Wilson v. Coolidtre, 42 Mich. 112, 1697 WUson v. Deen, 74 N. Y. 531, 41, 334, 957, 1066, 2179 Wilson v. Doran, 110 N. Y. 101, 407 WUson v. Doran, 39 Hun, 88, 407 Wilson v. Gaines, 103 IT. S. 667, 2139 Wilson v. Haeker, 85 IU. 349, 980 Wilson v . Hunter, 14 Wis. 683, 894 Wilson v. KeUogg, 77 IU. 47, 1033 WUson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah, 397, 16 Wilson v. Knott, 3 Humph. 473, 290, 291 Wilson v. Logue, 131 Ind. 191, 1720 WUson v. Marlow, 66 IU. 385, 854 Wilson v. McConneU, 9 Eich. Eq. 500, 227 Wilson v. MetropoUtan E. Co., 120 N. Y. 145, 1352 Wilson v. MUes, etc., Society, L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 3S1, 174, 1616 Wilson v. Morris, 4 Colo. App. 242, 969, 1066 Wilson v. Pelton, 40 Ohio St. 306, 805 Wilson v. Railway Co., 2 DeGex, J. & S. 475, 1123 Wilson v. Railroad Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 28, 1101 TABLE OF CASES. CXC111 \Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.'] 52, 867 646 562 1461 261 709 WilsoD v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338, Wilson v. Ray, 13 Ind. 1, Wilson v. Reed, 3 John. 175, Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 TJ. S. 499 Wilson v. Samuels, 100 Cal. 514, Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Maine, 120, Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow. 195, »93 Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & G. 236, 2185 Wilson v. WillimanJ Nott & MoC. 440, 385 Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L. Cas. 538, 2009 Wilstach v. Heyd, 122 Ind. 574, 679, 1484 Wilton v. Eaton, 127 Mass. 174, 210, 1473 Wimer v. Overseers, etc., 104 Pa. St. 317, 199 Wimer v. Worth Tp., 104 Pa. St. 317, 1651 Winans v. Peebles, 32 N. Y. 423, 1736 Winch v. Bean, 62 N. H. 427, 490 Winchell v. Bowman, 21 Barb. 448, 196 Winchester v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 4 Md. 231, 1288 Winchester v. Newton, 2 Allen, 492, 150 Winchester Co. v. Carman, 109 Ind. 31, 170 Winckworth v. Mills, 2Esp. 484, 613 Windham v. Cerf , 19 La. Ann. 498, 2021 Windham Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Hartford P. & F. R. Co., 23 Conn. 373, 1123 Winebinner v. Weisiger, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 32, 2015 Winfield v. Dodge, 45 Mich. 355, 2104 Winfield Nat. Bank v. Croco, 46 Kan. 620, 1831 Winfield Water Co. v. City of Winfield, 51 Kan. 104, 1578, 1580, 2193 Windmiller v. Pope, 107 N.Y. 674, 498, 507, 945 Winfield Water Co. v. City of Winfield, 51 Kan. 104, 701 Winget v. Quincy Building Assn., 128 111. 67, 1602, 1603 Wing, Matter of, 83 Hun, 284, 1845 Wing v. Chase, 35 Maine, 260, 179, 182, 231, 234 Wing v. Clark, 24 Maine, 366, 296 Wing v. Mill, 1 B. & A. 105, 197 Wing v. Thompson, 78 Wis. 256, 165, 168 Winn v. Bull, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 29, 97 Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Holzgrafe, 53 111. 516, 957 Winnipesaukee, etc., Assn. v. Gordon, 63 N. H. 505, 2256 Winnipisseogee, etc., Co. v. Perley, 46 N H 83 893 Winpermy v. French, 18 Ohio St. 469, 2090 Winslow v. Central, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa, 197, 2003 Winslow v. Herrick, 9 Mich. 380, 830 Winslow v. Patten, 34 Maine, 25, 884 Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 57, 348 Winstead v. Reid, Bus. L. (N. Car.) 76, 2191 Winston v. Dalby, 64 N. Car. 299, 540 Winter v. Brockwell, 8 East. 308, 641 Winter v. City Council, 65 Ala. 403, ' 804 Winter v. Goebner, 2 Colo. App. 259, 234, 1132 Winter v. Kinney, 1 N. Y. (1 Comst.l 365, 2091 Winters v. McMahon, 23 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 119, 1797 Winter y. Merrick, 69 Ala. 86, 1003 Winter v. Norton, 1 Ore. 42, 2224 Winter v. Trainor. 151 111. 191, 1107, 1197 Winter v. Truax, 87 Mich. 324, 2276 Wintermute v. Carner, 8 Wash. 585, 1125 Winton v. Sherman, 20 Iowa, 295, 378 Wintz v. Vogt, 3 La. Ann. 16, 2033 Wirth v. Branson, 98 U. S. 118, 2122 Wisconsin Brick Co. v. Hood, 54 Minn. 543, 339 Wisconsin Brick Co. v. Hurd Refrigerator Co. (Minn.), 62 N. W. Rep. 550, 349 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 862 Wise v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 891, 1055, 2281 Wise v. Grant, 140 N. Y. 593, 1001, 2280 • Wise v. Rogers, 24 Gratt. 169, 32, 2159 Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31, 643 Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437, 1057 xiii Wiswall v. Harriman, 62 N. H. 671, 536 Wiswall v. McGowan, Hoff. Ch. 125, 1158 Wiswell v. Wiswell, 35 Minn. 371, 1804 Witbeck v. Waine, 16 N. Y. 532, 52 Witbeck v. Witbeck, 25 Mich. 439, 1017, 1030 Witherby v. Mann, 11 Johns. 518, 443 WithereU v. Jones, 2 Earn. & Ad. 221, 1891 Witherow t. Witherow, 16 Ohio, 238, 116 Withers v. Ewing, 40 Ohio St. 400, 198 Withers T.Reynolds, 2 B. & Ad. 882, 497 Withers v. Richardson, 5 T. B. Mon. 94, 617 Withrow v. Adams, 4 Texas Civ. App. 438, 1760 Withy v. Cottle, T. & Russ. 78, 751 Witter v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 422, 1138 Witz v. Osburn, 83 Va. 227, 427 Wohlford v. Citizens' Loan, etc., Assn., 140 Ind. 662, 1598 Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, 315, 348 Wolcott v. Patterson, 100 Mich. 227, 1697 Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 248. 2196 Wolcott v. Yeager, 11 Ind. 84, 2229, 2248 Woldert v. Arledge, 4 Texas C. App. 692, 928 Wolf v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa, 380, 753, 760 Wolf v. Fogarty, 6 Cal. 224, 1642 Wolf v. Frost, 4 Sanf. Ch. 72, 642 Wolf v. Gerr, 43 Iowa, 339, 135, 144 Wolf v. Great Falls, etc., Co., 15 Mont. 49, 1165 Wolf v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197, 889 Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal. 228, 2212 Wolf T. Wall, 40 Ohio St. Ill, 2170 Wolf v. Zimmerman. 127 Ind. 486, 1725 Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197, 283, 286, 948 Wolke v. Fleming, 103 Ind. 105, 692. 838, 1183 Wolford y. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 228, 229, 233 Wolfenden v. Wilson, 33 TJ. C. Q. B. 442, 660 Wolff v. Campbell, 110 Mo. 114, 931, 940 Wolff v. Koppel, 5 Hill, 458, 613 Wolff v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 50 N. J. Law, 453, 120 Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 TJ. S. 358, 1496, 2126 Wollaston v. Tribe, L. R. 10 Eq.. 44, 253 Wolton v. Gavin, 16 Q. B. 48, 2095 Wolverhampton R. Co. v. London, etc., R. Co., L.Tt. 16 Eq. 433, 1101, 1422 Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 379, 549, 1756 Wood v. Bayard, 63 Pa. St. 320, 1779 Wood v. Benson, 2 C. & J. 94, 220 Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 1022 Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402, 471 Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509, 466 Wood v. Cochrane, 39 Vt. 544, 859 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308, 1375, 1398, 1400 Wood v. Edwards, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 205, 2185 Wood v. Fisk, 63 N. Y. 245, 823 Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 499, 621 Wood v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co.. 128 TJ. S. 416, 1443 Wood v. Hitchcock, 20 Wend. 47, 399 Wood v. Jones, 35 Texas, 64, 842 Wood v. Lake, Sayer, 3, 642 Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, 2125 Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 837, 642 Wood v. Leland, 1 Mete. 387, 827 Wood v. Lindley, 12 Ind. App. 258, 865 Wood v. Lowry, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 231, 1646 Wood v. Malone, 131 Pa. St. 544, 270, 299 Wood v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 556, 2168 Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana (Ky.), 366, 2082 Wood v. Merritt, 2 Bosw. 368, 826 Wood v. Murphy, 47 Mo. App. 539, 424 Wood v. Newkirk, 15 Ohio St. 295, 207 Wood v. Orford, 52 Cal. 412, 1719 Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488, 563 Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414, 2260 Wood v. Ross (Texas App.), 26 S. W. Rep. 148, 332 Wood v. Rowcliffe, 6 Exch. 407, 862 CXC1V TABLE OF CASES. [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291."] Wood v. Savage, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 816, 629 Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545, 132 Wood v. Thomly, 58 111. 464, 844, 1194 Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. 24, 172 Wood v. Watkinson. 17 Conn. 500, 834 Wood v. Young, 5 Wend. 620, 558 Wood, Walter A., Harvester Co. v. Bob- bins, 56 Minn. 48, 1319 Wood, etc., Machine Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565, 131, 133 Wood Machine Co. v. Gaetner, 55 Mich. 453, 31 Woodbury v. Parshley, 7 N. H. 237, Woodbury v. State, 69 Ala. 242, Wooddy v. Old Dominion Ins. Co. Gratt. 362, 1097 Woodford v. Dorwin, 3 Vt. 82, 707 Woodford v. Hamilton, 139 Ind. 481, 1898 Woodhull v. Little, 102 N. Y. 165, 34 Wooding v. Crain, 10 Wash. St. 35, 1145 Woodland, The, 14 Blatchford, 499, 740 Woodland, The Barque, 7 Benedict, 110, 740 Woodruff v. Clark, 42 N. J. Law, 198, 1668 Woodruff v. Erie E. Co., 93 N. Y. 609, 1281, 1436 Woodruff v. Hinman, 11 Vt. 592, 1860 Woodruff v. Noble Co. Comrs., 110 Ind. App. 179, 1486 Woodruff v. Scaife, 83 Ala. 152, 609 Woodruff v. Scruggs, 27 Ark. 26, 2125 Woodruff v. TrapnaU, 10 How. (U. S.) 190, 2126 Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309, 1859, 1867, 1986 Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349, 179, 234, 235, 1113 Woods v. Armstrong. 51 Ala. 150, 1898 Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 772, 784 Woods v. Brown, 93 Ind. 164, 1841 Woods v. Dial, 12 111. 72, 500 Woods v. Land, 30 Mo. App. 789. Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black (U. S.) 386, 1537 Woods v. Woods, 127 Mass. 141, 457 Woodson v. Massenburg, 3 Texas Civ. App. 146, 1760 Woodstock, Town of, v. Town of Barnard, 67 Vt. 97. 1849 Woodstock Iron Co. v. Eichmond & D. Extension Co., 129 U. S. 643, 1304, 1425, 1986, 1992, 2082, 2083 Woodward v. Allan, 3 Dana, 164, 364 Woodward v. Brooks, 18 111. App. 150, 724 Woodward v. Darcy, Plow. 184, 548 Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312, 131, 140, 372, 2231 Woodward v. Jewell, 25 Fed. Eep. 689, 867 Woodward v. Newhall, 1 Pick. 500, 831 Woodward v. Seel}', 11 111. 157, 641 Woodward v. Spurr, 141 Mass. 2*3, 1745, 1754 Woodward v. Wilcox, 27 Ind. 207, 1184 Woodworth v. Bennett, 43 N. Y. 273, 1940 Wooldridge v. Stern, 42 Fed. Eep. 311, 646, 647, 652 Wooley v. Clements, 11 Ala. 220, 767 Wooley v. Constant, 4 Johns. 54, 953 Woolner v. Levy, 48 Mo. App. 469, 384 Woolsey v. Funke, 121 N. Y. 87, 876 Woonsocket, etc., Press Co. v. Miller, 18 R. I. 657, 1100 Woonsocket R. Co. v. Sherman, 8 R. I. 564, 156 Wooster v. Sage, 67 N. Y. 67, 160, 2182 Woofers v. Kauffman, 67 Texas, 488, 831 Woofers v. Smith, 56 Texas, 198. 832 Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368, 1827, 2016 Worcester v. Milford, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 379, 1849 Worcester, Mayor, etc., of, v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 109 Mass. 103, 1439 Work v. Beach, 129 N. Y. 651, 2199 Work v. Beach, 53 Hun, 7, 779 Workingmen's, etc., Bank of Converse, 29 La. Ann. 369, 1326 Worland v. Kimberlin, 6 B. Mon. 608, 1364 Worley v. Moore, 97 Ind. 15, 797 Worley v. Tuggle, 4 Bush (Ky.) , 168, 1062 Worrall's Accounts, 5 W. & S. Ill, 2009 Worrall v. Munn, 38 N. Y. 137, 1213 Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 215 Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362, 9, 232 Worth v. Mumford, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 1, 465 Worth v. Worth, 84 111. 442, 1191 Worthen v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 562, 1392, 1393, 1405 Worthen v. Thompson, 54 Ark. 151, 187 Worthy v. Johnson, 8 Ga. 236, 356 Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray, 168, 649, 653 Worthley v. Emerson, 116 Mass. 374, 470 Worthington, In re, 141 N. Y. 9, 1971 Worthington v. Boston, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737, 1554 Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass. 196, 95, 894 Worthington v. McEoberts, 7 Ala. 814, 630 Wright's Appeal, 8 Pa. St. 57, 1845 Whelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 N. Y. 293 293 Wray v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146, 1817, 1850 Wright v. Barnes, 14 Conn. 518, 305 Wright v. Behrens, 39 N. J. Law, 413, 379, 398 Wright v. Bircher, 72 Mo. 179, 1435 Wright v. Brown, 116 N. Car. 26, 1185 Wright v. Buck, 62 N. H. 656, 458 Wright v. City of Chicago, 60 111. 312, 1546 Wright v. Crabbs, 78 Ind. 487, 2060, 2072 Wright v. Dobie, 3 Texas C. App. 194, 757 Wright v. First, etc., Co., 5 N. H. 410, 536 Wright v. Hays, 10 Texas, 130, 1739, 1760 Wright v. Hughes, 13 Ind. 109, 1931 Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 1603, 1902 Wright v. Laing, 3 B. & C. 165, 471 Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass. 385, 489 Wright v. McCormick, 17 Ohio St. 86, 1373 Wright v. McPike, 70 Mo. 175, 579 Wright v. Meyer (Tex. App.), 25 S. W. Eep. 1122, 142, 277 Wright v. Mills, 4 H. & N. 488, 761 Wright v. Mix, 76 Cal. 465, 442 Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 1504, 1581 Wright v. Percival, 8 L. J. E. Q. B. (N. S.) 258, 663 Wright v. Pipe-Line Co., 101 Pa. St. 204, 1267 Wright v. Puckett, 22 Gratt. 370, 1179 Wright v. Eeusens, 133 N. Y. 298, 860 Wright v. Russel, 3 Wils. 530, 566 Wright v. Ryder. 36 Cal. 342, 2027, 2029, 2069 Wright v. Senn Estate, 85 Mich. 191, 792 Wright v. Susquehanna, etc., Ins. Co., 110 Pa. St. 29, 121 Wright v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 49 Hun, 445, 544 Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 TJ. S. 252, 2003 Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 237, 244 Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389, 1133 Wright v. Trainer, 1 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 198, 50 Wright v. Wakeford, 17 Ves. 454, 12 Wright v. Weeks, 25 N. Y. 153, 674, 684, 692 Wright v. Whithead, 14 Vt. 268, 2243 Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 1686 Wright v. Wright, 99 Mich. 170, 849, 1211 Wright v. Wright, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 179, 2181 Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177, 1811 Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 222 Wristen v. Bowles, 82 Cal. 84, 87 Wullenwaber v. Dunigan, 30 Neb. 877, 1543 Wyatt v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, 147, 463 Wyckoff v.Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442, 385,386 Wycoff v. Summerson (Pa. St.), 19 Atl. Rep. 809, 165 Wylson v. Dunn, L. R. 34 Ch. Div. 569, 1120, 1148 TABLE OF CASES. CXCV [Beferences are to Pages, Vol. I, pp. 1-1050, Vol. II, pp. 1051-2291.] Wyndhain v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 414, 590 Wynkoopv. Cowing, 21 111. 570, 870 Wynu v. Wood, 97 Pa. St. 216, 605, 609 Wyscaver v. Atkinson, 37 Ohio St. 80, 1540 X Y Xenos T. Wickham, L. H. 2 H. L. 296, 15, 88 Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 1652, 1653 Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450, 1746 Yale v. Dederer, 68 N. Y. 329, 1704 Yale v. Edgerton, 14 Minn. 194, 616 Yale, etc., Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. 101, 1979 Yandes v. Lefavour, 2 Blackf. 371, 543 Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. St. 278, 182, 231, 234 Yard v. Yard, 27 N. J. Eq. 114, 1021 Yarmouth, Inhabitants of, v. North Yar- mouth, 34 Maine, 411, 2142 Yarnell v. Anderson, 14 Mo. 619, 452 Yarnold v. Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126, 1554 Yates v. Bond, 2 McCord, 382, 356 Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389, 819 Yates T. Gardiner, 20 L. J. Ex. 327, 123 Yates v. Law, 86 Va. 117, 1686, 1719 Yates v. Lyon, 61 N. Y. 344, 1822 Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446, 325, 328, 926 Yates v. Thomson, 3 Clark & F. 544, 717 Yauger v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq. 389, 1813, 1814 Yaw v. Kerr, 47 Pa. St. 333, 196 Yazel v. Palmer, 81 111. 82, 1664 Yazoo, etc., E. Co. v. Fulton, 71 Miss. 385, 529 Yazoo, etc., B. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 2136 Yeakle v. Jacob, 33 Pa. St. 376, 639 Yearteau v. Bacon's Estate, 65 Vt. 516, 1897 Yeats v. Ballentine, 56 Mo. 530, 126, 136 Yell v. Snow, 24 Ark. 554, 829 Yelland, Ex parte, 21 L. J. Ch. 852, 260 Yellow Jacket, etc., Mining Co. v. Steven- son, 5 Nev. 224, 1279 Yeomans v. Williams, L. B. 1 Eq. 184, 515, 555, 557 Yerger v. Bains, 259, 2022 Yerkes v. Eichards, 153 Pa. St. 656, 1147 Yerkes v. Salomon, 11 Hun, 471, 1935 Yetter v. Hudson, 57 Texas, 604, 277 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. 2160 York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie, 3 Paton (Scotland), 878, 1308 York Park Building Association v. Barnes, 39 Neb. 834, 1235, 1325 Yorkshire Wagon Co. v. Maclure, L. E. 19 Ch. Div. 478, 617 Youn v. Lamont, 56 Minn. 216, 1025 Young's Estate, 148 Pa. St. 573, 793 Young v. Currier, 63 N. H. 419, 572 Young v. Dibrell, 7 Humph. 270, 186 Young v. English, 7 Beav. 10, 469 Young v. Farwell, 139 111. 326, 1380 Young v. Fuller, 29 Ala. 461, 955 Young v. Glendenning, 6 Watts, 509, 847 Young v. Harris, 36 Ark. 162, 479 Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 45, 764 Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162, 1047 Young v. Miller, 10 Ohio, 85, 1062 Young v. Otto, 57 Minn. 307, 1811 Young v. Overbaugh, 76 Hun, 151, 844 Young v. Overbaugh, 145 N. Y. 158, 627 Young v. Eathbone, 16 N. J. Eq. 224, 1171 Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 250, 559, 1670 Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27, 7 Young v. Young, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 461, 1698 Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636, 14, 15, 17, 90, 91 Youngblood v. Birmingham, etc., Trust Co.. 95 Ala. 521, 1605, 1888 Youghiogheny Natural Gas Co. v. West- moreland Paper Co., 158 Pa. St. 559, 2239 z Zabriskie v. Central E. Co., 131 N. Y. 72, 327, 341, 504 Zabriskie v. Eailroad Co., 23 How. 381, 1430, 1527 Zacharie v. Franklin, 12 Pet. 151, 12 Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 131 Zane v. Zane (1819), 6 Munf. 406, 1179 Ziegler v. Chapin, 126 N. Y. 342, 1467 Ziegler v. McFarland, 147 Pa. St. 607, 438 Ziehen v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 558, 410 Zihlman v. Cumberland Glass Co., 74 Md. 303, 2234 Zell Guano Co. v. Emry, 113 N. Car. 85, 1634 Zimmer v. New York Central, etc., Co., 137 N. Y. 460, 1963 Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 115, 1023 Zimmerman v. Kinkle, 108 N. Y. 282, 1975 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229, 793 Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Dolph (Mich.), 62 N. W. Eep. 339, 335 Zimpelman v. Eobb, 53 Texas, 274, 1760 Zinn v. Law, 32 W. Va. 447, 1677 Zinn v. Eitterman, 2 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. N. S. 261, 2166 Zipcey v. Thompson, 1 Gray, 243. 725 Zoebisch v. Eauch, 133 Pa. St. 532, 1775 Zoller v. Ide, 1 Neb. 439, 1231 Zook v. Odle, 3 Colo. App. 87, 453, 466 Zorntlein v. Bram, 100 K Y. 12, 1768 Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, 1772, 1789, 1795 Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. St. 541. 500, 945 Zunz v. South Eastern By. Co., L. B. 4 Q. B. 539, 64 Zwerneman V. Von Rosenborg, 76 Texas, 522, 985 The Modern Law of Contracts CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTOKY. § 1. Simple contracts defined. § 20. 2. Contract complete before form- 21. ally written. 22. Eule as to written draft. The promise — Consideration es- 23. sential. 24. Consideration further discussed- Mutual promises. 25. New consideration where writ- 26. ten contract changed. Execution and form of contracts. 27. Delivery of contracts. "What is a good delivery. 28. The same subject continued. Contracts classified and distin- 29. guished. Sealed contracts. 30. Sealed contracts further consid- 31. ered. 14. Express and implied contracts. 32. 15. Implied contracts distinguished. Reservations and exceptions. 33. Contracts of record. The same subject continued — 34. Warrant of attorney. Merger in judgment. 3. 4. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 16. 17. 18. 19. Merger of mortgage in legal title. Judgment as estoppel. The same subject continued — Il- lustrations. Statutes as contracts. The same subject continued — Treaties. State grants. Written evidence of contracts the best. Negotiable instruments— How far conclusive. Where written contract is unam- biguous. Complete written contract ex- cluding parol evidence. Contracts in a foreign language. When parol evidence admissible, although contract written. Parol evidence as to written con- sideration. Notice and assent as evidence of contract. Circumstantial evidence of con- tracts. § 1. Simple contracts defined. — Chief Justice Marshall de- fined a contract as "an agreement in which a party undertakes (1) INTRODUCTORY. §1 to do or not to do a particular thing." 1 According to its ety- mology a contract is a drawing together of the minds of par- ties until they meet in agreement. 8 The elements of a complete contract are a lawful subject-matter, a sufficient con- sideration, and the aggregatio mentium,ov mutual assent, of the parties.' An instrument which a person signs and executes, when through mental disease or weakness he is incanable of 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197. See, also, to the same effect 2 Kent's Commentaries, 449; Story on Contracts, § 1 ; Wharton on Con- tracts, § 1 ; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 392; California Civ. Code, § 1549. The Louisiana Code defines a con- tract as "an agreement by which one person obligates himself to another to give, to do or permit, or not to do some- thing expressed or implied by such agreement." La. Code (1889), §1761. 2 McNulty v. Prentice, 25 Barb. 204. It is derived from the Latin verb con- tralto. And see Leake on Contracts, 12. If one of the parties intends to make a contract on one set of terms, and the other intends to make a con- tract on another set of terms, or, as it is sometimes expressed, if the parties are not ad idem, there is no contract, unless the circumstances are such as to preclude one of the parties from denying that he has agreed to the terms of the other. But no matter what a man's real intention may be, if he so conducts himself that a reason- able man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the con- tract with him, the man thus conduct- ing himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other party's terms. Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597, per Blackburn, J., 607; Freeman v. Cooke, L. R. 2 Ex. 663. And see Harlow v. Curtis, 121 Mass. 320. The intention must be communicated. Intention is im- material till it manifests itself in an act. If a. man intends to buy, and says so to the intended seller, and he intends to sell, and says so to the in- tended buyer, there is a contract of sale ; and so there would be if neither had the intention. But telling an in- tention to an indifferent person is no more than though it were noted in one's memorandum book, which is no more than though it existed solely in one's mind. Brown v. Hare, 3 H. & N. 484, 495, per Bramwell, J. 3 Fuller v. Kemp (1893) ,138 N.Y. 231, 236. Thus it is said in Loaiza v. Su- perior Court (1890), 85 Cal. 11, that "to constitute a contract there must be parties capable of contracting, con- sent, a lawful object, and a sufficient consideration ; and the consent must be free, mutual and communicated by each to the other and must not be in- duced by fraud, undue influence or mistake, else it is not free and the contract may be rescinded." That free consent of the parties is essential to a binding contract see, also, Morrill v. Nightingale (1892), 93 Cal. 455. And again in Comyn on Contracts, 2, the essentials of a simple contract are said to be, "A person able to contract; a person able to be contracted with ; a thing to be contracted for ; a good and sufficient consideration ; clear and ex- plicit words to express the contract; the assent of both contracting parties." This definition is approved in Story on Contracts (5th ed.), 1. The Cali- fornia Civ. Code, § 1550, is to the same effect. § 2 INTRODUCTORY. 3 understanding it, is not his contract, because it lacks the essen- tial element of his assent, and because his mind can not meet another mind in respect to it. 1 § 2. Contract complete before formally written. — Where par- ties conclude an agreement, and act upon it, they will be bound by it, although it may have been understood that the agreement was afterwards to be reduced to writing. So also a stipulation to reduce a valid written contract to some other form does not affect its validity, and the stipulation may not be used by either of the parties for the purpose of imposing upon the other additional burdens or obligations, or of evading the per- formance of any of the provisions of the contract. This rule applies where, by means of letters and telegrams exchanged between the parties, a clear and definite proposition, containing all the requirements of a completed contract, is made by one and accepted by the other, with an understanding that the agreement shall be expressed in a formal contract. 2 Where it 1 Girard v. St. Louis Car Co. (1894), ful act by his subsequent conduct, the 123 Mo. 358, per Barclay, J. The tes- effect of which would be to give to the timony for plaintiff tends strongly to agreement that assent which was nec- prove that he was incapable of under- essary to originate an obligation on standing the release when he signed his part ; but, in the absence of such it, and that he did not comprehend, acts as amounted to an approval of it, or intend to assent to, its terms. The he might proceed to enforce his rights, jury so found in response to instruc- irrespective of such a paper. Brews- tions. Those facts, when established, ter v. Brewster (1875), 38 N. J. Law destroyed the substance of the agree- 119. ment which the release in form ex- 2 Sanders a. Pottlitzer Co. (1894), 144 pressed. They took from the appar- N. Y. 209, O'Brien, J. : "Here the con- ent contract what was essential to its tract was already in writing, and it legal force and validity, namely, the was none the less obligatory upon both element of assent by the plaintiff, parties because they intended that it That element is a necessary part of should be put into another form, es- every contract. Without it, a mere pecially when their intention is made writing, expressing some formula of impossible by the act of one or the words, imposes no obligation. The other of the parties by insisting upon signature of plaintiff, obtained to such the insertion of conditions and provis- a paper without the assent of his ions not contemplated or embraced ii(. mind to the act, deprived him of no the correspondence. Vassaru.Camp, legal right. He might, indeed, affirm 11 N. Y. 441 ; Brown v. Norton, 56 such a signature, or make it his law- Hun, 248; Pratt v. Hudson River, INTRODUCTORY. §3 was agreed after arranging the terms of the proposed contract that it should be reduced to writing and signed by the parties, and afterwards some of the parties refused to sign the writing on the ground that it included matters not agreed on, the minds of the parties did not meet, and the contract was there- fore not completed. 1 § 3. Rule as to written draft. — If the written draft of a con- tract is viewed by the parties merely as a convenient memorial or record of their previous contract, its absence does not affect etc., R. Co., 21 N. Y. 305. The principle that governs in such cases was clearly stated by Judge Selden in the case last cited in these words : 'A contract to make and execute a certain written agreement, the terms of which are mutually understood and agreed upon, is, in all respects as valid and obligatory, where no statutory objection interposes, as the written contract itself would be, if executed. If, therefore, it should appear that the minds of the parties had met ; that a proposition for a con- tract had been made by one party and accepted by the other ; that the terms of this contract were in all respects definitely understood and agreed upon, and that a part of the mutual under- standing was, that a written contract, embodying these terms, should be drawn and executed by the respective parties, this is an obligatory contract, which neither party is at liberty to refuse to perform.' " In Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70, 76, Black, J., said: "If the parties make an agreement which they intend shall be binding from the time it is made, effect to it will be given from that time, though they intend it shall be superseded by a more formal written agreement. Bonnewell v. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 70; Blaney v. Hoke, 14 Ohio St. 292; Montague v. "Weil, 30 La. Ann. 50; Mackey v. Mackey, 29 Grat. 158 ; Bell v. Offutt, 10 Bush (Ky.), 632. In Al- len v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309, a written proposal concluded with these words : 'If this is agreed to, the agreement can be fully drawn up and signed,' and we held that an acceptance of the proposal would make a binding con- tract though no further written agree- ment was ever drawn up or signed by the parties. We do not regard the case of Eads v. Carondelet, 42 Mo. 113, as in conflict with what has been said ; for that case proceeds upon the ground that all the terms of the con- tract had not been settled, for the mayor was authorized to make a con- tract with 'such further conditions as may be deemed necessary.' Enough has been said to show that where par- ties have assented to all the terms of a parol agreement it does not fol- low from the mere fact that a written contract is to be thereafter prepared and signed that no binding contract was made. If they intend the parol contract shall be binding upon them, then effect will be given to that inten- tion." This is a correct statement of the rule, although the court, upon the facts of this case, reached a different conclusion on a rehearing. Green v. Cole, 127 Mo. 587; 30 S. W. Rep. 135. 1 Bryant v. Ondrak (1895), 34 N. Y. Supl. 384; 87 Hun, 477. §3 INTRODUCTORY. the binding force of the contract. If, however, it is viewed a: the consummation of the negotiations, there is no contract until the written draft is finally signed. In determining which view is entertained in any particular case, several circumstances may be helpful, as whether the contract is of that class which are usu- ally found in writing; whether it is of such nature as to need a formal writing for its full expression; whether it has few or many details; whether the amount is large or small; whether it is a common or unusual contract; and whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of the negotiations. If a written draft is pro- posed, suggested, or referred to during the negotiations, it is some evidence that the parties intended it to be the final clos- ing of the contract. The burden of proof is upon the party affirming the completion of the contract before the written draft is signed. 1 1 Mississippi, etc., Steamship Co. v. Swift (1894), 86 Me. 248, per Emery, J.: "In Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 638, the defend- ant's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff, naming the price for an estate about which they had been negotiating. The plaintiff wrote a letter, in which he agreed to give the price named, and then added: 'I shall be obliged if you will forward me the usual contract.' In reply, the defendant's solicitors wrote : 'We have been" instructed by the Marchioness of Ely to proceed with the sale to you of these premises. The draft contract is being prepared, and will be forwarded to you for approval in a few days.' Lord Chancellor "Westbury held that, so far, the parties were in treaty, merely, and that, without the execution of the draft mentioned, there was no contract concluded. In Bonnewell v. Jenkins, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 70, the defendant's agent offered certain premises for sale. The plaintiff wrote the agents, making an offer of £800 for the estate. The agents wrote in reply as follows : 'We are instructed to accept your offer of £800 for, these premises, and have asked Mr. Jenk- ins's solicitor to prepare contract.' The lord justices of appeal held that there was a concluded contract. Thesiger, L. J., said : 'The mere reference to a preparation of an agreement, by which the terms agreed upon would be put into a more formal shape, does not prevent the existence of a binding contract.' In Rossiter v. Miller, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 648, there was much corre- spondence about a sale of certain lots of land, and the question arose wheth- er the correspondence showed a com- pleted contract, without the formal draft which had been referred to in some of the letters. James, L. J., said : 'The reasonable view of the case is that the parties intended the sign- ing of the formal contract to be a con- dition precedent.' Coleridge, C. J., said, 'If a set of terms be agreed upon in writing, they constitute a contract, although it may be the intention of the parties that they should be put into a more formal shape ; but here a 6 INTRODUCTORY. §4 § 4. The promise — Consideration essential. — The intention of the one party to observe the matter in question, expressed set of terms was never agreed to.' Baggallay, L. J., said, 'The letters left the defendant a right to believe that the signing of a formal contract was necessary to create a binding agreement.' In the same case, upon an appeal to the house of lords (L. R., 3 App. Cas. 1124), Lord Hatherly said: 'Although the correspondence may not set forth, in a form which a solic- itor would adopt if he were instructed to draw an agreement in writing, that which is an agreement between the parties, yet, if the parties to the agree- ment, the thing to be sold, the price to be paid, and all those matters, be clearly and distinctly stated, though only by letter, an acceptance clearly by letter will not the less constitute an agreement, in the full sense, be- tween the parties, merely because the letter may say: "We will have this agreement put in due form by a solic- itor." ' In Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238, Lord Cranworth said: 'If parties have entered into an agree- ment, they are not the less bound by that agreement because they say : "We sent it to a solicitor to have it reduced into form;" but when the parties negotiate and do not say so, the mere fact that thejf do send it to a solii'itor to have the matter reduced into form affords, to my mind, generally cogent evidence that they do not intend to bind them- selves till it is reduced into form.' In Morrill v. Tehama, etc., Mining Co., 10 Nev. 1.35 (125), the court de- clared the general rule to be that where the parties enter into any general agreement, and the under- standing is that it is to be reduced to writing, or, if it is already in a writ- ten form, that it is to be signed be- fore it is to be acted on or to take effect, it is not binding until it is so written or signed. In Methudy v. Ross, 10 Mo. App. 101, the court said: 'The mere fact that a written contract was to be subsequently prepared does not show that a final agreement be- tween the parties was not made, but it tends to show it ; arid in this case we think it clear that there was to be more explicit agreement, which was to be reduced to writing, that this was not done, and that there was no meet- ing of minds.' In Eads v. Carondelet, 42 Mo. 113, the plaintiff made to the city of Carondelet a written proposi- tion, containing the terms on which he would build gunboats in that city. The city council passed an ordinance reciting the proposition, and expressly accepting it as made, hut, in the second section of the ordinance, directed and empowered the mayor to enter into a written contract with the plaintiff and employ counsel to draft the contract. The plaintiff carried out his proposi- tion, hut the city failed to perform any part. Held, that the city was not bound, as further formality was contemplated. In Water Commissioners v. Brown 32 N. J. Law, 504, Brown made a prop- osition to the commissioners to do certain work in laying pipe. The commissioners accepted the proposi- tion, and directed a written contract to be prepared. This was done, but it was not signed. Held, that the com- missioners were not bound. In this case, however, the law provided that the contracts of the water commission- ers should he in writing. This fact showed conclusively that a written contract must have been contem- plated. In Congdon v. Darcy, 46 Vt. 478, the negotiation was for building a dwelling-house by the plaintiff for the defendant. Everything was agreed §4 INTRODUCTORY. to and accepted by the other, for the purpose of creating a right to its observance, constitutes a promise. 1 This is a general statement of the rule. But where a person from whom an old harness had been stolen, in his excitement exclaimed, " I will give one hundred dollars to any one who will find out the thief," this was held not to be a promise to pay the reward, but rather an explosion of wrath against the thief. 2 Every promise must be supported by a consideration. The consider- ation is some matter accepted or agreed upon as a return or equivalent for the promise; and a promise made without any con- sideration is void. 3 Upon this ground a promise by one to make a particular testamentary disposition of property in favor of another is not binding, and can not be enforced unless founded upon a sufficient consideration. 4 upon, and it was also agreed that the contract should be put in writing if the defendant desired. The defendant afterwards expressed such desire, and a writing was prepared, embodying the agreement, but the defendant re- fused to sign it. Held, there was no completed contract. From these ex- pressions of courts and jurists, it is quite clear that, after all, the question is mainly one of intention. If the party sought to be charged intended to close a contract prior to the formal signing of a written draft, or if he signified such an intention to the other party, he will be bound by the contract actually made, though the signing of the written draft be omitted. If, on the other hand, such party neither had nor signified such an in- tention to close the contract until it was fully expressed in a written in- strument, and attested by signatures, then he will not be bound until the signatures are affixed." 1 Leake on Contracts, 13. 2 Higgins v. Lessig (1893), 49 111. App. 459. "Tolhurst v. Powers, 133 N. Y. 460; Drake v. Lanning, 49 N. J. Eq. 452 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 378. 4 Drake v. Lanning (1892), 49 N. J. Eq. 452; 24 Atl. Rep. 378, Pitney, V. 0. : "In Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, the consideration was a con- veyance of land by the son to his sis- ter at the request of the father, who, in consideration of it, promised to dis- pose of his property by will to the son's advantage. In Van Dyne v. Freeland, 11 N. J. Eq. 370; Van Duyne v. Freeland, 12 N. J. Eq. 142, the consideration was the loss by the plaintiff of the share which he would otherwise have received in his father's estate and his continued serv- ices to defendant until he was twen- ty-five years of age. In Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. 246, the consid- eration was the son's service to the father for fifteen years. In Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27, the son spent large sums of money upon the land in dispute in necessary repairs and im- provements." See, also, France «. France, 8 N. J. Eq. 650 ; Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34. In Myers v. Dean (1892), 132 N. Y. 65, 72, Brad- ley, J., said: "The conclusion on this evidence was permitted that the agency of plaintiff was not in any sense a procuring cause of the nego- 8 INTRODUCTORY. §5 § 5. Consideration further discussed — Mutual promises. — The performance of gratuitous promises depends wholly upon the good-will which prompted them and will not be enforced by the law. The general rule is that in order to support an action, the promise must have been made upon a legal consid- eration moving from the promisee to the promisor. 1 In an action on a specialty, however, it is unnecessary to allege con- tiation for the lease or in obtaining it by the defendant, and if so found by the jury the consequence may have been that the promise to pay was with- out consideration and ineffectual to charge the defendant. McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561 ; Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N.Y. 319 ; Sibbald v. Beth- lehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378." In War- ren a.Castello,109Mo. 338 ;19 S.W.Rep. 29, defendant promised to convey cer- tain land to a woman at any time dur- ing a term of fifteen years that she might pay him $2,000 ; there was no consideration for the promise and the contract provided that the woman was in no way obligated to purchase the land. Gantt, P. J., said: "There was no consideration for the promise to convey ; nothing was paid for the op- tion. The agreement was therefore gratuitous and incapable of enforce- ment." Tucker v. Bartle, 85 Mo. 114 ; Neef v. Redmon, 76 Mo. 195. Pfluger v. Wilshusen, 17 N. Y. Supl. 516, holding that an agreement between successive accommodation parties to a note, made after their rights and liabilities have been fixed by judgment against them, in favor of an indorsee, to establish between them the relation of cosureties, is void for want of con- sideration. Goldsborough v. Gable (1892), 140 111. 269; 15 L. R. A. 294: A. leased property to B. at a certain rental. Upon the expiration of the lease B. continued to hold the property and the first month paid A. the same amount of rent provided for in the expired lease. After that A. agreed to take less rent, which B. paid. It was held that A. was not bound by his promise to take less, although it was paid, and that A. might recover the balance due, to wit, the amount the expired lease provided for. Bick- art v. Hoffmann, 19 N. Y. Supl. 472; Shortle v. Terre Haute R. Co., 131 Ind. 338; 30 N. E. Rep. 1084, where a rail- road company is required by law to fence its way, a conveyance of the right of way in consideration of the promise to fence it, is void, as without consideration. King's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 143. 1 Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37, Gray, C.J. : "To constitute such consideration, there must be either a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss, trouble or inconvenience to, or a charge or obligation resting upon, the party to whom the promise is made." See, also, Chapter V, infra. In Low v. Foss, 121 Mass. 531, the holder of a note signed by the defendants, as trustees of a religious society, agreed with the society and the trustees to release them from all claims on the note, upon condition that all their debts, as such, should be released or paid from funds subscribed for the purpose, and they were so paid. It was held, in an action on the note, that there was no considera- tion moving from defendants for the holder's promise, and that it could not be availed of by them. An un- sealed written contract must be sup- ported by a consideration. Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 346, n. § 5 INTRODUCTORY. 9 sideration, as the seal sufficiently imports consideration. 1 Thus in an action against defendant, as indorser of a note payable on demand, given by the maker to plaintiff to secure an ante- cedent indebtedness, it appeared that there was no request for forbearance, but plaintiff, as he testified, agreed that he would not pay the note away, or put it in bank for collection, but would hold it until such time as he wanted the money, and would then make demand for it, and upon this defendant, at maker's request, indorsed the note. It was held that the evi- dence failed to disclose any consideration for the indorsement. 2 The mere inadequacy of a consideration does not render it in- sufficient except as a circumstance bearing on the question of fraud or undue influence. 8 A valuable'consideration, however small and nominal, if given or stipulated for in good faith is, in the absence of fraud, sufficient to sustain a parol contract.* Accordingly a grantor, who has been tendered one dollar as a consideration for his deed, can not have it set aside for want of consideration where it does not appear that he expected any other. 5 And where one acting on the faith of a promise per- forms the condition upon which the promise was made, the promise attaches to the consideration so performed and renders 1 Northern Assur. Co. v. Hotchkiss, would follow, and there was forbear- 90 Wis. 415 ; 63 N. W. Eep. 1020. ance in fact. But there was no agree- 2 Strong v. Sheffield (1895), 144 N. ment to forbear for a fixed time or Y. 392, per Andrews, O. J. : "The note for a reasonable time, but an agree- in question did not, in law, extend ment to forbear for such time as the the payment of the debt. It was pay- plaintiff should elect. The consid' able on demand, and, although being eration is to be tested bytheagree- payable with interest, it was in form ment, and not by what was done consistent with an intention that pay- under it. It was a case of mutual ment should not be immediately de- promises, and so intended. We think manded, yet there was nothing on its the evidence failed to disclose any face to prevent an immediate suit on consideration for the defendant's in- the note against the maker, or to r°- dorsement, and that the trial court cover the original debt. Merritt «- orred in refusing so to rule." Todd, 23 N. Y. 28; Shutts v. Fingar, 3 Eobinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544; 17 100 N. Y. 539. Such a suit would have So. Eep. 745; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. been an assertion that he wanted the 596; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362; money, and would have fulfilled the Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60. condition of forbearance. The debtor 4 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. and the defendant, when they became 426, 449. parties to the note, may have had the 5 Eendleman v. Eendleman, 156 111. hope or expectation that forbearance 568; 41 N. E. Eep. 223. 10 INTRODUCTORY. § 5 the promisor liable, for, after he has had the benefit of the con- sideration for which he bargained, it is no defense to say that the promisee was not bound by the contract to do the act. 1 And again, where one promises to pay another a certain sum of money for doing a particular thing which is to be done be- fore the money is paid, and the promisee does the thing upon the faith of the promise, the promise which was before a mere revocable offer thereby becomes a complete contract, upon a consideration moving from the promisee to the promisor. 2 Thus a promissory note given in consideration of future services to be rendered by the payee becomes valid and binding upon the rendering of the services, although the payee did not agree to render them at the time of the giving of the note." Plaint- iffs having contracts to furnish lumber to foreign buyers, de- fendants contracted with plaintiffs to supply them the lumber called for by the contracts; the lumber thus supplied being in- ferior, the defendants agreed to save plaintiffs harmless from any loss. It was held that the injury to plaintiffs in shipping an inferior cargo was a sufficient consideration to support de- fendants' promise to save plaintiffs from loss. 4 It has been 1 White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254, of the opinion, however, that there "where the English case of Hulae v. was sufficient consideration in the Hulse, 17 C. B. 711, is considered and present case to support the promise to some extent discredited. So in to hold plaintiffs harmless against all Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 26, An- loss in reference to the shipment of drews, J., said, "When a defendant the cargo of lumber. In speaking of a has actually received the considera- parol modification of a written con- tion of an agreement, by a voluntary tract, the court said, in Hastings v. performance of an act by the other Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261 : 'While recog- party, upon his proposition or sugges- nizing and giving effect to the rule of tion, such performance constitutes a a law that a creditor can not bind consideration which will uphold the himself by a simple agreement to ac- defendant's promise." cept a smaller sum in lieu of an as- 2 Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, certained existing debt of a larger 121 Mass. 528; Carr v. Nat. Security amount, because such agreement is Bank, 107 Mass. 45, 48; Freeman ». without consideration, courts have Boston, 5 Met. 56; Loring v. Boston, nevertheless often declared that the 7 Met. 409. rule is not to be extended beyond its 3 Miller v. McKenzie, 95 N. Y. 575; precise import, and, especially if a and see Willetts v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., consideration for such agreement is 45 N. Y. 45; Sands v. Crooke, 46 N. found to exist, of which the law can Y. 564. take notice, that courts will not in- 4 Robinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544; 17 quire into its adequacy.' In Conover So. Rep. 745, Mabry, C. J. : "We are v. Sfillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54, it is said: §6 INTRODUCTORY. 11 said in England that the law requires a consideration for the purpose of guarding against rash and inconsiderate bargains. 1 § 6. New consideration where written contract changed. — The general rule that a written contract not under seal may be varied or added to by subsequent oral agreement upon a suffi- cient consideration as to its terms, to be performed in the fu- ture, is sustained by many authorities. 2 While, as a general rule, a written contract not under seal may be varied by sub- sequent oral agreement, based upon a sufficient consideration as to its terms to be performed in the future, the prevailing view, following the common-law rule, is that a covenant or contract under seal can not be modified before breach by a parol executory contract. 8 The Wisconsin doctrine is that the 'A consideration emanating from some injury or inconvenience to the one party, or from some benefit to the other party, is a valuable considera- tion.' Plaintiffs were, as above stat- ed, under contract to supply their European buyers with a certain cargo of lumber, and the latter had char- tered and sent over a vessel for the purpose of transporting the lumber. While the lumber was being loaded on the vessel, frequent protests were made by plaintiffs to defendants that the lumber was not such as they had agreed to furnish. * * * It was a serious detriment to plaintiffs to allow an inferior cargo to go to Europe as they would be liable under their con- tract with foreign buyers for a failure to comply with it." 1 Leake on Contracts, 17 ; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 346, n. ; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 ; Easton v. Pratchett, 1 0. M. & R. 798. 2 Robinson v, Hyer, 35 Fla. 544 ; 17 So. Rep. 745; Wheeler v. Baker, 59 Iowa,86 ; 12 N. W. Rep.767 ; Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261; 2 N. E. Rep. 776 ; Conover*). Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54 ; Hasbrouck e.Winkler,48 N. J.Law, 431 ; 6 Atl. Rep. 22. It was decided in Spannv. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301, that, as a general rule, a verbal agreement be- tween the parties to a written contract, made before or at the time of the execu- tion of such contract, is inadmissible to vary its terms or affect its construc- tion ; but, after the contract is reduced to writing, it is competent for the parties at any time before the breach of it, by a new contract, not in writ- ing, either altogether to waive, dis- solve, or annul the former agreement, or in any manner to add to, subtract from or vary or qualify tbe terms of it ; but that, in such cases, the sub- stituted oral agreements being con- sidered in the light of new contracts, it is requisite that they be made upon some new and valuable consideration. 3 Tischler v. Kurtz (1895) ,35 Fla. 323 ; 17 So. Rep. 661, Mabray, C. J. : "In the case of Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261, the Massachusetts court held that, in an action for rent reserved in a writ- ten lease under seal the lessee could prove in defense that, after the deliv- ery of the lease, the lessor for a good consideration orally agreed that for the future the rent should be reduced. It was said : ' In reference to con- tracts under seal, it was formerly held, especially in England, that they could not thus be varied. But in the United 12 INTRODUCTORY. § 7 consideration existing in an original executory contract is con- sidered as imported into any new parol modification, and that the new agreement, when made, becomes binding upon the parties without any further or new consideration. 1 § 7. Execution and form of contracts. — Making a mark is sufficient signing of a contract by the general law in England and the United States. According to the rules of evidence adopted in Louisiana, the ordinary mark of a party to a con- tract places it on a footing with all other private instruments in writing. 2 But if a written agreement which is intended to be signed by several persons as parties thereto is not signed by all, it is not completely executed and does not bind any of the parties. 5 And if the parties to an alleged contract agree that it shall be reduced to writing the contract will not ordinarily be binding without the execution of the written instrument. 4 A simple contract is created by an agreement which contains a promise made by one party for a valid exe- cuted or executory consideration furnished by the other; and such a contract is not required to be in any particular form. 5 States the tendency of judicial decis- Hume v. Taylor, 63 111. 43; Eddy v. ion has been to apply the game rule Graves, 23 Wend. 82; Aliens. Jaquish, in this respect to sealed instruments 21 Wend. 628; Delacroix v. Bulkley, as to simple contracts.' Considering 13 Wend. 71 ; Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. the real virtue there is in the use of 141 ; Smith v. Kerr, 33 Hun, 567. The seals at the present day, the view New York courts hold that, after the taken by the Massachusetts court has breach of a sealed contract, the par- much weight. The legislation of this ties to it may discharge any liability state has not undertaken to change under it by entering into a new agree- the legal effect of sealed instruments, ment in relation to the same subject- and it is our duty, under our system, matter, founded upon a sufficient con- to keep in mind, in declaring the law, sideration." what is the common-law rule, so far : Lynch v. Henry, 75 Wis. 631; 44 N. as it has not been changed by statute W. Rep. 837 ; Ruege v. Gates, 71 Wis. or our peculiar institutions. With- 634; 38 N. W. Rep. 181. out going into a discussion of the 2 Zacharie v. Franklin, 12 Pet. 151; cases on the subject, we are of the Jackson r. VanDusen, 5 Johns. 144; opinion that the prevailing view in Wright v. Wakeford, 17 Ves. 454, 459; America, following the common-law Madison v. Zabriskie, 11 La. 247 ; rule, is that a covenant or contract Tagiasco v. Molinari, 9 La. 512. under seal can not be modified before 3 Barber v. Burrows, 51 Cal. 404. See, breach by a parol executory contract, also, § 2, supra. Sinard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf. 353 ; 4 Fuller v. Reed, 38 Cal. 99. Carpenter ?). Shanklin, 7 Blackf. 308; 5 Alien). Aller, 40N. J. Law, 446. "A § 8 INTRODUCTORY. 13 It is settled learning that a deed may be printed or written either in ink or pencil. 1 But if a mandatory statute prescribes a specific mode in which a contract shall be made it must be strictly complied with or the contract will be void. 2 § 8. Delivery of contracts — Delivery is essential to com- plete a deed. Thus in the case of conveyances, something more is necessary than the signature of the grantor to a blank instrument. There must be an intent to convey, and the de- livery of the deed for the purpose of vesting a present title in the grantee ; accordingly a deed delivered without the consent of the grantor is of no more effect to pass title than if it were a forgery. 8 No particular form or ceremony is necessary to constitute a delivery of a deed ; it may be by acts or words, or both. Anything which clearly manifests the intention of the grantor and the person to whom it is made that the deed shall then become operative and effectual — that the grantor shall lose all control over it, and that by it the grantee is to become possessed of the estate embraced in such deed, is a sufficient de- livery. 4 A delivery of a deed need not be formal nor into the hands of the grantee, or of some one for him, if from the cir- cumstances it clearly appears that the donor's intention is that the deed should take effect without such delivery. 6 But the fact that the grantor in a deed of gift caused its registration con- stitutes a prima facie case of delivery. 6 And the recording by a husband of a deed from himself to his wife, has been held a deed is a writing or instrument writ- Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. ten upon paper or parchment, sealed 200 ; Davidson v. Cooper, 11 M. & W. and delivered, to prove and testify the 778 ; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305 ; agreement of the parties whose deed Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343; Tisher v. it is to the things contained in the Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55; Hadlock v. deed. A deed can not be written Hadloek, 22 111. 384; Stanleys. Valen- upon wood, leather, cloth or the like, tine, 79 111. 544 ; Henry v. Carson, 96 but only upon parchment or paper, Ind. 412 ; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28. for the writing upon them can be least 4 Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313 ; Scott v. vitiated, altered or corrupted." Coke Scott, 95 Mo. 300; Turner v. Carpen- on Littleton, 35b, 171b; Sheppard's ter, 83 Mo. 333 ; Miller v. Lullman, 81 Touchstone, 50. Mo. 311. 1 Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286. 6 Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147 ; 18 2 Board v. Gillies (1894), 138 Ind. S. W. Rep. 113. 6 67. 6 Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147; 18 'Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317; S. W. Rep. 113. 14 INTRODUCTORY. § 9 sufficient delivery. 1 As a deed is not valid without delivery, the fact that it is signed and sealed on Sunday does not render it void, if delivered on Monday. 2 So also delivery of a deed to the real beneficiary is good, although the grantee named in the deed is ignorant of its execution. 8 Retention of a deed by the grantor, while it is evidence of non-delivery, is not con- clusive that the deed was not delivered;* and a delivery to one of several grantees is delivery to all. 6 Delivery to the grantee must be absolute and no oral conditions can be made to qualify or vary its purport. 6 The rules upon this behalf applicable to deeds or conveyances of realty are in general ap- plicable also to all written contracts. The careful reader will therefore note the cases concerning the delivery of a deed with equal attention as though they concerned any other written undertaking or agreement. § 9. What is a good delivery. — A deed left by the grantor in a place accessible to the grantee is not thereby delivered, un- less there was an intention on the grantor's part to deliver and on the grantee's part to accept the deed. 7 No delivery of a deed, either absolute or conditional, can be made without part- ing at the time with the possession of it, and with all power and control over it by the grantor, for the benefit of the grantee. 8 And everything which goes to show a delivery must 1 Glaze v. Three Bivers,etc, Ins. Co., other to his son, of certain land, but 87 Mich. 349. up to within a short time before he 2 Schwab v. Rigby, 38 Minn. 395. died exercised acts of ownership over 3 Holcombe v. Richards, 38 Minn, the land as was admitted by the 38; Easthamw. Powell, 51 Ark. 530; 11 grantees; after his death the deeds S. W. Rep. 823. were found in his house in a box 4 Terhune v. Oldis, 44 N. J. Eq. 146; which had no lock and key and the 13 Cent. Rep. 117 ; Vreeland v. Vree- son had access thereto as a place of land, 48 N. J. Eq. 56. deposit for his private papers, and 5 Payne v. Echols (Pa. St.), 15 Atl. shortly after the father's death he Rep. 895. took the deeds and filed them for 6 Hargrave v. Melbourne, 86 Ala. record. It was held that the evidence 270. did not show a delivery of the deeds 'Tyler v. Hall (1891), 106 Mo. 313; and that a conveyance of the land by Huey v. Huey, 65 Mo. 689. In Rei- the son was void as against the father's charts. Wilhelm (1891), 83 Iowa, 510, creditors. it appeared that an insolvent debtor a 8 Porters. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568 few months before his death executed Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 two deeds, the one to his wife and the Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 "Wall. 636 § 9 INTRODUCTORY. 15 happen in the grantor's lifetime. 1 But the deed may be suffi- ciently delivered although it refers to the grantor's will for some of its provisions. 2 Not only is delivery essential but the grantee must accept; and where the acceptance is not proven, and the facts do not justify the presumption of law that the grantee has accepted, the title does not pass. 3 But delivery of a deed f or record, although not known to the grantee, is, if fol- lowed by his assent, a good delivery. 4 Where the grantee has no knowledge of the existence of the deed, and the property which it purports to convey remains in the possession and under the control of the grantor, and where, therefore, the registry is of course without either his assent or knowledge, the presumption of a delivery from the fact of registry is re- pelled, and the deed is void. 5 Possession of .the deed by the grantee — the converse of possession by the grantor — is strong but not conclusive evidence of a delivery. 6 Where a deed of property in trust for a man's wife was signed and acknowl- edged by both the grantor and the trustee, and after the grantor's decease it was found among his papers, in a mutilated and can- celed condition, it was held not to be in the power of the grantor Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460; Fisher Meld, sufficient delivery. Taylor v. v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416 ; Jackson v. Leek, McClure, 28 Ind. 39 ; Somers v. Pum- 12 Wend. 105; Fay v. Eichardson, 7 phrey, 24 Ind. 231; Mallett v. Page, Pick. 91; Alsop v. Swathel, 7 Conn. 8 Ind. 364; Tallman». Cooke, 39 Iowa, 500; Hoboken, etc., Bank v. Phelps, 402 ; Thatcher v. Wardens, etc., St. An- 34 Conn. 92. drew's Church, 37 Mich. 264 ; Jones v. 1 Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568, Swayze, 42 N. J. Law, 279 ; Gilbert v. 574. North American Ins. Co. , 23Wend. 43 ; 2 Allen v. DeGroodt, 105 Mo. 442; Byars v. Spencer, 101 111. 429. See, 16 S. W. Eep. 494, 1049. also, Hotchkiss v. Olmstead, 37 Ind. 3 Moore v. Flynn, 135 111. 74; Wig- 74; Berry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36. gins v. Lusk, 12 111. 132; Kingsbury 5 Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636; v. Burnside, 58 111. 310; Dale v. Lin- Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 81; coin, 62 111. 22. Contra, in England, Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Xenosu. Wickham, L. R. 2H.L.296. Samson v. Thornton, 3 Mete. 275; 4 Lee v. Fletcher, 46 Minn. 49; Stone v. French, 37 Kan. 145. 12 L. R. A. 171, containing a note 6 Vreelando. Vreeland, 48N. J. Eq. on delivery of deeds, where the au- 56; 21 Atl. Rep. 627; Seibel v. thorities are collected. Vaughan v. Rapp, 85 Va. 28, 31; Ward v. Lewis, Godman, 103 Ind. 499, a father exe- 4 Pick. 520; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet. cuted a deed to his infant daughter 322. six years old, and had it recorded. 16 INTRODUCTORY. §10 to revoke the deed, inasmuch as he had signed it and procured the trustee's acceptance in due form. 1 § 10. The same subject continued. — A delivery of an assign- ment of a claim in suit to a person jointly interested in the purchase with the assignee named in the instrument must be deemed to have been assented to by the assignee, where he subsequently made payments to the assignor in accordance with its provisions, and hence the assignor's title passes by the assignment. 2 The mere fact that a lease has always been 1 Seibel v. Eapp, 85 Va. 28. ! Wilson v. Kiesel(1894), 9 Utah, 397, 35 Pac. Kep. 488, per Smith, J. : "It is expressly found by the forty- ninth finding of the fact that this pa- per was made and executed at the in- stance and request and pursuant to negotiations conducted by Henderson with Wilson; that Henderson acted in the interest of himself, Brinker, Garretson, and Bigelow, and the as- signment was made for all of them, although it was taken in the name of Brinker alone. By the forty-sixth finding it is shown that Henderson and Brinker occupied a single room as an office, and in this office there was a single safe, which was the prop- erty of Henderson ; that, after the ex- ecution of the written assignment, it was delivered by Wilson, to Hender- son, who put it in the safe, and kept it up to January, 1893, when he de- livered it to Ogden Hiles, Esq., who was attorney for Wilson, and also for Brinker and Henderson. In the fif- tieth finding it is shown that Brinker paid $3,000 to Wilson on the con- sideration named in the assignment before October 25, 1890. The court below found that these facts con- stituted no delivery of the writing, and hence that Wilson's title to the claim did not pass. We can not con- cur in that view. We hold that the delivery of this writing to the part- ner or joint owner of the obligee named in it for the joint use and ben- efit of the person to whom it was de- livered and the obligee named is a good delivery. Even a delivery to a disinterested third person for the obligee is a good delivery if assented to by the obligee. See 5American and En- glish Encyclopedia of Law, 448, and cases cited in note . It must be assumed that Brinker knew of the delivery to Henderson, and assented to it, because it is expressly found that he subse- quently made the first two payments ($3,000) in accordance with its provis- ions." In Leonard v. Kebler (1893), 50 Ohio St. 444, Spear, J., said: "Under these facts the circuit court held that such paper was never either actually or constructively delivered by Kebler to the assignees named therein or to either of them, and that he did not intend to deliver it during his life ; that he did not part with the domin- ion thereof while he was conscious, and that the assignees took no title by virtue of such instrument. We affirm this holding. Delivery is the final step necessary to perfect the existence of any written contract. Phipps v. Hope, 16 Ohio St. 586; Williams v. Schatz, 42 Ohio St. 47; Gano v. Fisk, 43 Ohio St. 462; Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108. And the rule is not changed by reason of the fact that the instrument is based on a consideration. Canfield v. Ives, 18 Pick. 253; Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28; § 11 INTRODUCTORY. 17 in the possession of the lessor is not conclusive evidence that it has not been delivered so as to become operative, and where it is retained by either party with the consent of the other it must be considered as delivered if both understand that it has been executed and is in operation. 1 Where, under a contract to exchange real property, deeds were deposited in escrow, equity will decree a specific performance at the in- stance of a party who has performed the conditions on which the deeds were deposited. 8 And where as part payment for a stock of goods a deed was executed to the vendor, but the deed was placed in the hands of another until the grantor should be saved harmless from certain lawsuits then pend- ing against the vendor, it was held that the transaction did not constitute a delivery in escrow, but that the title was transferred, subject to the grantor's lien for indemnity. 3 But the placing upon record by the assignor of a deed of assign- ment for the benefit of his creditors is a sufficient delivery of such deed. 4 So, also, delivery of a mortgage by the mortgagor to one of several mortgagees, with a request to file it for record, is a delivery of it to all of the mortgagees. 5 § 11. Contracts classified and distinguished. — Express con- tracts are classified as (a) contracts of record, which are usually judgments, or of the nature of judgments,(b) special contracts or Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636; the two suits named, by reason of Chamberlain v. Hopps, 8 Vt. 94 ; El- their having made the purchase from more v. Marks, 39 Vt. 538; Boyd v. Wilson during their pendency. The Slayback, 63 Cal. 493 ; Pulse v. Miller, transaction, therefore, did not con- 81 Ind. 190." stitute a conveyance in escrow proper, 1 Oneto v. Eestano (1891), 89 Cal. 63. although the parties so termed it, but 2 Bowman v. Gork (Mich. 1895), 63 its effect was to transfer the title N. W. Bep. 998. presently toWilson, incumbered with a a Wallace v. Butts (Tex. App. 1895), lien in favor of Butts Bros., and to make 31 S. W. Bep. 687, Head, J. : "While, Kuteman a trustee for both parties to in making this agreement, the word carry out their intention. Hathaway 'escrow' seems to have been used by •"• Payne, 34 N. Y. 92 ; 1 Devlin on the parties, yet it is manifest that Deeds,. §§ 319, 320." their intention was to pass the title * Ewing v. Walker (1895), 60 Ark. to the land to Wilson, subject only to 503. the right of Butts Bros, to hold it as 5 Breathwit v. Bank of Fordyce security for any sum they might be (1894) , 60 Ark. 26. compelled to pay to the plaintiffs in 2 18 INTRODUCTORY. §11 specialties, which class includes the various instruments re- quiring seals; and (c) simple, or parol contracts, or such as are either oral or written but not under seal. 1 In its widest sense the word contract includes records and specialties, but it is usu- ally employed to designate only simple contracts. 8 An execu- tory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing; an executed contract is one in which the object of the contract is performed. 8 An executory con- tract which is uncertain and incomplete may become certain and complete by being acted upon; the acts and conduct of the parties may divest it of uncertainty. 4 Avoid contract may be disregarded by either party; a voidable contract can not be. No executed contract, where a valuable consideration has passed, made between parties competent to contract, and not im- moral or prohibited by statute, nor against public policy, is void between the parties thereto, however fraudulently it may have been obtained; but it is voidable at the instance of the one who is defrauded. 6 1 1 Abbott's Law Dictionary, p. 280 ; 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 465 ; Story on Contracts, §§1,2; 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 393; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27. 2 Pelham v. State, 30 Tex. 422. The Louisiana Code thus describes and classifies contacts : "No contract is complete without the consent of both parties. In reciprocal contracts, it must be expressed. In some unilat- eral contracts, the law provides that, under certain circumstances, it shall be presumed. Commutative contracts are those in which what is done, given or promised, by one party, is a con- ; sideration for what is done, given or promised by the other. Independent contracts are those in which the mu- tual acts or promises have no relation to each other, either as equivalents or consideration. Contracts are pre- sumed to be commutative unless the contrary be expressed. A principal contract is one entered into by both parties on their own accounts, or in the several qualities they assume. An accessory contract is made for assur- ing the performance of a prior con- tract, either by the same parties or others, such as suretyship, mortgage and pledge. Contracts considered in relation to the motive for making them are either gratuitous or onerous. A contract is aleatory or hazardous when the performance of that which is one of its objects depends on an uncertain event. It is certain when the thing to be done depends on the will of the party, or when, in the usual course of events, it must hap- pen in the manner stipulated." Arts. 1766-1776. A contract consisting of mutual executory promises is bilater- al; if the consideration is executed on one side and executory on the other, the contract is unilateral. Leake on Contracts, 18. 8 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136. 4 Holtz v. Schmidt, 59 N. Y. 253, 256. 6 Och v . Missouri, etc., E. Co. (Mo. §12 INTRODUCTORY. 19 § 12. Sealed contracts. — Where the maker of a note uses a printed blank, and writes his name to the left of the printed word "seal," so as to bring the latter into the usual place for a seal, he adopts it as his seal, and no other is necessary. 1 But 1995), 31 S. W. Rep. 962, Burgess, J.: "As long ago as 1823, it was held by this court that a New Madrid certifi- cate, obtained through fraud or mis- take, and without consideration, waa not void, but voidable, and good against the United States until an- nulled or set aside. Stuart v. Rector, 1 Mo. 361. This case was followed and approved in Mitchell v. Parker, 25 Mo. 31. See, also, Kearney v. Vaughan, 50 Mo. 284." 1 Lorah v. Nissley (1893), 156 Pa. St. 329 ; 27 Atl. Rep.242, per Mitchell, J. : "The days of actual sealing of legal documents, in its original sense of the impression of an individual mark or device upon wax or wafer, or even on the parchment or paper itself, have long gone by. It is immaterial what device the impression bears (Alexan- der v. Jameson, 5 Bin. 238), and the same stamp may serve for several parties in the same deed. Not only so, but the use of wax has almost en- tirely — and, even of wafers, very largely — ceased. In short, sealing has become constructive, rather than ac- tual, and is in a great degree a matter of intention. It was said more than a century ago in McDill's Lessee v. McDill, 1 Dall. 63, that 'the signing of a deed is now the material part of the execution. The seal has become a mere form, and a written or ink seal, as it is called, is good.' And in Long v. Ramsay, 1 Serg. & R. 72, it was said by Tilghman, C. J., that a seal with a flourish of a pen 'is not now to be questioned.' Any kind of flourish or mark will be sufficient, if it be intend- ed as a seal. 'The usual mode,' said Tilghman, 0. J., in Taylor v. Glaser, 2 Serg. & R. 502, 'is to make a circular, oval, or square mark opposite to the name of the signer, but the shape is immaterial.' Accordingly it was held in Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 192 ; 15 Atl. Rep. 500, that a single horizon- tal dash, less than an eighth of an inch long, was a sufficient seal, the context and the circumstances showing that it was so intended. On the other hand, in Taylor v. Glaser, supra, a flourish was held not a seal, because it was put under, and apparently intended mere- ly as a part of, the signature. So, in Duncan v. Duncan, 1 "Watts 322, a ribbon inserted through slits in the parchment, and thus carefully pre- pared for sealing, was held not a seal", because the circumstances indicated the intent to use a well-known mode of sealing, by attaching the ribbon to the parchment with wax or wafer, and the intent had not been carried outl These decisions establish beyond ques- tion that any flourish or mark, howr ever irregular or inconsiderable, will be a good seal, if so intended ; and, a fortiori, the same result must be pro- duced by writing the word 'seal,' or the letters 'L. S.,' meaning originally 'locus sigilli,' but now having ac- quired the popular force of an arbi- trary sign for a seal, just as the sign '&' is held and used to mean 'and' by thousands who do not recognize it as the middle ages manuscript contrac- tion for the Latin 'et.' If, therefore, the word 'seal' on the note in suit had been written by Nissley after his name, there could have been no doubt about its efficacy to make a sealed in- strument. Does it alter the case any that it was not written by him, but printed before hand? We can not see any good reason why it should. Rati- fication is equivalent to antecedent authority, and the writing of his name 20 INTRODUCTORY. § 12 a reference in a later contract under seal to a former contract not sealed does not have the effect to impart the quality of a sealed contract to the former by requiring them to be read as one. 1 An abstract of title however, which contains the letters "L. S." after the signature of the notary before whom an acknowledgment was taken, sufficiently shows that he certified to the left of the printed word, so as to bring the latter into the usual and proper place for a seal, is ample evi- dence that he adopted the act of the printer in putting it there for a seal. The note itself was a printed form, with blank spaces for the particulars to be filled in, and the use of it raises a conclusive presumption that all parts of it were adopted by the signer, ex- cept such as were clearly struck out or intended to be canceled before sign- ing. The pressure of business life and the subdivision of labor, in our day, have brought into use many things ready-made by wholesale, which our ancestors made singly for each occa- sion, and among others the conven- iences of printed blanks for the com- mon forms of written instruments. But even in the early days of the cen- tury the act of sealing was commonly done by adoption and ratification, rather than as a personal act, as we are told by a very learned and experi- enced, though eccentric, predecessor, in language that is worth quoting, for its quaintness : 'Uli robur etaes triplex.' He was a bold fellow who first in these colonies, and particular in Pennsyl- vania, in time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, sub- stituted the appearance of a, seal by the circumflex of a pen, which has been sanctioned by usage and the ad- judication of the courts as equipollent with a stamp containing some effigies or inscription on stone or metal. * * * How could a jury distinguish the hieroglyphic or circumflex of a pen by one man from another? In fact, the circumflex is usually made by the scrivener drawing the instrument, and the word 'seal' inscribed within it. Brackenridge, J., in Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Bin. 238, 244. We are of opinion that the note in suit was duly sealed. We have not derived much light from the decisions in other states, but, so far as we have found analogous cases, they are in harmony with the views expressed. InWhiteley v. Davis, 1 Swan 333, the word 'seal,' without any scroll, was held to be a good seal, even to a public deed by the clerk of a court, he stating in the certificate that no seal of office had been pro- vided. And in Lewis v. Overby, 28 Grat. 627, the word 'seal,' without any scroll, was held a good seal, within a statute enacting that 'any writing to which the person making it shall affix a scroll by way of seal shall be of the same force aaif itwere actually sealed.' The learned court below, and the coun- sel for appellee, placed much reliance on the decision in Bennett v. Allen, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 256. In that case the signature was placed to the left of, but below, the printed letters 'L. S.,' and it is said in the opinion that there was a space of half an inch between. The decision might possibly be sus- tained on the ground that the position and distance showed that the signer did not intend to adopt the letters 'L. S.' as part of his act, but, unless dis- tinguished on that special ground, the decision is contrary to the settled trend of our cases, and can not be ap- proved." 1 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299. § 13 INTRODUCTORY. 21 to the acknowledgment under his official seal. 1 And where acom- mon-law seal is absent from an instrument required to be un- der seal, but it shows upon its face that the party executing it intended to seal it, a court of equity will assume that it is sealed and grant the same relief as if such a seal was attached. 2 So also, where an action is brought upon an executed sealed in- strument, by which defendant's intestate was estopped from denying the consideration of the instrument sued upon, his personal representative is subject to the same estoppel. 8 § 13. Sealed contracts further considered. — A seal unnec- essarily affixed to a contract for the sale of personal property can not affect the rights of the parties, and every defense is open to either which would exist had the writing not been sealed. A statement or certificate as to a fact contained in such a sealed contract has not the conclusive effect of a cove- nant. 4 So likewise a promissory note without a seal is not a specialty, within the meaning of that phrase at common law; nor is it made a specialty by a statutory provision that the same remedy may be had upon such an instrument as upon a bond or sealed instrument. 5 And a life policy of insurance re- citing that it was "signed and delivered" is not a specialty, because there is a printed device thereon purporting to be a 1 Bucklen v. Hasterlik,155 111. 423 ; 40 the court said : "The position in regard N. E. Rep. 561, Phillips, J.: "It is to the copy of the seal is also unten- contended that the letters 'L. S.,' fol- able. In copying a writ of summons, lowing the name of the notary, do not the fac-simile of the seal can not well indicate an official seal. In Illinois be made, and to do it would require Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 40 111. 35, more skill than pertains to the pro- it was contended that an appeal bond fession generally. By long usage and was defective because the records general understanding of legal writers, showed a mere scrawl instead of afac- 'L. S.' is regarded as the true repre- simile of the seal. The court said : sentation of a seal in a copy of all legal 'Moreover, this is a copy of the origi- precepts." nal bond, and the clerk would not 2 Barnard v. Gantz (1893), 140 N. Y. make a fac-simile of the corporate seal 249, following Town of Solon v. Will- or devise which might have been, and, iamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N.Y.122. for aught that appears, was, attached 8 Bender v. Bender (1895), 88 Hun, to the original bond.' In Smith v. 448. Butler, 25 N. H. 521, it was urged that a 4 Bridger v. Goldsmith (1894), 143 N. copy of the summons was bad because Y. 424. of the use of the letters 'L. S.' instead 5 Bank of U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. of a copy of the seal of the clerk. There 381. 22 INTRODUCTORY. §14 seal, when there is no evidence that this device was ever adopted by the company as its seal. 1 But where a rule of law requires the contract to be under seal, the sealing is necessary; and an instrument having the form of a deed, but executed without seal, is not a deed. 2 Where it appears, however, that it was made with the intent to pass an estate, and is otherwise suffi- cient for that purpose, it will be enforced in equity. 8 § 14. Express and implied contracts. — Mr. Anderson says that a contract is express "when the agreement is formal, and stated either verbally or in writing, and is implied when the agreement is matter of inference and de- duction." 4 Accordingly a contract is express "when it con- sists of words written or spoken, expressing an actual agreement of the parties . " It is implied ' 'when it is evidenced by conduct manifesting an intention of agreement. ' ' 5 An. agreement on the 1 Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 79 Md. 375 ; 29 Atl. Rep. 606, per Bris- coe, J.: "The policies were not de- clared on as sealed instruments, and we think that neither the proof nor the instruments themselves show that they were specialties. As was said in the case of Jackson».Myers,43 Md.452, 463, 'What is alleged to be the seal consists simply of an emblem or sym- bol printed by the printer at the time when the printed blanks were struck. There is no statement or declaration in any part of the policies that they were or were designed to be executed under the corporate seal of the com- pany.' The policies read: 'In wit- ness whereof, the said Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, by its pres- ident and secretary, signed and de- livered this policy,' etc. Nor does the proof show that the company ever adopted the printed device or emblem for the seal of the company." 2 Munds v. Cassidey, 98 N. C. 558. 3 Munds v. Cassidey, 98 N. C. 558; Downey v. Smith, 2 Dev. Eq. 535; Ponton v. Griffin, 72 N. C. 362; Mill- hiser v. Erdman, 98 N. C. 292. 1 Anderson's Law Dictionary, 248. In Ex parte Ford, L. P. 16 Q. B. Div. 305, it was said that" whenever circum- stances arise in the ordinary business of life in which, if two persons were ordinarily honest and careful, the one of them would make a promise to the other, it may properly be inferred that both understood that such a prom- ise was given and accepted." In Mar- zettic. Williams, 1 Barn. &Adol. 415, Lord Tenterden said : "The only dif- ference between an express and an implied contract is in the mode o? substantiating it. An express contract is proved by an actual agreement ; an implied contract, by circumstances, and the general course of dealing be- tween the parties." In the same case Park, J., said: "The only difference, however, between an express and an implied contract is as to the mode of proof. An express contract is proved by direct evidence, an implied con- tract by circumstantial evidence." 6 3 American and English Encyclo- pedia of Law. See, also, Chap. XVII, infra. $14 INTRODUCTORY. 23 other hand may be said to be implied when it is inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties instead of their words. The engagement is signified by conduct instead of words. 1 And where, for example, the services sued for were rendered by plaintiff while she was a member of the family of defendant, who was her cousin, it is proper to instruct the jury that they are authorized to find whether there was a contract, express or implied, to pay for plaintiff's services. 2 1 Bixby v. Moor, 51 N. H. 402. 2 Hefiron v. Brown,155 111. 322 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 583, per Magruder, J. : "If the expectation of each would not consti- tute a contract unless there was an expression of that expectation, such 'criticism would not apply here, be- cause the jury were instructed as fol- lows: "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant requested the plaintiff to do the services in ques- tion, and, by words or acts, know- ingly gave her to understand that she would be paid for doing it, and that plaintiff, in compliance with such re- quest (if there was any), did the work in question for the defendant, then she is entitled to recover." "The re- lationship existing between the par- ties, and the fact that they and de- fendant's mother lived together as a single household while the work was being done for which this suit is brought, will not bar a recovery in this case if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant requested the plaintiff to do the service in ques- tion, and promised to pay her for it, or, by words or acts, knowingly led her to believe that she would be paid for doing it." The jury were further instructed that, where voluntary serv- ices are rendered by those sustaining family relations, the presumption of law is that the parties do not contem- plate payment or receipt of wages; and that where services are rendered by those near of kin, or by tbose sus- taining family relations, the law will imply no contract for compensation ; and that, unless a contract to pay is shown in such case, no recovery can be had. It is true that in instructions asked by the defendant, and given for him, the jury were told that the plaint- iff could not recover unless she proved by the preponderance of the evidence an express contract to pay for her serv- ices ; but they were told in another instruction, that an express contract might be established by circumstances and the conduct of the parties, or by words in connection therewith ; and we do not think that the jury could have been misled when all the in- structions are considered together as one charge, and in view of the evi- dence heretofore and hereinafter re- ferred to. In Morton v. Rainey, 82 111. 215, plaintiff presented a claim for services against the estate of his de- ceased uncle, in whose family he had lived from the time he was 11 years old until he reached his major- ity, and during that time had labored for the deceased, and received his board, clothing, and medical attend- ance ; and we there said : "While ap- pellee, during minority, was provided by the deceased with clothing, medi- cal attendance, and all the necessaries furnished by a parent to a child, after his majority he provided his own cloth- ing, paid for his own washing and in fact received nothing from the de- ceased except his board. Under such circumstances, the presumption that appellee was working as he did when a minor is removed, and the facts are sufficient to establish an implied con- 24 INTRODUCTORY. § 15 § 15. Implied contracts distinguished. — A contract is the meeting of two minds, and is to be carefully distinguished from the implied promise to make reparation where one by his fraud or negligence or other tort injures another. 1 tract on the part of the deceased to pay appellee what his services were reasonably worth . " In Mills v . Joiner, 20 Fla. 479, where a daugher of full age brought suit against her father for services while living with him at his house and as one of his family, it was held to be a presumption of law that he was not bound to pay her, but that "this presumption may be over- come by proof of a special contract, express promise, or an implied prom- ise, and such implied promise or un- derstanding may be inferred from the facts and circumstances shown in evi- dence ; and that "the jury should have been further instructed that if, under all the circumstances of the case, the services were of such a nature as to lead to a reasonable belief that it was the understanding of the parties that compensation should be made for such services, then the jury should find an implied promise." In Scully v. Scully, 28 Iowa, 548, where a sister filed a claim against the estate of her de- ceased brother, a bachelor, for serv- ices in doing his housework while a member of his family, it was said: "Where it is shown that the person rendering the service is a member of the family of the person served, and receiving support therein, either as a child, a relative, or a visitor, a pre- sumption of law arises that such serv- ices were gratuitous ; and in such case, before the person rendering the service can recover, the express prom- ise of the party served must be shown, or such facts and circumstances as will authorize the jury to find that the services were rendered in the ex- pectation by one of receiving, and by the other of making, compensation therefor." In Smith v. Johnson, 45 Iowa, 308, it was held that no recov- ery can be had in such cases where there is no express contract, and "it is not shown in the record that the services were performed with the ex- pectation on the part of either that they were to be paid for." 1 People v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144, 151, per Danforth, J. : "If one man has ob- tained money from another, through the medium of oppression, extortion or deceit, or by the commission of a trespass, such money may be recov- ered back, for the law implies a prom- ise from the wrong-doer to restore it to the rightful owner, though it is ob- vious that this is the very opposite of his intention. Implied or construct- ive contracts of this nature are simi- lar to the constructive trusts of courts of equity, and, in fact, are not con- tracts at all. Addison on Contracts, 22." In Ogden ». Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 341, Marshall, C. J., said: "A great mass of human transactions de- pends upon implied contracts ; upon contracts which are not written, but which grow out of the acts of the par- ties. In such cases, the parties are supposed to have made those stipula- tions which, as honest, fair and just men, they ought to have made. When the law assumes that they have made these stipulations, it does not vary their contract, or introduce new terms into it, but declares that certain acts, unexplained by compact, impose cer- tain duties, and that the parties had stipulated for their performance. The difference is obvious between this and the introduction of a new condition into a contract drawn out in writing, in which the parties have expressed ev- §16 INTRODUCTORY. 25 § 16. Reservations and exceptions. — A reservation is always of something taken back out of that which is already granted, while an exception is of some part of the estate not granted at all. A reservation is never of any part of the estate itself, but of something issuing out of it; as, for instance, rent, or some right to be exercised in relation to the estate, as to cut timber. An exception, on the other hand, must be of a part of the thing granted or described as granted, and can be of nothing else. 1 An exception or reservation in a deed is to be taken most favorably to the grantee, and, if there is uncer- tainty or ambiguity in the language, he should have the ben- efit of the doubt or the ambiguity. They should be taken most strongly and construed most strictly against'the grantor whose words they are, and against him who stands in his place; and, if an advantage can be gained from an uncertainty or ambigu- ity in the words, the grantee or person standing in his place is entitled to the benefit of it. 2 The general rule is that a reser- erything that is to be done by either." In 1 Pothier on Obligations, 113, it is said: "In contracts, it is the consent of the contracting parties which pro- duces the obligation ; in quasi-con- tracts, there is not any consent. The law alone, or natural equity, produces the obligation, by rendering obligatory the fact from which it results. There- fore, these facts are called quasi-con- tracts, because, without being con- tracts, they produce obligations in the same manner as actual contracts." 1 Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315. 2 Grafton v. Moir, 130 N. Y. 465 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 974; Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Johns. 375 ; Provost v. Calder, 2 Wend. 517 ; Jackson v. Gardner, 8 Johns. 394 ; Ives D.VanAuken,34 Barb. 566 ; Borste. Empie,5 N.Y. 33,39,40 ; Duryeau. May- or,62 N. Y.592 ; 4 Kent's Commentaries 468 ; Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315. The primary rule of construction appli- cable to a clause in a deed in the form of an exception or reservation is to gather the intention of the parties from the words, by reading, not simply a single clause, but the entire context, and, where the meaning is doubtful, by considering such surrounding cir- cumstances as they are presumed to have considered. Clark v. Devoe, 124 N.Y.120;26N.E.Rep.275. The deed must be held to convey all the interest in the lands which the grantor had, unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest appears by express terms or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant. In Blackman v. Striker (1894), 142 N. Y. 555; 37 N. E. Rep. 484, an agreement by certain devisees for the partition of devised land re- cited that on one parcel of the land was a fenced burying ground, which was to remain the family burying place, and whoever of them should draw said parcel, and thereafter sell it, should in his deed reserve said ground for said purpose of burying, with full liberty to pass and repass. He who drew this parcel sold and con- veyed it to his brother and codevisee, "saving, excepting, and reserving un- to the heirs of [their father, testator] and to their and each of their heirs, out of this present demise," said 26 INTRODUCTORY. § 17 vation or exception for the benefit of a stranger or person not a party to the deed is void. 1 Where a deed contained the fol- lowing provision after the habendum clause: "And upon this further condition, that the party of the second part and his heirs and assigns shall permit and allow the parties of the first part and their heirs to have free access with teams, at all times, to and from the waters of Hempstead harbor by the road now and heretofore used through his land, for the purpose of load- ing and unloading vessels, and also to reach that portion of the shore contiguous to such waters belonging to the parties of the first part, for the purpose of carting to and from the same," it was held that such provision did not constitute a condition subsequent; but that its legal effect was to annex the right of way to the land of the grantor, and was an exception or reser- vation in his favor. 2 § 17. Contracts of record. — A judgment is a contract of record. The law is well settled that suits on valid judgments in courts other than those in which they were recovered may be maintained at the will of judgment creditors, regardless of the fact that the time allowed, either bystatute or the common law, for taking out an execution on the original judgment, has not expired. 8 And, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, a suit on a judgment may be maintained in the same court in which the judgment was rendered, although the time has not expired within which an execution may be sued out on the judgment. 4 This matter is, however, frequently regulated by statute. A judgment, being a simple mode of creating and of fenced burying ground, with free in- of the condition was to annex the gresa and egress, to bury the dead, right of way to the land set off to forever. Said grantor made no men- Adam. It was an exception or res- tion of the burying ground in his will, ervation in his favor. Mendella. De- nor did he'or his heirs, for 100 years, lano, 7 Mete. 176; Bowen v. Conner, lay any claim to it. It was held that 6 Cush. 132; Rexford v. Marquis, 7 he conveyed his whole estate in the Lans. 249." parcel, including the fee of the bury- 3 Hickman v. Macon County, 42 ing ground, subject to the easement. Fed. Hep. 759; Simpson'!). Cochran, 23 1 Bridger v. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601; Iowa, 81 ; 92 Am. Dec. 410 ; Kingsland AValrath v. Redfield, 18 N. Y. 457; v. Forrest, 18 Ala. 519; 52 Am. Dec. Hornbeck v. AVestbrook, 9 Johns. 73. 232; Freeman on Judgments, § 432. 2 Baker«. Mott (1894), 78 Hun, 141, 'Hickman v. Macon County, 42 per Brown, P. J.: "The legal effect Fed. Rep. 759. ■§ 18 INTRODUCTORY. 27 securing a debt, attended with easy proof and convenient rem- edies, is sometimes used for this purpose by agreement between the parties without any previous litigation; also, where a suit has been commenced and is pending, the parties may come to an agreement respecting the entry up of judgment, and the terms on which it is to be enforced. 1 A bona fide debt alone is not sufficient to support a confession of a judgment; the con- fession must be given for a bona fide purpose. Accordingly, ■the fraudulent intent of the parties — as, for instance, to force a settlement with other creditors — renders the judgment Void, regardless of the validity of the claim sued on. 2 A warrant of attorney is an instrument in writing, usually under seal, giving authority to enter up judgment against the party ex- ecuting it, without process. 3 § 18. The same subject continued — Warrant of attorney. — It is sometimes competent for the parties to include in their con- tract a provision that upon default a judgment may summarily be entered in favor of the party not in default. In such cases the agreement is in the form of a warrant of attorney, which having been inserted without fraud or surprise is binding and irrevoca- ble, so that even insanity happening after the execution of the warrant of attorney does not invalidate it. 4 The warrant of at- torney may authorize any attorney to confess judgment, and no particular one need be designated by name, 6 and the attorney may also be authorized to confess judgment upon a complaint in forcible detainer. 6 A provision in a lease to two lessees that "the party of the second part" authorizes any attorney to enter "their" appearance and confess judgment, gives au- thority to confess judgment against both lessees. 7 But if the judgment entered is not in conformity with the terms of the 1 Leake on Contracts, 156. 264. A warrant of attorney ordinarily 2 Galle v. Tode, 60 Hun, 132 ; 14 NY. need not be under seal. Supl. 531. See, also, McElwainB.Wil- * Spencer v. Reynolds, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. lis, 9 Wend. 549; Adsit v. Butler, 87 249. N. Y. 585 ; Adee v. Bigler, 81 N. Y. 5 Poppers v. Meager, 33 111. Upp. 19 ; 349; Carpenter v. Osborn, 102 N. Y. Halle. Jones, 32 111. 38; Keith c.Kel- 552; Claflin v. Gordon, 39 Hun, 54. logg, 97 111. 147. 3 Kinnersley v. Mussen, 5 Taunt. 6 Poppers v. Meager, 33 111. App. 19. 7 Prank v. Thomas, 35 111. App. 547. 28 INTRODUCTORY. § 19 warrant of attorney, it is void, and a new judgment must be entered in accordance with the tenor of the instrument. 1 An affidavit, required to be filed by the warrant, if omitted can not be filed nunc pro tunc. 2 All the pleading usually required in these cases is such a statement of the facts out of which the debt arose as will satisfy creditors and others as to the bona fides of the judgment. 3 The filing of the papers determines the date of a judgment by confession, and the judgment should be entered as of that date. 4 After the death of the obligee, his administrator or personal representative must have the judg- ment entered, and a judgment in the name of a deceased obligee is void. 5 It seems that judgment on a note containing a warrant of attorney to confess judgment may be made before the matu- rity of the note. 6 A warrant of attorney executed by certain members of a copartnership for the purpose of binding the firm, if unauthorized by all, is valid only as to those executing it;' but a warrant of attorney to confess judgment on a note is for the benefit of any holder, although the payee is alone named in the warrant. 8 § 19. Merger in judgment. — Whether or not the judgment of a court having jurisdiction merges the contract upon which it is recovered will depend somewhat upon circumstances. A judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage does not so far merge the mortgage in the judgment as to blot out the record of the mortgage, or relieve any one looking at the judgment and the deed given on sale pursuant thereto from the effect of that rec- ord as showing what the mortgage contains. 9 And where a note 1 Koons v. Hendricks, 6 Kulp. (Pa.) in the absence of express authority !65. in the note itself, an entry of j'udg- 2 Koons r. Hendricks, 6 Kulp. (Pa.) ment before maturity will, unless sat- lrli5 - isfactorily explained, be set aside, on 3 At water v. Manchester Bank, 45 motion. Minn. 341; Brown v. Barngrover 7 Uhlendorf i>. Kaufman, 41 111. App. (1891), 82 Iowa, 204; 47 N. W. Rep. 373. 1082; Richey v. Carpenter, 9 Pa. Co. 8 Packer v. Roberts (1891), 140 111. ('<■ 106 - 671; 29 N. E. Rep. 668; 40 111. App. 4 Snowden v. Preston, 73 Md. 261. 613. 5 Guyer v. Guyer, 6 Houst. (Del.) 9 Bernstein v. Nealis (1895), 144 N. 430. Y. 347. s Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387. But, 3 20 INTRODUCTORY. 29 is given as security for the payment of annuities which are due, the merging of it in a judgment changes only the form of the obligation, while its character as a collateral security re- mains. 1 The judgment of a court of record, however, ordinar- ily merges or extinguishes the cause of action on which it is founded. If there be a breach of contract, or wrong done, or any other cause of action by one against another, and judg- ment be recovered in a court of record, the judgment is a bar to the original cause of action, because it is thereby reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained so far as it can be at that stage; and it would be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant to another suit for the purpose of obtain- ing the same result. Hence the legal maxim, transit in rem judicatam, — the cause of action is changed into matter of rec- ord, which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in the higher. 8 § 20. Merger of mortgage in legal title Where the holder of a senior mortgage purchases the legal title to the mortgaged premises, such mortgage is not thereby necessarily merged in the legal title, but he is entitled to keep his mortgage alive to protect such legal title against a valid junior mortgage. 8 'Pond v. Harwood (1893), 139 N. justice to keep it alive, unless the ap- Y. 111. pellant intended to merge it. This 2 King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, we understand to be the test. Myers v. per curiam. O'Neal, 130 Ind. 370 ; 30 N. B. Rep. 510 ; 3 Swatts v. Bowen, 141 Ind. 322 ; 40 Hanlon v. Doherty , 109 Ind. 37 ; 9 N. E. N. E. Rep. 1057, per Hackney, J.: Rep.782;Elston?>. Castor,101Ind.426; "The purchase of the legal title by Haggertyu. Byrne, 75 Ind. 499; Smith the appellant did not soil her hands, v. Ostermeyer, 68 Ind. 432; Howe v. and, by owning that title, she is en- Woodruff, 12 Ind. 214 ; Coburn ». Ste- abled to do no more than another phens, 137 Ind. 683; 36 N. E. Rep. could do, namely, subject her prop- 132; Jewett v. Tomlinson, 137 Ind. ertyto the payment of the appellee's 326; 36 N. E. Rep. 1106. Nor do claim after the satisfaction of the sen- we understand that a purchaser of ior mortgage. By purchasing, she the legal title or the equity of the re- has certainly committed no injustice demption at a foreclosure sale there- that should operate to stay the inter- by assumes the payment of all liens ference of equity to protect her mort- junior to that upon which he buys. We gage against a junior mortgage. As do not understand Bunch v. Grave, 111 we have said, regarding the appel- Ind. 351; 12 N. E. Rep. 514, to so hold, lant's lien as valid and enforcible, it and certainly the contrary doctrine is would certainly subserve the ends of enforced in the later cases of Myers 30 INTRODUCTORY. § 21 § 21. Judgment as estoppel. — A judgment is conclusive upon all the parties and privies to the suit, and if rendered upon the merits, subsequent litigation between the same par- ties involving substantially the same facts and issues can not be prosecuted. 1 But in order that a judgment may have the effect of an estoppel, it is not enough that the party produce a record showing a judicial determination of the same question litigated in his favor, but it must also appear that it was rendered upon the merits, upon a material point, and substantially upon the same facts presented in the subsequent case. 2 In an action on the judgment, the defendant as of course can not plead any matter of defense which he might have pleaded in the original action. 3 And a judgment against the plaintiff, if rendered on the merits, is conclusive, and precludes him from bringing an- other action for the same cause. 4 As to estoppel by judgment the Supreme Court of the United States has held, that when the second suit is upon the same cause of action, and between the same parties as the first, the judgment in the former is con- clusive in the latter as to every question which was or might have been presented and determined in the first action; but when the second suit is on a different cause of action, although between the same parties, the judgment in the former operates as an estoppel only as to the point or question actually liti- v. O'Neal, supra, and Jewett v. Tom- Henderson v. Moss, 82 Tex. 69; Moses linson, supra." In Myers v. O'Neal, v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1009. 130 Ind. 370, Miller, J., said: "This 2 Shaw v. Broadbent, 129 N. Y. 114; case affords a strong illustration of Campbell v. Consalus, 25 N. Y. 613; the rule that equity will not permit People v. Johnson, 38 N. Y. 63; Weed titles to merge where it would be in- v. Burt, 78 N. Y. 191 ; "Webb v. Buck- equitable to do so. The appellants, elew, 82N.Y. 555; Nave v. Adams, 107 whose claims, because of the prior en- Mo. 414 ; James v. James, 81 Tex. 373. cumbrance, were practically worth- s Mayor, etc., New Orleans?;. United less, are in no condition to ask that States, 49 Fed. Rep. 40; Nagel v. the doctrine of merger shall be ap- Loomis, 33 Neb. 499; 50 N. W. Rep. plied in order to work a practical 441 ; Jewsbury v. Mummery, L. R. 8 0. confiscation of the superior property P. 56; Archer v. State, 74 Md. 410; rights of the appellees." Toddu. Maxfield, 6 B. & 0. 105 ; Braun ^auziede v. Jumel, 133 N. Y. 614; v. Weller, L. R. 2 Ex. 183. 44 N. Y. St. Rep. 897; People v. 4 Nesbit v. Riverside District, 144 IT. Holladay, 93 Cal. 241; Meyer v. S. 610; Archer v. State, 74 Md. 443; Meyer, 40 111. App. 94; Ellis v. North- Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. & Aid. 662; ernPac. R. Co., 80 Wis. 459; Northern Overton v. Harvey, 9 C. B. 324; New- Pac. R. Co. v. BIHs, 144 IT. S. 458; ington v. Levy, L. R. 6 C. P. 180. § 22 INTRODUCTORY. 31 gated and determined, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. 1 Thus a judgment against a municipal corporation in an action on coupons cut from its negotiable bonds, where the only defense set up is the inva- lidity of the issue of the bonds by reason of their being in ex- cess of the amount allowed by law, is no estoppel to another action between the same parties, on the bonds themselves and other coupons cut from them, where the defense set up is such invalidity, coupled with knowledge of the same by the plaintiff when he acquired the bonds and coupons. 2 § 22. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A judg- ment dismissing a suit on plaintiff's own motion, after a gen- eral demurrer to his petition has been sustained with leave to amend, does not bar plaintiff from bringing a second action. 8 So also a judgment dismissing a suit on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction is no bar to a second action, although the court did in fact have jurisdiction. 4 And in Kentucky it has been ingeniously held that a judgment on the merits touch- ing the ownership of a mare is not conclusive as to the own- ership of a colt foaled by the mare in the meantime. 5 A judgment at law dismissing a case on the ground of contribu- tory negligence is not a bar to a subsequent libel in admi- ralty. 6 So equally a dismissal of the complaint without an announcement by defendants that they rest their case is a non- suit only, although stated in the conclusions of law to be upon the merits. 7 In a divorce proceeding brought by the wife, based on cruelty, a dismissal on the merits precludes the same mat- ter from being set up as a defense to a subsequent action for divorce brought by the husband. 8 But a mere order for a de- cree is not a final decree. 9 Matters, however, embraced in the report of a master and confirmed by the court are res ju- 1 Nesbit v. Riverside District, 144 U. 5 Maize v. Bowman, 14 Ky. L. Rep. S. 610; Cromwell o. County of Sac, 121. 94 U. S. 351. 6 The City of Rome, 49 Fed. Rep. 2 Nesbit v. Riverside District, 144 TJ. 392. S. 610. ' Sproessig v. Keutl, 17 N. Y. Supl. 3 Scherff v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 81 Tex. 839. 471. 8 Tillison v. Tillison, 63 Vt. 411. 4 Weigley v. Coffman, 144 Pa. St. 9 Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 82 Me. 201. 489. 32 INTRODUCTORY. § 23 dicata. 1 The matter adjudicated may be raised by way of set- off, counter-claim, or defense. The actual passing on the merits of the question raised is conclusive, irrespective of the manner in which it is brought before the court. 2 § 23. Statutes as contracts. — A statute may contain all the ele- ments of a contract. Thus the Virginia act of 1891, providing for the funding and payment of the public debt and the issue of coupon bonds of the state under its provisions, constitute a contract between the state and the holders of coupons thus issued, and the subsequent Virginia acts passed for the pur- pose of restraining the use of the coupons for the payment of taxes and other state dues in many respects materially im- pair the obligation of that contract, and in so far as they have that effect are not valid or binding. 8 And where an Ohio statute vested in the Ohio University two townships of land for its support, and authorized it to lease the land for ninety- nine years renewable forever, and provided that said lands should forever be exempt from state taxes, it was held that the acceptance of such leases constituted a valid contract be- tween the state and the lessees, and that a subsequent statute levying a state tax on the leased land was unconstitutional as "impairing the obligation of contracts." 1 Under the Cali- fornia statute authorizing an issue of bonds to pay expenses of 1 Hubbard v. Camperdown Mills, 26 had no constitutional right to impair; S. C. 581. and such was for several years the uni- 2 Howe v. Lewis, 121 Ind. 110. See, form holding of the Virginia supreme also, Sayre v. Harpold, 33 W. Va. 553; court. See Antonio. Wright, 22 Gratt. Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315; 833; Wise v. Rogers, 24 Gratt. 169; Faust v. Faust, 31 S. C. 576; Berry v. Clarke v. Tyler, 30 Gratt. 134." The Whidden, 62 N. H. 473; Laffoon v. learned justice also reviewed and in Fretwell, 24 Mo. App. 258; Kenyon the main approved of the federal de- v. Wilson, 78 Iowa 408; Smiths. Luse, cisions in Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 30MApp.37;Saulsu.Freeman,24Fla. U.S. 672; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 209; Stickney v. Goudy, 132 111. 213; IT. S. 769; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 Helfenstein's Estate, 26 W. N. C. 194; U. S. 269; Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. Keator v. St. John, 42 Fed. Rep. 585. S. 550; Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U. S. 8 McGahey v. Virginia, 135 TJ. S. 662, 567 ; Royall v. Virginia, 121 U. S. 102 ; per Bradley, J. : "It has always been Sands v. Edmunds, 116 TJ. S. 585; In contended on the part of the bond- re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443. See, also, holders that this statute created a con- State v. Pickett (1894) , 46 La. Ann. 7 ; tract between them and the state firm 14 So. Rep. 340. and inviolable which the legislature 4 Matheny v. Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361. $23 INTRODUCTORY. 33 expeditions against the Indians, bonds and coupons were issued, payable at the office of the state treasurer in ten years, "provided the same be not sooner paid from funds anticipated in said act to be derived from the government of the United States." Congress did appropriate money to pay these bonds, but provided for payment at the national treasury, and im- posed certain reasonable conditions, to prevent imposition and fraud. It was held that the liability of the state of California was contingent upon the failure of congress to provide for the payment of such bonds, and, congress having provided for their payment, the state never became liable thereon. 1 1 Sawyer v. Colgan (1894), 102 Cal. pellant that his bonds and coupons 283; 36 Pac. Rep. 580, per curiam: ' 'The bond on its face provides for pay- ment by the state, 'provided the same be not sooner paid from funds antici- pated in said act to be derived from the government of the United States.' It was understood that congress might pay the money over to the state, and in that event the bonds would be pay- able at the office of the state treasurer, but it was not unreasonable to sup- pose, and such was anticipated, doubt- less, that the demands should be made payable by congress at the national treasury. It was the duty of the gen- eral government under the constitu- tion to defend the states from --inva- sion or insurrection, and when the state of California found it necessary to raise funds in order to defend it- self, the general government became in duty bound to reimburse the state for the cost of such defense. The state, however, recognized its obliga- tion to pay those who had enlisted in its defense, if the general government failed to discharge its obligation to the state. Therefore, it was provided that, if congress did' not within ten bear interest from the time of their maturity until payment; but section 1917 of the civil code, cited, does not apply to an indebtedness of the state, and the state is not liable to pay in- terest on its debts, unless its consent to do so has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or some law- ful contract of its executive officers. United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211; 10 Sup. Ct. 920; Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204; 26 N. E. Rep. 778. In mandamus the controller can be re- quired to draw his warrant only for what is expressly authorized by the statute. Auditorial Board v. Aries, 15 Tex. 72; Davis v. Porter, 66 Cal. 658 ; 6 Pac. Rep. 746 ; Davis b. County of Yuba, 75 Cal. 452, 13 Pac. Rep. 874,and 17 Pac. Rep.533, was an action brought to recover the sum of $5,600 and inter- est; it was not a case of mandate. The appropriation made by the act of 1851 was not repealed by the act of 1852, as claimed by respondent. The latter act expressly provides that "the repeal in no wise affects the war loan bonds already issued under the pro- visions of the act so repealed." In years make provision for the payment view of what has been said, it is un- of the bonds, the state would pay them Our conclusion is that the state of Cal- ifornia never became liable to pay bond 420 or its coupons, or any of the coupons of bonds issued under the act of 1852. It is contended by the ap- 3 necessary to consider the contention of the respondent that the act of 1852 is unconstitutional because it created a debt or liability against the state ex- ceeding the limit provided for in ar- 34 INTRODUCTORY. §24 § 24. The same subject continued — Treaties. — Proceedings under a statute may have the effect and force of a judgment which is a contract of the highest nature; 1 and a property right acquired under a state statute can not be divested by re- pealingthe statute. 2 Where, therefore, under an act directing a city to audit and adjust the amount of damage done to cer- tain private property by the opening of a street, providing foran appraisal thereof by commissioners, and requiring the city to raise the amount by assessment, and pay it over to the owner of the property, the commissioners have made the appraisal, and their report has been confirmed by the court, the owner's claim against the city is fixed, and can not be affected by a sub- sequent repeal of the act. 3 Under the constitution of the tide 8, Const. 1849, and it is not claimed that the act of 1851 is uncon- stitutional on that or any other ground. "We think that petitioner is entitled to a warrant for payment of the coupons issued under the act of 1851, but is not entitled to a warrant for the payment of bond No. 420, or any of the coupons issued under the act of 1852. The judgment is reversed, with directions to the court below to issue a peremp- tory writ of mandate to respondent, commanding him to draw his warrant upon the state treasurer, payable out of the general fund, in favor of peti- tioner, for the sum of $1,800, and to further adjudge that petitioner herein recover from the defendant the costs of this proceeding." 1 Woodhull v. Little, 102 N. Y. 165 ; People v. Com. Council, 78 N. Y. 56. 2 People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1. 3 People v. Com. Council (1893), 140 JST. Y. 300; 35 N. E. Rep. 485, O'Brien, J.: "It is contended that the act of 1890 simply conferred power upon the common council to audit the claim, leaving it to their discretion whether it should be exer- cised or not. The words are that the common council 'is authorized to audit and adjust the amount of dam- ages,' and, when appraised, 'the same shall be raised * * * and the amount * * * paid over,' etc. It would be a liberal construction of this language in favor of the city to say that it was simply permissive; but, assuming that it was, the rights of the parties must be governed by the rule of law that permissive words used in statutes con- ferring power or authority upon pub- lic officers or bodies will be held to be mandatory where the act authorized to be done concerns the public inter- est or the rights of individuals. People v. Board, etc., of Livingston Co., 68 N. Y.114; Peoples. Board, etc., of Otsego Co., 51 N. Y. 401; People v. Common Council of Syracuse, 78 N. Y. 56; Mayor, etc., v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; Lower v. U. S., 91 U. S. 536; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540. We have seen that the report of the commissioners under the statute, awarding damages to the relator in the sum of $5,500, confirmed by an order of the court, had all the force and effect of a judgment creating an obligation on the part of the city to pay. Woodhull v. Little, 102 N.Y. 165 ; 6 N. E. Rep. 266; People v. Common Council of Syracuse, supra. It vested in the relator, when the order of con- firmation was entered, an absolute 25 INTRODUCTORY. United States a treaty is to be regarded as a statute when it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when its terms import a contract, when either of the par- ties undertakes to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department, and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court. 1 § 25. State grants. — The title of a state to its sea coast, and the shores of tidal rivers, is different from the fee-simple which an individual holds to an estate in lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign, right, and it has been frequently said that a trust is engrafted upon this title for the benefit of the public, of which the state is powerless to divest itself." As the title which a state holds can not be surrendered or right to receive the amount. It cre- ated an obligation on the part of the city to pay, and in this sense was a contract of the highest nature. Cornell ■o. Donovan, 14 Daly, 295. All contract obligations are protected from impair- ment by state legislation by the pro- visions of the federal constitution. The obligation of a contract is im- paired in the constitutional sense by any law which prevents its enforce- ment, or which materially abridges the remedy for enforcing it, which ex- isted when it was contracted, and does not supply an alternative remedy equally adequate and efficacious. Mc- Gahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 685; 10 Sup. Ct. 972. The remedy subsist- ing in a state when and where an ob- ligation is made or created and is to be performed is a part of the obliga- tion, and any subsequent law of the state which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the constitution, and is, therefore, void. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595. This provision of the constitu- tion can not be evaded by indirect methods. The obligation of a muni- cipal corporation can not be impaired by restraining its power of taxation to the point of disabling it from perform- ance, or by a repeal of the law under which the obligation was to be en- forced, or by enacting statutes of lim- itation that do not allow a reasonable time for bringing the action any more than by open and avowed assaults upon the contract itself. In this case the repealing act could have no other purpose than to prevent the audit and payment of the relator's claim; but whatever the motive which prompted the legislation, it is clearly inoperative and void as to the award made by the commissioners and confirmed by the court." 1 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314. 2 3 Kent's Commentaries 545 (9th ed.) ; 3 Washburn on Real Property, 418 (4th ed.) ; Gould Law of Waters, §§ 18, 44; Angell on Tide Waters, 158 ; Smith v. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463 ; Gann v. Free Fishers, etc., 10 H. L. Cas.192 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illi- nois, 146 U. S. 387; Hardin v. Jor- dan, 140 U. S. 371 ; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 ; Saunders v. New York, etc., R. Co., 144 N. Y. 75. 36 INTRODUCTORY. § 26 granted, except for some public purpose, or some reasonable use for the public benefit, such a grant can never constitute a contract between the state and the grantee, which is beyond the power of revocation by a subsequent legislature. 1 For every purpose which may be useful, convenient or necessary to the public, the state has the unquestionable right to make grants in fee, conditionally, for the beneficial use of the grantee, or to promote commerce according to their terms. The extensive grant to the city of New York, of the lands un- der water below the shore line around Manhattan island, clearly comes within this principle, since it was a grant to a municipality, constituting a political division of the state, for the promotion of the commercial prosperity of the city and, consequently, of the people of the state. 2 Grants to railroads for rights of way and other facilities for the transaction of their business, made under the authority of the state, have also been held valid upon the same principle. 8 § 26. Written evidence of contracts the best. — Sometimes the courts can not reach a satisfactory conclusion as to the na- ture, character or quality of the contract into which parties have entered. Recently, in the state of New York, the transaction at issue was adjudged in the first trial to be a bailment, and in the second and third trials to be a sale. Yet the court of last re- sort, in its opinion on the third appeal, frankly declares "that the evidence preponderates in favor of the defendant's conten- tion," that the transaction was a bailment, and "we again say, as we have said upon the previous occasions when the case was under review, that the equities militate and the evidence tends strongly against the claim of the plaintiffs." It is apparent from that case that the purpose of a contract may sometimes fail, through the intervention of rules of law, and that in general the best evidence of a contract is a writing. 4 1 Coxe t>. State (1895), 144 N.Y. 396, "Langdonii. Mayor, etc., 93 N.Y. 129. 406; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 3 Saunders v. New York, etc., R. Co. 146 U. S. 387 ; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 (1894), 144 N. Y. 75. IT. S. 1 ; People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. * Crosby v. President, etc., of Del- 593; Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Buffalo, aware Canal Co. (1894), 141 N. etc.,R. Co. ,111 N.Y. 132,140; Hardin Y. 589; 36 N. E. Rep. 332, per D.Jordan, 140 U.S. 371. Gray, J.: "The defendant, claim- §27 INTRODUCTORY. 37 § 27. Negotiable instruments — How far conclusiye. — As be- tween original parties to a note and those occupying their po- ing to have always retained its own- ership of the lumber, introduced evi. dence for the purpose of showing that the lumber had been furnished to the Harndens only to be used in the boats contracted for ; payment to be made for it by deduction of its value from the price of the boats upon their completion in the spring. It was shown that it was the custom for the defendant to furnish its own lum- ber to boat builders generally; but solely for the purpose of being used in the construction of boats it had contracted for, and with the under- standing that its cost was to be taken out when the boats were paid for. Upon the last trial, the evidence of the company's agent in explanation of the purpose of sending the bill in question was admitted, and was to the effect that it was sent upon this occa. sion to the Harndens as it had been sent to them upon previous dealings, and, in accordance with the company's universal custom, to other parties, "as a memorandum of the lumber that they had, and as a memorandum of the amount that had to be deducted from the contract price of the boat when the company settled for it," and that it was not sent for any other pur- pose. With that explanation of the company's agent, in connection with some testimony by other boat builders that the company furnished lumber to all of them upon the same terms, and for the sole purpose described by the company's agent, the defendant's counsel insists that the case was so complete for the defendant as to have made it the duty of the trial judge to decide the question, as one of law, in favor of the defendant, and to have nonsuited the plaintiffs. That the evidence preponderates in favor of the defendant's contention as to what the transaction amounted to can not be doubted, and, as we have said upon the previous occasions when the case was under review, we again say that the equities militate, and the evidence tends, strongly against the claim of the plaintiffs. It is difficult to under- stand how the jury could have come to the conclusion which they did upon any fair and conscientious considera- tion of the proofs ; but we can not say that the case had been wholly re- moved from their province, and, if not, then we can not interfere with their decision of the issue. It does not follow that, with the evidence of the company's agent in the case, how- ever strongly supporting the compa- ny's position, the plaintiffs were fore- closed from insisting upon the incon- clusiveness of the evidence relied upon by the defendant, or upon certain opposing inferences being possible from the proofs, and that it was the province of the jury to consider and decide. Nor was anything else to be inferred from our previous opinion than that the evidence of the compa- ny's agent was admissible in its be- half upon the issues, in view of the use made of this bill by the plaintiffs, and to explain the object in sending it. However convincing the evi- dence, to the ordinary mind, that the defendant was right in its contention, it can not be said that the facts de- pended upon were incapable of another aspect, or that, from the cir- cumstances out of which they grew, and which bore upon the relations of these parties, it was impossible to in- fer that this transaction was not a sale of the lumber. It is the undoubted rule that in such actions the plaintiff must establish his title to, a!nd right to the possession of, the property alleged to have been wrongfully con- 38 INTRODUCTORY. §27 sition, the nature of the contract, as well as the consideration upon which it is founded, is open to inquiry, instead of being verted; and this was undertaken in this case. The Harndens were in pos- session of the lumber, and apparently, from the bill rendered, were indebted for it as upon a sale to them, and they had transferred it to plaintiffs by a bill of sale. It appeared that the Harndens had previously bought lum- ber of the defendant for cash, and that, after an interview between a member of that flrni and an officer of the company, the course of dealing was changed, and credit was given to them for lumber ordered and deliv- ered. With lumber so obtained, boats of other parties were repaired, and there was no proof that any restric- tions were imposed upon its use. Nor did it appear that anything was said or written as to the title to this lumber being only conditional in the Harn- dens. Though its cost was to be re- ceived by the defendant only when the boats were built, and then by way of deduction from the sum contracted to be paid for the boats, that was not necessarily conclusive upon the ques- tion of the ownership meanwhile, for the title to an article may pass upon a credit sale, if such be the intention of the parties. Another circumstance was that the company was not bound to accept and to pay for the boats until after inspection and approval ; thus introducing another element of possible doubt into the question of title. All these circumstances, and some others of more or less impor- tance, were open to the consideration of the jury, in connection with the form of the bill for the lumber sent by the company's agent; and, as it has been already intimated, however strong may seem the inference to our minds that there was only a condi- tional sale or a bailment of the lum- ber, a different inference was permis- sible ; so that, under the well-settled rule, the jury became the proper judges between the litigants, and their decision closes the dispute, in the ab- sence of any errors committed in the course of trial which would author- ize us to order a new trial. The defendant's counsel requested the trial judge to charge "that if the jury find that the evidence given by Larter that the bill sent to the Harn- dens November 2-t, 1882, was sent only as a memorandum of the quan- tity and of the quality of the lumber, and its value, is true, the bill is not an admission that the lumber was sold to the Harndens," — to which request he replied: "I decline to charge in those words, and will leave it as a question of fact, under all the evi- dence, for the jury to determine whether or not the lumber was sold." We think there was no error in this. Larter was the company's paymaster, and had testified that the bill had been sent, as previous ones had been sent, namely, as a memorandum to show the amount to be deducted from the contract price of the boats when constructed. The effect of that evidence upon the bill was for the jury to decide. It was not legal error for the court to refuse to say what would become of certain evidence if certain other evidence was believed ; nor was the court bound to put the proposition to the jury, if we assume its truth, as it was formulated by the counsel. Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618. Therefore, when, in his reply to the request, the trial judge simply rel- egated the whole matter to the jury, to be decided upon the evidence be- fore them, he committed no error. In his charge he remarked that "the intention with which a thing is done does not always control the legal §27 INTRODUCTORY. 39 concluded by the terms of the note only. 1 Thus, the relative time at which the indorsements were made, and the agree- ment or understanding as to the nature of such indorsements, are proper subjects of inquiry between such parties in deter- mining their relative liability to each other, as, to them, the instrument itself is only prima facie evidence of the con- tract implied by law. 8 But as against an innocent indorsee for value, in the regular course of business, a different rule ap- plies, and prohibits a defendant from asserting any extrinsic matter to vary the apparent liability exhibited by the note itself. 8 The courts, following the usage and customs preva- lent in mercantile circles, invariably hold that the innocent holder for value without notice is to be protected in construing the agreement he has obtained title to, as a reasonable man would construe it. It would be impossible to ascertain the •effect of the thing done." That is very true, and did not prejudice the defendant's case. That object which one may propose to himself in enter- ing upon some transaction often fails of its accomplishment by the opera- tion and intervention of rules of law. The judge sufficiently explained the hearing of the remark. When subse- quently, upon the request of the de- fendant's counsel, he instructed the jury that the minds of contracting parties must meet to make a valid contract, that the question was one for the jury as to what the contract was, and that "if, from the circum- stances, you are satisfied that it was the intention of both parties at that time that the title should pass — that their minds met upon that — then you may treat it as a sale; if, from the circumstances, you do not believe that the parties' minds met, you may treat it as no sale" — he made it clear enough what part intention played in the transaction of the parties, and there should have been no confusion in their minds about it. The trial judge refused to charge "that the intent of Larter as to the sending of the bill, * * * if Lar- ter is believed by the jury, does de- termine the legal effect of the sending of the bill." This was not error. As it has been said, Larter was following the usage in previous transactions, and though his own intention in send- ing the bill in that form may, neverthe- less, have been to treat the matter as a bailment, and the bill as a mere memorandum, that could not control the real arrangement, if it was other- wise; and what that was the facts and circumstances, taken all together, must be considered and weighed, for the absence of any definite agreement upon the subject in words or in writ- ings. We have scrupulously consid- ered these and other rulings upon re- quests to charge, and upon the admis- sion and exclusion of evidence, and we are not able to say that there ex- ists any error which would justify us in permitting the defendant to sub- mit its case to the chances of another trial. 1 Sturtevant v. Randall, 53 Me. 149; Smith v. Morrill, 54 Me. 48. 2 Patten v. Pearson, 57 Me. 428. 3 Smith v. Morrill, 54 Me. 48. 40 INTRODUCTORY. §28 understanding which the parties had privately as to who should or should not be holden. Having failed to make this meaning plain in the written contract, they should be forever estopped, as to such purchaser, from setting up any defense not to be inferred from such contract. 1 § 28. Where written contract is unambiguous. — Where a written contract is plain and unambiguous on its face, parol evidence is not admissible to explain or alter its meaning." In 1 Bradford v. Prescott (1893), 85 Me. 482 ; 27 Atl. Rep. 461, Foster, J. : "Ac- cordingly it is held in Maine and Massachusetts that the obligation which the signer of commercial paper assumes to the taker is to be deter- mined by an inspection of the note as it was when negotiated. Stevens v. Parsons, 80 Me. 351 ; 14 Atl. Rep. 741 ; Bigelow v. Colton, 13 Gray 309; Spaulding v. Putnam, 128 Mass. 363, 365. It is the settled doctrine of these states that one not appearing to be a party, either as payee or indorsee, to a note payable to a payee therein named, or his order, who puts his name on the back of it in blank at its inception and before negoti- ated, is a joint and several promisor. The legal presumption in such case is that it was done for the same con- sideration with the contract on the face of the note ; and when there is no date as to such indorsement the presumption is that it was made at the time when the note had its incep- tion. Colburn v. Averill, 30 Me. 310; Lowell v. Gage, 38 Me. 35 ; Childs v. Wyman,44 Me. 433; National, etc., Bank v. Lougee,108 Mass. 371, 373. This pre- sumption will prevail in favor of an in- nocent indorsee for value before due, and in the regular course of business; and his rights can not be infringed by proof of any extrinsic facts which might affect the original parties to the contract, or those occupying their posi- tion and having their rights only. SturtevanU. Randall, 53 Me. 149, 157; Smith v. Morrill, 54 Me. 48, 53; Mal- bon v. Southard, 36 Me. 147. Tha plaintiff having had the note in suit presented to him by the payee, before due, and being ignorant of any facta except such as he might obtain from an inspection of the note itself, found the defendant's name upon it. He had a right to presume it was placed there at the inception of the note, and before its delivery to the payee. Moore v. McKenney, 83 Me. 80, 85; 21 Atl. Rep. 749." 2 Brady v. Cassidy (1895), 145 N. Y. 171, 177. In Diebold Safe Co. v. Hus- ton, 55 Kan. 104; 39 Pac. Rep. 1035, Allen, J., said: "It appears from the plaintiff's own evidence that the agreement which he entered into with the agent of the safe and lock com- pany was reduced to writing. Oral evidence, therefore, is inadmissible to vary or enlarge its terms. Drake v. Dodsworth, 4 Kan. 159; Brenner v. Luth, 28 Kan. 581 ; Hopkins v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 29 Kan. 544; Furneaux u. Esterly, 36 Kan. 539; 13 Pac. Rep. 824; Phelps-Biglow Wind- mill Co. v. Pierr-y, 41 Kan. 763; 21 Pac. Rep. 793 ; Wiilard v. Ostrander, 46 Kan. 591; 26 Pac.Rep.1017. In Watson u.Roode, 43 Neb. 348 ; 61 N.W.Rep.625, the court said : "The infirmity of the testimony sought to be introduced, and the reason for its exclusion, was that it was a part of the transaction between the parties, and became § 28 INTRODUCTORY. 41 arriving at the real intention of the parties, as shown by the language employed by them in a contract, and, in order to make a correct application of the terms used to the subject- matter and objects referred to therein, when the same are not clearly expressed, the situation of the parties and the sur- rounding circumstances may be considered in construing the contract; but it must be borne in mind that it is the language of the contract itself that is to be construed, and when the parties reduce their agreement to writing, no other language employed by them in making the contract can be resorted to, except that furnished by the instrument itself. 1 To render parol evidence competent, in case of a written contract, it is not enough that there were circumstances known to one of the parties, which might have influenced him in making the con- tract, which were not known to the other party ; to create an ambiguity that opens the contract to parol explanation, it must be established by proof of circumstances known to all the par- ties. 2 Where an article is sold by a written contract, which is silent on the subject of warranty, it can not be shown by parol that there was an oral warranty made by the seller at the time of the sale, or previously, as the written instrument is conclu- sively presumed to embody the entire contract. 3 Evidence to explain an ambiguity, or show the meaning of technical terms, merged in the written contract, and be received to contradict or vary its its admission would directly contra- terms. Wilson u. Deen, 74 N.Y. 531; diet, and render of no effect, one ma- Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288 ; Marsh terial portion of the written contract, v. McNair, 99 N. Y. 174; Englehorn The general rule that such testimony v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 76; Thomas v. will not be received is well settled. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133. For cases more particularly applicable, ' 2 Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147. see Smith v. Taylor, 82 Cal. 533 ; 23 3 Case Plow Works «. Niles, etc., Co. Pac. Rep. 217; Koerper v. Jung, 33 90 Wis. 590; 63 N. W. Pep. 1013; Mc- 111. App. 144. Quaid v. Ross, 77 Wis. 470; Merriam 1 Robinson u.Hyer, 35 Pla.544 ; 17 So. v. Field, 24 Wis. 640. In DeWitt v. Rep. 745. In House v. Walch (1895), Berry, 134 IT. S. 306, 312, Lamar, J., 144 N.Y. 418, Bartlett, J., said: "We said: "There is good authority for have here a contract clear as to its the proposition that if the contract of terms, complete on its face, and parol sale is in writing and contains no evidence was inadmissible to vary or warranty, parol evidence is not ad- contradict the writing. It is a gen- missible to add a warranty. Van Os- eral rule that evidence of w£at was trand v. Reed, 1 Wend. 424; Lamb v. said between the parties to a valid in- Crafts, 12 Mete. 353 ; Dean v< Mason, strument in writing, either prior to or 4 Conn. 428, 432; Reed v. Wood, 9 at the time of its execution, can not Vt. 285." 42 INTRODUCTORY. §29 is not an exception to the general rule, but is allowed to enable the court to understand the contract as written, and not to contradict or vary the instrument in any particular. 1 The ver- ification of the complaint by plaintiff is, in legal effect, a writ- ten request to the attorney to commence the action, and a writ- ten recognition of his authority to do so, and is sufficient pre- sumptive evidence of such authority. 8 § 29. Complete written contract excluding parol evidence. — When parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the par- ties and the extent and manner of their undertaking were reduced to writing ; and all oral testimony is rejected of a previous colloquium between the parties, or of conversation or declaration at the time when it was completed, or afterwards, as it would tend in many instances to substitute a new and dif- ferent contract for the one which was really agreed upon, to the prejudice, possibly, of one of the parties. 3 A writing 1 House v. Walch (1895), 144 X. Y. 418, 422 ; Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40 Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200 Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. Y. 140 Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190. 2 Graham v. Andrews (1895), 11 N. Y. Misc. 649, per McAdam, J. : "The code provisions are taken from S Re- vised Statutes (6th ed.), page 573, section 15 of which declares that 'any -written recognition of the authority of the attorney' shall be deemed pre- sumptive evidence of such authority. "Under this statute, a writing signed by one of two plaintiffs on behalf of both, requesting the attorney to continue the action, was a sufficient recognition of his authority to com- mence it. Howard v. Howard, 11 How. Pr. 80. The code (§1514) pro- vides that 'any written request of the plaintiff or his agent to the plaintiff's attorney to commence the action, ur any written recognition of his author- ity so to do, verified by the affidavit of the attorney or any other compe- tent witness, is sufficient presumptive evidence of such authority.' In an- swer to the defendant's application, the plaintiff's attorney swears 'that the original complaint herein, verified by the plaintiff personally, was file4 with the clerk of this court on the 31st day of January, 1895, and that a copy of said complaint and verification was served on the defendants person- ally.' The complaint, so verified, is in legal effect a written request to the at- torney to commence the action, and a written recognition of his authority so to do, sufficient to satisfy every re- quirement of the code provisions. This is not a proper case for requiring further evidence of authority. Code, § 1513; Carpenter v. Allen, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 322." 3 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 275, adopted as the correct rule in Badart $ 29 INTRODUCTORY. 43 signed by the parties merges in it all parol contracts which precede it, relating to the same subject-matter. 1 Where the plaintiff executed a written agreement to furnish defendant with railroad ties, to be delivered at the points where they were needed, it was held, in an action for defendant's failure to comply with an alleged contemporaneous agreement to haul part of the ties, that such parol agreement was not admissible in evidence, as it varied the written contract. 2 And where the agents of a foreign ship, acting as brokers, negotiate an agree- ment, which, being communicated through their Liverpool house to the owner, results in the execution of a charter which is signed by the Liverpool house on behalf of the charterer, and thereupon the agents, to avoid complications from the necessary lapse of time before the charterer can inspect the in- strument, notify him in writing of its terms, requesting con- firmation, and at the same time send a similar notification to the owners, this is substantially a transaction by "bought and sold notes;" and where the charterer, by letter to the agent, confirms the terms stated, these two communications become complete evidence of the terms of the contract, and parol evi- dence is not admissible. 8 v. Foulon, 80 Md. 579; 31 Atl. Rep. 'bought and sold notes' had been ex- 513. changed, said : 'It has been urged for 1 Hartsfield v. Chamblin (S. C. 1895) , the defendant that the correspondence 21 S. E. Rep. 798. was but a negotiation for a contract, 2 Scott n. Norfolk R. Co. (Va. 1893), and that the parties contemplated the 17 S. E. Rep. 882; Hubble v. Cole, 85 exchange of formal written instru- Va. 87; Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352; ments as a definite conclusion of their Hughes v. Tinsley, 80 Va. 259. negotiation ; and in this view of the 3 Galgate Ship Co. v. Starr (1893), case emphasis has been placed upon 58 Fed. Rep. 894, per Morrow, J.: the facts that the defendant was acting "Now, what was the effect of the let- as a broker, that the plaintiff's agents ter to Starr & Co., and their reply con- knew this, and that both parties re- firming the terms of the contract? Dar- garded the credit which was to be sup- lington Iron Co. v. Foote, 16 Fed. Rep. plied in London as a condition prece- 646, 649, is a case much in point, sup- dent to a final contract. Although de- porting libelant's contention that Starr f endant was buying the rails to sell to & Co. became bound thereby to the another party, and although his profit terms stated in the letter of notifica- was to be derived from a commission tion. In the case cited, Judge Wallace, of one per cent. , to be allowed him on speaking of an agreement deduced the purchase-money by the plaintiff, from correspondence between a seller there is no room to doubt that both and a broker, in which it appeared parties contemplated a contract in 44 INTRODUCTORY. 30 § 30. Contracts in a foreign language. — It is the prov- ince of the court to construe all written instruments ; but, if the language in which they are expressed is not understood by the court, its meaning must in some way be ascertained before the construction can be determined. The words may have a peculiar and technical meaning ; they may be terms belonging to some art, trade, or science ; they may, by commercial or local usage, have acquired an unusual signification ; or they may be in a foreign language. In all these instances the courts, of necessity, resort to evidence to disclose that which is unknown. The meanings of words are facts ; and the jury is the tribunal to decide upon the existence of facts, except under circum- whichhe was to be a principal, and by which he was to pay cash for the rails upon delivery. The bought and sold notes, sent by the plaintiff's agent to defendant's in their letter of February 5th, named the defendant as the pur- chaser, and conclude with the clause, 'An approved bank credit to be ar- ranged when this contract is con- firmed.' What was to be done to 'con- firm' the contract? Certainly nothing after the bought and sold notes were exchanged. But could either party re- cant at any time before the notes were exchanged? Did they intend the period of uncertainty to intervene which would take place while the notes were crossing the Atlantic? Certainly not, because in the same letter plaintiff's agents asked defendant to 'cable con- firmation of the contract.' Confirma- tion of the contract was to be signified by a cablegram. If confirmation was to be signified by cablegram, the par- ties must have regarded the exchange of bought and sold notes ; not as the preliminary to a contract, but as evi- dence of a contract already conclud- ed. In line with this authority are the following rules governing 'bought and sold notes,' as stated by Mr. Ben- jamin in his work on sales (section 295) : 'The bought and sold notes do not constitute the contract, but, * < * when they correspond and state all the terms of the bargain, are complete and sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute, even though there be no en- try in the broker's books, or, what is equivalent, only an unsigned entry.' If there were any dealings or relations between Balfour, Guthrie & Co. and Starr & Co. that might be said to fairly give rise to an obligation on the part of the former to make a disclosure to the latter, it was a personal matter between them, and in no way involved the rights of the libelant in the con- tract now under consideration. To hold otherwise would be to open trans- actions of this nature to frauds of the most dangerous character, and the court establishing such a doctrine would, to use the language of Lord Thurlow in a leading case (Fox v. Mackreth, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 115, 141) , 'run the hazard of undoing all the common transactions of mankind, and of rendering all their dealings too insecure.' From these considera- tions I have reached the conclusion that the letter of Balfour, Guthrie & Co. of June 5th, having been con- firmed by Starr & Co., must be ac- cepted as stating the terms of the con- tract entered into by the parties in San Francisco to the exclusion of parol testimony." §30 INTRODUCTORY. 45 stances of a special character. To explain the meaning of a contract written in a foreign language, the original and trans- lations are admissible. 1 J Badart v. Foulon, 80 Md. 579 ; 31 Atl. Rep. 513, per Bryan, J.; "In Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220, 252, it was held that, when the terms of a written instrument are technical or equivocal, parol evidence is admissible to explain their meaning, and that this evidence is for the consideration of the jury, and that the court must instruct the jury, conditionally or hypothet- ically, what should be the proper con- struction of the written instrument, accordingly as they find the meaning of the words from the evidence. There can be no possible reason for a differ- ence in the mode of proving the mean- ing of unknown words, whether they belong to science, art, mercantile us- age, or a foreign language. It is the circumstance that their meaning is unknown which makes it necessary to have the evidence to explain them. And this necessity applies to a foreign language in exactly the same manner as to any other description of un- known words. In Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F. 355, a question arose about the admission of extrinsic evidence to explain certain terms and phrases contained in the deeds by which Lady Hewley's charities were established. The case was very fully and ably ar- gued in the house of lords, in the presence of seven of the judges, whose attendance was requested, and whose opinions were asked by the lords. The decree was passed in accordance with the opinion of six of the judges, and of Lord Brougham, Lord Lynd- hurst, and the lord chancellor. Three of the learned judges took occasion to show that, where the writing to be interpreted was in a foreign language, there was no difference in the mode of ' proof from that which prevailed in the ordinary case of unknown words. Mr. Justice Erskine said: 'Where the instrument is in a foreign lan- guage, * * * the jury must ascer- tain the meaning of the terms upon the evidence of persons skilled in the particular language.' Page 511, Baron Parks said : 'In the first place, there is no doubt that not only where the language of the instrument is such as the court does not understand it is competent to receive evidence of the proper meaning of that language, as when it was written in a foreign tongue, but it is also competent where technical words or peculiar terms or indeed any expressions are used which at the time the instrument was written had acquired an appropriate meaning, either generally, or by local usage, or amongst particular classes. ' Page 555 . Lord Chief Justice Tindal, speaking of ascertaining the meaning of a writ- ten instrument by external evidence, said : 'Such investigation does of ne- cessity take place in the interpretation of instruments written in a foreign language; in the case of ancient in- struments, where, by the lapse of time and change of manners, the words have acquired in the present age a different meaning from that which they bore when originally employed ; in cases where terms of art or science occur; in mercantile contracts, which in many instances use a peculiar language employed by those only who are conversant in trade and com- merce.' Pages 566, 567. In2Starkieon Evidence, p. 779, the learned author,in speaking of the admission of evidence to explain terms in a contract which are used in a special and peculiar sense, goes on to say: 'The case seems to fall within the same consid- eration as if the parties, in framing their contract, had made use of a for- 46 INTRODUCTORY. § 31 § 31. When parol evidence admissible although contract written. — The general rule which excludes parol evidence when offered to contradict or vary the terms, provisions or legal effect of a written instrument, has no application to col- lateral undertakings or cases in which the written instrument was executed in part performance of an entire oral agreement. 1 In a prosecution under the Alabama code, making it a felony to sell mortgaged personal property "for the purpose of hinder- ing, delaying, or defrauding" the mortgagee, the court refused to charge that if the sale was open, and there was no attempt at concealment, a strong presumption arises that no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the mortgagee existed, and this presumption must be repelled by clear evidence before a con- viction is authorized. It was held that the refusal was proper. In such case parol evidence is admissible to show a balance due defendant from the mortgagee on a timber contract, although the contract was in writing. 2 The rule that all previous negotiations or conferences between the parties are merged in a subsequent written instrument is open to qualification, as, for example, a contract which is not required by statute to be in writing may be partly expressed in writing and partly by an unwritten agreement between the parties; and if so, such eign language, which the courts are ance only of an entire oral agreement, not bound to understand.' Forthese (Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74; Van reasons, we think that the original Brunt v. Day, 81 N. Y. 251 ; Juilliard contract was properly admitted in ev- v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 529; Brigg v. Hil- ldence along with the translations." ton, 99 N. Y. 517, 526; Ferguson v. 'Beagle v. Harby (1893), 73 Hun, Baker, 116 N. Y. 257; Eoutledge v. 310, Martin, J.: "The general rule Worthington Co., 119 N. Y.592; Pond which excludes parol evidence v. Harwood, 139 N.Y. Ill, 126.)" when offered to contradict or vary 2 Cobb v. State, 100 Ala. 19, 14 So. the terms, provisions or legal ef- Rep. 362, Stone, C. J. : "Coming up feet of a written instrument is well as the question did, collaterally, the settled. There are various cases, how- rule which requires the production of ever, where this rule does not apply, the highest and best evidence does not It has no application to collateral un- apply. Any legal evidence bearing dertakings (Lindley v. Lacey, 17 C. B. on the inquiry of fraudulent intent [N.S.] 578; Jeffery v. Walton, 1 Stark, was admissible. Alsabrooks v. State, 213; Batterman *. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 ; 52 Ala. 24; Mattison v. State, 55 Ala. Erskine v. Adeane, L. R. [8 Ch. App.] 224; Johnson v. State, 73 Ala. 523; 756; Engelhorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Black v. State, 83 Ala. 81; 3 South. Y. 76), or where the written instru- 814." ment was executed in part perform- § 31 INTRODUCTORY. 47 agreement may be proved by parol, and when a verbal con- tract is entire, and a part only, in part performance, is reduced to writing, parol proof of the entire contract is competent. 1 "Where the original agreement is partly in writing and partly verbal, the rule which rejects parol evidence in respect to written contracts has no application. 2 At the time of a nego- tiation between parties for the sale by plaintiffs to defendants of certain goods, plaintiffs gave to defendants a writing which acknowledged the receipt of an order for the goods and stated the time of delivery and the price. It was held that defendants were not estopped thereby from proving a parol warranty as to quality ; that the instrument could not be construed as being the whole contract between the parties but was simply a mem- orandum ; that even if it could be construed as embodying a part of the agreement, and so conclusive as to that part, oral evidence was competent to show the rest. 3 Where a contract is not required by statute to be in writing and is partly written and partly verbal, parol evidence is admissible to show what was its consideration. 4 Where a written contract for laying bricks is silent as to the manner in which the number of bricks ■Beagle v. Harby (1893), 73 Hun, fendant was authorized and consented 310, Martin, J.: "Where a verbal "to settle all debts to and by the firm." contract is entire, and a part only, Plaintiff was permitted to show mostly in part performance, is reduced to by oral evidence that all the firm affairs writing, par'ol proof of the entire were about the time of the dissolution contract is competent. Hutchins v. settled and adjusted, its assets divid- Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 24 ; Hope v. Balen, ed, and nothing left to be done except 58 N. Y. 380 ; Brigg v. Hilton, 99 N. the collection and division of the Y. 517. The plaintiff's proof in this debts due the firm, and that defend- case showed that the whole contract ant agreed to pay to plaintiff his share between the plaintiff and defendants of the collections. It was held that was not reduced to writing, and that the evidence was properly received ; the deed was executed and delivered that it was not rendered incompetent in part performance only of the entire by the agreement of dissolution as the contract between them." adjustment of the firm matters and the 2 Routledge v. Worthington Co., 119 promise to pay were not merged in, N. Y. 592. and not contradictory of, said agree- 3 Brigg v. Hilton, 99 N. Y. 517. In ment. Ferguson v. Baker, 116 N. Y. 257, the 4 Cooper v. Southgate (1894), 10 The dissolution of a firm was by an in- Beports (Eng.)'552. And see Homer dorsement upon the partnership agree- o. Ashford, 11 Moore 91; Hutton v. ment which stated that the dissolution Parker, 7 Dow. Pr. C. 739. was by mutual consent and that de- 48 INTRODUCTORY. §32 is to be determined, parol evidence is admissible to show the custom by which such a matter is determined and in reference to which the parties must be deemed to have contracted. 1 § 32. Parol evidence as to written consideration. — The In- diana rule is that a consideration stated upon the face of a written instrument, by way of mere recital, may be explained, varied or contradicted by parol evidence; but where the stipu- lation as to the consideration is contractual, as where there is a positive promise to pay a consideration specified, the consid- eration can no more be varied or contradicted by parol evi- dence than any other part of a written contract. 2 1 Richlands Glass Co. v. Hiltebeitel (Va. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 806; Loweu. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 179 ; Ford v. Tir- rell, 9 Gray, 401 ; Hinton v. Locke, 5 Hill, 437 ; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464. 2 Stewart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 141 Ind. 55; 40 N. E. Rep. 67, Hack- ney, J.. "The appellant insists that the consideration stated upon the face of the instrument may be attacked by parol evidence, while the appellee as earnestly insists that it may not be so attacked, because the consideration so stated is contractual, and is protected from attack by the rule that parol evi- dence can not be heard to contradict, vary, or amend the terms of a written contract complete upon its face. To the contention of the appellant are cited cases holding that, as a general rule, the consideration expressed in written contracts may be explained, varied, and contradicted. See Lever- ing v. Shockey, 100 Ind. 558 ; McMa- han v. Stewart, 23 Ind. 590 ; Thomp- son v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323 ; Rock- hill v. Spraggs, 9 Ind. 30; Ever- hart v. Puckett, 73 Ind. 409; Smith v. Boruff, 75 Ind. 412; City of Au- rora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 492. Treat- ing the instrument pleaded in bar of the cause of action as a receipt, the appellant urges the rule that receipts may be varied by parol evidence. See Markel's Adm'r v. Spitler's Adm'r, 28 Ind. 488 ; Beedle v. State, 62 Ind. 26 ; Stewart v. Armel, 62 Ind. 593 ; Lapping v. Duffy, 65 Ind. 229 ; Lash v. Rendell, 72 Ind. 475. We will consider the in- strument as a contract, not doubting that such is its effect. Alcorn v. Mor- gan, 77 Ind. 184 ; Munson v. Wray, 7 Blackf. 403. None of the general rules suggested are denied, but all are conceded by the parties, and the issue is narrowed to the correct application of these rules. If the consideration, as stated in the instrument in review, is contractual, the appellee's view of the case and the ruling of the circuit court must be affirmed; if not the judgment must be reversed. In Pickett v. Green, 120 Ind. 584; 22 N. E. Rep. 737, in speaking of the rule that the consideration expressed in a writing may be varied or contradicted by parol, this court has said: 'The reason generally given for the rule is that the language with reference to the consideration is not contractual, it is merely by way of recital of a fact, viz., the amount of the consideration, and not an agreement to pay it, and hence such recitals may be contra- dicted . ' Referring to the general rule that parol evidence can not be admit- ted to contradict the terms of a writ- ten contract, it was there further said that 'out of this grows the exception $33 INTRODUCTORY. 49 § 33. Notice and assent as evidence of contract. — A contract «reating a general lien in favor of one who does work on the goods and chattels of another may be proved by evidence that the latter had such work done after receiving notice that the other would claim such a lien. Where plaintiff, for several years, dyed and finished clothes for defendant company, as it sent them to him, and a notice that he received goods only on con- dition that they were subject to a general lien, not only for the dyeing and finishing thereof, but also for the balance of any former amount due, was printed on most of the slips on which dyeing orders were written by defendant, on the delivery slips signed by it or its employes, and on all bills and monthly statements mailed to it, such condition will, in the absence of any denial that the notice was received and read by defend- ant's officers and employes, be held to be part of the con- tract for dyeing. 1 to the rule first above stated, that "where the contract is complete upon its face, a stipulation as to the con- sideration becomes contractual, and where there is either a direct and pos- itive promise to pay the consideration named, or an assumption of an in- cumbrance on the part of a grantee in a deed, which becomes binding upon its acceptance, then the ordinary rules with reference to contracts apply, and the consideration expressed can no more be varied by parol than any other portion of the written contract.' In our judgment, the consideration expressed in the writing before us is not contractual, but is manifestly a Tecital of the amount of the considera- tion. It includes no agreement to pay •or assume any sum or liability. It may be considered apart from the ob- ligations of the appellant, and its statement was not essential to the •validity of such obligations, but it might have been established by parol. We have no doubt that the cases cor- rectly applying the rule that no parol inquiry may be made into the consid- 4 eration expressed are those where the consideration consists in the perform- ance of some duty which is, by the terms of the writing, undertaken on the one side for the benefit of the other. Such duties can not be dimin- ished or enlarged by parol. As we have said, the consideration of the contract before us involves the per- formance of no duty. The contract recites, as a consideration for the re- linquishment therein stated, the pay- ment to the appellant of a sum of money. If this recital is false, the same right exists to prove that fact by parol as exists in any possible case where the consideration alone of a contract may be attacked by parol." 1 Firth v. Hamill, 167 Pa. St. 382 ; 31 Atl. Rep. 676. In this case the ref- eree's opinion, which was approved by the court, was as follows: "The trans- actions between the parties were many and frequent, and no effort was made by the defendant to show that the officers and employes of the company did not receive and read the notice, or that they were not aware of the 50 INTRODUCTORY. §34 § 34. Circumstantial evidence of contracts. — The Illinois doctrine is that an express contract may be proved, not only by an actual agreement, by direct evidence, by the express condition upon which the plaintiffs received the goods; and the conclu- sion is irresistible that they sent the goods in question with knowledge of the condition upon which alone they would be received, and under this state of facts the contract has the same force and effect as if it had been form- ally signed by the parties. That a general lien may be created by con- tract between the parties is a proposi- tion that is not disputed ; and this may be either by express agreement, or by notice from the dyer that he will receive the goods only upon con- dition that he shall have a lien upon them for balance due, provided it be shown that the owner received the notice prior to intrusting his property with the dyer. In 2 Kent's Commen- taries, 637, cited in Overton on Liens, p. 5, § 7, the following proposition is laid down : ' This general lien may also be created by express agree- ment, as where one or more per- sons give notice that they will not receive any property for the purpose of their trade or business except on condition that they shall have a lien upon it, not only in respect to the charges arising on the particular goods, but for the general balance of their account. All persons who after- wards deal with them, with the knowl- edge of such notice, will be deemed to have acceded to that agreement.' At page 52, §45, it is said: 'A general lien, therefore, must be shown to have its existence through a proven custom of the trade, or it may be shown by a notice of such claim brought home to the bailor prior to his making a de- posit of goods. Any further bailment will be presumed made by assent on the part of the bailor. This applies to all cases where the bailee is not compellable by law to receive the bail- ment.' In the case of Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 14, a meeting of the dyers of Manchester was held, at which certain resolutions were adopted ; that the said dyers gave public notice that they would not receive goods except on condition that such goods should be subject to a lien for the general balance of account. These resolutions were signed by the plaintiffs, and were advertised in the Manchester newspapers, and this ad- vertisement was seen by the defend- ant. It was held that the plaintiffs had a general lien on the defendant's goods for the balance of his general account. In Wright v. Trainer, 1 AVkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 198, it was held 'that rules posted in a factory, and known to the employes, form part of their con- tract with the employers.' Even though it appear in evidence that the customer did not read the notice, it is a question for the court and jury to decide, whether, in view of all the circum- stances, he ought to have read it. Watkins v. Rymill, 10 Q. B. Div. 178. In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. American Oil Works, 126 Pa. St. 485 ; 17 Atl. 671, it was said by the court: 'As between the carrier and the consignee, who is. owner, we see no reason why this lien may not be extended by a contract to cover the general balance due by the consignee for the carriage of other goods. There would be no injustice or oppression in asking the consignee to pay what he honestly owed before allowing him to remove the goods from the possession of his creditor, whether that creditor was a natural or an artificial person.' " §34 INTRODUCTORY. 51 words used by the parties, but also by circumstantial evi- dence; and that an implied contract may be proved by cir- cumstances showing that the parties intended to contract, and by general course of dealing between them . l Thus a guaranty is a 'Heffron v. Brown (1895), 155 111. 322; 40 N. E. Rep. 583, perMagruder, J.; "In Miller v. Miller, 16 111. 298, an instruction was approved which stated that it was 'incumbent on the plaintiff to prove an express hiring or circumstances from which an express hiring may be reasonably inferred,' etc. And in Brush v. Blanchard, 18 111. 46, it was said : 'There is no evi- dence of an express contract to pay for services, nor are there any facts in evidence from which such contract can be implied.' Similar language is also used in Faloon v. Mclntyre, 118 111. 292 ; 8 N. E. Bep. 315, and in Collar v. Patterson, 137 111. 403; 27 N. E. Rep. 604. The strict rule laid down in the cases in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania has its basis in the dangerof fraud and perjury by permitting any member of a family to insist on a greater share of the property of an estate than is given by the law, or by a will, upon the ground that it is due for services. The encouragement of claims for such services is to destroy the peace and harmony of families through the strife and controversy resulting therefrom. The rule in this state is stated in Mil- ler v. Miller, supra, where we said : 'Where one remains with a parent, or with a person standing in the relation of parent, after arriving at majority, and remains in the same apparent re- lation as when a minor, the pre- sumption is that the parties do not contemplate payment of wages for services. This presumption may be overthrown, and the reverse estab- lished, by proof of an express or im- plied contract, and the implied con- tract may be proven by facts and cir- cumstances which show that both par- ties, at the time the services were per- formed, contemplated or intended pecuniary recompense other than such as naturally arises out of the relation of parent and child.' This language was quoted and approved in the re- cent case of Switzeri). Kee, 146 111. 577 ; 35 N. E. Rep. 160. But, where it is said that a contract to pay for such services may be implied, something more is meant than the mere promise to pay which the law implies where one person does work for another with the knowledge and approbation of that other. The implied promise thus raised by the law is rebutted when there is shown such a relation be- tween the parties as to exclude the inference that they were dealing on the footing of a contract. Ayers v. Hull, supra; 3 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, p. 861. The evi- dence must show that, when the serv- ices were rendered, both parties ex- pected them to be paid for. Miller v. Miller, supra; Byers v. Thompson, 66 111. 421 ; Fruitt v. Anderson, 12 111. App . 421 . The facts and circumstances must be such as to show that, at the time the services were rendered, the one expected to receive payment and the other to make payment. Fruitt v. Anderson, supra." In Church v. Imperial Gas Co., 6 Ad. & El. 846, 859, Lord Denman, C. J., said: "Where the action is brought for the breach of an executed contract the evidence of the contract, if an express one, must be the same as if the action was brought while it was executory; an oral or written agreement or a series of letters might be produced to prove the fact and the terms of the con- tract." 52 INTRODUCTORY. § 34 mercantile instrument, to be construed according to what is fairly to be presumed to have been the understanding of the parties, without any strict technical accuracy, but in further- ance of its spirit, and liberally to promote the use and conven- ience of commercial intercourse. It should be given that effect which will best accord with the intention of the parties, as manifested by the terms of the guaranty, taken in connection with the subject-matter to which it relates, neither en- larging the words beyond their natural import in favor of the creditor, nor restricting them in aid of the surety. The cir- cumstances accompanying the whole transaction may be looked to in ascertaining the understanding of the parties. 1 By an exception in a grant, the thing excepted is taken wholly out of the grant, and is no parcel of the thing granted ; that which is excepted out of the general words is in the same case as if it had never been touched. 2 And the general rule is that where there is a contract for the sale of land, by the terms of which a deed is to be subsequently given, the delivery and acceptance of the deed merges the contract in it, and the contract is super- seded by the deed as to such provisions as are covered by the conveyance made in pursuance of its terms, and remains in force only as to any other provisions it may contain. 3 1 Hoopers. Hooper, 81 Md. 155; 31 Wells, 11 N. Y. 315, 320; Bridger v. Atl. Rep. 508; Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. Pierson, 45 N. Y. 601; and Marvin 482; Mauran u. Bullus, 16 Pet. 528; v. Brewster Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 538, Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169; Davis v. 548, in support of the text. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 TJ. S. 159; s Schoonmaker v. Hoyt, 148 N. Y. Mussey o. Rayner, 22 Pick. 223. 425; 42 N. E. Rep. 1059; Witbeck v. 2 Schoonmaker v. Hoyt (1896), 148 Waine, 16 N. Y. 532; Murdock v. Gil- N. Y. 425; 42 N. E. Rep. 1059, where christ, 52 N. Y. 242, 246; Wilson v. Martin, J., cites Burr v. Mills, 21 Randall, 67 N. Y. 338; Disbrow v. Wend. (N. Y.) 290, 293; Craig v. Harris, 122 N. Y. 362, 365. CHAPTER II. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 36. General nature of contract. 36. What is a proposal. 37. Revocation of offer. 38. The same subject continued. 39. The same subject continued — Il- lustrations. 40. Offer when revocable. 41. General offers. 42. Revocation of a general offer. 43. Lapsing of offer by death. 44. Proposal — Reasonable time. 45. The effect of a mere inquiry on an offer — Rejection. 46. Method of refusal. 47. Proposals contained in tickets, receipts, etc. 48. The same subject continued. 49. What constitutes acceptance. 50. Acceptance of written offer — Delivery. 51. Absolute acceptance. 52. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 53. Acceptance to be without con- dition. 54. Condition as rejection of offer. §55. The same subject continued — Counter offers. 56. Ancillary matters. 57. Acceptance by conduct. 58. The same subject continued. 59. Revocability of an acceptance. 60. The same subject continued — The effect of postal regula- tions. 61. Authority to accept by post. 62. Proposal and acceptance by letter. 63. Proposals by telegraph. 64. Contract by letters and tele- grams. 65. Certainty of proposal and ac- ceptance. 66. Place of contract. 67. The English doctrine of pro- posals in deeds. 68. The same subject continued. 69. The American doctrine. 70. The same subject continued. 71. Revocability of a deed before delivery. § 35. General nature of contract. — There are certain gen- eral principles of a practical kind, which are -useful in every case of a simple contract for determining the question whether or not a contract is created on a particular occasion. An offer of terms on the one side, and an assent to or acceptance of those terms on the other, communicated between the parties, must necessarily be the form of every simple agreement. The sending of an order for goods to a merchant or tradesman is an offer to purchase ; and the sending of the goods ordered is (53) 54 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 36 an acceptance of the offer, and creates a contract of sale. 1 An open letter of credit in the common form, undertaking to honor bills of exchange to be drawn by the person to whom it is given, operates as a general offer of a contract, addressed or intended to be shown to all persons who may be willing to act upon it ; which may be accepted by any such person making advances upon bills drawn in conformity with its terms. 8 The publication of an advertisement offering a reward for informa- tion is a general offer to any person who is able to give the desired information ; and the acceptance of it by giving such information creates a valid contract. 3 A guarantee for pay- ment of goods sold to a third person, or for the services of an agent or servant, is in general a mere offer until accepted by act- ing upon it according to its terms ; the party guaranteed is not bound to act upon it, but upon supplying the goods, or making the advances, or employing the agent or servant, he accepts the offer on the guarantee attached. 4 The sale by auction is de- cidedly the best illustration of the principle that a contract has its inception in offer and acceptance. Each bidding is an offer of a price for the article put up for sale ; and these biddings may be successively made until one is accepted by the fall of the hammer, when the agreement is complete. 5 And conse- quently the property in a chattel sold by auction passes at the fall of the hammer. 6 § 36. What is a proposal. — Great care should always be taken not to construe the conduct or declarations or letters of a party as a proposal which the party only intended as a pre- liminary negotiation. The question in such cases always is, did he mean to make a proposal, or was he only settling the terms of an agreement into which he proposed to enter, after 1 Harvey v. Johnston, 6 C. B. 295, 2 Q. B. 301; 36 L. J. Q. B. 112; Bent 304, Cresswell, J.: "If a man writes, v. Wakefield Bank, L. R. 4 C. ?. D. send me such and such goods and I 1; Thatcher v. England, 3 C. B. 254. will pay for them, is not the sending 'Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. of the goods, without more, an accept- 498 ; Westhead v. Sproson, 6 H. & N. ance of the offer?" 728 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 265. 2 In re Agra and Masterman's Bank, s Payne v. Cave, 3 T. R. 148. L. R. 2 Ch. 391 ; 36 L. J. C. 222. 6 Sweeting v. Turner, L. R. 7 Q. B. s Williams v. Oarwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 310 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 58. 621. Compare Tarner v. Walker, L. R. 3 36 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 55 all its particulars were adjusted ? The fact that the parties do intend a subsequent agreement to be made is strong evidence to show that they did not intend the previous negotiation to amount to any proposal or acceptance. An agreement, to be finally settled, must comprise all the terms which the parties intend to introduce into the agreement; and until the terms of a proposal are settled, the proposer is at liberty to retire from the bargain. This is particularly applicable to letters and ad- vertisements intended to get trade. Any communication, in general language proper to be addressed generally to those who are interested in a trade or business, is a mere advertise- ment, and not a proposal. 1 1 Hill v. Webb, 43 Minn. 545; 45 N. W. Rep. 1133; Ahearn v. Ayres, 38 Mich. 692; Lyman v. Eobinson, 14 Al- len, 242, 254 ; Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316; Beaupre v. Pacific & A. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155, 159; King- horne v. Montreal Tel. Co., 18 Up- per Canada (Q. B.), 60; Crocker v. New London, etc., R. Co., 24 Conn. 249, 261 ; Hiissey v. Horne-Payne, L. R. 4 App. Ca. 311. In this case Lord Selborne says : "The observation has oft?n been, made, that a contract es- tablished by letters may sometimes bind parties who, when they wrote those letters, did not imagine that they were finally settling the terms of the agreement by which they were to be bound J and it appears to me that no such contract ought to be held es- tablished, even by letters that would otherwise be sufficient for the pur- pose, if it is clear, upon the facts, that there were other conditions of the in- tended contract beyond and besides those expressed in the letters, which were still in a state of negotiation only, and without the settlement of which ■the parties had no idea of concluding any agreement.1 I adhere to what I said, when sitting in the court of chancery, in the case of Jervis v. Ber- ildge (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 360), that the statute of frauds 'is a weapon of defense, not offense,' and 'does not make any signed instrument a valid contract by reason of the signature, if it is not such according to the good faith and real intention of the parties.' And I think it especially important to keep that principle in view, when, as in the present case, it is attempted to draw a line at one point of a negotia- tion, conducted partly by correspond- ence and partly at meetings between the parties, without regard to the sequel of the negotiations, which to my mind plainly shows that terms of the intended agreement, which were of great practical importance, and were so regarded on both sides, then remained unsettled and were still the subject of negotiation between them." And in the same case Lord Cairns says: "Where you have to find your contract, or your note or memorandum of the terms of the contract in letters, you must take into consideration the whole of the correspondence which has passed. You must not at one particular time draw a line and say 'we will look at the letters up to this point and find in them a contract or not, but we will look at nothing be- yond.' In order fairly to estimate what was arranged and agreed, if any 56 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §§ 37, 38 § 37. Revocation of offer. — Any offer without consideration may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. 1 The reason that an offer may be revoked before acceptance is that there is no consideration for it, and, being a mere unilateral promise, it is nudum pactum.* In the case of Cooke v. Oxley, 8 Butler, Judge, says: "It is impossible to support this declaration in any point of view. In order to sustain a promise, there must be either a damage to the plaintiff, or an advantage to the de- fendant; but here was neither when the contract or offer was first made." A person who has made an offer must be considered as continuously making it, until he has brought to the knowledge of the person to whom it was made that it is withdrawn. 4 § 38. The same subject continued. — It is clear that a uni- lateral promise is not binding, and that, if the person who makes an offer revokes it before it is accepted, which he is at liberty to do, the negotiation is at an end. But, in the ab- sence of an intermediate revocation, a party who makes a pro- posal by letter to another is considered as repeating the offer every instant of time until the letter has reached its destina- tion, and the correspondent has had a reasonable time to an- swer it. "Common sense tells us that transactions can not go on without such a rule," says Lord Cottenham. 5 It can not make any difference whether the negotiation is carried on by post, or by telegraph, or by oral message. If the offer is not retracted, it is in force as a continuing offer, until the time for accepting or rejecting it has arrived. But, if it is retracted, there is an end of the proposal; and, to revoke a proposal once made, the revocation must be communicated before acceptance, and an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical pur- poses, and in point of law, no revocation at all. G thing was agreed between the parties, Aid. 681; Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. you must look at the whole of that L. C. 381 ; In re Imperial Land Com- which took place between them." pany (Harris's Case), L. R. 7 Cb. 1 Waterman v. Banks, 144 U, S. 394, App. 587 ; Byrne «. Van Tienboven, 402 - L. R. 5 C. P. D. 344. 2 Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653. s Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 381. 3 3 T. R. G.->3. e gtitt v _ Huidekopers, 17 Wall. 384; 4 Henthorn v. Fraser L. R. (1892), Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 2 Ch. 27, 1 ; Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & §§ 39, 40 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 57 § 39. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — While it is generally held, both in England and America, that an accept- ance of a proposal made by correspondence is complete and bind- ing from the time the letter containing the acceptance is posted, the rule as to revocation is different. A revocation of an offer is of no effect until brought to the mind of the person to whom the offer was made, and a revocation sent by post does not operate from the time of posting it. 1 And these two rules may give rise to a seeming anomaly, that the same letter might contain an acceptance, and also such a notice of revocation or offer as to other property that, when posted, it would be effect- ual as to the acceptance, and not as to the revocation or offer. But this anomaly, if it be one, arises from the different nature of the two communications. As to the acceptance, if it was contemplated that it might be sent by post, the acceptor has done all he was bound to do by posting the letter, but this can not be said as to the notice of withdrawal. This was not a contemplated proceeding. The person withdrawing is bound to bring his change of purpose to the knowledge of the other party. 2 § 40. Offer when revocable. — An offer is revocable until it is accepted in accordance with its terms. 3 Accordingly an 402 ; Potts v. Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 346 ; Moore v. Pierson, 55, 57, 59; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. 6 Iowa, 279; Tayloe v. Merchants', Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Craig v. Harper, etc., Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Wheat v. 3 Cush. 158; Burton v. Shotwell, 13 Cross, 31 Md. 99; 1 Am. Rep. 28. Bush, 271; Johnson v. Filkington, 39 2 Household Fire, etc., Co. v. Grant, Wis. 62; Houghwout v. Boisaubin, 18 L. R. 4 Exch. D. 216, 234. See, es- N. J. Eq. 315; Quick v. Wheeler, 78 pecially, the remarks of Lord Bram- N. Y. 300; Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & well. Aid. 681;Dunlop«.Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 3 Isham v. Therasson (N. J. Eq. 381 ; Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 1895), 30 Atl. Rep. 969, McGill, Ch. : L. R. 4 Exch. D. 216; Tayloe v. Mer- "Regarding the memorandum in chants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; the light of an offer to assign the Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L. R. 5 C. mortgage, it is noticed that it is con- P. D. 344; Stevenson r. McLean, L. ditioned upon the receipt of $250. R. 5 Q. B. D. 346; Henthorn v. Fra- Its language, divesting it of superflu- ser, L. R. (1892), 2 Ch. 27, 31; Smith ous words, is: 'I agree * * * to v. Weaver, 90 111. 392. assign * * * in consideration of 1 Henthorn ». Fraser, L. R. (1892), 2 receiving * * * the sum of $250.' Ch. 27 ; Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L. R. The only effective acceptance of such 5 C. P. D. 344 ; Stevenson v. McLean, an offer was the payment or tender of 58 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §40 offer to purchase goods may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance, but the withdrawal must be brought to the knowl- edge of the other party. And where a letter withdrawing an offer for the purchase of goods was mailed in time to haye reached the other party in the due course of mail before his letter accepting the offer was mailed, and it was shown that the letter of withdrawal was properly directed, and had a re- turn card thereon, but that it had not been returned to the sender, the presumption that the letter was received in due time is, in the absence of rebutting evidence, conclusive. 1 the $250. Prior to that payment, or the legal tender of the payment — which itself would furnish valuable consideration (Cutting v. Dana, 25 N. J. Eq. 265) — the whole matter rested in a mere voluntary promise or offer, which was revocable at the pleasure of the promisor or his legal represent- atives (Houghwout v. Boisaubin, 18 N. J. Eq.315)." 1 Sherwin v. Cash Register Co., 5 Colo. App. 162; 38 Pac. Rep. 392, per Thomson, J.: "The order given for the register was simply an offer or proposal which required the accept- ance of the plaintiff to constitute a contract. Until such acceptance there was no meeting of minds, or mutual- ity, in respect to the terms proposed or the subject-matter of the order, and without this there could be no contract. A proposal, while it re- mains unaccepted, is of no binding force, and is completely under the control of the person who makes it. At any time before acceptance, he may withdraw it, and, when so with- drawn, it is a nullity; but, to render the withdrawal effective, it must be brought to the knowledge of the other party before acceptance. See Pomeroy on Contracts, § 58 e t seq. ; also, Bishop on Contracts, § 321 et seq. We agree with counsel that the notice of the with- drawal of an offer must be actual, and must be received before the offer is ac- cepted ; but we think the admissions concerning the posting of the defend- ant's letter are at least prima facie evi- dence of actual notice. The letter was deposited in the post-office on January 9, in time for the out-going mail, and the order was given on the 8th, after the departure of the mail, so that the two probably went out together, and were received at the same time. At all events, the letter was posted in time to have reached the plaintiff one or two days before the date of its let- ter of acceptance. The presumption is that the letter of withdrawal reached its destination within the time usually required for the trans- mission of letters from the defend- ant's to the plaintiff's post-office. The presumption that the letter was re- ceived in due time is subject to rebut- tal by evidence that it was not in fact received. No attempt at rebuttal was made ; and, in the absence of rebut- ting evidence, the presumption be- came, for the purposes of the case, con- clusive. In Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185 ; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 382, the court said: "The rule is well settled that if a letter, properly directed, is proven to have been either put into the post- office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed, from the known course of business in the post-office depart- ments, that it has reached its destina- tion at the regular time, and was re- § 41 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 59 § 41. General offers. — At its first promulgation an offer need not be made to any specific person. It may be made gen- erally and left open so that any one accepting it is the one con- tracted with. While there is no matter of contract that can not be negotiated by means of a general offer, the most usual applications of the doctrine of general offer arise out of cases where rewards are offered for the return of lost and stolen prop- erty, and for information touching certain matters. It has often been decided that if the loser of property, in order to stimulate the vigilance and industry of others to find and restore it, makes an express promise of a reward, either to a particular person, or in general terms to any one who will return it to him and in consequence of such offer, one does return it to him, it is a valid contract. Until something is done in pur- suance of it, it is a mere offer, and may be revoked. But if, before it is retracted, one so far complies with it as to perform the labor for which the reward is stipulated, it is the ordinary case of labor done on request, and becomes a contract to pay the stipulated compensation. It is not a gratuitous service, because something is done which the party was not bound to do, and without such offer might not have been done. 1 An offer can not become a contract unless acted upon or assented to. The motive inducing consent may be immaterial but the consent is vital. Without that there is no contract. That a party claiming a reward of this character must give some in- formation, or do something having some reference to the reward •offered, is very obvious. Where a contract is proposed to all the world, in the form of an offer, any party may assent to it and it is binding, but he can not assent without knowledge of the proposition. It therefore follows that one, to be entitled to a reward offered, must show a rendition of the services re- ceived by the person to whom it was was ample time for its return between addressed." In this case the pre- the date of its posting and the date of sumption of the receipt of the letter is the agreed statement, and the pre- strengthened by the fact that it was sumption also is that it would have never returned to the defendant, been returned if it had not been de- either in obedience to the direction of livered. the return card on the envelope, or 'Wentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. 352. through the dead-letter office. There 60 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §§ 42, 43 quired after a knowledge of and with a view of obtaining the reward. 1 § 42. Revocation of a general offer. — A general offer is re- vocable at any time before it is accepted and before anything is done in reliance on it. There is no contract until its terms are complied with. Like any other offer of a contract, it may, therefore, be withdrawn before rights have accrued under it; and it may be withdrawn through the same channel in which it was made. Care should -be taken that the same notoriety is given to the revocation that was given to the offer. 2 Any gen- eral offer not made to any specific person directly may be re- voked in the manner in which it was made. ' And if a person, being ignorant of the withdrawal, performs the service the of- fer called for, still he can not recover. 8 § 43. Lapsing of offer by death. — An offer which has not been accepted in the life-time of the maker is necessarily ter- minated by his death; nor can the representatives of the de- ceased be made liable upon the unaccepted offer. 4 Thus, a continuing guarantee, so far as it is a mere offer which may be acted upon, is revoked as to a future action upon it, by notice of the death of the guarantor. 5 So an agency or authority to 1 Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604 ; paid for any information that shall 10 Am. Rep. 654; Fitch v. Sneda- conduce to the arrest of either of the ker, 38 N. Y. 248; Tamer r. Walker, above named criminals or their ae- L. R. 1 Q. B. 641; 2 Q. B. 301; Burke complices;" and such proclamation r. Wells, Fargo & Co., 50 Cal. 218; was not limited in terms to any spe- Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 134. Con- cific period, and it was signed "Ed- tra, Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush, 572; win M. Stanton, Secretary of War." Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199; About six months thereafter, the Pres- Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt.170 ; Williams ident caused to be published his order v. Tarwardine, 4B. & Aid. 621 (qucere). revoking the reward. Held, that the 2 Shuey v. United States, 92 II. S. 73. withdrawal was sufficient to work a In this case, the secretary of war of revocation of the offer. the United States issued, and caused s Shuey r. United States, 92 U. S. 73. to be published in the public news- * Mellish, L. J., Dickinson v. Dodds, papers, a proclamation, whereby he L. R. 2 Oh. Div. 463, 475. announced that there would be paid, 5 Coulthart v. Clementson, L. R. 5 by the war department, "for the ap- Q. B. D. 42; 49 L. J. Q. B. 204; Be prehension of John H. Surratt,one of Sherry, L. II. 25 Ch. Div. 692; 53 L. Booth's accomplices," $25,000 reward, J. Ch. D. 404. and also that "liberal rewards will be § 44 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 61 contract on behalf of a person is terminated by his death, and a contract purporting to be made under it, although without no- tice of the death, is not chargeable against his representatives. 1 An offer not having been accepted lapses on the death of the person to whom it is made." And an offer can not be either accepted or continued, and renewed by the executors or per- sonal representatives of a deceased person. 8 An offer relating to the property of a person is terminated by his bankruptcy, which transfers all his property to his trustees. 4 § 44. Proposal — Reasonable time. — Where an offer is made, there being no limit in terms, then, by a general rule of law, it must be limited to a reasonable time. 5 What is a reason- able time, when all the facts and circumstances are proved on which it depends, is a question of law. In order to determine it the objects and purposes of the offer must be considered. Thus, where an advertisement offering a reward for the appre- hension of criminals was made and four years thereafter the re- ward was claimed, the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts held the offer had lapsed before the expiration of four years 6 It 1 Blades v. Free, 9 B. & 0. 167 ; Cam- life-time, but was finished and deliv- panari v. Woodburn, 15 C. B. 400. In ered after his death, by his adminis- this case, A. agreed with B. that he tratrix. Held, that a suit brought to would endeavor to sell a picture be- recover the price of the coat, as though longing to B., and that, if he succeed- sold and delivered by the tailor, was ed in selling the same, B. should pay improperly brought, and that the ad- him £100. B. died before the picture ministratrix should have counted as was sold. In an action against the for goods sold and delivered by her. administratrix of B., upon the above Tindall, C. J., said: "If the property agreement, the count alleged that, in in the coat vested in the administra- pursuance of the agreement, A. did, trix, on the intestate's decease, and she before and after the death of B., en- finished and delivered it afterwards, deavor to sell, and, after the death of it seems to me that such coat was de- B., he did succeed in selling, the pict- livered under a new contract made by ure. Held, plaintiff could not recover her with the defendant." because B.'s offer was revoked by his 4 Meynell v. Surtees, 25 L. J. C. 257. death. 5 Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co. v. 2 Werner v. Humphreys, 2 M. & G. Montefiore, L. R. 1 Exch. 109; Bowen 853. v. McCarthy, 85 Mich. 26; Loring v. 3 J«r«CheshireBankingCo.,L.R.32 Boston, 7 Mete. 409; Larmon v. Jor- Ch. Div. 301; Werner v. Humphreys, dan, 56 111. 204; Meynell v. Surtees, 2 M. & G. 853. In this case, a coat, or- 25 L. J. C. 257 ; Powers v. Fowler, 4 deredof a tailor, was cut out, tacked to- E. & B. 511. gether, and tried on during the tailor's 6 Loring v. Boston, 7 Mete. 409. 62 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 45 has also been held that an interval of four months between the application for shares in a corporation and their allotment was not a reasonable time and the application or proposal had lapsed, 1 and in a late case in Iowa, 2 where an acceptance was delayed four weeks, the court said, "we could not say that four weeks was not an unreasonable time," and in another case 3 a delay to accept for twenty-four hours was held to be an acceptance not within a reasonable time. The better opinion is, that what is, or is not, a reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances attending the negotiation, and the character of the subject-matter of the contract, because in no better way can the intention of the parties be determined. If the negotia- tion is in respect to an article stable in price, there is not so much reason for an immediate acceptance of the offer, and the same rule would not apply as in a case where the negotiation related to an article subject to sudden and great fluctuations in the market. 1 § 45. The effect of a mere inquiry on an offer — Rejection — While an acceptance of an offer varying from the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer, 5 and constitutes a counter pro- posal, still a mere inquiry as to the terms of the proposal, or a request to modify or change the offer, does not have the effect of rejecting the offer, and if the offer has not been revoked a party may accept it, although he previously asked the proposer to modify it. 6 If an offer made is rejected, the party making 1 Baily's Case, L. R. 5 Eq. 428. wrote to the plaintiffs fixing 40s. per 2 Ferrier v. Storer, 63 Iowa, 484, 489. ton, net cash, as the lowest price at 3 Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Col- which he could sell, and stating that lier White Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431. he would hold the offer open till the 1 Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Col- following Monday. The plaintiffs on lier White Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431. the Monday morning at 9 :42 tele- 6 National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. 8., graphed to the defendant: "Please 43. wire whether you would accept forty 6 Stevenson v. McLean, L. R. 5 Q. for delivery over two months, or if B. D. 346. In this case the defendant, not, longest limit you could give." being possessed of warrants for iron, The defendant sent no answer to this wrote from London to the plaintiffs telegram, and after its receipt on the at Middlesborough asking whether same day he sold the warrants and at they could get him an offer for the 1:25 p. m. telegraphed the plaintiffs warrants. Further correspondence en- he had done so. Before the arrival of sued, and ultimately the defendant his telegram to that effect, the plain- §§ 46, 47 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 63 it is relieved from liability on that offer, and the party who has rejected the offer can not afterwards, at his own option, convert the same offer into an agreement by acceptance ; for that purpose he must have the renewed consent of the person who made the offer. 1 § 46. Method of refusal. — An offer can not be made in such terms that an acceptance will be assumed without communica- tion. Where a letter was sent offering to buy a horse, and stat- ing that if the writer received no answer he would assume that his offer was accepted, to which no answer was returned, it was held that there was no contract. The court said that a person in making an offer to another has no right "to put upon him the burden of the choice of writing a letter of refusal or being bound by the agreement proposed." 2 Accordingly where a letter was issued by a company to the shareholders, stating that the new shares were allotted and the certificates in- closed, with a receipt to be signed and returned, it was held that a shareholder who had taken no notice of the communica- tion was not bound to accept the shares, and could not be charged as a shareholder.' § 47. Proposals contained in tickets, receipts, etc. — A great number of contracts are in the present state of society made by the delivery by one of the contracting parties to the other of a document in a common form, stating the terms by which the person delivering it will enter into the proposed contract. Such a form constitutes the offer of the party tendering it. If the form is accepted without objection by the person to whom tiffs having at 1 p. m. found a par- to revoke his offer before the close of chaser for the iron, sent a telegram at the day on Monday, such revocation 1:34 p. m. to the defendant stating was not effectual till it reached the that they had secured his price. The plaintiffs; consequently the def end- defendant refused to deliver the iron, ant's offer was still open when the and the plaintiffs brought an action, plaintiffs accepted it. It was held that under the circum- 1 Sheffield Canal Co. v. Sheffield, stances the plaintiffs' telegram at 9:42 etc., Ey. Co., 3 Eng. By. & C. Cas. ought not to be construed as a rejec- 121. tion of the defendant's offer, but mere- 2 Felthouse v. Bindley, 11 C. B. N. S. ly as an inquiry whether he would 869. modify the terms of it, and that al- 3 Somerville's Case,L. E. 6 Ch.266; though the defendant was at liberty 40 L. L. C. 431. 64 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §47 it is tendered, this person is, as a general rule, bound by its contents; and his act amounts to an acceptance of the offer made to him, whether he reads the document or otherwise in- forms himself of its contents or not. 1 To this general rule, however, there are a variety of exceptions. In the first place, the nature of the transaction may be such that the person ac- cepting the document may suppose, not unreasonably, that the document contains no terms at all, but is a mere acknowledg- ment of an agreement not intended to be varied by special terms. Some illustrations of this exception may be found in the judgments in Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 2 and in 1 Watkins v. Rynrill, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 178 ; Zunz v. South Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 539; Harris v. Great Western Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 515 ; Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. D. 416 ; Burke v. South Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. D. 1; Grace v. Adama, 100 Mass. 505; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168 ; Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 171; Long a. New York, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. 76; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. S. 174 ; Madan v. Sherard, 73 N. Y. 329, 334. * L. R. 2 C. P. D. 416. In this case, there was a deposit of articles at the cloak room at a railway station, and a charge was made of 2d. for each, and the depositor received a ticket, on the face of which were printed the times of opening and closing the cloak room and the words, "See Back," and on the back there was a notice that the company would not be responsible for any package exceeding £10. A plac- ard, upon which was printed in legi- ble characters the same condition, was also hung up in the cloak room. The plaintiff deposited his bag, of value exceeding £10, in the defend- ant's cloak room, paid 2d. and re- ceived a ticket. The bag was stolen. In an action to recover its value, the plaintiff swore that he took the ticket without reading it, imagining it to be only a receipt for the money paid for the deposit of the article, or as evi- dence that the company had received the article ; that he did not read the condition on the back of the ticket, nor did he see the notice hung up in the cloak room. The judge left two questions to the jury: 1. Did the plaintiff read, or was he aware of, the special condition upon which the ar- ticle was deposited? 2. Was the plaintiff, under the circumstances, under any obligation, in the exercise of reasonable and proper caution, to read or to make himself aware of the condition? The jury answered both questions in the negative, and judg- ment was directed for the plaintiff. Held, by Mellish and Baggally, L. J. J., that there ought to be a new trial, on the ground that there had been a misdirection by the judge, inasmuch as the plaintiff could be under no ob- ligation to read the condition, and that the second question left to the jury ought to have been, whether the company did that which was reason- ably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the condition. Held, fur- ther, by Bramwell, L. J., that, on the above facts, it was a question of law, and that judgment ought to be en- tered for the defendants. §§ 48, 49 OFFEK AND ACCEPTANCE. 65 the language of some of the law lords in Henderson v. Steven- son, 1 although these must be received with caution for reasons given by Lord Blackburn in his judgment in Harris v. Great Western Ry. Co. 8 § 48. The same subject continued. — A second exception would be the case of fraud, as if the conditions were printed in such a manner as to mislead the person accepting the docu- ment.' A third exception occurs, where, without being fraud- ulent, the document is misleading, and does actually mislead the person who has taken it. 4 An exception has been suggested of conditions unreasonable in themselves or irrelevant to the main purpose of the contract. Lord Bramwell suggests some illustrations of this in his judgment in Parker v. South Eastern By. Co. 6 One is the case of a ticket having on it a condition that the goods deposited in a cloak room should become the ab- solute property of the railway if not removed in two days. § 49. What constitutes acceptance. — What shall constitute an acceptance will depend in a great measure on circumstances. 1 L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 470. brought to the knowledge of a con- 8 L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 515. tracting party, he shall be held to 8 Watkins v. Rymill, L. R. 10 Q. B. have assented to that which he has not D. 178. seen and of which he knows nothing." 4 The case of Henderson v. Steven- Also, per Lord Chancellor Chelms- son (L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 470) is an illus- ford: "A mere notice from the steam tration of this. In this case a ticket, packet company without the passen- having on its face only the words ger's assent will not discharge them " Dublin and Whitehaven," was given from performing the very essence of to a passenger, who, without looking their duty, which is to safely and at it, paid for it, and went on board, securely carry, unless prevented by Having lost all his luggage he brought unavoidable accidents." Per Lord an action against the company. De- Hatherley: "A ticket is in reality fense of the company, that on the back nothing more than a receipt for the of the ticket there was an intimation mouey, which has been paid." Per that they were not to be liable for losses Lord O'Hagan: "When a company ■of any kind or from any cause. Judg- desires to impose special and stringent ment against the company with costs, terms upon its customers, there is Per the Lord Chancellor : "It would nothing unreasonable in requiring be extremely dangerous to hold that that those terms shall be distinctly where a document is complete on the declared and deliberately accepted." face of it, but having on the back of s L. R. 2 C. P. D. 416. it something which had not been 5 66 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 50 The mere determination of the mind unacted on can never be an acceptance. The acceptance must be evidenced by some act that binds the party accepting. A man's mental resolu- tion, that can be changed, is not sufficient; both parties must be bound or neither will be. Where the offer is by letter the usual mode of acceptance is by the sending of a letter announc- ing a consent to accept; where it is made by a messenger a de- termination to accept returned through him or sent by another would seem to be all the law requires if the contract may be consummated without writing. There are other modes which are equally conclusive upon the parties; any appropriate act which accepts the terms as they were intended to be accepted, so as to bind the acceptor, just as clearly evidences the concur- rence of the parties — the bringing their minds together — as a formal letter of acceptance. Anything that will amount to a manifestation of a formed determination to accept, communi- cated or put in the proper way to be communicated to the party making the offer will complete the contract. The prin- ciple governing the matter of acceptance is, that there must be a concurrence of the minds of the parties upon a distinct proposition, manifested by an overt act. 1 In analogy to the rule that the interpretation of a contract in writing is a matter of law for the court, is the rule that what acts or words will suffice to constitute an acceptance, by one party, of a proposal submitted by another, so that a contract or agreement thereby becomes matured, is wholly a question of law for the court. 2 § 50. Acceptance of written offer— Delivery. — Where an offer is in writing, signed and delivered by the party making it, and is accepted, and acted upon by both parties, it is suffi- ciently executed to make it a binding obligation upon both, and will not be construed as a unilateral agreement. 8 Where 1 Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; 3 Bloom v. Hazzard, 104 Cal. 310 ; 37 White v. Corlies, 46" N. Y. 467 ; Trevor Pac. Eep. 1037, per Belcher, C. : "It v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307; Lungstrass r\ is claimed i or appellant that the agree- German Ins. Co .,48 Mo. 201; Mactier ment of September 21 was not a v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103. contract, and that at most it could z Falls Wire Manf. Co. v. Broderick, only be considered a unilateral of- 12 Mo. App. 378; Lancaster v. Elliott, fer on the part of the constable, 28 Mo. App. 86. which required an unconditional §51 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 67 one copy of a contract which is to be executed in duplicate has been signed by the parties, but is left with the attorney of one party to have a duplicate executed, there is not a sufficient de- livery of the instrument to constitute a contract. 1 § 51. Absolute acceptance — To constitute a contract, there must be a proposition by one party, accepted by the other, with- out any modification whatever. If the acceptance modifies the proposition in any particular, however trifling, it amounts to no more than a counter proposition; it is not in law an accept- ance which will complete the contract. The mere proposal of a bargain by one person to another imposes no obligation upon the former until it is accepted by the latter according to the terms in which the offer is made. Any qualification of, or de- parture from, those terms, invalidates the offer, unless the same be agreed to by the person who made it. 2 acceptance to make it binding, and that 'the writing as a contract in itself is void (a) because it is not exe- cuted by respondent,-that is, it does not show his assent ; (b) because there is no second party to the instrument ; (c) there is no mutuality of obligation or rights.' The writing was more than a unilateral offer on the part of the constable. It was an agreement in writing signed and delivered by him to the defendant. It was accepted by defendant, and was acted upon by both parties. This was a sufficient execution to make the writing a bind- ing obligation, and to meet all the ob- jections above noted. Eeedy v. Smith, 42 Cal. 245." 1 Lamar Milling Co. v. Craddock, 5 Colo. App. 203; 37 Pac. Rep. 950, per Reed, J. : The custodian of the signed paper was the attorney of the appellant. There had been no de- livery. "Every written contract must, to take effect, be delivered, and the delivery must be absolute." "The delivery of a written contract is any act whereby the party delivering it relinquishes his power over the writ- ing, whether by passing it directly to the other party, or to any third per- son, or otherwise, with the express or implied intent that shall operate as a contract." Bishop on Contracts, §§349,350; Fay v. Richardson, 7 Pick. 91; Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560; Thatcher v. Wardens, etc., 37 Mich. 264. The contract was to be du- plicated. Until the signing of both and delivery of one to appellee, there was no contract. The written paper in the possession of the legal agent of appellant was as much in its custody and under its control as if in the hand of the manager. Until fully executed and delivered, the contract was in limine; either party could revoke or withdraw. 2 Eliasona. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225 ; Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 77; Hough v. Brown, 19 N. Y. Ill ; Harlow v. Cur- tis, 121 Mass. 320; Jenness v. Mount Hope Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; Potts v. Whitehead, 23 N. J. Eq. 512; Eggle- ston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610 ; John- son v. Stephenson, 26 Mich. 63; Falls Wire Manufacturing Co. v. Broderick, 12 Mo. App. 378; Bruner v. Wheaton, 68 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 52 § 52. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where one wrote to another offering his farm for sale and the letter in answer contained a direct acceptance of the offer, except the security to be given for the proposed payments, it was decided that there was no contract between the parties. 1 A man ad- vertised his estate for sale. The plaintiff proposed to purchase it, and authorized his solicitor to make an offer of a certain sum for it. This offer was accepted by letter, but with the added condition that a certain deposit should be made and the sale completed within a given time. The House of Lords agreed that there was no contract here. 2 So, also, where de- fendant offered to sell plaintiff a certain number of kegs of nails and the plaintiff in reply wrote that he would not take the number of kegs proposed, but that the defendant might ship him a certain less number, there was no sale or agree- ment to sell. 8 The doctrine, that the acceptance must be un- equivocal has been carried in some cases to the extreme. Thus a resident of California wrote to a resident of Iowa, offering to sell certain land, and added: "Let me hear from you at once." The receiver of the letter telegraphed his acceptance of the of- fer and added "money at your order at First National Bank here." It was held by the court that as the proposal said nothing about the place where the money was to be paid, it was payable in California, and the depositing it in bank in Iowa was not an unconditional acceptance of the offer. 4 And where a person in Connecticut wrote to a man in Wisconsin, offering to sell land for a certain sum, nothing being said about the place of payment or delivery of the deed, a letter was 46 Mo. 363; Baker v. Holt, 56 Wis. with the offer, neither falling within 100 ; Clay v. Ricketts, 66 Iowa, 362 ; nor going beyond the terms proposed, Baxter v. Bishop, 65 Iowa, 582; but exactly meeting them at all points Honey man v. Marry att, 6 H. L. C. and closing with them just as they 112; Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441; stand." Hutchison v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535. » Barrow v. Ker, 10 La. Ann. 120. In the case of Potts v. Whitehead, 23 2 Honeyman v. Marryatt, 6 H. L. C. N. J. Eq. 512, 514, the court says: 112. Lord Wensleydale said : "There "An acceptance, to be good, must, of certainly was no complete contract in course, be such as to conclude an this case." agreement or contract between the 3 Jenness v. Mount Hope Iron Co., parties, and to do this, it must, in 53 Maine, 20. every respect, meet and correspond 4 Sawyer v. Brossart, 67 Iowa, 678. § 53 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 69 written accepting this proposal, and then added: "You may make out the deed, leaving the name of the grantee in blank, and forward the same to X. or to your agent, if you have one here, to be delivered to me on payment." It was held there was no unconditional acceptance. 1 In another case, the plaintiff by letter offered defendant $300 for two horses. The defendant wrote back: "You may have the horses for $300, if you will come for them," and the court declared there was no consum- mated contract. 2 § 53. Acceptance to be without condition. — The acceptance must be unconditional, and in strict accordance with the prop- osition; that is, the mind of the person making the offer and of the one accepting it must meet in regard to the same subjeot- matter. 8 Where a resident of one state writes to a resident of another state offering to make him a quitclaim deed to certain land, and the latter replies accepting the offer on the condition that the other turns over to him certain additional deeds, such acceptance does not create a contract. The acceptance must be absolute. 4 Plaintiff's agent wrote a letter to defendant, its 1 Baker v. Holt, 56 "Wis. 100. tract, but the mutual consent — the ag- s Fenno v. Weston, 31 Ver. 345. gregatio mentium — can not be attained 3 Eads v. Carondelet, 42 Mo. 113 ; 1 without the assent of both parties." Parsons on Contracts, 475; Green v. And see Harris v. Scott (N. H. 1893), Cole, 103 Mo. 70 ; 15 S.W. Rep. 317. In 32 Atl. Rep. 770. Bruneri>.Wheaton,46Mo.363,the court 4 InEgger u.Nesbitt,122Mo.667; 27 says: "In order that an acceptance S. W. Rep. 385, Burgess, J., said: "De- may be operative, it must be unequiv- fendant's letter to plaintiff of March ocal, unconditional, and without va- 4, 1890, was not an acceptance of the riance of any sort between it and the proposition contained in defendant's proposal, and it must be communica- letter to him of date February 26, ted to the other party without unrea- 1890, for the reason that the accept- sonable delay. To constitute a valid ance was not unconditional, but with contract, there must be a mutual as- the understanding that plaintiff would sent of the parties thereto, and they deliver to him all the papers in refer- must assent to the same thing in the ence to the land — United States pat- same sense. Therefore, an absolute ents and other deeds — about which acceptance of a proposal, coupled with there was nothing said in defendant's any qualification or condition, will letter or proposition, thereby making not be regarded as a complete con- a new proposition of his own, and im- tract, because there at no time exists posing new burdens upon defendant, the requisite mutual assent to the though light they may have been, same thing in the same sense. Any As the conditions upon which the words manifesting an aggregatio men- proposition was accepted materially Hum are sufficient to constitute a con- differed from the original proposition, 70 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 54 cotenant in a water ditch, suggesting that repairs were neces- sary, and that thereafter the ditch be kept in good condition, each party paying one-half the expense. Defendant answered that the suggestion was right, and stated that it would direct its manager to co-operate with plaintiff, and examine the prop- erty, and report what repairs were necessary. It was held that such correspondence constituted a contract binding each party to pay one-half of the expenses thereafter necessarily incurred in keeping the ditch in repair. Also that subsequent letters to plaintiff by defendant, indicating a desire on its part to modify the contract so that plaintiff should pay for all repairs while using the water, and that it should reimburse plaintiff for one- half when it begins to use the water, are not binding on plaint- iff, which regularly and continuously demanded of defendant one-half the expenses incurred in making the repairs. 1 Where an offer is made by one party, and the other annexes a condi- tion to his acceptance, there is no completed contract until the party making the first offer assents to the condition. Thus where defendants sent plaintiff an offer for the unexpired term of a lease, and plaintiff returned an acceptance, subject to the assent of the lessor, there was no contract, defendants not hav- ing accepted the condition. 2 § 54. Condition as rejection of offer. — Where the person to whom an offer has been made by letter sends a conditional ac- it amounted to the rejection of the five, plaintiff was to have the con- offer. Cangaa v. Manufacturing Co., tract therefor at the same price. At 37 Mo. App. 297; Rumsey Strange v. the end thereof was written: "Ac- Crowley, 91 Mo. 287; 2 S. W. Rep. cepted. Contract to be drawn in ac- 421. " cordance with the above proposition ; 'L 1 Societe, etc., v. Old Jordan Mining and then was added: "This is about Co. (1894), 9 Utah, 483; 35 Pac. Rep. right, and will be satisfactory to P." 492. (defendant). Pending a reference of 2 Putnam «. Grace, 161 Mass. 237; 37 this by the parties to an attorney to N. E. Rep. 166. In Sparks i . Pitts- draw a contract, plaintiff drilled the burgh Co. (1893), 159 Pa. St. 295; 28 one well, and was paid therefor. It Atl. Rep. 152, plaintiff proposed to was held that the proposition and ac- defendant to erect a rig and drill a ceptance was not a completed con- well a certain depth on any of defend- tract, so that, a contract not having ant's leases, with the further provis- been drawn, plaintiff could not recov ion that, if defendant decided to drill er damages for defendant's refusal to any more wells on his leases, or "in allow him to drill other wells which the vicinity," up to the number of defendant thereafter sunk. $ H OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 71 ceptance, such acceptance is a rejection of the offer, and he can not then bind the proposer by an unconditional acceptance made before the offer is withdrawn. 1 1 Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667 ; 27 S. W. Rep. 385, per Burgess, J. : " It is -contended by plaintiff that, even if his letter of March 4, 1890, was no more than a conditional acceptance, yet his letter of March 14, 1890, writ- ten prior to any withdrawal of defend- ant's offer, was an unconditional ac- ceptance of defendant's offer, and that thereby the offer was accepted, and the contract closed. Upon the other hand, the contention is that the plaintiff having rejected the offer of defendant by his conditional accept- ance, the offer was at an end, and could not be renewed by a subsequent acceptance of it by plaintiff. Judd v. Day, 50 Iowa, 247, is relied upon by plaintiff as sustaining his position, but in that case there was no condi- tional acceptance of the offer to pur- chase, and it was rightly held that the offer was a continuing one, unless otherwise specified or withdrawn. Mr. Parsons, in his work on contracts {page 477, 7th ed.), says: 'The party making the offer may renew it ; but the party receiving it can not reply accepting with modifications, and, when these are rejected, again reply, accepting generally, and upon his ac- ceptance claim the right of holding the other party to his first offer.' So in Baker v. Johnson Co., 37 Iowa, 186, it is held that a proposal to accept, or an acceptance of an offer upon differ- ent terms from those contained in the offer, amounts to a rejection of it. See, also, Jenness v. Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43. Plaintiff nowhere alleges a tender of the purchase-money to defendant per- sonally, but does allege that he has fully performed all the conditions of said contract and agreement on his part on the execution and acceptance of the terms of said agreement ; that he paid the defendant by deposit the sum of $400 at the First National Bank in the city of Appleton, St. Clair county, Mo., and notified defendant of the fact. He also alleges a refusal by de- fendant to execute the deed, and a readiness upon his part to pay the purchase price for the land. At the time of the offer by defendant he was a resident of Washington City, D. C, which was well known by plaintiff, where, by the terms of his offer, he was entitled to payment ; and the de- posit of the money in the bank at Ap- pleton City was no payment or offer to pay the purchase-money to him, and was not an acceptance of the con- tract. There is no pretense that the money was deposited in the bank by or with the consent or direction of de- fendant, and, in the absence of some- thing of that kind, defendant was en- titled to payment at the place where, or the city which, was at the time his place of residence. In Gilbert v. Bax- ter,71 Iowa, 327 ; 32 N.W. Rep. 364, itis held that, 'in case of any offer by a person in one state to sell land in an- other state at a certain cash price, an acceptance, directing the deed to be sent to a bank in the latter state, to be delivered upon payment of the price, will not create a binding con- tractus the terms of the offer entitle the vendor to payment in his own state.' See, also, Sawyer v. Brossart, 67 Iowa, 678; 25 N. W. Rep. 876; Langellier v. Schaefer, 36 Minn. 361 ; 31 N. W. Rep. 690. In the case at hand plaintiff di- rected the deed to be made out in blank, to be sent to the bank, and, upon receipt thereof, the money to be paid over to defendant. This was not an acceptance of the offer to sell as made by defendant. The burden of 72 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §55 § 55. The same subject continued — Counter offer. — Where one having land for sale sends a letter purporting to accept an offer to buy the land at a certain price, but inclosing for the purchaser's signature conditions of sale importing new terms into the contract, he does not accept the proposing purchaser's offer, but makes to him a counter offer; and he can not compel such purchaser to specifically perform his offer to buy. 1 proof rested upon the plaintiff to show by clear and satisfactory evidence the contract which he seeks to have speci- fically enforced — that is, that his ac- ceptance of the offer of defendant was unequivocal, unconditional, and with- out any variance of any sort between it and the proposal, — and, as he failed in this, he was not entitled to the relief which he sought. The judgment is affirmed." In Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. C. 252; 19 S. E. Rep. 158, Shepherd, C. J., said : "It is well settled that, in order to con- stitute a contract, there must be 'a proposal, squarely assented to.' 'If the proposal be assented to with a qualification, then the qualification must go back to the proposer for his adoption, amendment, or rejection. If the acceptance be not unqualified, or go to the actual thing proposed, then there is no binding contract. A proposal to accept, or acceptance based upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer.' 1 Wharton on Contracts, 4. 'The re- spondent is at liberty to accept wholly or reject wholly, but one of these things he must do ; for, if he answer, not rejecting, but proposing to accept under some modification, this is a rejection of the offer.' 1 Parsons on Contracts, 476. It amounts to a counter proposal, and this must be accepted, and its acceptance com- municated to the proposer; otherwise there is no contract. Pollock on Con- tracts, 10. Applying these general principles to the facts before us, it is plain that there was no contract by which the defendant Herndon became a stockholder. The proposal of the company was to purchase the land for $15,000 of its stock. Herndon's answer is not an acceptance, but a proposal to accept with the very important quali- fication that he is to reserve 'all and every kind of wood and timber on the place for his own exclusive use and benefit.' The acceptance of this proposal was never communicated to him, and, after many months, the proposal was revoked, without objec- tion, it seems, by the company. We think his honor was correct in hold- ing that there was no evidence that the defendant Herndon was a stock- holder." 1 Jones v. Daniel (1894) , L. R. (1894) 2 Ch. 332; 8 The Reports (Eng.) 579, per Romer, J.: "The plaintiff's case fails. It is clear that here there was no contract between the parties apart from the letters ; and if the letters do not show a concluded agreement, there is none. Now, in looking at these let- ters, I need only refer in the first in- stance to the letter of 26 April, 1893. The defendant before this had made a written offer for the premises, stating the price he was willing to give. Then the letter of 26 April, in answer, states that the plaintiff, who was the vendor, accepted the offer, 'and we inclose con- tract for your signature. On receipt of this signed by you across the stamp and deposit we will send you copy signed by him.' Turning to the in- closure in that letter I find that it is a document which contains special terms which had never been referred §§ 56, 57 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 73 § 56. Ancillary matters. — The mere fact that the acceptance contains directions and reference to outside matters, ancillary and subordinate to the contract, will not prevent it from being unconditional. Thus a boatload of flour was offered for sale and the offer was accepted in terms of the proposal, but the letter of acceptance also contained this inquiry: "Please say to us how we shall remit." It was held that this inquiry did not qualify the acceptance of the offer. 1 And where the letter of acceptance proposes to transact the business through a bank, instead of in person, this does not qualify the accept- ance. 2 Where a proposal was made by a merchant to ship cer- tain cotton to his factor and the factor replied accepting the proposal, requesting the merchant to designate and mark the cotton to be shipped and to advise when shipped, it was de- termined that this did not qualify the acceptance, but was merely directory and subordinate to the contract. 8 So, like- wise, where a proposal by a purchaser to take the remainder of a lease was answered by a letter, which, after acceding to the proposal, added, "We hope to give you possession at half-quar- ter day," it was held that the addition did not introduce a new term, and that the acceptance was unconditional. 4 § 57. Acceptance by conduct. — When an offer is made, con- taining a request express or implied, that the offeree must signify his acceptance by doing some particular thing, then, as soon as he does that thing, a contract is made. If a man sent an offer abroad saying: "I wish to know whether you will supply me with goods of such and such a price, and if you to in the offer, and those terms include assent to them. If you agree to them, a deposit of £10 per cent, to be paid sign the contract to pay the deposit, by the purchaser, a provision fixing and then there will be a binding con- the day for completion, and a provis- tract between us, but not till then.' I ion limiting the title of the vendor, think that is what the letter really and other important terms. Now, meant, and what it was intended to what was the fair meaning of that mean." Crossley v. Maycock, L. R. letter, and what would any one receiv- 18 Eq. 180, followed, ing it understand to be the meaning ! Clark v. Dales, 20 Barb. 42. of it? I certainly think he would 2 Matteson v. Scofield, 27 Wis. 671. understand it to mean this : 'We are 8 Brisban o. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17. agreed as to the price. I now inclose 4 Clive v. Beaumont, 1 DeG. & S. you the terms, and require you to 397. 74 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 58 agree to that, you must ship the first cargo as soon as you get this letter," then as soon as the cargo was shipped the contract would be complete. So again, where a person writes a letter and says, "I offer to take an allotment of shares," and ex- pressly or impliedly says, "If you agree with me send an answer by post," then, as soon as the answer is sent by the post, he has done an extraneous act, and the contract is con- summated. These contracts lack mutuality at their inception ; there is then no consideration and the obligation of it is sus- pended; but when performance of the condition is made there does then attach a consideration, which relates back to the making of the promise, and it becomes obligatory. The promise could not be enforced before performance of the con- dition on which it is made, for until then there is no considera- tion; but as soon as the act has been performed, by which a party has been injured, unless the promise is kept, the promise becomes binding. Although there be not mutual promises, yet if, before he calls for the fulfillment of the promise, the promisee do perform that in consideration of his doing which the promise is made, there is a consideration for the agreement, and it can be enforced. 1 § 58. The same subject continued. — Where a debtor offered to allow his creditor to take certain machinery from his mill in satisfaction of the debt, the action of the creditor in taking such machinery four days thereafter constituted an acceptance of the proposition. 2 And where a land-owner, desirous of hav- ing a railroad constructed over his land, executed a written agreement "releasing to the company which undertakes to construct such road the right of way of lawful width through my land ; * * * the damages to be assessed when the road is located, and the amount of such damages to be paid in stock in said railroad," it was held that the acceptance of such agreement by a railroad company by a resolution of its 'Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76; ton v. Southwick, 17 Me. 303; Brog- L'Amoreux v. Gould, 7 N. Y. 349; den v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Willetts v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 App. Ca. 666; Morton v. Burn, 7 Ad. N. Y. 45; Sands v. Crooke, 46 N. Y. & El. 19. 564; White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254; 2 Watters v. Glendenning, 87 Wis. Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14; Hil- 250 (1894) ; 58 N. W. Rep. 404. § 58 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 75 board of directors, followed by a construction of the road on the right of way so granted, rendered the agreement binding on the land-owner without formal written notice of acceptance, inas- much as the construction of the road was equivalent thereto, and that a delay of three years in the construction of the road after the agreement was executed was not unreasonable, in view of the nature of the work to be done, including the organization of a company, and the raising of money necessary for the enter- prise ; and hence that such delay did not invalidate the accept- ance, time not being declared to be the essence of the contract. 1 And in a recent case where the defendant contracted with the grantors in a trust deed to advance money, pay their other debts, buy in the land at trustee's sale, take a deed in his own name, and convey the land to the grantors if they repaid advancements within two years, it was held that the grantors in the trust deed who did not sign the contract with defendant were bound by its conditions and covenants, when they re- ceived benefits under it, and one of them made a written assign- ment of it, which was attested by the other. 8 So, also, an offer by the payee of a matured note to permit the maker to retain 'Hoffman v. Bloomsburg R. Co. Turnpike Co., 2 Pen. & W. 454; Hew- (1893), 157 Pa. St. 174; 27 Atl. Rep. son v. Paxson, 38 Leg. Int. 308; Bar- 564, per curiam: "Such acceptance nard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92. The delay, was not too late by reason of the de- under the circumstances of this case, . lay of over three years. No time was was not unreasonable, and it does not specified in the agreement, and from appear by the evidence that appellant the nature of the work to be done, the himself so treated or considered it." time required to organize the com- 2 Kennedy v. Siemers, 120 Mo. 73 ; 25 pany, and raise the money necessary S. W. Rep. 512, per Macfarlane, J. : for the enterprise, it was not intended "We think there is no significance in that it should in any manner be of the the fact that the Siemers agreement essence of the contract. The purpose was not signed by Brault and Bunch, of the appellant as shown was to se- the other parties interested in and to cure the building of the railroad, and, be benefited by it. Its acceptance by as soon as the company was in condi- them was sufficient to bind them to tion to build, it was contemplated that its covenants and conditions. Wig- it should then enter upon the right gins Ferry Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. of way thus granted. No time was Co., 73 Mo. 389; Heim v. Vogel, 69 designated for acceptance, and a rea- Mo. 529. The written assignment of sonable time was intended. Time the contract by Mrs. Brault, attested does not become of the essence of a by Bunch, and the co-operation of the contract, unless so declared or indi- latter in its execution, are sufficient cated by the circumstances. Shaw v. proof of its acceptance by them." 76 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 59 the money at a lower rate of interest than called for by the note, is binding when acted upon. 1 § 59. Revocability of an acceptance. — Where a proposal had been accepted by post, Lord Bramwell in his dissenting opinion in the case of Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 2 makes use of the following language: "It," meaning the letter of accept- ance," is revocable when sent by post, not that the letter can be got back, but its arrival might be anticipated by a letter or telegram, and there is no case to show that such anticipation would not prevent the letter from binding. It would be a most alarming thing to say that it would ; that a letter hon- estly but mistakenly written and posted must bind the writer,, if hours before its arrival he informed the person addressed that it was coming, but was wrong and recalled." But the law is probably otherwise in America. The rule is well settled here that a contract is complete the moment of posting the letter of acceptance. 3 And this is so because the minds of the parties have met and there is a concurrence upon a distinct proposition, manifested by an overt act. 4 Or, to use the lan- guage of Lord Blackburn, 6 the party has done an act which clinches the matter and shows an intention to be bound. If, then, the contract takes effect when the acceptance is posted, how can a withdrawal of the letter revoke an acceptance ? Of course where the law is as it is in Massachusetts, that an acceptance by post only takes effect when it reaches the pro- poser, 6 the language of Lord Bramwell touching the revoca- bility of a letter of acceptance is in point and authoritative. Until a contract is complete it is merely in a state of negotia- 1 Vereycken v. Vandenbrooks, 102 438; Kentucky Mutual Ins. Co. u. Mich. 1 19 (1894) ; 60 N. W. Rep. 687. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96 ; Ferrier v. Storer, 63 2 L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 216, 235. Iowa, 484; Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 3 3 Tayloe v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 9 Mete. (Ky.) 80; Lungstrass D.German How. 390; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. Ins. Co., 48 Mo. 201; Haas v. Myers, 1KJ; Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441; 111111.421. Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17 ; Hallock 4 Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 366, v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. Law, per Dwight, C. 2(W; Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14; 5 Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Pa. L. R. 2 App. Ca. 666, 691. St. 339; Stockham v. Stockham, 32 6 McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Md. 196; Bryant v. Booze, 55 ( teo. Pick. 278. § 60 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 77 tion. But in those states were it is held that the posting of the letter of acceptance completes the contract, the law prob- ably is that a letter of acceptance is irrevocable after it is posted or mailed. § 60. The same subject continued — Effect of postal reg- ulations. — Although a letter of acceptance is irrevocable after it is mailed, the question arises, what is the meaning of the word "mailed?" According to the regulations of the United States post-office the sender of a letter has a locus pceni- tentise, and has the power of reclaiming it after it is posted. In those countries, as in England, where the sender of a letter can not reclaim it after it has been posted, the letter be- comes the property of the one to whom it is sent directly it is posted. But where a party may reclaim a letter after it is put in the mail box, the probable effect of this regulation is to make the post-office the agent of the sender of the letter until it leaves the town, and that the posting or mailing of the let- ter of acceptance is not complete till the letter is dispatched from the office in which it is posted. 1 If this be the effect of such a postal regulation — that the letter is not completely mailed until it leaves the town — then a letter of acceptance is probably revocable up to the time that the sender is unable to have his letter returned to him. In Scotland it is the law that a letter of acceptance is revocable at any time before it reaches the proposer. And if the letter of revocation reaches the pro- poser before or at the same time as the acceptance, the ac- ceptance is countermanded and revoked. 2 1 Ex parte Cote, L. R. 9 Oh. App. 27. that the property in the bills did not In this case the judges, Lord Selborne pass to the indorsee till the letter had and Sir G. Mellish, L. J., discuss at left the office where it was posted, some length the effect of a postal reg- 2 Countess of Dunmore *. Alexan- ulation, allowing the sender of a let- der, 9 Shaw & Dunlop, 190. In this ter to reclaim it. The rules of the case, a lady having written to another French post-office permit a person, to engage a servant, and thereafter who has posted a letter, to recover it having written not to do so, and at any time before it is dispatched the two letters having been de- from the office where it is posted on livered, through the post-office, complying with certain forms. There- simultaneously to the servant — held, fore, where a letter containing bills that there was no completed contract, of exchange, indorsed to the person This case is constantly cited by text- to whom the letter was addressed, v.as writers as establishing the law in posted in a French post-office,— hM, OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §61 § 61. Authority to accept by post. — Posting an acceptance of an offer may be sufficient, where it can fairly be inferred from the circumstances of the case that the acceptance might be sent by post; that is, where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post was to be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer; then an acceptance by post is justified. But the doctrine that an acceptance by post is authorized upon an im- plied authority, from the person making the offer to the person Scotland, that an acceptance of a pro- posal is revocable at any time before, and up to, and concurrently with, its reception by the proposer, and that a letter of acceptance may be revoked by a letter reaching the proposer at the same time. See Benjamin on Sales, § 74; Leake on Contracts, 31. But all that case decides is, that a pro- posal by letter may be revoked by an- other letter reaching the party to whom the proposal is made at the same time. The facts of this case were as follows: The Countess of Dunmore wanting to hire » servant wrote to her friend Lady Agnew, say- ing she had heard that one Elizabeth Alexander was about to leave Lady Agnew's service, and saying shefDun- more) would hire the servant if her character was good, and also stating the rate of wages she expected to pay. Lady Agnew, in reply, wrote that she could recommend Alexander, who would accept the proposed wages, and then added: "If Lady Dunmore de- cides upon taking Betty Alexander, perhaps she will have the goodness to mention whether she expects her at thenew or the old term." Lady Dun- more then wrote in reply to Lady Agnew requesting that she would "have the goodness to engage Betty Alexander for her at the £12 12s. a year ; but she wishes to have her at the new term, or as soon after as pos- sible, because her present one must go at that time." On the next day Lady Dunmore wrote again to Lady Agnew telling her not to engage Alex- der. Both these letters were sent by post by Lady Agnew to Alexander who received them at the same time. Now from these facts it is quite plain that all that was done .was, that L;S,dy Dunmore made Lady Agnew her agent to engage a servant; that the only communication upon the subject with Alexander herself, the respondent, was the two letters forwarded to her. The one letter being merely a propos- al to engage her and the other a rev- ocation of the proposal. And it is evident that this was the view of the court. Lord Balgray, delivering the opinion, says: "The admission that the two letters were simultaneously received, puts an end to the case. * * * Lady Dunmore conveys a re- quest to Lady Agnew to engage Alex- ander, which request she recalls by a subsequent letter that arrives in time to be forwarded to Alexander as soon as the first. This, therefore, is just the same as if a man had put an order into the post-office desiring his agent to buy stock for him. He afterwards changes his mind, but can not recover his letter from the post-office. He therefore writes a second letter coun- termanding the first. They both ar- rive together, and the result is, that no purchase can be made to bind the principal." § 61 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 79 receiving it, to accept by this means, is erroneous. It cer- tainly is somewhat artificial to speak of the person to whom the offer is made as having the implied authority of the other party to send his acceptance by post. He needs no authority to transmit the acceptance through any particular channel; he may select what means he pleases, the post-office no less than any other. The only effect of the supposed authority is to make the acceptance complete so soon as it is posted, and au- thority will obviously be implied only when the tribunal con- siders that it is a case in which this result is justified and ought to be reached. And the reason assigned in some of the cases that the post might be used to accept a proposal, because it is the common agent of both parties, is not a satisfactory one. The post-office is only a carrier between them. It is an agent to convey the communication, not to receive it. The commu- nication is not made to the post-office, but by their agency as carriers. The difference is between saying, "Tell my agent A., if you accept," and "Send your answer to me by A." In the former case, A. is to be the intelligent recipient of the ac- ceptance; in the latter, he is only to convey the communica- tion to the person making the offer, which he may do by a letter, knowing nothing of its contents. The post-office is only an agent in the latter sense. 1 All the facts being found, the question as to whether the circumstances under which an offer is made are such that it must have been within the con- 1 Henthorn v. Fraser, L. K. (1892) livered in Liverpool after the society's 2 Ch. 27. In this case H., who lived office had closed, and was opened by at Birkenhead, called at the office of the secretary on the following morn- a land society in Liverpool, to nego- ing. It was held, that where the cir- tiate for the purchase of some houses cumstances under which an offer is belonging to them. The secretary made are such that it must have been signed and handed to him a note within the contemplation of the par- giving him the option of purchase ties that, according to the ordinary for fourteen days at £750. On the usages of mankind, the post might be next day the secretary posted to used as a means of communicating H. a withdrawal of the offer. This the acceptance of it, the acceptance is withdrawal was posted between 12 complete as soon as it is posted. And and 1 o'clock, and did not reach further that in that case, as the parties Birkenhead till after 5 p.m. In the lived in different towns, an accept- meantime H. had, at 3:50 p. m., posted ance by post must have been within _ to the secretary an unconditional ac- their contemplation, although the ' ceptance of the offer, which was de- offer was not made by post. 80 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §62 templation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communi- cating the acceptance of it, is one of law for the court. 1 § 62. Proposal and acceptance by letter. — A letter reading, "I am prepared to make the arrangements with you on the terms you name," in answer to a letter of proposal, does not constitute an unconditional acceptance. 8 It is well settled that 1 Henthorn v. Fraser, L. R. (1892) 2 Ch. 27. 2 Havens v. American Ins. Co., 11 Ind. App. 315 ; 39 N. E. Rep. 40, per Davis J. : "Counsel for appellee rely upon the case of Commercial Telegram Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun, 494. This was an action brought by the Commercial Telegram Company to restrain James D. Smith, as president of the New York Stock Exchange, and others, from interfering with the right of the plaintiff to collect upon the floor or the premises of the New York Stock Exchange the quotations of dealings made at said exchange and the dis- tribution of said quotations to its cus- tomers, and the claim of the plaintiff was founded, as in the case at bar, solely upon correspondence between the parties. Some preliminary let- ters passed between the parties, and on April 25, 1883, the following letter, with the matters not pertinent omit- ted, was sent to the plaintiff : 'Com- mittee of Arrangements, New York Stock Exchange, New York, April 25, 1883. Luther E. Shinn, Vice- President Commercial Telegram Com- pany — Dear Sir : I am instructed to forward to you the following plan adopted by the governing committee, which will form the basis of an agree- ment with you in the matter of your proposed service upon the floor of the exchange, viz. . First. A rental shall be paid by any telegraph company at the rate of $18,000 per annum, payable monthly in advance. * * * Re- spectfully, Geo. W. Ely, Secretary of Committee.' On the following day the plaintiff answered this letter as follows : 'The Commercial Telegram Company, Executive Offices, Equita- ble Building, 120 Broadway, New York, April 26, 1883. Geo. W. Ely, Esq., Secretary Committee of Arrange- ments, New York Stock Exchange — Dear Sir: Your communication of April 25 is received. I am instructed by our executive committee to say, in reply, that the plan set forth in your letter is entirely satisfactory to this company; that we accept the same, and are ready to execute an agree- ment upon the basis proposed when- ever prepared and submitted to us. I am, very truly, yours, Luther E. Shinn, Vice-President and Gen. Man.' The court held that the letters did not constitute a contract We quote from the opinion as follows: "It is claimed upon the part of the plaintiff that the letter of April 25th contained an entire contract, and that upon the acceptance of its terms by the letter of April 26th, of the plaintiffs, it became a com- plete contract, binding upon both parties. It is very important to ob- serve in this connection that although the claim is made, upon the part of the appellant, that these papers con- stitute an entire and complete con- tract, it is admitted upon its own points that there are exceptions as to its completeness, namely, that there is no provision as to the time it should 62 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 81 a proposition made by one party by letter to another party at a distance, containing a specific order, which is unconditionally accepted by the latter, will constitute a valid contract between them. The primary question in such case is whether the cor- respondence shows an agreement upon which the minds of the parties met, or whether the negotiations are inchoate and un- perfected until something should intervene and be determined in order to give it full effect. 1 remain in force, nor as to the terms and conditions upon which it could be terminated. These deficiencies seem to have struck the counsel for the ap- pellant, they being, as they admit, essential to the contract; but it is claimed that the law supplies the omission, and a perpetual grant is to be inferred, because the plaintiff could take a grant in perpetuity, and be- cause the plaintiff could perpetually perform the service, and because it would be of advantage to the plaintiff to have such a grant rather than one limited in duration. We know of no rule of law, applicable to those cases where grants of privileges are silent as to their duration, which measures the duration of such grants by the capacity of rapacity of the grantee. The very fact of the absence of these essential elements seems to indicate beyond question that the papers under consideration, if there was no other reason, could not be interpreted as containing a contract binding upon both parties." In the New York case the alleged letter of acceptance says : "I am instructed by our executive committee to say, in reply, that the plan set forth in your letter is entirely satisfactory to this company ; that we accept the same, and are ready to exe- cute an agreement upon the basis proposed whenever prepared, etc. * * *" In the case before us the corresponding letter contains the fol- lowing language "I have your favor 6 of 1st, and am prepared to make an arrangement with you for special work in Indiana on the termB you name. * * * " 1 Myers v. Smith, 48 Barb. 615. In this case the action was brought on a contract claimed to have been made by correspondence, in which the letters were as follows: "J. My- ers, Esq., Ilion — Dear Sir: Yours of" the 15th inst. came to hand, and I have refrained from answering till now, expecting to hear from parties I was negotiating with before receiving your letter. The malt I have is at Weedsport. I will sell you ten thou- sand bushels of the malt, 34 pounds to the bushel, 2)4 per cent, off for screenings, at ($1.54) one dollar and fifty-four cents per bushel, delivered at Weedsport. Answer by return mail, and direct the letter to Weeds- port. Respectfully yours, Thomas Smith, per G. O. Smith." This letter was answered within an hour of its receipt, and the reply was as follows : "Ilion, June 20, 1864. Thomas Smith- Dear Sir : Your letter under date of June 18th came to hand this (Mon- day) forenoon. I will take your malt, ten thousand bushels, deliverable on boat at Weedsport, at 154 cents for 34 pounds to the bushel, and 2)4 off for dust or screenings. I will be up as soon as I can get away from home, which will be the last of the week or the fore part of next week. Respect- fully yours, J. Myers." The court in 82 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 63 § 63. Proposals by telegraph. — It is well settled by the au- thorities in this country, and sustained by the later English decisions, that there is no difference in the rules governing the negotiation of contracts by correspondence through the post-office and by telegraph, and a contract is concluded when an acceptance of a proposal or offer is deposited in the tele- graph office for transmission. 1 And the reason given for this rule in case of acceptance by post 2 is entirely applicable to ac- ceptance by telegraph. For, if a bargain could not be closed by telegram before the answer was received, no contract could be completed through the medium of the telegraph; for if one party was not bound by his offer when it was accepted ( that is, at the time the telegram of acceptance is deposited in the telegraph office for transmission), then the other party ought not to be bound until after he had received a notification that the answer had been received and assented to, and so it might go on ad infinitum. 3 And it is now settled that the acceptance of an offer by telegraph completes the contract, when such ac-. ceptance is put in the proper and usual way of being commu- nicated by the agency employed to carry it; and that, when an offer is made by telegraph, an acceptance by telegraph takes effect when the dispatch containing the acceptance is de- this case held that there was a vari- not have maintained an action for its ance between the proposal and alleged alleged breach ; and for this reason, acceptance in the use of the words as well as upon the ground that there "delivered" and "deliverable," and was a contingency expressed in the that the proposed visit of the plaintiff letter — to wit : the visit of the plaint- to the defendant carried with it the iff to the defendant, and an inspection necessary implication that it was for of the malt prior to a full close of the the purpose of inspecting the malt negotiation — the defendant could not prior to a full close of the negotia- have enforced it as a valid contract tions. The language of the court is against the plaintiff, if he had repudi- as follows: "An acceptance must be ated its obligations." in the words of, or must be entirely l "Contracts by Telegraph," 14 Am. accordant with, the terms and condi- Law Reg. 401, by Judge Eedfleld and tions of an offer, to bind a party who authorities cited ; also Trevor rc. Wood, makes the proposition. In this case 36 N. Y. 307. the variance made the acceptance a 2 Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Aid. different thing from the offer. As 681. thus expressed, it could not have 3 Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 been claimed by the defendant to be Pa. St. 339; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend, binding upon plaintiff, and he could 103; Vassar v. Camp., 11 N. Y. 441. §64 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 83 posited for transmission in the telegraph office, and not when it is received by the other party. 1 § 64. Contract by letters and telegrams Where parties have exchanged letters and telegrams with a view to an agree- ment, and have arrived at a point where a clear and definite proposal is made on one side and accepted on the other with an understanding that this written agreement shall be reduced to a more formal writing, the contract is complete and binding although no such formal writing is ever executed. 2 1 Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431 ; Trevor „. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307; Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., 15 R. I. 380; Marshall v. Jamie- son, 42 Up. Can. Q. B. 115 ; Thorne v. Barwick, 16 Up. Can. C. P. 369. An offer or proposal may be made by tele- graph as may also the acceptance of such offer or proposal. Miller v. Nu- gent, 12 Ind. App. 348; 40 N. E. Rep. 282. In this case defendant con- tracted orally to sell plaintiff his farm for $13,000, but, having an offer of $13,800, telegraphed plaintiff, "Will you take four hundred and let them have it, or will you take it at $13,400?" to which he replied by telegram, "I will take $400, and let them have the farm." There was no answer to this. It was held that plaintiff would not be entitled to $400 unless defendant sold the farm. In Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667; 27 S. W. Rep. 385, Bur- gess, J., said: "A contract may be made by letter or telegram, and when the offer is made by letter and is ac- cepted by letter, although the letter accepting the offer never reaches the hand of the person making the offer, providing the acceptance is mailed in due time, postage prepaid, and di- rected to the proper address of the person making the offer, or, if ac- cepted by telegram, the charges being prepaid, and directed, as before stated, in regard to the acceptance by letter ; the acceptance must be made within a reasonable time, no time being fixed, or before the offer is withdrawn. Bishop on Contracts, § 328 ; Whaley v. Hinchman, 22 Mo. App. 481; Greeley-Burnham Grocer Co. v. Capen, 23 Mo. App. 301 ; Maclay v. Harvey, 90 111. 525 ; 32 Am. Rep. 35, 40, note 1 ; Lancaster v. Elliot, 42 Mo. App. 503; Tayloe v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 9 How. 390." In the case of Martin v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 596, a proposition was made by the plaintiff, by telegraph, to sell coal at a certain figure, to which the following reply was made : "Telegram received. You can consider the coal sold. Will be in Cleveland next week, and ar- range particulars." The question be- fore the court was whether these two dispatches made a definite contract be- tween the parties ; whether there was a direct, unqualified acceptance of the terms offered. The court held that there was not (after citing approv- ingly the case of Myers v. Smith, 48 Barb. 614, in the following lan- guage: "So it seems to me that the telegram carrying to the n proposed vendor a statement from the proposed vendee that he will come to Cleve- land, to his place of business, and ar- range particulars, carries with it a fair implication that the particulars are to be arranged before the contract is finally consummated." 2 Sanders v. Pottlitzer (1894), 144 N. Y. 209; 39 N. E. Rep. 75, per O'Brien, J. : "The writings and tele- 84 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. §65 § 65. Certainty of proposal and acceptance. — A contract means consensus ad idem. Lord Westbury puts it thus in the grams that passed between the par- ties contain all the elements of a complete contract. Nothing was wanting in the plaintiffs' origi- nal proposition but the defendant's assent to it, in order to consti- tute a contract binding upon both parties according to its terms. This assent was given upon condition that a certain specified modification was accepted. The plaintiffs finally as- sented to the modification, and called upon the defendant to signify its as- sent again to the whole arrangement as thus modified, and it replied that it was 'all right,' which must be taken as conclusive evidence that the minds of the parties had met and agreed upon certain specified and distinct ob- ligations which were to be observed by both. It is true, as found by the learned referee, that the parties in- tended that the agreement should be formally expressed in a single paper, which, when signed, should be the evidence of what had already been agreed upon. But neither party was entitled to insert in the paper any material condition not referred to in the correspondence, and if it was in- serted without the consent of the other party it was unauthorized. Hence the defendant, by insisting upon further material conditions, not expressed or implied in the corre- spondence, defeated the intention to reduce the agreement to the form of a single paper signed by both parties. The plaintiffs then had the right to fall back upon their written proposi- tion, as originally made, and the sub- sequent letters and telegrams ; and, if they constituted a contract of them- selves, the absence of the formal agree- ment contemplated was not, under the circumstances, material. When the parties intended that a mere verbal agreement shall be finally reduced to writing, as the evidence of the terms of the contract, it may be true that nothing is binding upon either party until the writing is executed. But here the contract was already in writ- ing, and it was none the less obliga- tory upon both parties because they intended that it should be put into an- other form, especially when their in- tention is made impossible by the act of one or the other of the parties, by insisting upon the insertion of condi- tions and provisions not contemplated or embraced in the correspondence. Vassaru. Camp, 11 N. Y.441; Brown v. Norton, 50 Hun, 248 ; 2 N. Y. Supl. 869 ; Pratt v. Hudson River R. Co., 21 NY. 305. The principle that governs in such cases was clearly stated by Judge Selden in the case last cited, in these words : 'A contract to make and exe- cute a certain written agreement, the terms of which are mutually under- stood and agreed upon, is, in all re- spects, as valid and obligatory, where no statutory objection interposes, as the written contract itself would be, if executed. If, therefore, it should appear that the minds of the parties had met ; that a proposition for a con- tract had been made by one party, and accepted by the other; that the terms of this contract were in all re- spects definitely understood and agreed upon, and that a part of the mutual understanding was that a writ- ten contract embodying these terms should be drawn and executed by the respective parties — this is an obliga- tory contract, which neither party is at liberty to refuse to perform.' In this case it is apparent that the minds of the parties met, through the cor- respondence, upon all the terms as well as the subject-matter of the con- tract, and that the subsequent failure to reduce this contract to the precise form intended, for the reason stated §65 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 85 case of Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely: "An agreement is the result of the mutual assent of two parties to certain terms, did not affect the obligations of either party, which had already attached, and they may now resort to the pri- mary evidence of their mutual stipula- tions. Any other rule would always permit a party who has entered into a contract like this, through letters and telegraphic messages, to violate it, whenever the understanding was that it should be reduced to another written form, by simply suggesting other and additional terms and conditions. If this were the rule the contract would never be completed in cases where, by changes in the market, or other events occurring subsequent to the written negotiations, it became the interest of either party to adopt that course in order to escape or evade ob- ligations incurred in the ordinary course of commercial business. A stip- ulation to reduce a valid written con- tract to some other form can not be used for the purpose of imposing upon either party additional burdens or ob- ligations, or of evading the perform- ance of those things which the parties have mutually agreed upon by such means as made the promise or assent binding in law. There was no proof of any custom existing between the shippers and consignees of such prop- erty in regard to the payment of the expense of firing, lining, and haying the cars. If it be said that such pre- cautions are necessary in order to pro- tect the property while in transit, that does not help the defendant. The question still remains, who was to bear the expense? The plaintiffs had not agreed to pay it, any more than they had agreed to pay the freight or incur the other expenses of transportation. The plaintiffs sent a plain proposition and the defendant accepted without any such conditions as it subsequently sought to attach to it. That the parties intended to make and sign a final paper does not warrant the inference that they also intended to make an- other and different agreement. The defendant is in no better position than it would be in case it had refused to sign the final writing, without alleg- ing any reasons whatever. The prin- ciple, therefore, which is involved in the case, is this : Can parties who have exchanged letters and telegrams with a view to an agreement, and have ar- rived at a point where a clear and definite proposition is made on the one side and accepted on the other, with an understanding that the agree- ment shall be expressed in a formal writing, ever be bound until that writ- ing is signed? If they are at liberty to repudiate the proposition or accept- ance, as the case may be, at any time before the paper is signed, and as the market may go up or down, then this case is well decided. But if, at the close of the correspondence, the plain- tiffs became bound by their offer, and the defendant by its acceptance of that offer, whether the final writing was signed or not, as I think it was, under such circumstances as the record discloses, then the conclusion of the learned referee was erroneous. To allow either party to repudiate the ob- ligations clearly expressed in the cor- respondence, unless the other will assent to material conditions, not be- fore referred to, or to be implied from the transaction, would be introducing an element of confusion and uncer- tainty into the law of contract. If the parties did not become bound in this case,they can not be bound in any case. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted ; costs to abide the event." All concur, except Earl, Gray and Bartlett, JJ., dissenting. In Keefe v. Chaffee, 11 Wash. 292 ; 39 Pac. Rep. 676, a shingle manufacturer wrote defendant that it desired to 86 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 65 and if it be clear that there is no consensus, what may have been written or said becomes immaterial." 1 The substance of the proposal and acceptance, and not mere form, should be re- garded in determining whether or not a contract has been made. There must be not merely a treaty or negotiation for an agreement, but there must be a proposal met by that sort of an acceptance which makes it no longer the act of one party, but of both. There must be a clear description of the subject-matter, relative to which the proposal and acceptance was in fact made and entered into. Both parties need not both actually and really mean the same precise thing, but both must actually give their assent to that proposal and accept- ance, be it what it may, which de facto arises out of the terms of their communication. If the words used are words which, if read with a mind desirous of understanding them, are in- telligible, a slight difference or a slight mistake will not pre- vent there being a contract, but where a mistake goes to the greater part of the subject-matter, then this is fatal to the idea of a contract. And it is also a principle of law well estab- lished that the terms of a proposal and acceptance may be so definite as to evince a contract and the consensus necessary to make a contract may perfectly exist, even although the parties may intend to have their agreement expressed in the most solemn and complete form that conveyancers and solicitors are able to prepare. The proposal and acceptance, as discovered from the acts or correspondence of the parties, may show a complete contract or consensus, such as a court of equity would contract for the sale of the entire out- defendant would take 100 cars at the put of its mills, and defendant replied, price named. Plaintiff, after receipt stating that he could use a certain of the telegram and letter, shipped amount of shingles at a certain price, the five cars as directed, and later Plaintiff then wired, accepting de- wrote, acknowledging receipt of the fendant's "terms," and requesting or- last letter, and stating that it had ders. Defendant, before any ship- twenty cars which it would be ready ment was made, wired plaintiff to ship to ship as soon as it could get cars, five car loads, stating that he had It was held that the correspondence written. The letter acknowledged re- did not show a contract for the 100 ceipt of plaintiff's telegram, and re- cars, peated the orders, and also stated that '4D.J. &S. 638, 643. § 66 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 87 specifically enforce, although the contract might be imperfect and incomplete as regards form. 1 § 66. Place of contract. — Where the locality of the making of a contract is material, it is determined by the place of acceptance. Thus, an order to make certain bets having been transmitted by postal telegraph from the plaintiff without the city of London to the defendant within it, he telegraphed from the city that the order had been obeyed. It was held that the contract of agency was made in the city. 2 And where an offer was made in Boston, and accepted by telegram from Provi- dence, it was held that the contract was made in Rhode Island, although to be performed in Massachusetts. 8 Where a letter containing an order for goods was posted in the city of London to a person outside, and the order was accepted by a delivery of the goods ordered to the buyer at his place of business within the city, it was held the contract was made in the city. 4 ' ' The place of contract is material as prima facie denoting the law by which it is to be construed and regulated, and the law by which the capacity of the parties to the contract, as depend- ent upon infancy, lunacy, marriage, is determined." 5 1 Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 441 ; Pres- an injunction to restrain L. from part- ton v. Luck, L. E. 27 Ch. Div. 497; ing with them. At the hearing of the Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 De motion, he asked leave to amend his Gex, J. & S. 638; Brogden v. Metro- writ, and for an injunction as to the politan E. Co., L. E. 2 App. Cal. 666; British patent only: Held, that as L. Pacific, etc., Co. v. Eiverside, etc., had understood that he was negotiat- Ey. Co., 90 Cal. 627; Wristen v. ing about the British patent only, and Bowles, 82 Cal. 84; Allen v. Chou- P. had understood that he was nego- teau, 102 Mo. 309, 321; Bonne well tiating as to all the patents, there v. Jenkins, L. E. 8 Ch. Div. 70. never was the consensus ad idem which Thus in the case of Preston v. Luck, is necessary to make a contract ; and L. E. 27 Ch. Div. 497, a negotiation there was, therefore, no contract took place as to the sale by L. to P. which P. could enforce, and an in- of a British patent and certain foreign junction was refused, patents for the same inventions, and e Cowan v. O'Connor, L. E. 20 Q. B. ultimately an offer was made for sale D. 640. at £500 and accepted by letter, but it 3 Perry v. The Mount Hope Iron Co., was not quite clear whether the offer 15 E. I. 380. and acceptance related to all the pat- 4 Taylor v. Jones, L. E. 1 C. P. D. ents, or to the British patent only. 87. P. brought an action for specific per- 6 Leake on Contracts, 49. See, also, formance, treating the contract as in- Male v. Eoberts, 3 Esp. 163. eluding all the patents, and moved for 88 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 67 § 67. The English doctrine of proposals in deeds. — It is well settled in England, that no particular technical form of words or acts is necessary to render an instrument the deed of the party sealing it. The mere affixing the seal does not render it a deed; but as soon as there are acts or words sufficient to show that it is intended by the party to be executed as his deed presently binding on him, it is sufficient. The most apt and expressive mode of indicating such an intention is to hand it over, saying: "I deliver this as my deed." But any other words or acts that sufficiently show that it was intended to be finally executed will do as well. And the authorities are quite unanimous that the deed is binding on the obligor before it comes into the custody of the obligee, and even before he knows of it. 1 And this consequence arises on account of the inherent nature of a deed, because it derives its legal effect from the formality of its execution, and not like simple con- tracts, from the mere fact of agreement. Until a deed is ac- cepted by the obligee it is merely an offer which he may refuse, 2 because it is well settled that no matter how formal a document may be and how it may purport to bind a party, until accept- ance by the person to be benefited thereby it is a mere offer. 3 As a consequence of these rules of law a proposal made by deed, for the deed itself until acceptance is a mere offer, is bind- ing on the obligor before the obligee either accepts or knows of the offer, and is irrevocable; thus where a policy of insur- ance, purporting to be signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of a witness by the directors of an insurance com- pany, was left in the company's office to be sent for by the in- sured, according to the usual practice, it was held to be a valid policy and binding upon the company, though they can- celed it while it remained in their possession. 4 A father, being displeased with his son, executed a deed giving his wife £100 1 Xenos v. Wickharn, L. E. 2 H. Compare Dillon v. Coppin, 4 M. & Cr. L. 296; 36 L. J. C. P. 313; Doe v. 647. Knight, 5 B. & C. 671 ; Exton v. Scott, 2 Xenos v. Wiokharn, L. B. 2 H. L. 6 Sim. 31; Hall v. Palmer, 3 Hare, 296,312. 532; Fletcher v . Fletcher, 4 Hare, 3 Dickenson v. Dodds, L. K. 2 Ch. 67; Cracknall v. Janson, L. E. 11 Ch. Div. 463, 473, per Mellish, J. D. 1 ; In re Dodds, 60 L. J. Q. B. 599. l Xenos v. Wickham, L. E. 2 H. L. 296. §§ 68, 69 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 89 per annum in augmentation of her jointure; he kept the set- tlement in his own power, and on being reconciled to his son, canceled it. The wife found the deed after his death, and on a trial at law, the deed being proved to have been executed, was adjudged good, though canceled. 1 § 68. The same subject continued A woman executed a deed, by which she covenanted to stand seized to the use of herself, remainder to a child, her nephew, in fee. She kept this deed in her possession and afterwards burnt it and made a new settlement; it was held that the first settlement was valid and a perpetual injunction was granted against the party- claiming under the second. 2 Where a bond was executed for the benefit of a woman with whom the grantor had cohabited, though retained in the hands of the testator's solicitor, and quite unknown to her till his death, it was declared to be valid for her benefit. 3 So in another case where a man had executed a deed in favor of his illegitimate son, though unknown to the son, and the deed was kept in the grantor's possession, and not discovered until after his death, it was held to entitle the son to sue his estate for the amount.' And in delivering a learned and elaborate opinion in a leading case on this subject, 5 Bailey, Judge, said: "Upon these authorities, it seems to me, where an instrument is formally sealed and delivered, and there is nothing to qualify the delivery but the keeping the deed in the hands of the executing party, nothing to show he did not intend it to operate immediately, that it is a valid and effectual deed, and that delivery to the party who is to take by it, or to any person for his use, is not essential." Contracts under seal do not have their inception in proposal and accept- ance, and the rules touching proposal and acceptance, their communication and revocation have no place in contracts by deed and are entirely inapplicable. § 69. The American doctrine. — In the United States the law is well settled, that a sealed instrument in order to take effect 1 See dictum of Bailey, J., inDoev. * Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Knight, 5 B. & C, 671, 690. Doe v. Lewis, 11 C. B. 1035. 2 Naldred v. Gilham, 1 Pr.Wms. 577. 6 Doe v. Knight, 5 B. & C. 671, 692. 8 Hall v. Palmer, 13 L. J. (N. S.), Ch. 352; 3 Hare, 532. 90 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 70 must be delivered by the grantor, and actually or by implica- tion be accepted as his own by the grantee. A deed takes ef- fect only from its delivery; and there can be no delivery with- out acceptance, either express or implied. They are necessarily simultaneous and correlative acts. 1 No definite or specific formality is prescribed by law, but it must be the concurrent act of two parties. It must appear that the grantor parts with the control and possession of the instrument with the intention that it shall operate immediately as a transfer of title, and that it passes into the hands or is placed at the disposal of the grantee, or of some other person in his behalf. 2 It is not nec- essary that the grantee, or his agent or servant, should be present at the execution, in order to have such a delivery of the instrument made as will give it operative validity and ef- fect. But it is necessary that it should be placed within the power of some other person for the grantee's use, or that the grantor shall unequivocally indicate it to be his intention that the instrument shall take effect as a conveyance and contract, in order to have it produce that result. 3 The mere subscribing and sealing, accompanied with the ordinary attestation of those acts by the witnesses, followed by the grantor keeping the deed in his own custody, are not sufficient to constitute a legal de- livery of a sealed instrument. 4 § 70. The same subject continued. — The cases in England which have established the doctrine that a deed can be effective without the grantee's knowledge or consent, and binding on the grantor beyond revocation, are directly opposite to the en- tire current of modern authority, both in the state and federal courts, and they have been repudiated. A rule of law by which a voluntary deed, executed by ths grantor, afterward 1 Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560; z Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass.560; Har- Church v. Gilman, 15 Wend. 656; rison v. Trustees Phillips Academy, Stillwell v.Hubbard, 20 Wend. 44; 12 Mass. 456; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257 ; Tib- Mass. 450 ; Elmore v. Marks, 39 Verm. bals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428 ; Berry v. 538 ; Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. 418. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36; Parmelee v. 3 Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Simpson, 5 Wall. 81; Younge v. Younge v. Gailbeau, 3 Wall. 636; Par- Gailbeau, 3 Wall. 636; Heffron v. melee v. Simpson, 5 Wall. 81. Flanigan, 37 Mich. 274. 4 Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416. § 71 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 91 retained by him during his life in his own exclusive possession and control, never during that time made known to the grantee, and never delivered to any one for him, or declared by the grantor to be intended as a present operative conveyance, could be permitted to take effect as a transmission of the title or as a binding proposal, is so inconsistent with every sub- stantial right of property, that it would be unsafe for any court, either of law or equity, to adopt it. 1 The authorities upon what is necessary to create a legal delivery of a deed have been sufficiently discussed elsewhere. 2 Judge Cooley, in his edition of Blackstone, makes use of the following language: "No title passes by a deed, though it be executed with all due formalities, so long as the grantor retains it in his own posses- § 71. Revocability of a deed before delivery — Mutuality. — A deed takes effect only from its delivery; 4 but so long as a deed is within the control and subject to the authority of the grantor, there is no delivery. And whether in the hands of a third per- son or in the desk of the grantor is immaterial, since in either case he can destroy it at his pleasure. To make the delivery good and effectual, the power of dominion over the deed must be parted with. Until then the instrument passes nothing; it is merely ambulatory, and gives no title and is not binding as to any proposal or term contained therein, and is revocable. 5 After the delivery of a deed, it is not revocable by the grantor even 1 Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416. The livery, the grantor must part with the court says that such a rule should de- possession of the deed, or the right to serve " no toleration whatever from retain it." Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 any intelligent court, either of law or Wall. 636, 641, per Field, J. equity." s 1 Cooley's Blackstone, 306. 8 Cowen & Hill's Notes, 3d ed.,826; 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 307. and their general result is stated to 5 Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460, 475 ; be that, "to constitute a complete de- Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257; Tib- livery of a deed, the grantor must do bals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428 ; Berry v. some act putting it beyond his power Anderson, 22 Ind. 36; Parmelee v. to revoke." The Supreme Court of the Simpson, 5 Wall. 81 ; Younge v. Guil- United States has said: "The deli v- beau, 3 Wall. 636; Heffron v. Flan- ery of a deed is essential to the trans- igan, 37 Mich. 274 ; Hawkes v. Pike, fer of the title. It is the final act 105 Mass. 560; Church v. Gilman, 15 without which all other formalities Wend. 656; Stillwell v. Hubbard, 20 are ineffectual. To constitute such de- Wend. 44. 92 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. § 71 with the grantee's consent. 1 The result of the American cases on the subject of sealed instruments is that a deed has no effect until delivered; that a delivery can only be made by such an act on the part of the grantor as communicates the fact to the grantee and such an act on the part of the grantee as com- municates to the grantor his acceptance; that the delivery of a deed is synonymous with its acceptance, the two things being correlative terms; that until the deed is delivered and accepted it is revocable; that after delivery of a deed it is irre- vocable. A contract by deed has its inception in proposal and acceptance, and the rules governing proposal and acceptance, their communication and revocation are as applicable to a sealed instrument in America as they are to a simple contract. Where plaintiff was employed by a corporation as its assistant manager, the employment to continue so long as the business should be continued, and plaintiff should continue to hold a specified number of shares of the corporate stock, it was held that there was sufficient mutuality. 2 A contract to employ a person to work from time to time, the service to continue only so long as satisfactory to the employer, 3 and which stipulates 'Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Wis. 36; long as the latter might elect to serve; Lowber-u. Connit, 36 Wis. 176; Hinch- the contract having been broken by liff v. Hinman, 18 Wis. 130; Bogie v. the employer and the employee not Bogie, 35 Wis. 659; Parker v. Kane, having by his election fixed the period 4 Wis. 1; Jeffers v. Philo, 35 O. S. of service it was held that the obliga- 173. tion violated was too uncertain to en- 2 McMullan v. Deckinson Co. (Minn, able the employee to recover substan- 1896), 65 N. W. Rep. 661, Collins, J. : tial damages. "The consideration tor the agreement s Vogel v. Pekoe, (1895), 157 111. 339, was ample and mutual, although the Craig, C. J. : "Treating the contract term of service might be terminated in the same way it would be treated by defendant's cessation of business if it had been signed by the parties or plaintiff selling his stock in the cor- named as parties of the first part, the poration. The expressions of a con- next question is whether the contract tingency whereby the contract might is mutual. It is a general rule, well be terminated by the act of either understood, that a contract between party expressly excluded the idea that parties must be mutual. Weavers. each was at liberty to terminate it at Weaver, 109 111. 225 ; Tucker v. Woods, any time without regard to the hap- 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 190. In the case last pening of either contingency." In cited it is said : 'In contracts where Bolles v. Lachs, 37 Minn. 315, there the promise of the one party is the was a contract for the employment of consideration for the promise of the a person in a particular business as other, promises must be concurrent §71 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE. 93 for a forfeit if the servant should abandon the service without giving the specified notice, is void for want of mutuality, and such forfeit can not be set off against wages due. and obligatory upon both at the same time.' 1 Chitty on Contracts, 297; Delamater v. Borland, 1 Caines, 594. In Chitty on Contracts, supra, the au- thor says : 'The agreement, as before observed, must, in general, be obliga- tory upon both parties. There are sev- eral cases satisfactorily establishing that if the one party never was bound on his part to do the act which forms the consideration for the promise of the other, the agreement is void for want of mutuality.' In 1 Wharton on Contracts, p. 2, the author says : 'The parties to a contract must both be bound. If one promise in considera- tion of the promise of the other, the one is not bound unless the other is bound. Promise to do a thing on an executed consideration is not a con- tract ; nor is a promise to do a thing in consideration of an illegal or impos- sible engagement on the other side. Without this reciprocal obligation, no contract can be constituted.' 'It is a general principle,' says Mr. Fry, 'that when from personal incapacity, the nature of the contract, or any other cause, a contract is incapable of being enforced against one party, this party is equally incapable of enforcing it specifically against the other party, although its execution in the latter way might, in itself, be free from difficulty attending its execution in the former.' Specific Performance, p. 214, § 440. Upon looking into the contract read in evidence, it will be found that the parties of the first part practically agree to do nothing. There is mu- tually no obligation imposed upon them by the contract. The only por- tion of the contract claimed to impose any obligation on the parties of the first part is the following : 'The said parties of the first part agree to em- ploy the said party of the second part to perform such work as they may as- sign to him from time to time, such service to continue only so long as satisfactory to the said parties of the first part.' What obligation does this impose? When ■ are they to employ the party of the second part? What sum are they to pay him? How long is the employment to continue? Sup- pose they refuse to employ the party of the second part, can an action for damages be maintained for a breach of the contract? The answer to these enigmas is obvious. We think it is plain that the parties of the first part were not bound under the terms of the contract to employ the party of the second part for a single day or hour, and, if they had absolutely re- fused to employ him, he was without remedy in any court of the country. It may be true that the plaintiff might have entered into a contract which would require him to give two weeks' notice before he could quit the service of his employer, without being liable to respond in damages, as might rea- sonably be provided in the contract, but no such case is presented by the record. Here the contract implies no obligation on one of the parties, and hence it is void for the want of mu- tuality." CHAPTER III. CERTAINTY. §72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. Certainty as a general requi- § 78. site. The same subject continued — 79. Contracts sustained if pos- 80. sible. 81. Rule of construction. Contracts to make future con- 82. tracts. 83. Miscellaneous uncertainties — 84. Particular instances. The same subject continued — 85. Stipulations reducible to cer- tainty. 86. Id certum est quod certum reddi potest. The same subject continued. Uncertainty as to time. Uncertainty as to place and time. "Carloads." "More or less." The same subject illustrated— "About." "More or less" in descriptions of land. "Say," and "say about." § 72. Certainty as a general requisite. — It is a plain and well settled proposition that, in order to constitute a valid, ver- bal or written agreement, the parties must express themselves in such terms that it can be ascertained to a reasonable de- gree of certainty what they mean. If the agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void; neither the court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties. Such a contract can neither be enforced in equity 1 nor sued upon at 1 The subject of specific performance of contracts is treated in another part of this work (Chap. XXV, infra), but it is proper here to state that a greater degree of certainty is required in the terms of an agreement, which is to be specifically executed in equity, than is necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an action at law for damages. The action at law is founded upon the mere non-performance by the defendant, and the negative con- clusion can often be established with- out determining all the terms of the (94) agreement with exactness. Belch v. Miller, 32 Mo. App. 387; Foster v. Kimmons, 54 Mo. 488 ; Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts (2d Am. ed.), *102; Lapham v. Dreisvoght 36 Mo. App. 275; Beach on Modern Equity Jurisprudence, § 582. In In- diana a teacher can not recover from a school corporation for the breach of an executory agreement for employ- ment unless it is so full and definite as to be capable of specific enforcement. Jewett v. Perrette, 127 Ind. 97, hold- ing that a stipulation for "good wages" §73 CERTAINTY. 95 law. 1 Where one part of a contract is in the form of an un- conditional obligation, and another part, which is evidently de- signed as a qualification or limitation, is absolutely unintel- ligible, the whole agreement is ineffective for radical uncer- tainty. 8 § 73. The same subject continued— Contracts sustained if possible. — But the courts very reluctantly reject an agreement regularly and fairly made as unintelligible or insensible. It will be sustained if the meaning of the parties can be ascer- tained, either by the express terms of the instrument or by fair implication, and to this end words or phrases will be supplied, transposed or treated as surplusage. 8 The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to give effect to every part of them if practicable. 4 A party who has performed services un- der a contract, void for uncertainty, is not remediless, but may recover upon a quantum meruit. 5 renders the contract fatally defective under the rule. Atkins v. Van Buren School Tp., 77Ind. 447. 'Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474, 482; Gelston v. Sigmund, 27 Md. 334; Myers v. Forbes, 24 Md. 598; Reed v. Lowe,8 Utah, 39 ; 29 Pac. Rep. 740 ; Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. Law, 369, 375 ; Coles v. Hulme, 8 Barn. & Cr. 568 ; Figes v. Cutler, 3 Stark. 139; Chumasero v. Gilbert, 24 111. 293, a case of a bond conditioned to pay "■ dollars." Gilpatrick v. Foster, 12 111. 355, where it was held that a credit of "50" in- dorsed on a note must be rejected as a nullity unless explained. In re Clarke, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 348, 352, 355. "If it is so uncertain and am- biguous, that neither a general nor particular intent can be clearly gath- ered from it, the contract can not be enforced." Nevins, J., in Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. Law, 369, 377. 2 Leonard v. Carter, 16 Wis. 607. But see, also, Giles v. Halsted, 24N. J. Law, 366. 3 Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. Law, 369, 375, citing Lord Say and Sele's Case, 10 Mod. 40 ; Langdon v. Goole, 3 Lev. 21; Coles v. Hulme, 8 Barn. & Cr. 568; Targus v. Puget, 2 Ves. Sr. 194; Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass. 196; Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162. It maybe perfectly certain that "North" was written for "South" in a descrip- tion of land in a deed, and the court may, by construction, correct such a palpable discrepancy. Barnard v. Russell, 19 Vt. 334, 337. 4 Fitzgerald v. Moran, 19 N. Y. Supl. 958; Martin, v. Murphy, 129 Ind. 464; Morris*. Levison, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 155, 157. "Where the contract is not ex- pressed in precise terms the facts and circumstances surrounding the sub- ject-matter it contains may be looked to in aid of construction, and the acts of the parties to the instrument are entitled to great weight. Cathwright v. Callaway County, 10 Mo. 663; Pat- terson v. Camden, 25 Mo. 13; Dob- bins v. Edmonds, 18 Mo. App. 307." Belch v. Miller, 32 Mo. App. 387. 6 Cole v. Clark, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 303. 96 CEETAINTY. §74 § 74. Rule of construction. — It is provided by the North Dakota code that, "if the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed at the time of making it that the promisee understood it." 1 This is a codification of a general rule of law. Thus, where a written contract specifies a place of delivery, delivery must be tendered at that place, and am- biguities in such written contract are to be solved in the same manner as ambiguities in other writings. The shipment by a vendor at a certain place, of goods consigned to himself at an- other place, the vendor making a draft for the price, and at- taching the bill of lading thereto, is a tender of delivery at the point to which the goods are shipped, and not at the place of shipment. 2 1 Code, § 3564. Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Fargo Gas Co., 4 N. Dakota, 365; 6] N. "W. Rep. 151, where this provis- ion of the code is construed. 2 Van Valkenburg v. Gregg, 45 Neb. 654; 63 N. W. Rep. 949, per Irvine, C. : "The car occasioning the con- troversy was loaded at Ohiowa, and consigned by Gregg to himself at Beaver City. The bill of lading was then sent by Gregg's agent to Gregg, at Lincoln, where Gregg made a draft on Van Valkenburg & Son, and, at- taching the bill of lading thereto, sent it to Minden, where Van Valken- burg & Son conducted their business. The right of recovery in this case de- pends upon whether Gregg tendered delivery of the car at the place where he contracted to deliver it. Van Valkenburg & Son claim that the contract was for delivery to them at Ohiowa or Tobias. Gregg claims that the price was merely fixed at those points, but that he was justified in consigning the corn to himself at the point designated by the vendees. In such a case there is no doubt that had Gregg con- signed the car at Ohiowa to the ven- dees at Beaver City this would have been a delivery at Ohiowa. On the other hand, consigned as it was, the delivery or tender of delivery was at Beaver City, and could not take place until the vendees, by payment of the draft at Minden, obtained possession of the bill of lading. Merchants', etc., Bank v. Bangs, 102 Mass. 295 ; For- cheimer v. Stewart, 65 Iowa, 593; 22 N. W. Rep. 886. Gregg did not tender a delivery in accordance with the con- tract if the contract required a deliv- ery at Ohiowa. This we think it did. Where no place of delivery is provided it may be inferred from the circum- stances of the case, from the usages of trade, or the previous course of dealing between the parties, or even from the nature of the article sold. Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124. But where the contract designates a place of delivery the contract prevails, and patent ambiguities in a written con- tract must be solved according to the ordinary rules in such cases. If it were not for the last clause in the written contract, there could be no possible doubt that the delivery was to be at Ohiowa or Tobias. It reads: 'Bought * * ,* [on] track Ohiowa orTobias.' It is evident, however, from the last §75 CERTAINTY. 97 § 75. Contracts to make future contracts. — Where the terms of a contract are clear, unambiguous and explicit, a provision therein looking to the preparation of a more formal instrument will not be treated as superseding that agreement. 1 But the acceptance of a proposition to make a contract, the terms of which are to be subsequently fixed, does not constitute a bind- ing contract. 2 Applying this rule it was held that where the agreement providing for a future contract to deliver logs mani- festly left the place of delivery to be agreed upon, and required certain payments to be made "within days" after the sale, evidently contemplating that the prospective contract should fix the number of days, these were deemed such important matters as to render the contract wholly void for want of pre- clause, that the contract contem- plated the shipping of the cars to some other point, and it is claimed that such other point was the point of delivery, and that the first clause only indicated that the vendee was to pay the freight from Ohiowa or Tobias to such point ; but to give it such a con- struction does violence to the lan- guage of the contract. We think its obvious meaning is that the corn was to be bought, i. e. delivered, on the tracks at Ohiowa or Tobias, billed to Van Valkenburg & Son at such point as they should designate. Their di- rection was, 'On Monday next load another large car to us at Beaver City . ' Gregg did not ship to them at Beaver City, but shipped to himself at Beaver City. A vendor can not recover dam- ages for the refusal of the vendee to accept, unless delivery is tendered at the place required." 1 Wills v. Carpenter, 75 Md. 80; Cheney v. Eastern Transp. Line, 59 Md. 557; Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 DeG., J. & S. 638. 2 Wills v. Carpenter, 75 Md. 80. See, also, Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 DeG., J. & 8." 638 ; Winno. Bull, L. B. 7Ch. D. 29. "A contract between two persons upon a valid consideration, 7 that they will at some specified time in the future, at the election of one of them, enter into a particular contract, specifying its terms, is undoubtedly binding, and upon a breach thereof, the party having the election or op- tion may recover as damages what such particular contract, to be entered into, would have been worth to him if made. But an agreement that they will in the future make such a con- tract as they may then agree upon amounts to nothing. An agreement to enter into negotiations and agree upon terms of a contract, if they can, can not be made the basis of a cause of action. There would be no way by which the court could determine what sort of a contract the negotiations would result in; no rule by which the court could ascertain whether any, or, if so, what damages might follow a re- fusal to enter into such future con- tract. So, to be enforcible, a con- tract to enter into a future contract, must specify all its material and es- sential terms and leave none to be agreed upon as the. result of future negotiations." Per Gilfillan, C. J., in Shepard o. Carpenter, 54 Mina. 153; 55 N. W. Eep. 906. 98 CERTAINTY. § 76 cision. 1 So a memorandum reciting the terms of a contract of employment, which are, however, "subject to the conditions and regulations of a contract which is to be substituted for the memorandum," imposes no legal obligation. 2 An agreement by the payee of a note with the maker that at its maturity he will double the loan to the latter and take a new note for double the amount of the first one, and a mortgage on certain lands to secure it, is void for uncertainty in the absence of any stipula- tions as to what the terms of the new note and mortgage shall be. 3 § 76. Miscellaneous uncertainties — Particular instances The court could find no determinate sense whatever in a stipula- tion in a contract that for "good cause" it might be canceled by either party upon notice, and required only that the revocation should be made in good faith. 4 Where the defendant, in con- sideration that the plaintiffs would purchase a storehouse and lot and a stock of goods, agreed to assist them by indorsing their paper and advancing money to enable them to carry on the mercantile business advantageously, the meaning of the parties could not be reduced to certainty by judicial effort. 5 A contract to aid and assist another to procure an order of court is too indefinite to sustain an action for refusal or neglect. 6 A father's promise upon a valuable consideration to give his child "a full share" of his property had no lineaments of a contract that the law could recognize. 7 In one case the court denied a suitor's request to mulct a contractor who had tried in vain to build a house according to specifications calling for more dimensions than finite minds have yet discovered. 8 The following order accompanied by a draft and measurements 'Shepardu. Carpenter, 5-lMinn. 153; 'Walton ». Mather, 4 Misc. R. 261; 65 N. W. Rep. 906. Gilflllan, 0. J., 24 N. Y. Supl. 307. said: "When a formal contract fails 3 VanSchaick v. VanBuren, 70 Hun, to express some matter, as, for in- 575; 24 N. Y. Supl. 306. See, also, stance, a time for payment, the law Mayers. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434; may imply the intention of the parties ; Milliman v. Huntington, 68 Hun, 258. but where a preliminary contract 4 Cummer v. Butts, 40 Mich. 322. leaves certain terms to be agreed upon 5 Erwin v. Erwin, 25 Ala. 236. for the purpose of a formal contract 6 Case v. Lennington, 3 N. J. Law, there can be no implication of what 420. the parties will agree upon.'* 7 Adams v. Adams, 26 Ala. 272. 8 Lyle v. Jackson County, 23 Ark. 63. §77 CERTAINTY. 99 was written upon a postal card: "Please send us pice counter screen like draft." The order was declared to be unintelligi- ble, and a refusal to submit it to the jury to determine whether the letters "pice" meant "piece" or "price" was sustained on appeal. 1 Where, by a memorandum in writing a party agreed to convey to another "seventy acres of land," the vendee "to have half the wheat on the piece that is to be sowed," by a third party, " exceeding seven acres," an action for breach of the contract was not sustained, as there was nothing from which it could be ascertained on what part of the earth the premises were situated. 2 § 77. The same subject continued — Stipulations reducible to certainty. — But a contract by a manufacturer in New York to furnish to a jobber in Dubuque goods of a certain brand for their exclusive sale in Dubuque "and the territory tributary thereto" was not so indefinite as to the territory embraced in its terms as to be invalid. 3 So, also, a promise by a father to give his 1 Cheney Bigelow Wire Works v. Sorrell, 142 Mass. 442. "These letters do not mean anything," said Morton, 0. J., "and neither the court nor the jury can construe them as meaning 'piece.' " 2 Rollin v. Pickett, 2 Hill, 552. But see Fish v. Hubbard, 21 Wend. 651. It was held in Palmer v. Albee, 50 Iowa, 429 (by a divided court) , that a subscription agreement to give "twen- ty acres of land" was too indefinite to sustain an action for damages for a failure to convey any certain tract and that the uncertainty could not be removed by parol evidence. In De- lashmuttu. Thomas, 45 Md. 140, there was an agreement under seal for the lease of a store for a term certain at a fixed rent containing the following words: "The said [lessee] to have the preference of renting said property so long thereafter as it shall be rented for a store." It was held that the lessee derived no definite rights which he could enforce in law or equity. In Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns. 297, it was held that "a covenant in a lease on the part of the lessor to let the lot at the expiration of the term to the lessee without mentioning any price for which it was to be let" was al- together void for uncertainty. See, also, Clunian v. Cook, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22. For other instances of contracts held void for uncertainty see Moore v. Smith, 19 Ala. 774 ; Leslie v. Smith, 32 Mich. 64. At the bottom of a note payable on demand was a memo- randum constituting a part of the con- tract — "one half payable in twelve months, the balance in twenty-four months." The court decided that it was intended to limit and control the generality of the words "on demand," and thus avoided a fatal repugnancy. Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228. 8 Kaufman v. Farley Mfg. Co., 78 Iowa, 679, 687. The court argued the case as follows : ' 'There is certainly a section of country tributary to Du- buque for the purpose of such a trade, and it is certainly a matter not in- susceptible of proof. * * * While 100 CERTAINTY. §77 son a particular farm, "but should Providence determine other- wise he is to receive from my estate one thousand dollars," was held not to involve an inscrutable condition and the court substituted the pronoun "I" in the place of "Providence." 1 And in a contract to buy a stock of merchandise, "all soiled or perhaps it would be very difficult if not impossible to establish definite lines as bounding the territory in- tended, the regulations of trade and the experience of tradesmen would enable the court to so find the fact as to meet the intent of all parties and enforce the contract with reasonable certainty if A. should employ B. as a traveling salesman in Dubuque and the territory tributary thereto, we do not think it would be held that either could avoid the contract merely because of indefiniteness as to the territory. The law assumes that the parties contracted understandingly upon the question, and the court will not dismiss them without inquiry as to the fact where its ascertainment is a matter of reasonable certainty. The case should not be confounded with the rule as to contracts being disregarded because of indefiniteness arising from the terms or language used in the contract where the intent of the parties can not be under- stood." 1 Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. Law, 369. A building specification provided that all walls should be plastered with K. & Co.'s cement, under the direction of a superintendent of K. & Co. Another specification provided that the cement should be mixed in equal parts. It was held that the two specifications were not inconsistent ; that the super- vision of the superintendent applied to the laying of the plaster on the walls ; and that the plaintiff could not use a less proportion of cement in the mixture because the superintendent assented thereto. Fitzgerald v. Mo- ran, 19 N. Y. Supl. 958. A. owed a certain sum upon a promissory note payable to C. and secured by a mortgage running to him, but repre- senting a debt due to B., and C. held the note and mortgage for B . 's benefit. A. owed other persons besides B., with whom, being insolvent, he settled, paying one in full and to the others different portions of their debts. A. also made a settlement with B. & C, which was evidenced by a written agreement, according to the terms of which A. paid fifty per cent, of B.'s debts, part to B., and part to C, andB. released C. from all liability to him, and the note and mortgage were given up by 0. and discharged. The agree- ment then provided as follows: "Said B. is to receive from said A. pro rata per cent, of all moneys said A. may hereafter pay his 'borrowed money creditors,' as he calls them, to the amount of fifty per cent, on" the sum due on said note before the set- tlement, said amount being stated in figures: "the prorata herein named is intended to mean on all moneys paid borrowed money creditors, after the settlement which A. now says he has made with such creditors," recit- ing in full the settlements, said to have been made, and leaving the amount remaining unpaid to be com- puted. It was held in an action by B. against A. upon this agreement, that it was not void for uncertainty, and that the meaning was that, when A. should pay to his "borrowed money creditors" any portion of their debts remaining unpaid, he should pay to B. the same proportion of his debt re- maining unpaid. Raymond U.Rhodes, 135 Mass. 337. §§ 78, 79 CERTAINTY. 101 damaged goods at valuation," the word valuation was con- strued to mean "value." 1 § 78. Id certum est quod certura reddi potest. — The defendant by an instrument in writing agreed with the plaintiff, a town, that a certain illegitimate child should not become a charge to the town "during such time as under the statute laws of this state the person accused of begetting such child would be liable for the support of such child, and only to an amount not ex- ceeding the amount to which under said statute laws the person begetting such child would be liable." This agreement was upheld as sufficiently definite, the time and amount being ca- pable of ascertainment in the mode provided by the statute re- ferred to. 8 And a contract to convey lands will not be held in- valid because of a defective description where the data are suffi- cient to enable a surveyor to locate the property. 8 § 79. The same subject continued. — An agreement to pay an attorney for his services an amount equal to that paid another attorney connected with the same action has been held valid. 4 1 Sergeant v. Dwyer, 44 Minn. 309. 4 Lungerhausenv. Crittenden (Mich. 'Town of Hamden v. Merwin, 54 1894), 61 N. W. Kep. 270, per Hooker, Conn. 418. In Gelston v. Sigmund, J.: "In the law, that is certain which 27 Md. 334, it was decided that a con- is susceptible of being made certain, tract on the part of a lessor "to let If Baldwin or Chadwick should ren- the tenant retain the possession from der any services, their compensation July 1, 1866, to July 1, 1867, upon his would fix the price to be paid to the giving the lessor the same rent the plaintiffs. There seems to be no claim latter might be able to obtain from that they did nothing. On the con- other parties" was void for uncertainty trary, this measure of the plaintiffs' " and could not be enforced, citing compensation seems to be greater Bromley v. Jefferies, 2 Vern. 415. But than the defendant is disposed to see Cunningham v. Brown, 44 "Wis. pay. But counsel argue that the con- 72, 78, distinguishing Gelston v. Sig- tract was void or valid when made, mund, supra. and, as it might have happened that s White v. Hermann, 51 111. 243 ; nothing was earned by either of these See, also, Atwater v. Schenck, 9 Wis. persons, there was a want of certainty 160. "If the land granted be so inac- in the contract. We need not trouble curately described as to render its ourselves with the question of plaint- identity wholly uncertain it is admit- iffs' rights or remedies in case of the ted that the grant is void." Board- failure of these gentlemen to render man v. Lessees of Eeed, S inters, service in the case. The plaintiffs 328; Barnard v. Russell, 19 Yt. 8W. performed the service promised, and 337. there was no dispute over the fact 102 CERTAINTY. §79 Upon similar grounds a contract providing that payment for cutting timber is to be according to a scale which is to exclude "dead culls" has been held to be unambiguous; and where a lumbering contract provides that payment for cutting the timber is to be made according to the tally of a certain saw-mill where the logs were to be sawed, dead culls being ex- cluded, the fact that the grading of the mill was higher than was customary among other mills is immaterial. 1 Under a contract by which plaintiff agreed for a price named to furnish defendant "free on board cars" at place of delivery a quantity of coal, it was incumbent on defendant to furnish the cars. 8 But on the other hand, an agreement to use one's best efforts, through a certain newspaper, to advance the value of lands, is too indefinite to constitute a valid consideration for an option to purchase. 3 And evidence as to the meaning of the word that the others did also. There was no legal uncertainty in this contract at its inception. Whatever of uncer- tainty existed was the uncertainty that might arise from or grow out of contingency, which might have re- sulted in a failure of consideration, but did not. See Kent, etc., Manu- facturing Co. v. Eansom, 46 Mich. 416; 9N.W. Rep. 454." 1 Brigham v. Martin (Mich. 1894) ; 61 N. W. Rep. 276. 2 Hocking v. Hamilton (1893), 158 Pa. St. 107, per Thompson, J.: "The appellee undertook to sell and deliver at the tipple the coal at the designated price, and the appellants covenanted to receive it there, and pay for it. If so, they were bound to furnish the cars for it, and the appellee was re- quired to be ready and willing to de- liver it there. Ashe was so prepared, and as the latter neglected and refused to receive it, they became liable in damages for the non-performance of their contract. In Kunklei). Mitchell, 56 Pa. St. 100, it is said: 'The article of agreement between plaintiff and de- fendant is dated December 27, 1862, by which the defendant Mitchell agreed to deliver on the car at Indiana 75,000 feet of lumber at eighty-five cents per 100 feet. This is a control- ling clause as to the place of delivery . The cars would be either the cars of the plaintiff or those of the railroad company. In either case they were to be provided by the plaintiff, and not by the defendant. The cars, there- fore, being to be provided by the plaintiff, the duty was imposed upon him to see that he was at least ready with the cars, or willing to provide them, and to have notified the de- fendant of such readiness and willing- ness.' And in Dwight v. Eckert, 117 Pa. St. 490; 12 Atl. Rep. 32, it is said: 'It is a well-established principle of law that in a contract for the sale and delivery of goods "free on board ves- sel" the seller is under no obligation to act until the buyer names the ship to which the delivery is to be made.' " 8 Barton v. Spinning (1894), 8 Wash. 458 ; 36 Pac. Rep. 439, per Hoyt, J. : "It is suggested that the considera- tion for the option, as expressed in the contract, is too indefinite to be the foundation of a right of action; that the general statement that the §80 CERTAINTY. 103 "deal" in a contract, where no extrinsic facts appear to create ambiguity, is rightly excluded. 1 § 80. Uncertainty as to time. — Where time is of the essence of the contract, the thing to be done must be done within the time stipulated or the contract will be void.' And in the absence of any definite time, or of an express stipulation in reference thereto, the proposal is limited to a reasonable time. 3 A letter accepting a proposition, the agreement thereby effected "com- mencing not later than the 15th day of July, possibly the 1st of July, the date to be fixed by us," was not so indefinite as to authorize the party to avoid the obligation altogether by refusing to specify a day. 4 Nor is a written contract of em- ployment void for uncertainty because the number of days' service to be performed is left blank in said contract; such number to be afterwards determined by the employer from data respondents are to use their best en- deavors, through the Tacoma Ledger, to advance the value of said lands, is not a sufficiently specific agreement on their part; that its performance could not be specifically decreed, as against the respondents ; and that, for these reasons, it is not a sufficient con- sideration to support an action for specific performance in their behalf. The respondents contend that the money consideration to be paid for the land would furnish a sufficient consideration. But an examination of the contract, in its entirety, shows clearly that the parties contemplated other than a money consideration as the equivalent for the conveyance of the land by the appellants to the re- spondents. There was no obligation on their part to take the land, and pay therefor the agreed cash price. They did not bind themselves to do anything. Such being the terms of the contract, the cash price to be paid for the land had nothing to do with the consideration for the option to purchase. The entire consideration for such option was that which the respondents were to do and have done to advance the value of the lands to be conveyed, and other lands of the appellants in that vicinity. It is true that there was the payment of one dollar stated in the contract, but it is evident that this was not the consid- eration which induced its execution. The real consideration was the benefit expected from the use of the columns of the Ledger, and, if such use had been so defined as to make it certain, it would, no doubt, have been a good consideration. It was not so defined, but was left so indefinite that no legal right or obligation could be founded thereon." ' First Nat. Bank v. Coffin, 162 Mass. 180; 38 N. E. Rep. 444. 2 Pedrick v. Post, 85 Ind. 255; Coulter v. Clark, 2 Ind. App. 512 (1892). See Chap. XVI, infra. 3 Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co., 4 Dillon (U. S.) 431; Ferrier v. Storer, 63 Iowa, 484. 4 Troy Fertilizer Co. v. Logan, 96 Ala. 619; 12 So. Eep. 712. 104 CERTAINTY. 80 not at hand at the time of making the contract.' There is no fatal uncertainty in a contract to deliver ice for sale at retail "during the coming season." 2 And where a debtor delivers to his creditor an obligation to pay to the obligee the amount of the debt when certain property owned by the obligor is sold for not less than a certain sum specified, such obligation is valid and may be enforced within a reasonable time whether such property was sold or not. 3 But an agreement to extend the time for the payment of a debt until such a time as a bank, which had suspended, should resume payment, is void for un- certainty. 4 So, also, a contract which furnishes no practicable basis upon which the amount of damages for a breach can be ascertained is void for uncertainty. Thus a contract by which one party agreed to furnish and carry on a shooting gallery in a building in the possession of the other party, the net profits of the business to be divided between them and the business to be continued so long as it paid expenses, is so uncertain that 1 Marion School Township v. Car- penter, 12 Ind. App. 191 (1895). In this case a teacher made a written contract with a township trustee to teach a certain school for the school year at so much per day. The num- ber of days constituting the school year was left blank because of the in- ability at the time the contract was made to determine that fact ; which fact could not be determined until the trustee knew the amount of tuition fund at his disposal for that year. This uncertainty never was remedied in the contract, although it was after- wards discovered by the trustee that the school year would consist of 105 days. The teacher after teaching 5W days was, without legal excuse, dis~ missed by the trustee, and another employed for the balance of the school year. The first teacher sued for the time. The court says: "The uncer- tainty in the contract sued on and which is material in this case was the number of days for which the plaintiff was employed, which was to be fixed when the trustee ascertained the amount of tuition fund which he was to receive for that school year. The number of days for the scnool term for which appellee was employed was shown to be 105 days. When the number of days constituting the school term were ascertained the time for which tbfe plaintiff was em- ployed was fixed.'' 8 Booske v. Gulf Ice Co., 24 Fla. 550. s Noland v. Bull, 33 Pac. Eep. 983 24 Oie. 1'i-ii; Sivers v. Sivers, 32 Pac. Eep. 6?! (Cal.). 4 AhIstrom v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Pac. hep. 757 (Mont. 1895). It being said in this case : "The time of the alleged extension was not only wholly in- definite, but for all that appears the extension might last for all time." A portion of the price of purchased crops was to be paid "when the crop is taken off at the end of the year." Held, that the end of the fruit season, and not the end of the calendar year, was meant. Brown v. Anderson, 19 Pac. Rep. 487; 77 Cal. 263. See South Boulder, etc., R. C. Ditch Co. v. Mar- fell, 25 Pac. Rep. 504; 15 Colo. 302. $80 CERTAINTY. 105 the breach thereof by the party controlling the building will not enable the other to maintain an action for damages against him. 1 'Pulliam v. Schimpf (Ala„ 1896), 19 So. Rep.428,Head,J.: "What is meant by 'paying expenses?' Will the dullness of the trade for a day or a week or a month or a year, causing for that time an excess of expense over re- ceipts, which may be compensated by the better success of the following day or week or month or year, termi- nate the contract? How long must the failure continue? Who, or what court, has the right to fix the limit? A busi- ness of this character, involving com- plicated settlements of account, which has been conducted by parties, wheth- er, strictly speaking, a partnership or not, is so analogous thereto that a court of equity is the only forum to determine the rights of the parties, neither party having taken it into his hands to violate a covenant of the articles of agreement. Pursuing this remedy, a party may file a bill for a dissolution of the contract, for cause, prior to the expiration of the time fixed by the parties for its continu- ance. Many causes of such relief, arising either from the fault of par- ties, or without fault, may be found in the books. Profit being the aim of ell such agreements, manifest un- profitableness of the enterprise is a cause. A loss or destruction of the principal means of conducting the business is a cause. A sale by a party of his interest, or a judicial sale thereof by creditors, is a cause. For these and other causes the jurisdiction of the court to dissolve and settle the business in advance of the time fixed therefor by the agreement is common- ly invoked ; but we think it is yet to be found where the jurisdiction was exercised upon no other alleged equity than the equity to have de- termined the intent and meaning of the parties as to the duration of the business, upon an agreement either so uncertain and indefinite as to be in- capable of evincing its meaning with- out the arbitrary interpolation of terms not found in it, or of such a character that the decree pronounced may finally and conclusively deter- mine absolutely nothing, but may leave the matter open for a new suit, of the same character and purpose, every week, month, or year thereafter, until a dissolution shall be decreed, or of such a character as to require a virtual account of the entire operation of the business in order to ascertain the happening of the contingency which determines the contract. The tribunals of the people are not open for purposes of this sort. Again, in all human conception, what is the measure of damage for the breach of an agreement like this? The only measure alleged is the loss of antici- pated profits. Conceding that past profits are legal criteria by which to judge the future, for or upon what period of time must the future profits be computed? Does the plaintiff, in his declaration or proof, point us to a time certain, or in the remotest degree probable, when the business would have ceased to pay expenses? Shall the court arbitrarily assume that it would have paid expenses, and there- fore be entitled to continue, as a going concern, for the residue of the plaint- iff's life, and that profits such as the business had earned should be award- ed him for the entire period of his life expectancy? His personal serv- ices, under the contract, entered large- ly into his profits. Shall he remain idle the rest of his days, and require the defendant to pay him the value of his services, or shall he utilize his 106 CERTAINTY. §81 § 81. Uncertainty as to place and time. — Contracts which are to be operative only in a certain place or locality should be construed according to the reasonable intention of the parties as gathered from the particular circumstances. 1 Accordingly a contract by a railroad company to establish its depot "at" a specified town is complied with by locating it at a convenient distance from the business portion of the town, and is con- trolled more by the buildings composing the town than by the corporate limits as defined in the charter. 2 And a contract not to engage in a certain business in a certain town while another carries on the same business there, is not invalid as indefinite as to its duration. 8 When it is stated in an agreement that the employment is to commence at not later than a certain named day but may go into effect at an earlier day, the time within which the agreement is to go into effect is stated with sufficient definiteness. 4 And an agreement between the solvent share- holders of a corporation that they will contribute to a fund to services while he lives, and earn, pos- be enforced. Where, in such a case, sibly, more than they would have re- alized in the shooting business, and make the defendant no allowance therefor? How are these alleged rights, the outgrowth of such indefi- nite duration and unknown circum- stances, to be ascertained upon any sort of practical or tangible basis? The plaintiff's loss, manifestly, rests in the idlest conjecture. In Erwin v. Envin, 25 Ala. 236, and Howard v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 268; 8 So. Rep. 868, we laid down the principle that, when no breach of a contract could be assigned which could be compensated by any cri- terion of damages to be furnished by the contract itself, the contract is void for uncertainty. That principle is decisive of this case." 1 Cole v. Edwards (Iowa, 1895,) 61 N. W. Eep. 940. In this case a contract by a physician: "Received of C. 5262 for my share of office fixtures, and proceeds of practice for month of March, and good-will of business in town of W., and agree not to practice therein," — is sufficiently definite to it appears that it was the understand- ing of the parties that defendant should not practice within W. or vicin- ity, defendant's chief practice having been in the surrounding country, the contract will be so construed. 2 Frey v. Fort Worth R. Co., 6 Tex. Civil App. 29; 24 S.W.Rep. 950. And see Williams v. Ft. W., etc., R. Co., 82 Tex. 553. 3 Eisel v. Hayes, 141 Ind. 41 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 119, perHoward, J. : "The cir- cumstance that the restraint is indefi- nite in point of time — "while Hayes carries on the butcher business in Brownstown" — does not invalidate the contract. A contract of this nature, reasonable in other respects, is not void merely on the ground that the restriction is indefinite as to dura- tion. Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 344; Martin v. Murphy, supra. See, also, the late English case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim, etc., Co., L. R. (1894) App. Cas. 535." 4 Troy Fertilizer Co. v. Logan, 96 Ala. 619. §82 CERTAINTY. 107 pay the corporate debts is not uncertain, because the contri- bution of each is not expressly fixed, as it would be understood that each should contribute in proportion to his stock. 1 So also an agreement "to give all moneys and personal property I may be possessed of in the United States" to a person named is not void for uncertainty. 2 § 82. "Car loads." — A contract to deliver a certain number of car loads of wood is not void for uncertainty, because a car load varies from thirty-five thousand to sixty thousand feet. The vendee has a right to insist upon as much, at least, as the specified number of loads of the smallest capacity. 3 1 Sterling Wrench Co. v. Amstutz (1893), 50 Ohio St. 484; 34 N. E. Rep. 794. 8 Brady v. Smith (1894), 8 Misc. R. 465; 28 N. Y. Supl. 776, per Sedgwick, C. J. : "I am of opinion that the agreement was not void for uncertainty. It is a common ex- pression of contracts and wills that 'all shall he or is given.' This expression has its foundation in un- certainty as to whether an enumera- tion or description, if made, would fulfill the actual intention of the grantor or testator, but the matter is made certain by using the word 'all.' " Stickler v. Giles, 9 Wash. 147 ; 37 Pac. Rep. 293. A debtor told his creditor that he was unable to pay him, but that he had a contract for certain work, and would get his first estimate from the 12th to the 15th of the month, and that he would then pay'the debt. The creditor agreed to wait. It was held that it did not con- stitute a valid contract of extension, because the time was not certain, as it depended on the contingency of the work being performed. Hoyt, J., said: "As we understand the con- versation, it amounted to no more than a statement on the part of the appellant that he had the contract for this work, and that in the usual and ordinary course he would receive his first estimate the middle of August, and that when he did so receive it, and get his money thereon, he would pay the bill; and, thus construed, it did not name any time for the pay- ment with such definiteness as to war- rant us in holding that the contract was extended to any definite time. We agree with the contention of the appellant that it is not necessary that such extension should be to a day absolutely definite and certain if it is to some time which the future is sure to make certain. If there had been an absolute certainty that the work under the contract woo,d be per- formed, and the appellant get his estimate and his pay thereon about the middle of August, and the agree- ment had been that it should be ex- tended until he did so get his pay, it would probably have been sufficiently definite. But from the very nature of the conversation it is evident that the happening of these events was un- certain, and dependent upon con- ditions which might or might not result." 3 Indianapolis Cabinet Co. v. Herr- man, 7 Ind.App.462 ; 34 N. E. Rep. 579, where the court said that "so far as the contract is uncertain the courts can not enforce it, lsut within the limits that the contract is certain, the courts will enforce it." In Schrieber 108 CERTAINTY. §83 § 83. "More or less." — The words "more or less" have a plain, ordinary, and popular signification, and are often used in contracts relating both to real and personal estate. As applied to quantity they are to be construed as qualifying a representa- tion or statement of an absolute and definite amount, so thai neither party to a contract can avoid it or set it aside by rea- son of any deficiency or surplus occasioned by no fraud or want of good faith, if there is a reasonable approximation, to the quantity specifically stipulated in the contract. In sales of merchandise, especially in large quantities, the office and ef- fect of the words "more or less," in connection with the spe- cific amount which forms the subject-matter of the contract, is to cover any variation from the estimate which is likely to arise from differences in weight, errors in counting, diminution by shrinking or other similar causes. It is sometimes briefly expressed to be "an absolute contract for a specified quantity within a reasonable limit." 1 What is a reasonable limit and a substantial compliance with such a contract, if the facts are v. Butler, 84 Ind. 576, it was held that a contract for the delivery of a certain number of car loads of ice was not void for uncertainty and that the quantity could be made certain by averment and proof. The suit was based upon the refusal of the defend- ant, after delivering ten car loads, to deliver the remainder of the specified number of thirty. See, also, O'Fer- rall v. Van Camp, 124 Ind. 336. ■Cabot v. Winsor, 1 Allen, 546, where it was held that a shortage of five per cent, on "500 bundles, more or less, gunny bags" was not such a deficiency as to fall outside of the fair and reasonable limit of short deliv- ery, and that by delivering of a portion of 475 bundles and a readiness to de- liver the residue of the 475, the plaint- iff proved a full compliance with the terms of his contract. After declaring the law in substantially the language of the text, the court continued : "In such cases parol evidence is not ad- mitted to show that the parties in- tended to buy and sell a different quantity or amount from that stated in the written agreement. On the contrary it is held to be a contract for the sale of the quantity or amount specified and the effect of the words, "more or less," is only to permit the vendor to fulfill his contract by a de- livery of so much as may reasonably and fairly be held to be a compliance with the contract after making due allowance for an excess or short de- livery arising from the usual and or- dinary causes, which prevent an ac- curate estimate of the weight or num- ber of the articles sold." See, further, to the point that the words "more or less" do not render a contract prima facie void. Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 219, 221, and cases there cited; Morris v. Levison, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 155; Cockerell v. Aucompte, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 440, 451; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 190. §84 CERTAINTY. 109 not in dispute between the parties, is a question of law for the determination of the court. 1 § 84. The same subject illustrated— "About."— A contract for a herd of cattle containing two hundred and sixty-two head, "more or less," was held not elastic enough to require an ac- ceptance of one hundred and seventy-eight. 2 Under a contract calling for "about three hundred quarters more or less" of rye, the buyer was not compelled to accept three hundred and fifty quarters. 3 But under a contract to deliver five hundred thou- sand feet of lumber, "more or less," a delivery of four hun- dred and seventy-three thousand feet was said to be a deviation quite within the degree the courts have held to be reasonable. 4 A contract to pay "a claim * * * of about $150" was held to be a contract to pay the whole amount, although the latter was in fact $50 more than the sum mentioned. 5 1 Cabot v. "Winsor, 1 Allen, 546 ; Cross v. Eglin, 2 B. & Ad. 106; Moore B.Campbell, 10 Exch. 323; Bourne v. Seymour, 16 C. B. 337; Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 414, 419; Pembroke Iron Co. v. Parsons, 5 Gray, 589. 2 Tilden v. Rosenthal, 41 111. 385. "We understand the phrase 'more or less' " said Lawrence, J., "as having been used by the parties to cover such trifling deficiencies in number as might be caused by the ordinary casualties of death or loss." 8 Cross v. Eglin, 2 B. & Ad. 106. « Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 218. "Turner v. Whidden, 22 Me. 121. "Where a contract is made to sell or furnish certain goods identified by reference to independent circum- stances, such as an entire lot depos- ited in a certain warehouse, or all that may be manufactured by the vendor in a certain establishment or that may be shipped by his agent or cor- respondent in certain vessels, and the quantity is named with the qualifica- tion 'about' or 'more or less,' or words of like import, the contract applies to the specific lot, and the naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty but only as an estimate of the probable amount, in reference to which good faith is all that is required of the party making it. In such cases the governing rule is somewhat analagous to that which is applied in the description of lands where natural boundaries and monu- ments control courses and distances and estimates of quantity. But when no such independent circumstances are referred to and the engagement is to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain amount the quantity specified is material and governs the contract. The addition of the qualifying words 'about' or 'more or less' and the like in such cases is only for the purpose of pro- viding against accidental variations arising from slight and unimportant excesses or deficiencies in number, measure or weight. If, however, the qualifying words are supplemented by other stipulations or conditions which give them a broader scope or a more extensive significancy, then the con- tract is to be governed by such added 110 CERTAINTY. §§85,86 § 85. "More or less" in descriptions of land.— The effect of the words "more or less," when annexed to a specified quan- tity in contracts relating to land, was thus declared in Massa- chusetts: "In an agreement for the sale and purchase of land for an entire sum, either the description of the land by its boundaries, or the insertion of the words 'more or less,' or equivalent words, will control a statement of the quantity of land or of the length of one of the boundary lines so that neither party may be entitled to relief on account of a defi- ciency or surplus, unless in case of so great a difference as will naturally raise the presumption of fraud or gross mistake in the very essence of the contract." 1 § 86. "Say" and "say about." — The same words may have different meanings, according to the context, in different con- stipulations or conditions." Per Jus- tice Bradley in Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 168, where a contrac- tor agreed to furnish eight hundred and eighty cords of wood, "more or less as shall be determined to be nec- essary," by an agent of the vendee. Subsequently, the agent in good faith notified the contractor that only forty cords were required, and it was held that there was no liability beyond the value of the forty cords. 'Noble v. Goggins, 99 Mass. 231, citing Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 414 ; Marvin v. Bennett, 8 Paige, 312 ; 26 Wend. 169; Morris Canal Co. v. Emmett, 9 Paige, 168; Faure v. Mar- tin, 7 N. Y. 210; Ketchum v. Stout, 20 Ohio, 453; Stull v. Hurt, 9 Gill, 446; Weart v. Rose, 15 N. J. Eq. 290. The latitude which will be given by a court of equity to the words "more or less" in such cases was thoroughly discussed in the light of the authori- ties by Comstock, J., in Belknap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 143. For other cases involving the phrase "more or less" in deeds, see Harrell v. Hill, 19 Ark. 102; Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 102; McCoun v, Delany, 3 Bibb. 46; 6 Am. Dec. 635 ; Pendleton v. Stewart, 5 Call, 1 ; Hoffman v. Johnson, 2 Bland, 103; Brady v. Hennion, 8 Bosw. 528; Pettit v. Shepard, 32 N. Y. 97; Couse v. Boyles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212; Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. 62; Tyson v. Hardesty, 29 Md. 305; Phipps v. Tarpley, 24 Miss. 597; Baynard v. Eddings, 2 Strobh. 374; Peden v. Owens, Rice (Eq.), 55; Smith ti.Fly, 24 Texas, 345; Duvals v. Ross, 2 Munf . 290 ; Gerrens v. Huhn 10 Nev. 139; McConnell v. Brayner, 63 Mo. 461 ; Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405 ; Allison v. Allison, 1 Yerg. 16; Sullivan v. Ferguson, 40 Mo. 79; United States v. D'Aguirre, 1 Wall. 311 ; Dale v. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1; Thomas v. Perry, Pet. C. C. 49; Pollock v. Wilson, 3 Dana, 25 ; Willi- ford v. Bentley, 5 J. J. Marsh. 181; Fannin v. Bellomy, 5 Bush, 663 ; Gen- try v. Hamilton, 3 Ired. (Eq.) 376; Shipp v. Swann, 2 Bibb. 82; Poague v. Allen, 3 J. J. Marsh. 421 ; Smallwood v. Hatton, 4 Md. Ch. 95; Lawson's Concordance of Words, Phrases and Definitions, tit. "More — or Less." A deficiency of eight acres in a con- tract for 552 acres is no more than a purchaser who buys for more or less can reasonably expect. Nelson v. Matthews, 2 Hen. & M. 164. $86 CERTAINTY. Ill tracts. 1 But, unless there is something in the context to dic- tate a more positive signification, such words as "say," or "say about," when used to specify quantity, ought not to be construed as words of warranty. 2 Thus, a contract to sell all the naphtha that the vendor might make during a certain pe- riod, "say from one thousand to one thousand two hundred gallons per month," was held not to impose an absolute ob- ligation to supply that number of gallons. 8 In a similar con- nection, the words "say about" afford a contractor as much latitude as the words "say from." 4 On the other hand, an agreement to furnish "say not less than" a certain quantity leaves no uncertainty as to the minimum 5 And a contract to load "a full and complete cargo of iron, say about one thousand one hundred tons," where the ship could carry one thousand two hundred and ten tons, was not fulfilled by loading one thousand and eighty tons. 6 1 McConnel v. Murphy, L. R. 5 Priv. C. App. 203, 217. 2 McConnel v. Murphy, L. R. 5 Priv. C. App. 203, 217. 8 Gwillim v. Daniell, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 61. 4 McConnel v. Murphy, L. R. 5 Priv. C. App. 203, 217, holding that 496 will satisfy "say about 600." 5 Leeming v. Snaith, 16 Q. B. 275, declared in McConnel v. Murphy, cited in the preceding note, not to be inconsistent with Gwillim v. Daniell, 2 C. M. & R. 61. 6 Morris v. Levison, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 155, where Brett, J., premising that the words "full and complete cargo" were a material factor in the construction, continued : "What, then, is the mean- ing of the word 'about?' This is partly matter of fact and partly mat- ter of law. I think the direction to the jury has always been that the de- viation must not be very large. The difference must be such as people would ordinarily consider as included in the word 'about.' There can be no exact rule of law as to the percent- age of difference allowed, but I have known juries often allow in practice three per cent. Here we are placed in the position of a jury and are en- titled to find the facts and we think that three per cent, above 1100 tonB is somewhere about the right quantity to fix upon. If so, the undertaking was to load a full and complete cargo, but the ship-owner undertook to be con- tent with 1133 tons as a fulfillment of the contract. Only 1080 tons were loaded and consequently defendant was 53 tons short." In the same case Archibald, J., said that "the nature of the subject-matter must be considered in determining what meaning is to be attributed to such expressions." CHAPTER IV. CONDITIONS. §87. Kinds of covenants. §113. 88. Time of performance. 89. Covenants construed as depend- 114. ent. 115. 90. Mutual promises. 91. Conditions in insurance poli- 116. cies. 92. The same subject continued — 117. Suicide. 118. 93. Examples of conditions prece- 119. dent— Vendor and purchaser. 120. 94. Condition of arbitration — Waiv- 121. er. 95. Vendor and purchaser. 122. 96. Sales of goods. 123. 97. The same subject continued. 124. 98. Sale of goods to arrive. 125. 99. The same subject continued. 126. 100. Architect's or engineer's certifi- 127. cate of approval. 128. i 101. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 129. 102. The same subject continued. 103. Promise conditional upon ap- 130. proval of promiser. 104. Right of approval to be exer- 131. cised reasonably. 132. 105. Eight of approval not to vary contract. 133. 106. Limitations upon the right to reject. 134. 107. Performance of conditions pre- 135. cedent. 136. 108. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 137. 109. Further illustrations — Waiver. 110. Building contracts. 138. 111. The result of the cases. 139. 112. Substantial performance of 140. building contracts. 141. (112) Substantial performance — De- lay. Insufficient performance. The same subject continued — A contrary view. Doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States. Sales — Incomplete delivery. The New York doctrine. Personal services. The same subject continued. The same subject continued— A contrary view. Delivery by installments. Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor. Insolvency of buyer. Subscriptions to stock. (a) Waiver. (b) Recitals. Subscriptions before incorpora- tion — How far absolute. The subject-matter of conditions in subscription to stock. How the condition must be stated. Performance. Performance — Full perform- ance waived. Time of performance — Reason- able time. Pleading. Conditional sales. Form of contract of conditional sale. Transfer of rights under condi- tional sale. Rights of the parties on default. Rights of buyer. Waiver of forfeiture and title. Destruction of property. §§ 87, 88 CONDITIONS. 113 §142. Recording. §145. Surety's bond signed under con- 143. Miscellaneous matters. dition. 144. Condition subsequent in deed— 146. Refunding dues, etc., to with- Subsequent defeasance. drawing members. § 87. Kinds of covenants. — There are three kinds of cov- enants : 1. Such as are called mutual and independent, where either party may recover damages from the other for the in- jury he may have received by a breach of the covenants in his favor; and where it is no excuse for the defendant to allege a breach of the covenant on the part of the plaintiff. 2. There are covenants which are conditions and dependent, in which the performance of one depends on the prior performance of another, and, therefore, until this prior condition is performed, the other party is not liable to an action on his covenant. 3. There is also a third sort of covenants, which are mutual conditions to be performed at the same time ;. and in these, if one party was ready, and offered to perform his part, and the other neglected, or refused, to perform his, he who was ready and offered has fulfilled his engagement, and may maintain an action for the default of the other, although it is not certain that either is obliged to do the first act. The dependence or in- dependence of covenants is to be collected from the evident sense and meaning of the parties, and, however transposed they may be in the deed, their precedency must depend on the order of time in which the intent of the transaction requires their performance. 1 § 88. Time of performance. — The following rules of con- struction as to the intention of the parties have been deduced from the times appointed for the performance of the respective promises: If a day be appointed for payment of money or part of it, or for doing any other act, and the day is to happen, or may happen, before the thing which is the consideration of the money, or other act, is to be performed, an action may be brought for the money, or for not doing such other act, before 1 Kingston v. Preston, cited in Jones Powell, 2 Smith L. C. 1 ; Stavers v. v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684; Pordage v. Curling, 3 Bing. N. C. 355. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. 320; Cutter v. 8 114 CONDITIONS. § 89 performance; for it appears that the party relied upon his remedy, and did not intend to make the performance a condi- tion precedent; and so it is where no time is fixed for perform- ance of that which is the consideration of the money or other act. 1 When a day is appointed for the payment of money, and the day is to happen after the thing which is the con- sideration of the money is to be performed, no action can be maintained for the money before performance. 2 Where two acts are to be done at the same time, as where A. cove- nants to convey an estate to B. on such a day, and, in con- sideration thereof, B. covenants to pay A. a sum of money on the same day, neither can maintain an action without showing performance of, or an offer to perform, his part, although it is not certain which of them is obliged to do the first act; and this particularly applies to all cases of sales. 3 § 89. Corenants construed as dependent. — Whether or not a stipulation or covenant is dependent or independent must be determined from the terms of the contract, the rule being that such stipulation or covenant will be construed as dependent unless a contrary intention appears by the terms of the con- tract. 1 Although an agreement for the sale and shipment of a 1 Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. said contract a patent deed from the 320. McCray Refrigerator Company, * * 2 Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. * * conveying all the rights under 320. said patents," is a dependent stip- 3 Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. ulation ; and the contractors can not 320; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 L. Raym. recover the amount agreed to be 6(i2 ; Campbell v. Jones, 6 T. R. 570 ; paid by the subscribers to the con- Terry v. Duntze, 2 H.B1.389; Dicker tract, in the absence of proof that said v. Jackson, 6 C. B. 103; Judson «. patent deed has been furnished or Bowden, 1 Ex. 162; Rolt v. Cozens, tendered to the subscribers. Carson, 18 C. B. 673; Peeters v. Opie, 2 Wms. P. J., said: "In the early case of Saund. 350; Doogood v. Rose, 9 C. B. President, etc., v. Hagner, 1 Pet. 132; Giles v. Giles, 9 Q. B. 164. 455, the Supreme Court of the United 4 Davis v. Jeffris (S. Dak. 1894), 58 States states the rule as follows: 'Ad- N. W. Rep. 815. In this casein a mitting, then, that a contract was en- contract for the construction of a tered into between the parties, the creamery and cold-storage building — inquiry arises whether the plaintiffs the contractors agreeing to furnish all have shown such a performance on material and labor, and the cold-stor- their part as will entitle them, in a age being constructed under the Mc- court of law, to sustain an action for Cray patent— a stipulation by which the recovery of the purchase-money, the contractors "agree to furnish with In contracts of this description the § CONDITIONS. 115 certain amount of coke is expressly conditioned on the ability of the seller to induce operators to build ovens and make the coke, and it provides for notice by the seller to the buyer, at specified times, as to how much of the entire quantity of coke can be supplied during certain periods, the seller is bound thereby so soon as he induces operators to build ovens and make the coke, and hence the agreement is mutual. 1 The rule as to dependent covenants requires only that a tender of the deed precede an action for the purchase-money. 2 Whether the requirements of a contract are conditions precedent which must be strictly complied with, or are independent stipulations the failure to completely perform which may be compensated in damages, is to be determined by an examination and fair inter- pretation of the entire contract. 8 Accordingly where the owner undertakings of the respective parties are always considered dependent un- less a contrary intention clearly ap- pears. A different construction would in many cases lead to the greatest in- justice, and a purchaser might have payment of the consideration money enforced upon him, and yet be dis- abled from procuring the property for which he paid it. Although many nice distinctions are to be found in the books upon the question whether the covenants or promises of the re- spective parties to the contract are to be considered independent or depend- ent, yet it is evident the inclination of the courts has strongly favored the latter construction, as being obviously the most just. The seller ought not to be compelled to part with his prop- erty without receiving the considera- tion, nor the purchaser to part with his money without an equivalent in return. Hence, in such cases, if either a vendor or a vendee wish to compel the other to fulfill his contract, he must make his part of the agreement precedent, andean not proceed against the other without an actual perform- ance of the agreement eta his part, or a tender and refusal ; and an averment to that effect is always made in the declaration upon contracts containing dependent undertakings, and that averment must be supported by proof, and that the one now before the court must be considered a contract of this description can not admit of a doubt." The principles there enunciated have since been generally followed by the courts of this country. For a very full review of the English and Ameri- can decisions upon this question, see Lester v. Jewett, 11 N. Y. 453. See, also, Kane v. Hood, 13 Pick. 281; Swan a. Drury, 22 Pick. 485; Williams v. Healey, 3 Denio, 363; Grant v. Johnson, 5 N. Y. 247 ; Parker v. Par- mele, 20 Johns. 130; Galvin v. Pren- tice, 45 N. Y. 162 ; Dunham v. Pettee, 8 N. Y. 508 ; Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110; Clark v. Weis, 87 111. 438; Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 4 Fed. Rep. 577. 1 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Hull Coke Co., 101 Ala. 446; 14 So. Eep. 672. 8 Suydamo. Dunton (1895), 84 Hun, 506. 'Keller v. Reynolds (Ind. App. 1895), 40N.E. Rep. 76 and 280, Gavin, J. : "Counsel for appellants claim the first paragraph of complaint to have been bad on demurrerforwantof facts, because it fails to allege by either spe- cific or general averment the perform- ance by appellee or her agent, E. L. 116 CONDITIONS. §90 of land makes an executory contract to convey when one-half the price is paid, in monthly installments, and the vendee makes default, the owner may declare a forfeiture and sue to recover the land, as such payment is a condition precedent to the vesting of title in the vendee. 1 § 90. Mutual promises. — When, upon consideration of the whole instrument, it is clear that the one party relied upon his remedy, and not upon the performance of the condition by the other, such performance is not a condition precedent. On the other hand, where it is clear that the intention was to rely on the performance of the condition, and not on the remedy, the performance is a condition precedent. 2 But the parties to a, contract may, if they think proper, agree that any matter shall Reynolds, of all the various matters to be by them performed in the course of conducting the business under said contract, upon the theory that some of these matters, such as keeping $3,000 invested in stock, are condi- tions precedent, and some concurrent stipulations upon the performance of which appellants' obligations were de- pendent. "Whether or not the per- formance of those things to be done by appellee is to be regarded as a con- dition precedent is to be determined from an examination of the entire contract, giving to it a reasonable and fair interpretation. Those matters as to which appellee has failed to aver performance constitute but a part of the consideration for the agreement of appellants to pay to her the amounts named ; and since the agreement has been in an essential feature performed by appellee, and the benefit of such performance received by appellants, and any loss to appellants from the failure to completely perform may be compensated by damages, such stipu- lations will be regarded as indepen- dent, and not as constituting condi- tions precedent. Pickens v. Bozell, 11 Ind. 275; Harman v. Moore, 112 Ind. 221; 13 N. E. Rep. 718; Cum- mings v. Pence, 1 Ind. App. 317; 27 N. E. Rep. 631 ; Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, note; 2 Parsons on Con- tracts (5th ed.), 525-529. There are, of course, many contracts in which the requirements must be regarded as conditions precedent or as covenants interdependent, performance of which must be alleged ; but, when fairly con- strued, this contract is not of that character. It would be manifestly in- iquitous to say that appellants should receive and keep appellee's $3,000 be- cause she had not kept the investment up to that amount continually, or because she had failed to perform some other matters called for in this contract. The appellee furnished ap- pellants this $3,000, which they in- vested in teeth, sold them, and col- lected the money, which it then be- came their duty, under the contract, to pay over to her with its profits, or to otherwise satisfactorily account to her therefor. The complaint alleges a clear breach of this obligation, and is therefore good upon demurrer." ■Pell v. Chandos (Tex. App. 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 48; Moore v. Giesecke, 76 Texas, 543.' 2 Roberts v. Brett, 18. C. B. 561. $ 91 CONDITIONS. 117 be a condition precedent; and, if words are used in the contract so precise, express and strong, that such intention, and such in- tention only, is compatible with the terms employed, however inconsistent it may be with general principles of reasoning, a court can only give effect to such declared intention of the parties. The only question in every particular case is, whether such intention is so declared. 1 Parties may think some mat- ter, apparently of very little importance, essential, and, if they sufficiently express an intention to make the literal fulfillment of such a thing a condition precedent, it will be one; or they may think that the performance of some matter, appar- ently of essential importance, and, prima facie, a condition precedent, is not really vital, and may be compensated for in damages; and, if they sufficiently express such intention, it will not be a condition precedent. 2 § 91. Conditions in insurance policies. — The conditions ex- pressed in an insurance policy are a part of the contract and the insured is bound to take notice of them. 3 And the fact that he did not read them or know of the conditions is imma- terial.* But after liability actually attaches under the policy, the entire relation between the parties is changed from that of insurer'and insured to that of debtor and creditor; and clauses in the policy which provide that certain acts or omissions shall invalidate it are inoperative. 5 If an insurance company is in the 1 Stavers v. Curling, 3 King. N. C. Co., 75 Pa. St. 378; Railway, etc., Co. 365. v. Burwell, 44 Ind. 460. 2 Bettini v. Gye, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 4 Quinlan v. Providence Ins. Co., 183. See following cases for instances 133 N. Y. 356; Herndon v. The Triple of the application of the rules above Alliance, 45 Mo. App. 426 ; Snider v. given: Ritchie v. Atkinson, 10 East, Adams Express Co., 63 Mo. 376; 306; Greaves a.Legg, 11 Ex. 642; Ellen Palmer v. Continental Ins. Co., 31 v. Topp, 6 Ex. 424; Seeger v. Duthie, Mo. App. 467; Robinson v. Jarvis, 25 8 C. B. (N. S.) 45; London Gas Co. o. Mo. App. 421; Rothschild v. Frens- Chelsea, 8 C. B. (N. S ) 215; Poussard dorf, 21 Mo. App. 318; Brown v. Wa- il. Spiers, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 410. bash, etc., R. Co., 18 Mo. App. 568; 8 Quinlan v. Providence Ins. Co. Taylor v. Fox, 16 Mo. App. 527. (1892), 133 N.Y. 356; O'Brien v. Com- 5 Seyk v. Millers Ins. Co., 74 Wis. mercial, etc., Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 108; 67; 3 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 523; Har- Bell v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 19 rington v. Fitchburg Ins. Co., 124 Hun, 238; Blossom v. Lycoming, etc., Mass. 126; Brown v. Roger, etc., Ins. Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 162; McDermott v. Co., 5 R. I. 394; Browning v. Home, Lycoming, etc., Ins. Co., 12 J. & S. etc., Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 508; Dogge v. 221; Edwards v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Northwestern Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 501 ; 118 CONDITIONS. § 92 habit of demanding payment of premiums, its failure to do so will estop it to take advantage of a condition forfeiting a pol- icy for non-payment, although the policy provides for the pay- ment at certain times. 1 And if a company take notes in pay- ment of premiums this prevents it from forfeiting the policy, although the policy expressly stipulates that it is to become void for non-payment of premiums. 2 Where a condition in a policy provided that the company would not be liable for a loss by "riot," it was held that the breaking of five masked men into a house, who compelled the owner to leave and then burned the building, was a "riot" within the meaning of the policy." Receiving what is due as a premium, after the condition as to payment has been broken, is a waiver of forfeiture. 1 § 92. The same subject continued — Suicide. — Insurance companies have recently inserted in the conditions of their policies words of limitation touching suicide, so that the com- pany will not be liable in case the insured died by his own hand, sane or insane. This takes the subject from the domain of controversy, and precludes all liability by reason of the death of the insured by his own act, whether he was at the time a responsible moral agent or not. 5 Thus one who shows intelli- gence enough to employ a rope and hang himself can not be said to be so unconscious of the result as to prevent the oper- ation of the condition to his policy which nullifies it if he com- mits suicide, sane or insane; 6 and such conditions preclude a recovery, although the insured acts in obedience to an insane Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., tional Life Co., 19 N. Y. Supl. 8; Mor- 53 Wis. 136. row v. DesMoines Co., 84 Iowa, 256; 1 Equitable Ins. Co. v. Van Etten, 51 N. W. Rep. 3 ; Daft v. Drew, 40 111. 40 111. App. 232; Ross v. Hawkeye App. 266. Ins. Co., 83 Iowa, 586; 50 N. W. Rep. 6 Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co., 93 47; McDougall f>. Provident, etc., Co., U. S. 284; Pierce v. The Travellers' 64 Hun, 515; 19 N. Y. Supl. 481. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389; Breasted v. 2 Michigan Ins. Co. v. Bowes, 42 Farmers', etc., Co., 4 Hill, 73. But Mich. 19. see, also, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leu- 3 Germania Ins. Co. v. Deckard, 3 brie (1896), 71 Fed Rep. 843, for the Ind. App. 361 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 868. rule where the policy does not contain 4 Arnott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 63 a "sane or insane" clause. Hun, 628; 17 N. Y. Supl. 710; Conti- 6 Sabin v. The Senate, 90 Mich. 177; nental Ins. Co. v. Miller, 4 Ind. App. Streeter v. Western, etc., Society, 65 553;30N. E. Rep. 718;DeFrece v. Na- Mich. 199. §93 CONDITIONS. 119 impulse which has overcome his will. 1 But the condition does not apply where the death is accidental, and where the insured dies under mysterious circumstances which suggest suicide. In such a case the burden of proof is on the company to prove suicide, the presumption being that accident caused death. 2 If the condition as to suicide omits to provide for an insane act, then suicide, while insane, does not prevent recovery. 8 But the word "insane" need not necessarily be used. Thus the words "suicide felonious, or otherwise" are equivalent to "suicide sane or insane," and exempt the company in case of insane suicide. 1 The word "suicide" is synonymous with "dying by one's own hand," in insurance policies. 5 § 93. Examples of conditions precedent — Vendor and pur- chaser. — Where a lot was orally donated to a person for the purpose of erecting a boarding-house thereon, with an express oral stipulation that there should be no liquor sold on the premises, after the boarding-house is erected and the party de- mands a conveyance, although there was no agreement that 1 Billings v. Accident Ins. Co., 64 • Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leubrie Vt. 78. See, also, Cooper ■«. Mass. Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227; Terry v. Life I. Co., 1 Dillon, 403; Life Ins. Co. w.Terry, 15 Wall. 580; DeGogorza v. Knickerbocker Co., 65 N. Y. 232; Adkins v. Col. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27; 35 Am. Rep. 410 ; Scarth v. Security, etc., Society, 75 Iowa, 346; Chapman v. Rep. Ins. Co., 6 Bissell, 238 ; Riley v. Hartford, etc., Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 315. "This is the better rule, in that it gives effect to the contract made by the parties, and the logical conclusion of the better considered cases." Per Taft, J., in Billings v. Accident Co., supra. 2 Ingersoll v. Knights of the Golden Rule, 47 Fed. Rep. 272; Home Benefit Assn. v. Sargent, 142 "U.S. 691; C> Fed. 711. See as to effect of a statute touching suicide : Knights Templar, ate, Co. v. Berry, 50 Fed. Rep. 511, and Berry v. Knights Templar, etc., Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 439, which sustains validity of statute making void a con- dition of forfeiture for suicide. (1896), 71 Fed. Rep. 843; Michigan, etc., Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79; Breasted v. Farmers', etc., Co., 8 N. Y. 299 ; Phadenhauer v. Germania Ins. Co., 7 Heisk. 567; Phillips v. Louisi- analns. Co., 26 La. Ann. 404; Con- necticut Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. St. 92 ; Schultz v. Ins. Co., 40 Ohio St. 217 ; Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580; Insurance Co. v. Haven, 95 U. S. 242; Manhattan Ins. Co.u. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121 ; 21 Central Law Journal, 378; Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Haze- lett, 105 Ind. 212; Equitable, etc., So- ciety v. Paterson, 41 Geo. 338; Mal- lory v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; Penfold v. Universal Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; Edwards v. Travellers' Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 661. 1 Bigelowf. Berkshire, etc., Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; Pierce v. Travellers', etc., Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389. 5 Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284; Barradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 639. 120 CONDITIONS. § 94 the stipulation touching the sale of liquor should be inserted in the conveyance, it was held that the conveyance should con- tain such condition, and that the sale of liquor should be en- joined until the party should accept such a conveyance. 1 Where a written option is given to sell certain real estate for a specified price, conditioned that the purchaser will pay his note given to the vendor for merchandise within six months, and also pay the purchase price within a given time, it is a condition precedent that the note be paid within the time be- fore the offer of sale can be accepted." In contracts for the sale of land, the conveyance of the estate and the payment of the purchase-money are, in general, concurrent acts and depend- ent promises; whether a particular day be appointed for com- pletion or not; and readiness and willingness to complete on either side is a condition precedent to liability to complete on the other. 3 Under such contracts the vendor can recover the purchase price when he tenders a deed of the land. 4 § 9-t. Condition of arbitration — Waiver. — A provision in a contract for the payment of money upon a contingency that the amount to be paid shall be submitted to arbitration, and that such award shall be final as to that amount, is a valid stipulation. 5 And there are many cases which hold that, if the contract further provides that no action shall be main- 1 Bad River Lumbering Co. v. Kai- the performance of conditions prece- Ber, 82 Wis. 166. dent; Wilcoxson v. Stitt, 65 Cal. 596; 2 Schields v. Horback, 30 Neb. 536; Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111. 388; Bos- 46 N. W. Rep. 629. ton v. Nichols, 47 111. 353 ; Lynch v. "Marsden v. Moore, 4 H. & N. 500; Jennings, 43 Ind. 276. Of course in Manby v. Cremonini, 6 Ex. 808 ; Laird case the vendor recovers the price this v. Pirn, 7 M. &W. 474; Heard v. Wad- operates as a specific performance, ham, 1 East, 619 ; Gilman v. Brown, 1 The proceeding to recover the price Mason, 191 ; Ransom v. Brown, 63 where a deed is tendered is an equita- Tex. 188; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. ble suit by vendor for specific per- 172 ; Bayley v. Greenleaf , 7 Wheat, formance. See Beach on Modern 46; Phillips v. Skinner, 6 Bush, 662; Equity Jurisprudence, §566 et seq., McDole v. Purdy, 23 Iowa, 277. where many cases are collected. 4 Banbury v. Arnold, 91 Cal. 606; 5 Wood on Insurance, p. 757; May Smith v. Mobn, 87 Cal. 489, an aver- on Insurance, §493 ; Wolff v. Liverpool ment that the vendor duly performed Ins. Co., 50 N. J. Law, 453; 14 Atl. all of the conditions of the contract to Rep. 561 ; United States v. Robeson, be performed by him up to the time of 9 Pet. 319. bringing suit is a sufficient averment of § 95 CONDITIONS. 121 tained upon it until after such an award, then the award be- comes a condition precedent to the right of action. 1 But when no such condition is expressed in the contract, or can be nec- essarily implied from its terms, the authorities are agreed that the provision for submitting the amount to arbitration is collateral and independent; that, while a breach of such con- dition will support a separate action, it can not be pleaded in bar to an action on the principal contract. 2 There is some con- flict in the authorities as to when such conditions are prece- dent or merely optional. 3 But the authorities are agreed that whether such conditions be absolute and precedent, or merely optional, they may be waived. Thus in an action on a policy providing that, in case of disagreement as to the loss, it should be ascertained by appraisers, and that no action should be maintained until after full compliance with the policy, it appeared that, the appraisers having failed to agree, the company adjusted the loss, and requested plaintiffs to make proof thereof in such amount, which request was complied with. It was held a waiver by the company of the provisions for appraisal. 4 § 95. Vendor and purchaser. — In the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, it is not a condition precedent that the vendor furnish an abstract of title. In America, contrary 1 Hamilton v. Liverpool Ins. Co., parties fail to agree that it must be 136 U. S. 242; 10 Sup. Ct. 945; Mar- resorted to. Whether or not arbitra- tinsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. March, 114 tion became a condition precedent to U. S. 549; 5 Sup. Ct. 1035; United the right to maintain the action on States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319. the failure to agree we need not de- 8 Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 termine. It appears from the aver- U. S. 370; 11 Sup. Ct. 133. ments that no award was made. It 8 Kahnweiler v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 57 does not appear who was responsible Fed. Rep. 562; Wright v. Susquehan- for the failure of the arbitrators to na, etc., Ins. Co., 110 Pa. St.29;20Atl. agree or make an award; but it does Rep. 716; Nurney v. Fireman's, etc., appear that, after the failure of the Ins. Co., 63 Mich. 633; 30 N. W. Rep. arbitrators to agree, the company ad- 350; Phcenix Ins. Co. v. Badger, 53 justed the loss on the building, and Wis. 283 ; 10 N. W. Rep. 504 ; Wood prorated a part to the policy in suit, on Insurance, § 1015. and requested the plaintiffs to make 4 Manchester Assur. Co. v. Koerner proof of their loss in that amount, (Ind. 1895), 40 N. E. Rep. 1110, per which the plaintiffs did. These facts, Lotz, J.: "In the policy before us. we are of the opinion, constitute a arbitration is not made absolute in waiver of the arbitration." the first instance. It is only when the 122 CONDITIONS. § 95 to the English rule, the purchaser furnishes his own abstract from the public records. 1 After a conveyance the vendor can sue at law to recover the purchase price. 2 And the mere recital of the receipt of the purchase price in the conveyance is not contractual in its character, and is only prima facie evidence of the payment of the purchase-money, which may be rebutted by parol evidence. 3 If a purchaser secures possession of a deed by fraud and claims under it, the vendor may ratify the deed and bring an action for the purchase price. 4 As long as a contract for sale of land remains executory, a purchaser may reclaim the money that he has paid for the property if tho title proves defective, or he may defend against a claim for the purchase-money. But when it is once executed and the deed delivered, then the purchaser has received full consideration for his promise. That consideration is such title as the vendor can convey to him, and no other, and he is absolutely without remedy either at law or in equity, unless the deed contains covenants of title. He can not reclaim money that he has paid and he can not defend against a claim for the purchase price. 5 Thus where the purchaser sought to recoup against the purchase note "damages to the title to the wharf property by the cloud placed on it by the late decision of the supreme court" it was held no proper matter of counter-claim. 6 Where "at the time of the purchase of a piece of real estate it was contemplated by the purchaser that certain municipal improve- ments then going on might cause damage to the property; therefore a conditional note for part of the purchase-money was given, payable, 'provided no damage be done' to the prop- erty at any time prior to a specified* date," it was held that it was incumbent on the vendor to show affirmatively that no damage was done to the property by the improvements; that 1 Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. Wright, 2 Dev. 289; Warvelle on 307; Carr v. Roach, 2 Duer, 20; Espy Vendors, Ch. 34. v. Anderson, 14 Pa. St. 308; War- 4 Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. C. 400. velle on Vendors, 291. 5 Bletz v. Willis, 19 D. C. 449; Re- 2 Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. C. 400; feld ... Woodfolk, 22 How. 318; Noo- Laird v. Pirn, 7 M. & W. 474. nan v. Lee, 2 Black, 499; Patton v. 3 Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. C. 400; Taylor, 7 How. 132. Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N. C. 581 ; Rice 6 Bletz v. Willis, 19 D. C. 449. v. Carter, 11 Ired. 298; Choat v. § 96 CONDITIONS. 123 if damage was done, but on the whole the property was in- creased in value at the expiration of the period during which the note was to run, the plaintiff, the vendor, was entitled to recover, and the general rise of property in the neighborhood was not to be considered in deciding whether the property was really damaged or benefited. 1 If the purchase-money is to be paid upon an appointed day, and the time appointed for the conveyance will not, or may not, arrive until after that day, the conveyance is not a condition precedent to the payment, and it is sufficient that the vendor be able and willing to con- vey according to the contract to entitle him to claim the pur- chase-money. 8 § 96. Sales of goods. — In executing contracts for the sale of goods the delivery of the goods and payment of the price are presumptively intended to be concurrent acts. The law is that nothing to the contrary appearing the presumption is that a cash sale is intended. 3 Readiness and willingness on both sides at the proper time for completion to perform their respec- tive parts of the contract are mutual conditions precedent. 4 It is not necessary that the buyer should actually tender the money, or that the seller should tender the goods, in order to satisfy the condition of readiness and willingness to complete. 5 But if the contract expressly provides that payment is to be after delivery, an actual delivery, and not mere readiness and willingness to deliver, is a condition precedent. 6 1 Bletz v. Willis, 19 D. C. 449. 5 Aultrnan v. Henderson, 32 Ill.App. 2 Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saun. 331; Hull v. Pitrat, 45 Fed. Eep. 94; 319i; Yates v. Gardiner, 20 L. J. Ex. Upham Manufacturing Co. v. Sanger, 327 ; Dicker v. Jackson, 6 C. B. 103. 80 Wis. 34 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 28 ; Boiling s Whitman, etc., Assoc, v. National, v. Kirby, 90 Ala. 215; 7 So. Eep. 914; etc., Assoc, 45 Mo. App. 90; South- Thompson v. Leslie, 14 N. Y. Supl. western Cotton Press Co. v. Stanard, 472; Morgan v. East, 126 Ind. 42; 44 Mo. 71 ; Morris v. Rexford, 18 N. Y. Daugherty v. Fowler, 44 Kan. 628 ; 552; Palmer v. Hand, 13 John. 434; Byam v. Hampton, 57 Hun, 585; Haggertyu. Palmer, 6 John. Ch. 437; 10 N. Y. Supl. 372; Waterhouse v. Keeler v. Field, 1 Paige, 312 ; Fletcher Skinner, 2 B. & P. 447 ; Boyd v. Lett, v. Cole, 23 Vt. 114; Ryder v. Hath- 1C.B. 222; Rawsonu. Johnson, 1 East, away, 21 Pick. 298. See Benjamin on 203; Jackson v. Allaway, 6 C. B. 942. Sales, title "Payment," Bennett's ed. 6 Eppens v. McGrath, 3 N. Y. Supl. 'Benjamin on Sales (6 Am. ed. 213; Benjamin on Sales (Bennett's 6 Bennett), § 707, and cases cited. Am. ed.), § 677. 124 CONDITIONS. § 97 § 97. The same subject continued. — Where personal prop- erty is contracted to be sold upon condition that it shall be de- livered at a particular place, it is subject to attachment at the suit of the creditors of the vendor until it is delivered in accordance with the condition of the contract. 1 And where property is sold on approval it is a condition precedent that the buyer signify his approval before the title passes. 2 Where goods are sold by weight they must be weighed before delivery and no delivery can take place sufficient to pass title till they are weighed, al- though the duty of weighing is on the buyer. 3 And where goods are to be delivered at a particular place by the seller, de- livery to a carrier to take to that place is delivery to him as the seller's bailee or agent to perform for him the act of deliv- ery in execution of his contract. Meanwhile and until deliv- ery is consummated in such a manner as to be effectual between seller and buyer, the goods are at seller's risk. 4 In a contract of sale by sample it is a condition precedent implied that the buyer shall have a fair opportunity, by examining the goods, to satisfiy himself that they are in accordance with the con- tract. 5 And under a shipment of goods by a carrier the con- signee is entitled to inspect and examine the goods to ascertain whether they correspond with the invoice, and to a reasonable time within which to receive and remove the goods. For that purpose a reasonable time within usual business hours must be allowed, and during that period the liability of the carrier as carrier remains undischarged. 6 1 Johnson v. Bailey, 17 Colo. 59. 209; Salmon Falls Co. v. Bark Tan- 2 Glasscock v. Hazell, 109 N. C. 145. gier, 1 Clifford, 396 ; Dibble v. Morgan, 3 Boss v. Hannan, 19 Can. S. C. B. 1 Wood, 406 ; The Tybee, 1 Wood, 358 ; 227. The Barque Iddo Kimball, 8 Ben. 297 ; 4 McNeal v. Braun, 53 N. J. Law, The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481 ; Price v. Pow- 617. Benjamin on Sales (Bennett's ell, 3 N. Y. 322; Dunham v. Boston Ed.), §566. & A. R. Co., 46 Hun, 245; Miller v. 5 McNeal v. Braun, 53 N. J. Law, Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y. 431; 617 ; Benjamin on Sales, § 910 ; Isher- Hedges v. Hudson R. Co., 6 Robt. 119 ; wood v. Whitmore, 11 M. & W. 347 ; Moses v. Boston & M. R. Co. ,32 N. H. Startup v. MacDonald, 6 C. B. 593; 23 ; Graves v. Hartford Steamboat Co., Croninger v, Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151. 38 Conn. 143 ; Richardson v. Goddard, 6 McNeal v. Braun, 53 N. J. Law, 23 How. 28; Bournes. Gatliffe, 3 M. 617; Bradstreet v. Heron, Abb. Adm. & G. 643. §§98,99 conditions. 125 § 98. Sale of goods to arrive. — Contracts for the sale of goods are sometimes expressed to be made subject to the terms "to arrive by," or "on arrival by," or "expected to arrive by," a certain ship named. It has uniformly been held that contracts of this description are conditional, the words "to arrive," or other equivalent words, not importing a war- ranty that the goods will arrive, and the obligation to perform the contract by an actual transfer of the property being there- fore, in the absence of other words showing a contrary intent, contingent upon its arrival. The condition is a double one, the arrival of the ship, with the goods on board. 1 The words "to arrive" and "on arrival" are synonymous terms. 8 If the ship has goods on board consigned to another person, but of the same description, the condition is not satisfied and there is no sale. 3 The goods must answer the description, and if they do not substantially do this, although of the kind and quan- tity, the buyer may reject. 4 If the buyer takes any portion and consumes it before discovering that the goods are not the same in quality bargained for, while he may rescind the con- tract, he must pay for the portion consumed. 5 This rule has been applied in Ohio 6 and New Jersey 7 in leading and illustra- tive cases. In the former case there was a sale of salt "to arrive by the 15th of November." This was held to create a condition precedent, that if the salt did not arrive there was no sale, although not to come by ship. The latter case ex- empts the seller who contracted to deliver coal "provided he could secure it" from a railroad company by a certain date. His failure to obtain it within the time was a defense. § 99. The same subject continued. — But where the language of the contract asserts the goods to be on board of the vessel 1 Rogers v. Woodruff, 23 Ohio St. 8 Garrissen v. Perrin, 2 0. B. (N. S.) 632; Shields v. Pettee, 2 Sand. 262; 681. Russell a. Nicoll, 3Wend. 112; Boydu. 4 Shields v. Pettee, 2 Sandf. 262; Siffkin, 2 Camp. 326 ; Idle v. Thornton, Vernede v. Weber, 1 H. & N. 311. 3 Camp. 274 ; Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 M. 5 Shields v. Pettee, 2 Sandf. 262. &W. 639; Alewynu. Pryor, Ryan & 6 Rogers v. Woodruff, 23 Ohio St. Moody, 406 ; Benedict v. Field, 16 N. 632. Y. 595. ' Nelson v. Smith, 36 N. J. Law, 148. 2 Johnson v. Macdonald, 9 M. & W. 600. 126 CONDITIONS. § 100 named, there is a warranty that the goods are on board, and if the vessel arrives, the seller's duty to deliver is fixed. Thus a sale of goods described as "now on passage and expected to arrive by" a named ship, is an absolute contract to deliver such- goods upon arrival of the ship. 1 A sale of goods "on arrival of " a ship named is an absolute one, and must be complied with, although the goods are not on board. 2 In sales of goods "to arrive" the condition is often made that the vendor shall give notice of the name of the ship on which the goods are expected to arrive as soon as it becomes known to him; the naming of the ship is then a condition precedent to the liabil- ity of the buyer to accept the goods. 3 In contracts to ship a cargo of sugar where the amount of the cargo is specified to be from seven hundred to eight hundred tons, the sellers, the price of sugar having advanced after the sale, may select the alternative which is the least burdensome to themselves, and deliver seven hundred tons, only, although the vessel was loaded with eight hundred and forty-nine tons. 4 § 100. Architect's or engineer's certificate of approval. — An architect's or engineer's certificate of approval is often made a condition precedent to the payment of work done. And when this is so, the procurement of the certificate re- quired by the contract is necessary to sustain a claim for com- pensation. 6 But if the architect refuse to give to the contractor his certificate, as required, if based upon an unreasonable re- quirement, then the owner can not justify a refusal to pay for 1 Garrissen v. Perrin, 2 0. B. (N.S.) York, 47 N. Y. St. R. 258 ; Crouch v. 681. Gutnian, 45 N. Y. St. R. 470 ; Ohio and 2 Dike v. Reitlinger, 23 Hun, 241 ; Mississippi R. Co. v. Crumbo, 4 Ind. Hale v. Rawson, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 85. App. 456; 30 N. E. Rep. 434; Roy ». 3 Busk v. Spence, 4 Camp. 329, hold- Boteler, 40 Mo. App. 213; Neenan v. ing a delay of eight days after knowl- Donoghue, 50 Mo. 493; Yeats v. Bal- edge of name by vendor discharged lentine, 56 Mo. 530; Dinsrnore v. Liv- buyer from contract ; 'Graves v. Legg, ingston Co., 60 Mo. 241; McCone v. 9 Exch. 709; Gilkes v. Leonino, 4 C. AVilliams, 37 111. App. 591; Michaelis B. (N .S.) 485. v. Wolf, 136 111. 68 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 384 ; 1 Standard Sugar Refinery v. Cas- Barney v. Giles, 120 111. 154; Lloyd's tano, 43 Fed. Rep. 279. Law of Building and Buildings, § 20, 5 O'Brien v. Mayor, etc., of New and cases cited. § 101 CONDITIONS. 127 lack of a certificate. 1 And an unreasonable refusal by the architect to give the certificate will dispense with its produc- tion. 2 § 101. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — The cer- tificate must be substantially such as the contract calls for. Where the contract requires the certificate to show that the job has been completed to the satisfaction of the architects, a certi- ficate only stating the balance due the contractor is insuffi- cient. 8 A mere payment is no waiver. Thus where payments were made without requiring the certificate, this was held no waiver of the certificate for the remaining installments;' and the certificate is not conclusive on the owner who may dispute its correctness as to amount due. 5 Where the contract gives the owner the election to finish the building at the contractor's ex- pense in case of his refusal to complete the work, if the owner elects to complete the work, the contractor is entitled to the certificate of the architect. 6 The certificates must be for each payment, although the building is completed. Thus where there was to be payment in six installments, the last two to be made after the completion of the building, obtaining a certifi- cate for the fifth installment does not do away with the necessity 1 Thomas v. Stewart, 132 N. Y. 580 ; 248 ; Brown v. Winehill, 3 Wash. St. Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382; 524; Linch v. Paris Lumber Co., 80 Smiths Alker, 102 N. Y. 87; Nolan Texas, 23; 14 S. W. Eep. 701; 15 S. v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648 ; Bowery, W. Rep. 208 ; Anderson v. Imhoff, 34 etc., Bank v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 339; Neb. 335; 51 N. W. Eep. 854. Thomas v. Fleury, 26 N. Y. 26. 3 Roy v. Boteler, 40 Mo. App. 213; 2 Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382, Michaels v. Wolf, 136 111. 68. Bat where the jury was permitted to say the form of the certificate is not es- as a question of fact whether the re- sential. O'Brien v. New York, 15 N. fusal to give the certificate was justi- Y. Supl. 520, and a parol approval will fled. Davis v. Badders, 95 Ala. 348; satisfy the condition of a certificate 10 So. Rep. 422; McCone v. Wil- unless a written one is expressly stip- liams, 37 111. App. 591 ; Keating v. ulated for. Roberts v. Watkins, 14 C. Nelson, 33 111. App. 357; Thomas v. B. (N. S.) 592. Fleury, 26 NY. 26; Bowery, etc., Bank 4 Brown v. Winehill, 3 Wash. St. v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 339 ; Nolans Whit- 524. ney, 88 N. Y. 648 ; Smith «. Alker, 102 5 Schuler v. Eckert, 90 Mich. 165 ; 51 N. Y. 87 ; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. N. W. Rep. 198. 230; Thomas v. Stewart, 132 N. Y. 6 Crouch v. Gutman, 45 N. Y. S. R. 580 ; Highton v. Dessau, 19 N. Y. Supl. 470. 395; Braun v. Winans, 37 111. App. 128 CONDITIONS. § 102 to obtain one for the sixth installment. 1 If the contractor de- stroys or returns a certificate he must obtain another before he can recover. 2 The owner may show negligent performance in the work despite the certificate to the contrary. 3 Where a cer- tificate is necessary to obtain part payment as the work pro- gresses, this is not construed to mean that the certificate is necessary to obtain final payment upon completion. 4 Where the owner is charged with the duty of obtaining the certificate the lack of the certificate is no defense. 5 Where the board of public improvements are charged with the duty of inspecting the work and certifying it in a street paving contract, their certificate of approval is conclusive on the city. 6 And when an architect is made judge between the parties, by the articles of contract, his decision and certificate are final in the absence of fraud or gross mistake. 7 But his decision is not an arbitration, and the certificate is not an award. 8 § 102. The same subject continued. — In a well consid- ered Massachusetts case, where a building contract provided that the payments should be made on the architect's certifi- cate, and that the second payment would be due when all the work was completed, and the final payment thirty days later, with the further stipulation that no certificate given, except that for the final payment, should be conclusive evidence of the performance of the contract, it was held that a certificate for the second payment did not dispense with the necessity for the final certificate, and that one who assumes a building con- tract, and agrees to pay all sums due or to become due from 1 Michaelis v. Wolf, 136 111. 68. 7 Crumlish v. Wilmington R. C6., 5 8 Bournique v. Arnold, 33 111. App. Del. Ch. 270 ; Ewing v. Fiedler, 30 111. 303. App. 202; St. Paul R. Co. v. Brad- 'Davidson v. Provost, 35 111. App. bury, 42 Minn. 222; 44 N. W. Rep. 1; 126 ; Bond v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, Sweet v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 19 ; Lang- 19 N. J. Eq. 376; Newman v. Fowler, don v. Northfleld, 42 Minn. 464; 44 37 N. J. Law, 89. See article on con- N. W. Rep. 984; Kennedy v. United clusiveness of architects' certificates States, 24 Ct. CI. 122; Sanders v. in 5 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 270. Hutchinson, 26 111. App. 633. 4 Braune. Winans, 37 111. App. 248. 8 Wadsworth v. Smith, L. R. 6 Q. 5 McKone«. Williams, 37 111. App. B.332;Sharpe v. San Paulo R. Co., 591. L. R. 8 Ch. 597. 6 Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148. §102 CONDITIONS. 129 the owner thereunder, "according to the tenor thereof," is en- titled to the benefit of a provision in the contract that the final payment would not be due till thirty days after the completion of the work, and would be paid only on the certificate of the ar- chitect, although the work was completed when the contract was assumed, and the agreement to assume stated that there was then due a sum of money from the owner to the con- tractor.' ^eharrell v. Quimby (1895), 162 Mass. 571; 39 N. E. Rep. 407, per Allen, J.: "The several payments were to be made "provided that in each of the said cases the architect shall certify in writing that all the work upon the performance of which the payment is to become due has been done to his satisfaction.' 'No certificate given or payment made un- der this contract, except the final cer- tificate or final payment, shall be con- clusive evidence of the performance of this contract, either wholly or in part, against any claim of the owner.' The owner 'hereby contracts to pay the same at the time, in the manner, and upon the conditions above set forth.' No later certificate was given than that for the second payment. The plaintiff therefore was not en- titled to recover, against Orcutt, the final payment, unless sufficient reason or excuse for not furnishing such a certificate was shown. What would amount to such sufficient reason or excuse has been dften considered, both in England and in this country, as appears by the authorities cited for the plaintiff and for the defendant, to which may be added Clarke v.Watson, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 278; Batterbury v. Vyse, 2 Hurl. & C. 42 ; Nolan v. Whit- ney, 88 N. Y. 648 ; United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319, 327, Hudson on Building Contracts, 265, 297-301 ; The plaintiff contends that there was evi- dence from which the court would 9 have been amply justified in finding that the provision requiring a certif- icate, if it ever constituted a condition precedent, had been waived, and also that the evidence showed that the certificate had been wrongfully and fraudulently withheld. All that is open to us on this part of the case is to determine whether, at the trial, and upon the evidence introduced, — that is, upon the auditor's report, — the presiding justice was bound to fipd that there was a sufficient reason or excuse for not producing such a cer- tificate. He found for the defendant ; and his finding must stand unless we can say, upon the evidence, that it was wrong. There was evidence which certainly tended to show that the architect might well have given a finaL certificate ; that he changed his mind* to some extent, shortly after giving the certificate for the second pay- ment ; and that he wrongfully with- held it. There was also some evi- dence of circumstances tending more or less to show that Orcutt interfered to prevent the architect from giving the final certificate, and, if this latter proposition had been made out, the plaintiff, clearly, would have been re- lieved from the necessity of producing such a certificate. Whether such a result would follow from the mere wrongful refusal of the architect alone is a question upon which, elsewhere, there has been some difference of opinion. Hudson on Building Con- 130 CONDITIONS'. §10? § 103. Promise conditional upon approval of promiser. — A contract may be made to pay for work upon condition of the work being done to the satisfaction or approval of the promis- er. 1 Thus where one contracts to work for a year provided his work is to the satisfaction of the employer, he may be dis- charged at any time without the need of the employer assign- ing any reason therefor. 2 And where the object of the contract is to gratify taste, serve personal convenience, or satisfy indi- vidual preference, the party for whom the work is done may properly determine for himself whether it shall be accepted. Thus where a tailor agreed to make a satisfactory suit of clothes and they were rejected as not satisfactory, no recovery was allowed. 3 A sculptor who agrees to make a bust to the tracts, 301; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. We need not now de- termine it. There was nothing to show that the plaintiff ever asked the architect to give a final cer- tificate, or complained to Orcutt that the architect was acting unfairly. The report of the auditor upon this whole subject is rather vague and un- satisfactory, but it was accepted by the parties, and neither of them offered to produce further evidence, except that of the documents. The certificate for the second payment was dated April 16, 1892, but the auditor reports that it was given April 23, 1892. The action was begun May 31, 1892. It is stated that at the hearing before the auditor the architect did not appear, and that it was admitted that he had been absent from Lowell, in parts unknown, for several months. We have no means of knowing the date of the hearing before the auditor. There is no averment or suggestion, and we can not' infer that the archi- tect went away before the commence- ment of the action. The auditor ex- pressly finds that it was not alleged or proved that the architect had fraudu- lently or capriciously withheld a final certificate, and, although he reports Bome facts tending to show the con- trary, yet they are not conclusive, and they do not enable us to say, as mat- ter of law, that a sufficient reason or excuse for failing to produce a final certificate from the architect was made out. Nor were the payments which were made to be deemed, as matter of law, a waiver of a further certificate." 'Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230; Rus- sell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 288 ; Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387; Church v. Shanklin (1892), 95 Cal. 626; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 ; Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 ; Hartford, etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528. 2 Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co., 24 Hun, 175. 3 Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136: "If the plaintiff saw fit to do work upon articles for the defendant and to furnish the materials therefor, con- tracting that the articles when manu- factured should be satisfactory to the defendant, he can recover only upon the contract as it was made ; and even if the articles furnished by him were such that the other party ought to have been satisfied with them, it was yet in the power of the other to reject them as unsatisfactory." Per De- wees, J. § 104 CONDITIONS. 131 satisfaction of a buyer can not recover, even where its rejection is caused by unreasonable dissatisfaction, and although the bust is a masterpiece. 1 A painter or artist, if he agrees to paint a picture to one's satisfaction, has no cause of action for the price unless the buyer is satisfied, however good the picture is. 2 A contract to employ an agent for a year, if he "could fill the place satisfactorily," may be terminated by the employer when in his judgment tbe agent fails to meet that requirement. 3 § 104. Right of approval to be exercised reasonably. — Where the object of the contract is not to gratify taste, or sat- isfy individual preference, a recovery can not be defeated by arbitrarily and unreasonably declaring that the work is not done to the satisfaction of the promiser. 4 Thus, where the contract provided that the work was to be done in the best workman-like manner to the entire satisfaction of the owner, it was held that the mechanic could recover, although the owner was dissatisfied, if he should have been satisfied. 5 A charter party provided that the ship owners should furnish venti- lation to the approval of the charterer, a cattle shipper. This did not confer upon the charterer the right to refuse to load, if all that could reasonably be required for ventilation was furnished, merely because he elected arbitrarily not to approve. 6 A contract provided that a passenger elevator "warranted sat- 1 Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218. co, 24 Fed. Rep. 893 ; Wood, etc., Ma- 2 Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49; chine Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565; Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly, 42. Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 291 ; 3 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) McClure v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82; Varian 280, and for further instances seethe v. Johnston, 108 N. Y. 645; Sinclair following cases : McCarren v. McNulty, e. Tallmadge, 35 Barb. 602; Smith v. 7 Gray, 139; Moore v. Goodwin, 43 Brady, 17 N. Y. 173; Johnson v. De- Hun, 534; Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. Peyster, 50 N. Y. 666; Phillip v. Gol- St. 291; Hartman v. Blackburn, 7 lant, 62 N.Y. 256; Woodwards. Fuller, Pittsburgh Leg. Jour. 140, where a 80 N. Y. 312; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 dentist agreed to furnish a satisfactory N. Y. 648; Bowery Bank v. Mayor, set of teeth; Gray v. Central B. Co., 63 N. Y. 336; Smith v. Alker, 102 11 Hun, 70, the case of a steamboat ; N. Y. 87. McClure v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, where 5 Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230. an organ was allowed to be rejected. 6 Bussell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 288, 4 Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230; Rus- and it is not necessary to show that sell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 288; Du- the shipper's refusal to load was in plex Safety Boiler Co. «. Garden, 101 actual bad faith. N. Y. 387 ; Silsby Manfg. Co. v. Chi- 132 CONDITIONS. §104 isfactory in every respect" should be put in a building. The elevator can not be rejected for mere caprice. 1 Where the pur- chaser is in fact satisfied, but fraudulently and in bad faith declares that he is not satisfied, there is a fulfillment of the con- tract on the part of the workman. 8 Where the contract called for the erection of a furnace in a good and workman-like man- ner, and to guarantee the furnace to work "satisfactorily" in melting iron, the word "satisfactorily" as used in the contract does not mean that the workman obligates himself, in erecting the furnace, to satisfy any whim or caprice of the other party, but it means that he should do the work reasonably well. 3 And generally in contracts which provide for work to be done to the satisfaction of one party, such satisfaction is not an arbi- trary or capricious one. It has its measure by which it can be fulfilled. That which the law shall say a contracting party ought, in reason to be satisfied with, that the law will say he is satisfied with. "The law will determine for the defendant when he ought to be satisfied." 4 Gingerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 291. In this case it was held that the words "warranted satisfactory in every respect" meant the promiser's satisfaction ; that is, the buyer. 2 Silsby Manfg. Co. v. Town of Chi- co, 24 Fed. Rep. 893, and to show the party's satisfaction, his declarations admitting satisfaction are admissible. 3 Pope Iron Co.i). Best, 14 Mo. xlpp. 502. This case also holds that the meaning of the term "satisfactorily" when used alone is satisfactory to a reasonable and fair-minded man, who is an expert in such matters, which meaning is rejected by the following cases and held to mean satisfactory to plaintiff: Campbell Printing Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. Rep. 414; Taylor v. Brewer, 1 Maule & Selw. 290 ; McCor- mick, etc., Machine Co. v. Chesrown, 33 Minn. 32; Singerley v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 291. 4 Folliard v. "Wallace, 2 Johns. 395, per Kent, Ch. See following cases where the question was raised as to whether or not the defendant capri- ciously refused to be satisfied. Logan v. Berkshire Assn., 18 N. Y. Supl. 164; Stockton, etc., R. Co. v. Stockton, 51 Cal. 328; Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545; People v. Alameda Co., 45 Cal. 395 ; Heron v. Davis, 3 Bosw. 336 ; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chi- cago, etc., R. Co., 66 Wis. 218, which holds, also, that the chattel must be properly tested and tried before the buyer can reject for dissatisfaction; Manny v. Glendinning, 15 Wis. 50; Hartford, etc., Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528; Daggett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345. "Indeed, to such import are really all of the authorities, which hold simply that to be dissatisfied in such a case is sufficient reason to re- fuse the purchase ; for to be dissatis- fied is a fact, and must be a verity, and not a pretext. It is not 'I will not accept it — will not have it' — but — 'It is not satisfactory,' or 'I am really and honestly dissatisfied with it.' This is implied in the very statement § 105 CONDITIONS. 133 § 105. Right of approval not to vary contract. — But while there can be no refusal to pay for benefits received, or for work and labor done, by merely capriciously declaring that it is not to one's satisfaction, still the weight of authority is that the parties must stand to their contract as they have made it, and, if the one party has agreed to do something that shall be sat- isfactory to the other, he constitutes the latter the sole arbiter of his own satisfaction. 1 Thus, where the vendor of a har- vesting machine gave a warranty that the contract of purchase should be of no effect unless the machine worked to the buy- er's satisfaction, it was held that the purchaser had reserved the absolute right to reject the machine, and that his reasons for doing so could not be investigated. 2 The agreement was that a certain grain binder should do good work and "give satisfaction." It was held that, unless the defendant was sat- isfied with the machine, although it did good work, he was not bound to purchase. 3 Where there was a guaranty that a corn binder would work satisfactorily, it was held that, in case, upon reasonable trial, it did not work satisfactorily, it was unnecessary to return it, but it was sufficient for the buyer, within a reasonable time, to notify the seller that it did not work to his satisfaction, and that he declined to accept it. 4 The same ruling was made with regard to a steamboat; 6 with re- gard to a machine for generating gas; 6 with regard to a fan- ning mill; 8 with regard to a passenger elevator;' and the same rule was applied in the case of a printing press. 9 Certain cases, however, establish a reasonable modification of this of the principle," per Orton, J., in 68 Mich. 101; 35 N. W. Rep. 841. See, Exhaust Elevator Co. v. Chicago, etc., also, Piatt v. Broderick, 70 Mich. 577 ; R. Co., 66 Wis. 218. 38 N. W. Rep. 579. 'White v. Randall, 153 Mass. 394; 4 McCormick, etc., Machine Co. v. Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, Chesrown, 33 Minn. 32. 36 Fed. Rep. 414; Taylor v. Brewer, 6 Gray v. Central R. Co., 11 Hun, 70. 1 Maule& S. 290; Rossiter v. Cooper, 6 Aiken v. Hyde, 99 Mass. 183. 23 Vt. 522; Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 'Goodrich v. Van Nortwick, 43 111. 280; Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co., 24 445. Hun, 175; Hart v. Hart, 22 Barb. 8 Singerley v. Thayer, 108 Pa. St. 606; Ellis v. Mortimer, 1 Bos. & P. 291; Howard v. Smedley, 140 Pa. St. (New R.) 257. 81. 2 Wood, etc., Machine Co. v. Smith, 9 Campbell Printing Press Co. v. 50 Mich. 565. Thorp, 36 Fed. Rep. 414. 8 Piano Manufacturing Co. v. Ellis, 134 CONDITIONS. §§ 106 107 rule, to the effect that the dissatisfaction must be real, and not feigned, and that the party is not at liberty to say he is dissat- isfied when, in reality, he is not. 1 The same cases, however, declare the rule that, while he is bound to act honestly, it is not enough to show that he ought to have been satisfied, and that his discontent was without good reason. 2 § 106. Limitations upon the right to reject. — But to permit a party under all circumstances to refuse to pay because dis- satisfied and at the same time to retain the fruits of the agree- ment is an unwarrantable extension of the doctrine applied to machines or articles of manufacture which can be rejected. Therefore in all cases if the party relies upon dissatisfaction as a defense he must rescind the agreement and restore the status quo. If he does not do this, or is unable to, then he must be satisfied if in reason he ought to be. Thus, where a printing press was unable to be restored the buyer was precluded from setting up as a defense the fact of his dissatisfaction. 3 A fur- nace after being built into a house is subject to a like rule, and the buyer's only remedy is to recoup for damages. 4 But where a party having the power to rescind the contract and restore the chattel elects to keep it, he must pay the contract price and can not recoup damages, because of his failure to be satisfied therewith, in an action for the price. 5 § 107. Performance of conditions precedent. — Conditions precedent must be performed in order to make the conditional promise absolute. But after the one party has performed the contract in a substantial part, and the other party has accepted 'Hartford Manufacturing Co. v. the only ones at variance with the text Brush, 43 Vt. 528; Daggett v. John- are the New York cases where it is son, 49 Vt. 345; McClure a. Briggs, 58 distinctly held that there must be Vt. 82; Exhaust Elevator Co. v. Chi- cause for dissatisfaction. See cases cago R. Co., 66 Wis. 218. collected in Duplex Safety Boiler Co. 2 See, also, Lynn v. Baltimore, etc., v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387. R. Co., 60 Md. 404; Baltimore, etc., 3 Campbell Printing Co. v. Thorp, R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. 198; Silsby 36 Fed. Rep. 414. Manufacturing Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. 4 Pope Iron Co. v. Best, 14 Mo. Rep. 893; and see the remarks of Mr. App. 502; Shupe v. Collender, 56 Justice Brown in Campbell Printing Conn. 489; 15 Atl. Rep. 405. Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. Rep. 414, 6 Campbell Printing Co. v. Thorp, 36 where all the cases are examined, and Fed. Rep. 414. § 108 CONDITIONS. 135 and had the benefit of the part performance, the latter may thereby be precluded from relying upon the performance of the residue as a condition precedent to his liability; in such case he must perform the contract on his part, and must rely upon his claim for damages in respect of the defective performance. "It is remarkable that according to this rule the construction of the instrument may be varied by matter ex post facto; and that which is a condition precedent when the deed is executed may cease to be so by the subsequent conduct of the covenantee in accepting less. This is no objection to the soundness of the rule, which has been much acted upon. But there is often a difficulty in its application to particular cases, and it can not be intended to apply to every case in which a covenant by the plaintiff forms only a part of the consideration, and the residue of the consideration has been had by the defendant. That resi- due must be the substantial part of the contract." 1 § 108. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a building is erected upon and becomes a part of the realty of the owner, and, although defective in some respects, is of real and substantial value to the owner, the contractor can recover the value of his work, less the damages to the other party, for a failure to comply with the terms of the agreement. 8 1 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424. See, the loading and sailing of the ship ; also, Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709; Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555 ; Da- Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751; Ox- vidson v. Gwynne, 12 East, 381, hold- ford v. Provand, L. B. 2 P. C. 135 ; ing that a promise to sail by the first White v. Beeton, 7 H. & N. 42 ; Carter convoy, although at first a condition v. Scargill, L. B. 10 Q. B. 564 ; Bitchie precedent, was not such after the voy- o. Atkinson, 10 East, 295, where a age had actually been performed, al- ship owner having contracted to load a though not by the first convoy, and complete cargo, sailed with only part, the freighter was held liable. Pust v. it was held that the freighter must pay Dowie, 5 B. & S. 20. freight, and recover damages sustained 2 School District No. 2 v, Boyer, 46 by cross action. Glaholm -u. Hays, 2 Kan. 54; Barnwell o. Kempton, 22 M. & G. 257, holding that conditions Kan. 314; Duncan v. Barker, 21 Kan. in charter-parties that the ship shall 99; Usher v. Hiatt, 21 Kan. 548; The be ready for loading at a certain day Aetna Iron Works v. Kossuth County, or a certain place, which are origi- 79 Iowa, 40; Wolf v. Gerr, 43 Iowa, nally conditions precedent to the ob- 339, contract to build a railroad; Jem- ligationof the charterer to load are mison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537; McClay converted into mere subsidiary stipu- v. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66 ; Pixler v. Nich- lations, remediable in damages, after ols, 8 Iowa, 106 ; Carroll v. Welch, 26 136 CONDITIONS. §109 § 109. Further illustrations — Waiver. — A formal acceptance of the work, or an acquiescence in the breach, is not essen- tial to recovery in a building contract. The benefits arising from the services rendered, the materials furnished, and labor performed in erecting the buildings, are the owner's without acceptance. He has no choice but to use and enjoy those ben- efits, although but a part performance of the contract. The benefits derived from the services he can not restore. The building becomes a part of the realty. And it is for these rea- sons that a recovery can be had on a quantum meruit where the contractor confers benefits on the owner, although he has not complied with his contract. 1 Where a person contracted to build a gas tank for a company, and complete it by a day specified, under a certain penalty per day for failure so to complete, provided the company would have the foundation ready by a day specified, it was held that the completion of the foundation by the company on the day mentioned was a con- dition precedent, in default of which the company could not Texas, 147, "the doctrine of the earlier decisions to the effect that, where the contract in cases like the present is entire, the performance by the em- ploye is a condition precedent, and he has no remedy until he has fully performed his part, is not now the recognized doctrine of this court. According to the modern decisions, and the decisions of this court, the rule appears to be, that if the employe abandons his contract, the employer shall be charged with only the rea- sonable worth, or the amount of ben- efit he has received upon the whole transaction." Hillyard v. Crabtree, 11 Texas, 264. Compare Linch v. Paris Lumber Co., 80Texas, 23; 14 S. W. Rep. 701 ; 15 S. W. Rep. 208 ; Nelson Manufacturing Co. v. Mitchell, 38 Mo. App.321, building a boiler in a house; Fleischmann v. Miller, 38 Mo. App. 177, a valuable case. "It is plain that this was in the nature of a building contract, and that it is consequently governed by the rule in Yeats v. Bal- lentine, 56 Mo. 530. Under this rule, although the plaintiff may not have performed the contract precisely in accordance with the terms of the agreement, he can recover the reason- able value of the work done, less the damages which the defendant may have sustained through his failure to complete the contract in accordance with its terms,'' perThompson, J., 181, and compare Gruetzner v. Aude Co., 28 Mo. App. 263, and Fox v. Pullman Co., 16 Mo. App. 122; Gove«. Island City, etc., Co., 19 Ore. 363, excepts voluntary abandonment. 1 Aetna Iron Works v. Kossuth Co. (1890), 79 Iowa, 40. Contra, Elliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 357; holding that where a builder fails to complete, or completes in a manner not substan- tially conforming to the contract, the mere fact that it remains on the land, and the owner enjoys the benefit of it, he having no option to reject it, is not such an exceptance as will imply a promise to pay for it. Allen v. Curies, 6 Ohio St. 505. $109 CONDITIONS. 137 claim the penalty as liquidated damages. 1 And where a bond is given towards the endowment of a professorship, the estab- lishment and endowment of such professorship is not a condi- tion precedent to the collection of the bond. 2 A stipulation in a bond to "secure" land for a railroad company for its depot requires the securing of a good title to the land, and the con- struction of a depot is not a condition precedent to the compa- ny's right to recover on the bonds for defendant's failure to secure the land. 3 And a complaint alleging thstt, after plaint- iffs became the owners of the note in suit, defendant admitted to them that it was due, and agreed that, in consideration of an extension of time for thirty days, he would pay it, and that he failed to do so, shows a waiver by defendant of the per- formance of a condition precedent in the note. 4 1 Standard Gas Co. v. "Wood (1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 74. The promise to com- plete on November 15th, and to pay $ 100 for each day's default thereafter, expressly hinged upon the gas com- pany's completion of its part of the work by June 15th. When the condi- tion upon which the promise depend- ed was unperformed through the de- fault of the gas company, the promise to complete by a certain day was no longer obligatory; but, if the con- tractors entered upon the work, they were tinder an obligation to finish within a reasonable time. The gas company had, by its default, waived or abandoned the right to call upon the contractors for strict performance as to time, who, if they entered forth- with upon the work, had the right to a reasonable time for performance. Dannat v. Fuller, 120 N. Y. 554 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 815 ; Mansfield v. New York Cent. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 205; 6 N. E. Rep. 386; Dermott v. Jones, 23 How. 220. The evidence on the part of the defendants in error, that, having been thrown over into the winter in con- sequence of the gas company's delay, they were delayed from prompt com- pletion of the work by the inclemency of the weather, tended to show that they were complying with their duty as to time. 8 Barnettu. Franklin College, lOInd. App. 103; 37 N. E. Rep. 427, per Reinhard, J.; "The endowment of the James Forsyth professorship, like the application of the funds, is a trust assumed by the acceptance of the bond, and such trusts, as we have al- ready seen, may be enforced upon the failure of the trustee to perform them. That the performance of the trust is not a condition precedent, see Northwestern Conference v. Myers, 36 Ind. 375." 3 Frey«. Fort Worth R. Co., 6 Texas Civil App. 29 ; 24 S. W. Rep. 950. 4 Johnson v. Bucklen, 9 Ind. App. 154; 36 N. E. Rep. 176, per Lotz, J.. "The performance of a condition prec- edent may be waived in many ways. A person who made a subscription to the capital stock of a railway company on the express condition that the road should be constructed on a certain line, and to within a certain distance of a given place, after the road had been constructed on another line, gave his note for the amount of his subscription. This was held to be a 138 CONDITIONS. § 110 § 110. Building contracts. — There is great conflict and much confusion in the authorities upon the subject of the per- formance of building contracts. Some authorities hold that the contractor, in order to recover, must substantially perform his contract, and that if he fails in this regard he can not re- cover in any form of action for what he has done under the contract, no matter how beneficial it may be to the owner. Under this rule it is possible for a land-owner to contract for the erection of a building (the contractor after having built a portion of it abandoning the contract without excuse), and have the benefit of a partial performance without paying any- thing therefor. Such seems to be the weight of authority in America. This rule obtains in New York, 1 Ohio,* Massachu- setts,' New Hampshire, 4 Michigan, 5 Minnesota, 6 Pennsylvania' and California." In Illinois 9 a substantially equivalent rule waiver of the condition. Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn, 17 Ind. 603. Where money is stipulated to be paid upon a condition expressed, and sub- sequently a promissory note is given for the amount, payable without con- dition, the condition precedent is waived. Swank v. Nichols, 20 Ind. 198; Swank v. Nichols, 24 Ind. 199. See, also, Hunter v. Leavitt, 36 Ind. 141; Masonic, etc., Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 207. It was at the option of the pleader to aver perform- ance of the condition precedent, or to aver a waiver of the condition. In- diana Insurance Co. v. Capehart, 108 Ind. 270, 273; 8 N. E. Rep. 285. We think the only purpose of the aver- ments with reference to the extension of the time of the maturity of the note is to show that the appellant waived a strict performance of the condition. The facts alleged do con- stitute a waiver." 1 Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382; Whelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 N. Y. 293; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211; Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 145. 2 Goldsmith v. Hand, 26 Ohio St. 101 ; Allen v. Curies, 6 Ohio St. 505. 8 Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426. "It seems that the performance must be of a substantial part of the contract, and that the acceptance must be under such circumstances as to show that the party accepting knew, or ought to have known, that the contract was not being fully performed." Per Field, 436. 4 Bailey v. Woods, 17 N. H. 365, but quaere. The same rule is not applied in cases of contracts for personal serv- ices. See Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481. 5 Scheible«. Klein, 89 Mich. 376. 6 Elliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 357. 7 Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492. 8 Harlan v. Stufflebeem, 87Cal. 508; Griffith v. Happersberger, 86 Cal. 605. 9 Illingsworth v. Slosson, 19 111. App. 612. § 111 CONDITIONS. 139 prevails. The same rule likewise obtains in Connecticut, 1 New Jersey," Maryland," and Nevada. 4 § 111. The result of the cases. — In some of the states in which the contractor can not recover the value of his services, where he has failed substantially to comply with the contract, the courts have to some extent modified the hardship of this rule. The weight of authority is now clearly in favor of allowing compensation for services rendered and materials furnished under a special contract, but not in entire conformity with it, provided that the deviation from the contract was not willful, and the other party has availed himself of, and been benefited by, such labor and materials; and as a general rule the amount of such compensation is to depend upon the extent of the benefit conferred, having reference to the contract price for the entire work. 5 In those states where it is necessary that the contractor should "substantially perform" the condition precedent, to wit, erect the building, before he can recover anything, substantial performance means that there has been no willful departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission of any of its essential parts, and that the contractor has in good faith performed all of its substantive terms. If so, he will not be held to have forfeited his right to a re- covery by reason of trivial defects or imperfections in the work performed. If the omission is so slight that it can not be regarded as an integral or substantive part of the orig- inal contract, and the other party can be compensated there- for by a recoupment for damages, the contractor does not lose his right of action; and this rule is peculiarly applicable in a case where the other party has received the benefit of what has been done, and is enjoying the fruits of the work. 6 1 Smith v. Scott, 20 Conn. 312. Moulton v. McOwen, 103 Mass. 587 ; 2 School Trustees v. Bennett, 27 N.J. Kelly v. Town of Bradford, 33 Vt. Law, 513. 35; Corwin v. Wallace, 17 Iowa, 374; 3 Gill v. Vogler, 52 Md. 663. White v. Oliver, 36 Me. 92; Blakeslee 4 Virginia R. Co. v. County Com- v. Holt, 42 Conn. 226; Lucas o. God- missioners, 6 Nev. 68. win, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 737. 5 Pinches v. The Swedish Church, 55 6 Harlan v. Stufflebeem, 87 Cal. 508. Conn. 183, citing Hayward v. Leonard, See following cases where it was held 7 Pick. 181; Smith v. First Congrega- that performance was sufficient: Van tional Meeting-house, 8 Pick. 178; Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N. Y. 571; 140 CONDITIONS. § 112 § 112. Substantial performance of building contracts. — It is the sound and settled rule that the right of a party to enforce a contract will not be forfeited or lost by reason of technical, inadvertent, or unimportant omissions or defects. A substantial performance must be established, in order to entitle the party claiming the benefit of the contract to recover; but this does not mean a literal compliance as to de- tails that are unimportant. There must be no willful or inten- tional departure, and the defects of performance must not per- vade the whole, or be so essential as substantially to defeat the object which the parties intended to accomplish. Whether, in any case, such defects or omissions are substantial, or merely unimportant mistakes that have been or may be corrected, is generally a question of fact. 1 Thus where the plaintiff deliver- ed slit steel of a gauge slightly differing from the order, and upon its return by defendant promptly replaced the shipments with goods of the proper grade, and the proof tended to show it was well known to the trade that it was nearly impossible to roll cold steel so as to have a uniform thickness and weight, and that defendant did not suffer any particular damage, it was held that a finding of substantial performance was warranted.* And to recover the purchase price under a building contract only a substantial compliance with the contract need be shown. Where the owner accepts the building, the contractor is entitled to its value as constructed although not in all respects as con- tracted for. 8 Substantial compliance with the building con- Highton v. Dessau, 19 N. Y. Supl. tract; he must have endeavored to 395 ; Crouch v. Gutmann, 134 N. Y. 45 ; perform it in all particulars. 31 N. E. Rep. 271; Oberlies v. Bullin- 'Miller v. Benjamin (1894), 142 N. ger, 132 N.Y. 598 ; Valk v. McKeize, 16 Y. 613 ; 37 N. E. Rep. 631 ; Glacius v. N.Y. Supl. 741; Munsell U.Baldwin, 56 Black, 50 N. Y. 145; Phillip v. Gal- Conn. 522, a map of a city of substan- lant, 62 N. Y. 256 ; Woodward ■». Ful- tial accuracy, although not absolutely ler, 80 N. Y. 312 ; Heckmann v. Pink- accurate; Gillespie Tool Co. v Wilson, ney, 81 N. Y. 211 ; Dauchey v. Drake, 123 Pa. St. 19, holding that one 85 N. Y. 407 ; Van Clief v. Van Vech- who invokes the protection of the ten, 130 N.Y. 571 ; 29 N.E. Rep. 1017; equitable doctrine of substantial per- Crouch v. Gutmann, 134 N. Y. 45; 31 formance, in order to show a right to N. E. Rep. 271. recover, must present a case in which * Miller v. Benjamin (1894), 142 N. there has been no willful omission or Y. 613. departure from the terms of the con- 3 Jennings u.Willer(Tex.App. 1895), 32 S. W. Rep. 24 and 375. § 113 CONDITIONS. 141 tract is therefore sufficient to support a recovery for the con- tract price less the expense of full completion. 1 Accordingly where plaintiff contracted to build a house for defendant "and charge everything at the exact cost, for which I will get vouch- ers," for a consideration to be paid upon completion of the building, it was held that vouchers furnished to defendant were prima facie evidence sufficient to show performance, and plaintiff was not bound to prove that every item, of material and labor was expended in the building. 2 § 113. Substantial performance — Delay. — Where it appeared that the plaintiff made every reasonable effort to perform a building contract in the required time, but failed to do so in some minor particulars, and the defendant took possession of the building when completed, and used it for the intended pur- pose, for which it was adequate, it was held that plaintiff could recover the contract price, less compensation to defendant for the minor imperfections and omissions; and that the plaintiff was not liable for delay in the completion of the build- ing where it was due to the fact that defendant's architect either changed the plans and specifications, or failed to furnish necessary lines and levels; but was liable where the delay re- sulted from the condemnation of materials which he furnished, and on which the architect was required to pass under the con- tract. 8 Accordingly where an architect is, by the building con- tract, made the sole arbiter between the parties, of matters concerning materials and character of work, the exercise of his judgment on such matters will be binding on both parties, unless fraud is pleaded and proved. And where the architect is present, and has knowledge of the character of the materials being used, and does not object at the time, it will be an ap- proval of the same, which can not be revised, to the injury of the contracter. And where a building contract, in which there is a damage clause for non-performance by a certain time, pro- vides for payment by the owner of monthly estimates, any de- 1 Toher v. Lappine, 60 N. Y. St. Rep. s White v. Braddock School Diet. 853; Hamburger v. Rottenberg, 61 N. (1893), 159 Pa. St. 201; 28 Atl. Rep. Y. St. Rep. 102. 136. 2 Blazo v. Gill (1894), 143 N. Y. 232. 142 CONDITIONS. § 114 lays caused by the wrongful withholding of the same are ex- cusable. 1 So, also, it is held that the provision of a building contract for forfeit of ten dollars for each day that building re- mained unfinished after the day fixed does not apply to delay necessitated by changes in the material ordered by the owners, although the contract provided that any change in the plans, "either in quantity or quality of the work," should be executed by the contractor, "without holding the contract as violated or void in any other respect." 2 § 114. Insufficient performance. — The doctrine of "substan- tial compliance" of building contracts does not apply when the omissions or departures from the contract are intentional, and so substantial as not to be capable of remedy and that an allowance out of the contract price would not give the owner essentially what he contracted for. In such a case it seems the contractor is remediless. 3 1 Wright v. Meyer (Tex. App. 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 1122. In a building contract, it was stipulated that, in case of the failure or unreasonable delay of the contractor to provide the neces- sary labor and materials to complete the work by a certain time, in the judgment of two architects named, then the other party to the contract might, after three days' notice, pro- vide other labor and materials, and complete the work. It was held that the contractor could not be lawfully stopped from proceeding with his work in constructing said buildings, upon the judgment of said architects, where the judgment of one was based solely upon what the other had in- formed him, and not upon his own examination of the premises and a proper inquiry into the facts consti- tuting such default on the part of the contractor. He was entitled to the benefit of the joint judgment of the architects, based upon a full knowl- edge by each one of the facts which constituted such default, especially where the examination of the condi- tion of affairs called for a personal examination of them, as a condition precedent for the exercise of the dis- cretion and judgment of each archi- tect. Benson v. Miller, 56 Minn. 410 ; 57 N. W. Rep. 943. 2 Lilly i>. Person, 168 Pa. St. 219; 32 Atl. Rep. 23, per Fell, J. : "InMahert). Davis Lumber Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 530; 57 N. W. Rep. 357, defendant con- tracted in writing to pay plaintiff a certain amount for drawing lumber to defendant's lumber yard, to furnish a wagon for such purpose, and to pay 2o cents additional on every 1000 feet if all should be delivered in a specified time. It was held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover the additional pay, although he did not deliver the lumber in the required time, if the delay was caused by defendant's refusal to fur- nish a wagon, and his failure to furnish requisite facilities for unloading the lumber in the yard." 3 Elliott v. Caldwell (1890), 43 Minn. 357. "It may seem a harsh doctrine to hold that a man who has bailt a house shall have no pay for it, but § 115 CONDITIONS. 143 § 115. The same subject continued — A contrary view. — Many cases on the contrary hold that notwithstanding the contractor has, either willfully or without sufficient excuse, abandoned his contract, he may recover on a quantum meruit the value of his services, leaving the owner to recoup damages for his failure to perform his contract. And these authorities apply the rule absolutely in all cases, no matter how little the con- tractor has done. And a formal acceptance of the work or an acquiescence in the breach is not essential to recovery. The benefits arising from the services rendered, the materials furnished, and labor performed in erecting the buildings being the owner's, without acceptance. He has no choice but to use and enjoy those benefits, though but a part performance of the contract. The benefits derived from the services he can not restore, nor can he restore the benefits that come to him from the buildings, for they have become incorporated into, and a part of, the realty upon which they stand. The courts of the following states adhere to this rule and allow the contractor to recover the value of his work less damages occasioned the the other party can well say : 'I It must appear that he has taken the never made any such agreement. I benefit under circumstances sufficient agreed to pay you if you would build to raise an implied promise to pay for my house in a certain manner, which the work done, notwithstanding the you have not done.' This fault is non-performance of the special con- with the one who voluntarily violates tract. Therefore, in a case of a build- his contract. * * * The accept- ing on land under a contract which ance of the benefit of a partial per- the builder fails to complete, or which formance, or of performance in a way he completes in a manner not con- different from that contracted for, forming to the contract, so that the where the party has the option of re- owner can not be charged with the turning or rejecting the consideration contract price, the mere fact of the performed, will usually be sufficient building remaining on the land, and to imply a promise to pay a compen- that the owner resumed possession sation commensurate with the benefit and enjoys the fruits of the labor, is accepted. But the mere fact that a not such an acceptance as alone will part performance has been beneficial imply a promise to pay for it." Per is not enough to render the party ben- Mitchell, J., 360, 361, 362. See, also, efited liable to pay for the advantage. Leeds v. Little, 42 Minn. 414. 144 CONDITIONS. §§ 116, 117 owner by default, to wit: Indiana, 1 Missouri, 2 Wisconsin," Texas, 4 Kansas, 5 Iowa, 6 Nebraska, 7 Maine, 8 and Alabama. 9 § 116. Doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States. — The following rules touching building contracts have been laid down by the supreme court: While the spe- cial contract remains executory, the contractor must sue upon it. When it has been fully executed according to its terms, and nothing remains to be done but the payment of the price, he may sue on the contract, or indebitatus assumpsit, and rely upon the common counts. In either case, the con- tract will determine the rights of the parties. When the con- tractor has been guilty of fraud, or has willfully abandoned the work, leaving it unfinished, he can not recover in any form of action. Where he has in good faith fulfilled, but not in the manner or not within the time prescribed by the con- tract, and the other party has sanctioned or accepted the work, the contractor may recover upon the common counts. 10 § 117. Sales — Incomplete delivery. — If the seller has deliv- ered a portion of the articles agreed to be furnished, which the buyer has used and had the enjoyment of, and the seller then makes default in the further performance of the contract, he may recover the value of the articles so delivered, subject to recoupment by the buyer of the damages sustained by rea- son of such non-performance. 11 1 Cummings v. Pence, 1 Ind. App. 8 White v. Oliver, 36 Me. 92. 317; Masonic Association v. Beck, 77 9 Davis v. Badders, 95 Ala. 348; 10 Ind. 203. So. Rep. 422. 2 Fleischmann v. Miller, 38 Mo. App. 10 Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1. 177. "Gage v. Meyers, 59 Mich. 300; "Taylora. Williams, 6 Wis. 363; but Shimpu. Siedel, 6 Houston (Del.), 421; the rule does not obtain in contracts Smith v. Keith, 36 Mo. App. 567; Elliott of personal service, no recovery in v. Espenhain, 59 Wis. 272, while the that case being allowed. See Diefen- question is not discussed it is assumed back v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462. that the vendor can recover, subject «Linch v. Paris Lumber Co., 80 to set-off; Wolf v. Gerr, 43 Iowa, 339 Texas, 23; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Texas, not a sale case, but principle the same 147. Byerlee v. Mendel, 39 Iowa, 382 ; Pol 5 School District v. Boyer,46 Kan. 54. hemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573; Rich 6 .Etna Iron Works v. Kossuth ards v. Shaw, 67 111. 222. See, also County, 79 Iowa, 40. Phillips Construction Co. *. Seymour 7 West «. VanPelt, 34 Neb. 63. 91 U. S. 646; Mitchell v. Scott, 41 Mich §118 CONDITIONS. 145 § 118. The New York doctrine. — Where goods are received and used by the vendee under a contract for the delivery of specified quantities at stated intervals, if the quantity de- livered is less than that required by the contract, such breach is a bar to an action by the vendor for the price of the goods de- livered. 1 The buyer under such a contract has a right to use the goods delivered, as required in his business, without wait- ing for the expiration of the time to see whether the vendor will fully perform his contract, and such use is no waiver of his defense in case of the vendor's breach of contract. 2 But while as a general rule no action lies on the part of a vendor upon a contract for the sale and delivery of a specified quan- tity of goods, until the whole quantity is delivered, yet where the whole delivery is to be at one and the same time and the vendee elects to receive a portion and appropriates the same to his own use, and by his acts evinces that he waives the con- dition precedent of a complete delivery, the vendor may re- cover for the portion delivered. 8 But in order that acceptance of a part should be a waiver of the residue there must be a complete delivery and the buyer must in accepting it know that the vendor intends no further delivery. 4 And if the buyer does not waive a complete delivery, he need not return the por- tion of the goods actually delivered, nor is he liable for their value. 5 108 ; Moon v. Harder, 38 Mich. 566 ; insist on retaining it without payment Begole v. McKenzie, 26 Mich. 470; until the vendor makes delivery of the McGueen v. Gamble, 33 Mich. 344. rest." Benjamin on Sales, §690; Cham- "If, on the other hand, the delivery pion v. Short, 1 Camp. 53; Shipton v. is of a quantity less than that sold, it Casson, 5 B. & C. 378; Oxendale v. may be refused by the purchaser ; and Wetherell, 9 B. & C. 386. if the contract be for a specified 1 Nightingale v. Eiseman, 121 N. Y. quantity to be delivered in parcels 288; Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217; from time to time, the purchaser may Champlin v. Rowley, 18 "Wend. 187; return the parcels first received, if the Visscher v. Greenbank, etc., Co., 11 later deliveries be not made, for the Hun, 159. contract is not performed by the ven- 2 Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217. dor's delivery of less than the whole 3 Avery v. Willson, 81 N. Y. 341 ; quantity sold. But the buyer is Flanagan v. Demarest, 3 Bobt. 173. bound to pay for any part that he ac- 4 Nightingale v. Eiseman, 121 N. Y. cepts ; and after the time for delivery 288. has elapsed he must either return or 5 Levene ». Rabitte, 2N. Y. Supl. 389. pay for the part received, and can not See Shields v. Bettee, 2 Sand. 262. See, 10 146 CONDITIONS. § 119 § 119. Personal services. — The question whether one who has agreed to work for a certain time, and has abandoned his work without cause, can still recover the value of his services rendered, is one in relation to which there is much contrariety of view. And some courts which allow a recovery on a quantum meruit in a building contract where the contractor willfully abandons his contract, still refuse to allow a recovery in contracts for personal services, unless the condition is sub- stantially performed. 1 Some courts declare that the weight of authority at the present time is against the doctrine that where a contract is entire, and consequently not apportionable, and has been only partially performed, the failing party is not en- titled to recover or receive anything for what he has actually done. And it is held that if the doctrine has been overturned with respect to all contracts except that for personal services, it should be overturned with reference to that also. The ac- quiring of a benefit, which is the reason there is a recovery in other cases of contract, is the same in case of personal services. 2 Other courts, with equal confidence declare that the weight of authority is to the effect that there can be no recovery, and also, Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. 550; ing fully performed." Per Field, J., Hill v. Heller, 27 Hun, 416 ; Brown v. 436. See Keyes v. Stone, 5 Mass. 391 ; Norton, 50 Hun, 248; Smith v. Brady, Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181; 17 N. Y. 173; Baker v. Higgins, 21 Snow v. Ware, 13 Mete. 42; Gleason N. Y. 397. And see the following cases v. Smith, 9 Cush. 484; Bassett v. San- where recovery was refused for a por- born, 9 Cush. 58; Veazie v. Hosmer, tion of goods actually delivered be- 11 Gray, 396; Bee Printing Co. v. cause of failure to deliver the stipula- Hichborn, 4 Allen, 63; Cardell v. ted quantity. Holden Co. v. Wester- Bridge, 9 Allen, 355 ; Thompson v. velt, 67 Maine, 446; Witherow v. Purcell, 10 Allen, 426; Veazie v. Ban- Witherow, 16 Ohio, 238 ; Haslack v. gor, 51 Maine, 509. Mayers, 26 N. J. Law, 284. In Massa- ' Hanel v. Freund, 17 Mo. App. chusetts recovery would probably be 618; Taylor ». Williams, 6 Wis. 363; denied where there was an incomplete Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462. See delivery and the buyer had not ac- Story on Contracts, § 33. cepted or waived his rights. Wiley v. 2 Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99; Mc- Athol, 150 Mass. 426. "It seems that Millan v. Malloy, 10 Neb. 228; Par- the performance must be of a substan- cell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209: "And tial part of the contract, and that the so I think the law may be considered acceptance must be under such cir- to be pretty generally settled through- cumstances as to show that the party out the western states." Per Cobb, J., accepting knew, or ought to have 212. known, that the contract was not be- § 120 CONDITIONS. 147 that the reasons for a recovery in case of partial performance of other contracts do not exist in case of contracts for personal services. 1 Some courts declare that the principles decided in the case of Britton v. Turner 2 have been gradually gaining credit, and are right in principle, however it may be upon the technical and more illiberal rules of the common law as found in the older cases. With the natural disposition of courts and juries to disfavor the cause of him who has broken his con- tract, and yet seeks a recovery, and with the limitation that the employer is entitled, if he so elect, to put the breach of con- tract in defense, for the purpose of reducing the damages, the application of this rule will not be found practically to work injustice to the employer. 8 Other courts declare that to allow suit in such cases upon a quantum meruit without full per- formance, and recoupment of damages, would in most cases be quite inadequate to indemnify the employer under the or- dinary rule of such damages. 4 § 120. The same subject continued. — With the authorities in this hopeless state of confusion, a mention may be made of a few states in which the question has arisen, the results arrived at being absolutely and diametrically opposite. The doctrine, that a party can not recover upon a contract for personal serv- ices, when He has failed to perform his part thereof, where the adverse party has neither waived, prevented nor dispensed with such performance ; — but that he may recover for services performed under such contract upon the quantum meruit, the employer having the right to set up against the same any dam- ages sustained by reason of such non performance — has been approved and recovery allowed in New Hampshire, 5 North 1 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462. 5 Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, a 2 Britton v. Turner, 6N.H. 481— the celebrated and leading ease. A farm pioneer case allowing recovery in laborer agreed to work from March, such cases. 1831, to March, 1832, and his employer 3 McOlay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66, Dil- was to give him at the end of the time Ion J. ; Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99. $120. The servant abandoned the work 4 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462; without cause in December, 1831. He Eldridge v. Rowe, 7 111. 91 ; Lantry v. was allowed to recover on a quantum Parks, 8 Cow. 63. meruit the value of his services. 148 CONDITIONS §121 Carolina, 1 Iowa/ Nebraska, 3 Kansas, 4 Vermont, 5 Michigan, 6 Texas, 7 and Indiana. 8 § 121. The same subject continued — Contrary view. — On the other hand, the courts of Wisconsin, 9 Pennsylvania, 10 Mis- souri," Illinois, 12 and Ohio" allow no recovery pro tanto where a contract for personal services is not substantially performed. And in New York, 14 Minnesota, 15 California, 16 Massachusetts 17 and Connecticut 18 the courts also deny the right to recover in such cases. 19 1 Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98. "The inclination of the courts is to relax the stringent rule of the com- mon law, which allows us no recovery upon a special unperformed contract, nor for the value of the work done, because the special excludes an im- plied contract to pay. In such case if the party has derived any benefit from the labor done, it would be un- just to allow him to retain that with- out paying anything. Accordingly, restrictions are imposed upon the gen- eral rule, and it is confined to con- tracts entire and indivisible, and when by the nature of the agree- ment, or by express provision, noth- ing is to be paid till all is perform- ed." Per Smith, 0. J., 101, 102. "McClay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66. The opinion is by Judge Dillon and is a masterpiece of judicial statement. Pixler v. Nichols, 8 Iowa, 106. "West v. Van Pelt, 34 Neb. 63. Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209, this opinion declares the weight of authority in the western states is in favor of allowing recovery. See Mc- Millan v. Malloy, 10 Neb. 228. 4 Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99, con- tains an elaborate review of Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481. 5 Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557. 6 Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449, but qucere. 7 Hollis v. Chapman, 36 Texas, 1. 8 Cummings v. Pence, 1 Ind. App. 317, but qucere. See, also, Phenix Ins. Co.i). Boyer, 1 Ind. App. 329; Masonic Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203. Pickens v. Bozell, 11 Ind. 275. 9 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462. 10 Gillespie Tool Co. v. "Wilson, 123 Pa. St. 19, but qucere. "Hanel v. Preund, 17 Mo. App. 618; Earp v. Tyler, 73 Mo. 617 ; Downs v. Smit, 15 Mo. App. 583; White v. Wright, 16 Mo. App. 551. 12 Thrift v. Payne, 71 111. 408. 13 Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561. 14 Goldstein v. White, 16 N. Y. Supl. 860. See, also, Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131 ; Cunningham v. Jones, 20 N. Y. 486 ; Smith v. Brady, 17 N . Y. 173 ; Waters v. Davies, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 39. "Unless there is a special agree- ment to the contrary, work, whether measured by the job or by time, must be finished in order that there shall be a right to pay for it." Per Book- staver, J., in Goldstein v. White, supra, 861. 15 Peterson v. Mayer, 46 Minn. 468: Nelichka v. Esterly, 29 Minn. 146; Kohn v. Fandel, 29 Minn. 470. 18 Hartman v. Rogers, 69 Cal. 643, but qucere. 17 Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267. See, also, Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426. "Dayton v. Dean, 23 Conn. 99, af- firms principle, but evidence showed waiver by employer. 19 Contracts for personal services means simply a contract for hiring §122 CONDITIONS. 149 § 122. Delivery by installments. — In contracts for the sale and delivery of goods by installments at stated periods, the seller is bound to deliver the quantity stipulated, and has no right either to compel the buyer to accept a less quantity or to require him to select part out of a greater quantity; and a de- fault in delivery of an installment, in respect of quantity or quality, gives the buyer the right to repudiate the whole con- tract. 1 The readiness of the buyer to accept an installment is services, or for work and labor simply. Diefenback v. Stark, 56 "Wis. 462, 466; See following cases more or less discussing the right of parties to re- cover on a quantum meruit when they have not fulfilled their contracts: Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6; 43 N. W. Eep. 484; Griffith v. Happersber- ger, 86 Cal. 605 ; Boteler v. Roy, 40 Mo. App. 234; Oberlies v. Bullinger, 132 N. Y. 598;' Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492 ; Walden v. Eldred, 58 Hun, 605; 11 N. Y. Supl. 856; Globe Light Co. v. Doud, 47 Mo. App. 439; Den- nis v. Walsh, 16 N. Y. Supl. 257; Ponce v. Smith, 84 Maine, 266. In England in contracts for work and labor, the work is a condition prece- dent, and must be completed before the payment for it can be claimed. Mor- ton v. Lamb, 7 T. R. 121 ; Peeters v. Opie, 2 Wms. Saund. 346. 1 Norrington v. "Wright, 115 U. S. 188 (1885), a leading case in which all the authorities are reviewed. A con- tract had been made to sell 5,000 tons of iron rails, the same to be shipped from Europe delivered at Philadel- phia, at the rate of about 1,000 tons per month. One month 400 tons were shipped and another 885 tons were shipped. It was held that this was a sufficient breach of the contract by the seller that the buyer could re- ' pudiate the whole contract. "In the contracts of merchants, time is of the essence. The time of shipment is the usual and convenient means of fixing the probable time of arrival with a view of providing funds to pay for the goods, or of fulfilling contracts with third persons. A statement descrip- tive of the subject-matter, or of some material incident, such as the time or place of shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded as a warranty in the sense in which that term is used in insur- ance and maritime law, that is to say, a condition precedent, upon the fail- ure or non-performance of which the party aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract." Per Gray, J., 203. Cleveland Rolling Mill v. Rhodes, 121 U. S. 255 ; Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward,36"W.Va. 573; 15 S. E. Rep. 89, this case also holds that the first install- ments may be returned by the seller if the latter deliveries are not suf- ficient in quantity to fulfill the con- tract requirement; Pope v. Porter, 102 N. Y. 366, a sale of iron to arrive, "500 tons of Coultness pig iron to be due in April next ; 500 tons of Caul- der's pig iron to be due here in March next," plaintiffs made default in the March installment, but were ready to perform the April one. Held defend- ants had a right to rescind. Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216 ; Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112 ; Catlin v. Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217, holding that not only justifies repudiation of contract by buyer, but that such breach is a bar to an action by the vendor for the price of the goods delivered, where the buyer ex- pends the goods delivered in his busi- ness, thinking that the seller will comply with the terms of the contract, a certain quantity a month. The Elting Woolen Co. v. Martin, 5 Daly, 150 CONDITIONS. § 123 a condition precedent to the delivery of subsequent install- ments, and his failure to accept one installment will discharge the seller from delivering subsequent installments. 1 The par- ties can, by express provision, stipulate that a default as to one delivery shall not put an end to the contract. 8 But a de- fault in payment for an installment delivered does not dis- charge the seller from future deliveries under the contract, if the buyer continue ready and willing to accept and pay for them. 8 If, however, a default in payment be made, with the declared intention of repudiating the contract, the seller is discharged. 4 Where an agreement is made to furnish an arti- cle of a given description, if the article delivered is not of the description of the one ordered, the purchaser has a right to reject it and to rescind the contract in toto. Thus, where an order is given for a monument with certain inscriptions, among which is the name, date of death and age of the deceased, and the manufacturer omits from the inscription the age, the or- derer has the right to reject the monument and absolutely re- scind the agreement. 5 § 123. Mersey Steel Company v. Naylor. — The leading case in point is Mersey Steel Company v. Naylor, 6 decided by the 417 ; King Phillip Mills v. Slater, 12 8 Erwin v. Harris, 87 Geo. 333 ; Mer- it. I. 82; Winchester v. Newton, 2 sey Steel Company v. Naylor, L. R. 9 Allen, 492; Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, App. Cas. 434; Freeth v. Burr, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 434; Bollman v. Burt, 61 9 C. P. 208. Md. 415. Contra, Jonassohn v. Young, *Stocksdalei;. Schuyler, 8 N.Y. Supl. 4 B. & S. 296; Coddington v. Paleo- 813; Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6; logo, L. R. 2 Ex. 192; Lucesco Oil Co. Starr Glass Co. v. Morey, 108 Mass. v. Brewer, 66 Pa. St. 351; Shinn v. 570; Winchester v. Newton, 2 Allen, Bodine, 60 Pa. St. 182; Morgan v. 492; Webb v. Stone, 24 N. H. 282; McKee, 77 Pa. St. 228; Scott v. Kit- Fletcher v. Cole, 23 Vt. 114; Bloomer tanning Coal Co., 89 Pa. St. 231; Black- v. Bernstein, L.R. 9C. P. 588, where it burn v. Reilly, 47 N. J. Law, 290. is held that it is a question of fact 1 Haines v. Tucker, 50 N. H. 307; whether the circumstances of non- and see cases in preceding note, which payment are such as to give the seller support the converse of this proposi- reasonable ground for believing that tion. Hoare v. Rennie, 5 H. & N. 19. • the buyer will be unable to pay for Contra, Simpson v. Crippin, L. R. future deliveries, and if so the seller 8 Q. B. 14; Roper v. Johnson, L. R. may rescind. 8 C. P. 167. 5 American, etc., Co. v. Gillette, 88 "Simpson v. Crippin, L. R. 8 Q. B. Mich. 2.31. 14. 6 9 App. Cas. 434. § 123 CONDITIONS. 151 House of Lords, to the effect that the failure of the buyer to pay for the first installment of the goods upon delivery does not, unless the circumstances evince an intention on his part to be no longer bound by the contract, entitle the seller to re- scind the contract and to decline to make further deliveries under it; and this case was, as to the point actually decided, cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Norrington v. Wright. 1 But the judgments of the Lords, inci- dentally in deciding the case, in substance lay down the rule that defaults by one party in making particular payments or deliveries will not release the other party from his duty to make the other deliveries or payments stipulated in the con- tract, unless the conduct of the party in default be such as to evince an intention to abandon the contract or a design no longer to be bound by its terms. This rule leaves the party complaining of a breach to recover damages for his injury on the normal principle of compensation, without allowing him the abnormal advantage that might enure to him from an option to rescind the bargain. It also accords with the ancient doctrine laid down by Sarjeant Williams in his notes to Pordage v. Cole, 2 that where a covenant goes only to part of the con- sideration on both sides, and a breach of such covenant may be paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant, and an action may be maintained for a breach of the contract without averring performance. It is inapplicable where the parties have expressed their intention to make performance of a stipu- lation touching a part of the bargain a condition precedent to the continuing obligation of the contract; and peculiar cases might arise where the courts would infer such an intention from the nature and circumstances of the bargain itself, cases in which the courts would see that the partial stipulation was so important, so went to the root of the matter, to use a phrase of Lord Blackburn, 8 as to make its performance a condition of the obligation to proceed in the contract. Accordingly the rule as laid down by this case has been approved by some of the American courts, which hold that if the contract is not entire, a failure in one delivery will not, without more, justify 1 115' U. S. 188. 3 Poussard v. Spiers, L. R., 1 Q. B 2 1 Saund. 320. D. 410. 152 CONDITIONS. § 124 rescission. 1 But the weight of authority in America is that the doctrine of this case is inapplicable in cases of deliveries by installment, it being held that default either in delivery or ac- ceptance of one installment gives cause of discharge from con- tract. 2 § 124. Insolvency of buyer. — If the buyer becomes insolv- ent the seller may refuse to deliver any installments until past installments are paid for. 3 But the mere insolvency of one of the parties to a contract of sale is not equivalent either to a re- scission or a breach. It simply relieves the seller from his agreement to give credit, and payment may be substituted. 4 In such a case the seller, notwithstanding he may have agreed to allow credit for the goods, is not bound to deliver any more goods under the contract until the price of the goods not yet delivered is tendered to him ; and if a debt is due to him for goods already delivered, he is entitled to refuse to deliver any more till he is paid the debt due for those already delivered, as well as the price of those still to be delivered. 5 If goods are sold on credit, it is an implied condition of the contract that the buyer shall keep his credit good, and the seller is not bound to deliver the goods if the buyer is insolvent ; and the fact that the buyer has given his note for the price is imma- terial. 6 To justify a seller in refusing to give credit and to de- liver installments the buyer must be insolvent. By the term "insolvent" is meant inability to pay debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business. 7 But a man can not be said 1 Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449. and also compare Blackburn v. Beilly, Bradley v. King, 44 111. 339; Cole 47 N. J. Law, 290. v. Cheovenda, 4 Colo. 17; Coleman v. 3 Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N. Y. 121; Hudson, 2 Sneed, 463; Dibol v. Mi- New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert E. nott, 9 Iowa, 400; Drake v. Goree, Co., 91 N. V. 153; Freeth v. Burr, L. 22 Ala. 409; Dugan v. Anderson, 36 E. 9 C. P. 208; Bloomer v. Bernstein, Md. 567; Dwinel v, Howard, 30 L. E. 9 C. P. 588. Maine, 258 ; Dunlap v. Petrie, 35 Miss. 4 Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N. Y. 121. 590; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251, Contra, Morgan v. Bain, L. E. 10 C. P. and see other cases collected in 15. Xorrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 5 Ex parte, Chalmers, L. E. 8 Ch. 289. l ;,s - 6 Diemr.Koblitz, 49 Ohio St. 41; 29 2 Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. N. E. Eep. 1124. 18S. See cases in preceding notes 7 Toofi!. Martin, 13 Wall. 40; Clarion § 125 CONDITIONS. 153 to be insolvent merely because he has not money enough on hand to meet his liabilities as they fall due in the course of trade. 1 § 125. Subscriptions to stock. — Whether conditions in a sub- scription to stock be precedent or subsequent is a question purely of intent, to be determined by considering the words both of the clause containing the condition and of the whole contract. 2 When subscriptions are made to take stock in an ex- isting corporation, upon a condition precedent, as for example upon condition that a specified amount of subscriptions shall hereafter be obtained, the contract of the subscribers is twofold in character. It is a contract between the several subscribers and it is also a continuing offer to the corporation to take and pay for the amount of stock subscribed, upon the terms pro- posed, whenever the specified amount of subscriptions shall have been obtained. The obtaining of the amount specified within a reasonable time is an acceptance of the offer by the corporation and the contract of each subscriber then becomes absolute. 3 A subscriber can not withdraw his subscription even though it be conditional, unless unreasonable delay occurs in performing the condition. 4 When the company obtains sol- vent subscribers for the amount specified, that becomes an effectual acceptance of the offer of all those who have pre- viously subscribed. Their subscriptions are no longer condi- tional, but become absolute and are thereafter payable, accord- ing to the terms of the contract, on the call of the board of directors. 5 The subscribers are then entitled to all the rights Bank v. Jones, 21 Wall. 325 ; Cunning- 120 Ind. 600 ; Minneapolis, etc., Co. v. ham v. Norton, 125 U. S. 77; Buchan- Davis, 40 Minn. 110. an u.Smith, 16 Wall. 277; Wagers. 4 Johnsons. Wabash, etc. ,PlankRoad Hall, 16 Wall. 584; Dutcher v. Wright, Co., 16 Ind. 389; Lake Ontario, etc., 94 IT. S. 553; May v. Le Claire, 18 B. Co. u. Mason, 16 N. Y.451; McClure Fed. Rep. 164; Jra re Bininger, 7 Blatch. v. People's, etc., R.Co., 90 Pa. St. 269. 262: In re Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 5 Beach on Private Corporations, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 108. §532, citing New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. 1 Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394; 10 Pickens, 5 Ind. 247; Estell v. Knights- So. Rep. 334. town, etc., Turnpike Co., 41 Ind. 174; 2 Beach on Private Corporations, Beckner v. Riverside, etc., Turnpike § 532, citing Bucksport R. Co. v. Bre- Co., 65 Ind. 468; Phoenix Warehous- wer, 67 Maine, 295; Chamberlain v. ing Co. v. Badger, 67N.Y. 294; Cra- Painesville R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 225. vens v. Eagle Cottons Mills Co., 120 8 Cravens v. Eagle Cotton Mills Co., Ind. 600. 154 conditions. §§ 126, 127 and privileges of stockholders, and they come under the correla- tive obligations and duties of holders of stock in a corporation. 1 § 126. Waiver. — In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the rule is that, where the charter, or articles of a corporation, or the terms of subscription to its capital stock, do not pro- vide otherwise, payment of a subscription can not be required until the whole capital stock is subscribed. 2 But the subscriber may waive that defense. Acts done by him, as stockholder or director, which constitute a part of the business for which the corporation is formed, and which, from their nature, assume it to be ready for business, and evince a willingness to enter upon that business, with the stock already subscribed, will amount to a waiver. 3 But a subscription to stock before incorporation must be paid, although the stock is not all taken, if the amount of stock is prescribed by a subsequently-adopted charter.' But the minimum of stock having been subscribed is not sufficient to render the subscriber liable, unless that amount has been fixed as the capital. 5 § 127. Recitals. — Recitals in the charter, or in the prospectus, or in the subscription paper, that the capital stock of a com- pany which, at the time, has not commenced active operations, shall be a certain amount, is an implied condition that the amount of stock specified shall be taken before the subscribers shall become liable on their contracts, 6 unless a contrary in- tention appear in the charter, enabling act, articles of associa- tion or contract of subscription.' Where a corporation, in- corporated under the general law requiring that the amount of 'Butler University v. Schoonover, 560; Bray v. Farwell, 81 N. Y. 600; 114 Ind. 381. Memphis R. Co. v. Sullivan, 57 Geo. 2 Masonic Association ■». Channell, 240; Temple v. Lemon, 112 111. 51; 43 Minn. 353. Contoocook R. Co. v. Barker, 32 N. 3 Masonic Association v. Channell, H. 363; Rockland, etc., Steamboat Co. 43 Minn. 353. v. Sewall, 80 Me. 400. 4 Belton Compress Co. r. Saunders, 7 Peoria R. Co. r. Preston, 35 Iowa, 70 Texas, 6!i9. 115; Musgrave e. Morrison, 54 Md. 5 Beach on Private Corporations, 161; Schloss v. Montgomery Co. , 87 §536, citing Pike v. Bangor, etc., R. Ala. 411 ; Beach on Private Corpora- Co., 68 Maine, 445. tions, § 535. * Haskell r. Worthington, 94 Mo. §§128,129 conditions. 155 its stock be stated in the certificate of incorporation, enters into active business with less capital stock subscribed than the amount thus stated, a subscriber can not be held to his sub- scription. 1 And equally under an act of incorporation pro- viding that the number of shares shall not exceed a certain limit, and shall be determined from time to time by the di- rectors, no assessment can be laid until the number is so de- termined. 2 § 128. Subscription before incorporation — How far abso- lute. — Where one subscribes to the stock of a corporation prior to the procurement of its charter, such subscription is to be regarded as absolute and unqualified, and any condition at- tached thereto is void. 3 But, after incorporation, a person may, in his subscription, voluntarily assume any other obligation not forbidden by law. He may impose any conditions not contrary to public policy or contrary to some statute. 4 § 129. The subject-matter of conditions in subscriptions to stock. — Anything which may be legally done by the corpora- tion may be made a condition to a subscription for stock. 5 The subscription may be legally conditioned as to the time, manner and means of payment. 6 In New York, where the 1 Haskell v. Worthington, 94 Mo. City Hotel v. Dickinson, 6 Gray, 586 ; 560. See, also, Hager v. Cleveland Lexington R. Co. v. Chandler, 13 Mete. 36 Md. 476; Hughes v. Antietam Co., 311; Penobscot E. Co. v. Bartlett, 12 34 Md. 316; Sedalia R. Co. v. Abell, Gray, 244; Boston, Barre & Gardner 17 Mo. App. 645; Cabot, etc., Bridge R. Co. v. Wellington, 113 Mass. 79; v. Chapin,6 Cush.|50; Stoneham, etc., New Albany R. Co. v. McCormick, 10 Railroad v. Gould, 2 Gray, 277 ; To- Ind. 499 ; McMillan v. Maysville R. peka Bridge Co. v. Cummings, 3 Kan. Co., 15 B. Monroe, 218; Union Hotel 55. Co. v. Hersee, 79 N. Y. 454; Burrows 2 Troy R. Co. v. Newton, 8 Gray, v. Smith, ION. Y. 550; Ashtabula R. 596. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 328. 8 Boyd v. Peach Bottom R. Co., 90 6 Penobscot R. Co. v. Dunn, 39 Pa. St. 169; Caley ». Philadelphia R. Maine, 587; Hanover Junction R. Co. Co., 80 Pa. St. 363; Troy R. Co. v. v. Grubb, 82 Pa. St. 36; Ticonic R. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297 ; Chamberlain v. Co. v. Lang, 63 Maine, 480 ; Ashtabula Painesville R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 225; R. Co. v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 328; Mil- Morrow v. Iron and Steel Co., 87 Tenn. waukee R. Co. v. Field, 12 Wis. 340. 2Q2 6 Smith v. Tallahassee, etc., Co., 30 4 Skowhegan R. Co. v. Kinsman, 77 Ala. 650 ; People t>. Chambers, 42 Cal. Maine,370; Kennebec R. Co. v. Jarvis, 201; Mitchell v. Rome R. Co., 17 Ga. 34 Maine, 360; Bucksport R. Co. v. 574; SwataraR.Co.u.Brune,6Gill,41; Buck 65 Maine. 537 ; Proprietors of Beach on Private Corporations, § 537 ; 156 CONDITIONS. § 130 general turnpike act did not authorize the commissioners to accept conditional subscriptions, it has been held that a sub- scription conditioned upon a certain location of the road is void as against public policy. 1 But this rule does not seem to have been generally applied to the location of railroads. 2 Con- ditions that a road go by a certain town, or over a designated course, are usually held valid in stock subscriptions. 3 § 130. How the condition must be stated. — All conditions in the subscription must be written in the subscription itself.* The doctrine that an agreement between one subscriber to the stock of a corporation and the company, made concurrently with the making of the subscription, which purports to annul its obligation, or materially limit and change the liability of the subscriber to the detriment of the company, is invalid and void, is founded upon the construction .that a subscription to the stock of a corporation, whose stock is open for general sub- scription, is not only an undertaking between each subscriber and the company, but also between him and all the other sub- scribers to the common enterprise; and that each subscriber has the right to suppose that the subscription of every other sub- scriber is a bona fide undertaking according to its terms. 5 Their Van Allen v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 Detroit R. Co. v. Starnes, 38 Mich. Bosw. 515; Highland Co. v. McKean, 698; Cooper r. MeKee, 53 Iowa, 239; 11 Johns. 98; Milwaukee R. Co. v. Chamberlain v. Painesville E. Co., 15 Field, 12 Wis. 340. Ohio St. 225 ; West Cornwall E. Co. 1 Beach on Railways, § 109, citing, v. Mowatt, 15 Q. B. 521. Fort Edward, etc., Go. «.Payne,15NY. 4 Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600; 583; Butternuts, etc., Turnpike Co. White Mountains E. Co. v. Eastman, i. North, 1 Hill, 518; Macedon, etc., 34 N. H. 124; Phoenix Co. v. Badger, Plank Eoad Co. v. Snediker, 18 Barb. 6 Hun, 293 ; Graff v. Pittsburgh E. Co., 317. 31 Pa. St. 489 ; Eobinson v. Pittsburgh 2 Beachon Railways, §109. R. Co., 32 Pa. St. 334; Downier. 3 Jacks v. Helena, 41 Ark. 213 ; Moore White, 1 2 AVis. 176 ; County of Craw- v. Hanover R. Co., 94 Pa. St. 324; Ca- ford v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 32 Pa. St. ley v.. Philadelphia R. Co., 80 Pa. St. 141; Jewell v. Rock River Co., 101 363; Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. 111.57. Baal i, 9 Watts, 458; WoonsocketR. Co. 5 White Mountains R. Co. v. East- v. Sherman, 8 R. I. 564 ; Paris R. Co. v. man, 34 N. H. 124. See, also, White v. Henderson, 89 111. 86; Wear v. Jack- Kuntz, 107 N. Y. 518, the case of a sonville R. Co., 24 111. 594; Bucksport secret arrangement between debtor R. C< i. v. Brewer, 67 Maine, 295; Jewett and creditor held void as against the v. LawrenceburghR. Co., lOInd. 539; terms of the composition. § 131 CONDITIONS. 157 respective subscriptions are contributions or advances for a common object. The action of each in his subscription may be supposed to be influenced by that of the others, and every subscription to be based on the ground that the others are what upon their face they purport to be. 1 But a contract by the in- corporators with a subscriber that they will take the stock off his hands after a certain time is valid as between the parties, although unknown to other subscribers. 2 If there be no evi- dence as to when the condition was made it will be presumed to have been made at the time of subscribing. 8 It can not be subsequently annexed without the consent of all the parties in interest. 4 § 131. Performance. — The subscriber is no member of the corporation until the conditions prescribed by him are per- formed by the company. 5 Notice must, it seems, be given of the performance of a condition, to the subscriber; 6 and whether a condition has been performed is a question of fact, 7 but the condition must be performed within a reasonable time, and what is reasonable time is a question of law. 8 And a substan- tial performance is all that is necessary. 9 This rule applies particularly to time of completion, to location, to termini, and to the method of building. 10 1 Graff v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 31 Pa. De Graffenreid, 12 Rich. L. 675; Nieh- St. 489 ; Miller v. Hanover E. Co., 87 ols v. Burlington Ry. Co.,4 Greene, 42. Pa. St. 95; Melvin v. Lamar Co., 80 'St. Louis Ey. Co. v. Eakins, 30 111.446. Iowa, 279; Toledo Ey. Co. v. John- 2 Meyer v. Blair, 109 N. Y. 600 ; son, 49 Mich. 148. Contra, Brand e. Morgans. Struthers, 131 U. S. 246. Lawrenceville Ry. Co., 77 Geo. 506. s Robinson v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 32 8 Blake v. Brown, 80 Iowa, 277; 45 N. Pa. St. 334; "Wood on Railway Law, W. Rep. 751; Stevens *,. Corbitt, 33 § 30. Mich. 458; Chartiers R. Co. v. Hod- 4 Beach on Private Corporations, gens, 85 Pa. St. 501; Chicago R. Co. v. § 538, citing New Hampshire R. Co. v. Schewe, 45 Iowa, 79. Johnson, 30 N. H. 390. 9 Des Moines R. Co. i>. Graff, 27 5 Montpelier R. Cp. v. Langdon, Iowa, 99; Paris E. Co. v. Hender- 46 Vt. 284; Philadelphia E. Co. v. son, 89 111. 86; Springfield Ry. Co. Hickman, 28 Pa. St. 318 ; Monadnock v. Sleeper, 121 Mass. 29. Ey. Co. ■«. Felt, 52 N. H. 379; Ash- I0 Beach on Private Corporations, tabula E. Co. «. Smith, 15 Ohio St. § 540, citing Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. v. 328; Burrows v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 550. Tygard, 84 Mo. 263; Des Moines 6 Chase v. Sycamore E. Co., 38 111. Valley Ey. Co. v. Graff, 27 Iowa, 99; 215. Contra, Spartanburg E. Co. v. Moore v. Hanover Junction Ey. Co., 158 CONDITIONS. § 132 § 132. Performance — Full performance waived. — Where, in ejectment, the defense is possession under contract of purchase, indebtedness of plaintiff to defendant for salary and money- paid in excess of the payments required may be considered as a performance of the contract, under the California code, which provides that, where cross demands have existed between per- sons under such circumstances that, if one sued the other a counter-claim could have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other. 1 And when one who is under contract to furnish lamps of the most approved form, made by a certain company, in good faith fur- nishes lamps made by it having a new kind of burner, the purchaser can not recover damages on the ground that this burner was a failure, and that it would cost three dollars per lamp to exchange it for the old kind, when there is no evi- dence that it ever made any such change, or paid any money therefor, or sold the lamps for any less price on account of the burner, or how much less the lamps were worth with the new burner than with the old. s So, also, the acceptance of contract work bi-weekly as it progresses, by the superintendent of a corporation, as done to his "satisfaction," in compliance with the terms of the contract, and a final acceptance of the whole in writing, is conclusive on the company as to performance, in the absence of fraud or mistake on the part of the superin- tendent. 3 A contract of hiring, by which the employe guar- 94 Pa. St. 324; Cayuga E. Co. v. properly considered as such de- Kyle, 5 Thomp. & C. 659; Peoples, fense, whether sufficient to entitle de- ,Holden, 82 111. 93; Detroit E. Co. v. fendant to equitable relief or not; Starnes, 38 Mich. 698; Michigan E. namely, the alleged facts that def end- Co. v. Bacon, 33 Mich. 466. ant was in possession by plaintiff's 'Jacob v. Carter (Cal. 1894), 36 Pac. consent, under a contract to purchase Eep. 381, per Vanclief, J.. "Under which defendant had fully performed this answer defendant was entitled to on his part, up to the time of the corn- prove any facts showing that plaintiff mencement of the action of ejectment, had no right of entry or possession at Meeker v. Dalton, 75 Cal. 154 ; 16 Pac. the time the action was commenced, Eep. 764." Sernple v. Cook, 50 Cal. 26; Eobertsw. 2 Cincinnati, etc., Gas Co. v. West- Columbet, 63 Cal. 22; and, even if ern, etc., Co., 152 U. S. 200; 14 Sup. this were not so, I think those facts Ct. Eep. 523. alleged in the cross-complaint which 3 Sheffield, etc., Iron Co. r. Cordon constitute a defense to the action (1894), 151 U. S. 285, per TJtoun, J. : at law, if proved, might have been "It is difficult to see what, effect should §132 CONDITIONS. 159 antees to give "satisfaction," vests the employer with full power to determine whether the work is satisfactory, and the reasonableness of the grounds of dissatisfaction can not be in- quired into by the court in an action by the servant for his discharge. 1 be given the acceptance of the work by the superintendent, if not to foreclose the parties from thereafter claiming that the contract had not been per- formed according to its terms. Mar- tinsburg R. Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1035." In Brady ». Cassidy (1895), 145 N. Y. 171, plaint- iffs, whose testator had carried on a manufacturing business, executed a bill of sale to defendants of "the en- tire manufactured stock * * * on hand at foundry and store rooms" at prices specified. Portions of the prop- erty covered by the bill of sale were delivered to and taken possession of by defendants. Another portion was omitted from the inventory taken im- mediately after the execution of the bill of sale and was delivered to other parties under a claim made by plaint- iffs that, at the time of such execution, the articles so omitted had been sold to those parties. In an action to recover the contract prices for the goods deliv- ered, defendants alleged a breach of the contract of sale in the failure to de- liver the articles omitted from the in- ventory, and that this was a condition precedent to a right of action. Plaint- iffs thereupon amended their com- plaint setting up a waiver of the con- dition that all the goods were to be de- livered. On the trial, plaintiffs were permitted to prove, under objection and exception, that during the nego- tiation which resulted in the sale it was spoken of and understood between the parties that plaintiffs had sold or agreed to sell a portion of the goods included in the bill of sale, and that these sales were assented to and ac- quiesced in by defendants ; that just prior to the execution of said bill, cer- tain of the goods were piled up and marked as sold to other parties ; that, subsequent to the delivery of the bill, defendants assisted in making delivery of some of the goods to the vendees thereof, and that they acquiesced in such sales. Plaintiffs also gave evi- dence to the effect that the delivery of the goods mentioned in the inven- tory was received by defendants as a fulfillment of the requirements of the bill, and that they acquiesced in the partial delivery, only claiming dam- ages for the omission to deliver all the goods. It was held that the evi- dence was properly received, and justified a finding of a waiver of full performance of the contract ; and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the contract prices for the goods delivered, deducting defendants' damages result- ing from a failure to deliver the bal- ance. 1 Allen v. Mutual Compress Co. 101 Ala. 574; 14 So. Rep. 362, Cole- man, J. : "The questions presented in the record for consideration arise from the construction of a provision in a written contract of employment. The defendant employed the plaint- iff for a period of five months, at two dollars per day, to sew and tie cotton bales for the compress. After serving a little over one month, the defend- ant paid the plaintiff for the time of service rendered, and discharged him, claiming that, under the contract, it had the right to discharge the defend- ant whenever it became dissatisfied with the services of the defendant, and that it was the sole judge of the sufficiency of the cause. The provis- 160 CONDITIONS. §133 § 133. Time of performance — Reasonable time. — Where an option is to be exercised or a condition to be performed in a time not limited by the agreement, such option must be acted upon and the condition performed or abandoned within a reasonable time. 1 But while one party has time and opportunity to com- ply with a condition precedent, if the other party does or says anything to put him off his guard, and induce him to believe that the condition is waived, or that strict compliance will not be insisted on, he is afterwards estopped from claiming non- performance of the condition. Thus, where bonds are pur- ion of the contract under which this right is claimed is as follows : 'We guaranty to give satisfaction in sewing and tying, or any other work that we may be required to do.' The defense to the complaint was that plaintiff failed to give satisfaction. The au- thorities are not altogether harmo- nious. In some it is held that a stip- ulation of similar import in a contract arms the party for whose benefit it was made with unquestioned author- ity to consult only his own judgment, will or feelings, and the reasonable- ness of the grounds of dissatisfaction is not a matter of inquiry. Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123 ; 49 N.W. Rep. 832 ; Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49; 33 Am. Eep. 351, and authorities cited in note; McCarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray, 139; Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280. On the other hand, there are authorities which hold that an employer can not dismiss his servant without actual cause. Jones v. Graham, etc., Trans- portation Co., 51 Mich. 539; 16 N. W. Rep. 893; Daggett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345. The latter case grew out of a pur- chase of milk pans, and the stipulation was that the purchaser was to pay for them 'if satisfied with the pans.' The supreme court held 'that the defend- ant had no right to say without cause that he was dissatisfied, and would not pay for the pans ;' 'that the dissat- isfaction must be actual, not feigned; real, not merely pretended.' It seems to us the latter authorities render nu- gatory an important provision in the contract. Exclude from the contract the provision, 'satisfaction guaran- antied,' or, 'if satisfactory,' and it is clear that 'for cause,' 'actual cause,' 'good cause,' the party would have the right to discharge the employe or reject the article. Parties make their own contracts, and either may stipu- late as he may deem it necessary for his own protection, and it is optional whether the other accepts the terms proffered. Having once made the con- tract, neither can hold the other to a different contract. When, therefore, one guaranties to give satisfaction, he assumes the undertaking to perform the work in such manner as to satisfy the other, and invests the latter with full power to determine the reasona- bleness of the cause. We can not presume the contract would have been made without such a provision, or od any other terms. This was the con- struction placed upon the contract by the trial court, and we are of opin- ion it was correct." 1 Catlin v. Green, 120 N. Y. 441, 445 ; Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561; Wooster v. Sage, 67 N. Y. 67 ; John- ston v. Trask, 40 Hun, 415 ; 116 151 ■ Y. 136 ; Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 442. §§ 134, 135 CONDITIONS. 161 chased with the understanding that, if the customer does not want to hold them, the broker will take them off his hands at cost price, a delay on the part of the customer to exercise his option does not deprive him of his right to do so, where the broker encourages him to hold on to the bonds by predicting better prices. 1 § 134. Pleading. — It was a rule at common law that a plaintiff must aver the fulfillment of a condition precedent, and that the allegation must be particular and state in de- tail the manner of performance. 2 But now the New York code of procedure, and those codes which follow it, have a provision to the effect that, in pleading the performance of a condition precedent in a contract, it is not necessary to state the facts constituting performance; but the party may state generally that he, or the person whom he represents, duly performed all the conditions on his part. If that alle- gation is controverted, he must, on the trial, establish per- formance. 3 § 135. Conditional sales. — A sale of personal property on credit, with delivery of possession to the purchaser, under a dis- 1 Johnston v. Trask, 40 Hun, 415. performance of conditions as to truth 2 Chitty on Pleading (16th Am. ed.), of the representations therein; Craw- 329, and cases cited. ford v. Satterfield, 27 Ohio St. 421, ap- s New York Code of Civil Procedure, plicable to implied as well as express §533. See following cases in construe- conditions precedent; Rhoda v. Ala- tionof this provision: Smiths. Mohn, meda Co., 52Cal. 350; Himmelman «. 87 Cal. 489; Case v. Phcenix Bridge Danos, 35 Cal. 441, also holding that Co., 55 N. Y. Superior, 25; Les Sue- the provision applies to contracts only, cesseurs D' Aries v. Freedman, 53 N. Y. and that conditions prescribed by stat- Superior, 518; Porter v. Kingsbury, 5 ute are not included, which must be al- Hun, 597; Garvey v. Fowler, 4 Sand, leged with the particularity required 665; Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438; at common law; People v. Johnson, 24 Rowland v. Phalen, 1 Bosw. 43 ; Oak- Cal, 630; Dye v . Dye, 11 Cal. 167. ley v. Morton, 11 N. Y. 25 ; Graham v. The followingis an approved form un- Machado, 6 Duer, 514; Gay v. Paine, derthis code provision : "Theplain- 5 How. Pr. 107 ; Ferner v. Williams, 14 tiff did duly perform all and singular Abb. Pr. 215 ; Union Insurance Co. v. the conditions aforesaid on his part to McGookey, 33 Ohio St. 555, holding be performed.'' Crawford v. Satter- that a policy of insurance could be field, 27 Ohio St. 421, 423, 424. sued on without averring particularly 11 162 CONDITIONS. § 135 tinct agreement that the title shall not pass from seller to buyer until the price is paid, is valid. 1 And the buyer can not con- vey the title or subject it to execution for his own debts, until the condition on which the agreement to sell was made has been performed. 2 1 Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 IT. S. 287; Harkness v. Russell, 118 IT. S. 663; Page M.Edwards, 64 Vt. 124; 23 Atl. Rep. 917; Nichols v. Ashton, 155 Mass. 205 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 519 ; Hart v. Carpen- ter, 24 Conn. 427; Pinkham v. Apple- ton, 82 Me. 574 ; King v. Bates, 57 N.H. 446; Skelton v. Manchester, 12 R. I. 326; Bean v. Edge, 84 N. Y. 510; Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. Law, 308; Williams v. Connoway, 3 Houston (Del.), 63; Call v. Seymour, 40 Ohio St. 670; McGirr ». Sell, 60 Ind. 249; Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198; Marquette Co. v. Jefiery, 49 Mich. 283; Sumerti. Cottey, 71 Mo. 121 ; Piedmont Land Co. v. Thomson Co. (Ala.), 12 So. Rep. 768; Walsh u. Taylor, 39 Md. 592; this case justifies a trespass by the seller to obtain pos- session after breach of condition by buyer; Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188; Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. Car. 522; Johnston v. Eichelberger, 13 Fla. 230; Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Geo. 379; Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596, "a buyer must beware of purchasing from one who has not title. Possession isnottitle," per Campbell, J., 607 ; Christian v. Bunker, 38 Texas, 234; Vaughn v. Hopson, 10 Bush, 337; Bradshaw v. Thomas, 7 Yerg. 497. z Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 IT. S. 287; Harkness v. Russell, 118 IT. S. 663; Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. Law, 308, where all the cases are collected. See, also, Dresser, etc., Co. v. Wa- terston, 3 Mete. 9; Coggill v. Hart- ford, etc., Co., 3 Gray, 545; 15 Am. L. Rev. 380; Wadleigh v. Bucking- ham, 80 Wis. 230; Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133. And see cases in preceding note, nearly all of which arose from seller asserting rights against bona fide purchas- ers from buyer. Contra, Vaughn v. Hopson, 10 Bush, 337, overruling Patton v. McCane, 15 B. Mon. 555; Forrest v. Nelson, 108 Pa. St. 481; Van Duzor o. Allen, 90 111. 499. In Pennsylvania, a distinction is taken between delivery under a bailment, with an option in the bailee to pur- chase at a named price, and a deliv- ery under a contract of sale contain- ing a reservation of title in the ven- dor until the contract price is paid, it being held, that in the former in- stance, property does not pass as in favor of creditors and purchasers of the bailee, but that in the latter instance delivery to the vendee sub- jects the property to execution at the suit of his creditors and makes it trans- ferable to bona fide purchasers. Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. St. 431; Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. St. 190; Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499. "This distinction is discredited by the great weight of authority, which puts pos- session under a conditional contract of sale and possession under a bail- ment, on the same footing — liable to be assailed by creditors and purchas- ers for actual fraud, but not fraudu- lent per se," per Depue, J., in Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. Law, 308, 315. And as to how difficult it is in Pennsylvania to effect the same object as a condi- tional sale effects elsewhere, see For- rest v. Nelson, snpra, which inhibits the transaction from being done under the guise of a bailment. Where the mere possession of a conditional buyer is held to warrant a purchaser buying from him, and thereby getting a good §136 CONDITIONS. 163 § 136. Form of contract of conditional sale In order to determine whether a transaction is a conditional sale it is es- sential to ascertain the character of the agreement. To do this courts look to the purpose of the parties as evidenced by the agreement and its provisions, and by applying the law determine the real character of the transaction; the construction of the transaction is a question of law for the court. And its con- struction and the terms and essence of the contract are the test of its nature, no matter what its f ramers may denominate it. 1 title, this certainly clothes possession with the attributes of ownership, a very dangerous doctrine. 1 By the term "conditional sale," as herein used, is meant a sale wherein the seller reserves title in himself until the price is paid, possession in the meanwhile being in the buyer. Nichols v. Ashton, 155 Mass. 205 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 519, a case in which the trans- action or written contract recited that the purchaser had borrowed and re- ceived certain goods which he could purchase by paying a certain sum in installments, but that no partial pay- ment would entitle the purchaser to keep the goods after demand by seller for default in payment. There was a mortgage back to the seller by the buyer. It was held a conditional sale. "It is impossible by construction of such a contract to turn the transaction between the parties into a sale pass- ing the title to S. and a mortgage or pledge back by him." Per Holmes, J. Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207; Hervey v. Rhode Island L. Works, 93 U. S. 664 ; Page u. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124; 23 Atl. Rep. 917; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 ; Buzzell v. Cum- mings, 61 Vt. 213 ; Wadleigh v. Buck- ingham, 80 Wis. 230, held to be a con- ditional sale although there was a provision that the chattels should be at risk of buyer. That is, if lost or destroyed the buyer bore the loss. Sanders v. Wilson, 19 D. 0. 555, the contract recited that the buyer had rented a piano and had agreed to pay as rent certain sums until the price was paid and then the piano was to be buyer's. Held, a conditional sale. Compare Bridget v. Cornish, 1 Mack- ey, 29; Cannons. McMichael, 6Mack- ey, 225 ; Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. St. 233, where machinery was deliv- ered under a contract termed a "lease," the lessee promising to pay a certain sum in installments, "as hire in ad- vance for the use of said machinery," and when the whole sum was paid and $1 additional, the machinery became the buyer's. Held, a conditional sale. "It lacked the essential feature of a bailment, viz., a stipulation for a re- turn of the property at the end of the term. * * * * It is of the essence of a contract of bailment that the article bailed be returned, in its own or some altered form, to the bailor, so that he may have his own again," per curiam, 240 ; Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. St. 219; Stadteld v. Hunts- man, 92 Pa. St. 53 ; Davis v. Giddings, 30 Neb. 209; Gross v. Jordan, 83 Maine, 380; Collins v. Houston, 138 Pa. St. 481 ; Dearborn v. Raysor, 132 Pa. St. 231 ; Summerson v. Hicks, 134 Pa. St. 566; Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga. 741 ; Shoshonetz v. Campbell, 7 Utah, 46 ; 24 Pac. Rep. 672 ; Aultman v. Olsen, 43 Minn. 409 ; Fleury v. Tufts, 25 111. App. 101 ; Pate v. Oliver, 104 N. C. 458 ; McComb v. Donald, 82 Va. 903. In all the above cases the parties sought to disguise the real transaction 164 conditions. §§ 137, 138 § 137. Transfer of rights under conditional sale. — The seller in a conditional sale may transfer his rights to a third per- son. 1 If notes have been taken for the price upon rescission of the sale the seller must return them to the buyer. 2 And the seller is bound to account for the notes he may have taken so as to save the buyer harmless, before he can recover the goods or the price for which he sold them. If he has negotiated the notes his rights are entirely transferred to the holder. 3 Where an agent of a company dealing in pianos sold an instrument under a written contract of conditional sale, and transferred this contract to the company, but also took from the purchaser negotiable notes which recited that they were secured by the piano for the price, which he transferred to a bona fide pur- chaser for value, it was held that the holder of the notes was entitled to enforce their payment out of the piano, in preference to the piano company, the assignee of the non-negotiable con- tract. 4 And where a note is taken for the price of the goods, if the buyer and seller agree that the goods may be disposed of or traded for others which shall stand in their place as security for payment, this transaction is valid, even against a third person, who in good faith purchased from the buyer. 5 § 138. Rights of the parties on default. — Upon default in payment of any of the installments the seller may resume pos- session. 6 And it is not necessary that there be an express pro- by calling it "bailment," "borrow- Heinbookle v. Zugbaum, 5 Mont. 344; ing," "lease," and in some instances Benjamin on Sales, § 730. there was an express recital that it " Kimball v. Mellon, 80 "Wis. 133. was not to be construed a conditional 6 Perry v. Young, 105 N . C. 463, where sale. Nevertheless in all cases it was a mule was sold, the parties agreeing pronounced a conditional sale. to trade it for a horse, the horse to 1 Kimball v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133; take the place of the mule as to secu- Norton v. Pilger, 30 Neb. 860 ; 47 N.W. rity. It was held that the seller could Rep. 471 ; San Antonio Brewing Co. enforce payment of the note against v. Arctic Ice Co., 81 Texas, 99; 16 S. the horse, although the buyer had sold W Rep. 797. him to an innocent purchaser. Ded- 2 Sumer v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139; man v. Earle, 52 Ark. 164. Heinbockle v. Zugbaum, 5 Mont. 344; 6 Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476; 51 Am. Rep. 59; Benjamin on Sales, Snook v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251 ; 15 S. E. § 730. Rep. 364 ; Campbell Printing Press Co. " Kimball v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133 ; v. Henkle, 19 D. C. 95 ; Nattin v. Riley, 54 Ark. 30; Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 §139 CONDITIONS. 165 vision authorizing the vendor to retake possession. In every conditional sale this right is implied. 1 Accordingly when the seller resumes possession this operates as a rescission of the sale. 8 But the seller has the option either to retake possession or to bring an action for the price. 8 And when the seller elects to sue, the buyer can not offer to rescind and tender back the goods. 4 § 139. Bights of buyer. — In the absence of a statute provi- sion to the contrary, a buyer loses absolutely all installments paid when the sale is rescinded on account of his default. 6 B ut a stipulation in a contract for the sale of goods, payable in installments, that if default be made in any of the pay- ments, the vendor may retake them, and all payments to be forfeited, will not be enforced in equity. 6 And in some states there are statutes providing for an adjustment of the amount of money the seller is to return upon rescission. 7 And if the Mich. 185 ; Seymour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292; Benjamin on Sales (Ben- nett's ed.), § 425, and authorities cited. 'Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476; Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185; Adams v. Wood, 51 Mich. 411 ; Ed- wards v. Symonds, 65 Mich. 348. 2 Hineman v. Matthews, 138 Pa. St. 204; Blanchard v. Cooke, 147 Mass. 215 ; 17 N. E. Bep. 313 ; Summerson v. Hicks, 134 Pa. St. 5R6; 19 Atl. Rep. 808; Wyckoff v. Summerson (Pa. St.), 19 Atl. Rep. 809; Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450; Hine v. Roberts, 48 Conn. 267; Cade v. Jenkins, 88 Ga. 791 ; 15 S. E. Rep. 292; Snook v. Rag- lan, 89 Ga. 251 ; 15 S. E. Rep. 364. 3 Monroe u. Williams, 37 S. C. (1892) 81; Appleton v. Norwalk, 53 Conn. 4; Bensinger Co. v. Cain (Texas App.), 18 S. W. Rep. 136; Cade v. Jenkins, 88 Ga. 791 ; 15 S. E. Rep. 292 ; Wing U.Thompson, 78 Wis. 256; 47 N. W. Rep. 606; Dederick v. Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500; 9 So. Rep. 350. 4 Appleton ». Norwalk, etc., Corp., 53 Conn. 4; Bensinger Co. v. Cain (Texas App.), 18 S. W. Rep. 136. 5 Fleck v. Warner, 25 Kan. 492 ; Singer Co. v. Treadway, 4 Bradw. (111.) 57; Latham v. Sumner, 89 111. 233; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Maine, 578;. Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Greenl. 454; Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356; Chamberlain v. Shaw, 18 Pick. 278; Fowler v. Gilman, 13 Mete. 267; Hyde v. Cookson, 21 Barb. 92; Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172; Heinbockle v. Zugbaum, 5 Mont. 344; Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Conn. 228 ; Knittel v. Cush- ing, 57 Texas, 354. 6 Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 Md. 299 ; 11 Atl. Rep. 848. 7 Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450. A statute of Ohio making it unlawful to retake possession without tendering back the sum paid by him, after "de- ducting therefrom a reasonable sum for the use of the property," is not in- valid on the ground that the amount of such compensation is uncertain, and no method is provided by the act for determining the same. Some courts, in the absence of such a stat- ute, compel an equitable refunding of the payments received. See Simon v. 166 CONDITIONS. § 140 seller has rescinded the sale and taken possession, he can not recover any balance due on the purchase price. 1 § 140. Waiyer of forfeiture and title. — A forfeiture for non- payment may be waived by the seller. If after an installment has become due and remains unpaid, the vendee is still per- mitted to retain possession, and the vendor receives part pay- ment, this is an assent to delay, and a waiver of any forfeit- ure, and a recognition of the right of the vendee to acquire title by payment of the residue of the price, which right con- tinues until a request by the vendor for such payment, and a refusal of the vendee. 2 The law does not favor forfeiture for non-payment of an installment. And to authorize or sustain such a claim of forfeiture, it must be specially provided for by the contract. 3 But a waiver of one or more forfeitures is not a circumstance tending to show a waiver of subsequent de- faults, and is not relevant evidence therefor.' The taking of negotiable notes in payment of the price is no waiver by seller of his title. 5 Where property was conditionally sold and mort- gaged by the buyer, it was held that there was no waiver of title by seller, although he advised the mortgagees to take the mortgage, stating at the time that he had a claim thereon which he would not waive. 6 To constitute a waiver of title, there must be not only an act of delivery, but an intent not to insist on immediate payment as a condition of the title pass- ing. Thus where the seller loaded wheat on cars designated by the buyer and noted in the bill that it was to be put "free on board," this did not estop the seller from reclaiming the Edmundson, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 315; Jamison, 33 Mich. 94, "The ven- Snook v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251 ; 15 S. E. dor may waive his right to a for- Rep. 364; Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich, feiture for prior neglect to pay, by 476; Bennett's note d to §320, 4th seeking afterwards to collect the bal- Am. ed. Benjamin on Sales. ance due," head note. Johnston v. Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 463; Giddey v. Henkle, 19 D. C. 95. Altman, 27 Mich. 206; Preston v. 2 O'Rourke v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260. 541; Hatchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. s Hill v. Townsend, 69 Ala. 286. 155; Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 Pick. ' Hill v. Townsend, 69 Ala. 286. 535; Lawrence v. Dale, 3 John. Ch. 5 Benjamin on Sales, § 730. 23; Lupin v. Marie, 6 Wend. 77; « Ames Iron Works i. Richardson, Smith v. Lynes, 5 N. Y. 41; Hill v. 55 Ark. 642; 18 S. W. Rep. 381- Townsend, 69 Ala. 286; Deyoe v. §141 CONDITIONS. 167 property from a bona fide purchaser from buyer, although he relied on the recital "free on board" in the bill. 1 § 141. Destruction of the property. — Where there is a con- ditional sale the accidental destruction of the propprty by fire or otherwise does not relieve the buyer of the necessity to pay the purchase price. 8 But the parties may by express agree- ment determine upon whom the loss shall fall in case of the destruction of the chattels. 3 1 Globe Milling Co. v. Minneapolis Elevator Co., 44 Minn. 153. Compare Pond Machine Co. v. Robinson, 38 Minn. 272. The first case cited is in- teresting as an attempt was made to convert by a local custom a condi- tional sale into an absolute one. "But a local usage can not be proved to contradict a contract. If by the contract for the sale of the wheat, it was for cash on delivery, the usage could not make it a sale on credit," per Gilfillan, C. J., 158. Compare Paine v. Smith, 33 Minn. 495 ; Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383 ; Blackett v. Royal Exchange Co., 2 Cromp. & J. 244; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136; Osborne v. Nelson Lumber Co., 33 Minn. 285; Thomp- son v. Ashton, 14 Johns. 316; Dick- inson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 29; Dodd v. I'arlow, 11 Allen, 426 ; Frith v. Bark- er, 2 John. 327. 2 Tufts v. Wynne, 45 Mo. App. 42; Taitsv. Griffen, 107 N. C. 47 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 68; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48. Compare, Snyder v. Murdock, 51 Mo. 175; Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 569; Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288; Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134; Vincent v. Cornell, 13 Pick. 294 ; New- hall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. 445; Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. 355. Contra, Randle v. Stone, 77 Geo. 501. "Wadleigh v. Buckingham, 80 Wis. 230; Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48. The reason that the buyer is held to pay the price, although the chattels are destroyed, is because he has made an absolute promise to pay it. "B. unconditionally and absolutely prom- ised to pay a certain sum for the property the possession of which he received from T. The fact that the property has been destroyed while in his custody, and before the time for the payment of the note last due, on payment of which only his right to the legal title of the property would have accrued, does not relieve him of payment of the price agreed on. He got exactly what he contracted for, viz., the possession of the property and the right to acquire an absolute title by payment of the agreed price. The transaction was something more than an executory conditional sale. The seller had done all that he was to do except to receive the pur- chase price; the purchaser had re- ceived all that he was to receive as the consideration of his promise to pay. The inquiry is not whether if he had foreseen the contingency which has occurred he would have provided against it, nor whether he might have made a more prudent contract, but it is, whether, by the contract he has made, his promise is absolute or con- ditional. The contract made was a lawful one, and, as we have said, im- posed upon the buyer an absolute ob- ligation to pay. To relieve him from this obligation the court must make a new agreement for the parties, instead of enforcing the one made, which it 168 CONDITIONS. § 142 § 142. Recording. — Where statutes exist making it necessary to record conditional sales, in the absence of express words to the contrary, these statutes are construed for the benefit of bona fide purchasers and mortgagees, and a failure to record does not invalidate the sale between the parties or effect in any manner the seller's remedies against the buyer. 1 And these statutes are construed strictly. Thus where the statute de- clared a conditional sale invalid for want of registration as against "subsequent purchasers and mortagees," it was held that it did not apply in case of a pledge, and that the seller under an unrecorded conditional sale might regain possession from the buyer's pledgee. 2 The statute making an unrecorded conditional sale void as against bona fide purchasers and cred- itors applies to creditors before the sale as well as after, and a creditor of the buyer may levy on the chattels although his debt was contracted before the sale. 3 And the goods are liable to a creditor's claim, although he knew and had actual knowl- edge that the sale was a conditional one.* The statute must be strictly complied with. Thus where the statute directs that the contract of sale shall be "subscribed by the parties," it is not complied with when only one party — the buyer — signs. 5 But when the seller brings suit to foreclose his lien on the chattels, this is notice sufficient, and a failure to comply with the regis- can not do," per Cooper, J., 51 ; Tufts Rep. 463 ; Mershon v. Moore, 76 "Wis. v. "Wynne, 45 Mo. App. 42; see the 502; Wing D.Thompson, 78 "Wis. 256; ingenious argument of defendant's 47 N. W. Rep. 606; Kimball v. Mel- counsel in this case, trying to place Ion, 80 "Wis. 133 ; 48 rf . "W. Rep. 1100. the loss upon the party who had title 2 Canton Dental Co. v. "Webb, 16 N. at the time ; Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. Y. Supl. 932. 47 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 68 ; Gould v. Murch, 3 Collins v. "Wilhoit, 108 Mo. 451 ; 18 70 Maine, 288 ; Thompson i>. Gould, 20 S. W. Rep. 839, overruling Coover v. Pick. 134. Johnson, 86 Mo. 533. 1 Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 4 Collins v. Wilhoit, 108 Mo. 451; 18 188 ; San Antonio Brewing Associa- S. "W. Rep. 839. Contra, Batchelder v. tion v. Arctic Ice Co., 81 Tex. 99; 16 Sanborn (N. H.), 22 Atl. Rep. 535; S. "W. Rep. 797; Hineman B.Mat- Morton v. Frick, 87 Ga. 230; 13 S. E. thews, 138 Pa. St. 204; Mann v. Rep. 463. Thompson, 86 Ga. 347 ; Norton v. Pil- 5 Kimball v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133 ; 48 ger, 30 Neb. 860; 47 N. "W. Rep. 471; N. W Rep. 1100; Sheldon v. Mayers, Morten v. Frick, 87 Ga. 230; 13 S. E. 81 "Wis. 627; 51 N. "W. Rep. 1082. $ 143 CONDITIONS. 169 try laws can not thereafter be taken advantage of by purchas- ers or creditors of the buyer. 1 § 143. Miscellaneous matters. — Where the contract provides for the payment of counsel fees, there must be a demand before suit, and a failure to make demand for payment or return of the goods will render null the agreement as to fees. 8 Stat- utes regulating conditional sales, their registry and the amount of money to be refunded by seller upon retaking goods, are to be construed as applying to sales made after their passage. They usually are not retroactive. 8 There are in some states penal statutes, punishing the buyer who sells goods without the seller's consent. Where they exist it is not incumbent upon the seller to keep espionage over the buyer and see he does not sell. Even the failure to comply with the registry laws does not serve as an excuse to violate the penal statute. 4 And the fact that the buyer is actuated by good faith and ignorant of the law is no defense. 5 If the buyer wants to prevent a forfeiture on the ground that he tendered the price, he must keep his tender good and be ready to pay all the time. 6 There is one exception to the general rule that chattels may be conditionally sold. Where a manufacturer and wholesale ven- dor of articles of personal property sells upon credit, and de- livers a lot of such articles to a retail dealer therein, for the apparent or applied purpose of resale by such vendee, the doc- trine of conditional sales does not apply or govern such a sale, in a controversy as to such articles between the original seller and the purchasers thereof from the original buyer. This transaction can not be made the subject of a conditional sale, because the purposes for which the possession of the property is delivered to the buyer are inconsistent with the continued ownership by the seller, and for this reason the condition upon which the sale and delivery are made is fraudulent as against 1 San Antonio Brewing Co. v. Arc- E. Rep. 653; Weilu. State, 46 Ohio St. tic Ice Co., 81 Texas, 99; 16 S. W. 450. Rep. 797. 5 Chambers v. State, 85 Ga. 220 ; 11 2 Wall ». Johnson, 88 Ga. 524. S. E. Rep. 653. 3 Harrell v. Godwin, 102 N. C. 330. 6 Summerson v. Hicks, 134 Pa. St. 1 Chambers v. State, 85 Ga. 220 ; 11 S. 566 ; 19 Atl. Rep. 808. 170 CONDITIONS. §144 buyers. 1 But it is competent for the parties as between them- selves to make a conditional sale of goods to be retailed. Thus a contract by which a brewing company agrees to ship to a firm all beer ordered by them at an agreed price per barrel, the title to remain in the company until the beer is sold, is valid as to creditors of the firm. 2 § 144. Condition subsequent in deed — Subsequent defeasance. — To create a condition subsequent in a deed, the intention of the parties to the deed must be clearly expressed in some words importing that the estate is to depend upon a contingency provided for. 3 The condition subsequent as expressed in a deed conveying an estate in fee-simple being the payment of a certain annuity by the grantee to the grantor on a given day in each year during the life of the grantor, the condition was not broken so long as the annuity was not in arrears, and until the condition was broken the grantor had no right to re-enter as for a forfeiture, and no cause of action to cancel the deed as a cloud upon his title. 4 When land is conveyed in payment of 1 Winchester Co. v. Carman, 109 Ind. 31; Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650; Griswoldw. Sheldon, 4N.Y. 581 Fitzgerald v. Fuller, 19 Hun, 180 Leigh v. Mobile R. Co., 58 Ala. 165 Benjamin on Sales, § 319. Contra, Lewis v. McCabe,49Conn. 141 ; Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Maine, 222; Arm- ington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448; Bur- bank v. Crooker, 7 Gray, 158 ; Sargent v. Metcalf, 5 Gray, 306. In Arming- ton v. Houston, supra, the court say : "There is also a material distinction between a general and unrestricted power to sell or dispose of property and a limited privilege to consume it, such as is claimed to have been confer- red on the vendee in this case." Com- pare, Ezzarda. Frjck, 76 Ga. 512. 2 Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198. Compare, Rawson Co. v. Richards, 69 Wis. 643. See the fol- lowing articles on conditional sales : 10 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 233, 314, 620; 12 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 446, 700. "Conditional Sales,'' by Judge A. H. Henn in 24 American Law Review, 64. 3 Baker v. Mott (1894), 78 Hun (N. Y.), 141. In Lyon v. Hersey, 103 N. Y. 264, 270, Ruger, C. J., said: "In the construction of all contracts under which forfeitures are claimed it is the duty of the court to interpret them strictly in order to avoid such a result, for a forfeiture is not favored in the law. Duryea v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 592; Lorillard v. Silver, 36 N. Y. 578; while no particular form of words is necessary to create a limitation or condition, it is yet essential that the intention to create them shall be clearly expressed in some words im- porting ex vi termini that the vesting or continuance of the estate or interest is to depend upon a contingency pro- vided for. Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315." 4 Denham v. Walker (1893), 93 Ga. 497. § 145 CONDITIONS. 171 a debt by deed absolute and without any agreement for a defeas- ance, a subsequent agreement executed by the grantee, stipu- lating that if he sells the land he will give the grantor the refusal to purchase or to find a purchaser upon the same terms offered to others, or if he sells a portion and realizes enough to pay the debt he will reconvey the property to the grantor, does not convert the fee into a defeasible estate. 1 While in such a case the subsequent agreement may not be read with the conveyance for the purpose of establishing the latter as a mort- gage, yet where the two instruments were executed in pursu- ance of the original agreement and so constitute a part of the same transaction, they may be so read together, although they were not reduced to writing at the same time and do not bear even date. 2 § 145. Surety's bond signed under condition. — Where one signs, as surety, a bond, which in form is a joint obligation, upon condition that others are to sign the same with him, and it is delivered without the condition having been complied with, the instrument is invalid as to the one so signing as surety, unless the obligee, prior to the delivery, had no notice of such condition, or the surety, after signing, waived the condition. 3 It is equally well settled that, when such a bond is delivered to the obligee without being signed by all the per- sons named in the body thereof as obligors, it is sufficient to put the obligee upon inquiry whether those who signed con- sented to its being delivered without the signatures of the others, and to charge the obligee with notice, if such be the fact, that the person signing did so upon the condition that the others named should also sign. 4 1 Pond v. Harwood (1893), 139 N.Y. tion. Cutlers. Eoberts, 7 Neb. 4; 1X1. Sharps. United States, 4 Watts, 21; 8 Kraemeru. Adelsberger, 122 N.Y. Fletcher v. Austin, 11 Vt. 447; Hall 467. v. Parker, 37 Mich. 590; Lovett v. a Mullen v. Morris, 43 Neb. 696; 62 Adams, 3 Wend. 380; State v. Pep- N. W. Eep.74, perNorval, C. J.: "The per, 31 Ind. 76; People v. Bostwick, bond can not be enforced against the 32 N. Y. 445." one so signing as surety, unless the l Cutler v. Roberts, 7 Neb. 4; State obligee had no notice of the condi- Bank v. Evans, 15 N. J. Law, 155 tion, or it be established that the sure- Sharp v. United States, 4 Watts, 21 ty, after signing, waived the condi- Clements v. Cassilly, 4 La. Ann. 380 172 CONDITIONS. § 146 § 146. Refunding dues to withdrawing members. — The arti- cles of association of a mutual building and loan association, organized under the New York act of 1851, relating to such associations, constitute a contract between it and its members, and a member of such an association is subject not only to regulations existing when he became a member, but to such as may be enacted from time to time by the association, within the scope of the power given it by statute, including the power to enact at any time reasonable by-laws. While under such a power such an association can not destroy a contract created between it and its members by the articles of association, to refund his dues to a withdrawing member, it may enact a by- law more or less affecting the remedy of the member, and ex- isting members will be bound thereby, so far, at least, as they consented to the exercise of such a power when they became members. Thus where the articles provided that a withdraw- ing member should be repaid his dues when the necessary funds were collected, and the original by-laws empowered the directors to make at any time by-laws which did not interfere with the articles of association, and declared that when enacted "they are equally binding upon all stockholders, as by them subscribed," it was held that a subsequent by-law, to the effect that withdrawing members should be paid in the order of the presentation of their applications, was a reasonable regulation and binding upon all members alike, including those who had City of Sacramento v. Dunlap, 14 Cal. and it is for the defendants to estab- 421; People v. Hartley,' 21 Cal. 585; lish that they signed on the express Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. 24; Bean condition that they were not bound v. Parker, 17 Mass. 591. Is there any until all the obligors named in the in- presumption that such a bond is in- strument should sign: Dillon v. An- complete and unfinished until exe- derson, 43 N. Y. 231 ; Parker v. Brad- cuted by all the parties whose names ley, 2 Hill, 584 ; Haskins v. Lombard, appear in it as obligors? Upon this 16 Maine, 140; Cutter v. Whittemore, point the authorities are not harmo- 10 Mass. 442; Johnson v. Weather- nious. The following cases hold that wax, 9 Kan. 75; Johnson v. Baker, 4 no presumption arises that such a Barn. & Aid. 440. Some of the author- bond was not considered as binding ities which hold that the presumption until the signatures of all the obligors is that such instrument was not to be named in the body have been ob- delivered until all had signed are tained, but, on the contrary, its exe- Sharp v. United States, 4 Watts, 21 ; cution is deemed prima facie complete, Clements v. Cassilly, 4 La. Ann. 380. §146 CONDITIONS. 173 become members before its adoption. 1 And in England, where a depositor in a building society gave notice of withdrawal and 1 Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward, etc., Loan Association (1896), 148 N. Y. 281 ; 42 N. E. Rep. 710, per Andrews, C. J.: "It seems to be very plain that the clause in the articles of association, that the dues paid by withdrawing members 'will be re- funded to them when the necessary funds are collected,' operated as a qualification of the liability of the as- sociation to. withdrawing members. It was essential to the practical work- ing of the scheme and purpose of the organization. The association, if the plan was followed, could have no as- sets of any considerable amount avail- able for immediate repayment of dues paid in by withdrawing members. It was not a moneyed corporation, in any proper sense, and would not, in the ordinary course of its business, have assets readily convertible -into money. Its assets would be repre- sented in the main by loans to mem- bers on mortgages payable in small weekly payments. If no restriction existed preventing withdrawing mem- bers from immediately maintaining actions to recover their dues and en- forcing judgments obtained, it is evi- dent that this and similar associations would have a precarious existence. They would be in peril at almost any moment to have their operations ar- rested, and to be thrown into a receiv- ership, by the conjoint action of a few withdrawing members. The ben- eficial purpose of the statute for the encouragement of small savings would be frustrated, and the assets of the as- sociation subjected to costs and ex- penses which would seriously impair the general fund contributed by the members. The articles of association, which showed the scheme of the or- ganization, and defined the obligation of the association and the rights of members, are binding upon each member thereof. They establish the relation between the association and the stockholders, and constitute a contract between them. The asso- ciation only bound itself to return the dues owing to a withdrawing member 'when the necessary funds are collected.' The plaintiff knew the probable resources of the association when he became a member, and, by subscribing the articles, consented that the payment by members should be invested in mortgages payable in small weekly payments. He does not stand in the position of a general out- side creditor. He paid his dues, and, although, by withdrawing, he has ceased to be a member of the associa- tion, his right to receive them back is measured by the contract between him and the association. There can be no doubt, we think, that the con- dition that the association should re- fund 'when the necessary funds are collected' was a material and sub- stantive part of the obligation as- sumed by the association, and that it constitutes a good answer to the suit of a withdrawing member that, nei- ther at the time that he withdrew, nor subsequently, before the action was brought, were there in the treasury of the association any funds collected, out of which the claim could be paid. We, of course, eliminate any element of bad faith, for this is not claimed. Nor is it the case of an association which has discontinued its business or become insolvent. We need not con- sider what effect these or other facts might have upon the legal remedies of a withdrawing stockholder. There is another question raised, respecting the right of the association to estab- lish a by-law that withdrawing mem- bers should be paid in the order in 174 CONDITIONS. § 146 brought action to recover his deposit, it was held that the in- sufficiency of the available balance to pay the depositors who which their applications were filed with the association. Such a by-law was enacted in the fall of 1891, after the plaintiff had purchased his stock, but, so far as appears, before any member had withdrawn, or any with- drawals were in contemplation. It is claimed, in behalf of the plaintiff, that his rights could not be prejudiced by the enactment of such a rule of preference after he had become a member. * * * * The member of :;n association accepts membership with notice of the statutory powers conferred upon it. He is subject, not only to regulations existing when he becomes a member, but to such as may be enacted from time to time by the association within the scope of the power given by the statute. It may be admitted that the associa- tion could not, under this power, de- stroy the contract between it and the member. But the contract made was in law subject to this power of the as- sociation to enact at any time reason- able by-laws. It would not be reason- able to extend the power so as to au- thorize the association, by a subse- quent by-law, to change the essential character of an antecedent agreement between a member and the associa- tion ; as, for example, that a with- drawing member should not be repaid his dues. But a by-law more or less affecting the remedy of the share- holder may be passed, and existing members will be bound, so far, at least, as they consented to the exer- cise of such a power when they be- came members. The recent English cases of "Wilson v. Miles, etc., Society, 22 Q. B. Div. 381, note; Rosenberg v. Northumberland, etc., Society, 22 Q. B. Div. 373; and Bradbury v. Wild (1893), L. R. 1 Ch. 377— are quite full upon this point. We think the by- law enacted in the present case, that withdrawing members should be paid in the order of the presentation fo their application, was a reasonable regulation, and bound the plaintiff, although enacted after he became a member. There is nothing in the ar- ticles of association forbidding, di- rectly or by implication, the enacts ment of such a by-law. It gave no preference to any named .stockholder over others. The plaintiff was at lib- erty at any time to withdraw, and make his application for repayment, but he saw fit to defer doing so until af- ter many others had preceded him. The association, by enacting the rule, did not deny the plaintiff's right to be paid out of collections, but, for con- venience, enacted a rule that those who first applied should be first paid ; and this, we think, it was competent for the association to do, and that when enacted the rule was binding upon all members alike. The by-laws originally enacted empowered the board of directors to make 'at any time' by-laws which do not interfere with the 'articles of association,' and further declared that, when enacted, 'they are equally binding upon all stockholders, as by them subscribed.' The by-law in question was not an in- terference with the articles of associa- tion. The authorities upon the ques- tion herein considered are not alto- gether harmonious. The case of United States Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Silverman, 85 Pa. St. 394, may be said to be adverse to the view that the plaintiff could not maintain an action until there were funds col- lected applicable to the payment of his claim. On the other hand, the cases of Brett v. Monarch Society (1894), L. R. 1 Q. B. 367; Barnard v. Tomson (1894), L. R. 1 Ch. 374; § 146 CONDITIONS. 175 had given prior notice to withdraw was an answer to the action, as the rules of the society provided in such a case that the withdrawing depositors should be paid in rotation accord- ing to the priority of their notices. 1 The Pennsylvania Build- ing Association act of 1859 provided that at no time should more than one-half of the funds in the treasury of the corpora- tion be applied to the demands of withdrawing stockholders. In an action by a stockholder who had given the required notice of his withdrawal to recover the money he had put in, it was held that he was not estopped by the statutory proviso from legal process for the recovery of his money until the treasury has sufficient funds to meet his claim, and also that the association's affidavit of defense was insufficient since it did not aver that its losses and debts in excess of fifty per cent, of its funds were incurred before plaintiff's withdrawal. 2 Heinbokel v. National, etc., Associa- winding up, to be paid according to the tion, 58 Minn. 340 ; 59 N. W. Eep. priority of the dates of their notices. 1050; and Texas, etc., Association v. An instrument of dissolution under Kerr (Texas Sup.), 13 S. W. Rep. the provisions of the English Building 1020, tend to support the opposite con- Societies act is not equivalent in its elusion, and rest, we think, upon the operation to a winding up order made better reason." by the court, and upon such an instru- 1 Brett v. Monarch, etc., Bldg. Soc'y ment taking effect advanced members (1894), L. R. 1 Q. B. 367. And in who have accounted in accordance Barnard v. Tomson (1894) , L. R 1 Ch. with the rules to pay up their advances 374, it was held that where the notices by installments can not be compelled of withdrawing members have ma- to pay up forthwith the balances due tured before the date of the deed of from them on their securities. Kemp dissolution, entered into pursuant to v. Wright, L. R. (1894), 2 Ch. 462, 21. the act of 1894, the withdrawing mem- 2 United States Bldg., etc., Assn. v. bers are entitled, notwithstanding the Silverman, 85 Pa, St, 394, CHAPTER V. CONSI D BKATION. §147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. Consideration denned. § 175. Sealed instruments. 176. Contracts in restraint of trade. Statutory abolition of seals. 177. The same subject continued. 178. Executed and executory con- 179. siderations. Moral obligation. 180. The same subject continued — Exceptions. 181. Benefits received — Considera- 182. tion accepted involuntarily. 183. Power to return the benefit. 184. Existing legal obligation as a 185. consideration. 186. The same subject continued. Promise to new party. 187. Past consideration. Consideration moved by previ- 188. ous request. Statute of limitations. 189. The same subject continued. Doing what another is bound 190. to do. 191. Where party is already bound. 192. The same subject continued. 193. Forbearance. 194. Extension of time. 195. Further illustrations. Forbearance to sue — Time. 196. Extension — Paying interest 197. — Surety's consent. 198. The same subject continued. 199. Nudum pactum — Promise of in- dulgence. Disputed and doubtful claims. 200. (176) ' Further illustrations. Forbearance — When the right or claim is doubtful. Dismissing a suit. Mutual promises. The same subject continued — College endowment bond. Past consideration — F u t u r e services. Marriage. Illustrations. Representations. Conveyances. Promise of third person. Illustrations of third person's promise. Marriage as the consideration of dower. Naming child as a considera- tion. Change of name as a consider- ation. Adequacy of consideration. Illustrations. Further illustrations. Inadequacy in equity. The same subject continued. Consideration moving from plaintiff. Further illustrations. The English rule. Exceptions to the English rule. Limitations upon the Ameri- can rule allowing third party to sue. Limitations. §147 CONSIDERATION. 177 i 201 . Illegality — Rescission. 202. Rescission not to affect rights attached. 203. Delivery essential to gift— Vol- untary trust distinguished. 204. Gift of savings bank deposit. 205. Gratuitous subscriptions. 206. The present doctrine. 207. Revocation by death — As a gen- eral rule. 208. Subscriptions to capital stock — Before incorporation. § 209. After incorporation. 210. The consideration for such a subscription. 211. Sufficient consideration illus- trated. 212. The same subject continued. 213. The same subject continued. 214. Insufficient consideration illus- trated — Common carrier. 215. When grantee is to sell for grantor — The trust as consid- eration. § 147. Consideration defined. — Consideration is a necessary element in the creation of a contract. A gratuitous promise is void unless made by deed. And except when made by deed, a promise, whether witnessed by a writing, or resting wholly in parol, must be founded on a sufficient consideration, either of benefit to the one party or of detriment to the other, or of both combined. 1 The "consideration" of a contract is the quid pro quo, that which the party to whom a promise is made does or agrees to do in exchange for the promise." The "motive" for entering into a contract and the "consideration" of the con- tract are not the same. Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties. It is the price voluntarily paid for a promisor's undertaking. Expectation of results 1 Drake v. Lanning, 49 N. J. Eq. 452; 24 Atl. Rep. 378; Rann v. Hughes, 7T. R. 346, n. ; Pillansa. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663. 2 Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 197, per Gray, J. : "The expression at the beginning of the policy, that the insurance is made 'in consideration of the representations made in the application of this policy,' and of certain sums paid and to be paid for premiums, does not make those representations part of the con- 12 sideration, in the technical sense, or render it necessary or proper to plead them as such. * * * * In a con- tract of insurance, the promise of the insurer is to pay a certain amount of money upon certain conditions ; and the consideration on the part of the assured is his payment of the whole premium at the inception of the con- tract, or his payment of part then and his agreement to pay the rest at cer- tain periods while it continues in force." 178 CONSIDERATION. § 148 will not constitute a consideration. 1 Considerations are either good or valuable. A "valuable consideration" consists either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some extension of time of payment, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. 2 A "good consideration" is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when a man grants an estate to a near rela- tion, being founded on motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty. 3 A "good consideration" imports merely the mo- tive of natural affection toward relations, and excludes the ele- ment of compensation or equivalent for the promise which is essential to constitute a legal consideration. But the fact that natural affection forms an element of the consideration does not impair the force of a contract. 4 A promise supported by a good consideration only is void, and a deed made on good consideration is a voluntary one, which is valid only between the parties, and is not aided in equity; but is void as to cred- itors and purchasers for value. 6 § 148. Sealed instruments. — Want of consideration is not a sufficient answer to an action on a sealed instrument. The seal imports a consideration, or renders proof of consideration un- necessary, because the instrument binds the parties by force of the natural and conclusive presumption that an instrument 'Philpot v. Gruninger, 14 Wall, tains Chief Justice Marshall's cele- 570; Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 153; brated definition of a contract. Ilendrick v. Lindsay, 93 IT. S. 143, Railroad Co. c. National Bank, 102 where Davis, J., said: "Any damage U. S. 14, 4G. or suspension of a right, or possibility 2 Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 of a loss occasioned to the plaintiff by 0". S. 14, 46, per Clifford, J. the promise of another, is a sufficient 3 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 297. consideration for such promise, and 4 Puterbaugh r . Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. will make it binding, although no ac- 2SS. The only purpose for which a tual benefit accrues to the party prom- good consideration is effectual is to ising." See the following cases where support a covenant to stand seized to consideration is defined : CottageStreet uses. Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528 Piatt v. United States, 22 Wall. 496 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 Terrill v. Auchauer, 14 Ohio St. 85 Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142, con 393. 6 Leake on Contracts, 615 ; Pulver- toft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 84; Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 100. §149 CONSIDERATION. 179 executed with so much deliberation and solemnity is founded upon some sufficient consideration. 1 § 149. Contracts in restraint of trade. — It thus becomes possible by means of a deed under seal to make a voluntary promise, that is, one that is gratuitous or without any consid- eration, in a manner which shall be binding on the promisor, although such a promise can not be made binding in the form of a simple contract. 2 There is, however, an exception to this rule in cases of contracts in restraint of trade. Here 1 Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 76. This was a case where a party was sued on an indemnity bond and set up as a defense that it was not mutual- ly binding and therefore lacked con- sideration, and Mr. Justice Clifford, after stating the difference between unilateral and bilateral simple con- tracts, said: "Such a defense could not be sustained, even if the action was upon a simple contract ; but the agreement here is under seal, and the action is an action of debt founded on the bond given to secure the perform- ance of the agreement; and it is an elementary rule, that a bond or other specialty is presumed to have been made upon good consideration, so long as the instrument remains unim- peached." Parker v. Parmele, 20 Johns. 130, "a mere failure of consid- eration is no defense at law to an ac- tion on a deed or specialty" ; Vroo- man v. Phelps, 2 Johns. 177 ; Dorr v. Munsell, 13 Johns. 430; Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray, 211 ; Wing v. Chase, 35 Maine, 260 ; Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. K. 471 ; Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225 ; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 ; Rannu. Hughes, 7T.R. 346, n. "There are two ways of making contracts of agreements; the one is by words, which is the inferior method; the other is by writing (i. b. under seal), which is the superior. And because words are sometimes spoken by men unadvisedly and without deliberation, the law has provided that a contract by words shall not bind without con- sideration. But where the agreement is by deed, there is more time for de- liberation. For, when a man passes a thing by deed, first there is the de- termination of the mind to do it, and upon that he causes it to be written, which is one part of deliberation ; and afterwards he puts his seal to it, which is another part of deliberation; and lastly he delivers the writing as his deed, which is the consummation of his resolution. So that there is a great deliberation used in the making of deeds, for which reason they are received as a lien final to the party, and are adjudged to bind the party without examining upon what cause or consideration they were made." 'Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. Law, 446; Morley v. Boothby, 3 Bing. 107 ; Shar- ington v. Strotton, 1 Plowden, 298; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 346, n. ; Je- rome v. Ortman, 66 Mich. 668; 33 N. W. Rep. 759; Burkholder v. Plank, 69 Pa. St. 225; Stanley v. Smith, 15 Ore. 505; 16 Pac. Rep. 174; Woodruff ». Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349; 16 Atl. Rep. 4. The head note of Aller v. Aller, supra, is "It is not a good de- fense to a promise in writing, under seal" to pay a sum of money, for value received, that it was voluntary. 180 CONSIDERATION. § 150 there must be an actual consideration, and the seal does not import one. 1 § 150. Statutory abolition of seals. — Legislation dealing with the question of seals has taken three forms: The first is where the use of private seals is absolutely abolished ; 2 the second is where all distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments is done away with ; s the third is where a seal is made only presumptive evidence of consideration, which may be rebutted as if the instrument were not sealed.' 1 Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St. 194 ; Weller v. Hersee, 10 Hun, 431 ; Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 ; Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166; Draper v. Snow, 20 N. Y. 331 ; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223. The considera- tion in this case was one dollar, the promise being not to run a stage on a certain road specified. This sum was held adequate to support the prom- ise. Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166, where it is said: "It is true that a consideration will be implied from the seal, where the parties contract by deed. But the seal only imports that there was some consideration — not that there was a peculiar one, such as this case requires. If we imply a pecuniary consideration, however large it may be in amount, it will not remove the difficulty under which the plaintiff labors. It must appear that he purchased the defendant's works, or a secret which he possessed in the relation to the manufacturing of ashes, or that there was some other good reason for taking this bond. Otherwise it was a contract to de- prive a man of his livelihood, and the public of a useful member, without any benefit to the plaintiff, which the law will not permit." Palmer?). Stebbins, 3 Pick. 188; Homer o. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438; Archer v. Marsh, 6 A. & E. 959. "An agree- ment not to carry on a certain busi- ness anywhere is invalid, whether it be by parol or specialty." Story on Contracts, § 650. Compare Bender v. Been, 78 Iowa, 283 ; Sanders v. Bag- well, 32 S. C. 238; Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 192; Lemon v. Graham, 131 Pa. St. 447. 2 The following states have legisla- tion of this sort: Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, Dakota (North), Dakota (South), Montana and Mississippi. Stimson's "American Statute Law," p. 197. 'This obtains in Kentucky, Ten- nessee, Texas, California, Oregon, and Mississippi; Stimson's "American Statute Law," p. 197. It will be seen that some states have enacted both forms of legislation. 4 New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Wisconsin, Oregon and Alabama; Stimson's "American Statute Law," p. 455. There is a fourth form of legis- lation in some states, which enacts that all contracts in writing import a consideration. The following are these states : Iowa, Kansas, Tennessee, Mis- souri, Texas, California, Dakota, Ala- bama and Florida. While the language of the statutes may differ they are all referable to one or the other kinds $151 CONSIDERATION. 181 § 151. The same subject continued. — But although there are these different forms of legislation upon the subject their effect is substantially the same. Parties may still bind themselves to the performance of a duty, and if such was their intention no consideration for the promise is necessary. The statutes merely make it necessary for the courts to gather the intention of the parties entirely from the instrument. They substitute the intention of the parties fo" the form of the instrument. 1 stated in the text. Legislation has in a great many states accurately defined "a seal." 1 Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. Law, 446. This case construed the New Jersey statute allowing a want of sufficient consideration to be shown as a de- fense, and it was held that, in spite of this statute, a voluntary promise under seal, not supported by a con- sideration, was valid. After having discussed at length the effect of a common law sealed instrument, Scud- der, J., said: "These statements of the law have been thus particularly given in the words of others, because the significance of writings under seal, and their importance in our common law system, seem in danger of being overlooked in some of our later legislation. If a party has fully and absolutely expressed his inten- tion in a writing sealed and delivered, with the most solemn sanction known to our law, what should prevent its execution where there is no fraud or illegality? But because deeds have been used to cover fraud and illegality in the consideration, and just defenses have been often shut out by the con- clusive character of the formality of sealing, we have enacted in our state the two recent statutes above quoted. The one allows fraud in the consideration of instruments under seal to be set up as a defense, the other takes away the conclusive evi- dence of a sufficient consideration heretofore accorded to a sealed writ- ing, and makes it only presumptive evidence. This does not reach the case of a voluntary agreement, where there was no consideration, and none intended by the parties. The statute establishes a new rule of evidence, by which the consideration of sealed in- struments may be shown, but does not take from them the effect of estab- lishing a contract expressing the in- tention of the parties, made with the most solemn authentication, which is not shown to be fraudulent or illegal," 451, 452. Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala. 518; here an instrument which pur- ported to be a deed was so construed, and held that, as the principal did not purport to sign and the agent executed it in his own name, it could not be varied by parol evidence. Fay v. Eichards, 21 Wend. 626. The head note is : "Where a party obtains what he contracted for, he can not avoid his contract on the ground that what he received is valueless, unless he shows fraud or a misapprehension in respect to the subject-matter of the contract." Talmadge v. Wallis, 25 Wend. 107. "A plea of want of seizin in a vendor who has conveyed real estate with covenant of seizin, is no bar to an action of debt on bond given for the purchase-money." Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 107 ; Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio St. 562 ; Osborn v. Kistler, 35 Ohio St. 99 ; Avery v. Latimer, 14 Ohio, 542. These cases recognize the validity of voluntary promises. "It is a grossly inaccurate 182 CONSIDERATION. §152 § 152. Executed and executory considerations. — The con- sideration of a promise is either executed or executory. If the thing is done at the time of the promise it is executed. But if there is only a promise to do something in return for another promise, here the consideration on both sides is executory. In one case the consideration is executed at the time of contract- ing; in the other it is executory. 1 statement of the law to say 'that equity always required an actual con- sideration, and permits the want of it to be shown notwithstanding the seal.' The truth is that equity recog- nized the failure of consideration as a defense to a sealed instrument, but never so recognized the want of a consideration." Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 119. And see further to this effect: Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. St. 278 ; Harris v. Harris, 23 Gratt. 737 ; Sherk v. Endress, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 255 ; Carter v. King, 11 Rich. L. 125 ; Harrell v. Watson, 63 N. Car. 454; Walker u. Walker, 13 Ired. 335; Wing v. Chase, 35 Maine, 260 ; Kennedy v. Howell, 20 Conn. 349. See, also, the following cases which deal with the question as to how far consideration can be inquired into, and the effects of statutes abolishing distinctions between sealed instruments and simple contracts. Stegman v. Hol- lingsworth, 14 N. Y. Supl. 465; Williams v. State, 25 Fla. 734; Jacobs v. Daugherty, 78 Texas, 682; Wain v. Wain (N. J.), 22 Atl. Rep. 203; Frost v. Wolf, 77 Texas, 455; 14 S. W. Rep. 440; Stevens v. Philadelphia Ball Club, 142 Pa. St. 52; 21 Atl. Rep. 797 ; Osborne v. Hubbard, 20 Ore. 318 ; 25 Pac. Rep. 1021; Todd v. Union Dime Co., 118 N. Y. 337; McCoy v. Cassidy, 96 Mo. 429; Carrington v. Potter, 37 Fed. Rep. 767; Conover 13. Brown, 49 N. J. 156; 23 Atl. Rep. 507 ; Excelsior Manufacturing Co. v. Wheelock, — N. M. — ; 28 Pac. Rep. 772. 1 A promise with an executed con- sideration is a unilateral contract. Where there are two promises, each the consideration of the other, the contract is bilateral. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 683 ; Richard- son v. Hardwick, 106 U. S. 252, where the court said: "In suits upon unilat- eral contracts, it is only where the de- fendant has had the benefit of the con- sideration for which he bargained that he can be held bound." Jones v. Robin- son, 17 L. J. Ex. 36 ; Mill v. Blackall, 11 Q. B.358;Morton*!.Burn,7A.&E.19; Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. 498; Butler v. Thomson, 92 IT. S. 412, 415; Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318, where the court said: "The class of contracts to which the contract in this case belongs is cited in the au- thorities as an exception to the gen- eral rule. It is styled a conditional or unilateral contract. The prom- isor binds himself to execute the agreement on his part upon happen- ing of the condition, or upon perform- ance within a stated period of time by the other party, of certain acts or con- siderations. Up to the time of such performance, these undertakings usu- ally lack the elements of binding con- tracts. The promisee in many in- stances not being bound at all, the promisor is at liberty to revoke the promise on his part at any time be- fore acceptance or performance. Up- on performance of the condition, how- ever, the contract is said to become absolute and mutual in its obligations. A decree can not then be prevented by §153 CONSIDERATION. 183 § 153. Moral obligation. — A moral obligation is not a valu- able consideration, and will not support a promise. 1 But a person's moral duty to another may be sufficient to uphold his contract witb him, although prior to the contract the other did not have an interest or right which could be enforced at law.' setting up the original lack of mutu- ality." Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 111. 216. A matter executed and past be- fore the time of making the promise is no consideration. The considera- tion can only be executed at the time of the promise, or subsequently. A bilateral contract is converted into a unilateral one when the consideration ceases to be executory and becomes executed ; that is, one of the mutual promises is performed, leaving the other still to be fulfilled. 1 Hale i>. Rice, 124 Mass. 292. "If a debt is voluntarily released by the creditor, a subsequent promise to pay it made by the debtor is without con- sideration." Cole v. Bedford. 97 Mass, 326,n. ; Shepherd v. Young, 8 Gray, 152, the case of a widow who supported a destitute infant grandchild. She can not, upon the death of the child by a railroad accident, and the payment of damages to its administrator by the railroad, maintain an action against the administrator, for the amount of the child's board, even if be has ex- pressly promised to pay it. Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429, where a man's minor children were taken from his house without bis consent, and were boarded by his wife's father during the pendency of a suit for divorce. It was held that the father's express promise to pa}' after the board had been furnished was void. Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159; Mills s.Wy- man, 3 Pick. 207, promise to pay for one's infant children's board held void. Valentine v. Foster, 1 Mete. 520; Robinson v. McAfee, 59 Mich. 375; Freeman v. Smallwy, 38 N. J. Law, 383, where goods were sold to a minor child without parent's knowl- edge or consent. It was held that the parent's subsequent promise to pay was invalid, the court saying: "The principle thus enunciated [that a moral consideration will not support a promise] was approved by Lord Dennan in Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438, and adopted by the judges of the Queen's Bench in Beau- mont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483, and may now be considered as the settled law in the English courts. It has also been approved and made the basis of the judicial decision quite generally by the courts in this country." Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. 258; Ehle v. Jud- son, 24 Wend. 97; Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420; Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, a promise by a son to pay for nec- essaries which had previously been furnished to his father, who was in- digent. Snevily v. Read, 9 Watts, 396; Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Maine, 475; Warren v. Whitney, 24 Maine, 561 ; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf . 273 ; Hawley v. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420 ; Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281. Contra, Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. 289 ; Wen- nail v. Adney, 3 B. & P. 247 ; Briggs v. Sutton, Spencer (X. J. Law), 581, 582; Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 B. & C. 501; Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 32; At- kins v. Barnwell, 2 East, 505. 2 Brown v. Latham (Ga. 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 421, per Bleckley, C. J.: "Touching the contract which the parties made after the father's death, there was ample moral consideration to uphold it if the petition be true; for, even if the son was in a position to protect himself against reconveying to the father, he could waive that pro- 184 CONSIDERATION. §154 Accordingly the moral obligation to provide for an illegitimate child is a sufficient consideration to support a trust declared by a parent for the child. 1 To render a moral obligation a good consideration for an express contract there must have been some pre-existing legal obligation to which it can attach. The mother of an illegitimate child is under the primary duty of supporting it; the father's contract to pay for its support is therefore without consideration, and not enforcible. 2 The moral obligation resting upon a woman to make good her promise made during coverture is not a sufficient considera- tion to uphold an affirmation of the promise made after she becomes discovert. 3 § 154. The same subject continued — Exceptions — Where a person is under a moral and legal obligation to do an act, and another does it for him under such circumstances of urgent necessity that humanity and decency admit of no time for delay, the law will imply a promise to pay. 4 And in Pennsylvania a tection, and upon his moral obligation to share the lands with his sister in proportion to her interest as a coheir with himself could contract with her to retain both her interest and his own in some of the lands, convey to her the balance, and pay her a money compensation besides. It is true, an- other coheir, the widow, might have reason to complain at this, and she might be a proper, if not a necessarj', party to the present action; but no objection on account of her not being a party was made. We think the moral duty of the defendant to ac- count to his sister for her interest in the land, although it may not have been a legal interest, or one that could be enforced, would be a sufficient con- sideration to uphold the contract be- tween them." 1 K. X. v. A. Y. (1894), 34 W. N. Cas. (Pa.) 145. 2 Easley v. Gordon (1892), 51 Mo. App. 637. In Greenabaum v. Elliott, 60 Mo. 25, Wagner, J., said : "A moral obligation by itself is not a good con- sideration for a promise. To impart to it any binding character there must be some antecedent legal ability to which it can attach." 3 Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624. 4 Force v. Haines, 17 N. J. Law, 385 ; Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 Hen. Bl. 90, paying a wife's funeral expenses. The husband not being present to bury the wife, he was held liable to reimburse the plaintiff; Scarman v. Castell, 1 Esp. 270, doctoring a sick servant. Master held liable. Simmons v. Wil- mott, 3 Esp. N. P. 91, where Lord Eldon said: "A person in- fluenced by humanity, may provide instant relief for an indigent, helpless creature overtaken by casualty and misfortune, without waiting for any request. * * * They (the excep- tions to the rule) may all be arranged, in fact, under the great head of urgent necessity ; such as sickness, casualty, and burial of the dead." Atkins v. Ban-well, 2 East, 305 ; Dunbar v. Will- iams, 10 Johns. '249; Wennall v. Ad- ney, 3 Bos. & Pull. 247. §155 CONSIDERATION. 185 moral obligation will constitute a valuable consideration to support a promise. 1 § 155. Benefits received — Consideration accepted involun- tarily. — Any act done for the benefit of another, without his request, is to be deemed a voluntary act, for which no action can be sustained. 2 The reason of this rule is 'Bentley v. Lamb (Pa. St.), 25 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 632, a suit on a due bill. Defense, a want of consideration. "If it be granted that the agreement to give the due bill im- posed no legal obligation, how can it be denied that it created at least a moral obligation to do so? The duty to perform a positive promise which is not contrary to law or to public policy, or obtained by fraud, imposi- tion, undue influence, or mistake, is certainly an obligation in morals, and if so, it is a sufficient consideration for an express promise." In his an- notation of this case in the Law Register, Mr. Ewell says: "But the court have, as it seems to us, in laying down the rule that the duty to perform a positive prom- ise which is not contrary to law, or to public policy, or obtained by fraud, imposition, undue influence or mistake, is an obligation in morals, and if so, sufficient consideration for an express promise, gone further than the English or American authorities will support them; or to state our opinion more clearly, it seems to us that this doctrine can find no valid support in common law." See, also, 32 Central Law Journal, 53, on "Moral Obligation," as a consideration. 2 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bensley (1892), 51 Fed. Rep. 738. This case treats the whole subject of benefits re- ceived as raising an implied promise to pay. This was an agreement to pay a certain sum for having a build- ing erected on a neighboring lot, it being supposed by defendant that the value of his property would be en- hanced thereby. The court held the agreement could not be enforced be- cause of the failure of plaintiff to com- ply with the condition as to time, the building not being erected as soon as agreed. The court then discusses de- fendant's liability to pay for benefits received, and Brown, J., said: "Had the defendant received a benefit from the performance of this contract to which he would not have been en- titled had the contract not been made, the result might have been dif- ferent." Forbis v. Inman (1892), 23 Ore. 68; 31 Pac. Rep. 204, work done and materials furnished by mistake ; held, no recovery, the court saying: "The gist of the action grows out of the request for the performance of the services, and the promise to pay therefor. To make one liable on such a contract it is not enough to allege and show that the defendant had received a benefit, but it must appear that the defendant had either requested the performance of the service, or that, when he knew the service had been performed, he must have promised to pay for the same." Glenn v. Savage, 14 Ore. 567; to, recover for goods furnished, the court saying: "The great and leading rule of law is to deem an act done for the benefit of another without his request as a voluntary act of courtesy, for which no action can be sustained." Davidson v. Westchester Co., 99 N. Y. 558, the court saying: "A promise to pay for services is sometimes im- 186 CONSIDERATION. §156 that one man can not make another his debtor without his con- sent. 1 § 156. Power to return the benefit. — Where consideration is given without express or implied request, it must be returned if it be in the power of the party to do so. 2 But if buildings have been erected on land without request they can not be removed, and the use of them by the owner of the land is not such an acceptance of the benefit as raises an implied promise to pay therefor. 8 1 Force v. Haines, 17 N. J. Law, 385, the court saying : "The world abounds with acts of this kind, done upon no request ; but would more abound with ruinous litigation, and the overthrow of personal rights, and civil freedom, if the law was otherwise." And see, also, Stokes v. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20 ; Jen- kins v. Tucker, 1 Hen. Bl. 90; Potter v. Potter, 3 N. J. Law, 9; Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns. 249; Everts v. Allen, 12 Johns. 352 ; Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28, where a field was afire and a man removed a stack of wheat to save it ; no recovery al- lowed. 2 Cincinnati R. Co. v. Bensley, 51 Fed. Rep. 738; Rohr v. Baker, 13 Ore. 350; Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa, 512; Frear v. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272 ; Balcom v. Craggin, 5 Pick. 295. 3 Guernsey v. Wilson, 134 Mass. 482; Madigan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 376, the court saying: "If one erects a permanent building, like a dwell- ing-house, upon the land of another, voluntarily and without any contract with the owner, it becomes a part of the realty, and belongs to the owner of the soil." Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts, 238; West v. Stewart, 7 Pa. St. 122; Oakman v. Dorchester, 98 Mass. 57; Inhabitants of First Parish, etc., v. Jones, 8 Cush. 184; Merriam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391, a railroad company laying rails on land. It was held could not remove them. plied by law ; but this is done only when the court can see that they were rendered under such circum- stances as authorized the party per- forming to entertain a reasonable ex- pectation of their payment by the party soliciting the performance." In the following case it was held a question of fact for jury as to whether the facts of the case made out request. Hicks v. Burhans, 10 Johns. 243 ; Van Rensselaer v. Aikin, 44 N. Y. 126; Moore v. Moore, 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.), 303; Robinson v. Raynor, 28 N. Y. 494; Force e. Haines, 17 N. J. Law, 385, the plaintiff fed a slave which would otherwise have perished. It was held that no recovery could be had against master. James v. O'Dris- coll, 2 Bay, 101 ; Bartholomew r. Jack- son, 20 Johns. 28; Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587; Mum- ford*. Brown, 6 Cowen, 475, one ten- ant not allowed to recover from co- tenant for repair to land, though proper, without a previous request to repair, thecourt saying: "I know of no adjudication or principle by which one shall be compelled to pay another for services rendered without request or assent, express or implied." Lynch t'. Bogy, lSCMo. 170 ; Watson v. Blavlock, 2 Const. Ct. (S. C.) 351; Bailey ,,. Gibbs, 9 Mo. 45 ; Jones v. Wilson, 3 Johns. 434; Beach v. Vandenburgh, 10 Johns. 360; Young v. Dibrell, 7 Humph. 270; Lewis v. Lewis, '3 Strobh. 530. §157 CONSIDERATION. 187 § 157. Existing legal obligation as a consideration. — The performance of an act which the party is under a legal ob- ligation to perform can not constitute a consideration for a promise. 1 Thus a promise to surrender stolen property to its owner, being an undertaking to do only what the law exacts, is not a consideration that will support a promise to pay money therefor. 2 And a promise to remit the extra expenses incurred in building a house, provided the original contract price is paid, is not supported by a consideration. 8 So, also, an agreement to pay a witness more than the fees prescribed by law for his at- tendance at court will not, in an ordinary case, be sustained.* Graham v. Connersville B. Co., 36 Ind. 463; Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38; Pattinson v. Luckley, L. E. 10 Ex. 330; Eanger v. Great Western E. Co., 5 H. L. C. 72, 118; Munro v. Butt, 8 E. & B. 738; Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52; Burn v. Miller, 4 Taunt. 745. Compare Cincinnati E. Co. v. Bensley, 51 Fed. Eep. 738, the court saying: "Thus, if a man build a house upon the land of anoth- er, with his assent, the law raises an obligation on his part to pay for it, since he has been benefited to that ex- tent, and, if he did not intend to pay for it, it was his duty to forbid its construction, or, at least, to give no- tice that he would not be chargeable. * * * * So, if A. promises to pay B. for a house to be built upon the land of C, provided it be built within a certain time, and the house be not completed within the time named, it is difficult to see how A. could be held liable in any form of action, since he has received no benefit from the sub- sequent performance of the contract. In such case, however, if C. should accept the house, he would undoubt- edly be bound to pay its value ; but, if he failed to do so, the builder would have no recourse but to remove the house from the land." 1 Eobinson ». Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40 ; 26 N. Y. St. Eep. 387; 28 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 584; 22 N. E. Eep. 224; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y 392; Crosby v. Wood, 6 N. Y. 369 Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 259 Bickhart v. Hoffmann (Com. PI. N Y.), 19 N. Y. Supl. 472; Bush v. Eawlins, 89 Ga. 117 ; 14 S. E. Eep. 886 Freeman v. Brehm (Ind. App. 1892) 30 N. E. Eep. 712; 31 N. E. Eep 545 ; Heisch v. Adams, 81 Texas, 94 16 S. W. Eep. 790; Schuler v. My ton, 48 Kan. 282 ; 29 Pac. Eep. 163 Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420 ; Ayres v Chicago, etc., E. Co., 52 Iowa, 478 Eeynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328 Deacon v. Gridley, 15 C. B. 295 Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578; 15 S. W. Eep. 844 Widiman v. Brown, 83 Mich. 241 ; 47 N. W. Eep. 231 ; Wadhames v. Page, 1 Wash. 420; 25 Pac. Eep. 462; Worthen v. Thompson, 54 Ark. 151; 15 S. W. Eep. 192 ; Dennis v. Piper, 21 111. App. 169 ; Killough v. Payne, 52 Ark. 174; 12 S. W. Eep. 327 ; Sulli- van v. Sullivan, 99 Cal. 187 ; 33 Pac. Eep. (1893) 862. "A debt owing by defendant's deceased husband to plaintiff, barred by the statute of limitations, is no consideration for her promise." 2 Worthen v. Thompson, 54 Ark. 151 ; Killough v. Payne, 52 Ark. 174. 8 Widiman v. Brown, 83 Mich. 241. 1 Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463; Sweany v. Hunter, 1 Murphey (N. C.) 181. 188 CONSIDERATION. § 157 But such an agreement may be valid, where the witness as- sumes a duty that the law would not impose upon him, — as where he agrees to remain at home at special inconvenience, that he may be found at the sitting of the court, or where he agrees to attend in person when his deposition might have been taken. 1 And where the president of a railway company takes a lease for its benefit in his own name, without the as- sent of the corporation, he is bound to transfer the lease to it upon demand, and any promise such corporation makes to secure the transfer is void for the reason that the president only does what he is legally bound to do. 2 A public officer is not allowed to receive, for performing an official duty, any other compensation or reward than that which is prescribed by law. 3 But a public officer may perform services in the detec- tion and punishment of crimes and recovery of stolen property which it is not his official duty to perform, and such services will constitute a consideration for a promise. 4 Thus a sheriff, acting in reliance upon a general offer of a reward for the capture of a criminal, is entitled to the reward the same as though not a peace officer, where he succeeds in making the capture, having no process in his hands. 5 And the perform- 1 Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463. necessary to save the community 2 Robinson a. Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40. from extortion and oppression. Once 3 Warner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487; allow an officer to contract for extra Day v. Putnam Ins. Co., 16 Minn, compensation for the discharge of his 408; Stotesbury v. Smith, 2 Burrow, duty, and bribery would become the 924 ; Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44 ; means by which alone the laws could Smiths. Whildin, 10 Pa. St. 39; Gil- be executed." Scott, J., in Kick v. more v. Lewis, 12 Ohio St. 281 ; Kick Merry, 23 Mo. 72, 74. v. Merry, 23 Mo. 72; Mitchell v. 4 Russell v. Stewart, 44 Ver. 170; Vance, T.B.Mon. 528. "Itisaprinci- Davis v. Munson, 43 Ver. 676; England pie of the common law that an officer v. Davidson, 39 Eng, Com. Law, 453; ought not to take money for doing his AVarner v. Grace, 14 Minn. 487 ; Gregg duty. Hawkins says: 'If once it v. Pierce, 53 Barb. 387. should be allowed that promises to an 5 Davis v. Munson, 43 Ver. 676, the officer, to pay more for his services court saying: "This case is broadly than the law allows, could sustain an distinguished from Pool v. Boston, 5 action, the people would quickly be Cush. 219. The plaintiff in that case given to understand how kindly they was a watchman, employed by the city would be taken, and happy would of Boston. While engaged in the per- that man be who could have his busi- formance of his regular duties under ness well done without them.' This his engagement with the city as watch- is an ancient principle, and it has man, he discovered and arrested an in- been steadily adhered to as being cendiary setting fire to a house. He §158 CONSIDERATION. 189 ance of any services which a constable, policeman or other pub- lic officer is not bound to render may be the consideration of a contract. 1 § 158. The same subject continued. — An agreement to for- bear to sue upon a debt already due and payable, on the pay- ment of part of the debt, is without legal consideration, and can not be availed of by the debtor, either by way of contract or of estoppel. 2 And to this principle is referable the doc- trine that the payment of a smaller sum in satisfaction of a larger is no discharge of the residue. 8 The steadfast adhesion then claimed a reward of $2,000 which sented upon the appeal is, whether the the city had offered for the detection and conviction of any incendiary. The plaintiff having done what he waa hired and paid to do, independent of the reward, the court properly held he could not recover. This case would be like that one, if the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for a fixed compensation by the day to search for these prisoners. If he had thus agreed beforehand upon a fee for his services, he would, of course, have been limited to a re- covery of the stipulated compensa- tion." See, also, Brown v. Godfrey, 33 Vt. 120. 1 England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856. The plaintiff, a constable, gave information leading to a conviction of a felon, it not being in the line of his duties to furnish such information. It was held he could recover on a promise supported by such a service. 2 Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106 ; Holliday v. Poole, 77 Ga. 159 ; Pfeif- fer v. Campbell, 111 N. Y. 631; Turn- bull v. Brock, 31 Ohio St. 649; Reyn- olds v. Ward, 5 Wend. 502; Gibson v. Eenne, 19 Wend. 389; Tryon v. Jen- nings, 22 How. Pr. 421; Farmers' Bank v. Blair, 44 Barb. 641 ; Parmelee v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. 58 ; Liening v. Gould, 13 Cal. 598. 3 Jaffray v. Davis (1891), 124 N. Y. 164, the court saying : "One of the ele- ments embraced in the question pre- payment of a sum less than the amount of a liquidated debt under an agree- ment to accept the same in satisfaction of such debt forms a bar to the recov- ery of the balance of the debt. This single question was presented to the English court in 1602, when it was re- solved in Pinnel's case (5 Coke, 117) 'that payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater can not be any satisfaction for the whole,' and that this is so, although it was agreed that such payment should satisfy the whole. This simple question has since arisen in the English courts and in the courts of this country in almost numberless instances, and has re- ceived the same solution, notwith- standing the courts, while so ruling, have rarely failed, upon any recur- rence of the question, to criticise and condemn its reasonableness, justice, fairness or honesty. No respectable authority that I have been able to find has, after such unanimous disapproval by all the courts, held otherwise than was held in Pinnel's case." Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426; Foakes v. Beer, L. B. 9 App. Cas. 605; Goddard v, O'Brien, L. E. 9 Q. B. D. 37 ; Down v. Hatcher, 10 Ad. & El. 121 ; American Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 Kan. 35; Ottof. Klauber, 23 Wis. 471 ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11 Vt. 60; Bright v. Cofi- man, 15 Ind. 371 ; Curtis v. Morton, 20 111. 558; St. Louis E. Co. v. Davis, 35 190 CONSIDERATION. § 158 to this doctrine by the courts, in spite of the current of con- demnation by individual judges while upholding it, demon- strates the force of the doctrine of stare decisis. And the doc- trine of stare decisis is further illustrated by the course of judi- cial decisions upon this subject, for while the courts still hold to the doctrine, they seize with avidity upon any consideration to support the agreement to accept the lesser sum in satisfac- tion of the larger, and to extract, if possible, from the circum- stances of each case a consideration for the new agreement, so as to substitute the new agreement in place of the old, and thus, or in some other way, to form a defense to the action brought upon the old agreement. 1 Thus the giving of a nego- tiable note in full payment is a good satisfaction. 2 And al- though the claim is a money demand liquidated and not doubt- ful, and it can not be satisfied with a smaller sum of money, yet if any other personal property is received in satisfaction it will be good, no matter what the value. 3 The giving further se- curity for part of a debt or other security, although for a less sum than the debt, and the acceptance of it in full of all demands, Kan. 464; Gates v. Steele, 58 Conn. 48 N. Y. 225; Bliss v. Shwartz, 65 N. 316; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 55 Ark. Y. 444; Redfieldu. Holland, etc., Co., 369; People v. Board, 17 N. Y. Supl. 56N.Y.354; Miller v. Coates,66 N. Y. 314; Indianapolis R. Co. v. Hyde, 122 610. Ind. 188; Pasewalk v. Bollman, 29 1 Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116, Neb. 519; Griffin v. Petty, 101 N. C. "The rale that the payment of a less 380; Glaze v. Duson, 40 L. Ann. 692; sum of money, although agreed by the Jones v. Grantham, 80 Ga. 472 ; Miller plaintiff to be received in full satisfac- v. Eldridge, 126 Ind. 461; Holton v. tion of a debt exceeding that amount, Noble, 83 Cal. 7; Jones v. Wilson, 104 shall not be so considered in contem- N. C. 9; Capital City Ins. Co. v. Det- plation of law, is technical, and not wiler, 23 111. App. 656; Hills v. Som- very well supported by reason. Courts mer, 53 Hun, 392; J affray v. Davis, 48 therefore have departed from it upon Hun, 500; Helling v. United Order, slight distinctions." 29 Mo. App. 309; Duluth Chamber 2 Goddard v. O'Brien, L. R. 9 Q. B. Commerce v. Knowlton, 22 Minn. 229; D. 37; Huddleston, B., approved the 44 N. W. Rep. 2; Day v. Gardner, 42 language of the opinion in Sibree v. N. J. Eq. 199; 7Atl. Rep. 365; Bryant Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23, "that a ne- r>. Brazil, 3 N. W. Rep. 117; Kooker gotiable security may operate, if so v. Hyde, 6 Wis. 204; 21 N. W. Rep. 52; given and taken, in satisfaction of a Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341; debt of a greater amount." Hayes v. Davidson, 70 N. C. 573; "Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Foakes Daniels v. Hatch, 21 N. J. Law, 391 ; v. Beer, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605, "but Smith v. Phillips, 77 Va. 548; Ryan v. the gift of a horse, hawk or robe in Ward, 48 N. Y. 204; Bunge v. Koop, satisfaction is good." § 158 CONSIDERATION. 191 extinguishes the whole. 1 And if a debtor gives his creditor a note indorsed by a third party for a less sum than the debt (no matter how much less), but in full satisfaction thereof, and it is received as such, this transaction furnishes the consideration to support a promise to remit the excess. 2 So, also, it has been held where, by some mode or time of part payment, different from that provided for in the contract, a new benefit is or may be conferred or a burden imposed, a new consideration arises out of the transaction, and gives validity to the agreement of the creditor. 3 And if payment of less than the whole debt is made before it is due or at a different place from that stipulated, if re- ceived in full, this is a good satisfaction. 4 But the payment of the smaller sum, without any release, will not constitute a sat- isfaction of the residue. It must be accepted as payment in full. 5 And the mere retention by the creditor of money to which he is entitled unconditionally will not amount to a re- lease, or constitute an accord and satisfaction, although he knows that it is tendered as such. 6 The rule upon this sub- ject, under the modification of later decisions, both in England and America, seems to be that a creditor can not bind himself by a simple agreement to accept a smaller sum in lieu of an ascertained debt of larger amount, such an agreement being nudum pactum because the debtor only does what he is legally bound to do; but if there be any benefit or even any legal possibility of benefit to the creditor thrown in, that additional weight will turn the scale, and render the consideration suffi- cient to support a promise to forego the balance. 7 1 La Page v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 164 ; Knowlton, 42 Minn. 229 ; People v. Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76. Board of Supervisors, 40 Hun, 353. 2 Varney v. Conery, 77 Maine, 527; 7 Jafiray B.Davis (1891), 124N.Y.164; Stein-way v. Magnus, 11 East, 390. Fisher v. May, 2 Bibb. 448; Reed v. But cf. Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East, 230. Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273 ; Union Bank v. 3 Rose v. Hall, 26 Conn. 392. Geary, 5 Peters, 99 ; Brooks v. White, 2 1 Jones v. Bullitt, 2 Lit. 49; Rick- Mete. 283; Hall v. Smith, 15 Iowa, etts v. Hall, 2 Bush, 249; Smiths. 584; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561; Brown, 3 Hawks (N. C), 580; Jones Jones v. Perkins, 29 Miss. 139; Alli- v. Perkins, 29 Miss. 139; Schweider son v. Abendroth, 108 N. Y. 470, v. Lang, 29 Minn. 254. the court saying: "But it is held 5 Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. that where there is an independ- Knowlton, 42 Minn. 229; 44 N. W. ent consideration, or the creditor Rep. 2. receives any benefit or is put in a 6 Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. better position, or one from which 192 CONSIDERATION. §§ 159, 160 § 159. Promise to new party. — Liability to a new party in respect of a debt or obligation already incurred will not form a sufficient consideration to support a promise by the new cred* itor; thus a promise to pay a mail contractor for performing his contract with the post-office department is without con- sideration. 1 § 160. Past consideration. — An executed and past consid- eration is not sufficient to support a subsequent promise. It is not enough to show that a service has been rendered, and that it was beneficial to the party sought to be charged, unless it was rendered at his express request, or under such circum- stances that the law would imply a request. A mere volun- teer can not make himself the creditor of another. Even an ex- press promise, subsequently made and depending wholly on the past consideration, is not sufficient to create a legal lia- bility. 8 Thus, if a horse is sold and afterwards is warranted as sound, this warranty not having been made at the time of the sale is void. 3 The past default of a debtor, or past forbear- there may be a legal possibility of N. 295; Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 159. 2 Walker v. Henry, 36 W. Va. 100; 14 S. E. Rep. 440; Parsons v. Robin- son, 15 N. Y. Supl. 138; Chamberlin v. Whitford, 102 Mass. 448; Dear- born v. Bowman, 3 Met. (Mass.) 155; McGilvery v. Capen, 7 Gray, 523; Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Bar- low v. Smith, 4 Vt. 139, 144; Ros- corla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234, the court saying: "A considera- tion past and executed will support no other promise than such, as would be implied by law." Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438; Hayes * Warren, 2 Strange, 933; Tipper v. Bicknell, 3 Bing. N. C. 710; Jones v. Asbburnham, 4 East, 455; Tooley v. Windham, Cro. Eliz. (1 Croke) 206; Shealy v. Toole, 56 Ga. 210. See, also, Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 159. 8 Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234; Roswel v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196; Pope v. Lewyns, Cro. Jac. 630 ; Thorn- ton i. Jenyns, 1 Man. & G. 166. benefit to which he was not enti- tled except for the agreement, then the agreement is not nudum pactum." Thompson ». Percival, 5 B. & Adol. 925 ; Ludington v. Bell, 77 N. Y. 138 ; Pardee v. Wood, 8 Hun, 584 ; Douglass v. White, 3 Barb. Ch. 621. See Jaf- fray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, where the whole question is reviewed at length. 1 Putnam v. Woodbury, 68 Maine, 58, the court saying: "But since the trial, the defendant moves for a new trial, on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, and offers to prove that the change of route (the alleged consideration of the promise) was made with the con- sent of the post-office department. * * * * This is very important and material; for the defendant would not be liable upon his promise to pay the plaintiff for carrying the mail in ac- cordance with his contract with the postmaster-general." In England the law is otherwise. See Morton v. Burn, 7 A. & E. 26; Scotson v. Pegg, 6 II. & § 161 CONSIDERATION. 193 ance of the creditor, is not a consideration for a promise to pay increased interest. 1 A note given by a candidate for an elect- ive office in payment of services in promoting his election, but which were not rendered at his request, is void for want of consideration. 2 A warranty of an article sold should be made at the time of the sale ; s and whether the warranty is made at the time of the sale, there being several negotiations between the parties relative to the sale, is a question of fact for the jury, all that passes between the parties in relation to the terms of the sale being competent evidence. 4 But where an auctioneer has let fall his hammer and sold a horse, if before the money is paid and the horse delivered the question of warranty arises between the parties, and they agree that words of warranty shall be written in the bill of sale, and the money is then paid and the horse delivered, this warranty rests upon a present consideration; but it would be otherwise if the horse is deliv- ered and the money paid before the warranty is given. 6 § 161. Consideration moved by previous request. — An excep- tion to the rule that a past consideration is no consideration, is the case of services rendered on request, no promise of remu- neration being made at the time, but subsequently an express promise being made to payforthem. Such a promise is binding. 6 1 Shealy v. Toole, 56 Ga. 210. Comstook v. Smith, 7 Johns. 88 ; Allen 1 Dearborn ■». Bowman, 2 Met. v. Woodward, 22 N. H. 544; Brown (Mass.) 155. v. Crump, 1 Marsh. C. P. 567 ; Granger 3 Reed v. Wood; 9 Vt.285, 287; Wil- v. Collins, 6 Mes. & Wels. 458; Brad- mot u. Hurd, 11 Wend. 586 ; More- ford v. Roulston, 8 Irish Com. L. house v. Comstock, 42 Wis. 626; Ho- Rep. 468; Dearborn ». Bowman, 3 gins ». Plympton, 11 Pick. 97: "Any Met. (Mass.) 155, where Shaw, C. J., subsequent or collateral contract of said: " The past performance of serv- warranty must arise from an express ices constitutes no consideration even promise to warrant, and that upon a for an express promise, unless they new consideration, distinct from that were performed at the express or im- of the sale itself." Per Shaw, C. J. plied request of the defendant." Per 4 Way v. Martin, 140 Pa. St. 499 ; 21 Shaw, C. J. Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. Atl. Rep. 428; Wilmot v. Hurd, 11 207; Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159 ; Wend. 586. Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429; Pool v. 5 McGaughey v. Richardson, 148 Horner, 64 Md. 131 ; Osborne v. Rog- Mass. 608. See, also, Hobart v. ers, 1 Wms. Saunders, 264, where Young, 63 Vt. 363 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 612; the court said: "A past considera- Eastern Ice Co. v. King, 86 Vir. 97. tion is not sufficient to support a sub- 6 Lampleigh v. Braithwait, Hobart, sequent promise, unless there was a 105 ; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 267 ; request of the party, express or im- 13 194 CONSIDERATION. §162 But the only promise which such a consideration will sustain is to pay what the parties agree the services are worth, and a subsequent promise to do something else, different from, or in addition to, that which the law implies, is nudum pactum; 1 and when it is claimed that a promise is supported by a past consideration, it must be shown, as a matter of fact, that the promise was made in respect of that consideration. 2 § 162. Statute of limitations. — One exception to the rule that a past consideration will not support a promise, is the case of a claim barred by the statute of limitations. Such a debt may form the consideration of a promise to pay it. 3 The rule plied, at the time of performing the consideration; but where there was an express request at the time, it would in all cases be sufficient to sup- port a subsequent promise." Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681. 1 Merrick v. Giddings, 1 Mackey (D. C), 394; Brown v. Crump, 1 Marsh. C. P. 567 ; Granger v. Collins, 6 M. & W. 458; Goldsby v. Robert- son, 1 Blackf. 247. 2 Merrick v. Giddings, 1 Mackey (D. C.) , 394 ; Carson v. Clark, 2 111. 113 ; Chaffee v. Thomas, 7 Cow. 358. The rule of the leading case of Lampleigh v. Brathwait, 1 Hob. 105 b., that serv- ices rendered on request will support a subsequent promise to pay for them, is similar in doctrine to the rule that a barred debt will support a promise to pay it. In neither case will the consideration support any promise other than one to pay for the services or to pay the debt. See authorities supra. While in some instances this rule has been applied to cases other than services, as for instance the pay- ment of a note, Pool v. Harner, 64 Md. 131, the doctrine is well settled as stated in the text that the subse- quent promise different from, or in addition to, that which the law im- plies, is nudum pactum. 3 Lowrey v. Robinson, 141 Pa. St. 189 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 513; Davis v. Noyes, 15 N.Y. Supl. 431 ; Flemings. Fleming, 33 S. C. 505; 12 S. E. Rep. 257; Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99; Collar v. Pat- terson, 137 111. 403 ; Bowmar v. Peine, 64 Miss. 99; Ray e. Rood, 62 Vt. 293; Linderman v. Pomeroy, 142 Pa. St. 168; Rose v. Foord, 96Cal. 152; Stew- art v. McFarland, 84 Iowa, 55 ; Drury v. Henderson, 36 111. App. 521; Wal- dron v. Alexander, 136 111.550; Wells v. Wilson, 140 Pa. St. 645 ; Davis v. Davis, 20 Ore. 78; Marshall's Estate, 138 Pa. St. 285; Georgetown College v. Perkins, 74 Md. 72 ; 21 Atl. Rep. 551 ; Chapman v. Barnes, 93 Ala. 433; Walker v. Henry, 36 W. Va. 100 ; 14 S. E. Rep. 440 (W. Va.) ; Bryarv. Will- cocks, 3 Cow. 150; Ross v. Ross, 6 Hun, 80; Morrow v. Morrow, 12 Hun, 386; Adams v. Orange County Bank, 17 Wend. 514; Jackson v. Hunt, 6 Johns. 16; McNamee v. Tenny, 41 Barb. 495 ; Murray v. Coster, 20 Johns. 576; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick. 368 ; Sands v. Gelston, 15 Johns. 511 ; Clementson v. Williams, 8 Cranch, 72; Brown v. Campbell, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 176 Wetzell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309 Harrison v. Handley, 1 Bibb, 443 Earle v. Oliver, 2 Ex. 71, 90, the court saying: " Where the considera- tion was originally beneficial to the party promising, yet if he be pro- tected from liability by some provision §162 CONSIDERATION. 195 is general in America that such a promise must be in writing, or that there must be such a written acknowledg- ment of the barred debt as will support an implied promise to pay it. 1 of the statute or common law meant for his advantage, he may renounce the benefit of that law; and if he promises to pay the debt, which is only what an honest man ought to do, he is then bound by the law to , perform it." It is to be ob- served that the rule goes no further than that a debtor may renew his liability by a promise to pay the debt without further consideration. A barred debt does not constitute a con- sideration for any other promise than that of a promise to pay it. 1 § 395 New York Code of Civil Pro- cedure ; City Nat. Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484 ; Morrow v. Morrow, 12 Hun, 386 ; Clark v. Van Amburgh, 14 Hun, 557; Kincaid v. Archibald, 73 N. Y. 189; Ray v. Rood, 62 Vt. 293; Chap- man v. Barnes, 93 Ala. 433 ; Bowmar v. Peine, 64 Miss. 99 ; Fleming v. Flem- ing, 33 S. C. 505; Sturges v. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215; Chabot v. Tuoker, 39 Cal. 434, the court saying: "An acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, is the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take a case out of the operation of the statute of limitations." New York Code of Civil Procedure, § 395; Maine Rev. St., ch. 146, § 19; Mas- sachusetts Rev. St., ch. 120, § 13; Vermont Rev. St., ch. 58, §22; Ohio Rev. St., § 4992; Michigan Rev. St., §13; Arkansas Rev. St., ch. 91, §14; Texas, act Feb., 1841, art. 2388; Iowa, Frisbee v. Seaman, 49 Iowa, 95 ; California, § 31, St. Cal. ; Oregon, § 24, G. L. Ore. ; Minnesota, § 23, Rev. St. ; Virginia, act April 3, 1838 ; Nevada, § 30, Code ; Nebraska, Gen. St., ch. 55, §22. Usually the statute prescribes three methods of reviving a barred debt. One is an express written promise ; the second is by such a written acknowledgment as implies a promise, and the third is by part payment, which of course may be shown, ex necessitatu, by oral evidence. "I will read what is laid down by Chief Justice Jervis on the subject, in this book called Jervis's New Rules, which, in my early days at the bar, we were constantly in the habit of quoting, and I find this pass- age cited with approbation by Lord Campbell: * * * * 'Before this statute (that is, 9 Ga. 4, c. 14, making a written promise or acknowledgment necessary to stop the running of the statute of limitations), not only a verbal promise to pay a debt more than six years old, but a bare uncon- ditional acknowledgment of its sub- sistence, made within six years be- fore action brought, had been held sufficient to take this case out of the statute, 21 Jac, c. 16, § 3. But now, in order to revive the liability of the debtor, after the expiration of the six years, by subsequent acknowledgment or promise, there must be proof of some writing, signed by himself, either containing an express promise to pay the debt, or being in terms from which an unconditional promise to pay it is necessarily to be implied. If, there- fore, the writer, although he admits the existence of a debt, refuses to pay it, or reserves the matter for future consideration, or refers the creditor to some third person for payment, or the like, this will not be sufficient to prevent the operation of the statute.' That being the rule, there must be one of these three things to take the case out of the statute. Either there 196 CONSIDERATION. § 163 § 163. The same subject continued. — The acknowledgment or admission must be a clear and unambiguous recognition of an existing debt, and so distinct and express as to preclude all doubt as to the debtor's meaning, and as to the particular debt to which it applies, and must be consistent with a prom- ise to pay. 1 But an admission or acknowledgment made to a stranger, not intended to be communicated to or to influence the conduct of the creditor, is not effectual to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations. 2 When the creditor sues, after the statute has run upon the original contract, his cause of action is not the original contract, for his action there- upon is barred, but it is the new promise. There are many authorities to the contrary, some holding that the new promise takes the case out of the statute, others that it removes the bar of the statute, and others still that it renews the original con- tract. But the better opinion is that the action is sustain- able only upon the new promise, the original contract, or the moral obligation arising therefrom, binding in foro conscientise, notwithstanding the bar of the statute, being the considera- tion for the new promise. 8 Although a statute provides that a must be an acknowledgment of the Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215; Van Alen v. debt, from which a promise to pay is Feltz, 32 Barb. 139. Contra, Soulden to be implied ; or, secondly, there v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Wend. 293 ; Mc- must be an unconditional promise to Crea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460; Wat- pay the debt; or, thirdly, there must kins ^.Stevens, 4 Barb. 168; Carshore be a conditional promise to pay the v. Huyck, 6 Barb. 583 ; Philips v. debt, and evidence that the condition Peters, 21 Barb. 351 ; Winchell v. has been performed." Mellish, L. J., Bowman, 21 Barb. 448; Esselstyn v. in In re River Steamer Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Weeks, 12 N. Y. 635 ; Wadsworth v. App. 822, 828. Thomas, 7 Barb. 445; Frisbee ». Sea- 1 Wesner v. Stein, 97 Pa. St. 322. men, 49 Iowa, 95 ; Wesner v. Stein, 97 2 Matter of Kendrick, 107 N. Y. Pa. St. 322, the court saying: "The 104 ; Collar v. Patterson, 137 111. 403. debt is not destroyed by the statute of 'Fleming v. Fleming, 33 S. C. 505; limitations, but the right of action is Walters n. Kraft, 23 S. C. 578; Dick- lost; when that is restored the decla- son v. Gourdin, 29 S. C. 343 ; Reigne v. ration is still on the original contract Desportes,Dud. Law (S.C.), 118; Smith and not on the new promise." Suter i'. Caldwell, 15 Rich. 365; Colvin v. v. Sheeler, 22 Pa. St. 308; Burr v. Phillips, 25 S. 0. 228; McCormick v. Burr, 26 Pa. St. 284; Yaw v. Kerr, 47 Brown, 36 Cal. 434; Chabot v. Tucker, Pa. St. 333; Patton v. Hassinger, 69 39 Cal. 180; Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, Pa. St. 311; Barclay's Appeal, 64 Pa. 9 ; Ray v. Rood, 62 Vt. 293 ; Sturges v. St. 69. §§164,165 CONSIDERATION. 197 promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations must be in writing, still the promise, if in parol, is not illegal; the only effect of the statute is to take away the right to prove the promise save by written evidence, and if a party permits the promise to be shown by parol evidence, he waives the statutory objection, and the promise is effective to prevent the operation of the statute. 1 § 164. Doing what another is bound to do The subse- quent ratification of an act done by a voluntary agent of another, without authority from him, is equivalent to a pre- vious authority. The law will not allow a party to maintain an action for money paid to discharge the debt of another with- out his consent; for, to allow this would subject every debtor to the power of those who might be disposed to injure him, and who might harass him with suits, and burden him with costs, in the most unreasonable and oppressive manner. But if the debtor assents to the payment, the reason of the law fails; and whether this assent be given before or after the payment is immaterial. The promise to recompense, therefore, a person who has performed a duty which one is under a legal obliga- tion to perform, is binding although made subsequent to the doing of the act done without request. Thus if a person pay a mortgage without request of the mortgagor, this will support a subsequent promise of reimbursement therefor. 2 But if one not a party to nor liable upon a chose in action take it up with his own money, the transaction will be deemed a purchase, and not a payment, if such was the intention of the parties; and this is the rule, whatever may have been the mode adopted of accomplishing the result. 3 § 165. Where party is already bound. — Neither the promise to do, nor the actual doing, of that which the promisor is, by 1 Ray v. Rood, 62 Vt. 293. 105 ; Atkins v. Banwell, 2 East, 505. 2 Gleason v. Dyke, 22 Pick. 390; 8 Swope v. Leffingwell, 72 Mo. 348 ; Osborne v. Rogers, 1 Wms. Saund. Allen v. Dermott, 80 Mo. 56; Campbell 264; Doty v. "Wilson, 14 Johns. 378; v. Allen, 38 Mo. App. 27; Thompson Watson v. Turner, Buller, Nisi Prius, v. Longan, 42 Mo. App. 146; Brice's 147, n. ; Paynter v. Williams, 1 C. Appeal, 95 Pa. St. 145 ; McCall v. Len- & M. 810; Wing ». Mill, 1 B. & A. ox, 9 S. & R. 302. 198 CONSIDERATION. §165 law or subsisting contract, bound to do, is a sufficient consider- ation to support a promise in his favor. 1 Thus the payment by a debtor of a part of an adjudicated liability is not a suffi- cient consideration to support a promise by the creditor to cancel the whole liability, although the debtor be insolvent.* To the same effect, where a promoter of a corporation gave it a license to use a patent owned by him, because another de- clared that, unless this was done, he would not pay his sub- scription to the capital stock, it was held that the license was without consideration, since the other promoter merely prom- ised to do what he was legally bound to do. 3 And equally a surrender of mortgaged premises by the mortgagor, after condition broken, "to save the mortgagee trouble in getting possession of the mortgaged premises," is no con- •Esterly Machine Co. v. Pringle, 41 Neb. 265; 59 N. W. Rep. 804. "The rule is elementary that neither the promise to do, nor the actual doing, of that which the promisor is by law or subsisting contract bound to do, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise in his iavor. Pollock on Contracts, 177 ; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 437 ; Bishop on Con- tracts, 420 ; Deacon v. Gridley, 15 C. B. 295; Bartlettu.Wyman,14 Johns. 260; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328 ; Ayres v. Chicago, etc , Railroad Co., 52 Iowa, 478 ; 3 N.W. Rep. 522 ; Conoveru. Still- well, 34 N. J. Law, 54; Hennessey v. Hill, 52 . Mathews, 42 Ind. 7 ; Smith v. Tyler, 51 Ind. 512 ; Fletcher v. Wurg- ler, 97 Ind. 223; Laboyteaux v. Swig- art, 103 Ind. 596, 3 N. E. Rep. 373; Miller v. Eldridge, 126 Ind. 461 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 132. A promise to pay one for what he is obliged to render has no consideration to support it. Peel- man v. Peelman, 4 Ind. 612; Ford v. Garner, 15 Ind. 298; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328." 3 Havana Drill Co. v. Ashurst (1893), 148 111. 115; 35 N. E. Rep. 873. §166 CONSIDERATION. 199 sideration for the mortgagee's agreement to cancel notes se- cured thereon. 1 § 166. The same subject continued. — Where one party to a contract refuses to perform it unless promised some further pay or benefit than the contract provides, and the promise is made, and such refusal and promise are one transaction, the promise is without consideration, unless the refusal was in- duced by substantial and unforeseen difficulties in the per- formance, which would cast upon the party additional burdens not anticipated by the parties when the contract was- made.' 1 Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 273 ; 25 S. W. Rep. 918. 2 King v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1105, the court saying: "In other words, a promise by one party to a subsisting contract to the opposite party to prevent a breach 'of the contract on his part is without consideration. The following cases sustain and illustrate the practical ap- plication of the rule. Ayres v. Chi- cago, etc., Railroad Co., 52 Iowa, 478; 3 N. W. Rep. 522; McCarty v. Ham- ilton, etc., Association, 61 Iowa, 287; 16 N. W. Rep. 114; Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co.,103 Mo. 578 ; 15 S.W.Rep. 844 ; Vanderbilt v. Schrey- er, 91 N.Y.392 ; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328; Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40; 22 N. E. Rep. 224; Wimer v. Overseers,etc.,104 Pa.St.317. If the al- legations of the complaint, when taken together, are in legal effect simply that the contractors finding, by the test of experience in the prosecution of the work, that they had agreed to do that which involved a greater ex- penditure of money than they calcu- lated upon, that they had made a los- ing contract, and thereupon notified the opposite party that they were un- able to proceed with the work, and he promised them extra compensa- tion if they would perform their con- tract, the case is within the rule stated, and the demurrer ought to have been sustained as to the first cause of action. It is claimed, how- ever, by the respondent, that such is not the proper construction of the complaint, and that its allegations bring the case within the rule adopted in several states, and at least ap- proved in our own, to the effect that if one party to a contract refuses to per- form his part of it unless promised some further pay or benefit than the contract provides, and such promise is made by the other party, it is sup- ported by a valid consideration, for the making of the new promise shows a rescission of the original contract and the substitution of another. In other words, that the party, by refus- ing to perform its contract, thereby subjects himself to an action for dam- ages, and the opposite party has his election to bring an action for the re- covery of such damages or to accede to the demands of his adversary and make the promise ; and if he does so it is a relinquishment of the original contract and the substitution of a new one. Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298; Bryant a.Lord, 19 Minn.396(Gil. 342) ; Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266 ; Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489; 11 N. W. Rep. 284; Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 440, 1 N. E. Rep. 122. The doctrine of these cases as it is frequently applied does not com- mend itself either to our judgment or 200 CONSIDERATION. §167 But where one party to a contract has by his acts so delayed the other party in the performance of his part of the contract that he is not legally bound to complete the contract within the stipulated time, and thereupon the former promises him extra pay if he will complete the contract within such time, and he so promises and performs, the promise of extra pay is sup- ported by a valid consideration. 1 § 167. Forbearance. — The forbearance to exercise a right for a definite time is a sufficient consideration. 2 An agree- our sense of justice, for where the re- fusal to perform and the promise to pay extra compensation for perform- ance of the contract are one transac- tion, and there are no exceptional circumstances making it equitable that an increased compensation should be demanded and paid, no amount of astute reasoning can change the plain fact that the party who refuses to per- form, and thereby coerces a promise from the other party to the contract to pay him an increased compensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do, takes an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party." 1 King v. Duluth, etc., E. Co., 63 N. W. Rep. 1105, the court saying: "What unforeseen difficulties and burdens will make a party's refusal to go for- ward with his contract equitable, so as to take the case out of the general rule and bring it within the excep- tion, must depend upon the facts of each particular case. They must be substantial, unforeseen, and not within the contemplation of the par- ties when the contract was made. They need not be such as would legal- ly justify the party in his refusal to perform his contract, unless promised extra pay, or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from the con- tract ; for they are sufficient if they are of such a character as to render the party's demand for extra pay manifestly fair, so as to rebut all in- ference that he is seeking to be re- lieved from an unsatisfactory contract, or to take advantage of the necessities of the opposite party to coerce from him a promise for further compensa- tion. Inadequacy of the contract price which is the result of an error of judgment, and not of some excus- able mistake of fact, is not sufficient. The cases of Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 108, where the unforeseen difficulty in the execution of the con- tract was quicksand, in place of ex- pected ordinary earth excavation, and Michaud v. McGregor, 63 N. W. Rep. 479, where the unforeseen obstacles were rocks below the surface of the lots to be excavated, which did not naturally belong there, but were placed there by a third party, and of the exist- ence of which both parties to the con- tract were ignorant when the contract was made, are illustrations of what un- foreseen difficulties will take a case out of the general rule." 2 Von Brandenstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Texas, 267 ; Shadburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355; Fraser v. Backus, 62 Mich. 540; Howen. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320; Hockenbury v. Meyers, 34 N. J. Law, 346 ; Atlantic Bank v. Franklin, 55 N. Y. 235; Foard v. Grinter (Ky.), 18 S. W. Rep. 1034; Perkins v. Proud, 62 Barb. 420 ; Traders' Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415; Rogers v. Wiley, 131 §168 CONSIDERATION. 201 ment between parties interested in a foreclosure sale, that all but one shall refrain from bidding, and permitting that one to become the purchaser, is a sufficient consideration for a mort- gage given by the purchaser on the property purchased. 1 The forbearance to file a mechanic's lien is a good consideration to support a promise to accept an order for payment, although there is nothing due the drawers of the order. 2 The relin- quishment of a right to a homestead entry on public land, and the dismissal and withdrawal of a written protest against the final proof of another, is a good and valid consideration in a written instrument for the payment of money.* § 168. Extension of time. — A promise to extend the time of payment of a debt is void unless founded upon a good consid- eration; and a payment of a part of a debt or the interest al- ready accrued, or an agreement to pay interest for the future, is not a sufficient consideration for such a promise; nor will the N. Y. 527; Heitsch «. Cole, 47 Minn. 320; McCullough v. Barr, 145 Pa. St. 459; Mygalt v. Tarbell, 78 Wis. 351; Hopkins ^.'Ensign, 122 NY. 144; Pel- ham v. Service, 45 Kan. 614; 26 Pac. Rep. 29; Smith v. Bibber, 82 Me. 34; Flanagan v. Mitchell, 10 N. Y. Supl. 234; Murdock v. Lewis, 26 Mo. App. 234 ; Lundberg v. Northwestern Eleva- tor Co., 42 Minn. 37; 43 N. W. Rep. 685 ; Tousey v. Moore, 79 Mich.574 ; 44 N. W. Rep. 958; Jones v. Sikes, 85 Ga. 546; 11 S. E. Rep. 664; Bell v. Bean, 75 Cal. 86. 1 Hopkins v. Ensign, 122 N. Y. 144. "We are also of the opinion that W.'s relinquishment of his right to bid at the sale was a sufficient consideration to support the mortgage. It is not essential that the consideration should import a gain or loss to either party. If the party in whose favor the con- tract was made foregoes some right or benefit it is sufficient." 2 Flanagan v. Mitchell, 10 N. Y. Supl. 234. "The real consideration here was forbearance on the part of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's theory of the action is that, relying on M.'s accept- ance, he did not take immediate steps to secure himself by a lien. This is certainly ample consideration, etc." The defendants sought to escape lia- bility on the ground that they owed the drawer of the order nothing when they agreed with plaintiff to accept. "Pelham v. Service (1891), 45 Kan. 614; 26Pac.Rep.29. "All [cases] affirm that contracts about the possession, improvements and relinquishment [forbearance] of rights of public land, when free from fraud, can be enforced, and constitute a good consideration." See, also, McCabe v. Caner, 68 Mich. 182; 35 N. W. Rep. 901; Olson v. Or- ton, 28 Minn. 36; 8 N. W. Rep. 878; Thompson v. Hanson, 28 Minn. 484; 11 N. W. Rep. 86; Lamb v. Daven- port, 18 Wall. 307; Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall. 291 ; Kennedy v. Shaw, 43 Mich. 359; 5 N. W. Rep. 396; Lapham v. Head, 21 Kan. 332; Moore v. Mc- intosh, 6 Kan. 39; Belle. Parks, 18 Kan. 152; Fessler v. Haas, 19 Kan. 216. 202 CONSIDERATION. §168 giving of a new obligation, with additional security, for part of the debt, be a good consideration for a promise to extend the time as to the residue. The discharge of a legal obligation by a debtor to his creditor is not sufficient consideration for the promise of the latter. 1 So, also, an executory agreement by the plaintiff with the defendant to accept in payment less than the whole amount of the debt is not obligatory without a fresh consideration to support it, and mere pay- ment of a part of the sum agreed on will not serve as a con- sideration. 2 But a promise to a person entitled to a distribu- tive share in excess of the other distributees, on account of ad- 1 Parmelee v. Thompson, 45 N.Y. 58. In Babcock v. Kuntzsch (1895), 32 N. Y. Supl. 663, Hardin, P. J., said: "No valid extension of the time of payment was shown by the evidence to have taken place prior to the com- mencement of the action." In Miller v. Holbrook, 1 Wend. 318, it was held that a promise to extend was not valid unless founded upon a good and suf- ficient consideration; also, "the prom- ise of a maker to pay part of a note when due and payment in pursuance thereof is not sufficient considera- tion." In Gibson v. Renne, 19 Wend. 389, the question of the sufficiency of a consideration to support a promise was raised, and, in dealing with it, Bronson, J., said: "The debt was due. The debtor says to the creditor, 'You promised, in consideration that I would discharge in part an existing and present duty, that you would give further time for the satisfaction of the residue.' 1 can not understand how this makes a good consideration for the promise. The discharge of a legal obligation by the debtor to the cred- itor can not be such an injury to the one, or benefit to the other, as will make what the law calls a 'sufficient consideration' for an agreement." In Manchester v. Van Brunt (City Ct. N. Y.), 19 N. Y. Supl. 685, it was said: "The promise to extend the time of payment of the note was void unless founded upon a good consideration, and the payment of $100, part of the amount due on the note, was not a good consider- ation for such promise." In Graham v. Negus, 55 Hun, 440, 8 N. Y. Supl. 679, it was said: "If the promises to pay in the future had been verbal only, as there was no consideration to sustain them, the plaintiffs, after accepting them, would have been at liberty at once to disregard the prom- ises, and commence an action for the recovery of their debt." In 2 Ran- dolph on Commercial Paper, p. 650, §964, it is said: "An agreement for an extension, to have such effect, must have a new and valid considera- tion, and without such consideration it will not discharge the surety." In Pabodie v. King, 12 Johns. 426, a par- tial payment was made upon the plaintiff's debt, and it was claimed there was an agreement in considera- tion thereof to "forbear to sue." The court said: "The promise to forbear was a nvilum pactum. In paying the fifty dollars, King did no more than he was legally bound to do ; and the promise, on the part of Pabodie, was without any benefit to him, and occa- sioned no loss to King." 2 Blalock v. Jackson 94 Ga. 469; 20 S. E. Rep. 346. § 169 CONSIDERATION. 203 vancements to them, to pay the excess if he will forbear to enforce his claim therefor, is based on a sufficient considera- tion. 1 § 169. Further illustrations. — A surety on a promissory note, at the request of the holder, refrained from taking from the principal debtor security to indemnify him from liability, in reliance upon the promise of the holder that, if he would so re- frain, he should be released from liability on the note. Except for such request and promise, the surety would and could have obtained such indemnity. It was held that there was a suffi- cient consideration for the promise to release. 2 Where two exe- cution creditors, each of whom claims priority in his levy upon certain property, agree to allow the property to be sold under one execution and to divide the proceeds, the release by the junior execution creditor is a sufficient consideration on his part to support the compromise agreement. 3 Where one party is engaged in a business venture with another, from which he may retire at will, his continuance therein is a suffi- cient consideration to uphold a promise to allow him an advan- tage not embraced within the terms of the original contract; and in such a case it may be inferred that the promisee con- tinued in the business upon the strength of the promise.* Forbearance, under an agreement to forbear, by a creditor, to present a claim to the executor of the will of a deceased person is a consideration for a promise on the part of the widow of the 'Fain v. Turner (Ky. 1895), 29 S. 'Rogers v. Wiley, 131 N. Y. 527, W. Rep. 628. the court saying: "A sufficient con- 2 Heitschu. Cole, 47 Minn. 320. "A sideration, however, for the promise valuable consideration, in the sense of the defendants to carry the stock of the law, may consist either in some without additional margin, was shown benefit resulting to the one party, or when it was made to appear that the in some forbearance, detriment, loss, plaintiff forebore his determination to or responsibility given, suffered, or immediately cover the stock and close undertaken by the other. Considera- his account without the risk of further tion means, not so much that our loss." See, also, Emery v. Wilson, 79 party is benefited, as that the other N. Y. 78; Clarke v. Meigs, 10 Bosw. suffers detriment." 337; Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. "Mygatt v. Tarbell, 78 Wis. 351. 135; White v. Smith, 54 N. Y. 522; See, also, Knox v. Webster, 18 Wis. Hess v. Rau, 95 N. Y. 359; Gillett v. 406; People v. Goss, 99 111. 355. Whiting, 120 N. Y. 402. 204 CONSIDERATION. §170 testator to pay such claim. 1 And the withdrawal of opposition to the probate of a will and the allowance of its probate, when there is ground for the opposition, is a consideration to support a promise on behalf of the devisees to pay a certain sum there- for. 2 A highway board agreed with a gas company, that if the board would give the company a license to open a highway in their jurisdiction, the company should make good the surface of the road and would pay the board a certain sum besides. It was held the contract was valid because the agreement of the board to allow the company to interfere with the surface of the road was a good consideration. 3 § 170. Forbearance to sue — Time. — A.n agreement to with- hold suit is a good consideration to support a promise to pay a debt, although no fixed and definite time is expressly agreed upon. 4 Thus an agreement by a creditor to withhold suit against his debtor is a good consideration to support a promise by a third party to pay the debt, although no fixed and definite time "of extension is expressly agreed on. 5 And what would 1 Shadburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355, but it is otherwise if there is no agree- ment to forbear. 2 Prater v. Miller, 25 Ala. 320. s Edgeware Highway Board v. Har- row District Gas Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 92. "The first objection is that the contract is nudum pactum for want of a consideration. The agreement is that if the plaintiffs would give to the de- fendants their license to open a cer- tain public highway the defendants would make good the surface of the road, etc. * * * There is both a benefit to the one party and a detriment to the other — a detriment to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as they are charged with the duty of repairing and maintaining the highway, and would have had to incur costs for this purpose ; and a benefit to the defend- ants, who could not have opened the highway without the consent of the plaintiffs, and who forebore to exer- cise their power of preventing the de- fendants from opening the highway." 4 Traders', etc., Bank v. Parker, 130 N.Y. 415 ; Walkers. Sherman, 11 Mete. 170 ; Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85 ; Hakes v. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 231 ; Cal- kins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320; Lons- dale v.Brown, 4 Wash.C.C. 148 ; Down- ing v. Funk, 5 Rawle, 69; Sid well v. Evans, 1 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 383 ; King v. "Upton, 4 Maine, 387 ; Eltingu. Yander- lyn, 4 Johns. 237; Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201 ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. ». Smith, 23 Hun, 535; Foard v. Grinter (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 1034 ; Prouty d. Wilson, 123 Mass. 297 ; Howe v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 2,84 ; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55 ; Boyd v. Frieze, 5 Gray, 553; Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 389; Pratt v. Hedden, 121 Mass. 116 Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85 Manter v. Churchill, 127 Mass. 31 Coles v. Pack, L. R. 5 C. P. 65 ; Older- shaw v. King, 2H.&N. 517. 5 Traders', etc., Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415. §171 CONSIDERATION. 205 be a reasonable time, if not always a question of fact, would be at least a mixed question of law and fact, depending for its solution upon the circumstances of each case. 1 And whenever there is an agreement to forbear bringing suit for a debt due, for an indefinite time, if followed by actual forbearance for a reasonable time, this is a good consideration for a promise to pay the debt by a person other than the debtor. 8 § 171. Extension — Paying interest — Surety's consent. — A promise to pay interest is a sufficient consideration for a promise to extend the time for the payment of a note. 8 But a promise to pay at a future time a debt already due, and which draws interest, is not a consideration for the extension of the time of payment when the rate of interest thereon is not changed. 4 A surety's consent to an extension by the creditor to the debtor of the time of paying the debt is a sufficient con- sideration for a promise by the creditor to the surety to pro- cure a chattel mortgage from the debtor to secure the debt for which the surety has assumed liability. 6 And, likewise, an 'Traders', etc., Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415. 2 Howe v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284 ; Prouty (7. Wilson, 123 Mass. 297; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55 ; Boyd v. Frieze, 5 Gray, 553; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320; Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201. 3 Moore v. Redding (1892), 69 Miss. 841, the court saying: "It is wholly immaterial what rate of interest is agreed on by the parties. It may be the same, or a greater or less, rate than that stipulated for by the original contract. The right to have the use of money for a defined time, and the right to have interest at any agreed rate, for any defined time, are alike deemed valuable in law; and reci- procal promises — one by the creditor, to permit the money to remain on interest, and the other by the debtor, to retain it on interest — mutually sup- port each the other. Brown v. Pro- phit, 53 Miss. 649." 'Stickler v. Giles, 9 Wash. 147; 37 Pac. Rep. 293, per Hoyt, J. : "As to the question of consideration for the contract of extension, it is claimed that the agreement to pay interest constituted such consideration. That an agreement to pay interest on an account which would not otherwise draw interest would constitute such consideration is beyond question. It is equally clear that such an agree- ment would constitute no considera- tion if, without it, the account would draw the same rate of interest. Was this account of such a nature, at the time this conversation was had, that it would draw interest without any express promise on the part of the ap- pellant to pay it? We think it was." s Resseter v. Waterman, 151 111. 169 ; 37 N. E. Rep. 875, where Shope, J., said : "It needs the citation of no authority that if the transaction was of advantage to Waterman, or detrimental or to the disadvantage of Resseter, it would 206 CONSIDERATION. §172 agreement to extend the time of payment of a debt is sufficient consideration for the execution by a third party of his note to the creditor as collateral security for the payment of such debt. 1 So, also, a promise by a third mortgagee to forbear foreclosing is sufficient to support a promise by a second mortgagee to keep the interest on all senior mortgages paid. 2 To constitute a for- bearance to sue a third person a good consideration for a prom- ise by a stranger to the original consideration, it must have been in pursuance of an agreement to forbear ; s and the mere forbearance to sue is not enough. 4 But an actual forbearance to sue may often, in connection with other facts, be evidence of an agreement to forbear, and, as such, form a good consid- eration for a promise. 6 § 172. The same subject continued. — An agreement between the maker of a note and the payee that the latter will extend the time of payment, and that the former will pay interest dur- ing the time extended, is binding without additional consider- form a sufficient consideration for the promise. That Resseter was induced thereby to consent to the extension of the time of payment to Severson, and continue his liability as surety, and forego his right to then compel pay- ment out of Severson's property, which, by the failure of Waterman to keep his promise, and subsequent conduct in violation of it, subjected Resseter to the loss, is not questioned. Bunting v. Darbyshire, 75 111. 408; Buchanan v. International Bank, 78 111 . 500 ; Burch 7>.Hubbard, 48 111. 164. " 1 Nichols, etc., Co. ;;.Dedrick(Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1110. 2 Burke v. Dillin (Iowa 1894), 61 N. W. Rep. 370: "It is well settled that an agreement to for- bear, for a time, proceedings at law or in equity to enforce a well-founded claim, is a valid consideration for a promise. 1 Parsons on Contracts, § 441 ; American and English Ency- clopedia of Law, p. 836; Lomax v. Smyth, 50 Iowa, 223. See Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538; 27 N. E. Rep. 256. Whatever may be said as to Rice, Lodge & Henry, by carrying out the contract, would not be doing what they were in any event obligated to do, as they were under no legal ob- ligation to pay the taxes, or to pay the interest on the Squire mortgage, in the absence of this agreement." 3 Shadburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55; Me- corney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85 ; Walker v. Sherman, 11 Mete. 170; Breed v. Hillhause, 7 Conn. 523; Manter v. Churchill, 127 Mass. 31; Von Bran- denstein v. Ebensberger, 71 Texas, 267; Rue v. Meirs, 43 N. J. Eq. 377. 4 Shadburne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355; Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85; Foard v. Grinter (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 1034. 5 Walker v. Sherman, 11 Mete. 170; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; Me- corney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85; Rue u. Meirs, 43 N. J. Eq. 377. §172 CONSIDERATION. 207 ation, and will release a surety who does not consent to the ex- tension. 1 But an agreement by the holder of a note not to sue thereon for a certain length of time, supported only by the debtor's promise to pay within that time, is not binding;' and where a father gave to the owners of money embezzled by his son a note secured by mortgage, for the amount thereof, it is error to instruct, in an action on the mortgage, that there was no consideration therefor, the evidence warranting a find- ing that the obligations were given at the request of the son, 1 Benson v. Phipps, 87 Texas, 578; 29 S. W. Eep. 1061, per Gaines, C. J. : "Whether a mere agreement for an extension by the debtor is sufficient to support a promise to extend by the creditor is a question upon which the authorities are not in accord. We are of opinion, however, that the question ishould be resolved in the affirmative, at least in cases in which it is contem- plated by the contract that the debt should bear interest during the time for which it is extended. If the new agreement were that the debtor should pay, at the end of the period agreed upon for the extension, precisely the same sum which was due at the time the agreement was entered into, the case might be different. But a prom- ise to do what one is not bound to do, or to forbear what one is not bound to forbear, is a good consideration for a contract. In case of a debt, which bears interest either by convention or by operation of law, when an exten- sion for a definite period is agreed upon by the parties thereto, the con- tract is that the creditor will forbear suit during the time of the extension, and the debtor foregoes his right to pay the debt before the end of that time. The latter secures the benefit of the forbearance ; the former secures an interest bearing investment for a definite period of time. One gives up his right to sue for a period, in con- sideration of a promise to pay inter- est during the whole of the time ; the other relinquishes his right to pay during the same period, in considera- tion of the promise of forbearance. To the question why this is not a con- tract, we think no satisfactory answer can be given. It seems to us it would be a binding contract, even if the agreement were that the debt should be extended at a reduced rate of in- terest. That an agreement by the debtor and creditor for an extension for a definite time, the debt to bear interest at the same rate, or at an in- creased, but not usurious, rate, is bind- ing upon both, is held in many cases, some of which we here cite : Wood v. Newkirk, 15 Ohio St. 295; Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240; Davis v. Lane, 10 N. H. 156; Stallings v. Johnson, 27 Ga. 564; Robinson v. Miller, 2 Bush, 179 ; Reynolds v. Barnard, 36 111. App. 218 ; Chute u. Pattee, 37 Maine, 102 ; Reese v. Berrington, 2 Ves. Jr. 540. See, also, Crossman v. Wohleben, 90 111. 537; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio, 348. In many cases which seemingly support the contrary doc- trine, there was a mere promise by the creditor to forbear, without any corresponding promise on part of the debtor not to pay during the time of the promised forbearance. In such cases it is clear that there is no con- sideration for the promise." 2 Austin Real Est. Co. v. Bahn, 87 Texas 582; 30 S. W. Rep. 430, distin- guishing Benson v. Phipps, 87 Texas, 578 ; 29 S. W. Rep. 1061. 208 CONSIDERATION. §173 and that it was understood that the giving of them suspended any action against the son for the debt until maturity of the note. 1 § 173. Nudum pactum — Promise of indulgence. — A mere promise to relinquish part of a debt, or, what is the same thing, to take part in discharge, or for an assignment of the whole, is nudum pactum, and without legal obligation. 2 Thus, where the attorney for heirs, half-owners in a mill, which plaintiff, the other half-owner, was operating, having written 1 Saalfield v. Manrow, 165 Pa. 114 ; making of the memorandum there ex- 30 Atl. Eep. 823. 8 Day v. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199, 201 ; 7 Atl. Eep. 365 ; Tulane v. Clif- ton, 47 N. J. Eq. 351; 20 Atl. Rep. 1086; on appeal Clifton v. Tulane, 48 N. J. Eq. 310; 24 Atl. Rep. 131. In Isham v. Therasson (N. J. Eq. 1895), 30 Atl. Rep. 969, a mortgagee gave the mortgagor a memorandum as follows : "I agree with you to assign your * * * mortgage * * * to any party you may desire, in consideration of receiving from you or them the sum of $250. * * * I do this in consideration of the taxes, assessments, and charges you have already paid and now due on the property." The administrator of W. repeatedly called upon T. to pay the $250, and take an assignment of the mortgage. T. expressed a willingness to do so, but failed to produce the money. After T. had had ample op- portunity to pay the money, and take the assignment, the administrator as- signed the mortgage to L, who brought suit to foreclose it. There- upon T. tendered I. $250, and de- manded an assignment of the mort- gage. It was held that the memoran- dum, regarded as a promise to assign, was not supported by valuable con- sideration." McGill, Ch., said: "The memorandum purports to have been made in consideration of previous payments, by Mr. Therasson, of taxes, etc., charged on the mortgaged premises, and of the fact that at the isted unpaid taxes incumbering the property. To constitute a valuable consideration, which will render a promise enforcible, the promisor must thereby acquire some benefit or ad- vantage, and the promisee, or some one for him, must in consequence of the promise surrender some right or suffer loss or disadvantage. Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54. Mr. Winans did not reap any benefit or advantage from his promise, nor did Mr. Therasson suffer any disadvantage or loss because of it. Mr. Therasson did not pay the taxes and assessments in reliance upon the promise, nor did he suffer taxation because of it. The reference in the memorandum to Mr. Therasson's payment of taxes and as- sessments, as the consideration for his promise to assign upon being paid §250, was not reference to a valuable legal consideration, but merely to matter of sympathetic inducement, as though the promisee had said : 'You have been burdened with the pay- ment of taxes and assessments, and the mortgaged lands are yet charged with taxes and assessments which have not been paid. Therefore, when you pay me $250, I will assign my mortgage to you, or to another whom you may procure to take it.' The promise thus made was clearly volun- tary, and incapable of enforcement, prior to the payment or tender of the $250." § 174 CONSIDERATION. 209 to plaintiff about the rent then in arrears, received an answer that an agent of the heirs had recently been at the mill, and expressed a wish not to take advantage of plaintiff, but to sell the mill and adjust matters; and the agent had three years be- fore combated plaintiff's desire to give up the mill, saying that, if he would continue to operate it, the heirs would, when they sold it, do what was right by him, it was held that there was no foundation for a demand on the heirs for wages for operating the mill, less profits made, the agent's promise be- ing merely one of indulgence as to the rent. 1 A naked prom- ise as of course, by a party to an award to allow to the other party an additional credit for an item, if it were inadvertently omitted by the arbitrators from the award, is without consid- eration, and hence not binding. 2 Except in the case of com- mercial paper unsealed promises do not imply any legal con- sideration. Accordingly, a mere written promise to pay the debt of another is not binding, if there be no evidence of con- sideration outside of the promise. 8 § 174. Disputed and doubtful claims. — The basis of forbear- ance is the giving up either a legal right or else a disputed and doubtful claim. 4 Thus the compromising a suit after ver- dict is a sufficient consideration to support a promise, although the suit is to try a question respecting which the law is doubt- ful or is supposed by the parties to be doubtful. 6 1 Glover v. Tousley, 101 Mich. 229 ; 299 ; Dunckel v. Failing, 5 N. Y. Supl. 59 N. W. Eep. 620. 504; Wahl v. Barnum, 116 N. Y. 87 2 Patton v. Garrett, 116 N. Car. 847 ; Phillips v. Pullen, 50 N. J. Law, 439 21 S. E. Eep. 679. Schaben v. Brunning, 74 Iowa, 102 3 Pike v. Van Riper (N. J. 1894), 30 Antoine v. Smith, 40 La. Ann. 560 Atl. Eep. 529. United States Bank v. Homestead 1 Fire Ins. Co. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. Bank, 18 N.Y. Supl. 758 ; Battle v. Mc- 564 ; Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Texas, 677 Lukens' Appeal, 143 Pa. St. 386 Leavitt v. Dodge, 16 N. Y. Supl. 309 French v. French, 84 Iowa,655 ; 15 L.E A. 300; Smith v. Farra, 21 Ore. 395 Arthur, 49 Fed. Eep. 715; Eenwick v. Wheeler, 48 Fed. Eep. 431; Dunbar v. Tirey, —Texas App.— ; 17 S. W. Eep. 1116 ; Creutz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 429 (1891) ; Shaw B.Chicago E.Co.,82 Iowa, 199 ; 47 Blackwell». Bainbridge, 19N.Y. Supl. N. W. Eep. 1004; Coffey v. Emigh, 15 681; Prout v. Pittsfleld Fire Dist., 154 Colo. 184; Potts v. Polk County, 80 Mass. 450; Bunn v. Bartlett, 8 N. Y. Iowa, 401. Supl. 160; Emery «. Royal, 117 Ind. 6 Prout v. Pittsfleld Fire District, 154 14 210 CONSIDERATION. §175 § 175. Further illustrations. — Where an action was brought for criminal conversation, and, pending suit, the parties agreed to settle in consideration of a fixed sum being paid at a certain time, and subsequently, this sum not having been paid, suit was brought to enforce the agreement, it was held that the agreement was supported by sufficient consideration. 1 And where a woman agreed to abandon her claim upon an alleged promise of marriage upon the offer by the man of an annuity, 2 this was a consideration. So, also, is the concession of such a claim without litigation. 8 And a note given in compromise of a disputed claim, the validity of which is doubtful, is sup- Mass. 450, where the court said : "The general power to compromise doubt- ful and disputed claims is necessa- rily incident to the power to sue and the liability to be sued. If a claim against the defendant can not be adjusted by way of compromise, neither could a claim in its favor. If this doctrine were applied generally to all claims, the result would be that in all diputed cases the defendant must perforce engage in a litigation, the expense of which would be certain, but the result doubtful. The defend- ant would be under the necessity of insisting at all hazards upon a judicial determination of all its controverted rights, and would be bound to pursue or resist all doubtful claims until final adjudication by the court of last re- sort. * * * * Whether the result of a litigation depends chiefly upon the ascertainment of the facts by the verdict of a jury, or upon the determination of the rules of law found .applicable by the court, in either case there is an uncertainty un- til the decision is reached." See, also, Cushing v. Stoughton, 6 Cush. 389; Drake v. Stoughton, 6 Cush. 393; Matthews v. Westborough, 131 Mass. 521 ; Inhabitants of Medway ». Mil- ford, 21 Pick. 349; Bean v. Jay, 23 Maine, 117; Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193; Agnew v. Brail, 124 111.312; Board of Supervisors v. Bowen, 4 Lans. 24; Supervisors of Chenango v. Birdsall, 4 Wend. 453; Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 4 Mete. 270; Cobb v. Arnold, 8 Mete. 403; Al- lis v. Billings, 2 Cush. 19; Leach v. Fobes, 11 Gray, 506; Kerr v. Lucas, 1 Allen, 279; Easton v. Easton, 112 Mass. 438 ; Riggs v. Hawley, 116 Mass. 596; Wilton v. Eaton, 127 Mass. 174; Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 99; Miles v. New Zealand Co., L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 266 ; Ex parte Banner, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 480; Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559. 1 Phillips v. Pullen, 50 N. J. Law, 439, where the court said : "The agreement for forbearance was car- ried out and the situation produced was this: The damages were liqui- dated so that P. could obtain and S. would be answerable for, no more than the fixed sum ; and the proceed- ings in the pending suit were fore- borne and the suit might, on demand, be discontinued. It therefore fur- nished a sufficient consideration for the promise to pay." See also, Con- over v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54; Union, etc., Co. v. Erie, etc., 37 N. J. Law, 23 ; Collins v. Gibbs, 2 Burr. 899. 2 Keenan v. Handley, 2 D. J. & S. 283. 3 Stracy v. Bank, 6 Bing. 754. § 176 CONSIDERATION. 211 ported by sufficient consideration. 1 An agreement to give up all the land covered by a mortgage, by an amicable foreclosure suit, is a sufficient consideration for an agreement to accept the land in full satisfaction of the debt, including any deficiency that might remain after the foreclosure sale. 2 The withdrawal of a distress for rent, some rent being due, although the amount was disputed, was held a good consideration for a promise to pay a certain sum. 8 And even though one does not receive all that is legally due him, yet where the sum actually due is in dispute, the avoidance of litigation is a sufficient consideration to sup- port a settlement fairly made with full knowledge of all the facts. 4 The settlement of a dispute between the owners of min- ing cross-veins, although ignorant of their legal rights, is a con- sideration to support a voluntary agreement for the amicable adjustment of the controversy. 5 Where a note was given in settlement of a threatened suit on a prior note given for a machine after objection to the working of the machine, and a test and knowledge that it failed to do good work, it was held a valid note. 6 As a result of the authorities, a doubtful or disputed claim, sufficient to constitute a good consideration for an executory contract of compromise, is one honestly and in good faith asserted, arising from a state of facts upon which a cause of action can be predicated, with the reasonable belief on the part of the party asserting it that he has a fair chance of sustaining his claim, and concerning which an honest contro- versy may arise, although in fact the claim may be wholly un- founded.' § 176. Forbearance where the right or claim is doubtful. — A promise to give something for the compromise of a claim, abput which there is merely a dispute and controversy, and for which there is no legal foundation whatever, is void. 8 The 1 French v. French, 84 Iowa, 655 ; 15 6 Dunbar v. Tirey (Texas, 1891), 17 L. R. A. 300. S. W. Rep. 1116. 2 Renwick v. Wheeler, 48 Fed. Rep. 7 Smith v. Farra, 21 Ore. 405. 431. 8 Moon 1). Martin, 122 Ind. 211; 3 Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983. Emery v. Royal, 117 Ind. 299; Jarvia 4 Battle v. McArthur, 49 Fed. Rep. v. Sutton, 3 Ind. 289; Schnell v. Nell, 715. 17 Ind. 29; Spahr v. Hollingshead, 8 6 Coffee v. Emigh, 15 Colo. 184. Blackf . 415 ; Smith v. Boruff , 75 Ind. 212 CONSIDERATION. § 176 husband of a life tenant, after her death, refused to surrender possession, asserting a claim to the property, and in order to obtain possession the remainder-man gave him a mortgage on the property. It was held that the mortgage was obtained by enforcing a void claim and that it was invalid. 1 Where a difference having arisen between the parties to an illegal gam- bling contract, as to who should bear the losses incurred in furtherance thereof, and paid by one, and as a compromise of the business it was agreed that each should pay a certain sum, this was an invalid compromise, as the only claim each had against the other was a void one, insufficient to sustain a promise. 2 Where a party refuses to cancel a mortgage which he wrongfully insists is not paid, his forbearance to insist upon an examination as to whether it has been paid or not will not be a consideration, because if it has been paid his right to re- fuse to cancel it is invalid and void. 3 Where a judgment debtor wrongfully obtains a satisfaction of the judgment from the creditor, the surrender of the instrument of satisfaction, forms no consideration for a promise. 4 A promise to conduct proceedings in bankruptcy against a person in such a manner as to injure his credit as little as possible is no consideration for a promise to pay the costs. 5 Where a claim against a town for damages is without foundation, because no action lies 412; Coy v. Stacker, 31 Ind. 161; v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449; Haynes v. Kidder v. Blake, 45 N. H. 530; Thorn, 29 N. H. 386, 141; Dunbar v. Pitkin*. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294 ; North v. Maden,13N. H. 311 ; Stewart?'. Ahren- Forest, 15 Conn. 400; Enimitsburg R. feldt, 4 Denio, 189; Anthony v. Boyd, Co. it. Donoghue, 67 aid. 383; Demars 15 E. I. 495. v. Musser, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 418; ] Creutz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 429. Creutz«.Heil,89Ky.429;Pottsi>.Polk 2 Everingham v. Meighan, 55 "Wis. County, 80 Iowa, 401 ; Pitkin v. Noyes, 354. 48 N. H. 294, the court saying: "The 3 Smith v. Boruff, 75'Ind. 412. surrender or discharge of a claim, 4 Crosby v. Wood, 6 N. Y. 369. which is utterly without foundation, This case might also have been de- and known to be so, is not a good con- cided on the ground that the debtor sideration for a compromise ; but it is in surrendering the paper was only otherwise if the claims are doubtful." doing what in law he was bound to do, Tucker v. Ronk, 43 Iowa, 80; Sullivan which is no consideration. v, Collins, 18 Iowa, 228 ; Jones v. Ash- 5 Bracewell v. Williams, L. R. 2 C. burnham, 4 East, 455 ; Smith v. Alger, 1 P. 196. This result was arrived at be- B. & Ad. 603; Wade*. Simeon, 2 C. B. cause the promise really amounted to 548; Gould v. Armstrong, 2 Hall, 266; one not to abuse the process of the Cabot u. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83; Warder court. $177 CONSIDERATION. 213 against it therefor, this claim will not support a promise by the electors of the town, assembled in town meeting, to pay tho same, as the claim is not doubtful but void. 1 § 177. Dismissing a suit. — Where legal proceedings have been instituted, the dismissal of them constitutes a considera- tion for the compromise agreement, regardless of the validity of the claim sued on, and whether the suit could have been prosecuted to a successful issue or not. 8 1 Morey v. Town of Newfane, 8 Barb. 645, the court saying: "It has been repeatedly said by courts, that the compromise of a ' doubt- ful claim ' will support a promise to pay. It is not very easy to de- termine what sort of claim is in- tended by this expression. It is clear it need not be a valid claim either in law or equity. May it be entirely without foundation ? Where a suit has been actually commenced, and is pending, it would seem that its settle- ment will constitute a sufficient con- sideration, although there should be no probable or plausible ground for the action. * * * * The discon- tinuance of a pending suit appears of itself to be sufficient, without regard to the nature of the claim. But in a case where no proceedings have been instituted, the mere assertion of a claim, having no plausible ground for its support, could hardly prevent a promise to pay from being regarded as a nudum pactum. But how much or what foundation a claim must have to elevate it from a baseless to a doubtful claim, which will support a promise, it is difficult to say. In the case of Russell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 504, the compromise of a disputed claim, not in suit, was held to sustain a promise. Judge Cowan there says, no one would think of de- nying that at least the dispute be- tween the parties was doubtful, and that probably tbe law was against the defendant on the facts disclosed by their evidence. It is enough, however, that it was doubtful. This language seems that the word doubtful, as used, in this connection, has some meaning — that the claim must have some probable foundation — must be really doubtful. This being so, if the case, instead of being doubtful, is clear in the judgment of the court, and free from doubt against the claim, it fol- lows that the compromise could not be sustained." 2 Clark v. Turnbull (1885), 47 N. J. Law, 265, the court saying: "This rule, both in England and America, seems to be without exception, in the absence of fraud or duress," and calling attention to the diver- sity in judicial opinion as to the degree of strength requisite in a claim to make a compromise of it a good consideration where the claim is not actually in suit. Longridge v. Dor- ville, 5 B. & Al. 117; Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641; Cooper v. Parker, 14 C. B. 118; Morey v. Town of Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Sigsworth v. Coulter, 18 111. 204; Grandin v. Grandin, 49 N. J. Law, 508, 510; Stewart v. Ahrenfeldt, 4 Denio, 189, the court saying: "The plain- tiff is right in his law, that the settlement of a suit, or the compro- mise of a doubtful claim, is a good consideration for a promise to pay money." Moon v. Martin, 122 Ind. 211, the court saying: "There is a difference between compromising a suit that has been instituted in good faith and settling a claim asserted by 214 CONSIDERATION. §178 § 178. Mutual promises. — A promise may constitute the con- sideration for another promise. 1 But in order that one prom- ise may be the consideration for another, both promises must be concurrent in point of time and both parties must be bound. 2 But while both promises must be binding, there need not be the same remedy to both parties. Thus an infant's promise may be the consideration for a promise, although the infant may elect to plead infancy. 3 And a contract may be unenforci- one againBt another." See, also, Flan- 533; Barringer v. Warden, 12 Cal. 311. nagan v. Kilcome, 58 N. H. 443, where it is ruled that "A promise to pay a sum certain, upon the discon- tinuance of a pending suit, by the promisee, is prima facie founded on a good consideration." Contra, Wade v. Simeon, 2 C. B. 548; Tooley i>. Windham, Cro. Eliz. 206; Loyd v. Lee, 1 Strange, 94; Haynes v. Thorn, 28 N. H. 386; Kidder v. Blake, 45 N. H. 530. 1 Flanders v. Wood, 83 Texas, 277, 280; 18 S. W. Rep. 572; Baker v. Kan- sas City R. Co., 91 Mo. 152; 3 S. W. Rep. 486; Pryor v. Hunter, 31 Neb. 678 ; 48 N.W. Rep.736 ; Siddall v. Clark, 89 Colo. 321 ; 26 Pac. 829; Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N.Y. 38 ; Livingstone. Rogers, 1 Cai. 583 ; Briggs v. Tillotson, 8 Johns. 304; Keep v. Goodrich, 12 Johns. 397; Tucker D.Woods, 12 Johns. 190; White v. Demilt, 2 Hall, 405 ; Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend. 562; Missisquoi Bank v. Sabin,48 Vt. 239; Babcockt*. Wilson, 17 Maine, 372; Aldrich v. Lyman, 6 R.I. 98; Commissioners v. Perry, 5 Ohio, 57; Nott v Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 270; Boies v. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 387; Leach v. Keach, 7 Iowa, 232; Craw- ford v. Paine, 19 Iowa, 172; Downey v. Hinchman, 25 Ind. 453; Bruce v. Smith, 44 Ind. 1 ; Funk t>. Hough, 29 III. 145; Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629; Whitehead v. Potter, 4 Ired. L. 257; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Texas, 512; Rice v. Sims, 8 Rich. L. 416; Howe v. u'Mally, 1 Murphy, 287; 3 Am. Dec. 693 ; Congregational Society r. Perry, 6 N. H. 164 •; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 2 Utica R. Co. v. Brinckerhoff, 21 Wend. 139; Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Caines, 583, Tucker v. Woods, 12 Johns. 190; Keep v. Goodrich, 12 Johns. 397;Efneru. Shaw, 2 Wend. 567; Lester v. Jewett, 12 Barb. 502; Townsend v. Fisher, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.), 47; Flanders v. Wood, 83 Texas, 277; 18 S. W. Rep. 572; James v. Fulcrod, 5 Texas, 512. "The promise of each must be concurrent and obligatory at the same time to render either bind- ing, and should be so stated in the declaration." Nelson, Ch. J., in Utica R. Co. v. Brinckerhoff, 21 Wend. 139. "The legal principle that contracts must be mutual, that they must bind both parties or neither, does not then mean that in every case each party must have the same rem- edy for a breach by the other. Cove- nant may lie against one, when only assumpsit can be maintained against the other. Nor does the principle mean that when a contract is written each party must sign it. It is true that when a contract consists of mu- tual promises, both parties must be bound, or neither is; but in no case, when the consideration is a covenant or a promise, is the form of the under- taking material. It is its substance." Strong, J., in Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. St. 504, 516. 8 "The numerous decisions which have been had in this country justify the settlement of the following defi- nite rule as one that is subject to no exceptions. The only contract bind- §179 CONSIDERATION. 215 ble as to one party as within the statute of frauds, while the same contract is enforcible as to the other because of his signa- ture in writing. 1 § 179. The same subject continued — College endowment bond. — A bond payable after the maker's death to a college for its endowment, accepted by the college, rests upon a sufficient consideration, and may be enforced after the maker's death. 8 ing on an infant is the implied con- tract for necessaries. The only act which he is under a legal disability to perform is the appointment of an at- torney. All other acts and contracts, executed or executory, are voidable or confirmable by him at his election." 1 Am. Lead. Cas., 5th ed., 300. See, also, Curtin v. Patton, 11 Serg. & Eaw. 305; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Pa. St. 428 ; Patchin v. Cromach, 13 Ver. 330 ; Vaughan v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600; Shrop- shire v. Burns, 46 Ala. 108; Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256; Fetrow *. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148 ; Fonda v. Van Home, 15 Wend. 631 ; Scott v. Buch- anan, 11 Humph. 467; Cole v. Pen- noyer, 14 111. 158; Cummings v. Pow- ell, 8 Texas, 80; Mustard v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt. 329. 'Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; Justice v . Lang, 42 N. Y. 493 ; Wor- rall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Parton v. Crofts, 16 C. B. N. S. 11 ; Farwell v. Lowther, 18 111. 252; Hodson v. Car- ter, 3 Pinney, 212; Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452. "The weight of author- ity from adjudicated cases will be found to fully sustain the doctrine that a contract may not bind one party, in consequence of his omitting to sign it according to the statute of frauds ; and yet he may sue the other party who has complied with the act." Dewey, J., in Old Colony B. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.i, 25, 32. See Wilkinson v. Heavenrich (1886), 58 Mich. 574, where a great many author- ities on both sides of this question are collected and discussed. But this subject is more germane to the stat- ute of frauds, and will be treated thereunder. "Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N. E. Rep. 427, the court saying: "The case of Garrigus v. Home, etc., Society, 3 Ind. App. 91 ; 28 N. E. Rep. 1009, bears a strong an- alogy to the case at bar upon the ques- tion of the sufficiency of such a con- sideration. In that case the society filed a claim against the estate of Eliz- abeth Storer, deceased, on an instru- ment in the form of a note, by which she had promised to pay to said socie- ty, out of her estate, one month after her death, the sum of |600, 'to advance the cause of missions, and to induce others to contribute for that purpose.' A demurrer having been overruled to the claim, it was urged, on appeal to this court, that the instrument was without sufficient consideration, and that the action could not be maintained. This court ruled, however, that the promise could not be held void for want of consideration,citing in support of its ruling the cases of Johnston v. Wabash College, 2 Ind. 555, and Roche v. Roanoke, etc., Seminary, 56 Ind. 198, in which cases instruments of a similar character to those in the present case were adjudged to be founded upon a sufficient consideration to sustain an action for their collection. In the case of Roche v. Seminary, supra, the supreme court expressly held that the instrument required no further con- sideration to support it than 'the ac- 216 CONSIDERATION. §179 So, also, in a well considered Texas decision, a demand for ac- commodation in a sleeping-car, and a promise on the part of complishment of the object in aid of which the money was promised,' which, in that case, as in this, was to go to the endowment fund of an insti- tution of learning. The case of Gam- mon, etc., Seminary v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 85 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 341, is easily dis- tinguishable from the case before us, as well as from the cases cited. In that case there had been no delivery of the instrument sued upon, and it contained a mere promise to give something. It was held not to be a valid gift inter vivos, as there had been no delivery to the payee, and as the promise was purely one to make a gift, and not a contract. In the case at bar there had not only been a delivery of the in- strument, but it is expressly averred that the same had been accepted upon the terms stipulated, and that the acceptance had been entered of record by the appellee, to say nothing of the difference between a promise to give something in the future and an ob- ligation to pay upon a valid consider- ation. The principle upon which promises of the character of those em- braced in the present case are held to be valid is the reciprocal undertaking on the part of the promisor to pay and the promisee to perform something of value to the promisor, though the value may only be of indirect benefit to the latter, such as the obligation in the present case that the appellee will hold and apply the funds prom- ised in compliance with the terms of the contract. The benefit to the prom- isor to be derived from the perform- ance of the promise may consist in the introduction into the community in which he resides or is interested something which will permanently enhance the general value of property in such community, or will elevate the moral or educational standing thereof. On the other hand, the con- sideration may lie in the assumption of certain risks and the incurring of expenditures upon the faith of the promise on the part of the obligee. In either case, and, a fortiori, when the two are combined, the essence of the validity of the consideration is found in the promise to pay, and the acceptance of the same. Nor will it do to say that there is no method of enforcing the performance of the duty or obligation assumed by the promises in such cases. Courts of equity have ample powers to coerce the applica- tion of the funds arising from sub- scriptions or bonds, such as those in controversy, to the accomplishment of the purpose expressed in the con- tract. The acceptance of the obliga- tion imposed creates a trust incapable of being subsequently renounced, and which may be enforced by proper le- gal proceedings. Xor is it necessary that the obligation of the trustee should be performed in advance of the payment of the fund, for the very purpose of the subscription is to ena- ble such party to perform the duty imposed ; and hence the mere retain- ing of the instrument and the institu- tion of suit upon the same is regarded as sufficient prima facie evidence of such acceptance. Carnahan v. Tou- sey, 93 Ind. 561 ; Ooppage v. Gregg, 127 Ind. 359; 2G N. E. Rep. 903; 1 Lewin on Trusts, p. 200, and note 1 ; 1 Perry on Trusts (4th ed.), § 259. The views we have expressed as to the va- lidity of such a promise as that sought to be enforced in this action, and the sufficiency of the consideration there- for, are fully supported by the decis- ions of able courts in other jurisdic- tions, as well as by eminent writers. Thus, it was said in Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427, which was an action on a note given to the college : 'But it is quite sufficient to create a §179 CONSIDERATION. 217 the employe of the car company to furnish it, constitute a con- tract; the mutual obligations and promises between passenger consideration that the other party, the payee, should have assumed an obligation in consequence of receiv- ing the note, which he was compella- ble either at law or in equity to per- form, unless the promisor should be able to show, when sued, that the payee had refused, or was unable, or had unreasonably neglected, to per- form the engagement on his part ; in which cases a defense might be raised on the ground of a failure of the con- sideration. The defense is not put upon that ground, and so it must be presumed that the corporate body to whom the promise is made has applied its funds to the purpose for which they were raised, or is ready and willing to do it whenever the different contrib- utors to it shall have performed their engagements. In a court of equity of general jurisdiction, they could be compelled to discharge their duty. Without such a court, they would be subjected to a loss of their charter by refusal or neglect, for without doubt the legislature are the visitors of all corporations founded by them for public purposes, where there is no in- dividual founder or donor, and may direct judicial process against them for abuses or neglects which, by common law, would cause a for- feiture of their charters. It cer- tainly, then, would seem that ev- ery contributor to the funds of a corporation authorized by law to re- ceive moneys and apply them to the improvements, in most essential points, of the community to which he belongs, has his recompense in his share of the public good resulting from them; and if by means of his contribution, or his solemn promise to pay, the body to whom he has pledged his word should encounter expense, become under legal obliga- tions, or otherwise pursue the intent and purpose of the legislaturein grant- ing them the charter, this is a suffi- cient legal consideration to support such a promise. In this respect the principles of common honesty can not be at variance with the law of the land.' In Ladies' Institute v. French, 16 Gray, 196, which was a suit upon a college subscription, the court said: ' The second objection is that the promises of the defendants, being mere subscriptions to the funds of the institute, are without consideration, and therefore void. Subscriptions of this character have been made the subject of litigation in many instances, and the earlier cases in our reports contain dicta some of which have not been sanctioned by later decisions. But in the cases of Amherst Acad- emy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427; Will- iams College v. Danforth, 12 Pick. 541, and Thompson v. Page, 1 Mete. 565, their validity is established, and the ground of it is definitely stated. It is held that by accepting such a subscription the promisee agrees on his part with the subscribers that he will hold and appropriate the funds subscribed in conformity with the terms and objects of the subscription, and thus mutual and independent promises are made, which constitute a legal and sufficient consideration for each other. They are thus held to rest upon a well-settled principle in respect to concurrent promises.' In Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 189, which was also a suit upon a college subscription, it was said: 'A legal consideration may consist in loss, damage, or inconvenience sustained by the party to whom the promise is made, or of benefit or advantage to the party promising. The amount of the consideration is unimportant ; nor is it necessary, in this state, that it should appear upon the face of the con- 218 CONSIDERATION. §179 and carrier being a valid consideration. 1 And an agreement to sell is sufficient to support a promise to pay an agreed amount for an option to purchase a mining claim, although the contract provides for liquidated damages in a like amount in case of refusal by the vendor to complete the sale, as the vendee may insist upon a specific performance. 2 A contract tract or agreement, as it may be charity. The promise was made to a proved by testimony aliunde. The consideration for this agreement is found in the obligation imposed upon and assumed by the trustees of this academy to see to and make the ap- plication of this money as directed to the subscribers to this fund, so as to enable this institution to prosecute its duties of public instruction, for which it was incorporated; thus rendering this assumed liability and promise the consideration of the promise of the other. To create this obligation upon this corporation or its trustees it was not necessary that the instrument should have been signed by them, for that obligation arises from the ac- ceptance of those subscriptions for that purpose, and which can be en- forced at law and in equity. This was so expressly decided in the case of Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292. The court there says : "That the accepting and adopting a written contract by a party who has not put his name to it binds such party equally as if he had signed such contract." ' In Maine, etc., Institute v. Haskell, 73 Maine, 140, which was also a suit upon a college subscription, the court said: 'But we are not prepared to admit that the sub- scription paper in this case "is a bare, naked promise, "without any consider- ation whatever. It is true, no consider- ation was actually received at the time of signing, but one was plainly im- plied, if not expressed, from the language used. The promise was of money for a specified purpose, "to make up a building fund for said in- stitution." This purpose was ever recognized by the law as a public definite payee by name, one legally competent to take, incorporated for the express purpose of carrying out the object contemplated in the promise, and therefore amenable to law for negligence or abuse of the trust. It is not, of course, binding upon the promisor until accepted by the promisee, and may, up to that time, be considered as a revocable promise. But when so accepted, and much more when the execution of the trust has been entered upon, when money has been expended carrying out the purpose contemplated, it be- comes a completed contract, binding upon both parties ; the promise to pay, and at least the implied promise to execute, each being a consideration for the other.' The same rule has been adopted by the Kentucky court of appeals. Collier v. Baptist, etc., Society, 8 B. Mon. 68." 1 Pullman Car Co. v. Booth (Texas App. 1894), 28 S. W. Rep. 719. 2 Morris v. Lagerfelt, 103 Ala. 608 ; 15 So. Rep. 895, where the court said : "If, under the agreement, properly inter- preted, it be true that the vendor had the right to repudiate the promise to sell, and, in that event, incur no other responsibility or obligation than the payment of the liquidated damages of $100, we would unhesitatingly declare the instrument a mere nudum pactum, for the obvious reason that, the sum fixed as liquidated damages being that sum which was paid for the option to purchase, the payment of such dam- ages would be no more than the mere restoration of the consideration paid for the option to purchase, placing §179 CONSIDERATION. 219 between plaintiff and defendant recites that plaintiff owned tim- ber lands tributary to two streams on which defendant was en- gaged in the business of driving logs, and that differences had arisen between the parties in regard to charges for services ren- dered by defendant; it was therefore agreed that, in considera- tion of a specified compensation, defendant should drive, boom, and deliver all logs put by plaintiff in the rivers in question, not to exceed a named limit annually. The parties acted un- der this contract until all but a small part of the timber was cut from plaintiff's land. It was held that defendant could the vendor precisely where he was when the agreement was made, with no other obligation whatever resting upon him. But we do not so inter- pret the agreement. It clearly evi- dences a promise to sell and convey the specified interest in the mine, upon specified conditions and terms. It is true liquidated damages are stip- ulated for the breach of that promise, and the vendee, relying, for his re- dress, upon the payment of damages for the breach, would be limited in his recovery to the stipulated sum; but the fact that the damages are liquidated by the contract for the sale of realty, as in the present case, does not affect the right of the vendee to insist upon a specific performance of the contract. In all breaches of this kind, the vendee has his election to enforce specific performance of the contract, or, waiving that, sue at law for damages for the breach. If the latter redress is elected, and the dam- ages have not been liquidated by the agreement of the parties, they will be assessed by the jury according to the known principles of law ; if liquidated by the agreement, that will be the measure of recovery. 22 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 999, and cases cited in note 4 ; 22 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 970, and note 6 ; Haynes v. Farley, 4 Port. (Ala.) 528; Eads v. Murphy, 52 Ala. 520 ; Micou v. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607 ; Cotton v. Cotton, 75 Ala. 345. We therefore hold, in this case, that the appellant, Morris, upon com- pliance with the conditions and terms of the agreement upon his part, could have enforced performance, on the part of the other party, of his agree- ment to convey ; wherefore the con- tract was mutually obligatory, and the appellee entitled to receive the $100 agreed upon as its consideration." In Morrow v. Jones, 41 Neb. 867 ; 60 N. W. Eep. 869, Norval, C. J., thus ex- pressed the rule: "It is elementary that mutual promises constitute a good consideration for a contract. By the written proposition submitted to Mrs. Jones she was promised the right to redeem the property at any time by paying the amount of the mortgage and costs, with interest, in case she would execute a quitclaim deed to the premises, and an assignment of her equity of redemption. The deed and assignment were duly executed and delivered, and they certainly consti- tute a valid and binding consideration for the promise and agreement made by Morrow. Without the deed and assignment he could not have re- deemed the premises from the fore- closure sale, but would, in all proba- bility, have been forced to lose $125 of his debt. By the new arrange- ment he was to receive the full amount of his debt, interest, and costs, in case Mrs. Jones should redeem from the mortgage." 220 CONSIDERATION. §180 not refuse performance as to the balance of the timber on the ground that there was a lack of mutuality in the contract. 1 § 180. Past consideration — Future services. — The rendering of future services may be a good consideration to uphold a promise to pay for services already rendered. Thus where an attorney had rendered service and was then told that if he would continue to render services he would be paid both for those already rendered and for what he might do in future, it was held that under this promise the attorney could recover for his past services. 2 And giving credit in future, or for- bearing to sue the debtor for a certain time, or any other suf- ficient consideration, will support a promise to guarantee all debts, past as well as future. 3 If supplies are furnished to a person and afterwards in consideration of future supplies a 1 Robson v. Mississippi Logging Co. (1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 893, where Shiras, J., said: "In Storm'!). United States, 94 U. S. 76, wherein was involved the question of the liability of a contractor and his sureties for the non-perform- ance of a contract to furnish certain supplies, it was objected that the con- tract was not mutually binding, was therefore without consideration, and hence was void. The court overruled the objection, saying that, 'Beyond doubt, the written agreement went into operation, and it is not even suggested that the department and division commanders ever expressed any dis- approval of its terms or conditions. * * * Suppose it to be true that the quartermaster - general might termi- nate it, if he should see fit. It is a sufficient answer to the suggestion to say that he never did interfere in the matter, and that the contract contin- ued in full force and operation throughout the whole period for which the necessary supplies were purchased by the United States in open market. Where the defendant has actually re- ceived the consideration of a written agreement, it is no answer to an action brought against him for a breach of his covenants in the same to say that the agreement did not bind the plaintiff to perform the promises on his part therein contained, provided it appears that the promises in ques- tion have in fact been performed in good faith, and without prejudice to the defendant. Addison on Contracts (6th ed.) 15; Morton v. Burn, 7 Adol. & E. 19. Agreements are frequently made which are not, in a certain sense, binding on both sides at the time when executed, and in which the whole duty to be performed rests pri- marily with one of the contracting parties. * * * Cases often arise where the agreement consists of mu- tual promises, the one promise being the consideration forthe other; and it has never been seriously questioned that such an agreement is valid, and that the parties are bound to fulfill their respective obligations.' " 2 Roberts v. Griswold, 35 Vt. 496. 3 Johnston v. Nicholls, 1 C. B. 251 ; Boyd v. Moyle, 2 C. B. 644; AVhite t>. "Woodward, 5 C. B. 810; Wood v. Ben- son, 2 C. & J. 94; Hoad v. Grace, 7 H. & N. 494; Coles v. Pack, L. R. 5 C. P. 65. §181 CONSIDERATION. 221 promise is made to pay for the past as well as future supplies, this is a binding promise. 1 And for similar reasons a prom- ise by the father of a bastard child to pay the step-father for the child's support, past and future, if he will continue to support it, is binding. 2 § 181. Marriage. — Marriage is a valuable consideration, 8 and will support a contract made in consideration of it.* So an antenuptial settlement of lands, although made by the set- tler with the design of defrauding his creditors, will not be set aside in the absence of the clearest proof of his intended wife's participation in the fraud. 6 Marriage is such a consideration for the assignment of a mortgage by the intended husband to the wife, before marriage, as will make the wife a purchaser for value. 6 A covenant or promise before marriage to settle certain land, or to charge certain land, in favor of the intend- 1 Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159. The head note of this case is : "an en- tire promise founded partly on a past and executed consideration and partly on an executory consideration, is sup- ported by the executory considera- tion. See also, Sturlyn v. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67; "Williamson v. Clem- ents, 1 Taunt. 523 ; Phillips v. Bate- man, 16 East, 356 ; Jones v. Ashburn- ham, 4 East, 455. 2 Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252. 8 Mellick v. Mellick, 47 N. J. Eq. 86; 19 Atl. Rep. 870; Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22, the court saying : "Now marriage is not only a valuable con- sideration, but as Coke says, there is no other consideration so much re- spected in the law." Barrow v. Bar- row, 2 Dick. 504 ; Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. Jr. 752; Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. Jr. 264 ; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261; Herring v. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628. 4 The contract of mutual promises to marry are more properly referable, as to the matter of consideration, to the doctrine of mutual promises, one promise being a consideration for the other. 5 Prewit v. Wilson, 103 IT. S. 22. 6 Mellick v. Mellick, 47 N. J. Eq. 86 ; 19 Atl. Rep. 870. In this case a man induced a woman to marry him by a promise to assign to her before mar- riage a certain mortgage, but before he did assign it he previously assigned it to his son for value, and then after- wards obtaining possession of the mortgage, on the day of the wedding assigned it to his wife. It was held that the wife was entitled to the bene- fit of the mortgage, notwithstanding that the prior assignment was record- ed on the day it was executed, and that the son was innocent and igno- rant of the fraudulent scheme of his father. "It is common learning that marriage is a valuable consideration, and quite as much so as cash. The complainant, then, stands in this court precisely as if, instead of marrying Mr. Mellick, she had paid him $5,000 in cash for this security. * * * She stands therefore as a bona fide pur- chaser for full value." 222 CONSIDERATION. §§182,183 ed wife, becomes binding upon the marriage taking place, and creates a lien in equity upon the specific land. 1 § 182. Illustrations. — A legal contract and promise of mar- riage, made in good faith by a woman to one who has executed to her a deed of land for the purpose of inducing her to marry him, furnishes a good consideration for the deed; and she will be entitled to hold the land against his creditors, although the marriage is prevented by his death. 2 Where land was conveyed to an intended wife "in consideration of the promise of the said party of the second part to marry" the grantor, the deed was held supported by a sufficient consideration, although the original promises were not in writing, since the grantee is bound by the recitals in the deed. 8 A husband gave his note as an inducement to his wife to marry him ; she was allowed to recover. 4 An oral contract between the wife and husband before marriage, by which the latter was to provide for her support during life, pay her debts and improve the land, and the parties then marrying, she conveying to him certain land, it was held that the consideration for the conveyance was not the marriage, but the support of the wife. 6 § 183. Representations. — A representation made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of another, and acted on by him, will, in general, be sufficient to entitle him to the assistance of a court of equity. And so in proposals of marriage. If the parent or his agent deliberately holds 1 Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. law, it is the contract to marry, and 429. not the marriage itself, which is the 8 Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454. "A consideration which supports the legal contract and promise made in deed." And see, Potts v. Merrit, 14 good faith to marry another must, B. Mon. 406, which was an antenuptial therefore, like an actual marriage, be contract, the husband agreeing to al- deemed to be a valuable consideration low the wife to keep her slaves if she for the conveyance of an estate, and would marry him. will justly entitle the grantee to hold it 4 Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437. against subsequent purchasers, or the See, also, Dygert v. Remerschnider, creditors of the grantor." 32 N. Y. 629. 3 Prignon v. Daussat, 4 Wash. 199; 6 Larsenu. Johnson, 78 Wis. 300; 47 29 Pac. Eep. 1046. " As we view the N. W. Rep. 615. §.184 CONSIDERATION. 223 out inducements to the suitor to celebrate the marriage, and he consents and celebrates it, believing he should have the benefits so held out to him, a court of equity will give effect to the proposals. 1 § 184. Conveyances. — Marriage is a valuable consideration, sufficient to support a conveyance of property, even against creditors, and in such a case the wife is deemed a purchaser of the property settled on her, in consideration of the mar- riage, and is entitled to hold it against the world. 2 And when a settlement is made in contemplation of marriage, the 1 Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 0. & F. 45, where a man represented to his daughter's suitor that he would leave her a provision by will. Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. 0. 185, the court saying: "That is a principle of uni- versal application, and has been par- ticularly applied to cases where rep- resentations have been made as to the state of property of persons about to contract marriage, and where, upon the faith of such representations, marriage has been contracted. There the person who has made the false representations has in a great many cases been held bound to make his representations good." Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. C. C. 543; Mon- teflori v. Montefiori, 1 W. Bl. 363; Gale v. Lindo, 1 Vern. 475;' Mills v. Fox, L. E. 37 Ch. Div. 153 ; Prole v. Soady, 2 Giffard, 1. Here a settlement was directed to be made in accordance with the representations, although they were by parol. "If it be sup- posed to be necessary for this purpose to find a contract such as usually ac- companies transactions of importance in the pecuniary affairs of mankind, there may not be found in the mem- orandum or in the other evidence in the cause proof of any such contract. When the authorities on this subject are attended to, it will be found that no such formal contract is required. A representation made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the other party, and acted on by him, will in general be suffi- cient to entitle him to the assistance of this court for the purpose of realiz- ing such representation." Lord Cot- tenham in Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 C. & F.45, 62, note. See the following cases where the distinction is taken between marriage as a consideration to support the promise, which under the statute of frauds must be in writ- ing, and cases where marriage not so much as fraud was held the ground for relief, in the latter instances no memorandum being necessary. Han- non v. Hounihan, 85 Va. 429 ; South- erland v. Southerland, 5 Bush, 591 ; Mallory v. Mallory, 92 Ky. 316; 17 S. W. Rep. 737; White v. Bigelow, 154 Mass. 593; Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22; Nickerson v. Nickerson 127 TJ. S. 668; Prole v. Soady, 2 Giff. 1; Bold v. Hutchinson, 5 De G., M. & G. 558 ; Savage v. Foster, 9 Mod. 35. 2 Herrings. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628 ; Barrow ». Barrow, 2 Dickens, 504, the court saying : "I never knew an in- stance where a settlement in considers tion of marriage has been set aside and I will make no precedent." Cam' pion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. 264 ; Nairn v Prowse, 6 Ves. 752; Tunno v. Treze vant, 2 Des. 264; Ex parte Mo Burnie's Trustees, 1 DeG., M. & G 440; Fraser v. Thompson, 4 DeG. & 224 CONSIDEKATION. §184 law presumes it was an inducement to it. So, where a father makes such a settlement upon his daughter, even before any contract of marriage, if the settlement was known to third persons, it will be presumed it was a probable inducement to the marriage. 1 And a settlement in consideration of mar- riage is valid against the creditors so far as concerns the in- terests of the wife and the children, but a limitation in a marriage settlement in favor of the settler's illegitimate child and his issue is not within the marriage consideration. 8 When a marriage settlement goes beyond the immediate ob- jects of the marriage and there are provisions for collateral relatives from whom no valuable consideration moves, then, as to such provisions, the settlement has nothing to do with the marriage, but it is considered as a settlement purely for the purpose of providing for those relatives and void as against creditors. 3 J. 659; Magniac v. Thomson, 1 Bald- win, 344; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Peters, 367, where Judge Story said: "Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that, to make an ante- nuptial settlement void as a fraud upon creditors, it is necessary that both parties should concur in or have cognizance of the intended fraud. If the settler alone intended a fraud, and the other party have no notice of it, she is not and can not be affected by it. Marriage in contemplation of the law is not only a valuable consid- eration to support such a settlement, but a consideration of the highest value, and from motives of the sound- est policy is upheld with a steady res- olution. The husband and wife, part- ies to such a contract, are therefore deemed, in the highest sense, pur- chasers for a valuable consideration, and so that it is bona fid<: without no- tice of fraud brought home to both sides, it becomes unimpeachable by creditors." Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Oh. 260, where Chan. Kent said : "It is the constant language of the books and of the courts that a voluntary deed is made good by a subsequent mar- riage, and a marriage has always been held to be the highest considera- tion in law." Verplank v. Sterry, 12 Johns. 536; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454 ; Jones' Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 324 ; Greenhow v. Coutts, 4 Hen. 6 Mun. 485 ; Bunnel v. Witherow, 29 Ind. 123; Armfleld v. Armfield, Free- man Ch.(Miss.)311 ; Andrews?-. Jones, 10 Ala.400. See also, Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 136; Bentley v. Harris, 2 Gratt. 357; Eppes v. Randolph, 2 Call, 125 ; Welles v. Cole, 6 Gratt. 645 ; Fones v. Rice, 9 Gratt. 568. 'Herring v. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628, 646; Welles v. Cole, 6 Gratt. 645; Brown v. Carter, 5 Ves. 862. 2 Demestre v. West, L. R. (1891) A. C. 264; Kevan«. Crawford, L. R. 6 Cb. Div. 29. 3 Smith v. Cherrill, L. R.4. Eq. Ca. 390; Johnson v. Legard, 6 M. & S. 60. 185 CONSIDERATION. 225 § 185. Promise of third person. — Marriage is a sufficient consideration to support a promise by a third person to the husband or wife. 1 1 Gurvin v. Cromartie, 11 Ired. (Law) 174; 53 Am. Dec. 406. In this case the following language was re- lied on as establishing a promise to pay: "Now, Charles, be smart and get a wife and have a child, and I will give you five hundred dollars." The plaintiff subsequently married and had a child, and brought this action against the executor of the promisor. The parties were in no wise related to one another, and it was insisted there was no consideration for the prom- ise. Chief Justice ftuffin said : " It is not needful to consider of the benefit which the marriage of the plaintiff and the birth of the issue might have been to the testator in preventing the estate, which he had purchased, from going over and mak- ing his fee absolute; since, without doubt, marriage is a valuable con- sideration, and sufficient to support a contract, whether executed or execu- tory. It is generally the sole consid- eration on which marriage settle- ments are founded, and it sustains them against the creditors of the con- tracting parties and purchasers from them. * * * * So mutual prom- ises between a man and woman to marry will sustain each other, and the party violating his or her promise is liable to the action of the other, as is often seen. In like manner a prom- ise by one man to another to pay him so much in consideration that he will marry a certain woman is valid. The same reasons make it so upon which a marriage settlement is upheld upon the consideration of the marriage. There are many cases of actions on collateral promises to one, in con- sideration that the promisee will mar- ry a third person. * * * * It fol- lows, that a promise to pay him for 15 marrying any woman, without desig- nating one in particular, is likewise valid ; for there is no perceptible dis- tinction on which the law can give the action in the one case and not in the other. It was argued, indeed, that it might be a prejudice to one to marry a particular woman, and by possibility, in such a case, the man would not have married her, had it not been for the promise ; whereas marriage generally is to be taken to be to the party's gratification and benefit, and when he is left at Urge to his own free choice, his marriage can not be intended to be to his disadvan- tage ; and therefore, that in this last case the marriage is not a sufficient consideration. But the distinction seems to be entirely untenable; for experience proves, even when the parties are of their own exclusive selection, marriages may or may not be judicious or happy. And it is just as much an act of prudence for a man to refrain from marrying any woman without having a competent livelihood for himself, his wife, and a family, as it is for him, under those circumstances, not to marry a particular woman. In either case he may be induced to mar- ry or not to marry by his having or not having a reasonable considera- tion. But the law does not inquire whether the party has or has not made a fortunate match, because it is not the adequacy of the consideration which determines the validity of the prom- ise, but it is the doing of something by the party to whom the promise is made, and it is a familiar elementary principle that such act, however trifling, constitutes a, sufficient con- sideration. The act of marriage with any one woman must, in this point of 226 CONSIDERATION. §186 § 186. Illustrations of third person's promise. — Thus, where an uncle wrote to his nephew saying he was glad to hear of his intended marriage and that he would pay him a certain sum yearly during his life, this was held a binding promise. 1 And while an actual marriage, forming the consideration for a promise, renders it necessary that the promise should be in writing under the statute of frauds, still it is doubtful if a promise to marry which is the consideration of a promise other than a reciprocal promise to marry is not of itself sufficient to support any promise, although such promise does not comply with the statute of frauds. The distinction here made is be- tween the doing of an act, to wit, marrying, as a consideration, and a mere promise to marry as a consideration. It is well view, be the same as that with any other ; and therefore, as far as the ob- jection to the want of a consideration affects the case the instructions were right." See this case further for a dis- cussion of the distinction between a unilateral and a bilateral contract. The proposition in the text might be stated in the following manner; a re- quest of another to marry a third per- son is a unilateral contract which be- comes binding upon the doing of the act. This contract is within the statute of frauds, and the promise must be in writing. Douglasse v. Waad, 1 Ch. Oas. 100; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 188; Browne ». Garborough, Cro. Eliz. 63; Bradley v. Toder, Cro. Jac. 228; Ber- isford v. Woodroff, Cro. Jac. 404; Ex parte Cottrell, 2 Cowp. 742; Poynter ■b. Poynter, Cro. Car. 194; Bockenham v. Thacker, 2 Vent. 71. ^hadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. (IT. S.) 159. The following is the head note of this celebrated case, it also being an authority on another branch of the subject: "A promise based on the consideration of doing that which a man is already bound to do is in- valid ; and it is not necessary, in order to invalidate the consideration, that the plaintiff's prior obligation to afford that consideration should have been an obligation to a third person. Per Byles, J. . A. wrote to B. as follows: 'I am glad to hear of your intended marriage with E. N. ; and, as I prom- ised to assist you at starting, I am happy to tell you that I will pay to you £150 yearly during my life and until your annual income derived from your profession of a chancery barrister shall amount to 600 guineas. Your ever affectionate uncle, A.' In an action against A.'s executors for arrears of the annuity the declaration alleged the consideration for the promise to be, 'that the plaintiff would marry E. N.' Held, by Earle and Keating, that the promise was bind- ing, and made upon good considera- tion. Held, by Byles, that the letter was no more than one of kindness, creating no legal obligation. Held, by the whole court, that B's contin- uance to practice was not a condition precedent to his right to the annuity.'' See also, Luders v. Anstey, 4 Ves. 501 ; In re Badcock, L. E. 17 C. D. 361 ; Freemoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. 429; Viret v. Viret, 50 L. J. C. 69. § 187 CONSIDERATION. 227 settled that mutual promises to marry are not within the stat- ute of frauds. 1 § 187. Marriage as the consideration of dower.— In South Carolina the wife's dower is based upon the valuable consid- eration of marriage, and under the revised statutes of that state can be defeated only where she elopes and is not after- wards reconciled to her husband, 2 the doctrine in that com- monwealth being that marriage is a valuable consideration paid by the wife for such rights and estates as the laws accord to her as a wife. 3 A bond given by a man to his wife as a pro- vision for her, or as a gift, is not enforcible against his estate, since an executory contract supported only by a meritorious consideration is. not enforcible either in law or equity. 4 But a promise in writing made by a husband, prior to his mar- riage with his wife, that, "if she would marry him, he would leave her certain real property for her life, on the faith of which promise she married him, constitutes a binding con- tract on the part of the husband to leave the property to his 'Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland, 284; and enters into an indissoluble en- Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495; gagement with him, foregoing all Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 ; Harrison other prospects in life ; and, if the v. Cage, 1 L. Eaym. 386 ; Philpott v. consideration for which she stipulates Wallet, 3 Lev. 65; Cork v. Baker, 1 fails, she can not be restored to the Strange, 34; Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 status in quo. She can have no remedy P. Wins. 618; Caton v. Caton, L. R. or relief.' Rivers v. Thayer, 7 Rich. 1 Ch. 137; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Yes. Eq. 136. In Wilson v. McConnell, 9 67;Ungley v. Ungley, L. R. 4 C. D. Rich. Eq. 500, the court used this 73. Seethe form of a declaration to language: 'But this claim is met by a recover damages for the breach of a corresponding equity on the part of promise to pay a certain sum upon a the widow, who is entitled, under her a marriage having taken place in marriage, to the position of a pur- Chitty on Pleading, 16 Am. ed. 207. chaser for valuable consideration, 2 McCreery v. Davis (S. C. 1895), 22 against all but existing liens,' — liens S. E. Rep. 178, per Pope, J. : "Under that existed before the marriage. It our law, 'marriage is a valuable con- is true, at present, this right of dower sideration. Some have considered it of Mrs. McCreery in the lands of her the highest known in law. None husband, the plaintiff, is inchoate; would say it was a lower considera- yet it is substantial right of property, tion than money. There is nothing and not a lien. Shell v. Duncan, 31 unreasonable in this. The great value S. C. 547; 10 S. E. Rep. 330." of the consideration consists in this: s Brooks v. McMeekin, 37 S. C. 285. That the wife surrenders her person 4 In re James Estate, 78 Hun, 121 ; and her self-dominion to the husband, 28 N. Y. Supl. 992. 228 CONSIDERATION. §188 wife for life, and she was entitled to treat a conveyance by the husband to a third party as a breach of that contract, and to at once sue him for damages. 1 § 188. Naming child as a consideration. — It has been held in Massachusetts that the privilege of naming a child is a val- id consideration for a promise to the parents to pay the child a certain sum of money, and that the parents having surren- dered to the child all rights therein, the child may enforce the promise against the promisor. 2 'Synge v. Synge, L. R. (1894), 1 Q. B. 466; 9 Rep. (Eng.) 265, per Lord Justice Keay: "The learned judge who decided this case has held that the letter was not treated by the lady as a contract, although by the advice of Mr. Woodruff she preserved it, because she did not adopt his recommendation to have the terms carried out by deed nor to have the letter stamped. "We can not, with deference to the learned judge, agree in his view that she treated the letter as a mere statement of inten- tion by which the intended husband was not to be bound. The law re- lating to proposals of this kind before marriage was thus stated by Lord Lyndhurst, L. C, in Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 01. & F. 45 : 'The princi- ple of law, or at least of equity, is this — that if a party holds out induce- ments to another to celebrate a mar- riage, and holds them out deliberately and plainly, and the other party con- sents and celebrates the marriage in consequence of them, if he had good reason to expect that it was intended that he should have the benefit of the proposal which was so held out, a court of equity will take care that he is not disappointed, and will give ef- fect to the proposal.' We are of opin- ion that the proposal of terms in this case was made as an inducement to the lady to marry, that she consented to the terms and married the defend- ant on the faith that he would keep his word, and that accordingly there was a binding contract on the defend- ant's part to leave to his wife the house and land at Ardfield for her life. Mar- riage is a valuable consideration for such a contract of the highest order, and when, as here, the contract is in writing, so that there is no question upon the statute of frauds, in the language already quoted, a court of equity will take care that the party who marries on the faith of such a proposal is not disappointed, and will give effect to the proposal." 2 Eaton v. Libbey (1896), 42 N. E. Rep. 1127, Barker, J.: "The de- fendants concede that the privilege which was given to their testator of naming the plaintiff was a valid con- sideration for the testator's promise to the plaintiff's parents to pay him the sum of $100, for which sum the testator then gave his promissory note, payable to the plaintiff. But they contend that the plaintiff was a stranger to the consideration, and that he could not recover upon that note, and that he can not recover upon the note in suit, which the testator after- wards gave to the plaintiff in renewal of the original note. We have no doubt that the privilege of naming a child is a valid consideration for a promise. It was so held in Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 307. See, also, §139 CONSIDERATION. 229 § 189. Change of name as a consideration. — Where the grandfather of a child promises her parents to leave to her by his will a specified amount of money as a legacy, if they would change her name from Catharine to Harriet, and the change was accordingly made, it was held that the change of name Was a sufficient consideration for the promise, and that there was a sufficient privity between the child and her parents to enable her to enforce the promise. 1 Parks v. Francis, 50 Vt. 626. Gifts to a child because of its name are com- mon, and a change of name is often made the condition of a gift or be- quest. In many jurisdictions, the change of a name is regulated by statute. If we assume that the right to name a child belongs to its parents, and, ultimately, to its father, the child can not be said to have no interest in the name imposed. The consequences affect the child more than any one else. He is deprived of the advantage of receiving any other name, and is subjected to the possibility of detri- ment because he bears the name im- posed. Assuming that the privilege belongs to the parents, if they waive the right in favor of another, we think the child has an interest in the name which it shall bear, analogous to the interest which the child has in its own services, which belong to the father, but which, if the father waives his right, furnish a good consideration for a promissory note given to the child by a person to whom they have been rendered. Nightingale v. Withing- ton, 15 Mass. 272. The right of the parents is one which they have as the natural guardians of the child, and they may be presumed to act in the matter for its interest. If, for exer- cising the right in a particular man- ner, they received a reward, which they recognize and treat as belonging to the child, it should be considered as its property, even if the parents could have kept the reward as their own. In this case, it is fair to say that, in the transaction in which the original note was given, the parents were acting for the child, and were understood by the defendants' testa- tor to be so acting. The plaintiff has continued to bear the name, and has accepted the present note since he ar- rived at years of discretion, and he has further ratified the contract by bringing this suit since he became of age. We are of opinion that there was a valid consideration for the note moving from the plaintiff himself." 1 Babcock v. Chase (1895), 92 Hun, 264; 36N.Y.Supl.879;Merwin, J.. "In Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, it was held that a promissory note, executed in consideration of a parent naming a child after the maker of the note, and in pursuance of a promise made by him that if the child were so named he would provide generously for its education and support in life, is based on a sufficient consideration. In that case it is said : 'The surrender at the intestate's request of the right or priv- ilege of naming the appellant's child was the yielding of a consideration. The right to give his child a name was one which the father possessed, and one which he could not be deprived of against his consent. If the intestate chose to bargain for the exercise of this right he should be bound, for by his bargain he limited and restrained the father's right to bestow his own or some other name upon the child. We can perceive no solid reason for de- 230 CONSIDERATION. §190 § 190. Adequacy of consideration. — It is considered unwise to interfere with the facility of contracting, and the free exer- claring that the right with which the father parted at the intestate's request was of no value. It is difficult, if not impossible, to invent even a plausible reason for affirming that such a right or privilege is absolutely worthless. The father is the natural guardian of his child, and entitled to its services during infancy, and within this nat- ural right must fall the privilege of bestowing a name upon it. In yield- ing to the intestate's request, and in consideration of the promise accom- panying it, the appellant certainly suffered some deprivation and sur- rendered some right. * * * It will not do to say that the bestowal of a name is a valueless act, and if once it be granted to be of some value, then, in the absence of fraud and oppres- sion, it must be held to possess the value placed upon it by the contract- ing parties.' In Diffenderfer v. Scott, 5 Ind. App. 243; 32 N. E. Rep. 87, it was held, following the Wol- ford case, that naming a child after the maker of a note is a sufficient consideration for the note given to the child. In general a waiver of any legal or equitable right at the request of another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise. Parsons on Contracts (8th ed.), *444. It is said : 'A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other.' Currie v. Misa, L. P. 10 Exch. 153, referred to in Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, where it also said that courts 'will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in ffict benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any substantial value to any one. It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him.' It is also said, quoting from Pollock on Contracts, 166, that 'consideration means not so much that one party is profiting as that the other abandons some legal right in the present, or limits his legal free- dom of action in the future as an in- ducement for the promise of the first.' In Hamer v. Sidway, supra, a promise to pay the promisee $5,000 if he would refrain from drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he should become twenty-one years of age, was held to be based on sufficient con- sideration. A similar view was taken in Lindell v. Pokes, 60 Mo. 249. In Earle v. Angel], 157 Mass. 294, it was held that a promise to pay the pro- misee $500 if he would attend the fun- eral of the promisor was enforcible. In view of the doctrine of the Wolford case and the general principle enun- ciated or approved in the Hamer case, we are of the opinion that a suffi- cient consideration is alleged for the promise of the decedent. There is no question here about the adequacy. Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596. That has been fixed by the parties. Can the plaintiff enforce the promise ? It was made expressly for her benefit, and by reason of the relationship be- tween her and the promisees, and also by reason of her connection with the consideration, there was such a privity between her and the promisees that she had a right to enforce the con- tract. This view is sustained by au- thority. In 1 Comyn's Digest (5th ed., p. 210, note), the rule is stated: 'Where one for whose benefit a con- tract has been expressly made is nearly related to the party from whom §190 CONSIDERATION. 231 cise of the judgment and will of the parties, by not allowing them to be sole judges of the benefits to be derived from their bargains. Therefore, the law will not enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the consideration, but will leave the par- ties to judge of that for themselves. 1 Thus, for example, the consideration of giving up a promissory note of a third per- son was held sufficient consideration for a note, although the note surrendered was not collectible. 2 So, where a person, being aware of his approaching death, executed and delivered its consideration moves, either may sue for the breach of it, though the pendency of either's suit will preclude the other's action . ' This is based main- ly on the case of Dutton v. Poole, 2 Levinz, 210, where the right of the child to sue was asserted. The author- ity of that case has been often recog- nized. Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. 57; Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 193; Knowles v. Erwin, 43 Hun, 152; affd., 124 N. Y. 633 ; Sackett v. Sackett, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 251. The principle that relationship may be the basis of a privity sufficient for the action is also recognized in Bogardus v. Young, 64 Hun, 398 ; Coleman v. Hiler, 85 Hun, 547. In Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 284, it is said : 'To give a third party who may derive a benefit from the performance of the promise an action, there must be, first, an intent by the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party, and, second, some privity between the two, the promisee and the party to be benefited, and some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter which would give him a legal or equitable claim to the benefit of the promise or an equivalent from him personally.' The plaintiff here has certainly an equi- table claim to the benefit of the promise. The plaintiff's parents acted for her as well as for themselves in the transaction. They owed her a duty in that regard from which it may well be said a privity arose sufficient for the maintenance of the action." 1 Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio, St. 562; Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657; Yards. Patton, 13 Pa. St. 278; Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 119; Har- ris v. Harris, 23 Gratt. 737; Sherk v. Endress, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 255; Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. Law, 446; Carter o. King, 11 Rich. L.125; Harrell v. "Wat- son, 63 N. C. 454 ; Walkers. Walker, 13 Ired. 335; Wing v. Chase, 35 Maine, 260; Kennedy v. Howell, 20 Conn. 349 ; Richardson v. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257; Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438. "The adequacy of the considera- tion is for the parties to consider at the time of making the agreement, not for the court when it is sought to be enforced." Per curiam in Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55. 2 Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio St. 562. "If, before and at the time the note was surrendered, it was not col- lectible out of L.'s estate, it would not follow that the written obligation was necessarily without consideration. L. received from the plaintiff that for which he contracted, and obtained that which, by the terms of the con- tract, was evidently deemed by the contracting parties an object of value. In contemplation of law, there was, in our view, no want or failure of con- sideration for the written obligation of L." 232 CONSIDERATION. §191 to his housekeeper, to whom he was indebted for services, a promissory note for the sum of ten thousand dollars, the con- sideration expressed being for "services rendered," this note was held valid, although the amount greatly exceeded the value of the services. 1 § 191. Illustrations. — Judicial sales will not be disturbed for mere inadequacy of price, unless so gross as to amount to a fraud. Thus, where property valued at twenty-five hun- dred dollars was sold at judicial sale for nineteen hundred dollars, the court declined to set aside the sale. 2 The re- lease of a married woman's right of dower is a good consideration for a separate provision for her benefit, or of a promise to pay money to her separate use. 3 An agree- ment to accept a transfer of railway shares, on which nothing has been paid, is not nudum pactum, but a contract which may be specifically enforced in equity. 4 Where the holder of a promissory note agreed with the maker to extend the time of 'Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596, where the court said : "If the intestate chose to pay for the services rendered a much larger sum than they were worth, he had a right to do so. The note was not a gratuity or gift. There is no standard whereby courts can limit the measure of value in such a case, and an obligation is not wanting even partially in consideration, be- cause the value is less than the obliga- tion. A note for a thousand dollars given for a horse confessedly worth but one hundred can not be success- fully defended in whole or in part, on the ground of a want or failure in con- sideration." See, also, Johnson v. Ti- tus, 2 Hill, 606 ; Oakley v. Boorman, 21 Wend. 588 ; Sawyer v. McLouth, 46 Barb. 350; Scott v. Frink, 54 N. Y. 635; Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 327 ; Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 362. 2 Duncan v. Sanders, 50 111. 475. See, also, Comstock v. Purple, 49 111. 158. 8 Sykes v. Chadwick, 18 Wall. 141. 'Oheale v. Kenward, 3 De G. & J., 27, where the court said: "But the defendant insists that this particu- lar agreement can not be enforced for want of consideration and mutu- ality. Now what are the circum- stances of the case? The plaintiff was the owner of ten specific shares, which was so much property in his hands, subject to certain liabilities. Whether this would be valuable or valueless at the time of the agreement no one could tell. The value was merely speculative, and persons' ideas differ very much about specula- tions. But the plaintiff was willing to divest himself of the shares, and to relieve himself from his liabilities; and the defendant was willing to take the chances of the speculation, and to undertake those liabilities. * * * The defendant desired to have the shares; he was willing to pay the amount of the liabilities, from which he agreed to exonerate the plaintiff ; and that appears to me a sufficient consideration." §192 CONSIDERATION. 233 payment, provided the maker would get another to sign the note, it was held that the procurement of such other's signa- ture was a sufficient consideration for the extension, although the new signer had no property subject to execution. 1 A val- uable consideration, however small or nominal, if given or stipulated for in good faith, is, in the absence of fraud, suffi- cient to support an action on any parol contract. 2 § 192. Further illustrations. — So the delivery up of a will is a sufficient consideration, although the will is invalid. 8 A note given by the maker to a child, in consideration that the parents should name it after him, is valid.' A valid patent, or any interest in or license under it, without regard to its pecuniary value or the degree of its utility, is a good consid- eration for a promissory note, or other contract. 6 But a void 'Williams v. Jensen, 75 Mo. 681. "It may have been an inconvenience for S. to secure the signature of his wife." 2 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How- ard, 426. s Smith v. Smith, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 418. 4 Diffenderfer v, Scott (1893), 5 Ind. App. 243; 32 N. E. Rep. 87; 48 Alb. Law Journal, 257. See, also, Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 ; 44 Am. Rep. 16; Glasgow v. Hobbs, 32 Ind. 440; Dunton v. Dunton, 18 Vic- torian L. Rep. 114; White v. Bluett, 23 L. J. Ex. 36. 6 Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60, where the court said: "Letters patent of the United States can be lawfully granted only for new and useful in- ventions; and are but prima facie evidence of the novelty and utility of the invention described. All that is required to make an invention useful, under the patent laws, is that it should be capable of being applied to some practical and bene- ficial purpose, and not be frivolous, or injurious to the well-being or morals of societv. If it is useful in this sense, it is patentable, and the degree of its utility or practical value does not af- fect the validity of the patent ; if it is not useful, a patent for it is void. In a suit brought on a promissory note, the only consideration for which is the assignment of an interest in or right under a patent, the question of consideration depends upon the valid- ity of the patent; if the patent is void, the note is of course without consideration ; but if it is valid, the court will not inquire into the ad- equacy of the consideration. The issue in such a case is therefore the same as in a suit in the courts of the United States for the infringement of a patent, the validity of which is denied by the defendant." See, also, Lowell v. Lewis, 1 Mason, 182 ; Bedford v. Hunt, 1 Mason, 302 ; Kneass v. Schuyl- kill Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. 9; Langdon v. De Groot, 1 Paine, 203; Roberts v. Ward, 4 McLean, 565 ; Bliss v. Negus, 8 Mass. 46; Dickinson v. Hall, 14 Pick. 217 ; Bierce v. Stocking, 11 Gray, 174; Lester v. Palmer, 4 Allen, 145; Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 311; Cross v. Huntly, 13 Wend. 385 ; Geiger u.Cook, 3W. &S. 266; McClure v. 234 CONSIDERATION. § 193 patent is no consideration. 1 And while a direct suit for the infringement of a patent must be brought in the courts of the United States, because the acts of congress, which create the right, provide that all actions and cases, in law or equity, arising under those laws, shall be originally cognizable in those courts, 2 yet this does not deprive the state courts of the power or the duty, when the question arises collaterally, of deciding whether the patent which is relied on as a considera- tion for a promise is of any validity. 8 § 193. Inadequacy in equity. — With respect to the adequacy of the consideration in equity the rule is, that in ordinary cases mere inadequacy of consideration is not a ground even for refusing a decree for specific performance of an unexecuted contract, and is not a ground for rescinding an executed con- tract. The only exception is where the inadequacy is so gross as to shock the moral sense, and tends to prove fraud or im- position on the part of the purchaser; in such a case, it is the fraud, and not the inadequacy of the consideration, which invalidates the contract. 4 Thus specific performance was de- Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79; Myers v. Turner, Sherman v. Champlain Transportation 17 111. 179; Jollifie v. Collins, 21 Mo. Co., 31 Vt. 162; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 338 ; Clough v. Patrick, 37 Vt. 421 ; Pa. St. 155. Elmer i>. Pennel, 40 Maine, 430; Rich 4 Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440; Blake v. Hotclikiss, 16 Conn. 409; Sherman v. Blake, 7 Iowa, 46; Rice v. Gibbs, v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31 33 Neb. 460; 50 N. W. Rep. 436; Hun- Vt. 162; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. ter v. Mills, 29 S. C. 72; Morrill v. 155. Everson, 77 Cal. 114; Woodruff v. 1 Geiger v. Cook, 3 Watts & Serg. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349; Winter v. 266; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60, 62, Goebner, 2 Colo. App. 259; 30 Pac. 63; Hunter v. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. Rep. 51 ; Henrici v. Davidson, 149 Pa. 38, 49; Kernodle v. Hunt, 4 Blackf. St. 323; 24 Atl. Rep. 334; Hibbert v. (Ind.) 57; Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. MacKinnon, 79 Wis. 673; Stock •«. 39; Gatling v. Newell, 9 Ind. 572; Stoltz, 34 111. App. 645; Coles v. Tre- Johnson v. McCabe, 37 Ind. 535. cothick, 9 Ves. 234 ; Mortlock v. Buller, 2 5 TJ. S. Statutes at Large, 124 ; Gib- 10 Ves. 292 ; Davies v. Cooper, 5 M. & son v. Woodworth, 8 Paige, 132 ; Dud- Cr. 270 ; Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drewry, 651 ; ley v. Mayhew, 2 Comst. 9; Parkhurst Harrison v. Guest, 6 D. M. &. G. '124; v. Kinsman, 2 Halst. Ch. 600; Kemp- Yardu. Patton 13 Pa. St. 278 ; Candor's ton v. Bray, 99 Mass. 350; Howe *. Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 119; Harris r. Har- Richards, 102 Mass. 64. ris, 23 Gratt. 737 ; A Her v. A Her, 40 N. 3 Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60,64; J. Law, 446; Wing v. Chase, 35 Maine, Rich v. Hotchkiss, 16 Conn. 409; 260; Kennedy v. Howell, 20 Conn. §194 CONSIDERATION. 235 creed of a contract where it was admitted that the price was in- adequate. 1 "The adequacy of the consideration is regarded in equity upon the same general principles as at law; mere inade- quacy is not a ground upon which courts of equity will set aside a contract or even refuse a decree for specific perform- ance, or an injunction to restrain a breach." 2 § 194. The same subject continued. — In modern times it has been considered not only that those who were dealing for expectations, but those who were dealing for vested remainders also, were so exposed to imposition and hard terms, and so much in the power of those with whom they contracted, that it was a fit rule of policy to impose upon all who deal with ex- pectant heirs and reversioners the onus of proving that they had paid a fair price, and otherwise to undo their bargains, and compel a reconveyance of the property purchased. 8 349; Harrell v. Watson, 63 N. 0. 454; Walker D.Walker, 13 Ired. (N. C), 335; Carter v. King, 11 Rich. L. 125; Sherk v. Endress, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 255. 1 Rice v. Gibbs, 33 Neb. 460; Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440 ; Hunter v. Mills, 29 S. C. 72; but by a code provision specific performance will not be de- creed in California without adequate consideration; Morrill v. Everson, 77 Cal. 114; Woodruff u.Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349. See, also, Stock v. Stoltz, 34 111. App. 645. 2 Leake on Contracts, 614. 3 1 Story on Equity Jurisprudence (13th ed.),§§ 337,338; Beach on Mod- ern Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 145, 146. In Chambers «. Chambers, 139 Ind. Ill ; 38 N. E. Rep. 334, the court said : "Counsel argue that no inadequacy of consideration is shown for the quit- claim deed given by appellee to ap- pellant. The consideration was $562. It was proved on the trial, and found by the court, that the land at the time was worth $2,835. Counsel think that the incumbrance of the life estate should be taken into account in esti- mating the value. This the law does not permit in case of heirs, reversion- ers, and remainder-men, making sale of their expectancy. The law looks upon such sales as gambling upon the lives of the ancestors or life-tenants, and so against public policy, and will only sanction the sale, as we have seen, when the full market value is paid. McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139; 25 N. E. Rep. 179." In Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co. (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 864, Simonton, J., said: "It can not be said that this agreement, or any part of it, is without considera- tion. In the absence of fraud, mis- take, illegality, or oppression, and where no relations of trust and confi- dence exist between the parties, courts can not inquire into the inade- quacy of the consideration of a con- tract, or set up their own opinions re- specting that which parties in good faith on both sides have agreed upon." In Registering Co. v. Samp- son, L. R. 19 Eq. 465, the court said : "If there is one thing more than another that public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost 236 CONSIDERATION. § 195 § 195. Consideration moving from plaintiff. — A promise made to another for the benefit of a third person can be en- forced by such third person, although the consideration did not move directly from him. 1 Where a wife separated from her husband, and her brother, in consideration of a certain sum paid by the husband to him, then executed a mortgage to the husband conditioned to maintain and support her without further expense to him, it was held that she was entitled to the benefit of the mortgage, although not a nominal party to it, and could sue the mortgagor thereon. 2 A stock of goods was sold and in payment the buyer agreed to pay the notes due a third person from the seller. Such third person was allowed to recover on the agreement. 8 So, also, in a famous case in New York, it was held that where one party advanced a sum of money to another, he agreeing to pay it to a creditor of the first party the next day, such creditor could recover on the promise. 4 liberty of contracting, and that con- tracts, when entered into fully and voluntarily, shall be held good, and shall be enforced in a court of jus- tice." Some consideration is requisite to support a contract, but the suffi- ciency of the consideration can not be inquired into. 1 Sedgwick on Dam- ages, 455." 1 Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498; 4 N. Y. Supl. 441 ; Kaufman v. United States, etc., Bank, 31 Neb. 661; Bar- rett o. Henrietta, etc., Bank, 78 Tex- as, 222; Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123; 20 Atl. Rep. 322; Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind. 61 ; Shamp v. Meyer, 20 Neb. 223; Miliani v. Tognini, 19 Nev. 135; 7 Pac. Rep. 279; Dodge v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441 ; Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589 ; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432; King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465 ; Hal- sey v. Reed, 9 Paige, 446; Schmer- horn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 139; Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319; Aus- tin v. Seligman, 18 Fed. Rep. 519. 2 Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123. " The mortgage taken by him [the husband] secures a provision directly beneficial to the oratrix. She can en- force that provision, although not a party to the instrument." 3 Kaufman v. United States, etc., Bank, 31 Neb. 661. " Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268. • This is the leading case in the United States on the subject. The facts as given in the report are : "On the trial before Mr. Justice Masten, it appeared by the evidence of a bystander that one Holly, in November, 1857, at the request of the defendant, loaned and advanced to him $300, stating at the time that he owed that sum to the plaintiff for money borrowed of him, and had agreed to pay it to him the then next day." From these facts all the transaction amounted to was that one Holly, who owed a sum of money to Lawrence, gave it to Fox, who at the time promised to pay it over to Lawrence. Also, see, the opinion of Gray, J. Irrespective of any rules of procedure, such a transaction consti- tutes a person receiving the mohey a §196 CONSIDERATION. 237 If a person covenant in a bond to pay another's debt, the creditor may sue on such bond. 1 § 196. Further illustrations. — Where an instrument is made payable to certain persons, but in fact for the benefit of and to secure a number of subscribers to a certain fund, the un- paid subscribers, being the real parties in interest, may bring suit in their own name against the person who executed the instrument and received the money, without joining the trust- ees to whom the instrument is, by its terms, made payable. 2 A mortgagee may maintain a personal action against a grantee of the mortgaged premises who has assumed by a recital in the deed to pay the incumbrance. 3 trustee for the benefit of the third per- son, who of course in equity could sue. Cf. Barker v. Buklin, 2 Denio, 45; Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. The Westchester Bank, 4 Denio, 97 ; Ar- nold v. Lyman, 17 Mass. 400; Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 575; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337; Mellen v. Whip- ple, 1 Gray, 317 ; Felton v. Dicken- son, 10 Mass. 287; Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577; Gold ». Phillips, 10 Johns. 412; Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend. 235; Crow v. Eogers, 1 Strange, 592 ; Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433; Lilly v. Hays, 5 A. & E. 548. 1 Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319. 2 Bice «. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470. See, also, Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471 ; Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481 ; Tay- lor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279. 3 Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253. How far the rule that one not a party to a contract may sue upon it ex- tends, is doubtful. In Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 TJ. S. 143, it was said: "It is now the prevailing rule in this country, that a. party may maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal made to another for his benefit." This confined the doctrine to simple con- tracts, but in a number of the states such action has been maintained on sealed instruments. Coster v. Mayor, 43N.Y. 399; McDowells. Lev, 35 Wis. 171 ; Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319 ; Burrs. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Kaufman v. United States, etc., Bank, 31 Neb. 661 ; Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123 ; Hall v. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417. In Coster v. Mayor, supra, the court said: "It is settled in this state, that an agreement made on a valid consideration, by one with an- other, to pay money to a third, can be enforced by the third in his own name. And, although a distinction has sometimes been made in favor of a simple contract (Delaware, etc., Canal Co. v. Westchester, etc., Bank, 4 Den. 97) it is now held that where the agreement is in writing and under seal the same rule prevails. (Van Schaick ti.Third Ave. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 346; Eicard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179). Nor need the third person be privy to the consideration. Nor need he be named especially as the person to whom the money is to be paid." This was a case where the city of Al- bany gave an indemnity bond to the state of New York, agreeing to pay all damages caused to property by cer- tain improvements. It was held that a person whose property was injured could sue on the bond. See also Wright 238 CONSIDERATION. §197 § 197. The English rule. — The rule in England is well set- tled that the consideration must move from the plaintiff, and that a stranger to the contract can acquire no rights under it. 1 v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160. "The question whether this principle extends beyond mere simple contracts, or is applicable to contracts under seal, is involved in more doubt, and is one upon which courts seem not to be agreed. Whilst it has sometimes been decided that the principle does not so extend it may also be true that the opposite has never been directly adjudicated, though opinions to that effect have been expressed. Such was the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Paine in Kimball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695, which seems to have been sustained by the case of Keeler v. Niagara, etc., Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523. The reasoning of Mr. Jus- tice Payne is very clear and satis- factory, and we feel little hesitation in adopting his views as correct in the law." McDowell v. Lev, 35 Wis. 171, 175; a bond given to pay the covenantee's debts. The cred- itor sued and recovered. And see, Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis. 422; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596; McClel- lan v. Sanford, 26 Wis. 595; Putney v. Farnham, 27 Wis. 187 ; "It is now the settled doctrine in so many of the states, that it may be called the American doctrine — although the contrary rule has been established in England and some states — and notably in Massachusetts, where it has been very recently re-affirmed with emphasis — that, where an ex- press promise was made by A. to B., upon a consideration moving from B. whereby the promisor engages to do something for the benefit of C, as, for example, to pay him a sum of money, although C. is both a stranger to the consideration and not an immediate party to the contract, yet he may maintain an action upon the promise in his own name against the promisor, without in any manner joining as a party the one to whom the promise was directly made. This rule was originally adopted prior to the re- formed procedure, and was based partly upon considerations of con- venience, and partly upon a liberal construction of the nature of the con- tract. The provision of the codes [the real party in interest to be the plaintiff] under review places the matter beyond all doubt ; for the per- son for whose benefit the promise ia thus made is certainly the real party in interest." Pomeroy on Remedies, § 139. See, also, Ward v. Cowdrey, 5 N. Y. Supl. 282; Pope v. Porter, 33 Fed. Rep. 7 ; Berry v. Brown, 107 N. Y. 659; 14 N. E. Rep. 289; Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. St. 76; 13 Atl. Rep. 184 ; Peacock v. Williams, 7 R. I. 295 ; 4S.E. Rep. 550; Wilbur v. Wilbur, 21 Atl. Rep. 497; Baum v. Parkhurst, 26 111. App. 128; Boals v. Nixon, 26 111. App. 517 ; Todd». Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, a valuable case which discusses at length the doctrine and re-affirms that "a party for whose benefit a promise was made may maintain an action thereon, although the consid- eration was one between the prom- isor and a third person." Glen v. Hope Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379, allowing insurance money to be collected by the insured from a company who re- insured the first company. Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y. 581; Hutchings v. Miner, 46 N. Y. 456 ; Barker v. Brad- ley, 42 N. Y. 316 ; Dingeldein v. Third Ave. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 575; Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170; Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171. 1 Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393 ; Crow v. Rogers, 1 Strange, 592 ; Colyear §198 CONSIDERATION. 239 And such is the rule in Massachusetts, 1 Michigan , 2 Pennsyl- vania, 8 Connecticut, 4 Virginia and Rhode Island. 6 But even where this rule obtains there are exceptions to it, and particu- lar attention is called to the statement of these exceptions in the sections next following. § 198. Exceptions to the English rule. — The first and princi- pal exception consists of those cases in which the defendant v. Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81 ; Ex parte Piercy, L. B. 9 Ch. 33. The rule that a stranger can not sue or be sued on a contract is applied in all its strictness in case of a deed ; the person to sue for the breach of a contract by deed is the person with whom the contract is expressed by the deed to be made. A covenant is not a covenant with any person except the covenantee ; but a simple contract, though made on the face of it with one person, and there- fore giving him a right to sue upon it, may be often treated as a contract made with some other person whose name does not appear on the face of the contract, but who, as being the person really contracted with, has a right to sue upon the contract. Dicey on Parties, 102. And as to who is the covenantee in a deed, there is a distinction between deeds poll and indentures. No one is a party to an indenture except he is expressly men- tioned as a party, while in a deed poll the covenantee is merely the person in respect of whom the obligation is undertaken, that is the beneficiary, who, of course, could always sue. The American rule, allowing the third per- son to sue on a contract made for his benefit, has been extended to inden- ture deeds by some states. Exchange Bank of St. Louis v. Eice, 107 Mass. 37, where the court said: "The general rule of law is, that a person who is not a party to a simple contract, and from whom no consideration moves, can not sue on the contract, and consequently that a promise made by one person to an- other, for the benefit of a third person who is a stranger to the consideration, will not support an action by the lat- ter. And the recent decisions in this commonwealth and in England have tended to uphold the rule and to nar- row the exceptions to it." Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528 ; Moore ». Moore, 127 Mass. 22. See, also, Colburn, v. Phillip, 13 Gray, 64; Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass. 68; Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317; Millard v. Baldwin, 3 Gray, 484; Field v. Craw- ford, 6 Gray, 116; Dow «. Clark, 7 Gray, 198 ; Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383. 2 Halsted v. Francis, 31 Mich. 113; Toohey v. Comstock, 45 Mich. 603. 3 Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. St. 76; 13 Atl. Eep. 184; Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts, 182 ; Torrens v. Campbell, 74 Pa. St. 470 ; Kountz v. Houlthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235 ; Guthrie v. Kerr, 85 Pa. St. 303. 4 Treats. Stanton, 14 Conn. 445. The head note is: "The rule that where one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third the latter is the proper party to main- tain an action on it, is confined to those cases where the third person for whose benefit the promise was made had the sole and exclusive ben- eficial interest in the subject of the promise, and was therefore deemed to be invested with the legal interest therein." 5 Eoss t>. Milne, 12 Leigh, 204 ; Wil- bur v. Wilbur (1891), 17- E. I. 295. 240 CONSIDERATION. § 199 has in his hands money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff, as where one person receives from an- other money or property as a fund from which certain creditors of the depositor are to be paid, and promises, either expressly, or by implication from his acceptance of the money or property without objection to the terms on which it is delivered to him, to pay such creditors. 1 Cases where promises have been made to a father or uncle for the benefit of a child or nephew form a second class, in which the person for whose benefit the promise was made has maintained an action for the breach of it. The nearness of the relation between the promisee and him for whose benefit the promise was made is assigned as a reason for this. 2 And a third exception exists in Massachusetts where a person promises to take an assignment of a lease and pay the rent. Here the landlord may sue on this promise, after possession is transferred, for rent subsequently accruing. 3 § 199. Restrictions upon the American rule allowing third party to sue. — While there is a tendency in those states which have adopted the English rule to introduce exceptions thereto, those states which allow the real party in interest to sue have begun to limit this doctrine. The courts of New York have repeatedly held that the principle declared in Lawrence v. Fox 4 should be limited to cases having the same essential facts. 6 1 Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. near relationship being no longer re- 37; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Mete, garded as a sufficient consideration (Mass.) 381 ; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Oush. for a contract," citing Tweddle v. At- 337; Lilly v. Hays. 5 A. & E. 548; kinson, 1 B. & S. 393; Hall v. Hun- Walker v. Eostron, 9 M. & W. 411. toon, 17 Vt. 244; Boss v. Milne, 12 8 Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287. Leigh (Va.), 204. Contra Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. s Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337. 393 ; Wilbur v. Wilbur (1891), 17 R. I. 4 20 N. Y. 268. 295, where the court said: "The 5 Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498; plaintiff contends that there are Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296, where three grounds on which this action Lawrence v. Fox is distinguished and can be maintained. The first is that limited. This latter case decided that the contract to pay the note was a creditor of a firm can not maintain an made by said F. with his father action upon an agreement made with for his benefit, and that in such case the firm, by one not a member, to pay the action can be maintained in a portion of its indebtedness ; as no consideration of the relationship, one creditor can show from the con- Some old cases hold so but the weight tract that it was intended for his ben- of modern authority is against them, efit, or covers any part of his debt. §200 CONSIDERATION. 241 § 200. Limitations. — And in those states which have adopted the reformed procedure, the fundamental rule of Beveridge v. N. Y. E. Co., 112 N. Y. 1, where the court said: "Within the principles of adjudged cases in this court, where the plaintiff seeks to base his right to maintain his action against a third party upon a contract made between that party and another, it must be one made or intended for his benefit. Such a beneficial intent must be clearly found in the agreement. ****** In all the cases I have found where the action was sus- tained, the facts showed that the prom- ise clearly was for the third person's benefit, and made with that distinct intention." Carter ■». Holahan, 92 N. Y. 498 ; Seward v. Huntington, 94 N. Y. 104. Here, three persons, who had jointly indorsed the notes of a corpo- ration, entered into a written agree- ment with each other to the effect that if the corporation should fail to pay said notes, they would each pay a third. It was also agreed that each of the parties should execute, to a trustee named, a mortgage as security for the performance of his agreement; and it was provided that in case of failure of one of the parties to pay his share of the unpaid paper and which either of the parties should pay, then the trustee was empowered to foreclose the mortgage at the request of the parties so having paid. It was held that no creditor of the corporation could sue on this agreement, as the trust was not created for his benefit, but solely for that of the parties. Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30. In this case mortgaged property was sold ; the grantee by a recital in the deed agreed to pay the mortgage. The grantee was evicted by title para- mount. It was held the mortgagee could not enforce the covenant in the grantee's deed, as the consideration 16 failed, and the court said: " It seems that a person for whose benefit a promise is made can not, within the case of Lawrence v. Fox, maintain an action to enforce the promise when the promise is void as between the promisor and promisee, because of want or failure of consideration or fraud. The action upon such a promise is subject to the equities between the original parties." Bean v. Edge, 84 N. Y. 510, where the transaction was construed to be a conditional sale and not a contract for the benefit of a third person. Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385, a well considered case. This was an action brought to enforce a covenant in a deed by which the grantee assumed and agreed to pay a judgment lien on the premises con- veyed. The court said: "We think the true result of the decisions upon the effect of an assumption clause in a deed is, that it can only be enforced by a lienor, where in equity the debt of the grantor secured by the lien be- comes, by the agreement between him and his grantee, who assumes the payment, the debt of the latter. On the other hand, if the assumption is in aid of the grantor, upon the secur- ity of the land, and not as between them, a substitution of the liability of the grantee for that of the grantor, or, in other words, if in equity as at law the grantor remains the principal debtor, then the assumption clause is a contract between the parties to the deed alone, and the liability of the grantee, for any breach of his obliga- tion, is to the grantor only. Where the grantee is in equity bound to pay the debt as his own, then the cove- nant, according to the case of Burr v. Beers, may be treated as a promise made for the benefit of the lienor, 242 CONSIDERATION. §200 which concerning parties is that the real party in interest shall sue, there are also certain limitations upon the right and may be enforced in a legal action, although, even in that case, it would seem that the primary object of the covenant is to protect the grantor against his personal liability for the debt secured upon the land. * * * The recent cases show that the court is disinclined to extend the rule in Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268)." The Lake Ontario K. Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219, a subscription case. Here certain persons signed a paper pledging themselves to subscribe for and take stock in and for the con- struction of a railroad, to a certain amount set opposite their names, on condition that the road be located through a certain town. The railroad company brought suit to enforce this agreement. Danf orth, J. , after stating that the alleged subscription was in fact none at all, but only a promise to subscribe, said: "The general rule applicable to the par- ties before us, and the instruments signed by the defendant, is that when two persons, for a consideration suffi- cient as between themselves, cove- nant to do some act which if done would incidentally result in the bene- fit of a mere stranger, that stranger has not a right to enforce the cove- nant, although one of the contracting parties might enforce it as against the other," 222. Clark v. Dickinson, 74 N. Y. 47, a bought and sold note case. A bought and sold note contract was entered into between two parties, and then one of the parties assigned his bought and sold note to a third. The court said : ' ' Although the defendant was entitled to demand and claim the oil which was agreed to be delivered, yet there was no such privity between the plaintiffs and the defendant which rendered the latter directly liable to the plaintiffs for a breach of the con- tract." Miller v. Winchell, 70 N. Y. 437. The owner of land mortgaged it, the mortgagee agreeing verbally to pay two prior mortgages. Subse- quently the mortgagor conveyed the property to a third person. It was held such third person could not maintain an action to compel the mortgagee to perform his promise. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, a leading case. The following is the syllabus: "A grantee of mortgaged premises whose conveyance recites that the land is conveyed subject to the mortgage and that the grantee as- sumes and agrees to pay the same as part of the consideration, is not liable for a deficiency arising upon a fore- closure and sale, in case the grantor was not personally liable, legally or equitably, for the payment of the mortgage." In the opinion the court said: "The courts are not inclined to extend the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to cases not clearly within the principle of that decision. Judges have differed as to the principle upon which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest, but in every case in which an action has been sustained there has been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the party claiming to sue upon the promise. Whether the de- cisions rest upon the doctrine of agency, the promisee being regarded as the agent for the third party, who by bringing his action adopts his acts, or upon the doctrine of a trust, the promisor being regarded as having received money or other thing for the third party, is not material. In either case there must be a legal right, founded upon some obligation of the promisee, in the third party, to adopt and claim the promise as made for his benefit." Simsom>.Brown,68N.Y.355. The syllabus is : "A promise for a valid §200 CONSIDERATION. 243 to sue. The contract must be intended to benefit the third party, and the fact that he will be incidentally benefited does not entitle him to sue. 1 So in a case where a creditor agreed consideration by A. to B. gives no right of action to C, he being neither privy to the contract nor to the con- sideration, unless it was made for his benefit and he was the party intended to be benefited ; the fact that a benefit would inure to him from the perform- ance is not sufficient." Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233. This is the lead- ing case limiting the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268. The following were the facts : The owner of property had mortgaged it and then subsequently by a deed (which was in fact a mortgage) conveyed the prop- erty, the grantee by the terms of the deed assuming the payment of the mortgages. There was a right reserved by parol to the grantor to have a re- conveyance upon payment of a certain sum. This sum having been paid by note the grantee reconveyed to the grantor the premises, the deed stipu- lating that the grantee (the original owner, the mortgagor) should re- assume the payment of the mortgages. The mortgagee brought suit against the first grantee on his covenant to pay, and it was held he could not re- cover. In the opinion the court said : "I do not understand that the case of Lawrence v. Fox has gone so far as to hold that every promise made by one person to another, from the performance of which a third would derive a benefit, gives a right of action to such third party, he being privy neither to the contract or the con. sideration. To entitle him to an action, the contract must have been made for his benefit. He must be the party in- tended to be benefited ; and all that the case of Lawrence v. Fox decides is, that where one person loans money to another, upon his promise to pay it to a third party to whom the party so lending the money is indebted, the contract thus made by the lender is made for the benefit of his creditor, and the latter can maintain an action upon it without proving an express promise to himself from the party re- ceiving the money. * * * If such a contract [meaning the stipulation in the mortgage] could be enforced by the creditor who would be incident- ally benefited by its performance, every agreement, by which one party should agree with another, for a con- sideration moving from him, to be- come security for him to his creditors, or to advance money to pay his debts, could be enforced by the parties whose claims were thus to be secured or paid. I do not understand any case to have gone this length. * * * It must further be considered that where such an assumption is made on an ab- solute conveyance of land, it is un- conditional and irrevocable. The grantor can not retract his convey- ance, or the grantee his promise or undertaking; but when contained in a mortgage, the conveyance is defeas- ible. The grantor reserves the right to annul it by paying his debt, and when he does so, he discharges the agreement to .pay the prior mortgage." And see Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 41; Kelly v. Roberts, 40 N. Y. 432; Berry v. Brown, 1 Silvernail (N. Y. App.), 542; Arnold v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117. Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378, where the court said: "We do not question former rulings of this court, that a party may maintain an action on a promise made for his ben- efit, although the consideration moved from another, to whom the promise was made. But this rule must be un- derstood and applied with its proper 244 CONSIDERATION. 200 that if his debtor would apply for and procure insurance upon his life, in a designated insurance association, for a stipulated amount, he would from time to time pay the premium assess- ments necessary to keep the insurance alive, and, at the debtor's death, would apply the proceeds to the reimbursement of his expenditures for premiums with interest, and then to the satisfaction of his debt with interest, and pay over to the debtor's wife whatever balance should remain of such pro- ceeds, it was held that there was sufficient consideration to support the creditor's promise, and that the proceeds of the insurance in the creditor's hands were held upon a trust, the performance of which the debtor's wife might enforce by suit in equity. 1 qualifications." Bagaley v. Waters, 7 Ohio St. 359; Thompsons. Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333; Miller v. Florer, 15 Ohio St. 148; Canney v. South Pac, etc., R. Co., 63 Cal. 501; Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind. 61 ; Baum v. Parkhurst, 26 111. App. 128 ; Boals v. Nixon, 26 111. App. 517; Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. •160; Pope v. Porter, 33 Fed. Eep. 7; Kaufman v. Bank, 31 Neb. 661 ; Bar- rett v. Henrietta, etc., Bank, 78 Texas, 222; Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123; Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa, 349; Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589. This should not be confounded with the rule allowing the assignee of a chose in action to sue in his own name. Such assignee, of course, may always sue, must be the only plaintiff in fact, at least in those states making it man- datory for the real party in interest to sue. 'Sell v. Steller (N. J. Eq. 1895), 32 Atl. Rep. 211, where the court said: "The proceeds of the insurance have come to the defendant, and after pay- ing the agreed payments to himself he has a balance in his hands, which the debtor's widow demands from him. His promise to pay her that balance was not a mere voluntary undertaking. It was conditioned upon the debtor do- ing that which he hoped would secure his debt, — that is, apply for and ob- tain insurance. In performing that condition the debtor gave valuable consideration for the promise, because he secured that which benefited the defendant in providing a possible means for the recovery of his debt, and, at the same time, at the defend- ant's request, he put himself to the inconvenience, trouble, and expend- iture of time, in applying for and sec- uring the insurance. Mr. Justice De- pue, in Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. Law, 54, said that 'a consideration emanating from some injury or incon- venience to the one party, or from some benefit to the other party, is a valuable consideration.' And in Trap- hagen's Ex'r v. Voorhees, 44 N. J. Eq. 21 ; 12 Atl. Rep. 895, Vice-Chan- cellor Van Fleet said: 'A very slight advantage to one party, or a trifling inconvenience to the other, is a suffi- cient consideration to support a con- tract.' Prior to the latter decision, the same distinguished judge had, in Dayu. Gardner, 42 N. J. Eq. 199; 7 Atl. Rep. 365, defined consideration in the same way. The courts will not 201 CONSIDERATION. 245 § 201. Illegality — Rescission. — In order to enable a third person to. sue on a contract made for his benefit, it must be valid as between the original parties. No action can be maintained where the promise is void as between the promisor and promisee, for fraud, or want of consideration, or failure of consideration. 1 And the parties to a contract made for the inquire into the adequacy of con- sideration in absence of trie sugges- tion of fraud or deceit. I think that, in this instance, there was sufficient consideration, both in the benefit the defendant received and in the incon- venience the complainant's husband suffered, to support the promise in question. When the proceeds of the insurance reached the defendant's hands, they became a trust fund which he was to apply to the satisfac- tion of his demands already specified, and to the payment of the surplus thereof to the complainant. The en- forcement of this trust by a benefici- ary under it is sought in this suit. That she may maintain this action is consequent upon her beneficial in- terest, and is a well-recognized right. In Cubberly v. Cubberly, 33 N. J. Eq. 82, affirmed on appeal, Cubberly v. Cubberly, 33 N. J. Eq. 591, Chancellor Runyon said: 'If one person make a promise to another, on lawful con- sideration, for the benefit of a third person, such third person may main- tain an action, even at law, upon it. Joslin v. New Jersey Car Spring Co., 36 N. J. Law, 141.' " 1 Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30. The grantee of mortgaged property as- sumed to pay the mortgage, and after taking possession was evicted by title paramount. It was held the mort- gagee could not recover the amount of his mortgage on the stipulation in the grantee's deed, because as between the original parties there was a failure of consideration. In the opinion the court said: "I know of no author- ity to support the proposition that a person not a party to the promise, but for whose benefit the promise is made, can maintain an action to enforce the promise, where the promise is void as between the promisor and promisee, for fraud, or want of consideration, or failure of consideration. It would be strange, I think, if such an adjudica- tion should be found. The party su- ing upon the promise, in cases like Lawrence v. Fox, is in truth asserting a derivative right. In Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, it was held that an assumption clause in a deed did not give a right of action to the mort- gagee, where the grantor was not him- self liable to pay the mortgage debt, although in that case there was ample consideration for the promise of the defendant. There is no justice in holding that an action on such a prom- ise is not subject to the equities be- tween the original parties springing out of the transaction or contract be- tween them. It may be true that the promise can not be released or dis- charged by the promisee, after the rights of the party, for whose benefit it is said to have been made, have at- tached. But it would be contrary to justice or good sense to hold that one who ccmes in by what Judge Allen, in Vrooman v. Turner, calls 'the privity of substitution,' should acquire a bet- ter right against the promisor than the promisee himself had." See, also, Crowe v. Lewin, 95 N. Y. 423. 246 CONSIDERATION. § 202 benefit of a third person may rescind without the permission of such third party, and he then has no right of action. 1 § 202. Rescission not to affect rights attached. — Where two parties contract for the benefit of a third, and where the law allows such third person to maintain a suit thereon, after knowledge and assent thereto by such third person the con- 1 Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barna- bas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650. A leading case where the whole doctrine of the liability of the grantee of mort- gaged property, who assumes by cove- nant in his deed to pay the mortgage, is discussed. Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233. In this and the preceding case the grantee of mortgaged prop- erty, who assumed to pay the mort- gage by a stipulation in his deed, re- conveyed to his grantor, and it was held the mortgagee could not enforce the stipulation because the parties had a right to rescind. Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 543. Here mort- gaged property was conveyed subject to the mortgage, and the grantee con- veyed subject to the mortgage, the property passing through mesne con- veyances (in each conveyance the grantee by covenant assumed the pay- ment of the mortgage) to the defen- dant. The defendant's grantor sub- sequent to the conveyance released him from his covenant to pay the mortgage. It was held this barred the mortgagee's suit on defendant's cove- nant to pay the mortgage. Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378, the rescis- sion of an agreement to pay a firm's liabilities. Held, creditor barred. Tal- burt v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 80 Ind. 434, the canceling a deed as- suming payment of mortgage. Dur- ham v. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211. Creditor can not sue on canceled agreement to pay firm's debts. Miller v. Billingsly, 41 Ind. 489; Davis v. Calloway, 30 Tnd. 112; Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Towa, 349. Compare Co rbett v. Water- man, 11 Iowa, 86 ; Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 ; Kelly v. Roberts, 40 N. Y. 432; Jones v. Higgins, 80 Ky. 409. It will be observed and it is necessary to distinguish that authorities are not agreed as to the grounds upon which the grantee, who by a covenant in his deed assumes payment of a mortgage, is held liable. In some of the ad- judicated cases (notably Crowell v. Hospital, 27 S. J. Eq. 650) it has been held the contract of indemnity, or to pay the mortgage, operates as a collateral security, obtained by the mortgagor, which by equitable sub- rogation inures to the benefit of the mortgagee. This being so, it has been held to follow that the mortgagee can only recover a personal judgment against the person who agreed to pay the debt, when the mortgagor holds an obligation that will support the judgment. See Jones on Mortgages, § 762 ; Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152. But in those states having the reformed procedure the cases gen- erally place the liability of the grantee to the mortgagee on the broad principle that if one person make a promise to another for the benefit of a third person, the latter may maintain an action on such prom- ise. Garnsey v. Roberts, 47 N. Y. 233; Ross v. Kennison, 38 Iowa, 396. In the former the grantee really incurs no personal liability to the mortgagee, but in the latter while he incurs a personal liability, it is liable to be nullified by the act of the grantor and grantee. §202 CONSIDERATION. 247 tract can not be rescinded to his prejudice. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Davis, said: "The right of a party to maintain assumpsit on a prom- ise not under seal, made to another for his benefit, although much controverted, is now the prevailing rule in this country. '" The action was assumpsit to recover money paid by sureties on a bail bond, upon the following facts : The president of a corporation against which judgment had been rendered, wishing to appeal, requested another by letter to secure an appeal bond stating that he would indemnify him in case of 1 Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319, a bond executed to pay the covenantee's debts; after the creditor learned of its execution and assented thereto, held, too late for parties to rescind. Kelly v. Roberts, 40 N. Y. 432 ; Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 543. This was a case where the mortgagor released the grantee from his covenant to pay the mortgage, and the court said: "No such release, after the rights of the mortgagee had become fixed, would operate as a discharge. The contract for the benefit of the mort- gagee was one which he could avail himself of or not, at his election, but until he had done some act which fixed his right it was competent for the parties thereto, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, to rescind or cancel it." Trimble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378, where the court said : "If he has not been induced to alter his position by relying, in good faith, on the promise made in his favor, the defendant is not estopped from set- ting up any defense." Dodge v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441. The following is the syl- labus : "C. conveyed a tract of land to W., in consideration that he would pay the former's debts. Held, the vendor can not, after the creditors have accepted, release W., the ven- dee, from liability on the promise. * * * That the party, for whose benefit a promise is made to another may maintain an action upon such promise against the party who has made it, has long since been settled." Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233. In this celebrated case Judge Bapallo draws a distinction between a grantee of mortgaged premises assuming pay- ment of a mortgage by a covenant in a deed, an absolute conveyance of the land, and the case of mortgaged prop- erty being mortgaged a second time, the second mortgagee, by a covenant in his mortgage, assuming payment of the prior mortgage. He holds that where an assumption is made on an absolute conveyance of land, it is un- conditional and irrevocable. Aliter, where the assumption is in a mort- gage. This distinction is severely criticized in Crowell v. Hospital, 27 N. J. Eq. 650, 657. The statement in the text, of course, only refers to those states allowing a third party to sue. Where he is not allowed to sue, of course, he acquires no rights under the contract to enforce. Where a person is not allowed to sue on a con- 1 tract not made with him, still a party thereto might so act with reference to the contract as would give a third party an action on the ground of estoppel, or something else. But this would not be suing on the contract to which he was not a party. 2 Hendricks v. Lindsay, 93 IX. S. 143, 149. 248 CONSIDERATION. § 203 loss, and it was held that an action could be brought by the bondsmen on the promise to the third party to indemnify. But in a later case in the same court this rule would seem to be greatly modified, if, in fact, not entirely overruled. In this case a corporation for a valuable consideration assumed to pay the debts of another corporation, to wit, its coupon bonds ; it was held that the bond holders could not recover on this agreement, and from the language of the opinion it is probable that the court intended to establish the English rule, that no one but the parties to a contract can be bound by it or entitled under it. 1 The doctrine of the court of chancery from which the rule of the reformed procedure is taken is that, as a general rule, strangers to the contract, who are also strangers to the consideration, may, at their pleasure, abandon the con- tract and mutually release each other from performance; upon such rescission and abandonment, the contract is completely at an end, and thereafter can not be enforced. 2 § 203. Delivery essential to gift — Voluntary trust distin- guished. — To constitute a valid gift inter vivos, the giver must part with all present and future dominion over the property 1 National Bank v. Grand Lodge, of an action of assumpsit. The sub- 98 U. S. 123, where the court said: jeet has been much debated, and the "The resolution of the Grand Lodge decisions are not all reconcilable. No [to pay the bonds] was but a prop- doubt the general rule is that such a osition made to the Masonic Hall privity must exist." The court then Association, and when accepted the goes on to point out that if such action resolution and acceptance constituted is allowed the promisor is liable to two at most only an executory contract separate actions, one to the other party inter 'partes. It was a contract made and one to the beneficiary; but as to for the benefit of the association and this objection see the following cases of tbe Grand Lodge, made that the which hold that the beneficiary's suit latter might acquire the ownership of supersedes the other party's. Rice r. stock of the former, and that the Savery, 22 Iowa, 470 ; Cottle «. Cole, 20 former might obtain relief from its Iowa, 481 ; Miller v. Florer, 15 Ohio liabilities. The holders of the bonds St. 148; Hall v. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. were not parties to it, and there was 417 ; Lacey v. Cent. Nat. Bank, 4 Neb. no privity between them and the 179; Sloman v. Great Western R. Co., lodge. ' * * "We do not propose 67 N. Y. 208. to enter at large upon a consideration 2 2 Spence's Equity Jurisprudence, of the inquiry how far privity of con- 280; Hill v. Gomme, 1 Beav. 540; tract between tbe plaintiff and defen- Crowell v. Hospital, 27 N. J. Eq. 654. dant is necessary to the maintenance § 203 CONSIDERATION. 24'J given. He can not give it, and at the same time retain the ownership of it. There must be a delivery to the donee or to some one for the donee; and the gift must be absolute and ir- revocable, without any reference to its taking effect at some future period. 1 The intention to give is often established by most satisfactory evidence, although the gift fails. Instru- ments may be ever so formally executed by the donor, pur- porting to transfer title to the donee, or there may be the most explicit declaration of an intention to give or of an actual pres- ent gift, yet, unless there is delivery, the intention is defeated. 2 The only important difference between a gift and a voluntary trust is that in the one case the whole title, legal as well as equitable — the thing itself — passes to the donee, while in the other the actual, beneficial, or equitable title passes to the cestui que trust, while the legal title is transferred to a third person, or is retained by the person creating it, to hold for the purposes of the trust. But a gift of the equitable or beneficial title must be as complete and effectual in the case of a trust, as is the gift of the thing itself in a gift inter vivos. 3 While 'Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Maine, 422; in a gift these would be inconsistent Carleton v. Lovejoy, 54 Maine, 445 ; with the very purposes of a trust Eobinson v. Ring, 72 Maine, 140; where a person creates himself as the Northrop v. Hale, 73 Maine, 66. trustee. Possession and control in 2 Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421; such a case remain in him who has 22 N. E. Rep. 940. the legal title, subject to the direction 8 Norway Sav. Bank v. Merriam, 88 of courts of equity. But while de- Maine (1895) ; 33 Atl. Rep. 840, per livery and surrender of possession are Wiswell, J. . "It is just as essential, not necessary in the creation of such to establish the trust sought to be set a trust as is here sought to be rnain- up here, to prove some act on the part tained, there must be other acts which of the donor that shall operate to pass are so far equivalent as the nature of the equitable title to the donee, as it is the transaction will permit. A per- to prove delivery in a gift inter vivos." feet or completed trust is created Bath Sav. Institution v. Hathorn, 88 where the donor makes an unequivo- Maine, — ; 33 Atl. Rep. 836. The cal declaration, either in writing* or creation of a trust is but the gift of by parol, that he himself holds the the equitable interest. But on ac- property in trust for the purposes count of the difference in the form named. He need not in express terms and purposes of the two transactions, declare himself trustee, but he must it necessarily follows that different do something equivalent to it, and acts are essential in the two cases, use expressions which have that While delivery and a surrender of all meaning. To create a trust, the acts present and future dominion over the or words relied upon must be un- property given is absolutely necessary equivocal, implying that the person 250 CONSIDERATION. § 203 courts of equity will enforce a perfect and completed trust, al- though purely voluntary, equity will lend no assistance towards perfecting a voluntary contract or agreement for the creation of a trust, nor regard it as binding so long as it re- mains executory. In order that such a trust may be valid and enforcible, it must always appear from the written or oral declaration, from the nature of the transaction, the relation of the parties, and the purposes of the gift, that the fiduciary re- lation is completely established. Nor will the court enforce as a trust a transaction which was intended as a gift, but is im- perfect for that purpose, because thereby every imperfect in- strument might be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust. If such a trust is otherwise sufficiently created, its validity is not affected by the fact that the donor reserved the right to modify the purposes or to revoke the trust, nor that he reserved the income of the trust fund during life. 1 holds the property aa trustee for another. There must be an executed gift of the equitable title without any reference to its taking effect at some future time. In Barker v. Frye, 75 Maine, 29, a deposit was made in a savings bank in the name of the donee subject to the order of the donor dur- ing his life-time. Subsequently, the donor notifiedthe treasurer of the bank that she desired to make such a change as would give the donee the full and absolute control over the deposit from tli at time, and that her right to con- trol the same should cease, and at her request the original entry, subject to the order of the donor, was erased. She immediately notified the donee by letter of what had been done, and tha| the bank-book would be delivered to him the first time that they met. The donee accepted the gift. The court held that the gift was complete. The important and controlling facts in these cases do not exist in the cases now under consideration. This court has held that where A. deposited money in a savings bank in the name of B. without a declaration of trust at the time or subsequently and re- tained the deposit book until his death, it was not sufficient to consti- tute either a gift or a trust. Robinson v. Ring, 72 Maine, 140. Where A. de- posited money in a bank in the name of B., but without the knowledge of B. with the entry on the books of the bank and on the pass-book, subject to A., and A. received the dividends and such portion of the principal as she required for her own use and held the pass-book always in her possession, these facts did not constitute either a gift or a trust in favor of B., and if there was any trust B. was the trustee for the depositor. See, also, Parcher v. Saco, etc., Institution, 78 Maine, 470; Curtis v. Portland, etc., Bank, 77 Maine, 151, and Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Maine, 231." 'This is the general doctrine in relation to voluntary trusts as laid down by many authorities. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134; Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422 ; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590 ; Gerrish v. New Bedford In- §204 CONSIDERATION. 251 § 204. Gift of savings bank deposit. — A gift must be exe- cuted by delivery; a trust by declaration. An express trust of personal property may be created or declared by parol, but its terms must be clearly established and show an executed gift, so that the equitable title shall pass effectually to the donee, as in the case of a gift inter vivos. An entry on the books of a savings bank, in the name of a donor, and followed by the clause, "in trust for the donee," is not in itself con- clusive evidence of an absolute gift, but it creates a prima facie trust in favor of the donee, which may become complete through the donor's declarations and conduct. 1 The deposit on his part was both vol- untary and secret. Information of it may have been communicated to her by others, but never at his request or with his knowledge. What evidence, then, operates to pass the equitable title in the deposit to her? He had consummated no contract with her. His intentions were kept in his own breast. He could have withdrawn the money at any time, and have made a new disposition of it, and she may not have been the wiser, so far as he knew. It is just as essential, to establish the trust sought to be set up here, to prove some act on the part of the donor that shall operate to pass the equitable title to the donee, as it is to prove delivery in a gift inter vivos. Both require the same essen- tials. In both, some title must pass from the donor, differing only in de- gree. A gift must be executed by de- livery; a trust, by declaration. In Augusta Bank v. Fogg, 82 Maine, 538, 20 Atl. Rep. 92, the donor deposited a sum of money in the name of the donee, subject to his own order, with intent that, at his death, it should go to the donee. No trust was claimed or shown. It was an unexecuted pur- pose, an ineffectual attempt at testa- mentary disposition. In Parcher v. Saco, etc., Institution, 78 Maine, 470; 7 Atl. Bep. 266, a depositor caused to be entered upon the bank stitution, 128 Mass. 159; Sherman v. New Bedford Bank, 138 Mass. 581; Pope v. Burlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt. 284; Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571; 25 Atl. Rep. 487 ; Marcy v. Amazeen, 61 N. H. 131 ; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140. 1 Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Maine (1895) ; 33 Atl. Rep. 836, per curiam : "In this case, the deposit is in the name of the donor, 'in trust for the donee.' Standing alone, this entry does not work an absolute, indisputa- ble gift in the form of a dry trust — that is, a trust without limitation or condition, that may be terminated at the will of the cestui; but extrinsic evidence is competent to control its effect. Brabrook v. Boston, etc., Bank, 104 Mass. 228; Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522; Powers v. Provident Institution, 124 Mass. 377; Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593, Fed. Cas. No. 13,482 ; Northrop v. Hale, 72 Maine, 275. The evidence discloses that, at the time the donor made the de- posit, he expressed a desire that the donee should have the money at his death. That certainly shows no intent to part with the legal title at an earlier day. He is said to have subsequently made talk of the same purport ; but he neither informed the donee of the deposit, nor made any effort or did any act to apprise her of it, or of his intention concerning it. 252 CONSIDERATION. § 205 § 205. Gratuitous subscriptions. — A subscription may or may not be a contract. As a contract is said to be an arrange- ledger words, in substance, 'Payable also to Mrs. Leavitt in case of my death,' and it was held no gift. In Curtis v. Portland, etc., Bank, 77 Maine, 151, the entry of 'Subject also to' the donee was held to constitute no gift, but that a subsequent delivery of the bank-book completed the gift. In Barker a. Frye, 75 Maine, 29, a de- posit in the name of the donee, sub- ject to the order of the donor during life, afterwards changed by erasing words giving the donor any control of the fund, and after notice to the donee of the change and that the bank-book would be delivered to him the first time they met, and after his reply re- questing that the book be sent to him, which the court says 'was an accept- ance of the gift,' it was held that the gift was complete. The same doctrine is held in Northrop v. Hale, 73 Maine, 66; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Maine, 140; Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Maine, 231 ; 17 Atl. Rep. 63 ; Parkman v. Suffolk, etc., Bank, 151 Mass. 218 ; 24 N. E. Rep. 43. All of our cases require something more than a mere intention to give, a promise to give, or an expectation to give. Benevolence alone will not do. There must be beneficence also. The mystery sometimes supposed to exist about a trust can not change the na- ture of a transaction. A voluntary trust is a gift, and requires all the essentials of a plain gift to sustain it. In Dresser v. Dresser, snpra, a writ- ing specifying the terms of a volun- tary trust, and a delivery of the trust property so that the dominion of the donor over it was there- after lost, is a good example of a trust of this sort. In Alger v. North End, etc., Bank, 146 Mass. 418 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 916, the donor made a deposit similar to the one under consideration. It was in his own name, as trustee for the do- nee, his housekeeper, who claimed the deposit as a payment for her services. It was shown that, shortly before his death, he told her, 'I put it in for you;' 'that money is yours;' and the court held that the judge, who tried the case, was authorized to find a perfected gift, if he chose to do so. Some of the cases are in conflict con- cerning the question now under con- sideration, more in the application of the law to the ever-varying facts in the numerous cases than otherwise; but our own cases are all consistent, and squarely hold to the doctrine that a trust in personal property may be created by parol, and that a deposit in bank in the name of another may be explained or controlled by evidence outside the written terms of the de- posit. In this case, the terms of the deposit clearly show an intended trust in favor of the donee, but may be con- trolled or limited by extrinsic evi- dence. This evidence confirms the trust, showing that it should cease at the death of the donor, and that the legal title should then pass to the cestui. "When the deposit was made, the treasurer of the bank told the donor that, at his decease, the money would go to the donee, and the donor replied that was his wish. All the subsequent acts and declarations of donor show the same intent. The gift can not be upheld as an absolute gift inter vivos, nor as a gift causa mortis, for these gifts require a delivery of the res, a complete transfer of title. They differ from a gift in trust in that tbey purport to, and must, pass the whole title, so that the donor can have no dominion or control over them. But a gift in trust withholds the legal title from the donee. It may be transmitted to a third person, or it may be retained by the donor, but in § 205 CONSIDERATION. 253 ment "in writing to furnish a sum of money, or its equivalent, for a designated purpose; as, to assist a charitable or religious either case the equitable title has gone from him, and unless the declaration of trust contains the power of revoca- tion, or the wide discretion of chan- cery attaches (Coutts v. Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558; Wollaston v. Tribe, L. R. 9 Eq. 44; Everitt v. Everitt, L. R. 10 Eq. 405 ; Phillips v. Mullings, 7 Ch. App. 244; Welman v. Welman. 15 Oh. Div. 570 ; Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 491 ; Anderson v. Elsworth, 3 Giff. 154; Toker v. Toker, 31 Beav. 629; Phillips v. Mullings, 7 Ch. App. 244 ; Smith v. Iliffe, L. R. 20 Eq. 666 ; Welman v. Welman, L. R. 15 Ch.Div.570, 578, 579 ; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 433), it leaves him powerless to ex- tinguish the trust. Of course, the trust must be established by proof, and the fact that no evidence of a voluntary trust once created remains or can be shown, does not alter the principle. Many rights fail of enjoy- ment from the lack of evidence that might once be adduced. So, a secret trust may be valid when it can be proved ; but if the donor conceals the evidence of it, and later appropriates the fund to his own use, it is simply a wrong on his part, that prevails be- cause of his perfidy, and goes un- punished and unnoticed because un- known. The cestui's rights are the same, although his remedy may have been destroyed. In the case of ire re Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 428, 22 Atl. Rep. 916, a lad of three years went to live with his uncle. When the lad was twelve the uncle placed $13,000 in bonds in an envelope, on which he had written and signed a declaration that he held them for his nephew. The bonds remained in the uncle's pos- session until his death, and the court held a completed gift in trust for the nephew. In Conn. , etc., Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571 ; 25 Atl. Rep. 487, the court says : 'A completed trust, although vol- untary, may be enforced in equity. It is not essential that the beneficiary should have had notice of its creation or have assented to it. The owner or donor of personal property may create a perfect or complete trust by his un- equivocal declaration in writing, or by parol, that he himself holds such property in trust for the purposes named. The trust is equally valid whether he constitutes himself or an- other person the trustee.' In that case a father deposited money in a savings bank in the name of his son, naming himself trustee. It appeared that one motive of the father was to avoid taxation; but, said the court, ' that fact does not negative the idea that he also intended to create a trust for the benefit of his son. It is per- fectly consistent with it, and the re- tention of the pass-book is not incon- sistent with such a purpose. He must have retained it as trustee.' Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, is in point. ' One Bosworth deposited money in a savings bank in his own name as trustee for a step-daughter. He did not tell her what he had done, nor show her the pass-book. He kept that himself. After his death, the court held that the step-daughter was entitled to the money — that the trans- action constituted a trust in her favor.' So is Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134. Susan Boone deposited $500 in a savings bank ' in trust for Lillie Wil- lard.' Susan kept the pass-book, and Lillie had no knowledge of it until after Susan's death. Want of notice to Lillie, and the retention of the pass- book by Susan, were urged in defense ; but the court held a gift in trust com- plete. This is an exhaustive case, and contains a review of authorities by Chief Justice Church prior to 1878. So is Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512: 254 CONSIDERATION. 205 object, or to take stock in a corporation." 1 It is either volun- tary — that is, gratuitous — or else it is supported by a consider- ation. The cases on the subject of gratuitous subscriptions present several views of the subject. But, according to a dis- tinguished American writer, 8 all cases of gratuitous subscrip- tions are referable to one of six classes. The first is that all such subscriptions are null as wanting consideration. 8 A widow deposited $250 in her own name, ' as trustee of Wm. A. Minor,' the child of a neighbor. The child knew nothing of the deposit until after the depositor's death, and mean- time did not have possession of the pass-book; and the court held the trust complete, and allowed a recov- ery of the money from the depositor's executor. So is In re Gaffney 's Estate, 146 Pa. St. 49 ; 23 Atl. Rep. 163. It ap- peared that Hugh Gaffney deposited $560 in his own name, as trustee for Polly Kim, and the court held the entry itself prima facie evidence of the trust and, unexplained, sufficient to uphold it. In Gerrish v. Institution, supra, the court says : ' No particular form of words is required to create a trust in another, or to make the party himself a trustee for the benefit of another ; that it is enough for the lat- ter purpose if it be unequivocally declared in writing — or orally, if the property be personal ; that it is held in trust for the person named; that when the trust is thus created, it is effectual to transfer the beneficial in- terest, and operates as a gift perfected by delivery.' The same case holds that notice to the beneficiary is un- necessary where the transaction is clear; but when ambiguous, or sus- ceptible of different interpretations, it removes the doubt, and is decisive of the purpose of the donor. Some of the earlier Massachusetts cases seem to hold notice to the beneficiary essen- tial to the validity of a trust, but, when considered in the light of this case, rather consider the notice a con- trolling than an essential element in the creation of a voluntary trust. The prevailing doctrine now is that notice is unnecessary, but, when shown, has controlling effect. In this case, the entry ' in trust for ' is of clear and unmistakable import, and sufficient to create a prima facie trust. It might have been controlled by evidence that would have shown a contrary inten- tion, but such evidence is wholly wanting. Moreover, all the declara- tions, acts, and conduct of the donor are consistent with the presumption arising from the entry itself, and show that it expresses the true import of the transaction and creates a com- pleted trust in favor of the donee." 1 Anderson's Law Dictionary, title, "Subscribe." It is important to bear in mind the meaning of subscription. To constitute a "subscription" there must be a person or corporation as the beneficiary or payee. 2 Judge E. H. Bennett, of Boston, in 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 548. 3 Boutell v. Cowdin, 9 Mass. 254; Phillips, .etc., Academy v. Davis, 11 Mass. 113 ; Foxcroft Academy v. Favor, 4 Maine, 382; Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert, 2 Pick .579 ; Stewart v. Trustees Hamilton College, 2 Denio, 403. Judge Bennett points out that many of the cases, where gratuitous subscriptions were declared null and void, were also lacking in all the element of a con- tract because there was no legal payee who could be compelled to carry out the trust. But, of course, in this view 205 CONSIDERATION. 255 The second is that one gratuitous subscription is the con- sideration of the other. 1 A third is that, although the payees named in the subscription paper can not recover upon the original subscription paper, yet if, relying thereon, they have properly expended money for the common object, they might recover upon a count for money paid, laid out, expended, especially if the defendant ratified the subscription after such outlay. 2 A fourth seems not to be in fact gratuitous at all. They are where, by the terms of the subscription paper, each sub- scriber is to have an interest or share in the object of the sub- there was no subscription at all. A subscription must be at least between definite persons. 1 Congregational So'ciety v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164, where the doctrine origin- ated. Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537. "It has sometimes been supposed that when several persons promise to con- tribute to a common object, desired by all, the promise of each may be a good consideration for the promise of the others, and this although the object in view is one in which the promisors have no pecuniary or legal interest, and the performance of the promise by one of the promisors would not in a legal sense be beneficial to the others. * * » The doctrine seems to us unsound in principle. It pro- ceeds on the assumption that a stranger both to the consideration and the promise, and whose only relation to the transaction is that of donee of an executory gift, may sue to enforce the payment of the gratuity for the reason that there has been a breach of contract between the several prom- isors and a failure to carry out as between themselves their mutual en- gagement. It is in no proper sense a case of mutual promises, as between the plaintiff and defendant." An- drews, J., in Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 521-2; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533. "A consider- ation of mutual promises wholly be- tween A. and B. will not support a promise by either to pay C." 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 551. Berkeley, etc., School v. Jarvis, 32 Conn. 412. "Sim- ilar promises of third persons to the plaintiff may be a consideration for agreements between those persons and the defendant; but as they confer no benefit upon the defend- ant and impose no charge or obli- gation upon the plaintiff they con- stitute no legal consideration for the defendant's promise to him." Per Gray, J., in Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 531 ; but in those states allowing a suit to be brought on a contract by the bene- ficiary, although not a party, of course, if the subscribers as between them- selves made a valid contract to sub- scribe, this contract could be enforced by the beneficiary. Thrasher v. Pike County R. Co., 25 111. 393. And it is upon this principle, and not on the principle that one subscription is the consideration of the other, that many cases are decided. See following cases : Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214 ; Un- derwood, v. Waldron, 12 Mich. 73; Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629. 2 16 Am. Law Eeg. (N. S.) 551, citing the following cases: Farming- ton Academy v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172 ; Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228 ; My- ricka. French, 2 Gray, 420; McAuley v. Billenger, 20 Johns. 89; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537. 256 CONSIDERATION. § 205 scrip tion, a pew in the church, a share in the academy, and the like. These are cases, notof gratuitous subscriptions, but of sub- scriptions supported by distinct grounds of consideration. 1 A fifth class is where the payee, or the institution for whose ben- efit the subscription is made, has expressly agreed to do cer- tain things, perform certain duties, or has complied with the conditions on which the subscription was made. This makes the subscription valid and enforcible. 2 There is finally a sixth class of cases upholding gratuitous subscriptions upon the ground of an implied duty and obligation on the part of the payee to carry out the object of the paper, and apply the money for the purposes and objects intended by the donor. This is referred to the doctrine of mutual promises.' 1 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 551, cit- ing Thompson v. Page, 1 Metcalf, 565; Ives v. Sterling, 6 Metcalf, 310; My- rick v. French, 2 Gray, 420. 2 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 551, cit- ing Williams College v. Danforth, 12 Pickens, [541 ; University Vermont v. Buell, 2 Vt. 48; State Treasurer v. Cross, 9 Vt. 289; Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. St. 416 ; Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18 ; Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 ; Trustees v. Stetson, 5 Pickens, 506. See, also, Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517. 3 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 553, cit- ing as instances of the doctrine : Col- lier v. Baptist, etc., Society, 8 B. Mon- roe, 68; Troy Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 194; Ladies,' etc., Institute v. French, 16 Gray, 19.6; Amherst Acad- emy v. Cowls, 6 Pick. 427 ; Trustees ■v. Ripley, 6 Maine, 442. Judge Ben- nett thinks the case of Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, should have been decided on this ground. He says: "There was a competent payee, an absolute sub- scription, an acceptance thereof by the payee, a, subsequent ratification by the defendant, and an actual col- lection of money from the other sub- scribers, all of which might be thought to create an implied duty, or raise an implied promise to devote the pro- ceeds to the object intended by the donors ; and, in that light, might, in the view of some authorities, consti- tute a good consideration for the de- fendant's promise." See following cases as referring themselves to one of the six classifications of gratui- tous subscriptions, as given in the text: Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Interna- tional Mil. Encampment Co., 140 111. 248. This is a very exhaustive dis- cussion of the subject of subscriptions generally, but it is to be observed that the court here found a consideration. The defendant, to increase its trade, subscribed to a fund to bring a mili- tary encampment to Chicago. The benefit to the defendant was considera- tion enough. The following language is taken from the opinion as instruct- ive generally on subscriptions: "The case, then, as presented here, is one of a subscription, not to an existing, but to a contemplated, corporation, and the question is, whether such sub- scription is enforcible by the corpora- tion after it comes into being. Ques- tions of this character most frequently arise in case of preliminary subscrip- tions to the capital stock of corpora- tions not yet organized, and it is held §206 CONSIDERATION. 257 § 206. The present doctrine. — A gratuitous subscription is a mere offer, which may be revoked at any time before it is accepted by the promisee. And an acceptance can only be shown by some act on the part of the promisee whereby some legal liability is incurred or money is expended on the faith of the promise. 1 that such subscriptions are in the na- ture of continuing offers to take stock upon the organization of the corpora- tion, and they ripen into binding con- tracts when the corporation, after be- coming a corporate body, accepts the offer. The same principle is held to be applicable to other preliminary contracts. Thus, in Johnston v. Ewing Female University, 35 111. 518, it was held that a subscription for the build- ing of a university, made prior to its incorporation, but in contemplation thereof, was legal and binding upon the party making it. So, in Snell v. Trustees, 58 111. 290, it was held to be no defense to a suit to enforce a sub- scription to aid in building a church, that, at the time of the subscription, the society was not incorporated," citing Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary, 113 111. 618; Pratt v. Trustees, 93 111. 475 ; Trustees of Ky. Baptist Society v. Carter, 72 111. 247 ; Hall v. City of Vir- ginia, 91 111. 535; Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 40 111.379; McClureu. Wilson, 43 111. 356; Pryor v. Cain, 25 111. 292; Snell v. Trustees, 58 111. 290; Griswold v. Board of Trustees, 26 111. 41 ; Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co., 17 111. 54; George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533; Congregational Society v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164; Berkeley Divinity School v. Jarvis, 32 Conn. 412; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537 ; Trustees v. Stet- son, 5 Pick. 506. The five cases last cited were decided on the ground that one gratuitous subscription upholds another. The doctrine was repudiated in New Hampshire, where it origi- 17 nated. Curry v. Rogers, 21 N. H. 247. See also, "Voluntary subscriptions to charitable and other objects,'' 9 Vir- ginia Law Journal, 321. 1 Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. A leading case, where the court said : "Agratuitous subscrip- tion, to promote the objects for which a corporation is established, can not be enforced unless the promisee has, in reliance on the promise sued on, done something, or incurred or assumed some liability or obligation ; and it is not sufficient that others were led to subscribe by the subscription sought to be enforced . " "The performance of gratuitous promises depends wholly upon the good will which prompted them, and will not be enforced by the law. * * * The general rule is that, in order to support an action, the promise must have been made upon a legal consideration moving from the pro- misee to the promisor. To constitute such consideration, there must be either a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss, trouble or incon- venience to, or a charge or obligation resting upon, the party to whom the promise is made. A promise to pay money to promote the objects for which a corporation is established falls with- in the general rule."' And it was ac- cordingly held that a church could not recover on a subscription when it was not built in reliance thereon. The subscription was one to build a church and the church was built, but there was conflicting evidence as to whether anything was done, or , any liability 258 CONSIDERATION. §207 § 207. Revocation by death. — As a general rule death re- vokes a gratuitous subscription. 1 The rule is otherwise, how- incurred or obligation assumed in reliance on the subscription of de- fendant. In the opinion Gray, J., likens a gratuitous subscription to a unilateral contract. It being a request to do an act which when done becomes a unilateral contract binding the subscriber. Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military, etc., Co., 140 111. 248, where the court said: "His promise to pay was a mere offer until acted upon. * * * The real consideration upon which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, in such cases [gratuitous subscriptions], is, that it has expended money, fur- nished materials, or bestowed labor, upon the faith of the promise in writ- ing, and not any special benefit derived or expected to be derived by the promisor from the corporation." Pres- byterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, where the court said: "It is of course unquestionable that no action can be maintained to enforce a gra- tuitous promise however worthy the object intended to be promoted." In this case a person, together with oth- ers, had subscribed to pay off a church debt. The subscription was held to be gratuitous and not enforcible. Reimensnyder v. Cans, 110 Pa. St. 17; Stuart v. Presbyterian Church, 84 Pa. St. 388. The following is the syllabus: "A verbal promise to pay a certain sum to reduce the debt of a church, on condition that the whole amount be raised, is not binding unless this condition is performed." The case discusses the effect of a subscription. Lafayette County Monument Co. v. Magoon, 73 Wis. 627; Schuler v. Myton, 48 Kan. 282; Fulton v. Ster- ling Land Co., 47 Kan. 621; Bohn, etc., Co., v. Lewis, 45 Minn. 164; Grand Lodge v. Farnham, 70 Cal. 158; Williams v. Rogan, 59 Texas, 438. And see, also, Freidline v. Board of Trustees, 23 111. App. 494; Kinsley v. International, etc., Co., 41 111. App. 259; Miller o. Preston, 4 N. M. 314; Vierling v. Horton, 27 111. App. 263; The Twenty-third Street Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601; Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600; 9 N. E. Rep. 500; Lake Ontario R. Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N. Y. 219. A seal placed to a subscription would, of course, under general principles of law, pre- clude any consideration of a lack of consideration. 'The Twenty-third Street Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601, where the court said: "The con- tention is, that the church corpora- tion erected its new edifice and incurred the large cost of its con- struction in reliance upon these sub- scriptions, and so in the end, if not in the beginning, a consideration arose to support the promise. That may happen where the expenditure can be said to have proceeded with the knowledge and assent of the sub- scribers; but here, before any expen- diture was made, or any work was begun, Mrs. Weeks died. Her gift was unexecuted at her death and re- voked by that event; and no after action of the church corporation could change or affect the result ;" Presbyte- rian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517; Grand Lodge v. Farnham, 70 Cal. 158, where the court said: "If the promisor dies before his offer is accepted, it is thereby revoked, and can not after- wards, by any act showing acceptance, be made good as against his estate," per Belcher, C. C, 159; Beach v. First, etc., Church, 96 111. 177; Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. St. 260; Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. St. 328; Cottage St. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. § 208 CONSIDERATION. 259" ever, where subscribers agree together to make up a specified sum, and where the withdrawal of one increases the amount to be paid by the others. In such case, as between the sub- scribers, there is a mutual liability, and the co-subscribers may maintain an action against one who refuses to pay, or, if dead, against his personal representative. 1 § 208. Subscription to capital stock — Before incorpora- tion. — In the case of original subscriptions made for the pur- pose of effecting the organization of the company, a subscriber becomes a stockholder only upon the performance of all the conditions precedent to corporate existence which may be re- quired by the charter or general act of incorporation. 2 Before the company enters upon its corporate existence, however, he may withdraw; 3 and, although he may have been active in persuading others to subscribe, he can not be held liable for any part of his subscription. 4 Subscriptions to the stock of a company to be formed in the future are not mutual promises between the subscribers themselves, 5 nor binding upon them as such; but, upon the organization of the corporation, a 1 Grand Lodge v. Farnham, 70 Cal. ing to its charter is a question that can 158. But this is an action upon a con- not be made collaterally, but can only tract distinct from that of the sub- be made by a direct proceeding scription. against the corporation; Penobscot 2 Beach on Private Corporations, E. Co. v. White, 41 Maine, 512 ; Pe- § 63; Spear v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20; nobscot B. Co. v. Dummer, 40 Maine, 28 Am. Dec. 513; Burrall v. Bush- 172; Thigpen v. Mississippi R. Co., 32 wick E. Co., 75 N. Y. 211; Buffalo E. Miss. 347; Temple v. Lemon, 112 111. Co. v." Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336; Milford, 51. etc., Co. v. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111; 36 Am. 'Stanton v. Wilson, 2 Hill, 153; Dec.78;SedaliaE.Co.».Wilkerson,83 Buffalo E. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. Mo. 235; East Tennessee E. Co. v. 336; Ashuelot, etc., Co. v. Hoit, 56 Gammon, 5 Sneed, 567 ; Mobile E. Co. N. H. 548 ; Athol Music Hall Co. v. -j.Yandal, 5 Sneed, 294 ; Connecticut E. Carey, 116 Mass. 471. Co. v. Bailey, 24 Vt. 465; 58 Am. Dec. 4 Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. De 181; Selma E. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. LaGreen (Pa. 1888), 13 Atl.Eep. 747; 787; New Albany E. Co. v. McCor- 12 Cent. Eep. 386. mick, 10 Ind. 499; Instone v. Frank- 5 Athol Music Hall v. Carey, 116 fort Bridge Co., 2 Bibb. 576 ; Waukon, Mass. 471 ; Lake Ontario R. Co. v. Cur- etc., E. Co. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121; tiss, 80 N. Y. 219; Quicks. Lemon, 105 Wight v. Shelby E. Co., 16 B. Mon. 4, 111. 578 ; Mt. Sterling Coal Eoad Co. v. holding that whether the company Little, 14 Bush, 429; Strasburg E. Co. was properly organized or not accord- v. Echternacht, 21 Pa. St. 220. 260 CONSIDERATION. 209, 210 subscription made prior thereto becomes binding, 1 the pro- spective rights of membership being deemed a sufficient con- sideration to support the contract. 8 § 209. After incorporation. — A subscription made after the organization of the corporation does not constitute the sub- scriber a shareholder until it be accepted by the company, 3 and, until accepted, it may be withdrawn, as in the case of offers generally, 4 but the offer, when accepted, becomes bind- ing, both upon the subscriber and upon the corporation. 5 § 210. The consideration for such a subscription. — The real consideration which supports a stock subscription is the pecu- niary advantages and the profits anticipated from being a stock- holder. 6 ' Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Crevier, 39 Minn. 417. 2 Beach on Private Corporations, § 63, citing Lake Ontario R. Co. v. Mason, 16 N.Y. 451; Hamilton, etc., Co. v. Rice, 7 Barb. 157 ; Stanton B.Wilson, 2 Hill, 153 ; Barkers. Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45; Schenectady, etc., Plank R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102; "Union Tun- pike Co. v. Jenkins, 1 Caines, 381 ; Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. 3 Beach on Private Corporations, § 64 ; Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364; Sewall v. Eastern R. Co., 9 Cush. 5; Carlisle v. Saginaw Valley Co., 27 Mich. 315 ; Parker v. Northern R. Co., 33 Mich. 23; Northern Central Co. v. Eslow, 40 Mich. 222 ; Busey v. Hooper, 35 Md. 15 ; St. Paul R. Co. v. Robbins, 23 Minn. 439. 4 Thrasher v. Pike County R. Co., 25 111. 393; Rhey v. Ebensburg, etc., Co., 27 Pa. St. 261; Mt. Sterling Coal Road Co. v. Little, 14 Bush, 429 ; Quick «. Lemon, 105 111. 578 ; Lake Ontario R. Co. «. Curtiss, 80 N.Y. 219; Stuart v. Valley R. Co., 32 Gratt. 146 ; Goff v. Winchester College, 6 Bush, 443. 5 Spear v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20; Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463; Busey v. Hooper, 35 Md. 15 ; McClure v. Peoples', etc., R. Co., 90 Pa. St. 269 ; Cass v. Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. St. 31 Bucher v. Dillsburg, 76 Pa. St. 306 Ex parte Mansfield, 19 L. J. Ch. 258 Ex parte Yelland, 21 L. J. Ch. 852 ; E. parte Hawkins, 25 L. J. Ch. 221 ; Ex parte Smith, 17 W. R. 491 ; Ex parte Barrett, 34 L. J. Ch. 558 ; In re Direct Exeter R. Co., 3 De G. & Sm. 234; Bell's Case, 22 Beav. 35. 6 Beach on Private Corporations, § 584; Selma R. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787; Lake Ontario R. Co. v. Mason, 16 N. Y. 451 ; Buffalo R. Co. v. Dud- ley, 14 N. Y. 336; Schenectady R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102; Thigpen v. Mississippi R. Co., 32 Miss. 347; New Albany R. Co. v. Fields, 10 Ind. 187; Fry v. Lexington R. Co., 2 Mete. (Ky.) 314; Hartford, etc., Co. u. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 499. The following cases hold that the mutual promises of the subscribers and the implied engagement of the company to issue stock are the considera- tion, to wit: Bullock v. Falmouth, etc., Co., 85 Ky. 184; Twin Creek etc., Co. v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552; St. Paul R. Co. v. Robbins, 23 Minn. 439, while the following hold that the § 211 CONSIDERATION. 261 § 211. Sufficient consideration illustrated. — Where an agree- ment was made between plaintiff and defendant's testator that friendly suits should be brought on notes given by plaintiff to defendant's testator as the price of certain lands; that no de- fense was to be made thereto; that the lands were to be bought in by defendant's, testator, and, if they could be afterwards sold, defendant's testator was to retain amount due on the notes, and, if not so sold, they should be taken in full satis- faction of the judgment — there was a sufficient consideration for the agreement on the part of the defendant's testator. 1 So, also, the payment of part of a judgment by a person other than the debtor is a sufficient consideration for the judgment cred- itor's agreement to cancel the judgment. 2 In a case where creditors of an insolvent contractor held liens for materials fur- nished to erect a building, and agreed with him, in writing, to assign their liens to the owner of the building if he would pay the money still due, before a certain day, by first paying in full the claims for labor, and then dividing the remainder proportionately among all other lien claimants, it was held that the agreement was valid, and binding on each signer, as the contract of each was a sufficient consideration for the con- tracts of the others. 8 Likewise a contractor's promise to pay for extra materials ordered by the architect, made before the work is completed, is founded on a sufficient consideration for materials already used, as well as for the rest. 4 And the agree- execution of the purpose of incorpo- When they mutually agree to forego ration is the consideration, to wit: their right to pursue the usual method Kennebec E. Co. v. Palmer, 34 Maine, of enforcing their demands in con- 366; McCully v. Pittsburgh R. Co., eideration of being paid at a given 32 Pa. St. 25; Miller v. Wild Cat Co., time, the engagement of each was a 52 Ind. 51 ; Illinois River Co. v. Zim- sufficient consideration for the en- mer, 20 111. 654. gagement of the others to do the 'Ward v. Gibbs (Texas App. 1895), same. In this respect, it is, in prin- 30 S. W. Rep. 1125. ciple, not distinguishable from a 2 Smith v. Gould (1895), 84 Hun, composition agreement. Pierson v. 325 ; 32 N. Y. Supl. 373. McCahill, 21 Cal. 122." 'Wilson v. Samuels (1893), 100 Cal. 4 Irwim>. Locke, 20 Colo. 148; 36 Pac. 514, per Searls, J. : " There was sum- Rep. 898, per Hayt, C. J. : " A part of cient consideration for the agree- the extras were not used, and it is ment. In such cases the contract of claimed that the new promise, in so each creditor is a sufficient considera- far as it covered past work that was tion for the contract of all the others, of no benefit to appellant, was without 262 CONSIDERATION. § 212 merit of a construction company to commute its contract rate of compensation for finished work to a lower rate because of the work not being completed as agreed, in consideration of which commutation the other contracting party consented to presently accept the work in its unfinished condition, afforded a sufficient consideration to sustain the stipulated reduction as a compromise between the parties. 1 So, too, the release of a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods is a sufficient considera- tion for the execution of an agreement by the mortgagor stat- ing that he holds the goods as consignee of the mortgagees, to be sold on their account, and authorizing them to take posses- sion whenever they deem themselves insecure. 2 And a con- tract by a lessor of land to pay a certain sum to a third person for furnishing water to cattle herded on the land is not with- out consideration moving to the lessor. 8 § 212. The same subject continued. — Where two creditors of an insolvent firm took a chattel mortgage on all its prop- erty, agreeing therein to pay the debts of the firm, and one of these creditors promised the plaintiff, also a creditor, that they would pay his debt ; the mortgaged property having been exhausted in paying other debts, it was held that the creditor making the promise was liable to plaintiff, the receipt of the prop- erty from the debtors being a sufficient consideration therefor; 4 consideration and not binding, but it fore the making of this promise to the is well settled that when a part of a plaintiffs. The undertaking of the consideration is past, and a part is defendants, as recited in the mort- not, this is sufficient to sustain the gage, was not contingent upon a dis- promise. Loomis v. Newhall, 15 posal of the property, nor restricted Pick. 159; "Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. to the amount of its avails. This 252; Roberts v. Griswold, 35 Vt. 496." promise to the plaintiffs was for the 1 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, etc., Con- payment of a debt which had already struction Co., 41 Neb. 374; 59 N. W. become, by arrangement with the Rep. 838. debtor, an obligation of the promisor. 2 Norris v. Vosburgh (1894), 98 A promise to pay the debt of another, Mich. 426. when there has been an assumption 8 Osmundson v. Thompson, 90 Iowa, of the debt by the promisor in consid- 755; 57 N. W. Rep. 863. eration of a conveyance from the 4 Keyesw. Allen (1893), 65 Vt. 667, debtor, is to be treated as an inde- perMunson, J. : "The defendants had pendent undertaking, notwithstand- placed themselves under a valid obli- ing the continuance of the original gation'to pay the debts of the firm be- liability. Wait v. Wait, 28 Vt. 350; § 213 CONSIDERATION. 263 and a written contract by plaintiff, made at defendant's request, to cut and haul certain timber, is a good con- sideration for defendant's oral agreement that he has the right to take the timber from the land on which it is growing. 1 And equally the attendance of one as a witness in an action pending in another state is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay the witness a sum in excess of the legal witness fees, since such attendance could not have been compelled by subpoena. 2 In consideration of plaintiffs advertising defendant's property, defendant agreed to pay them a certain commission in case the property should be sold within a specified time, either by reason of the advertisement or otherwise ; it was held that any disposition of the property within the specified time ren- dered defendant liable for the commission. 8 And where the assignee of a mortgage brings a foreclosure suit after the mort- gagor is garnisheed as a creditor of the mortgagee, when he is not entitled to maintain it, the mortgagor's right to costs in the proceeding are sufficient consideration for a contract by such assignee to accept less than the amount due in satisfaction of the mortgage. 4 § 213. The same subject continued. — The following recent case in California well illustrates the rule: Plaintiffs, having executed a note and mortgage to defendant, conveyed the mort- gaged property to another, who assumed the payment of the note and mortgage, but, the assignee having defaulted thereon, de- Fullamu. Adams, 37 Vt. 391; Bailey Dunn, 59 Minn. 99; 60 N. W. Rep. v. Bailey, 56 Vt. 398." 843, it appeared that each of two par- 1 Hutt v. Hickey (N. H. 1893), 29 ties owned an adjoining lot. There Atl. Eep. 456, per Carpenter, J. . was a driveway and shed one-half on "The execution of a contract in writing each lot. The parties' agreed to use may be a good consideration for a ver- them in common, but one party pre- bal agreement relating to the same vented the other from using the same, subject-matter. Morgan v. Griffith, used them exclusively himself, and L. E. 6 Exch. 70; Angell v. Duke, L. promised to pay the other for such E. 10 Q. B. 174." use. Canty, J., said: "Whether he ' 2 Armstrong v. Prentice (1893), 86 so agreed before, during, or after the Wis. 210. time he so used the property, there 3 Cook v. Blake (1894), 98 Mich, was a sufficient consideration for his 389. promise to pay for that use, and the 4 Gemberling v. Spaulding (Mich, complaint states a cause of action." 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 342. In Fish v. 264 CONSIDERATION. § 213 fendant agreed with plaintiffs to purchase the land at the fore- closure sale for the full amount of his claim, and not to take a personal judgment against plaintiffs, and the latter, relying on such promise, allowed a default to be entered, and refrained from attending the sale ; it was held that there was a sufficient consideration for such agreement under the provisions of the California civil code. 1 And where the defendants con- tracted to erect a building for plaintiffs, but before it was finished a portion thereof fell, and work was suspended, it being disputed which of the parties was at fault, and subse- quently one of the defendants made a new contract to complete the structure, it was held that the question of doubtful liability was sufficient consideration for the new contract, and upon the fulfillment thereof by such defendant he was entitled to recover the balance of the contract price. 2 A complaint which states that at the time of the sale of land a judgment and decree of foreclosure for a mechanic's lien stood against it, on which an appeal had been taken, and that the vendor gave a bond to the 1 Heim v. Butin (Cal. 1895), 40 Pao. Rep. 29, per Belcher, C. : "Section 1605 of the civil code provides : 'Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be con- ferred, upon the promisor by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any preju- dice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise.' Under this provision, if, as alleged, the plaintiffs, in reli- ance upon the defendant's agreement, allowed their defaults to be entered, and refrained from being present and bidding at the sale, thus surrender- ing their legal rights, a benefit was conferred upon the defendant, and a prejudice suffered by them, which, in our opinion, constituted a good and sufficient consideration for his prom- ise to purchase the property for the full amount of his judgment, and that no deficiency judgment should be en- tered against them. See Montgomery v. Gibbs, 40 Iowa, 652." 2 Brodek v. Farnum, 11 Wash. 565 ; 40 Pac. Rep. 189. In Grant v. Du- luth, etc., R. Co. (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1026, A. let a contract to B. by which B. agreed to perform cer- tain work. B. let a subcontract to C. by which C. agreed to perform a part of this work, and B. agreed to pay C. therefor monthly as the work pro- gressed. After C. had partly per- formed, B. defaulted in these pay- ments, and for this reason C. refused furtherto perform his contract. There- upon A. made an agreement with C. by which C. agreed to perform and complete his contract with B., and A. agreed to pay C. extra compensation therefor over and above the price agreed to be paid therefor by B. to C. It was held there was sufficient con- sideration for the contract between A. and C, and the same was binding. § 214 CONSIDERATION. 205 vendee to hold him harmless from any lien against the property growing out of said judgment, sets forth a sufficient considera- tion for the bond. 1 § 214. Insufficient consideration illustrated — Common car- rier. — In another case it appeared that the defendant, acting for his client, requested the plaintiffs to render services for the client, and, after they were rendered, promised to pay therefor out of money then held by him for his client, if the latter did not sue him, and it was held that the promise was without considera- tion. 2 So, also, where defendant agrees to act as stakeholder for money due a contractor, and to pay the same to the subcon- tractor, and the person who is to pay the money refuses to accept the order, and the subcontractor draws a portion of the money direct, a subsequent agreement by defendant to pay the debt, under the belief that he was bound to do so by the first agree- ment, is without consideration. 3 And the assignment of an insurance policy constitutes no consideration for an agreement then made by the assignee, where a mortgage theretofore given by the assignor to the assignee had provided for the obtaining of the policy on the mortgaged property, and the assignment 1 Frank v. Jenkins, 11 Wash. 611 ; 40 was no request that plaintiffs should Pac. Rep. 220. perform the services for him. They 2 Walker v. Irwin (Iowa, 1895) 62 were performed for Matheson. So far N. W. Rep. 785, per Deemer, J. : " It as shown, defendant received no per- is also contended that there is an ex- sonal benefit from plaintiffs' services, press written promise to pay plaintiff's and there is no reason why the law claim in the letter before set out. It should imply a previous request. We is doubtless true that there is a promise think it was a mere nudum pactum. to pay plaintiffs in the event Mathe- While, from a moral standpoint, de- son commenced no suit against de- fendant may not appear to have acted fendant ; and it is shown that Mathe- in good faith with his brethren in son commenced no suit. But the in- profession, yet, from a legal point of quiry suggests itself, where is the view, under the now well-established consideration for such a subsequent rule announced in Meyer v. Houck, promise? If defendant had previously 85 Iowa, 319; 52 N. W. 235, we think requested the services performed by the defendant is not liable, and that the plaintiffs, or if they had been per- the court did not err in directing a formed for defendant with his knowl- verdict for defendant." edge or consent and for him, no doubt 8 Sweed Iron Works v. Jefferson the subsequent promise would be (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 883. valid. But, as we have seen, there 266 CONSIDERATION. § 215 thereof as further security. 1 In order that a common carrier, by whom the transportation begun on a preceding connecting line is to be completed, may take the benefit of a special contract between the shipper and the initial carrier limiting liability in case of loss to a stipulated value per one hundred pounds, it must appear either that the contract was such as to bind the initial carrier for full performance, so as to make the second carrier the agent of the first, or else that the reduced rate forming the consideration of the special contract was not confined to the line of the first carrier, but was, either by the contract itself or by the act of the second carrier in rating and billing the goods over its line, extended and applied to that line also. 2 § 215. Where grantee is to sell for grantor — The trust as consideration. — Where land is conveyed in consideration of the promise of the grantee to sell it, and pay the proceeds to the grantor, and the grantee sells the land, a promise by the grantee, after the sale, to pay the same to the grantor, is an admission of the trust, and the trust is a consideration for the promise. 3 And where land is conveyed subject to judgments 1 Lewis v. McReavy (1893), 7 Wash, verbal promise to sell the same, and 294. In Read i). Brewer (Miss. 1894), to pay the net proceeds arising from 16 So. Rep. 350, it appeared that B. the sale to plaintiff; that he has sold and R. agreed to buy together a life the land; that the net proceeds, after estate in land, B. to make the pur- paying all liens, is about $1,600; and chase, and R. to furnish the money, that he refuses to pay the same, or B. bought the estate in his wife's any part thereof. If this was all that name, and offered to give R. $800 if appeared in the petition, it would be he would cancel the agreement. R. clearly within the statute of frauds agreed to this, and took B.'s note for and the ruling in McGinnessw. Barton, that amount secured on the estate. 71 Iowa, 644; 33 N". W. Rep. 152, cited The sale to B.'s wife was afterwards by appellee, the agreement being ver- set aside as fraudulent. It was held bal. It is also alleged as to the $1,600 that there was no consideration for that 'defendant, at "various times after the note. the receipt of the same as trustee, 2 Central Railroad v. Bridger, 94 Ga. agreed to pay to plaintiff.' It is upon 471 ; 20 S. E. Rep. 349. this alleged agreement as to money 3 Harris v. Clark (Iowa, 1895), 62 then in defendant's hands that plaint- N. W. Rep. 854, per Given, C. J.: iff seeks to recover. Appellee con- "The petition shows that the plaintiff tends in support of his demurrer that conveyed the land described to the 'there is no reason given for the agree- defendant in consideration of his ment, or any consideration therefor. §215 CONSIDERATION. 267 on notes against the grantor, and the grantee afterwards pays the judgments, and takes assignments of them to himself, notes and mortgages given such grantee and assignee by a surety on the former notes for the amount and in settlement of such judg- ments are without consideration, and will be canceled at the suit of the surety. 1 A promissory note, given for the privilege of Their case must fail for want of con- sideration.' The alleged agreement is not only an admission that the money was held in trust, but also promises to pay it. The existence of the trust is sufficient consideration for the promise. In Collar *. Collar, 86 Mich. 507; 49 N. W. Rep. 551, it is said: 'We held, when the case was here before, that where lands were conveyed under a parol trust to sell and convert into money, and divide the proceeds, and the trust had been so far executed by the trustee as to sell the land and receive the money, and such trust had been recognized by him, an action for money had and received would lie to recover such money by the person entitled thereto.' See, also, Collar v. Collar, 75 Mich. 414; 42 N. W. Hep. 847; Calder v. Moran, 49 Mich. 14; 12 N. W. Eep. 892; White v. Cleaver, 75 Mich. 17; 42 N. W. Eep. 530." 1 Price v. Rea (Iowa, 1894), 60 N. W. Rep. 208, per Rothrock, J.. "Such being the case, there was no consideration for the notes and mort- gages in the suit, and it would be in- equitable and unjust to ailow the de- fendant to enforce them. I have no doubt the defendant thought he had a right to enforce the judgments against plaintiff. I do not find him guilty of an intentional fraud. He admits he did not know the legal ef- fect of the assignment to him. He admits he told plaintiff execution would be issued on the judgments he owned, and levied on the land he had received from Walker, and that the land would probably not sell for enough to pay them. He may have thought that true, but of course his counsel would not claim that he could sell his own land on his own judg- ment. Giving time under such cir- cumstances could not constitute any consideration. Defendant says in ev- idence : 'I am not making any claim on mortgages I have purchased on notes I hold against Walker. They are substantially paid.' This is cer- tainly true and they were paid by the transfer of the land to him, as they were a part of the consideration. Are not these debts in which plaint- iff was only the surety in pre- cisely the same situation? Can part be paid, and not all? Could defend- ant be allowed to select what he should consider paid, and what not paid? Can the debt be paid as to Walker, and not as to his surety? There was then certainly a misappre- hension on the part of the parties as to their legal rights at the time, and I do not believe defendant would have endeavored to persuade plaintiff to enter into the contract and execute the notes and mortgages if he had known of the plaintiff's rights, or if he had thought of the equity of his claim; and certainly the plaintiff would not have bound himself to pay a debt if he had known that in legal effect it was already paid. When one, under a mistake of law, acknowl- edged himself under an obligation which the law will not impose, he should not be bound thereby. Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449. If, by reason 268 CONSIDERATION. §215 using or selling an article which all men are equally at liberty to use and sell, lacks consideration to support it. 1 And a promise to pay for past services, rendered without a request, is void for want of consideration. 2 of the mistake, there is no considera- tion for the contract, it, like any other similar agreement without considera- tion, is void. Such, for instance, is one's guaranty of another's debt, founded on the debtor's forbear- ance to l6vy an attachment for which in fact there is no valid ground. Bishop on Contracts, §696." In Dwelle v. Dwelle 1 Kan. App. 473; 40 Pac. Eep. 825, it was held that a writing in words and figures, as follows: "Marion, Kansas, March 11th, 1889. Messrs. F. E. Dwelle and Charles A. Sayre — Dear Sirs: Upon my own motion, and to show you my earnest desire for peace between us, having in view the great expense to which you have been put in recent litigation, in which you were con- cerned, I voluntarily agree to assume part of that burden, and agree to pay you by the 1st of October, A. D. 1889, the sum of six hundred ($600.00) dol- lars, and for the purpose of privacy would thank you to intrust this paper to Dennis Madden, Esq. Your obe- dient servant, J. C. Dwelle," does not import a consideration upon its face, but the consideration therefor must be alleged and proven by the party who relies upon it for the basis of a cause of action. ' ' Schroder v. Neilson, 39 Neb. 335 ; 57 N. W. Eep. 993. 2 Myers v. Dean (1895), 11 Misc. R. 368 ; 32 N.Y. Supl. 237, perBookstaver, J.. "It is well settled that, where services are rendered by a volunteer without request, an action can not be maintained to recover their value. Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28 ; Livingston v. Ackeston, 5 Cow. 531 ; Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312; McCarthy «. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 1. An express promise to pay for past services, rendered without a request, is void for want of consideration. The defendant was under no obligation to make the promise or to pay for serv- ices theretofore rendered. It was wholly voluntary, and can not be made the basis of an action. Presbyterian Church o.Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517; 20 N. E. Rep. 352; Twenty-third Street Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601; 23 N. E. Rep. 177; Eastwood v. Kenyon.ll Adol.&E. 438. A primary benefit voluntarily conferred by plain- tiff, and adopted by defendant, is not such a consideration as will sustain an action on a subsequent express promise. Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. 257; Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97; Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420; Chilcott B.Trimble, 13 Barb. 502; Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans. 116." CHAPTER VI. IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 216. Impossibility defined. § 230. 217. The general rule. 231. 218. Impossibility by act of God. 219. Contracts excepting acts of 232. God. 220. Events exempting carrier. 233. 221. The same subject continued. 234. 222. Physical impossibility at time of contracting — Known to 235. the parties. 223. Further illustration. 236. 224. Legal impossibility at time of 237. contracting. 238. 225. Impossibility caused by subse- 239. quent law. 226. The same subject continued — 240. Recovery pro tanto. 227. Contracts of service. 241. 228. The same subject continued — 242. Recovery. 243. 229. Further illustrations of re- covery. Contracts for personal acts. What are contracts for per- sonal acts. Contracts to build becoming impossible. The same subject continued. Particular contracts concern- ing specific things. The same subject continued — Further illustrations. Bailment. Delivery of goods. "Strikes." Impossibility caused by the promisee. Impossibility caused by the promisor. Alternative promises. The same subject continued. False assumption of impossi- bility—Provisions excepting impossibility. § 216. Impossibility defined. — A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is im- practicable when it can only be done at an excessive or un- reasonable cost. 1 But where no express or implied provision as to the event of impossibility can be found in the terms or circumstances of the agreement, it is a general rule of con- struction, founded on the absolute and unqualified term of the promise, that the promisor remains responsible for damages, notwithstanding the supervening impossibility. 2 l Moss v. Smith, 9 C. B. 94, 103, 2 Switzer Pinconning Co., 59 where the court said: "A man may Mich. 488; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. be said to have lost a shilling, when Co. v. Hoyt (1893), 149 U. S. 1; 13 he has dropped it into deep water; though it might be possible, by some very expensive contrivance, to re- cover it." (269) Sup. Ct. Rep. 779, where the court said: "There can be no question that a party may, by an absolute con- tract, bind himself or itself to per- 270 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. §217 § 217. The general rule. — The general doctrine that, when a party voluntarily undertakes to do a thing without qualifica- tion, performance is not excused because by inevitable accident or other contingency not foreseen it becomes impossible for him to do the act or thing which he agreed to do, is well settled. 1 But it is equally well settled that when performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, and such continued existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement, the death of the person or the destruction of the thing puts an end to the obligation. Executory contracts for personal services, for the sale of specific chattels, or the use of a building, are held to fall within this principle. 2 Thus an ob- form things which subsequently be- come impossible, or pay damages for the non-performance ; and such con- struction is to be put upon an unqual- ified undertaking, where the event which causes the impossibility might have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract, or where the impossibility arises from the act or default of the promisor. But where the event is of such a character that it can not be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by general words, which, though large enough to include, were not used with reference to the pos- sibility of the particular contin- gency which afterwards happens." Sauner v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 41 Mo. App. 480, where the court said : "For, where a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, not- withstanding any accident by in- evitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his con- tract." Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 74 Mo. 364; White v. Mis- souri Pacific Railroad, 19 Mo. App. 400; Fulkerson v. Eads, 19 Mo. App. 620; Indiana R. Co. v. Adamson, 114 Ind. 282; 15 N. E. Rep. 5; Vicksburg, etc., Co. v. Gorman, 70 Miss. 360; 11 So. Rep. 680; Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238; Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. &W 442; Makin v. Watkinson, L. R. 6 Ex. 31. See, also, Thornborow v. Whitacre, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164; James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. Ill ; Wood ti. Ma- lone, 131 Pa. St. 554. 1 Lorillard v. Clyde (1894), 142 N.Y. 456; 37 N. E. Rep. 489. This doctrine protects the integrity of contracts, and one of the reasons assigned in its support in the early case of Para- dine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26, is that, as against such contingencies, the party could have provided by his contract. See Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 ; Ford v. Cotesworth, L. R. 4 Q. B. 127; Jones v. United States, 96 U. S. 24. 2 Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; People v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174; Taylor v. Caldwell, 113 E. C. L. 826. These cases are not ex- ceptions to the rule that contracts vol- untarily made are to be enforced, but the courts, in accordance with the manifest intention, construe the con- tract as subject to an implied condi- tion that the person or thing shall be §217 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 271 ligation in a contract providing for the organization of a cor- poration, and that defendant shall have the management there- of, and in consideration shall guarantee plaintiff a dividend of not less than seven per cent, per annum for seven years, ter- minates prima facie with the dissolution of the corporation. 1 And most contracts for personal services are subject to the im- plied condition that the party contracting to perform shall continue in health, and such contracts are revocable upon his incapacity from illness to perform. 2 Where one employed to in existence when the time of per- formance arrives. So if, after a con- tract is made, the law interferes and makes subsequent performance im- possible, the party is held to be ex- cused. Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412. 1 Lorillard v. Clyde (1894), 142 N.Y. 156; 37 N. E. Eep. 489, per Andrews, 0. J. : "It must be conceded that it is difficult to draw the line and to deter- mine the exact limitations of the prin- ciple . When the executory contract relates to specific chattels, and the subject-matter is destroyed without fault of the party, the implied con- dition arises, and excuses perform- ance. But where the contract is based on the assumed existence and contin- uance of a certain condition, or upon the continuance of a subject-matter which, however, is not the direct ob- ject of the contract, is the principle in such cases excluded? The present case illustrates what we have in mind. The contract in question was not with the corporation whose life was extin- guished by the judgment of dissolu- tion. But the guaranty assumed that the corporation would continue in ex- istence during the seven years period. The liability which the defendants assumed was in consideration of the ___benefits which might accrue to them froln the management of the trans- portation business of the corporation during that period. Upon the assump- tion that the death of the corporation was brought about without their fault, were they thereafter bound? Is the doctrine of implied condition less ap- plicable than it would be if the con- tract had been between the defend- ants and the corporation? If, in the one case, the contract, so far as it was unexecuted, would be terminated, did not the happening of the same event terminate the engagement of these par- ties, based on the assumed continu- ance of the corporation in life? There is, in the present case, we think, an element which strengthens the con- clusion we have reached, that the ob- ligation of the contract terminated prima facie with the dissolution of the corporation. There is something more than an implied and wholly unex- pressed condition that the corporation should continue in life during the sev- en years. It is the fair construction of the language of the contract itself. The contract was not unilateral. It contains mutual stipulations. These mutual stipulations, by their terms, look to the continuance of the corpo- ration, and the mutual obligations into which the parties entered are qualified by this understanding." 2 Powell v. Newell, 59 Minn. 406; 61 N. W. Eep. 335, per Collins, J. : "Plaintiff's contract, the considera- tion for the note, was for the rendi- tion of professional, and hence per- sonal, services. He could not delegate the performance of these services to 272 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. §217 teach in a public school for a certain time is able and willing to teach during that time, the fact that the school was neces- sarily closed part of the time by order of the board of health, because of the prevalence of a contagious disease among the pupils, does not deprive the teacher of the right to compensa- tion for the entire time, since such closing of the schools is not caused by the act of God. 1 another physician. The rule is that contracts for personal services are subject to the implied condition that the party contracting to perform shall continue in health, and such con- tracts are revocable by his incapacity from illness to perform. If he be- comes disabled through sickness, the other party is released from his obli- gation under his part of the contract. But whether sickness is to constitute an excuse sufficient to release the party who has agreed to render per- sona] services, or sufficient to absolve one who has contracted with him for such services, must necessarily de- pend on the circumstances of each case. In this instance we think the defendant was released from his obli- gation to pay in accordance with the terms of his note." 1 School Town of Carthage v. Gray, 10 Ind. App. 428; 37 N. E. Rep. 1059, per Reinhard, J. : "It is the general rule that when the performance of a con- tract becomes impossible on account of an act of God, the non-performance is excused, and no damages can be recov- ered therefor. 2 Parsons on Contracts (8th ed.) , 786-789. But it is often a diffi- cult question to determine when such failure to perform was caused by an act of God, as mere hardship or great difficulty will not suffice. The precise question now under consideration was decided by the supreme court of Mich- igan in the case of Dewey v. Union School Disk, 43 Mich. 480; 5 N. W. Rep. 646. In that case the plaintiff had baen regularly employed as a teacher in the public schools for ten months, at $130 per month. He taught the school from the 2d day of September up to the 10th day of December, when the school officers closed the schools on account of the prevalence of small- pox in the city, and kept them closed until the 17th of March, at which time they were re-opened, and the plaintiff resumed his duties. The district refused to pay for the pe- riod of suspension, and the teacher brought his action to recover it. It was claimed, among other defenses, that the suspension was owing to the act of God, and that, conse- quently all parts of the contract were suspended for the time being. The court decided, however, that the posi- tion was not tenable. In the course of the opinion, Graves, J., speaking for the court, said : ' Beyond con- troversy, the closing of the schools was a wise and timely expedient, but the defense interposed can not rest on that. It must appear that observance of the contract by the district was caused to be impossible by act of God. It is not enough that great difficulties were encountered, or that there exist- ed urgent and satisfactory reasons for stopping the schools. But this is all the evidence tended to show. The con- tract between the parties was positive, and for lawful objects. On one side school buildings and pupils were to be provided, and on the other per- sonal service as teacher. The plain- tiff continued ready to perform, but the district refused to open its houses §§ 218, 219 ' IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 273 § 218. Impossibility by act of God.— Extraordinary floods, storms of unusual violence, sudden tempests, severe frosts, great droughts, lightnings, earthquakes, sudden deaths and illnesses are acts of God. 1 The act of God is in some cases said to excuse the breach of a contract; but this is in fact an in- accurate expression. All that is meant is that the accident called "act of God" was not within the contract. 2 The general rule is that, where an obligation or a duty is imposed upon a person by law, he will be absolved from liability for non-per- formance of the obligation, if such non-performance was oc- casioned by an act of God. But when one undertakes by an express contract to do a given act, he is not absolved from liability for non-performance, even though he is prevented from doing the same by an act of God. In that class of cases, if a person desires to absolve himself from liability for non- performance under any circumstances, he should so stipulate in his contract. 8 § 219. Contracts excepting acts of God. — If goods are deliv- ered to a railroad company for transportation without more, the liability of the carrier attaches, and this means an insur- ance, a responsibility for every loss, save only such as result from the acts of God or the public enemy, 4 and this is the rule and allow the attendance of pupils, self that it shall rain to-morrow, or and it thereby prevented performance that he will pay damages." Mayor of by the plaintiff. Admitting that the Berwick-upon-Tweed v. Oswald, 3 E. circumstances justified the officers, and & B. 653, where the court said : ' ' There yet there is no rule of justice which will is nothing to prevent parties, if they entitle the district to visit its own choose, by apt words, to express an misfortune upon the plaintiff. He intention so to do, from binding them- was not at fault. He had no agency selves by a contract as to any future in bringing about the state of things state of the law." which rendered it eminently prudent 8 Central Trust Co. u.Wabash R. Co., to dismiss the schools. It was the 31 Fed. Rep. 440, 441 ; Wear Commis- misfortune of the district, and the dis- sioners v. Adamson,L.R. 1 Q. B.D.546 ; trict, and not the plaintiff, ought to Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 1. bear it.' " 'Gregory v. "Wabash R. Co., 46 1 Gleeson D.Virginia Midland Ry. Mo. App. 574; Bank of Kentucky v. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 439. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174, 2 Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 where the court said: "The duty Q. B. 180; Canham v. Barry, 15 C. of a common carrier is to transport B. 597, where the court said: "A and deliver safely. He is made by man might, by apt words, bind him- law an insurer against all failure to 18 274 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 220 with regard to all common carriers. In the absence of an ex- press stipulation to the contrary, common carriers are re- sponsible for all loss save that caused by act of God and the public enemy. 1 The contract of longshoremen, bargemen, light- ermen, canal-boatmen, and boatmen of every description, who engage in the business of carrying goods indifferently for all who may employ them, is, in the absence of an express contract regulating the terms, subject by the common law to the same implied liabilities and exceptions as that of a common carrier by land. 2 And ferrymen, proprietors of land vehicles, like stage coaches, water craft, express companies, and in fact all persons who make it a business to carry for hire the goods of such as choose to employ them, no matter what the method of carriage is, are common carriers, and liable as such. 3 § 220. Events exempting carrier. — A land-slide in a railway cut, caused by an ordinary fall of rain, is not "an act of God" which will exempt the railway company from liability to passengers for injuries caused thereby while being carried on the railway. 4 So, also, a fire which originated in the battery room of an hotel is not "an act of God" absolving an inn- keeper from liability. 5 But a snow storm of such violence as perform his duty, except such failure Humphreys v. Reed, 6 Whart. 435 ; as may be caused by the public en- Fuller v. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120. emy, or by what is denominated the 'Hutchinson on Carriers, §59, cit- act of God." Park v. Preston, 108 ing as to hackney coaches, Bonces. N. Y. 434; Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 53 Iowa, 278 115 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, 2d ed., as to omnibuses, Parmelee v. Lowitz §170a. 74 111. 116; Dibbles. Brown, 12 Geo 'Hutchinson on Carriers, §170 a; 217 ; Parmelee v. McNulty, 19 111. 556 also, loss caused by act of public as to street cars, Levi v. Lynn, etc. authority, and by act of shipper him- R. Co., 11 Allen, 300; and see, also self, and loss arising from inherent Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234 nature of the goods, are excepted Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251 from the carrier's common law liabil- Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50 ; Pow- ity. ell v. Mills, 30 Miss. 231. 2 Nugent v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 4 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. 423; Hutchinson on Carriers, §58 a, Co., 140 U. S. 435. citing Bowman u.Teall, 23 Wend. 306; 6 Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215; 93 Cal. 253; 26 Pac. Rep. 1099; 28 DeMott v. Laraway, 14 Wend. 225 ; Pac. Rep. 943. §220 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 275. to prevent the moving of trains is an act of God. 1 And a furi- ous wind which blows a car from the track is "an act of God," and the carrier is not liable, if the car took fire and burned from a lamp, after it had been turned over by the wind.* So, also, of an extraordinary flood; 3 and the flood may be ex- traordinary without necessarily being unprecedented. 4 And the occurrence of such a flood in each of two preceding years does not deprive a flood of its "extraordinary" character; 6 but precautions must be taken against such rises of high waters as are usual and ordinary, and reasonably to be anticipated at cer- tain seasons of the year. 6 The fall of a sign caused by such a wind as was likely to occur at that season of the year is not at- tributable to an act of God. 7 So, also, losses caused by fire, not originating in lightning, 8 by explosion, 9 by collision 10 or by a landslide, 11 are not caused by an ' 'act of God . ' ' But a loss caused 'Black v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 30 Neb. 193; 46 N. W. Rep. 428; Ballentine v. North Mo. R. Co., 40 Mo. 491 ; Pruitt v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., ■62 Mo. «527 ; Briddon v. Great North- ern R. Co., 28 L. J. Ex. 51. •sBlythe v. Denver & R. G. E. Co., 15 Colo. 333 ; 11 L. R. A. 615. 8 Gleeson v. Virginia R. Co., 140 TJ. S. 435; Long v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 343; 14 L. R. A. 741; Davis v. Wabash R. Co., 89 Mo. 340. 'People v. Utica Cement Co., 22 111. App. 59; Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Gilleland, 56 Pa. St. 445; Smyrl v. Niolon, 2 Bail. L. 421; Faulkner v. Wright, Rice L. 107. 5 Norria v. Savannah R. Co., 23 Fla. 182. 6 Gleeson v. Virginia R. Co., 140 TJ. S. 435, 440; Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451 ; Ewart v. Street, 2 Bailey L. (S. C.) 157; Executors of Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns. 11 ; New Bruns- wick, etc., Co. v. Tiers, 24 N. J. Law, 697 ; Great Western R. Co. v. Braid, 1 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 101. 7 St. Louis R. Co. v. Hopkins, 54 Ark. 209 ; 12 L. R. A. 189. See, also, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251 ; Hannem v. Pence, 40 Minn. 127 ; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217. A brick blown off a wall; land-owner held liable for damages. Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458. The case of a sign, hung over a street in a city, with due care as to its construc- tion and fastenings, but in violation of a city ordinance which subjected its owner to a penalty for placing and keeping it there, being blown down by the wind in an extraordinary gale, and in its fall a bolt which was part of its fastenings, struck and broke a window in a neighboring building. It was held that the owner of the sign was liable for the injury of the window. 8 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27; Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., ]0 N. Y. 431 ; Story on Bailment, § 507. 9 Propeller Mohawk, 8 Wall. 153. 10 Plaisted v. Boston, etc., Naviga- tion Co., 27 Maine, 132; Hays v. Ken- nedy, 41 Pa. St. 378. 11 Gleeson v. Virginia R. Co., 140 U. S. 435. 276 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. §§221, 222 by an earthquake exempts the carrier from his common law liability. 1 § 221. The same subject continued. — The true rule is that the non-performance of a contract is not excused by the act of God, where it may be substantially carried into effect, although the act of God makes a literal and precise performance of it impossible. 2 And the negligent act of a person, concurring with an act of God, which produces damages makes the party liable. The act of God must be the sole and proximate cause of the damage in order to exempt one from liability on that ground. 8 § 222. Physical impossibility at time of contracting — Known to the parties. — Obvious and absolute physical impossibility, apparent upon the face of the promise, and thus known to the parties, renders the promise void.' Thus, a charter-party, exe- 1 Slaters. South Car.R.Co., 29 S.0.96. 'Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; White e. Mann, 26 Maine, 361. See the following cases where "act of God" is discussed: Dunsbach v. Hol- lister, 49 Hun, 352, where a quantity of sand was deposited opposite plain- tiff's house and blew into the house ; it was held that defendant could not excuse himself from liability because of the wind, it being his duty to re- move sand. Long v. Penn. R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 343; 14 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 741 ; Central R. Co. v L Kent, 87 Geo. 402; Norling v. Allee, 37 N. Y. S. R. 409; Hummel v. Seventh Street Co., 20 Ore. 401; 26 Pac. Rep. 277; Smith v. Western R. Co., 91 Ala. 455; 11 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 619, holding that a railroad is not bound to provide against unusual floods ; Columbus R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; Coosa, etc., Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala.120 ; McHenry v. Philadelphia R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 448; Chicago R. Co. v. Sawyer, 69 111. 285; Ferguasson v. Brent, 12 Md. 33 ; The Bark Charlotte, 9 Bened. 1 ; Merrittii. Earle, 29N.Y.117; Michaels v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Pa. St. 378, contains an elaborate opinion distin- guishing " act of God," "inevitable accident," " unavoidable dangers of the river navigation ;" Haysu. Kenne- dy^ Grant (Pa.),357 ; Nugent w.Smith, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 423, a leading case, con- taining Lord Cockburn's exposition of "act of God." The carrier under- took to carry a horse from London to Aberdeen, but after the ship got out to sea the horse injured herself through fright, caused by the rolling of the vessel. The court held that the car- rier was not liable. Cowley v. David- son, 13 Minn. 92; Keystone, etc., Co. v. Dole, 43 Mich. 370; Dewey v. "Union School Dist., 43 Mich. 480; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99; Vanderslice v. Newton, 4 N. Y. 130. 3 Dunsbach v. Hollister, 49 Hun, 352. See also, cases in preceding note. i Where the impossibility is known to the parties at the time of making the agreement it seems obvious that there can be no intention of perform- ing it on the one side, and no expec- § 223 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 277 cuted on the 15th of March, covenanting that the ship would proceed from where she then lay on or before the 12th of Febru- ary, was held void, and the owner having made the trip could re- cover freight, as the non-sailing on the 12th of February, being impossible, was not a condition precedent. 1 On the same prin- ciple a covenant to insure is not broken by the covenantor not insuring the very next minute after he has entered into a cov- enant to do so; and if no time be expressed, he must have a reasonable time in which to do it. 8 And all conditions annexed to estates, that contain in them matter at the time of making them impossible to be done, are void. 3 "If a man be bound in an obligation, with condition that, if the obligor do go from the church of St. Peter in Westminster to the church of St. Peter in Rome within three hours, then the obligation shall be void, the condition is void and impossible, and the obli- gation standeth not."* § 223. Further illustration. — Where a person contracts to build a building of a certain kind of stone, and to complete the same within a specified time, the impossibility of procur- ing the stone, to be an excuse for delay, must have existed when the contract was made. 6 A contract which in the very tation of performance on the other, was entered into. A mutual mistake and therefore the essentials of a valid of fact would then be presented, promise in regard to such act are which would relieve either party, wanting. The impossible act can not The evidence shows that no such im- form the matter for a promise, or possibility existed at that time, for the consideration of a promise ; The"inability of plaintiff to obtain the Leake on Contracts, 686. A. agrees stone is due to causes that arose after- with X. to discover treasure by wards, without any agency or default magic. The agreement is void. In- on the part of defendant, and in some dian Contract Act, §56. measure, if not altogether, by default 1 Hall v. Cazenove, 4 East, 477. of the plaintiff to take steps in time 2 Doe v. Ulph, 13 Q. B. 204. to secure the supply of stone. Plain- 3 Sheppard's Touchstone of Com- tiff may have made a prolonged and mon Assurance, 132. honest effort to secure it, notwith- 4 Coke on Littleton, 206 b. standing the difficulty or apparent 5 Wright ■». Meyer(Texas App.1894), hopelessness of doing so; but the 25 S. W. Rep. 1122, where the court authorities are clear that this, alone, said: "Our view of the law on the ques- would not avail him as a defense for tion presented is that the impossibility a non-performance of his contract." of getting the stone, to be an excuse Yetter v. Hudson, 57 Texas, 604; Der- for the delay connected with it, must mottu. Jones, 2 Wall. 1. have existed at the time the contract 278 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 224 nature of things is essentially impossible of performance, and known by the parties to be so, is void. 1 As between individ- uals, the impossibility which releases a man from the obliga- tion to perform his contract must be a real impossibility, and not a mere inconvenience. And, while such an impossibility may release the party from liability to suit for non-perform- ance, it does not stand for performance, so as to enable the party to sue and recover as if he had performed. 8 § 224. Legal impossibility at time of contracting. — Legal impossibility at the time of contracting renders the contract void. A promise to marry by one who is already married, and known so to be by the other, is a void promise ; 8 but if the fact that one of the parties is married is not known to the other, he is liable in damages for deception. 4 Where a person being in- debted to another agreed with the bailiff of his creditor that, in consideration of the bailiff discharging him from the debt, he would do certain work, it was held that as the bailiff could not legally discharge the debt of his master, the proposed con- sideration was impossible and the promise void. 6 A covenant by a person to pay a sum of money to himself and others was held void. 6 A bond was conditioned that, if the obligee should procure the formation of a company for taking the assignment of a patent, and in consideration thereof the obligor should 1 Bennett i>. Morse (Colo. App. 1894), Haviland v. Halstead, 34 N. Y. 643. 89 Pac. Rep. 582. In this case sixteen The syllabus of this case is: "An ac- persons signed a contract attached to tion for the breach of a contract of a note of W., which recited that the marriage, between parties in this note "is secured by attached certifi- state, can not be maintained where cate of stock No. 44" of a specified one of the parties was by law incapa- corporation "for 5,000 shares of the ble of entering into the marriage rela- par value of $20 each;" and that if tion at the time of making the con- the note for $2,500, with interest, is tract." not paid by W. when due, "we will 4 Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339; each purchase of the above-attached Wild v. Harris, 7 C. B. 999; Millward stock 400 shares, and pay therefor in v. Littlewood, 5 Ex. 775. cash 50 cents per share." It was held 6 Harvey v. Gibbons, 2 Lev. 161. that such contract being joint, and in 6 Faulkner k. Lowe, 2 Ex. 595. "The effect calling for the purchase of covenant, to my mind, is senseless. I 6,400 shares to come out of 5,000, was do not know what is meant, in point impossible of performance and void, of law, by a man paying himself." 8 Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. 36, 46. Per Pollock, C. B. 'Paddock v. Robinson, 63 111. 99; § 225 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 279 pay him certain sums of money, the bond should be void; the patent contained a proviso that it should be void if as- signed to more than five persons, and consequently the assign- ment to the company, which was intended to consist of more than five persons, was legally impossible; it was held that the possibility of such an assignment was the basis of the contract and that the bond was void. 1 But it was held that, where the defendant had covenanted that he would perfect in England a patent right granted in America so as to insure to the plaintiff the exclusive right of vending the article patented in the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, he was not excused from performance, although it appeared that the power of granting exclusive privileges of this kind appertained not to England, but to the provinces, and were never granted except to subjects of Great Britain and residents of the provinces, and could not be granted to either the plaintiff or defendant, as both were citizens of the United States. 8 § 225. Impossibility caused by subsequent law. — No contract can be carried into effect which was originally made contrary to the provisions of law; or which, being made consistently with the rules of law at the time has become illegal in virtue of some subsequent law. 8 Accordingly performance is excused by 1 Duvergier v. Fellows, 5 Bing. 248. held ; as where one covenants it shall 2 Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, rain to-morrow, or that the pope shall where the court said: "It is sup- be at Westminster on a certain day. posed by the counsel for the defend- To bring the case within the rule of ant that a legal impossibility pre- dispensation, it must appear that the vented the fulfillment of the cov- thing to be done can not by any enant to perfect the patent right in means be accomplished; for, if it is England, so as to secure the monop- only improbable, or out of the power oly of the Canadas to the plaintiff, of the obligor, it is not in law deemed and hence that the obligation was impossible. Now it is clear that the dispensed with so that no action can fulfillment in this case can not be be maintained. There are authorities considered an impossibility within which go that length. Coke on Little- the above exposition of the rule ; be- ton, 206 b ; Sheppard's Touchstone of cause, for anything we know to the Common Assurance, 164 ; 2 Coke on contrary, the exclusive right to make, Littleton, 26; Piatt on Covenants, use and vend the machine in the 569; but if the covenant be within Canadas might have been secured the range of possibility, however ab- in England by act of parliament or surd or improbable the idea of the otherwise." execution of it may be, it will be up- 3 Atkinson v. Ritchie, 10 East, 534. 280 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 225 a supervening impossibility caused by operation of a change in the law. 1 But the fact that performance of a contract is rendered more burdensome and expensive by a law enacted after it is entered into does not excuse performance. 2 Accord- ingly a contract by an owner of land with a builder to erect houses is discharged and the owner excused from allowing the building to proceed where a subsequent ordinance appropriates the land for a street. 3 Where the further prosecution of work in the alteration of a building is forbidden by the superin- tendent of buildings, as authorized by law, for a defect not occasioned by the contractor, and he is thus prevented from performing that which, by the terms of the contract, is made a condition precedent to payment, he is discharged from per- formance. 4 An absolute contract to move a building from one lot to another was held discharged where the requisite permis- sion could not be obtained from the city officials. 5 But persons entering into a contract, relying on a decision of the highest court of the state, are bound in the performance thereof by the law as declared by a subsequent decision of the same court overruling the former decision as erroneous. 6 The laying an 1 Baily v. De Orespigny, L. R. 4 Q. v. Woodrow, 39 Md. 194 ; Clark v. B. 180. Marsiglia, 1 Denio, 317. 2 Baker u. Johnson, 42 N. Y. 126. 'Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171. See, The defendants entered into a con- also, Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26; tract to deliver a quantity of alcohol Mounsey v. Drake, 10 John. 27; Peo- "on hoard vessel under the tax law, pie v. Bartlett, 3 Hill, 570. from 20th August to 31st August, 1862, 5 Theobald ». Burleigh, 66 N. H. 574 ; duty paid." Subsequently the secre- 23 Atl. Rep. 367. See, also, Harvey v. tary of the treasury, by authority of Coffin,44N.H.563; Kimball y.Cocheco law, postponed the time when the act Eailroad Co., 23 N. H. 579; Blake v. to provide internal revenue was to go Niles, 13 N. H. 459; Melville v. Tie into operation, from the 1st of August Wolf, 4 E. & B. 844. to the 1st of September; in conse- 6 Allen v. Allen (Cal.), 27 Pac. quence of which there was no tax Rep. 30, where, when the contract imposed on alcohol during the month was made, the law, as declared by the of August. It was held that the de- supreme court of California, was that fendants were bound to perform and a conveyance absolute in form, but that the performance had not been intended merely as security, did not rendered impossible by the act of law. pass the legal title to the grantee, but 8 Heaver v. Lanahan, 74 Md. 493; when the time for performance arrived 22 Atl. Rep. 263; Slipper v. Totten- the court had overruled this and held ham R. Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 112; Baily v. that a deed absolute in form, intended DeCrespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180; Black as a mortgage, did convey the title. It § 225 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 281 embargo for an unlimited time does not extinguish a promise to deliver debentures, but operates a suspension only during the continuance of the law. 1 It is no bar to a scire facias against bail, that the principal, since the arrest, was duly en- listed as a non-commissioned officer in the service of the United States, and is holden to do duty as such. 2 A condition in a replevin bond, that the obligor shall prosecute his action of replevin to final judgment, is saved by his prosecuting it until the writ is abated by the death of the defendant. 3 A ship was chartered to go from New Bedford to Savannah, there take a cargo of timber and carry the same to England. After the cargo was laden on board, an embargo took place, and it was agreed by the agent for the hirers and the master that she should return to New Bedford and there wait the end- ing of the embargo. After arriving at New Bedford, war was declared against England, which put a stop to the voyage. In the meantime the agent had sold the cargo. The purchaser was held entitled to the cargo notwithstanding the master had signed bills of lading promising to deliver the cargo in Eng- land. 4 On the same principle, where a contract required the delivery of smooth-bore cannon to the claimants for alteration, and while the work was in progress the government orders it to be suspended, no damages can be recovered on a counter- claim for not finishing the work. 6 A covenant by a lessor that neither he nor his assigns would permit any building upon a piece of land adjoining the devised premises was held to be discharged by a railway company subsequently taking the land under compulsory powers given them by statute, to build a was held that this latter view of the Claims, 7. This case also decides that law should have governed in the per- where a contract contemplates that formance of the contract. See Hughes the government shall decide when v. Davis, 40 Cal. 117 ; Espinosa v. Greg- suspended work shall be resumed or ory, 40 Cal. 58; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 the original contract be abandoned, IT. S. 645. unreasonable neglect to decide is 'Baylies v. Fettyplace, 7 Mass. 325. equivalent to a decision. See, also, 2 Harrington v. Dennie, 13 Mass. 93. Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412 ; Wadham 'Badlam v. Tucker, 18 Mass. 284. v. Marlowe, 8 East, 314; Mills v. East 'Brown v. Delano, 12 Mass. 370. London Union, L. R. 8 C. P. 79; Doe See, also, Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, ■«. Bugeley, 6 Q. B. 107 ; Davis v. Cary, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 417. 15 Q. B. 418; Brown v. Mayor, 9 C. 6 Nourse v. United fttates. 25 Ct. B. (N. S.) 726. 282 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 226 railway station on it. "The defendant is discharged from his covenant by the subsequent act of parliament, which put it out of his power to perform it, on the principle expressed in the maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia.' " l § 226. The same subject continued. — Recovery pro tanto. — If by the terms of a contract for work and labor the full price is not to be paid until the work is completed, and a complete performance becomes impossible by act of the law, the con- tractor may recover for the work actually done at the full prices agreed on. 2 Thus, where the defendant contracted with the state to construct a section of a canal, and made a sub-contract with the plaintiffs for a portion of the work, at so much per yard for excavation and embankment, payable monthly, except ten per cent., which was not to be paid until the final estimate, and before the completion of the plaintiff's job the work was stopped by the state officers, and the original contract termi- nated by an act of the legislature, it was held that the plaint- iffs were entitled to recover the price agreed on for the work actually done by them. 3 On a like principle, a contractor, after having started repairs on a house, is entitled to recover at the contract price for the work actually done, if, without his fault, the officials of the city stop the work. 4 Where one employed to move a building and place it upon a certain lot is prevented by the city officials from fulfilling his contract by withholding the requisite permission, he is nevertheless entitled to recover for the services actually rendered by him in attempt- ing to remove the building. 5 But after a contractor knows that there is a legal impediment in the way of performance, he must cease at once and can not recover for the services ren- dered after knowledge of such legal impossibility is brought home to him. 6 1 Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. Nourse v. United States, 25 Ct. Claims, B. 180. 7. 2 Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171; 5 Theobalds Burleigh, 66 N. H. 574; Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412. 23 Atl. Rep. 367. 8 Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412. 6 Heaver v. Lanahan, 74 Md. 493; •Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171; 22 Atl. Rep. 263. § 227 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 283 § 227. Contracts of service. — Contracts for personal services, which can only be performed during the life-time of the party contracting, are subject to the implied condition of his continu- ing alive and in health to perform them, and such contracts are revoked and nullified by his death or incapacity from ill- ness. 1 Thus, if an author undertakes to compose a work, and dies before completing it, his executors are discharged from this contract." A painter is excused from performing his con- tract to paint a picture if his eyesight fails him. 3 The con- tract of a singer, although absolute in form, is subject to the implied condition that she be in health at the time perform- ance is due, and illness excuses her. 4 If one man contract with another to serve him as an overseer for a year and dies before the expiration of that time, his estate is not liable to re- spond in damages for a failure to serve for the stipulated period. 5 An agreement to work as a farm hand is revoked by the hand's illness. 6 Sickness will also excuse delay in the per- formance of a personal contract.' While sickness is generally an excuse for the non-performance of a personal contract, still the sickness must be such as could not have been provided against or foreseen. Thus, where a contract was made for the personal services of a man and his wife for the period of one year at a specified sum, and four months thereafter the wife left the service in anticipation of her confinement, it was held that she should have provided against this contingency, which 'Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, or their executors can be excused where the court said: "There is a from the consequences of the breach class of contracts in which a person of the contract is, that from the binds himself to do something which nature of the contract, there is an im- requires to be performed by him in plied condition of the continued ex- person, and such promises, e. g., istence of the life of the contractor." promises to marry, or promises to 2 2 Williams on Executors, 1560; serve for a certain time, are never Marshall v. Broadhurst, 1 Tyr. 348 ; in practice qualified by an express ex- Wentworth v. Cock, 10 A. & E. 42. ception of the death of the party ; and, 8 Hall v. Wright, E. B. & E. 746, therefore, in such cases, the contract 749. is in terms broken if the promisee 4 Bobinson v. Davison, L. B. 6 Ex. dies before fulfillment. Yet it was 269; Spalding v. Bosa, 71 N.Y. 40. very early determined that if the per- 6 Givhan v. Dailey, 4 Ala. 336. formance is personal the executors 6 Dickey v. Linscott, 20 Maine, 453. are not liable. * * * In those cases ' Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395 ; the only ground on which the parties Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197. 284 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 228 could have been foreseen, and that the employer was justified in discharging both without pay. 1 A contract to board a per- son for a specified time is subject to revocation on account of the death of either party. 2 An attorney at law is excused from completing his contract to render legal services, if he becomes too ill to properly do so. 3 But the inability of an apprentice to work, caused by sickness without his fault, is no breach of his father's covenant in the indenture of apprenticeship, that he should "well and faithfully serve and give and devote his whole time and labor" to his master; nor is it ground for abatement or diminution of wages, which, in consideration of such a covenant, the master agreed to pay to him weekly during the whole term of apprenticeship, the master never having undertaken to terminate the contract. 4 The sickness of an apprentice, however, discharges the contract on the side of the master, who is no longer bound by the articles. 5 And gen- erally in all contracts for personal services it is an implied condition that the death of either the employer or employe dissolves the contract. 6 § 228. The same subject continued — Recovery. — If a person renders personal services under an entire contract, which either his own, or his employer's sickness, or death, prevents him from fullyperforming, he can recover upon an implied assump- sit what those services are reasonably worth. 7 Thus, where a 1 Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553. the relation." See, also, Whincup v. 2 Willington v. West Boylston, 4 Hughes, L. R. 6 C. P. 78. Pick. (Mass.) 101. 'Parker v. Macomber, 17 R. I, 674, 3 Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79. where the court said : "In case of the 4 Caden v. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137. destruction of the fruits of the service See, also, Boast v. Firth, L. R. 4C. P. so that neither party has the value of 1. them, the loss must be adjusted accord- 5 Jackson v. Union, etc., Ins. Co., ing to the scope of the contract and L. R. 10 C. P. 125. the circumstances of the case, and 6 Farrow v. Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 744, different courts may come to diverse where the court said: "Generally conclusions in cases which are very speaking, contracts bind the executor similar to each other. But when, as in or administrator, although not named, this case, the defendant has received Where, however, personal considera- and retains the benefit of the service, tions are of the foundation of the we think that the plaintiff should re- contract, as in cases of principal and cover. It is not just that one should agent and master and servant, the benefit by the labor of another, and death of either party puts an end to make no return, when the event which § 229 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 285 man and his wife agreed to live with the wife's aunt and care for her, the death of the wife was held to give cause to the aunt to rescind the contract, but the husband was allowed to recover on a quantum meruit for the services he and his wife rendered before her death. 1 Where the plaintiff, having con- tracted to labor for the defendant six months at a specified price for the term, was taken unwell, and left the defendant's services, and was so unwell for about a month that he was un- able to perform the full labor of a man, and then he recovered his health, but did not return to the defendant's employment, it was held that he was entitled to recover for his services, upon a quantum meruit, for the time he labored." A sailor can recover pro tanto on a contract interrupted by his sickness; 3 and so can a laborer. 4 The same rule obtains in regard to a clerk. 5 A servant, who, by his contract of hiring, agrees that, if he intends to leave his master's employ, he will give notice of such intention, and work ten full working days thereafter, and, in default thereof, forfeit all money that may be due him, may recover from the master wages previously earned, if he is kept from his work by sickness, gives reasonable notice thereof to the master, and is absent only so long as he is so disabled. 6 A father may maintain an action upon a covenant with him- self to pay wages to his minor son for services as an apprentice, and unless the master terminates the contract he is liable for wages, although the apprentice is unable to work from sick- § 229. Further illustrations of recovery. — A special agree- ment was made to the effect that if the laborer should be dis- ends the service happens without the 'Parker v. Macomber, 17 R. I. 674. fault of either party, and is not ex- i Sea.ver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620. pressly or impliedly insured against 'Gray v. Murray, 3 John. Ch. 167. in the agreement which induced the 4 Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Maine, labor. This conclusion seems now to 463. be established by authority, as well 5 Dunlap v. Montgomery, 123 Pa. as to rest in sound reason." Cutter v. St. 27. Powell, 6 T. R. 320; Bream v. Marsh, 6 Harrington v. Fall River Works, 4 Leigh, 21 ; Haynes v. Second Baptist 119 Mass. 82. Church, 12 Mo. App. 536 ; Carpenter ' Caden v. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137. v. Gay, 12 R. I. 306 ; Farrow v. Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 744. 286 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 230 satisfied and wish to leave the service, he would give four weeks' notice before quitting, and then reeeive his pay; after he had begun to work under this agreement, he became sick and unable to work and left without giving the required notice; he was allowed to recover the value of his services. 1 The la- borer can recover although there is an express contract that he is not to be paid until a definite amount of work is done. 2 And it seems that the recovery for partial performance is upon a quantum meruit, and not on the contract. 8 But the recovery can not exceed the contract price, or the rate of it for the part of the service performed.' The court of appeals of New York has decided that recovery for partial performance of a contract, where sickness prevents complete performance, is not confined to a quantum meruit, but is to be measured by the contract. 6 But the recovery is subject to the damages sustained by the employer in consequence of the employe not being able to complete the full term of service." Where sickness interrupts the performance of a contract, either party may elect to rescind; the employe then recovers the value of his services without offering to return to work, although subsequently able. 7 § 230. Contracts for personal acts. — Contracts which have for their object some performance or matter which is strictly personal to the parties are in general construed as made upon the implied condition that the parties shall live long enough and continue practically capable to perform the contract. Thus, contracts to marry are determined by the death of either J 1 Fuller v. Brown, 11 Mete. (Mass.) for the benefit and at the request of 440. the employer which were different 2 Fentona. Clark, 11 Vt. 557. from those which the employe had 3 Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395; contracted to perform. Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197; Fahy 'Hubbard v. Belden, 27 Vt. 645. v. North, 19 Barb. 341. See also, Giv- See, also, Dickey v. Linscott, 20 han r. Dailey, 4 Ala. 336. Maine, 453. Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 4 Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79. 197, holding that it is unnecessary 5 Clark v. Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 279. that the plaintiff should set up in his 6 Patrick v. Putnam, 27 Vt. 759. complaint the excuse of illness for Neither the legal or equitable rights not fully performing his contract. It of the parties under such circum- is a matter of reply to a defense in- stances are affected by the fact that terposing the contract. Dryer v. the sickness was occasioned by the Lewis, 57 Ala. 551. voluntary performance of services § 231 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 287 party. 1 If the promisee is able and ready to proceed with his work, where his personal services or acts are bargained for, nothing short of absolute physical impossibility will excuse the employer. Thus, small-pox will not excuse a school district from liability on a contract with a teacher the performance of which the district has prevented by closing the school. 2 But if at the place where the contract is to be performed, which can not be performed elsewhere, a contagious disease is prevalent, this excuses performance. 3 Upon the same principle the death of a partner per se dissolves the firm, whether the partnership was for a fixed duration or not. 4 § 231. What are contracts for personal acts. — Whether a contract is one which is strictly personal, that is, to be per- formed by the parties themselves and not by agency, depends partly on the nature of the contract itself and partly on con- struction. Thus where a lumber manufacturer agreed to sell all the lumber to be sawed at his mill during five years, but died before the five years elapsed, it was held that this contract was a personal one and was abrogated by his death. 6 A con- tract, the duration of which is not fixed, to pay a reasonable compensation for the board, tuition and clothing of a person whom the promisor is not bound to support, is terminated by the death of the promisor, and an action can not be maintained against his executor for anything subsequently furnished, al- though the executor has not given notice of the death. 6 Where adjoining land-owners make an agreement relative to the duty of each in maintaining & partition fence, and one of them dies, his administrator is not bound by the contract for any future repairs. 7 A ground rent covenant does not survive 1 Chamberlain o. "Williamson, 2 M. tracts must be construed with ref- & S. 408. erence to their subject-matter, and a 2 Dewey a. Union School District, 43 contract denning an existing rela- Mich. 480. tion can have no operation when 8 Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Maine, 463. that relation ceases, for its founda- 4 Bates on Partnership, § 580. tion is gone. This is a contract in- 5 Dickinson v. Oalahan, 19 Pa. St. tended to regulate the relation of 227. adjoining owners, and it is involved • Browne v. McDonald, 129 Mass. 66. in its very nature that it can not last 'Bland v. Umstead, 23 Pa. St. longer than the relation." 316, where the court said : " All con- 288 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 231 against executors or administrators except as to the rents which accrued in the life-time of the decedent; the rents which accrued subsequent to the death of the covenantor are not pay- able out of his personal estate. 1 A contract to marry, 2 to write a book, 8 to instruct an apprentice, 4 to act as agent, 5 are all personal contracts terminated by the death of either party. But if a contract with a deceased party is of an executory nature and his personal representative can fairly and suffi- ciently execute all that the deceased could have done, he may do so, and enforce the contract. The exception to this rule is when the contract is of a purely personal character, or requires, in its execution, the exercise of peculiar skill or taste. 6 And, therefore, as a general rule the personal representatives of a deceased person can sue and be sued on all contracts of what- ever description made with him, whether broken before or after his death.' Thus a contract to build a house survives the death of either party; 8 the personal representatives of the builder are bound to complete his building contracts, 9 and the personal representatives of the owner are bound to permit the building to be done. 10 It is, however, always competent for the parties to make any contract, no matter what the subject-mat- ter, a personal one. If the intention is manifested by the par- ties in express terms in the contract itself, it effects the same object as where the law implies the intention from the subject- matter. Accordingly where by express terms the parties have excluded the idea of a substituted performance, no question, upon the subject-matter of the contract, can arise. The death of either party in such a case terminates the contract, as it would a contract construed from its subject-matter a personal 1 Quain's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 510. 566 ; Quick v. Ludburrow, 3 Bulst. 29 ; 8 Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. Janin v. Browne, 59 Cal. 37. & S. 408. 9 Janin v. Browne, 59 Cal. 37. 8 Marshall v. Broadhurst, 1 Tyr. 348. 10 Reicke v. Saunders,3 Mo. App. 566. 4 Baxter v. Burfield, 2 Strange, 1266. It seems a contract to build a light- 5 Smout -o. Ilbery, 10 M. & W. 1; house is a personal one terminated by Gait v. Galloway, 4 Pet. 332. death. 2 Williams on Executors, 1593 6 Smith v. Wilmington Coal Co., 83 n. (t). 111.498. "Shultz v. Johnson, 5 B. Monroe, 7 Dicey on Parties, 206. 497, 501 ; Siler v. Gray, 86 N. C. 566. 8 Reicke v. Saunders, 3 Mo. App. ■§ 232 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 289 § 232. Contracts to build becoming impossible. — Where one covenanted to build a bridge and keep it in repair for a cer- tain time, he was held bound to rebuild the bridge, although it was washed away by an extraordinary flood. 1 A railroad company contracted to pay a sum equal to one-third of all ex- penditures necessarily incurred in, by or through the operation, maintenance, renewal, repairs, or protection of a certain bridge; the bridge was blown down by a cyclone; it was held that the company was liable for one-third the amount expended in putting it in repair, notwithstanding its destruction by the cy- clone. 8 Where one contracts to build a house on the land of another, and the house is, before completion, destroyed by fire, without his fault, he is not thereby discharged from his obligation to fulfill his contract; 3 and in case of his refusal to proceed to build he is liable to refund all money advanced to him, and is also liable for damages for its non-performance. 4 And this rule obtains although the contract provides that the employer shall furnish the materials. 6 Where a carpenter en- tered into a contract to do the carpenter work and furnish the materials therefor, upon a brick building, but the mason work was to be done by another independent contractor, and after the brick work was nearly completed, and a part of the car- penter work done, the brick walls were blown down, it was held that the carpenter was discharged from further perform- ance, and could recover pro tanto for his services. 6 But 1 Meriwether v. Lowndes County, law is more firmly established by a 89 Ala. 362; 7 So. Rep. 198; Breck- long train of decisions than this, that nock v. Pritchard, 6 T. R. 720. where a party, by his own contract, 2 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash R. creates a du'y or charge upon himself, Co., 31 Fed. Eep. 440. he is bound i'o make it good, notwith- 3 Cutcliff v. McAnaliy, 88 Ala. 507; standing an} accident by inevitable Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 275; necessity, bee ause he might have pro- Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272; vided against it by his contract." School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 5 Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala. 123. 530; Fildew?>. Besley, 42 Mich. 100; 6 Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 111. 18. School Trustees of Trenton v. Ben- If, however, the carpenter had con- nett, 27 N. J. Law, 513; "Wells u. tracted to erect an entire building for Calnan, 107 Mass. 514. the defendant, and before it was com- 4 Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272, pleted it was destroyed, he would not where the court said: "No rule of be excused. 19 290 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 233 where the contract to build a complete house, for a specified sum, is not absolute and indivisible, but only a contract to do a part of the work and furnish a part of the materials, and a part built is destroyed by fire before completion of the whole, the contractor is discharged from further performance, and can recover for what he has done. 1 Where a contractor agreed to manufacture the iron work for a house and put up the same, the work to be at his risk until the building was completed, it was held the manufacturer did not assume the risk of the build- ing, which was burned, but only his materials furnished, and therefore that the destruction of the building did not operate to prevent him from recovering the price of the iron work manufactured and ready to be delivered. 2 A contractor en- gaged to build a house in accordance with certain plans and specifications; when the building was nearly completed, it fell, owing to a lateral defect in the soil; it was held that the defects in the soil did not excuse the contractor from the per- formance of his contract, and that it was no defense that the building, so far as it was erected, was constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications. 3 § 233. The same subject continued. — Where a contractor agrees to build a house "fit for use and occupation," he is lia- ble in damages if the house sinks from a latent defect in the soil, although he has fulfilled his contract in building the house according to the plans and specifications.' The courts of Virginia, 5 Texas, 6 and Tennessee 7 do not hold to the doc- trine that a builder must complete the building, if he under- takes the work by a 1 absolute contract, although it be destroyed by fire or otherwis' , without his fault, before completion; but allow the destructi* >n of the building to form an excuse from fur- ther performance, and permit the contractor to recover the value 1 Cook v. McOabe, 53 Wis. 250. must make it good, unless its perform- 8 Rawson v. Clark, 70 111. 656. ance is rendered impossible by the 3 Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494. act of God, the law, or the other 4 Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1, where party. Unforeseen difficulties, how- the court said: "It is a well settled ever great, will not excuse." rule of law, that if a party by his 6 Clark v. Franklin, 7 Leigh, 1. contract charge himself with an obli- 6 Hollis v. Chapman, 36 Texas, 1. gation possible to be performed, he 7 Wilson v. Knott, 3 Hump. 473. § 234 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 291 of his services. 1 And it may be laid down as a general rule that under a contract for building, the payments to be made in installments, as certain parts of the work are finished, if the structure, while in progress, be destroyed by inevitable ac- cident, the builder is entitled to be paid all such installments as are fully earned; but that he has no claim for a proportional part of the next installment, partially earned. 2 § 234. Particular contracts concerning specific things. — When from the nature of the contract it appears that the parties must from the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled, unless when the time for the fulfillment of the con- tract arrives some particular specified thing continues to exist, so that when entering into the contract they must have con- templated such continued existence as the foundation of what was to be done, then, in the absence of any express or implied warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be construed as a positive contract, but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, the contract becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without the default of the contractor. 3 Thus where an agreement was made for giving a series of concerts at a music hall, by which one of the parties was to let the use of the hall for a certain daily payment, and the other party was to provide the performers and to take the money, but before the time arrived the hall was destroyed by fire, it was held 'And in Wilson v. Knott, 3 Hump, to recoup by the amount of damages 473, it was held that proof of a custom sustained by reason of the f ail- among builders that the loss should ure of the plaintiff to fully per- fall on the contractor was inadmis- form. This has been the law of this sible. And see Parker v. Scott, 82 state, as announced by this court, for Iowa, 266, where a man contracted to many years. Pixler V.Nichols, 8 erect a church spire which was blown Iowa, 106. But the principle has no down before completion. It was held application to the facts in this case, he could not recover, and the court The part performance claimed was of said: "Counsel for Scott claim that no benefit to Leahy. He never ac- recovery may be had for the value of cepted the unfinished spire, and, as it the work and labor and materials lay upon the ground in ruins, it had upon the ground that when a party no value as a spire." performs a contract in part he may a Richardson v. Shaw, 1 Mo. App. recover the reasonable value of his 234. work, with the right of the employer 'Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826. 292 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 235 that the agreement was impliedly conditional upon the con- tinued existence of the hall, and was put an end to by its de- struction, and that no claim could be made under it for not letting the hall. 1 So, also, where one is employed to do work in a particular building for a series of days, the burning of the building by inevitable accident will terminate the employer's liability for wages. 2 And an agreement that a bull shall serve a cow is dependent upon the bull's ability, and his death re- scinds the bargain. 8 Where the keeper of a stallion advertises "with the privilege of breeding back again next season, should the mare not prove with foal, the money due at the time of the service, or before the mare is removed," one putting a mare to the stallion, the mare not proving in foal, is liable for the fee, although he is deprived of the privilege of breeding back the next season by the death of the horse. 4 Where a contract was to the effect that a certain sum should be paid "for publishing my advertisement in the Fifth Avenue, Union Square and Lyceum Theater programs, to occupy one inch on program page for the theater season," it was held that when one of the theaters closed this terminated the contract. 5 Upon a covenant in a lease of a mill for years, to pay rent, the rent may be recovered after a destruction of the mill by fire, al- though the lessor does not rebuild. 6 So equally where a car- penter agreed to lath and plaster a building for so much per square yard, and after he had done some work on it the house burned down, he was allowed to recover the value of his § 235. The same subject continued — Further illustrations. — Where the contractor was bound to follow the specifications and plans under which the work was to be done, which were so defective that by strictly following them in the construction of an arch the foundation of the building would not sustain 1 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826. 3 Shear v. Wright, 60 Mich. 159. 2 Hall v. School District, 24 Mo. 4 Price v. Pepper, 13 Bush, 42. App. 213, where a school-house 5 Hazzard v. Hoxsie, 53 Hun, 417. burned; held to exonerate the district 6 Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63; Baker from payment of the teacher after the v. Holtpzaffell, 4 Taunt. 45. destruction of the building. ' Oleary v. Sohier, 120 Mass. 210. § 235 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 293 the weight thereof, the contractor was exonerated from blame because of the falling of the arch. And it was held he could recover pro tanto, and was not bound to rebuild the arch. 1 So, also, where a laborer contracted to varnish clock cases at certain prices per case, the work to be done in his employer's factory, and the factory was burned, together with a large num- ber of cases, upon some of which it appeared that the laborer had performed work, some having been completed but not inspected, it was held that he could recover the contract price for the work completed ; and also could recover upon a quan- tum meruit for that unfinished. 2 Upon the same principle one who had taken stock in a turnpike company was held not to be answerable in an action for the assessments, where the course of the road had been changed. 8 A contract was made for the erection of certain machinery upon the premises of one of the parties, to be paid for on completion, and in course of the work the premises were destroyed by fire ; it was held that both parties were excused from further performance, and that no liability accrued on either side. 4 A contract to work coal mines is terminated by the exhaustion of the mines. 5 Where a contractor agreed to manufacture new boilers for a ship, then at sea, and the ship-owners advanced the contractor some money on the contract, and after the boilers were nearly com- pleted the ship was lost at sea, it was held that this terminated the contract and released the parties, but that the ship-owners could not recover back the money they advanced, nor did the boilers belong to them. 6 A contract to supply water from a certain spring is terminated and the promisor excused from performance if the spring fails from drought or other natural cause. 7 So, likewise, where for a certain sum a contractor agreed to contribute certain labor and materials towards the erection of a house on land of another, which, before comple- 1 Byron v. Mayor, etc., 22 J. & S. common pleas, where it was held (N. Y. Super.) ; 54 Hun, 411. that the contractor could recover the 2 Whelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 value of his services. See same case, N. Y. 293. L. E. 1 C. P. 615. 8 Middlesex Turnpike Co. v. Locke, 5 Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527. 8 Mass. 268. 6 Anglo-Egyptian Co. v. Eennie, 4 Appleby v. Myers, L. E. 2 C. P. L. E. 10 C. P. 271. 651, but this was on appeal from the ' Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa. St. 499. 294 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 236 tion, was destroyed by fire, the contractor was held excused from further performance and recovered the value of his work. 1 But the general rule is that where work is to be done under a contract on a chattel or building which is not wholly the property of the contractor, or for which he is not solely accountable, as where repairs are to be made on the property of another, the agreement on both sides is upon the implied condition that the chattel or building shall continue in exist- ence, and the destruction of it without the fault of either of the parties will excuse performance, and leave no right of recovery in favor of either for services rendered previous to the destruction. 2 § 236. Bailment. — The bailee is excused from his obliga- tion to redeliver the goods, if, without his fault, they perish; 8 and he is also in such case entitled to recover a compensation for any labor he may have done on the chattel previous to its destruction. 4 But where a workman is to furnish the ma- terials, as well as the work, if the thing perish before delivery, 1 Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517; factory by the plaintiff, to sell the 27 N. E. Rep. 667, where the court products and distribute the proceeds said: " The principle seems to be that in the manner stipulated. The factory when, under an implied condition of was thereafter destroyed by fire and the contract, the parties are to be ex- a quantity of milk and cheese thereby cused from performance if a certain lost. In an action to recover the event happens, and by reason of the amount of the loss it was held, that happening of the event it becomes the contract was one of bailment, and impossible to do that which was con- defendant only assumed the duty of templated by the contract, there is an ordinary care, and that the contract implied assumpsit for what has prop- was put an end to by the destruction erly been done by either of them." of the factory, and the defendant was 2 Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass 517 ; not liable for the loss of the goods. 27 N. E. Rep. 667; Lorda. Wheeler, 1 Story on Bailments, § 25, 427; Will- Gray, 282; Gilbert Manufacturing Co. iams i>. Lloyd, W. Jones, 179, where v. Butler, 146 Mass. 82; Eliot, etc., a horse was loaned and died ; Headu. Bank u. Beal, 141 Mass. 566; Appleby Tattersall, L. R. 7 Ex. 7, where a v. Myers, L. R. 2 C. P. 651. horse was bought with option to re- 3 .Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500. turn, it was held that the option could In this case plaintiff contracted with be exercised although the horse waa defendant to the effect that defend- injured while in bailee's possession, ant was to manufacture cheese and 4 Story on Bailments, § 427. Contra, butter from milk delivered at his 2 Kent's Commentaries (4th ed.), 590. § 237 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 295 there is no recovery. 1 "However, all these doctrines prevail only in the absence of any contrary stipulations of the parties, who may by their contract vary and control the ordinary re- sults of the law." 8 § 237. Delivery of goods. — "It is no excuse for the non- performance of a condition that it is impossible for the obligor to fulfill it, if the performance be in its nature possible. But if a thing be 'physically impossible, quod nature fieri non concedit, or be rendered impossible by the act of God, as if A. agree to sell and deliver his horse, Eclipse, to B. on a fixed future day, and the horse die in the interval, the obligation is at an end."' But if the property has passed to the buyer, the common law fixes the risk where the title resides and he must lose, and can not recover back any money paid the seller. 1 And the converse of this is equally true that if the property has not passed, the seller, although excused from performance, can not recover the price. 5 A contract for the sale and delivery of a certain quantity out of a specific crop of potatoes was held to be impliedly conditional upon the crop producing that quan- tity; and upon a failure of the crop the seller was held not to be liable for the deficiency in the quantity contracted for. 6 But upon a contract to raise, sell and deliver a specified quan- tity of beans of various kinds, no particular land upon which they were to be raised being specified, it was held, that the fact that unexpected early frosts so far destroyed the party's crop that he could not deliver the whole quantity specified did not excuse his non-performance of the contract. 7 And the general rule is that if a contract is made for the sale and de- livery of specified articles of personal property, under such circumstances that the title does not vest in the vendee, if the property is destroyed by an accident, the vendor is not liable to the vendee in damages for non-delivery. 8 One who has 'McConihe v. New York E. Co., 5 Benjamin on Sales, §319. See 20 N. Y. 495 ; Story on Bailments, Kugg v. Minett, 11 East, 210. § 427. 6 Howell v. Coupland, L. R. 1 Q. B. 2 Story on Bailments, § 427. D. 258. 3 Benjamin on Sales, § 861. ' Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280 ; 52 4 Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291 ; Ben- N. W. Eep. 530. jamin on Sales, § 319. 8 Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62. 296 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 238 entered into a contract to make and deliver a certain manu- factured article within a specified time, having ample time for performance, can not, however, postpone performance to the last moment and then excuse it upon plea of an accident; in such case he takes the responsibility of the delay. 1 § 238. "Strikes." — A "strike" of workmen is no excuse for the failure to perform a contract. 8 But where the workmen abandon their work, and by violence and intimidation prevent other employes, who are ready and willing to work, from so doing, then this ceases to be a "strike." 3 And accordingly a common carrier is not liable for delay in the shipment of goods caused solely by the lawless and irresistible violence of strikers and their confederates. 4 But if the workmen simply quit work because the employer does not pay, this will not ex- cuse the performance of a contract by the employer. 5 A com- mon carrier may lawfully stipulate by special contract for ex- emption from liability for loss occurring by reason of delay in 1 Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487. See, also, Stone v. Waite, 88 Ala. 599; Kemp v. Knicker- bocker Ice Co., 69 N. Y. 45; West v. VanTuyl, 1 N. Y. Supl. 718; Jones v. Anderson, 82 Ala. 302; 2 So. Rep. 911, where the court said: "Where a contract imposes some duty not purely personal — that is, which may be done by others as well as the promisor himself — his inability to perform by reason of accident, want of means, insolvency, or other reason, does not excuse non-performance." And see following cases where per- formance of delivery was excused and the seller allowed to recover the price from the buyer after the chattels per- ished: Bissell v. Balcom, 39 N. Y.275, where cattle were drowned ; Seckel v. Scott, 66 111. 106, butter sold, and de- stroyed by Chicago fire ; Ruthraaff v. Hagenbuch, 58 Pa. St. 103 ; Sweeney v. Owsley, 14 B. Mon. 413; Phillips v. Moor, 71 Maine, 78 ; King v. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190 ; Wing v. Clark, 24 Maine, 366; Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325. 2 Nightingale v. Eiseman, 121 N. Y. 288; Blackstock v. New York R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48; Budgett v. Binning- ton, L. R. 25 Q. B. D. (1890) 321; Beach on Railways, §§ 730, 926, 932. 3 Geismer v. Lake Shore R. Co., 102 N. Y. 563. 4 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Levi (Texas), 14 S. W. Rep. 1062; Inter- national R. Co. v. Tisdale, 74 Texas, 8; 4 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 545; South- ern Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson (Texas), 15 S. W. Rep. 121; Haas v. Kansas City R. Co., 81 Ga. 792; 7 S. E. Rep. 629; Geismer v. Lake Shore R. Co., 102 N. Y. 563. ButseePeople v. New York, etc., R. Co., 28 Hun, 543 ; Beach on Railways, §§ 730, 926, 932; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Mc- Kenna (1887), 30 Fed Rep. 48. 5 McLeod v. Genins, 31 Neb. 1 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 473. § 239 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 297 the transportation and delivery of goods occasioned by a strike. 1 Where a "strike clause" is inserted in a contract, exempting liability in case of failure to perform occasioned by a strike, the contractor is not thereby prohibited from conducting his business upon the same general principles which would have governed him had the clause not been inserted, nor is he re- quired to resort to extraordinary or unusual means to prevent strikes, but he has the right to adopt such rules and regula- tions and pay such wages as are reasonable under the circum- stances. 2 In the absence of any provision in a bill of lading fixing a time for unloading, the consignee's obligation to un- load is to use all reasonable diligence under the circumstances; and demurrage will not run during a delay for which he was in no wise responsible, caused by a general strike of lighter- man. 3 The duty imposed upon railroad companies by the "interstate commerce act," of receiving freight from connect- ing roads, is one which the federal courts will enforce by mandatory injunction notwithstanding a strike of employes. 4 § 239. Impossibility caused by the promisee. — It is a well- settled principle of law that if by any act of one of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, then the other party may rescind the contract. 6 And this may be done although the contract may be performed in some other manner not very different. 6 " Where the condition of a bond is possi- ble at the time of making it, and, before the same can be per- formed, becomes impossible by the act of the obligee, there the obligation is saved.'" Where, by a building contract, damages for delay on the part of the contractor to perform his contract within the time limited were fixed and liquidated, and the work contracted for could not be completed until other work 1 Gulf, Colorado B. Co. «. Gatewood, Co., 34 Fed. Eep. 481. See, also, 89 Texas, 89; 10 Lawyers' Eep. Ann. Budgett v. Binnington L. E. (1891), 419. 1 Q. B. 35; McFadden v. Compagnie 2 Delaware E. Co. o. Bowns, 58 Generale Transatlantique (1887), 1 N. Y. 573. Eailway and Corporation L. J. 112. 3 Hick v. Eodocanachi, 65 L. T. E. 5 Panama Telegraph Co. v. India N. S. 300; 44 Alb. L. J. 462. But see Eubber Co., L. E. 10 Ch. App. 515, People v. New York, etc., E. Co., 28 532. Hun, 543. 6 Planche v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14. 'Chicago E. Co. v. Burlington E. ' Coke on Littleton, 206. 298 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 239 to be done by the owner was finished, it was held, that a fail- ure on the part of the latter to finish his work in season to enable the contractor to complete his contract within the time specified was a sufficient excuse for delay, and discharged him from liability for the liquidated damages. 1 A subcontractor is excused from further performance if the contractor and owner cancel their contract. 2 Where a party, for a valuable consideration, gives to another an order payable out of a fund not then in existence, such party can not, by his own default, prevent the creation or realization of the fund and interpose the absence or failure of the fund as a defense to an action upon the order ; and where an order is drawn upon a fund to be paid upon the happening of a condition, which order is accepted, the acceptor can not, by his own act, defeat the con- dition and then set it up as a defense in an action upon the acceptance. 3 Where the obligation of one party to a contract requires of him the expenditure of a large sum in prepara- tion to perform, and a continuous readiness to perform, the law implies a corresponding obligation on the other party to do what is necessary to enable the other to comply with his agreement. 4 Thus, where the promiser agreed to pack a definite number of hogs and made all his preparations to do so, and was ready to do so, but the promisee refused to furnish the hogs to be packed, this excused performance by the promiser. 5 Where a contract bound the government to make the bed of a pool " as dry as is reasonably practicable, by putting a coffer-dam across the head of the pool," this bound the government to erect a dam sufficient to exclude the water above it from entering the area which the contractor was to excavate, and the period of the exclusion must have been sufficient for the performance of the work, and the gov- 1 Coke on Littleton, 206. in season to enable the builder to end 2 Weeks v. McCarty, 89 N. Y. 566, his within the time limited by the where the court said: "The rule is contract is a sufficient excuse for his well settled that where the work to delay beyond the agreed period of be performed by the builder can not completion." See, also, Stewart «. be performed until the other work Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388. provided to be done by the owner or 3 Gallagher v. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438. his employes is finished, the failure i Risley v. Smith, 64 N. Y. 576. by the latter to complete their work 5 United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77. $ 239 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 299 •eminent failing in this, the contractor was justified in aban- doning his work. 1 So, also, where the failure of the promisee to furnish the water required for irrigation as agreed caused the death of vines, for the protection of which the promiser had agreed to build a fence, it was held the promiser was not liable because of his failure to build the fence. 2 And again, a contractor, having provided machinery for an elevator, and delivered it on the owner's premises, being wrongfully pre- vented by the owner from completing the contract, can recover the full value of his labor and materials, though the owner afterwards finished the elevator, not using the contractor's materials. 3 Where the promisee becomes surety on the bond in a replevin case, by means of which the goods are taken from the promisor, this excuses him from his contract of sale with the promisee. 4 If one contracting party can show that the other prevented his performance, it is to be taken as prima facie true that he would have accomplished it if he had not been stopped. 5 But one who entered into an agreement for the sale of property on which he had a lien for the payment of a debt is not relieved from liability by the failure of bidders to comply with the terms of the sale. 6 In a case where a publisher engaged an author to write a treatise for a periodical, but, before he had completed it, the publisher abandoned the publication, it was held that the author could recover com- pensation without tendering or delivering the treatise. 7 1 United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77. stock, 80 Mich. 448; 45 N. W. Rep. 2 Skelsey v. United States, 23 Ct. CI. 378 ; Wood v. Malone 131 Pa. St. 554 ; 61. Home Bank v. Drumgoole, 109 N. Y. 3 Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537. 63 ; Holme v. Guppy, 3 M. & W. 387 ; 4 Ellithorpe Air Co. e. Sire, 41 Fed. Thornhill v. Neats, 8 C. B. N. S. 831 ; Rep. 662. Russell v. Sa da Bandeira, 13 C. B. 5 Ketchum«. Zeilsdorff, 26 Wis. 514. N. S. 149; Roberts v. Bury Com- McCreery v. Green, 38 Mich. 172. misskmers, L. R. 4 C. P. 755; West- 6 Bradshaw». McLoughlin, 39 Mich, wood v. Secretary, 11 Weekly Rep. 4g0. 261, where a contractor undertook 'Planche v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14. certain work subject to alterations to See, also, Highton v. Dessau, 19 N. Y. be done within a prescribed time and Supl. 395 ; McCartney v. Glassford, 1 was held excused because employer Wash. St. 579; Byron v. Mayor, etc., 54 ordered more than was possible to N. Y. Super. Ct. 411 ; Rayburn v. Com- complete. 300 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. §§ 240, 241 § 240. Impossibility caused by the promisor. — "A promise is not excused by an impossibility of performance caused by the promisor; an act of the promisor rendering the perform- ance on his part impossible, while it dispenses with the per- formance of all conditions precedent on the other part, consti- tutes at once a breach of contract." 1 § 241. Alternative promises. — If a party contract to do one of two things, the fact that one part of this alternative prom- ise is impossible of fulfillment does not relieve him from per- forming the other. 2 Thus, where the bailee of a chattel prom- ised to return the chattel, or its value in money, he was held bound to pay its value, although it perished without his fault. 5 Two physicians agreed to form a partnership; the articles were to the effect that they should divide the receipts should the partnership continue, but, if one withdrew from practice, the other should pay him a certain sum; before anything was done under this contract, one party declined to proceed with the business; it was held that this act did not prevent the other from recovering the sum agreed on as compensation for withdrawal from practice, he having elected so to do. 4 An alternative contract to pay money, or convey land in a cer- tain event, is not discharged by the death of the contractor rendering the conveyance of the land impossible. 5 In accord- ance with the same principle, where a party has agreed to do two things, which are entirely distinct, and one of them is prohibited by law and the other is legal, such illegality of the 1 Leake on Contracts, 709, citing : and the buyer discontinued the busi- Beswick v. Swindells, 3 A. & E. 868, ness; it was held a breach; Evans v. 883, a case of a bond ; Clarke v. West- Wood, L. R. 5 Eq. 9. rope, 18 C. B. 765, where an incoming 2 Drake v. White, 117 Mass. 10; tenant agreed to buy the straw upon a Stevens v. Webb, 7 C. & P. 60; State /arm at a price to be fixed by valua- v. Worthington, 7 Ohio, 171. ti'in and then consumed the straw be- 3 Drake v. White. 117 Mass. 10. fore a valuation could be made, and 4 Frothingham?>. Seymour, 121 Mass. so rendered it impossible, he was held 409, where the court said : "The fact to pay the value to be estimated by that the defendant, by his own act, the jury ; Telegraph Dispatch Co. v. had rendered one part of his alterna- McLean, L. R. 8 Ch. 658, where a busi- tive promise impossible of fulfillment ness sold was to be paid for in install- does not relieve him from the other." ments dependent upon the profits, 5 State v. Worthington, 7 Ohio, 171. § 242 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. 301 one stipulation can not be set up as a bar to a suit for a breach of the valid one. Thus, where a railroad company agreed to allow an express company to transport cars over its railway, their refusal to so allow the express company to transport trains was a breach of their stipulation, and it was held no defense that another stipulation of this contract was void and impossible because contrary to law. 1 § 242. The same subject continued. — In a leading case, Vice-Chancellor Kindersley said: "It is impossible to lay down any universal proposition either way, but that the prin- ciple to be applied in each case is that it must depend on the intention of the parties to the bond, or covenant, or agree- ment, such intention to be collected from the nature and cir- cumstances of the transaction and the terms of the instru- ment. And this, I think, will hardly admit of contradiction, that, if the court is satisfied that the clear intention of the parties was that one of them should do a certain thing, but he is allowed at his option to do it in one or other of two modes, and one of these modes becomes impossible by the act of God, he is bound to perform it in the other mode." 2 Lord Coke, however, laid down the contrary rule, "that, where the condition of a bond consists of two parts in the disjunctive, and both are possible at the time of the bond made, and after- wards one of them becomes impossible by the act of God, the obligor is not bound to perform the other." 3 But where a man contracted to pay a certain sum for every ton of coal he should obtain from a mine, or, if he ceased to work the mine, he would pay a fixed sum instead, he was held bound to pay this latter sum, although the mine became exhausted. 4 And where a bond was given conditioned either to pay the obligee a certain sum, or to surrender a person who had been arrested 'Erie B. Co. v. Union Locomo- Freeland, Ley E. 71; Sheerman v. tive Co., 35 N.J. Law, 240. See, also, Thompson, 11 A. & E. 1027. Year Book, 14 Henry VIII, 25, 26; 2 Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drewry, 1, Chesman v. Nainby, 2 Ld. Eay. 1456 ; 24, 25. Mallan v. May, 11 M. &. W. 653 ; Price 3 Laughter's Case, Coke's Eep., pt. v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346; Gaskell v. 5, 22. King, 11 East, 165; Nicholes v. Stret- 4 Marquis of Bute v. Thompson, 13 ton, 10 A. &E.(N.S.) 346; Chester v. M. & W. 487. 302 IMPOSSIBLE CONTRACTS. § 243 to appear in an action at his suit by an appointed day, and the person to be surrendered died before that day, the bondsman was compelled to pay the bond. 1 Somewhat akin to this prin- ciple is the law that where, under the terms of a lease, the landlord covenants to insure, and the tenant has the option to purchase for a fixed sum, if, before the time for exercising the option, the buildings demised are burnt, and the landlord receives the insurance money, the tenant then exercising his option to purchase has no claim on the insurance money. 2 § 243. False assumption of impossibility — Provisions ex- cepting impossibility. — A party who becomes involved in diffi- culties for which he is not responsible, if ultimately able to perform, is not to be deprived of the benefits of his contract because of an assumption by the other party that the difficul- ties will prove insurmountable. Thus, where a contract re- quired a theatrical manager to furnish a hall for a concert, and to pay a certain sum after the entertainment, the fact that a most extraordinary snow storm prevailed in the vicinity, which early on the day of the concert rendered the streets of the village and the roads from the surrounding country prac- tically impassable, and trains on the railroad to the village were suspended, and in consequence the manager thought it impossible for the performers to reach the village, — this did not excuse him from his duty to furnish the hall, the per- formers reaching the village by a special train. 8 Of course "the contract may in express terms provide against contin- gencies interfering with the performance, by excepting certain events from the liability. Thus charter-parties and bills of lading; contracting for the carriage of goods by sea, being pe- culiarly liable to be interfered with by accidents over which the ship-owner has no control, are generally made with an ex- ceptive clause restricting his liability." 4 1 Warner v. White, T. Jones, 95. the surety not liable, where the de- But -where the condition of the bond fendant failed to appear because he has become impossible by act of God was taken sick. Scully v. Kirkpatrick, the obligation is discharged ; as where 79 Pa. St. 324. the defendant was arrested as a fraud- 2 Edwards v. West, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. ulent debtor, and he gave bond for 858. his further appearance, it was held s Hathaway v. Sabin, 63 Vt. 527. that this bond was not broken, and 4 Leake on Contracts, 698. CHAPTER VII. WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 244. Sales — Quantity. §269. Implied warranty excluded by 245. Sales — More or less. written. 246. Insurance warranties — Nature 270. Implied warranty as affected and effect. by acceptance — Sale by sam- 247. The same subject continued — ple. Illustrations. 271. The same subject continued — 248. The same subject continued. The federal doctrine. 249. Insurance warranty distin- 272. Co-existing implied and writ- guished from representa- ten warranties. tions. 273. Receipts and memorandum ex- 250. The same subject continued — cluding oral warranty. Marine statute. 274. Substitution of warranties. 251. Insurance warranties not fa- 275. Implied warranty of identi- vored. ty — Genuineness of passage 252. Description as warranty — ticket. Agent's mistake. 276. Implied warranty of quality. 253. Insurer may waive breach — 277. Warranty as to quality — Illus- Effect of waiver. trations. 254. Warranties in sales — Horses. 278. Implied warranty as to fitness 255. The same subject continued — — Latent defects — Fraud. Machinery. 279. The same subject continued — 256. Warranty of workmanship. Illustrations. 257. Statements in catalogues. 280. Vendor's warranty as to value. 258. The same subject continued. 281. Warranty of future state of an 259. Construction of warranties. article. 260. The same subject continued. 282. Implied warranty of title. 261. To what defects a warranty 283. Seller's implied warranty of extends. title — Exception . 262. The same subject continued. 284. The same subject continued-' 263. Warranty of horses — Stallions. When the seller is not in 264. Further illustrations — Sound- possession. ness in horses. 285. What constitutes breach of 265. Open defects. warranty of title. 266. Written contract excluding 286. The same subject continued. oral warranty. 287. Implied warranty of title by 267. The same subject continued — sheriffs and administrators. Illustrations. 288. Implied warranty of title to 268. Seller's oral warranty — Illus- bonds. trations. 289. General warranty covenant. (303) 304 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE, § 244 §290. Covenants of warranty— Grant- §293. Performance of building Con- or's rights. tract. 291. Damages for breach of war- 294. The same subject continued — ranty. Digging wells. 292. Covenant of seizin — Damages 295. Method of performance. for breach. 296. Miscellaneous. § 244. Sales — Quantity. — The vendor in a contract of sale must deliver the exact quantity contracted for. A tender of a larger bulk from which the buyer can select the quantity he bargained for is no tender, and the buyer can reject the whole of the goods tendered. 1 Thus, where the vendor wrote that he had a vessel of three hundred and seventy-five tons of coal, and the buyer telegraphed in reply, "Ship that cargo, three hundred and seventy-five tons, immediately," it was held that the buyer could reject the cargo because it contained three hundred and ninety-two tons. 2 So a tender of two hundred and six bales of cotton may be rejected when only two hun- dred are contracted for. 3 A buyer was allowed to reject a tender of ten hogsheads of claret, when the vendor sent fifteen.' It is the duty of the vendor to make the separation and to tender only such as the vendee is bound to accept; and a re- fusal to perform save by such a delivery in bulk is a breach of the contract, subjecting the vendor to an action for dam- ages, and for any money paid or advanced upon it. 5 Likewise the buyer may reject the goods if they are tendered mixed with other goods. 6 If the delivery is of a quantity less than that sold, it may be refused by the buyer; and if the contract be for a specified quantity to be delivered in parcels from time to time, the purchaser may return the parcels first received, if the latter deliveries be not made, for the contract is not per- formed by the vendor's delivery of less than the whole quan- 'Croninger v. Crocker, 62 N. Y. ' s Dixon v. Fletcher, 3 M. & W. 146. 151; Dixon v. Fletcher, 3 M. & W. 4 Cunliffe v. Harrison, 6 Ex. 903. 146; Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 6 Croninger v. Crocker, 62 N.Y. 151. 327; Hart v. Mills, 15 M. & W. 85 ; 6 Benjamin on Sales,'§'689; Levyr. Cunliffe v. Harrison, 6 Ex. 903 ; Nich- Green, 8 E. & B. 575, where the goods olson v. Bradfield Union, L. R. 1 Q. ordered were sent, but were packed B. 620; Levy v. Green, 8 E. & B. 575. in a crate with other goods not or- 2 Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327. dered. $ 245 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 305 tity sold. 1 Where an invoice of clothing was sold, amounting to twenty-two garments, the buyer was allowed to reject the whole because two small garments were lacking; 2 but it seems that the deficiency in the quantity must be such as would and ought to be regarded as material to the whole, in order to jus- tify the buyer's rejection. 3 § 245. Sales — More or less. — Where a contract is made to sell or furnish certain goods identified by reference to inde- pendent circumstances, such as an entire lot deposited in a certain warehouse, or all that may be manufactured by the vendor in a certain establishment, or that may be shipped by his agent or correspondent in certain vessels, and the quantity is named with the qualification of "about," or "more or less," or words of like import, the contract applies to the specific lot, and the naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty, but only as an estimate of the probable amount, in reference to which good faith is all that is required of the party making it. In such cases, the governing rule is somewhat analogous to that which is applied in the descrip- tion of lands, where natural boundaries and monuments con- trol courses and distances and estimates of quantity. 1 But when no such independent circumstances are referred to, and the engagement is to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain amount, the quantity specified is mate- rial, and governs the contract. The addition of the qualifying words, "about," "more or less," and the like, in such cases, is only for the purpose of providing against accidental varia- tions arising from slight and unimportant excesses or defi- ciencies in number, measure or weight. 5 Thus, an excess of forty-five bushels of rye was held not covered by the words "more or less," and the buyer was allowed to reject. 6 But twenty-seven tons of coal was held to be covered by the words 1 Benjamin on Sales, § 690; The * Brawley v. United States, 96 TJ. S. Highlands Chemical Co. v. Matthews, 168. 76 N. Y. 145. 5 Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 1 Smith v. Lewis, 40 Ind. 98. 168. 8 Wright v. Barnes, 14 Conn. 518. 6 Cross v. Eglin, 2 B. & Ad. 106. 20 306 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 245 "more or less," and the buyer was held to pay for it, he hav- ing contracted to buy one hundred tons, "more or less," one hundred and twenty- seven tons being delivered. 1 A delivery of sixteen thousand feet of lumber is no compliance with a contract calling for a delivery of twenty-three thousand feet, "more or less." 2 If, however, the qualifying words are sup- plemented by other stipulations or conditions which give them a broader scope or a more extensive significancy, then the con- tract is to be governed by such added stipulations or condi- tions. As, if it be agreed to furnish so many bushels of wheat, more or less, according to what the party receiving it shall require for the use of his mill, then the contract is not governed by the quantity named, nor by that quantity with slight and unimportant variations, but by what the receiving party shall require for the use of his mill; and the variation from the quantity named will depend upon his discretion and requirements so long as he acts in good faith. So, where a manufacturer contracts to deliver at a certain price all the arti- cles he shall make in his factory for the space of two years, "say a thousand to twelve hundred gallons of naphtha per month," the designation of quantity is qualified, not only by the indeterminate word "say," but by the fair discretion or ability of the manufacturer, provided he acts in good faith. 8 And where an army contractor agreed to deliver at a certain army post eight hundred and eighty cords of wood, "more or less, as shall be determined to be necessary by the post com- mander," and such post commander notified the contractor that only forty cords would be required, it was held that the contractor could not recover for any wood delivered above forty cords. 4 A contract bound a party to supply six hundred thousand pounds, "more or less," of oats to a military post; it was held that after the six hundred thousand pounds were 1 Cockerell v. Aucompte, 2 C. B. bell, 10 Ex. 323; Bourne v. Seymour, (N. S.) 440. 16 C. B. 337. 2 Creighton v. Comstock, 27 Ohio St. 3 Gwillim v. Daniell, 2 Cromp. M. & 548. See also, McConnell v. Murphy, R. 61. 21 Weekly Rep. 609; Moore v. Camp- 4 Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 168. § 246 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 307 delivered, the buyer need take no further deliveries, and might buy elsewhere. 1 § 246. Insurance warranties — Nature and effect. — In insur- ance contracts, the truth of all statements warranted to be true is a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer; for, if the statements so warranted are untrue, there is no con- tract. Where the policy recites that the statements made in the application are warranted to be true, and are the basis of the contract, and that any misstatements in the application should make the policy void, the answers in the application are warranties. 8 And when the statements in the application are made part of the policy, and declared to be warranties, it is a good defense to show that they were untrue, without further showing that the applicant knew or believed them to be untrue. 3 No particular form of words is necessary to con- stitute a warranty. Any statement or stipulation upon the literal truth or fulfillment of which, in the intention of the parties, the validity of the contract is made to depend, amounts to a warranty. But no particular form of words will make a statement or stipulation a warranty, not even the use of the word 'warranty,' where it is apparent from the context or from the other parts of the contract that it is not the intention of the parties to make the validity of the contract depend on the literal truth or fulfillment of the statement or stipulation. 4 A 1 Marriam v. United States, 14 Ct. case, however, the statements were CI. 289. referred to in the body of the policy 2 Bacon on Life Insurance, etc., §194. as representations, and it was held 'Provident, etc., Assur. Soc. v. that terms used in the policy con- Llewellyn (1893), 58 Fed. Eep. 940, trolled those used in the application, per Taft, J. : "In Moulor v. Ameri- In this case, we do not see any room can, etc., Insurance Co., Ill United for doubt or construction. It is im- States, 335 ; 4 Sup. Ct. 466, it was held possible to escape the meaning that that when there was any reason to the statements were intended to be doubt the meaning of the contract of warranties. Strict construction against insurance, it would be presumed that the company can not destroy the nec- the statements of the applicant were essary effect of plain language. Par- to be regarded as representations, ties have a right to contract in this and not as strict warranties, and the wise if they will. Clemans v. Su- agreement would be presumed to be a preme Assembly, etc., 131 N. Y. 485 ; warranty only that the answers were 30 N. E. Eep. 496; Foot v. Mtna, made in good faith, and true to the etc., Insurance Co., 61 N. Y. 571." knowledge of the insured. In that 4 May on Insurance, § 156. 308 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §246 charge that false representations in an application for life in- surance, to the effect that the applicant's habits are "correct and temperate," will not avoid a policy based on the truth of such application, unless they were "willfully and intentionally made, and known at the time to be false," is error where such representations were warranted to be true. 1 1 Standard L. & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Lauderdale, 94 Tenn. 635 ; 30 S. W. Eep. 732, where the court said: "In the application referred to is the fol- lowing statement: 'I hereby apply for insurance against bodily injuries caused solely by violent, external, and accidental means, to be based upon the following statement of facts, all of which I hereby warrant to be true. If found to be untrue in any re- spect, then, in every such case, the policy hereon shall be null and void.' Following the above, at division 11, letter a, is the following: 'My habits of life are correct and temperate.' The closing paragraph of said application is in the words following: 'I hereby agree that this application and war- ranty, together with all the premium paid [by] me, shall be the basis of the contract between the company and me.' We are of opinion the statements made by the assured in his application for the policy in re- spect to his habits were not mere rep- resentations, but absolute warranties. Those statements were made in re- spect to a material matter, that vitally affected the contract, and, if untrue, invalidated the whole insurance, whether the misstatement was will- ful and intentional or made through inadvertence. Indeed, in this view of the case, it is immaterial whether such statements be called 'representa- tions' or 'warranties.' As stated by this court in Boyd u.Vanderbilt Insur- ance Co., 90 Tenn. 212; 16 S. W. Eep. 470 : 'If, however, the representation be of a fact material to the risk, and be relied upon by the insurer, it is the un- doubted general rule that such repre- sentation, whether made intentionally or through mistake and in good faith, avoids the policy.' The materiality of the applicant's statement in respect to his habits on the subject of temper- ance will not be controverted. Appli- cations for life and accident insurance invariably contain questions bearing upon the habits of the applicant, es- pecially in regard to the use of intox- icants. The use of intoxicating liquors and drunkenness are habits tending to shorten life, and for this reason such risks are avoided by well- regulated life insurance associations. Schultz v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 6 Fed. Eep. 672; Kuecht v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 90 Pa. St. 118. Ac- cident insurance companies also avoid such risks for the reason that such in- dulgences render the assured incapa- ble of discerning danger, and espe- cially incapacitate him from avoiding its consequences after it is discovered. The statement, therefore, of the ap- plicant in this case that his habits were correct and temperate was most material to the risk, whether it be called a 'representation' or 'warran- ty,' and, if untrue, it avoided the pol- icy. It was, therefore, erroneous for the court to charge 'that, to have this effect, the misstatement must be will- fully and intentionally made, and known at the time to be false.' The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial." § 247 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 309 § 24:7. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A life insurance policy recited that the applicant warranted that the statements to be made to the medical examiner should be true and the basis of the contract, and, if any untrue statements should be made, the policy should be void. Following the questions propounded by the medical examiner were the fol- lowing words, signed by the applicant: "I hereby declare that I have read the above questions and answers, and that the same are warranted to be true." It was held that the answers were warranties. And where, in a life insurance policy, the answers to the questions propounded by the med- ical examiners are made warranties, and among such ques- tions is the following: "When and by what physician were you last attended and for what complaint?" to which the applicant answers that he never called a doctor in his life, previous attendance by a physician, though for a trivial sick- ness, shows a breach of the warranty, voiding the policy. 1 Where an application for life insurance, which was agreed to be a part of the contract, warranted the answers of the as- sured to questions asked therein to be "full, true and com- plete," and the policy was conditioned to be void if they 'were not so, and one of the questions demanded the name and ad- dress of each physician who had attended the assured within a given period; and the answer gave the name and address of a single physician, when, as a matter of fact, three phy- sicians had attended the assured within the period named, it was held that the answer was untrue, and, being a breach of the warranty, vitiated the policy and destroyed the right 'Providence, etc., Assur. Soc. v. that the contract shall be avoided if the Reutlinger (1894), 58 Ark. 528, 253; answers made by him in his applica- West. Rep. 835, where the court said : tion are not true, makes their truth the "The answer averred that he had basis of the contract.' In the applica- never called a physician to attend him tion two questions were propounded in sickness. He warranted this state- to the applicant, as follows : (1) 'Have ment to be true, and the evidence ad- you personally consulted a physician, duced at the trial of this case tended been prescribed for or specifically to prove that it was untrue, a breach of treated within the last ten years?' warranty. In Cobb v. Covenant, etc., (2) 'If so, give dates, and for what Association, 153 Mass. 176; 26 N. E. diseases.' To the first he answered Rep. 230, the court held that 'an ap- 'No,' and to the second no answer plicant for benefit insurance, agreeing was made. The court said : 'While 310 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 248 to recover thereunder. 1 Where an application for a fire in- surance policy on a cotton gin recites that the representations therein contained are the basis on which the insurance is effected, and both the application and the policy expressly state that the representations in the application are warran- ties, and that the insurance shall be void if the insured has made any misrepresentations, the failure of the insured to keep a barrel of water and two buckets in the same room and within ten feet of the gin stand, as he had agreed to do in the application as a condition of insurance, will bar a recov- ery for a loss sustained. 2 § 248. The same subject continued. — In Virginia the in- sured as well as the insurer is held strictly to the terms and conditions of their contract as it is expressed in the policy. Thus, a policy of fire insurance contained a clause that it was based upon a written application, the statements in which as it deemed necessary. By answer- ing the question in the negative, the applicant induced the defendant to refrain from doing this." 1 Brady v. United Life Ins. Assn. (1894), 60 Fed. Bep. 727. 2 Southern Ins. Co. v. White (1893), 58 Ark. 277 ; 24 S. AV. Rep. 425, where the court said: "The following clause in the policy shows the effect of a breach of this warranty : 'This entire policy shall be void if the insured has concealed or misrepresented, in writ- ing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstance concerning this insur- ance, or the subject thereof, or if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated herein.' Johnson v. Maine, etc. .Insurance Co. ,83 Maine, 182 ; 22 Atl. Bep. 107 ; Cobb v. Cove- nant, etc., Association, 153 Mass. 176; 26 N. E. Bep. 230. This court, in the case of Mechanics', etc., Insurance Co. v. Thompson (1893), 57 Ark. 279; 21 S. W. Bep. 468, by Battle, J., held that the failure of the assured to per- form an agreement of this kind would bar recovery." the question whether the insured had a fixed disease, and what the disease was, might be an inquiry involved in considerable embarrassment, the ques- tion whether he had consulted a phy- sician, or had been professionally treated by one, was simple, and one about which there could be no mis- understanding. Had it been replied to in the affirmative, the answer would have led to other inquiries. Indeed, the question which follows, which re- mains unanswered, is: 'If so, give dates, and for what diseases.' It is upon the existence of this latter ques- tion that the plaintiff founds an argu- ment that it was necessary to show that the insured had some distinct disease permanently affecting his gen- eral health before it could be said that he had answered this question un- truthfully. But the scope of the ques- tion can not be thus narrowed. Even if the insured had only visited a phy- sician from time to time for temporary disturbances proceeding from acci- dental causes, the defendant had a right to know this, in order that it might make such further investigation § 248 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 311 should be treated as warranties ; in the application the in- sured was asked if he would keep his account books in another building than his store-house and securely in an iron safe, and he answered that he would ; it was held that this statement was a warranty. The policy also recited that it "shall be void if the assured has concealed or misrepresented in writing or otherwise any material fact concerning this insurance," and also that "this policy is made and accepted subject to the fore- going stipulations and conditions ; " it was held that this clause would not permit the court to inquire into the materiality of the warranties. 1 In Arizona it has been held that the 'Virginia, etc., Ins. Co. v. Morgan (Va. 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 191, where the court said : '"A warranty is an agree- ment in the nature of a condition pre- cedent, and like that, must be strictly complied with.' May on Insurance, § 156. This is the language of the de- cided cases and of this court in Lynch- burg Insurance Co. v. West, 76 Va. 575. And the author correctly adds that whether the fact stated or the act stipu- lated for be material to the risk or not is of no consequence, the contract being that the matter is as represented, or shall be as promised, and unless it prove so, whether from fraud, mistake, negligence, or other cause, not pro- ceeding from the insurer or the inter- vention of the law or the act of God, the insured can have no claim. ' One of the very objects of the warranty,' he continues, ' is to preclude all contro- versy about the materiality or imma- teriality of the statement. The only question is, has the warranty been kept ? There is no room for construc- tion; no latitude; no equity. If the warranty be a statement of facts, it must be literally true ; if a stipulation that a certain act shall or shall not be done, it must be literally performed.' "Whether a statement is a warranty or not depends upon the intention of the parties, as does the nature and effect of the warranty, when there is one which is to be gathered from the lan- guage used and the subject-matter to which it relates. Parties have the right to make their own contracts, and when the meaning of the contract-is ascertained, effect must be given to it. It is not for the courts to add to or detract from it, but the contract must be enforced without regard to any hardship, real or supposed, to either party, or whether it is wise or unwise, provident or improvident. Thus, in , Jeffries v. Life Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 47, where the insured was asked in the application whether he was married or single, and falsely answered that he was single, it was held that the falsity of the answer defeated the re- covery, as one of the express condi- tions of the policy was that the state- ments in the application were in all respects true. And in the course of the opinion it was said : ' There is no place for the argument either that the false statement was not material to the risk, or that it was a positive ad- vantage to the company to be deceived by it. It is the distinct agreement of the parties that the company shall not be deceived to its injury or to its benefit. The right of an individual or a corporation to make an unwise bar- gain is as complete as that to make a wise one.' According to the authori- ties, warranties are of two kinds, viz. . 312 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 248 answers of an applicant that he has not consisted a physician since childhood, and does not remember the names and ad- (1) Affirmative, or warranties in prm- senti, aa they are sometimes called, which affirm the existence of certain facts pertaining to the risk at the time of the insurance ; and (2) continuing or promissory. An instance of the first class is Insurance Co. v. Buck, 88 Va. 517; 13 S. E. Rep. 973. There the insured, in answer to a question in the application, stated that a watch- man slept on the premises at night. On the night of the fire the watchman was absent, but it was held that the policy was not thereby avoided, be- cause the answer related to the pres- ent, and not to the future; in other words, that the statement was mani- festly intended merely as affirmative of the usual and existing state of things, and had nothing promissory as to the future. But, as was said in the same case, a promissory warranty, i. e., one which requires something to be done or omitted after the insur- ance takes effect and during its con- tinuance, avoids the contract if not complied with according to its terms. The present case falls within the latter category, certainly as regards the promise to keep the books in an iron safe, or secure in another building. It is quite probable, in the nature of the case, that this stipulation was regarded as material, but whether it was or not — for with that we have nothing to do — the contract is express that the books would be thus safely kept; and if, as is conceded, the promise has not been fulfilled, there can be no recovery. A warranty may be in part affirmative and in part promissory. Thus, in an Iowa case, the building was described as ' occu- pied for stores below, the upper por- tion to remain unoccupied during the continuance of this policy.' In an action on the policy it was held that so much of tte statement as related to the lower portion of the building was an affirmative warranty merely, but that what related to the upper portion was a promissory warranty, which was broken if at any time during the life of the policy that portion of the building was occupied. Stout v. City, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Iowa, 371. The main ground upon which the plaintiff relies in support of the judgment is a provision in the policy that the same ' shall be void if the assured has con- cealed or misrepresented, in writing or otherwise, any material fact or circumstance concerning this insur- ance or the subject thereof;' and further, that ' this policy is made and accepted subject to the foregoing stipulations and conditions.' This language, it is contended, is incon- sistent with an idea of a warranty, and shows that the answers in the application were intended as repre- sentations, none of which would avoid the policy unless false and material to the risk. The answer to this is that just as a policy may contain both affirmative and promissory warran- ties, so it may contain both warranties and representations, and the present is a case of that sort. In the applica- tion wherein the applicant affirms and warrants his answers to be true, and agrees that the same shall constitute the basis of the insurance, he was asked as to the dimensions of the storehouse, when it was built, etc. Now, as to the answers to these ques- tions and the like, it would be absurd to say that they were anything more than representations, because they are merely descriptive, and were evi- dently so intended by the parties. Wood on Insurance, §138. On the other hand, looking, as we must, to the whole contract, it is equally clear § 248 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 313 dresses of physicians who have attended him, "warranted to be true," and "offered to the company as a consideration of the con- tract," constitute a warranty which is broken on findings that applicant had received medical treatment within two years of his application, and did know the names and addresses of the physicians who attended him, and on a stipulated admission that such a one had been his physician within that time. 1 that the answer in regard to safely keeping the books was intended as a warranty. It is not descriptive of anything, and related not to matters depending upon opinions or judg- ment, as in Lynchburg, etc., Insur- ance Co. v. West, 76 Va. 575, and Na- tional Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673, in which cases the as- sured was asked as to the value of the property, but it constituted an under- taking to do a certain thing in the future, and is therefore not within the operation of the provision just quoted. To call such a stipulation a representation, or anything less than a warranty, is a misuse of terms." 1 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Arhelger (Arz. 1894), 36 Pac. Rep. 895, where the court said : " If he had consulted any physician in a professional char- acter, or received any treatment or ad- vice at the hands of one, it was his bounden duty to disclose the fact in an- swer to the inquiries, for his warranty fully covers such matters. The appel- lant had a perfect right to make the questions and answers in the applica- tion a part of the contract and we have no right to make any other or differ- ent contract for the parties. Such answers were material to the policy. They were made so by its terms, and no rule of construction will be suffered to destroy the effect of plain language. We hold that the statements by the deceased in the application for the insurance about a physician were war- ranted to be true, and that the stipu- lation and the evidence show a clear breach of such warranty. The policy is voided. Dwight v. Germania, etc., Insurance Co., 103 N. Y. 341; 8 N. E. Rep. 654; McCollum v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Co., 55 Hun, 103; 8 N. Y. Supl. 249; Boland v. Industrial, etc.. Association, 74 Hun, 385; 26 N. Y. Supl. 433. It makes no difference whether the deceased knew them to be untrue or not. It is a good defense to show that, as a matter of fact, they were untrue, without showing that he knew or believed them to be un- true. Provident, etc., Society v. Llew- ellyn, 58 Fed. Rep. 940; 7C. C.A. 579. Counsel for appellee directs our atten- tion to the case of Moulor v. Insur- ance Co., Ill U. S. 335; 4 Sup. Ct. 466, and thinks that case should gov- ern this. The cases are clearly dis- tinguishable. Provident, etc., So- ciety v. Lle.wellyn, supra. In Moulor v. American, etc., Insurance Co. it was held, in effect, that there was doubt of the meaning of the contract, and it was therefore proper to con- sider the statements of the applicant as ' representations' and warranties only to the extent that they were made in good faith, and were true as far as the insured knew. The state- ments of the applicant were referred to in the body of the policy as being representations, and this expression was made to govern. But there is no doubt of the meaning of this contract. Read it as you will, it remains a strict warranty. The words used are plain, and are comprehended as soon as read. In such a case there is no room for construction, for the very good reason that there is no need of it." 314 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 249 § 249. Insurance warranty distinguished from representa- tions. — A warranty as to any fact contained in an insurance policy or other contract differs from a mere representation of such fact in that it precludes any controversy as to the ma- teriality of such fact, and a breach of the warranty is a ground for avoiding the policy, while a false representation is not ground for avoiding the policy or contract unless the party to whom it is made relies upon it and be induced by it to enter into the contract or consent to terms disadvantageous to him. 1 Both warranties and representations are of two kinds, viz., affirmative and promissory. A promissory warranty is, of course, as valid and binding as any other kind, and it is not essential whether the fact or statement warranted to be true be material or immaterial to the risk. But a mere promissory 'Selby v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 490. In Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Alpert (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 460, Wales, J., says: "The assured war- rants his statements to be true, and covenants that if they are untrue the policy shall be void, whether the state- ments were or were not material to the risk. The agreement of the par- ties is conclusive, and the question of materialty is no longer an open one. But, in the absence of a warranty of the character just described, the rep- resentations of the assured, when ap- plying for insurance, may or may not be material to the risk, and this may be a subject on which minds will rea- sonably differ, and come to different conclusions. The materiality of a representation, then, becomes a mat- ter of proof, to be found by the jury like any other fact, under all the cir- cumstances of the particular case, and, in action on a policy, must be proved by the insurer, in order to prevent a recovery. This distinction between warranties contained in the contract and parol representations made by the assured as inducement to the in- surer to assume the risk, is a well- settled rule of law. The principle has been recognized by the highest au- thorities, and is nowhere more clear- ly defined than in the case of Ander- son v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. Cas. 484, which went up from the courts of ex- chequer and exchequer chamber in Ireland, was elaborately discussed, and carefully considered. The lord chancellor, in his opinion, said: 'There is a great distinction between that which amounts to what is called a warranty, and that which is merely a representation inducing a party to enter into a contract. Thus, if a per- son effecting a policy of insurance says, "I warrant such and such things here stated," and that is a part of the contract, then whether they are ma- terial or not is quite unimportant. The party must adhere to his war- ranty, whether material or immate- rial. But if the party makes no war- ranty at all, but simply makes a cer- tain statement, if that statement has> been made bona fide, unless it is mate- rial, it does not signify whether it is false or not false. Indeed, whether made bona fide or not, if it is not ma- terial, the untruth is quite unimpor- tant." •§ 250 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 315 representation amounts to nothing if not material to the risk, and even then its violation does not vitiate the policy, unless it was made with a fraudulent purpose. 1 As a general rule, a warranty is a stipulation expressly set out, or by inference in- corporated, in the policy, whereby the assured agrees "that cer- tain facts relating to the risk are or shall be true, or certain acts relating to the same subject have been or shall be done." Its purpose is to define the limits of the obligation assumed by the insurer, and it is a condition which must be strictly com- plied with, or literally fulfilled, before the right to recover on the policy can accrue. It is not necessary that the fact or act warranted should be material to the risk, for the parties by their agreement have made it so. Lord Eldon says: "It is a first principle in the law of insurance that, if there is a war- ranty, it is a part of the contract; that the matter is such as it is represented to be. The materiality or immateriality signi- fies nothing. The only question is as to the mere fact." 2 On the other hand, representations are no part of the contract of insurance, but are collateral or preliminary to it. When made to the insurer at or before the contract is entered into, they form a basis upon which the risks proposed to be assumed can be estimated. They operate as the inducement to the contract. Unlike a false warranty, they will not invalidate the contract because they are untrue, unless they are material to the risks, and need only be substantially true. They render the policy void on the ground of fraud, "while a non-compliance with a warranty operates as an express breach of the contract." 3 § 250. The same subject continued — Maine statute. — Under the Maine statute providing that statements of description in a policy of insurance are representations, and that a change in 1 11 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, Indiana, etc., Insurance Co. ». Run- 299. In Indiana, etc., Ins. Co. v. Byr- dell, 7 Ind. App. 426; 34 N. E. Rep. kett (1894), 1 ; 36N. E. Eep. 779 ; 9 Ind. 588, followed. App. 443, it was held that a provision z Providence, etc., Assur. Soc. v. in an application for insurance that Beutlinger (1894), 58 Ark. 528; 25 the applicant "warrants" the applica- S. W. Rep. 835. tion to contain a full and true descrip- 3 Providence, etc., Assur. Soc. v. tion of the property to be insured is Reutlinger (1894), 58 Ark. 528. not a warranty, but a representation. 316 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 250 the property insured, or in its use or occupation, or a breach of any of the terms of the policy by the insured, does not affect the policy unless they materially increase the risk, the words " constant watch," occurring in a rider, attached to a policy issued in that state on the plant of a brick-manufacturing company, in the following words : " Steam pump, with suffi- cient hose to cover buildings. Constant watch," — consti- tutes a representation and not a warranty. And under a provision in a policy of insurance making an application, sur- vey, plan or description referred to in the policy a part of the contract, and a warranty by the insured, a rider attached thereto describing the property can not be construed a warranty. 1 1 King Brick Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 291; 41 N. E. Rep. 277, where the court said : "We are some- what embarrassed in construing this statute by the fact that the decisions of the supreme court of Maine afford us but little assistance. The precise ques- tion here involved does not appear to have been decided. There are, how- ever, expressions of opinion in several cases which show that the statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. In Campbell v. Mon- mouth, etc., Insurance Co., 59 Maine, 430, 434, the court, speaking of the statute in question, say that it 'was not designed to lay any additional stumbling block in the way of the pol- icy-holder before his case could be heard upon its merits, and it should not be so construed as to give it that effect.' In Emery v. Piscataqua, etc., Insurance Co., 52 Maine, 322, 325, it is said by the court: 'Warranties on these points [the valuation and in- terest of the insured] are to be treated as representations, and nothing more.' And in Day v. Dwelling-House In- surance Co., 81 Maine, 244; 16 Atl. Rep. 894, it is said: 'Previous to the enactment of our present in- surance law, policies had become so loaded down with provisos, limita- tions, and conditions that in many cases they secured to the insured nothing better than an unsuccess- ful lawsuit, in addition to the loss of his property. And one of the pur- poses of our present statute was to put an end to this evil.' The words 'con- stant watch,' in the connection in which they occur, may, perhaps, amount to a description of the risk, and, if so, by the terms of the statute they constitute a representation, and not a warranty ; but the description can not be said to be erroneous in this case, for the words in the statute, which follow the clause above cited, show that the words 'erroneous de- scriptions' refer to descriptions of the property as it really existed, and not to a promise as to the future. The words upon which the defendants principally rely are these : 'A change in the property insured, or in its use or occupation, or a breach of any of the terms of the policy by the insured, do not affect the policy unless they materially increase the risk.' But in this case there was no change in the property, or in its use or occupation. The word 'change' in the law of in- surance means a permanent or habit- ual change, and does not include the temporary absence of a, watchman of §251 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 317 § 25 L Insurance warranties not favored. — In an applica- tion for fire insurance, containing at its close a clause that "applicant warrants that the foregoing is a full and true ex- position of all the facts and circumstances, conditions, situa- tions, and value of and title to the property to be insured, and is offered as a basis of the insurance requested, and is made a special warranty," the answer "yes" to the question, "Do you agree to keep merchandise and cash accounts?" is a which the insured has no knowledge, a constant watch was kept. This was done by making a rule to that effect and providing a watch. No negligence or fraud is imputed to the assured. The loss was caused by the negligence of a servant, and this is a risk covered by the insurance. There was, there- fore, no breach of the terms of the policy by the insured. Shaw v. Rob- berds, 6 Adol. & E. 75; Dobson v. Sotheby, 1 Moody & M. 90; Hough- ton v. Manufacturers', etc., Insurance Co., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 115; Daniels v. Hudson, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Cush. 416; Loud v. Citizens', etc., Insur- ance Co., 2 Gray, 221; Insurance Co. of North America v. McDowell, 50 111. 120, 131 ; Aurora Insurance Co. v. Eddy, 55 111. 213, 219; Mickey v. Bur- lington, etc., Insurance Co., 35 Iowa, 174. The defendants further rely upon certain provisions in the policies as showing that the words 'constant watch' constitute a warranty. In four of the policies the language is : 'If an application, survey, plan, or description of property be referred to in this policy, it shall be a part of this contract, and a warranty by the in- sured.' This clearly refers to some paper outside of the policy, and not to words in the policy itself. Moreover, if the clause were broader, and con- stituted a description of the property a warranty, it would be in conflict with the provisions of section 20, and void by section 21, which provides: 'All provisions contained in any policy of insurance in conflict with any of the provisions hereof are null and void.'" Shaw v. Eobberds, 6 Adol. & E. 75; Houghton v. Manufacturers', etc., In- surance Co., 8 Mete. (Mass.) 115; Loud v. Citizens', etc., Insurance Co., 2 Gray, 221, and cases cited. Was there a breach of any of the terms of the policy by the insured? This de- pends upon whether the assured ab- solutely promised that there should be a 'constant watch,' — in other words, whether he warranted this, — or whether the words constitute a rep- resentation merely, and are governed by the familiar rules applicable to rep- resentations. Unless they amount to a warranty, there is no breach of the agreement. In this part of the case we assume, of course, that the first clause of the section is not broad enough to include a statement as to the future. It is a familiar rule of construction that a promise in regard to the future, which is not clearly made a warranty, is a representation •only, and not a warranty. Houghton ■y. Manufacturers', etc., Insurance Co., 8Metc.(Mass.)115; Daniels V.Hudson, etc., Insurance Co., 12 Cush. 416; Na- tional Bank v. Hartford Ins. Co., 95 U.S. 673; Garcelon v. Hampden, etc., Insurance Co., 50 Maine, 580. On the principles laid down in these cases, we can not regard the words 'constant watch' as constituting a condition precedent to the right to recover, and consider them as a representation that ■ a constant watch would be kept. The duty was thus imposed upon the in- sured to use all reasonable care and to take all reasonable means to see that 318 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 252 mere representation and not a warranty. 1 Forfeitures are not favored in law, and where the contract of insurance is equally susceptible of two interpretations, or is doubtful, the courts will resolve the doubt in favor of averting a forfeiture, always giving the stricter construction in favor of the insured/ Neither are statements or agreements of the insured which are inserted or referred to in a policy always warranties. Whether they be warranties or representations depends upon the lan- guage in which they are expressed, the apparent purpose of the insertion or reference, and sometimes upon the relation they bear to other parts of the policy or application. All reasonable doubts as to whether they be warranties or not should be resolved in favor of the assured. 3 Nothing is better settled than the rule that a mere representation will not amount to a warranty, and that, in case of doubt whether a statement is a warranty or a mere representation, the latter construction will be given. 4 § 252. Description as warranty — Agent's mistake. — Al- though the policy provided that the description of the insured 1 Etna Ins. Co. v. Norman, 12 Ind. App. 652; 40 N. E. Rep. 1116, where the court said: "It may be said, in the present case, if the company in- tended the statement that the appel- lee would keep a merchandise and cash account to be a promissory war- ranty, it would have been very easy either to make this a special warranty or to warrant the correctness of each statement made by the appellee in his application. This, as has been seen, was not done, and hence we can not, by construction, place a warranty where the parties have not done so by the plain provisions of the contract. The statement or promise to keep a merchandise and cash account must be regarded as a mere representation ; and no fraud being charged, and as even the materiality of the matter is not .shown, and it is not averred how the appellant was injured by the ap- pellee's failure to keep such account, the falsity of the promise or represen- tation can not be used to work a for- feiture." 2 Continental Insurance Co. v. Van- lue, 126 Ind. 410; 26 N. E. Rep. 119; Indiana, etc., Insurance Co.n.Rundell, 7 Ind. App. 426; 34 N. E. Rep. 588. In the case last cited, Davis, J., speaking forthis court, said: "If it was the pur- pose of the company to secure a war- ranty of the correctness of each state- ment of the applicant, why did it not stop with the express declaration of a warranty?" 3 Continental Insurance Co. v. Rog- ers, 119 111. 474; 10 N. E. Rep. 242; Fitch v. American, etc., Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 557 ; Moulorv. American, etc., Insurance Co., Ill U.S. 335, 4 Sup. Ct. 466; Campbell v. New England, etc., Insurance Co., 98 Mass. 381 ; Alabama, etc., Insurance Co. v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 467; 2 So. Rep. 125; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673.^ 4 11 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 294. \ §253 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 319 property should be part of the contract, and a warranty by the insured, the fact that the agent misdescribed the property will not defeat a recovery on the policy, where the insured accurate- ly described the property, and did not know of the error in the description until after the fire. 1 § 253. Insurer may waive breach — Effect of waiver. — An insurer may waive a breach of warranty by the insured and 1 Dowling v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 168 Pa. St. 234 ; 31 Atl. Sep. 1087, where the court said: "The fraud or mistake of an insurance agent within the scope of his authority will not enable his principal to avoid a contract of insur- ance to the injury of the insured, who acted in good faith ; and the fraud or mistake of the agent may be proved by parol evidence, notwithstanding it is provided in the policy that the de- scription of the property shall be a part of the contract and a warranty by the insured. This is clear upon principle, and it is abundantly sus- tained by authority. Smith v. Farm- ers,' etc., Insurance Co., 89 Pa. St. 287; Eilenberger v. Protective, etc., Insurance Co., 89 Pa. St. 464; Susque- hanna, etc., Insurance Co. v. Cusick, 109 Pa. St. 157; Kister v. Lebanon, etc., Insurance Co., 128 Pa. St. 553; 18 Atl. Eep. 447 ; Meyers v. Lebanon In- surance Co., 156 Pa. St.240 ; 27 Atl. Eep. 39. This case is much stronger for the plaintiff than those above cited. In all of these, written applications had been signed by the insured, and in each case the application was made a part of the contract. In this case no written application was made, and the policy was written by the agent, and not read by the insured until after the fire. The building insured was built for and used as a boarding house, and was erroneously described in the policy as 'occupied by the in- sured as a dwelling only.' The testi- mony was clear and uncontradicted that there was no mistake or decep- tion on the part of the plaintiff, who fully and accurately described the property to the agent as a boarding house, and spoke to him of its capac- ity and use. It was seen and ex- amined by the agent, and its use, which was apparent, was fully known to him. The misdescription was his act alone, in the face of light and knowledge, and was unknown to the insured until after the loss occurred. The defendant can not be released from its contract because the plaintiff, acting in good faith, accepted without examination the policy written by its agent. In Swan v. Watertown, etc., Insurance Co., 96 Pa. St. 37, the insured signed an application which had not been finished. He directed another to fill it up, and expressed a doubt as to the manner in which it should be done. It was held that he knew facts to incite him to read the policy, and was charged with knowledge of its contents, and should, under the circumstances, be presumed to have accepted it as writ- ten. No such presumption arose in this case. Having made a full and frank disclosure of the facts to the company's agent, who was empowered to write the policy, and who, from observation, knew the character and use of the building, there was nothing to induce or warn the insured to read the policy, unless it was the anticipa- tion of fraud or mistake, and this could impose no duty in protection of the rights of the defendant." 320 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 253 abide by the contract between them contained in the policy. 1 Where neither a policy of life insurance nor the application upon which it is granted contains any stipulation that a breach of a warranty contained in the application shall ipso facto nullify the policy, the breach of such a warranty renders the policy voidable, but does not render it void, nor entitle the in- surer to defeat a recovery upon it, unless he have seasonably manifested an intention to rescind the contract, and returned or tendered a return of the premiums. 2 'Phoenix, etc., Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 197. 2 Selby v. Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1885), 67 Fed. Rep. 490, where the court said: "Since the insurer may, in a case like this, waive a breach of warranty, it is obvious that the insured can not, be- fore giving an opportunity to waive, take advantage of his own wrong by avoiding the contract; hence the va- lidity of the contract depends upon the will of the insurer, rather than upon any inflexible rule of law. By this test, the contract, as it is set forth in the pleadings, is shown to be one which must necessarily be classed as voidable. In the argument and brief of counsel for the defendant, many cases have been cited in which courts have held, in actions upon insur- ance policies, that the right to re- cover is barred by breaches of war- ranty. But on examination I find that in the leading cases of Jennings v. Chenango, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Denio, 75, and Jeffries v. Life Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 47-57, the parties fixed the penalty for a breach of warranty by stipulating in the contract that, in case of the vio- lation of any of the conditions upon which the same were based, the poli- cies should become null and void ; and it is probable that in other cases the facts were similar, or that the courts, in deciding them, failed to take note of the particular stipulations to which effect was given in cases which were Fiii posed to be precedents and fol- lowed. I find, also, that, in the light of later decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, many of these decisions must be regarded as erroneous. For example, in the case of Cooper v. Farmers', etc., Ins. Co., 50 Pa. St. 299, Mr. Justice Strong, in the opinion of the court, cites and follows Jennings i - . Insurance Co., supra, hold- ing that parol evidence is not admis- sible to show that the insured truly informed the agent of the insurers of particulars which the agent had incor- rectly stated in the application writ- ten by him for the insured, the state- ments in the application having been made warranties. And in the case of Insurance Co. ». Mahone, 21 Wall. 152, the same learned justice wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it was ruled that parol evidence to show that the insured made true answers to ques- tions in the application to the agent of the insurers, different from the an- swers as written by the agent, was admissible in an action on the policy, notwithstanding the fact that the an- swers as written by the agent were sub- sequently read to the insured, and vol- untarily signed by him. I do not find in any of the authorities a reason given for departure from elementary principles in order to relieve an in- surance company of the obligation to pay according to its promise while it retains the money paid upon the faith of that promise. The caseof New York, §254 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 321 § 254. Warranties in sales — Horses. — No special form of words is necessary to create a warranty. 1 A positive affirma- tion of quality or condition, as a fact, and not an opinion, ac- cepted and relied upon by the buyer as a warranty, suffices to constitute a warranty. 2 At the time the sale of a horse was completed the buyer said to the vendor: "I have nothing to show that you warrant this horse as you represented him," to which the vendor replied: "The horse is just the same as when you drove him on Monday;" it was held that these words did not constitute a warranty. 3 Where the buyer went to the seller before a sale by auction, and asked about a horse to be sold, and the seller told the buyer that the horse was only twelve years old and sound, this was held a warranty. 4 A bill of sale of "one pair of black geldings, sound and kind," is a warranty. 5 A direct affirmation of the ability of a horse to etc., Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 536; 6 Sup. Ct. 837, is relied upon by counsel for the defendant. But I do not regard that case as controlling, for this reason : the insurance compa- ny, before defending, made a lawful tender of the premiums received, and did everything necessary to a rescis- sion of the contract ; hence the ques- tion whether the contract was void or only voidable was not in the case. This answer is defective for the rea- son that it shows only a right to re- scind the contract. A complete de- fense on the ground of a breach of the warranty could be made only hy alleging that the defendant had claimed and exercised its right within a reasonable time, and that there had been an actual rescission of the con- tract, or at least the answer should disaffirm the contract, and plead a tender of the premiums. 3 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 929, 932 ; 2 Par- sons on Contracts (7th ed.), 677, 681. This objection is not answered by saying that the legal representatives of the deceased may recover the pre- miums, and that the defendant is not required to make a tender to this 21 plaintiff. Conceding that a tender, to be valid, must be made to the legal representative, it is nevertheless es- sential to a rescission of the contract that the defendant should return, or at least offer in good faith to return, the premiums to whomsoever may be lawfully entitled to receive the same. No such repayment or offer having been made, the contract is operative, so that the plaintiff may enforce it in this action. Foreman v. Bigelow, 4 Cliff. 508, Fed. Cas. No. 4,934; Gray v. National, etc., Association, 111 Ind. 531; 11N.E. Rep. 477." 1 Fairbank Co. v. Metzger, 118 N. Y. 260; Cross v. Garnet, 3 Mod. 261 Wilbur v. Cartright, 44 Barb. 536 Willard v. Merritt, 45 Barb. 295 Chapman v. Murch, 19 Johns. 290 Eoberts v. Morgan, 2 Cow. 438 ; Cook v. Moseley, 13 Wend. 277; Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 83 Pa. St. 437; Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573. 2 Naylor v. McSwegan, 21 N. Y. Supl. 930. 8 Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. St. 305. 4 Crossman v. Johnson, 63 Vt. 333. 5 Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363. 322 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 255 labor, is a warranty. 1 But a mere statement by tbe seller of a horse, that he has driven him and found him all right, is not a warranty. 2 A statement that the horse is "sound, straight and all right, and just such a horse as you want," constitutes a warranty. 3 In determining whether or not words constitute a warranty, they should receive their common acceptation; and where the buyer asked the seller whether the mules he was about to buy were "all right," and the seller said "yes," it was held that the seller warranted the soundness by an abso- lute and unqualified representation to that effect. 4 Where the bill of sale was to the effect, "received one hundred pounds for a bay gelding got by Cheshire Cheese, warranted sound," it was held that there was no warranty that the horse was of the breed named. 5 In determining whether an affirmation was intended as a warranty, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is igno- rant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion, and to ex- ercise his judgment. In the former case there is a warranty, in the latter not. 6 § 255. The same subject continued — Machinery. — Where the buyer wrote to the seller ordering "one of your latest im- proved eight-tool fluting machines, so arranged as to flute both card and spinning rolls," and the seller in reply wrote "you may rely upon having a first-rate machine, which will do your work in a satisfactory manner," it was held that, if the seller knew what the work was for which this machine was bought, it would be an. express warranty, and that oral evi- dence was admissible to show knowledge. 7 And where a cata- logue of an auction sale stated that a machine to be sold would be "put in first-class order, guaranteed," it was held to be a 1 Morgan v. Powers, 66 Barb. 35. 5 Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 48. ! McMaster v. Smith, 3 N. Y. St. 6 Benjamin on Sales, § 613, citing Rep. 481. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51 ; Medi- 3 Murphy v. McGraw, 74 Mich. 318; na v. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Raymond, 593. 41 N. W. Rep. 917. ' Whitehead Machine Co. v. Ryder, 4 McClintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160. 139 Mass. 366. § 256 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 323 warranty that the machine was in good order. 1 A contract to furnish machinery for a first-class oil-mill is not to be con- strued as meaning first-class of the particular manufacturer making the contract, but first-class generally. 2 § 256. Warranty of workmanship. — A warranty of good workmanship does not cover a defect in the plan of construc- tion of the article manufactured, but relates only to the exe- cution of the plan. 8 Thus a warranty in a contract for the erection of blast furnaces for an iron company, that all the work shall be "done in good, workman-like manner, and of suitable material, and each part to be adequate in design, strength, capacity and workmanship for the purposes for which it is intended," the work to be examined by the com- pany's superintendent bi-weekly, and finally accepted if to his satisfaction, is not a guaranty that the plant, as a whole, shall be adequate in design, strength, capacity and workmanship for the purpose intended. 4 But where plaintiff, a machinist, contracted to make for defendants at a fixed price a certain piece of machinery from plans and models furnished by de- fendants and, after examining these last, guaranteed that the machine would work, the fact that the plans furnished plaintiff were defective will not relieve him from liability on bis guaranty, since he should have known that they were defective before making the contract. 5 1 Latham v. Shipley, 86 Iowa, 543 ; 53 they were defective ; and the fact that N. W. Eep. 342. the drawings were furnished by appel- 2 Van Winkle v. Wilkins, 81 Ga. 93. lants does not relieve it of its liability See, also, McLennan v. Ohmen, 75 on its guaranty. This is not a case of Cal. 558 ; Nay lor v. McSwegan, 21 a, pattern being presented to a work- N. Y. Supl. 930. man, and an order given for the man- 3 Case Plow Works v. Niles, etc., ufacture of a piece of machinery in Co., 90 Wis. 590; 63 N. W. Rep. 1013. accordance with the model; but the 4 Sheffield, etc., Iron Co. v. Gordon model is placed in the hands of a ma- (1894), 151 U. S. 285; 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. chinist, his judgment and skill are in- 243. voked, and his opinion sought as to 5 Giles v. San Antonio Foundry Co. the practicability of the thing desired, (Texas App. 1893), 24 S. W. Rep. 546, and, after a thorough investigation, where the court said: "Appellee had he not only represents that the ma- possession of the drawings for the chine will operate, but enters into a machine before the contract was exe- written guaranty to make it work cuted, and should have known that properly. Unless it did work as in- 324 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 257 § 257. Statements in catalogues. — The mere showing of testimonials received from other customers by a dealer in an attempt to sell his goods, or in the sale of them, can not be considered as a warranty that the goods sold shall conform to such testimonials, unless there is something said which ex- pressly or impliedly guarantees that they shall equal in quality or performance the praise of the testimonials. 1 A statement in a catalogue of sale that the chattel would be "put in first-class order, guaranteed," was held a warranty; 2 but where some pictures were sold at auction, a statement in the catalogue that they were the works of certain distinguished artists was held no warranty that such artists painted them. 3 Where, however, the catalogue recited "four pictures, views in Venice, Cancelletti," it was left to the jury to decide whether the seller meant to warrant the pictures as genuine works of the artist named.' Where a buyer sent to the seller a printed form of order for a machine, upon the back of which was a printed warranty and the seller's name printed at the bottom, and the seller sent the machine called for by the order, but did not sign the warranty, or fill up certain blank spaces in the form, it was held that the seller was bound by the warranty, and that its blank spaces could be filled up before trial. 5 A statement in a letter of in- structions from the seller to his drummer is not a warranty to be taken advantage of by a customer ; 6 but generally state- ments in advertisements are warranties. 7 If the sale is at public auction the warranty need not be in the catalogue of sale; it may be made privately by the seller to a bidder. 8 And tended and contemplated by the con- critical examination of all the cases, tracting parties, appellee should not it may be safely ruled that a sample recover for anything for the ma- or description in a, sale note, adver- chine.'' tisement, bill of parcels or invoice 1 Richey v. Daemicke, 86 Mich. 647. is equivalent to an express war- 2 Latham r. Shipley, 86 Iowa. 543; ranty that the goods are what they are 53 N. W. Rep. 342. described or represented to be by the 3 Jeudwine «. Slade, 2 Esp. 572. vendor." Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. •Power v. Barham, 4 A. & E. 473. 139; Henshaw v. Robins, 9 Met. 83; 5 Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397. Bridge v. Wain, 1 Starkie, 410; Allan 'Wiggin r. Butcher, 154 Mass. 447. v. Lake, 18 Q. B. 560; Swett v. Col- 7 Harrington v. Smith, 138 Mass. gate, 20 Johns. 196. 92; Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle, 23, 8 Bronson v. Leach, 74 Mich. 713; where the court said: "From a 4^ N. W. Rep. 174. § 258 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 325 by the great weight of recent authority, positive statements in instruments evidencing contracts of sale, descriptive of the kind, or assertive of the quality and condition of the thing sold, are treated as a- part of the" contract and regarded as warranties, if the language is reasonably susceptible of that construction and it is fairly inferable that the purchaser under- stood and relied upon it as such. 1 § 258. The same subject continued. — Where defendant ordered wagons of plaintiff upon the latter 's blank form, upon which was indorsed a warranty agreeing to replace or pay for broken parts under certain conditions, if said parts were sent to the factory as evidence, the catalogue of the plaintiff, upon which the defendant also relied in purchasing, also containing a warranty as to the material and workmanship, and one lot of wagons was bought upon the representations of the catalogue alone, when in fact the wagons were made of defective material, and repairs for some parts were sent for, but never came, and one wheel was sent but never heard from, it was held that de- fendant was entitled to damages under the warranty in the catalogue, although the parts were not sent to the factory. 2 ■Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363, 370; was "copper-fastened." Allanc. Lake, Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214; 18 Q. B. 560; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Henshaw v. Robins, 9 Met. 83 ; Brown Pa. St. 448 ; Barrett v. Hall, 1 Aik. 269, ». Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242; Gould v. where the note was payable in "good Stein, 149 Mass. 570; Osgood v. Lewis, cooking stoves," held no warranty 2 Harris & Gill (Md.), 495; Kearly v. because "good" is a very common Duncan, 1 Head (Tenn.), 397; Cramer term of praise in trade, and as used v. Bradshaw, 10 Johns. 484, where the in the note, ascribed no particular words in a sale bill of slaves were quality to the stoves, and might well "being of sound mind and limb, and be regarded in that case as mere mat- free from all disease" and held a war- ter of opinion. Wason v. Eowe, 16 ranty; Hawkins?;. Pemberton, 51 N.Y. Vt. 525, where the term "considered 198 ; Yates -a. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446, a de- sound" was held no warranty, the scription of bacon in a sale note as term "considered" being a mere ex- "prime singed," was held to be a war- pression of opinion. Beals v. Olm- ranty; Bridge v. Wain, 1 Stark. 410; stead, 24 Vt. 114; Drew v. Edmunds, 60 Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Al. 240. The Vt. 401 ; Enger v. Dawley, 62 Vt. 164. advertisement of the sale of a ship de- 2 Milburn Wagon Co. v. Nisewarner scribed her as a "copper-fastened ves- (Va. 1894) , 19 S. E. Eep. 846, where the sel," whereas she was only partially court said: "The evidence shows that copper-fastened, and not what was all the wagons were ordered 'upon called in the trade a copper-fastened the representations set forth in the vessel. It was held a warranty that she catalogue;' and in the catalogue they 326 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 258 But in a case where the seller said to the buyer '.'they are a nice lot of eggs; you will lose hardly anything out of a case of eggs;" this was held no warranty. 1 Where wine was sold, " all to be delivered in merchantable order, the said goods to be approved by the buyer within three days after delivery;" it was held that the only legal effect of this language was to allow the buyer three days to examine the wine, there being no warranty that the wine was merchantable. 2 Where a contract called for were expressly warranted to be 'well made, of good, thoroughly seasoned material, and of sufficient strength to carry the weight mentioned' in the catalogue. There is no evidence in denial of the fact that this was in- tended and understood by the parties as a warranty. It is certain the de- fendant was induced by it to enter into the contract in question, and there is no doubt she had a right to rely upon it. It is therefore, as it purports to be, a warranty, and was admitted as evidence, without objec- tion, at the trial. Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 572; Herron v. Dibrell, 87 Va. 289; 12 S. E. Rep. 674; Enger v. Dawley, 02 Vt. 164; 19 Atl. Rep. 478. Now, is there any conflict between this and the warranty on the back of the printed order? The latter merely provides how ordinary breakages may be made good, and was not in- tended to affect the former in any way." InGroetzingerv. Kann, 165 Pa. St. 578; 30 Atl. Rep. 1043, after de- fendant had ruade complaint to plaint- iffs that the leather which he had bought of them was not thoroughly tanned, plaintiffs wrote him: "Our leather is now thoroughly tanned. Will reship on Saturday, hoping the same will exist as before;" and de- fendant replied : "But if your leather is thoroughly tanned now, and all right in other respects, we would take it as before." It was held that these letters made a contract that the leather thereafter sent must be thoroughly tanned. Green, J., said: "We have no hesitation in placing the contract with- in the line of cases illustrated by Phila- delphia Iron Co. v. Hoffman (Pa. Supl.), 4 Atl. Rep. 848, in which the contract was for the sale and delivery of iron 'strictly neutral,' and we said: 'We are clearly of opinion that the con- tract of sale in this case created a warranty as to the quality of the iron.' Holloway v. Jacoby, 120 Pa. St. 583; 15 Atl. Rep. 487, is another instance of the same kind. The defendant of- fered by letter to sell plaintiff a car load of corn. Plaintiff replied by let- ter, saying: 'We will give 53c. per bushel for car corn, provided it is good, salable corn.' Defendant an- swered : 'We will accept your offer for one car load of corn.' We held that there was a warranty that it was good, salable corn. In Pratt v. Paules (Pa. Supl.), 4 Atl. Rep. 751, the plaint- iff ordered slate from defendant, say- ing in his letter: 'Shipment must be strictly No. 1 in quality ; no graybacks or scabs.' Defendant replied: 'Can fill your entire order at once.' We held that these communications cre- ated an express warranty, saying: 'He [plaintiff] was entitled to receive slate of quality No. 1, free from scabs and graybacks.'" See, also, Holt v. Pie, 120 Pa. St. 425, 440. 'Hunter v. Stuge, 12 N. Y. Supl. 557. 2 Gentilli v. Starace, 14 N. Y. Supl. 764, § 259 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 327 " Powelton coal of the same quality and kind as furnished" by the seller the preceding year, this was a warranty as to quality. 1 Where a customer sends an order to a dealer to fur- nish an article "the same as last," the dealer by rilling the order warrants the article to equal in all respects the preced- ing. 8 The mere option given the buyer to return goods is, however, no warranty. There is a wide difference between an option given to the buyer to return the goods if not satisfac- tory and a warranty of quality. The latter is continuous, and runs with the goods ; but the former must be exercised within a reasonable time after the receipt of the goods, and the reten- tion of the goods after the lapse of that reasonable time must be regarded as an acceptance, unless the option is extended in clear and unmistakable language. 8 A warranty may be the re- sult of several continuous negotiations. It need not neces- sarily be made on the very day of sale.' § 259. Construction of warranties. — Any affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing sold (not uttered as a mat- ter of opinion or belief), made by the seller at the time of sale for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the fact affirmed, and inducing him to make the purchase, if so received and relied on by the purchaser, is an express war- ranty. In cases of oral contracts it is the province of the jury, upon considering all the circumstances attending the transaction, to decide on the existence of these necessary ingredients to such a warranty. 5 But when the contract is in writing, it is for the court to construe it, and to decide whether it contains a warranty or not. 6 And where it is 1 Zabriskie v. Central E. Co., 131 v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577 ; Osgood v. Lewis, N. Y. 72. 2 H. & Gill (Md.), 495; Henshaw v. 2 Moore v. King, 134 N. Y. 596; 31 Robins, 9 Met. 83; Oneida Society v. N. E. Rep. 624. See also, Whittier Lawrence, 4 Cowen, 440; Cook v. Machine Co. v. Graffam, 156 Mass. Moseley, 13 Wend. 277; Chapman 415; Harris v. Brain, 33 111. App. 510; v. Murch, 19 Johns. 290; Hawkins v. Durfee v. Newkirk, 83 Mich. 522. Berry, 5 Gilman (111.), 36; McGregor 8 Childs v. O'Donnell, 84 Mich. 533. v. Penn, 9 Yerger, 74; Otts v. Alder- 4 Way v. Martin, 140 Pa. St. 499. son, 10 S. & M. 476. 5 Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U. S. 575, 6 Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363; 581; Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363; Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525; Hastings Foster v. Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176; Bond v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214; Henshaw v. 328 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 260' clear, in the case of an oral contract, that the seller either has or has not warranted the condition of the property, there being no dispute as to the facts, the question of warranty is one of law. 1 § 260. The same subject continued. — It is not always easy to determine whether the language used by the seller in his written contract should be construed as a warranty or as the Eobins, 9 Met. 83 ; Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242, where the words "sound and kind," were held to constitute a general warranty of a horse. Gould v. Stein, 149 Mass. 570, holding that where a bought and sold note de- scribed the article as "Ceara scrap- rubber as per sample, of second qual- ity," it did not admit of doubt that the note was intended to express the terms of the sale, and thatthe contract of the parties was to be found in what was thus written. Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Harris & Gill (Md.), 495, a leading case on this subject. There the bill of particulars contained a statement that the article was "winter-pressed spirm oil," and the question was, whether these words were per se a warranty ; and it was held that they were. Kear- ly v. Duncan, 1 Head (Tenn.),397; Cramer v. Bradshaw, 10 Johns. 484 ; Fosters. Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176; Yates v. Pym,6 Taunt. 446; Bridge v. Wain, 1 Stark. 410; Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Al. 240 ; Allan v. Lake, 18 Q. B. 560 ; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. St. 448 ; Barrett v. Hall, 1 Aik. 269. 'McClintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160; Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198, where the court said: "It is not true, as sometimes stated, that the representation, in order to consti- tute a warranty, must have been intended by the vendor, as well as un- derstood by the vendee, as a warran- ty. If the contract be in writing, and it contains a clear warranty, the ven- dor will not be permitted to say that he did not intend what his language clearly and explicitly declares; and so if it be by parol, and the represen- tation as to the character or quality of the article sold be positive, not mere matter of opinion or judgment, and the vendee understands it as a war- ranty, and he relied upon it, and is in- duced by it, the vendor is bound by the warranty, no matter whether he intended it to be a warranty or not. He is responsible for the language he uses and can not escape liability by claiming that he did not intend to convey the impression which his language was calculated to produce upon the mind of the vendee." Holmes u. Tyson, 147 Pa. St. 305, where the court said: "It was contended, in the case in hand, that the question whether there was a warranty should have been submitted to the jury ; as the warranty, if any, is to be fonndin the oral testimony, it would undoubt- edly be the province of the jury to de- termine it, if there was a conflict of evidence. Had the language used been equivocal ; had the one party as- serted a warranty, and the other de- nied it, the matter should have been submitted to the jury. But the plaint- iff's own testimony showed there was no warranty. There was the mere as- sertion of a fact, which the cases cited show was not a warranty." See, also, Way v. Martin, 140 Pa. St. 499; Tewkesbury v. Bennett, 31 Iowa, 83; McLennan v. Ohmen, 75 Cal. 558. §260 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 329 mere expression of his opinion. 1 While a general warranty does not extend to imperfections known to both parties, yet the seller may bind himself as against patent defects by an ex- press warranty to that effect. 8 If the seller of unsound sheep warrants them to be sound, the buyer has a right to rely on the warranty, although he may have an opportunity to exam- ine them. 8 1 Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Fargo Gas Co., 4 N. Dak. 365; 61 N. W. Eep. 151. In this case it appears that at a time when the defendant owned and operated a horizontal tubular steam boiler, plaintiff sold defendant an upright steam boiler, and gave the de- fendant a written warranty, which contained the following language: "We hereby guarantee that the boiler in regular practice, properly man- aged, shall evaporate ten pounds of water from one pound of good coal at 212 Fahrenheit, which we guarantee to be a saving of at least twenty per cent, in fuel over any horizontal tubu- lar boiler." It was held (construing the language quoted), that the last clause, viz. : "Which we guarantee to be a sav- ing of at least twenty per cent, in fuel over any horizontal tubular boiler," — is a definite warranty of the fuel-saving capacity of the boiler sold, when com- pared with the horizontal tubular boiler. Said last clause is legally binding, and is not a mere expression of opinion or "puffing" on the part of the vendor. In Sleeper v. Wood (1894) , 60 Fed. Eep. 888, it appeared that in March, 1888, certain packers of corn sold 2,000 cases "best packing of 1888 corn," with "usual guaranty against swells." The evidence showed conclusively that "swells," as used in the trade, included all cans whose contents were sour; that the "usual guaranty" was until July 1st, of the following year ; and that it was cus- tomary before that time to notify the seller of the number of spoiled cans, and return the goods. The evidence failed to show that the words "best packing of 1888" had any definite meaning in the trade. It was held that these words carried no implied warranty of quality, and that in the absence of any notice or return of the spoiled goods, according to the condi- tions of the warranty against swells, there could be no recovery for the spoiled corn. Carpenter, J., said: "Passing by the question whether there can be an implied warranty in any words of a written contract which contains an express warranty, we are unable to find any warranty implied in the words above quoted. There is no evidence to show that these words have any definite meaning in the trade here involved. It is clear that of themselves they do not import a definite warranty. Many witnesses were called to state the understanding of these words by the trade, but hardly any two of them agree in their interpretation. Some say it means 'the best corn packed that year;' some, 'the best corn packed that year in the state of Maine;' some, 'the ex- tra corn, the finest grade;' some, 'the best corn that can be produced in Maine;' and some, the best quality of milky, white, tender, juicy and sweet corn. It is manifest that there is no evidence of a general custom of the trade which could interpret the warranty supposed to be contained in these words." 2 Watson v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264; Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631. 3 First Nat. Bank v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind. 158. 330 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 261 § 261. To what defects a warranty extends. — Illustrations in cases of machinery. — The contract of sale of a harvesting machine provided that the machine should "work well;" it was held that if the draft of the machine was too heavy, or if it had too much side draft, the effect of which was to make the horses' necks sore, it did not "work well" within the meaning of the warranty. 1 A warranty to the effect that "the said Vulcan Iron Works guaranty the workmanship and materials made up in their own shops, but do not guaranty boiler and other parts bought outside, nor the working of the ma- chine as a whole," was held not to extend to such matters as the relative capacity of the boiler and engines. 2 Where a machine is warranted, this warranty does not extend to the pulleys that operate it; a separate warranty is required for them. 3 Where machinery is warranted "at the time of first starting," this is to receive a reasonable construction, and the warranty will not be limited to such defects only as are discovered when the machinery is first started, unless the wording clearly requires such restriction. 4 A warranty of a cotton press "that it will press domestic cotton, hand tied, seven bands, at the rate of sixty bales per hour, was held not a warranty that it would compress at the rate of sixty bales an hour for a day of ten hours, but that it was only to the effect that, under favorable conditions, it would com- press cotton at the stipulated rate for a limited period of time. 5 § 262. The same subject continued — Horses. — Where a horse was warranted as a " foal-getter," and during one sea- son was bred to eighty mares, and out of this number only fifteen were with foal, it was held that the warranty was broken. 6 A general warranty that a mare is all right for livery purposes 1 McCormick Harvesting Machine son, 3 N. Dakota, 81 ; 54 N. W. Rep. Co. v. Russell, 86 Iowa, 556; 53 N. W. 311. See, also, McCormick Harvest- Rep. 310. ing Co. *. Brower, 88 Iowa, 607; 55 2 Cyclone Steam Co. v. Vulcan Iron N. W. Rep. 537. Works, 52 Fed. Rep. 920. s Hazlehurst Compress Co. v. Boom- 3 Troy Laundry Machine Co. v. Hen- er Compress Co., 48 Fed!. Rep. 803. ry, 23 Ore. 232 ; 31 Pac. Rep. 48-1. 6 Watson v. Roods, 30 Net>. 264. 4 Minnesota Thresher Co. v. Han- § 263 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 331 can not be construed into a special undertaking that she is not with foal. 1 Where a horse was sold as "all right except that he would sometimes shy;" it was held that this amounted to a warranty of soundness, and that the warranty was broken if the horse was partially blind, although that caused him to shy. 8 But where a horse was warranted sound for one month, this warranty was held to only cover defects discovered within the month, and defects not discovered until after the lapse of the month, although existing at the date of sale, were ex- cluded from the warranty. 3 § 263. Warranty of stallions. — When producers of and dealers in horses for breeding purposes sell one of such horses to one who they know desires a horse for such purposes, there is an implied warranty that the horse is reasonably fit for breeding purposes. 4 A warranty of a stallion, sold for breeding purposes — that he was " sound and healthy, and, with proper handling, a foal getter," — was a warranty that he could do reasonable service as a foal getter, and the require- ments thereof were not satisfied where, with proper handling, 1 Whitney v. Taylor, 54 Barb. 536. Co., 58 N. Y. 358; Jones v. Bright, 5 2 Kingsley v. Johnson, 49 Conn. Bing. 533. In the case last cited, it 462. was said by Best, C. J. : 'The decis- 3 Chapman v. Gwyther, L.R.I Q.B. ions, however, touching the sale of 463. horses turn on the same principle. If 4 Merchants, etc., Bank v. Fraze, a man sells a horse generally, he war- 9 Ind. App. 161 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 378, rants no more than that it is a horse. where the court said : "Here the con- The buyer puts no question, and per- tract was to supply an article which haps gets the animal cheaper. But if the seller produced and was dealing he asks for a carriage horse, or a horse in. The article was for a particular to carry a female or a timid and in- purpose, and the implication necessa- firm rider, he who knows the qualities rily arises that the buyer relied upon of the animal, and sells, undertakes, or trusted in the judgment or knowl- on every principle of honesty, that edge of the seller. Hence the sale he is fit for the purpose indicated. carried with it an implied warranty The selling upon a demand for a horse that the horse should be reasonably with particular qualities is an affirma- nt for breeding purposes. Benjamin tion that he possesses those qualities.' on Sales, § 988. See also, Conant v. We think there was, under the con- National, etc., Bank, 121 Ind. 323; 22 tract alleged, an implied undertaking N. E. Rep. 250; Brenton v. Davis, 8 that the horse was a reasonably sure Blackf. 317; Gurney v. Atlantic K. breeder or foal getter." 332 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 264 only eight mares out of fifty-five served were gotten with foal.' In an action for a failure of a written warranty given on the sale of a stallion that the horse was registered in the Stud Book of England, it was held incompetent for the seller to prove by parol testimony that prior to the sale he informed the purchaser that the horse was not registered, as parol testi- mony is not admissible to contradict or vary a written con- tract. 2 Where the contract of sale of a stallion contains no express warranty, and states that he is "in bad fix," no war- ranty as to his foal-getting ability is implied. 3 § 264. Further illustrations — Soundness in horses.— -The enlargement of a horse's bag is an unsoundness; 4 and so is spavin. 5 Lameness may or may not make a horse unsound. If it was only accidental and temporary, it would not be a breach of warranty; but if it was chronic and permanent, arising from causes which were beyond the reach of immediate reme- dies, it would be clearly a case of unsoundness. 6 To consti- tute unsoundness the disease need not be incurable.' Crib- biting is not of itself covered by a general warranty of soundness, 8 but if it assume such a state that it affects the health and condition of the horse, so as to render him less able to perform service and of less value, this is unsound- ness. 9 But if the warranty is to the effect that the horse is "sound and right" any crib-biting at all is a breach of this warranty. 10 Ossification of the cartilages; 11 the vavicular dis- ' McCorkelln. Karhoff,90 Iowa, 545; 'Thompson v. Bertrand, 23 Ark. 58 N. W. Rep. 913. In the somewhat 730, the case of sale of a slave. similar case of Davis v. Iverson (S. 8 Scholefield v. Robb, 2 Moo. & R. Dakota, 1894), 58 N. W. Rep. 796, 210. there was held to be no breach of the 9 Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 Gray, warranty. 430 2 Watson v. Roode (1890), 30 Neb. "Walker v. Hoisington, 43 Vt. 608. 2m, followed in Watson v. Roode See, also, Dean v. Morey, 33 Iowa, 43 Neb. 348 ; 61 N. W. Rep. 625. 120, where it was held tbat the failure 3 Wood v. Ross (Texas App. 1894), on the part of the seller to disclose 2(i S. W. Rep. 148. his knowledge that the horse was a 4 Watson v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264. eribber furnished no cause of action 5 Fitzgerald r. Evans, 49 Minn. 541 ; to the buyer. Watson v. Denton, 7 C. & P. 85. n Simpson v. Potts, Oliphant on Law 6 Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242; of Horses, 224, Eng. ed. by Lloyd, Dickinson v. Follett, 1 M. & R. 299. 467. §§265,266 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 333 ease; 1 thick wind, 8 and roaring, 8 are all cases of unsoundness. Curby hocks is not unsoundness. 4 Any injury or infirmity which renders a horse less fit for present use and convenience, even though the same be temporary and curable, is an unsoundness, constituting a breach of the warranty of the soundness of the horse. 5 If animals sold are warranted sound, and are not so, but have an infectious or contagious disease, which they communicate to others, where the parties contem- plate their being placed with other stock, the loss, not only in respect to the animals purchased, but to others to which the warranted animals communicate the disease, may be recov- ered, as well as the expense of taking care of and doctoring them. 6 § 265. Open defects. — Open and visible defects, or qualities of articles sold and warranted, are not reached, as a general rule, by the warranty, although they be inconsistent with its terms, the law presuming that the vendor did not warrant against defects and qualities whose existence is clear to the buyer and everybody else ; but the seller can, of course, by ex- press and appropriate language warrant against blemishes and defects which are patent, open and visible, as well as others.' § 266. Written contract excluding oral warranty. — When a contract is couched in terms which import a complete legal 1 Bywater v. Richardson, 1 A. & E. the soundness of horses is more or less 508. discussed: Watson v. Roode, 30 Neb. 2 Joliff v. Bendell, Ry. & Moo. 136. 264; Fitzgerald v. Evans, 49 Minn. 3 Onslow v. Eames, 2 Stark. 72. 541; Postel v. Oard, 1 Ind. App. 252; 4 Brown v. Elkington, 8 M. & W. 132. Crossman v. Johnson, 63 Vt. 333; Ho- 5 Roberts v. Jenkins, 21 N. H. 116; bart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363; Scroggin v. Elton *, Jordan, 1 Stark. 102; Gar- Wood, 87 Iowa, 437; 54 N. W. Rep. merit v. Barrs, 2 Esp. 673; Watson v. 437, where it was held that the repre- Denton, 7 C. & P. 85; Kornegay v. sentation of the seller to the buyer, White, 10 Ala. 255 ; Elton v. Brogdon, that the horse would not produce 4 Camp. 281. sorrel colts, was not a warranty. Mc- 6 Joy v. Bitzer, 77 Iowa, 73 ; 3 Law- Clintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160. yers' Rep. Ann. 184; Pinney v. An- 7 Fitzgerald v. Evans, 49 Minn. 541 ; drus, 41 Vt. 631; Marsh v. Webber, Postel v. Oard, 1 Ind. App. 252; Wat- 16 Minn. 418; Smith v. Green, 45 son v. Roode, 30 Neb. 264; Pinney r. L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 28; Bradley v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631; First Nat. Bank Re a, 14 Allen, 20; Packard v. Slack, v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind. 158; Benjamin 32 Vt. 10. See following cases where on Sales. § 616. 334 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 267 obligation, with no uncertainty as to the object, or extent of the engagement, it is, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, conclusively to be presumed that the whole engage- ment of the parties and the extent and manner of their un- dertaking were reduced to writing. And hence where there is a written warranty on a sale of personal property, no prior or contemporaneous oral warranty can be shown; neither can an oral warranty be shown when the written contract of sale con- tains no warranty. 1 Whether a written contract fully ex- presses the terms of the agreement, and if so, thus exclud- ing all warranties not expressed therein, is a question of construction for the court. 2 § 267. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where the seller by a written contract agreed to furnish a refrigerat- ing machine, and the contract was silent as' to any warranty, it was held incompetent for the buyer, in an action for the price, to recoup damages for breach of an oral antecedent war- ranty. 3 Where a bull was sold, and a writing, stating the pedi- gree and also containing the phrase, "I have this day sold the above named bull to * * *, I hereby certify the above pedigree to be true, ' ' was given to the buyer, it was held that this writing evidenced the sale and contained an express warranty not im- plied by law, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to show a 'Seitz©. Brewers' Refrigerator Co., 374; Wilson v. Deen, 74 N. Y. 531 ; 141 U.S. 510; McQuaid v. Ross, 77 Robinson v. McNeill, 51 111. 225. Wis. 470; Humphrey v. Merriam, 46 2 Seitzw. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., Minn. 413; Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 141 U. S. 510. 363; Lamson Consolidated Co. ■«. s Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Hartung, 18 N. Y. Supl. 143; Rumely Co., 141 IT. S. 510, where the court v. Emmons, 85 Mich. 511; Hunger- said: "Since it [the contract] was in ford v. Rosenstein, 19 N. Y. Supl. 471 ; this instance complete and perfect Chase v. Evarts, 19 N. Y. Supl. 987; on its face, without ambiguity, and McMullen v. Carson, 48 Kan. 263; 29 embracing the whole subject-matter, Pac. Rep. 317; Bradford v. Neill-, 46 it obviously could not be determined Minn. 347; 49 N. W. Rep. 193. See, to be less comprehensive than it was. also, Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30; And this conclusion is unaffected by Gilbert v. Moline Co., 119 U. S. 491 ; the fact that it did not allude to the The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579; Naum- capacity of the particular machine, berg v. Young, 44 N. J. Law, 331 ; To hold that mere silence opened the Conant v. National State Bank, 121 door to parol evidence in that regard Ind. 323; Mast v. Pearce, 58 Iowa, would be to beg the whole question." 579; Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. § 267 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 335 further express warranty against sterility. 1 Where a horse was sold and the receipt given for the purchase-money stated, "I do warrant the title and pedigree of this horse to be the same as always represented by myself," it was held that this excluded any oral warranty of soundness. 8 A contract of sale of stock in a corporation contained the statement, "there are no assessments against said stock, and none about to be made;" evidence was excluded which tended to show that the seller had also made oral representations that the corporation would not issue additional and preferred stock. 3 In a conditional sale of chattels, the writing, specifying the conditions, names of the parties, and further details as to payment and delivery, is the contract, and binds both parties, although signed only by the buyer; 4 and such writing must be looked to for any warranties, and no parol ones can be proven. 5 A contract pro- vided that, although the engine was warranted, the buyer, in or- der to take advantage of the warranty, must give the seller notice of its defects within one week after starting the engine; it was held that a parol agreement by the seller that he would not hold the buyer to the written warranty could not be proved. 6 Where a contract contains express warranties on the part of the seller, parol evidence is, in the absence of fraud in its exe- cution, inadmissible to show verbal warranties.' Accordingly where the seller gives to the purchaser a written warranty, the purchaser can not maintain an action upon a contract of war- ranty not included in such written instrument received by him. 8 And in an action to recover the price of a refrigerator, 1 McQuaid v. Ross, 77 Wis. 470. Hungerford ». Eosenstein, 19 N. Y. 2 Bradford v. Neil, 46 Minn. 347. Supl. 471. 3 Humphrey v. Merriam, 46 Minn. 6 Rumely v. Emmons, 85 Mich. 511. 413. See, also, Hatch's. Spooner (1896), 'Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Dolph 37 N. Y. Supl. 296. (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 339. 4 Lamson Consolidated Co. v. Har- 8 Farmers' Stock Assn. v. Scott, tung, 19 N. Y. Supl. 233 ; Mason v. 53 Kan. 534; 36 Pac. Rep. 978. In Decker, 72 N. Y. 595; Dent v. North Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Am. Steamship Co., 49 N. Y. 390; Wis. 120; 58 N. W. Rep. 232, the court Pierson v. Morch, 82 N. Y. 503; Sands said: "It is well settled that, if the ■v. Crooke, 46 N. Y. 564 ; McCrae v. article is sold by a formal written con- Purmort, 16 Wend. 460. tract which is silent on the subject of 5 Lamson Consolidated Co. v. Har- warranty, no oral warranty made at tung, 19 N. Y. Supl. 233. See, also, the same time or previously can be 336 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §267 on a written contract of sale which contains no warranty, parol evidence is not admissible to prove an express warranty. 1 shown, as the writing is conclusively supposed to embody the whole con- tract; nor can any additional oral warranty be ingrafted or added to one that is written. Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640; McQuaid v. Eoss, 77 Wis. 470; 46 N. W. Rep. 892; De Witt v. Berry, 134 U. S. 306; 10 Sup. Ct. 536. The ruling of the court in rejecting the evidence of McGregor, the ten- dency of which was to show a parol warranty, or that the plaintiff knew for what use the boiler was required, was correct. The instructions of the court were in accordance with these principles, and fairly submitted to the jury the question in respect to the warranty or guaranty contained in the contract." 1 McCray Refrig. Co. v. Woods, 99 Mich. 269; 58 N. W. Rep. 320, where the court said : "The true rule is that a written contract can not be varied or added to by parol. The addition of a warranty is as objectionable as any other. Mr. Parsons, in his work on Contracts, at page 547, uses this language: 'A warranty in the sale of a chattel is an essential part of the bargain, and should be stated in the bought and sold notes.' In Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. 459, Marcy, J., re- marked, in giving the opinion of the court: 'Suppose the contract had been with a warranty, and the mem- orandum in the plaintiff's sales book had been signed by the defendant, but the warranty clause omitted, and suppose the rice had been delivered and had proved to be of an inferior quality, could the defendant have shown the warranty by parol? The authorities to which I have referred show most abundantly that he could not.' Again, the author says (Par- sons on Contracts, p. 548) : 'It is clear that parol evidence of a war- ranty not mentioned in the writing is not admissible in a suit brought by the purchaser for damages for breach of warranty;' citing Reed v. Wood, 9 Vt. 285. Mr. Parsons, on pages 589 and 590, again refers to the subject, saying : 'And where the contract of sale is in writing, and contains no warranty, there parol evidence is not admissible to add a warranty ;' say- ing, in a note, that 'this was distinctly adjudged in Van Ostrand v. Reed, 1 Wend. 424. It rests upon the familiar principle that the writing is supposed to contain all the contract.' The gen- eral rule is too well understood to re- quire the citation of authorities. But see 17 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 420, and note. Some Michigan cases are supposed to support the de- fendants' contention. Phelps v. Whit- aker, 37 Mich. 72. This was an order for a windmill, signed only by the purchaser. The court said that the paper did not constitute such a con- tract as would exclude evidence of the conversation when it was made. Trev- idick v. Mumford, 31 Mich. 467, holds that a deed and bill of sale made by the plaintiff were not meant to con- tain all of the obligations of the de- fendant. This is familiar doctrine, the papers being mere incidents of the contract, and made to carry out some of its provisions. Parsons on Contracts, 613; Richards v. Fuller, 37 Mich. 161, was similar to that of Trev- idick v. Mumford, while Weiden v. Woodruff, 38 Mich. 130, was identical in principle with Phelps v. Whitaker, which it followed, as also was Wood Machine Co. v. Gaertner, 55 Mich. 453 ; 21 N. W. Rep. 885. Many of these cases cited in the Michigan cases re- ferred to involve fraud and deceit, of which parol evidence may always be given. See Nichols, Shepard & Co. v. 268 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 337 § 268. Seller's oral warranty — Illustrations. — Where the seller of hogs at auction states to those present, for the purpose of bidding, that the hogs are all right, intending thereby to effectuate a sale, and a person who is ignorant of the condition of the hogs purchases them, believing that the statement was so intended, and relying thereon, the statement constitutes a warranty that the hogs are sound. 1 In another case the defend- ant returned to plaintiff an engine purchased by him, and told plaintiff that it used too much steam, that it was not as economi- cal as was represented, that the boiler was not big enough, and would not furnish steam enough; plaintiff then said that if defendant would get a certain sized boiler he would guaranty that the engine would do the work, and as economically as any other engine; defendant bought such boiler, and used Crandall, 77 Mich. 401 ; 43 N. W. Rep. 875; Rumely & Co. v. Emmons, 85 Mich. 511 ; 48 N. W. Eep. 636 ; Na- tional, etc., Register Co. v. B lumen- thai, 85 Mich. 464; 48 N. W. Rep. 622." 1 Powell v. Chittick, 89 Iowa, 513 ; 56 N. W. Rep. 652, where the court said : "We may well apply the rule quoted bj' appellant from Bennett's Benja- min on Sales, § 613: 'It is rightly held by Holt, C. J., and has been uni- formly adopted ever since, that an af- firmation at the time of a sale is a warranty, provided it appears in evi- dence to have been so intended. In determining whether it was so in- tended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter upon which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer also may be expected to have an opinion, and to exercise his judg- ment. In the former case it is a war- ranty ; in the latter it is not.' There is not a requirement of the rule for a warranty that could not have been found in this case under the evidence. That plaintiff, when he made the pur- 22 chase, was ignorant of the facts as to the disease of the hogs is not to be doubted, and the defendant certainly 'assumed to assert a fact' of which plaintiff was ignorant. There is testi- mony tending to show that the hogs were 'off feed,' or affected by over- feeding or change of climate, and that this condition was observable from in- spection, and, when admitted, it is but a fact strengthening the claim in be- half of a warranty. Defendant had an opportunity better than the buyers to know the true situation and the buy- ers had a right to reply upon his spe- cial knowledge ; and, as to the cause of the apparent condition, the buyers would not be expected to have an opinion. It is likely true that the re- mark that the hogs were all right was made to remove any apprehension. Under such circumstances, a purchase would most likely be made with re- liance upon such a statement, and such a statement made under such circumstances would be designed to induce a purchase upon its reliance. Clearly the case is within the rule cited." 338 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 269 the engine over eight months; it was held that, whether there was a warranty, and, if so, whether defendant relied on it in good faith, were questions for the jury. 1 Where, at the time of purchasing a machine, it is orally agreed that the war- ranty shall be the same, with certain exceptions, as contained in another contract, the warranty is an oral one. 2 § 269. Implied warranty excluded by written. — Where an ar- ticle is sold by a written contract which is silent on the subject of warranty, no express or oral warranty, made at the same time or previously, can be shown, nor can an oral warranty be added to one that is written. The fact that warranties of material and workmanship of certain wheels manufactured according to specifications were expressed in the contract, pre- cludes any implied warranty that the wheels were otherwise suitable for the purpose for which they were intended. 3 In an 1 Dake Engine Mfg. Co. v. Hurley 99 Mich. 16 ; 57 ST. W. Rep. 1044. 2 Aultman Co. v. Shelton, 90 Iowa, 288; 57 N. W. Rep. 857. 3 Case Plow Works v. Niles, etc., Co., 90 Wis. 590; 63 N. W. Rep. 1013, where the court said: "The contention of the plaintiff that it was not precluded by the warranties in the written con- tract from insisting upon an implied warranty that the wheels should be suitable for the purpose for which they were required, for reasons in addition to those already stated, can not, we think, be sustained. The fact that the limited warranties going to the question of suitableness of the wheels were expressed in the con- tract by the strongest implication, ex- specified warranties indicates that no others were intended or expected. Had the parties intended that there should be an implied warranty, there was no occasion to make any stipula- tion on the subject. The one intro- duced must be taken as covering the entire subject ; otherwise it would be idle and unmeaning. Adjudicated cases on this point are numerous and conclusive. We have not been re- ferred to any decision expressly on the point to the contrary. Dickson •_ Zizinia, 10 C. B. 602; Chanter «. Hop- kins, 4 Mees. & W. 399 ; Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N. Y. 487; DeWitt o. Berry, 134 TJ. S. 306; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 536; Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 72 Hun, 254; 25 N. Y. Supl. 570, eludes and negatives the idea that it 575; Whitmore v. South Boston Iron was intended that other or more com- prehensive warranties should exist, and repels any implication of law to that effect. The contract, as written, must be taken as the final and con- clusive evidence of all that was in- Co., 2 Allen, 52;Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165; Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bing. 48; Shepherd v. Gilroy, 46 Iowa, 193. The case of Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640, was relied on as establishing a contrary view. In tended or agreed upon. The familiar that case there was an express war- rule, 'Expressio unius est exclusio ranty of title in the bill of sale alterius,' clearly applies. The de- but it was held that facts might mand of (he purchaser for certain § 269 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 339 action for the price of a refrigerator sold under a written con- tract which contains no warranty, it is error to submit to the jury the question as to an implied warranty shown only from be shown from which an implied war- ranty of quality would arise. Between these two subjects there was no de- pendent connection, but each stood by itself. There was not, as in this case, any qualified or restricted warranty upon the question of quality or suit- ableness, and the case was ruled on the authority of Bigge v. Parkinson, 7 Hurl. & N. 955, where the warranty, as in Merriam v. Field, was on a sepa- rate and independent subject, namely, that the goods would pass inspection, and it was held that an express written warranty on that subject would not preclude an implied one that the goods were in fact fit for the purpose intended. The case of Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626, was also referred to, but in this case there was no express warranty by written contract, and it was held that an implied war- ranty of suitableness might exist, although a handbill had been deliv- ered at the time of the sale, and the agent of the vendor affirmed of the fanning mill that it possessed the capacities therein set forth. There was no written warranty on any sub- ject, and the particular point litigated was that the agent making the oral affirmation had no authority to war- rant the mill. The case, therefore, is no authority upon the point under consideration. As already stated, the plaintiff having specified the sizes and dimensions and materials of the par- ticular plan or kind of wheel it de- sired, and its agents having looked over and examined wheels of that kind,- manufactured by the vendor, which had been tested in their pres- ence as to their quality and strength, the conclusion seems irresistible that, subject to defects in material and workmanship, the case falls within that of Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120; 58 N. W. Rep. 232, and the plain- tiff must be held to have obtained that for which it contracted, subject to such remedy as it may be entitled to on the warranties against defective material and workmanship; and, in this connection, it is proper to observe that a defect in the plan of the wheels is not a defect of workmanship, for workmanship has only to do with the execution of the plan, and it follows that the objection much relied on, that the plan for the wheels was defective and impracticable, is not covered by the written warranties. The plan relates to the question of suitableness of the wheels for the purpose for which they were pur- chased, in relation to which, for rea- sons already stated, we hold that there was no implied warranty." In Ber- thold v. Seevere Manufacturing Co., 89 Iowa, 506; 56 N. W. Rep. 669, it was held that where a purchaser of material to be delivered, instead of trusting to the seller's judgment, em- bodies in the contract specifications as to quality, there is no implied war- ranty that the material delivered is suitable. In Wisconsin Brick Co. e. Hood (1893), 54 Minn. 543; 56 N. W. Eep. 165, plaintiff and the defendants entered into a written contract where- by the former agreed to furnish and the latter to receive a certain quantity of bricks, at a stipulated price per thousand, "of the grade known as 'common brick,'" all to be "of good quality, and equal to sample sent." There was no finding of the court in reference to the sample. It was held, disregarding this omission in the find- ings, that there was no implied war- ranty in the sale that the bricks to be furnished should be reasonably fit for 340 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §270 the parol evidence of conversations between the parties at and before the time the written contract was made. 1 § 270. Implied warranty as affected by acceptance — Sale by sample. — The general rule established by the authorities is that, in an executory contract for the sale of personal prop- erty, words descriptive of the kind, quality or nature of the property do not import a warranty that survives acceptance." the purpose for which they were pur- chased, of which purpose plaintiff was advised. 1 McOray Refrigerator Co. v. Woods 99 Mich. 269 ; 58 N. W. Rep. 320, where the court said : "It is a rule of gen- eral application that warranties, whether express or implied, can only issue from the contract itself ; and it must be a legal deduction, and can not depend upon extrinsic evidence, except as it may be necessary for the explanation of some latent ambiguity. 10 Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 110, and note 1 ; Ottawa, etc., Flint-Glass Co. v. Gunther, 31 Fed. Rep. 208; Scott v. Hix, 2 Sneed, 192; 62 Am. Dec. 458, 467. Parol evidence is not admissible to add to an ambiguous writing facts which may aid the im- plication of warranty. Whitmore v. South Boston Iron Co., 2 Allen, 52, 58; Johnson v. Cranage, 45 Mich. 14." 2 Pottlitzer v. Wesson, 8 Ind. App. 472; 35 N. E. Rep. 1030, where the court said: "The purchaser in such case has the right, upon inspection, to reject the goods if not of the particular description ordered; but, if he ac- cepts the property after such examina- tion, he can not complain of the de- fects disclosed by the examination. McConnell v. Jones, 19 Ind. 328; Brown v. Foster, 108 N. Y. 387 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 608; Studor v. Bleistein (N. Y. App.), 22 N. E. Rep. 243; Pier- son v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 316; 22 N. E. Rep. 349 ; Coplay Iron Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232; 15 N. E. Rep. 335. In Mc- Connell v. Jones, supra, there was an agreement to sell wool 'to be washed on the sheep, to be put up in good, merchantable order, free from tags.' The court, in holding that there was no warranty in this case, say : 'Ac- cording to the case of Ricketts v. Hays, 13 Ind. 181, the contract for the sale of the wool did not contain a warranty proper, but an agreement to deliver washed wool. * * * But, as it [the agreement] was given for wool, to be prepared and delivered at a future time, it amounted but to an agreement to deliver, at such future time, wool of a given character, — was but an executory agreement, — and a failure to deliver such wool worked, not a breach of warranty of a thing sold, but a simple breach of contract for the delivery of a given kind of article ; and it seems that in a subse- quent execution of such executory contract, if the party purchasing ac- cepts the article delivered, in execu- tion, after examining it, or with full opportunity to examine, although the opportunity is voluntary, and without any understanding with the other party, unimproved, he estops himself to deny that the article filled the re- quirements of the contract.' The case of Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416, is not in favor of appellants. In that case the defects of the article sold were not discernible upon inspection, and there was a warranty of the quality of the syrup sold, which was obviously in- tended to survive the receipt and use of the syrup. It was, however, held § 271 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 341 But where goods are sold by sample, with a warranty that they shall correspond with the sample, the vendee may recover damages for a breach of the warranty, although he has ac- cepted the goods after an opportunity for inspection. 1 § 271. The same subject continued — The federal doctrine. — Where the seller is the maker or manufacturer of the thing sold, the fair presumption is that he understood the process of its manufacture, and was cognizant of any latent defect caused by such process, against which reasonable diligence might have guarded. This presumption is warranted, in part, by the fact that the manufacturer or maker, by his occupation, holds himself out as competent to make articles reasonably adapted to the purposes for which such or similar articles are designed. When, therefore, the buyer has no opportunity to inspect the article, or when, from the situation, inspection is impracticable or useless, it is unreasonable to suppose that he bought on his own judgment, or that he did not rely on the judgment of the seller as to latent defects of which the latter, if he used due care, must have been informed during the process of manu- facture. If the buyer relied, and under the circumstances had reason to rely, on the judgment of the seller, who was the manufacturer or maker of the article, the law implies a war- ranty that it is reasonably fit for the use for which it was de- signed, the seller at the time being informed of the purpose to in that case that the vendee in an ex- and plaintiff's evidence clearly indi- ecutory contract can not rely upon a cate that. In this view of the case warranty as to defects open and vis- the refusal to nonsuit was no error, ible." and even if the question was one for 'Meagley v. Hoyt(1895), 88 Hun, the court alone, its submission to the 328, where the court said : "Tamentire- jury was harmless. In Zabriskie v. ly satisfied that the contract between Central V. R. Co., 131 N. Y. 72, 77, it the parties was a sale of goods with a is said : 'The principle is well estab- warranty that they should correspond lished that upon an executory sale of to a sample furnished. The first five goods by sample, with warranty that barrels were sold as a 'sample' of de- the goods shall correspond with the fendant's tallow, and it seems very sample, the vendee is not precluded plain to me that both parties under- from claiming and recovering dam- stood that all tallow subsequently or- ages for breach of warranty although dered and delivered should corre- he has accepted the goods after an spond to such sample. The letters opportunity fsr inspection." 342 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §272 devote it to that use. 1 But where a known, described, and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer, although it is stated by the purchaser to be required for a particular pur- pose, still, if the known, described, and definite article be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer. 2 § 272. Co-existing implied and written warranties. — The Iowa rule is that while a warranty will not be implied in con- flict with an express warranty, yet that an implied and an ex- press warranty may exist under the same contract, if the ex- press warranty does not relate to the obligations covered by the implied. 3 1 Bridge Co. u. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108, 116. 2 Seitz v. Brewers', etc., Machine Co., 141 U. S. 510, 518; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46. In Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Metropolitan R. Co. (1895), 157 U. S. 94; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503, Harlan, J., cites the last two cases with manifest approval and for the purpose of dis- tinguishing them. " Bucy v. Pitts. Agricul. Works, 89 Iowa, 464; 56 N. W. Rep. 541, where the court said : ' 'There are authorities holding that, where there is an ex- press warranty, none will be implied, upon the theory that, by the express warranty, the parties have stated in words that by which they agreed to be bound. It is held in this and many other states that this rule does not ex- tend to the exclusion of warranties implied by law where they are not excluded by the terms of the contract. 'A warranty will not be implied in conflict with the express terms of the contract.' Blackmore v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 79 Iowa, 282; 44 N. W. Rep. 548. The rule deducible from the authorities is that an implied and an express warranty may exist under the same contract as when the expressed does not relate to the obligations created by the implied ; but when the expressed warranty does provide as to the same obligation, it excludes the implied. In other words, the law will not imply anything as to matters about which the parties have ex- pressly agreed. It is not clear to our minds why, under the pleadings, the case was submitted as upon an im- plied warranty, and not upon the al- leged oral warranty, which, as is alleged, covered all and more than the implied warranty." The Bucy case cited above was an action by the purchaser of a threshing machine for breach of the implied warranty that the machine was reasonably suited to do the work for which purchased, plaintiff alleged that the machine was sold without any express warranty, which defendant denied. It was held that it was error to withdraw from the jury a written warranty incorporated in the contract of sale, not materially different from what the law would im- ply, but requiring plaintiff to give no- tice of defects within a certain time. In Ober v. Blalock, 40 S. C. 81; 18 S. E. Rep. 264, the court said: "The judge charged that the contract was, in effect, an express warranty that the article contained all the elements known to constitute what was called the 'Farmers' Standard Phosphate,' §273 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 343 § 273. Receipts and memorandum excluding oral warranty. — The fact that a mere informal memorandum or receipt is given by the seller does not preclude the buyer from proving an oral warranty. 1 Where, upon the sale of a horse, a bill of sale was executed by the seller, specifying the price and ac- knowledging its receipt, it was held that the instrument was to be construed as being a mere receipt for the purchase-money, and that an oral warranty of soundness could be proved; 2 and a mere bill of parcels given by the seller to the buyer does not exclude evidence of a warranty. 3 The buyer gave his note for the price of a sulky, at" the end of which note was, "No promise or con- tract outside of this note will be recognized ; " and it was held compounded by the formula of G. Ober & Sons Company, and no more ; that it was silent as to anticipated re- sults from its use. This was certainly the proper construction of the written contract. If so, the question arises whether, in addition to the express contract, the law will imply another, insuring good results from the ap- plication of the article. As we un- derstand, it is only in cases where there is no express warranty that the law will imply one, or set up what is sometimes erroneously called the 'equitable condition of the sale.' The general rule very clearly is that, where the contract is reduced to writ- ing, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that anything else was intended than what was expressed. The pre- sumption always is, in the absence of proof, that the parties to any written agreement between them have, upon the subject-matter, expressed their whole agreement. Besides, there would seem to be an inherent difficul- ty, from the uncertainty incident to the subject, in attempting to estimate the fruits of the application of a fer- tilizer, for the results must always de- pend largely upon the manner of its application, the character of the soil, the seasons, climate, culture, etc. It is insisted, however, that the rule is not always applicable, and it does seem that there is an exception in the case where the express warranty goes only to the title, as in Wells v. Spears, 1 McCord, 421. But this case was re- stricted by that of McLaughlin v. Hor- ton, 1 Hill (S. C), 383, as applicable 'only to a case where the express war- ranty is silent, for, if there is any stip- ulation in the written contract in re- lation to the quality of the thing sold, the law will imply nothing.' Hey- ward v. Wallace, 4 Strob. 181. There certainly were, in the contract here, 'express stipulations' as to the quality of the article — indeed, a warranty of the ingredients necessary to make the article sold — and we therefore concur with the judge, and think he commit- ted no error." 1 Richey v. Daemicke, 86 Mich. 647 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 516; Gale, etc., Co. v. Stark, 45 Kan. 606; Storer v. Taber, 83 Maine, 387 ; McCormick Co. v. Mar- tin, 32 Neb. 723 ; Filkinsu.Whyland, 24 Barb. 379; Hersom v. Henderson, 1 Foster (N. H.), 224; Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 140; Jeffery v. Walton, 1 Starkie, 213. 2 Filkins v. Whyland, 24 Barb. 379. 3 Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass. 166; Hazard v. Loring, 10 Gush. 267; Hild- reth v. O'Brien, 10 Allen, 104. 344 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §§ 274, 275 that this did not estop the buyer from setting up the breach of a warranty. 1 A bill rendered by the seller to the buyer had at its bottom printed the following words: "Guaranty: The above cooling room is guaranteed to keep fresh meat a satis- factory length of time, if properly iced and regulated ; " it was held that this was not such a warranty as excluded evidence of a parol warranty. 8 And if there be a formal written contract of sale, the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any matter on which the written contract is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proven by parol, if under the circumstances of the particular case it may properly be inferred that the parties did not intend the written paper to be a complete and final statement of the whole of the trans- action between them. 8 § 274. Substitution of warranties. — An executory bilateral written contract may be varied by a subsequent oral agreement between the parties. 4 Therefore parties who have bound them- selves in an executory contract of sale without warranty are not precluded thereby from superseding such contract afterwards by an executed sale of the same property with warranty. 5 But in order to do this, if the contract is in writing, it must be wholly superseded by the subsequent one. The contract can not rest partly in writing and partly in parol. Either the writing must control, or there must be shown an agreement to waive all that the writing contains and the substitution of the verbal warranty for the writing. 6 § 275. Implied warranty of identity — Genuineness of pas- sage ticket. — Where a person authorized to sell engines for an engine company contracted to sell plaintiff an engine of a spe- cific kind and knowingly delivered to him an engine of an in- ferior kind, it was held that he had authority to warrant the engine and did warrant it to be of that specific kind, and that 1 Gale, etc., Co. v. Stark, 45 Kan. 606. Bartlett v. Stanchfield, 148 Mass. 394 ; 2 Richey v. Daemicke, 86 Mich. 647; Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31; Courte- 49 N. W. Rep. 516. nay v. Fuller, 65 Maine, 156. 3 Seitz v. Brewers', etc., Co., 141 U. S. 5 Storer v. Taber, 83 Maine, 387. 510, 517. 6 Rumely & Co. v. Emmons, 85 Mich. 1 Thomas v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581 ; 511, 518. §275 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 345 plaintiff might retain it and sue both the agent and the com- pany for damages. 1 There is in America an implied warranty of identity; namely that the article shall be of the kind or species it purports to be or is described to be, — that is, that the article delivered shall be the very thing contracted for. 2 1 Alpha Mills v. Watertown Engine Co., 116 N. Car. 797 ; 21 S. E. Rep. 967, where the court said : "Exhibit 5 con- tains the contract for the sale of the en- gine, which, in our opinion, shows that Brem & McDowell acted as agents of the Watertown Company in making the sale ; and that it also constitutes a sale with warranty (Thomas v. Simp- son, 80 N. C. 4; Love v. Miller, 104 N. C. 582 ; 10 S. E. Rep. 685) ; and that plaintiff might retain the engine, and have an action against defendants for damages (Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. C. 323 ; McKinnon v. Mcintosh, 98 N. C. 89 ; 3 S. E. Rep. 840) . An agent author- ized to sell is authorized to make a warranty. Hunter v. Jameson, 6 Ired. 252. We do not think the fact that Brem was a member of the plaintiff corporation benefits the defendants. If he acted as the agent of the Water- town Company in making this sale — was in its employ, and pay — he could not at the same time be acting for the plaintiff corporation ; and, thus acting, it is not to be supposed that he would give plaintiff information injurious to his principal, and which would likely prevent a sale of its property. De Kay to. Hackensack Water Co., 38 N. J. Eq. 158; Hickman v. Green, 123 Mo. 165; 27S.W.Rep.440; Atlantic, etc., Bank v. Harris, 118 Mass. 147; Allen v. South Boston Railroad, 150 Mass. 200 ; 22 N. E. Rep. 917. It has been held that, if the agent did not know of the defects at the time of making the sale, he would not be guilty of a moral fraud, but still it would be a legal fraud. Peebles ». Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233. But in this case the jury, by the seventh issue, find that the agents had knowledge at the time of the sale that the engine was not a 150 H. P. engine. So it is not necessary to invoke the rule in the case of Peebles v. Guano Co., supra." "Benjamin on Sales (6th ed.) 636. This proposition is illustrated in thef ol- lowing cases : In Henshaws). Robins, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 83, a sale and bill of parcels of two cases of indigo was made. It was shown that the article paid for and delivered was not indigo at all, but composed of Prussian blue, chromate of iron and potash, and worthless for any purpose. It was held that the description of the article inserted in the bill of parcels amounted , to a warranty that the article was such as represented. In Hawkins v. Pem- berton, 51 N. Y. 198, it was held that the sale of an article as blue vitriol amounted to a warranty that it was such. In Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, it was held that a sale of seed which the seller said was early strap-leaf, red-top turnip seed was equivalent to a warranty that it was such, and that the purchaser might recover the difference between the market value of the crop raised and the same crop from such seed as was ordered. In White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118, it was held that, on a sale of "large Bristol cabbage seed" to a mar- ket gardener, there was an implied warranty that the seed was not only raised from such stock, but free from any latent defect arising from the mode of cultivation, and would pro- duce that kind of cabbage. In Jones v. George, 61 Texas, 345, it was held that a sale by a druggist to a planter 346 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 276 But the seller of a ticket for passage issued by a common car- rier does not, from the sale alone, undertake for anything beyond the genuineness of the ticket. 1 § 276. Implied warranty of quality. — Where the testimony showed that the agent of the buyer cut the samples in the presence of the owner's agent; that the samples were good, clean, and undamaged cotton, and that the cotton in the bales had been damaged by fire and repacked; that the bales were so placed with other good cotton that only the side or edge of the bales covered with bagging was exposed; that samples were taken from this part of the bale; and that there would have been no sale if the samples had indicated in the least the real quality of the cotton in the bale, — it was held sufficient to warrant the charge of implied warranty. 2 Defendant, in Spokane Falls, telegraphed plaintiffs, in Omaha, inquiring the price of five car loads of "good potatoes," and, after some dis- agreement as to price, the sale was made, and the potatoes shipped to defendant ; it was held that plaintiffs gave an implied warranty that the potatoes were of good, merchantable quality when shipped. 3 A sale on an order, without opportu- nity to inspect, to ship "Barton" egg, stove, and chestnut coal, is on an implied warranty that it is merchantable, even if the title passes on the seller's delivering the coal free on board barge, and sending bill of lading to the buyer, by which the cargo is to be delivered to him, upon payment of the freight. 4 of an article as Paris green implied a 3 English v. Spokane Com. Co. warranty that it was that substance. (1893), 57 Fed. Rep.451, where thecourt And see Shaw v. Smith, 45 Kan. 334. said: "We are of opinion that there 1 Elston v. Fieldman, 57 Minn. 70; was an implied warranty that the pota- 58 N.W. Rep. 830, where the court said: toes should be of good, merchantable "Such tickets have come to be bought quality when shipped from Omaha, and sold, and passed from hand to Benjamin on Sales (8th ed.), §§988, hand, almost as any article of merchan- 989,993; Schouler on Personal Prop- dise. By the mere sale of such a ticket erty, § 354 et seq. ; Kellogg Bridge Co. the seller does not undertake to trans- v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108 ; 3 Sup. Ct. port the buyer, nor contract that tin Rep. 537, and authorities there cited; carrier will do so, nor bind himsel f for Pease v. Sabin, 38 T;r t. 432." anything except the genuineness of 4 Alden v. Hart (1894), 161 Mass. the ticket." 576; 37N. E. Rep. 742, where tin court MVilkerson v. Randle (Texas App. said: "There was an implied warranty mr,\, 29 S. W. Rep. 431. that the coal should be merchantable. §277 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 347 § 277. Warranty as to quality— Illustrations.— Plaintiffs or- dered from the defendant a No. 4 fire-proof safe; the order was in writing; it contained no reference to a warranty; a safe was delivered in compliance with the order, and received and used by the plaintiffs to store valuable papers; the build- ing in which it was kept was afterwards destroyed by fire, and some of the contents of the safe were consumed; it was held that parol evidence was inadmissible to prove a warranty made at the time the order was given, and that the words "fire-proof safe" do not imply a warranty of the quality of the safe, or that it will protect its contents from fire for any definite period or under any given circumstances. 1 The article sold must Murchie v. Cornell, 155 Mass. 60 ; 29 N. E. Eep. 207. The report recites that the court, trying the case with- out a jury, found as a fact that the coal was not merchantable, and ruled, against the plaintiffs' objection, that the defendants had the right to reject the coal on its arrival at New Bedford. We think that this ruling was right. Pope v. Allis, 115 TJ. S. 363; 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 69 ; Cleveland Boiling Mills v. Ehodes, 121 IT. S. 255 ; 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 882 ; Wiley v. Inhabitants of Athol, 150 Mass. 426, 434; 23 N. E. Eep. 311; Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178; 33 N. E. Eep. 493; Bryant v. Isburgh, 13 Gray, 607 ; Grimoldby v. Wells, L. E, IOC. P. 391." 1 Diebold Safe Co. v. Huston, 55 Kan. 104 ; 39 Pac. Eep. 1035, where the court said : "It is clear that the safe was de- livered to the plaintiffs in compliance with the terms of the written order. Does this order contain what in law amounts to a warranty? There are no words in it of express warranty. Does an order, however, for a fire-proof safe, imply a warranty? It is contended that this is a case of a sale of an art- icle of the vendor's manufacture for a particular purpose, and imports a warranty that it is reasonably fit for that purpose and free from latent de^ fects arising in the process of manu- facture, and not disclosed to the ven- dor. In the case of Lukens v. Freiund, 27 Kan. 664, it appeared that the de- fendant was a miller ; that two copper clasps accidentally fell into some bran which was sold to the plaintiff. The clasps were swallowed by one of the plaintiff's cows, and killed her. It was held that, in the absence of ex- press warranty, the plaintiff could not recover for his cow. The second clause of the syllabus reads as fol- lows : 'While, when an article is ordered from a manufacturer, to be by him manufactured for a specific and understood purpose, there is in some cases an implied warranty that the article, when manufactured, will be reasonably fit for the purpose in- tended, yet, when a purchase is made from him of a specific and completed article, he is to be regarded as a dealer, and his liability determined accordingly.' There is nothing in this case indicating that the safe pur- chased by the plaintiffs was manu- factured specially for them, but the fair inference is that it was one or a kind of safes which the defendants manufactured for sale to whomsoever would buy." As to the effect of fire- proof, as applied to a safe or ware- 348 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §277 answer in kind to the description under which it is sold, and there is an implied warranty that the article delivered is such an article as the name under which it is sold indicates. When, how- ever, the question arises whether an article is of a particular quality or degree of excellence, unless it is designated by some term which is descriptive of the article and calls for a particu- lar quality, the general rule is that no warranty of quality will be implied. 1 The mere description of iron sold as mill iron in a bill rendered to the purchaser will not amount to a warranty that the same is of the quality or grade described, but will be regarded as a mere statement or expression of opinion as to the quality. 8 house, see, Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454; Knoxville, etc., Ins. Co. v. Hird, 4 Texas Civ. App. 82. 1 In Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262, it was said: "In general, the only contract which arises on the sale of an article by a description, by its known designation in the market, is that it is of the kind specified." In Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 57, it was held that, where a large number of barrels of mackerel branded under the inspection laws as No. 1 and No. 2 mackerel were sold in the spring with that desciption of them in the bill of parcels, it was not a warranty that the mackerel were free from rust, although it appeared that mackerel affected by rust are not considered as No. 1 and No. 2. In Gossler v. Eagle, etc., Re- finery, 103 Mass. 331, it was held that "one who agreed to sell 'Manilla sugar' to refiners, and delivered to them what is usually called in commerce by that name, can, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or warranty, re- cover the agreed price, although the article delivered contained more im- purities than sugar known under that name usually does." The case of Shis- ler v. Baxter, 109 Pa. St. 443, seems to be opposed to White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118, holding that the sale of seed as Wakefield cabbage seed did not amount to a warranty that it was such, but was a representation as to quality. In To well t\ Gate wood, 2 Scam. (111.) 22, a bill of sale of good first and second rate tobacco was made. The court refused to treat this as a warranty, but rather as an ex- pression of opinion as to the quality of the article sold, concerning which the buyer should have relied on his own judgment or obtained an express warranty. In English v. Spokane Com. Co. (1893), 57 Fed. Pep. 451, defendant, in Spokane Falls, tele- graphed plaintiffs in Omaha : "Wire price car strictly fresh eggs, new cases." Plaintiffs replied : "Carfresh eggs, 16. Track here for immediate acceptance." Defendant answered: "If eggs strictly fresh, 14 cents. An- swer if accepted." Plaintiffs replied: " Offer eggs accepted." It was held that plaintiffs warranted the eggs to be strictly fresh at Omaha, and was not liable for deterioration naturally resulting during transportation. See, Bull v. Robison, 10 Exch.342; Mann v. Evertson, 32 Ind. 355 ; Leggat v. Sands Brewing Co., 60 111. 158. 2 Carondelet Iron Works v. Moore, 78 111. 65. See also, Ryan v, Ulmer, 108 Pa. St. 332; Dounce v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411 ; Fraley v. Dispham, 10 Pa. St. 320. §278 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 349 § 278. Implied warranty as to fitness — Latent defects — Fraud. — The law implies a warranty by the manufacturer in a contract for the sale of machines that they are reasonably adapted to the purpose for which he made and sold them, and the question should be left to the jury, when the issue is raised, whether there was a breach of such warranty. 1 Plaintiff, the manufacturer, agreed to sell to a customer, and the latter pur- chased a certain quantity of bricks; to be "of the grade known as 'common,' " which is a well-recognized kind or description in the market, "to be of good quality and equal to sample sent;" it was held, in the absence of a finding as to a sale by sample, that there was an implied condition of the contract, which was in writing, that the bricks should conform to the description, be of good material, and well made, according to the description, but none that they would answer the purpose for which they were purchased. 8 Defendant agreed to ship to 'Kennebrew v. Southern, etc., Ma- chine Co. (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Rep. 545; Snow v. Schomacker Manufac- turing Co., 69 Ala. 111. 8 Wisconsin Brick Co. v. Hurd Re- frigerator Co. (Minn. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 550, where the court said : "There was an implied condition of this con- tract that the bricks should conform to the description, be of good material, and well made, according to the de- scription, but none that they would an- swer the purpose for which they were purchased. As to this the rulo of caveat emptor applies. Goulds v. Brophy, 42 Minn. 109; 43 N. W. Rep. 834. Pait of the testimony stricken out related to an alleged defect in the clay used in making the bricks, and tended to show that plaintiff must have known of the unsuitability of the material. A good deal has been written on the subject, and the con- founding of conditions precedent with implied warranties has resulted in great confusion and conflict in the decisions ; but we hold the only just rule in such cases to be that, if a man- ufacturer knowingly uses unsuitable and defective material in the manu- facture of an article sold in the market by description, he is liable for any latent defect not disclosed to the pur- chaser. Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552; White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118. See, also, title 'Implied Warranty,' particularly paragraph 7, 10 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 85 ; also, Randall v. Newson, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 102; 19 Moak. Eng. R. 213." In Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120; 58 N.W. Rep. 232, the court said : "It was made plain that the defendant got the exact article or thing he bargained for ; and, although it may have been stated that it was required for a par- ticular purpose, still, as he did not exact an express warranty, he took the risk of its fitness for the intended use, and no warranty in that respect can be implied. Benjamin on Sales, § 657; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees. & W. 399; Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q B. 288. In Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 202, the rule was laid down that "where a known, described, and de- 350 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 278 plaintiff a certain amount of paving stone according to dimen- sions set forth in specifications furnished by plaintiff. It was held that there was no implied warranty that the stone would be suitable for a particular work, in the absence of evidence that defendant knew what such work required, and agreed that the stone should be tested by its requirements. 1 fined article is ordered of a manufact- urer, although, it is stated to be re- quired by the purchaser for a particu- lar purpose, still, if the known, de- fined, and described thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer.' Where the buyer in such case gets what he has bargained for, there is no implied war- ranty. Seitzu. Brewers', etc., Machine Co., 141 U.S. 510, 519 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 46 ; Goulds v. Brophy, 42 Minn. 109 ; 43 X. W. Rep. 834; Deming v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165. The distinction seems to be between the manufacture or sup- ply of an article to satisfy a required purpose and the manufacture or sup- ply of a specified, described, and de- fined article, as in this case. In the former case there may be an implied warranty, but in the latter there is none." 1 Talbot Paving Co. v. Gorman (Mich. 1894), 61 N. W. Eep. 655, where the court said : ' 'The exact point made by plaintiff appears to be that, inas- much as the defendant knew what the specifications were, the law implied a warranty of fitness. A pertinent in- quiry is, 'a fitness for what?' Was it fitnes3 for the paving jobs that the plaintiff had on hand? If this be claimed, it is a sufficient answer to say that the evidence fails to disclose that the defendant knew what jobs he had. Moreover, if the law is to im- ply that the stone was to be fit for the job, it must be, because defendant knew what the job actually required, and had undertaken to provide that, and his liability would be tested by that. But this was not so. He only knew what the specifications required. They might be right or wrong. He had no way of determining, and it was not left to defendant's judgment to make suitable stone for the jobs. He had simply undertaken to deliver certain stone of given dimensions. If he should deliver such he would be entitled to pay. If he did not, it could hardly be claimed that he could require acceptance on the ground that the stone was suitable, or better adapted, to the purpose of the plaint- iff than as though made according to direction. Clearly, if plaintiff had furnished specifications, and had a right to insist on the stone being in conformity thereto, regardless of de- fendant's judgment, it could not sus- tain the proposition that the law should imply a warranty to make them conform to some other test ; and man- ifestly it can not be said that knowl- edge of the use intended should re- quire defendant to vary from his con- tract as to dimensions. The conclu- sion appears to us irresistible that no such warranty as this can be implied. Breen v. Moran, 51 Minn. 525 ; 53 N.W. Rep. 755, is cited as a, case 'upon all fours' with this, but we infer from a perusal of that case that the contractor there undertook to furnish stone for a particular purpose which he under- stood. And in that case the court based the right to recover upon a warranty, and not the failure to per- form a condition precedent ; thus rec- ognizing the rule of law stated. The distinction between conditions prece- dent and warranty is clearly recog- § 279 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 351 § 279. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Plaintiff ordered from defendant certain wheels, which were warranted against defects in material and workmanship; the wheels were constructed according to specifications, and tested in plaintiff's presence before the contract was signed; it was held that, as there was no reliance on the judgment of the man- ufacturer that the wheels were otherwise suitable for the pur- pose for which they were intended, there was no implied war- ranty to that effect. 1 A vendor, with full knowledge of the nized in the Minnesota cases cited in Breen v. Moran. See Maxwell v. Lee, 34 Minn. 511; 27 N. W. Rep. 196; Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn. 443; 29 N.W. Rep.150. An examination of the brief of the plaintiff's counsel will show that all of the cases cited are based on the existence of a warranty. In this respect they are in harmony with the cases cited by opposing counsel. See Potter v. Lee, 94 Mich. 140; 53 N. W. Rep. 1047. We notice one or two that seem to rest upon facts leading to the inference that a warranty may have been found from a bare promise to deliver goods of a given description. Such is perhaps the rule in South Carolina, and possibly other states. But if such can be called a warranty, it is an express warranty, and in this case would be a warranty to deliver stone according to specification, and not a warranty to deliver those fit for the purpose that plaintiff had in hand, whatever that may have been. The correctness of those decisions may be questioned in view of the English and American cases in opposition to them." In Beasley v. Huyett, etc., Mfg. Co., 92 Ga. 273; 18 S. E. Rep. 420, per Blockley, C. J.: "There can be no doubt that it is a fraud for man- ufacturers of machinery to fill it with latent defects not discoverable in 30 days, and then sell it as good, but warranting the same only as against defects actually discovered within 30 days; they knowing that the exist- ing defects are not discoverable with- in that time, and concealing both the defects and their knowledge of them. To do this would be practicing deceit and committing actual fraud. Those who commit actual fraud can not pro- tect themselves against answering therefor by any form of warranty, or any limitations which they may in- troduce in the terms of the warranty. Fraud in the principal contract, the contract of sale, is not to be answered by setting up a collateral contract which was as much the offspring of the fraud as was the principal con- tract itself. The special plea, as finally shaped by the plea of fraud, should not have been stricken ; and in strik- ing the same, and in afterwards di- recting a verdict for the plaintiff, the court erred." 1 Case PlowWorks v. Niles, etc., Co., 90 Wis . 590 ; 63 N . W . Rep .1013, where the court said : " The contract was not for the manufacture of wheels general- ly, to satisfy a required purpose, but for the manufacture and delivery of a specific kind or plan of wheels, of specified dimensions and sizes. This was the essential matter of the con- tract. Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 124; 58 N. W. Rep. 232; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees. & W. 399 ; Olivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288; Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 202; Goulds v. Brophy, 42 Minn. 109; 43 N. W. Rep. 834; Seitz v. Machine Co., 141 U. S. Rep. 510; 12 Sup. Ct. 46; Demingc. 352 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 279 capacity of an engine, is liable for breach of warranty to one who purchased it for running a threshing machine, relying on his representation that it was suitable for that purpose, when in fact it was not. 1 Where plaintiff was not a manufacturer making windmills, but merely a dealer selling them ready made, unless he expressly warranted the mill to work satisfac- torily, or fraudulently represented that it would work satisfac- torily, he would be entitled to recover on a note given in payment therefor, even if it did not work satisfactorily. 2 Foster, 42 N. H. 165. Where, how- ever, a manufacturer or dealer con- tracts to supply an article which he manufactures or produces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an implied warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is to be applied. Benjamin on Sales (14th ed.), § 657; Jones v. Just, supra. The test in such cases is whether the purchaser trusts and re- lies upon the judgment of the manu- facturer, and not upon his own. Brown v. Edgington, 2 Man. & G. 279; Mc- Quaid v. Ross, 85 Wis. 492, 496; 55 N. W. Rep. 705. This case, we think, falls within the rule first stated, and that there was no implied warranty of suitableness of the particular kinds of wheels, with specified sizes and di- mensions, required by the plaintiff. It is insisted, however, that the plaintiff relied upon the representations made by the defendant's agent as to the plan or method of construction, and, in particular, the manner of securing the spokes in the hubs of the wheels ; but these representations preceded the ex- ecution of the written contract, and the plaintiff took a limited warranty, incorporated in the written contract, in respect to material and workman- ship, going to and covering in part the suitableness of the wheels for the pur- pose for which the plaintiff desired them. Where an article is sold by a formal written contract, which is silent on the subject of warranty, no express or oral warranty made at the same time or previously can be shown, nor can additional oral warranty be in- grafted upon or added to one that is written, as the written instrument is conclusively presumed to embody the entire contract. Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640; McQuaid v. Ross, 77 Wis. 470; 46 N. W. Rep. 892; De Witt v. Berry, 134 U. S. Rep. 306; 10 Sup. Ct. 536. The rule on this subject is too firmly settled to require discussion, or the citation of other authorities. Evi- dence to show an express oral war- ranty of the wheels, made previous to the written contract, was, therefore, clearly incompetent." 1 Rose v. Meeks (Iowa, 1894), 59 N. W. Rep. 30. 2 Sellers ?-. Stevenson, 163 Pa. 262 ; 29 Atl. Rep. 715, where the court said: "The plaintiff was not a manufacturer making windmills to order,but a dealer selling them ready made. The circum- stances, therefore, did not raise any warranty by implication. If there was no express warranty, there was none at all. Warren v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 83 Pa. St. 437 ; Ryan n.Ulmer, 108 Pa. St. 332; Shislerv. Baxter, 109 Pa. St. 443; Mahaffey v. Ferguson, 156 Pa. St. 156; 27 Atl. Rep. 21. The learned judge charged that ' there was no express guaranty proven.' In the absence of any evidence of fraudulent misrepre- § 280 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 353 § 280. Vendor's warranty as to value. — A vendor may give a warranty as to value as in respect of any other fact, and if he makes a representation as to value, which is intended as a warranty, and it enters as a constitutent element into the trans- action, it will then become a part of the contract, and may be en- forced as a warranty. In determining whether it was so intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judg- ment. In the former case there is a warranty; in the latter not. 1 Whether a particular affirmation made by a vendor on an oral contract for the sale of property was intended as a war- ranty is often a question for the jury. 2 Under the code of South Dakota the seller of personal property does not, except as therein specifically provided, impliedly warrant the quality of the thing sold. And an instruction to the jury that charging and receiving the full market price for a harvesting and binding machine imports a warranty by the seller that it will do as good work as other first-class machines is error. 3 sentation, under this view, he should early stockholders ; that the stock have directed a verdict for plaintiff." was worth 100 cents on the dollar, 'Titus v. Poole (1895), 145 N. Y. and was good, high, dividend paying 414; 40 N. E. Eep. 228; Benjamin on stock; and that in reply plaintiff Sales, §932. said, "If the stock is all right, as you 2 Shippena. Bowen, 122 U. S. 575; say, we will make the trade;" and 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1283; Henshaw v. that the deal was then consummated. Bobins, 9 Metcalf , 83, 88 ; Oneida Mfg. It was held that the question whether Soc. v. Lawrence, 4 Oowen, 440, 442 ; there was a warranty was for the jury. Cook v. Moseley, 13 Wend. 277 ; Chap- 3 McCormick Machine Co. v. Watson man v. Murch, 19 Johns. 290; Haw- (S. Dak. 1894), 57 N. W. Bep. 945, kins v. Berry, 5 Gilm. (111.) 36; Mc- where the court said : "Section 3628 of Gregor v. Penn, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 74, the Compiled Laws is as follows: 77 ; Otts v. Alderson, 10 Smedes & M. ' Except as prescribed by this article, (Miss.) 476. In Titus v. Poole (1895), a mere contract of sale or agreement 145 N. Y. 414; 40 N. E. Bep. 228, in to sell does not imply a warranty.' an action on an alleged warranty as Section 3633 is as follows : ' One who to the value of bank stock, it appeared sells or agrees to sell an article of his that the vendor stated that the bank own manufacture, thereby warrants was organized under the laws of Penn- it to be free from any latent defects, sylvania, and that he was one of the not" disclosed to the buyer, arising 23 354 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §§ 281, 282 § 281. Warranty of future state of an article. — In the ab- sence of express words to the contrary, all warranties, either express or implied, refer to the state of the chattel at the date of the sale. 1 Thus, in a suit for a breach of warranty of sound- ness, in the sale of a horse, it must be shown that the disease existed at the date of the sale. 8 The sellers sold twine stored in a ware-house, but not to be delivered until ware-house re- ceipts for the same should be turned over, the sellers warrant- ing that the twine sold was in good condition and a merchant- able article; it was held that this warranty had reference to the condition of the twine at the time the contract was made, and not to the time when the ware-house receipts were turned over, although the buyers could not obtain possession of the goods without such receipts. 3 But a party can by express contract warrant the future state of a chattel ; l and a custom may ex- ist in a particular locality which will extend an implied war- ranty of soundness to the condition of the article for some fu- ture time. 5 § 282. Implied warranty of title. — A vendor in possession of personal property, which he undertakes to sell as his own, im- pliedly warrants that he has title to it, and that it is free from incumbrances. 6 And a warranty of title is implied equally in a from the process of manufacture, and 2 Stamm v. Kuhlman, 1 Mo. App. also that neither he nor his agent in 296. such manufacture has knowingly used s Luthy v. Waterbury, 140 111. 664. improper material therein. We think, 4 Eden v. Parkison, 2 Doug. 732. therefore, that it was error to thus 5 Fatman v. Thompson, 2 Disney instruct the jury." (Cincinnati), 482, where it was held 1 Postel o. Oard, 1 Ind. App. 252. competent to prove a custom in Cin- At common law an implied warranty cinnati among tobacco dealers, that in extends only to defects existing at the all sales of tobacco the seller impliedly time. Garrett v. Heaston, 5 Blackf. warranted the tobacco to remain sound 349 ; Stamm v. Kuhlmann, 1 Mo. App. and merchantable for four months af- 296; Luthy ... Waterbury, 140 111. ter the sale. 664; Upton v. Suffolk Co. Mills, 11 6 Close i>. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500; Cush. 586, where it is held that a Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283; Gross v. general agent has no implied author- Kierski, 41 Cal. Ill ; Linton v. Por- ity to bind his principal by a war- ter, 31 111. 107 ; Thompson v. Irwin, ranty that flour sold will keep sweet 42 Mo. App. 403; Hodges v. Wilkin- during a sea voyage. son, 111 N. C. 56 ; Huntingdon v. Hall, 36 Me. 501 ; Long v. Hickingbottom, § 282 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 355 contract of exchange as upon a sale of personal property. 1 So, also, when a sale by an agent is made, and the purchaser, will- ing to trust the agent, while the principal is a stranger, takes written evidence of the sale signed by the agents, as princi- pals, they must be held to have assumed the responsibility of principals; and none the less so because their business im- plies agency, and hence where an instrument in the form of a bill of sale was delivered by brokers to the purchaser, al- though not signed by them, it was held that the instrument was a contract of sale not subject to change by parol evi- dence, and that they were personally liable to him on their implied warranty of title. 2 The presumption of law is that there is no express agreement touching title, the seller im- pliedly warranting it, and if he desires to be relieved from the liability attending this warranty, he must set up and prove the special contract. 8 The rule of implied warranty of title ob- tains in the case of buildings sold as chattels; if they are in possession of the seller he impliedly warrants title. 4 Mr. Ben- jamin states the law to be, that in an executory agreement the vendor warrants, by implication, his title in the goods which he promises to sell; also in the sale of an ascertained specific chattel, an affirmation by the vendor that the chattel is his is equivalent to a warranty of title; and that this affirmation may be implied from his conduct, as well as from his words, and may also result from the nature and circumstances of the sale. But in the absence of such implication, and where no express warranty is given, the vendor, by the mere sale of a chattel, does not warrant his title and ability to sell, unless he knew he had no title, and concealed that fact from the buyer. 5 "In every sale of a chattel, if the possession be at the time in 28 Miss. 772; Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 win, 42 Mo. App. 403; Schell t. Mo. App. 87; McCoy v. Artcher, 3 Stephens, 50 Mo. 375 ; Mills v. Hunt, Barb. 323; Shattuck ». Green, 104 20 Wend. 431; Smyth v. Spalding, Mass. 42; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 13 Mo. 529. 478. 3 Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N. C. 56. 1 Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500; 4 Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87; Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich. 18 ; Patee Huntingdon v. Hall, 36 Me. 501 ; v. Pelton, 48 Vt. 182. Shattuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42. 2 Sprague v. Rosenbaum, 38 Fed. 5 Benjamin on Sales, §627. Rep. 386. See also, Thompson ». Ir- 356 WAERANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 283 another, and there be no covenant or % warranty of title, the rule of caveat emptor applies, and the party buys at his peril. But if the seller has possession of the article, and he sells it as his own, and not as agent for another, and for a fair price, he is understood to warrant the title." ' § 283. Seller's implied warranty of title — Exception. — In sales of personal property by one in possession there is, as we have seen, an implied warranty on the part of the seller that he has a good title to such property ; 2 but there is no such implied warranty in the case of judicial or official sales. 8 1 2 Kent's Commentaries, 478. 2 Jarrett v. Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602 ; 20 S. E. Rep. 575, where the court said : "When a sale of chattels is made, there is an implied warranty of good title by the vendor, where the goods are in the vendor's possession. Byrn- side v. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702 ; Ben- jamin on Sales (6th ed., by Bennett), § 627 et seq., and note 11, p. 631 ; Ml note to Scott v. Hix, 62 Am. Dec. 460 ; 2 Kent's Commentaries, 478. Some old English Text-books lay down that there is no implied warranty of title, but Mr. Benjamin says no case was ever so decided there. That old rule, repugnant to reason, if it really exist- ed, was long since 'wellnigh eaten away,' as Lord Campbell well said; and now it is settled in England that there is such implied warranty, and it is universally admitted in America. But there is no implied warranty of soundness or quality of goods sold. Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 572 ; Ben- jamin on Sales, § 644, and note 13, p. 640. In this case the vendor, at the date of sale, had given a deed of trust on the property, and his war- ranty was broken at once. He was also guilty of fraud in the sale. Ben- jamin on Sales, § 628, says, 'If the vendor knew he had no title, and con- cealed that fact from the buyer, he would be liable on the ground of fraud.' " Under the Georgia code, § 2651, "The seller in all cases (unless expressly or from the nature of the transaction excepted) warrants: (1) that he has a valid title and the right to sell ; (2) that the article sold is marketable and reasonably suited to the use intended." 3 Johnsons. Laybourn,56Minn. 332; 57 N.W. Rep. 933, where the court said: "It is well settled that in judicial sales the rule caveat emptor applies. Barron v. Mullin, 21 Minn. 374. The rule also applies to official sales ; that is, sales made by and as officers of the law, such as sheriffs, constables, etc., under writs of exscution, although they are not strictly judicial. The Monte Al- legre, 9 Wheat. 616 ; Worthy v. John- son, 8 Ga. 236; Hensley v. Baker, 10 Mo. 157 ; Chapman v. Speller, 14 Q. B. 621 ; Morgan v. Fencher, 1 Blackf. 10; Rodgers v. Smith, 2 Ind. 526 ; Bostick v. Winton, 1 Sneed, 525; Yates v. Bond, 2 McCord, 382; Bashore v. Whisler, 3 Watts, 490; Davis v. Hunt, 2 Bailey, 412; Stone v. Pointer, 5 Munf . 287. In case of such sales, of- ficial as well as judicial, the buyer is, unless the officer assumes to do more, bound to know that the latter sells only what he is authorized to sell, and to sell it just as it is. An assignee under the insolvent law is an officer of the court. His title and all his acts are official." § 284 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 357 § 284. The same subject continued — The seller is not in possession. — The rule in America is that a person selling chat- tels of which he has not possession does not impliedly warran- ty the title. But the term "not in possession" only covers certain excepted cases, in which the vendor sells his mere naked interest. 1 Thus, where the vendor sold a note of which he was not in possession, he stating to the vendee that he did not know whether the note existed or not, it was held that there was no implied warranty of title. 2 Where an execution had been levied on a corporation's property, and the buyer with knowledge of this fact bought the property from the corpora- tion, the property at the time of the sale being in the possession of the sheriff, it was held there was no warranty of title to be implied. 3 If a house is sold as a chattel, it being at the time in the occupation and on the land of another, the rule as to title is caveat emptor. i Should a chattel subsequently come to the possession of a vendor by purchase, he having previously sold it while out of possession, a bona fide purchaser from him would have title as against the first vendee. 6 In the absence of pos- itive proof to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the vendor had possession at the time he sold the property. 6 And if there be an affirmation of title where the vendor is not in possession, the vendor is subjected to the same liability as if he had pos- session of the property.' 1 Whitney v. Heywood, 6 Oush. 82, This doctrine assimilates itself to a 86, where the court said: "The prin- deed of land. "There is no warranty ciple is usually stated under this lim- in the conveyance of land except such itation of a vendor in possession, and as is contained in the deed. I take it properly so. But possession 5 Scranton v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220. here must be taken in its broadest 6 Long s. Hickingbottom, 28 Miss, sense, and as including possession by 772. bailee of the vendors The excepted 'McCoy v. Artcher, 3 Barb. 323. cases must be substantially cases of See, also, Fletcher v. Drath, 66 Mo. sales of the mere naked interest of 126, holding that the doctrine of persons having no possession, actual caveat emptor applies to one advancing or constructive ; and in such cases no money and taking a deed of trust warranty of title is implied." Shat- upon personal property, not in the tuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42. possession of the grantor in the deed 2 McCoy v. Artcher, 3 Barb. 323. of trust. Thompson v. Irwin, 42 Mo. 8 Hopkins v. Grinnell, 28 Barb. 533. App. 403. Huntingdon i>. Hall, 36 Maine, 501. 358 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 285 § 285. What constitutes breach of warranty of title. — A buyer of chattels can not maintain an action upon the implied or express warranty of title, nor interpose the breach of such warranty of title, as a defense to an action for the price, with- out showing actual damage resulting from such breach of warranty. 1 If the vendor fraudulently represents himself to be the owner, when he knows to the contrary, such facts will bar a recovery for the price, 2 and the vendor is not entitled to have the property returned to him. 3 But fraud in reference to the property, other than the title, would allow a return of the property if the buyer refused to pay the price. 4 The pur- chaser of personal property, who takes and retains possession thereof, and uses and consumes the same, can not afterwards prevent a recovery of the price he agreed to pay by showing he had bought the title of a third person. 5 A buyer is not re- quired, before proceeding against his vendor upon the war- ranty of title, to wait for an actual deprivation by the true owner; he may surrender the property voluntarily, but must be then able to show conclusively that his surrender was to the paramount owner. 6 The purchaser from a person without title was sued by the true owner for its conversion, and a judgment recovered against him for the value; before payment of this judgment by such purchaser he sued his vendor for breach of the implied warranty of title; it was held that only nominal damages could be recovered. 7 The statute of limitations, upon an implied warranty of title does not commence to run until the buyer is disturbed in his possession by the true owner. 8 In its operation and legal bearings, the warranty of title in case of sales of personal property is very like a covenant of war- 1 Hull v. Caldwell, 3 South Dakota, 2 Sweetman v. Prince, 62 Barb. 256; 451 ; 54 N. W. Rep. 100; Case v. Hall, Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102. 24 Wend. 102; Huntingdon v. Hall, 3 Sweetman v. Prince, 62 Barb. 256. 36 Me. 501; Sweetman v. Prince, 26 4 Sweetman v. Prince, 62 Barb. 256. N. Y. 224; Sweetman v. Prince, 62 6 Krumbhaarv. Birch, 83 Pa. St. 426. Barb. 256; Krumbhaar v. Birch, 83 6 Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87; Pa. St. 426; Linton v. Porter, 31111. Sweetman v. Prince, 26 N. Y. 224; 107; Long v. Hickingbottom, 28 Miss. Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N. C. 56. 772; Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 7 Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283. 87; Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. Ill; 8 Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111. Hodges B.Wilkinson, 111 N. C. 56; Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283. § 286 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 359 ranty for quiet enjoyment in the sale of land. As respects an adverse title, according to the best authority, the warranty of title is not broken until an ouster or a surrender to the para- mount claim of an adverse owner. Hence it is sometimes styled a "warranty of quiet possession." 1 § 286. The same subject continued. — The courts of Massa- chusetts and Kentucky repudiate the doctrine that a buyer can set up a breach of warranty only when disturbed in the pos- session ; and they allow a purchaser to maintain an action against the seller to recover damages, although the purchaser has not been deprived of possession. 2 If the property sold is incumbered, the buyer must pay off the incumbrance or be deprived of possession before proceeding against his vendor. 8 Thus, where the vendee of mortgaged property does not surren- der the same upon the demand of the mortgagee, but defends an action brought by him for the recovery thereof, an action by the vendee against his vendor for breach of the warranty of title is ' premature while the suit by the mortgagee is still pending. 4 But if, in such suit, the buyer has been deprived of possession by claim and delivery proceedings, or replevin procedure, he may at once sue his vendor, although he answers in the suit brought against him. 5 The mere fact that the buyer has been notified 1 Close v. Oossland, 47 Minn. 500, ages in such action is the value of the 502; Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283; chattel; Perkins v. Whelan, 116 Mass. Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102, where 542, holding that the statute of limita- the court said: "Now, it would tions runs from the time of sale; be highly inequitable to permit the Chancellor v. Wiggins, 4 B. Mon. vendee to retain the possession or 201, holding that the warranty is like enjoy the use of the property thus a covenant of seizin, broken at once acquired, and put his vendor at if the vendor have no title, and from defiance. Possibly, the owner may that time limitation commences to never claim, and enforce his title, run. or, if he does, the seller may set- 3 Hull v. Caldwell, 3 S. Dak. 451; tie with him. The breach implies 54 N. W. Eep. 100; Close v. Cross- no bad faith, and therefore, is com- land, 47 Minn. 500 ; Hodges a.Wilkin- patible with perfect fair dealing be- son, 111 N. C. 56 ; American Electric tween the parties ; and the indemnity Co. v. Consumers Co., 47 Fed. Eep. is complete by responding therefor 43 ; Harper v. Dotson, 43 Iowa, 232. after a recovery under the paramount 4 Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. 500. title." Matheny v. Mason, 73 Mo. 677. 5 Hodges v. Wilkinson, 111 N. C. 56. 2 Grose v. Hennessey, 95 Mass. 389, Contra: Close v. Crossland, 47 Minn. holding also that the measure of dam- 500, holding that a provisional taking 360 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 287 that the chattel sold hira infringes on another's patent, and he will be held responsible for damages, is no defense to an action for the price. 1 A vendee of personal property, with covenants of warranty, may discharge an existing lien upon the property purchased, and deduct the amount from the unpaid balance of the purchase price. 2 And in an executed contract of sale, the buyer, so long as he is not disturbed in the possession by an adverse claim, or an incumbrance, can not rescind the sale. 3 But if the vendor fraudulently represents the property to be his when he knows it belongs to a stranger, this will allow a rescission without the buyer being disturbed in the possession. 4 When the buyer has been deprived of the chattel by an ad- verse claim, he may elect to either rescind and recover the con- sideration, or sue on the warranty. 6 § 287. Implied warranty of title by sheriffs and administra- tors. — The rule of caveat emptor is strictly applicable to sales by administrators. The purchaser must inquire into title and quality before purchasing. 6 And a purchaser of personal prop- erty at an administrator's sale, who has paid the money, can not recover it back, either from the administrator or distribu- tees, on the ground of an implied warranty of title.' The pur- chaser of property sold at sheriff's sale buys at bis own risk, there being no warranty, express or implied. 8 He also buys in claim and delivery before the de- 4 Hull v. Caldwell, 3 S. Dakota, 451 ; termination of the principal action 54 N. W. Rep. 100. decides nothing as to the title, and ia 5 Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich. 18. See, not an eviction warranting an action also, McGiffin v. Baird, 62 N. Y. 329, by the vendee before the decision of holding that the only effect of an ex- the principal suit. press or implied warranty of title is to 1 American Electric Co. v. Consum- guarantee the buyer against eviction er's Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 43. or injury from other parties, and * Harper v. Dotson, 43 Iowa, 232. until this occurs he is entitled to no 3 Hull v. Caldwell, 3 S. Dak. 451 ; 54 indemnity. Carter v. Walker, 2 Rich. N.W. Rep. 100; Close u. Crossland, 47 Law, 40; Clark v. People's Co., 46 Minn. 500, where the court said: Mo. App. 248. "Upon the general question of the 6 Bingham v. Maxcy, 15 111. 295. remedy of the buyer in such cases, 7 Prescott v. Holmes, 7 Rich. Eq. 9. courts differ, but the doctrine more 8 Neal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind. 451 ; generally accepted is that the action Brunner v. Brennan, 49 Ind. 98; should be solely upon the contract of State v. Prime, 54 Ind. 450; Hensley warranty." v. Baker, 10 Mo. 157; Hicks v. (Skin- ner, 71 N. C. 539. § 288 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 361 subject to all equities against the owner, whether he knows of them or not. 1 The rule of caveat emptor obtains, and the sheriff is not liable, although by mistake he sells the wrong property. 2 Thus, where, by mistake, real estate belonging to one person is mortgaged by another as his property, and, under a decree of foreclosure, is sold at sheriff's sale to a purchaser who has no notice of such mistake, he can not, in an action against such sheriff and the judgment plaintiff, have such sale set aside, and recover back the purchase-money for such realty, bid and paid by him at such sale." § 288. Implied warranty of title to bonds. — The vendor of securities, negotiable in form, is liable ex delicto for bad faith, and, ex contractu, there is an implied warranty on his part that they belong to him, and are not forgeries. Where there is no express stipulation, there is no liability beyond this. 4 Thus, the vendor does not impliedly warrant that bonds are not fraud- ulent re-issues of genuine bonds. 5 Where over-issued county bonds are sold in good faith, there is no implied warranty, and the purchaser can not recover the purchase-money paid. 6 Under authority of an act of the legislature, a city issued certain bonds payable to a party named, or bearer ; they be- came the property of a bank, which put them upon the market, and disposed of them ; it having been held that the act of the legislature was unconstitutional, and the bonds void, the pur- chaser brought suit against the bank to recover the considera- tion money paid; it was held that the bank was not liable. 7 Where one holding bonds in pledge for a loan, in pursuance of a sale made thereof by an owner, delivers the same to the purchaser, receives the purchase price, and then pays this over to the owner less his loan, such person is not liable al- 1 Hicks v. Skinner, 71 N. C. 539. TJ. S. 190; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 2 State v. Prime, 54 Ind. 450. TJ. S. 278. * 3 Neal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind. 451. s Meyer v. Richards, 46 Fed. Rep. 4 iEtna Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 727. U. S. 534; Otis v. Cullom, 92 TJ. S. 6 Sutro v. Rhodes, 92 Cal. 117. 447. See also, Louisiana v. Wood, 102 7 Otis v. Cullum, 92 TJ. S. 447. TJ. S. 294; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 3G2 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 289 though the bonds are forgeries. 1 The declarations of the seller at the time of the sale, to the effect that he did not own the goods, are not admissible to vary a written warranty. 2 Upon a sale of property, by virtue of a chattel mortgage, the pro- ceeding is notice to the public that the mortgagee is selling not his own title to the property, but merely what he has acquired, and no warranty of title is to be implied against the mort- gagee. 3 § 289. General warranty covenant. — The general "warran- ty" clause in a conveyance is equivalent to the several special covenants in use under the common law, and is sufficient to compel the grantor, before receiving the full amount of the purchase-money, to discharge all liens on the property. And a grantee in possession under a general warranty deed made in good faith, the grantor being alive and solvent, can not de- fend in an action for the purchase-money, solely on the ground that the deeds of remote grantors prohibited the sale of liquors on the premises. 4 1 Baker v. Arnot, 67 N. Y. 448. See Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676; Mtnn Ins. Co. ». Middleport, 124 U. S. 534; Ripley v. Case, 86 Mich. 261. 2 Koerper v. Jang, 33 111. App. 144 ; "Wadhams v. Innes, 4 111. App. 642 ; Wadhams v. Swan, 109 111. 46; Beach v. Miller, 51 111. 206; Keegan v. Kin- naire, 12 111. App. 484. 'Sheppard v. Earles, 13 Hun, 651. And see, Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500, the ease of an auction sale, by order of a pawnbroker, of unre- deemed pledged goods, and the court decided that the pawnbroker was not liable to a purchaser because he was deprived of possession by title para- mount. 4 Smith v. Jones (Ky. App. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 475, where the court said : "This term, used by the grantor in a deed that he conveys by or with gen- eral warranty, has been often held by this court to be in substance equivalent to the several special covenants, in use, under the common law ; as that one is seized of the land sold, that he has good and perfect right to convey, that the landis free from incumbrances.that the grantee shall quietly enjoy posses- sion, and that the grantor will war- rant and defend the title against all claims of all persons. Butt v. Riffe, 78 Ky. 352, and Pryse v. McGuire, 81 Ky. 608, as well as in numerous other cases. So that in this case the cove- nant of general warranty is all suffi- cient for the protection of Smith in the full, complete, unrestricted use and enjoyment of the land sold, free from all incumbrances, and is suffi- cient to compel the grantor, before receiving the full amount of the pur- chase-money, to pay off and discharge all outstanding unpaid liens on the property ; and this the evidence shows had been done before the rendition of the judgment for the purchase money, in fact before suit was brought. ***** Tne pi ea( ji n g 8 admit 290 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 363 § 290. Covenants of warranty — Grantee's rights. — The fact that if a grantee, who has been dispossessed, had taken posses- sion of the land at the time of the conveyance to him, he would have acquired title by adverse possession, does not re- lieve his grantor from liability to him on his warranty of title; and in an action on a convenant of warranty, plaintiff may re- cover interest on the price paid for the land from the time it that this clause appears in several of the deeds of the remote vendors of the plaintiffs in this case, but not in either of the deeds under which the grantors in this case obtained title, the last deed wherein this clause did appear being in 1872. It is not claimed by the defendant, Smith, that this property was suitable, either in its building or location, for saloon pur- poses, nor that he ever contemplated selling spirituous liquors on same, nor that he bad been in any wise inter- fered with or prohibited in any way, by legal process or otherwise, from so doing ; neither does he say that he has any apprehension of such pro- ceedings, but simply that it is an incumbrance on the free, unrestricted use of his property, and that it has injured its salable value. As we have seen, his warranty in his deed is suffi- cient to protect him in this respect, should he ever be actually disturbed in this use and enjoyment of his property; and being in possession, protected by this warranty, and one of his grantors being amply solvent (worth, according to the evidence, $20,000 or more), the uniform doctrine and practice in this court is, and for a long time has been, that the court will not interfere; that it will not cancel the contract where executed unless actual fraud has been perpe- trated in procuring same; neither will it withhold or restrain a vendor in the collection of his purchase- money on such a record. An early, well-considered and interesting case in this court on this question is Simp- son v. Hawkins, 1 Dana, 303. Other cases have followed : Taylor v. Lyon, 2 Dana, 276 ; Duvall v. Parker, 2 Duv. 182; Trumbo v. Lockridge, 4 Bush, 415 ; and recently English v. Thomas- son, 82 Ky. 280. In support of the title of plaintiffs in the court below, it is shown that they and those under whom they claim have had this prop- erty in actual, continuous, uninter- rupted possession for more than thirty years — the extreme limit beyond which the law in Kentucky will not protect any claimant by reason of any disability. This sale was made in good faith, the grantor not doubting his title. He says he did not think at the time of telling Smith, his ven- dee, of this clause in the earlier deeds prohibiting the sale of liquor on the premises, because he says that said premises had long been deemed obso- lete ; that for thirty years whisky had been regularly sold in saloons (twenty or more) in the town of Ashland, without any protest by the Kentucky Iron, Coal and Manufacturing Com- pany, who were the owners of all that tract of land whereon this city is built, and who had a similar clause inserted in all their deeds of convey- ance of said lots; that in fact this same company built a fine hotel in said city, and sold same in 1890, wherein a saloon was then and now kept. It is clear that appellee was in good faith, and contemplated no fraud in the sale of his property ; and when such is the case, and the con- 364 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 291 was paid, if he has not used or occupied the land. 1 All that is necessary for a vendee to recover on a covenant of war- ranty in his deed, is to show eviction and that the vendor was a party to the action or had notice of its pendency. 2 So, also, one claiming under a bargain and sale deed, with covenant of warranty against all persons claiming under the grantor merely, is not precluded from claiming as a bona fide purchaser. 3 § 291. Damages for breach of warranty. — The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference between the actual value of the defective articles, and their value had they been in accordance with the warranties — to which may be added compensation for the trouble and expense suffered, and any other special damages. Accordingly, in an action against a vendor for breach of warranty against defects and for the price paid, or agreed to be paid, it is competent to show what the goods would have been worth had they been as warranted. A manufacturer of wheels is liable, under his warranty against defective material, for using a grade of iron not suitable for the purpose for which the wheels were intended. In an action for breach of warranty in delivering articles not in conformity with the contract, the number of defective articles, and their value, must be established by competent evidence, and it can not be inferred that all were defective because some were. 4 tract fully executed by deed, with 'Raymonds. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219; 40 clause of " general warranty," and Pac. R. 158. the vendor living and solvent, as we i Case Plow Works u.Niles, etc., Co., have seen, the courts will not inter- 90 Wis. 590; 63N.W.Rep. 1013, where fere, even though a defect was shown the court said: "It is impossible to in the title." determine from the general terms of 1 Graham v. Dyer (Ky. 1895), 29 the finding upon what theory or basis S. W. Rep. 346. the plaintiff's damages were assessed. 2 Elliott v. Paufley, 89 Ky. 52. The The proper measure of damages was court said in Woodward v. Allan, the difference between the actual 3 Dana, 164: "As the defendant value of the defective wheels deliv- had notice of pendency of the eject- ered, and their value had they been ment, the judgment concluded him as in accordance with the written war- to the title, and, therefore, no other ranties ; and the price paid, or agreed proof of the adverse title was neces- to be paid, for them was competent sary on the trial." When the vendor evidence of the latter value (Giffert is notified of the pendency of the v. West, 33 Wis. 617; Merrill v. Night- action, he is bound by the recovery, ingale, 39 Wis. 247; Aultman, Taylor Cummins v. Kennedy, 3 Litt. 118. & Co. v. Hetherington, 42 Wis. 622; §291 WARRANTY IND PERFORMANCE. 365 Liability for breach of a covenant of warranty must be deter- mined by the law in force when the contract of warranty was Aultman & Co. v. Case, 68 Wis. 612 ; 32 N. W. Eep. 772), to which may be added compensation for the trouble and expense suffered, and other spe- cial damages incurred, in consequence of the wheels not being in conformity with the contract. Sutherland on Damages, §§ 670, 671 ; Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 306 ; Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U. S. 630; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696. The price for which the purchaser had sold the goods can not be shown, in order to modify the rule above stated, nor is it material whether he had sold them at all. Muller «. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597; Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 246; Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen, 242 ; Jones v. Just, L. E. 3 Q. B. 197; Bach v. Levy, 101 N. Y. 511, 515 ; 5 N. E. Eep. 345. The court re- fused to allow the plaintiff damages on account of defective wheels which it had sold and disposed of to third parties, and for which it had received an amount equal to the purchase price of the same. Within the well-settled rale established by the cases cited, this was error prejudicial to the plaint- iff, for which it is entitled, on its ap- peal, to a reversal of the judgment and a new trial. It was optional with the plaintiff to have certain of the specified wheels made with 8 steel or 10 iron spokes, and it insisted, in the main, on having them made with 10 iron spokes. It is claimed as a serious defect in the wheels that common iron was used for that purpose. There is evidence that the defendant figured on using common iron, but not that this fact was communicated to the plaintiff, or that any particular kind or grade of iron was discussed or agreed on. The evidence tends to show that refined iron ought to have been used. The stipulation against defective material is substantially an agreement that material not suited to the purpose should not be used, and required that the iron for the spokes should be of the necessary grade and quality, if there was any such pro- curable in the market. The defend- ant could not comply with the contract by using a cheap and inferior kind of iron, unfit to be used in the manufact- ure of such wheels. In view of the facts presented by the record and the contentions of counsel on the question of damages, it is proper to add that the difficulty in assessing damages arises mainly out of the nature of the proof offered to show how many wheels were defective for want of con- formity to the warranties in the con- tract, rather than out of any uncer- tainty as to the rule of damages. The fact that certain wheels were defective in these respects, the number of them, and the proper amount of damages, must be established by competent and satisfactory evidence. Meageley v. Hoyt, 125 N. Y. 771 ; 26 N. E. Rep. 719 ; Leeds v. Metropolitan Gaslight Co., 90 N. Y. 26 ; Houghkirk v. President, etc., of Canal Co., 92 N.Y. 219, 225. Itcan not be necessarily or fairly inferred that all the wheels were defective be- cause quite a large number of them have been found to be so. It appears that out of nearly 14,000 shipped to agents, as sold and to be sold, 3,556 had been returned as defective, and 400, al- leged to be so, remained in the hands of agents after notice had been given to agents and others, for a period of four months or more, inviting the return of all wheels claimed to be defective. This does not, in connection with the other evidence, justify the inference that wheels not so returned or held were defective, but tends, at least, to show that they were not. As already stated, the plaintiff must prove how 366 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. §291 made. Under the South Carolina act of 1824, which provides that, in an action on a covenant, the measure of damages shall be the amount of the purchase-money at the time of the aliena- tion, with legal interest, it is held that where, in an action for breach of warranty, it appears that a life-estate was conveyed to the grantee, and enjoyed by him and his grantees, the value of the life-estate should be deducted from the damages, although the grantee who brought the action enjoyed but a small portion of such life-estate. 1 many and what wheels were defective, by competent and satisfactory evi- dence. This can not be established by mere conjecture or guesswork." As to the buyer's remedy and procedure on a breach of warranty by the seller, see, Ohio Thresher Co. v. Hensel, 9 Ind. App. 328; 36 N. E. Rep. 716; Marsh v. Low, 55 Ind. 271. 1 Aiken v. McDonald (S. C. 1895), 20 S. E. Rep. 796, where the court said : "It would be contrary to the plainest principles of justice that one who has lost only a portion of the thing pur- chased should be entitled to just as much damages as if he had lost the whole of the thing purchased. It is, however, contended by the counsel for respondents, and the circuit judge so held, that under the act of 1824, as construed in the case of Lowrance v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8, the measure of damages adopted by the circuit judge is fixed by statute, and can not be de- parted from. This is undoubtedly true where there has been a total breach of the warranty ; but it by no means follows that the same measure must be applied where there has been only a partial breach of the warranty. In the case of Earle v. Middleton, Cheves, 127 (decided in 1840), the ac- tion was upon a covenant of warranty in a deed from Middleton to Earle, purporting to convey 1,020 acres of land, and the breach assigned was the loss of 131 acres by paramount title in a third person. Plaintiff recovered judgment for the value of the 131 acres, and the judgment was affirmed. In that case O'Neall, J., used the fol- lowing language: 'The A. A., 1824, § 4, p. 24, enacts in affirmance of the rule as laid down in Furman v. El- more, 2 Nott & McO. 189 (decided in 1812), Bond v. Quattlebaum, 1 Mc- Cord, 584 (decided in 1822), and the other cases decided at law, "that in any action or suit at law or in equity for reimbursement or damages, upon covenant or otherwise, the true meas- ure of damages shall be the amount of the purchase-money at the time of the alienation, with legal interest.'' Testing the case before us by this act, or by the rule of law settled long be- fore it was enacted, there can be no doubt that the jury adopted the true measure of damages in giving to the plaintiff the proportion of the pur- chase-money which the land recov- ered bore to the whole tract, with in- terest from the date of his deed.' The same doctrine was recognized and applied in the cases of Wallace v. Talbot, 1 McCord, 466, and Crawford v. Crawford, 1 Bailey, 128, where there was only a partial breach of the warranty by a deficiency in the num- ber of acres of the land sold. The fact that these cases arose prior to the passage of the act of 1824 can not make any difference, if, as O'Neall, J., supra, said (what is undoubtedly the fact), the act of 1824 was -but an affirmance of the rule which had been § 292 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 367 § 292. Covenant of seizin — Damages for breach. — A written instrument, executed and delivered by the assignor of a lease contemporaneously with its assignment, stipulating that the lease "is genuine and in full force and effect," and guaranty- ing to the assignee "the rights and title of said lease," is founded on a sufficient consideration, and amounts to a cov- enant of seizin by the assignor of the demised premises, and that the assignee shall peacefully enjoy the same during the term of the lease, according to its provisions. Such covenant is broken if the assignor have not the possession of the prem- ises at the time of the assignment, and is unable to deliver the same to the assignee on account of a prior and paramount title and possession of another; and the assignee's right of action for the breach of the covenant will not be affected by his subsequent purchase of the paramount title, and posses- sion thereunder. The measure of the damages which the plaintiff may recover in such action is the amount of the con- sideration paid for the lease, with interest; and it is not essential to the recovery that the lease be reassigned or ten- dered back. 1 settled in this state ever since the case is a partial breach of the warranty by of Furman v. Elmore, supra. In ad- reason of a failure of the title to a dition to this, we have two cases in portion of the estate conveyed." this state, which arose since the pass- 'Wetzel v. Richcreek (Ohio, 1895), age of the act of 1824, — Lewis v. Lew- 40N. E.Rep. 1004,where the court said : is, 5 Rich. Law, 12, and Jeter«. Glenn, "Thequestionwhetherthedefendants' 9 Rich. Law, 374, — in which there was contract of guaranty, with respect to a partial breach of warranty by out- the measure of damages recoverable for standing estates of dower, and in its breach, may properly be classed which the same rule for the measure- with covenants of seizin, is fairly made ment of damages was applied. If, on the charge of the court, and its con- then, the rule requires that in case of sideration becomes necessary in the a partial breach of the warranty by a decision of the case. A covenant of failure, of title to a portion of the seizin is denned to be 'an assurance to thing conveyed there shall be an ap- the purchaser that the grantor has the portionment of the measure of dam- very estate in quantity and quality ages fixed by the statute, based upon which he purports to convey,' and ex- the relative values of that portion to tends not only to the land itself, but which title fails and of that portion to also to whatever is properly appurte- Which the title proves to be good, we nant to and passes by the conveyance do not see why, upon the same prin- of the land ; and, though the covenant ciple, there should not be a similar is usually found in conveyances of the apportionment in a case where there fee, it is appropriate in leases and as- 368 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 293 § 293. Performance of building contract. — The performance of a building contract need not be literal and exact. It is signments of them. Indeed, it seems well settled that in leases the cove- nant, or its equivalent, will be im- plied, unless the terms of the lease ex- clude the implication. It is said in Rawle on Covenants, § 272 : ' With respect to estates less than freehold, covenants for title were from the ear- liest times implied, not only from the words of leasing, such as demisi, con- cessi, or the like, but even from the re- lation of landlord and tenant, and such is the law at the present day, un- less where, as in some of the United States, it has been altered by legisla- tion.' And in § 273 that author says: ' The covenants for title thus implied from the words of leasing were and are two: First, a covenant that the lessor has power to demise; and, sec- ondly, a covenant for quiet enjoy- ment — and both of these covenants are, of course, as are all common-law implied covenants, general or unlim- ited.' It is held by some authorities that no covenants are implied in the assignment of a lease. Waldo v. Hall, 14 Mass. 486; Blair v. Rankin, 11 Mo. 440. Other authorities, however, main- tain the contrary doctrine. Thus, in Souter v. Drake, 5 Barn. & Adol. 992, 1002, it is said by Lord Denman that, ' unless there lie a stipulation to the contrary, there is in every contract for the sale of a lease an implied under- taking to make out the lessor's title to demise, as well as that of the vendor to the lease itself, which implied un- dertaking is available at law as well as inequity.' And see Benselv. Gray, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 447. This would seem to be the better rule, because it can hardly be supposed to be the in- tention of one party to purchase, or of the other to sell, the mere instru- ment of lease without any beneficial interest under it, but, rather, that the subject of the purchase and sale is the right to enjoy the term purported to be demised, and all the benefits which it stipulates to confer on the lessee. But it is not deemed necessary to de- termine here what, if any, obligation may be implied from the assignment of the lease. It is, of course, com- petent for the parties to introduce into the assignment any covenant or stipu- lation pertinent to the subject which they have agreed upon, and it is not unusual for the assignor to covenant that the indenture of lease is good, that he has power to assign, that he will save the assignee harmless from former grants and incumbrances, and for quiet enjoyment. 2 Tay- lor on Landlord and Tenant, § 431. The instrument of guaranty executed by the defendants, and delivered to the plaintiff contemporaneously with the delivery of the assigned lease and the payment of the balance of its purchase price, was founded upon a sufficient consideration, and became a part of the contract of assignment. By it the defendants stipulated that the lease was in full force and effect at the time of its assignment and deliv- ery to the plaintiff, and guaranteed to him 'the rights and title of said lease.' This amounts to an express covenant of the assignor's title to the term de- mised, and for its quiet enjoyment by the assignee. It has long been the law of this state that a covenant of seizin is not broken so as to give the covenantee a right of action if the covenantor had the actual seizin, though not the legal title, at the time of the conveyance, and the former is put in possession under it, until there has been an eviction under a para- mount title. Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 584, and cases there cited. And the same rule obtains in regard § 293 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 369 in contemplation of law sufficient, if the contractor, acting in good faith in carrying out the contract according to its terms, to a covenant for the quiet enjoyment of a lessee. Such eviction, however, may be constructive, as well as actual ; as where the covenantee has purchased or taken a lease under the paramount title, even without any actual change of possession, when the validity of such title has been established by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and, under certain cir- cumstances, when it has not been so established. In opposition to this doc- trine it has often been urged, says Mr. Rawle, in his work on Covenants for Title, § 142, 'that it confounds all dis- tinctions between a covenant for seizin and a covenant for quiet enjoyment or warranty ; and it has also been argued that an analogy exists to the rule which prohibits a tenant from dis- puting his landlord's title, unless there has been an actual eviction under the paramount claim. But, in answer to such analogy, it may be said, first, that whatever may have been the origin of this rule, or its earlier ap- plication, it is now well settled that, whenever the landlord's title is insuf- ficient for the security of the tenant, the relation between them may be re- nounced, and the latter may protect himself under the paramount title.' The only effect of the judgment estab- lishing such title is that it makes a prima facie case of paramount title if the covenantor is not a party, and is conclusive evidence thereof if he is a party to the judgment ; while if, with- out it, the covenantee surrenders the possession, or buys in the superior title to protect his possession, he does so at his peril, and assumes the bur- den of proving such superior title, to which he would have been compelled to yield. So, when a covenantee is una- ble to obtain possession in consequence 24 of an existing possession by a person claiming and holding under an elder title, it is equivalent to an eviction. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, § 314. The evidence in the case before us was such that the jury might well have found, as shown by the verdict, that the defendants had broken their cove- nants in the contract of assignment of the lease to the plaintiff. The liability of the defendants on their covenants being established, the measure of the damages was not less than that author- ized by the rule given in the charge to the jury. In McAlpin v. Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120, it is said that ' where a grantee of an estate in fee-simple, with warranty, is evicted, by paramount title, of his entire estate, the rule of damages is settled in Ohio to be the amount of the original purchase- money, with interest, not, however, to exceed the time limited by statute for the recovery of mesne profits from the time of eviction. So, if he be evicted of a definite portion of the premises, the damages are a proportional amount of the purchase-money with like in- terest. King v. Kerr, 5 Ohio, 154; Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 317 ; Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211 ; Clark v. Parr, 14 Ohio, 118 In analogy to this rule it has been held that the rents re- served in a lease, where no other con- sideration is paid, must be regarded as a just equivalent for the use of the demised premises. The parties have agreed so to consider it. In case of eviction the rent ceases, and the lessee is relieved from a burden which must be deemed equal to the benefit which he would have derived from the con- tinued enjoyment of the property.' But where a further consideration has been paid, in addition to the rent re- served, its amount or value may be re- 370 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 293 and intending and attempting to perform, does so substantially. 1 But while substantial compliance with the terms of a contract is sufficient to entitle a party to recover, the owner is entitled to a just allowance for slight or trivial defects 2 And the fact that the defects are very trivial does not preclude the owner from recovering for them. 3 All the owner can recover, however, is the difference between the value of the work as the contractor left it, and what it will cost to leave it completed m strict con- formity with the contract. 4 A stipulation that the contractor shall furnish releases from subcontractors before the last in- stallment of the contract price shall be paid will not prevent the filing of a mechanic's lien by the contractor, in advance of the furnishing or procuring of such releases. Whether a con- tract has been substantially performed is a question of fact de- pending upon all the circumstances of the case to be deter- mined by the trial court. 6 Thus, a contract to build a barn is covered. In the case of Lock v. Furze, 19 C B. (N. S.) 96, where a tenant in possession had, in consideration of a premium of £400, obtained from the landlord a second lease, to commence when his old lease should expire, but before this time arrived the lessor died, it being discovered that the sec- ond lease was an excessive execution of a power, the lessee, upon being notified that it would not be recognized by the parties in interest, secured the premises at a much higher rent, and then sued on the covenant for qniet enjoyment contained in the lease, the court held 'that the measure of dam- ages was, besides the £400 premium paid and the costs of preparing the void lease, the difference in value, as estimated by the jury upon the evi- dence, between the term professed to be granted to the plaintiff by his les- sor and the seven years' term which he obtained from the reversioners — in other words, the value of the term he had lost.' This decision was, on ap- peal, affirmed in exchequer chamber, and was followed in the later case in the court of exchequer of Rolph v. Crouch, L. R. 3 Exch. 44 ; and the rule it announces, it is said, prevails generally in this country. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, § 317. At all events, in such cases the measure of damages is not less than the amount of the consideration paid, with the in- terest, and the trial court was not in error, we think, in applying that rule to the plaintiff's action." 1 Oberlies v. Bullinger, 132 N. Y. 598; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382. 2 Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492 ; Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. St. 446; Monocacy Co. v. American, etc., Co., 83 Pa. St. 517; Boteler v. Roy, 40 Mo. App. 234; Heckman v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211; Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 145. 3 Boteler v. Roy, 40 Mo. App. 234, but he must plead the matter and ask recovery. 4 Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. St. 446. 5 Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. St. 492. 6 Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. § 293 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 371 substantially performed and the contractor can recover, al- though he have left some large doors unhung. 1 An architect performs his contract to furnish plans, and substantially per- forms his contract if the only defect is a chimney which is inadequate. 8 A deviation from the plans by an error in measurement, by which the roof of the rear addition of the house is built five inches too low, does not preclude the con- tractor from recovery for a substantial performance. 3 A con- tract to varnish and grain a building is substantially complied with, if the only thing left undone is some graining which will cost about five dollars to complete. 4 Where it will take six hun- dred dollars to complete the work, this is not substantial perform- ance; 6 but defects in the plastering to the extent of two hundred dollars do not prevent the contractor from alleging substantial performance. 6 And since the rule of exact or literal perform- ance has been relaxed, and recovery may be founded upon sub- stantial performance, that term, in its practical application to building contracts, has perhaps necessarily become somewhat indefinite; accordingly, the fact that the builder has in good faith intended to comply with the contract, and has substan- tially done so, in the sense that the defects are not pervasive, does not constitute a deviation from the general plan contem- plated for the work, and is not so essential that the object of the parties in making the contract and its purpose can not, without difficulty, be accomplished by remedying them. 7 Con- sequently, slight defects caused by inadvertence or unintentional omissions are not necessarily in the way of recovery of the con- tract price, less the amount, by way of damages, requisite to ' Rose v. O'Riley, 111 Mass. 57. the syllabus : "The trial court charged 2 Hubert v. Aitken, 5 NY. Supl.829. that, if the plaintiff had not substan- An architect is bound only to exercise tially performed, he could not recover reasonable care, and to use reasona- the balance of the contract price ; but, ble means of observation and detec- if he had, although a small and unim- tion, in the supervision of the build- portant portion of the work remained ing. to be done, he could recover the bal- 3 Oberlies v. Bullinger, 132 N. Y. ance of the contract price, less the ex- 598. pense of performing that portion left 4 Harlan v. Stufflebeem, 87 Cal. 508. undone. Held, no error." 5 Flaherty v. Miner, 123 N. Y. 382. 6 Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. This case presents the New York law ' Crouch v. Gutman, 134 N. Y. 45 ; in building cases. The following is 31 N. E. Rep. 271. 372 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE . § 294 indemnify the owner for the expense of conforming the work to that for which he contracted; and whether, having in view those guiding considerations, the contractor has proceeded in good faith, and whether the defects are slight in their relation to the work as a whole, are usually questions of fact, and upon their determination hinges the disposition of the question of substantial performance. 1 § 294. The same subject continued — Digging wells. — The contractor is bound to construct the building substantially of the material and in the manner specified in the contract; and any deviation from the plans in regard to the material used is not a substantial compliance, although better materials are used. Thus, where the contract called for a particular kind and make of columns other columns substantially like them can not be substituted. 2 A stone wall can not be substi- tuted for a brick one. 3 A contract to make a cellar water-tight is not substantially performed if any water at all gets in the cellar. 1 Where the contractor offers to do any work the owner desires to have done in completion of the contract, and the owner fails to designate any work unfinished, this shows a sufficient performance on the contractor's part. 5 It is compe- tent for a contractor to make his delivery of a building or a ship conditional upon the owner's releasing all claims for dam- ages for non-performance. And the acceptance by the owner in such cases operates as a full and complete performance of the building contract, and estops the owner from afterward alleg- ing anything to the contrary. 6 If no particular distance is specified in a contract to dig a well, then only a reasonable depth 1 Crouch v. Gutman, 134 N. Y. 45; 5 Dennis v. "Walsh, 16 N. Y. Supl. 31 N. E. Rep. 271 ; Glacius v. Black, 257. 50 N.Y. 145; Phillip v. Gallant, 62 6 Oregon Improvement Co. v. Roach, N. Y. 256; Woodward v. Fuller, 80 117 N. Y. 527. See, also, McMastero. N.Y. 312; Nolan u. Whitney, 88 N.Y. State, 108 N. Y. 542 ; Linch v. Paria 648. Lumber Co., 80 Texas, 23; 14 S. W. 2 Linch v. Paris Lumber Co., 80 Rep. 701; 15 S. W. Rep. 208>; Coon v. Texas, 23; 14 S. W. Rep. 701 ; 15 S. Citizens' Co., 152 Pa. St. 644; Schei- W. Rep. 208. ble v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376; Phelps t>. 3 Aldrich v. Wilmarth, 4 S. Dak. 38; Beebe, 71 Mich. 554; Linch v. Paris 54 N. W. Rep. 811. Lumber Co., 80 ITexas, 23; 15 S. W. 4 Weeks».0'Brien,12N.Y. Supl.720. Rep. 208. § 295 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 373 need be dug. 1 And this is so although the contract provides that the work shall continue until water is found or the owner satisfied." The contract diameter must be adhered to, and if it is not, no recovery can be had, even though the required depth is dug, and neither gas nor oil is struck, and this as a test of the territory is as effective as if the contract diameter had been adhered to; 8 but if the owner takes possession of such a well after it is dug he is liable to pay the contractor the value of his services.' A contract to dig a water-well is substan- tially performed when water is reached, and the omission to put on a screen at the bottom, and clean out the sand, does not prevent the contract from being substantially performed. 5 A contract to test a country for oil is substantially performed if wells are drilled through the stratum to the usual depth at which oil should be found, and such wells need not be "shot, torpedoed or tubed," unless the drilling shows some promise of oil. 8 § 295. Method of performance. — Generally speaking, the stipulated methods for the execution of the thing contracted to be done is not of the essence of the contract. If the perform- ance is efficient the compensation is due, although the per- formance may have been more economical than it would have been had the stipulated method of performance been fol- lowed. Thus where a city contracted with a fire company for the extinguishment of fires, and the contract stipulated that the company should keep a certain kind of apparatus, and a certain number of men, if the company fully accomplished the object of the contract, it may recover the stipulated compensa- tion, although it did not provide the apparatus or number of men called for by the contract.' So, also, a contract to furnish 1 Bohrer v. Stumpff, 31 111. App. 139. 7 City of New Orleans v. Fireman's 2 Bohrer v. Stumpff, 31 111. App. 139. Co., 43 La. Ann. 447. See also, Fres- 8 Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 no Canal Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. £30, Pa. St. 19. where it was held that a contract 4 Holmes v. Chartiers Oil Co., 138 to supply water was complied with, Pa. St. 546. although the ditch was so negligent!}' 6 Madden v. Oestrich, 46 Minn. 538; constructed as to be an injury to the 49 N. W. Rep. 301. owner's land. 6 Rice v. Ege, 42 Fed. Rep. 661. 374 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 296 plans for a building to cost "about $100,000" is complied with if the plans will entail an expenditure of $102,000 to erect the house. 1 And an architect can modify his plans, if they call for an expenditure exceeding the designated sum, and after such modification the owner must accept them. 2 Upon similar principles a contract to maintain a college of "standard grade" is substantially performed where the scheme of studies is up to the average of other colleges of the state, and the professors and teachers are of good ability, and well qualified for their respective positions. The fact that their compensation is small does not affect their ability, nor necessarily their efficiency. And their teaching in the preparatory department does not pre- vent the college from being "standard grade.'" § 296. Miscellaneous. — A contract to erect a combination passenger and freight elevator is performed, although gates have been omitted. 4 And a contract by a stockholder in a cor- poration, to pay a sum of money for the negotiating of a sale of land belonging to the corporation, by a third person, is not performed by such third person if he, after having found a purchaser, fails to get the corporation to convey. 5 In an action upon a contract to exterminate the prairie dogs upon a certain tract of land, it was held a sufficient performance if a large majority of them were destroyed. 6 So, also, a hot-water pres- sure tank is built correctly, if the usual man-hole at the side is omitted, provided a man can pass between the tank and the ceiling. 7 A corporation agreeing to erect a manufactory in a certain place does not perform its contract by erecting such manufactory in an adjoining place, even though its business is transacted in the place where it agreed to locate its manu- factory; and it can not recover upon stock subscriptions, containing such agreement. 8 An agreement to place a depot 1 Smith v. Dicky, 74 Texas, 61 ; 11 6 Curtis v. Watson, 64 Vt. 549. S. W. Rep. 1049. 6 Craig v. Weitner, 33 Neb. 484 ; 50 2 Marquis v. Lauretson, 76 Iowa, 23. N. W. Rep. 442. 'University of Des Moines v. Polk 7 Logan v. Berkshire Apartment Co., County, etc., Co., 87 Iowa, 36; 53 20 N. Y. Supl. 369. N. W. Rep. 1080. » Auburn Bolt, etc.,Worfc3».Shultz, 4 Horgan v. McKenzie, 17 N. Y. 143 Pa. St. 256. Supl. 174. § 298 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. 375 in a town is substantially performed by placing it within one hundred yards of the city's corporation line. 1 And the widen- ing of a street under a contract therefor is performed suffi- ciently to allow a recovery, although the second story of some buildings on such street project beyond and over the line of the lower story. 2 An agreement to remove the business of a cor- poration to a certain place is not complied with, if the corpora- tion only erects a building; and subscriptions to this effect may be recovered, although the money was used in erecting the buildings. 8 An unnecessary provision in a contract for the prevention of liens of subcontractors, which do not and can not accrue in favor of such subcontractors, need not be per- formed. 4 A person obtaining subscriptions for the purpose of locating a business in a town is entitled, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, after he has made an honest and faithful attempt to render the business a success, to close up the business, and the subscribers can not recover their subscriptions. 5 A contract to deposit a certain sum in favor of a party is performed if the person with whom the de- posit is to be made charges on his books the person who agrees to make the deposit, and gives credit to the one in whose favor the deposit is to be made, although no cash is passed. 6 But advertising in one thousand and twenty-two papers, .when the contract called for advertising in one thousand and seventy- five papers, is not a substantial performance. 7 Where work is done under direction of a city engineer and in accordance with the usage of the city works department, the fact that the con- 1 Fort Worth R. Co. v. Williams, B Ayres v. Dutton, 87 Mich. 528. To 77 Texas, 121 ; 18 S. W. Rep. 206. See a similar effect is, Texas, etc., R. Co. also, Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Marshall, v. Marshall, 136 TJ. S. 393. 136 U. S. 393. 6 Rigdon v. Conley, 43 111. App. 593, 2 City of Boston v. Simmons, 9 Cash, where the court said: "Mere book- 373. keeping, in most commercial trans- port Wayne Light Co. i>. Miller, 131 actions of magnitude, stands in the Ind. 499 ; 14 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 804. place of the actual handling of cash." See also, the leading case of Texas, See also, Russell v. Hadduck, 3 Gilm. etc., R. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393. 233. 4 Griffith v. Happersberger, 86 Cal. 7 Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N. Y. 407. 605. 376 WARRANTY AND PERFORMANCE. § 296 tract specifications are departed from does not prevent the con- tractor recovering. 1 'Gillen v. Babcock, 14 N. Y. Supl. 941. See also, Black v. Ostrander, 1 Colo. App. 272 ; Hunt v. Elliott, 77 Cal. 588; Warren v. Tinsley, 53 Fed Rep. 689; Gray ■«. Gannon, 4 Hun, 57; O'Dea v. Winona, 41 Minn. 424; Tu- iane v. Clifton, 47 N. J. Eq. 351 ; 20 Atl. Rep. 1086, holding that acts which are merely indicative of inten- tion to perform a voluntary promise, which do not prejudice the promisee, are not irrevocable steps in the per- formance of such a promise. Hume v. Flint Co., 11 N. Y. Supl. 431. CHAPTER VIII. TENDER. i 297. Tender defined. § 320. 298. Necessity of tender — Illustra- 321. tion. 322. What constitutes a tender. 323. Statutory rules. Method of tender. 324. Continued readiness to pay. 325. The same subject continued. Time of tender. 326. Notes and bills. 327. Ordinary contracts. 307. Tender of delivery of goods. 328. 308. Producing the money. 329. Further illustrations. 330. Production of the money on a 331. mortgage. 332. Money available for tender. 333. Power of congress to pass legal 334. tender acts. Waiver of defect in tender. 335. Tender of note or check. Contracts payable in gold or 336. silver dollars. Amount of tender. 337. The same subject continued. 338. Sufficiency of amount — 339. Waiver. 340. 319. Tender on severable debts. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. Conditional tender. The same subject continued. Giving receipt. To whom a tender should be made. Tendering at a bank. Tendering to an attorney at law. Tender of money into court. By whom a tender may be made. Tender under protest. Place of tender. Unliquidated damages. Effect of tender. The same subject continued. Further illustrations. Vendee's tender and demand of performance. In cases of pledge and mort- gage. Tendering back borrowed stock. Tendering railroad fare. Tender excused. Questions of practice. Touching costs. § 297. Tender defined. — "Tender," in its technical applica- tion, has reference to the discharge of debts and contracts to pay money, but sometimes it is used in reference to perform- ance generally. Some misapprehension or confusion appears to have arisen from the mode of expression used in the books in treating of the necessity of a tender or offer by the parties, (377) 378 TENDER. § 298 as applicable to cases of mutual and concurrent promises. The word "tender," as used in such a connection, does not mean the same kind of offer as when used with reference to the payment or offer to pay an ordinary debt due in money, in cases where the money is offered to a creditor entitled to receive it and nothing further remains to be done, the trans- action thereby being completed and ended; but it then means a readiness and willingness, accompanied with an ability on the part of one of the parties, to do the acts which the agreement requires him to perform, provided the other will concurrently do the things which he is required by it to do, and a notice by the former to the latter of such readiness. Such readiness, ability, and notice are sufficient evidence of, and indeed con- stitute and imply an offer or tender in the sense in which those terms are used in reference to agreements generally. It is not an absolute unconditional offer to do or transfer any- thing at all events, but is in its nature conditional only, and dependent on, and to be performed only in case of, the readi- ness of the other party to perform his part of the agreement. 1 § 298. Necessity of tender — Illustrations. — Before a cor- poration can sue on its stock subscriptions it must tender stock to the subscribers. 2 A real tender is a condition precedent, sine qua non, to authorize a suit to rescind a judicial sale; when it is alleged, denied and not proved, the plaintiff's action must be dismissed. 3 An offer in writing to pay the purchase price of land is such a compliance with a land contract as to cast on the vendor the necessity of tendering a deed. 4 A party is never under the necessity of accepting a 1 Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110, 119, Adams v, Williams, 2 Watts & Ser- 120; Cook v. Doggett, 2 Allen, 439, geant, 227; Hollowayw. Davis, Wright 41; Irvin o. Gregory, 13 Gray, 215; (Ohio), 129; Taylor v. Rhea, 10 Minor Browning v. Board of Comrs. Owen (Ala.),414; School Districts. Rogers, 8 County, 44Ind.ll ; Lynch v. Jennings 43 Ind. 276; Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. R 121 ; Rawson v. Johnson, 1 East, 203 Waterhouse v. Skinner, 2 Bos. & Pull 447 ; Ferry v. Williams, 8 Taunt. 62 Norwood v. Read, Plowd. 180. Pac. Rep. 928. 2 Courtright v. Deeds, 37 Iowa, 503; Iowa, 316; Berryhill v. Byington, 10 Iowa, 223; Winton v. Sherman, 20 Iowa, 295. 3 Farquhar v. lies, 39 La. Ann. 874. Peckham v. Stewart, 97 Cal. 147 ; 31 §§299, 300 tender. 379 tender until it is due.' Accordingly a tender made before the money is due is void as well as unnecessary. 2 § 299. What constitutes a tender. — An offer to buy a claim is no tender. Thus a mere offer by the debtor to buy the notes and mortgage given by him to secure a debt, before a sale by the mortgagee, will give no equitable ground for setting aside the sale and allowing a redemption. 8 Nor is the mort- gagee bound to accept what is due him, and assign his notes and mortgage to the person offering to pay him. 4 And a tender must always be made with an intent to extinguish the obliga- tion. 5 A mere allegation in a pleading that one tenders is no tender ; 6 and an offer, during vacation of court, to pay damages in a pending action, does not constitute a tender.' § 300. Statutory rules. — The Utah statute which declares that "an offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money," does not apply to a tender unless made in good faith, with ability to produce the money. 8 The California civil code provides that unless an offer of performance be accepted, 1 Patch v. Collins, 158 Mass. 468 ; 33 36 Pac. Rep. 202, where the court said : N. E. Rep. 567. " Ordinarily, where a party makes a 2 Berry Bros. v. Davis, 77 Texas, tender, independently of the statute, 191 ; Haskell v. Brewer, 11 Maine, he must actually produce the money 258; Ashburn v. Poulter, 35 Conn, to the creditor. It must be in sight, 553; Wheeler v. Woodward, 66 Pa. capable of immediate delivery, and St. 158 ; Wright v. Behrens, 39 N. J. the creditor be allowed a reasonable Law, 413; Eaton v. Wells, 22 Hun, time to determine the amount due, 123 ; Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 108 ; and to decide whether he will accept. Pennypacker v. Umberger, 22 Pa. St. A tender in writing under the statute 492; Peoples', etc., Bank v. Norwalk, is 'equivalent to the actual produc- 56 Conn. 547; Emerson v. White, 10 tion and tender of the money.' To Gray, 351. have this effect, however, the party 3 Magnusson v. Williams, 111 111. tendering must have the ability to 450. produce it, and must act in good faith. 4 Handy v. Munsell, 109 111. 362. Nor does such a tender deprive the 5 Chielhovich v. Krauss (Cal.), 11 creditor of the allowance of a rea- Pac. Rep. 781. sonable time in which to ascertain the 6 Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 amount due, and to determine whether Wis. 56; 45 N. W. Rep. 21. he will accept; and if he accepts, and 7 Strusguth v. Pollard, 62 Vt. 157 ; the debtor fails to produce the money, 19 Atl. Rep. 228. his tender will be of no avail. Start- 8 Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah, 3 ; up v. MacDonald, 46 E. C. L. 593 ; 380 TENDER. §301 the thing to be delivered need not be actually produced, and declares that all objections to the mode of an offer which could be stated at the time to the person making the offer, and could be then obviated by him, are waived unless then stated. It is held that, in case of an offer to pay money, actual production of it is waived unless demanded at the time. 1 § 301. Method of tender. — It is not every offer to deliver that amounts to a tender. The offer must be made under circum- stances which give to the other party the opportunity of ex- amining and receiving the thing tendered. Thus an offer to deliver a large quantity of oil to a person in the highway is no tender. 2 If a thing be locked up in a box, so that the party to whom it is shown can not open it or see the contents, it is not properly tendered. 8 The courts of California 4 and Iowa 5 allow a tender to be made in writing without the actual production Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; 77 Am. Dec. 483; Proctor v. Robinson, 35 Mich. 284; Smith v. Walton, 5 Houat. 141, Shugart v. Pattee, 37 Iowa, 422. Where a person makes a tender in writing, the statute excuses him from actually producing the money at the time of making the tender, but it ex- cuses no other act or requirement on his part which would be necessary to make a valid tender, independently of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to turn the statute, which was intended as a mere convenience, into an instrument of fraud to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their claims. In Mclnerney v. Lindsay (1893), 97 Mich. 238; 56 N. W. Rep. 603, in an action on a note executed by M. and L., the latter, an accommodation maker, defending, plaintiff testified that when the note was due M. came to his house, laid some money on the table, and said he wanted another year, to which plaint- iff replied that he would let it go, whereupon M. took the money, with- out plaintiff having touched or count- ed it ; that plaintiff then gave M. the note, on which he indorsed the in- terest, and M. then paid the interest to that time. Held, that this testi- mony did not show a payment or ten- der, authorizing the direction of a verdict for defendant L." 1 Green v. Barney (Cal. 1894), 36 Pac. Rep. 1026, applying §§ 1496, 1501, of the civil code. 2 Startup v. Macdonald, 6 M. & G. 593, where the court said: "In such a case it would be improper to say that which the jury have said here, that a tender had been made at all. There would, indeed, have been an offer to deliver, but an offer under circumstances which made acceptance impossible. Such an offer would be altogether nugatory and'delusive and certainly would not amount to a ten- der." s Isherwood v. Whitmore, 10 M. & W. 757, 764, per Parke, B. 4 Herberger v. Husman, 90 Cal. 583. 6 Casady v. Bosler, 11 Iowa, 242. § 302 TENDER. 381 of the thing. But this method is strictly construed and if the tender is not made by a sufficient instrument in writing, the thing must be actually produced. 1 If there be any fraud in a sale, the buyer is not required to tender back every- thing he received before he can rescind; a few minor things may be paid for in money, if consumed, while the bulk is tendered. 2 Where a person said to the sheriff who held an ex- ecution against his goods: "I tender you eighty dollars for that judgment," it was held a tender properly made. 3 A ten- der of chattels, or other property not money, in order to be a bar to an action, or amount to payment, must be made in such manner as to vest the property in the creditor and enable him to recover its possession in a future action. 4 And as of course a payment of money into court is always a proper form of tender. 5 § 302. Continued readiness to pay. — Tenders are always to be considered stricti juris ; if a tender is not legal in every respect, even a court of equity will not support it, nor supply a defect. Nor are tenders more favored at law; the rules which govern them are strict, and must be strictly applied. 6 Therefore a tender must always be kept good. 7 "The principle of the plea of tender is, that the defendant has performed, so far as he could perform, his part of the contract, by being always ready to pay the debt, and actually offering to do it, but this replica- tion shows that there was a time when the defendant was not ready to perform his part, viz., when the demand was made of 1 Casady v. Bosler, 11 Iowa, 242. court said: " If a tender is not le- 2 Hill v. Wilson, 88 Cal. 92 ; Tark- gal, a court of equity will not support ington v. Purvis, 128 Ind. 182; 25 it; nor supply a defect of a tender N. E. Rep. 879. against a rule of law, unless perhaps 3 Parmenter v. Fitzpatrick, 14 N. Y. where fraud is used to prevent it." Supl. 748. Hoyt v. Hall, 3 Bosw. 42. 4 Hughes v. Eschback, 7 D. 0. 66. 'Odum v. Eutledge, etc., R. Co., 94 6 Loughbridge v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., Ala. 488; McLelland v. Cook, 94 84 Iowa, 141 ; 50 N. W. Rep. 568. See Mich. 528 ; Dodge v. Fearey, 19 Hun, Sanders v. Bryer, 152 Mass. 141. 277; Brooklyn Bank v. DeGrauw, 23 6 King v. Finch, 60 Ind. 420, 423; Wend. 342; Roosevelt v. Bull's Head Shotwell v. Denman, Coxe, 174; Lit- Bank, 45 Barb. 579; Becker v. Boon, tell v. Nichols, Hardin, 66 ; Gammon 61 N. Y. 317. v. Stone, 1 Ves. Sen. 339, where the 382 TENDER. § 302 the whole amount of the note, at which time he ought to have been ready to pay the whole, as the whole was then due." 1 The failure to keep the tender good by using the money after tender destroys the attribute of a legal tender. 2 After a tender and its refusal, the money must be paid over on request; the failure to comply with the request destroys the effect of the tender. 3 The burden of proof is on the one pleading tender to show that he set the money aside and has not had the use of it; if he has had the use of the money this destroys the effect of a tender. 4 Thus, where, after making a tender, the party deposited the money to his own use, and a part of the sum was drawn out, and it was not shown that other money was kept ready to supply its place when called for, it was held the tender was not kept good. 5 Where a mortgagor and mortgagee were riding together and the mortgagor made repeated offers of money to the mortgagee, and the settlement was interrupted by a quarrel, but before any costs were incurred the mortgagee offered to receive the amount due, which had previously been tendered, and the mortgagor then failed to pay, it was held that as the tender was not kept good the mortgage lien was not discharged. 6 If, after a tender and refusal the debtor, with notice to the creditor, deposits the money with a third person, to be paid to the creditor whenever he shall call for it, the cred- itor is under no obligation to apply to the depository, and if the debtor, upon a subsequent demand, does not pay or tender the sum due, he loses the benefit of the previous tender.' 1 Cotton v. Godwin, 7 M. & W. 147, 6 Parks v. Allen, 42 Mich. 482. per Parke, B. ' Town v. Trow, 24 Pick. 168, where 2 Gray v. Angier, 62 Geo. 596, where the court said : "It is therefore neces- the defendant testified that "I used sary that the person making the ten- the money tendered Solomon in other der should always hold himself in ways, when Solomon refused to ac- readiness to meet a demand for the cept it." Oothrans v. Mitchell, 54 money or thing tendered; because Geo. 498, holding that the time when the party to whom it is due has a the tender was made, with an aver- right to call for it at any time, and ment of a continued and a present if he fails to pay or deliver it on re- readiness to pay, are essential ele- quest, he loses the benefit of the ments of a plea of tender. See also, tender. But this principle is to be Fannin v. Thomason, 50 Geo. 614. received with reasonable limitations 3 Carr v. Miner, 92 111. 604. and qualifications. It does not im- 4 Thayer v. Meeker, 86 111. 470, 474. pose upon the person making the 5 Crain v. McGoon, 86 111. 431. tender the duty of having the money § 303 TENDER. 383 § 303. The same subject continued. — The effect of a tender can not be destroyed by a subsequent demand for any other sum than that due. 1 And when a tender is relied on it must be brought into court. 2 Where the mortgagor relies on a tender of a part of the mortgage debt and asks to have part of the premises released from the mortgage, this does not have the effect of discharging the lien, but the mortgagor must make his tender good by bringing the money into court. 8 A com- plainant in equity, who relies for relief upon a tender, must allege all the facts substantially which are necessary in plead- ing a tender at law. 4 But where a bill in equity alleged sev- eral tenders and concluded with the words "which complain- ants are now ready and willing to pay him, and have been ready and willing to pay him ever since," it was held that the payment into court was not essential to the equity of the bill, and that an injunction to stay foreclosure proceedings would not be dissolved on account of the failure to pay the money into court. 5 And, it seems, that in bills for specific perform- ance by purchasers, tenders made to the vendor are not re- quired to be absolutely technical to entitle the purchaser to about his person or in his actual pos- "Allen v. Cheever, 61 N. H. 32; session at all times and in all places. Frost v. Flanders, 37 N. H. 549; Gilke- It would be sufficient to have it in son v. Smith, 15 W. Va. 44; Hamlett readiness to be delivered at his resi- v. Tallman, 30 Ark. 505; Becker v. dence or place of business, or, if a Boon, 61 N. Y. 317. large sum, in some safe and con- 3 Werner v. Tuch, 127 N. Y. 217 ; 27 venient place of deposit. If a de- N. E. Nep. 845; Breunich v. Wesel- mand was made at a distance from man, 100 N. Y. 609; Halpina. Phenix the place where it was kept, he would Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 ; Day v. Strong, have a right either to deliver it there 29 Hun, 505. See also, Weeks v. Ba- or to take a reasonable time to pro- ker, 152 Mass. 20; 24 N. E. Eep. 905; duee and deliver it where the demand Darling v. Chapman, 14 Mass. 101; was made. Had the defendant, when Edwards v. Farmers', etc., Ins. Co., called upon for the money, offered to 21 Wend. 467; Kortright v. Cady, 21 accompany the plaintiff to his home N. Y. 343; Mitchell v. Roberts, 17 or place of business, and there pay Fed. Rep. 776; Burtis v. Bradford, 122 the money, or to pay it where they Mass. 129; Boston, etc., Iron Works were, as soon as he could bring it, v. Montague, 108 Mass. 248; Gordon and actually used reasonable diligence v. Clapp, 111 Mass. 22 ; Stone v. Jenks, for the purpose, it would have been a. 142 Mass. 519. legal compliance with his demand." ' McGehee v. Jones, 10 Geo. 127. 'Dixon v. Clarke, 5 C. B. 365; 5 McCalley v. Otey, 90 Ala. 302. Spybey v. Hide, 1 Camp. 181. 384 TENDER. § 304 relief. 1 A tender in court of a part of the demand in suit ad- mits that the amount tendered was due at the date of the suit, and is therefore inconsistent with the claim that the suit was prematurely brought. 2 A proposition to pay off a chattel mortgage does not amount to a tender, and, even if it did, can not avail in replevin of the mortgaged goods unless kept good by payment of the money into court. 3 An offer in a complaint to deliver up a draft is a tender without actually producing it in court. 4 In an equitable action, where a party relies upon a tender of money, it is sufficient to keep such tender good, that he offers to bring the money into court and is ready to comply with the directions of the court in regard to it. 6 § 304. Time of tender. — All bills of exchange and nego- tiable notes are, by the law merchant, in the absence of a statu- tory provision to the contrary, entitled to grace; except those payable on demand or without specification of time — in which case on demand without grace is understood — or those expressly payable without grace. 6 To find when a bill or note is due, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary,, add three days of grace to the nominal time of payment in the case of all notes and bills not payable on demand; the nominal time of payment is determined by excluding the day from which time is to run, and including the day of payment. 7 By the law merchant, both in England and the United States, a month is construed to mean a calendar month in all cases of negotia- ble instruments, and of mercantile contracts. 8 If a bill falls due on Sunday or on a legal holiday, if entitled to grace, it is 1 Thayer v. Meeker, 86 111. 470. tation in saying * * * * thatne- 2 Giboney v. German Ins. Co., 48 gotiable instruments payable at sight Mo. App. 185. are, and should be, entitled to grace. 3 Woolner v. Levy, 48 Mo. App. 469. The weight of authority in the United 4 Berry v. American Central Co., States is to this effect." 132 N. Y. 49. 7 Chalmers on Bills, art. 20. 5 Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis. 8 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 140. See, also, Mankel v. Belscamper, 3d ed., § 624, citing Thomas v. Shoe- 84 Wis. 218 ; 54 N. W. Rep. 500 ; Levan maker, 6 Watts & S. 179 ; McMurchey v. Sternfeld, 55 N. J. Law, 41 ; 25 Atl. v. Robinson, 10 Ohio, 496; Lang v. Rep. 854; Dunbar v. De Boer, 44 111. Gale, 1 M. & S. Ill ; Matter of Swon- App. 615. ford, 6 M. & S. 226; Webb v. Fair- 6 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, maner, 3 M. & W. 473; Chalmers on 3d ed., § 617. "And we have no hesi- Bills, art. 20. 305 TENDER. 385 deemed to be due on the preceding day; if not entitled to grace, it is due on the succeeding day. 1 The law as to when suit may be instituted on a bill or note is thus summarized: "The au- thorities are in conflict as to when suit may be begun against the maker or acceptor. It is held that suit may be commenced (1) not until the day after the last day of grace, since the maker has the whole of that day in which to pay the note, and is not in default until its expiration. 2 (2) On the last day of grace after due demand and refusal. 3 (3) On the last day of grace after reasonable hours for payment have elapsed . ' ' 4 And Senator Daniel states the law thus: "The weight of authority supports the view that suit may be commenced on the last day of grace against the maker; but there are decisions of most respectable character to the contrary effect — that suit can not be brought on the last day of grace, nor on the last day of maturity, when there is no grace." 5 § 305. Notes and bills. — The tender of a debt before it is due is ineffectual. 6 And a tender, before due, to pay a 1 Chalmers on Bills, art. 20, citing Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 39; Pres., etc., City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205 ; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426; Kuntz v. Tem- pel, 48 Mo. 71 ; Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 627. 2 Benjamin's Chalmer's Notes and Bills, art. 120, citing Osborn v. Mon- cure, 3 Wend. 170; Bevan v. El- dridge, 2 Miles (Pa.) 353; McFar- land v. Pico, 8 Cal. 626. s Benjamin's Chalmer's Bills and Notes, art. 20, citing Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65 ; Ammidown v. Wood- man, 31 Maine, 580 ; Daly v. Proetz, 20 Minn. 411. 4 Benjamin's Chalmer's Bills and Notes, art. 20, citing McKenzie v. Du- rant, 9 Rich. L. 61. Of. Veazie Bank v. Winn, 40 Maine, 62. 5 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 3d ed., § 1209, citing Staples v. Frank- 25 lin Bank, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 43 ; Sleed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401 ; New England Bank v. Lewis, 2 Pick. 125 ; Greeley v. Thurs- ton, 4 Maine, 479 ; Flint v. Rogers, 3 Maine, 67; Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65; Veazie Bank v. Winn, 40 Maine, 62 ; Vandesande -u.Chapman,48 Maine, 262; Dennie v. Walker, 7 N. H. 199; Wilson v. Williman, 1 Nott & McC. 440 ; McKenzie v. Durant, 9 Rich. 61 ; Am- midown v. Woodman, 31 Maine, 580 ; Coleman v. Ewing, 4 Humph. 240; eh% ing contra, Osborn v. Moncure, 3 Wend. 170; Smith v. Aylesworth, 40 Barb. 104; Wells v. Giles, 2 Gale, 209; Walter v. Kirk, 14 111. 55 ; Coxw. Bern- hardt, 41 Texas, 591; also citing the following cases to the effect that suit can not be brought on the last day of maturity , when there is no grace : Davis v. Eppinger, 18 Cal. 381; Moore v. Hollaman, 25 Texas Supp. 81. 6 Wyckoff v. Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442, where the court said: "There is no 386 TENDER. § 306 negotiable instrument is void; but in view of the fact that days of grace were originally an indulgence accorded by commercial usage for the benefit of the debtor, if the parties to a bill or note treat it as due on the day when by its terms it is payable, and a transaction at that time takes place between them, based on this assumption, and the rights of third persons have not intervened, the days of grace will be deemed waived, and the same legal consequences will follow as though the transaction took place on the day of the legal maturity of the paper. Thus where certain bonds were held as collateral security for a note, and the maker tendered the amount to the holder on the day the note fell due, barring days of grace, it was held this was a sufficient tender; that if the holder objected to the tender on the ground that the days of grace had not expired, he should have objected expressly on that ground, and not on another. 1 A tender may, as of course, be made at any time after a note payable on demand is given. 2 § 306. Ordinary contracts. — When an obligation falls due on Sunday the obligor is bound to tender a performance of it on the following Monday. 8 Tender must be made a reasonable time before sunset on the given day; at least the tender must be continued till that time if the party who is to receive the article does not appear until that time; doubt of the general principle that a purchase of the bill and does not the tender of a debt before it is due operate as payment properly so-called, is ineffectual. The debtor can not be though it operates to put an end to compelled to pay the debt before mat- the liability between the parties." urity, and the creditor is not bound i Wyckoff v. Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442. to accept payment before that time." 2 Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461, Richardson v. Harris, L. R. 22 Q. B. where the court said: "A tender of D. 268, where the court said: "I do the amount of the note with interest not think that there is any authority de die in diem, at any time, would be in English law for the proposition that a good plea." the acceptor of a bill may tender the 3 Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, 73; amount before the bill is due, and Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Sands v. that such tender operates as a dis- Lyon, 18 Conn. 18; Carothers v. charge of the bill. The only payment Wheeler, 1 Ore. 194,196; Barrett v. that can discharge the bill is a pay- Allen, 10 Ohio, 426. Contra, perform- ment at or after maturity. If a pay- an ce must be tendered on Saturday: ment is previously made, it is really Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & J. 268. § 307 TENDER. 387 although, if he be present, a tender to him at any time on the day is good. 1 Where a statute prescribed that a tender might be made "until three days before the commencement of the term," it was held that three days must intervene between the day of tender and the day of the commencement of the term. 2 Where a tender is made, if the party to whom it is made object that it was not made in time, and make no further objection, but refuse to accept it, the tender will be taken prima facie to have been sufficient in amount. 8 Where a mortgagee enters for a breach of a condition to pay interest, and the mortgagor tenders the principal, not yet due, together with the interest, and the mortgagee refuses to receive the money, he can not object that the tender was insufficient in respect to the interest alone, unless he showed a willingness to receive so much only as was due for the interest. 4 The tender must be an actual one at the time. A mere offer at the time to tender, not coupled with the present ability to do so, is no tender. 5 The word "between," when applied to contracts, ex- cludes the two dates ; thus where the seller agreed to deliver some hogs at any time "between" the 10th and 20th of No- vember that the buyer might choose to call for them, it was held that a demand by the buyer on the 19th for the delivery of the hogs on the 20th of November was not a sufficient tender of performance. 6 It seems a tender after the debt be- comes due, and before suit, is of no effect. 7 § 307. Tender of delivery of goods. — "A contract to deliver goods is completely discharged by tendering the goods for ac- ceptance according to the contract; and if acceptance is refused there is no further obligation to continue ready to deliver." 8 1 Larimore v. Hornbaker, 21 Ind. 6 Cook v. Gray, 6 Ind. 335. 430; Startup v. Macdonald, 6 M. & G. 'Poole v. Tumbridge, 2 M. & W. 593; Sweet v. Harding, 19 Vt. 587; 223. See, also, Hume v. Peploe, 8 1 Parsons on Contracts, 445. East, 168 ; Dobie v. Larkan, 10 Ex. 776 ; 2 Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 566. Dixon v. Clark, 5 C. B. 365. 8 Bradshaw v. Davis, 12 Texas, 336. 8 Leake on Contracts, 3d ed., 740, 4 Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259. citing the following from Coke: "If 6 Hiatt v. Harris, 28 Ind. 379, wbere a man be bound in 200 quarters of a seller of hogs which had been re- wheat for delivery of 100 quarters, fused offered to go and procure other if the obligor tender at the day a 100 hogs immediately. quarters, he shall not plead emcore 388 TENDER § 308 The American rule, where the buyer rejects a tender of a de- livery of goods, seems to be, that the vendor has the choice of either one of three methods to indemnify himself : ( 1 ) He may store or retain the property for the vendee, and sue him for the entire purchase price. (2) He may sell the property, acting as the agent for this purpose of the vendee, and recover the difference between the contract price and the price obtained on such resale; or (3) he may keep the property as his own, and recover the difference between the market price at the time and place of delivery, and the contract price. 1 § 308. Producing the money. — A tender implies, on the part of the actor an offer to do the thing proposed, and a power and willingness then and there to do it as offered. In no view is that a tender, which the debtor had not the power, or the right to perform, if his offer is accepted. 2 And while the formal requisites of a tender of performance of a contract may be waived, to establish a waiver there must be an existing capacity to perform. 3 Therefore, a mere offer to pay, it not appearing that the party had the money ready, does not amount to a tender. 4 The bare refusal to receive the sum due, and the demand of a larger sum, is not enough to excuse the actual tender of the money. 5 And the rule is that to make a legal tender there must either be an actual offer of the money produced, or the production of it must be dispensed with by the express declara- tion, or equivalent act, of the creditor. 6 But a tender of money will be presumed sufficient if not objected to. 7 Great impor- tance is attached to the production of the money, as the sight prist, because albeit it be parcel of the See, also, Startup v. Macdonald, 6 M. condition, yet they be bona peritiira, & G. 593 ; Howe v. Moore, 14 N. V. and it is a charge to the obligor to Supl. 236 ; Cleveland v. Sterrett, 70 keep them." Coke on Littleton, 207 a. Pa. St. 204; Simmons v. Green, 35 1 Dustan v. Mo Andrew, 44 N. Y. 72 ; Ohio St. 104 ; Berry v. Nail, 54 Ala. Mason v. Decker, 72 N. Y. 595; Hay- 4-46 ; Phelps v. Hubbard, 51 Vt. 489. den ». Demets, 53 N. Y. 426 ; Smith v. 2 Champion v. Joslyn, 44 N. Y. 653. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13; 2 Kent's Com- 3 Eddy v. Davis, 116 N. Y. 247. mentaries, 504; 2 Parsons on Con- 4 Fuller v. Little, 7 N. H. 535. tracts, 484; Sedgwick on Damages, 5 Dunham v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 22. 282; Lewis v. Greider, 49 Barb. 606; 6 Thomas v. Evans, 10 East, 101. Pollen v. LePoy, 30 N. Y. 549 ; Benja- ' Conway v. Case, 22 111. 127. min on Sales, § 788, fith ed. Bennett. § 309 TENDER. 389 of it may tempt the creditor to yield. 1 Accordingly in a case where one left some money with his clerk to pay and when the creditor came the clerk notified him that he had the money but the creditor said he would not receive the sum, nor anything less than the whole demand, but the clerk did not produce the money, this was held no tender." But where the debtor placed upon a table, in the presence of the creditor, a package of bank notes and a few dollars in coin, and said to the creditor and his attorney, who was present, "There are one thousand four hundred dollars, count it if you please," this was held a suffi- cient production." Where, however, the debtor took a wagon and was proceeding to the residence of the creditor with the money to pay him, when he met the creditor on foot and the debtor stopped his wagon, and said to the creditor, "I have got the money here to pay you," and put his hand into his pocket to take out the bag which contained the money, and the cred- itor thereupon said, "I want nothing to do with such cut- throats as you," and walked away, the court held this a good tender. 4 § 309. Further illustrations. — Having the money in one's pocket and telling the creditor so, is not sufficient produc- tion, although the debtor asks the creditor to take it. 5 But an offer to pay in bank notes and a declaration of the party that he would as soon take bank notes as specie, but that he would take neither, is a sufficient tender. 6 A tenant said to his landlord, "Here is the rent," he holding the money in his hand in a desk, but not actually showing it to the landlord; the landlord said nothing and left the premises; it was held that there was no evidence of a tender, or of a dispensation with a tender. 7 So, also, where the cred- itor was passing by in a wagon and the debtor said to him, "I want to tender you this money for labor you have done lor me, " at the same time holding in his hand a sum equal 1 Finch v. Brook, 1 Bing. N. C. 253. Strong v. Blake, 46 Barb. 227; Finch 2 Thomas v. Evans, 10 East, 101. v. Brook, 1 Bingh. N. C. 253. s Hartsock v. Mort, 76 Md. 281. 6 Wheeler v. Knaggs, 8 Ohio, 169. 4 Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 18. 7 Matheson v. Kelly, 24 Up. Can. 6 Bakeman v. Pooler, 15 Wend. 637 ; C. P. 598. 390 TENDER. § 310 to his indebtedness, and the creditor said nothing but pro- ceeded, this was held no tender. 1 Ordinarily, however, in making a tender, actual production of the money is not neces- sary, if the creditor refuses to receive it. 2 Accordingly where the debtor said, "I am now ready to pay you the seventeen dollars which I owe you," having money in his pocket suffi- cient to pay the debt and intending to pay it, and the creditor said, "There have been costs made and you must settle with my attorney," it was held a good tender. 3 It seems that a ten- der can not be made when the debtor has no money but a third person has the money on the spot, which he would loan. 1 But if such person actually consents to loan it for the purpose of a tender then this is sufficient. 5 The party must have the money within his control and where a debtor said "he could get the money in five minutes," it was held no tender. 6 An offer of money in bags is a legal tender; and it is the duty of the re- ceiver to count it, and see that there is enough. 7 And a ten- der of money in a handkerchief, with a statement of the amount, was held a good tender. 8 While the debtor need not count the money 9 if he offers bank notes twisted up, he must declare their amount. 10 But an offer of money in an envelope can not be a tender." § 310. Production of the money due on a mortgage. — In view of the serious consequences to the holder of a mortgage, upon the refusal of a tender — consequences which may often amount to the absolute loss of the entire debt — and in view of the strong temptation which must exist to contrive merely color- able or sham tenders not intended in good faith, in case of such a tender the evidence should be so full, clear and satis- 1 Knight v. Abbott, 30 Vt. 577. did not at the time take notice of 2 Guthman v. Kearn, 8 Neb. 502; what was done, he being allowed to Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. 267. ratify the act by pleading. * Ashburn v. Poulter, 35 Conn. 553. 6 Breed v. Hurd, 6 Pick. 356. * Sargent v. Graham, 5 N. H. 440. ' Behalyt). Hatch, 1 "Walker (Miss.), 6 Harding v. Davies, 2 C. & P. 77, 369. where a third person present offered 8 Davis v. Stonestreet, 4 Ind. 101. to go upstairs and fetch the sum, but 9 Breed v. Hurd, 6 Pick. 356, 357. was prevented by the creditor saying 10 Alexander v. Brown, 1 C. & P. 288. he would not take it, it was held a " Strong v. Blake, 46 Barb. 227. sufficient tender, although the debtor §§311, 312 TENDER. 391 factory, as to leave no reasonable doubt that it was so made that the holder must have understood it at the time to be a present, absolute and unconditional tender, intended to be in full payment and extinguishment of the mortgage, and not de- pendent upon his first executing a receipt or discharge, or any other contingency. And the holder must, in every case, have a reasonable opportunity to look over the mortgage and ac- companying papers, to calculate and ascertain the amount due; and if such papers are not present, he must be allowed a rea- sonable time to get them and make the calculation. He can not be bound, under the penalty or at the hazard of losing his entire debt, to carry at all times, in his head, the precise amount due on any particular day. 1 § 311. Money available for tender.^-Legal tender is regu- lated by act of congress. The following is the substance of the legal tender acts: No foreign gold or silver coins are a legal tender in payment of debts. 2 Gold coins of the United States are a legal tender in all payments at their nominal value when not below the standard weight provided by law for the single piece, and when reduced in weight below such standard are a legal tender at valuation in proportion to their actual weight. 8 Silver coins of the United States are a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding five dollars in any one payment. 4 The minor coins of the United States are a le- gal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceed- ing twenty-five cents in any one payment. 5 United States notes are lawful money, and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except for duties on imports and in- terest of the public debt. 6 Also certain demand treasury notes are legal tender.' § 312. Power of congress to pass legal tender acts. — Con- gress has the constitutional power to make the treasury notes of 1 Potts v. Plaisted, 30 Mich. 149. 2 Rev. St. (1878), §3584. See, also, Harmon v. Magee, 57 Miss. 3 Rev. St. (1878), § 3585. 410; Hall v. Norwalk Co., 57 Conn. 4 Rev. St. (1878), §3586. 105; Sheredine v. Gaul, 2 Dall. 190; 5 Rev. St. (1878), §3587. Brown v. Gilmore, 8 Maine, 107 ; Ben- 6 Rev. St. (1878) , § 3588. son v. Carmel, 8 Maine, 110. 'Rev. St. (1878), §§3589-90. 392 TENDER. §313 the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts, in time of peace as well as in time of war. 1 § 313. Waiver of defect of tender. — It is well settled that a tender in bank notes is good, unless objected to on the ground that they are not legal tender. 2 Thus where national bank notes were tendered and no objection was made on that ground it was held a good tender. 8 And where a person has previ- ously agreed to take bank bills he must do so and can not in- sist on a legal tender . 4 Where a debtor sent bills of a certain bank to his creditor to take up a note, but the creditor refused to deliver up the note while at the same time he retained the bills, and the bank failed the next clay, it was held the creditor 1 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 TJ. S. 421, where the court said: "It ap- pears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence, that congress has the power to issue the obliga- tions of the United States in such form, and to impress upon them such qualities as currency for the purchase of merchandise and the pay- ment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign governments. The power, as incident to the power of borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of pri- vate debts, was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The governments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legisla- ture, according to the distribution of powers under their respective consti- tutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power has been distinctly recognized in an important modern case, ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained from the English court of chancery an injunction against the issue in England, without his license, of notes purporting to be public paper money of Hungary. (Emperor of Austria D.Day, 2Giff. 028.) The power of issuing bills of credit, and making them, at the dis- cretion of the legislature, a tender in payment of private debts, had long been exercised in this country by the several colonies and states ; and dur- ing the Revolutionary War the states, upon the recommendation of the con- gress of the confederation, had made the bills issued by congress a legal tender, the exercise of this power not being prohibited to congress by the constitution. It is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States." Maryland r. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 105; Railroad Company v. Johnson, 15 AVall. 195 ; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604. Contra, Hepburn ». Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. See McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. 2 Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496; Fosdick v. Van Husan, 21 Mich. 567; Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53; Lacy v. Wilson, 24 Mich. 479. 3 Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496. 4 Warren v. Mains, 7 John. 476. § 314 TENDER. 393 must lose the amount of the bills. 1 A tender, partly in silver coin, and partly in bank notes, offered to be converted into silver, but the opposite party refusing to accept any money, was held to be good. 8 And a tender of bank notes is good even if at the time the bank is in a suspended state, unless objection is made on that ground. 8 It seems that a clerk has authority to waive objection on the ground that legal tender is not of- fered. Thus, where a tender of bank bills was made to a clerk for goods purchased, and he made no objection on that ground, it was held a valid tender, although the claim had been lodged with an attorney for suit. 4 Bank notes, however, are not cash and can not be tendered as cash; 5 neither are they legal tender. 6 A contract to pay a certain sum in money, without any stipu- lation as to the kind of money in which it shall be paid, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum in any currency which is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made. 7 § 314. Tender of note or check. — The doctrine that bank bills are a good tender, unless objected to at the time on the ground that they are not money, only applies to current bills, which are redeemed at the counter of the bank on presentation, and pass at par value in business transactions at the place where offered. Notes not thus current at their par value, nor redeemable on presentation, are not a good tender to principal or agent, whether they are objected to at the time or not. 8 Therefore an offer to pay by check or draft is not a tender suffi- cient in law. 9 But where a person has been in the habit of paying by check, and when the check is tendered it is refused on the ground that the contract is at an end, this is a good 1 Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick. 539. B Moody v. Mahurin, 4N.H. 296. 2 Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Eawle, 408. 7 Juillard v. Greenman, 110 IT. S. See Ball v. Stanley, 5 Yerger, 199; 421, 449; 1 Hale P. C. 192, 194; Ba- Noe v. Hodges, 3 Humph. 162; Will- con Ab. Tender, B. 2; Pothier on iams v. Borer, 7 Mo. 556. Contracts of Sale, No. 416; Pardes- 3 Seawellu. Henry, 6 Ala. 226. See, sys, Droit Commercial, No. 204; Sea- also, Wheeler v. Knaggs, 8 Ohio, 169. right v. Calbraith, 4 Ball. 324. 4 Hoyt v. Byrnes, 11 Maine, 475. 8 Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 451-2. 6 Coxe v. State Bank, 8 N. J. Law, 172. 9 Collier v. White, 67 Miss. 133. 394 TENDER. §§ 315, 316 tender. 1 It seems that a certified check may always be ten- dered, if not objected to on that ground, 2 and so may a certif- icate of deposit. 3 But a debtor holding his creditor's over-due promissory note has no right to tender it in payment of his debt. 4 And a party to whom a check is sent in payment may elect to sue before he sends it back. 5 § 315. Contracts payable in gold or silver dollars. — Express contracts payable in gold or silver dollars can only be satis- fied by the tender and payment of coined dollars, and a tender of notes of the United States declared to be a legal tender in payment of debts is not a good tender; such contracts can only be discharged by the payment of specie. The legal tender acts of congress only apply to debts which are payable in money generally, and not to obligations payable in com- modities or obligations of any other kind. 6 § 316. Amonnt of tender. — A tender is not objectionable on account of being a larger sum than the amount due; 7 but it is otherwise if the tender be made in bank bills. 8 And a tender of a larger sum requiring chauge is not a good tender of a smaller sum. 9 A demand of money tendered, in order to have 1 McGrath v. Gegner (1893), 77 Md. also, In re Steam Stoker Co., L. R. 19 331 ; 26 Atl. Rep. 502, where the court Eq. 416 ; Towson v. Havre de Grace said: " And such being the case, we Bank, 6 H. & J. 47; Wilmarth v. take it to be well settled that, where a Mountford, 4 Wash. C. C. 79 ; Walsh tender is made, whether it be by or- v. St. Louis Exposition, 101 Mo. 534. dinary bank notes or by a check on a s Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687; bank, and the tender is refused, not Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wall. 229; Eut- because of the character or quality of ler v. Harwitz, 7 Wall. 258; McGuon the tender itself, but on other grounds, v. Shirk, 54 111. 408. the tender thus made and refused will 7 Patterson v. Cox, 25 Ind. 261 ; Tra- be considered in law a lawful ten- cy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659; Bevans u. der." Rees, 5 M. & W. 306; Dean v. James, 2 Harding v. Commercial Loan Co., 4 B. & Ad. 546; Downing v. Plate, 90 84 111. 251. 111. 268; 8 Cent. L. J. 283; Nesbit v. s Gradle v. Warner, 140 111. 123; 29 Hanway, 87 Ind. 400. N. E. Rep. 1118. s Hubbard v. President Chenango 4 Barker v. Walbridge, 14 Minn. Bank, 8 Cow. 88. 469; Cary v. Bancroft, 14 Pick. 315; "Robinson v. Cook, 6 Taunt. 336; Bellows v. Smith, 9 N. H. 285. Contra, Betterbee ». Davis, 3 Camp. 70, where he may, Foley v. Mason, 6 Md. 37. the court said : "If I tender a man 5 Hough v. May, 4 A. & E. 954. See twenty guineas in the current coin of § 317 TENDER. 395 the effect, if not complied with, to avoid the tender, must be of the precise sum tendered. 1 But in all cases of redemption of mortgaged property, when the court is satisfied that the party has tendered or offered what he believed to be the true amount, and when he offers to pay whatever amount the court may find to be due, a party is not to be turned out of court because he was unable to tender the exact amount. 2 § 317. The same subject continued. — A tender of less than the sum due is not sufficient. 8 Where the debtor had brought into court what he supposed justly due on the claim, and the costs up to that time, and upon the trial it appeared that he had brought in too little by forty-one cents, and the trial court directed the jury that they might find a verdict for the debtor, if the balance appeared to them a mere trifle, and they found accordingly, a new trial was granted for the misdirection of the judge. 4 In Iowa a tender of a less amount than due is sufficient to discharge the debtor from costs and interest un- less objection is made to the amount. 3 A tender in admiralty the realm, this may be a very good ten- when properly applied, a correct der of fifteen, for he has only to select maxim. But to this point it is not ap- so much and restore me the residue, plicable. In calculating interest, there But a tender in bank notes is quite dif- may be, and probably must arise, f rac- ferent. In that case, the tender may be tions not to be expressed in the legal made in such a way that it is physically money of account. These fractions impossible for the creditor to take what are trifles, and may be rejected. In is due and return the difference. If £3 making payments, it is sometimes not 10s could be tendered by a note for £5, possible, from the value and divisions so it might by a note for £50,000." of the current coin, to make the exact 'Town of Thetford v. Hubbard, 22 sum. If the payment be madeasnear- Vt. 440. ly as it can conveniently be made the 2 Downing v. Plate, 90 111. 268; 8 fractional part of a small coin may be Cent. L. J. 283; Nesbit v. Hanway, 87 neglected; it is a trifle. But the pres- Ind. 400. See, also, Wade's Case, 5 ent case is not one of these trifles. A Co. 114; Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Str. man may sue and recover on a note 916 ; Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T. E. 683 ; given for forty cents ; also on a larger Dean v. James, 4 B. & Ad. 546. note where forty cents remain un- 3 Smith v. Anders, 21 A.la. 782; Ba- paid." ker v. Bowell, 3 Strob. 25 ; Patnote v. 5 Sheriff v. Hull, 37 Iowa, 174 ; Guen- Sanders, 41 Vt. 66; Dixon v. Clark, 5 gerich v. Smith, 36 Iowa, 587; Hay- C. B. 365. ward v. Munger, 14 Iowa, 516. But it 4 Boyden v. Moore, 5 Mass. 365, does not preclude plaintiff from recov- where Parsons, C. J., said: "That ering whatever sum is due him. See the law will not regard trifles is, Guengerich v. Smith, supra. 396 TENDER. § 318 should always cover accrued costs. 1 The tender is not enough if the smallest amount of interest is not covered. 2 If a party tender less than is due he does so at his peril, although he may honestly believe that the amount tendered is all that is due the creditor. 3 And a creditor may accept a tender of a less sum than is due without precluding himself from claiming the residue, unless it is made a condition of the tender that it be accepted in discharge of the whole. 4 § 318. Sufficiency of amount — Waiver. — An offer of less than the amount due, made on condition that it be accepted in full, is not a sufficient tender and does not defeat the right to recover interest from the time the demand was due. 5 Accord- ingly payment into court of less than the amount due will not stop the running of interest. And an appeal on the ground that the amount paid into court and adjudged to appellant was not the full amount due, will not be dismissed because ap- pellant withdraws the amount adjudged him by such decree. 6 1 The Enos B. Phillips, 53 Fed. Eep. 153. 2 Weld v. Eliot Bank, 158 Mass. 339 ; 33 N. E. Rep. 519, where 15 days' in- terest on a small bank deposit not being tendered was held to render the tender inoperative. See, also, Craw- ford v. Osmun, 94 Mich. 533 ; Hoyt v. Smith, 4 Wash. St. 440; 30 Pac. Rep. 664; Riley v. McNamara, 83 Texas, 11; 18 S. W. Rep. 141. 3 Helphrey v. Chicago, Rock Island Co , 29 Iowa, 480. 4 Leake on Contracts, 865, citing Bowen v. Owen, 11 Q. B. 130. 5 Chapin v. Chapin (Mass. 1894), 36 N. E. Rep. 746. 6 McCalley v. Otey, 103 Ala. 469; 15 So. Rep. 945, per Coleman, J. : " The amount paid into court was not the full amount due, and the respondent was under no legal obligation to accept anything less than his entire debt. The fact that the complainant must lose the interest upon the money during the time it was in court can not be attributed to any fault of the respondent. To make a plea of tender available to stop the accumulation of interest, it is indispensable that the entire amount due be tendered. The court should have allowed interest on the principal ($1,200) to the 23d day of September, 1893, the date of the rendition of the decree. The motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the appellant had accepted pay- ment of the amount of the decree of the court must be overruled. This case is clearly within the principle declared in the case of Phillips v. Towles, 73 Ala.406 ; 1 Brickell's Digest, p.l04,§308. The principal ($1,200) was admitted in complainant's bill to be due, and it was clearly shown that the amount tendered had not been kept good. Under no circumstances could the appellant be entitled to less than that decreed him. In fact, we hold that the error of the court con- sists in not decreeing to him the full amount of his claim. The case of §319 TENDER. 397 But where a tender is refused without objection to the suffi- ciency of the amount, but on other grounds, the amount can not afterwards be questioned. 1 And where objection to the suffi- ciency of a tender is made solely on a certain specified ground, the party is precluded from afterwards raising another objection, at least where it is trifling in its nature, and such that, if made at the time, the other party might have easily remedied it. 8 Where a vendee objects to the vendor's title, the latter is not obliged to tender a deed in order to enforce his rights un- der the contract of sale, since a tender need never be made where it is clear that, if made, it would be refused. 8 § 319. Tender on severable debts. — Where the creditor holds distinct claims against the debtor a tender may be made to any one claim. 4 But the tender must always be specifically ap- plied to the distinct claim the debtor tenders on, and the ten- der of a gross sum insufficient to cover the aggregate claims is no tender unless specifically applied. 5 And a part tender is not good to one entire demand. 6 If A., B. and C. have a joint Hanson v. Todd, 95 Ala. 328; 10 So. Rep. 354, has no application, as will be seen by an examination of the case of Phillips v. Towles, and cases cited." 1 Hill v. Carter, 101 Mich. 158; 59 N. W. Rep. 413; Allen v. Atkinson, 21 Mich. 351; Flanders v. Chamber- lain, 24 Mich. 305. 2 Lathrop v. O'Brien, 57 Minn. 175; 58 N.W. Rep. 987, per Mitchell, J. . "It appears that the amount of money demanded by plaintiff was $3.50 less than the Bum named in the contract. The evidence is silent as to why this deduction was made, but it is not a very violent assumption that it was designed to meet the cost of record- ing patents ; and, if so, the defendant did not object to the sufficiency of the amount. But, however this may be, upon the facts proved and found de- fendant must be held to have waived the objections to the tender which he now urges." And see Green v. Bar- ney CCal. 1894), 36 Pac. Rep. 1026. 3 Bucklen v. Hasterlik, 155 111. 423; 40 N. E. Rep. 561, where the court said: "Where a vendee objects to a title, a tender of a deed which he de- clares he will not accept is unnecessa- ry. Hampton v. Speckenagle, 9 Serg. & R. 212 ; Teirnan v. Roland, 15 Pa. St. 429; Lyman v. Gedney. 114 111 388, 406, 410; 29 N. E. Rep. 282; Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Hare, 420-432; Webster v. French, 11 111. 254, 276, 278; Sheplar v. Green, 96 Cal. 218; 31 Pac. Rep. 42." 4 East Tennessee R. Co. v. Wright, 76 Geo. 532; Robinson v. Ward, 8 Q. B. 920; Brandon v. Newington, 3 Q. B. 915 ; Jones v. Owen, 5 A. & E. 222. 5 Hardingham v. Allen, 5 C. B. 793. Whether or not there was such specific appropriation is a question for the jury. 6 Searles v. Sadgrave, 5 E. & B. 639 ; Hesketh v. Fawcett, 11 M. & W. 35fi. 398 TENDER. § 320 demand, and C. has a separate demand on D., and D. offer A. to pay him both the debts, which A. refuses without objecting to the form of the tender on account of his being entitled only to the joint demand, D. may plead this tender in bar of an ac- tion on the joint demand, and should state it as a tender to A. B. and C. 1 A demand of payment, to lay the foundation of a claim for interest, must be a separate demand of a debt or sum, which is afterwards proved or admitted to be due, and not a de- mand for such a debt or sum, together with another, which is afterwards proved or admitted not to be due. 2 A tender of a gross sum upon several demands, without designating the amount tendered upon each, is sufficient. 3 Where a bank- ruptcy statute allows two or more creditors to bring bankruptcy proceedings against their debtor, such debtor can not forestall such proceedings by tendering one of the creditors his demand, so as to reduce the aggregate claims below the amount which the statute prescribes as requisite to issue a summons on. 1 § 320. Conditional tender. — Generally a tender must be unconditional. 5 Thus the tender of payment made by the maker of a promissory note, on condition that the holder will dismiss an action against the maker in no way connected with the note, is bad. 6 A tender is defective, if it be qualified by anything to be done on the other side.' And equally a tender, on condition that a release of all demands shall be first deliv- ered, is not good. 8 Thus, there was no tender where the 1 Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T. R. 683. Barb. 227 ; Irwin v. Gregory, 13 Gray, 2 Goff v. Rehoboth, 2 Cush. 475. 215; Brooklyn Bank v. De Grauw, 'Town of Thetford v. Hubbard, 22 23 Wend. 342; Moynahan v. Moore, Vt. 440. 9 Mich. 1 ; Cothran v. Scanlan, 34 i In re Andrew, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. Ga. 555; Shaw v. Sears, 3 Kan. 242; 358. See, also, Wright v. Behrens, 39 Wagenblast v. McKean, 2 Grant's N. J. Law, 413. Cases, 393; Bickle v. Beseke, 23 Ind. 6 Tompkins v. Batie, 11 Neb. 147; 18; Hunter v. Warner, 1 Wis. 141; Cashman v. Martin, 50 How. Pr. 337 ; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259; Balme Rose v. Duncan, 49 Ind. 269; Appeal of v. Wambaugh, 16 Minn. 116; Green Forest Oil Co., 118 Pa. St. 138; Odum v. Smith, 29 Hun, 166; Holton v. v. Rutledge, 94 Ala. 488; 10 So. Rep. v. Brown, 18 Vt. 224. 222 ; Henderson v. Cass County, 107 6 Rose v. Duncan, 49 Ind. 269. Mo. 50; 18 S. W. Rep. 992; Cass v. 'Brooklyn Bank v. De Grauw, 23 Higenbotam, 27 Hun, 406; Flake v. Wend. 342. Nuse, 51 Texas, 98 ; Strong v. Blake, 46 e Hepburn v. Auld, 1 Cranch, 321. § 321 TENDER. 399 debtor wanted an acknowledgment from his creditor that the sum was "in full discharge of all demands." 1 And where there is either an express or implied demand of a receipt in full it will not be a sufficient tender. 2 But the fact that the debtor uses language which merely explains what he claims and intends the tender to cover does not amount to the impo- sition of a condition. 8 § 321. The same subject continued. — Where there is no dispute as to the amount of the debt, a tender may always be restricted by such conditions as by the terms of the contract are conditions precedent or simultaneous to the payment of the debt or proper to be performed by the party to whom the tender is made. 4 Thus, a condition that a mortgage should be discharged was held to be a proper one by which to restrict a tender, without destroying its effect. 5 So a condition that certain diamonds deposited as collateral to the debt should be returned. 6 A release that the party was entitled to have was allowed to be demanded.' So, likewise, it was held that a de- mand of payment of a promisory note without an offer to return collateral securities was insufficient to charge an in- dorser." The maker or indorser is not bound to pay a nego- tiable note without receiving it as their voucher. 9 And it has 'Wood??. Hitchcock, 20 Wend. 47. 516; Bailey v. County of Buchanan, See Roosevelt v. Bull's Head Bank, 115 N. Y. 297; Smith v. Rockwell, 2 45 Barb. 579. Hill, 482. 2 Sanford v. Bulkley, 30 Conn. 344. 5 Wheelock v. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481. 3 Foster v. Drew, 39 Vt. 51, Bowen G Cass a. Higenbotam, 100 N.Y. 248. v. Owen, 11 Q. B. 130; Henwood v. 7 Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259. Oliver, 1 Q. B. 409. See, also, to the 8 Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. effect that a demand for a release de- 474. stroys a tender: Doty v. Crawford, 9 Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 39 S. Car. 1; 17 S. E. Eep. 377; N. Y. 177; Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill, Draper v. Hitt, 43 Vt. 439 ; Richard- # 482 ; Daniel on Bills and Notes, § 1228, son v. Boston, etc., 9 Mete. 42; Loring 3d ed., citing Crandall v. Schroeppel, v. Cooke, 3 Pick. 48 ; Thayer v. Brack- 1 Hun, 557 ; Davis v. Miller, 14 Gratt. ett, 12 Mass. 450. 1 ; Moses v. Trice, 21 Gratt. 556 ; Han- 4 Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 sard v. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 90; In- N. Y. 165; Wheelock v. Tanner, 39 habitants of Otisfield v. Mayberry, 63 N. Y. 481; Cass v. Higenbotam, 100 Maine, 197 ; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. N. Y. 253 ; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 545 ; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483 ; 259; Ocean National Bank v. Fant, 50 Best v. Crall, 23 Kan. 482. Vontra, N. Y. 248; Cutler v. Goold, 43 Hun, Baker v. Wheaton, 5 Mass. 509. 400 TENDER. 5 322 been held that the debtor was justified in requiring that certain negotiable notes given to the creditor, and not due, should be delivered up to him as a condition of parting with the money- tendered. 1 The obligee of a bond having the option to redeem has a right to demand as a condition of payment the surrender of the bond and all the coupons in the holder's possession. 2 A mortgagor has a right to attach, as a condition of payment of the debt secured, that the owner execute a satisfaction of the mortgage." But a tender coupled with an express or implied demand for a satisfaction piece before the money would be paid is insufficient to discharge the mortgage lien,' and the same rule obtains in case of a chattel mortgage. 6 § 322. Giving receipt. — In England contradictory rulings seem to have been made as to whether a person tendering money may demand a receipt for the sum tendered. Lord Kenyon said that "it has been determined that a party tender- ing money could not in general demand a receipt for the money." 6 This ruling was followed in a later case. 7 But in another case it was held that a request for a receipt was not a condition. 8 But where no objection is made on account of a demand of a receipt, and the creditor refuses the money because he considers the amount is not sufficient, it was held that he could not afterwards object to the tender because the party making it required a receipt. 9 It is well settled in many juris- dictions that, while a receipt in the form of a general release 1 Cutler v. Goold, 43 Hun, 516. N. W. Rep. 809. In this case, there ' Bailey v. County of Buchanan, 115 was a demand for the notes as well N. Y. 297. as satisfaction of the mortgage. See, 3 Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 also, Rowley ?>. Ball, 3 Cow. 303; Wild- ly. Y. 165, where the court said: er u.Seelye, 8 Barb. 408; JJooley v. "In all these cases, the party inak- Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Smith v. Rock- ing the tender has a legal right well, 2 Hill, 482; Bevans v. Rees, 5 to insist, as a condition of pay- M. & W. 306. ment, that the party to whom the 6 Cole v. Blake, Peake N. P. C. (239) tender was made do the things de- 179. manded, and for that reason coupling 'Richardson v. Jackson, 8 M. & W. "such condition to the acceptance of 298. the tender did not destroy its effect." 8 Jones v. Arthur, 8 Bowl. Prac. Cas. 4 Jewett v. Earle, 21 Jones & Spen- 442. cer, 349; Storey v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 9 Richardson v. Jackson, 8 M. & W. 397. 298. 5 Moore v. Norman, 52 Minn. 83 ; 53 § 323 TENDER. 401 can not be required, the party tendering may nevertheless de- mand a simple receipt for the money tendered. 1 § 323. Towhom a tender should be made. — A tender of money to an agent authorized to receive payment is a good tender to the creditor himself. 2 Accordingly, a mortgage running to several mortgagees jointly to secure a joint debt may be paid to and released by either mortgagee, and a tender to either is good, and is operative as to the interests of all the mortgagees. 8 And where two purchase together, a tender of a deed by the vendor to one of them is sufficient. 4 So, also, generally, where two or more persons are interested, a tender to either is sufficient. 5 The trustee is the person to whom a tender of money due the cestui que trust should be made. 6 And a tender of money to a man's servant, if he be in the house, is a good tender.' The assignee in bankruptcy is the proper person to whom a tender should be made of any debt due the bankrupt. 8 But it seems that a tender can not be made to an executor, while in another state and on other business, before he has qualified, although after his appointment. 9 A clerk in a re- 1 Storey v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397 ; * Flanigan v. Seeiye, 53 Minn. 23 Buffum v. Bufium, 11 N. H. 451 ; Saun- 55 N. W. Rep. 115. ders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259; Salinas 4 Dawson v. Ewing, 16 S. & R. 371 v. Ellis, 26 So. Car. 337; Strafford v. Prescott v. Everts, 4 Wis. 314. Welch, 59 N. H. 46; Wilder v. Seeiye, 5 Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich. 53 8 Barb. 408; Balme v. Wambangh, Southard v. Pope, 9 B. Mon. 261. 16 Minn. 116. Contra, Sanford v. Bulk- 6 Chahoon v. Hollenback, 16 S. & R. ley, 30 Conn. 344, holding no receipt 425. can be demanded. The law of tender 7 Anonymous, 1 Esp. 349, where is aptly summed up by Abbott, C. J., Lord Kenyon said that, in the com- in Peacock v. Dickerson, 2 Car. & P. mon transactions of life, this kind of 51, where he holds that "a party ten- intercourse, by the intervention of dering money should tender it with- servants, must be allowed ; and that if out making any terms, and should money was so brought to the house of leave itstill open to the one party to say the plaintiff, and delivered to his serv- that more was due ; and to the other, ant, who retired, and appeared to go that the sum tendered was sufficient." to the master, it was evidence to be See also, Doty v. Crawford, 39 So. left to the jury, from which they might Car. 1 ; 17 So. E. Rep. 377. infer that a tender was made. 8 Goodland v. Blewith, 1 Camp. 477. 8 Cook v. Kelly, 9 Bos. 358. 9 Todd v, Parker, 1 N. J. Law, 45. 26 402 tender. §§324,325 tail store is, however, always a proper person to whom to make a tender. 1 § 324. Tendering at a bank. — The designation of the place of payment in instruments, as, for instance, bonds and notes payable at a certain bank, imports a stipulation that their holder will have them at the bank, when due, to receive pay- ment, and that the obligors will produce there the money to pay them. If the instrument be not there lodged, and the obligor is there at its maturity with the necessary funds to pay it, he so far satisfies the contract that he can not be made responsi- ble for any future damages, either as costs of suit or interest, for delay. When the instrument is lodged with the bank for collection, the bank becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to receive payment and a tender to the cashier is good/ But where the payee of a note, not payable at bank, placed the same in a sealed envelope, and deposited it in a bank as a spe- cial deposit, and by mistake the officers of the bank took the note out of the envelope and notified the maker of its maturity, and the maker tendered to the cashier the amount due, which he declined to receive, it was held not to be a valid tender. 3 And where the tender is to the cashier, the note payable at bank not having been left there, coupled with a demand for the delivery of the note, and not kept good, such tender does not discharge a mortgage lien. 4 Where an instrument is pay- able at bank a deposit in the bank of sufficient money to pay it works a tender. 5 § 325. Tendering to an attorney at law. — A tender to an at- torney at law with whom a demand has been left for collection, is a tender to the principal. 6 And this is so, although such at- torney denies that he has authority to receive payment. 7 But a 1 Hoyt v. Byrnes, 11 Maine, 475. also, Bacon v. Dyer, 12 Maine, 19; 2 Ward -„-. Smith, 7 Wall. 447. See, Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136. also, Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & Bing. 6 Molniffe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray, 600; 165. Billiott v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529. 3 King v. Pinch, 60 Ind. 420. Contra, Thurston v. Blaisdell, 8 N. H. 4 Balme v. Wambaugh, 16 Minn. 367. 116. ' McIniHe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray, 600. 5 Hill v. Place, 7 Robt. 389. See, § 326 TENDER. 403 tender may be made to the creditor himself, although he has previously put the matter into his attorney's hands. 1 An at- torney is bound by the acts of those whom he allows to repre- sent him at his office. Therefore, after a letter is sent demand- ing payment, a tender to the clerk of the attorney at his office is good. 8 But the attorney's letter may be so framed as to pre- clude a tender being made to any but himself. 3 A demand for payment "at my office," will warrant a tender to any one em- ployed there. 4 An attorney's clerk can not disclaim having authority to receive payment of a sum demanded by the at- torney in a regular attorney's letter. 6 Generally, in the ab- sence of words to the contrary, an attorney's letter imports that some person will be at his office who will have authority to receive the money, if the payment is made there, 6 and there- fore a tender is good although made to the office boy. 7 § 326. Tender of money into court. — In order that a tender before suit shall amount to payment, as far as the incidental right to declare a forfeiture and recover possession of premises for default in interest on a land contract is concerned, it is not necessary to bring the money into court. 8 But where the pur- chaser did not offer in the pleadings to pay the sum due on the contract, it was not error for the judge to refuse a tender made in open court after the closing of the argument. 9 There is no prejudice in sustaining a plea of tender which fails to allege that defendant "now brings the money into court," when an- other plea to the same count is in legal form, and the proof is conclusive that the money was paid into court when the pleas 1 Hoyt v. Byrnes, 11 Maine, 475 ; ' Kirton v. Braithwaite, 1 M. & W. Mofiat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307. 310. 2 Wilmot v. Smith, 3 0. & P. 453. 8 Hill v. Carter, 101 Mich. 158, 59 N. 8 Watson v. Hetherington, 1 C. & K. W. Pep. 413. " It was not necessary 36, where the letter demanding pay- that the amount of the tender should ment was to the effect: "Must be be brought into court. Caruthers v. paid to me." Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270; Monyhan 1 Watson v. Hetherington, 1 C. & K. v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9 ; Allen v. Atkin- 36. son, 21 Mich. 351 ; Stewart v. Brown, 5 Finch v. Boning, L. E. 4 0. P. 48 Mich. 383; 12 N. W. Rep. 499. D. 143 ; 9 Cent. Law Jour. 288. 9 Pell v. Chandos (Texas App. 1894) . 6 Kirton v. Braithwaite, 1 M. & W. 27 S. W. Pep. 48. 310. 404 tender. §§ 327, 328 were filed. 1 And the fact that with a plea of tender into court there is also pleaded a general denial does not render the ten- der conditional. 2 § 327. By whom a tender may be made. — A tender may be made by the debtor himself or his duly authorized agent. 8 And a creditor can not lawfully refuse a tender by an agent duly authorized, if he has reasonable opportunity to learn his authority. 4 But, it seems, a creditor may object to a tender on the ground that the agent has no authority to make it. 6 An agent authorized to tender a sum less than the whole may make the tender good by furnishing the money himself for the balance due. 6 And a tender by a stranger is good if his act is subsequently ratified by the debtor pleading it. 7 So, also, a tender of money in behalf of an infant, made by his uncle, the father being dead, but the mother living, is good, although the uncle has not been appointed guardian. 8 And equally a tender made by an inhabitant of a school district, to one hav- ing a claim against it, is valid, although such inhabitant is not regularly authorized by the district. 9 § 328. Tender under protest. — Although a conditional ten- der is not good, a tender under protest, reserving the right of the debtor to dispute the amount due, is a good tender if it does not impose any conditions on the creditor. Thus, a mort- gagor tendered to a mortgagee the balance appearing to be for principal, interest and costs, according to an account made out by the mortgagor from documents furnished by the mortgagee, such balance being less than what the mortgagee claimed to be due; the mortgagor stated at the time that he did not admit the correctness of the mortgagee's accounts, and that he intended to take steps to dispute them, and to have the costs taxed; the mortgagee refused to accept the sum ten- dered; the mortgagor then brought an action to redeem; it 1 Christian v. Niagara Ins. Co., 101 6 Lampley v. Weed, ,27 Ala. 621. Ala. 634 ; 14 So. Rep. 374. « Read v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86. 2 Cundiff t>. Corley (Texas App. 'Harding v. Davies, 2 C. & P. 77. 1894!, 27 8. "W. Rep. 167. ■ Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle, 408. 3 Eslow v. Mitchell, 26 Mich. 500. 9 Kincaid v. School District, 11 4 Eslow v. Mitchell, 26 Mich. 500. Maine, 188. §329 TENDER. 405 was held, that the tender, as it did not impose any conditions on the mortgagee, was a good tender, and that the mortgagor was entitled to accounts, for the purpose of showing whether it was sufficient in amount, reserving further consideration and costs in case it proved to have been sufficient. 1 § 329. Place of tender. — When money is to be paid by one party to another and the contract fixes no place for the pay- ment, the rule is that the payment must be to the person at the place where he is, if he be within the same dominion." Thus, calling at the office of the creditor's attorney prepared to pay does not meet the requirements of the law. 3 Nor is a tender at the residence of the creditor, during his absence, good. 4 But, unless the contract provides otherwise, the debtor is not bound to go to another state to tender money to the creditor. 5 And where the statute has provided that an offer in writing to pay the money, if not accepted, is equivalent to a tender, if the debtor knows the residence and post-office ad- 1 Greenwoods. SutcliffeL. B. (1892), ICh. 1, where the court said: "What is the object of a tender? It is not necessarily to put an end to all con- troversy. It may have that effect, and very often has, but its main object is to throw the risk of further contro- versy upon the other party." * * * "A man has a right to tender money, reserving all his rights, and such a tender is good, provided he does not seek to impose conditions." Scott v. TTxbridge E. Co., L. E. 1 C. P. 596, where the tender was in this form : "If you insist on being paid the amount demanded before satisfactory explana- tions have been given, our clerk will hand you a check this morning for the amount, but you must consider the payment as under protest, and our client will seek to recover back what is overpaid afterwards." This tender was held to be sufficient. Sweny v. Smith, L. E. 7 Eq. Oas. 324, where money was sent as payment, together with a letter which read: "I request that you will enter this, my protest, in the records of the com- pany; and further, that this money be held in trust by the directors (each of whom I shall hold responsible for repayment of the same) until the question of the vendors' patent rights has been settled." It was held a good tender. 2 Francis v, Deming, 59 Conn. 108; Startup v. Macdonald, 6 Man. & G. 593, where the court said : "In such a case the party bound must find the other at his peril and within the time limited if he be within the four seas." Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118; King v. Finch, 60 Ind. 420 ; Littell v. Nichols, Hardin, 66. 3 Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 108. 4 Smith v. Smith, 2 Hill (N. Y.) , 350. 5 Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15; Alls- house v. Earn say, 6 Whart. 331 ; Tasker v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359; Smith v. Smith, 25 Wend. 405. 406 TENDER. § 330 dress of the creditor, he may make a legal and proper tender to the creditor, although he is beyond the state. 1 Ignorance of where the creditor can be found does not excuse a tender.' And where rent is not payable on the land, a tender on the land is not good; 3 but if the rent is payable on the land a personal tender off the land is also good. 4 § 330. Unliquidated damages. — In some jurisdictions a tender is lawful not only in actions brought for the recovery of a sum certain, but also in cases of damages for a casual or involuntary personal injury. Statutes upon that behalf, or decisions of the courts, provide for the tender of such a sum of money as the defendant conceives to be sufficient to make amends for the injury. This tender is subject to the same rules as ordinary tenders. When the money is brought into court it becomes the plaintiff's, and it is immaterial, as to the question of its ownership, what the result of the trial is. The plaintiff runs the risk, in proceeding after a tender or deposit, of paying defendant's costs, if the recovery falls short of the amount tendered; while the defendant in such a case runs the risk of losing that amount in the event of his success upon the ensuing trial. 5 An action to recover damages for a con- version of personal property is not one for "damages for a casual or involuntary injury to property," within the meaning of the section of the New York Code of Civil Procedurej warrant- ing a tender. 6 In Illinois a tender may be made in all cases of unliquidated damages.' One who seeks to restrain by injunc- tion any act for the collection of money must first determine 1 Crawford v. Paine, 19 Iowa, 172. N. Y. 561, where the defendant paid 2 Sage v. Ranney, 2 Wend. 532, $200 into court to liquidate dam- where the purchaser was ignorant of ages for negligence, but upon the trial the place where the vendor could be the defendant had a verdict. It was found, and hence did not tender him held that the deposit belonged to the the purchase-money. plaintiff, notwithstanding the verdict. 3 Haldane v. Johnson, 20 Eng. Law 6 Clement v. N. Y. Central E. Co., 9 & Eq. 498. N. Y. Supl. 601, construing N. Y. Code 'Hunter v. Le Conte, 6 Cow. 728. of Civ. Proc, §731. See, also, Slingerland v. Morse, 8 7 Dunbar v. Deboer, 44 111. App. -John. 474; Poole v. Turnbridge, 2 M. 615, where a tender of damages for & W. 223. cattle damage feasant was held good. Taylor v. Brooklyn E. Co., 119 § 331 TENDER. 407 and make an approximate tender of the amount due. 1 Where the claims are severable, one being for liquidated and the other for unliquidated damages, the debtor may tender the liquidated damages. 2 § 331. Effect of tender. — A tender of money in payment of a debt due does not discharge the debt. The only effect of the tender is to relieve the debtor from the payment of interest subsequently accruing, and costs incurred in the collection of the debt." A plea of tender is always an admission that the amount tendered is due. 4 And if the amount of the tender is paid into court it belongs to the plaintiff, 5 no matter what the result of the action, or what the verdict is. 6 Accordingly where a tender was paid into court, and defendant's counsel, before offering any evidence, announced the withdrawal of the tender, it was held that the court could not consent to the withdrawal of the tender without plaintiff's consent.' Whenever under a tender money is paid into court, while it passes into the custody of the law, it is always subject alone to the demand of the plaintiff. 8 If the plaintiff withdraws money from court paid in to make a plea of tender good, this abso- lutely extinguishes and discharges all his claim. 9 Where the 'McDaniel v. Springfield, etc., Co., Doran, 110 N. Y. 101; Wilson v. Do- 48 Mo. App. 273, where the consumer ran, 39 Hun, 88. of water was allowed to tender an ap- 6 Taylor v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co., proximate amount due as water rent, 119 N. Y. 561; Rhodes v. Andrews and then was given an injunction (Ark.), 13 S. W. Rep. 422, where against the company from shutting off there was a verdict for the defendant, water. See also, Overall v. Ruenzi, ' Kansas Transfer Co. v. Neiswan- 67 Mo. 203. ger, 27 Mo. App. 356. 2 East Tennessee R. Co. v. Wright, 8 Voss v. McGuire, 26 Mo. App. 452. 76 Geo. 532. See also, Nelson v. 9 Hanson v. Todd, 95 Ala. 328; 10 Robson, 17 Minn. 285; Oakland Bank So. Rep. 354, where the court said: v. Applegarth, 67 Cal. 86. "A plea of tender, if in proper form, 3 Gracy v. Potts, 4 Baxter, 395; contains substantially the averment Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 14; Suf- that the sum tendered and brought folk Bank v. Worcester Bank, 5 Pick, into court is the entire amount due 106. plaintiff. -The plea is in bar of — and if 4 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Readinger, 28 proved defeats — any recovery. Bring- Neb. 587; 44 N. W. Rep. 864. ing the money into court on such a 6 Slack v. Brown, 13 Wend. 390; plea has all the effect of a tender, on Dakin v. Dunning, 7 Hill, 30; Becker condition that the plaintiff receive r. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317; Wilson v. the amount in full satisfaction of his 408 TENDEK. § 332 defendant pleaded a tender of the amount due, which he paid into court, and also pleaded a recoupment, the court held that the plaintiff having accepted the money discharged his claim, although the defendant admitted the whole claim of plaintiff's to be due, and simply paid into court the difference between his recoupment and plaintiff's claims. 1 § 332. The same subject continued. — Tender of the amount due upon a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage ex- tinguishes and discharges the lien of the mortgage. 2 In such a case it is not necessary to keep the tender good by bringing the money into court in case an action is thereafter brought by the mortgagee to obtain possession of the chattels; 3 nor need the tender be made when the note matures. Any time before foreclosure is sufficient. 4 So, also, a tender of the money due upon a real estate mortgage, at any time before foreclosure, discharges the lien, although made after the law day, and not kept good. 6 And where a mortgagor, or his as- signs, claims that the lien of a mortgage is discharged on account of a tender of the amount due, the evidence must clearly establish an unconditional tender, sufficient in amount.' claim. It is disembarrassed of the 5 Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; principle that a tender can not be Reisan v. Mott, 42 Minn. 49; Norton made on condition that a reception of v. Baxter, 41 Minn. 146; Ferguson v. the money satisfies the creditor's de- Hogan, 25 Minn. 135; Coffin v. Reyn- mand. * * * * Where the plaintiff olds, 21 Minn. 456; Flanders v. Cham- voluntarily accepts the money paid berlain, 24 Mich. 305 ; Bartel v. Lope, into court, without contesting the suf- 6 Ore. 321. In Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 ficiency or truth of the plea, it there- Hun, 466, a distinction is taken be- by becomes his property, but its ac- tween the effect of a tender in cases ceptance is upon the terms of the of chattel and real estate mortgages : plea, — that is, in full satisfaction and it is there held that a tender of the extinguishment of his claim. * * * amount due does not discharge the He can not afterward say that it was lien of a chattel mortgage, because accepted only as a payment pro tanto." the legal title has passed to the mort- Gardner v. Black, 98 Ala. 638; 12 So. gagee, which does not happen in a Rep. 813 ; Frank v. Pickens, 69 Ala. real estate mortgage. Noyes v. Wyck- 369. off, 114 N. Y. 204. 'Gardner v. Black, 98 Ala. 638; 12 5 Benson v. Hove, 45 Minn. 40; So. Rep. 813. Tuthill v. Morris, 81 N. Y. 94; Moore 2 Moore v. Norman, 43 Minn. 428. v. Norman, 43 Minn. 428, where the 8 Moore v. Norman, 43 Minn. 428. court said: "But in view of the se- 1 Moore b. Norman, 43 Minn. 428. rious consequences which might pos- § 333 TENDER. 409 But while a tender discharges the lien of a mortgage, a court of equity will not decree affirmative relief, such as the release or satisfaction of a mortgage, or deed of trust, or other lien, with- out payment of the amount due at the date of the tender. This is upon the principle of "he who seeks equity must do equity." 1 § 333. Further illustrations. — Plaintiff gave his note to an irrigation company in payment for water rights, secured by a trust deed of the land to which these rights were to attach, and had, under a transfer from the company, undisturbed use of the rights for seven years; but at the time of the transfer the company was in the hands of a trustee, and, this trustee hav- ing failed to complete the conveyance by executing a release of the rights, plaintiff sued to cancel the note and the trust deed; it was held that defendant having, in his answer, tendered a sufficient deed of the water rights, plaintiff was bound to ac- cept it, and there could be no cancellation of the note. 8 And in the action to cancel such note on the ground of defendant's non-compliance with the contract of sale, tender of a deed of the property by defendant admits a cause of action for specific performance. But if it appears that plaintiff has had un- disturbed use of the water rights from the time the contract was made, a period of seven years, the complaint, to entitle him to a decree of cancellation of the note and the trust deed, sibly result from a refusal to accept (Colo. App. 1895), 40. Pac. Eep. 195, such a tender, the proof should be per Thomson, J. : " The policy of the clear that it was fairly made, deliber- law is to sustain contracts, not to de- ately and intentionally refused by stroy them; and, if the withholding the mortgagee, that sufficient oppor- of the title resulted in no injury to tunity was afforded to ascertain the the plaintiff in the intermediate time, amount due, and that a sum sufficient the execution to him of a sufficient to cover the whole amount due was deed before final decree, giving him absolutely and unconditionally ten- all that he purchased, placed him in dered." See also, Storey v. Krewson, the exact situation contemplated when 55 Ind. 397; Wilder v. Seelye, 8 Barb, the contract was made, and disen- 408; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 titled him to the relief prayed. Da- N. Y. 474; Nelson v. Robson, 17 vidson v. Moss, 5 How. (Miss.) 673 Minn. 284. Wickliffe v. Lee, 6 B. Mon. 543 1 Landis v. Saxton, 89 Mo. 375, 383; Hunt v. McConnell, 1 T. B. Mon. 219 Tuthill v. Morris, 81 N. Y. 94; Cowles Evans v. Boiling, 5 Ala. 550; Boyce's v. Marble, 37 Mich. 158; Nelsons. Ex'rs v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Ayres v. Wilson, 75 Iowa, 710. Mitchell, 3 Smedes & M. 683." 2 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Redfield 410 TENDER. § 334 must contain an offer to account or pay for the use he has had of the water rights. 1 A vendor's right to declare a forfeiture and recover possession, on a default in payment of interest on a land contract, is lost by a tender of the interest, although he refuse it. 2 So, also, an offer to pay and a refusal by the creditor to accept will release sureties, although the tender is not kept good. Thus, where a tenant tenders his rent, this releases his sureties, although he subsequently declines to pay. 8 § 334. Vendee's tender and demand of performance. — The mere fact of the existence, at the time fixed for the concurrent mutual performance of an executory contract for the conveyance of real estate, of a lien or incumbrance on the property which it is in the power of the vendor to remove, does not relieve the vendee from the necessity of making a tender and demand of performance, as a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action to recover money paid on the contract, or for dam- ages as for a breach of the contract on the part of the vendor. 4 1 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Redfield the contract. Morange v. Morris, 3 (Colo. 1895), 40 Pac. Rep. 195. Keyes, 48; Ingalls v. Hahn, 47 Hun, 2 Hill u.Carter, 101 Mich. 158; 59 104. The general rule, however, to be N. W. Rep. 413, per McGrath, C. J. : deduced from an examination of the " The creditor, by refusing to accept, leading authorities seems to be that does not forfeit his right to the thing in cases where by the terms of the tendered, but he does lose all col- contract the acts of the parties are to lateral benefits or securities. Kort- be concurrent, it is the duty of him right v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343 ; Tiffany who seeks to maintain an action for a v. St. John, 65 N. Y. 314; Frost v. breach of the contract, either by way Yonkers, etc., Bank, 70 N. Y. 553; of damages for the non-performance, Caruthers a. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270; or for the recovery of money paid Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 302." thereon, not only to be ready and s Randal v. Tatum, 98 Cal. 390; 33 willing to perform on his part, but he Pac. Rep. 433. must demand performance from the 4 Ziehen v. Smith (1896), 42 N. E. other party. The qualifications to Rep. 1080; 148N.Y.558, O'Brien, J.: this rule are to be found in cases "The decisions on the point involved where the necessity of a formal tender do not seem to be entirely harmonious, or demand is obviated by the acts of In some of them it is said that the ex- the party sought to be charged as by istence, at the date fixed for perform- his express Refusal in advance to com- ance, of liens or incumbrances upon ply with the terms of the contract in the property is sufficient to sustain an that respect, or where it appears that action by the vendee to recover the he has placed himself in a position in part of the purchase-money paid upon which performance is impossible. If §335 TENDER. 411 § 335. In cases of pledge and mortgage. — A pledge is ex- tinguished by a tender of the amount due before a valid sale of the pledged property, although the tender is made after matu- rity of the debt. 1 In some of the states, a tender of the amount due on a mortgage, made after the law day, extinguishes the lien the same as a tender at common law, made on the law day. The property is thereby discharged from the lien, and the mortgagee is left to his remedy against the mortgagor the same as though no mortgage had existed. To have this effect, it would seem not even necessary to bring the money into court, or to show that the tender has since been kept good. 2 the vendor of real estate, under an executory contract, is unable to per- form on his part, at the time provided by the contract, a formal tender or demand on the part of the vendee is not necessary in order to enable him to maintain an action to recover the money paid on the contract, or for damages. Hudson v. Swift, 20 Johns. 24; Fuller v. Hubbard, 6 Cow. 13; Green v. Green, 9 Cow. 47 ; Hartley v. James, 50 N. Y. 38 ; Bigler v. Morgan, 77 N. Y. 312 ; Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535; Bogardus v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 101 N. Y. 328; Tamsen v. Schaefer, 108 N. Y. 604." 1 Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah, 3; 36 Pac. Rep. 202, Bartch, J. : "Jones, in his Treatise on the Law of Pledges (§ 543), says : 'A creditor, by refusing a tender properly made of the amount of a debt secured by a pledge, con- verts it to his own use. He makes it his own so far as to run the chance of any depreciation that may afterwards occur.' And again, in the same sec- tion, he says: 'Upon the pledgee's refusal of a tender of the whole amount of the debt secured, the debtor may maintain trover for the property, and he is entitled to damages to the full value of the property, without any abatement for the amount for which the property was pledged. The creditor must resort to an action to recover the debt. The refusal of the tender discharges the lien upon the property and places the parties, in relation to the property, in the same position as if the debt had been paid and no pledge had ever existed.' Schouler on Bailment, §254; Suth- erland on Damages, § 277 ; Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303 ; Ball v. Stan- ley, 5 Yerg. 199 ; Mitchell v. Roberts, 17 Fed. Rep. 776; Norton ». Baxter, 41 Minn. 146; 42 N. W. Rep. 865; 1 Bacon's Abridgment, tit. 'Bailment' (b), p. 610; Ratcliff v. Davis, Yelv. 178; Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250; 14 Pac. Rep. 369 and 15 Pac. Rep. 773; Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441 ; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Salk. 523, note; Ratcliff v. Davies, Cro. Jac. 244." 2 Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah, 3 ; 36 Pac. Rep. 202, per Bartch, J.: "This appears to be the rule in New York and Michigan. 1 Jones on Mortgages, § 893 ; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110; Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Potts v. Plaisted, 30 Mich. 149. The rule laid down by these authorities appears to be founded upon the doctrine that the mortgage is merely a pledge of the property, the ownership of which remains in the mortgagor, and that the tender, after default, produces the same result 412 TENDER. §836 § 336. Tendering back borrowed stock. — A tender implies not only an offer to do the thing proposed, but the power and willingness then and there to do it as offered. In no view is that a tender which the party has not the power or right to perform, in case his offer is accepted. Nevertheless his title to, or method of obtaining the thing tendered, is ma- terial only so far as it affects his ability to make an actual and valid transfer, so as to vest the title in the other party, if his offer is accepted. Thus where it is necessary to tender stock, the identical stock contracted for need not be offered, but the one making the tender may borrow stock for that purpose. 1 And stock may always be borrowed for the purpose of making a tender in order to rescind a sale of stock for fraud, where the buyer has parted with the stock bought before discovering the fraud. 2 § 337. Tendering railroad fare. — A passenger traveling on a street-railroad need not tender the exact fare, but he may as a tender in the case of a pledge of personal property ; which is a depart- ure from the common-law doctrine that a mortgage is a conveyance to the mortgagee in fee, subject to be defeated by performance of the con- dition by the mortgagor. The gen- eral rule adopted by the weight of authority, from the time of Lord Coke down to the present, appears to be that at common law a, tender of the debt, secured by mortgage, made after the day named for payment, does not operate to discharge the mortgage. This rule is founded on the ground that, upon a breach of the condition of the mortgage, the mortgagee be- comes the owner of the property in fee, and thereafter he is not required to accept the tender and reconvey the property to the mortgagor. In equity, however, the mortgagor has a right to redeem at any reasonable time, and a tender of the debt after breach of conditions, while it will not dis- charge the mortgage, yet it will have the effect, so long as it is kept good, to protect the mortgagor from cost, and stop interest." " 1 Mayo v. Knowlton, 134 N. Y. 250, where the court said: "Undoubtedly, when the purchaser of personal prop- erty, capable of identification and de- scription, has sold and parted with the same before the discovery of fraud practiced upon him in the purchase, he will be left to an action for dam- ages. Having parted with the prop- erty, he can no longer rescind by ten- dering back that which he had re- ceived. But the stock had no ear- mark; one share was the same as an- other, and could not be identified or distinguished therefrom." 2 Mayo v. Knowlton, 134 N. Y. 250. Bee, also, Horton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. 170; Champion v. Joslyn, 44 N. Y. 653 ; Burrall v. Bushwick R. Co., 75 N. Y. 211 ; Barclay v. Culver, 30 Hun, 1 ; Nourse v. Prime, 4 Johns. Ch. 490; Cobb v. Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 533. § 338 TENDER. 413 tender a reasonable sum, and the carrier must accept such ten- der, and must furnish change to a reasonable amount. 1 Thus the tender of a five-dollar gold piece in payment of a five-cent fare, by a street-car passenger, who has no smaller change, is a tender of a reasonable sum. 2 But a tender of a hundred dollar bill is not a good tender. 8 And in the case of a traveler on steam-railroads, a tender of a twenty-dollar gold coin, requiring- more than eighteen dollars to be paid back, is not a good ten- der. 4 In actions for breach of duty by a railroad company in not conveying a passenger, it is not necessary to allege a strict legal tender of fare. It is sufficient to allege that the passen- ger was ready and willing and offered to pay such sum as the carrier was legally entitled to charge ; and the tender may be made in legal tender notes. 5 Upon similar grounds a gen- uine silver coin worn smooth by use, not appreciably dimin- ished in weight, and distinguishable, is a legal tender for car fare; and if ejected for refusal to make other payment, the pas- senger may have an action for damages. 6 § 338. Tender excused. — When before tender made, the party to whom money is due declares he will not receive it, or makes any declaration or demand which "is equivalent to a re- fusal to accept the money if tendered, then actual tender is dis- pensed with. 7 But this is the rule only when relief is sought 1 Barrett v. Market Street B. Co., 81 would be impossible that the busi- Cal. 296. ness could be transacted with the ex- 8 Barrett v. Market Street R. Co., 81 pedition which is necessary, or with Cal. 296. proper caution, for there would be 8 Barrett v. Market Street E. Co., 81 people, probably, who would soon Cal. 296. take their chance of putting off coun- 4 Fulton v. The Grand Trunk E. Co., terfeit coin or bills, if they found that 17 U. C. Q. B. 428, where the court the officer was obliged to receive them said: "The general practice is for under circumstances which did not ad- the passengers to pay at the office mit of his taking time to scrutinize and get tickets. The officer attend- them." ing there might reasonably object 5 Tarbell v. The Central Pacific, 34 to an offer of a twenty dollar gold Cal. 616. piece in order that one dollar and 6 Jersey City E. Co. v. Morgan, 52 twenty-five cents might be taken out N. J. Law, 60. of it. If any or all of the passengers ' Root v. Johnson, 99 Ala. 90; 10 might put him to the trouble of giv- So. Eep. 293; Odum v. Eutledge, 94 ing back so much change as that, it Ala. 488. 414 TENDER. § 339 in equity. For in actions at law it makes no difference that the creditor declares in advance that he will not accept the tender; the creditor can only be put in default by a tender. 1 When a person, entitled to the transfer of a patent right as a condition to the liability sued for, absolutely and unqualifiedly refuses to accept such an assignment, and denies the liability, a formal tender of such assignment is unnecessary, and such li- ability may be enforced without such tender. 2 In a suit to an- nul a tax sale, where the prescription of the tax is relied on, a tender is excused. And also is a tender excused when the amount is indefinite and uncertain. 3 A tender is not necessary where a party puts it out of his power to comply. 4 Where a party asks subrogation a tender is excused until the amount is ascertained by the decree. 5 And in all bills to redeem a ten- der is excused until the amount necessary is ascertained by the court. 6 § 339. Questions of practice. — Payment of money into court without a rule may be disregarded by the creditor. 7 And when- ever a tender is relied on as a defense it must be pleaded. 8 In Maine it is the settled law that a tender can only be kept good by payment of the money into court upon the first day of the term. 9 It is held that an appellate court has no control over money paid into the trial court as a tender, except when the cause is reviewed and determined and remanded for further proceedings, in pursuance of the determination. 10 If the cred- 1 Nelson v. Wilson, 75 Iowa, 710; 4 Davis v. Van Wyck, 64 Hun, 186. Courtright v. Deeds, 37 Iowa, 503. 6 Koehler v. Farmers' Bank, 5 N. Y. 'MacDonald v. Wolff, 40 Mo. App. Supl. 745. 302, where the court said: "The 6 Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239; Weeks law never requires a person to v. Baker, 152 Mass. 20; Soell v. Had- do a useless thing, and, apply- den, 85 Texas, 182; Haskell v. Brewer, ing this principle, we are of opinion 11 Maine, 258. that the absolute and unqualified 7 Levan v. Sternfeld, 55 N. J. L. 41 ; refusal of defendant to accept the 25 Atl. Rep. 854. assignment relieved the plaintiff of 8 Hughes v. Eschback, 7 D. C. 66. the duty of making a formal tender 9 Gilpatrick ». Ricker, 82 Maine, 185; of a written transfer. What good Pillsbury v. Willoughby, 61 Maine, could have resulted from it?" 274; Reed v. Woodman, 17 Maine, 43. 3 Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La. Ann. 10 Mignano v. McAndrews, 56 Fed. 426. Rep. 300. § 340 TENDER. 415 itor is absent from the state, the tender may be first made by plea filed, accompanied with the amount claimed to be due, and accrued costs. 1 And in cases where money is paid into court, the findings of the court or master are unimportant so far as the tender is concerned. 8 § 340. Touching costs. — If money is paid into court under a tender, no tender having before been made, and the parties go to trial on an issue other than that of tender, the costs are to be apportioned in the discretion of the trial court. 3 But where a property owner seeks to have a tax sale set aside he must tender costs to the buyer. 4 And every tender after suit has begun must include all accrued costs. 5 A question of costs can not be raised for the first time on appeal. 6 But if a party accept money paid in as a tender, after the cause has been re- manded from an appellate court, this does not preclude him from recovering costs.' 1 Gardner v. Black, 98 Ala. 638 ; 12 v. Otey, 90 Ala. 302 ; Bluntzer v. De- So. Rep. 813; Spoor v. Phillips, 27 wees, 79 Texas, 272 ; Nelson v. Loder, Ala. 193; Trimble v. "Williamson, 49 132 N. Y. 288. Ala. 525 ; Lehman v. Collins, 69 Ala. s Redman v. Thomas, 39 Mo. App. 127; Monahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 8; 143. 77 Am. Dec. 468. l Gage v. Arndt, 121 111. 491. 2 Anderson v. Moore, 145 111. 61 ; 33 6 Collier v. White, 67 Miss. 133. N. E. 848. See, also, Phoenix Ins. Co. 6 Saum v. Shell, 45 Kan. 205. v. Readinger, 28 Neb. 587 ; Foster v. ' Summerson v. Hicks, 142 Pa. St. Mayer, 20 N. Y. Supl. 487; McCalley 344; 21 Atl. Rep. 875. CHAPTER IX. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. §341. Contracts for Bale of land. §353. Compensation for deficiencies. 342. Title founded on adverse pos- 354. Bona fide purchaser — Posses- session. sion as notice. 343. Title from a stranger. 355. Vendor's lien. 344. Remedying defects. 356. Vendor's lien — Liability of 345. Whether a title is marketable. purchaser from vendee. 346. The same subject continued — 357. Vendor's lien — Expressly re- Illustrations. served. 347. Duties of vendor. 358. Reserving lien on crops to se- 348. Burden of proof. cure purchase-money. 349. Illustrations of unmarketable 359. Vendor's right to earnest titles. money. 350. Specified land to be conveyed. 360. Equitable mortgage analogous 351. Sales in gross. to vendor's lien. 352. Conflict in description. § 341. Contracts for sale of land. — A purchaser of real es- tate is not entitled to demand a title absolutely free from all suspicion or possible defect. He may claim simply a market- able title, that is one which a reasonable purchaser, well in- formed as to the facts, and their legal bearings, willing and anxious to perform his contract, would in the exercise of that prudence which business men ordinarily bring to bear upon such transactions, be willing to and ought to accept. 1 And mere captious objections to the title ought not to prevail, when made by a purchaser who seeks to avoid the performance of his contract. A mere doubt, however honestly entertained by the purchaser, will not justify him in refusing to execute his contract. It is only in cases where the court itself is in doubt 1 Todd v. Union Dime Co., 128 N.Y. Altgeld, 33 111. App. 373 ; Beioley v. 636; Dingley v. Bon, 130 N. Y. 607 Rife v. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422 Atkinson *. Taylor, 34 Mo. App. 442 Hale v. Cravener, 128 111. 408; Parm- Walters, L. R. 17 Eq. 252 ly v. Head, 33 111. App. 134; Mead v. Carter, L. R. 4 Ch. 230; Alexander v. Mills, L. R. 6 Ch. 124; Bell v. Holtby, L. R. 15 Eq. 178; Collier v. (416) § 342 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 417 as to the title that a specific execution will be refused on the ground that the title is not marketable. 1 Whether a title to land is a good and marketable one is for the determination of the court on the papers and other facts submitted to it. The opinion of a witness, however, competent to determine whether the title be good and marketable or not, can not be received in evidence; 2 and the opinions of lawyers as experts should not be considered. 3 But while a lawyer's opinion is to be rejected, still if such opinion is adverse to the title, the court will look into and examine the title with closer scrutiny, before compel- ling a purchaser to accept it. 4 § 342. Title founded on adverse possession. — If the vendor's title has been acquired by adverse possession for the statutory period, this will enable him to comply with a contract to con- vey the fee. 5 The burden of showing that the adverse posses- sion has ripened into ownership is on the vendor. 6 But a pur- chaser will not be compelled to complete the purchase where there is some reasonable ground of evidence shown in support of an objection to the title, or where the title depends upon a 1 Rife v. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422, 4 Atkinson v. Taylor, 34 Mo. App. 429, where the court said : "It is said 442. that the vendees bought the land with 5 Ballou v. Sherwood, 32 Neb. 666; a view to its subdivision into town lots, 49 N. W. Rep. 790 ; Shriver v. Shriver, and its immediate resale, which pur- 86 N. Y. 575; O'Connor v. Huggins, pose was made known to the vendor, 1 N. Y. Supl. 377; Ottinger v. Stras- and that by reason of this incum- burger, 33 Hun, 466; Rife v. Lybarger, brance they lost a sale at a consider- 49 Ohio St. 422; Hellreigel v. Man- able advance on the price they were ning, 97 N. Y. 56; Murray v. Harway, to pay. This may be true, but the 56 N. Y. 337; Brown v. Witter, 10 plaintiff is no more to be affected by Ohio, 143; Thacker v. Booth (Ky.), the captious objections of possible pur- 6 S. W. Rep. 460; Shober v. Dut- chasers of the vendees, than by simi- ton, 6 Phila. 185 ; Pratt v. Eby, 67 Pa. lar objections on the part of the ven- St. 396; Godden v. Kimmel, 99 U. S. dees themselves." Walsh v. Barton, 201 ; Union, etc., R. Co. v. McAlpine, 24 Ohio St. 28; Ludlow v. O'Neil, 29 129 U. S. 305; Railroad Co. v. McCar- OhioSt. 181. thy, 96 TJ. S. 258; Carson v. German 2 Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. St. 485. Ins. Co., 62 Iowa, 433; Jennings v. 3 Mead v. Altgeld, 33 111. App. 373 ; Reeves, 101 N. C. 447 ; 7 S. E. Rep. 897 ; Parmly ■». Head, 33 111. App. 134; Garner v. Lasker, 71 Texas, 431; 9 Camfleld v. Gilbert, 4 Esp. 221; Al- S. W. Rep. 332. pass v. Watkins, 8 T. R. 516. 6 Kneller v. Lang, 63 Hun, 48. 27 418 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 343 matter of fact which is not capable of satisfactory proof, or, if capable of that proof, yet is not so proved. 1 While a title de- pending upon the bar of the statute of limitations is a mar- ketable title, still it must clearly appear that the entry of the real owner is barred; 2 and the time prescribed by statute must be proven not to have been prolonged by some act of the parties which has operated to prevent the running of the statute. Thus, where a mortgage appeared of record it was held neces- sary for the vendor to show that there had been no incident, such as infancy, coverture or lunacy, to extend the time, al- though it appeared that without such an event the mortgage was barred. 3 But such a rule, it seems, would not obtain in case of promissory notes; all the vendor has to show in such case is that they are barred, without proving the non- existence of incidents extending the time. 4 In California the courts do not follow the rule that a title depending on the bar of the statute of limitations may be marketable, and it is ac- cordingly there held that a purchaser is entitled, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, to a good paper title, sufficient in law. 5 § 343. Title from a stranger. — A purchaser is not required to accept a conveyance from a third party, but only from the vendor. 6 But if the vendee accepts a deed from a third party who makes it at the vendor's request, the vendee must pay the purchase price to the vendor. 7 And it is not necessary for the vendor to own the land at the date of the contract to sell. Provided that he is able to convey when the time for perform- ance arrives, this is all that is required. 8 1 Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575, Pac. Rep. 216; Benson v. Shotwell, 87 where the absence of a party in Aus- Cal. 49. See, also, Sheeby v. Miles, tralia was held should have been ac- 93 Cal. 288. counted for by the vendor. 6 George v. Oonhaim, 38 Minn. 338 ; 2 PratU.Eby,67Pa. St. 396; Towns- 37 X. W. Rep. 791. hend v. Goodfellow, 40 Minn. 312. ' Hamilton v. Hulett, 57 Minn. 208; 3 Austins. Barnum, 52 Minn. 136 ; 53 53 N. W. Rep. 364. N. W. Rep. 1132. 8 Handley v. Tibbetts (Ky.), 16 4 Rife v. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422. S. W. Rep. 131. 6 McCroskey v. Ladd (Cal.), 28 §§ 344, 345 vendor and purchaser. 419 § 344. Remedying defects. — Inasmuch as a vendor may al- ways, if possible, perfect his title, the vendee must point out to the vendor wherein the title is defective; 1 and then the vendor has a reasonable time to perfect the title. 2 And the vendor may perfect the title at any time up to the actual trial of an action for the recovery of the purchase-money. 8 In an ordinary sale of land there is an implied condition that, if the title be defective, the vendee may decline to take it and may recover the deposit-money if he have paid any; but there is no such legal obligation on the part of the vendor to perfect the title as will give the vendee the right to recover damages for the failure to do so. 4 If the title becomes perfect by the lapse of time, barring the defects noted by the vendee, this relieves the vendor from the necessity of perfecting. 5 § 345. Whether a title is marketable. — As a general rule a title which is open to judicial doubt is not a marketable title. But what is a sufficient ground for judicial doubt is not to be conclusively reduced to fixed and determinate principles, be- cause it depends, in some degree, upon the discretion of the court. 6 First, however, it must be remembered that contracts for the conveyance of a "perfect title" do not contemplate a perfect title in the strict sense of the word perfect, because, roughly speaking, there are no such titles. It means a title that is perfect and safe to a moral certainty, a title, which does not disclose a patent defect, suggesting the possibility of a law suit to defend it; a title, such as a well-informed and pru- dent man, paying full value for the property, would be willing to take. 7 And a perfect title does not mean a perfect record title, because if it did, then the term contemplates a case which, under the American system of conveyancing and registry, is 1 Anderson v. Strassburger, 92 Cal. 6 Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575, 38. 584. 1 Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109 ; ' Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69 26 Atl. Rep. 715. Todd v. Union Dime Co., 128 N. Y 'Mitchell v. Allen, 69 Texas, 70; 636; Dingley v. Bon, 130 N. Y. 607 6 S. W. Rep. 745. Rife v. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422; At 4 Presbrey v. Kline, 20 D. O. 513. kinson v. Taylor, 34 Mo. App. 442 5 Williams v. Porter (Ky.), 21 S.W. Hale v. Cravener, 128 111.408; Parmly Rep. 643. Contra, Noyes v. Johnson, t>. Head, 33 111. App. 134; Mead v. 139 Mass. 436. Altgeld, 33 111. App. 373. 420 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 346 next to impossible. The grantor in a deed in the chain of title may convey by implication as of full age, while in fact he is a minor; female grantors may be married and their deeds void for misjoinder of their husbands, or male grantors may convey as single, while in fact they are married, and convey property incumbered with a dower interest. Where there are many persons of a common name, one may attempt to convey property which in fact belongs to another. A perfect title never can be shown by the record alone, but always depends for its existence upon the record as well as upon facts outside of the record. 1 § 346. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — While the title tendered need not in fact be bad to justify a rejection thereof by the vendee, it must be either defective in fact or so clouded by apparent defects, either appearing in the record or by proof outside, that prudent men, knowing the fact, would hesitate to take it. A suspicion or conjecture merely, without any facts to support it, does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the validity of a title good upon the record. If the defect or doubt is disclosed on the face of the record title the vendee need go no further, but if it depends upon some extrinsic fact not discovered by the record, he must prove this fact to justify a refusal to accept the title. 2 1 Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69. clouded by apparent defects, either in 2 Greenblatt v. Hermann (1894), 144 the record or by proof outside of the N. Y. 13, per Andrews, C. J.: "The record, that prudent men, knowing point that at least the title was doubt- the facts, would hesitate to take it. ful, and, therefore, unmarketable, Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1; rests upon the possible existence of Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586. In heirs on the mother's side, not the present case there is no presump- brought into the proceedings. If tion in the absence of proof that the their existence had been shown, or mother of the decedent had brothers evidence given rendering it probable or sisters or descendants of either, that such heirs were in being, the The title is not doubtful by reason of plaintiff would have been entitled to any fact shown or by reason of any relief. It has been often said that inference from any such fact. It is a the purchaser is entitled to a market- possibility merely that such heirs may able title. The title tendered need exist. But the plaintiff has not seen not in fact be bad in order to relieve fit to give any proof on the subject, him from his purchase, but it must and has left it to conjecture merely, either be defective in fact, or so and a suspicion or conjecture, without $§347, 348 vendor and purchaser. 421 § 347. Duties of vendor. — If the burden of showing title rests with the vendor, and he exhibits a complete chain of title by record, which is apparently regular on its face, he has done all that the law requires of him in the first instance; and, if the vendee then challenges the title thus exhibited, the burden is upon him to show that there are imperfections in the title dehors the record. 1 But this rule can apply to cases only where there is no necessary break in the record title, by death, mar- riage or other causes. Where there is no will, for instance, and especially where there is no administration, the devolution of title does not take place by matter of record; but upon the death of an ancestor, the title vests immediately in his heirs by descent. Marriage changes the name of the female, and the deed seldom discloses her former name. In all such classes of cases it is sufficient for the vendor to show in the first in- stance, by the recitals of the record itself, if the record so recites, that certain grantors were all the children of A., or that B., married to C, was formerly E., giving her name as a maid or widow. If the record does not so recite, then the least that can be required of the vendor is that he adduce some other prima facie evidence of that fact, before he can put the vendee in the wrong for refusing to accept the title. 2 § 348. Burden of proof. — The burden of proof, no matter what the action may be, is on the vendor to show that his title is marketable, and not on the vendee to show that the title is unmarketable. 3 And when it is the duty of the vendor, by the terms of the contract, to exhibit his title to the vendee, he must exhibit it within a reasonable time. 4 If he have prima any facts to support it, does not raise ford, 13 N. H. 167. "In fact, we know a reasonable doubt as to the validity of no exception to the rule, certainly of a title good upon the record." none established by decided cases, 1 Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69, 76, that an executory agreement to con- 77_ vey a title to land means the convey- 2 Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69. ance of a good title, and that the 3 Birge v. Bock, 24 Mo. App. 330; showing of such a title by the vendor Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566 ; Burwell is a condition precedent to his recov- v. Jackson, 15 N. Y. 536; Delevan ery." Bombauer, J., in Birge v. Bock, v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 485 ; Swayne v. 24 Mo. App. 330, 334. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436; Phillips v. l Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69, 47. Breck, 79 Ky. 465; Little v. Paddle- 422 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § £49 facie a perfect title of record, it may be assumed that he dis- charges his undertaking by exhibiting to the vendee the cer- tificate of a competent title examiner, affixed to what purports to be an abstract of all the conveyances affecting the property, such abstract showing a complete chain of title and disclosing no flaws. But if the abstract shows a break in the title, the vendor must look up the evidence in pais, which is necessary to supply the gap and to show that the title is good; and this evidence must be communicated to the vendee. 1 In suits be- tween vendor and vendee a doubtful title can not be made marketable by an opinion of a court on a case stated between them. 2 § 349. Illustrations of unmarketable titles. — Where the owners of certain land have bound themselves to build only in a certain manner, and this covenant runs with the land, this renders the title unmarketable. 8 A title is not marketable which depends for its validity upon information which is not fully presented to the court, and upon the doubtful construc- tion of the limitations of a deed and the terms of a statute, each of which is inartificially drawn. 4 Inasmuch as a deed absolute in form, but intended as a mortgage, is a mortgage, a title under such a deed is not marketable. 5 And a title de- pending on a deed of recent date, without further proof of title, is not marketable. 6 The pendency of proceedings to con- demn real property for public use is, as between vendor and purchaser, such a defect in the title that the purchaser, under a contract to convey to him good title, is not obliged to take the title so affected. 7 And it seems that any recitals in a rec- ord, which are not binding on third persons, and which if 1 Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69, 78. Taylor v. McLain, 64 Cal. 513; Mur- 2 Pratt v. Eby, 67 Pa. St. 396. dock v. Clarke, 90 Cal. 427; Lane v. 8 Kountze v. Helmuth, 67 Hun, 343 4 Paulmier v. Howland, 49 N. J. Eq 364; 24 Atl. Rep. 268. 6 Adair v. Adair, 22 Ore. 115 Smith v. Smith, 80 Cal. 323; Hall v Arnott, 80 Cal. 348 ; Booth v. Hoskins 75 Cal. 271; Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal 307; Healy v. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 517 Shears, 1 Wend. 433; Peugha. Davis, 96 U. S. 332; Odell v. Montross, 68 N. Y. 499 ; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498 ; Howe v. Carpenter, 49 Wis. 697. 6 Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28. 7 Cavenaugh v. McLaughlin, 38 Minn. 83; 35 N. W. Rep. 576. § 350 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 423 false will give title to such third persons, have a tendency, at least, to make the title unmarketable. 1 § 350. Specified land to be conveyed. — "The vendor must convey property answering in all respects to that contracted for, and can not compel the purchaser to accept a conveyance of property differing from the contract in any material partic- ular; whether in estate, or tenure, quantity, identity, or con- dition.'" Thus a contract for the conveyance of a specified tract of land is not satisfied by the conveyance of a part of such tract. 3 Accordingly if the vendor pulls down any build- ing after the contract of sale, the purchaser is not bound to complete the purchase. 4 "But any subsequent deterioration or improvement in the property from accidental or natural causes accrues to the loss or profit of the purchaser, as being the beneficial owner by virtue of the contract." 5 Where a leasehold property described as a term of twenty-three years was sold, and it appeared that a yard, part of the premises, was only held by the vendor from year to year, it was held that the defect avoided the sale. 6 And if a house is described as a certain number on a street, this is a material description and the vendor does not fulfill his contract by tendering a house next to the designated one. 7 A contract to convey a wharf with a jetty is not performed unless the jetty is con- veyed as well as the wharf. 8 1 Sheehy v. Miles, 93 Cal. 288, where with or without controversy between the record recited that a homestead the parties is immaterial. Unless it was declared upon community prop- was accepted in satisfaction of the erty, it being held that the title was agreement, the unexecuted part of the unmarketable because if the recitals original agreement remained in full were false and the property not com- force." munity, the land would descend to 4 Granger v. Worms, 4 Camp. 83. other parties than the grantor. 5 Leake on Contracts, 833, citing 2 Leake on Contracts, 831. White v. Nutt, 1 P. Wms. 61 ; Spur- 3 Cavanaugh v. Casselman, 88 Cal. rier v. Hancock, 4 Vesey, 667; Paine 543, where the court said : "Thatob- v. Meller, 6 Vesey, 349. ligation could not be satisfied by the 6 Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. conveyance of a part of the tract, any 355. more than would the payment of a 'Stanton v. Tattersall, 1 Sm. & G. money obligation be satisfied by the 529. payment of a part thereof. Whether 8 Peers v. Lambert, 7 Beav. 546. the conveyance of a part was made 424 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 351 § 351. Sales in gross. — "When land is sold in bulk for a gross sum, and not by the foot or the acre, and there is no fraud or willful misrepresentations or concealment amounting to fraud, and the description is definite — as by metes and bounds, governmental subdivisions or other certain descrip- tion — and there is no special covenant or averment as to quantity, then a call for quantity in the conveyance, whether qualified by the words "more or less" or other equivalent words or not, is merely descriptive; and if it does not corre- spond with the quantity within the boundaries given such call yields to the description, and the grantee takes all within the boundaries, be the same more or less than the quantity stated, and can have no relief on account of a deficit, either on the covenants by way of recoupment nor directly for damages. 1 Thus in a purchase of a farm, said to contain two hundred and sixty-one acres, by certain boundaries, the sale is binding although there is a deficiency of seventeen acres. 2 And relief was even denied where the language used was "there being in the lot one hundred and thirty-five acres strict measure." 3 Where the deed stated without qualifying words that the quantity conveyed was two and three-fourths acres, and the actual quantity was one acre and one hundred and forty-eight perches, it was held to be a sale in gross and the purchaser was remediless. 4 In such cases, if the vendee visits the prop- 1 Wood v. Murphy, 47 Mo. App. 539. Am. Dec. 202 ; Stebbina v. Eddy, 4 Ma- The statement in the text is taken son, 414; Weaver v. Carter, 10 Leigh, from the brief of counsel for the re- 37 ; Eubank v. Hampton, 1 Dana, 343; spondent in this case, a statement Brown v. Parish, 2 Dana, 6; Jackson which can not be improved on for ac- v. McConnell, 19 Wend. 175; Noble curacy and clearness. See also, Mann v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231, holding that v. Pearson, 2 John. 37; Smith v. in a written contract for the purchase Evans, 6 Bing. 102 ; Phillips v. Porter, of land for a gross sum, a description 3 Ark. 18; Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. , of the land by its boundaries, or the 355 ; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cowen, 706 ; insertion of the words "more or less," Allison v. Allison, 1 Yerg, 16; Beach or of equivalent words, will control a v. Stearns, 1 Aik. 325; Eoat v. Puff, 3 statement of the quantity of land, or Barb. 353. of the length of one of the boundary 2 Wood v. Murphy, 47 Mo. App. 539. lines, so that neither party will be en- 3 Eoat v. Puff, 3 Barb. 353. titled to relief on account of a defi- 4 Large v. Penn, 6 S. & E. 488. See ciency or surplus. McEvoyti. Loyd, 31 also, Harrell v. Hill, 19 Ark. 102; 68 Wis. 142, Ufford v. Wilkins, 33 Iowa, §§352, 353 vendok and purchaser. 425 erty itself prior to the sale, and makes a personal examination of it touching quantity, he will be presumed to rely on his own judgment in making the purchase, and not upon any rep- resentations of the vendor. 1 § 352. Conflict in description. — If there be a conflict in the boundaries between the monuments and the courses and dis- tances, the latter must yield to the former, because they are more certain, and reference will be had to them to determine the intention of the parties to the conveyance. 2 Thus where, after the description of the lands conveyed in the deed, by metes and bounds, were the words "containing one hundred and eighty acres, strict measure," it was held that as the sub- ject-matter of the conveyance was a farm with natural bound- aries, which were used in the deed, the natural boundaries governed and controlled, although the quantity specified was nine acres too much. 3 And when the land is specifically and definitely described in the instrument by which it is conveyed, a recital, in the same clause with the description, that the tract conveyed contains a specific quantity, is mere description, and will not operate as an implied warranty that the tract con- veyed contains the number of acres or quantity specified. 4 § 353. Compensation for deficiencies. — In a case where the vendor is unable from any cause not involving mala fides on his part, to convey each and every parcel of the land contracted to be sold, or where the deficiency in regard to quantity, iden- tity, or condition, is slight in substance, there the vendor may insist on performance with compensation to the purchaser, or a proportionate abatement from the agreed price if that has not been paid. "It is much too late to contend, that every 110; Campbell v. Johnson, 44 Mo. 3 Andrews v. Rue, 34 N. J. Law, 402, 247; Ketchum v. Stout, 20 Ohio, 453. 4 Fuller v. Carr, 33 N. J. Law, 157; 1 Farrar v. Churchill, 135 TJ. S. 609. Smith v. Negbauer, 42 N. J. Law, 305 ; 2 Andrews v. Rue, 34 N.J. Law, 402; Elliott v. Weed, 44 Conn. 19; Arm- Opdyke v. Stephens, 28 N. J. Law, 83 ; strong v. Brownfield, 32 Kan. 116; Powell a. Clark, 5 Mass. 355; Roat v. Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 355; Jack- Puff, 3 Barb. 353 ; Jackson v. Moore, son v. Barringer, 15 John. 472. 6 Cowen, 706; Weart v. Rose, 1 C. E. Green, 290. 426 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 354 variance from the description will enable a man to resist the performance. The principle is that if he gets substantially that for which he bargains, he must take a compensation'for a deficiency in the value." 1 The practice among English con- veyancers is to insert an express condition in contracts of sale to the effect that any misdescription, mistake or error shall not avoid the sale, but shall be matter of compensation. 2 § 354. Bona fide purchasers — Possession as notice. — If a contract of sale be registered it is conclusive of notice of the contract to any subsequent purchaser notwithstanding the pur- chaser lived in another state, and did not, in fact, search the register's books. 3 Actual, notorious, and exclusive possession of land takes the place of the recording of the instrument of title; and a subsequent purchaser of land in possession of one who is not his vendor is affected with notice of whatever claim or interest the person in possession has, and which an inquiry into the possession would have revealed. He is not permitted to dispute such right or interest unless he has made the inquiry which equity and good conscience impose on him, and such in- quiry, duly prosecuted, has failed to reveal any right or inter- est in the tenant in possession. 4 Actual possession of real es- 1 Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Vesey, Jr., interest in the property conflicting or 506, per Sir William Grant, Master of inconsistent with the title or alleged the Rolls, 506; Foley v. Crow, 37 title under which he is in possession, Md. 51 ; Poole v. Shergold, 2 Bro. or which he has a right to connect C. C. 118; Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Bin. with his possession of the property. (Pa.) 355. It is equally a part of the law of the 2 Dart on Vendors, 86. country, as I understand it, that a 3 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, man who knows, or can not be heard § 403. to deny that he knows, another to be 4 Chapman *. Chapman (Va. 1895), in possession of a certain property, 21 S. E. Rep. 813, Riely, J. . "In the can not for any civil purpose, as case of Holmes ». Powell, 8 De Gex, against him at least, be heard to deny M. & G. 572, that eminent jurist, having thereby notice of the title or Lord Justice Knight Bruce, said: alleged title under which or in respect ' I apprehend that by the law of of which the former is or claims to England, when a man is of right be in that possession.' The same and de facto in the possession of a general rule is said by Mr. Pome- corporeal hereditament, he is en- roy to be established in the United titled to impute knowledge of that States by a very great preponderance possession to all who deal for any of authority. 2 Pomeroy on Equity 355 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 427 tate is sufficient notice to a person proposing to take a mort- gage on the property, and to all the world, of the existence of any right which the person in possession is able to establish. 1 The Virginia rule is that trustees under a conveyance by a debtor in trust for the benefit of his creditors are purchasers for value without notice, although the general rule is other- wise; 8 but notice of adverse title to one of such trustees is notice to all of them, and none of them are bona fide pur- chasers. 8 § 355. "Vendor's lien. — The vendor's lien is based upon the theory that a vendee ought not to hold the land of another, and not pay for it; and the rule that equity looks to substance and not to form is applicable to the enforcement of vendor's Jurisprudence, § 614, and the cases cited in the note thereto in support of the text. The doctrine has re- cently been upheld by the court of appeals of New York to its fullest ex- tent in the case of Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y.587; 23 N. E. Rep. 1109." 1 It was argued in Edwards u.Thornp- son, 71 N. C. 177, where the purchaser was a resident of South Carolina, and bought land in North Carolina, that the question of notice of an equity in derogation of the vendor's right to sell was exclusively one of fact, and that, in order to be fixed upon the purchaser, it must be shown either that he had notice in fact, or else willfully or imprudently omitted to inquire when the means of . inquiry were in his reach. " We do not think," said the court, "this is the true principle. On policy, the law avoids such minute and uncertain inquiries. It says that open, notori- ous and exclusive possession in a person other than his vendor is a fact of which a purchaser must inform himself, and he is conclusively pre- sumed to have done so." 2 Chapman v. Chapman (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 813, Riely, J.: "They are unquestionably, under many de- cisions of this court, purchasers for value. Evans v. Greenhow, 15 Gratt. 153 ; Wickham v. Martin, 13 Gratt. 427 Exchange Bank v. Knox, 19 Gratt. 739 Shurtz v. Johnson, 28 Gratt. 657, 667 Cammack v. Soran, 30 Gratt. 292 Williams v. Lord, 75 Va.390; Witz v Osburn, 83 Va. 227; 2 S. E. Rep. 33. 3 Chapman v. Chapman (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 813, Reily, J.: "The conveyance was to them jointly. The particular estate they took was joint and inseverable ; the title joint and indivisible. To be bona fide pur- chasers without notice, they must be wholly so. There can be no such thing as a purchase partly bona fide. If tainted in part, the whole is in- fected. Consequently, notice to one of two or more trustees is notice to all. Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq., pt. 1, p. 109; Smith v. Smith, 2 Cromp. & M. 230; Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 73; Willes v. Green- hill, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 147, 150; Bank v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451, 464; Myers v. Ross, 3 Head, 59; 2Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, §667; Lewin on Trusts, 609-612." 428 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 356 liens. 1 Generally speaking, the lien of the vendor exists; and the burden of proof is on the purchaser to establish that, in the particular case, it has been intentionally displaced or waived by the consent of the parties. 2 It has been held that where there is an exchange of lands, a covenant by one of the parties to pay off the liens on the lands transferred by him, as part of the consideration of the land deeded to him, is as much an agreement to pay a part of the purchase-money as though there had been an agreement to pay that amount directly to the ven- dor to enable him to payoff the liens. If the agreement is not kept, so much of the consideration fails, and a vendor's lien exists for the amount paid to clear off the liens. 3 Where a note does not show that it was given for the price of land, but declares that it is secured by rent on other property, and the deed conveying the land recites a cash consideration and reserves no lien, in an action to foreclose his lien, the burden is on the vendor to show that a lien on the land was reserved. 4 § 356. Vendor's lien — Liability of purchaser from vendee. — If a purchaser of land knows that his vendor is still owing a part of the purchase-money for which no security has been given, he will take the land subject to the implied lien of the 1 Beal v. Harrington, 116 111. 113; 4 sory note, and sought to foreclose the N. E. Rep. 664; 2Warvelleon Vendors, vendor's lien on the tract of land foi 707. which he alleged the note had been 2 2 Story on Equity and Jurispru- given. The deed conveying the land dence, § 1224. to appellant recited a cash considera- 3 Elliott v. Plattor, 43 Ohio St. 198; 1 tion and reserved no lien. The note N. E. Rep. 222; Pratt i). Eaton, 65 Mo. did not even disclose on its face that 157; Bennett u. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448; it had been given for unpaid purchase- Dayton, etc., Railroad Co. v. Lewton, money of the land, but, on the con- 20 Ohio St. 401 ; 2 Warvelle on Ven- trary, contained this recital : ' This dors, 707. In Mackreth v. Symmons, note is secured by rent on the Barton 15 Ves. 329, Lord Eldon decided in farm for 1891.' In this state of case, favor of the lien as to the debt as- where a lien is expressly reserved upot sumed by the purchaser, but which he other property, the implied lien on failed to pay, while he refused to ex- the land will not be presumed, but the tend it to the annuities. See Sugden burden rests on the vendor to show on Vendors, p. 679, § 19. that it, too, was retained. Parker 4 Weeks u. Barton (Texas App. 1895), County v. Sewell, 24 Texas, 238; Faver 31 S. W. Rep. 1071, Stephens, J.: v. Robinson, 46 Texas, 204; Cresap v. "Appellee sued appellant on a promis- Manor, 63 Texas, 485." §356 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 429 original vendor. 1 But land is not chargeable with a vendor's lien which has been conveyed to a subsequent purchaser for value without notice of the existence of the lien. 2 Where part of the consideration for a deed is the vendee's assumption of certain debts of the vendor, amounting to a sum certain, and the vendee settles such debts by compromise for less than their face, he is liable to the vendor for the rebate on such debts since he acts in the matter as the vendor's agent. The vendor has a lien for the amount of such rebate, and a vendor's lien may be enforced after the vendee has sold the land to one who buys with notice of the lien. 8 1 Harsbarger v. Foreman, 81 111. 364; Moshier v. Meek, 80 111. 79; 2 Warvelle on Vendors, pp. 699, 700. 2 Bang v. Brett (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1067. 8 Kochc. Roth, 150 111. 212; 37 N. E. Rep. 317, per Magruder, J. ; " Did a vendor's lien exist in favor of ap- pellee for the difference between the amount of indebtedness agreed to be paid and the amount actually paid? Counsel for appellants refer to a state- ment in Devlin on Deeds (Vol. 2, §1256), in support of the proposition that, if the obligation of the vendee of land be for the discharge of a lia- bility to a third party, no lien is re- tained by the vendor when the con- veyance is absolute; and that, in order to create a vendor's lien, there must not only be a debt for unpaid purchase-money to a fixed amount, but that such debt must be due di- rectly to the vendor. The cases relied on in support of the proposition are Patterson v. Edwards, 29 Miss. 67; Chapman v. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115 ; Hiscock v. Norton, 42 Mich. 320; 3 N. W. Rep. 868; Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243; Vandoren v. Todd, 3 N. J. Eq. 397. In the Mississippi case the deed recited a consideration of $10,000, paid in cash, and ' in consideration of said Edwards (the vendee) assiirning to well and truly pay and satisfy the principal and interest, due upon ' two certain notes due to the Planters' Bank, and payable February 26, 1840. The deed, upon its face, left the pre- cise amount of the consideration un- stated, and to be determined by ref- erence to an outside matter. In the Connecticut case, also, the amount of the consideration was indefinite, it appearing that the vendee, to whom the conveyance was made, assumed the payment of 'other claims, together with the mortgage debt to the bank.' In neither of the other cases referred to did the facts show an assumption of the debts of the vendor by the vendee. In Sears v. Smith, supra, the lien was held to have been waived, because the vendor accepted the note of a third person, either as security or in absolute payment for the land. In Vandoren v. Todd, supra, it was held that the lien was not waived, although the period of payment was dependent upon the life of another person, etc. In Hiscock v. Norton, supra, the vendee agreed to build a house for the vendor, and other ele- ments of an indefinite character en- tered into the consideration; and there was held to be no lien, because the sale was not for a specific sum, and it could not be ascertained with any certainty what the amount in money was for which the lien was 430 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. §357 § 357. Vendor's lien — Expressly reseryed. — Where the deed expressly reserves a vendor's lien, the superior title to the land conveyed remains in the vendor, on the death of the ven- sought to be enforced. Other cases are referred to by counsel where the vendee agreed to support the vendor during his life, and where the con- sideration was for personal services of an indefinite character, such as Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102; Brawley v. Catron, 8 Leigh, 522 ; McCandlish v. Keen, 13 Gratt. 615 ; McKillip v. Mc- Killip, 8 Barb. 552. The rule extract- ed from all these cases by Pomeroy, in hi* work on Equity Jurisprudence, is thus stated by him (Vol. 3, §1251): 'The grantor's lien, wherever recog- nized, is only permitted as a security for the unpaid purchase price, and not for any other indebtedness or lia- bility. There must be a certain, as- certained, absolute debt owing for the purchase price ; the lien does not ex- ist in behalf of any uncertain, con- tingent, or unliquidated demand.' In the case at bar, the amount of in- debtedness to be paid by the vendee was fixed at a specified sum, which went to make up the amount of the consideration named in the deed. Hence there was no violation of the rule laid down by the author above referred to in the following words: 'The vendor can not claim a lien as security for an uncertain demand.' 2 Devlin on Deeds, § 1256. Of course, where the obligation of the vendor to discharge a definite amount of indebt- edness owing by the vendor appears to be substituted for the purchase- money, or to be taken instead of the purchase-money, or as a direct securi- ty for it, the lien is lost. But we see nothing in the facts of the present case to indicate that such was de- signed to be the object of the agree- ment to pay the vendor's debts. Up- on principle, there can be no good reason why there should not be a lien for unpaid purchase-money due the vendor, whether such money is to be paid into the hands of the vendor himself or into the hands of a cred- itor for his benefit. The obligation to pay the debts in such case is that of the vendee himself, and not the obli- gation of a third person, and, there- fore, can not be regarded as the taking of such outside security as will waive the lien. 2 Warvelle on Vendors, p. 714 ; Boynton v. Champlin, 42 111. 57 ; Sears v. Smith, supra; Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 111. 317; 13 N. E. Rep. 505. In Phelps n. Reeder, 39 111. 172, where one of two tenants in common of land purchased his cotenant's interest therein, and there were mechanics' liens upon the premises, which were to be paid off by the purchasing ten- ant by allowing a sale to take place under the anticipated decree, and having him become the purchaser, and he was to be allowed, as a credit on the purchase-money, one-half of the full amount of those debts ; it was held that this agreement constituted the purchaser the agent of his vendor in respect to the payment of these liens ; that, as such agent, he could not speculate in regard to the dis- charge of the liens at the expense of his principal; that, whatever abate- ment of the liens the agent may have procured, he would be required to al- low it to his principal. In Hitchcock v. Watson, 18 111. 289, we held that an agent or trustee for another can not speculate in the execution of his fiduciary duties or employment ; and, if he by compromise or otherwise liquidates or pays off a debt of his principal or cestui que trust at less than he has received for that purpose, he is accountable for the residue." §357 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 431 dee, and the vendor's lien on the proceeds of the land, sold by the vendee's administrator, is superior to the claim of the ven- dee's family for the yearly allowance, and claims for funeral expenses or the general administration expenses. The facts that a renewal note is given in place of purchase-price notes, which were secured by a vendor's lien, the renewal note ex- pressly continuing the lien, and that the vendee also executes a deed of trust to secure such note, does not impair the origi- nal vendor's lien. 1 1 Jackson v. Ivory (Texas App. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 716, per Collard, J. : "The contract was executory, and no title passed to Gox, and could not pass, until the purchase-money notes were paid. Foster v. Powers, 64 Tex- as, 247 ; McKelvain v. Allen, 58 Texas, 383 ; Lundy v. Pierson, 67 Texas, 233 ; 2 S. W. Rep. 737. The transfer of these notes by Faubion to Francis Smith & Co., with his title to the land, vested in the assignee all the rights held by Faubion, both in the lien and the title to the land. Oox consented to this, and executed a new note as a re- newal of all other notes, expressly continuing and preserving the lien, and declaring that the new note was for the original purchase-money. This gave the renewal note the same char- acter and the same binding effect as the original notes. Johnson v. Towns- end, 77 Texas, 639; 14 S. W. Rep. 233. The execution of the deed of trust by Cox and wife to secure the note by express lien upon the land did not waive or impair the original lien. It was a confirmation of it. Irvin v. Gar- ner, 50 Texas, 48; De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Texas, 464; Dibrell v. Smith, 40 Texas, 447. All the rights of the orig- inal vendor were transferred to ap- pellee, and he occupied the same relation to the property, and could enforce the same rights, as the orig- inal vendor. He held and owned the lien, and also the superior title to the land. The estate of Cox had no title to the land as against the vendor so long as the purchase-money remained unpaid, and it could not become sub- ject to administration as ordinary as- sets. The vendor's rights and the right of his assignee were not affected by the death of Cox. His death did not create a title different from that possessed by him, and his heirs could not, upon his death, become vested with rights in the land superior to his, as against the superior title and right of the vendor's assignee. The title to the land was not in the estate, and the surviving constituents of the family would have no more right to a homestead, or to a year's allowance preferred to the vendor's rights, than they could have toother lands belong- ing to strangers. In this respect, the vendor's lien is different from ordi- nary mortgages and liens created by contract of the deceased mortgagor. The latter are subordinate to adminis- tration and statutory rules of priority declared and enjoyed therein. Rob- ertson v. Paul, 16 Texas, 472; Gid- dings v. Crosby, 24 Texas, 295 ; McLane v. Paschal, 47 Texas, 365; Mabry v. Ward, 50Texas,404 ; Jenkins u.Cain, 72 Texas, 88 ; 10 S.W. Rep. 391 ; Clements v. Neal, 1 Posey Unrep. Cas. (Tex.) 41. In the very nature of the vendor's rights in the land and his lien, which, under circumstances of failure of the vendee to pay, will entitle the former to a recovery of the land itself or a rescission of the sale, there can be no 432 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 358 § 358. Reserving lien on crops to secure purchase-money. — A reservation in a deed of a lien on crops to be thereafter planted on the land, to secure the purchase-money, is valid, and entitled to precedence over the lien of a subsequent mort- gagee, who had actual notice thereof. 1 right in the vendee, or his heirs after his death, that can defeat it." 1 Martin v. Schichtl, 60 Ark. 595 ; 31 S.W. Rep. 458, where the court said : "In Apperson p. Moore, 30 Ark. 56, which was a suit in equity on the mort- gage of a future crop, it was held the lien of a mortgage on an unplanted crop attaches, in equity, as soon as the sub- ject of the mortgage comes into exist- ence ; and can be enforced, in a pro- ceeding to foreclose, against the mort- gagor, and those holding under him with record notice. This power was recognized and confirmed by an act of the general assembly, approved Febru- ary 11, 1875, which made mortgages on crops to be planted valid. It has been frequently held that a reserva- tion in a lease of a farm of a lien on crops not in esse, which are to be grown on the land, as security for the payment of a stipulated rent, is suf- ficient to hold the crops so soon as they come into existence. Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465. The reservation of the lien on crops in this case was an equitable mortgage. If a mortgage on a crop before it is planted, to secure an ordinary debt, and the lien of the lessor reserved in the lease, attach to the crop so soon as it is planted, the lien reserved by Mrs. Rice certainly attached and held the crops as a se- curity for the payment of the purchase- money. The fact that the reservation is inconsistent with and repugnant to the grant in the deed does not defeat the lien. Reservations of easements, like a right of way in conveyances of land, and in leases of ' grass, herbage, feeding and pasturage,' have been up- held, and yet they are inconsistent with the grant. Rose v. Bunn, 21 N. Y. 275. The case of Darling v. Robbins, 60 Vt. 347; 15 Atl. Rep. 177, sustains our view. In that case it was held that a 'reservation in a warranty deed of land of the crops that might be produced thereon, to secure the in- terest on the purchase-money, is a valid lien, and may be foreclosed.' The difference between this and that case is, the lien reserved on the crops in the former is to secure the payment of the notes given for the purchase- money, instead of the interest alone, as in the latter case. But the rule is the same, and sustains the lien in both cases. In Walters v. Meyer, 39 Ark. 560; Watson v. Pugh, 51 Ark. 218; 10 S. W. Rep. 493, and Quertermous v. Hatfield, 54 Ark. 16; 14 S. W. Rep. 1096, cited by appellants, no lien on crops v was reserved or created by con- tract, and the law gave none. They were cases in which land was sold, and the vendee executed his note for the purchase-money, and promised to pay it as rent. The court held that ' calling the purchase-money rent would not make it such, nor create a lien on the crops for its payment.' In Walters v, Meyer, while so holding, Chief Justice English, who delivered the opinion of the court, said : ' No doubt a vendor may, by contract, re- serve a lien upon lands and crops, its fruits, to secure the payment of pur- chase-money.' The calling the lien reserved on the crops a ' landlord's lien' does not defeat the manifest in- tent of the parties to create it. The misnomer can not defeat the intention of the parties. Equity requires no particular words to be used in creating §§ 359, 360 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 433 § 359. Vendor's right to earnest money. — While courts of equity, not less than courts of law, recognize the rights of par- ties to a contract to stipulate for penalties and forfeitures, and while, on a proper showing, courts of equity will always re- lieve against forfeitures, it is a rule of universal application that they will never enforce either a penalty or a forfeiture. 1 But where a vendee has deposited part of the price as earnest money, to be forfeited as liquidated damages in case he fails to fulfill his contract, and he does fail to fulfill it, a court of equity will enforce a vendor's title to the earnest money, since it is not a penalty, but compensation for the breach of contract. 8 § 360. Equitable mortgage analogous to vendor's lien. — There is no doubt upon the authorities that where one party advances money to another upon the faith of a verbal agree- ment by the latter to secure its payment by a mortgage upon certain lands, but which is never executed, or which, if exe- cuted, is so defective or informal as to fail in effectuating the purpose of its execution, equity will impress upon the land intended to be mortgaged a lien in favor of the creditor who advanced the money for the security and satisfaction of his debt. This lien attaches upon the payment of the money and, unless there is a waiver of it, express or implied, remains and may be enforced so long as the debt itself may be enforced, and no waiver can be implied from the act of the creditor in receiving a mortgage which by reason of fraud, inadvertence or mistake a lien. It looks through the form to choose to give it, it is in equity a mort- the substance of an agreement ; and if gage.' Bell v. Pelt, 51 Ark. 433; 11 from the instrument evidencing the S.W.Rep. 684; 3 Pomeroy on Equity- agreement ' the intent appear to give Jurisprudence, § 1237 ; 2 Devlin on or to charge or to pledge property, real Deeds, § 1237." or personal, as a security for an obliga- 1 2 Story on Equity Jurisprudence, tion, and the property is so described §1319; Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 that the principal things intended to Johns. Ch. 415; Marshall v. Vicks- be given or charged can be sufficiently burg, 15 Wall. 146 ; Vail v. Drexel, 9 identified, the lien follows.' In the 111. App. 439; Horsburg v. Baker, 1 case of Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486 ; Pet. 232 ; Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H. Eed. Oas. No. 4,847, Judge Story said : 530. ' If the transaction resolve itself into 2 Bucklen v. Hasterlik, 155 111. 423 ; a security, whatever may be its form, 40 N. E. Rep. 561. and whatever name the parties may 28 434 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. § 360 is not effectual to secure a specific lien on the lands or any part of them, nor is this lien merged in any such instrument subsequently executed. 1 Some of the cases hold that the lien of the party who has advanced money under such circum- stances is analogous to that of the vendor of real estate for the unpaid purchase-money. The vendor's lien rests solely upon the doctrine of equity that it would be inequitable for the ven- dee who has received the legal title without payment of the purchase-money to hold the estate discharged from the claim of the seller for its price, and it is certainly difficult to see any just distinction between the two cases. In one case a party receives the title to real property without paying for it, with or without an agreement that his vendor shall be secured in the payment of the purchase price by a lien upon it by way of mortgage or otherwise. In the other case the party advances money under an agreement that its payment shall be secured by mortgage upon specific real estate, but which agreement has never been perfected. The right of the vendor and that of the person who has advanced the money are not essentially differ- ent, and each would seem to commend itself with equal force to the conscience of a court of equity. The doctrine of equi- table mortgages is not limited to written instruments intended as mortgages, but which by reason of formal defects can not have such operation without the aid of the court, but applies also to a very great variety of transactions to which equity at- taches that character. 2 It is not necessary that such transac- tions or agreements as to lands should be in writing in order to take them out of the operation of the statute of frauds for two reasons, first, because they are completely executed by at least one of the parties and are no longer executory, and, sec- ondly, because the statute by its own terms does not affect the 1 Sprague v. Cochran (1894), 144 ken v. Brown, 39 Hun, 294; Lanning N. Y. 104; De Peyster v. Hasbrouck, v. Tompkins, 45 Barb. 308; Matter of 11 N. Y. 582; Payne v. Wilson, 74 Howe, 1 Paige, 125; Smith v. Smith, N. Y. 348 ; Coman v. Lakey , 80 N. Y. 125 N. Y. 224 ; Hoag v. Town of Green- 345; Husted v. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. wich, 133 N. Y. 152. 251; Perry v. Board of Missions, 102 2 Sprague v. Cochran (1894), 144 N. Y. 99 ; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581 ; N. Y. 104. Haverly ». Becker, 4 N. Y. 169; Glac- § 360 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 435 power which courts of equity have always exercised to compel specific performance of such agreements. 1 "Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224; 2 R. S. (N. Y.), § 10. Beardsley v. Duntley, 69 N. Y. 577; CHAPTER X. PAYMENT. 361. Payment denned. §381. Taxes paid under compul- 362. Conditional payment. sion. 363. Voluntary payments — Illustra- 382. The same subject continued. tions. 383. Receipts. 364. Payment under protest. 384. Receipts in full. 365. Compulsory payments — Re- 385. The same subject continued. covery back. 386. Receipt under seal. 366. Payment by^, stranger. 387. Effect of a receipt. 367. Medium of payment — Illustra- 388. Application of payments. tion. 389. Payments on open account. 368. Payment to creditor's creditor 390. Application by the creditor. or to agent after principal's 391. Debts barred by statute of lim- death. itations. 369. Paying creditor's debt — West 392. Rights of third parties. Virginia doctrine. 393. Time of appropriation. 370. Payment by order. 394. Appropriation by law. 371. Payment by check. 395. Partial payments. 372. The same subject continued — 396. Further illustrations. Illustration. 397. Exception to the rules as to ap- 373. Certified checks. plication of payments. 374. Further illustration. 398. The same subject continued. 375. Payment by bill or note. 399. Payments made under mis- 376. The same subject continued. take of fact. 377. Further illustration. 400. Payments made under mistake 378. Evidence of intention to merge of law. the debt. 401. Presumption of payment — 379. The same subject continued. Time of payment. 380. Eepayment of taxes illegally collected. 402. Executor's duty to pay debts. § 361. Payment defined. — Originally payment was the per- formance of a promise to pay money, at the time and in the manner required by the terms of the contract; but it has been extended to include the delivery of money in satisfaction of a debt, after a default has been made in payment according to the terms of the contract. But the delivery of anything else than money is not a payment, and can not be pleaded as such. (436) § 361 PAYMENT. 437 Thus, if wood is delivered and received as a payment of money due on a note it is only by virtue of a subsequent and inde- pendent agreement to that effect, and these facts can not be shown under a plea of payment. 1 Payment, in a restricted sense, is a discharge in money of a sum due. As usually un- derstood, it means the transfer of money from one person, who is the payor, to another, who is the payee, in satisfaction of a debt. In such sense, it would not include an exchange or compromise, or an accord and satisfaction, but would mean the full satisfaction of a debt in money. But, in its general sense, payment is the performance of an agreement, or the fulfill- ment of a promise or obligation, whether it consists in giving or doing. The discharge of a contract or obligation in money or its equivalent, with the assent of the parties, would consti- tute payment. It may be made in something else than money; in fact, anything that the creditor will accept as payment. It is a mode of extinguishing obligations. To constitute pay- ment, therefore, money, or some other valuable thing, must be delivered by the debtor to the creditor for the purpose of ex- tinguishing the debt, and the creditor must receive it for the same purpose. 2 Accordingly where a vendor of land gave the agent making the sale a note for his commissions, payable when the purchase-money notes were paid, the discharge of the notes with the consent of the parties, although money did not pass, constituted payment. 8 Upon similar grounds it is held that 1 Ulsch v. Muller, 143 Mass. 379 ; consummated it would be a substi- Grinnell v. Spink, 128 Mass. 25 ; Whea- tuted payment, and as effectually ex- ton v. Nelson, 11 Gray, 15. tinguish such notes as though pay- 2 Bush v. Abraham, 25 Ore. 336 ; 35 ment had been made in money. Such Pac. Eep. 1066. being the case, any agreement to that 8 Bush v. Abraham, 25 Ore. 336; 35 effect carried into execution by the Pac. Eep. 1066, Lord, C. J. : "As pay- parties would operate as payment of ment is but a mode of extinguishing a the note in question within the pur- debt, it lies with the creditor whether view of the condition to which the he will accept something different notes sued on are subject. We hold, from that which was owing as pay- therefore, that the payment contem- ment of his debt. So that, if the de- plated by the condition need not nec- fendant chose to enter into an agree- essarily be made in money, but any ment with the company to accept mode which operated as payment by something else than money, though which such note was satisfied and ex- of less value, in satisfaction and dis- tinguished, to which the defendant charge of the company's notes, when agreed." 438 PAYMENT. §362 there is no variance between the proof and the allegations of a defense denominated a defense of payment, when all the facts constituting such payment are set out in such defense, although such defense appears more properly to constitute an accord and satisfaction. The nature of the defense is to be determined from the facts pleaded, and not from the name given to it by the pleader. 1 § 362. Conditional payment. — Generally, a payment may be made conditionally. Thus, if the debtor transmit money to his creditor as a payment in full of the demand, the cred- itor may not receive and retain the money as a credit upon a larger sum claimed by him, without discharging the debtor as to the whole. 2 But a party can not impose conditions upon the payment of a liquidated demand admitted to be due; and even if the debtor transmits the money to the creditor with a condition attached, the creditor may keep the money and apply it to his claim and disregard the condition. 3 Conditions, attached to payments, must be clear and expressly stated. No conditions are to be implied. 4 1 Green v. Hughitt Township (S. Dak. 1894), 59 N. W. Eep. 224, Cor- son, P. J. : "Whether technically a payment, or an accord and satisfac- tion, is not very material, as the facts are fully stated. By section 3456, Compiled Laws, a payment is denned as the 'performance of an obligation for the delivery of money,' and an accord is defined as 'an agreement to accept, in extinction of an obligation, something different from or less than that to which the person agreeing to accept is entitled' (§ 3483, Compiled Laws). Whether, therefore, the facts, as claimed by the respondents to have been proven, show a payment or an accord and satisfaction, is not easily determined, and, in our view, is not necessary to be determined in this case. That they did constitute pay- ment or an accord and satisfaction tan not be doubted. Courts are gov- erned, under our system of practice, by the facts stated in the party's pleadings." 2 Washington Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. St. 576 ; Berdell v. Bissell, 6 Colo. 162 ; McDaniels v. Bank, 29 Vt. 230 ; Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt. 201 ; Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Potter v. Doug- lass, 44 Conn. 541 ; Elton v. Johnson, 16 Conn. 253; Lyman v. Rasmussen, 27 Minn. 384; 7 N. W. Rep. 687; Detroit, etc., Railroad Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 1 12 ; McAfee v. Fisher, 64 Cal. 246 ; Libby v. Hopkins, 104 U. S. 303. 3 Hamill v. German Nat. Bank, 13 Colo. 203. Where a draft was trans- mitted to pay a note, upon which suit had been brought, with an express condition to dismiss the suit, it was held the creditor might keep the draft, apply it as far as it went, and con- tinue his suit. 4 Ziegler v. McFarland, 147 Pa. St. 607. See also, Castner v. Fisher, 104 N. C. 392. §§363,364 payment. 439 § 363. Voluntary payments — Illustrations. — A justice of the peace, who accepts a judgment debtor's check payable to him- self personally in payment of the judgment rendered by him, and then satisfies the judgment on his record, and pays to the successful party the amount due him, can not, on dishonor of the check, recover of the party the money voluntarily paid him; and whether the judgment debtor had money in the bank to pay the check between the times it was made and presented is immaterial. 1 Voluntary payments of pension money, made to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Home by an inmate thereof, in pursuance of an agreement under which his admission to the home was obtained, can not be recovered. 2 But where the plaintiff is in the employ of defendants, who are advancing him money from time to time on his wages, an overpayment by them to him under such circumstances can not be con- sidered as a voluntary payment in the sense that they can not require him to account for it. 8 § 364. Payment under protest. — Where a party, with full knowledge of the facts, pays a demand that is unjustly made against him, and to which he has a valid defense, and where no special damage or irreparable loss would be incurred by making such defense, and where there is no claim of fraud upon the part of the party making such claim, and the pay- ment is not necessary to obtain the possession of the property wrongfully withheld, or the release of his person, such pay- ment is voluntary, and can not be recovered. Nor will the fact that such payment was accompanied by a protest make that involuntary which otherwise would be voluntary. A pro- test is of no avail unless there be duress or coercion of some 1 Garretson o. Joseph, 100 Ala. 279; the kind of a case where the doctrine 13 So. Eep. 948. can be invoked that a voluntary pay- ! Bryson v. Home for Soldiers, etc. ment can not be recovered back. 168 Pa. St. 352 ; 31 Atl. Rep. 1008. This is a case of a current running 3 Farrell v. Burbank, 57 Minn. 395; account, where there are advances on 59 N. W. Eep. 485, per Canty, J. : the one side and continuous earning "The finding that this over-payment of the same on the other, and the law was 'voluntary' amounts to nothing, implies an agreement to repay any This ia not the kind of a payment or over-payments." 440 PAYMENT. §365 character, and then its only office is to show that the pay- ment is the consequence of such duress or coercion. 1 § 365. Compulsory payments — Recovery back. — A payment by a person to free his goods from an attachment levied for the purpose of extorting money, by one who knows that he has no cause of action, is a payment under duress, and the money paid can be recovered back. 2 And so a trader who pays money he does not owe under the threat that his stock in trade will be attached if he does not pay it may recover back the amount as paid under compulsion. 3 a Wessel v. Johnson Land Co., 3 N. Dak. 160; 54 N. W. Rep. 922; Ben- son v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125 ; Commis- sioners v. Walker, 8 Kan. 431; Em- mons v. Scudder, 115 Mass. 367 ; Les- ter v. Mayor, 29 Md. 415; Potomac Coal Co. v. Cumberland Co., 38 Md. 226; Gerecke v. Campbell, 24 Neb. 306; Mariposa Co. v. Bowman, Deady, 228; Lamborn v. County Commis- sioners, 97 U. S. 181 ; Powell v. Board, 46 "Wis. 210; People v. Wilmerding, 136 N. Y. 363 ; Ashley v. Eyan, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 208 ; Copas v. Anglo-Am. Pro- vision Co., 73 Mich. 541; McCabe v. Shaver, 69 Mich. 25. 2 Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364. 3 Weber v. Kirkendall (1894), 39 Neb. 193, per Ragan, C: "It is un- doubtedly a general rule that money paid voluntarily, without fraud, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, can not be recovered back by the party who has so paid it. There are, how- ever, many exceptions to this rule, or rather instances in which the pay- ments, having been made under a pressure of an enforced emergency, are not considered voluntary, but com- pulsory, in law. Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn. 358. In that case the defendant had possession of a chest of tools be- longing to the plaintiff, who was a mechanic, and refused to give up the chest unless plaintiS would pay a bill for board which defendant had against the plaintiff's son, and for which the plaintiff was in no manner liable. To get possession of his chest of tools, Cobb paid the board bill, and the court held that it was not voluntarily paid, and that it might be recovered back. In Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112; 1 N. W. 997, the defendant compelled plaintiff to make a settlement with him, and to forgive certain moneys which the defendant lawfully owed the plaintiff, by informing tne plaintiff that he had stopped payments of cer- tain moneys due the plaintiff from third persons, knowing at the time that if plaintiff failed to get these moneys owing him he would be finan- cially embarrassed, or perhaps ruined. It was held that the settlement made was obtained by duress, and would be set aside, and the defendant compelled to pay the moneys to plaintiff which the plaintiff had forgiven him in the settlement made. In Spaids v. Bar- rett, 57 111. 289, goods were wrongfully taken from the owner thereof by means of a writ of attachment fraud- ulently obtained, and the party in pos- session refused to surrender the goods on payment of the sum actually due, but demanded more than twice that amount as a condition of his releasing the attachment and surrendering pos- session of the goods. The owner paid § 36G PAYMENT. 441 § 366. Payment by a stranger. — A payment by a stranger does not ordinarily inure to the benefit of a debtor. Thus, in an action on a covenant to pay money, it was held to be no de- fense that the creditor had accepted a full satisfaction from a third person. 1 So, where a creditor's bill founded on a judg- ment was instituted, a plea that the judgment had been paid by the municipal corporation as a gratuity to the complainant, a police officer, who had obtained the judgment for costs in an the sum demanded, and the court held that it was not voluntarily paid, and might be recovered back. In Adams v. Schifier, 11 Colo. 15 ; 17 Pac. Rep. 21, Adams agreed to convey to Schifier an interest in certain mining property by a deed passing a good title. In pursuance of this agreement he gave Schifier a quitclaim deed, which he accepted. A third party made an un- founded claim to the property, which Schifier bought up. At the time, Adams was a depositor in Schifier's bank, and Schifier compelled him, by refusing to pay his checks, to settle for a part of the sum paid by Schifier to such third party. The court held that such a payment was involuntary. This money which appellees have ex- torted from appellant may not have been obtained by duress of property, technically speaking, but it was ob- tained from appellant involuntarily. It was obtained by a specie of intimi- dation, fraud and compulsion, and no court of equity will permit them to re- tain it. If this had been a debt which appellant owed the appellees, then, had appellant paid it under the fear that if he did not his goods would have been attached, the case would be entirely different. But the con- trolling facts in this case are that it was not the appellant's debt, and that it was not voluntarily paid." In Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766; 63 N. W. Eep. 35, after a rehearing of the case last recited, the court said: "It has been frequently held, and may be accepted as sound law, that payments or concessions exacted from the owner of property unlaw- fully withheld, in order to obtain pos- session thereof, where the detention is accompanied by immediate hard- ship or irreparable injury, may be avoided on the ground of compulsion, although not amounting to technical duress. See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, etc., Construction Co., 44 Neb. 463 ; 62 N. W. Rep. 899, and authorities cited. But the mere apprehension of legal proceedings, unaccompanied by any act of hardship or oppression, has never been held sufficient ground for the avoiding of a contract. The books, on the other hand, abound in cases holding that, where the parties are on terms of equality towards each other, one threatened with civil process is required to make his defense in the first instance to the merits of the claims, and can not postpone litigation by paying the demand and afterwards maintain an action therefor. No court would be warranted in going further in protecting parties against uncon- scionable demands than did we in the opinion heretofore filed in this case. And yet the ground of our conclusion therein was not alone the threatened attachment, but also the detention of the plaintiff, amounting to physical restraint, and the alleged fraudulent representations with regard to his lia- bility for the indebtedness claimed." 1 Clow v. Borst, 6 John. 37. 442 PAYMENT. §367 action against him for false imprisonment, was held to be bad. 1 These cases proceed upon the principle that satisfaction from a stranger amounts to nothing. 2 But if the payment by a stranger operates as a purchase of the claim, then of course, this may be pleaded by the debtor. 3 And, if a creditor accept money from a stranger, in extinguishment of a claim, and then sue and recover from his debtor, he would be liable to repay the stranger what he had paid. 4 It seems that if a stranger pay an over-due note, and take it away with him, but decline having it canceled, this will be deemed a payment, and not a sale. 6 § 367. Medium of payment — Illustration. — Where the pur- chaser of a printing establishment contracts to pay a certain amount in printing, the seller can not enforce the collection of such amount in cash, as a profit presumably attaches to the printing. 6 And where one person is obligated to pay money 1 Bleakley v. White, 4 Paige, 654. z Muller v. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597. 8 Bleakley v. White, 4 Paige, 654 ; Cason v. Heath, 86 Geo. 438; Wright o. Mix, 76 Cal. 465. 1 Bleakley v. White, 4 Paige, 654, 656. See, also, Edgcumbe v. Rod, 1 Smith's Rep. (Eng. K. B.) 515; Clow v. Borst, 6 John. 37; King v. Barnes, 109 N. Y. 267, 289. 5 Burr v. Smith, 21 Barb. 262. 6 Allen v. Wall (1893), 7 Wash. 316; 35 Pac. Rep. 65, per Dunbar, 0. J. : "To enforce the collection of this amount in cash would be equivalent, or at least might be equivalent, to compelling the appellant to pay more than he contracted to pay for the plant. The parties must be bound by the contracts which they make." In Sheehy v. Chalmers (Cal. 1894), 36 Pac. Rep. 514, the court said: "The code provides that : 'In an action on a contract or obligation in writing for the direct payment of money, made payable in a specified kind of money or currency, judgment for the plaint- iff, whether it be by default or after verdict, may follow the contract or obligation, and be made payable in the kind of money or currency speci- fied therein.' Code Civil Procedure, § 667. This action was on a contract in writing for the direct payment of money, made payable in 'U. S. gold coin.' There was no error, therefore in making the judgment payable in the kind of money specified in the contract. Carpentier v. Atherton, 25 Cal. 564." In Butler v. Merchant (Texas App. 1894), 27 S. W. Rep. 193, in an action on a contract to pay a certain sum in Mexican dollars, the evidence showed that a Mexican dol- lar, between the time the money be- came due and the institution of the suit, was worth from 69 to 92 cents. Held, that it was not error to allow the value of the Mexican money at the rate of 80 cents on the dollar, al- though at the time of the trial it was worth only 66 cents, as plaintiff should not suffer from defendant's failure to pay. § 368 PAYMENT. 443 for the use of another, a payment made in any mode, either property or negotiable paper or sureties, if such payment is re- ceived as full satisfaction of the demand, is equivalent to, and will be treated as, a payment in cash. Where payment is re- ceived as a complete satisfaction, and the debt or obligation is extinguished, it is a matter of no moment to the person to whose use the payment is made whether it is made in money, property, or obligations. The benefit to him is the same, and the obligation to refund should be the same. 1 § 368. Payment to creditor's creditor or to agent after principal's death. — The fact that a debtor has voluntarily paid, without the assent of his creditor, a debt due by the latter to a third person, is no defense in an action against the debtor by the creditor. 2 And in an action for a decree satisfying a judgment, in which a set-off is claimed of fee bills owed by the judgment creditor, and included in the judgment for costs, a complaint simply stating that the fee bills were paid by complainant is demurrable, because no one can volunteer to pay another's debts, and then claim repayment." Ordinarily 1 Brandt on Suretyship, § 285. The the surety upon the new note was not rule laid down by this author is entitled to contribution from the sure- adopted in Smith w.Mason,44 Neb. 610; ties upon the original note, the court 63 N. W. Rep. 41, and the following recognizes the doctrine that, where one cases are cited : Witherby v. Mann, 11 of several sureties discharges the orig- Johns. 518; Stone v. Porter, 4 Dana, inal obligation by his individual note, 207; Robertson v. Maxcey, 6 Dana, he is in a position to recover contribu- 101 ; Cornwall v. Gould, 4 Pick. 444 ; tion from his cosureties. Stubbins v. Mitchell, 82 Ky. 535 ; At- 8 Harrison v. Moran, 163 Mass. 495 ; kinson v. Stewart, 2 B. Mon. 348; 40 N. E. Rep. 850, per Field, C. J.: Ralston v. Wood, 15 111. 159; Brisen- "It is no defense for a debtor that he dine v. Martin, 1 Ired. 286; Pinkston has voluntarily paid to a creditor of v. Taliaferro, 9 Ala. 547 ; Anthony v. the plaintiff what he owed the plain- Percifull, 8 Ark. 494; White v. Carl- tiff , unless such payment is authorized ton, 52 Ind. 371 ; Keller v. Boatman, or assented to by the plaintiff . Credits 49 Ind. 104. The case of Bell v. Boyd, sometimes can be attached and taken 76 Texas, 133; 13 S. W. Rep. 232, on execution, but, without legal pro- does not conflict with the rule above cess, a debtor can not compel the per- stated. In that case a principal and son to whom he is indebted to assent one of several sureties executed their to the payment of the debt to a note, which was accepted by the cred- creditor of that person." itor, in payment of the former note. 3 Keifer v. Summers, 137 Ind. 106; While it was held in that case that 35 N. E. Rep. 1103. 444 PAYMENT. § 369 payment to an agent after the principal's death does not dis- charge the obligation, even if made in actual ignorance of the death. But long-continued silence on the part of a principal when a payment has been ignorantly made to his agent after revocation of his authority raises a presumption, in favor of the payor, that the agent has accounted for the money. 1 And where notes for the purchase-money of land are made payable to the vendor's agent or "bearer," payment to the agent, who still holds the notes, after his principal's death, is valid, and entitles the vendee to a deed. 8 § 369. Paying creditor's debt — West Virginia doctrine — A stranger paying the debt of another without request can not sustain an action at law against such other unless he has in some way ratified such payment. But such payment by a stranger, if accepted as such by the creditor, discharges the debt, so far as the creditor is concerned, and also as to the debtor, if he satisfy it; and a stranger who pays a debt without request by the debtor, when his payment is not ratified by the debtor, may bring a suit in equity praying relief in the alter- native, that is, that if the debtor do not ratify such payment the debt may be enforced in his favor, as its equitable assignee, or, if so ratified, that he be decreed repayment of the amount paid for the use of the debtor. 8 'Long v. Thayer (1893), 150 U. S. pie ia better settled than that the 520; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189, per Brown, powers of an agent cease on the death J.. "Western's death undoubtedly of his principal. If an act of agency operated as a revocation of Kinney's be done subsequent to the decease of authority to act for him or his estate, the principal, though his death be The payments made to Kinney as his unknown to the agent, the act is agent would not be sufficient to dis- void.' " charge Thayer's obligation to his es- 2 Long v. Thayer (1893), 150 IT. S. tate, even if such payments were made 520 ; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189. by him in actual ignorance of West- 3 Crumlish v. Central Imp. Co. era's death. Michigan Insurance Co. (1893), 38 W. Va. 390; 18 S. E. Rep. >. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11; Davis t\ 456, per Brannon, J. "If his pay- Vv'indsor, etc., Bank, 46 Vt. 728; Jen- mentis not ratified, he may go into kins v. Atkins, 1 Humph. 294; Clay- equity, praying that if the debtor rati- ton v. Merrett, 52 Miss. 353; Lewis v. fy it he may be decreed to repay him, Kerr, 17 Iowa, 73. Indeed, it was or, if he do not ratify the payment, said by this court in Gait v. Gallo- that the debt be treated as unpaid, as way, 4 Pet. 332, 344, that ' no princi- between him and the debtor, and that $370 PAYMENT. 445 § 370. Payment by order. — The mere acceptance by a cred- itor from his debtor of an order on a third person, without it be enforced in his favor, as an equitable assignee. Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 ; Moore w. Ligon, 22 W. Va. 292; Beard v. Arbuckle, 19 W. Va. 135. But how as to the creditor? When a stranger pays him the debt of a third party, without request of such third party, as in this case, can the creditor say the debt is yet unsolved, and enforce it against the debtor, as is attempted to be done by Jamison & Co.? Can he accept such payment, and say, because it was made by a stranger, it is no payment? Is his ac- ceptance not an estoppel by conduct in pais, as to him? There has been a difference of opinion in this matter. The old English case of Grymes v. Blofleld, Cro. Eliz. 541 (decided in Elizabeth's reign), is the parent of the cases holding that even the cred- itor accepting payment from a stranger may repudiate and still enforce his demand as unpaid. That case is said to have decided that a plea of accord and satisfaction by a stranger is not good, while Rolle's Abridgment, 471 (condition F.) , says it was decided just the other way. Denman, C. J., ques- tioned its authority in Thurman v. Wild, 39 E. C. L. 252; 11 A. & E. 453. Opposite holding hasbeen made in En- gland in Hawkshaw v. Rawlings, 1 Strange, 23. Its authority is questioned at the close of the opinion by Creswell, J., in Jones v. Broadhurst, 67 E. C. L. 173, as contrary to an ancient decision in 36 Henry VI, and against reason and justice. Parke, B., seemed to think it law in Simpson v. Eggington, 10 Exch. 845. It was followed in Edg- combe v. Rodd, 5 East, 294, and Stark v. Thompson, 3 T. B. Mon. 296. Lord Coke held the satisfaction good. Coke on Littleton, 206b, 207a. See 5 Bob. Pr. (New), 884; 7 Bob. Pr. (New) 548. The cases of Goodwin v. Cre- mer, 83 E. C. L. 757, and Kemp v. Balls, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 498, seem to hold that payment must be made by a third person as agent for and on account of debtor, with his assent or ratification. In New York, old cases held this doctrine. Clow v. Borst, 6 Johns. 37 ; Bleakley v. White, 4 Paige, 654. But later, in Wellington v. Kel- ly, 84 N. Y. 543, Andrews, J., said that the old cases were doubtful, but had not been overruled, but it was not necessary in that case to say whether it should longer be regarded as law, and the syllabus makes a qucere on the point. It was held in Harrison v. Hicks, 1 Port. (Ala.) 423, that 'pay- ment of a debt, though made by one not a party to the contract, and al- though the assent of the debtor to the payment does not appear, is still the extinguishment of the demand.' The opinion says that as between the per- son paying and him for whose benefit it was paid, a question might arise whether it was voluntary, which would depend on circumstances of previous request, or subsequent, ex- press or implied . This doctrine i s sus- tained by Martin v. Quinn, 37 Cal. 55 ; Gray v. Herman, 75 Wis. 453 ; 44 N. W. Bep. 248; Cain v. Bryant, 12 Heisk. 45 ; Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71 ; Webster v. Wyser, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 184 ; Harvey v. Tama Co., 53 Iowa, 228; 5 N. W. Bep. 130. Bishop on Contracts, §211, holds that, if payment 'be ac- cepted by creditor in discharge of debt, it has that effect.' See 2 Wharton on Contracts, § 1008. It seems utterly un- just, and repugnant to reason, that a creditor accepting payment from a stranger, of the third person's debt, should be allowed tomaintainanaction against the debtor pleading and there- by ratifying such payment, on the tech- nical theory that he is a stranger to 'he 446 PAYMENT. 370 more, will not be regarded as more than a conditional pay- ment. It requires proof to the effect that the parties under- stood and agreed that the order should be received as absolute payment, and that it was so accepted. The question whether the order was received in payment of the debt is one of fact for the jury. 1 And an order is only conditional payment, even though the creditor accept an order from a third person. 2 But Vermont 3 and Wisconsin 4 have adopted the rule, that the taking of an order drawn upon a third person for the amount of a previous indebtedness of the drawer is prima facie a pay- ment of the debt. 5 Where an attorney at law having a note contract. He has himself, forthis pur- pose, allowed him to make himself a quasi party. He consents to treat him so, so far as payment is concerned . To regard the debt paid, so far as he is concerned, is but to hold him to the result of his own act. Shall he col- lect the debt again? Then, can the stranger recover back? What mat- ters it to the creditor who pays? As the supreme courts of Wisconsin and Ohio, in cases above cited, said, this doctrine is against common sense and justice. It does not at all infringe the rule that one can not at law make another his debtor, without request to allow such payment to satisfy the debt as to the creditor ; and this court, while recognizing the rule that one can not officiously pay the debt of an- other, and sue him at law, unless he has ratified it, by allowing the stranger to go into equity and get re- payment, makes the payment, in the eyes of a court of equity, operate to satisfy the debtor, and render the stranger a creditor of the debtor. Neely v. Jones, supra. I know that in Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625, it is held that, 'if a payment by a stranger is neither ratified nor authorized by the debtor it will not be held to be a discharge of the debt;' but although this point is general, that was a case of the stranger seeking to make the debtor repay, and the case and opin- ion intended to lay down the rule at law only as between the stranger pay- ing and the debtor, not as between the creditor and debtor." 1 Williams v. Costello, 95 Ala. 592; 11 So. Rep. 9; Bond v. McMahon, 94 Mich. 557 ; Mead v. Stevens, 22 111. App. 298; Lupton v. Freeman, 82 Mich. 638; Born v. First Nat. Bank, 123 Ind. 78 ; Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233; First Nat. Bank v. Buchanan, 87 Tenn. 32; 9 S. W. Rep. 202; Cald- well u. Hall, 49 Ark. 508 ; Lowrey v. Murrell, 2 Port. (Ala.) 280; Carriere v. Ticknor, 26 Ala. 575; Lee v. Foun- taine, 10 Ala. 755; Pearson v. Thom- ason, 15 Ala. 700. ' Williams v. Costello, 95 Ala. 592; 11 So. Rep. 9, where A., being in- debted to B., gave an order on a tailor to make B. a coat, which order the tailor accepted. When the coat was made, the tailor refused to deliver it unless the order was paid. It was held the tailor did not have to deliver the coat, although B. had, in addition to the order, given the tailor some cash. 3 Holmes v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 175. 4 Schierl v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 69. 5 See, also, Mehlberg v. Tisher, 24 Wis. 607 ; Corbett v. Clark, 45 Wis. 403 ; Allan v. Eldred, 50 Wis. 132. § 371 PAYMENT. 447 for collection gave up the note to the maker and took his order on a third person for the amount, it was held that this consti- tuted a payment of the note. 1 § 371. Payment by check. — The giving of a check for an antecedent debt is not an absolute payment and extinguishment of the debt in the absence of an agreement to that effect. Ordi- narily it is only a means of payment, and the debt will not be extinguished unless and until the check is paid, or unless loss be sustained by the drawer in consequence of the laches of the holder, in which case the debt will be discharged in proportion to the loss sustained. If the check be not paid, and the payee is without fault, his right of action against the drawer for the debt, which has been merely suspended by the giving of the check, revives, and he may have recourse to the drawer, either upon the debt or upon the check, at his option. 2 Checks may, aowever, as of course, be received as absolute payment, and whether so received is a question for the jury, under all the cir- cumstances. 3 A debt is not, however, the subject of garnishment after delivery of a check in payment. 4 A written receipt in full does not establish a positive agreement for absolute payment when the payment is by check. 5 A check, as between the holder 1 Rice v. Dudley, 34 Mo. App. 383. s Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233; 2 Comptoir D' Escompte De Paris 18 Atl. Rep. 928 ; Blair v. Wilson, 28 v. Dresbach, 78 Cal. 15; Brewster v. Gratt. 165; National Bank v. Levy, Bours, 8 Cal. 501; Griffith v. Grogan, 17 R. I. 746; 19 Lawers' Rep. Ann. 12 Cal. 317; Higgins v. Wortell, 18 475. Cal. 330; Crary v. Bowers, 20 Cal. 85; * National Bank v. Levy, 17 R. I. Smith v, Owens, 21 Cal. 11 ; Brown v. 746 ; 19 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 475 ; Den- Cronise, 21 Cal. 386; Welch v. Ailing- nie v. Hart, 2 Pick. 204; Barnard v. ton, 23 Cal. 322 ; Mitchell v. Hockett, Graves, 16 Pick. 41 ; Getchell v. Chase, 25 Cal. 538; Brown v. Olmstead, 50 124 Mass. 366; Hemphill v. Yerkes, Cal. 162 ; Crawford v. Roberts, 50 Cal. 132 Pa. St. 545 ; Cohen v. Gale, L. R. 235; Blair «. Wilson, 28 Gratt. 165; 3 Q. B. D. 371. Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Exch. 153; 5 Comptoir D 'Escompte De Paris v. People v. Baker, 20 Wend. 602 ; Small Dresbach, 78 Cal. 15 ; Carroll v. Sweet, v. Franklin Mining Co., 99 Mass. 277; 5 N. Y. Supl. 572; Greer v. Laws, 56 Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233; 18 Ark. 37. See also, Tobey v. Barber, Atl. Rep. 928; Good v. Singleton, 39 5 Johns. 68; Murray v. Gouverneur, Minn. 340; 40 N. W. Rep. 359; Owen 2 Johns. Cas. 438; McMurray v. Tay- v. Hall, 70 Md. 97; 16 Atl. Rep. 376; lor, 30 Mo. 263; Glenn v. Smith, 2 Gill Williams v. Chisholm, 128 111. 115 ; 21 & J. 493 ; Muldon v. Whitlock, 1 Cow. N. E. Rep. 215; Hall v. Stevens, 116 290; Putnam v. Lewis, 8 Johns. 389. N. Y. 201 ; 22 N. E. Rep. 374. Contra, a written receipt in full is con- 448 PAYMENT. §372 and the drawer, may be presented at any time, and delay in presentment does not discharge the liability of the drawer, either on the check or on the debt for which it was given, un- less loss has resulted. 1 "When checks deposited with a bank, and credited in the depositor's pass-book, are taken, in the absence of any special agreement, they are deemed to be taken for collection, and not as cash. They may be afterward re- turned and the credit annulled if there are no funds to meet them; and this is so whether the check is drawn on the same bank or another." 8 § 372. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a debtor on account of his debt gave his creditor the check of a third person, and the creditor receipted the debt and gave up the debtor's notes for the debt, it was held that the check was accepted as payment of the debt. 8 And on an issue whether a legacy was paid during testator's life-time, where it appeared that.the bequest was made as compensation for services, and that the legatee had expressed her intention of getting the elusive evidence of absolute payment. Bailey v. Parbridge, 134 111. 188; La Fayette County Corp. v. Magoon, 73 Wis. 627. 1 Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19. 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1023, citing, National Gold Bank v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64; Morse on Banks, 320, 321. 3 Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409; 24 8. W. Pep., per Snodgrass, J. : " It will be remembered that this is not the case of Puryear giving his own check for his own account, and the law relating to that condition of facts need not be discussed. It is the case of the indorsement of a check of another to a creditor in settlement of the account, whether it be payment absolute or conditional, and to be governed by the law as to such trans- fer. It is well settled that the taking of the creditor's check on account is not payment unless it was so intended, Springfield v. Green, 7 Baxt. 301, and it is true that the taking of a check of another by a creditor on account is not necessarily payment, but must have effect according to the intention of the parties. In the ab- sence of proof of a special agreement, the giving up or retention of the orig- inal security will, in general, be a decisive circumstance in determining that question, for if the creditor means, in any contingency, to resort to the original indebtedness, he will scarcely be willing to surrender all evidence of that indebtedness to his debtor without fortifying himself with some evidence of the real nature of the transaction. Morriss v. Harveys, 75 Ya. 726; Fidelity, etc., Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah Valley R. Co., 86 Va. 1 ; 9 S. E. Rep. 759. Upon the facts of this transaction, as given by the son and not denied by the complainant, we are of the opinion that the check was accepted in payment." §372 PAYMENT. 449 money at once, and that while the bulk of testator's estate was in litigation, and when his bank account was very low, he gave the legatee a check for an amount covering the bequest, which check was paid, it was proper to find that the legacy was sat- isfied by the check. 1 But where plaintiff sent for collection a demand draft on defendant, to a bank with which defend- ant had an account, and when drafts on defendant were sent to such bank for collection he was accustomed to write his ac- ceptance thereon, and to pass them back to the bank, where they were treated by defendant and bank as checks, and the defendant, according to such custom, wrote his acceptance on the draft in suit, passed it back to the bank, and charged him- self with it in his pass-book, but the bank failed, and never paid plaintiff, it was held that the transaction between de- fendant and the bank did not constitute payment. 8 1 Whitney's Appeal, 167 Pa. St. 609; 31 Atl. Eep. 867. 2 State Bank v. Byrne, 97 Mich. 178 ; 56 N. W. Rep. 355, per Hooker, C. J. . "It is elementary doctrine that 'an agent authorized merely to collect a demand or to receive payment of a debt can not bind his principal by any arrangement short of an actual collection and receipt of the money.' Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447 ; Pitkin v. Harris, 69 Mich. 133; 37 N. W. Rep. 61; Hurley v. Watson, 68 Mich. 531; 36 N. W. Rep. 726. The most that can be claimed for this transaction is that the defendant, by accepting and delivering the demand draft, directed the Milford bank to pay this note, and charge the amount to his account, and that the bank promised to do so. As between them it was perhaps un- derstood that defendant had paid this note, but it was in law no more than an attempted substitution of the bank for himself, as debtor. Had the acceptance been a check, and the check drawn upon another bank or private person, the effect would have been in law the same. The law re- 29 quires payment in money, and, as already shown, nothing else answers the purpose, except by agreement with the creditor, or his agent duly authorized, to accept something else. As between defendant and his bank it was clearly the latter's duty to honor his check (or acceptance, which under their custom was practically a check) by payment of the note, but the creditor was no party to that transaction. The bank was plaintiff's agent to collect the money, not to make an arrangement by which it should assume the debt. A debtor who seeks to pay a debt through his debtor, thereby securing his own claim, acts at his peril, and is not exonerated from his obligation until his debtor performs his part by satis- fying the creditor. There are a few authorities which at first blush might be supposed to justify a different con- clusion. Morse on Banking (section 247) is authority for the following: ' By custom, banks receive their own certificates of deposit as payment, and such custom will be judicially noticed by the courts, and will justify a col- lecting bank in receiving its own 450 PAYMENT. §373 § 373. Certified check. — A certified check is subject to the same rules as ordinary checks with regard to operating as ab- solute or conditional payment. In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, a certified check is only a con- ditional payment; it does not of its own force operate as a payment. 1 certificate of deposit in payment of paper that it holds for collection ; and the debtor is discharged, even if the bank fails before remitting. And especially will this be so where the owner of the paper directed the bank to remit by draft, for he is presumed to have intended a draft of the col- lecting bank.' The case of British, etc., Mortgage Co. v. Tibballs, 63 Iowa, 468 ; 19 N. W. Rep. 319, is the authority cited for this. It bases the decision upon the usage of banks, which it says courts will take judicial notice of. This was a certificate of deposit. If there is any usage by which certificates of deposit are so used, it is plain that such certificates are but the promise of the bank to pay ; and, were it the certificate of deposit or certified check of another bank, it would be the mere substitution of one obligation for another, and it is difficult to see any difference between such a case and one where the certificate of deposit or certified check is that of the collecting bank. This holding is not supported by citations. Mr. Jus- tice Reed dissents in an able opinion, adhering to the common-law rule. Another case — that of Welge v. Batty, 11 111. App. 461 — is relied upon. Here the debtor drew a check on the collecting bank, having at the time a deposit sufficiently large to cover it. The check was received, and note delivered, and the amount was charged against the debtor on his bank ac- count. A draft was sent by the col- lecting bank, but, before it got around, the bank failed. This was held to be a payment, the court saying that it would have been an idle ceremony for the debtor to draw his money out of the bank and pay it back again to the bank. Here, again, the court cites no authority to support its decis- ion. The great weight of authority is against these cases. The payment by check, certificate, or what not is not for the convenience of the creditor, and he has no concern with the fact that it is the custom of the bank to take checks in payment. The fact that a debtor has a credit at a bank is not conclusive evidence that the bank has money with which to honor his checks. As in this case, the bank may be insolvent when it receives the check, and there is no good reason apparent for permitting the depos- itor of an insolvent bank to pay his debt with worthless paper, thereby making his creditor a loser. No cus- tom should be allowed to justify such a transaction, unless it be in a case where the creditor is connected with and a party to the custom. Many cases can be found where checks are received and operate as payment, but they are usually in suits between the creditor and the collecting bank, where a different question is in- volved." 1 Born v. First National Bank, 123 Ind. 78, where the court said: "It is, and long has been, settled law that an ordinary check does not con- stitute payment. This doctrine is so well settled that it is unneces- sary to refer to the authorities. Ac- cepting, as we must, this rule as obligatory, we can not conclude that a certified check constitutes payment, § 374 PAYMENT. 451 § 374. Further illustrations As a check is only conditional payment, the bank can not offset amount due by holder to it, against the check. 1 "Vast amounts of property are sold by agents, brokers, and commission men for their principals, and it would be unreasonable and unjust when they received a check, as the means of procuring the money for their prin- cipals, to permit the bank to set off an amount due by them individually." 2 But no governmental officer can receive a • check in payment of taxes or fees due by law; if checks are taken they are mere conditional payments, although there is an express agreement to the contrary. 3 When a debtor pays money to his creditor, in the absence of anything to the con- trary, the presumption is that it was a payment on the exist- ing debt; and so if the payment is made by the delivery of a check, which is afterwards converted into cash. 4 Where a principal provides his agent with funds to pay a debt, if the creditor take the agent's own check in conditional payment, this releases the principal entirely, even though the agent deceived the creditor as to the fact of his having funds of the principal to pay with. 5 If a check be indorsed and transferred in conditional payment of a debt, the indorser will be dis- charged unless the check is presented within a reasonable time, and due notice given. 6 But an acceptance by a creditor of a unless we assume that the certification Bank, 42 111. 238; Rounds v. Smith, makes it the equivalent of money as 42 111. 245 ; Brown v. Leckie, 43 111. a medium of payment. But neither 497 ; Mutual National Bank v. Rotge, in principle nor authority is there to 28 La. Ann. 933; Andrews v. German be found warrant for the assumption, National Bank, 9 Heisk. 211; Larsen for, as we have seen, the nature of a v. Breene, 12 Colo. 480. check is not changed by certification, ' Brown v. Leckie, 43 111. 501. except in the one particular already 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, indicated. As there is no other § 1628. change, it is logically impossible that 'Houghton v. City of Boston, 159 the effect of that change can make the Mass. 138; 34 N. E. Bep. 93. check the equivalent of money. From 4 Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. C. 589. whatever point of view the question s Cleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127. is examined it appears clear that 6 Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19; there is no release of the drawer of Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, the check unless there is either an § 1587, citing Merchants' Bank v. express or an implied agreement to Spicer, 6 Wend. 443; Little v. Phenix thateffect." Bickford v. First National Bank, 2 Hill (N. Y.),425; Murray v. 452 PAYMENT. §375 check from his debtor which imports a full payment of the amount due him is not conclusive evidence of that fact, and does not estop him from recovering a balance due unless there was an agreement that it should be in full satisfaction. 1 § 375. Payment by bill or note. — Senator Daniel discusses in detail conditional and absolute payment by bill or note, and the effect of taking a bill or note for a debt. The follow- ing is a summary of the results at which he arrives: When the debtor gives his own bill or note for a precedent debt it is prima facie evidence of an agreement to suspend the remedy until the instrument is due. If it be not paid when due the original debt is revived. The taking by the creditor of his debtor's note or bill in such a case does not merge or extin- guish the indebtedness; the note is simply evidence of the debt, and its operation is only to extend the time of payment. 2 Judah, 6 Cow. 484; Humphries v. Bicknell, 2 Litt. 296 ; Daniels v. Kyle, 1 Kelly, 304; Harbeck v. Craft, 4 Duer, 122. 1 Greer v. Laws, 56 Ark. 37 ; Spring- field Co. o. Allen, 46 Ark. 217; Burke v. Snell, 42 Ark. 57 ; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 211. See, also, Independ- ent Bldg. Assn. v. Real Est. Title Co., 156 Pa. St. 181; Bibb v. Snodgrass, 97 Ala. 457; 11 So. Rep. 880; Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233. 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1260, 4th ed., citing, The Kimball, 3 Wall. 37 ; Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32 ; Peter v. Beverley, 10 Pet. 532; Dow- ney v. Hicks, 14 How. 240; Clark v. Young, 1 Crancb, 181; Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253; Lewis v. Davison, 29 Gratt. 216 ; McCluney v. Jackson, 6 Gratt. 96; McGuire r. Gadsby, 3 Call, 334; Armistead v. Ward, 2 Pat. & H. 512; Middlesex v. Thomas, 5 C. E. Green, 39; Glenn v. Smitb, 2 Gill & J. 493; Clopper v. Union Bank, 7 Har. & J. 92 ; Walton v. Bemiss, 16 La. 140; McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa, 297 ; Steamboat v. Ham- mond, 9 Mo. 64 ; Yarnell v. Anderson, 14 Mo. 619; Doeblingu. Loos, 45 Mo. 150; Archibald v. Argall, 53 111. 307; and see, also, to the same effect : The Jagger Iron Co. u. Walker, 76 N.Y. 521 ; Whitley v. Dumham Co., 89 Ala. 493; Hadley v. Bordo, 62 Yt. 285 ; Stewart, etc., Co. v. Rau, 92 Ga. 511; 17 S. E. Rep. 748; Price v. Barnes, 9 Ind.App. 1; 31 N. E. Rep. 809, which seems to overrule Nixon v. Beard, 111 Ind.l37,in the latter it being held that the note operated as a payment, and discharge ; Bank of Monroe v. Gifford, 79 Iowa, 300; 44 N. W. Rep. 558; Graham v. Negus, 8 N. Y. Supl. 679, holding that the note does not even operate to ex- tend the time for payment of the orig- inal debt, or suspend the right of action on the same until the maturity of the note ; Fuller v. Negus, 8 N. Y. Supl. 681; Craddock v. Dwight, 85 Mich. 581; 48 N. W. Rep. 644; Shel- don Axle Company v. Scofield, 85 Mich. 577, holding that a provision in a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered from time to time during the year, to the effect that settlements were to be made monthly "by note or cash," did not bind the ven- §376 PAYMENT. 453 § 376. The same subject continued. — An agreement between the maker and payee of a note, entered into after the delivery thereof, that the payee shall purchase stock of the maker, and that the note shall be taken as payment pro tanto therefor, is no defense to an action on the note, as it is not a satisfaction of the note, nor a new contract substituted therefor. 1 Where a dor to accept any note or notes in payment of the account. Crad- dock v. Dwight, 85 Mich, 587; Ed- wards v. Harvey, 2 Colo. App. 169 ; 29 Pac. Rep. 1024; Baker v. Baker, 2 S. Dak. 261 ; 49 N. W. Eep. 1064, hold- ing that the mere fact that a chattel mortgage, given to secure a note given in payment of an antecedent debt, has been foreclosed, nothing appear- ing as to the value of the property mortgaged, does not raise the pre- sumption that the property sold for enough to pay the debt, and that by reason thereof it extinguished it. Combination Steel Co.e. St. Paul Co., 47 Minn. 207, holding that a mere re- cital in a receipt or other writing, to the effect that the note was given "for" or "on account of" or in "pay- ment of" the debt, is not sufficient to make the note an absolute payment. Miller v. McCarty, 47 Minn. 321 Bausman v. Credit Co., 47 Minn. 377 Hanson v. Tarbox, 47 Minn. 433 Davis v. Parsons, 157 Mass. 584; 32 N. E. Bep. 1117, holding that if a note is not taken in absolute payment, it does not become so by the creditor negotiating it, provided the creditor takes it up again and offers it at the trial. Zook v. Odle, 3 Colo. App. 87; 32 Pac. Eep. 82. Massachusetts, Maine and Vermont courts hold that a note given for a precedent debt is, in the absence of an express agree- ment, a discharge of the debt. O'Con- nor v. Hurley, 147 Mass. 145; Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36 ; Varner v. Noble- borough, 2 Greenl. 121; Daniel on Notes and Bills, § 1260; Hadley v. Bordo, 62 Vt. 285; 19 Atl. Rep. 476. 1 Hayes v. Allen (1894), 160 Mass. 286; 35 N. E. Rep. [852, where the court said: "The note in question was made for a valid considera- tion. The defense is that, subse- quent to the making and delivery of it, an oral agreement was made be- tween the parties that the defendant would Bell, and the plaintiff would buy, on the first of January next en- suing, 3,000 shares of the capital stock of the Antique Marble Company at one dollar per share, and that the note should be taken as payment pro tanto for said shares. The stock was sea- sonably tendered by the defendant, and the note and the balance of the purchase-money demanded, but the plaintiff refused to give up the note and perform the contract. It is evi- dent that the agreement in regard to the stock was an independent agree- ment. It was to be performed at a different time from that contained in the note, and the measure of damages for a failure to perform it would be different from that in case of failure to pay the note. It was not itself a satis- faction of the note, nor a new con- tract substituted for the note, and en- titling the defendant to it. Inde- pendent contracts, of the nature of that set up in defense in this suit, do not come within the principle which allows parties, in order to prevent circuity of action, to avail themselves, by way of defense in certain cases, of matters which might be the subject of a suit. Waterhouse v. Kendall, 11 Cush. 128 ; Traver v. Stevens, 11 Cush. 167 ; Stanton o. Maynard, 7 Allen, 335 ; Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 106; Bart- 454 PAYMENT. §377 creditor accepts from his debtor the notes of a third person, it is not necessary to show an express agreement that they were taken in absolute payment, but an understanding to this effect is sufficient. 1 And the fact that a note was received in pay- ment of a debt may be proved from the circumstances sur- rounding the transaction, although there may bave been no express agreement to that effect. 2 Where the surety on a note transferred as collateral security to the payee thereof a mort- gage given him by the maker as indemnity against loss as such surety, it was held, that the acceptance of this transfer did not operate as a payment of the note. 8 If a note which is void for something aliunde, e. g., because made and delivered on Sun- day, be given for a debt, it does not operate as payment of the debt nor discharge the maker's liability to pay the debt. 4 § 377. Further illustrations. — Where the debt is contracted at the time the note or bill is executed, Senator Daniel seems to lett v. Farrington, 120 Mass. 284; Hunt v. Brown, 146 Mass. 253; 15 N. E. Rep. 587. The defendant does not claim that he can avail himself of the agreement by way of set-off. The case is not like that of First Nat. Bank ». Watkins, 154 Mass. 385; 28 N. E. Rep. 275, where the court held that the agreement operated at once, and in effect discharged the defendant from liability on the note." 1 Ralston v. Aultman (Texas App. 1894), 26 S.W. Rep. 746, per Head, J.. " If a creditor accepts from his debtor the note of a third party, with the un- derstanding that it shall be in satisfac- tion of the latter debt, we see nothing to prevent this from being a legal contract, whether this be expressly stipulated or not. S wearingen v. Buck- ley, 1 Texas Unrep. Cas. 421." 2 Macombere.Macomber(R.I. 1894), 31 Atl. Rep. 753, where the court said : "The ground on which they were dis- allowed as payment by the master was that by the law of this slate a note does not operate as payment un- less received as such under an ex- press contract to that effect. "We pre- sume this opinion of the master rested on a remark of Chief Justice Ames in Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383. We do not think that an express con- tract is necessary in order that a note shall operate as payment, and that the fact that it was so received may be proved by the circumstances attend- ing the transaction, even if there may have been no express agreement to that effect. Wilbur v. Jernegan, 11 R. I. 113; Nightingale v. Chafee, 11 R. I. 609." "Barkwell v. Swan (1892), 69 Miss. 907; 13 So. Rep. 809. 4 Hartshorn v. Hartshorn (N. H. 1892), 29 Atl. Rep. 406, per Carpenter, J. "Giving a void note (Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133) did not pay the debt for which it was given, nor dis- charge the defendant from his liabil- ity. Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197; Burnham v. Spooner, 10 N. H. 165; Walker v. Lovell, 28 N. H. 138 ; Carle- ton v. Woods, 28 N. H. 290; Pecker v. Kennison, 46 N. H. 488." §377 PAYMENT. 455 be of the opinion that this should be regarded as absolute pay- ment; but he states that the weight of authority is to the effect that this is only conditional payment. 1 Where the note or draft of a third party is received by a creditor from his debtor for a pre-existing debt, the presumption is that it is received as a conditional payment, unless there is an agreement that it is to be an absolute payment, and the burden of proving such an agreement is upon the debtor. 2 If the creditor take the note of a third person from his debtor at the time the debt is contracted, whether such note will operate as a conditional or absolute payment depends upon whether the debtor indorses it. If he does not indorse it then it operates as absolute pay- 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1261, 4th ed., quoting the following from Parsons on Notes and Bills, 157 : "It seems to be substantially selling a note by barter, or exchanging it for goods. * * * We can hardly con- ceive a bill being taken at the time of the sale, unless it be the understand- ing of the parties to regard it as pay- ment. The remedy on the note or bill, which is more convenient to the creditor, is all that should be allowed him, for there is no sufficient reason for allowing resort to be had to the original." 8 Shepherd v. Busch, 154 Pa. St. 149 ; Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. St. 233, where the court said: "Nothing is better settled than in the absence of any special agreement to the contrary the mere acceptance by a creditor from his debtor of the note or check of a third person, to the creditor's or- der, for a pre-existing indebtedness, is not absolute, but merely conditional payment, defeasible on the' dishonor or non-payment of the note or check, and in that event the debtor remains liable for his original debt." League v. Waring, 85 Pa. St. 244 ; Cheltenham Stone Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 23 111. App. 635, holding, that the credit of the note to the debtor's ac- count, and the subsequent rendering of monthly statements showing such credit, is not evidence from which a positive inference can be drawn of an intention that the acceptance of the note should operate as an absolute satisfaction and discharge of the debt. In the opinion the court said: "The rule universally recognized is, that the mere acceptance from a debtor of his own note or the note of a third person, in case of an ante- cedent indebtedness, is not a pay- ment of such indebtedness. In the absence of a special agreement, it is considered as a conditional payment or as a collateral security." Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68 ; Whitbeck v. VanNess, 11 Johns. 409; Breed v. Cook, 15 Johns. 241 ; Noel v. Murray, 1 Duer, 388; Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 373 ; Gibson v. Toby, 53 Barb. 191; Hunter v. Moul, 98 Pa. St. 13; Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns. 310 ; James v. Hackley, 16 Johns. 273 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532 ; Griffith v. Gro- gan, 12 Cal. 317 ; Brown v. Olmsted, 50 Cal. 162; Akin v. Peters, 45 Ark. 313; Jaffrey v. Cornish, 10 N. H. 505; League v. Waring, 85 Pa. St. 244; Mc- Intyre i>. Kennedy, 29 Pa. St. 448. 456 PAYMENT. § 378 ment — a barter of the note, 1 but if he indorses it then the contrary rule obtains — it is only conditional payment. 2 § 378. Evidence of intention to merge the debt. — The ques- tion whether a note or bill is taken in absolute or conditional payment is a pure question of fact dependent upon the inten- tion of the parties, which intention must be evidenced by an actual agreement, if the presumptions stated in the two pre- ceding sections are to be overcome. The following are some instances where it was held that the evidence established an agreement touching the matter : Where a note is taken for an antecedent debt and a receipt in full is given, the presumption that the debt was not paid unless the notes were paid is op- posed by the presumption of payment raised by giving the receipt, and the jury must decide. 3 Ordinarily a receipt, if intended to be proof of an agreement to receive the paper as absolute payment, should say so, and if the receipt does not contain recitals to this effect it is very feeble proof. 4 A draft was held to be taken in absolute payment of a mortgage, where it appeared that the amount of the draft was credited on the back of the mortgage. 5 Where the vendor agreed to accept "cash at the end of thirty days trial, or note, with interest, due in ninety days," and the vendee elected to give his note, this was held to be absolute payment and a merger of the debt 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, §1264, citing the following cases: § 1262, 4th ed., citing McLughan v. Bank of England v. Newman, 1 Ld. Bovard,4 W atts, 308; League v.Wasing, Raym. 442; Ex parte Blackburne, 10 85 Pa. St. 244; Gordon v. Price, 10 Ves. 204; Fydell v. Clark, 1 Esp. 447. Ired. Law, 385; Downey v. Hicks, 14 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, How. 240; Gibson v. Toby, 53 Barb. § 1265, 4th ed., citing Monroe v. Hoff, 191 ; Crane v. McDonald, 45 Barb. 354; 5 Den. 360; Boyd «. Hitchcock, 20 Noel v. Murray, 13 N. Y. 167; Glenn Johns. 76; Soffe v. Gallagher, 3 E. D. v. Burrows, 37 Hun, 602; Malpas v. Smith, 507; Shriner v. Keller, 25 Pa. Lowenstine, 46 Ark. 552 ; Hunt a. Hig- St. 61. See also, Sebastian Co. v. man, 70 Iowa, 406; Hopkins v. Det- Codd, 77 Md. 293; 26 Atl. Rep. 316; wiler, 25 W. Va. 734; Gallaghers. Tiffany v. Glasgow, 82 Mich. 266; Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191. O'Bryan v. Jones, 38 Mo. App. 90; 3 Walker v. Tupper, 152 Pa. St. 1. White Star Line, etc., Co. v. Morange, * Shepherd v. Busch, 154 Pa. St. 149. 91 Ala. 610 ; 8 So. Rep. 867 ; Houston v. 6 Whitley v. Dunham Lumber Co., Evans, — Texas, — ; 17 S.W. Rep. 925; 89 Ala. 493; 7 So. Rep. 810. § 379 PAYMENT. 457 in the note. 1 If the creditor make any composition with the parties liable on the paper, this will operate as a full payment although, when taken, there was an understanding that the paper was only conditional payment." Bank drafts have come to be an important medium in the transaction of business, especially where large payments are made. They are regarded as safe and convenient. Under the improved systems of bank- ing that now prevail, the confidence reposed in such drafts is very great. The presumption, therefore, that a bank draft is received in absolute payment, is stronger than in the case of a note, check or draft of a private individual. 8 § 379. The same subject continued. — While the giving of a note for an existing debt is prima facie payment of it, 4 this presumption is rebutted when the creditor holds security, as the mere taking of a debtor's note shows the want of sufficient motive by the creditor to forego his security. He can not be presumed to have intended an action so prejudicial to his inter- est. 6 "When a bill is given in renewal of a former bill, and the holder retains such former bill, the renewal, in the absence of special agreement, operates merely as a condi- tional payment thereof. If the renewed bill be paid in due course, or otherwise discharged, the original bill is like- wise discharged." 6 When a note is discounted by a bank to take up a prior note held by the bank against the party pro- curing the discount, and the avails are credited to him, the 1 Challoner v. Boyington, 83 "Wis. * Bunker v. Barron, 79 Maine, 62 ; 399; but in Wisconsin the Massachu- O'Conner v. Hurley, 147 Mass. 145; setts rule obtains that in all cases Schierl v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 69; Farr v. where a bill or note is received, the Stevens, 26 Vt. 299. note will be deemed to have been 5 Titcomb v. McAllister, 81 Maine, taken by the creditor in satisfaction, 399. unless the contrary be expressly 6 Benjamin's Chalmer's Bills, Notes proved. Ford v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. and Checks, art. 251. See also, Woods 304; Hoeflinger v. Wells, 47 Wis. v. Woods, 127 Mass. 141; Ex parte 628; Allis v. Meadow Springs Co., Barclay, 7 Ves. 597; Waydell v. Luer, 67 Wis. 16. 5 Hill, 448; Moses v. Trice, 21 Gratt. 2 Loth v. Mothner, 53 Ark. 116. 556; Godfrey v. Crisler, 121 Ind. 203; 8 Hall v. Stevens, 116 N. Y. 201. See East Eiver Bank v. Butterworth, 45 also, McCord v. Durant, 134 Pa. St. Barb. 476 ; Chisholm v. Williams, 128 184; Case Mfg. Co. v. Soxman, 138 111.115. TJ. S. 431. 458 PAYMENT. § 380 transaction is to be regarded as an extinguishment of the prior note, although it may not have been actually surrendered. 1 And whether a note is delivered up or not, upon its renewal, it may always be sued on, if the debtor fails to keep his promise to give security for the new note. 2 § 380. Repayment of taxes illegally collected. — Under cer- tain circumstances taxes illegally collected can be recovered back. But this is not always so. "If the town, city or other strictly public corporation could be held liable to repay all taxes irregularly collected, even if paid voluntarily, it is evi- dent that great public inconvenience would ensue. Such a condition of things would afford unlimited opportunity to demagogues to appeal to the natural avarice of mankind. Ac- tions would be brought to recover taxes, necessary and legal in their essentials, but collected irregularly or by virtue of legisla- tion in which some technical defect could be found. The ad- ministration of government would be seriously impeded, and the just and equitable principle of the common law would be distorted into an instrument of injustice." 3 Therefore, in the ab- sence of a statute there are three prerequisites to the right of re- covery for money paid by reason of illegal taxation, viz.: (1) The assessment must be absolutely void. (2) The money sued for must have been received by the corporation for its own use. (3) The payment must have been upon compulsion and not 1 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 81 N.Y. Bank v. Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49 ; Bank of 218; Slaymaker v. Gundacker, 10 S. Commonwealth v. Mayor of New & E. 75; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 York, 43 N. Y. 189; City of Grand Pet. 34 ; Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426 ; Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367 ; Tut- 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (357) 633. tie v. Everett, 51 Miss. 27; Town of 2 Wright v. Buck, 62 N. H. 656; Douglasville v. Johns, 62 Geo. 423; Jaffrey w. Cornish, 10 N. H. 505; John- Lamborn v. County Commissioners, son v. Cleaves, 15 N. H. 332; Clark v. 97 IT. S. 181; Railroad Co. v. Corn- Draper, 19 N. H. 419; Smith v. Smith, missioners, 98 U. S. 541; Phelps v. 27 N. H. 244; Poster v. Hill, 36 N. H. Mayor, 112 N. Y. 216; Ege v. Koontz, 526. 3 Pa. St. 109; Princeton v. Vierling, 3 Beach on Public Corporations, §231. 40 Ind. 340; Mayor of Jersey City v. It seems that the liability of the cor- Riker, 38 N. J. Law, 225; Haines v. poration for the repayment of taxes School District, 41 Maine, 246 ; Cook illegally collected exists at common v. Boston, 9 Allen, 393. law independent of statute. National § 381 PAYMENT.] 459 voluntary. 1 The following are illustrations of the first rule: Where property exempt by law from taxation is illegally taxed, the assessment is void and the money may be recovered. 8 Where an assessment is levied for street improvements and the assessment is void, the sum paid can be recovered; 3 and an as- sessment may be recovered as void when the corporation fails to carry out the improvement for which the assessment was levied. 4 The burden is upon the party attacking the validity of a tax. There is no presumption that municipal authorities have acted illegally or that conditions precedent have not been performed. 5 The following are illustrations of the second rule: A tax was paid to a collector who paid it into the town treasury, and the treasurer of the town paid it over to a building com- mittee of a school district. The tax being void it was held that a tax-payer might recover his share from the school district, but had no cause of action against the town. 6 But so long as the corporation actually has the money in its custody or under its control, it is liable to be sued, although the money is not to be used for its own purposes.' § 381. Taxes paid under compulsion. — The third rule is to the effect that the tax must be paid under compulsion. By compulsion is meant payment only when the tax-payer can save himself and his property in no other way than by paying the illegal demand. 8 It seems that some overt act towards 1 Richardson v. City of Denver, 17 Valentine v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446 ; Colo. 398 ; Beach on Public Copora- Beach on Public Corporations, § 232. tions, § 231. 5 Vaughn v. The Village of Port 2 City of Indianapolis v. McAvoy, Chester, 135 N. Y. 460 ; Tingue v. The 86 Ind. 587. Village of Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 294 ; 3 Taylor v. People, 66 111. 322 ; Brad- Town of Douglasville v. Johns, 62 Geo. ford v. Chicago, 25 111. 411 ; Diefen- 423. thaler v. Mayor, etc., New York, 111 6 Joyner v. Third School District, 3 N. Y. 331 ; Peyser v. Mayor, etc., New Cush. 567. York, 70 N. Y. 497; Mayor, etc., Jer- ' City of Grand Rapids v. Blakely, sey City v. O'Callaghan, 41 N.J. Law, 40 Mich. 367. 349; Phelps v. Mayor, 112 N. Y. 216, 8 Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 where it is held that when the assess- U. S. 541 ; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick, ment is made under an ordinance void 14 ; Lamborn v. County Commission- on its face, the payment of the assess- ers, 97 U. S. 181 ; Beach on Public Cor- ment, being a, mere mistake of law, porations, § 234, citing the following can not be recovered. cases, Galveston City Co. v. Galveston, 4 Bradford v. Chicago; 25 111. 411; 56Texas,486;TownofPrinceton».Vier- 460 PAYMENT. §381 collecting the tax must have been taken before the tax can be considered to have been paid under such compulsion as the law requires. Thus where land was assessed for taxation and the taxes remaining unpaid, the tax-lists, with warrants thereto attached, were issued, authorizing the county treasurer, upon default in the payment of the taxes, to enforce the collection of them by the seizure and sale of the personal property of the owner. The owner paid the taxes, but protested in writing that the taxes were illegally assessed. This was held to be no compulsion ; that the owner was not coerced and therefore could not recover the tax j 1 and a mere protest against pay- ment is not enough. 8 But a protest is enough to make a pay- ment involuntary where the law under which the levy is made is constitutional, and the illegality of the tax is claimed because of irregularities or defects in the statutory proceed- ings. 3 ling, 40 Ind. 340; Board of Commis- sioners v. National Land Co., 23 Kan. 196; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Com- missioners, 16 Kan. 587; City of De- troit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Bank of N, O. v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 421 ; Bobinson v. Charleston, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 317; Leonard, v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Raisler ...Athens, 66 Ala. 194; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674; City of Muscatine v. Keokuk, etc., Co., 45 Iowa, 185; Falls v. Cairo, 58 111. 403; Harrison v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 247; Mayor of Richmond v. Judab, 5 Leigh (Va.), 305; Phelps v. Mayorof New York, 112N.Y. 216 ; Die- fenthaler v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 111 NY. 331 ; Bank of Com. v. Mayor, etc., of NewYork,43 NY. 184 ; Bucknall r. Story, 46 Cal. 589; Emery v. Low- ell, 127 Mass. 138; Benson v. Monroe, 7 C'ush. 125; Churchman v. Indian- apolis, 110 Ind. 259; McCreikart v. Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 133 ; Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73. ! Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541. 2 Newcomb v. City of Davenport, 86 Iowa, 291 ; 53 N. W. Rep. 232; City of Detroit r. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Buck- nall v. Story, 46 Cal. 595; De Baker v. Carillo, 52 Cal. 473; Rutledge v. Price Co., 66 Wis. 35. 3 Whitney v. City of Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268. See further on this sub- ject, Beach on Public Corporations, §§ 235-238, where many cases are col- lected. Payments made through ig- norance of law, and not by mistake of fact, can not be recovered ; Painter v. Polk County, 81 Iowa, 242; Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S. 439; Kraft v. City of Keokuk, 14 Iowa, 86; Falls v. Cairo, 58 111. 403. Contra, City of Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush, 381. In Iowa it is held that a tax paid without protest may be recovered back if the tax is imposed by a city ordi- nance. Robinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa, 240. See also, Rushton v. Burke, 6 Dakota, 478 ; 43 N.W. Rep. 815, hold- ing that a county treasurer may be sued personally for money paid to him in his official capacity for illegal tax- es, where it is paid under protest with notice that suit will be brought to re- cover it. Gerecke v. Campbell, 24 Neb. 306, not a tax case, but an analogous one, where an execution was issued on a dormant judgment, and money $382 PAYMENT. 461 § 382. The same subject continued. — Taxes under a special assessment, paid before the penalty for non-payment became due, under protest and with an expressed intention to sue to recover them back, there being no actual seizure or immediate danger of actual seizure of the property, can not be recovered back in an action of assumpsit, on the ground that the payment was compulsory. And one who pays taxes, under protest, under a special assessment for sewers, where the assessment was not set aside, and the sewers were built, and the general power of the city to make such assessment under valid ordinances was not disputed, can not recover them back. 1 The common-law rule ■was paid under protest, held to be a voluntary payment. Lyman v. Lau- derbaugh, 75 Iowa, 481; Barney & Smith Co. v. County Com'rs, 29 Week- ly Law. Bui. (Cin.) 366; McFarlan v. Township, 93 Mich. 558, holding a mere protest enough; ScharffbilligD. Scharf- billig, 51 Minn. 349 ; 53 N. W. Eep. 713 ; Doolittle B.Luzerne Co.,6Kulp. 495; Baker v. City of Fairbury, 33 Neb. 674 ; Painter v. Polk Co. , 81 Iowa, 242 ; Atchison R. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 722, holding that where a protest in writing was filed which stated that the payment was made solely to avoid the issue of process, and gave notice that an action would be brought to recover the payment, that this con- stituted an involuntary payment; Powell v. Board, etc., St. Croix Co., 46 Wis. 210; Pooley v. Buffalo, 4 N. Y. Supl. 450, holding that a pay- ment without protest and voluntary can be recovered when paid under ignorance of fact. The council of a city failed to comply with the statute authorizing it to assess for street pav- ing, of which fact the tax-payer was ignorant. Tripler v. City of N. Y., 17 N. Y. Supl. 750; 63 Hun, 630; Lo- redo v. Loury (Texas App.), 20 S. W. Rep. 89, a case going the full length that the case of Railroad Co. v. Com- missioners, 98 U. S. 541, went. A most rigid doctrine. Vaughn v. Village of Port Chester, 60 Hun, 401 ; De Graff v. County of Ramsey, 46 Minn. 319; Lathrope v. McBride, 31 Neb. 289; Longnecker v. Shields, 1 Colo. App. 264; 28 Pac. Rep. 659; Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester, 46 Hun, 87. 1 Hopkins v. City of Butte, 40 Pac. Rep. 171, per Hunt, J. : " It can not be successfully argued that Mrs. Hopkins paid the tax which she now seeks to recover for the pur- pose of immediate relief. Indeed, the contrary appears, for she herself stated that she wanted to go away from Butte, and, while she thought the tax was unjust and illegal, of her own free will she paid the amount of it, merely stating, in effect, that it was paid un- der protest, and that she intended to sue to recover it back. The assess- ment does not appear to have ever been set aside by any legal proceed- ings, and it is admitted that the im- provements for which the levy was made were built in front of the prop- erty assessed. She knew, presumably, that the city treasurer could not sell her property, and could not even do as much as assess the penalty in case the tax was not paid. All these facts clearly show, at law, and unwilling, but none the less voluntary, payment, as contradistinguished from a com- pulsory payment. Such a payment does not entitle her to the relief she asks. Cooley on Taxation, § 811 ; First Nat. Bank v. Mayor, etc., 68 Ga. 119; 462 PAYMENT. 382 which, in the absence of statute, must govern all demands sim- ilar to that made by a municipality for taxes, from one of its in- habitants whose property has been assessed, is that where a party pays an illegal demand, with a full knowledge of all the facts which rendered such demand illegal, without an imme- diate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release his person or property from detention, or to prevent the immediate seizure of his person or property, such payment must be deemed voluntary, and can not be recovered back; and the fact that Rogers v. Inhabitants of Greenbush, 58 Me. 90; Conkling v. City of Spring- field, 132 111. 420; 24 N. E. Rep. 67; Bowman v. Boyd, 21 Nev. 281; 30Pac. Rep. 823; Richardson v. City of Denver, 17 Colo. 398; 30 Pac. Rep. 333; Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511. The constitutionality of the law under which the assessments were levied was not assailed. It is merely claimed that the city of Butte, by reason of a failure to pass an ordi- nance dividing the city into sewer dis- tricts, had not taken the steps neces- sary to authorize it to levy any special sewer assessments. There was a reso- lution and ordinance passed, how- ever, in which sewer districts were created. The ordinances may have been defective, and the assessments even irregularly made, but the gen- eral power of the city to make sewer assessments under valid ordinances is not disputed. The case, therefore, is not one where authority to levy the tax was wholly wanting, and must be distinguished from decisions which uphold the right to recover back taxes where the levy of the tax is on its face invalid, and where protest on the ground of illegality was made at the time of payment. Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho, 108 ; 6 Pac. Rep. 124 ; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Newman v. Board of Supervisors, 45 N. Y. 676. It is also to be distinguished from the opinion of Chief Justice Chase in Er- skine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75, in that payment was made in that case to release property from detention, and the protest against payment (as in other cases involving the payment of revenues to release property) saved the rights which grew out of that fact, while in the case at bar there was no levy at all, and no right to make a levy was conferred upon the treasurer of the city, to whom payment was made. Nor can Whitney v. City of Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268; 50 N. W. Rep. 316, control under the conditions of fact here existing. In that case the plaintiff sued to recover taxes paid by her, under protest, on a special pav- ing assessment. Payment was made under protest, and to protect the property from being sold, and on ac- count of the taxes being illegal. The city treasurer had advertised the plaintiff's property for sale, and she had the right to presume that he would proceed with the sale. The case was thereby brought within the rule of immediate and urgent neces- sity of paying the tax to prevent seiz- ure. And it was held that a payment made under such a threat was an in- voluntary one. Under the great weight of authorit}' and reason, the law looks with disfavor upon suits to recover back taxes where dissatisfac- tion and unwillingness to pay, rather than compulsion, to prevent the im- mediate execution of a levy or seiz- ure, are the causes which prompt the protest. The judgment is affirmed." § 388 PAYMENT. 463 the party, at the time of making the payment, files a written protest does not make the payment involuntary. 1 § 383. Receipts. — A receipt is the written acknowledgment of the delivery of money or other thing of value, without con- taining any affirmative obligation upon either party to it — a mere admission of a fact, in writing. 2 Therefore a receipt is only prima facie evidence of the admissions which it contains, and where it does not embody a contract it is open to explana- tion, and the party admitting payment in full may show it to be untrue. 3 But if by means of the receipt a person has been induced to alter his position, then it is conclusive. 4 A receipt on a bill of exchange stating that the bill was paid may be contradicted, and the payment shown to be a purchase instead of an extinguishment of the bill. 5 But the burden is always on the person attacking a receipt, and in the absence of evidence contradicting a receipt it becomes conclusive. 6 All questions touching the giving of a receipt are triable at law and a bill in equity does not lie to set aside a receipt. 7 And even in a case where the receipt is obtained by fraud this may be shown on a plea of payment. 8 Where a debtor has the money ready to pay, the giving him a receipt for the same with the intention 1 Eailroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 464 ; Clark v. Marbourg, 33 Kan. 471 ; TJ. S. 541; Little v. Bowers, 134 TJ. S. American Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 547; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. And the Kan. 35; Stout ». Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232. test of whether or not money paid 'Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 318; for the payment of taxes was a pay- Straton «. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366 ; Wyatt nient under duress, so as to make it v. Marquis of Hertford, 3 East, 147; an involuntary payment, "must, in Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 586. general, consist of some actual or 6 Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313. threatened exercise of power pos- 6 Nielsen ». United States, etc., Co., sessed, or believed to be possessed, 37 111. App. 283; Peaslee v. Glass, 61 by the party accepting or receiving 111. 94. the payment, over the person or prop- 7 Lee v. Lancashire R. Co., L. R. 6 erty of another, from which the latter Ch. App. 527. has no other means, or reasonable 8 Lee v. Lancashire R. Co., L. R. 6 means, of immediate relief, except by Ch. App. 527, 538. See, Stewart v. making payment." 2 Dillon on Mu- Great Western R. Co., 2 D. J. & S. nicipal Corporations, § 943. 319, to the effect that there is no ne- 2 Krutz v. Craig, 53 Ind. 561. cessity to go into chancery. s St. Louis R. Co. v. Davis, 35 Kan. 464 PAYMENT. § 384 of making him a present of the money is the legal equivalent of payment, although no money in fact passes. 1 § 384. Receipts in full. — The payment of a portion of an ascertained, overdue and undisputed debt, although accepted in full satisfaction, and a receipt in full is given, is not a sat- isfaction of the balance; and will not, where there is no new consideration, estop the creditor from recovering the remainder of such debt. 2 But a receipt in full is always prima facie a sat- isfaction of all claims, 3 also that the accounts on both sides are settled and adjusted.' A receipt in full, given upon the settle- ment of a disputed claim, is restricted to the subject-matter of it; and will not include a note not yet due. 5 So, also, a re- ceipt "in full for my last year's wages" is not broad enough to operate to cut off an existing claim, under a special contract for extra services. 6 But a receipt by a servant who had been discharged, "in full of all demands of every name and nature, which I have against" the employer was held to constitute a satisfaction of any claim for wrongful dismissal. 7 And a re- ceipt by a physician of a certain sum in full satisfaction of professional services is a bar to a subsequent action for the value of such services. 8 Where an attorney sent his client a draft stating on its face that it was in full for his share of the recovery, and the client indorsed the draft and collected it, the question whether the draft and indorsement were equivalent to a receipt in full was left to the jury. 9 And where a contractor, on receiving payment under his contract, gave a certificate to the effect that it was in full, he was held precluded from bring- ing an action for damages for being improperly delayed in the performance of his contract. 10 1 Maber v. Maber, L. R. 2 Exch. 4 Alvord v. Baker, 9 Wend. 323 ; 153, and it was here held to take the Lambert v. Seely, 2 Hilt. 429. debt out of the statute of limitation. 5 Joslyn v. Capron, 64 Barb. 598. 2 St. Louis R. Co. v. Davis, 35 Kan. 6 Fredenburg v. Biddlecome, 17 464 ; Danziger v. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 190, Weekly Dig. 25 (N. Y.). 194. 7 People v. Board of Managers, 96 3 Patterson v. Ackerson, 2 Edw. Ch. N. Y. 640. 427 ; Welch v. Lynch, 5 N. Y. Leg. e Danziger v. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 190. Obs. 20 ; Danziger v. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 9 Serat v. Smith, 40 N. Y. St. Rep. 45. 190. " Coulter v. Board, 63 N. Y. 365. §§ 385, 386 PAYMENT. 465 § 385. The same subject continued. — A receipt in full, given in settlement of a disputed claim, is conclusive. 1 And at least in Connecticut 2 and Vermont 8 the courts have adopted the rule that a receipt in full, given upon the part payment of a debt, in the absence of any impeachment of it for fraud or mistake, is valid and a discharge of the entire debt.' § 386. Receipt under seal. — An acknowledgment of pay- ment in the consideration clause of a deed does not conclude the grantor. In an action to recover the purchase price, he may show the actual consideration; that it was not paid, or the time when and the manner in which it was to be paid. The consideration clause is open to explanation, and may be varied by parol proof. 6 But the acknowledgment in a deed of the 1 Green c.Rochester,etc.,Co.,l T. and C. 5 (N. Y.) ; Cleere v. Cleere, 82 Ala. 581, by virtue of statute; Freeman v. Tucker, 20 Geo. 6 ; Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257; Henderson v. Stokes, 42 N. J. Eq. 586, refusing to reform a re- ceipt in full ; O'Neil v. Lake, etc., Co., 63 Mich. 690, holding that the signing of such a receipt by a man's wife, whom he had sent for the money, did not bind him. 8 Elting v. Sturtevant, 41 Conn. 176 ; Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444. s Ashley v. Hendee, 56 Vt. 209; Holbrook v. Blodget, 5 Vt. 520; Guy- ette v. Town of Bolton, 46 Vt. 228. 4 See Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444, where the receipt was of a cer- tain sum "in full to date.' 1 ' This was held to discharge a larger liquidated debt which was undisputed. See also, further on receipts in full : Ensign v. Webster, 1 Johns. Cas. 145 ; Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68; Bogart v. Van Velsor, 4 Edw. Ch. 718 ; Higby v. New York R. Co.,. 3 Bos. 497; Ryan v. "Ward, 48 N. Y. 204; Redfleld v. Hol- land, etc., Co., 56 NY. 354 ; Boardman v. Gaillard, 1 Hun, 217 ; Wilcox v. Mc- Carthy, 3 Brad. (N.Y.) 284; Worth v. 30 Mumford, 1 Hilt. 1 (N. Y.) ; Thomas v. McDaniel, 14 Johns. 185; Ham- mond v. Slocum, 50 How. Pr. 415 Miller v. Coates, 66 N. Y. 609 Churchill v. Bradley, 11 J. & S. 170 Riley v. White, 6 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 272, holding that a receipt in full, though under seal, if given without consider- ation, is not a void release. Downey v. McGinn, 1 City Ct. (N. Y.) 478 Greer v. People's Co., 18 J. & S. 110: Peck v. Peck, 20 Weekly Digest, 83 99 N.Y. 608; Brewer v. Union Pac. R. Co., 31 Hun, 545; Matter of Jones, 10 St. Rep. (N. Y.) 176; Matter of Dun- kell, 5 Dem. (N. Y.) 188; Guldager v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. Rep. 459; Sutton?;. The Albatross, 2 Wall. Jr. 327, hold- ing slight evidence sufficient to vary and contradict a receipt in full ; Illi- nois R. Co. v. Welch, 52111. 183; Ruby v. Railroad Co., 8 W. Va. 269. 5 Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54 Purmort v. McCrea, 5 Paige, 620 Shephard v. Little, 14 Johnson, 210 Bowen D.Bell, 20 Johnson, 338; Bing- ham v. Weiderwax, 1 N. Y. ?09 ; Bat- tle v. Rochester City Bank, 3 N. Y. 88 ; Bridges v. Russell, 30 Mo. App. 258; Agnew v. McGill, 96 Ala. 496; 11 So. Rep. 537. 466 PAYMENT. §387 payment of the consideration money is prima facie evidence of payment. 1 The consideration clause in a deed, while it estops the grantor from alleging that it was executed without any consideration whatsoever, is always open to explanation for any other purpose. 2 And a receipt indorsed upon a deed is like any other simple receipt ; merely prima facie evidence of the statements it contains. 3 But if a party has purchased an estate, relying on the statements contained in an indorsed re- ceipt, then the receipt becomes conclusive. 4 § 387. Effect of a receipt. — In a suit to enforce a vendor's lien, the acknowledgment of payment contained in the deed is only prima facie evidence of payment ; 5 and as against 1 Agnew v. McGill, 96 Ala. 496; 11 So. Rep. 537; Wood v. Chapin, 13 N.Y.509; Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 6 Cow. 90; Jackson v. McChesney, 7 Cow. 360; Carpenter v. Freeland, Lalor (N. Y.) 37; Amsden v. Man- chester, 40 Barb. 158. 2 Whitbeck v. Whitbeck, 9 Cow. 26(3 ; Baker v. Connell, 1 Daly (N. Y.), 469; Stackpole v. Robbing, 47 Barb. 12; Taylor v. Hoey, 4 J. & S. 402; Mains v. Haight, 14 Barb. 76; Dooper v. Noelke, 5 Daly, 413 ; Lacus- trine Fertilizer Co. u. Lake Guano, etc., Co., 82 N. Y. 476. 3 Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Aid. 606. 4 Hunter e. Walters, L. R. 7Ch. App. 75 : "I apprehend that if a man exe- cutes a solemn instrument by which he conveys an interest, and if he signs on the back a receipt for money * * * he cannot affect not to know what he was doing, and it was not enough for him afterwards to say that he thought it was only a form." Per Hatherley, L. C, 82. See also, Ken- nedy v. Green, 3 M. & K.699; Salazar v. Taylor, 18 Colo. 538; 33 Pac. Rep. 369; Maddox v. Bramlett, 84 Geo. 84; Shepherd e. Busch, 154 Pa. St. 149; Watson v. Miller, 82 Texas, 279 ; Mc- Closkey v. McCormick, 37 111. 66; Neilsenti.United States, etc., Co., 37111. App. 283 ; Zookr. Odle,3 Colo. App. S7 ; Crow v. Gleason, 20 N. Y. Stv>]. 590; 65 Hun, 625; Hunt v. Gleason, 22 N. Y. Supl. 366; 67 Hun, 649. Leake lays down the rule, that the absence of an indorsed receipt on a deed is constructive notice that the considera- tion money is not paid. Leake on Contracts, 905. 5 Koch v. Roth, 150 111. 212; 37 N. E. Rep. 317, per Magruder, J.: "It is well settled that the recital of the con- sideration in a deed or bill of sale is not conclusive upon either party, and that it may be shown by parol what was the true amount of the considera- tion, and how it is to be paid. Booth v. Hynes, 54 111. 363 ; Primm v. Legg, 67 111.500; Drury v. Holden, 121 111. 130; 13 N. E. Rep. 547 ; Fort v. Richey, 128 111. 502; 21 N. E. Rep. 498. The formal clause in a deed reciting the consideration is always open to ex- planation ; and such a recital does not waive or destroy the vendor's lien, but is only prima facie evidence of payment. The fact of the non-pay- ment of all the purchase-money may be shown, and, when such fact ap- pears, a lien may be declared, not- withstanding the formal receipt for the consideration. 2 Warvelle on Vendors, 705. It is shown here that the appellee received no money upon the delivery of the deed and bill of sale." §387 PAYMENT. 467 strangers thereto, a receipt is incompetent evidence of the pay- ment thereby acknowledged; because, as against such strangers, such receipt is but the hearsay declaration of the party who signed it, made without opportunity for his cross-examination, and independently of the sanction of his oath. 1 Where an administrator sued a life insurance company to recover the premium alleged to have been paid by his intestate upon an application for insurance, which was not granted by the com- pany ; and he put in evidence the latter's receipt for such premium, which provided for repayment if the application was denied, and the testimony of defendant's agent, who con- ducted the transaction, showed that the intestate had given a sight-draft for the premium, but had paid no cash ; that the draft was protested, and had never since been paid ; and that 1 Ellison v. Albright 41 Neb. 93; 59 N. W. Rep. 703, per Kyan, 0. : "There is, therefore, now presented the competency of this receipt as against Ellison, who was not a party to the action in which the judgment was rendered, of which satisfaction and payment are attempted to he shown by the receipt. In Davidson v. Berthoud, 1 A. K. Marsh. 353, the case was for money laid out and ex- pended by the defendants in error to the use of the plaintiff, and for work, labor, etc. The language used in dis- cussing the effect and nature of a re- ceipt was as follows : ' The only ques- tion material to be decided is whether the circuit court erred in admitting as evidence a receipt signed by A. Woolford for $222.11, alleged to be advanced by the defendant in error to the plaintiff's use. It is explicitly laid down toy Peake, in his treatise on Evidence (page 254), that, to prove the payment of money, in such a case, the person who made it, or he by whom it was received, should be called as a witness, for the receipt or or acknowledgment of a person will be no evidence against the defendant. And of the correctness of this doc- trine, on principle, there can be but little reason to doubt, for proof of the acknowledgment of a person who re- ceived the money would only be hear- say evidence, and the receipt of such person is nothing more than written evidence of his acknowledgment; and, whether in writing or by parol, hearsay evidence is equally inadmis- sible. Phillipps on Evidence, 174.' In Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. St. 419, there was under consideration the ef- fect to be given a receipt on a deed, as against one not a party to the deed. Having premised that such receipt was competent evidence against the grantor, and all who derived title from him, and was such evidence as to pass the grantor's title, the opinion continued in the following language : ' But it is no evidence whatever of the fact of payment against a stranger, or even against one who derived title from Thomas Farrell [the grantor] previously to the date of the convey- ance to Lloyd. Against them, it is nothing but hearsay. It is a mere ex parte declaration, not under oath, taken without any opportunity to cross-examine.' " 468 PAYMENT. § 388 it was partly on this ground that the application had been refused, and there was no conflicting evidence sufficient to raise a doubt, it was held that it was proper to direct a verdict for defendant. 1 While an indorsement of the payment of interest on a note is prima facie evidence that such payment was made by the maker, such presumption is rebutted by the testimony of the maker to the contrary ; 2 and where a note was delivered by the payee to the maker at the time when payment was demanded, and was retained by the maker, although the full amount due was not paid, the maker having claimed a credit which the payee refused to allow, it was held that the maker, by marking the note " paid," could not destroy its character as evidence of the indebtedness. 8 The payment of a sum less than the amount actually due will not operate as a satisfaction of the entire debt, even though a receipt in full be given, unless there is a positive agreement to receive the amount paid in full discharge of the debt. 4 Thus, a receipt in full for fees is not a complete defense to an action for attorney's fees, rent, and use of law library, in the absence of an agreement that the amount for which it was given was in full discharge of the debt. 6 § 388. Application of payments. — A person indebted on sep- arate and distinct accounts is entitled to have his payments ap- plied on such account or accounts as he shall direct. 6 And if the party to whom the money is offered does not agree to apply it according to the expressed will of the party offering it, he must refuse it, and stand upon the rights which the law gives 'Whiting v. Equitable Life Assur. 6 Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80; Con- Soc. (1893), 60 Fed. Rep. 197. duittv. Ryan, 3Ind. App. 1; Moore v. 2 Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1; 25 Norman, 52 Minn.83; 18 Lawyers' Rep. S. W. Rep. 359. Ann. 359 ; Boyd v. Jones, 96 Ala. 305 ; 3 Liesemer v. Burg (Mich. 1895), 11 So. Rep. 405; Vaughan v. Powell, 63 N. W. Rep. 999. 65 Miss. 401 ; Atkinson v. Cox, 54 Ark. 4 Markel v. Spitler, 28 Ind. 488 ; Og- 444 ; Hanson v. Cordano, 96 Cal. 441 born v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439; Board Hinkle v. Higgins, 83 Texas, 615; El of Com'rs v. State, 109 Ind. 596; 10 lis v. Mason, 32 S. C. 277; 10 S. E N. E. Rep. 625. Rep. 1069; Clayton's Case, 1 Mer, 5 Kepler u . Jessupp, 11 Ind. App. 572; Simson v. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65; 241 ; 37 N. E. Rep. 655. Mills v. Fowkes, 5 Bing. (N. C.) 455. § 389 PAYMENT. 469 him. 1 It is not necessary that the debtor should give an ex- press direction as to the application of the payment; if, from the circumstances of the case, his intention as to its applica- tion may be clearly implied, the creditor is bound to regard it. 2 Thus, where a creditor claims that his debtor owes him upon two separate demands, one of which is admitted and the other disputed, if the debtor, under such circumstances, makes a payment to his creditor, it will be presumed that the payment is made upon the demand admitted, rather than upon the one disputed. 3 Payment will be referred to an interest- bearing debt, rather than to one not bearing interest. 1 A pay- ment equaling the exact amount of a debt is an appropriation. 5 Where it appears that, at the time payments were made by a debtor to his creditor, the debtor intended them to be applied upon a specific obligation, and the creditor "well knew" that the debtor so intended, this is a sufficient appropriation. 6 If the debtor pay with one intention, and the creditor receive with another, the intent of the debtor must govern. 7 If a payment is made from the proceeds of the sale of mortgaged property, it must be applied to the discharge of the mortgage debt. 8 § 389. Payments on open accounts. — Where a payment is made upon general account, with no direction as to its appli- cation, the law applies it to the oldest items; that is, the first debits are to be charged against the first credits, and the debt paid according to priority of time. 9 The fact that a part of 1 Croft r. Lumley, 5 E.&B. 648, and 4 Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumner, 98; it matters not that the creditor said at Pattison v. Hull, 9 Oowen, 747. the time he received the money he 6 Marryatts v. White, 2 Stark. 91. would not apply it as the debtor di- 6 Hanson v. Cordano, 96 Oal. 441. rected. His taking the money is ' Conduitt v. Eyan, 3 Ind. App. 1 ; enough. Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick. 441. 2 Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80; Mar- 8 Ellis v. Mason, 32 S. Car. 277; 10 ryatts v. White, 2 Stark. 91; New- S. E. Eep. 1069; Young v. English, 7 march v. Clay, 14 East, 240; Nash v. Bear. 10; Stoveld v. Eade, 4Bing. 154. Hodgson, 6 D., M. & G. 474; Burn v. 9 Allen v. Culver, 3 Denio, 284, Boulton, 2 C. B. 476; Shawn. Picton, where the court said: "In the case 4 B. & C. 715 ; Bell v. Buckley, 11 Ex. of a running account between par- 631. ties, where there are various items of 3 Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80 ; Burn debit on one side and of credit on the v. Boulton, 2 C. B. 476. other, occurring at different times, 470 PAYMENT. § 390 the account is covered by a guaranty or surety does not pre- vent the rule from operating. An item secured by a guaranty will not be discharged until the items of debit precedent are discharged; 1 this is also the rule in admiralty. 2 But when an account is opened with a vessel during a period of two months — her stay in one port — and the account embraces some items which have the force of maritime liens, and others which do not, a payment will be applied in discharge of the items not liens, and the lien of the rest will be preserved. 8 The princi- ple that a payment is applied to the earliest item of an account applies to a payment made by the husband, with money be- longing to the corpus of his wife's statutory estate, although some items of the account are a proper charge against her es- tate. 4 California has by a code provision extended this rule to all cases of separate demands, and a payment applicable to either of them is applied to the one earliest in date of maturity. 5 § 390. Application by the creditor. — The general rule is that a creditor who holds several obligations or claims against his debtor has the right to apply a payment made to him by the debtor to either of the obligations he holds, unless the debtor at the time of making the payment directs its application, which right the debtor has in every case. 6 "Accordingly, in and no special appropriation of pay- land, 6 Cranch, 8 ; Schuelenburg v. ments, constituting the credits, has Martin, 2 Fed. Rep. 747 ; Pardee v. been made by either party, the sue- Markle, 111 Pa. St. 548; Mack v. Ad- cessive payments and credits are to be ler,22Fed. Rep.. 570; Hersey». Bennett, applied in discharge of the items of 28 Minn. 86; Hannan v. Engelmann, debit antecedently due in the order of 49 Wis. 278; Dennington v. Kirk, 57 time in which they stand in the ac- Ark. 595; 22 S. W. Eep. 430. count. In other words, each item of : Conduitt v. Ryan, 3 Ind. App. 1; payment or credit is applied in ex- Truscott v. King, 6N. Y. 147; Worth- tinguishment of the earliest items of ley v. Emerson, 116 Maes. 374; Cushing debt until it is exhausted." National v. Wyman, 44 Maine, 121 ; Harrisonu. Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 Johnston, 27 Ala. 445. N. Y. 28 ; Sheppard ti. Steele, 43 N. Y. 2 The Tom Lyle, 48 Fed. Rep. 690. 52 ; Webb v. Dickenson, 11 Wend. 62 ; 3 The D. B. Steelman, 48 Fed. 580. Thompson v. St. Nicholas Bank, 113 'Ounnorc. Armstrong, 91 Ala. 265. N. Y. 325; Conduitt v. Ryan, 3 Ind. s Coalter v. Hurst, 97 Cal. 290; 32 App. 1; First National Bank v. Hoi- Pac. Rep. 248; Civil Code, § 1479. Hnsworth, 78 Iowa, 575. In fart, it is 6 Cohen v. L'Engle, 29 Fla. 655 ; 11 doubtful if any authority can be found So. Eep. 44; Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. contravening this rule. Field v. Hoi- Utley, 155 Mass. 3! '.6; 29 N. E. Eep. § 391 PAYMENT 471 England the debtor may, in the first instance, appropriate the payment, solvitur in modum solventisj if he omit to do so, the creditor may make the appropriation, recipitur in modum re- cipientis." 1 Thus, a creditor of a partnership, and also of one of the partners individually, may, upon payment by such partner, apply it to extinguish the partner's individual debt, although the money belonged to the firm/ Likewise, the cred- itor may apply the money to the payment of an unsecured debt in preference to one secured.' The creditor may apply a payment to an item the contracting of which is forbidden by law. Thus, where one of the items sold was liquor, the recov- ery for which was inhibited by statute, it was held that the creditor could apply a payment to extinguish this claim, and sue on the other claims. 4 One holding two notes by the same maker, one of them secured by mortgage, who receives further security, with an express agreement that he may apply it to either note at his election, may make such application to the unsecured note; and a second mortgagee can make no valid objection thereto. 5 Where an attorney had claims against a corporation, some of which he could enforce, and some of which he could not by reason of the want of a valid appoint- ment, and money was paid to him generally on account, it was held he might apply such payments to the latter claims. 6 § 391. Debts barred by statute of limitations. — Where a creditor has two several items against his debtor, one barred by the statute of limitations, and the other not, and a part pay- ment is made by the debtor without any express appropriation by him at the time of making it, the creditor is at liberty to appropriate the payment towards the satisfaction of that por- 635; Haynes v. Nice, 100 Mass. 327; Bosanquet v. "Wray, 6 Taunt.- 597.; Henry v. Dietrich, 7 N. Y. Supl. 505; Goddard v, Hodges, 1 Cromp, & M.33, Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402; • Phiipott v, Jones, 2 A. & E, 41. See Northern Bank v. Lewis, 78 Wis. 475. also, Cruickshanks ». Rose, 1 M. & 'Mills v. Fowkes, 5 Bing. (N. C..; Rob- 100; Wright v. Laing, 3 B.& C. 455, per Tindal, C. J. 165, z Senter v. Williams (Ark.), 17 5 Case v. Fant, 53 Fed. Rep, 41. S. W. Rep. 1029. 6 Arnold v. Mayor 4 M. & (i, 860, 'Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402; 472 PAYMENT. § 392 tion of the debt which the statute would bar. 1 And it seems that such appropriation by the creditor constitutes such a part payment of a debt as will take the balance out of the operation of the statute. 2 § 392. Rights of third parties. — While as between the debtor owing several debts and his creditor where the former at the time of payment of a sum of money fails to designate the debt on which it is to be applied, the latter may do so, yet there is an exception in case the money was received by the debtor from a third person whose property would be liable for the debt in case the money was not applied upon the third party's liability. 3 Where there was a creditor of a firm and also of a surviving partner thereof individually, and the latter made a payment out of the funds belonging to the firm with- out designating the debt on which it should be applied, it was held that as the funds belonged to the firm they must be applied to the partnership debt. 4 So, also, where a treasurer of a county was also ex officio treasurer of a city, and he min- gled and kept the moneys of these corporations together, and during his term of office there was a deficit, the county com- missioners, having found money in the treasury exactly suffi- cient to satisfy the amount due the county and having directed the same to be placed to the credit of the county, it was held that the moneys so mingled belonged to the several corpora- tions pro rata, and that the- county commissioners could not appropriate the whole to the exclusive use of the county. 5 An attorney who has several demands against his client, some of which are barred by the statute of limitations, has no right to 1 Beck v. Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180. 4 Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106. The weight of American authority See, also, Thompson v. Brown, 1 Moo- seems to be in favor of this view, dy & M. 40. Mills v. Fowkes, 77 Scott 444; Will- 5 Commissioners v. Springfield, 36 iams v. Griffith, 5 M. & W. 300 ; Wood Ohio St. 643. See, also, Van Alen v. on Limitations, § 110. American Bank, 52 N. Y. 1 ; Matter 2 Beck v. Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180. of Van Duzer's Estate, 51 How. Pr. Contra, Mills v. Fowkes, 5 Bing. N. C. 410; Farmers' Bank v. King, 57 Pa. 455; Waters v. Tompkins, 2 C. M. & St. 202; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 D. M. & E. 723; Waugh v. Coppe, 6 M. & W. G. 372; Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332; 824. Bayne v. United States, 93 U. S. 642; 8 Crane v. Keck, 35 Neb. 683. United States v. Bank, 96 U. S. 30. §§393,394 payment. 473 appropriate, in payment of the demands so barred, a sum received by him on account of his client for damages recovered in an action. 1 § 393. Time of appropriation. — The creditor may apply payments up to the time of controversy. Until that time he continues to have the option of applying the several payments as he thinks fit. 2 And entries made by a man in books which he keeps for his own private purpose are not conclusive on him until he has made a communication on the subject of those entries to the debtor. But if a book has been kept for the com- mon use of both parties, and the entries have been communi- cated to the debtor, then the creditor would be precluded from altering the appropriation.' But after a controversy has arisen concerning such payments, the creditor can not then, at his discretion, appropriate payments. 4 After controversy has be- gun, there having been no appropriation by either party be- fore, the law will apply the payments according to the recog- nized rules of law governing the application of unappropriated payments. 5 § 394. Appropriation by law. — Where payments are made generally to a party who holds several obligations against the payor, which are not applied by either party, the court will make such application of the payments as equity and justice require, according to its own notion of the intrinsic equity and justice of the case. 6 Thus the law will apply a payment to the liquidation of an unsecured debt rather than to a secured one. 7 1 Walter v. Lacy, 1 M. & G. 53, 3 Simson v. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65. where the court said: "The doctrine 4 Oonduitt v. Ryan, 3 Ind. App. 1; of appropriation can not apply to the Applegate v. Koons, 74 Ind. 247. present case, where money has come 5 Applegate v. Koons, 74 Ind. 247. to the plaintiff's hands, not by act of 6 Camp v. Smith, 136 N.Y. 187 ; Bank the defendant, but by the act of a of California v. Webb, 94 N. Y. 467; third party." Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch. 8; Cremer 2 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 v. Higginson, 1 Mason 323. Wheat. 720; Robinson v. Doolittle, 'Gardner v. Leek, 52 Minn. 522, 54 12 Vt. 246; Milliken v. Tufts, 31 Maine N. W. Rep. 746; Scheik v. Trustees, 497; Marryatts v. White, 2 Stark 91; 24 111. App. 369. Fairchild v. Holly, 10 Conn. 175 ; Con- duitt v. Ryan, 3 Ind. App. 1. 474 PAYMENT. § 395 Where a debtor owed his creditor on a judgment, on a running account, and on a note secured by mortgage executed subse- quently to the judgment, it was held that the payments should be applied as follows ; Those made prior to the execution of the mortgage and the judgment were to be applied to the account; those made after the judgment were to be applied to satisfy it m preference to the secured note. 1 And where a debtor is in- debted severally and also jointly with another to the same creditor, the law will apply a general payment upon the indi- vidual debt. 2 Where a surviving partner continues dealings with a creditor of the firm and makes payments generally with funds arising from the firm property the law requires that they shall be applied to the account made by the firm. 8 But in or- der that the law may make an appropriation, the parties them- selves must have been able to do so, had they elected. Thus where articles were all bought at one time under a single con-^ tract and payments were made on that contract and were ap- plicable to the sum due upon it, and not to any part of that sum, the court refused to appropriate the payments to any one of the articles more than to all the others. 4 § 395. Partial payments. — The following is the rule adopted in most of the United States for the computation of interest and the application of payments in cases of interest-bearing JFiazieru. Lanahan, 71 Md = 131 Atl. Rep. 1046; Durrell v. Todd, 31 *Camp v. Smith, 136 N. V. 187. Neb. 256; Camden Bank v. Cilley, 83 1 Tootle v. Jenkins, 82 Texas, 29. Maine, 72; Ellis "w. Mason, 32 S. C. '' Hill v. McLaughlin, 158 Mass. 307, 277, appropriating payments from pro- See also, Smith v. Stevens, 81 Texas, ceeds of mortgaged goods to mort- 461, where an appropriation of pay- gage. Flarsheim v. Brestrup, 43 Minn, ments on two notes was made, each 298, to the effect that a debtor, after in its proportion to the aggregate of acquiescing in the application of a pay- the two, Cohen t>, L'Engle, 29 Fla, ment to one demand, can not avail 655, holding that payments made by himself of the same fund to extinguish an assignee should be applied pro ram another demand, although, when he to all the separate obligations of the made the payment he directed its ap- debtor in the proportion that the ag- plication to the latter. Holley r. Har- gregated claims of the creditor bears deman,76Geo.328; Gifforda. Thomas, to the amount of the payment made; 62 Vt. 34; 19 Atl. 1088; National and this, too, whether the creditor for Bank r. Dean, 86 Iowa, 656; 53 N. W. some parts of his claim holds other in- Hep. 338, payments secured by the dependent collateral securities or not. same mortgage shall be paid off in Ayers v. Staley ( M. J, Eq ), 18 their order. § 396 PAYMENT. 475 claims. 1 When partial payments have been made, apply the payment, in the first place to the discharge of the interest then due. If the payment exceeds the interest, the surplus goes towards discharging the principal, and the subsequent in- terest is to be computed on the balance of the principal re- maining due. If the payment be less than the interest, the surplus of interest must not be taken to augment the principal, but the interest continues on the former principal until the pe- riod when the payments, taken together, exceed the interest due, and then the surplus is to be applied towards discharging the principal, and interest is to be computed on the balance as aforesaid. 2 This rule is equally applicable, whether the debt be one which expressly bears interest, or on which interest is given as damages. 3 The rule seems to be universal that pay- ments are always first applied to satisfy interest. 4 The Con- necticut courts have adopted a different rule for partial pay- ments, which the supreme court of that state defends in the following language: "However that may be, we should not think fit, at this late period, to disturb the rule which was, on much deliberation, established by our superior court as early as 1784, and which has prevailed ever since. We believe that it is founded on as correct principles as any that can be devised." 5 By this rule interest is computed upon the principal up to the liquidation of the indebtedness, and then computed on payments up to the same time, and the amount deducted from the principal and interest. 6 § 396. Further illustrations. — A subcontractor must ap- ply all payments made by the contractor, the money being furnished by the owner, to the satisfaction of his demands 1 Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359 ; Longworth c. Higham, 89 Ind. 352 ; "Wallace v. Glaser, 82 Mich. 190; 46 Dean v. Williams, 17 Mass. 417; Lash N. W. Rep. 227, "is the rule recog- v. Edgerton, 13 Minn. 210; Baker r. nized in most of the United States ; " Baker, 28 N. J. Law, 13; Hurst v. Payne v. Avery, 21 Mich. 524. Hite, 20 W. Va. 183; Case v. Fish, 58 2 Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359. Wis. 56; United States v. McLemore, 3 Jacobs v. Ballenger, 130 Ind. 231 ; 4 How. 286. Green v. Vardiman, 2 Blackf. 324; 4 Treat v. Stanton, 14 Conn. 445, Wasson v. Gould, 3 Blackf. 18; 457. Markel v. Spitler, 28 Ind. 488 ; Mc- 5 Avery v. Wetmore, Kirby 49, note. Cormick v. Mitchell, 57 Ind. 248 ; 6 Rogers v. Yarnell, 51 Ark. 198. 476 PAYMENT. § 396 against the contractor arising out of the contract; he can not apply such payments to other demands against the contract- or. 1 But the money paid by a contractor to material men, and applied by them on account of another building contract, can not be applied by the owner of the building to reduce the claim of lien of the material men, notwithstanding the fact that the contractor used the receipt from the material men in obtaining a credit on the building contract. 2 Where a contractor bor- rowed money for the erection of two distinct buildings, and left the money with the lender to be paid out on the orders of the mechanics doing the work, it being understoood that the orders should designate for which building each particular lot of material was procured; it was held that the orders were a direction for the application of the payments, and that the ma- terial man could not credit such orders as payment on an old account due him from the mechanics, but must credit them to the contractor's account for the particular building designated in the order. 3 Where a creditor takes security for an existing indebtedness, and thereafter continues his account with the debtor in the ordinary running form, charging him with goods sold and crediting him with moneys received, there is no irre- buttable presumption that the payments are to be applied upon the original indebtedness. 4 Where a bank president borrowed money of a bank, which he lent to a debtor of the bank, the debtor giving the president a mortgage to secure the loan, it was held that, notwithstanding the president promised that the debt to the bank should be paid, yet, having received the proceeds of the mortgage, he might apply them to extinguish the debt to .him. 5 1 Mack v. Colleran, 18 N. Y. Supl. laghan v. Barrett, 21 N. Y. Supl. 368; 104; 136 N. Y. 617, where it was re- Wells v. Hughes, 89 Va. 543; 16 S. E. versed on another point. Rep. 689; Thomas v. Stewart, 132 8 Schallert-Ganahl Co. v. Neal, 91 N. Y. 580; Sankey v. Cook, 78 Iowa, Cal. 362. 419; 43 N. W. Rep. 280; Anderson v. 3 Western Sash Co. v. Young, 48 Perkins, 10 Mont. 154; Chaffe v. Mo. App. 505. Mackenzie, 43 La. Ann. 1062; Weil 4 Griffith v. Crocker, 18 Ont. App. v. Flowers, 109 N. C. 212; Johnson v. 370. Blazer, 33 Neb. 841; Arbuckles v. 5 Apperson •». Exchange Bank (Ky.), Chadwick, 146 Pa. St. 393; North 10 S. W. Rep. 801. See also, Per- Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. American due v. Brooks, 85 Ala. 459; O'Cal- Express Co., 73 Wis. 656; Sanborn § 397 PAYMENT. 477 § 397. Exception to the rule of application of payment. — The general rule is that, when a party indebted to the same person on more than one account makes a partial payment, he has the unqualified right to direct its application to one debt in preference to the other. The payment is voluntary, and the debtor may declare the terms upon which it is made, and the creditor must accept them, or reject the payment. If he accepts the payment, he takes it cum onere. Therefore it is that if the debtor pay with one intent, which is known or communicated to the creditor, and the creditor receives with another intent, the intent of the payer must prevail. But if the debtor does not, at or before the time of the payment, give direction for its application, his control of the payment is gone, and the right of the creditor to appropriate it arises, and he has the unqualified right to apply it to any valid, subsisting debt he may hold against the debtor. 1 An exception to this rule obtains when the money with which the payment is made is known to the creditor to have been derived from a particular source or fund. Then, without the consent of the debtor, the creditor can not apply it otherwise than to the exoneration of the source or fund from which it was derived. Nor can the debtor, without the consent of the creditor, divert the payment from the relief of that source or fund. 2 In the absence of v. Cole, 63 Vt. 590, holding that if a ment from the relief of the source or debtor treats several notes as consti- fund from which it arises he must tuting one demand, and makes a pay- show for the diversion the authority ment, the creditor may apply it upon of the party to be affected.' " To the all the notes ; also a part payment will same effect the learned chief justice renew a note barred by the statute of cited also Mahan v. Smitherman, 71 limitations, although the credit on the Ala. 563 ; Johnson v. Thomas, 77 note is made by the application of a Ala. 367 ; Aderholt v. Embry, 78 Ala. general payment; Henry v. Dietrich, 185. In Pearce v. Walker, 103 Ala. 250 ; 7 N. Y. Supl. 505. 15 So. Rep. 568, in a suit to enjoin the 1 Mayor, etc., v. Patton, 4 Cranch, enforcement of a power of sale in a 317, 321 ; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 330, 341. mortgage on the ground that the debt 2 Strickland v. Hardie, 82 Ala. 412; had been paid, it appeared that the 3 So. Rep. 40, where Stone, O. J., re- mortgagor was indebted to B. on a ferring to Levystein v. Whitman, 59 mortgage, and also to a firm of which Ala. 345, said: "As to the cotton B. was a member. A payment was covered by the mortgage and the ap- made by a third person, with whom plication of its proceeds we said : 'If money had been deposited by the a creditor proposes to divert a pay- mortgagor, to another member, and 478 PAYMENT. 398 evidence of the application by a creditor who holds several demands against the debtor, or by agreement of the parties or of any equities requiring a different application, payments made by the debtor will be applied to the oldest debt and to a secured rather than to an unsecured debt. 1 § 398. The same subject continued. — Where the debtor pays generally, or fails to make the application when he might do so, the creditor may apply the payment to whatever debt he pleases, unless there are circumstances which would render the exercise of such discretion by him unreasonable, and unjust to the debtor. If no application is made by either party, the court will make it according to the justice and equity of the Where personalty and realty are sold at the same time case. the depositary made a memoranda at time of the deposit indicating that the money was to be applied on the mortgage, but neither such member nor the mortgagee had knowledge of it. The uncontradicted testimony of this other member was that he re- ceived the money under an agreement with the mortgagor that it was to be applied on the debt due the firm. The payment was not entered on the mortgagor's account with the firm until twelve months later, though written evidence of it was given. It was held that a conclusion that the payment should have been applied in satisfaction of the mortgage was er- roneous. Brickell, C. J., said: "There may or may not have been in the mind of the mortgagor an intent, when the payment was made, that it should be applied to the mortgage debt. Such intent was not communicated to the mortgagee, and the payment was unattended by any act or declaration manifesting it ; and, if there was nothing else in the case, it would be enough to say that, before the cred- itor can be affected by the intent of the debtor in making a payment, the intent must be disclosed to him. Brice v. Hamilton, 12 S. C. 32; Long v. Miller, 93 N. C. 233. The subse- quent declarations of the mortgagor that he intended the payment to be applied to the mortgage debt are not of any consequence. The payment was an act completed. Before or at the time of making it, he could have given direction to it; after it was made, he was without control over it; nor could his past conduct be qualified or explained by his subsequent decla- rations. The partner receiving the payment did not act or profess to act as the agent of the mortgagee, nor was he dealt with in that capacity. If he had been dealt with in that capacity, the evidence does not disclose author- ity to receive payment of the mort- gage debt. Smith ;>. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130; 23 Am. Eep. 157." 1 Pond v. Harwood (1893), 139'N. Y. Ill ; Thompson v. St. Nicholas Bank, 113 N. Y. 325; Nat. Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28. 2 Koch v. Roth, 150 111. 212 ; 37 N. E. Rep. 317; McCurdy v. Middleton, 82 Ala. 131 ; 2 So. Rep. 721 ; Arnold v. Johnson, 1 Scam. 196; Mayor v. Pat- ten, 4 Cranch,317; United States v. Kirkpatriek, 9 Wheat. 720. In Moose v. Marks, 116 N. C. 785; 21 S. E. Eep. 561, plaintiff held two notes § 399 PAYMENT. 479 to the same person, but a separate price is agreed on for each, and the vendee afterwards pays generally more than the price of the personalty, the vendor may apply such payment, first, to the price of the personalty, and enforce a vendor's lien for the balance due on the realty. 1 Where an agent authorized to collect a judgment takes a check inpayment, knowing that there is money in the bank to pay it, and notifies his principal, who draws it out on a check previously given for another debt, but which had been dishonored, so that no money remains to pay the second check, the judgment will be considered paid, so that it may not be enforced against sureties for the debt for which it was obtained. 2 § 399. Payments made under mistake of fact. — In a case where the plaintiff, as surety of an executor, having become liable to legatees because of a misappropriation by the executor Of funds of the estate, drew his check in favor of a legatee who had died without issue before testator, but of which fact Doth plaintiff and the executor were ignorant, and the executor, in whose hands the plaintiff had put the check for delivery to against defendant— one as executor, 367, 3 So. Rep. 4; McCandlish «. Keen, the other in his own right, as assignee, 13 Gratt. 615 ; Young v. Harris, 36 without defendant's knowledge; and Ark. 162. But no such a state of in answer to his request for money, things exists in this case. A price or made on the ground that "one of the value was fixed upon the personalty- heirs" needed it, defendant remitted a separate from that fixed upon the check. It was held that the same realty, the price of the one being should he applied on the note held by $1,000, as above stated in the bill of plaintiff as executor. sale, and of the other being $13,000, 'Koch v. Roth 150111. 212; 37 N. E. as stated in the deed. As to the pay- Rep. 317, per Magruder, J. : "Where ment of the $2,000 in stock, the ven- land and personal property are sold dor had the right to apply one-half together, under one contract, at a of it in payment for the personalty, gross price, without stating the sep- in the absence of any direction by the arate price or value of the land and vendee to make a different applica- personalty, so that it can not be de- tion. The debtor is entitled to elect termined what part of the gross price on which debt the payment shall be is for the one and what part is for the credited, and it is the duty of the other, there will be a waiver of the creditor to so apply it. This election, vendor's lien, as it will be presumed however, should be made at the time that the vendor intended to rely upon the payment is made." the personal responsibility of the 2 Kallander v. Neidhold (1894), 98 vendee. Stringfellow e. Ivie, 73 Ala. Mich. 517; 57 N. W. Rep. 571. 209; Wilkinson v. Parmer, 82 Ala. 480 PAYMENT. §399 the legatee, delivered it to defendant, who was the personal representative of the deceased legatee, it was held that plaint- iff could recover the amount of such check as money paid un- der a mistake of fact, although it had been distributed by de- fendant among those entitled to the estate of the deceased leg- atee, unless defendant shows that it would be inequitable to allow such recovery. 1 1 Phetteplace v. Bucklin, 18 E.I. 297 ; 27 Atl. Eep. 211, per Matteson, C. J. : "The principle is well settled that, if a person pays money which he was not liable to pay in ignorance of the facts, he may recover the money so paid. Garland v. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. 408 ; Mayer t>. Mayor, etc., 63 N.Y. 455 ; Kingston Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N.Y. 391 ; and see note to Marriott v. Hampton, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 421 et seq. It is, however, subject to the qualification that, if it is inequitable to allow a re- covery, the money can not be recov- ered, but the person making the pay- ment must bear the loss. Mayer v. Mayor, etc., 63 N. Y. 455. The de- fendant seeks to bring himself within this qualification, and contends that having paid the money received from the plaintiff to the legatees under the will of Catherine C. Flagg, one of whom resides in Australia, and is therefore not readily accessible, be- fore the plaintiff or the executor de- manded repayment, his position is so changed that it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover. We do not think it is enough to relieve the defendant from liability that he has paid the money to others, even though such payment was made be- fore a repayment was demanded. He must show that a recovery by the plaintiff would be inequitable. If at the time he received the plaintiff's money he knew that Catherine C. Flagg had died before the testatrix, leaving no lineal descendant, so that the legacy to her had lapsed, he was bound to have communicated those facts to the plaintiff or to the execu- tor. When a person pays money in ignorance of circumstances with which the receiver is acquainted, and which, if disclosed, would have prevented the payment, the parties do not deal on equal terms, and the money is held to be unfairly obtained, and may be re- covered. Martin v. Morgan, 1 Brod. & B. 289; George v. Taylor, 55 Texas, 97 ; 8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law,645, note 4 ; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 99. The testimony on the part of the de- fendant does not negative such a state of facts, and certainly, if such a state of facts existed, it would not be in- equitable to permit the plaintiff to re- cover, even if the defendant had paid the money to others before demand for its repayment. Again, assuming that the defendant had no such knowl- edge, but received the money inno- cently, he should at least show that he has made some effort to restore the money, or that such effort would be unavailing. The testimony does not show that he has made the slightest effort in that direction, not even that he has requested the legatee here in Providence to give back the portion of the money received by such legatee. It is possible that a simple request to the legatees, accompanied by a state- ment of the facts showing the injus- tice of their retention of the money, would result in their returning it to be restored to the plaintiff. Until all reasonable efforts have been made by the defendant to get back the mocey, §400 PAYMENT. 481 § 400. Payments under mistake of law. — Where a surety on the general bond of a county treasurer makes a payment to the obligee to avoid suit, knowing that the default of his principal was greater than the amount paid, which was unknown to the obligee, but under the mistaken belief of law that the bond se- cured school funds as well as the general county fund, he can and have proved unavailing, how can it be said that it would be inequitable to permit a recovery? But assuming, again, that such efforts had been made, and had proved unavailing, we think it may well be doubted whether such a state of facts would be enough to render a recovery by the plaintiff inequitable. To have that effect, must there not be something besides the mere payment of the money by the plaintiff which has caused the posi- tion of the defendant to be changed? Must there not be some negligence or laches on the part of the plaintiff in not promptly demanding repayment of the money on discovery of the true state of facts, but for which the de- fendant's change of position might not have occurred? In Durrant v. Ec- clesiastical Commissioners, L. E. 6 Q. B. Div. 234, it was held that a plaintiff who had paid by mistake a tithe rent charge for lands not in his occupation could recover the amount from the defendants, although, at the time when he discovered his mis- take, the remedy of the defendants against the lands actually chargeable had become barred. Again, in Kings- ton Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391, the sheriff, having received an execution issued on a judgment in favor of the defendant, and afterwards one on a subsequent judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the same defendant, and before the last had run out, but after the sixty days had expired as to the first, made a levy on personal property not sufficient to satisfy both, sold it, and paid over the proceeds to 31 the defendant in satisfaction of his execution, with the assent of the plaintiff, neither party knowing that the execution had run out before the levy, but supposing the contrary, it was held that the plaintiff could re- cover the money as paid under a mis- take of fact, though the defendant's judgment had been in consequence of the receipt of the money canceled and discharged of record. And see Stan- dish v. Ross, 3 Exch. 527; Rheel v. Hicks, 25 N. Y. 289 ; National Bank of Commerce v. National Mech. Bank. Assn., 55 N. Y. 211. In the case at bar neither the plaintiff nor executor learned the true state of the facts un- til the plaintiff was called on by the attorney for the residuary legatees to pay to them the amount of the legacy which the plaintiff had already paid to the defendant. The precise date when this demand on the plaintiff was made does not appear. The plaintiff testifies that it was two months or more after he had made the check and placed it in the hands of the executor for delivery. It is not claimed, however, that the de- mand on the plaintiff by the attorney of the residuary legatees was before the defendant had distributed the money, and, consequently, no negli- gence or laches on the part of the plaintiff after discovering the facts could have had any effect in causing the defendant to change his position by the payment of the money ; and, if not, it is difficult to see how there can be any equity in his favor to pre- vent the plaintiff's recovery." 482 PAYMENT. §401 not, on the ground of mistake or coercion, recover the amount paid in excess of the default as to the general fund. 1 Although a provision in a mortgage for the payment of interest on a note secured by the mortgage can not be enforced in California because it violates the constitution of that state, yet where the mortgagors voluntarily paid such interest under a mistaken belief that they were bound to do so, they can not recover it back, or demand that it be credited on the principal of the loan. 2 § 401. Presumptions of payment — Time of payment. — Long delay in urging payment of a claim, although a circum- stance tending to raise a presumption of payment, will not, in the absence of aiding circumstances, or affirmative proof that the period of the statute of limitations has expired against the claim, establish a conclusive presumption of payment. 3 The 1 Pass v. Granada County, 71 Miss. 426; 14 So. Rep. 447, per Cooper, J. . "The very truth is that the sureties be- lieved they were discharging their ob- ligation by the payment of a less sum than that for which payment might be enforced. The mistake was one of law, in assuming that the effect of the gen- eral bond was to secure the school funds as well as the general fund of the county. In truth the sum paid by the sureties is less than the county would have recovered by suit on the bonds on which Pass was surety, for by suit a recovery would have been for double the amount embezzled by the treas- urer. Code, § 375. The appellant, Pass, in the light of the known facts, does not occupy a position to com- mend him to a court of equity for re- lief. He withheld from the county authorities facts known to him, and which it was then supposed made the sureties on the bond liable for a much larger sum than the board of super- visors was demanding. He has since discovered that, although these facts might exist, yet by law their ability was less. The payment made under these circumstances can not be recov- ered back, and the chancellor should have denied all relief against the county." 2 Harralson «. Barrett (1893), 99 Cal. 607; 34 Pac. Rep. 342. s Swatts v. Bowen, 141 Ind. 322; 40 N. E. Rep. 1057, per Hackney, J. : "It is insisted that the appellant lost her right to enforce her mortgage by her long delay and laches. She certainly suffered none from laches during the period of limitation, since the law gave her 20 years in which to main- tain an action to foreclose her mort- gage. As we have already seen, we can not adjudge, as a question of law arising upon the pleadings, that the period of limitation has yet expired. There is no doubt that, as held in Long v. Straus, 124 Ind. 84; 24 N. E. Rep. 664, and Gamier v. Renner, 51 Ind. 372, a jury may properly consider long delay in urging a claim as a cir- cumstance tending to raise the pre- sumption of payment. Here there are no other circumstances than delay, and, since the law may have author- ized that delay, we can not hold the §401 PAYMENT. 483' burden of proof as to payment, without regard to lapse of time, rests upon the party who pleads it. 1 delay conclusive of payment. See Potter v. Smith, 36 Ind. 231; Harper v. Terry, 70 Ind. 264 ; Schererrc. Inger- man, 110 Ind. 428; 11 N. E. Rep. 8, and 12 N. E. Rep. 304." In Mulhall v. Berg (Iowa, 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 573, in an action on a note signed by a husband and wife, defendant husband testified that the note was paid by an- other note signed by him, his wife, and his father-in-law, and that the note in suit was not surrendered be- cause plaintiffs claimed that they had tostit. This evidence was corroborated by that of the wife and the father-in- law, but their knowledge of English was very imperfect, and it did not ap- pear that the transaction involving the payment was not in English. The note in suit was amply secured, and the one alleged to have been given in payment thereof was not secured. A witness testified that he heard one of the defendants ask plaintiff " about that note," and that they replied that they "had not found the note yet," but what note was referred to did not ap- pear. It was held that the presump- tion of non-payment arising from the fact of plaintiff's possession of the note in suit was not overcome. 1 Lanier v. Huguley (1893), 91 Ga. 791 ; 18 S. E. Rep. 39. And see Tip- pin v. Brockwell, 89 Ga. 467. In Pearce v. Walker, 103 Ala. 250; 15 So. Rep. 568, the court said: "A party pleading payment, whether as matter of defense or as ground of affirmative relief, must prove it, if the fact is de- nied. If of it no evidence is offered, or if the evidence of it be equally bal- anced, or if the evidence does not gen- erate a rational belief of the fact, the party affirming its existence must fail for want of proof. 3 BrickelPs Digest, p. 698, §§ 1, 2." In Gardner v. Burch, 101 Mich. 261 ; 59 N.W. Rep. 613,anote setting out that, in consideration that the B. & C. Ry. Co. will build from B. to C, via M., the maker will pay a certain sum upon the first arrival of a regular passenger train at M. from C. over the road of said company by a cer- tain date, is payable on the timely com- mencement of regular passenger serv- ice from C. to M., although nothing has been done on the line from M. to B. except to survey it. Grant, J., said: "It is argued in behalf of the defendant that the consideration for the note was the construction of the entire road, and the running of a regu- lar passenger train from West Bay City to Battle Creek, and that these were conditions precedent to the right of recovery. Three similar contracts have been before this court for con- struction, in the following cases: Stowell v. Stowell, 45 Mich. 364; 8 N. W. Rep. 70 ; Toledo, etc., Rail- road Co. v. Johnson, 55 Mich. 456; 21 N. W. Rep. 888 ; Gardner v. Walsh, 95 Mich. 505; 55 N. W. Rep. 355. In Stowell v. Stowell, 45 Mich. 364, the note was as follows : ' In consid- eration of the construction of the Chicago and Canada Southern Railway through or within one-half a mile of the village of Dundee, in the county of Monroe, state of Michigan, within three years of this date, and the build- ing of passenger and freight depot at Dundee, Mich., I promise to pay to the treasurer of said railway com- pany, or bearer, the sum of fifty dol- lars in thirty days after said road and depot are constructed as aforesaid.' In Toledo, etc., Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 55 Mich. 456, as follows: 'For the purpose of promoting and aiding the construction of the Toledo, Ann Arbor and Northern Railroad, and in consideration of the benefits to be derived therefrom, I do hereby pledge and agree to pay to the or- der of the Toledo, Ann Arbor and 484 PAYMENT. §402 § 402. Executor's duty to pay debt. — An executor who has notice of a debt outstanding against the testator, and who resists payment on the ground that the debt was discharged by the testator in his life-time, can not justify himself for the non-production of assets with which to pay it by setting up that he retained in his hands an ample amount of stock in a private corporation, and that, pending litigation which he inaugurated and carried on in resistance to the creditor's suit, the stock became depreciated in value, so as to be insufficient to satisfy the creditor. 1 It is the duty of the executor to pay Northern Railroad Company the sum of one hundred dollars, payable in six months after the first cars run over the road from Ann Arbor to To- ledo. Payable on or before the time specified, without interest.' In Gard- ner v. Walsh, as follows: 'For the purpose of promoting and aiding the construction of the Battle Creek and Bay City Railroad, and in consid- eration of the benefits to be derived therefrom, I do hereby promise and agree to pay to the order of George H. Young, trustee, the sum of twenty- five dollars, payable when the road is constructed and the cars are running thereon from Midland to West Bay City, Michigan.' In all these cases the right of recovery was sustained, notwithstanding that the road in each case was not completed. We think they are conclusive in the present case. While the language of each contract is different, still in each the termini were fixed, and it was con- templated that the road should be eventually completed between them. But it was held that the notes became due before that time. In the present case it is clear that a complete con- struction before payment was not in the minds of the parties. The only condition precedent was the construc- tion of the road from West Bay City, which was not a terminus, to Mid- land, another intermediate station. To complete the road to Bay City would require the building of a costly bridge, with a draw, over the Saginaw river. The expression 'the first ar- rival of a regular passenger train at Midland from West Bay City over the road of said company ' can not, under the facts, be fairly construed to mean the running of a train over the entire length of the road." 1 Lanier v. Huguley (1893), 91 Ga. 791; 18 N. E. Rep. 39, per Sim- mons, J. : "In the case of Mcintosh v. Hambleton, 35 Ga. 94, this court held: 'Though an administrator is not liable for property lost or destroyed without fault on his part, he is bound to ad- minister the estate according to law, by paying the debts before making distribution to legatees or heirs. This duty is enjoined upon him by law, by his oath of office, and by a sound pub- lic policy. An administrator who, with notice of an outstanding debt, paid to the heir, before the expiration of 12 months from the grant of admin- istration, a portion of the estate, re- taining, in slaves and other property, enough to meet said debt, is not pro- tected against the creditor's claim by the results of the late war in the way of the abolition of slavery and the § 402 PAYMENT. 485 the debts of the estate, or amply to secure the payment thereof, before he makes any distribution. This is true, notwithstand- ing the will disposed of the whole estate, including the stock, by directing the executor to deliver the same to the legatees in kind. serious depreciation of the otner as- ficiency caused by his own illegal sets retained. The administrator, in act.' See also, Sharp v. Bonner, 38 such case, must make good the de- Ga. 418." CHAPTER XI. BKEACH OF CONTRACT. §403. Patting it out of one's power §412. to perform. 413 404. Further illustrations. 414. 405. Promisee disabling promisor. 415 406. Ill treatment. 416. 407. Bankruptcy or insolvency. 417 408. The same subject continued. 418. 409. Eefusal to perform, the time for performance not having 419. arrived— rThe English rule. 410. The same subject continued — Illustrations of the English 420, rule. 421. 411. American rule as to renuncia- tion of contract. The same subject continued. Character of notice. Notice repudiated. Notice retracted. Further illustrations. Scienter. Locatio opens faciendi — Defect- ive performance. Seller's breach — Buyer's reme- dy. Loss of profits as damages for breach. Partial or entire breach — Prof- its as damages. § 403. Putting it out of one's power to perform. — Where the promisor has expressly or impliedly undertaken to keep himself ready to perform at any time, the disabling himself is a breach. 1 But whether merely temporarily disabling one's self, the time for performance not having arrived, constitutes a breach, is doubtful; from language used by Lord Kenyon, it is to be inferred that it would not. 2 The rule in Massachu- 1 Lovelock v. Frankly n, 8 Q. B. 371. 2 Lovelock v. Franklyn, 8 Q. B. 371. "The plaintiff has a right to say to the defendant: 'You have placed your- self in a situation in which you can not perform what you have promised ; you promised to be ready during the period of seven years ; and during that period, I may at any time tender you the money and call for an assign- ment, and expect that you should keep yourself ready; but if I now were to tender you the money, you would not be ready.' That is a breach of the contract. No case contradicts this view ; the language in the author- ities relied upon by the defendants relates to a different state of things. "Where a party agrees to sell, or to lease, on a given future day, he may have all the intermediate time open to him for acquiring the means of per- forming his contract, but here the party puts it out of his power to per' form what he has agreed to perform; that is, to assign at any time at which he may be called upon. This distinc- tion shows that the passage cited from (486) § 404 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 487 setts is, however, otherwise. 1 Accordingly, if one agree to convey land to another, and convey the land to a third per- son, such other has a cause of action, although there has been no tender on his part; and it is no defense that such party was unable to pay the money. 2 The winding up of an insurance company, and transferring all its assets and obligations to a new company, gives a policy-holder a right to consider his contract terminated, and to demand what is justly due him in that exigency. 3 Likewise, an order for winding up a company is notice of discharge to all the persons in the employment of the company, who are entitled at once to their salary for the full time. 4 An agreement to make a will of a certain kind is broken at once when another kind of will is executed, although the testator has not deceased. 5 Where the promisor agreed to furnish the promisee a show case and shelving with which to conduct a stationery business, the leasing part of the store for a dyeing establishment and putting up a partition so the show case could not be seen was held a breach. 6 § 404. Further illustrations. — The marrying another by a person engaged to be married is a breach, although the time Lord Coke is inapplicable ; that proves to be sued before the day arrives. So, no more, on the point now before us, although he should repurchase the than that, if an act is to be performed same estate before the day appointed at a future time specified, the contract for the performance of his contract, is not broken by something which lie would still be liable for a con- may merely prevent the performance structive breach of his contract, and in the meantime. We are introduc- he could not compel the other party ing no novelty. In all the cases put to perform it on his part." See also, for the defendants, the party had the Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133. means of rehabilitating himself be- 2 Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133; fore the time of performance arrived ; Newcomb v. Brackett, 16 Mass. 161; here he has incapacitated himself at Buttrick v. Holden, 8 Cush. 233; Far- the very time when he may be called rington v. Hodgdon, 119 Mass. 453. on and should be ready." 3 Lovell v. St. Louis Ins. Co., Ill 1 Heard v. Bowers, 23 Pick. 455. U.S. 264; Cook's Policy, L. R. 9 Eq. "The general doctrine undoubtedly is, 703; Holdich's Case, L. R. 14 Eq. 72. that where a party stipulates to make i In re Oriental Bank, L. R. 32 Ch. a conveyance of an estate to another Div. 366. at a future day, and before the day 6 Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128. conveys the estate to a third person, 6 Dickinson v. Hart, 142 N. Y. 183 ; he is to be considered as guilty of a 36 N. E. Rep. 801, affirming s. c. breach of his stipulation, and is liable 21 N. Y. Supl. 307. 488 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 405 has not yet arrived for performance and the promisee has made no request to marry. 1 Where a telegraph company agreed to maintain a telegraph office at a certain place, but subsequently leased their lines to another company which of- fered to maintain the office, this was held a breach. 2 And where a party by dissipation renders himself incompetent to perform his contract, the contract may be rescinded by the other. 3 In the sale of specific goods, to be delivered on re- quest, a sale of the goods to a third person is a breach. 4 In Michigan it seems to be the rule that, even if the promisor has disabled himself, the promisee must tender performance before suit. 5 But this is opposed to the weight of authority to the effect that such disability dispenses with the performance of all conditions precedent or concurrent. 6 § 405. Promisee disabling promisor. — A breach of the con- tract takes place when the promisee disables the promisor from performing. Thus, where there was a contract to exchange land for a homestead right and the party owning the land aban- doned the contract and refused to perform it before the time at which the other was required to procure the homestead right, and in consequence of which the homestead right could not be 1 Short v. Stone, 8 Q. B. 358. B. & S. 840; Caines v. Smith, 15 M. & 2 Tufts U.Atlantic Tel. Co., 157 Mass. W. 189; M&clure.Ex parte, ~L. R.5Ch. 269; 23 N. E. Rep. 844. 737; Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, 3 Rector v. McDermott (Ark.), 13 266; in re Imperial "Wine Co., 42 I,. J. S. W. Rep. 334. C.5; Carrington v. Waff, 112 N. C. 115; 4 Bowdell v. Parsons, 10 East, 359. 16 S. E. Rep. 1008 ; Heard v. Bowers, 23 5 Thomas v. Corey, 74 Mich. 216, Pick. 455 ; United States v. Behan, 110 41 N. W. Rep. 901, where a declara- XT. S. 338'; De Peyster v. Pulver, 3 tion to recover damages for breach Barb. 284; Christy v. Stafford, 22 111. of a contract to let the sawing of a App. 430; Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. & C. quantity of logs, because of the sale 325; Ruesens v. Mexican Co., 20 Cen- of the logs to a third person, was tral Law Jour. 34 ; McNish v. Coon, held demurrable on account of not 13 Wend. 26; Rhodes v. Forwood, alleging a readiness to saw. L. R. 1 App. Cas. 256, holding that 6 Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133 Newcomb v, Brackett, 16 Mass. 161 Buttrick v, Holden, 8 Cush. 233 Lovelock v. Franklyn, 8 Q. B. 371 Bowdell v. Parsons, 10 East, 359 Reid v. Explosives Co., L. R. 19 period named. Q. B. D.264; Stirling „. Maitland, 5 where one party agrees to employ another as agent at a certain place, for a fixed time, there is no implied con- dition that the business itself shall continue to be carried on during the § 406 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 489 procured, it was held that the land-owner should comply with his contract, even though he got nothing for his land, and specific performance was decreed. 1 A creditor holding a life insurance policy on the life of his debtor, thinking the widow would obstruct him in its collection, contracted with her that "she is to do all within her power in aid of the collection of the policy;" in consequence of her voluntarily making an affidavit to the effect that at the time the creditor took out his policy the debt was much less than the policy, he was com- pelled to compromise with the company; she was held pre- cluded from recovering by her action in making the affidavit. 2 In accordance with this principle the promisor may always re- cover in assumpsit the value of his work done before the prom- isee's act rendered it impossible to proceed ; as in case of me- chanics hindered and delayed in the further prosecution of their work. 3 When an act of the promisee disables the prom- isor he may abandon his contract at once and sue. Thus, where the promisor agreed to saw a certain number of feet of lumber according to specifications to be furnished by the prom- isee, the failure to furnish the specifications is a breach, war- ranting the promisor in abandoning the contract and enabling him to recover pro tanto.* § 406. Ill treatment. — In all cases of contracts for personal services the treatment by the promisee of the promisor in such a manner that he can not reasonably be required to submit is a breach. This principle is most frequently invoked in cases of parents conveying property to their children in considera- 1 Dalin v. Prince, 124 111. 76. See 27 Hun, 557 ; Garretty v. Brazell, 34 also, McClure v. Otrich, 118 111. 320; Iowa, 100; Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. Towner v. Tickner, 112 111.217; Cohn 514; Applebee v. Percy, L. E. 9 C. P. v. Mitchell, 115 111. 124; Lyman v. 657. Gedney, 114 111. 388. 4 DeLoachw. Smith, 83 Geo. 665; 2 Alexander v. Sanders, 93 Ala. 345 ; Branch v. Palmer, 65 Geo. 210. Nor 9 So. Rep. 521. need he demand further specifiea- 3 Gilbert, etc., Co.». Butler, 146 Mass. tions. See also, Soderberg v. Crock- 82 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 76 ; Cleary v. Sohier, ett, 17 Nev. 409 ; Chandler v. Thomp- 120 Mass. 210; Lord v. Wheeler, 1 son, 30 Fed. -Rep. 38; Gates v. Na- Gray, 282; Niblo v. Binsee, 1 Keyes tional Bldg. Co., 46 Minn. 419; 49 N. (N. Y.), 476; Rawson v. Clark, 70 111. W. Rep. 232; Wright v. Lothrop, 149 656; Whelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., Mass. 385. 490 BKiSACH OF CONTRACT. §406 tion of being supported, nursed and attended during life. Any treatment of the parent which he can not reasonably be re- quired to endure is a breach of the condition in the deed and ejectment can be brought. 1 But contracts of this kind are often improvidently made on both sides, and their general policy has been doubted, 2 and probably there never was a case 'Winch v. Bean, 62 N. H. 427; Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34; Center v. Center, 38 N. H. 318 ; Whit- ton v. Whitton, 38 N. H. 127; Barker v. Cobb, 36 N. H. 344; Eastman v. Batchelder, 36 N. H. 141; Holmes v. Fisher, 13 N. H. 9; Rhoades v. Parker, 10 N. H. 83; Flanders v. Lamphear, 9 N. H. 201; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 9 N. H. 117; Hartshorn v. Hubbard, 2 N. H. 453; Currier v. Currier, 2 N. H. 75; Petteeu. Case, 2 Allen, 546; Gilson v. Gilson, 2 Allen, 115; Marsh v. Austin, 1 Allen, 235; Robinson v. Robinson, 9 Gray, 447; Gibson v. Taylor, 6 Gray, 310; Wales v. Mellen, 1 Gray, 512; Fiske v. Fiske, 20 Pick. 499 ; Thayer v. Richards, 19 Pick. 398 ; Lanfair v. Lanfair, 18 Pick. 299 ; Wil- der v. Whittemore, 15 Mass. 262; Fales v. Hemenway, 64 Maine, 373 ; Bryant v. Erskine, 55 Maine, 153 ; Sib- ley v. Rider, 54 Maine, 463; Philbrook v. Burgess, 52 Maine, 271 ; Lamb v. Foss, 21 Maine, 240; Norton v. Webb, 35 Maine, 218; Brown v. Leach, 35 Maine, 39; Allen v. Parker, 27 Maine, 531 ; Hoyt v. Bradley, 27 Maine, 242 ; Clinton v. Fly, 10 Maine, 292 ; Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358; Frizzle v. Dearth, 28 Vt. 787 ; Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415; Olcott e. Dunklee, 16 Vt. 478; Briggs v. Beach, 18 Vt. 115; Crane v. Stickles, 15 Vt. 252 ; Austin v. Austin, 9 Vt. 420; Ferguson v. Kim- ball, 3 Barb. Ch. 616 ; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581 ; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 2 N. Y. 360; Tucker v. Tucker, 24 Mich. 426; Hawkins v. Clermont, 15 Mich. 511; Daniels v. Eisenlord, 10 Mich. 454; Smith v. Smith, 34 Wis. 320. 2 Soper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. St. 219. In the opinion in this case Judge Sharswood impressively said: "The wisdom of such a contract is very questionable, even where the most entire confidence is felt at the time in the affection of the child. The son of Sirach pronounces emphatic- ally against it: 'Give not thy son and wife, thy brother and friend, power over thee while thou livest and give not thy goods to another ; lest it repent thee, and thou entreat for the same again. As long as thou livest and hast breath in thee, give not thy- self over to any. Far better it is that thy children should seek to thee than that thou shouldst stand to their courtesy. In all thy works keep to thyself the pre-eminence ; leave not a stain in thine honor. At the time when thou shalt end thy days and finish thy life, distribute thine inher- itance.' The most striking illustration of the same thing is in the pathetic tragedy of Lear, where the fool con- firms the opinion of the wise man of the Apocrypha: 'Would I had two coxcombs and two daughters. If I gave them all my living, I'd keep the coxcombs myself.' One of the evil consequences which seems almost in- variably to attach itself to such ar- rangements is the distressing family discord and lawsuits which spring from them. Many of them have been brought to this court. It is not always easy to administer justice in such cases in conformity to law. The nat- ural feeling of right prompts to the rule which would hold the child to the strict performance of his part of the contract, and give to the parent § 407 BREACH OP CONTRACT. 491 in which some breach of the contract, more or less important, might not be proved. But these are usually overlooked or ex- cused. It would be a violation of correct principles to hold in those cases that a breach of which no serious notice was taken of the time is sufficient to enable the parent to maintain eject- ment. 1 § 407. Bankruptcy or insolvency. — The fact that the prom- isor becomes insolvent or bankrupt does not of itself constitute any breach of contract. Thus, where a bank has issued a letter of credit, on the terms that the bills which they agree to accept are to be covered by bills of lading to a like amount, suspension of payment by the bank before there has been time for the letter of credit to be used is not a breach of the contract. 2 Where a person who had contracted for a certain quantity of oil, to be delivered to him at a future day, became bankrupt before that day arrived and obtained his certificate, it was held he was nevertheless liable to an action for not accepting and paying for the oil. 3 Insolvency does not excuse performance ; 4 nor can a contract be rescinded on the ground of insolvency. 5 As to what the rights of a party to a contract are, in case of insolvency of the other, the following language of Mellish, L. J., speaking in reference to a sale, is pertinent: "I am of opinion that the result of the authorities is this — that in such a case the seller, notwithstanding he may have agreed to allow credit for the goods, is not bound to deliver any more goods under the contract until the price of the goods not yet delivered is tendered to him ; and that, if a debt is due to him for goods already delivered, he is entitled to refuse to deliver any more until he is paid the debt due for those already delivered, as well as the price of those still to be delivered I !6 the right to recall the gift if he fails." 4 Jones v. Anderson, 82 Ala. 302. 1 Smith v. Smith, 34 Wis. 320, hold- 6 Ex parte Chalmers, L. E. 8 Ch. ing refusal to serve the parent at table App. 289. no breach warranting ouster. 6 Ex parte Chalmers, L. B. 8 Ch. 2 In re Agra Bank, L. E. 5 Eq. Cas. App. 289. See also, Bloxam v. San- 160. ders, 4 B. & C. 941 ; Hanson v. Meyer, 8 Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145. 6 East, 614. 492 BREACH OF CONTRACT. §§408, 409 § 408. The same subject continued. — While insolvency of itself is no breach of contract and does not authorize rescis- sion, there may be such an admission of the insolvency as amounts to a declaration of intention not to abide by a con- tract, and it may operate as a renunciation. 1 A trustee of a bankrupt, who has elected to perform a continuing contract of the bankrupt, does not adopt the contract personally. 2 A party may, upon discovering the insolvency, make such arrangements as will likely prevent losses arising therefrom, and he need not await the day to see whether the insolvency will prevent the other party from performing. 3 § 409. Refusal to perform, the time for performance not having arrived — The English rule. — In England it is well set- tled that the positive and absolute refusal by one party to carry out the contract is in itself an immediate complete breach of it on his part, and gives immediate right of action. 4 1 Ex parte Stapleton, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 586, -where Jessel, M. R., said: "I am of opinion that if a person who has entered into a contract of this kind gives to the vendor before he has parted with the goods that which amounts in effect to this notice, 'I have parted with all my property, and am unable to pay the price agreed upon,' it is equivalent to a repudia- tion of the contract." In re, Phcs- nix Bessemer Steel Co., L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 108; Ex parte Carnforth, etc., Co., L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 108. 2 Ex parte Davis, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 463. 3 Chamber of Commerce v. Sollitt, 43 111. 519. See also, Lowe «. Har- wood, 139 Mass. 133; Follansbee v. Adams, 86 111. 13; Fox v. Kitton, 19 111.519; Bingham v. Mulholland, 25 U. C. C. P. 210; Morgan v. Bain, L. R. 10 C. P. 15. 4 Roper v. Johnson, L. R. 8 C. P. 167; Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. Ill, where Cockburn, C. J., said: "It is true, as is pointed out by the Lord Chief Baron, in his judgment in this case [Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678], that there can be no actual breach of a contract by rea- son of non-performance so long as the time for performance has not yet arrived. But, on the other hand, there is — and the decision in Hoch- ster v. De La Tour proceeds on that assumption — a breach of the contract when the promisor repudiates it and declares he will no longer be bound by it. The promisee has an inchoate right to the performance of the bar- gain, which becomes complete when the time for performance has arrived. In the meantime, he has a right to have the contract kept open as a sub- sisting and effective contract. Its unimpaired and unimpeached efficacy may be essential to his interests. His rights acquired under it may be dealt with by him in various ways for his benefit and advantage. Of all such advantage the repudiation of the con- tract by the other party, and the an- nouncement that it never will be fulfilled, must of course deprive him. § 409 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 493 The English doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract is summed up by Lord Esher as follows : "I think that in all of them the effect of the language used with regard to the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract is that a renuncia- tion of a contract, or, in other words, a total refusal to per- form it by one party before the time for performance arrives, does not, by itself, amount to a breach of contract, but may be so acted upon and adopted by the other party as a rescission of the contract as to give an immediate right of action. When one party assumes to renounce the contract, that is, by antici- pation refuses to perform it, he thereby, so far as he is con- cerned, declares his intention then and there to rescind the contract. Such a renunciation does not, of course, amount to a rescission of the contract, because one party to a contract can not by himself rescind it, but by wrongfully making such a renunciation of the contract he entitles the other party, if he pleases, to agree to the contract being put an end to, subject to the retention by him of his right to bring an action in respect of such wrongful rescission. The other party may adopt such renunciation of the contract by so acting upon it as in effect to declare that he too treats the contract as at an end, except for the purpose of bringing an action upon it for the damages sustained by him in consequence of such renunciation. He can not, however, himself proceed with the contract on the footing that it still exists for other purposes, and also treat such renunciation as an immediate breach. If he adopts the renunciation the contract is at an end except for the purposes of the action for such wrongful renunciation ; if he does not wish to do so, he must wait for the arrival of the time when in the ordinary course a cause of action on the contract would arise. He must elect which course he will pursue." 1 It is therefore quite right to hold that bring his action accordingly." See such an announcement amounts to a also, Danube and Black Sea Co. v. violation of the contract in omnibus, Xenos, 13 0. B. (N. S.) 825. and that upon it the promisee, if so : Johnstone v. Milling, L., R. 16 Q. minded, may at once treat it as a B. D. 460, 467. breach of the entire contract and 494 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 410 § 410. The same subject continued — Illustrations of the En- glish rule. — Where a party agreed to employ one as a courier, but, before the time of service arrived, refused to perform the agreement, and notified the courier that he would not employ him, it was held that an immediate action lay for such renun- ciation. 1 Where a man promised to marry a woman so soon as his father should die, but during the father's life-time re- fused absolutely to marry the woman, it was held that this was a breach of contract, and the woman could sue at once. 2 Likewise, where a renunciation of a marriage contract to wed in a reasonable time is made before the expiration of the time, there is an immediate breach.* The election to take advantage of the repudiation of the contract goes only to the question of breach, and not to the question of damages. Thus, where the seller of personal property repudiates his contract before the time for delivery has arrived, the damages are to be estimated by the difference between the contract price and the market price at the day or days appointed for performance, and not at the time of breach. That is, the damages are such as the buyer would sustain at the day appointed for perform- ance of the contract. 4 Where a party, by his agent, agreed with a railway company to receive certain goods on board his ship, to be carried to a port in the Black Sea, and, before the time for the first shipment arrived, he wrote the company that he would not abide by the contract, as the agent had no authority to make it, but offered a substituted contract, it was held the company could accept such renunciation as a breach, and ne- gotiate with another ship owner for the conveyance of the goods. 6 1 Hochster v. De La Tour, 2E. & B. price and the market price at the 678. several periods for delivery, notwith- z Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111. standing that the last period had not 3 Cherry v. Thompson, L. R. 7 Q. B. elapsed when the cause was tried. 573, 574, per Blackburn, J. Brown v. Muller, L. R. 7 Ex. 319; the 4 Roper v. Johnson, L. R. 8 0. P. rule laid down in this case was ap- 167, a sale to be delivered in monthly plied to the preceding, cy pres. installments; it was held that the 5 Danube, etc., R. Co. v. Xenos, 13 measure of damages was the sum of C. B. (N. S.) 825, the differences between the contract §§ 411, 412 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 495 § 411. American rule as to renunciation of contract. — The New York Court of Appeals has gone to the extent, that where one party to a contract declares to the other that he will not make the performance on the future day, and does not, before the time arrives for an act to be done by the promisee, with- draw his declaration, the promisee is excused from performance on his part, or offer to perform, and may maintain his action for a breach of the contract when the day has passed. 1 But it seems doubtful whether an action can be commenced at once upon renunciation, 8 lays down the rule that "it is now well set- tled that if a person enters into a contract for service, to com- mence at a future day, and before that day arrives does an act inconsistent with the continuance of the contract, an action may be immediately brought by the other party." 3 But this doctrine was somewhat qualified in a subsequent case. 4 The only extent, then, to which the doctrine is carried is, that a renunciation of a contract before the time for performance ar- rives will dispense with the performance, or the offer to per- form, conditions precedent or concurrent. 5 § 412. The same subject continued. — The Massachusetts courts adopt the doctrine that a renunciation may give- Gause for treating the contract as rescinded, and excuse the other party from making ready for performance on his part, or re- lieve him from the necessity of offering performance in order 'Shaw v. Republic Ins. Co., 69 entered into an engagement to marry N. Y. 286 ; Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cow. " in the fall," the man told the woman 506; Traver v. Halsted, 23 Wend. 66. in October that he would not perform z Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492. the contract. It was held that an ac- 3 Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362, a tion commenced immediately was not leading case, containing a review of prematurely brought. But the court all the cases. expressly refuse to extend this rule to 4 Shaw v. Republic Ins. Co., 69 N.Y. any other case than an engagement to 286,293. marry. Schwab v. Coghlan, Daily Reg. 5 Bungea.Koop,48N.Y.225; Good- (N. Y.), Dec. 4th, 1883; 1 Brightly's sell ^.Western Union Tel. Co., 130 N.Y. Digest, 1679, § 399 ; Gast v. Johnston, 430; Parr v. Village of Greenbush, 3 St. Rep. 258; Crist v. Armour, 34 112 N. Y. 246 ; Ferris v. Spooner, 102 Barb. 378 ; Wills v. Simmonds, 8 Hun, N. Y. 10; Canda v. Wick, 100 N. Y. 189; holding an action may be brought 127; Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N.Y. at once. 246. In this case the parties having 496 BREACH OF CONTRACT. §413 to enforce his rights. But it does not constitute a present vio- lation of a legal right of the other party, or confer upon him a present right of action. 1 The courts of Iowa go to the full extent of the English cases and allow an action to be brought at once upon renunciation. 2 So do the courts of West Vir- ginia. 3 The federal courts, it would seem, apply this rule.' And so also in Michigan. 5 Illinois follows the Massachusetts ruling and holds a renunciation not enough of itself to work a breach. 6 But the promisee need not wait until the day of performance before making new arrangements. He does not lose his remedy against the promiser by providing at once against losses likely to arise. 7 § 413. Character of notice. — The renunciation must be ab- solute and unequivocal "A mere assertion that the party will 1 Daniels ti. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, where the court said: "An executo- ry contract ordinarily confers no ti- tle or interest in the subject-mat- ter of the agreement. Until the time arrives when, by the terms of the agreement, he is or might be en- titled to its performance, he can suf- fer no injury or deprivation which can form a ground of damages. There is neither violation of right,nor loss upon which to found an action. The true rule seems to us to be that in order to charge onein damages for breach of an ex- ecutory personal contract, the other party must show a refusal or neglect to perform, at a time when and under conditions such that he is or might be entitled to require performance." Heard v. Bowers, 23 Pick. 455 ; Col- lins v. Delaporte, 115 Mass. 159'; Clem- ent v. Meserole, 107 Mass. 362. 2 McCormick v. Basal, 46 Iowa, 235; Holloway u. Griffith, 32 Iowa, 409; Crabtree v. Messersmith, 19 Iowa, 179. 3 James v. Adams, 16 W. Va. 245, allowing an action to be maintained by the seller against the buyer, on his declaration in advance that he would not accept the goods. 4 Dingley v. Oler, 11 Fed. 372, re- versed in 117 U. S. 490, but upon the ground that there had been no re- nunciation. Hancock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 13 Am. Law Reg. 103. See Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. 36; Say- lor's Case, 14 Ct. CI. 453. 5 Platt v. Brand, 26 Mich. 173; Hos- mer v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 299. See also, McGregor v. Estate of Ross, 96 Mich. 103; Sullings v. Goodyear, etc., Co., 36 Mich. 313. 6 McPherson v. Walker, 40 111. 371. Contra, Fox v. Kitton, 19 111. 519. See also, Wight ». Gardner, 66 111. 94. 7 Chamber of Commerce v. Sollitt, 43 111. 519. See also, Mountjoy o. Metzger, 12 Am. Law Peg. 442; Harkreader v. Eubanks (Miss.), 12 So. Rep. 210; Haines v. Tucker, 50 N. H. 307; Smith v. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110; Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624; Green v. Haley, 5 R. I. 260; Buff kin v. Baird, 73 N. C. 283 ; Casey v. Gunn, 29 Mo. App. 14; Black v. Woodrow, 39 Md. 194; Simmons v. Green, 35 Ohio St. 104; Mowry v. Kirk, 19 Ohio St. 375; Curtis ». Smith, 48 Vt. 116; Allen v. Thrall, 36 Vt. 711; Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17. § 413 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 497 be unable or will refuse to perform his contract is not suffi- cient; it must be a distinct and unequivocal absolute refusal to perform the promise, and must be treated and acted upon as such by the party to whom the promise was made." 1 Thus, where a party had contracted to deliver ice, and wrote to the buyer: "We can not, therefore, comply with your request to deliver the ice claimed, and respectfully submit that you ought not to ask this of us, in view of the facts stated herein and in ours of the 7th. * * * \y e will be glad to hear from you in reply, but will be more pleased to have a personal in- terview, and venture the suggestion that you come here for the purpose," it was held that this was not a final refusal to perform the contract. 2 Where the government had a contract to purchase cavalry horses, and, subsequent to the contract, adopted a code of rules touching their inspection before pur- chase, this was held to be no notification that the government would not accept the horses unless the rules were complied with. 3 A charter-party provided that a ship should lay up at a port forty days for cargo. When the officers of the ship ap- plied to the agent of the charterer for cargo, he said: "We have none for you; you had better go away." It was held this did not' relieve the ship from the obligation to remain forty days. 1 A mere assertion of inability to go on with a contract is no notice of repudiation. 6 And it is doubtful, in case of a lease or other contract containing various stipulations, where the whole contract can not be treated as put an end to upon the wrongful repudiation of one of the stipulations, whether any notice of repudiation of one stipulation can be construed as a renunciation of the whole contract. 6 1 Benjamin on Sales, § 860,cited with 6 Johnstone v. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. approval in Dingley v. Oler, 117 TJ. S. B. D. 460. See also, Barrowman v. 490, 503, and Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. Free, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 500; Mersey 36, 49. Steel Co. v. Naylor, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 2 Dingley v. Oler, 117 IT. S. 490. 434, holding a mere refusal to pay for 8 Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. 36. one installment, not being willful, was 4 Avery v. Bowden, 5 E. & B. 714, not a repudiation, but that a willful and 6 E. & B. 953. See also, Phill- refusal to pay would be. See also, potts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475. Withers v. Reynolds, 2 B. & Ad. 882. 5 Johnstone v. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 460. 32 498 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 414 § 414. Notice repudiated. — The promisee, if he pleases, may treat the notice of intention as inoperative, and await the time when the contract is to be executed, and then hold the other party responsible for all the consequences of non-per- formance ; but in that case he keeps the contract alive for the benefit of the other party as well as his own ; he remains subject to all his own obligations and liabilities under it, and enables the other party not only to complete the contract, if so advised, notwithstanding his previous repudiation of it, but also to take advantage of any supervening circumstance which would justify him in declining to complete it. 1 Thus, where a ship, in accordance with the provisions of a charter- party, proceeded to a port to load, and the charterer renounced the contract but the officers of the ship refused to accept the renunciation and waited at the port for cargo, and war broke out between the two countries, rendering it impossible for the charterer to furnish cargo, this was held a valid defense for the charterer. 2 And, in accordance with this principle, "it is not competent for the purchaser of property which is to be delivered in the future to impose upon the vendor the legal duty to take' such steps with reference to the subject of the contract, as by at once reselling the property on the market on the buyer's account or making a forward contract for the purchase of other property of like amount, to be delivered at the same time, as shall most effectually mitigate the damages to be paid by the buyer in consequence of his refusal, though no loss would thereby result to the vendor." 3 'Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. Ill, s Reid v. Hoskins, 6 E. & B. 953. 112, per Cockburn, C. J. ; Johnstone v. See also, Barrick v. Buba, 2 0. B. (N. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 460: "If S.) 563. the promisee does not elect to treat 3 Sutherland on Damages, §648, cit- the, promisor's announcement of in- ing Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540; tention not to perform as a wrongful Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475; putting an end to the contract, and Ripley v. McClure, 4 Exch. 345; En- treats the contract as still subsisting, dish v. Young, 108 111. 170; Wind- he lets in the promisor to claim the muller n. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674; Stew- benefit of any subsequent contingency art v. Cauty, 8 M. & M r . 160; Boorman under the contract which may prevent v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145; Clements, a breach from arising." The fore- Meserole, 107 Mass. 362; Smith v. going is .x quotation from counsel's Lewis, 24 Conn. 624; Haines v. Tuck- brief, approved by the court. er, 50 N. H. 307. "The original con- § 415 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 499 i § 415. Notice retracted. — A refusal before it operates as air anticipatory breach may be retracted ; but such refusal un- retracted, down to and inclusive of the time when the promisee is bound to perform a condition, is evidence of a continuing refusal and a waiver of any conditions precedent. Thus, when there is an executory contract for the manufacture and supply of goods from time to time, to be paid for after delivery, if the purchaser, having accepted and paid for a portion of the goods contracted for, gives notice to the vendor not to manufacture any more as he has no occasion for them and will not accept or pay for them, the vendor may, without manufacturing and tendering the rest of the goods, maintain an action against the purchaser for breach of contract. 1 Where a buyer wrote to the seller, that unless he sent word at once (being before the time performance was due) that he intended to keep his contract he would purchase elsewhere, and later wrote again that he had bought, and on the day fixed for delivery the buyer demanded delivery, it was held that as the seller had not acted on the communications of the buyer, he was bound to deliver the oil. 2 And where the act of the party in renouncing a contract is relied on to excuse the perform- ance of conditions precedent, it must be the proximate and not the remote cause of the failure to perform, and be of such a character as to induce the belief that performance was waived, or if attempted would not be accepted. 3 Thus, in a sale of bonds, the mere fact that the vendor denied having made the contract and refused to deliver the bonds, was held no such evidence of an intention to break the contract as released the buyer from a tender of payment when the day for performance arrived ; 4 it seems that one party has no right to tract was in no way modified by the 530; Southwestern Stage Co. v. Peck, notice, and the plaintiffs were not 17 Kan. 271 ; Davis Sewing Machine bound then to sell in order to reduce Co. v. McGinnis, 45 Iowa, 538. the damages." Lord Abinger, C. B., 2 Westlake v. Bostwick, 35 N. Y. in Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. Super. Ct. 256. 474 476. 3 Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Bledsoe, 1 Cort v. Ambergate It. Co., 17 Q. B. 52 Ala. 538. 127; Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 4 Mowry v. Kirk, 19 Ohio St. 375. 500 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 416 exact from the other, before performance is due, a declaration, either formal or informal, that he expects to keep his contract. 1 § 416. Further illustrations. — A contract payable "in trade, ' ' without time or place for a payment, is payable on demand, or within a reasonable time, and at the residence or place of busi- ness of the promisor; and, before the promisee is entitled to a money judgment against the promisor for non-performance, he must show a demand on his part and a refusal upon the part of the other. 2 Thus, where the owner of a stallion agreed to allow him to serve a mare, it was held that it was the duty of the owner of the mare to take her to the stallion within a reason- able time, and a failure to do this precluded an action against the owner of the stallion, although he had notified the mare's owner that he would not allow the stallion to serve. 8 Where a contract provides a penalty for the failure to do an act, the failure to do the act is not a breach; it merely liquidates the penalty. 4 Where one covenanted not "to engage, directly or indirectly, or concern himself in carrying on or conducting the ice business, either as principal or agent, within ten miles" of a certain place, his riding upon an ice cart, deliv- ering ice for a rival dealer, is a breach thereof. 5 A contract to pay a certain sum upon the receipt of specified funds is not broken by a failure to pay upon the receipt of a part of the funds. 6 That can not constitute a breach which can not be prevented by the promisor. Thus, an agreement not to ap- point any other agent to sell goods in a locality is not broken 'Ripley v. McClure, 4 Ex. 345. 4 Ehrlich v. ..Etna Ins. Co., 103 Mo. See also, Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. St. 231 ; 15 S. W. Rep. 530, where an in- 541 ; Coffin v. Reynolds, 21 Minn. 456 ; surance agent agreed to furnish the Pennell v. Mayor, etc, 14 N. Y. Supl. company with a certain amount of in- 376 ; Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Texas, 383. surance each year, and in case of fail- 2 Schriner v. Peters, 39 111. App. ure to obtain that amount he was to 309; Rice v. Churchill, 2 Denio, 145; pay a certain sum; it was held to he Lobdell v. Hopkins, 5 Cowen 516; no breach authorizing his discharge, Vance v. Bloomer, 20 Wend. 196; because of his failure to obtain the Woods v. Dial, 12 111. 72; Wehrli v. requisite amount. Rehwoldt, 107 111. 60. 6 Babcocku. Clear, 17 N.Y. Supl. 664. 3 Schriner v. Peters, 39 111. App. 6 Fox v. Walker, 62 N. H. 419. 309. § 417 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 501 by a sale by persons without authority. 1 But if the agreement contains an express or implied term to prevent such sales, then the fact of the sales being unauthorized does not pre- vent them from constituting a breach.' § 417. Scienter. — Where, in an action on a contract for put- ting parquet floorings in defendant's house, the work to be ' 'first- class," the evidence showed that first-class work required the blocks to be so seasoned and so well laid that there would be no space between them; that after being laid the blocks shrank, and plaintiff repeatedly repaired the work; and that, after it was repaired, defendant expressed satisfaction with the work, but the blocks again shrank, it was held that a nonsuit was proper, although plaintiff gave evidence that the floors were of the best material and workmanship. 5 And where defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff a show case and shelving with which to conduct a stationery business in defendant's jewelry store for five years, but after two years removed his business, and leased one part of the store for a dyeing establishment and the other for a second-hand clothing store, putting a partition through the middle, it was a question for the jury whether the contract was violated. 4 An Illinois corporation having a con- 1 Doctor Harter Co. v. Hopkins, 83 the record any evidence that the Wis. 309. plaintiffs substantially performed their 2 Doctor Harter Medicine Co. v. Hop- contract, and we think the motion for kins, 83 Wis. 309. See the following nonsuit on that ground should have cases for discussion of what will con- been granted. The plaintiffs gave stitute breach : Gray v. Journal Pub. evidence that the floors were of the Co., 21N.Y. Supl.967; Fairbrotherw. best materials and workmanship. This England, 40 Wkly. Rep. 220; Teall v. does not meet the specific and uncon- Consolidated Co., 119 N. Y. 654; tradicted evidence as to shrinkage, Vance v. Hartzell (Tex. App.), 18 and the acts of the plaintiffs in relay- S. W. Rep. 88; Widiman v. Brown, ing and repairing them show that the 83 Mich. 241 ; Bates v. Herrick, 82 general statements were not intended Mich. 295 ; Stewart v. Huntington, 124 to cover this defect." N. Y. 127; McDonald v. Liggett, 146 4 Dickinson o. Hart (1894), 142 N.Y. Pa. St. 460; 23 Atl. Rep. 338; Rigdon 183; 36 N. E. Rep. 801. "The de- v. Conley, 141 111. 565; 30 N. E. Rep. fendant could not, after the plaintiff 1060' Swallow v. Bain (N. M.), entered upon his business in the store, 32 Pac. Rep. 501. so change the character of the business 3 Boughton v. Smith (1894), 142 to be carried on there, and the ar- N. Y. 674; 37 N. E. Rep. 470, per rangements of the store, as to make it Andrews C. J. "We fail to find in wholly unfit and unsuitable for the 502 BREACH OF CONTRACT. §418 tract right to be furnished by a Pennsylvania corporation with patented lamps to be sold by it, exclusively, within a prescribed territory, made a similar contract as to part of its own terri- tory with a local company, and stipulated that it would "not knowingly sell, or permit other parties to sell," lamps for use therein. It was held that the scienter was an essential term of the covenant, and that an assignee of the Illinois company could not be held responsible, in the absence of proof of knowl- edge on the part of itself or its assignor, for sales made within such territory by the Pennsylvania company. 1 § 418. Locatio operis faciendi — Defective performance. — Where materials are furnished by one, and labor is to be per- formed upon it by another, and the identical article produced is to be returned to the employer, who pays a compensation for the labor, the contract is one of bailment, although the manufacturer or workman may have furnished some accessorial material or ornaments. This is the locatio operis faciendi of the civil law. 2 In the case of vendor and vendee under an ex- plaintiff's business. The contract was made, not only in reference to the plaintiff's business, but also to the de- fendant's business. While the de- fendant may not have been obliged to continue the jewelry business, yet he could not so change the internal ar- rangement of the store, and so intro- duce other business therein, as to render impracticable and unprofita- ble, and destroy the plaintiff's busi- ness. We think, upon all the evi- dence, it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the de- fendant, by what he did and said, did not oust the plaintiff from the store, break up his business there, and vio- late the agreement he had made with him.'' 1 Cincinnati, etc., Gas Co. v. Western, etc., Co. (1834), 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 523; 152 U. S. 200, per Brewer, J. "With reference to the sale by the Pennsyl- vania corporation, the stipulation in the contract is that the Chicago com- pany 'will not knowingly sell, or per- mit other parties to sell, for use in said territory, any burners, lamps,' etc. The scienter is an essential term in this covenant. There is no pre- sumption, and no evidence, that the original Chicago corporation or the plaintiff knew what the Pennsylvania company was doing, and, if they did not know of such a sale, the fact that one was made involved no breach of the contract." 2 Story on Bailments, §§ 422, 423; 2 Kent's Commentaries (13th ed.), 588; Foster v. Pettibone, 7 N. Y. 433 ; Mal- lory v. WiHis, 4 N. Y. 76; Pierce v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 28. The title to the completed article generally rests, by accession, in the party who has fur- nished the principal material, in such cases. Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns. 473; Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Maine, 404; Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 ; Beers v. St. John, 16 Conn. 322. § 418 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 503 ecutory contract, on delivery of the goods the title passes con- ditionally only to the vendee. It is necessary to the proper protection of the vendor that the" vendee, if he rejects the goods, and thereby throws them back upon the vendor, should act with reasonable promptness. It would be unjust to permit him to retain the goods after opportunity for inspection, giv- ing no sign, and subsequently claim that they were not accord- ing to the contract. He is bound to express his dissent, and thus enable the vendor to protect his interests. The reason upon which the doctrine governing executory contracts for the sale of chattels subsequently delivered rests is inapplicable to contracts for the manufacture of articles from materials fur- nished to the manufacturer by the other party to the contract. The title to the things manufactured is in the owner of the ma- terials, whether they conform to the contract or not. The claim of the other party is for work and labor. The employer may await the presentation of the claim of the other party be- fore acting. His retention of the articles manufactured is the exercise of an absolute right, and he is neither bound to in- spect the articles, nor to notify the other party of his objec- tions. 1 Thus, if cloth be delivered to a tailor to make a coat, and it is delivered to the owner when made, who accepts it, or re- pack v. Snell (1893), 140 N. Y. ant's possession followed the title, and 193; -35 N. E. Rep. 493, Andrews, the plaintiffs in no event were entitled C. J. . "The omission to object may in to have the shears delivered returned many cases be material evidence on to them. The owner of real property, the question of performance, and, in who has employed another to erect a case of continuous deliveries of articles house on his land, does not, by taking manufactured from time to time, the possession of the house and occupying duty to speak after knowing the de- it, preclude himself from denying that fects might arise. But in the present the builder has performed his con- case the findings exclude the infer- tract. Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173. ence of bad faith on the part of the In like manner, the owner of ma- defendant, or that, knowing that the terials, who employs another to manu- shears delivered were defective, he facture them into garments or chat- kept silent,and permitted the plaintiffs tels of any description, does not lose to manufacture the others. The fact his property in the materials, nor is he that the defendant retained the shears precluded by receiving the manufac- delivered, and did not offer to return tured articles from asserting his title them, after he discovered that they thereto, and at the same time resist- were defective, is no answer to the ing a recovery for the value of the defense that the plaintiffs had not per- work on the ground that the work-, iormed their contract. The defend- man had not performed his contract." 504 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 419 tains and uses it for a long time, without any objection or claim of defective workmanship, he can not be heard to claim, when sued for the price of the work, that it was not done according to agreement; and it would not strengthen such a claim to call the workman's agreement to make the coat according to a cer- tain style or pattern a warranty that survived acceptance. In such cases, acceptance, or omission to object within a reason- able time after delivery or opportunity for examination, oper- ates to extinguish all claims for breach of the contract. 1 § 419. Seller's breach — Buyer's remedy. — In an executory contract for the sale of goods, in the absence of fraud or war- ranty, the right of the vendee to claim damages, set up as a defense to an action for the purchase price, or by way of coun- ter-claim, does not survive a delivery of the goods by the seller and an acceptance by the purchaser. The retention of the property by the purchaser without objection is an admission on his part that the contract has been performed. Of course he is not bound to receive or pay for an article he has not purchased, but he is bound to ascertain, when it is delivered to him, whether or not it is what he wants, or whether it con- forms to the contract; and, if it does not, he must either return it to the vendor, or give him notice to take it back, or he will be presumed to have acquiesced in its quality. He can not accept the delivery of property under the contract, retain it after examination, or full opportunity for examination, as to its quality, and afterwards be heard to urge, as a defense to the purchase price, or in support of a claim for damage, that the quality was inferior to that specified in the contract. 2 Where there is an express warranty, that survives the acceptance, and the purchaser may subsequently sue on it, if the price of the goods has been paid, or defend in suit for the price. 3 'Spraguev. Blake, 20Wend.61; Cop- 749; Norton v. Dreyfuss, 106 N. Y. 90; lay Iron Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232 ; 15 12 N. E. Rep. 428. N. E. Rep. 335 ; Brown v. Poster, 108 2 Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358. N. Y. 387; 15 N. E. Rep. 608; Studer a Zabriskie v. Central, etc., Railroad v. Bleiatein, 115 N. Y. 316; 22 N. E. Co., 131 N. Y. 72; 29 N. E. Rep. Rep. 243 ; Pierson «. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 1006 ; Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metz- 539; 22 N. E. Rep. 349; Mason v. ger, 118 N. Y. 260; 23 N. E. Rep. Smith, 130 N. Y. 474; 29 N. E. Rep. 372; Brigg v. Hilton, 99 N. Y. 517 ; 3 §420 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 505 § 420. Loss of profits as damages for breach. — An inad- vertent sale of a patented article in territory for which the seller has granted an exclusive right to another renders him liable only for actual damages, represented by the profits actually realized, and not for profits which the grantee would have realized if he himself had made the sale, at the higher prices established by him ; especially when there is evidence that he could not have effected such a sale. 1 The profits which would have been realized had the contract been performed, and which have been prevented by its breach, are included in the damages to be recovered in every case where such profits are not open to the objection of uncertainty or of remoteness, or where, from the express or implied terms of the contract itself, or the special circumstances under which it was made, it may be reasonably presumed that they were within the intent and mutual understanding of both parties at the time it was entered into. 2 The grounds upon which the general N. E. Rep, 51; Norton v. Dreyfuss, 106 N. Y. 90; 12 N. E. Rep. 424. 1 Cincinnati, etc., Gas Co. v. West- ern, etc., Co. (1894), 152 U. S. 200; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 523, per Brewer, J. : "It is against all the rules in respect to damages for a breach of contract to give to the defendant the profits of a sale which it did not make, and which there is no reason to believe it ever would have made. (There is no pre- tense of any wanton and willful breach by the plaintiff ; nothing that suggests punitive damages, or that shows wherein the defendant was damnified, other than by the loss of the profits which the plaintiff received. Pass beyond f"iat, and there is only a do- main of speculation, — a mere guess as to what might have happened. The case of Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, is in point.) Actual dam- age is what the law gave in case of an infringement (Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64) ; actual damage is all the law gives in case of a breach of con- tract. Indeed, the real difference be- tween that case and this is not so great as would be suggested by a de- scription of the respective causes of action; for here, under the contract made by the plaintiff's assignor with the Cincinnati parties, the defendant became vested with a monopoly of sales within the prescribed territory, of like nature to the monopoly given by the government for the whole ter- ritory of the United States whenever it issues a patent ; and the act of the plaintiff in making a sale within that territory was an infringement similar to that of a sale of a patented article made within the limits of the United States in defiance of the rights of the patentee. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that in the case at bar there is technically a claim for a breach of a contract, and it is undeniable that in some cases the profits that would have been made are proper elements of damage in such an action." 2 United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 338, 345, 347 ; 4 Sup. Ct. 81 ; Western, etc., Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444, 454, 456; 8 Sup. Ct. 577. 506 BREACH OF CONTRACT. § 421 rule of excluding profits in estimating damages rests are ( 1 ) that in the greater number of cases such expected profits are too dependent upon numerous, uncertain, and changing con- tingencies to constitute a definite and trustworthy measure of actual damages; (2) that such loss of profits is ordinarily remote, and not, as a matter of course, the direct and imme- diate result of the nonfulfillment of the contract; and (3) that most frequently the engagement to pay such loss of profits in case of default in the performance is not a part of the contract itself, nor can it be implied from its nature and terms. 1 When an entire contract to lumber several tracts of land is broken by the owner's sale of the one tract out of which the contractors expected to make their profit, they are not obliged to finish the other tracts in order to maintain a suit on the contract, or to recover merely for money expended and the value of work done, but they may abandon, and recover, as dam- ages for the breach, the profits they would have made on the whole job ; since the profits that would have been made on an abandoned lumbering contract are ascertainable, and not specu- lative. 2 § 421. Partial or entire breach — Profits as damages. — Where a contract for railroad construction provides for payment in installments as the work progresses, a failure to pay an install- ment when due is not such a breach of the entire contract as to authorize the contractor to refuse to proceed further and to sue to recover the profits which he would have earned had the con- tract been fully performed. In such case, the contractor may 1 Howard v. Stillwell Manufacturing burn v. Comstock, 80 Mich. 448 ; 45 Co., 139 U. S. 199; 11 Sup. Ct. 500; N. W. Rep. 378, it was held, in a suit Sedgwick on Damages (7th ed.), p. for breach of a logging contract by 108; The Lively, 1 Gall. 315, 325, Fed. being prevented from cutting and re- Cas. No. 8,403, per Mr. Justice Story ; moving the timber, that the difference The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327; The between the cost of said cutting and Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; La removal and the contract price was the Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheat. 385 ; Smith proper measure of damages. These v. Condry, 1 How. 28; Parish v. United damages are not speculative, but are States, 100 U. S. 500, 507; Bulkley v. capable of ascertainment. Leonard v. United States, 19 Wall. 37. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312; 36 N. W. Rep. 2 Lee v. Briggs 99 Mich. 487; 58 N. 88; Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276; W. Rep. 477, per Long, ,T. : "In Ray- 29 N. W. Rep. 711." § 421 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 507 at once rescind and recover for what he has done, or proceed with performance and sue to recover the past due install- ment. 1 And if an action is brought by the contractor before completion of the contract by him, to authorize a recovery of prospective profits, a willingness on his part to complete the work, and defendant's refusal to be further bound by the con- tract, must appear. 2 Where, by the terms of a contract of sale, the property is to be delivered in specified portions, from time to time, the purchaser to give his notes for each portion delivered, and, before completion of the contract, he refuses to give notes demandable for deliveries made, and also refuses to give notes for future deliveries, or to be further bound by the terms of the contract, this constitutes a breach of the entire contract, and gives a present right of action to recover dam- ages for the breach The vendor is not required to wait until the expiration of the terms of credit for the goods delivered in order to recover therefor, nor is he required to make further deliveries." 'Wharton v. Winch (1893), 140 muller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674; Ferria N. Y. 287 ; 35 N. E. Rep. 589. v. Spooner, 102 N. Y. 10; Freer v. 2 Wharton v. Winch, 140 N. Y. 287. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492, 496; Howard v. 'Nichols u. Scranton Steel Co. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 374; Burtis v. (1893), 137 N. Y. 471, and see Wind- Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246. CHAPTER XII. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 422. Accord and satisfaction de- §441. fined. 442. 423. The subject illustrated. 443. 424. Further illustrations. 444. 425. The same subject continued. 445. 426. Accord supported by a con- 446. sideration. 447. 427. Contracts under seal. 448. 428. The same subject continued. 429. Subject-matter of an accord. 449. 430. The same subject continued. 431. Payment of less sum than due. 450. 432. Compromises. 433. The same subject continued. 451. 434. As to unliquidated demands. 435. The same subject continued. 452, 436. Illegal claims. 453. 437. Accord executory. 438. The same subject continued. 454. 439. Further illustrations. 440. Accord without satisfaction. 455. New promise. The same subject continued. Composition with creditors. The same subject continued. Liability of third party. The same subject continued. Further illustrations. Settlement by third person- New consideration. Accord and satisfaction by a joint creditor. Accord and satisfaction with a joint debtor. Reserving rights against co- debtors. Co-tort-feasors. Accord and satisfaction by a stranger. Rescinding accord for mistake or fraud. Pleading. § 422. Accord and satisfaction defined. — An accord, in the case of contracts, is an agreement whereby one party consents to accept some other thing in lieu of that which is contracted or promised to be done by the other party, and when this agreement is performed, it constitutes what is technically called accord and satisfaction. 1 "By the accord, the parties agree upon a sum of money or other matter to be given and accepted as compensation for the breach, instead of the legal remedy provided by process of law; and by the execution of 'Kramer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574, 1 Ld. Ray. 122; Lynn v. Bruce, 2 H. 576; 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, Bl. 317; Peytoe's Case, 9 Coke, 78; 15; Bacon's Abridgment, tit. Accord Goodrich v. Stanley, 24 Conn. 613t and Satisfaction ; Cock v. Hony- Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574 ; Way church, T. Ray. 203; Allen v. Harris, v. Russell, 33 Fed. Rep. 5. (508) § 423 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 509 the accord, that is, by the actual delivery and acceptance of the matter agreed upon, the right of action is satisfied and dis- charged." 1 § 423. The subject illustrated. — In a case where the defend- ants mailed plaintiff a check for a less amount than he claimed, and in the letter said : "We claim this to be in full settlement of account, but admit that you do not allow the claim," and the plaintiff retained the check, and gave defendants credit for the amount, it was held that the retention of the check did not operate as an accord and satisfaction. 2 So also, where the defendant, being indebted to plaintiffs in a certain sum, sent them a check for part thereof, with a letter saying: "It is understood' that I am retaining the following moneys under the following conditions," specifying the sums and the condi- tions, there being no dispute as to the amounts, and the items named in the paper were not in any way connected, it was held that the acceptance of the check with such a letter did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. 8 To constitute an accord 1 Leake on Contracts, 876. See also, Pulliam v. Taylor, 50 Miss. 251. > Van Dyke b. Wilder, 66 Vt. 579; 29 Atl. Rep. 1016, per Thompson, J.: "The defendants contend that the re- tention of the 1609.55 by the plaintiff, under these circumstances, operates as an accord and satisfaction. The referee does not find that the check was accepted by the plaintiff in satis- faction, or that it was in fact offered as an accord. This was a question of fact for the referee to determine. Miller v. Holden, 18 Vt. 337. Do the facts reported by him constitute, in law, an accord and satisfaction? The answer to this question depends upon the construction put upon the letter of defendants. There was no declara- tion in the defendants' letter that, if the plaintiff took and retained the $609.55, it must be taken in full satis- faction of his claim. On the con- trary, it in effect informed him that the defendants did not understand it was to have such an effect, and that he could take it without such taking operating as an admission on his part that it was in full satisfaction of his claim, or precluding him from any of his rights in the premises. This is the fair construction of the letter it- self, and, were it ambiguous, it must receive this construction, in view of what occurred in respect to a payment before the letter was sent. We there- fore hold there was no accord and satisfaction." 3 Pennell v. Bucki (1894), 84 Hun, 432; 32 N. Y. Supl. 407, per Brown, P. J. : " It is the defendant's contention that this paper and the acceptance of the check constituted a compromise of disputed claims, and that it is a bar to the prosecution of this action. We can not concur in that view of the testi- mony. The amount paid to the plaint- iffs did not represent a compromise of any kind. Defendant was indebted to them in the sum of $5,192.50, and 510 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 423 and satisfaction, it is necessary that the money should be offered in satisfaction of the claim, and be accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the money is accepted it is to be accepted in satisfaction, and such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand there- from that if he takes it he takes it subject to such condition. 1 But where the defendant contended that a claim made against him by plaintiff had been paid, but he finally sent plaintiff a check for part of the amount, stating therein that it was in "full settlement" of the claim, and at the same time wrote plaintiff that he sent the check because he could not spare the time to hunt up proofs of payment, and that he would "expect in return a receipt in full," and plaintiff retained the check, and sued on the balance of his claim, it was held that the acceptance and collection of the check was an accord and satisfaction. 2 A receipt in full is not an accord and satisfaction merely because it purports to be in full payment of the claim in issue.' he claimed that they were liable to him in the sum of $3,901.40. There was no dispute about the difference between these two amounts. That was due to the plaintiffs in any event, and its payment could not constitute a, consideration for an agreement by which the plaintiffs surrendered the right to the payment of the balance. The items named in the paper are not connected together, either in the pa- per itself or by the oral testimony. Each stands upon its own facts. The paper is evidence of an agreement only, and the utmost effect that can be claimed for it is that it tends to corroborate the defendant's testimony that an agreement was entered into with reference to the items named in it, by which plaintiffs surrendered the right to present payment upon condi- tions which, at the time of the com- mencement of this action, had not been fulfilled.'-' 1 Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt. 201. To the same effect are Towslee v. Healey, 39 Vt. 522, and Boston Rubber Co. v. Peerless Wringer Co., 58 Vt. 551; 5 Atl. Rep. 407; Brigham v. Dana, 29 Vt. 1 ; Gassett v. Andover, 21 Vt. 342. 2 Brown v. Symes (1894), 31 N. Y. Supl. 629, per Dykman, J. : "The ac- ceptance of the check under the cir- cumstances stated, and the collection and retention of the money, consti- tuted an accord and satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231; 33 N. E. Rep. 1034." In Field v. Aldrich, 162 Mass. 587 ; 39 N. E. Rep. 288, A. being indebted to F., they agreed to form a corporation, one-fourth of the stock to be trans- ferred to F. in trust to dispose of it, and apply the proceeds in payment of the debt, the balance of the proceeds and all stock remaining after the debt was paid to be equally divided be- tween them ; F. was unable to sell any of the stock ; it was held, that the agreement was not an accord and satisfaction of the debt. 3 Ahrens v. United Growers' Co. (1895), 31 N. Y. Supl. 997. § 424 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 511 § 424. Further illustrations. — An agreement to accept less than the face amount of a note is not good as an accord and satisfaction. 1 In a suit upon a note the answer alleged that, under an agreement between the payee and the defendant, whereby the defendant was to employ the payee at a stipulated salary, and to pay him at the close of his term of service, in full satisfaction of the note, a sum less than the amount due, the defendant had so employed the payee ata;salary larger than his work was worth, and had tendered him the agreed sum in payment of the note when he quit work, and had since paid him more than the amount due on the note, and it was not alleged that this last amount was paid or accepted in discharge of the note, nor that the agreement to accept less than the amount due on the note was made in consideration of the contract of employment, it was held that this was not a good plea of accord and satisfaction. 2 Where a draft for part of an indebt- 1 Swope a.Bier, 10 Ind. App. 613 ; 38 N. E. Rep. 340, per Davis, J. : "The facts do not constitute a good accord and satisfaction, and can not be pleaded in bar of the right of action on the note. Fletcher v. Wurgler, 97 Ind. 223; Smith v. Tyler, 51 Ind. 512. If it appeared in the reply that there was any additional consideration for the discharge of the debt, the agree- ment would be upheld. It is not al- leged that appellee was the wife of Michael Bier, nor that she signed the note as surety. Neither is any other reason given to excuse payment of full debt by her." 2 Sheets v. Russell, 12 Ind. App. 677 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 30, where Davis, J., cited and relied upon Swope v. Bier, 10 Ind. App. 613 ; and Renihan u.Wright, 125 Ind. 536. In Pottlitzer v. Wesson, 8 Ind. App. 472 ; 35 N. E. Rep. 1030, plaintiff having notified defendant that the goods shipped him were as ordered and that he should hold him for the full price, defendant, three weeks later, sent plaintiff a check "in settlement for" the goods held subject to plaintiff's order, which defendant had sold for his account; inclosed an invoice, show- ing net proceeds to the amount of the check; and trusted that same would prove satisfactory, and "to hear from you again." Plaintiff wrote defendant that he would, place the check to his credit, and had handed the claim to an attorney. To this defend- ant did not reply. It was held, that since defendant had not required ac- ceptance of said check in full, or its return, no accord and satisfaction was made out, in the face of a finding for plaintiff below. Davis, J., said: "In the case of Curran v. Rummell, 118 Mass. 482, a check for a sum less than the debt was sent by the debtor's attorney to the creditor in a letter stating that the check was 'in settle- ment of your account.' The check was received and collected in the or- dinary course of business, but the court held that the creditor was not bound to treat it other than as a part payment by the debtor, to be applied in reduction of the debt only. * * * The case of Hutton v. Stoddart, 83 Ind. 539, cited by appellant's counsel, 512 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 424 edness was sent by letter, both draft and letter stating that it was to be in full payment of the debt, the creditor, by con- verting the draft into money, elects to accept the compromise, and the debt is thereby discharged in full. 1 is entirely unlike this case. In that case the letter containing the check expressly stated that the check was to be returned if not accepted in full satisfaction of the debt. See also, Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231 ; 33 N. E. 1034. In the last case cited the court says : 'To make out the defense, the proof must be clear and equivocal that the observance of the condition was insisted upon, and must not ad- mit of the inference that the debtor intended that his creditor might keep the money tendered in case he did not assent to the condition upon which it was offered.' The case of Hills v. Sommer (Sup.), 6 N. Y. Supl. 469, as stated by counsel for appellants in his brief, is more nearly in point in favor of appellants. In that case it appears that when the dispute arose the plaintiffs drew on defendants for the invoice price, which draft was re- turned with the indorsement: 'Amount incorrect. Will remit.' Then to a letter from plaintiffs, ask- ing what they intended to do, de- fendants inclosed draft for the amount which they stated they would pay for the goods. As applicable to the facts in this case, however, we prefer to follow the principles enunciated in Currant). Rummell, 118 Mass. 482; and Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231." 1 Petit v. Woodlief, 115 N. Car. 120; 20 S. E. Rep. 208, Avery, J.: "Our statute (Code, §575) having been declared constitutional, the offer of a part in satisfaction of the whole, if accepted, discharges a debt as fully and effectually as if the en- tire sum originally due is paid in full. When the amount due is uncer- tain or unliquidated, if an offer in sat- isfaction of the claim is accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that the money shall be accepted only as a payment in full of the claim, and the party to whom the offer is made must of neces- sity understand from its very terms that if he takes the money he takes it subject to such condition, then in law the payment operates to discharge the whole claim. Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt. 201; Towslee v. Healey, 39 Vt. 522; Boston Rubber Co. v. Peerless Wringer Co., 58 Vt. 551, 5 Atl. 407. Under the construction placed upon our statute, the offer of a less sum than is due, when the amount of the debt is certain, is in effect the same as an offer of a given sum in satisfac- tion of a contingent or unliquidated claim. We can not rely as authority, therefore, upon the earlier cases de- cided by the court, or upon the authorities in other states, where the principle still prevails that an agree- ment to accept a payment of a part of an unconditional claim for a sum cer- tain in satisfaction of the whole is, unless there is an actual release, but a nudum pactum. We must, therefore, be governed by the rule adopted in reference to offers to settle contingent claims, because they are analogous to proposals of compromise of indebt- edness under our statute. The plaint- iff knew from the face of the draft that the defendant intended it to be accepted upon condition that it should discharge the debt, and that the draft itself should be in the nature of a re- ceipt or voucher for the full payment. With that knowledge he chose to use the draft, and take his chances to col- lect more. We think the question of §425 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 513 § 425. The same subject continued. — In an action for breach of warranty in a deed, where the defendant answered, alleging that subsequently to the delivery of the deed the parties entered into an agreement to the effect that defendant place in the hands of a certain person a certain sum, to be paid to plaintiff in sat- isfaction of any damages from a breach of the covenant, and that said sum was placed in the hands of such person, who was advised of the disposition to be made thereof, it was held that it was a good plea of accord and satisfaction. 1 When a settlement is made, and a promissory note is given as a re- sult of the settlement, the giving of the note is prima facie evidence that all matters in difference between the parties at the time of the settlement were settled in the settlement; and intent was no more an open one, for the jury to determine upon the testi- mony, than would be the question of acceptance, where the drawee writes the word 'Accepted' on the back of a bill of exchange, and signs his name under it. There is no difference in principle between the case at bar and that of Boykin v. Buie, 109 N. C. 501 ; 13 S. E. Rep. 879. There the creditor agreed by letter to accept an offer from the debtor of a part in discharge of his whole debt, but when the latter forwarded a check in compliance with the agreement the creditor entered the amount paid as a credit. In our case the defendant sent a draft and a letter, both expressing the condition upon which the draft was to be ac- cepted ; the terms of the proposition being unmistakably,, we think, that the acceptance of the money was an implied assent to the proposal, the legal effect of which was to discharge the whole debt." 1 Reichel v. Jeffrey, 9 Wash. 250; 37 Pac. Rep. 296, per Dunbar, C. J.: "The fact that they agreed upon the person to whom it was to be paid, and that the person agreed upon was in- structed to pay the same to the plain- 33 tiffs in case of a breach, amounts sub- stantially to an allegation of payment to and acceptance by the plaintiffs. No subsequent action by either party remained to be done to perfect the agreement, and the manner and cir- cumstances under which the parties to the agreement placed this money would preclude either of them from denying the execution of the agree- ment ; and as the reply of the plain- tiffs in no way denies this affirmative allegation in the answer, but sub- stantially admits it, the accord and satisfaction stand confessed by the pleadings. This agreement would also be good under the doctrine announced in Hart s.Gould, 62 Mich. 262 ; 28 N.W. Rep. 831, where the doctrine was an- nounced that the law favors settle- ments of disputed matters by the parties without recourse to litigation, and, presuming that in such settle- ments the parties consulted their own interests, will not interfere, except in the case of fraud or mistake; and, where such settlement has been made by way of compromise, it can not be avoided by either party excepting on the grounds of fraud or mistake." 514 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 425 this presumption must prevail until a preponderance of the evidence shows that there were matters in the difference at the time between the parties that were not included in such settle- ment. 1 Where plaintiff's intestate was accidentally killed while in the defendant's employ and defendant paid a certain sum to a relative of decedent in full satisfaction of any claim against defendant on account of such death, and afterwards the rela- tive and the father of decedent took out letters of administra- tion and brought an action against defendant, it was held that the receipt in full before given by the relative to defendant did not operate as an accord and satisfaction and did not estop the plaintiffs from bringing the action. 2 1 Wagner v. Ladd (1893), 38 Neb. 161 ; 56 N. W. Rep. 891, per Maxwell, C. J. : "In McKinster v. Hitchcock, 19 Neb. 100; 26 N. W. Rep. 705, this court held that : 'An account stated is an agreement between persons who have had previous transactions, fixing the amount due in respect to such transactions. As distinguished from a mere admission or acknowledg- ment, it is a new cause of action, it is not a contract upon a new considera- tion, and does not create an estoppel, but establishes, prima facie, the ac- curacy of the items charged without further proof.' In our view, the in- struction comes within the rule there stated, and, as applied to the testimony in the case, is not erroneous. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed." 2 Stuber v. McEntee (1894) , 142 N.Y. 200; 36 N. E. Rep. 878, per O'Brien, J.: "It is only necessary to refer to the two leading cases in this state. Rattoon v. Overacker, 8 Johns. 126; Priest v. Watkins, 2 Hill, 225. These cases hold that when a person as- sumes to collect the assets or credits belonging to the estate of a deceased person, and who subsequently is ap- pointed administrator of the estate, and in that capacity brings an action upon the claim so collected, the prior payment made to him before his ap- pointment is a. defense to the party against whom the claim existed, and who made the payment. For the purpose of protecting parties making payment in good faith to the widow or other person without authority to collect the assets at the time, the let- ters, when subsequently issued to them, are deemed to relate back so as to legalize such payments. But these cases do not hold that a stranger may compromise a claim due to an estate on receiving a part only of what is due, and thereby estop himself in a subsequent suit, in a representative capacity, from collecting the residue. If there is any such rule of law in the administration of the estates of de- ceased persons, it has no application in an action like this for the recovery of unliquidated damages, under a special statute, by the next of kin, re- sulting from a negligent or wrongful act, causing the death of their in- testate. We have no doubt that the defendant was entitled to prove the fact of payment and its application to the expenses of the funeral and burial of the deceased, and to be credited with the same by the jury in making its estimate of the damages which the plaintiff should recover, if any. In this way the principle decided in the §§ 426, 427 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 515 § 426. Accord supported by a consideration. — The fact that the accord is supported by a consideration is not enough of itself either to constitute a new contract, or to do away with the necessity of performance; and likewise reducing the accord to the form of a sealed instrument does not change its effect. 1 § 427. Contracts nnder seal. — In England it was questioned in the common law courts whether accord and satisfaction was a good plea to a sealed instrument . If the accord and satisfac- tion was after breach it was a good plea ;" but a satisfaction before breach, not made through the instrumentality of a deed, was a bad plea. 3 This distinction, however, was rejected in equity and an accord and satisfaction before breach was a ground to stay proceedings at law.* It would seem that the cases above referred to is given full effect, but to hold that the receipt operated as an accord and satisfaction would be extending its operation in a manner to accomplish results that can not be sustained by reason or authority." 1 Hosier v. Hursh, 151 Pa. St. 415. "The legal notion of accord is a new agreement on a new consideration to discharge the debtor. And it is not enough that there be a clear agree- ment or accord and a sufficient con- sideration, but the accord must be executed." 2 Smith v. Trowsdale, 3 E. & B. 83. "Spence v. Healey, 8 Exch. 668, holding that a covenant for payment of a sum certain, although the pay- ment does not accrue until after notice given, can not be discharged by parol before breach. The court said: "I am sorry that I am compelled to agree in holding that the plea is bad. It is difficult to see the correctness of the reasons upon which the rule is found- ed." The following cases sustain the proposition that a satisfaction and discharge before breach by parol can not be set up as an answer to an action for the breach of a covenant under seal: Snow v. Franklin, 1 Lutw. 358; Blake's Case, 6 Coke, 44; Alden v. Blague, Cro. Jac. 99; Neal v. Sheaffield, Cro. Jac. 254; Kaye v. Waghorne, 1 Taunt. 428 ; Covill v. Gef- fery, 2 Roll. Rep. 96; Mayor of Ber- wick v. Oswald, 1 E. & B. 295. 4 Steeds v. Steeds, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 537, where the court said : "It is clear that at law accord and satisfaction of a debt due upon a bond is no bar to the action. This is, however, purely the result of a technicality absolutely devoid of any particle of merits or justice, viz. : that a contract under seal can not be got rid of except by per- formance or by a contract also under seal; so that supposing it had really been the case that in satisfaction of an overdue bond for £1,000 the per- son liable had given property worth £2,000, which had been accepted in discharge of the obligation, still at law the obligee of the bond might re- cover his £1,000 without returning the property." See also, "Webb v. Hewitt, 3 K. & J. 438; Taylor v. Manners, L. R. 1 Ch. 48; Yeomans v. Williams, L. R. 1 Eq. 184; Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675; Cross v. Sprigg, 6 Hare, 552. 516 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 428 common law went to the extreme that a debt in a sum cer- tain covenanted to be paid presently could not in any wise be gotten rid of by an accord and satisfaction. 1 § 428. The same subject continued. — The technical distinc- tion between a satisfaction before and after breach seems to be generally disregarded in this country, and a new agreement by parol, followed by actual performance of the substituted agree- ment, whether made and executed before or after breach, is treated as a good accord and satisfaction of the covenant. And likewise a new agreement by parol, although without perform- ance, if based on a good consideration, will be a satisfaction, if accepted as such. 2 In North Carolina the distinction is 1 Blake's Case, 6 Coke, 44 ; Massey v. Johnson, 1 Exch. 241. 2 McCreery v.' Day, 119 N. Y. 1, where the court said : "The plaintiffs make a point, founded on the doctrine of the common law, that a contract under seal can not be dissolved by a new parol executory agreement, al- though supported by a good and val- uable consideration, 'for every con- tract or agreement ought to be dis- solved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed.' The application of this rule often produced great in- convenience and injustice, and the rule itself has_ been overlaid with dis- tinctions invented by the judges of the common law courts to escape or mitigate its rigor in particular cases. But in equity the form of the new agreement is not regarded, and under the recent blending of the jurisdiction of law and equity, and the right given by the modern rules of procedure in this country and in England to inter- pose equitable defenses in legal ac- tions, the common law rule has lost much of its former importance. * * * * Courts of equity often interfered by injunction to restrain proceedings at law to enforce judgments, cove- nants or obligations equitably dis- charged by transactions of which courts of law had no cognizance. It is a necessary consequence of our changed system of procedure, that whatever formerly would have con- stituted a good ground in equity for restraining the enforcement of a cov- enant or decreeing its discharge will now constitute a good equitable de- fense to an action on the covenant it- self. It was one of the subtle distinc- tions of the common law as to the dis- charge of covenants by matter inpais, that although a specialty before breach could not be discharged by a parol agreement, although founded on a good consideration, nor even by an accord and satisfaction, yet after breach the damages, if unliquidated, could be discharged by an executed parol agreement, because, as was said, in the latter case the cause of action is founded not merely on the deed, but on the deed and the subsequent wrong. The absurd results to which the common law doctrine sometimes led is illustrated by the case of Spence v. Healey, 8 Exch. 668, in which it was held that a plea to an action on cov- enant for the payment of a sum cer- tain, that before breach defendant satisfied the covenant by the delivery to and acceptance by the plaintiff, of goods, machinery, etc., in satisfaction, §§ 429, 430 accord and satisfaction. 517 taken that while generally accord and satisfaction before breach is no defense, yet where the covenant sounds altogether in damages, although secured by a penalty, accord and satis- faction in parol is a good defense. 1 § 429. Subject-matter of an accord. — Anything may consti- tute the subject-matter of an accord and satisfaction; but it must be advantageous to the party and of some value. 2 Thus, a mere acknowledgment of satisfaction is not sufficient to sus- tain the plea of accord and satisfaction, as in the case of an action of trespass for taking cattle, a plea that the owner ex- pressed himself satisfied because he received back his cattle again was held demurrable. 3 And the accord must refer to the present or future. In other words, the agreement of accord must take place antecedently to, or at the time of, the act of satisfaction. Accordingly, a prior delivery of goods can not be pleaded as an accord. 4 § 430. The same subject continued. — The acceptance of a collateral thing, without regard to its value, is a good accord and satisfaction ; and the promissory note of the debtor is such collateral thing. 5 Thus, where the holder of a promissory note surrenders it to the maker, and takes one of less amount in satisfaction, it is a full discharge, and no action can be was bad, Martin B., saying, 'I am bert, 3 Johns. 528; Lattimore v. Har- sbrry I am compelled to agree in hold- sen, 14 Johns- 330 ; Dearborn v. Cross ing that the plea is bad. It is dim- 7 Cow. 48; Allen v. Jaquish, 21 Wend cult to see the correctness of the 628; Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574 reason upon which the rule is found- Rutland's Case, 5 Coke, 26 ; Cabe v ed.' I suppose there can be no doubt Jameson, 10 Ired. Law (N. C.) 193 that the facts presented by the plea Garveya. Jarvis 54 Barb. 179; Mitchell in the case of Spence v. Healey would v. Hawley, 4 Denio, 414; and Esmond have constituted a good ground for re- v. Van Benschoten, 12 Barb. 376, lief in equity. The technical distinc- holding that a judgment can not be tion between a satisfaction before or discharged by accord and satisfaction, after breach seems to have been dis- 'Davis v. Noaks, 3 J. J. Marsh, regarded in this state, and a new (Ky.) 494, 497; Logan v. Austin, agreement by parol, followed by act- 1 Stew. (Ala.) 476. ual performance of the substituted 2 Keeler v. Neal, 2 Watts (Pa.), 424. agreement, whether made and exe- 3 Stead v. Poyer, 1 C. B. 782. cuted before or after breach, is treated 4 Tucker v. Murray, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. as a good accord and satisfaction of 497. covenant." See also, Fleming v. Gil- 6 Draper v. Hitt, 43 Vt. 439. 518 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 430 maintained for the unpaid portion. 1 But if the note is not delivered up, it is not extinguished by a less payment agreed to be accepted in full. 2 A mere proposal to give a note, al- though money is paid to cover part of the proposed note, is no accord and satisfaction. 3 Where a creditor held a note against copartners, and it was agreed by all that, in consid- eration of the transfer, by one partner to the others, of all his interest in the partnership property, the latter would pay the note, this was held a valid accord and satisfaction. 4 Ordina- rily, there is no presumption that the cashing of a check sent in payment is a consent to its being in full, 5 and the accept- ance in silence of a sum of money, declared to be all that was due, is no accord and satisfaction, where the creditor needed the money, and was afraid that a receipt in full would be de- manded. 6 The fact that the debtor is insolvent, and the creditor thinks he will lose all unless he accepts part, is not such consid- eration as will uphold an accord. 7 There may be an accord and satisfaction of a right of action for usury paid, even though the sum advanced on such an agreement be less than the usury received. The agreeing not to bid on property sold at auction is a good accord and satisfaction of a debt; 8 and any claim which can be urged under color of right may either form the subject-matter of an accord and its foregoing, the satisfac- tion, or it may itself constitute a good consideration to uphold an accord. 9 1 Pearson v. Thomason, 15 Ala. 700. Twitchell v. Shaw, 10 Cush. 46; Bradt 2 Rising v. Cummings, 47 Vt. 345. v. Scott, 63 Hun, 632 ; People v. Board, 8 Rusk v. Gray, 83 Ind. 589. 63 Hun, 625 ; Loan.etc, Bank B.Miller, 'Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 65 Hun, 39 S. C. 175; 17 S. E. Rep. 592; Edg- 491 ; Looby v. West Troy, 24 Hun, combe v. Rodd, 5 East, 294 ; Mitchell 78; Hills v. Sommer, 53 Hun, 392; v. Knight, 7 Ohio Ct. Ct. 204; Looby McKeen v. Morse, 1 TJ. S. App. 7. v . West Troy, 24 Hun, 78; Hayes v. 6 Sicotte v. Barber, 83 Wis. 431. See Davidson, 70 N. C. 573 ; Mains v. Min- also, Hills v. Sommer, 53 Hun, 392. tie, 86 Iowa, 742; 53 N. W. Rep. 256; 6 Vance v. Lukenbill, 9 B. Mon. 249. Hanselman v. Doyle, 90 Mich. 142; 7 Rogers v. Ball, 54 Geo. 15. 51 N. W. Rep. 195 ; Gordon v. Mitchell, 8 Jones v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 9. 68 Geo. 11 ; Strong v. Comer, 48 Minn. 'Wilder v. St. Johnsbury Railroad 66; 50 N. W. Rep. 936; Clifton v. Co., 65 Vt. 43; 25 Atl. Rep. 896; Litchfield, 106 Mass. 34; Richelieu Weber v. Couch, 134 Mass. 26; Brooks Hotel Co. v. International, etc., Co., v. Moore, 67 Barb. 393. See further, 41 111. App. 268. §431 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 519 § 431. Payment of less sum than due. — A parol agreement by a creditor to accept from his debtor less than is due, by way of compromise, is nudum pactum and void, and can not be set up in bar as accord and satisfaction. 1 The steadfast adhesion to this doctrine by the courts, in spite of a current of condemnation by individual judges, and in the face of the demands and conveniences of business, demonstrates the force of the doctrine of stare decisis, and the doctrine is further il- lustrated by the course of judicial decision upon this subject; for, although the courts still hold to the doctrine, they have seemed to seize with avidity upon any consideration to support the agreement to accept the lesser sum in satisfaction of the larger, or, in other words, to extract, if possible from the cir- cumstances of each case, a consideration for the new agree- ment, and to substitute the new agreement in place of the old, 'Baird v. United States, 96 TJ. S. 430, where the court said: "It is, no doubt, true that the payment by a debtor of a part of his liquidated debt is not a satisfaction of the whole, un- less made and accepted upon some new consideration." Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, where the court said: "This single question was presented to the English court in 1662, when it was resolved (if not decided) in PinneFs Case, 5 Coke, 117, 'that payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater can not be any satisfaction for the whole,' and that this is so, although it was agreed that such payment should satisfy the whole. This simple question has arisen in the English courts and in the courts of this country in almost numberless instances, and has re- ceived the same solution, notwith- standing the courts, while so ruling, have rarely failed, upon any recur- rence of the question, to criticise and condemn its reasonableness, justice, fairness or honesty. No reputable authority that I have been able to find has, after such unanimous disapproval by all the courts, held otherwise than was held in Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke, 117; and Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426." Foakes v. Beer, L. K. 9 App. Cas. 605 ; Goddard v. O'Brien, L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 37; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 55 Ark. 369 ; Gates v. Steele, 58 Conn. 316; Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Knowlton, 42 Minn. 229; 44N.W. Rep. 2; Helling v. United Order, 29 Mo. App. 309; Commonwealth v. Cummins, 155 Pa. St. 30 ; Tucker v. Murray, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 497; Capital City Ins. Co. v. Detwiler, 23 111. App. 656 ; Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. Law, 358 ; Daniels v. Hatch, 21 N. J. Law, 391 ; Bryan v. Foy, 69 N. C. 45; Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559; Curran v. Rummell, 118 Mass. 482; Mitchells. Sawyer, 71 N. C. 70; Cavaness v. Ross, 33 Ark. 572; Loney v. Bailey, 43 Md. 10, 22; Geiser o. Kershner, 4 Gill & Johns. 305; Hardey v. Coe, 5 Gill, 189; Jones v. Ricketts, 7 Md. 108; Allen v. Roosevelt, 14 Wend. 101; Rose v. Daniels, 8 R. I. 381; Troutman v. Lucas, 63 Geo. 466. 520 AOCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 432 and thus to form, create or sanction a defense to the action brought upon the old agreement. 1 § 432. Compromises. — A compromise of honest differences, whereby a less sum than that claimed has been paid and ac- cepted in full of plaintiff's claim, bars the right of plaintiff to insist upon a recovery of the amount originally claimed by him. 2 But where a claim is undisputed, payment of a part thereof furnishes no consideration for a promise by the creditor to wholly discharge the debtor; and the creditor need not, before bringing suit for the unpaid balance of the claim, tender a return of the part paid on the attempted settlement. 3 a Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164. See Chap. V, supra, where the cases are collected. ' Slade v. Swedeburg El. Co., 39 Neb. 600; 58 N. W. Rep. 191. 8 Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich. 247 ; 58 N. W. Rep. 72, per Montgomery, J.: "This case presents the question of whether the acceptance, by the holder of a promissory note past due, of a less sum than the face of the note, with an agreement to discharge the debt, operates to fully release the debtor. We are constrained to hold that it does not. The debtor, in pay- ing a portion, only, of the debt, when he is bound to pay the whole, fur- nishes no consideration for a promise by the creditor to discharge him, and such payment is treated in law as a pay- ment pro tanto only. See 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1289, and cases cited. See also, Harrison v. Close, 2 Johns. 448 ; Ryan v. "Ward, 48 N. Y. 204; American Bridge Co. v. Mur- phy, 13 Kan. 35; Smith v. Schulen- berg, 34 Wis. 41 ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11 Vt. 60; Bailey v. Day, 26 Maine, 88 ; Bright v. Coffman, 15 Ind. 137; Headley v. Hackley, 50 Mich. 43; 14 N. W. Rep. 693. See also, note to Cumber v. Wane, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 357 (633) et seq. The result is different if payment is made in compromise of a. claim over which there is an honest dispute, or by gener- al composition with creditors, or if the payment be in something other than money. It was contended in the present case that, before suit was brought for the portion remaining un- paid, the plaintiff should have been tendered back the amount received, and thus repudiated the settlement; and defendant's counsel cite Pangborn v. Continental Insurance Co., 67 Mich. 683; 35 N. W. Rep. 814, as sustaining this contention. But in that case the plaintiff 's only ground for setting aside the settlement was that it was effected by fraud. If there had been no fraud, the settlement was admittedly valid, and effectual to discharge the debt. Such was also the case in Jewett v. Petit, i Mich. 508. The settlement, but for the alleged fraud, was good and valid, and it was held that the plaintiff was bound to rescind this transaction before he could treat it as a nullity. But such is not the case here. No fraud was practiced. The defendant has simply failed to pay the amount which he owed, and, under the authorities cited, this was payment pro tanto, leaving the re- mainder unpaid. The defendant, by paying a portion of his indebtedness, has not been induced to part with any money which, by the obligation of his §433 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 521 § 433. The same subject continued. — Where the plaintiff agreed to a settlement of a claim for injuries while in a condi- tion of physical pain which rendered the agreement voidable, and there was no evidence that the agreement was procured by fraud, an acceptance of the amount of such settlement by her attorney with her consent, at a time when she fully understood what she was doing, is a ratification of the settlement. 1 But where an agent who renders services in an endeavor to pur- chase real estate for another accepts payment in full therefor, he can not recover an additional sum, although he was origi- nally entitled to more, and although such services facilitated the subsequent purchase of the property by the principal. 2 contract, he was not bound to pay ; and the payment which he has made is ineffectual to discharge wholly plaintiff's claim, because it was not sufficient in amount, and because the plaintiff's agreement to release the defendant was not upon any valid consideration, and hence the relations of the parties are the same as though such agreement had not been made. We do not overlook the several objec- tions to the proceedings which are taken by defendant's counsel, but there was a finding of law and fact, and a general exception, which, with the error assigned upon such finding, is sufficient to raise the question of whether the findings support the judg- ment. The conclusion of law stated by the trial judge was that 'the parties had a right to compromise the debt, and that the plaintiff had a right to take less than the face of the claim upon condition of a~payment of a part of the same; and, if he did so, that was a sufficient consideration to make the compromise valid and binding.' This conclusion of law was necessary to support the judgment, and, being at variance with the views of this court, as herein expressed, it follows that the judgment below should be reversed." 1 Drohan v. Lake Shore E. Co., 162 Mass. 435; 38 N. E. Rep. 1116, per Lathrop, J. : " When the tender was made of the amount mentioned in the agreement of July 9th, and was re- ceived by her without objection from her or her counsel, we can have no doubt that she adopted and ratified the former agreement. If either of them had any concealed intention to the contrary, it would be bad faith, and could not be shown. Alden v. Thurber, 149 Mass. 271, 275; 21 N. E. Eep. 312. See also, O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461 ; 14 N. E. Eep. 747 ; Eosenberg v. Doe, 146 Mass. 191 ; 15N.E. Eep. 510; Mansfield v. Hodg- don, 147 Mass. 304; 17 N. E. Eep. 544. The verdict ordered for the de- . fendant might well rest upon the ground of ratification." 2 Ford v. Hubinger (1894), 64 Conn. 129; 29 Atl. Eep. 129, per Andrews, C. J.: " If the plaintiff had accept- ed payment in full, that was a bar to his recovering anything more. The receipt of a payment tendered and accepted in full was a discharge of his entire claim. Aborn v. Eathbone, 54 Conn. 444; 8 Atl. Eep. 677; Gates v. Steele, 58 Conn. 316; 20 Atl. 474; Buell v. Flower, 39 Conn. 462 ; Ayer v. Ashmead.,31 Conn. 447; Beam a. Bar- num,21 Conn.200 ; Canfieldo.Eleventh School Dist.., 19 Conn. 529; MoGuire 522 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 434 § 434. As to unliquidated demands. — The New York rule is that where a debtor offers a certain sum of money in full satis- faction of an unliquidated demand and the creditor accepts and retains the money, his claim is canceled and no protest, declaration or denial on his part, so long as the condition is in- sisted on by the debtor, can vary the result. The law favors the adjustment of such controversies without judicial intervention, and will not permit the creditor to accept and retain money which has been tendered by way of compromise and then suc- cessfully litigate with his debtor for the recovery of a greater sum. 1 A similar rule exists in many other states. 2 But where v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co., 156 Mass. 324; 31 N. E. Rep. 3. The request was apparently predicated on the law as laid down in these and other like cases, and it should have been complied with in the very words in which it was made, or in equivalent words. If the de- fendant satisfied the jury that he had made such a payment as he claimed to have made, he was entitled to have them told explicitly what its effect would be on the plaintiff's right to recover. This was not done. The instructions given implied that the payment, although the jury should find that it was made and accepted in full of all claims, would not preclude a further recovery, unless it should also appear that the services which the plaintiff had rendered did not in any way facilitate the subsequent pur- chase of the property. Each time the judge alludes to this payment in the charge he couples it with this condi- tion. It is, perhaps, true that the judge did not get the entire meaning of the request in looking it over. The defendant contended that he had made a payment to the plaintiff in September, 1891, to be in full, and which the plaintiff accepted in full, of all the matters claimed in the ac- tion. If such a payment was made, then the defendant owned all the services which the plaintiff had ren- dered, and might make such use of them as he chose, or as he found ad- vantageous. He might rightfully, and without further liability to the plaint- iff, use such services in facilitating a purchase of the property. If such a payment had been made, then the plaintiff had parted with and the de- fendant had acquired those services, as fully as though the plaintiff had sold to the defendant some tangible thing — as barrels of flour, or tons of coal." 1 Fuller v. Kemp (1893), 138 N. Y. 231. The same principle has been ap- plied on varying facts in Palmerton v. Huxford, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 166; Loo- by v. West Troy, 24 Hun, 78; Hills v. Sommer, 53 Hun, 392. In Baird v. United States, 96U. S. 430, a claimant presented an unliquidated claim for $151,000, which was audited by the ac- counting officers and allowed for $97,- 000. He was informed of this adjust- ment and a draft for the $97,000 paya- ble to his order was sent to him which he received and collected without ob- jection. It was held that his receipt of the money was equivalent to an ac- ceptance of it in satisfaction of the claim. 2 McDaniels v. Lapham, 21 Vt. 222; Preston v. Grant, 34 Vt. 201 ; Towslee v. Healey, 39 Vt. 522 ; Boston Rubber § 435 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 523 the demand is liquidated and the debtor's liability is not in good faith disputed a different rule has been applied. In such cases the acceptance of a less sum than is due will not of itself discharge the debt even if a receipt in full is given. The ele- ment of a consideration is lacking and the debtor's obligation to pay the entire debt is not satisfied. 1 Where sales agents hold a note of a corporation under an agreement that they are to pay themselves from collections which they make and the collections to be applied on the note until it is paid, and they thereafter remit a balance to the corporation after deducting a commission which the corporation notifies them is illegal, the receipt by the corporation of such money in partial payment, together with its statement that such sums would be received on account, do not amount to an accord and satisfaction and do not estop the corporation from recovering the sums with- held by the agents. 2 § 435. The same subject continued. — The mere fact that the creditor receives from the debtor less than the amount of his claim in silence, and with knowledge that the debtor claims to be indebted to him only to the extent of the payment made, does not conclusively and as matter of law establish an accord and satisfaction. 8 Neither will the retention by the creditor of money to which he is entitled absolutely amount to an accord and satisfaction, although tendered or transmitted to him as payment in full. 4 But where a debtor sends a certain sum in full satisfaction of an unliquidated demand, and the creditor Co. v. PeerlessWringer Co., 58 Vt. 551 ; the amount of the indebtedness exists Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Potter v. between a creditor and his debtor, Douglass,44 Conn. 541 ; Beed v. Board- and the debtor tenders to the creditor man, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 441; Donohue the amount which he claims is due on v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 148; condition that the acceptance of it Hilliardu. Noyse, 58 N. H. 312; Brick should discharge the entire demand, v. Plymouth Co., 63 Iowa, 462; Hin- the acceptance will, as a matter of kle v. Minneapolis, etc., B. Co., 31 law, constitute an accord and satis- Minn. 434. faction ; since an acceptance of a con- 1 Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231. ditional tender assents to the condi- 8 Eames Brake Co. v. Prosser (1895), tion. 88 Hun, 343. 4 Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. 8 Perkins v. Headley, 49 Mo. App. Knowlton, 42 Minn. 229; 44 N. W. 656. But where a controversy as to Rep. 2. 524 , ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 436 accepts and retains the money, his claim is canceled, and no protest, declaration or denial on his part, so long as the condi- tion is insisted on by the debtor, can vary the result. 1 In Con- necticut, the payment of a less sum to extinguish a liquidated greater one is an accord and satisfaction if a receipt in full is also given/ The payment at a different place, or before due, will discharge the debt. 8 But the acceptance by a creditor of a dividend, under a voluntary assignment made by a debtor, without the concurrence of his creditor, is no bar to an action for the balance.' When the payment is before the sum is due, in order to constitute a good discharge the whole sum agreed to be paid must be paid; a part payment of the stipulated sum is no defense. 6 § 436. Illegal claims. — An illegal claim can not be the con- sideration of an accord and satisfaction. Thus, if a purchaser of intoxicating liquors sold in violation of law, in settling mutual accounts with the seller, credit him with the price thereof, receiving from him payment of the balance found due after such an allowance, and gives him a receipt in full settlement of the accounts, such payment and receipt do not have the effect of an accord and satisfaction to bar an action to recover the amount so credited. 6 And the reverse of the 1 Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231. In the present case there was no ad- 2 Gates B.Steele, 58 Conn. 316; Buell justment of unliquidated claims or v. Flower, 39 Conn. 462; Ayeri). Ash- compromise of disputed demands on mead, 31 Conn. 447; Beam v. Barnum, either side. Nothing was done ex- 21 Conn. 200; Ahorn v. Rathbone, 54 cept to ascertain and pay the differ- Conn. 444 ; Canfleld v. Eleventh School ence between a larger and smaller ac- District, 19 Conn. 529. count. We can not treat this payment 3 Cavaness v. Ross, 33 Ark. 572. as an accord and satisfaction sufficient " Loney <>. Bailey, 43 Md. 10; Allen to preclude future inquiry into the il- v. Roosevelt, 14 Wend. 101. legality of a part of the items. They 5 Troutman v. Lucas, 63 Ga. 466. were necessarily as well as actually See also, McKenzie v. Culbreth, 66 embraced in the settlement. If a bal- N. C. 534; Bryan v. Foy, 69 N. C. 45; ance had been struck without them, Hayes v. Davidson, 70 N. C. 573 ; there would have been no considera- Mitchell v. Sawyer, 71 N. C. 70. tion to support even an express prom- 6 Walan v. Kerby, 99 Mass. 1, where ise to accept the smaller sum paid in the court said : "The allowance of the full discharge of the larger sum act- illegal items by way of set-off can have ually due. Such an agreement being no greater effect than would have been without consideration as to the ex- given to their actual payment in cash, cess, notwithstanding a receipt in full, §437 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 525 rule is equally true, an illegal accord and satisfaction will not extinguish a claim. As where a contract was made by an aged man with his grandson, that if the latter would aid the grandfather in inducing a young lady to marry him, the latter would deliver to the grandson a note held against him, this was held not to extinguish the note. 1 § 437. Accord executory. — The accord agreement must be fully executed, and the thing to be taken must have been received and accepted in satisfaction, in order to constitute a bar to a recovery. 8 A part performance of an accord, and readiness to perform the rest, is no defense. 8 Colorado adopts the difference could still be recov- ered." Smith v. Grable, 14 Iowa, 429; Donohue v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 148, also holding that when money is paid it is the duty of the party receiving the money to pay attention to what the payer says ; and if the words are so spoken that, with ordinary care, he might have heard them, and, through carelessness or inattention, he fails to do so, he assents to the terms spoken by the payer. Alvord v. Marsh, 12 Allen, 603; Tuttle v. Tuttle 12 Mete. 551; Brooks v. White, 2 Mete. 283; Twitchell v. Shaw, 10 Cush. 46. 1 Johnson v. Hunt, 81 Ky. 321. See also, Cole v. Gibson, 1 Vesey Sen. 503 ; Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vernon, 412. 2 Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber Co., 41 Minn. 548 ; Giboney v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 185; Wilkerson v. Bruce, 37 Mo. App. 156; German Bank v. Mulhall, 8 Mo. App. 558; Shaw v. Burton, 5 Mo. 478; Goff v. Mulholland, 28 Mo. 397; Sanford v. Abrams, 24 Fla. 181 ; Bragg v. Pierce, 53 Me. 65; Brooklyn Bank v. De Grauw, 23 Wend. 342; Piper v. Kingsbury, 48 Vt. 480; Ballard v. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45; Bayley v. Homan, 5 Bing. N. C. 915, where the court said: "It appears by along train of authorities, commencing with that in Dyer, 356, that a plea of accord, to be a good plea, must show an accord which is not executory at a future day, but which ought to be executed, and has been executed, before the action brought. The same law is laid down in Bolle's Abridgment, 129, 'Accord,' 11, 12, 13. Again, inPeytoe's Case, 9 Bep. 78, where it is broadly stated by the court that in an accord, if the thing is to be performed at a day to come, an averment of tender and refusal is not sufficient, with- out actual satisfaction and acceptance. In Allen v. Harris, Ld. Baym. 122, the court says, 'the books are so numerous that an accord ought to be executed, that it is now impossible to overthrow all the books, but if it had been a new point, it might have been worthy of consideration.' * * * We think, if this plea amounted to a plea of an accord executory made upon mutual promises, it must, upon the authori- ties above referred to, be held to be bad." Lynn „. Brace, 2 H. Bl. 317; James v. David, 5 T. B. 141 ; Case v. Barber, Sir T. Jones, 158, where the rule is doubted and it is held that a plea of accord executory is good ; Good v. Cheesman, 2 B. & Ad. 328; Gabriel v. Dresser, 15 C. B.622; Ho- ganv. Burns (Cal.), 33Pac. Bep. 631. s Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa. St. 146, where the court said : "Mere readi. 526 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 438 the rule that if the performance of the accord is prevented by the creditor, he thereby waives its performance ;' and, gener- ally, a tender of performance casts no duty on the creditor of accepting it. 2 No action can be brought on the accord by either party. 3 "The accord is in the nature of a mere negotia- tion or offer which the creditor may refuse or withdraw, and during the pendency of which he may commence an action; and which the debtor may execute or not, as he pleases, nor will an action lie against him for the non-execution. The accord not amounting to a contract, therefore, does not require the forms of a contract ; it may be proved by parol evidence for the purpose of explaining the performance in satisfaction, although it involve matter which, as the subject of an executory contract, would be within the statute of frauds; and as an accord alone without execution does not discharge or affect the right of action, the statute of limitations continues to run from the time the right of action first accrued." 4 § 438. The same subject continued. — There is a distinction between an accord and a condition ; in an accord the debtor engages to do something, but in the case of a condition the creditor may impose it without the debtor engaging to do it. 5 Thus a mortgage given and accepted in satisfaction of a claim on which an action is pending against another person, who is liable as a tort-feasor equally with the mortgagor, constitutes ness to perform the accord, or a ten- 2 Brennan v. Ostrander, 50 N. Y. der of performance, or even a part Super Ct. 426; Kromer v. Heim, 75 performance and readiness to per- N. Y. 574; Noe v. Christie, 51 N. Y. form the rest, will not do. Such 270. is the law between debtor and cred- 3 Brennan v. Ostrander, 50 N. Y. itor." Carter v. Wormald, 1 Ex. 81 ; Super Ct. 426. McKean v. Read, Littell's Select Cases, 4 Leake on Contracts, 879, citing, Re- 395; Flack v. Garland, 8 Md. 188; niger v. Fogassa, Plowden, 1 ; Allen v. Kromer v. Heim, 75 N.Y. 574; Noe t>. Harris, L. Raym. 122; Linn v. Brace, Christie, 51 N. Y. 270; Tilton v. Al- 2 H. Bl. 317; Reeves v. Hearne, 1 M. cott, 16 Barb. 598; Dolsen v. Arnold, & W. 323; Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 10 How. Pr. 528; Russell v. Lytle, 6 M. & W. 596; Massey v Johnson, 1 Wend. 390; Brooklyn Bank v. De Ex. 241; Lavery v. Turley, 6 H. & Grauw, 23 Wend. 342 ; Bragg v. Pierce, N. 239. 53 Maine, 65. 6 Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 108. 'Tucker *. Edwards, 7 Colo. 209; Cary v. Mclntyre, 7 Colo. 173. § 438 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 527 an accord and satisfaction; but if the acceptance of the mort- gage is conditional on an executory agreement which is not complied with, it has no such effect. 1 So also, where a seller of lumber failed to deliver according to contract, it was held that the buyer's agreement to receive other lumber at a different place, and the actual receipt of a part thereof, was no satisfaction. 8 The mere setting apart certain securities and notifying the creditor is no execution of an accord to give security. 8 And it seems that a promise by a third person to pay a debt can not assume the form of accord and satisfaction, unless the debtor is present and assent.* The adjustment of the amount of a claim for fire insurance between the insured and the insurer is a mere accord, not binding on the insured. 5 And the written transfer of a policy of insurance purporting to be for the benefit of certain creditors is not of itself the performance of an ac- cord; there must be evidence of the transfer being accepted as satisfaction by the creditors. 6 So also, an agreement to accept a smaller sum of money in satisfaction sooner than the debt fell due, and a tender of this sum, was held to be no defense. 7 The giving of notes is no satisfaction, even although indorsed by third parties; if the notes are not paid at maturity the debtor can not plead accord and satisfaction. 8 Where the plaintiff made a stipulation stating that he consented to dis- miss his action, and the suit was thereby discontinued, and the cause of action released in consideration of the payment of the costs and seventy dollars to plaintiff's attorney, defendant paid the seventy dollars and tendered the costs, and set up an accord and satisfaction, it was held that this was at most a simple, unexecuted accord, and not a satisfaction. 9 1 Cobb v. Malone, 86 Ala. 571. son v. Detroit, 84 Mich. 658; Holton 2 Gabriel v. Dresser, 15 0. B. 622. v. Noble, 83 Cal. 7. 3 Geary v. Page, 9 Bosw. 290. 5 Giboney v. German Ins. Co., 48 4 Meyer ■„. Stitz, 9 N. Y. Supl. 805 See also, Gifford v. Whittaker, 6 Q. B 249; Baillie v. Moore, 8 Q. B. 489 Allies v. Probyn, 2 C. M. & R. 408 McManus v. Bark, L. R. 5 Ex. 65 Mitchell v. Hawley, 4 Denio, 414 Rising v. Cummings, 47 Vt. 345 Schilling v. Durst, 42 Pa. St. 126 Clark v. Bowen, 22 How. 270; Robin Mo. App. 185; but it is intimated in this case that a tender of the amount found due would be a satisfaction. 6 Wilkerson v. Bruce, 37 Mo. App. 156. 7 Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa. St. 147. 8 Dolsen v. Arnold, 10 How. Pr. 528. 9 Noe v. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270. 528 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. §§ 439, 440 § 439. Further illustrations. — Where a note was given in payment for pianos purchased under a contract by which the purchaser was to be the exclusive sales agent of the payee for a certain period, and, by reason of the revocation of the agency without cause, the buyer had been unable to dispose of the pianos, this was held sufficient to prevent a judgment against the buyer. 1 But where there is merely a claim for unliquidated damages by the buyer against the seller, and an agreement is reached that the seller shall deduct from his claim a certain amount on account thereof, this is a mere unexecuted accord. 2 So, also, the payment of money into court, or the depositing prop- erty with an officer of the law, is no satisfaction. 3 A person being injured in a collision agreed with the company's agent to accept a certain sum in satisfaction. According to the practice of the company a voucher was made out and passed through the various departments, and when it was ready to be paid the party was notified thereof, but he refused to accept. This was held a satisfaction. 4 § 440. Accord without satisfaction. — The fact that a person, injured through the negligence of a city, agreed to accept a certain sum in satisfaction of his claim does not bar his right of action against the city when the city council afterward merely authorized the comptroller to pay him such sum, and he did not accept it, and no tender was made to him. 6 The Mississippi 1 Ludington v. North, 141 Pa. St. ing that, in the latter case there shall 184. be no satisfaction without perform- 2 Heilman v. Lebanon R. Co., 145 ance, while in the former, if the Pa. St. 23; 23 Atl. Rep. 389. promise be not performed, the plaint- 3 Cannon River Co. v. Rogers, 46 iff' s only remedy is by action for the Minn. 376 ; 49 N. W. Rep. 128. breach thereof, and he has no right to 4 Gulf R. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Texas, recur to the original demand.' " 73; 15 S. W. Rep. 556: "The law 6 Rogers v. City of Spokane, 9 "Wash, bearing upon this issue is very clearly 168; 37 Pac. Rep. 300, per Dunbar, stated in Chitty on Contracts : 'Upon C. J.: "Goodrich v. Stanley, 24 the whole, the true distinction would Conn. 613, which is the main case seem to be between the cases in which cited by appellant in his reply brief, the plaintiff has agreed to accept the holds that: 'Where it is claimed that promise of the defendant in satisfac- an agreement, with promises on the tion, and those in which he has agreed one side to pay, and on the other to to accept the performance of such accept payment of, an obligation in a promise in satisfaction ; the rule be- mode other than according to its §440 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 529 rule is that, while a promise to perform may be accepted as satisfaction of an. accord, it will not be so held if the parties contemplated immediate performance, as by payment of the sum agreed. Thus, where plaintiff agrees to accept a sum in compromise of a suit, and gives a receipt therefor as act- ually paid, on defendant's promise to remit, but the defend- ant, who has been garnished in another state in respect to his debt to plaintiff, does not remit, but answers the garnish- ment, admitting an indebtedness, for which judgment is en- tered, there is no satisfaction of the accord, and the right of plaintiff to recover on his original demand is not affected. 1 An accord without satisfaction is not conclusive evidence upon the amount of damages to be recovered in an action; as, tenor, is a satisfaction or extinguish- ment of such obligation, it should ex- plicitly appear that such was the in- tention of the parties. That where the payee of a negotiable promissory note, both before and after its trans- fer, promised the maker that if the latter would continue to labor for him he would apply the amount of such labor in payment of the note ; that in consideration thereof the maker prom- ised to continue so to labor until the note should be fully paid, and the payee agreed to accept the labor in satisfaction of the note, — it was held that this was only an agreement on the part of the payee to accept the la- bor of the maker, and not an agree- ment to accept merely his promise to render it, in satisfaction of such note.' It was further held: 'Where the payee, for a valuable consideration, assigned such note wben overdue, but the labor agreed to be performed in satisfaction of it had not been rendered at the time of the assignment, that said agreement to labor not only con- stituted no satisfaction of the note, but was merely an unexecuted accord, and therefore imposed no legal duty upon the maker, prior to the assign- 34 ment, or consequently upon the as- signee, afterwards, to accept such la- bor, even if it had been tendered.' And the court, after commenting upon cases of this character, proceeds as follows : 'In order that such an ac- cord should be a defense to the original debt, it is necessary, in the language of Park, B., in the case last cited (namely, Evans v. Powis, 1 Ex. 601), that the plaintiff should have 'agreed to accept the agree- ment itself, and not the perform- ance of it, as a satisfaction for his debt, so that if it was not performed his only remedy would be by an ac- tion for the breach of it, and not a right to recur to the original debt.' There must be a valid agreement sub- stituting a new cause of action in place of the old. It is not sufficient that there is a mere accord between the same parties, with mutual prom- ises, but there must be a new agree- ment, with a new consideration." See also, Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561. 'Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Fulton (1893), 71 Miss. 385; 14 So. Rep. 271; Whit- ney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 551. 530 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 441 where the decedent agreed to take a certain sum in satisfaction of damages sustained by the illegal sale of liquor. 1 Where the plaintiff, the holder of notes, agreed to release defendants from all liability as indorsers thereon, on payment of twenty- five per cent, of the indebtedness represented by the notes, and the defendants were to give notes for that amount, secured by deed of trust; and it was stipulated that plaintiff should hold the original notes, that, on failure of defendants to pay the composition notes at maturity, the amount paid thereon by sales of land under the trust deed should be credited on the original indebtedness, and that the plaintiff should have the right to enforce full payment of the balance due on the orig- inal notes, and the composition notes were not paid at ma- turity, and plaintiff made no agreement to extend them, or to receive them as a discharge of the original notes, it was held that plaintiff was not estopped to assert its claim on the original notes by receiving payments from defendants, partly derived from sales of property covered by the trust deed, and crediting them on the composition notes after maturity. 2 § 441. New promise. — The rule that a promise to do another thing is not a satisfaction, is subject to the qualification that where the parties agree that the new promise shall itself be a 1 Herrmann v. Orcutt, 152 Mass. 405; promises of the debtor with or with- 25 N. E. Rep. 735. out » surety in satisfaction of the 2 Third Nat. Bank v. Humphreys debts, or tbey may agree that pay- (1S95), 66 Fed. Rep. 872, per Sage, J. : ment shall be a condition precedent, "The general rule is well understood and that, if the debtor pays the com- to be in accord with the express terms position at a certain time and place, of the contract made in this instance, the creditors will accept such pay- — that a composition necessarily in- ment in satisfaction of their debts, vol ves the fact of payment, as was ob- He adds that: 'It is a question of served by Willes, J., in Edwards «, construction of the instrument of ar- Coombe, L. R. 7 O. P. 519. To make rangement, and it is not uncommon a composition agreement operate as for the creditors to accept a promise more than a suspension of the remedy, by the debtor and a surety as a satis- there must be a performance of the faction of their debts. But where condition; that is, due payment of they agree to accept a composition, the composition. Edwards n. Hancher, the debtor is not discharged unless he 1 C. P. Div. 111. In Be, Hatton, 7 pays the composition, for that is the Ch. App. 723, Mellish, L. J., said that, only thing which compels him to pay where creditors accept a composition, it, and that is the only hold which the they may either agree to take the creditors have upon him.' " § 442 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 531 satisfaction of the prior debt or duty, and the new agreement is based upon a good consideration, and is accepted in satisfac- tion, then it operates as such, and bars the action. 1 An accord unperformed, consisting of mutual promises, and thus having a new consideration, is binding upon the parties, and an action will lie for the breach of it. 2 Whether the creditor agreed to accept the promise itself, and not its performance, as a satisfaction for his debt, is one of fact for the jury. 3 But when all the facts are admitted, whether they show an agree- ment to accept the promise in satisfaction is one of law for the court. 4 § 442. The same subject continued. — In every case, where one security, or contract, is agreed to be received in lieu of another, whether the substituted contract be of the same or a higher grade, the action, in case of failure to perform, must be upon the substituted contract. 5 Where two persons, each having a cause of action against the other, met to adjust their differences, and the damages of one was agreed upon and paid and a receipt was given in full in addition thereto, this was held a new agreement canceling the claims on both sides. 6 So also, where two persons having suits for false imprison- ment against each other, agreed to discontinue their respective suits, this was held a new agreement ;' but where a note was 1 Kromer v. Heim, 75 K. Y. 574; whether the plaintiff agreed to accept Kinsler v. Pope, 5 Strobhart, 126 ; the agreement itself, not the perform- Evans v. Powis, 1 Ex. 601, where ance of it, as a satisfaction for his Parke, B., said: "If the plea had debt, so that if it was not performed been that a new mutual agreement his only remedy would be by an ac- between the plaintiffs and defend- tion for the breach of it, and not a ant and the other creditors, bind- right to recur to the original debt." ing on each at the time when it 2 Billings v. Vanderbeck, 23 Barb, was made, was given as a substitu- 546; Cartwright v. Cooke, 3 B. & Ad. tion for or satisfaction of the debt due 701. from the defendant to the plaintiff, 3 Evans v. Powis, 1 Exch. 601, 607, we think such a plea would have been per Parke, B. good, on the authority of Oomyn's 4 Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257. Digest, 'Accord;' this not being a 6 Babcock U.Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561; mere accord between the same par- Thatcher v. Dudley, 2 Root, 169. ties with mutual promises, but a new 6 Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 257. agreement with new consideration 7 Foster v. Trull, 12 John. 456. See pleaded. If so, the question would also, Crowther v. Farrer, 15 Q. B. 677. have been for the jury to decide 532 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 443 given for a certain sum, and afterwards a written agreement was entered into by the maker and payee to the effect that the note should be paid by installments, it was held that this sub- sequent agreement was not a new promise canceling the note, inasmuch as it was not founded on any valuable consideration. 1 A claim on notes may be canceled and discharged by a new agreement, and it is not necessary that there should be any formal or written promise ; all that is required is a distinct contract to that effect. 2 In Kentucky one note can not be discharged by another note for the same sum, signed by the same party and due at the same time. 3 Where it is claimed that an agreement, with promises on the one side to pay, and on the other to accept payment of an obligation, in a mode other than according to its tenor, is a satisfaction or extin- guishment of such obligation, it should explicitly appear that such was the intention of the parties. 4 § 443. Composition with creditors. — A composition agree- ment by several creditors, although by parol, so as to be inca- pable of operating as a release, and although unexecuted, so as not to amount in strictness to a satisfaction, is a good answer to an action by the creditor for the original debt, if he accepted the new agreement in satisfaction thereof; the consideration of the agreement is the undertaking by the other creditors to give up a part of their claim. 5 Mutuality between the creditors as respects the consideration is therefore essential to the validity of an agreement for a composition. The creditors must join together; they must stipulate one with the other. 6 At com- 1 McManus v. Bark, L. R. 5 Ex. 65. v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574; McCreery v. 2 Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 551 ; Day, 119 N. Y. 1 ; Plevins v. Down- Barnes v. Lloyd, 1 How. (Miss.) 584; ing, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 220, discussing Guion v. Doherty, 43 Miss. 538; Heirn the distinction between the alteration v. Carron, 11 S. & M. 361 ; Pulliam v. of a contract and a mere arrangement Taylor, 50 Miss. 251. as to time or mode of performing it. 3 Bank v. Letcher, 3 J. J. Marsh. Henderson v. Stobart, 5 Ex. 99. 195. 6 Renard v. Tuller, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 4 Goodrich v. Stanley, 24 Conn. 613. 107; Norman ». Thompson, 4 Ex. 755; See also, Hall v. Smith, 15 Iowa, 584; Good v. Cheeseman, 2 B. & Ad. 328; Levi v. Karrick, 13 Iowa, 344; Moly- Boyd v. Hind, 1 H. & N. 938. neaux v. Collier, 13 Geo. 406; Haskins 6 Sage v. Valentine, 23 Minn. 102; v. Newcomb, 2 John. 405; Billings v. Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249. Vanderbeek, 23 Barb. 546; Kromer § 443 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 533 mon law, where a body of creditors accept a composition, they may either agree to take the promise of the debtor with or with- out a surety in satisfaction of the debts, or they may agree that payment shall be a condition precedent, and that if the debtor pays the composition at a certain time and place the creditors will accept that composition in satisfaction of their debts. It is a question of construction of the instrument of arrangement, and it is not uncommon for the creditors to accept a promise by the debtor and a surety as a satisfaction of their debts. But where they agree to accept a composition, the debtor is not dis- charged unless he pays the composition, for that is the only thing which compels him to pay it, and that is the only hold which the creditors have upon him. 1 It is impossible for a composition to be made between the debtor and a single cred- itor. There is no consideration for the release. 2 Where the creditors of a failing debtor contract with a third person to sell and assign to him their claims at a certain percentage, in the absence of proof that such third person was acting merely as agent of the debtor, the transaction is to be considered as a purchase and sale, not a composition; and a creditor who has received the percentage agreed upon, and has assigned his claim, can not enforce the balance of the indebtedness upon proof simply that some of the creditors received more than the stipulated per cent, for their claims. 3 In all compositions, the creditors are moved by some advantage to be obtained in a dis- tribution of the property of the debtor, or by fixed payments t6 be made securing to each a certain proportion of his assets; and therefore a mere agreement by creditors to grant an extension of time and not sue, is no valid composition. 4 But it seems, that in Indiana a contrary rule prevails, and there a debtor may compound with a single creditor. 5 It is not necessary that a composition deed should express the 1 In re Hatton, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 723, 4 Henry v. Patterson, 57 Pa. St. 346. 726. 5 Devou v. Ham, 17 Ind. 472; Kahn 2 Norman v. Thompson, 4 Ex. 755; o. Gumberts, 9 Ind. 430. By the terms Renard v. Tuller, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) "compound" and "composition" is 107; Pierson v. McCahill, 21 Oal. 122. meant a parol agreement by a creditor 3 Goldenbergh v. Hoffman, 69 N. Y. to accept less of a liquidated debt 322 ; Blair v. Wait, 69 N. Y. 113. than is due him. 634 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 444 mutuality of all the signers. It is sufficiently implied by the nature of the agreement. 1 § 444. The same subject continued. — Where the payment of the composition debt is made a condition precedent to the cancel- ing the original debt, the cause of action on the original debt is suspended until default is made in paying the composition. 2 Because when the creditors have resolved upon a composition, if the debtor complies with the conditions of that resolution, or rather, until he fails to comply with them — for which purpose he must have a reasonable time — the resolution is binding upon the creditors. 3 But when default is made the creditor may sue for his original debt. 4 Where the composition deed is conditioned on the giving of notes by the debtor, to bear a certain date, but does not specify when they are to be given, the question whether a neglect to give them is a violation of the contract depends on the fact of an offer being made within a reasonable time after the date, and is a question for the jury. 5 An agreement of a creditor with his debtor to accept a certain percentage of the debt in full satisfaction thereof, "provided that no other creditor shall receive more than the same per- centage of his claim," is void for want of consideration. 1 " It is not necessary that the debtor be a party to the composition; his acting upon it is sufficient to bind the creditors. 7 A cred- itor who has signified his assent to a composition between his 1 Horstman v. Miller, 35 N.Y. Super. 2 Slater v. Jones, L. R. 8 Ex.186; Ct. 29, where the deed, purporting Edwards v. Coombe, L. E. 7 C. P. that the creditors "severally and each 519. for himself agree," was held to be 3 Edwards v. Coombe, L. R. 7 C. P. good, the court saying: "Whatever 522. may be the nature of the obligation 4 Edwards v. Coombe, L. R. 7 C. P. in terms, it must necessarily in all 519. cases be several. Each creditor must 5 Hall v. Merrill, 9 Abb. Pr. 116. agree for himself with the debtor, and Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. his several agreement is joint, or his 249. See also, Harriman v. Harriman, joint agreement is several only so far 12 Gray, 341 ; Brooks v. White, 2 Mete, as it is mutual with the others sign- (Mass.) 283; Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 ing." See also, Hall v. Merrill, 5 Mass. 424; Steinman v. Magnus, 11 Bosw. 266, where the agreement was East, 390. joint. ' Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 Mass. 424. §445 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 535 debtor and the other creditors can not subsequently withdraw his assent without the consent of the debtor. 1 § 445. Liability of third party. — The law is well settled that the acceptance by a creditor of the liability of a third person, in full satisfaction of an existing debt, is an extinguishment of the original indebtedness. But properly to be called "accord and satisfaction," as distinguished from payment or purchase, the third person must become a party to a valid contract to that effect. 2 Also the liability of the debtor must be completely canceled and discharged. The reservation of any right by the creditor against his original debtor will destroy the effect of the acceptance of the third party's liability as an accord and satisfaction. 8 1 Fellows v. Stevens, 24 Wend. 294. See also, Farrington v. Hodgdon, 119 Mass. 453 ; Sage v. Valentine, 23 Minn 102; "Williams v. Carrington, 1 Hilt (N. Y.)515; Paddleford v. Thacher 48 Vt. 574; Pierce v. Jones, 8 S. C 273 ; Good v. Cheesman, 2 B. & Ad 328; Steinman v. Magnus, 11 East 390; Pfleger v. Browne, 28 Beav. 391 Gillfillan v. Farrington, 12 111. App 101; Wayu. Langley, 15 Ohio St. 392 Murray v. Snow, 37 Iowa, 410; Fas- dyke v. Nixon, 107 Ind. 410; 8 N. E. Rep. 11; Parkerson v. Sessions, 40 Geo. 171; Eehard v. Tuller, 4 Bosw. 107; Lanes v. Squyres, 45 Texas, 382; Greenwood v. Lidbetter, 12 Price, 183. 2 Henderson v. Stobart, 5 Ex. 99. "We are satisfied that this is an agree- ment which would have been broken if the company had gone on with the original action ; for, a new person be- ing made a party to the contract, it becomes a binding agreement, and not a mere accord." 3 Cuxon v. Chadley, 3 B. & C. 591. As this matter is well summed up by Abbott, C. J., we quote at length from the opinion : "This case came before us on a motion for a nonsuit. We are of opinion that the rule must be discharged. Sweet, the bankrupt, had sold goods to the amount of £14 to James Chadley, the defendant. The bankrupt, and Eobert Chadley, the brother of the defendant, were con- cerned together in accommodation bills, and there was another account between them, in which Robert Chad- ley was debtor to Sweet. Eobert Chad- ley was also debtor to his brother James. About the month of August or September, Eobert Chadley spoke to Sweet and desired that he would put down the goods which had been sold to James Chadley to the account of him, Eobert. Sweet agreed to this, and Eobert Chadley informed his brother of what had passed between them. Towards the end of the year, when Sweet gave in an account of the moneys due to him from Eobert, he put at the end of the account this entry : 'Decemberthelst, 1822, your brother's account of £14 Is.' This is all that passed. Sweet is not proved ever to have said 'I will take you, Eobert, as my debtor and discharge James' ; he is not proved ever to have said or done that which would have the ef- fect of discharging James. It is con- tended by the defendant's counsel 536 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 446 § 446. The same subject continued. — Accordingly the ac- ceptance in full satisfaction by a creditor of the note of a third person is an accord and satisfaction. 1 And equally the note of a third person may be taken in payment of a judgment. 8 But it seems that the presumption is that such a note is sub- ject to an implied condition of its payment, and default in pay- ment will warrant an execution on the judgment. 3 Where, therefore, the note of a third person is taken in full satisfaction of a debt, on condition that such note shall be paid at maturity, and not otherwise, if the note is not paid when due, the creditor may insist that the contract is broken, and claim the whole amount of the original debt. 4 Where a note is not negotiable the onus of proving that it was taken in full satisfaction is on the debtor. 5 The liability of the third person must, as of course, be enforcible. Thus, where the note of an infant is taken, the agreement to receive it in satisfaction is without considera- tion and void. 6 Where a creditor received several notes held by his debtor against third persons, and one of them was worth- less, it was held the creditor could return all the notes and sue on his original debt, although his debtor supposed all the notes to be good and the creditor agreed to accept them in satisfac- tion. 7 An attorney at law to whom a claim has been sent for collection, and who has obtained judgment thereon, can not, that this is accord and satisfaction; 2 Mete. (Mass.) 283; Webb v. Gold- but, admitting the previous agree- smith, 2 Duer, 413; Dryden v. ment, where is the satisfaction? Bat Stephens, 19 AV. Va. 1; Hunter v. I consider the entry made by Sweet Moul, 98 Pa. St. 13 ; Mehan v. Thomp- to mean no more than this; I will son, 71 Me. 492; Goodnow v. Smith, debit the account of Robert for £14 18 Pick. 414. Is.; not, I will discharge James, at z New York Bank v. Fletcher, 5 all events, from this sum. Nor are AA r end. 85. the dealings of the parties at all varied 3 Sanders v. Branch Bank, 13 Ala. by this arrangement; the bankrupt's 353. condition is not improved by it, nor * Conkling v. King, 10 Barb. 372. the defendant's deteriorated. It 6 Smith v. Bettger, 68 Ind. 254. amounts at most to an accor.d, but 6 AVenthworth v. AVenthworth, 13 certainly not to a satisfaction." Johns. 87 ; AVright v. First, etc., Co., 5 'Booth ».Smith, 3 AVend. 66; Conk- N. II. 410; Crawford v. Millspaugh, 1 ling«. King, 10 Barb. 372; Currie v. N. H. 281. Kennedy, 78 N. C. 91; Brassell v. 7 Wiswall v. Harriman, 62 N. H. Williams, 51 Ala. 349 ; Lee v. Oppen- 671 . lieimer, 32 Me. 253; Brooks v. AVhite, §§ 447, 448 accord and satisfaction. 537 without special authority, receive, by way of accord and satis- faction, notes of third persons in satisfaction of the judgment. 1 § 447. Further illustrations. — The acceptance by a creditor of the sole and separate liability of one of two or more joint debtors is a good consideration for an agreement to discharge all the other debtors from liability. 2 So also, the acceptance of the note of a third person from one of the members of a firm is an accord and satisfaction. So a judgment confessed by one of the partners for the debt of the firm is a satisfaction ; s and and where one of two partners pays a debt of the partnership by compromise with the creditor, it is not competent for the creditor to keep the debt alive, and authorize the partner pay- ing to enforce it by action against the other partner. 4 An accord and satisfaction may be made by a debtor taking up his own note and giving another made by him and indorsed by a third party ; 5 but there must be the liability of a third person accepted. The fact that the third person advances money to assist the debtor to pay is not an acceptance of payment from such third party. 6 § 448. Settlement by third person — New consideration. — An agreement by the payee of a note, with the maker's widow, that certain sums paid by the maker, and by her after his death, for the payee's benefit, together with a sum paid by her to the payee, should be accepted in full settlement of the note, constitutes a valid satisfaction thereof. 7 Where one indebted 1 Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327. See does not warrant recurring to the Letcher v. Bank, 1 Dana f Ky .), 82. original debt ; Wagner v. Union Stock 2 Lyth v. Ault, 7 Exch. 669; Thomp- Yards Co., 41 111. App. 408; Bullen v. son v. Percival, 5B.& Ad. 925; Hartu. McGillicuddy, 2 Dana (Ky.), 90. Alexander, 2 M. & W. 484. ' Beck v. Snyder, 167 Pa. St. 234; 3 Frisbie v. Larned, 21 Wend. 450. 31 Atl. Rep. 555: "There was no 4 Le Page v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 164. allegation of, nor was there any at- s Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 John. 76. tempt to prove, payment and accept- 6 Bunge v. Koop, 5 Robertson, 1. an ce from the maker of the note or See also, Guild v. Butler, 127 Mass. his administrator of any smaller sum 386 ; Stagg v. Alexander, 55 Barb. 70 ; than the amount actually due, in satis- Bliss v. Schwarts, 64 Barb. 215; faction of the note. In saying, by Coonley v. Anderson, 1 Hill, 519; way of illustration, what is com- Cadens v. Teasdale, 53 Vt. 469, hold- plained of in the second specification, ing that insolvency of the third party the learned judge doubtless had in 538 ACCOKD AND SATISFACTION. § 448 on an open book account gave to his creditor his notes for one- half of his debt secured by a chattel mortgage under an agree- ment with the creditor that he would accept the same in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt, and the debtor paid the notes as they became due and the creditor satisfied the mort- gage, it was held that the new agreement was a valid accord and satisfaction and supported by a sufficient consideration, and estopped the creditor from bringing action to recover the balance of the debt. 1 An overdue demand, whether liquidated or unliquidated, may by agreement be discharged by payment of a thing different from that contracted to be paid, although of less pecuniary value.' mind the facts of the case, as indicated by the defendants' testimony, and meant a settlement, not with the maker of a note, but with a third party — such a settlement as that shown to have taken place between plaintiffs' intestate and Mrs. Shoe- maker after her husband's death." 1 Jaffray v. Davis (1891), 124 N. Y. 164. 2 Bush v. Abraham, 25 Ore. 336; 35 Pac. Rep. 1066, Lord, C. J.: "For instance, £1,000 by the payment of a peppercorn. Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke, 117 ; Cumber v. Ware, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. (337) 633. Although a money de- mand, liquidated and not doubtful, can not be satisfied with a smaller sum of money, yet, if any other personal property is received in satisfaction, it will be good, no matter what the value. Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455. In such case the court will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration. Reed v. Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273 ; Fisher v. May's Heirs, 2 Bibb, 448. 'A claim or demand,' Mr. Sutherland says, 'may be satisfied by the party liable delivering, paying, or doing, and the claimant accepting, something different from that which was owing or claimed, if they so agree. It is a substituted payment. "When such agreement is executed — carried fully into effect — the original demand is canceled, satisfied, extinguished. It is thus discharged by what the law denominates accord and satisfaction. It is a discharge of the former obliga- tion or liability by receipt of a new consideration, mutually agreed upon.' 1 Sutherland on Damages (2d ed.), § 246. In support of such agreements, if the consideration has some value, the law regards it as sufficient with- out regard to its extent. Savage v. Everman, 70 Pa. St. 315. The fact that the mill property was of less value than the amount remaining un- paid of the purchase-price notes is not material if its conveyance was ac- cepted in satisfaction and discharge of such notes. In Strang r. Holmes, 7 Cow. 224, it was held that a convey- ance of land, given in satisfaction of money due on a bond, would operate as a release of the bond, if given and accepted in full satisfaction. Suther- land, J., said: 'The sufficiency of the satisfaction can not be questioned. It was the conveyance of land which, like the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, shall be intended might be more ben- eficial to the plaintiff than the money; or otherwise he would not have ac- cepted it in satisfaction.' In Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 Mass. 424, Parker, C. J., said : 'The execution and delivery of §449 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 539 § 449. Accord and satisfaction by a joint creditor. — Where one of two or more joint creditors makes an accord and satisfac- tion with the debtor, this puts an end to the debt. 1 Thus where three creditors sue on a joint demand and the debtor pleaded an accord and satisfaction with one of the creditors, by a pay- ment in cash and a set-off of a debt due from that one to the debtor, the plea was held good. 2 Where two or more are in- terested in a contract the presumption of law is that their interest is joint, and either may make a valid accord and satis- faction. Thus where two persons bought a quantity of goods in their own names, and then sold the goods to a corporation and one of them made an accord and satisfaction for the price with the corporation, this was held to discharge the corporation from the other's demand. 3 So also, where one partner makes an accord and satisfaction with a debtor of the firm,' and it does not appear whether it is intended to apply to separate or to partnership demands, the presumption is that it is a discharge the deed by the defendant, in pur- suance of the agreement of the cred- itors, and the acceptance of that deed by their agent, and his sale of the property afterwards, was a, complete execution of the contract on both sides. These facts would have main- tained the issue for the defendant upon aplea of accord and satisfaction.' To constitute an accord and satisfac- tion there must be a satisfaction of the entire debt so as to completely ex- tinguish it." 1 Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264. 2 Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264. "Were we to decide otherwise, it is plain it might lead to this absurdity, that supposing the plaintiff Wallace to have received a full discharge of the debt, yet he might, if he survived the other parties, recover the whole of it over again." 3 Osborn v. Martha's Vineyard E. Co., 140 Mass. 549. "The interest of the three plaintiffs in their joint claim against the defendant was such that each had an interest in the entire claim. One of them had not only an interest in the third which might be his share, but also in the two-thirds belonging to the others. It has been settled in this action that one can not maintain an action for his share ; the three must join in the suit, because each one has a joint interest in the entire amount due them, and in every part thereof. Osborn is debarred from bringing suit for his third part, be- cause Norton and Jernegan own that third as fully as does Osborn. Each having such an interest in the debt due, one being unable to sue for the whole or his share thereof, it follows that each one, being interested in the entire claim, can settle it with the de- fendant. Each of the three, by the manner of their dealing with the de- fendant and with the property, has effectually authorized his partners in the contract to dispose of his interest by payment, settlement, or accord and satisfaction, etc." 540 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 4o0 from partnership claims. 1 Tenants in common are likewise bound by an accord and satisfaction made by one of them. 2 But in Ohio, it seems, that joint creditors, between whom no partnership exists, can not either release or make an accord and satisfaction with the common debtor so as to conclude their co-creditors who do not assent to such release or accord. 8 § 450. Accord and satisfaction with a joint debtor. — The creditor discharges all joint debtors by an accord and satisfac- tion with one. 4 And likewise a partial accord and satisfaction by one joint debtor is a satisfaction pro tanto as to all. 5 Where a creditor of a corporation, by an accord and satisfaction with a stockholder released such stockholder from all personal lia- bility for his debt, he was held to thereby discharge the cor- poration, and other stockholders to the same extent as the one with whom the accord was made. 6 A covenant not to sue one of the joint obligors does not amount to an accord and satis- faction. It does not prevent the creditor from proceeding against all the joint debtors. 7 While as a general rule a cove- nant not to sue is not pleadable in bar — it being a covenant only, and the covenantee being put to his cross-action to re- 1 Emerson v. Knower, 8 Pick. 63. ' Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675; 2 Austin v. Hall, 13 John. 286. Lamb v. Gregory, 12 Neb. 506; Neligh " Upjohn v. Ewing, 2 Ohio St. 13. v. Bradford, 1 Neb. 451 ; Vandever v. "It is true, they may defeat an action Clark, 16 Ark. 331 ; Heckman v. Man- at law, but it does not follow that a ning, 4 'Colo. 543 ; Elliott v. Holbrook, recovery in equity can not be had. At 33 Ala. 659; Arnold v. Camp, 12 law, joint creditors must join in the Johns. 409; McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 action, and all must recover, or none Mo. 462; Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305; can. Hence if part of them are barred Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 569. all are. But the forms of equity pro- 5 Merchant's Bank v. Curtiss, 37 cedure require no such joinder when Barb. 317. justice would be defeated by it. It 6 Prince v. Lynch, 38 Cal. 528. maybe admitted, that as a general 7 Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455; Tuck- rule joint creditors can not, by a di- erman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581 vision between themselves, acquire a Snow v. Chandler, 10 N. H. 92 separate right of action against the Walker v. McCulloch, 4 Me. 421 debtor, either at law or in equity. But Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 Mete. (Mass. where the debtor himself procures the 276 ; Rowley v. Stoddart, 7 Johns. 207 release of a part of them, we do not Spencer i«. Williams, 2 Vt. 209; Berry see how he can object to the others v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 1; Winston v. Dal- proceeding against him in equity." by, 64 N. C. 299. §§ 451, 452 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 541 cover the damages which a breach may occasion him — there is an exception to this rule in case of a sole obligor. It then amounts to accord and satisfaction, and may be pleaded. 1 § 451. Reserving rights against co-debtors. — There is some difference of judicial opinion as to whether a creditor can settle with one joint-debtor and reserve his rights against the others. In Ohio, 2 Connecticut 3 and Maryland, 4 the courts will not enforce agreements between a creditor and a joint-debtor which do not equally inure to the benefit of all the debtors. But Pennsylvania allows an accord and satisfaction between a creditor and joint- debtor so that on payment of his proportion of the debt he alone is discharged. 5 The same rule likewise probably obtains in New York. 6 A receipt given to one joint-debtor on a note, for a part payment, coupled with the words "which is in full on his part on the within note, and the said A. B. is hereby discharged from all obligations on the same," is not such a release as will dis- charge the others.' In Maine the courts not only will not allow an accord and satisfaction with one joint-debtor to discharge the others, but adopt the rule that where one of two joint debtors has been discharged such discharge is no defense to either in an action against both. The only remedy of the discharged debtor is to sue for a breach of the contract of discharge. 8 In California the code provides that the release of one joint-debtor does not extinguish the obligation of any of the others. 9 § 452. Co-tort-feasors. — An accord and satisfaction with a tort- feasor discharges the liability of all the co-tort-feasors, although 1 Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. Law, 358; 8 Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447. Crane v. Ailing, 15 N. J. Law, 423; 4 Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60. Walker v. McCulloch, 4 Me. 421. 5 Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. St. 168. 2 Ellis ■». Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 289; where e Honegger v. Wettstein, 47 N. Y. in an action to trespass against five, Super. Ct. 125. the plaintiff accepted a note from two ' Armstrong v. Hayward, 6 Cal. 183. for a sum of money to be paid at a 8 Drinkwater v. Jordan, 46 Me. 432 ; future day, in satisfaction as to them, McAllester v. Sprague, 34 Me. 296; but not to operate as a satisfaction for McCrillis v. Hawes, 38 Me. 566. the other defendants, it was held a "Northern Ins. Co. v. Potter, 63 Cal. good discharge for all. 157; Civ. Code, § 1543. 542 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 453 it is expressly stipulated that they shall not be discharged ;' but the discharge of a party not shown to be a joint wrong- doer will not operate as a discharge of the others. 2 A written instrument, given to one of two joint tort-feasors, and reciting the receipt from him of a certain sum "as full payment, as per claim," is a bar to an action against the other tort-feasor ; and oral evidence is inadmissible to show that the sum paid was intended to be received as part, and not as full payment ;' but in an action against one of several co-trespassers, evidence of payments by any one of them, though not received in full satisfaction or in discharge of the claim, is admissible, for their effect is to diminish the recovery. 4 A right of action by the owner of a chattel for injuries done to it in the possession of a bailee is not barred by a settlement between the owner and the bailee, accompanied by an agreement that the bailee may bring a suit in the owner's name, but at his own risk and expense and for his own benefit. 6 § 453. Accord and satisfaction by a stranger. — An accord and satisfaction, moving from a stranger or person having no pecuniary interest in the subject-matter, if accepted in dis- charge of the debt, constitutes a good defense to an action to enforce the liability against the debtor. 6 Thus, a bond was given to the bank comptroller of a state for the security of the circulating notes of a bank. The owner of the bank sold and transferred its entire stock and the purchaser delivered a new bond for the same purpose. The old bond was given up and the new one accepted in its place. It was held that the old bond was extinguished ; 7 but some authorities allow the accord and satisfaction of a stranger to be taken advantage of only 'Urton v. Price, 57 Cal. 270; Gil- See also, Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. patrick v. Hunter, 24 Me. 18; Sloan 148; Pond v. Williams, 1 Gray, 630; v. Herrick, 49 Vt. 327 ; Brown v. Cam- Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393 ; hold- bridge, 3 Allen, 474; McAllister v. ing a discharge of one joint tort-feasor Dennin, 27 Mo. 40. not to discharge another if the ac- 2 Wardell v. McConnell,25 Neb. 558. cord expressly so stipulated. Dud- 8 Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503. ley v. Bland, 83 N. Car. 220. * Chamberlin v. Murphy, 41 Vt. 110. 6 Leavitt v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71. s Eindge o. Coleraine, 11 Gray, 157. 'Rusk v. Soutter, 67 Barb. 371. §454 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 543 when it is subsequently ratified by the debtor. The pleading it will be sufficient satisfaction. 1 § 454. Rescinding accord for mistake or fraud. — Parties to an accord and satisfaction may, by a subsequent agreement, rescind it, and restore the debt to its original status. 8 But a party seeking to rescind a settlement or compromise on the ground of fraud or mistake must in general first place the other party in statu quo. 3 Where an accord and satisfaction is 1 Snyder v. Pharo, 25 Fed. Rep. 398. See, Grymes v. Blofield, Oro. Eliz. (2 Croke) 541 ; Jones v. Broadhurst, 67 E. C. L. 173; Belshaw a. Bush, 73 E. C. L. 191 ; Goodwin v. Cremer, 83 E. C. L. 757 ; Kemp v. Balls, 10 Exch. 607 ; Simpson v. Eggington, 10 Ex. 845. Contra, Clow v. Borst, 6 John. 37 ; Daniels v. Hallenbeck, 19 Wend. 408 ; Bleakley v. White, 4 Paige, 654 ; At- lantic Co. v. Mayor, 53 N. Y. 64. Cf., Webster v. Wyser, IStew. (Ala.) 184; Scott v. Alexander, 1 Wash. ( Va.) 77 ; Allen v. Farrington, 2 Sneed, 526; Cornell v. Masten, 35 Barb. 157; Vroom v. Van Home, 10 Paige Ch. 549 ; Priest v. Watkins, 2 Hill, 225 ; Britton ». Lewis, 8 Rich. Eq. 271 ; Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1; Phoenix Bank v. Bumstead, 18 Pick. 77; Eastman v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387; Reigart v. Ell- maker, 14 S. & R. 121 ; Brown v. In- habitants of Chesterville, 63 Me. 241 ; Armstrong v. School District, 28 Mo. App. 169; Dana v. Taylor, 150 Mass. 25; Copleys. Hyland,46Minn.205; 48 N. W. Rep. 777; Marrett v. Babb, 91 Ky. 88 ; 15 S. W. Rep. 4 ; Stimpson v. Poole, 141 Mass. 502; President, etc., v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 123; Blewett v. Gaynor, 77 Wis. 378 ; United States v. Thompson, Gilp. (U. S.) 614; Simp- son v. Eggington, 10 Ex. 845; Bel- shaw v. Bush, 11 C. B. 191 ; Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 320; Collier v. Field, 1 Mont. Ter. 612; Richardson v. Mc- Lemore, 5 Baxter, 586; Simpson v. Moore, 6 Baxter, 371 ; Frisbie v. Larned, 21 Wend. 450; Waydell v. Luer, 3 Denio, 410; Luddington v. Bell, 77 N. Y. 138; Gray v. Brown, 22 Ala. 262; Williams v. Hitchings, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 326; Kendrick v. O'Neil, 48 Geo. 631; Long v. Long, 57 Iowa, 497; Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583 ; Mitchell v. Allen, 25 Hun, 543; Irvine v. Millbank, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 264 ; Bronson v. Fitz- hugh, 1 Hill, 185; Allen v. Wheat- ley, 3 Blackf . 332 ; Metz *. Soule, 40 Iowa, 236; Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138; Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29; Knickerbacker Co. v. Colver, 8 Cow. Ill ; Matthews v. Chicopee, etc., Co., 3 Robt. 712; President, etc., of Bank v. Messenger, 9 Cow. 37 ; Bonney v. Bon- ney, 29 Iowa, 448 ; Parmelee v. Law- rence, 44 111. 405 ; Smith *. Gayle, 58 Ala. 600 ; Austin v. Hall, 13 John. 286 ; Decker v. Livingston, 15 John. 479; Myrick v. Dame, 9 Cush. 248 ; Kimball v. Wilson, 3 N. H. 96 ; Yandes v. Lefa- vour, 2 Blackf. 371; Gregg v. James, 1 111. 143 ; White v. Jones, 14 La. Ann. 681 ; Vanderburgh v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 242; Salmon v. Davis, 4Binney (Pa.), 375; Noyes v. New Haven R. Co., 30 Conn. 1; Doremus v. McCormick, 7 Gill, 49. 2 Heavenrich v. Steele, 57 Minn. 221 ; 58 N. W. Rep. 982. 3 Galvin v. O'Brien (1893), 96 Mich. 483 ; Pangborn v. Continental Insur- ance Co., 67 Mich. 683; Crippen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344; Headley». Hack- ley, 50 Mich. 43 ; Walsh v. Sisson, 49 Mich. 423 ; Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich.508. 544 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. § 455 fully executed, the party receiving money from the other can not rescind on the ground of fraud, or of his own mental in- competency to make a binding contract, without refunding, or offering to refund, the money which was the fruit of the accord and satisfaction. If any exception to this general rule results from inability, by reason of poverty, to restore the money, it is only where the fraud is not discovered, or the mental disability continues, as the case may be, until after the money has been expended, or otherwise put beyond the power and control of the plaintiff. To use and appropriate the money, with knowledge of the imposition, would be a rati- fication of the settlement. 1 § 455. Pleading. — Accord and satisfaction can not be proved unless it is pleaded ; 2 and in a suit for an accounting, where the court finds that there has been an accord and satisfaction, but allows it to be opened for the purpose of showing errors, the pleadings should be amended so as to specify what errors are relied on. 3 In an action for the value of property alleged 1 Strodder v. Stone, etc., Granite Co. (Ga. 1894), 19 S. E. Rep. 1022. 2 Niggli v. Foehry (1894), 31 N. Y. Supl. 931 ; George v. Chicago, etc., B. Co., 85 Iowa, 590; 52 N. W. Rep. 512. 3 Hoyt v. Clarkson, 23 Ore. 51 ; 31 Pac. Rep. 198. See also, for ques- tion of practice, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Clark, 10 U. S. App. 66; Lesson v. Mass. Assn., 23 N. Y. Supl. 294; Har- ris v. Harris, 89 Ya. 762 ; 17 S. E. Rep. 871; Lamed v. City, 86 Iowa, 166; 53 N.W. Rep. 105; Hyland v. Anderson, 20 N. Y. Supl. 707; George v. Chicago, etc., Co., 85 Iowa, 590; 52 N. "W. Rep. 512; Hogan v. Burns (Cal.), 33 Pac. Rep. 631 ; Hoyt v. Clarkson, 23 Ore. 51; 31 Pac. Rep. 198; Stuber v. Mc- Entee, 19 N. Y. Supl. 900; Burnham v. Rosenberger, 110 Mo. 468; 19 S. W. Rep. 732; Sewell v. Mead, 85 Iowa, 343; 52 N. W. Rep. 227; Sieber v. Amunson, 78 Wis. 679 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 1126; City, etc., Bank ». Stevens, 15 N. Y. Supl. 139; Renihan o. Wright, 125 Ind. 536; Armijo v. Abeytia, 25 Pac. Rep. 777; Thurber v. Sprague, 17 R. I. 634; 24 Atl. Rep. 48; Martin v. White, 40 111. App. 281 ; Patterson v. Graham, 140 111. 531 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 460; Hayes v. Fenn, 89 Ga. 264; 15 S. E. Rep. 361; Deuser v. Walkup, 43 Mo. App. 625; Cobb v. Malone, 86 Ala. 571; Wheeler v. Timpson, 59 Hun, 625; 13 N. Y. Supl. 640; Parker v. Collins, 32 N. Y. S. R. 1107; 57 Hun, 590; Lister, etc., Works v. Pen- der, 74 Md. 15; 21 Atl. Rep. 686; Du- luth Chamber of Commerces. Knowl- ton, 42 Minn. 220; 44 N. W. Rep. 2; Rosenfeld v. New, 10 N. Y. Supl. 232; Stengel v. Preston, 89 Ky. 616; 13 S. W. Rep. 839; Wright v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 49 Hun, 445; Weeks v. Zimmerman, 4 N. Y. Supl. 609; Mc- Namara v. McEntee, 4 N. Y. Supl. 620; Mortlock v. Williams, 76 Mich. 568; Springfield, etc., Co. v. Van Brunt, 77 Iowa, 82; Hills v. Sommer, 6 N. Y. Supl. 469; Roberts v. Ellwood, 116 §455 ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 545 to have been converted by the defendant where the answer was that the defendant had a full and complete settlement, and a full and complete arbitration and settlement, of all matters and things in dispute, which settlement and arbitration in- cluded all matters and things in controversy between plaintiff and the defendant at the time, and more especially the matter referred to in the petition, it was held to present the issue of settlement as a distinct and separate defense, and that" the defendant is not confined to proof of the arbitration alleged. 1 A replication of accord and satisfaction to a plea of set-off is defective which does not allege the giving and accepting of anything in satisfaction of the causes of action set up in the plea. 2 N. Y. 651 ; Parr v. Village of Green- bush, 112 N. Y. 246; Savage v. Blan- chard, 148 Mass. 348 ; Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. C. 589; Dana v. Taylor, 150 Mass. 25; 22 N. E. Rep. 65; Mc- Namara v. Babcock, 50 Hun, 602 ; 3 K. Y. Supl. 700; Taylor v. Blackman (Miss.), 12 So. Rep. 458; Butler v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 88 Ga. 594; Knoxvilleu. Acuff, 92Tenn. 26; 20 S. W. Rep. 348; Ball v. McGeoch, 81 Wis. 160; 51 N. W. Rep. 443. 'Forbes v. Petty (1893), 37 Neb. 899; 56 N. W. Rep. 730. 2 Heath v. Doyle, 18 R. 1. 252 ; 27 Atl. Rep. 333, per Matteson, C. J. : "If this 35 was intended as a replication of an ac- cord and satisfaction, it is defective, because it does not aver the giving and acceptance of anything in satis- faction of the causes of action, etc., specified in the plea. If it -was in- tended merely as a replication of a stated account, it should aver that the account as stated was just and true. Case 24, 3 Atk. 70. It should also set forth that the account was in writing, and what was the balance of account, Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk. 397, and also that the balance was agreed on by the parties, and a promise to pay such balance. 3 Chitty on Pleading, 926." CHAPTER XIII. RELEASE. 456. • Release defined. §480. The same subject continued — 457. Consideration of release. Illustrations. 458. Who may release — Limita- 481. Contingent release. tions. 482. Covenant not to sue. 459. Release under seal. 483. Covenant not to sue for a defi- 460. What words make a release. nite time. 461. The same subject continued. 484. Release of sureties. 462. Effect at law. 485. Where extension to debtor 463. Effect in equity. does not release surety. 464. Release in equity. 486. Release of a co-debtor. 465. Indorsements and entries op- 487. Release of joint and several erating as releases. debtors. 466. Receipts and written memo- 488. Release of a co-tort-feasor. randa sufficient to constitute 489. Further of joint tort-feasors — a release. Of partners. 467. When written release not con- 490. Statutory provisions. trolled by parol evidence. 491. Express reservation of remedy 468. Destruction of the obligation. against co-debtor. 469. Delivery of the obligation. 492. Covenant not to sue a co- 470. Voluntary declarations. debtor. 471. The same subject continued — 493. Release by a co-creditor. Illustrations. 494. Fraud and mistake. 472. Release of bills and notes. 495. Release obtained by fraud— Il- 473. Release of actions. lustrations. 474. Release of debts. 496. Legal effect of a release ob- 475. Release of dower — Between tained by fraud. executors. 497. Release procured by undue in- 476. Release of all demands. fluence. 477. Accessory and consequential 498. Release by railroad employes' matters. relief department. 478. What a general release does 499. The same subject continued. not cover. 500. Deed-poll or indenture. 479. Recitals and object of release qualifying it. 501. Pleading. § 456. Release defined. — A release is an act or writing by which some claim or interest is surrendered to another person. 1 "The term release applies to the discharge of the claim or 'Anderson's Law Dictionary, tit. Release. (546) § 457 RELEASE. 547 right of action arising from a breach of contract by the formal consent or dispensation of the promisee. It does not, strictly speaking, apply to the discharge of a contract before breach by the agreement of the parties to that effect ; which is more correctly described as a rescission of the contract, or a dis- charge by a new or substituted agreement." 1 § 457. Consideration of release. — The consideration men- tioned in a written release, reciting the receipt of a specified sum, and that the defendant shall be released from all further liability, is not contractual, and parol evidence is admissible that such release was not supported by any consideration. 2 Where an employe, in consideration of an agreement on the part of the employer to give him work as long as he is able to perform it, releases a claim for damages said to have been caused by the employer's negligence, the agreement is not void because lacking mutuality. By releasing his claim the employe has paid in advance for an optional contract, and he has the right to have it remain optional. 3 Under the 1 Leake on Contracts, 922. 2 Stewart v. Chicago R. Co., 141 Ind. 55 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 67. In Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bell, 44 Neb. 44; 62 N. W. Rep. 314, the contract signed by an employe of said railroad company, on becoming a member of said relief department, to the effect that, if he should be injured and receive moneys from the relief fund of said relief de- partment on account thereof, the ac- ceptance of such relief funds should operate as a release of such employe's claim against said railroad company for damages because of such injury, was construed, and it was held that such contract of an employe did not lack consideration to support it ; that such contract was not contrary to pub- lic policy ; that the effect of such con- tract was not to enable the railroad company to exonerate itself by con- tract from liability for the negligence of itself or servants; that the em- ploye did not waive his right of ac- tion against the railroad company, in case he should be injured by its neg- ligence, by the execution of the, con- tract ; that it is not the execution of the contract that estops the injured employe, but his acceptance of mon- eys from the relief department on ac- count of his injury, after his cause of action against the railroad on account thereof arises. 3 Smith v. St. Paul R. Co. (Minn. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 392, Collins, J. . "There can be no sufficient objection to the contract as proven, on the ground that it lacks mutuality, be- cause the plaintiff was not bound, by its terms, to continue in defendant's service, but could cease work at his pleasure. The consideration for de- fendant's agreement to employ was paid by the release of plaintiff's claim for damages quite as much and as effectually as if plaintiff had actually paid cash. By releasing his claim for damages, the plaintiff paid in advance 548 RELEASE. §458 Michigan statute providing that a seal is only presumptive evidence of consideration a sealed release given without con- sideration does not bar the releasor from bringing an action for damages for injury to the person. 1 Where one consents to pay in full a bill the correctness of which he in good faith disputes only on condition that certain other demands against him shall be released, such payment constitutes a good con- sideration for the release. 2 § 458. Who may release — Limitations. — A man might, by the common law, release a sum of money owing to his wife while sole. 3 But since the general passage of statutes limiting a wife's estate to her separate use, all control, so far as aliena- tion is concerned, is denied the husband. 4 Hence it follows that the husband has in general no power to release any rights of his wife. A partner has the power to release firm debts of every description, and all claims whether founded in tort or contract. 5 Upon similar grounds one of several executors or for the privilege or option of working for the defendant ; and, having done this, he had the right to have it re- main optional with him how long he would continue to work for the com- pany, while it remained obligatory upon the latter to furnish the oppor- tunity so long as he chose to work, and was able to properly perform the same. The plaintiff had parted with value for the optional contract, and there was owing to him a reciprocal duty and obligation on the part of the company. Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109; 32 N. E. Rep. 802." 1 Wabash Western R. Co. v. Brow (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 941, Taft, J.: "With reference to the release, we are very clear that the court was right in charging the jury to disregard it. All the evidence in the case showed that no money was paid, and no employ- ment tendered or received, to fulfill the recited consideration of the re- lease. In the absence of any consid- eration, the release could not, of course, constitute a bar to the action. It is true that a seal imports consider- ation, but by section 7520 of Howell's Annotated Statutes of Michigan it is only presumptive evidence, and may be rebutted. Green v. Langdon, 28 Mich. 221-225. As the evidence here conclusively established that there was no consideration, the seal had no effect." 2 Lehigh Val., etc., Co. v. Miller (1893), 59 Fed. Rep. 483; Boffinger r. Tuyes, 120 U. S. 198; United States v. Child, 12 Wall. 232. 3 Woodward v. Darcy, Plow. 184; Miles v. Williams, 1 P. Wms. 249. 4 See the article on "Married Wom- en" in Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, where many cases are collected. 5 Bates on Partnership, § 383, citing Hawkshaw ». Parkins, 2 Swanst. 539 Arton v. Booth, 4 J. B. Moore, 192 Furnival v. Weston, 7 J. B. Moore 356 ; Metcalfe v. Rycroft, 6 M. & S. 75 Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M. & W. 264 Phillips v. Clagett, 11 M. & W. 84 § 459 RELEASE. 549 administrators may release a debt due to the decedent. 1 But the lessor of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, can not release the action. 8 § 459. Release under seal. — A release is an executed con- tract, and in New York must be under seal, to be valid as a release. A release not under seal is what is called an accord and satisfaction. In the one case the release is effected by virtue of its form, in the other by virtue of its having all the elements making a good accord and satisfaction. 8 A release Nottidge v. Prichard, 2 CI. & Fin. 379; Dyer v. Sutherland, 75 111. 583; Emerson v. Knowber, 8 Pick. 63 ; Bulk- ley v. Dayton, 14 John. 387. Mr. Bates is of the opinion that all claims can be released either before or after dissolution ; but quasre. 1 Woerner on Administration, § 346, citing Shaw v. Berry, 35 Maine, 279 ; Gilman v. Healy, 55 Maine, 120 ; Hoke v. Fleming, 10 Ired. L. 263 ; Bryan v. Thompson, 7 J. J. Marsh. 586 ; Her- ald v. Harper, 8 Blackf . 170 ; Hyatt v. McBurney, 18 S. C. 199. The unity of estate which co-executors and co- administrators have is thus neatly summed up by the learned author: "The interest and estate of each of several executors or administrators of the same testator or intestate in all his effects and chattels is joint and entire, and incapable of being sev- ered. Executors and administrators stand on the same ground in this re- spect. We have already seen, that if one or more of the number die, re- sign, or be removed, the estate passes to and vests in those remaining or surviving. They are considered in law as one person, hence the act of one is deemed to be the act of all, al- though they respectively administer on different parts of the estate." § 346, citing Douglass v. Satterlee, 11 John. 16 ; Grinstead v. Fonte, 32 Miss. 120 ; Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 300 ; Quinn v. Stockton, 2 Lit. 343 ; Simon v. Al- bright, 12 S. & R. 429; Gulledge v. Berry, 31 Miss. 346 ; Devling v. Little, 26 Pa. St.502 ; George v. Baker, 3 Allen, 326, note; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151 ; Weir v. Mosher, 19 Wis. 311 ; Rick v. Gilson, 1 Pa. St. 54 ; Dwight «.Newell,15 111. 333 ;Wheeler B.Wheel- er, 9 Cow. 34; Mackay v. St. Mary's Church, 15 R. I. 121 ; Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 379 ; Lank v. Kinder, 4 Harr. (Del.) 457. See Hudson v. Hudson, 5 Bac. Ab. 700, where Lord Hardwicke thought otherwise. See also, Willand v. Fenn, Selwyn N. P. 784, note ; Ja- comb v. Harwood, 2 Ves. Sen. 265; Stanley v, Barnes, 1 Hagg. 221. 2 Doe v. Brewer, 4 M. &.S. 300. 3 Seymour v. Minturn, 17 John. 169; a case well illustrating the difference : The plaintiff lent the defendant his promissory note, payable to the de- fendant or order, who indorsed it, and procured it to be discounted at a bank. The note was protested for non-payment ; and the defendant be- ing insolvent, the plaintiff signed a written agreement discharging him from all debts and demands. It was held that this agreement, for want of a seal, could not operate as a release ; and the consideration, being merely nominal, could not operate as an ac- cord and satisfaction. See the chapter on Accord and Satisfaction, supra. 550 RELEASE. 460 needs no consideration to support it; 1 but a deed inter partes can not operate as a release to strangers. 2 It was an old maxim of the common law that an obligor could only be re- leased by an instrument of as high a nature as that by which he was bound — being obligated by a seal, he could be released only by an instrument under seal. Technically, this may be the rule of modern times, but practically it is not enforced. 3 § 460. What words make a release. — The proper words of a release are remise, release, quitclaim, renounce and acquit. Any expressions, however, which denote the intention of the one party to discharge the other, are sufficient ; 4 and words of Tavist'. Bowker, 1 Nev. 487; Ma- ness v. Henry, 96 Ala. 454; 11 So. Rep. 410; Richmond R. Co. v. Wal- ker, 92 Ga. 485; 17 S. E. Rep. 604; Dillingham v. Estill, 3 Dana (Ky.), 21; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109; 32 N. E. Rep. 802. 2 Storer v. Gordon, 3 M. & S. 308, holding that a charter-party between A. & B., in consideration of a for- mer charter-party between A. & C, which former charter-party, in con- sideration of the freight B. was to pay, was thereby declared null and void, A. agreeing to cancel the first in consideration of the second, and C. was thereby acquitted of all claims which A. might have against him in virtue of the first charter-party, was held not to operate as a release from A. to C. of the first charter-party. 3 White v. Walker, 31 111. 422; Pratt v. Morrow, 45 Mo. 404; Farmer's Bank v. Blair, 44 Barb. 641 ; Union Bank v. Call, 5 Fla. 409 ; Illinois R. Co. v. Read, 37 111. 484, holding that a release of a debt secured by mortgage need not be under seal, nor need it be under seal when prospective damages are released. Benjamin v. McCon- nel, 9 111. 536, holding that a release of contract, not under seal, but made part of a decree of court, is valid. Leviston v. Junction R. Co., 7 Ind. 597, to the effect that even if a re- lease is supported by a consideration, it must be under seal to convey an easement. Smith wick v. Ward, 7 Jones' Law, 64 ; Thomason v. Dill, 30 Ala. 444 ; First National Bank v. Mar- shall, 73 Maine, 79. See chapter on Accord and Satisfaction. 4 Coke on Littleton, 264 b; Hick- mott's Case, 9 Rep. 52 b; Lock v. Etherington, 1 Sid. 265. The follow- ing is an approved form of a general release: This indenture, made the day of , between A. B. of, etc., of the one part, and C. D. of, etc., of the other part, witnesseth, that each of them, the said A. B. and C. D., hereby releases the other of them, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and his and their estates and effects, from all sums of money, accounts, actions, proceedings, claims and demands whatsoever, for or by reason or in respect of any act, cause, matter, or thing, whatsoever, up t. Williams, L. R. 1 Eq. Jr. 453. "A mere waiver signifies 184. nothing more than an expression of 3 Cross v. Sprigg, 6 Hare, 552. intention not to insist upon the right; 4 Leddel v. Starr, 20 N. J. Eq. 274, which in equity will not without con- per Zabriskie, Oh., 283. sideration bar the right any more 5 Green v. Langdon, 28 Mich. 221. than at law accord without satisfac- 6 Batton v. Allen, 5 N. J. Eq. 99. tion would be a plea.'' Per Grant, M. R. 556 RELEASE. § 466 itself, release the interest on the bond. But when from other directions in the will it is the evident intention of the testator to require only the balance of the principal, this is a re- lease of the interest. 1 The words "not to be enforced" were indorsed by the holder on a note. This was held to be no dis- charge or release of the note. 8 And the making an indorse- ment on a bond by which the obligee forgives the obligor of the same is no discharge. 3 But a writing attached to bonds by the obligee, directing their cancellation at her death, was held a release. 4 Where a bond was indorsed, "This bond is never to appear against A, witness, C. D.," an action at law on the bond was restrained. 6 Where a child gave a receipt for articles delivered, promising to return thein if called for, and the parent wrote underneath that they were not to be exacted, but were to answer as a part of the child's portion, it was held to be an ad- vancement. 6 § 466. Receipts and written memoranda sufficient to consti- tute a release. — Where a father holding a bond and mortgage executed by his son, with the intention of releasing to the lat- 1 Leddell v. Starr, 20 N. J. Eq. 427. and relied upon their fulfillment 'Peace v. Haines, 11 Hare, 151, a of his intention; and (4) (in strict- leading case, holding also that, "The ness belonging to another class of cases in which the court has held a cases) where the transaction supposed debtor liberated from his obligation to create the debt or obligation is to pay a debt which once existed, and rather in the nature of an advance- from which he has not been dis- ment by one in loco parentis, or is part charged by any testamentary instru- of a family arrangement." ment, are: (1) Where the act or dec- 3 Tufnell v. Constable, 8 Simon, 69. laration relied on creates an immediate 4 Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sandf . discharge, which the debtor might Ch. 400. plead as a release or by way of accord 6 Major v. Major, 1 Drewry, 165. and satisfaction at law, or which he 6 Bulkeley v. Noble, 2 Pick. 337. See might enforce in equity as against the also, Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn, creditor. (2) Where the discharge, 516; Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & though not immediate and absolute, J. 208; Otis v. Beckwith, 49 111.121; but conditional, becomes perfect by Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Meri- the condition having, in the event, wether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572, a been performed. (3) Where the cred- case of a gift rather than a release; itor intended to discharge the obliga- but some of the cases use the ele- tion at his death, and communicated ments of a gift to determine whether that intention to those who would, an equitable release has been made, under his own disposition, take or They assimilate the two. represent his interest upon his death, § 467 RELEASE. 557 ter a portion of the mortgage debt, executed and delivered to him a receipt therefor, containing a provision that the sum stated should be indorsed on the mortgage, it was held an equitable release. 1 But letters written by a mortgagee to the mortgagor and persons interested under him, containing the expressions "I now give this gift to become due at my death, unconnected with my will," "I hereby request my executors to cancel the mortgage deed," etc., "I again direct and prom- ise that my executors shall comply with my former request, that is, to cancel all deeds and papers I may have chargeable on the R. estate," were held not to operate as a release. 2 An entry in a man's account book, that, "P. pays no interest, nor shall I take the principal unless greatly distressed," was con- strued a release. 3 Where a mortgagee, on hearing that his son-in-law, the mortgagor, was about to sell the mortgaged property (a house occupied by the mortgagor) in order to pay off the debt, wrote that he might continue to live there without paying any rent, it was held that the mortgagor was entitled to redeem, on paying the principal, together with interest from the last day on which interest fell due, previously to the death of the mortgagor. 4 Whether a mere written entry or memorandum can of itself constitute a release is doubtful. 5 But while a paper writing might not of itself constitute a re- lease it might nevertheless contain such statements as to amount to a declaration of trust in favor of the debtor. Equity would then enforce the trust. 6 § 467. Where written release not controlled by parol evi- dence. — A writing, which, besides being a receipt, contains 1 Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251. v. Page, 8 Ind. 364; Hartwell v. Rice, 8 Scales v. Maude, 6 De G., M. & G. 1 Gray, 587; Oiler v. Bonebrake, 65 43. Pa. St. 338; Loring v. Blake, 106 3 Ashton v. Pye, 5 Ves. 350, note. Mass. 592; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 4 Yeomans v. Williams, L. R. 1 Bq. 185; Moore v. Darton, 7 Eng. Law & Cas. 184. Eq. Rep. 134; Clark v. Warner, 6 5 2 Story on Equity Jurisprudence, Conn. 355. The above cases are cases § 706. See, Eden v. Smyth, 5 Ves. Jr. of advancements, and gifts, but the 341 ; Jennings v. Blocker, 25 Ala. doctrine is analogous. See Story's 415; Stallings v. Finch, 25 Ala. 518; Equity Jurisprudence, §706. Crawford v. M'Elvy, 2 Speer, 225; 6 Morgan©. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. High's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 283 ; Mallett Cas. 475. 558 RELEASE. §468 stipulations of release and discharge from all claims growing out of a collision except one, can not be disputed or controlled by parol evidence. 1 § 468. Destruction of the obligation. — The willful destruc- tion of the evidence of the debt, done for the purpose of re- leasing the obligor, works a release. Thus where the holder of certain notes destroyed them and afterwards stated that as she did not expect to live long she did not want the maker to be compelled to pay them after her death, this was construed a release. 2 A debt contracted by the wife was held to be dis- charged, as a gift, causa mortis, by the husband's destroying the bond, the evidence of the debt, and declaring that the 1 Lehigh Val., etc., Co. v. Miller (1893), 59 Fed. Eep. 483, Severens, J. . "It is, no doubt, well-settled law that so much of such an instrument as is in the nature of an acknowledg- ment of receipt, being the mere state- ment of a fact, and not containing terms of agreement, may, as a general rule, be explained and contradicted by parol evidence. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 305 ; 2 Wharton on Evi- dence, §1064; "Weed v. Snow, 3 Mc- Lean, 265. But this instrument con- tained more than a mere receipt. It stated that, in consideration thereof, the owners of the Manitowoc released and forever discharged the Cayuga and her owners from all claims what- soever on account of the injury re- sulting from the collision, except the claim made by the owners for the loss of the use of the barge Manitowoc. It was a release, under seal, of all claims resulting from the collision except the one saved, namely, that for the value of the use of the vessel during the time she was disabled. This agree- ment for release was in the nature of contract, and could no more be dis- puted or controlled by parol evidence than any other instrument in writing witnessing an agreement of parties. 2 Wharton on Evidence, § 1063 ; Wood v. Young, 5 Wend. 620; Stearns v. Tappin, 5 Duer, 294; Pratt v. Castle, 91 Mich. 484; 52 N. W. Rep. 52; Cum- mings v. Baars, 36 Minn. 350; 31 N. W. Rep. 449; Sherburne v. Good- win, 44 N. H. 271. A release is held to include all demands embraced by its terms, whether particularly con- templated or not ; and direct parol ev- idence that a certain claim was not in the minds of the parties is not admis- sible. Deland v. Amesbury, etc., Man- ufacturing Co., 7 Pick. 244; Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303; Sherburne v. Goodwin, 44 N. H. 271. The surround- ing facts and circumstances may, as in other cases, be shown in order to ap- ply the language of the instrument to its proper subject-matter, and prevent its application to a matter not in- volved in the transaction. Littledale, J., in Simons v. Johnson, 3 Barn. & Adol.175; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 286, 288." 2 Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503. §§469, 470 RELEASE. 559 money was hers.' The destruction must, however, be actual; an intention to destroy will not suffice. 2 § 469. Delivery of the obligation. — The delivery by the creditor to the debtor of the obligation, or the evidence thereof, is a release. 3 So, also, the delivery or surrender of a note by the payee to the maker is prima facie a satisfaction or release of the debt. 4 § 470. Voluntary declarations. — The cases are not in accord upon the question whether voluntary declarations of release will work a release. The court of errors and appeals of New Jersey, in a very elaborate opinion, has reached the conclusion that no voluntary declaration by a creditor of an intention to release a debtor, unless accompanied by some act which 1 Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526. See also, Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238; Hillebrant v. Brewer, 6 Texas, 45; Grangiac v. Arden, 10 John. 292; Burney v. Ball, 24 Geo. 505 ; Silvers v. Reynolds, 19 N. J. Eq. 275; Gilbert v. Wetherell, 2 Sim. & Stu. 254; Rees v. Bees, 11 Rich. Eq. 86. "In Be Campbell's Estate, 7 Pa. St. 100; Chew v. Chew, 23 N. J. Eq. 471. See also, Nelson v. Cartmel, 6 Dana (Ky.), 7; Harley *. Harley, 57 Md. 340. 3 Lee v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182. 4 Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Ind. 337, a case showing the distinctions between a release and a gift. The court said : "We shall not inquire whether the de- livery of the note and mortgage in this case can be supported as a donatio mor- tis causa; nor whether the support of Benoni and wife constitutes a consid- eration that will uphold their sur- render. There are other principles upon which, in equity, the case can be determined. 'Acts and declara- tions may amount to what, in the court of chancery, will be equivalent to a release of a debt.' 2 Spence on Equitable Jurisdiction, 912. A court of equity will order the delivery up and cancellation of instruments, where they are 'clearly established by the proofs to have become functus officio according to the original intent and understanding of both parties;' and, also, 'where it has been fairly inferable from the acts or conduct of the party entitled to the benefit of the deed or other instrument, that he has treated it as released, or otherwise, dead in point of effect.' " 2 Story on Equity Jurisprudence, 19. See also, Wekettu. Raby, 2 Bro. P. C. 16; Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351 ; Edwards v. Campbell, 23 Barb. 423; Vanderbeck v. Vanderbeck, 30 N. J. Eq. 265; Bridgers v. Hutchins, 11 Ired. 68. Also, see the following cases on gifts, advancements, and the facts necessary to show an executed gift: Young r. Young, 80 N. Y. 422; Doty v. Willson, 47 N. Y. 580 ; Grangiac v. Arden, 10 John. 295; Davis v. Davis, 1 Nott & McCord, 224; Trow «. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446; Pitts ». Mangum, 2 Bailey, 588; Vassv. Hicks, 3 Murphy (N. C.) 493; Sutton's Ex. v. Hollowell, 2 Dev. 185; Lance v. Lance, 5 Jones L. 413. 560 RELEASE. § 471 amounts to a release at law, will work an equitable release. 1 This is also the rule in Pennsylvania, 2 Indiana, 3 Kentucky, 4 Mississippi, 5 Connecticut, 6 and Vermont. 7 In New York the courts also recognize the rule that a debt can not be released or transformed into a gift by a mere parol declaration subse- quent to its creation, but the distinction is drawn that where money is delivered by one person to another, under circum- stances rendering it uncertain as to whether it was intended as a loan or gift, a distinct declaration made afterward by the one who delivered the money may have the effect of deter- mining which it was. 8 § 471. The same subject continued. — Illustrations. — It ia always competent to show by parol declarations of the creditor that the so-called debt was only an advancement. Thus, dec- larations of the intestate that he had given his son something handsome, and, if he did well for him, should give him more; that he had held a writing against him, not a note, but had made him a present of it; and that he had had claims against him, but had none then, in the absence of any proof that he 1 Irwin v. Johnson, 36 N. J. Eq. in conformity with the requirements 347 (overruling Leddel v. Starr, 20 of the statute. The doctrine has been N. J. Eq. 274), where the court said: accepted in a few cases, but it seems "The recognition of a doctrine which to have arisen from a desire to alle- permits a mortgage to be extinguished viate the supposed hardship of spe- by a verbal declaration of the debtee cial cases, and from a mistaken view that he did not intend to insist upon of what was ruled in a case decided its payment, would seem to break in the high court of parliament as down not only the rule already men- early as the year 1724." tioned, but that which forbids the 2 McNutt v. Loney, 153 Pa. St. 281, revocation of an instrument by an where it was a promise to release, act less solemn than the act creating Kreider v. Boyer, 10 Watts, 54. it. Here there is neither a payment 3 Denman v. McMahin, 37 Ind. 241. nor an agreement for a good consid- 4 Clarke v. Clarke, 17 B. Mon. 698. eration to discharge, nor a technical 5 "Wheatley v. Abbott, 32 Miss. 343. release under seal. There is in the e Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322. doctrine an encroachment upon the 'Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595. field designed to be covered by the 8 Doty v. Willson, 47 N. Y. 580. See statute of wills, because it permits a also, Haverstock i>. Sarbach, 1 Watts person by parol to give a direction to & Searg. 390; McGuire v. Adams, 8 his property after his decease variant Pa. St. 286; Bradley v. Long, 2 from the course it would take by the Strobh. 160; Chew v. Chew, 23 N. J. direction of the instrument executed Eq. 471. § 472 RELEASE. 561 had given his son anything else, or had held any other paper or claim against him, are evidence tending to show the sur- render by the intestate of a receipt evidencing an advance- ment to the son. 1 § 472. Release of bills and notes. — It seems to be settled in England that a bill or note is discharged when the holder at or after maturity absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor or maker. And the liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be released by the holder verbally and without consideration either before or after its maturity. 2 But it is doubtful if this is law in America. Senator Daniel states the rule that if there is not a technical release under seal, no agreement can operate as a release, un- less it is upon a sufficient consideration. 8 The New York court of appeals has decided that where the holder of a note volun- 1 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 47 Vt. 637, the illustration in the text shows that an advancement may be converted into an absolute gift by the intestate surrendering the evidence thereof to be canceled, but it likewise would support, by inference, the ground that a matter was intended as an advance- ment instead of a debt. See also, Peabody v. Peabody, 59 Ind. 556, a case directly in point ; Harris v. Har- ris, 69 Ind. 181 ; Fitzhugh v. Fitzhugh, 11 Gratt. 210 ; Brooks v. Rogers, 101 Ala. Ill; 13 So. Rep. 386; Williams v. Chicago R. Co., 112 Mo. 463; Union Stone Works *. Breidenstein, 50 Kan. 53; Smith v. Ijams, 70 Hun, 155; 24 N. Y. Supl. 202; Deering v. Porter, 42 111. App. 120; Bluefields, etc., Co. v. Wollfe (Tex. App.), 22 S. W. Rep. 269 ; Landon «. Hutton, 50 N. J. Eq. 500; 25 Atl. Rep. 953; Davidson v. Burke, 143 111. 139; 32 N. E. Rep. 514; Tuckerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581 ; Strong v. Bird, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 315; Flower v. Marten, 2 M. & C. 459; Aston v. 'Aston, Ves. Sen. (Belt) 134; Wekett v. Raby, 3 Bro. P. 36 C. 16, the following language held to work a discharge : "I have R.'s bond, which I keep. I don't deliver it up, for I may live to want it more than he, but when I die he shall have it. He shall not be asked for it." 2 Benjamin's Chalmer's Bills, Notes and Checks, art. 239, citing Foster v. Dawber, 6 Ex. 839; Cook v. Lister, 32 L. J. C. P. 121; Abrey v. Crux, L. R. 5 C. P. 37. The following illus- trations are given : ' 'The holder of a bill at maturity tells the acceptor that he renounces all claims against him and gives up the bill to him. The bill is discharged." 2. "The holder of a bill before it matures writes to the first indorser that he renounces all claim against him. The first and subsequent indorsers are (probably) discharged as regards such holder. The drawer and acceptor are not." See Whatley v. Tricker, 1 Camp. 35. 3 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, (3d ed.) § 1290, citing Keeler v. Bar- tine, 12 Wend. 110; Carter v. Zen- blin, 68 Ind. 436. 562 release. §§ 473, 474 tarily cancels the same, and surrenders it to the maker, this ©perates as a release, although no consideration was paid. 1 § 473. Release of actions. — By a release of all actions, actions real, personal or mixed, are discharged; and so are all causes of action. 2 But the real parties alone are competent to release the action; and those are the real parties who are parties upon record. 3 A release of all actions is no bar to an execution, "which is not an action, but begins when the action ends." 4 But a release of all suits will extend 'to an execution, because an execution can not be had without application to the court, which is the "suit" of the party. 5 - A release of all "quarrels" discharges all actions and causes of action. 6 A man may enter into land, or take goods, notwithstanding a release of all actions;' and a release of all actions to the sheriff, who had seized partnership property, and sold it in execution for the debt of an individual partner, is no bar in trover, brought by the other partners, against the purchaser. 8 A release of per- sonal actions discharges mixed also; and, likewise, a release of real actions discharges mixed. 9 A release of all actions and causes of action against a partner is not a release of a cause of action against the firm. 10 § 474. Release of debts. — The word "debt" is as applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. To distinguish between the two, we say of the former that it is a debt owing, and of 1 Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y. der, 33 Pa. St. 268; Smith v. Barthol- 333. See also, Albert v. Ziegler, 29 oinew, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 270. Pa. St. 50 ; Beach v. Endress, 51 Barb. 2 Comyn's Digest, tit. Release. 570; Doty v. Wilson, 5 Lans. 7; Kent M M. & S. 300. v. Reynolds, 8 Hun, 559; Vanderbeck 4 Coke on Littleton, 291 a. v. Vanderbeck, SON. J. Eq.265; Booth 5 8 Rep. 153 b., but queer?, where an v. Succession of Smith, 3 Wood's C. C. execution issues as a matter of course 19; Adams v. Hull, 2 Denio, 306; without an application to the court. Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263 ; Bar- 6 Coke on Littleton, 292 a. ker D.Bradley, 42 N.Y. 316. And see 7 Littleton, §§ 496, 497, 498. the following cases cited in Benjamin's e Wilson v. Reed, 3 John. 175. Chalmer's Bills, Notes and Checks, 9 Littleton, §§ 492, 493. Coke on 246, to the contrary: Crawford v. Littleton, 285. Millspaugh, 13 Johns. 87; Harrison 10 Reading Railroad v. Johnson, 7 v. Close, 2 Johns. 448 ; Kidder v. Kid- Watts & S. 317. § 475 RELEASE. 563 the latter that it is a debt due. In other words debts are of two kinds: solvendum in prsesenti and solvendum in futuro. Whether a claim or demand is a debt or not is in no respect determined by a reference to the time of payment. A sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency, however, is not a debt, and does not become a debt until the contingency has happened. 1 Therefore, by a release of all debts, are dis- charged and released all debts whether owing or to become owing at a certain fixed future time. But debts due on a con- tingency, which may never happen, are not released. 2 By releasing the debt, the security for the debt is released; and, therefore, where by a composition deed a creditor released his debtor from all debts, accounts, actions, claims, 'etc., it was held, that he had thereby discharged his lien upon an indenture of lease which had been deposited with him by the debtor as a se- curity for his debt, so that the subsequent giving up of that deed formed no consideration for a new promise. 3 § 475. Release of dower — Between executors. — A contract by a wife releasing her dower to her husband is valid if not procured by fraud or duress. 4 Where an executor and execu- trix who were legatees under the will executed an instrument stating that their accounts were settled "as between them- selves, and as between themselves and said estate," and mutually releasing each other from every liability "by reason of anything relating to the estate or the doings or proceedings People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 524; Meeker, 37 N. J. Law, 382 ; Appeal of Wentworth v. Whittemore, 1 Mass. City of Erie, 91 Pa. St. 398. 471; Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 2 Sheppard's Touchstone of Common 488; Davis v. Ham, 3 Mass. 33; Assurances, 342. Frothingham v. Haley, 3 Mass. 68; 3 Cowper v. Green, 7 M. & W. 633; McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, Cragoe v. Jones, L. P. 8 Ex. 81; 224; 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, Ward v. National Bank, L. E. 8 App. 154; Kimpton v. Bronson, 45 Barb. Cas. 755. 618; United States v. Colt, 1 Pet. C. 4 Chittoch v. Chittoch, 101 Mich.367; C. 145; New Haven, etc., Co. v. Fow- 59 N. W. Rep. 655, following Dakin ler,28Conn.l03; Mayor, etc., of Balti- v. Dakin (1893), 97 Mich. 284; 56 N. more v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 ; Frazer v. Tu- W. Rep. 562. nis, 1 Binn. 254 ; New Jersey Ins. Co. v. 564 release. §§476-478 of either of them as executrix or executor of said will," it was held that the release was a bar to proceedings instituted by the executor before the surrogate to compel the executrix to account. 1 § 476. Release of all demands. — The most beneficial release a man can have is a release of all demands. 2 By such a release, all actions, real, personal and mixed, and all actions of appeal, and also all executions are discharged. 3 So are all covenants, personal or real ; as, warranty, bonds and con- tracts; 4 and all conditions before breach, or performance, or after; 5 also a right or title to land. 6 Where a rent does not attend the reversion, but is in gross, such release discharges all arrears, and all which may afterward accrue. 7 § 477. Accessory and consequential matters. — In a release of the principal the accessory is included; a release of a fraud or breach of trust will debar the releasor from his remedy against parties secondarily liable. 8 So a release of covenants would operate to discharge a bond given for the performance of those covenants. 9 Where a release of all demands is given this puts an end to all claims for the detention of the debt; also, all collateral matters growing out of the transaction are closed up and satisfied. 10 § 478. What a general release does not cover. — Where a thing is not payable directly by the contract, and is not yet due, a release of all demands does not discharge it ; as, if upon a submission to an award by bond, money is awarded to be paid at a day after the release ;" likewise such release does not dis- charge rent incident to a reversion, not due, 12 nor a collateral covenant to be formed in fvturo.™ A release of all demands to 1 Matter of Pruyn (1894), 141 N. Y. "Thompson v. Harrison, 2 Bro. C. 544. C. 164 ; Blackwood v. Borrowes, 2 Con. 2 Littleton, §508. & L. 478. 3 Littleton, § 508. 9 Reade v. Bullocke, Dyer, 56b. 4 Coke on Littleton, 291 b. 10 Tetley v. Wanless, L. R. 2 Ex. 275. 6 Coke on Littleton, 291 b. " 2 Croke, 300. 6 Littleton, § 509. 12 2 Rolle's Abridgment,408 ; Croke's 7 Croke's Elizabeth, 606; 2 Croke, Elizabeth, 606; 2 Croke, 487 487; 2 Rolle, 408, 1, 15; 1 Siderfin, 13 2 Croke, 170. 141. § 479 RELEASE. 565 the bail, before judgment against the principal, does not dis- charge the recognizance by the bail. 1 Likewise a release of all demands, in general words, is restrained to the particular occasion ; and is often construed as qualified by the recitals. 2 § 479. Recitals and object of release qualifying it. — Where a release is general in its terms and there is no limitation by way of recital or otherwise, the releasor may not prove an exception by parol ; the instrument itself is the only compe- tent evidence of the agreement of the parties, unless avoided for fraud, mistake, duress or some like cause. So also, if the words of a release fairly import a general discharge, their effect may not be limited so as to exclude a demand simply upon proof that at the time of its execution the releasor had no knowledge of the existence of the demand ; s but it is now a general rule in construing releases, especially where the same instrument is to be executed by various persons, standing in various relations, and having various kinds of claims and demands against the releasee, that general words, though the most broad and comprehensive, are to be limited to particular demands, where it manifestly appears, by the consideration, by the recitals, by the nature and circumstances of the several demands, to one or more of which it is proposed to apply the release, that it was so intended to be limited by the parties, and for the purpose of ascertaining that intent, every part of the instrument is to be considered. The general words in a '2 Croke, 170. W. Eep. 734; Henas v. Henas, 5 Ind. 2 Cole v. Knight, 3 Mod. Rep. 277; App. 100; 31 N. E. Rep. 832; Ohio & Coke on Littleton, 254 b. Mississippi R. Co. v. Crumbo, 4 Ind. 3 Whiting v. Plumas Co., 64 Cal. App. 456; 30 N. E. Rep. 434; Pierce v. 65; Hitchcock c. Davis, 87 Mich. 629; Sweet, 33 Pa. St. 151, holding a re- Fidelity Trust Co. v. People's Co., lease of the personal liability of a 150 Pa. St. 8; Robinson v. MeFaul, 19 debtor will not, unless so intended, Mo. 549; Kirchner v. New Home Co., discharge a lien for the same claim. 16 1ST. Y. Supl. 761 ; Frost v. Brigham, Pratt v. Castle, 91 Mich. 484 ; 52 N. W. 139 Mass. 43; Cowan B.Abbott, 92 Rep. 52; Richards v. Angell, 21 N. Y. Cal. 100; Hart v. Taylor, 70 Miss. 665; Supl. 646; In re Naglee's Estate, 10 12 So. Rep. 553; Loth v. Friedrick, 95 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 525; Currier v. Bil- Mich. 598; 55 N. W. Rep. 369; Battle v. ger, 24 Atl. Rep. 168; Murphy v. McArthur, 49 Fed. Rep. 715; Lambert Kastner; 24 Atl. Rep. 564; In re v. Alcorn,144Ill. 313; 33 N.E. Rep. 53; Reynolds, 21 N. Y. Supl. 592. Taylor v. Horst, 52 Minn. 300; 54 N. 566 RELEASE. § 480 release are limited always to that thing or those things which were especially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given ;' but a dispute that had not emerged, or a question which had not at all arisen, can not be considered as bound and concluded by the anticipatory words of a general release, 2 as where general words of release are immedi- ately connected with a proviso, restraining their operation. 5 So a release of all demands, then existing, or which should thereafter arise, was held not to extend to a particular bond, which was considered not to be within the recital and consid- eration of the assignment, and not within the intent of the parties. 4 So where it is recited, that various controversies are subsisting between the parties, and actions pending, and that it had been agreed that one should pay the other a certain sum of money, and that they should mutually release all actions and causes of action, and thereupon such releases were executed, it was held that, though general in terms, the releases were qualified by the recital and limited to actions pending. 5 So it has been held in Massachusetts, that where, upon the receipt of a proportionate share of a legacy given to another, the person executed a release of all demands under the will, it was held not to apply to another and distinct legacy to the person himself. 6 § 480. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a mortgagee, who also had another debt against the mortgagor, together with other creditors executed a release to the mort- gagor, by which they released him "from all and singular 1 Kirchner v. The New Home Co., ford v. Murray, 6 Johns. Ch. 452; Par- 135 N. Y. 182 ; Jackson v. Stackhouae, sons v. Hughes, 9 Paige, 591. 1 Cow. 122; Pierson v. Hooker, 3 * Turner v. Turner, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. Johns. 68. Of. Lyman v. Clarke, 9 829, per Malins, V. C, 835; Rich v. Mass. 235 ; Farewell v. Coker, 2 Merr. Lord, 18 Pick. 322. 353, note; Post v. Mtnn, etc., Ins. 3 Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. &Bing. 38.' Co., 43 Barb. 251 ; Butcher v. Butcher, * Payler v. Homersham, 4 Maule & 4 B. & P. 113; Wright v. Russel, 3 Sel. 423. Wills. 530; Cole v. Knight, 3 Mod. 6 Simons v. Johnson, 3 Barn. & 277; Barclay v. Lucas, 1 T. R. 291, Adolph, 175; Jackson v, Stackhouae, note; Miller v. Craig, 6 Beav. 433; 1 Cow. 126. Lindo v. Lindo, 1 Beav. 496; Turner 6 Lyman v. Clark, 9 Mass. 235. v. Turner, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 829; Mum- § 481 RELEASE. 567 their several claims and demands against him, of every name and nature," it was held that the mortgage was not thereby- released. 1 A debt due from an individual is a totally distinct thing from a debt due from a firm, society or partnership of persons of which that individual happens to be a member; and a release of a debt by a creditor is to be taken as a release of the private debt of a partner rather than a partnership debt, if the words of the release are satisfied by the private debt.' A deed of release is not avoided by a blank being left in the schedule showing how much the debt is. The question is left open to proof to show which debt is meant. 3 A deed contain- ing a general release of all debts recited that the releasee had previously agreed to pay to the releasor the sum of £40 for the possession of certain premises, and that, in "consideration of the said sum of £40 being now so paid as hereinbefore is men- tioned," the receipt of which money he did acknowledge, did release, etc. The releasor brought an action to recover the £40 due for the release; it was held he was not estopped to show that the £40 had not in fact been paid. 4 § 481. Contingent release. — A release may be contingent; that is, it may take effect upon the happening of some uncer- tain future event, or it may cease to be a release upon some uncertain future event. In other words, it may be condition- al. 5 Thus, where a debtor made a deed with his creditors, which recited that, inasmuch as it was essential to the enter- ests of the creditors that the debtor should not be harassed, 1 Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 322. the whole intention of the deed. But, 2 Ex parte Kirk, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 800. upon what assumption is that ground 8 Fazakerly v. McKnight, 6 El. & taken? Upon the assumption that Blackf. 794, 807; Harrhy v. Wall, 1 every release, to have any operation B. & Aid. 103. at all, must operate from the moment 4 Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Aid. 606. at which it is given, I must confess I 5 Gibbons v. Vouillon, 8 C. B. 483. do not assent to that proposition. I "The plaintiff's counsel, on the other do not see why parties may not agree hand, argues with much ingenuity, that a certain instrument shall oper- that if we hold it to be a release, we ate as a release, from the happening must hold it to be a release from the of such an event. The passage in moment of its execution ; and that is Coke on Littleton, referred to by my manifestly contrary to the intention brother Maule, seems to show that of the parties. To extinguish the they may." debt would manifestly be to defeat 568 RELEASE. § 482 therefore the creditors agreed that, if any creditor should, while the agreement was in force, commence an action in re- spect of his debt, the deed should operate as a release; it was held that the bringing of suit before the time limited by the deed worked a release. 1 Likewise, an example of a release becoming null and void upon condition subsequent, is where a composition is made by a debtor with his creditors in which the creditors release the debtor from his debts upon certain payments, with a proviso that, on default in payment, the re- lease is to become void. A failure to make the stipulated pay- ments avoids the release. 2 § 482. Covenant not to sue. — A bond or covenant not to sue is equivalent to a release. 3 At common law such a covenant was only available to the covenantee personally; that is, could only be pleaded as a release where sued alone. If sued jointly with another, or if the creditor jointly sues with another, the covenant was not pleadable as a release, but the covenantee was driven to his cross-action. 4 But by the reformed pro- cedure a covenant not to sue one debtor is available to him aa a counter-claim in an action against him and others. 5 A covenant, however, not to sue one of two joint obligors will not discharge the other. 6 1 Corner v. Sweet, L. R. 1 C. P. 456. sue at any time. In such cases, in or- 2 Hall v. Levy, L. R. 10 C. P. 154. der to avoid circuity of action, the See also, Blakemore v. Jones, 5 Tex. covenants may be pleaded in bar as a Civ. App. 516 ; 22 S.W. Rep. 779 ; John- release." Fowell v. Forrest, 2 Saund- son v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. ers, 48; Smith v. Mapleback, 1 T. R. 229; Shepherd u.Busch,154Pa. St. 149; 441; Deux v. Jefferies, Cro. Eliz. 352. Newington v. Levy, L. R. 6 C. P. 180; * Couch v. Mills, 21 Wend. 424; Walker v. Nevill, 3 H. & C. 403; Bel- Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168; Hutton shaw v. Bush, 11 C. B. 190. v. Eyre, 6 Taunt. 289; AValmesley v. s Cuyler v. Cuyler, 2 Johns. 186; Cooper, 11 A. & E. 216; Webb v. Spi- Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cow. 122; cer, 13 Q. B. 886; Thompson v. Lack, Ford !>. Beech, 11 Q. B. 852, where 3 M. G. &S.540; Crane ■«. Ailing, 15 Parke, B., said: "The only case N. Y. L. 423; Bowne v. Mount Hol- in which a covenant or promise ly Bank, 45 N. J. Law, 360. not to sue is held to be pleadable 5 Pomeroy on Code Remedies (3d as a bar, or to operate as a bar or ed.), 755, et seg. suspension, and by consequence a re- e Cuyler v. Cuyler, 2 John. 186; Mil- lease or extinguishment of the right ler v. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18; Butchers' of action, is where the covenant or Bank v. Brown, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. promise not to sue is general, not to 149; Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455; U 483, 484 RELEASE. 569 § 483. Covenant not to sue for a definite time. — A covenant not to sue upon a simple contract debt for a limited time is not pleadable in bar of an action for such debt. At least it was so held at common law. 1 But now by the reformed procedure the covenantee may recoup damages in the same action in which he is sued. 2 § 484. Release of sureties. — If the person guarantied does any act injurious to the surety, or inconsistent with his rights, or if he omits to do any act which his duty enjoins him to do, and the omission proves injurious to the surety, the latter will be discharged. 3 Where the mortgagor of a house executed a Bank of Chenango v. Osgood, 4 Wend. 607; Phelps v. Johnson, 8 John. 54; Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18; Lysaght v. Phillips, 5 Duer, 106. lr rhimbleby v. Barron, 3 M. & W. 210; Deux v. Jefferies, Cro. Eliz. 352; Lacy v. Kynaston, 2 Salk. 575 ; Smith v. Mapleback, 1 T. E. 441 ; Burgh v. Preston, 8 T. B. 483 ; Deanu. Newhall, 8 T. E. 168. ' See the cases cited in the note to the preceding section and also the ar- gument of Barrister Cresswell in Thimbleby v. Barron, 3 M. & W. 210. 3 Watts v. Shuttleworth, 5 Hurl. & N. 233. In Benson v. Phipps, 87 Texas, 578; 29 S. W. Eep. 1061, Gaines, C. J., said: "It is the right of the surety, at any time after the maturity of the debt, to pay it, and to proceed against the principal for indemnity. This right is impaired if the creditor enter into a valid contract with the principal for an extension of the time of payment. The obligation of the surety is strictly limited to the terms of his contract, and any valid agree- ment between the creditor and the principal, by which his position is changed for the worse, discharges his liability. For this reason it is uni- versally held that a contract between the two, which is binding in law, by which the principal secures an ex- tension of time, releases the surety, provided the surety has not become party to the transaction by consenting thereto." In Gallagher v. St. Pat- rick's Church, 45 Neb. 535; 63 N. W. Eep. 864, the contract provided : (a) That the building should be com- pleted by the 31st of December, 1890; (b) that, if the building should not be completed by that time, the con- tractors should forfeit to the church the sum of $10 for each day that the building remained unfinished there- after; (c) that, if the contractors should neglect or refuse to comply "with any of the articles of this agree- ment," the church might take posses- sion of the premises, after giving three days' notice in writing, complete the building, and charge the costs thereof to the contractors; (d) that the archi- tect should make estimates on the last days of August, September, October, and November, of the value of the material and labor furnished by the contractors; and the church at said dates should pay to the contractors three-fourths of the amount of such estimates ; (e) that the church should protect by insurance to cover its in- terest in the property when payments had been made to the contractors. To secure the performance of their agree- ments the contractors executed a bond 570 RELEASE. §484 bond with sureties to the mortgagee that he would rebuild the house if it should be destroyed by fire, and the mortgagee as- signed the mortgage and debt secured thereby, but did not formally assign the bond to rebuild the house, it was held that the bond was a part of the security for the debt, and passed to the assignee with the debt; and, further, that such change in the ownership of the debt and security did not release the sureties on the bond. 1 to the church signed by themselves as principals and a number of other parties as sureties. The building was not completed by the 31st of Decem- ber, 1890, and the contractors were proceeding with its construction on the 18th of February, 1891, when it was totally destroyed by fire. Prior to the 31st of December, 1890, the church had paid to the contractors for labor and material the sum of $12,440 ; prior to the day of the destruction of the building the church had paid to the contractors $14,489.59. The church took out insurance on the property in the sum of $10,000, and no more. The church sued the contractors and the sureties on their bond to recover the money paid to the contractors under the contract. It was held (1) That the failure of the church to keep the building insured to the extent of its interest therein was a complete de- fense for the sureties on the bond of the contractors ; (2) the object of the provision in the contract requiring the church to insure its interest in the property was to lessen the risks taken by the sureties; (3) that the sureties were under no obligation to make in- quiries from time to time to ascertain if the church had complied with its contract to insure its interest in the property ; (4) that the sureties had a right to suppose that the church would comply with its contract in that re- spect, and that if the building should be destroyed before its acceptance by the church, and they were called upon to and did make good the loss, they would be entitled by subrogation or otherwise to the benefit of the insur- ance effected on the property by the church ; (5) that the question as to whether the destruction of the build- ing was the result of the negligence of the contractors was an immaterial is- sue ; (6) that the church could not excuse its failure to comply with its part of the contract on the ground that its performance would have been of no value to the sureties, because the loss of the building through the negligence of their principals would defeat a recovery of the insurance, if it had been effected; (7) that its duty was to insure the property, and, when the loss sued for occurred and was paid by the sureties, to transfer to them the insurance contracts, and leave the sureties and the insurance companies to litigate the question of the latter's liability ; (8) that the fact that the church was unable to procure responsible insurance companies to write insurance on the building to the extent of its interest therein did not relieve it from the performance of its agreement to insure the property to the extent of its interest. 1 Longfellow v. McGregor (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1032, following Longfellow v. McGregor (1894), 56 Minn. 312, where Gilfillan, C. J., said: "In accordance with the well- known general rule that an assign- ment of a debt takes with it, and vests in the assignee, the right to all se- 5 485 RELEASE. 571 § 485. When extension to debtor does not release surety. — An agreement to give time to the debtor, which reserves a right to sue at the request of the sureties, does not release the latter. 1 So also, where, during the whole period covered by a guaranty, the principal was unable to pay the debt, the mere delay of the creditor in demanding payment of the principal will not discharge the guarantor. 8 And an agreement between curities for the debt, the bond passed to plaintiff; and, where the security is a bond with sureties, change in the ownership of the debt and security does not affect the contract of the sureties, so as to release them." 1 Exchange Bldg. Co. v. Bayless (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 279. "There is no principle of law better settled than the one contended for by the appellant, viz., that any change of the contract by the principal, however slight, without the consent of the surety, releases the latter from all further liability. Extension of time for payment is the most frequent form in which the creditor so deals with the principal as to discharge the surety; and, whenever such indul- gence is granted in pursuance of a binding legal contract, the surety is at once released from his obligations. 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1312. The same author says : 'But this principle on which sureties are released is not a mere shadow without substance. It is founded on the re- striction of the rights of the sureties by which they are supposed to be in- jured. Therefore, when there is a legal impossibility of injury, the prin- ciple does not apply.' Hence it is equally well settled that if, in a con- tract between the creditor and the principal debtor for an extension of time, all the rights and remedies of the surety are reserved unimpaired, the surety is not discharged. 2 Brandt on Suretyship, § 376. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments, in giving the elements or circumstances that must unite in order to constitute an indulgence which will discharge the surety, states the fifth to be as follows: 'The indulgence must be without reservation of remedy, against the surety, for that would reserve the surety's recourse on the principal.' See also, Harris v. Brooks, 2 Am. L. C. 425, where it is said : 'It follows from this reasoning that an agreement to give time to the debtor, which re- serves a right to sue at the request of the surety, will not be effectual as a defense in an action brought againBt the latter.' " 2 Hooper v. Hooper, 81 Md. 155; 31 Atl. Rep. 508, McSherry, J.: "Un- der these conditions, a mere delay in making a demand upon him could not have resulted in an injury to the guarantors, because they were placed by such delay in no worse position than if demand had been made ear- lier. Mere prolongation of the time of payment will not dischage a surety or a guarantor (Benjamin v. Hillard, 23 How. 149), because, as concisely stated by the late Mr. Justice Mathews in Davis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159, 'both the laches of the plaintiff and the loss of the defend- ant must occur to constitute a de- fense.' It is therefore incumbent on the party relying on this defense to establish the facts which compose it; and hence he must not only show that there has been an unreasonable de- lay, but, further, that an injury or 572 RELEASE. §486 a creditor and the principal debtor for an extension of the time of payment will not operate to release the surety, where there is no consideration for the agreement. So, also, the mere volun- tary forbearance on the part of the creditor, enlarging the time of payment, without consideration, or the mere failure to in- stitute an action against the principal when the debt becomes due, will not alone discharge the surety. 1 § 486. Release of a co-debtor. — The release of one joint or joint and several promisor is, generally speaking, a release of all. 2 But the release of an infant who is a co-debtor for a debt upon which he is not liable is no release of the other debtors.' And a mere agreement to release a co-debtor, which is not valid as to him because of lack of consideration, will not release the loss consequent thereon has been sus- tained by him. Not only has that not been done, but the record con- tains evidence to the effect that at no time Bince his assignment, in 1886, has William J. Hooper been in a con- dition to pay his creditors all that he owed." 1 Smith v. Mason, 44 Neb. 610 ; 63 N. W. Rep. 41, Norval, C. J. . "In order that an agreement to extend the time of payment made by the creditor with the principal debtor may operate to release the surety, it must be for a suf- ficient consideration, and without the surety's consent. Burr v. Boyer, 2 Neb. 265; Dillon v. Russell, 5 Neb. 484. If the consideration for such extension be proved, and there can be no doubt of it, it must also be pleaded. In the next place it does not appear from the record that there was any agreement entered into for an extension of the time of payment of the original note, but the evidence shows the contrary to be true. The note matured August 1, 1890, and was not taken up until a year later, but this fact alone did not discharge the sureties. There was but merely a voluntary forbearance on the part of the payees to enforce the collection of the note, without any consideration for the same. The mere failure to bring an action upon the note when it matured did not have the effect to release the sureties. Dillon v. Rus- sell, 5 Neb. 484; Sheldon v. "Williams, 11 Neb. 272; 9 N. W. Rep. 86." 2 Maslin v. Hiett, 37 W. Va. 15; Vandever v. Clark, 16 Ark. 331 ; Tuck- erman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581 ; Row- ley v. Stoddard, 7 John. 207; Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 320 ; Dudley v. Bland, 83 N. C. 220; Gould o. Gould, 4N. H. 173; Elliott v. Holbrook, 33 Ala. 659, holding a release of one partner only prima facie a release of all. The United States v. Thompson, Gilpin (U. S.) 614; Campbell v. Brown, 20 Ga. 415 ; Crawford v. Roberts, 8 Ore. 324 ; Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann.583 ; Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447; Tay- lor c.Galland, 3 Greene (Iowa) , 1 ; Ben- jamin v. McConnel, 9 111. 536; Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 569. 3 Young v. Currier, 63 N. H. 419. 5 487 RELEASE. 573 others. 1 So also, the agreement to wait on a joint debtor for his part of a debt is no release of the others. 2 § 487. Release of joint and several debtors. — It is, as we have seen, ordinarily true that a release of one of several joint and several obligors or debtors, or a release by a part of the joint obligees, is a release of all. 8 But where one is liable in contract to two persons jointly, and settles with one of them individually, so that the latter has no longer any real interest in the matter, the debtor is still liable to the other of the two creditors. 4 A release of one joint debtor, or one joint and sev- eral debtor, may be such as to release all; but a release may be given to one of several debtors, and, if the rights are re- served, against the others, the debt can still be collected of them. 5 Nothing short of a technical release under seal, how- ever, can operate as a discharge of two joint and several debtors, where a part only of the debt is paid by one. 6 'Clifton v. Foster (Texas App.), tucket Institution, 15 R. I. 489 ; 8 Atl. 20 S. W. Rep. 1005; Bridges v. Phil- Rep. 697. lips, 17 Texas, 128; Mcllhenny v. 6 First Nat. Bank v. Marshall, 73 Blum, 68 Texas, 197 ; Small v. Older, Maine, 79 ; Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 57 Iowa, 326; Coonley v. Wood, 36 125, and cases cited; McAllester v. Hun, 559 ; Tryon v. Hart, 2 Conn. 120 ; Sprague, 34 Maine, 296-298 ; Sohier v. American Bank v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. Loring, 6 Cush. 537 ; Potter v. Green, 123 ; Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 Mete. 6 Allen, 442 ; Dickinson v. Metacomet, 276; McLellan v. Cumberland Bank, etc., Bank, 130 Mass. 132. 24 Maine, 566 ; Ward v. Johnson, 13 6 Bradford v. Prescott (1893), 85 Mass. 148; McNeal v. Blackburn, 7 Maine, 482; 27 Atl. Rep. 461, Foster, Dana (Ky.), 170 ; Alexander v. Alex- J.: "This matter has been settled ander, 3 Pa. St. 56 ; Whitaker v. Salis- too long, and ratified too often, to ad- bury, 15 Pick. 534. mit of any question in this state. It 2 Pinney v. Bugbee, 13 Vt. 623. was first declared in Walker v. Mc- 'Tuckerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. Culloch, 4 Maine, 421, and reaffirmed 581 482 Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. in McAllester ^.Sprague,34 Maine, 296; 14 N. E. Rep. 534; 7 Wait's Drinkwater v. Jordan, 46 Maine, 432, Actions and Defenses, 460, and cases and in First Nat. Bank v. Marshall, there cited ; Houston v. Darling, 16 73 Maine, 79. Formerly a more strict Maine, 413 ; Hall v. Gray, 54 Maine, # and technical rule prevailed ; but the 230. weight of authority now is more lib- 4 Crafts v. Sweeney 18 R. I. 730; 30 eral, and, although technical words of Atl. Rep. 658; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. release are used, the intention of the Portland, etc., R. Co., 119 Mass. 498; parties is sought in construing the in- See also, Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. strument as a whole, the circum- 482; 14 N. E. Rep. 534; Clapp v. Paw- stances of the case and the relations 574 EELEASE. §§ 488. 489 § 488. Release of co-tort-feasor. — Upon similar grounds, the release of one joint tort-feasor is the release of all. 1 Thus, in case of a collision of trains of two railroad companies, where a person was injured, and had a right of action against either company, it was held that, whether he could have maintained a joint action or not, a release of one discharged both. 8 But where joint tort-feasors have been severally sued, the receipt of money in settlement of the action against one does not discharge the others unless it was received as satis- faction for the whole injury. 3 § 489. Further of joint tort-feasors — Of partners. — A city which pollutes the water of a natural stream by discharging drainage therein, to the injury of one through whose lands the stream flows, and an owner of gas works who also dis- charges noxious matter from the works into the stream, al- though not joint tort-feasors, are jointly and severally liable in damages; and a release of such owner will not release the city from liability for damages, unless executed in full satis- of the parties being taken into con- sideration ; and if it is found that it was not intended as a release of the whole debt, it will be construed as only an agreement not to charge the party to whom the release is given, and will not be permitted to have the effect of a technical release. In such case it has no greater effect than an agreement or covenant to discharge, or not to sue, which is never regarded as a release, and when given to one of several joint debtors is never con- strued as a release to the others. La- cy v. Kynaston, 2 Salk. 575; Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168; Bank of Cats- kill v. Messenger, 9 Cow. 37 ; "Walker v. McCulloch,-4 Maine, 421 ; McAlles- ter v. Sprague, 34 Maine, 296 ; Durell v. Wendell, 8 N. H. 369, 372; Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 125 ; Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305; Pond v. Williams, 1 Gray, 630; Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. St. 168; Bonney v. Bonney, 29 Iowa, 448; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 44 111. 405, 410-413; 1 Parsons on Contracts, *28. And the remedy of the party to whom such an agreement is given, if afterwards molested on account of the debt, is by a special action founded upon such agreement. It can not be pleaded in bar of an action against all, or set up in defense. Drinkwater v. Jordan, 46 Maine, 432; Walkers. Mc- Culloch, 4 Maine, 421 ; McAllester v. Sprague, 34 Maine, 296; Berry v. Gil- lis, 17 N. H. 9; Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 125, 128." 1 Long v. Long, 57 Iowa, 497 ; Bar- rett v. Third Ave. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 628; Knickerbacker v. Colver, 8 Cow. Ill; Livingston ». Bishop, 1 John. 290 ; Ru- ble v. Turner, 2 Hen. & Munf. 38. 2 Chapin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 18 111. App. 47; Gunther e. Lee, 45 Md. 60; Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185. 3 Pogel v. Meilke, 60 Wis. 248 ; Corn- stock ii. Hopkins, 61 Hun, 189; Sharpe v. "Williams, 41 Kan. 56. §489 RELEASE. 575 faction of all the injury sustained by reason of the nuisance. 1 If the person injured by a joint tort accept full satisfaction from one of the tort-feasors, he can not sue the other. 8 A release by a creditor, reciting that, whereas, a certain named partnership is indebted to him by "virtue of a judgment" re- covered against the firm, and whereas he has agreed to com- pound "said indebtedness" to him of said firm, therefore he releases the "members of the said late firm, " other than a certain member from all liability for the "said indebtedness," and that the release shall operate to discharge all and every person other than such member from all liability growing out of the "indebtedness aforesaid," is a release of the original indebtedness, and not merely of the judgment, and releases a dormant partner of whose existence the creditor was unaware. 3 to prepare for market with notice of H.'s interest, and instructions not to deliver to T., he becomes a bailer for hire for both H. and T. ; and if the cotton is delivered to T., and by him converted, the ginner is jointly liable with him for H.'s interest. Such lia- bility is not removed by the fact that T. accounted for, and H. accepted, part of the proceeds of the cotton first taken away, this not being a sat- isfaction of the conversion. 2 Spurr v. North Hudson R. Co., 56 N. J. Law, 346 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 582, Beas- ley, C. J. : "It was admitted upon the argument on the legal issue thus presented that, in the language of the brief of the counsel of the defendant, 'while separate suits may be brought against several defendants for a joint trespass, and while there may be a recovery against each, yet there can be but one satisfaction.' For this doctrine, which is not disputable, the case among others, of Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290, was cited." 3 Harbeck v. Pupin (1895), 145 N. Y. 70; 39 N. E. Eep. 722, Finch, J.: "Authorities are cited to the purport that where one deals with a known member of a firm, so as to discharge him, the release does not operate to 1 City of Valparaiso v. Moffit, 12 Ind. App. 250; 39 N. E. Rep. 909, Lotz, J.. "The case made by the plaintiffs' complaint in this action is that of a public nuisance, and all per-, sons who created or continued it are jointly and severally liable for all the damages resulting therefrom, al- though they are not joint tort-feas- ors. The release of Stratton did not release the city, unless it appears that it was in full satisfaction of all the in- jury sustained by reason of the nui- sance. It further appears by the com- plaint and the answers that the nui- sance has been continued since the release was given on July 1, 1892. Ev- ery continuance of a nuisance makes a fresh one, and he who continues a nuisance is liable to successive suits, each continuance being a new one, in which there is a fresh injury and a fresh damage. Stein v. City of La Fayette, 6 Ind. App. 214; Prentiss v. Wood, 132 Mass. 486 ; Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass. 72; Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503. One recovery does not bar subsequent actions where the nuisance is continued." In Horsley v. Moss, 5 Texas Civ. App. 341 ; 23 S. W. Rep. 1115, it was held that where cotton is delivered to a public ginner 576 release. §§490,491 § 490. Statutory provisions. — Some of the states have en- acted laws authorizing one or more of several joint debtors to compound or compromise for their joint indebtedness in dis- charge of their liability and without affecting the liability of the other joint debtors. These statutes are liberally construed, and all joint debtors seem to be within their meaning; in- asmuch as it is held that a creditor of a partnership may re- lease one member without discharging the others. 1 § 491. Express reservation of remedy against co-debtors. — By an express provision to that effect a creditor may release one co-debtor and reserve his rights against others. 2 But in Illinois the courts have rejected this rule, and the reservation is held void. 3 A release of one of several joint tort-feasors, re- serving the right to proceed against the others, will notdischarge the latter. 4 The reservation mast be in the deed of release; oral evidence of an express parol reservation is not sufficient. 6 A distinction should be noted between a release of a co-tort- feasor and the receiving of satisfaction for the injury. If the tort is satisfied all the tort-feasors are released, although the set free an unknown and dormant 2 Greenwald v. Kaster, 86 Pa. St. partner. The case specifically relied 45; Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. St. 1G8; on is that of Robinson v. Wilkinson, Northern Ins. Co. v. Potter, 63 Oal. 3 Price, 538. What it holds is appli- 157 ; North v. Wakefield, 13 Q. B. cable only to a case where ho release 536: "The reason why a release actually discharging the dormant part- to one debtor releases all jointly lia- ner has been executed, but his dis- ble is because, unless it was held to charge is claimed under the common- do so, the co-debtor, after paying the law rule that a discharge of one is a debt, might sue him who was released discharge of all. That was the legal for contribution, and so, in effect, he inference from the act, and, possibly, would not be released ; but that rea- was not invariably drawn in behalf of son does not apply where the debtor a dormant or unknown partner. But released agrees to such a qualification here the discharge comes not from a f the release as will leave him liable legal inference, which may be re- to any rights of the co-debtor." strained or modified, but from an ex- 8 Rice v. Webster, 18 111. 331; Par- press covenant to release the dormant melee v. Lawrence, 44 111. 405. partner. The question is not one of * Matthews v. Chicopee Manufactur- inference from ambiguous acts, but of i ng Co., 3 Rob. 711 ; Irvine v. Mil- an actual contract for a discharge." bank, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 378; Bloss 1 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109; Bo- v . Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393. len v. Crosby, 49 N. Y. 183 ; Northern s Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. 482. Ins. Co. v. Potter, 63 Cal. 157 ; Starr v. Stiles (Ariz.), 19 Pac. Rep. 225. §§ 492-494 release. 577 release expressly reserves the right to proceed against the others. 1 § 492. Covenant not to sne a co'debtor. — A covenant not to sue one co-debtor or one co-tort-feasor does not discharge the others. Thus the dismissal of an action against one of two joint tort-feasors, and the giving him a covenant not to sue, although supported by a consideration, is no release of the other tort-feasor. 2 § 493. Release by a co-creditor. — A release by a co-creditor binds all the creditors. 8 Thus one partner of a firm may sign a deed of composition and release a debt due the firm. 4 But in Ohio the courts reject the rule that the action of a creditor binds his co-creditors, and in that state all a co-creditor can release is his own aliquot share. 5 5 § 494. Fraud and mistake. — A release may be set aside on the ground of fraud or mistake ; but the party must first re- turn the amount received for the release. 6 The federal courts draw a distinction between the equitable and legal remedies for fraud. As for instance whether a release is void on the ground that the creditor was of unsound mind as known to the 'Seitherv. Philadelphia Co., 125 Pa. a release of one and receiving satis- St. 397 ; Tompkins v. Clay Street E. faction for the tort. Co., 66 Cal. 163. Both of these cases 2 City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 111. were where a person was riding in a 358; 32 N. E. Rep. 271; Rawley v. street car and was injured by a col- Stoddard, 7 John. 206; Duck u. Mayen, lision with those of another company. L. R. (1892), 2 Q. B. 511. One company, although not guilty of 3 Austin v. Hall, 13 John. 286. negligence, paid for a release, and it 4 Bruen v. Marquand, 17 John. 58 ; was held that, having thus satisfied Kimball v. Wilson, 3 N. H. 96 ; Pier- the tort, the party could not afterward son v. Hooker, 3 John. 68 ; Eisenhart proceed against the company guilty of v. Slaymaker, 14 S. & R. 153; Fitch v. negligence. See also, Benton ».Mul- Forman, 14 John. 172; Morse v. Bel- len, 61 N. H. 125; Seligman v. Pinet, lows, 7 N. H. 549; Wells v. Evans, 20 78 Mich. 50; Gray v. Brown, 22 Ala. Wend. 251; Myrick v. Dame, 9 Cush. 262; Pettigrew Machine Co. v. Har- 248. mon, 45 Ark. 290 ; Mitchell v. Allen, 5 Upjohn v. Ewing, 2 Ohio St. 13. 25 Hun, 543, a very satisfactory case 6 Mullen v. Old Colony R. Co., 127 pointing out the distinction between Mass. 86; Johnson v. Merry Mount Granite Co., 53 Fed. 569. 37 578 RELEASE. §495 law; or whether the creditor was of weak intellect, and was imposed on. The former may be set up in an action at law as a replication to the plea of release, but the only remedy for the latter is a suit in equity. 1 § 495. Release obtained by fraud — Illustrations. — A release is not binding as a defense to an action at law if obtained in circumstances amounting to a fraud on the signer, whereby he was led into giving formal assent to a paper different from his understanding as to the scope of the agreement which he in- tended actually to make thereby. 2 Where, in an action for damages for personal injuries, defendant, by answer, set up an alleged agreement in the nature of a release or discharge of the. 1 Johnson v. Mount Merry Granite ful discrimination in the various di- Co., 53 Fed. 569, where the court said: "There are only two questions : First, whether the release is void or voidable on the ground that the plaintiff was of unsound mind as known to the law ; and, second, whether it is voidable on the ground that the plaintiff was of weak intel- lect, enfeebled by the injuries which he received, and was imposed on, or by any improper methods induced to make an adjustment for an inadequate consideration. So far as the former is concerned, it must be shown that the plaintiff was non compos mentis — that is, unsound in some one of the phases known to the law ; and also that his unsoundness was of a character which prevented him from understanding the nature of the transaction resulting in the release. If this mental condi- tion existed with the qualifications stated, it seems to be the law of Mas- sachusetts that it can be set up as a defense to the release, without either tendering or returning the considera- tion. * * * I think the latter is- sue can not be made in this district in a suit at common law ; and that, if the state of facts is as claimed by plaintiff, plaintiff's only remedy is by a bill in equity to set aside the release. * * * However, it must be admit- ted that, on account of want of care- rections which I have suggested, late text-writers, and even courts of com- mon law, have not always distin- guished between the remedy in equity and that at common law, when fraud is alleged as an answer to a release under seal or other deed.'' See also, Allorew. Jewell, 94 TJ. S.506; Conley v. Nailor, 118 V. S. 127 ; Trambly v. Ricard, 130 Mass. 259; Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 Maine, 376; Flummerfelt v. Flummerfelt, 51 N. J. Eq. 432; 26 Atl. Rep. 857; Cleary v. Electric Light Co.,19N. Y. Supl. 951; Hav- iland v. Willetts, 21 N. Y. Supl. 1112; Fist v. Fist, 3 Col. App. 273; 32 Pac. Rep. 719; Sheanon v. Pacific, etc., Co., 83 Wis. 507; Pederson v. Seattle, etc., Co., 33 Pac. Rep. 351; 34 Pac. Rep. 665 ; 6 Wash. 202 ; In re Rock- ey's Estate, 155 Pa. St. 453; Lesson v. Mass. Assn., 23 N. Y. Supl. 294 Addyston, etc., Co. r. Copple, 94 Ky 292; 22 S. W. Rep. 323; Brooks v Rogers, 101 Ala. Ill ; 13 So. Rep. 386 White v. Richmond, 110 N. C. 456 Girard v. St. Louis Co. ,46 Mo. App. 79 Binneyu. Delmar, 17 N. Y. Supl. 524 Freedley v. French, 154 Mass. 339 Newell v. Mayor of New York, 61 Hun, 356 ; Dobinson v. McDonald, 92 Cal. 33. 2 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Harris (1895), 158 U. S. 326 ; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843. § 495 RELEASE. 57» cause of action, and to that plea plaintiff replied that the agreement had been obtained by fraud, while he was unable, because of pain and suffering caused by the injuries, to com- prehend his act in signing it, and that he never assented to the agreement; it was held that the reply to the plea of a re- lease was sufficient in an action at law, without resorting to equity to cancel that document. 1 Plaintiff, while suffering from the injuries complained of, executed a release of all claims against defendant railroad company, and accepted a fixed sum, which she afterwards tendered back to the company. Her testimony showed that she fully understood the nature and effect of the release at the time she executed it, and knew that the doctor who procured it from her was an agent 1 Girard v. St. Louis Car Co. (1894), 123 Mo. 358; 27 S. W. Eep. 648, Bar- clay, J. : "In circumstances such as are here exhibited, a writing in the form of a release, which never ac- quired original validity as a contract for want of competent assent to its terms, may be disregarded by a court of law in the administration of justice, without the intervention of a court of equity. The paper in question is, in contemplation of law, nothing more than the form of a contract; and, on finding that the substance which should give life to an obligation is wanting, the court may cast aside the form, and proceed to judgment, not- withstanding the fraud which may have brought the verisimilitude of an obligation into existence. Hartshorn v. Day (1856), 19 How. 211; Vander- velden v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. (1894), 61 Fed. Eep. 54, opinion by Judge Shiras. A court of law, upon ascertain- ing such a fraud, may properly pass over it to the conclusion which it con- siders to be just; thus, in effect, dis- carding the fraud as an obstacle to the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is not thought necessary, at this day, to fur- ther argue the correctness of this prop- osition. It has been repeatedly asserted in earlier decisions in this state, both before and since the adoption of the reformed code of procedure in 1849. Burrows v. Alter (1842) , 7 Mo. 424 ; Wright v. McPike (1879), 70 Mo. 175. They conform to a multitude of prec- edents elsewhere, many of which are cited in the briefs of counsel, to which may be added : Thompson v. Faus- sat (1815), Pet. C. C. 182, Fed. Cas. No. 13,954; Bliss v. New York, etc., Eailroad Co., 160 Mass. 447; 36 N. E. Eep. 65. The case of Blair v. Chicago, etc., Eailroad Co. (1886) , 89 Mo. 383; 1 S. W. Eep. 350, which is cited as having some tendency to the contrary, goes no further in that direction than to approve the prac- tice of proceeding to first cancel the release for fraud, upon allegations stating a cause of action in equity, before trying the other cause of action at law on the merits of the plaintiff's original claim. While that course may be adopted, it is not essential where the alleged fraud goes to the integrity of the release as a legal agree- ment, which is the case in the pres- ent action. The Blair decision does not declare it necessary to go into equity to get rid of a paper executed in such circumstances as here appear." 580 RELEASE. § 496 of the company. It also tended to show that defendant's doctor had told her that she would be "up and around in ten days or two weeks," but that it was three months before she could walk as well as usual. There was no evidence that the doctor's remark was made to deceive her as to the extent of her injuries, which she admitted were properly described in the release. She also testified that the doctor had told her that "parties usually didn't get anything" when they sued the company, but offered no evidence to show the falsity of the statement. It was held that the evidence failed to establish fraud which would entitle plaintiff to avoid the release. 1 The settlement of a claim for personal injuries will not be set aside merely because it is improvident. The mere fact that a per- son, at the time of making a settlement for personal injuries, was still sensitive of her injuries, and had been taking medi- cine, is not ground for rescission; the medicine not being such as to impair her mental faculties, nor the pain such as to sub- vert her judgment. 2 § 496. Release obtained by fraud. — In an action against a railroad corporation for injuries occasioned to the person and clothing of the plaintiff, who gave to the corporation, shortly after the accident which caused the injuries, a receipt in full and a release, evidence that the oral agreement of settlement was for a small sum, and covered merely the injuries to the plaintiff's clothing, that the defendant's agent, who procured the plaintiff's signatures, represented to him that the receipt was only for the injuries to the clothing, and that the release was merely a form, whereas they both covered his claim for personal injuries also, that the plaintiff, who at the time was in a dazed condition, signed both papers without reading them or knowing their contents, and that his personal injuries were in fact serious, will warrant a finding that the receipt and release were procured by fraud on the part of the defendant's agent. Accordingly, where one who has sustained injuries to his clothing and also to his person by an accident has been 'McFarlandw. Missouri, etc., E. Co., 2 Barker v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 125 Mo. 253; 28 S. W. Eep. 590. (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 460. § 497 RELEASE. 581 induced by fraud to execute to the railroad a receipt in full and a release for both injuries, upon being paid a small sum, which was understood by him to be compensation merely for the injuries to his clothing, he need not return the money so received before bringing an action for the personal injuries. 1 It has, however, been lately held in Missouri by a divided court that a release for damages caused by a railroad accident is a bar to an action for damages against the company until it is set aside in equity for fraud in its procurement. 2 § 497. Legal effect of a release procured by undue influence. — A release may be set aside without proof of positive fraud where it was obtained from a person suffering great pain and mental anxiety and unable for the time being to compre- 1 Bliss v. New York, etc., R. Co. the defendant, unless the execution of the release was obtained by fraud, she should have returned, or offered to return, the same before or at the time of bringing her suit, and incor- porated in her petition a count in equity to set aside the settlement on the ground of fraud, as was done in Blair v. Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., 89 Mo.383 ; 1 S.W. Rep. 350; Allen v. Logan, 96 Mo. 591; 10 S. W. Rep. 149; Clearyw. Electric Light Co., supra; Sudlow v. Mead, 109 N. Y. 643; 16 N. E. Rep. 682; Francis v. Railway Co., 108 N. Y. 93 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 192. Or the peti- tion might have been amended before or at the trial upon proper terms, by adding a count in equity to set aside the settlement. Until this was done, she had no cause of action ; for until the settlement is set aside, if in fact there was one, it stands as an insur- mountable barrier to the prosecution of this action. Upon this branch of the case, while plaintiff, in her repli- cation to defendant's answer, alleges that the release was obtained in part by the false and fraudulent represen- tation of the physicians of defendant company, there was no evidence tend- ing to show that she was in any man- ner misled thereby, and the judgment upon that question is res judicata." (1894), 160 Mass. 447. See also, on this point, Lee v. Lancashire, etc., Railway Co. (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. App. 527; Hirschfeld v. London, etc., Rail- way Co. (1876), L. R. 2 Q.B.Div. 1; Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Lewis (1884), 109 111. 120; O'Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Co. (1886), 63 Mich. 690; 30 N. W. Rep. 688; Ryan v. Gross (1888), 68 Md. 377; 12 Atl.Rep. 115, and 16 Atl. Rep. 302; Sobieski v. St. Paul, etc., Railroad Co. (1889), 41 Minn. 169 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 863 ; Butler v. Richmond, etc., Railroad Co. (1891), 88 Ga. 594; 15 S. E. Rep. 668; Cleary v. Municipal Electric Co. (Sup. 1892), 19 N. Y. Supl. 951, affirmed (1893), 139 N. Y. 643; 35 N. E. Rep. 206; Sheanon v. Pacific, etc., Insurance Co. (1892), 83 Wis. 507 ; 53 N.W. Rep. 878 ; Smith v. Occidental, etc., Steamship Co. (1893), 99 Cal. 462; 34 Pac. Rep. 84; Shaw v. Webber (1894), 79 Hun, 307; 29 N. Y. Supl. 437. 2 Och v. Missouri R. Co. (Mo. 1895), 31 S.W. Rep. 962. See also, Homuth v. Metropolitan R.Co.,129Mo. 629 (1895), 31 S.W. Rep. 903. In the first of these cases the court said: "As there was evidence tending to show that the money received by plaintiff was in full satisfaction of her claim against 582 RELEASE. §497 hend the purpose and meaning of the instrument, and where its procurement was attended with suddenness and surprise, which prevented the releasor from getting advice or consult- ing with friends. 1 'Where the plaintiff, an aged ne- gro, in less than twelve hours after the amputation of his foot, while stu- pid from opiates, waking only when aroused, and in pain, was induced, in the absence of his friends, by the of- ficials of the defendant railroad com- pany, to release his claim of damages for the loss of his foot against the company in consideration of $300, the release is void. Plaintiff, through the defendant railroad company's fraud, released his claim of damages for in- juries, and did not learn of it until two weeks afterwards. He took steps, two weeks after that, to employ coun- sel, and in about three weeks thought counsel had been engaged. He was confined to his bed during all said time, and spent all the money paid him for executing the release. It was held that the question whether he ratified such release was for the jury. Jones v. Alabama R. Co., 72 Miss. 32; 16 So. Rep. 379. Whitfield, J., said : ' ' We are abundantly support- ed by authority, if any were needed, in declaring the release void, if this testimony be true. In Evans v. Llew- ellin, 1 Cox Ch. 333, a husband who had no interest in lands, a moiety of which had belonged to his wife, claim- ing under a void will of the wife, be- lieved by him to be valid, was in- formed by his solicitor, when offering to sell the same, that the title was in his deceased wife's brothers, who were living in London 'in very mean circumstances, as journeymen in dif- ferent trades.' On August 20, 1785, the husband and his solicitor and a friend of the husband (Llewellin) met one of these brothers by Llewellin's appointment. The whole situation was fully explained to him. He ex- pressed himself perfectly satisfied, said he knew it was his sister's inten- tion that Llewellin should have the property, as manifested by her will, and agreed to execute a release for 200 guineas. He was urged by Llew- ellin to see and consult his friends and his wife before making the agree- ment, but he refused to do so. On August 23 he executed the release and received the money. On September 27th the other brother and the one first dealt with, again, after full ex- planation, affirmed the release, the other brother executing a memoran- dum, and on September 30th both ex- ecuted a second release. After all this — facts making a far stronger case than this — the court said : ' It has been truly argued that no facts were in this case kept back from the party, no false recitals in the deed, but that all the instruments contained a full discovery of the facts upon which the plaintiff was to make his bargain, notwithstanding which I am of the opinion that this agreement ought not to stand. I lay great stress upon the situation of the parties to it and the persons who compose the drama.' And then, after a summing up of the evidence, the court proceeded : 'I am called on for principles upon which I decide this case ; but where there are many members of a case it is not always easy to lay down a principle upon which to rely. However, here I say the party was taken by surprise. He had not sufficient time to act with caution, and therefore, although there was no actual fraud, it is something like fraud, for an undue advantage was taken of his situation. The cases § 498 RELEASE. 583 § 498. Release by railroad employes — Relief department. — A railroad company had connected with it a relief department, composed of employes who contributed certain amounts from their wages towards an insurance fund for their relief when injured, and for the relief of beneficiaries named in case of death. The railroad company collected the funds, furnished the necessary clerical force and guarantied payment of loss. A member of this association agreed that, in consideration of the amounts paid by the company, the acceptance of benefits for injury or death should operate as a release and satisfaction of of infants dealing with guardians, of sons with fathers, all proceed on the same general principle, and establish this : that if the party is in a situation in which he is not a free agent, and is not equal to protecting himself, this court will protect him.' Again : ' It is said he was cautioned. It is true, and so far the parties did right. But they ought to have gone further. They should not have permitted the man to have made the bargain without going to consult his friends. There was not sufficient locus poenitentice. There was no person present for giving advice. He was entirely in their hands, and surprised at this unexpected acquisi- tion of fortune.' How all this fits in here. This case was decided in A. D. 1787, but the principle is immutable and eternal. And the precise point was adjudged the same way by the su- preme court of North Carolina, in 1890, in Bean v. Western, etc., E. Co., 107 N. C. 731, 747; 12 S. E. Rep. 600. The injuries there were inflicted November 25th, and the release was executed December 18th. The court says : 'The reply to the answer does not expressly allege that the release in question was obtained from the plaintiff by the fraud of the defendant or its agent, but it does allege that it was obtained by the defendant under such circum- stances of unfairness, undue advan- tage, inadequacy of consideration, suddenness, while the plaintiff was suffering great pain and mental anx- iety, while he was ignorant and un- able to comprehend the meaning and purpose of such an instrument, under such circumstances of mistake and surprise as that the court * * * will not allow the defendant to plead and use it to the disadvantage of the plaintiff.' And the defense was ap- proved, and the release declared prop- erly found void by the jury, the court saying, after a full discussion of the precise point: 'Granting that there was no positive fraud on the part of the defendant or its agents, there was evidence to prove * * * that the plaintiff, * * * by mistake, occa- sioned by his ignorance, physical pain, mental anxiety, and lack of capacity, under the circumstances, to understand or comprehend the nature and purpose of such release. * * * Mere ignorance, mere inadequacy of consideration, mere weakness of mind, mere mistake on the part of one par- ty, will not entitle that party to re- lease. But it is otherwise when there is a combination of such things to prejudice the part}'. In such case, in good faith and fair dealing, the ad- verse party ought to see and know, and must be presumed to know, that the complaining par^y was not fit or in such mental condition as to bind himself by contract.' " 5S4 RELEASE. § 498 all claims for damages against the company, arising from such injury or death, which could be made by him or his legal rep- resentatives. He was killed in an accident upon the railroad. The beneficiary named was his widow, who accepted the benefit, and, by instrument in writing, received it "in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims or demands on account of, or arising from, the death of said deceased, which I now have, or can hereafter have," against either the relief fund or the railroad company. Subsequently, as administratrix, she brought suit for damages against the railroad company on behalf of herself and children. It was held that the deceased's contract did not, of itself, waive a right of action ; that neither that contract, nor the acceptance of the money or release of liability by the widow, operated to bar a right of action by the administratrix on behalf of the children; but that her voluntary acceptance of the benefit, and release of the company, did operate to bar any action for her own benefit. 1 'Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. TVymore, 40 Neb. 645; 58 N. W. Rep. 1120, Ir- vine, C. : "The deceased did not waive his right of action, but only provided in the contract that the receipt by his beneficiary of the death benefit should constitute a release ; and the constitu- tion of the association, in evidence, shows, in many places, that it was contemplated that the member might elect to maintain his action, or accept the benefit. It is true that the su- preme court of Maryland has held, under a similar state of affairs, that where the mother was named as a beneficiary, and the widow recovered damages under Lord Campbell's act, a similar provision in the contract of membership was a good defense to the association in an action by the mother for the benefit. Fuller v. Baltimore, etc., Association, 67 Md. 433; 10 Atl. Rep. 237. AVe have two or three re- marks to make, however, about that case. In the first place, it was a suit up- on a contract in the nature of a con- tract of insurance, and the result might be justified by a strict construction of the contract. The position of the rail- road company in an action for damages might be different. In the next place, it appears from that case that the railroad company compelled all its employes to become members of the association ; and we are certainly not prepared to commit ourselves to the doctrine that a master may enforce a compulsory agreement to release him from the consequences of his own neg- ligence. "We are also aware that in several cases it has been held that the release by a person injured operates as a valid release, and that the con- tract, in such case, is not against pub- lic policy. Graft B.Baltimore, etc., Rail- road Co. (Pa. Sup.), 8 Atl. Rep. 206 (a case decided without an opinion, and not in the official reports) ; Owens v- Baltimore, etc., Railroad Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 715 ; Martina. Baltimore, etc., Rail- road Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 125. As against these federal cases, there might be set off the opinion of Judge Gresham in Roesner v. Hermann, 8 Fed. Rep. 782, declaring a contract with a master, § 499 RELEASE. 585 § 499. The same subject continued. — Membership by rail- way servants in a relief fund association being voluntary, seeking to relieve him from liability for negligence, void, as against public policy. We repeat that the broad question is not before us. If the facts exist as claimed by the plaintiff, the circumstances were such that Wymore might have maintained an action had he lived. He had not waived his right of action. He undertook to contract that the beneficiary named in the con- tract might waive it by accepting the benefit, but this action is not for the benefit of his estate, but for that of his widow and next of kin ; and the measure of damages is not what he might have recovered, had he lived, but their pecuniary loss by reason of his death. "Whether or not he could, by a compromise after the accident, before his death, deprive them of their right of action, he could not contract away their right before the injury, and without their consent. Nor could he contract that the widow might, after his death, deprive the next of kin of their remedy. The children, of whom there were eight, were not beneficiaries in the contract, and his contract, and the widow's ac- ceptance of a sum for her benefit, did not discharge the right of action on the children's behalf. The widow in accepting her benefit acted individu- ally, and not as an administratrix. In maintaining this action, she proceeds in her representative capacity, and is not estopped, so far as the rights of others are concerned, by her acts as an individual. We think, therefore, that the action could properly be maintained, notwithstanding the de- ceased's contract of membership, and the widow's acceptance of the benefit, and release of the company, so far as necessary to enforce the rights of the children. Plaintiff's position is, how- ever, different. Disregarding the rep- lication of duress, as not now pre- sented to us, we must take it that, after the cause of action accrued, she voluntarily accepted a sum of money named, in discharge and satisfaction of the company's liability. A similar case was presented in the case of State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 655. The court there considered itself bound, upon the question of public policy, by the decision of the court of appeals of Maryland in the case we have cited, but added : 'It is also con- sidered that the release pleaded as a discharge was executed by the plaint- iff after the cause of action upon which she sues had arisen. The insurance upon the life of her husband did not affect her rights at all, as it was made payable to her husband's mother. She had no contractual relations with either the railroad company or the re- lief association, and can not complain of any contract made with her hus- band, as being against public policy, because she is unaffected by any such contract, except so far as she herself has chosen to respect it since his death.' The court accordingly held that the release bound her. We think this reasoning is sound. She had a right to compromise with the company after her husband's death, so far as her own rights were con- cerned. It is suggested that the re- lease, in this aspect, was without con- sideration, but this is not true. Un- der the contract for the insurance, she was not absolutely entitled to it, but only became so upon releasing the company. We think that the agree- ment she so made with the relief de- partment after the cause of action accrued for the benefit of the com- pany may be enforced by the com- pany. By the instruction referred to, the jury was directed to ascertain 586 RELEASE. §499 the stipulation, in the application for membership, that ac- ceptance of benefits for an injury shall release all claims for damages against the railroad, is not void as an attempt on the part of the railroad to contract against its liabilities for negli- gence. And the agreement for release is not bad merely be- cause it may enable the railroad to settle some claims more cheaply than it otherwise could. 1 Where a railroad company is a member of a relief association, and has agreed to assume its obligations, an employe of the company who joins the asso- ciation under an agreement that the acceptance of benefits the damages which both plaintiff and her children had sustained. The court should have confined the jury to a consideration of the damages sus- tained by the children." 1 Lease v. Pennsylvania Co., 10 Ind. App. 47; 37 N. E. Rep. 423, Rein- hard, J. : "The case of States. Bal- timore & O. R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 655, was decided in the United States cir- cuit court for the district of Maryland. In that case the widow of an employe of the railroad company, after the death of her husband, released the company from any claim she might have against it for causing his death for the purpose of enabling her hus- band's mother to obtain from the Bal- timore and Ohio Relief Association payment of an amount of life insurance which, under its constitution, was payable only on condition that all persons entitled to sue the railroad company for the death should release such company from liability. In a suit by the widow against the railroad company for damages, it was held (Morris, J., delivering the opinion) that the release was not invalid as against public policy . The same ques- tion was before the United States cir- cuit court of the district of West Vir- ginia in the case of Martin v. Balti- more & O. R. Co., reported in 41 Fed. Rep. 125. It was held in that case, as we learn from the syllabus, that 'where an employe of a railroad company be- comes a member of a relief association, and as a condition of membership, and in consideration of the contribu- tions of the railroad company to said association, and of the company's guaranty of the payment of the bene- fits of the association in case of inju- ry, signs a contract by which he re- leases the company from liability by reason of any accident that may hap- pen to him while in the company's employ, an action will not lie against the company where, both before' and after bringing action, he receives money from the association on ac- count of the injur}', and gives receipt releasing and discharging the com- pany from all claims for damages.' The question of the validity of these contracts was also before the court of appeals of Maryland in Fuller v. Bal- timore & 0., etc., Ass'n, 67 Md. 433; 10 Atl. Rep. 237. In Graft v. Balti- more, etc., R. Co. (Pa.), 8 Atl. Rep. 206, we do not find that the court ex- pressed any opinion upon the validity of such contracts further than to up- hold instructions to find for the de- fendant when it appeared that the plaintiff, who had been injured through the alleged negligence of the defend- ant was a member of the relief associ- ation, and had accepted benefits and signed a release." §§ 500, 501 RELEASE. 587 from the relief fund for an injury caused by the operation of the railroad shall release all claims for damages against the company, and that he will execute such further instrument as may be necessary to evidence the acquittance of the com- pany, is, by the acceptance of benefits after an injury, pre- cluded from recovering damages from the railroad company, though he has never executed a formal release of damages. 1 § 500. Deed-poll or indenture — Instructions for drafting. — • A simple release may be made either by deed-poll or indent- ure, but if the instrument is to contain a covenant for indemnity, or other covenants or provisos, the release will generally be made by indenture. Where a release is made by indenture, as a general rule, all persons who can give or receive a release, or who are to enter into any obligations, or take any benefit under any of the covenants or provisions of the instrument, should be made parties. In the case of a deed-poll the releasee must be expressly named. 8 § 501. Pleading. — A release, like all other defenses, must be pleaded. 8 But in case a release is procured by fraud the re- •Eingle v. Pennsylvania R. Co., Pa. St. 134; 29 Atl. 854. The facts of 164 Pa. St. 529; 30 Atl. Rep. 492, per that case and this are not materially Mitchell, J. : "This case is ruled by different. In both the agreement is Johnson v. R. Co., 163 Pa. St. 127; 29 that the acceptance of benefits (of Atl. 854. The essential principle course, after the accident) shall operate therein established is that a contract as a release. In the present case there between employer and employe which is an additional agreement that the preserves to the latter all his rights of plaintiff shall 'execute such further action in case of negligence until after instrument as may be necessary form- the facts have occurred and are known ally to evidence such acquittance;' to him is not against public policy, and it is argued that no such release 'There is no waiver of any right of has been executed by plaintiff. But action that the person injured may it is not necessary that it should be. thereafter be entitled to. It is not the The acceptance of benefits is the sub- signing of the contract, but the ac- stance of the release, and the agree- ceptance of benefits after the accident, ment for a further instrument is by that constitutes the release. The in- its express terms a mere formality for jured party, therefore, is not stipulat- convenience of evidence." ing for the future, but settling for the 2 6 Bythewood & Jarman's Convey- past. He is not agreeing to exempt ancing, 50. the company from liability for negli- 3 Meka v. Brown, 84 Iowa, 711 ; 50 N. gence, but accepting compensation for W. Rep. 46; Doty v. Chicago R. Co., an injury already caused thereby.' 163 49 Minn. 499 ; 52 N.W. Rep. 135 ; Spitze 588 RELEASE. §501 leasor need not go into equity to annul the release; he may sue on his original cause of action and if the release is pleaded he may then reply the fraud. 1 And under the code, a party may, in the same action, by means of different counts in the same complaint, sue to have the release set aside and also on the original cause of action. 2 But if the releasor asks to have the release set aside this makes it a question for the court, while a mere replication of fraud is for the jury. 8 v. Baltimore, 75 Md. 162; 23 Atl. Rep. 307; Freedley v. French, 154 Mass. 339 ; Tucker v. Baldwin, 13 Conn. 136 ; Maness v. Henry, 96 Ala. 454; 11 So. Rep. 410. 1 Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co., 46 Mo. App. 79. 2 Blair v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 89 Mo. 334. 3 Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co., 46 Mo. App. 91. See also, Wild v. Williams, 6 M. & W. 490; Webb v. Steele, 13 N. H. 230; Hoitt v. Hol- comb, 23 N. H. 535; Chicago R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 120 ; Bussian v. Mil- waukee, etc., R. Co., 56 Wis. 325 ; Dix- on v. Brooklyn City Railroad, 100 N. Y. 170; Vautrain *. St. Louis, etc., Railroad, 8 Mo. App. 538; O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461; Peterson v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 38 Minn. 511; Lusted v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 71 Wis. 391 ; Ryan ». Gross, 68 Md. 377; 12 Atl, Rep. 115. CHAPTER XIV. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 602. Its origin and purpose. § 524. 503. Its effect on verbal contracts. 604. Promises by executors and ad- ministrators. 505. Promises to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. 506. Oral agreements to answer for the debt of another. 607. To whom the promise must be made. 508. Original and collateral prom- ises. 609. Original undertakings — Prom- isor's interest. 610. The same subject continued. 611. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States. 512. The rule in New York and Pennsylvania. 513. The same subject continued. 514. Further illustrations. 515. Illustrations of original agree- ments. 516. Where the promisor holds the debtor's funds, or where the ' old debt is extinguished. 517. Relinquishment of lien — The modern rule. 518. Independent promise releas- ing another. 519. Del credere commission. 520. As to contracts of indemnity. 521. Oral promise to indemnify guarantor not within the statute. 522. The same subject continued. 623. Agreements in consideration of marriage. (589) 525. 626. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. The same subject'continued — Antenuptial contracts. Antenuptial parol agreements reduced to writing after mar- riage. Contracts relating to lands. Invalid verbal contracts as to land. Cases net within the statute — Constructive trusts. What not an interest in land — Mortgagee's interest. Part performance. Parol contract for sale of land and possession transferred. Parol contract for sale of land — Purchaser's possession. Parol sales of land in North Carolina. Executed oral lease — Statute to be pleaded. Executed parol contract for exchange of land not within the statute. Fixtures. Cases not within the statute — Illustrations. Fructus industriales. Parol sale of perennial crops. Contracts for the sale of grass and growing trees. The same subject continued — Intention of the parties. Licenses to enter on lands. Easements. Rule as to sale of buildings. Partnerships to deal in lands. The same subject continued. Agreements not to be perform- ed within a year. 590 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §502 §548. The same subject continued. §567. 549. The Texas doctrine. 568. 550. Illustrations — Cases within the 569. statute. 570. 551. Illustrations — Oases not within the statute. 571. 552. Further illustrations — Cases not within the statute. 572, 553. Performance on one side with- in a year. 573. 554. Contracts for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise — 574. Executory sales. 555. Contracts for sale of goods dis- tinguished from contracts for 575. work and labor. 576. 556. The English rule. 557. The rule in New York. 577. 558. Shares in corporations and choses in action. 578. 559. Receipt and acceptance. 579. 560. The same subject continued. 561. Further illustrations. 580, 562. Constructive delivery and ac- ceptance. 581. 563. Delivery to a carrier. 564. Delivery which takes contract out of the statute. 582. 565. Question for the jury. 683. 566. Earnest or part payment. ' Auctioneer's sales. Judicial sales. Form of the memorandum. The contents of the memoran- dum. The same subject continued. Sale of realty in Texas and Kentucky — The memoran- dum. What is a sufficient memoran- dum in other states. Whether the memorandum must show the consideration. Correspondence as evidence of the contract. Bought and sold notes — "Slip contracts." Insufficient writings to take contract out of statute. The signature. Oral variation of written agree- ment. Parol discharge of written agreement. When parol evidence may be resorted to. Eemedy for services rendered under voidable contract. As to pleading the statute. § 502. Its origin and purpose. — The statute of frauds, so called, requiring in many cases written evidence of a contract, was passed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of Charles II, j being A. D. 1677. It is very generally in force in this country, but the statutes of the different states, while agreeing substanti- ally with the English statute, do not copy its provisions exactly. 1 1 The authorship of this celebrated enactment is mainly ascribed to Sir Matthew Hale, but it was without doubt the product of several minds, Lord Nottingham and others bearing a part in framing it. Of. Reed on Statute of Frauds, § 1 ; 18 American Law Reg. 442; Lord Mansfield in Wyndham v. Chetwynd (1757), 1 Burr. 414; Lord Ellenborough in Wain v. Warlters (1804), 5 East, 10. The stat- utes of the different states are pub- lished in the appendix to Reed on Statute of Frauds and Browne on Statute of Frauds, and Wood on Frauds. See, introduction to Throop on Verbal Agreements. The statute, says Lord Kenyon in Chaplin v. Rog- ers, 1 East, 192, " is one of the wisest laws on our statute book." § 502 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 591 The object of the statute was that contracts of an important character, as well as those which were not to be executed within a prescribed period, should be supported by more satis- factory evidence than could be afforded by verbal testimony only. The risk of mistakes, arising from the defective and imperfect recollection of witnesses, and the temptation to com- mit fraud by perjury, were the evils against which the statute was directed. 1 The provisions bearing especially on contracts are contained in the fourth and seventeenth sections. The fourth section is as follows: "No action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator, upon any special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; or whereby to charge the defendant, upon any special promise, to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another per- son; or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; or any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other per- son thereunto by him lawfully authorized." 2 The seventeenth 1 Marcy v. Marcy, 9 Allen, 8 ; Justice representation or assurance be made Holroyd in Saunders v. Wakefield, in writing and signed by the party to 4 Barn. & Aid. 595; Norman v. Mo- be charged thereby, or by those per- lett, 8 Ala. 546 ; Townsend v. Har- sons by him thereto lawfully author- graves, 118'Mass. 325. ized. The provisions of the statute 2 The words "contract or sale of are applicable only to cases where the lands, "etc., were probably at first mis- intent and purpose of the party mak- printed for "contract for the sale of ing the representation is to enable a lands." Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342. third person to obtain credit, goods or The English statute, known as Lord money by means of it. He who Tenterden's Act (1829),Stat.9Geo.TV, means to rely upon such representa- C. 14, has been substantially adopted tions as are referred to in the statute, in many states, in which it is pro- respecting the character, credit or re- vided that no action shall be brought sponsibility of another, as a ground to charge any person upon or by rea- of maintaining an action to recover son of any representation or assur- compensation in case of loss if they ance made concerning the character, should prove to be false, must take conduct, credit, ability, trade or deal- care that they are reduced to writing ings of any other person, unless such and signed by the party ultimately to 592 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 503 section is as follows: "No contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandises for the price of £10 sterling, or up- wards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall ac- cept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, or some note or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized." 1 § 503. Its effect on verbal contracts. — The statute does not prohibit the making of an oral agreement, but bars the legal remedies by which it might otherwise have been enforced. A new rule of evidence is introduced and a new defense created by requiring that the agreement shall be proved by a writing. 8 A contract within the statute is not illegal unless put in writing, but only not capable of being enforced, an immunity which the defendant on the trial may waive . 3 If the parties choose to perform it, the contract remains in full force notwithstand- ing the statute, so far as relates to the legal effect and conse- quences of what has been done under it. 4 The difference in the phraseology between the fourth and seventeenth sections in this, that the former says "no action shall be brought" upon the contract, and the latter says the contract shall not be "al- be charged. Kimball v. Comstock, 14 'Adams v. Patrick, 30 Vt. 516; Gray, 508. Montgomery v. Edwards, 46 Vt. 151. 1 In the several states of this coun- 4 Crane v. Gough, 4 Md. 316. It was try the sum varies from $30 to $300. settled by Leroux v. Brown (1852), 12 Stimson on American Statute Law. C. B. 801, that the statute does not 2 Crane ». Powell (1893), 139 N. Y. effect the validity of the contract, but 379; Lowman v. Sheets (1890), 124 only makes a particular kind of proof Ind. 416; La Du-King Mfg. Co. v. La necessary to enable a party to bring Du (1887), 36 Minn. 473; Kriger v. an action upon it. "I think it is now Leppel (1889), 42 Minn. 6; Child v. finally settled that the true construc- Pearl (1870), 43 Vt. 224; Cahill v. tion of the statute of frauds, both the Bigelow, 18 Pick. 369; AVhitney v. 4th and the 17th sections, is not to Cochran, 1 Scam. (111.) 209; Chicago render contracts within them void, Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 111. 289; still less illegal, but is to render the Haynes v. Nice, 100 Mass. 327; Magee kind of evidence required indispen- v. Blenkenship, 95 N. C. 563; Beach sable when it is sought to enforce the on Modern Equity Jurisprudence, contract," per Lord Blackburn in § 614 and cases cited. Maddison v. Alderson (1883), 8 App. Cas. 467, 488. § 504 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 593 lowed to be good," has been commented upon in various cases, but the difference does not change the force and effect of the two sections. 1 § 504. Promises by executors and administrators. — The clause of the statute providing that "no action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate," made verbally, was enacted to prevent executors or adminis- trators from being fraudulently held for the debts or liabilities of the estate upon which they were called to administer. The special promise referred to is any actual promise made in dis- tinction from promises implied by law, which are held not within the statute. 8 Where the cause of action exists against the deceased, the executor or administrator may make himself personally liable by a written promise founded upon a sufficient consideration. 3 There must be either assets in their hands or forbearance by the creditor to constitute a consideration. In case there are no -assets, a promise by an executor to pay his testator's debt is nudum pactum.* The giving a bond by an administrator to the judge of probate, to pay the debts and legacies of the testator, is held to operate as an admission of assets. 5 This clause is closely allied to the following one in 'Bird v. Munroe, 66 Maine, 337; s Davis v. French, 20 Maine, 21. Townsendu. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325. 4 Bank of Troy v. Topping, 9 Wend. "There seems to be no reason to at- 273; Pearson v. Henry, 5 T. R. 6; tribute to the former phraseology any Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. B. 346, note, force or to draw from it any infer- " For such promises must be under- ences, different from those which at- stood with reference to assets, other- tend the construction of the latter." wise men might be drawn in." Lord Browne on the Statute of Frauds, Hardwicke in Reech v. Kennegal, 1 § 115; Reed on the Statute of Frauds, Ves. Sen. 123. Where A., as adminis- § 678. In New York and some other trator of B., deceased, gave a prom- states the statutes expressly provide issory note to C, by which he prom- that certain contracts "shall be void," ised to pay the amount of the note for unless expressed in writing. A void value received by B. and his heirs, it contract confers no right and creates was held that there was no considera- no obligation between the parties, tion for the promise. Ten Eyck v. Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494. Vanderpoel, 8 John. 120. 8 Bellows v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 164 ; Sage 6 Stebbina v. Smith, 4 Pick. 97. v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81. 38 594 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §§ 505, 506 regard to a promise to answer for the debt of another and the undertaking contemplated by it is in the nature of a guaranty. 1 § 505. Promises to answer for the debt, default or miscar- riage of another. — To make the promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another binding, it must be in writing and founded upon a consideration. 2 Where a contract of guaranty is entered into concurrently with the principal obligation, a consideration which supports the principal con- tract supports the subsidiary one also ; 3 but where the promise is made subsequent thereto, there must be a distinct considera- tion to support it. A mere naked promise to pay the already existing debt of another without any consideration is void. 4 The guaranty of a future liability is within the statute pre- cisely as it would be if the liability existed when the promise was made. 5 A promise to answer for the tort of another is within the statute. 6 § 506. Oral agreements to answer for the debt of another. — Where an attorney, acting for his client, requested plaintiff 'Bellows v. Sowles,57 Vt.169; Har- rington v. Rich, 6Vt. 666; Redfield on Wills, Vol. 2, p. 290, et seq. 2 Robinson v. Gilman, 43 N. H. 485 Dougherty . . Stone (1892), 66 Hun 498 ; Frames. August (1878), 88 111.424 Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. (Mass. )396 Hess's Estate ilX'.i2), 150 Pa. St. 346 Ackley v. Parmenter (1885), 98 N. Y 425; Gower v. Stuart, 40 Mich. 747 Eddy v. Roberts, 17 111. 505; Furbish v. Goodnow (1867), 98 Mass. 296; Cook v. Elliott (1864), 34 Mo. 586; Ware v. Adams, 24 Maine, 177 ; Gilli- ghan v. Boardman, 29 Maine, 79. 3 Erie Co. Savings Bank v. Coit (1887), 104 N. Y. 532; McNaught v. MeClaughry, 42 N. Y. 22; Simons v, Steele, 36 N. H. 73 ; Brandt on Surety- ship, §§ 6, 7. 4 Bebee v. Moore, 3 McLean, 387; Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John. 29; Davis v. Tift (1883), 70 Ga. 52; Starr v. Earle, 43 Ind. 478. Damage to the promisee constitutes as good a con- sideration as benefit to the promisor. Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 169; Kill- ian v. Ashley I releasing a lien), 24 Ark. 511. Consideration in the nature of forbearance: Martin v. Black's Executors, 20 Ala. 309; Sage i\ Wil- cox, 6 Conn. 81 ; Stewart v. Campbell, 58 Maine, 439 ; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; McCelvy v. Noble, 13 Rich (S. C), 330; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350; Philpot v. Briant, 4 Bing. 717. See §§ 129 et seq., supra. 5 Mead v. Watson (1885), 57 Vt. 426. 6 Kirkham v. Marter, 2 B. & Aid. 613, where one person, without the license of another, had ridden such other's horse, and thereby caused its death ; it was held that a promise by a third person to answer the damage caused thereby, in consideration that the owner of the horse would not bring an action against the person causing its death, was within the statute. §506 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 595 to render services for the client, and subsequently prom- ised to pay for the same whenever the client furnished him money for that purpose, it was held that, although the money was furnished, his promise was within the statute of frauds. 1 It is not necessary that the written memorandum of a " special promise to answer for the debt of another ' ' should expressly state the consideration for the promise; It is sufficient if, from the whole writing, it appears with reasonable clearness what the consideration was ; as, for example, to procure credit for a third party from the promisee. 2 Accordingly the contract of a minor to pay the principal and interest of money loaned him to carry on business not being void, the promise of another to answer for such debt is within the statute of frauds, 8 and an oral agreement by the owner of a building to pay a subcontractor, on the abandonment of the contract by the original contractor, an amount already due him from the latter, and an additional sum for extras if he would complete the work, is not void as being a promise to 1 Walker v. Irwin (Iowa, 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 785, Deemer, J.. "The lower court ruled that all the prom- ises made by the defendant were within the statute of frauds, and that the promise contained within the let- ter, if any such there be, was without consideration. It appears to us this is correct. The testimony tends strongly, if not conclusively, to show that plaintiffs looked upon Matheson as the principal debtor, and that de- fendant's promise, if any, was con- tingent and collateral, — contingent upon his receiving the money on the assignment, and collateral to Mathe- son's obligation to pay. This being true, it was clearly within the statute of frauds. Sternburg v. Callanan, 14 Iowa, 251; Beerkle v. Edwards, 55 Iowa, 750; 8 N. W. Rep. 341; Ben- bow v. Soothsmith, 76 Iowa, 154; 40 N. W. Rep. 693 ; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 197. The happening of the contingency of defendant's re- ceiving the money on the assignment did not make his promise an original one. The agreement was to step into the place of Matheson, and pay his liabilities, upon certain conditions. It is no less collateral than if the con- tingencies had not happened. Kauff- man v. Harstock, 31 Iowa, 472." And see, Lewis v. Lewis Lumber Co. (1893) , 156 Pa. St. 217. 2 Straight v. Wight (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 105. 3 Brown v. Farmers', etc., Bank (Texas, 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 285, Denman, J.: "In the case of Dexter v. Blanchard, 11 Allen, 365, the su- preme court of Massachusetts decided the very question before us, holding that the debt due from the minor was not void, but voidable, at his election, and that, therefore, the verbal prom- ise of the father to pay same was within the statute, and could not be enforced." 596 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §507 answer for the debt of the contractor. 1 A Michigan statute provides that no action shall be brought to charge one upon a representation as to the character, credit, or trade of another person unless such representation is in writing, and signed by the person to be charged. In construing this statute it has been held that representations by one that he was the owner of certain corporate stock, and that the corporation was paying large dividends, which representations were made for his own benefit to induce plaintiff to purchase, are not within the statute. 2 An oral acceptance of an order is not within the statute of frauds, as a promise to pay another's debt. 3 § 507. To whom the promise must be made. — To bring a promise within the statute it must be made to the person en- titled to enforce the liability assumed by the promisor. 1 A 1 McLaughlin v. Austin (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 719, Hooker, J. : " It is contended that this contract, if proved, was void under the statute of frauds, inasmuch as it was not in writing. It is urged that, at the time it was made, Jones owed the plaintiff $20 or $30 for work already done, and was under a legal obligation to pay the remainder of the claim when the work should be finished; that there was no agreement to release Jones from his liability, and therefore, as his liability continued, the promise of the defendant was a promise to an- swer for the debt of another. It is possible for one to make a valid oral promise to pay the debt of another without releasing the original debtor, although it is not where the considera- tion moves to the original debtor alone. This seems to be the point upon which the rule turns. Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 396; Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412; White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222; 15 N. E. Rep. 318; Oorkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 477; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320; Bice v. Marquette, etc., Building Co., 96 Mich. 24, 30; 55 N. W. Rep. 382." 2 Hubbard u. Long (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 644. s Lavell v. Frost, 16 Mont. 93; 40 Pac. Rep. 146, DeWitt, J. : "Appellant claims that, as the acceptance of the order by Frost was not in writing, it can not be relied upon by respondents, because it was a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another. Comp. St., p. 652, §223. But the acceptance of the order was not the promise to pay the debt of an- other. As far as Frost's acceptance was concerned, if there were any, it was simply to pay his own debt, if anything." 4 Tighe v. Morrison (1889), 116 N. Y. 263; Harrison v. Sawtel, 10 John. 242; Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657; Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462; Sand- ers v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250; Mc- Craith v. National, etc., Bank, 104 N. Y. 414 ; Smith v. Sayward, 5 Maine, 504; Jones ti. Shorter, 1 Ga. 294; Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & Ores. 728; Reader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344; Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Salk. 27; Fitzgerald v. Dressier, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 885; Batson v. King, 4 H. & N. 739; Wildes v. Dudlow (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 198. Green v. Cresswell, 10 Ad. & E. 453, per contra, no longer regarded as §507 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 597 promise to the debtor to pay his debt and thereby relieve him from the payment of it himself is not within the statute. 1 If the debt of another, which a man promises to pay, is also his own debt, the statute has no application. 2 The statute con- templates the mere promise of one man to be responsible for another, and can not be interposed as a cover and shield against the actual obligations of the debtor himself. The common case of the holder of a third person's note assigning for value with a guaranty, seems to be clearly referable to this principle. The assignor owes the assignee and that particular mode of paying him is adopted; he guarantees in substance his own debt. 8 law in the county where it was de- cided. Throop on Verbal Agreements, § 361. "The statute applies only to promises made to the persons to whom another is already or is to become answerable." Hargreaves v. Parsons, 13 M. & W. 560. "I think that to bring a promise within the statute the debt for which the defendant has promised to answer must be a debt due to the person to whom the prom- ise is made, and that the promise must be made to a person who could bring an action for the debt." Bowen, L. J., Hoyle v. Hoyle, L. R. (1893), 1 Ch. 84. 1 Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438, a leading case. There the plaint- iff was liable to one Blackburn, on a promissory note; and the defendant for a consideration promised the plaintiff to pay that note. Lord Den- man said: "If the promise had been made to Blackburn, doubtless the statute would have applied ; it would then have been strictly a promise to answer for the debt of another ; and the argument on the part of the de- fendant is that it is not less the debt of another because the promise is made to that other, viz., the debtor, and not to the creditor, the statute not having in terms stated to whom the promise contemplated by it is to be made ; but upon consideration we are of opinion that the statute applies only to promises made to the person to whom another is answerable." Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205; Alger v. Scoville, 1 Gray, 391; Fish v. Thomas, 5 Gray, 45; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170 ; Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 48 111. 36; Goetz v. Foos, 14 Minn. 265; Perkins v, Littlefield, 5 Allen, 370; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45, 60; Shook v. Vanmater, 22 Wis. 532 ; Aldrich v. Ames (1857), 9 Gray, 76 ; Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467; Merserean v. Lewis, 25 Wend. 243; Brown v. Strait, 19 111. 88; Rab- bermann v. Wiskamp, 54 111. 179; Meyer v. Hartman, 72 111. 442. A partner in a firm agreed to indemnify the firm against certain debts owing to the firm ; held not to be an agree- ment to answer for the debt of an- other. Hoyle v. Hoyle (1893), 2 The Reports, 145, L. R. (1893); 1 Ch. 84. 2 Robinson v. Gilman, 43 N. H. 485 ; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 396 ; Chamberlin v. Ingalls, 38 Iowa, 300; Putney v. Farnham (1870), 27 Wis. 187; Goodman v. Cohen (1892), 132 N. Y. 205; Snell v. Rogers (1893), 70 Hun, 462; Lester v. Bowman, 39 Iowa, 611 ; Stondt v. Hine, 45 Pa. St. 30; Besshears v. Rowe, 46 Mo. 501. 3 Malone v. Keener, 44 Pa. St. 107. 598 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 508 § 508. Original and collateral promises. — There is much difficulty in determining what are original and what are collateral agreements. The cases upon this point are much in conflict. The English cases have not been at all harmonious. 1 A large class of cases is found which fall within the general language of the statute, but which have been decided to be ex- ceptions. 2 It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a rule by which to determine in every case whether a promise relating to the debt or liability of a third person is or is not within the statute. 8 The test question is whether it is a prom- ise to pay the debt of another, for which that other remains liable. 4 When no action will lie against the party for whom the undertaking is made it is an original promise. 5 There can be no suretyship unless there be a principal debtor, existing at the time, or constituted by matters ex post facto. "Nor can a man guarantee anybody else's debt unless there be a debt of some other person to be guaranteed." 6 1 Anderson v. Spence (1880), 72 Ind. S15: The terms "original" and "col- lateral" promises do not occur in the statute and have been introduced by courts to explain its objects and ex- pound its true interpretation. D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476. 2 It is competent for the court to es- tablish exceptions to statutes ex- pressed in general and sweeping terms, where cases are found to come within the letter of the enactment, but do not fall within the reason and apparent purpose of the law. Robinson v. Oilman, 43 N. H. 485. 3 Nugent v. Wolfe (1886), 111 Pa. St. 471; Cross «. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641. It is often difficult from the words in which a promise is made to determine whether any credit was given to a third person, and the undertaking therefore collateral, or whether it was a wholly independent and original undertaking. In such cases courts must rely upon the circumstances of each particular case in order to ascer- tain the intention of the parties. Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. (1863) 360. In the case of Dillaby v. Wilcox (1891), 60 Conn. 71, the court says in regard to this clause : "An immense amount of litigation has arisen over its con- struction. It is impossible to reconcile the decisions which have been made under it. * * * The most careful text-writers have acknowledged their inability to find anything like uniform rules of construction in the conflicting decisions which have been rendered." 4 Hetfield v. Dow (1859), 27 N.J. Law, 440; Birkmyr v. Darnell, Salk. 27 (leading case) ; Forth v. Stanton, 1 Wms. Saunders, 210, 211, note 2. 5 Mease v. Wagner, 1 McCord (S.C.) 395.. 6 Lakemau v. Mountstephen, L. R. 7 H. L. 17, per Lord Selbourne. The test to be applied is whether the party sought to be charged is the principal debtor, primarily liable, or whether he is only liable in case of the default of a third person. Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y. 187; Booth e. Eighmie (1875), 60 N. Y. 238; Sw--* §509 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 599 § 509. Original undertakings — Promisor's interest. — A promise to indemnify one for becoming a surety on the re- plevin bond of another, made by one interested as the latter's mortgagee in the goods replevied, is not a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, within the statute. 1 Where deceased, being indebted to plaintiff, assigned v. Colleton (1893), 96 Mich. 391. When the contract is not distinct or consistent in its different parts it should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions to determine •whether it is collateral or direct: Perkins v. Hinsdale, 97 Mass. 157. 1 Boyer v. Soules (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Eep. 1000, Long, J.: "Aside from the consideration of the security which Soules had, the promise was not a collateral one, and therefore not within the statute of frauds. It was an original undertaking to save the plaintiff harmless. A promise by one person to indemnify another for be- coming a guaranty for a third is not within the statute of frauds. Such promise need not be in writing, and the assumption of the responsibility is a sufficient consideration for the promise. Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657. It is settled that if B. agrees with C. that, if he will execute an in- strument as co-security for A., he (B.) will indemnify him from loss, such agreement, in a suit by B. against C. for contribution, will be enforced and held valid. Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462; Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412 ; Taylor v. Savage, 12 Mass. $8; Story on Equity Jurisprudence, § 498 ; Cutter v. Emery, 37 N. H. 567 ; Boss- v. Espy, 66 Pa. St. 481 ; Cress- well v. Wood, 10 Adol. & El. 460; Fennell b. Mulcahy, 8 Irish Law Rep. 434. The statute enacts that 'every special promise to answer for the debt, default or misdoings of another person' shall be void unless actually signed, etc. The undertaking in the present case was not to pay a debt of Crane's, but, if plaintiff would sign the bond or undertaking with Crane, Soules would save him harmless if plaintiff was called upon to pay any- thing thereunder. Such a case is fully discussed in Wildes v. Dud- low, L. R. 19 Eq. C. 198; 11 Moak Eng. Rep. 788, decided in 1874; and Sir R. Malins, V. C, there re- marks: 'If one man could induce another to alter his line of conduct in that way and then meet him with the statute of frauds, that statute, instead of being a protection against fraud, would be the direct means of fraud;' citing Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728, where the case is fully discussed by Justices Bagley and Parke. The present case need not, however, rest solely upon the naked promise of the defendant to save the plaintiff harm- less. Here it is proved without con- tradiction that the defendant had an interest in the property replevied. He had a mortgage upon it for more than half its value, and assured the plaintiff that he had ample security in his hands to protect him. Relying upon this, the plaintiff signed the bond. The case in this view falls within the rule of Calkins v. Chandler, 56 Mich. 323, which follows the rule of Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 396, which is that 'cases are not consid- ered as coming within the statute when the party promising has for his object a benefit which he did not be- fore enjoy accruing immediately to himself.' This rule was followed in Bice v. Marquette, etc., Bldg. Co., 96 Mich. 24; 55 N.W. Rep.382." In Amort v. Christofferson, 57 Minn. 234; 59 N. 600 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §509 to him a note and mortgage under the false representation that the mortgage was good, although he knew that it was of no value, and the amount of the mortgage plaintiff credited on deceased's debt to him, and when plaintiff found that the mortgage was worthless, he asked deceased to make it good, and deceased told him to sue on the note and that he would pay the expense of the suit, and, if the note was not collected by suit, he would pay the amount thereof, and plaintiff sued the maker, but was unable to collect the judg- ment, it was held that the right of action on the promise of deceased to pay the note and the expense of suit survived his death; and that the promise by deceased was not an under- taking to answer for the debt of another, within the statute of frauds. 1 W. Rep. 304, Collins, J., said : "Kieley applied to plaintiff for seed, but the latter refused to give him credit, and thereupon, according to the testi- mony, defendant told plaintiff to let Kieley have the seed, and 'I will see you paid for it.' This assurance, con- strued with reference to the connec- tion in which the words were used, and the facts surrounding their utter- ance, can not be distinguished from that considered in Grant v. Wolf, 34 Minn. 32 ; 24 S. W. Rep. 289 ; and the words are fairly susceptible of the construction that the responsibility assumed by defendant was original, and not collateral to the agreement of another ; hence not within the statute of frauds. The words, 'I will see you paid' for the seed-grain, amounted, under the circumstances, to an agree- ment by defendant to pay for it him- self. It was shown that, when the plaintiff delivered the grain to Kieley, he took a seed-grain note from him for the amount of the purchase price, and from this it might be argued that defendant's promise was unquestion- ably collateral. But the plaintiff tes- tified (and the jury had the right to believe him) that defendant told him, when becoming responsible for the grain, that he must take a seed-grain note from Kieley, and, further, that he (defendant) would sign it also. The note was taken, and afterwards pre- sented to defendant for his signature, which was refused. The explanation offered by plaintiff as to the taking of the note is such that it can not be said to have been conclusively shown that any credit was given to Kieley. See Cole v. Hutchinson, 34 Minn. 410 ; 26 N. W. Rep. 319." Bryant *>.,Rich (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 146, Long, J. : "The claim is not made that the deceased prom- ised to pay the Miller note and mort- gage if the claimant failed to collect of Miller, but it is that he (the de- ceased) would pay the amount to set- tle the fraud if the claimant failed to collect of Miller. It is claimed, how- ever, that the claimant could not have the judgment against Miller, and at the same time have a claim against Mr. Rich. It was held in Calkins v. Cliandler, 36 Mich. 320, that, 'where the third party himself is to receive the benefit for which his promise is exchanged, it is not usually material whether the original debtor remains § 510 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 601 § 510. The same subject continued. — The general rule is that if the promise is in the nature of an original undertaking to pay a debt to a third party, and is founded on a valuable consideration received by the promisor himself, it is not within the provisions of the statute, and need not be in writing to make it valid and binding. 1 The terms original and collateral promise are used to distinguish 'between the cases, where the direct and leading object of the promise is to become the surety or guarantor of another's debt, and those where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of another, yet the lead- ing object of the undertaker is to promote some interest or purpose of his own. The former, whether made before or after, or at the same time with the promise of the principal, is not valid unless in writing. The latter, if made a good considera- tion, is binding, although by parol. The following illustration is given: In case one says to another, " Deliver goods to A. and I will pay you," it is an original promise, and the prom- isor is liable without putting it in writing; but if he says, "I will see you paid," or "I will pay, if he does not," or uses equivalent words, showing that the debt is in the first instance the debt of A., the undertaking is collateral, and not valid un- less in writing. 2 The form of expression, "I will be personally responsible; I will see you paid," imports a collateral promise, but the real character of a promise does not depend alto- liable or not.' In Nelson v. Boynton, efit of the deceased. It was made to 3 Mete. (Mass.) 396, it was said : 'The settle a matter of his own, and clearly true rule to be derived from the cases is not within the statute of frauds. In seems to be this : That cases are not fact, the original debt against Rich considered as coming within the stat- was never extinguished, by reason of ute when the party promising has this fraud. Huntington v. Welling- for his object a benefit which he ton, 12 Mich. 10." And see Watson did not before enjoy, accruing im- ». Poezel (1893), 158 Pa. St. 513. mediately to himself; but where '"Wilson v. Bevans (1871), 58 111. the object of the promise is to obtain 232; Meyer v. Hartman (1874), 72 111. the release of person or property of 442; Watkins v. Sands (1879), 4 111. the debtor, or other forbearance or App. 207. benefit to him, it is within the stat- z Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Mete. 396 ; ; ute.' This case was cited with approval Matson v. Wharam, 2 T. R. 80; An- in Bice v. Marquette, etc.. Building Co., derson v. Hayman, 1 H. B. 120; Far- 96 Mich. 24; 55 N. W. Rep. 382. Here ley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432; Chapin the promise was not made for the v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467; Langdon ». benefit of Miller. It was for the ben- Richardson (1882), 58 Iowa, 610. 602 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §§ 511, 512 gether upon the form of expression, but largely upon the situ- ation of the parties, and the question always is what the par- ties mutually understood by the language, whether they under- stood it to be a collateral or a direct promise. 1 The substance and not the form should control. 2 § 511. The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States. — The United States Supreme Court has stated the doc- trine that whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving either a benefit to him- self or damage to the other contracting party, his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it may incidentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability. 3 § 512. The rule in New York and Pennsylvania. — The doc- trine which serves to distinguish between original and collat- eral promises has been stated by the Court of Appeals of New York thus: that where the primary debt subsists, and was antecedently contracted, the promise to pay it is original when 1 Davis v. Patrick (1891), 141 U. S. principal and immediate object of the 479. transaction is to benefit the promisor, 2 The expression "would see that not to secure the debt of another per- they had their pay" implies a collat- son, the promise is considered not aa eral promise, but if this form of ex- collateral to the debt of another, but pression was intended and understood as creating an original debt from the as a promise to pay directly, and not promisor, which is not within the conditionally it would be so treated, statute, although one effect of its pay- Greene v. Burton (1887), 59 Vt. 423. A ment may be to discharge the debt of promise to an employe of another in another. The court, per Gray, J., these words "Keep on at work just as said: "When the original debtor re- you have been, we will see you paid," mains liable,- yet if the creditor, in held, to be a collateral undertaking, consideration of the new promise, re- Lewis v. Lewis Lumber Co. (1893), leases some interest or advantage re- 156 Pa. St. 217. lating to or affecting the original debt, 3 Emerson v. Slater (1859), 22 How. and inuring to the benefit of the new 28; Davis v. Patrick (1891), 141 U. S. promisor, his promise is considered 479; Johnson v. Knapp (1873), 36 as a promise to answer for his own Iowa, 616; Board of Commissioners v. debt, and the case is not within the Cin.SteamHeatingCo.(1890),128Ind. statute." Amer. Lead Pencil Co. v. 243. It was held in Furbish v. Good- Wolfe (1892), 30 Fla. 360. now (1867), 98 Mass. 296, that if the §512 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 603 it is founded on a new consideration moving to the promisor, and beneficial to him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor. 1 In Pennsylvania and some other states it has been held that, except in certain cases in which the contract shows an intention of the parties that the new promisor shall become the principal debtor, and the old debtor become but secondarily liable, while the old debt 1 White v. Rintoul (1888), 108 N. Y. 222, per Finch, J., distinguishing Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John. 29 ; Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412; Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y. 187, and Ackley v. Parmenter (1885), 98 N. Y. 425. The facts in the case of Rintoul v. White were as follows : The de- fendant was a creditor of a firm, and was secured by a chattel mortgage. The plaintiff was the holder of notes of the firm which were nearly ma- tured. The defendant disclos'ed the fact that he held the mortgage, and promised, if the plaintiff would for- bear for a time, to pay the notes. It was held that the promise was within the statute. Rule in White v. Rin- toul criticised in Dillaby v. Wilcox (1891), 60 Conn. 71. In the case of Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John. 29, one of very high authority and a lead- ing case in New York on the subject, Chief Justice Kent divided the cases under this clause into three classes, as follows: (1) Where the promise is collateral to the principal contract, but is made at the same time, and be- comes an essential ground of the orig- inal credit. (2) Cases in which the collateral undertaking is subsequent to the creation of the debt, and was not the inducement to it, although the subsisting liability is the ground of the promise. "Here," the chief jus- tice observed, "there must be some further consideration shown, having an immediate respect to such liability, for the consideration of the original debt will not attach to this subsequent promise." (3) Cases where the prom- ise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new and original consid- eration of benefit or harm moving be- tween the newly contracting parties. "The two first classes," he further ob- served, "are within the statute of frauds, but the last is not." In Far- ley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432, the prin- cipal was laid down that where a prom- ise to pay the debt of a third person arises out of some new consideration of benefit to the promisor, or harm to the promisee, moving to the promisor, either from the promisee or the origi- nal debtor, such promise is not with- in the statute, although the original debt still subsists and remains entire- ly unaffected by the new agreement. The subject was very fully and ably discussed by Chief Justice Comstock in Mallory v. Gillett (1860), 21 N. Y. 412, and while he in the main approved of the views of the court in Leonard v. Vredenburg, he held it necessary to the completeness of the definition of cases coming within the third class before mentioned that the new or original consideration move to the promisor. Many cases were cited and commented upon, English and Ameri- can. The principle was reaffirmed in Becker v. Torrance (1864), 31 N. Y. 631; Pfeiffer v. Adler (1867), 37 N. Y. 164; Brown v. Weber 1868), 38 N. Y. 187 ; White v. Rintoul (1888) , 108 N. Y. 222; Tighe v. Morrison (1889), 116 263. 604 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 513 remains the new promise is regarded as collateral and within the statute. 1 § 513. The same subject continued. — The Pennsylvania doctrine is that a promise to answer for the debt or default of another is not within the statute, unless it be collateral to a continued liability of the original debtor. If it be a substitute, an arrangement by which the debt of the other is extinguished, as where the creditor gives up his claim on his original debtor, and accepts the new promise in lieu thereof, it need not be in writing. And, as the cases show it may be unaffected by the statute, though the original debt remains, if the promisor has received a fund pledged, set apart, or held for the payment of the debt. But except in such cases, and others, perhaps, of a kindred nature, in which the contract shows an intention of the parties that the new promisor shall become the principal debtor, and the old debtor become but secondarily liable, the rule is that, while the old debt remains, the new must be regarded as not an original undertaking, and is therefore within the statute. 2 Where one creditor agrees with another 1 Maule v. Bucknell (1865), 50 Pa. and the following authorities are St. 39, in which Strong, J., says in cited in surport of the proposition: regard to the third class of Chief Mitchell v. Griffin, 58 Ind. 559; Pal- Justice Kent, before mentioned (note mer v. Blain, 55 Ind. 11 ; Krutz v. to preceding section) that the propo- Stewart, 54 Ind. 178; Vaughn v. sition is accurate, and practically de- Smith, 65 Iowa, 579; Gill v. Herrick, nies all effect to the statute. "The 111 Mass. 501; Dows v. Swett, 134 general rule is, that as long as the Mass. 140; Ruppe v. Peterson (1887), debt of the person, for whom the 67 Mich. 437 ; Ackly v. Parmenter, 98 promise is made, remains the promise N. Y. 425 ; Hooker v. Russell, 67 Wis. is collateral." Steward v. Campbell 257; Willard v. Bosshard (1887), 68 (1870), 58 Maine, 439. In Dillaby v. Wis. 454. In California and some Wilcox (1891), 60 Conn. 71, the new other states the law expressly pro- promise was held to be collateral "so vides when a promise to pay the debt long as the original debt still subsists of another is deemed original. "The as the principal debt." It is stated in wisdom of incorporating these excep- the text of the Am. and Eng. Encyc. tions into the statute is not doubtful, of Law, in loco, that, in a large and as they are mainly such as have been increasing number of the states of the adopted by the courts." Wood on Union, the promise, although made the Statute of Frauds, § 124. upon a new consideration of benefit 2 Nugent t\ Wolfe, 111 Pa. St. 471; to the promisor, is held to be collat- Maule v. Bucknell, 50 Pa. St. 39. era], whatever the intent of the par- In Daugherty v. Bach, 167 Pa. 429; ties, if the original liability remains, 31 Atl. Rep. 729, Green, J., said: "In §513 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 605 and with the debtor to pay the debt due such other creditor, in consideration of the transfer of the debtor's property to the Williams's Saunders, p. 211e, note 1, it is said : ' The question whether each particular case comes within the clause of the statute or not depends not on the consideration for the prom- ise, but on the fact of the original party remaining liable, coupled with the absence of any liability on the part of the defendant or his property, except such as arises from his express promise.' The doctrine of this note is supported by very many cases, and it is in harmony with the words of the statute. It is incumbent, then, upon him who would enforce a mere verbal promise of one to answer for the debt or default of another, if the original debt remains, to show that his case is one of those that are recognized as ex- ceptional. And it will be found after examination that in nearly all the decisions in which it has been held that such a promise is not within the statute there was some liability of the promisor, or his property independent of his express promise, or that he had become the actual debtor, so that as between him and the original debtor the superior liability was his. The case of Mallet v. Bateman, L. E. 1 C. P. 163, comes nearer to this in its facts than any other we have met with. In fact, it is entirely similar in its leading features. Pollock, C. B., de- livering the opinion, said : 'The real question here is whether the contract declared upon is not substantially a contract that if Calvert & Co., the buy- ers of the goods, do not pay for them at the expiration of the month's credit, the defendant will indemnify the plaintiff against their default. In consideration of a discount of three per cent., the defendant undertakes to hold the bill without recourse to the plaintiff. That is, in substance, an engagement by which the buyers of the goods are not to be exonerated, but the defendant is to indemnify the seller against their default. That is clearly a contract within the statute of frauds.' This case was an appeal from the common pleas to the exche- quer chamber, and both courts con- curred in the ruling. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs claims that this decision is in conflict with our own cases of Arnold v. Stedman, 45 Pa. St. 186; Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436, and Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. St. 143 ; but an examination of those cases fails to disclose any hostility to Mallet v. Bateman, but shows that they were all cases which were taken out of the operation of the statute by the exceptional circumstances pre- viously indicated. Arnolds. Stedman was decided upon the express ground that Arnold's verbal promise was to pay a debt which was a mechanic's lien upon his own property, and in which he was interested to have the proceedings on the lien suspended. In Taylor v. Preston the promise was by the assignee of a vendee under articles to pay unpaid purchase-money named in the articles ; and we held that the promisor was bound to pay it, because it was his own debt. So also, in Townsend v. Long the prom- isor bought out an entire partnership stock, and agreed to pay, as part con- sideration of the purchase, all the debts of the firm, one of which was due to a former partner, who had sold his interest to the other members for 1700, and this debt was also specially named in the transfer. We held the promisor liable on this promise, be- cause it was his own debt which he had agreed to pay, in consideration of the property sold to him. We made the same ruling in Wynn v. Wood, 97 Pa. St. 216. We have not been re- 606 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §514 promisor, the promise rests on a consideration of such char- acter as to make the promise original, and take it out of the statute of frauds. 1 § 514. Further illustrations. — The Alabama rule is that, where any credit is extended to the party to whom the con- sideration moves — where he is looked to at all for payment, although the other party may be in much greater degree re- lied on — the debt is his, and the other party's obligation is that of guarantor, which, to be binding, must be in writing. 8 Where a lumber dealer had an arrangement to furnish lumber to his landlord in payment of the rent, and the landlord ordered a certain kind of lumber of the tenant, who, not having it, gave the order to another lumber dealer, and the latter refused to send ferred to any case, nor have we met with any, in which a transaction like the present has been held to be clear of the statute. We are of opinion that the promise of the defendant, Bash, was in reality a promise to pay the debt of another, without any acquisition of property as a considera- tion therefor, and without the pres- ence of any of the exceptional cir- cumstances which prevent the appli- cation of the statute. Being only a verbal promise, it is void, under the statute." 1 First Nat. Banku. Chalmers (1895), 144 N. Y. 432; 39 N. E. Rep. 331, per Finch, J. : "What constitutes an original promise, upon which the statute of frauds does not operate, and which, therefore, may be valid and effectual without a writing, is fairly settled in one direction at least. Wherever the facts show that the debtor has transferred or delivered to the promisor, for his own use and benefit, money or property in consid- eration of the latter's agreement to assume and pay the outstanding debt, and he thereupon has promised the creditor to pay, that promise is origi- nal, upon the ground that, by the acceptance of the fund or property under an agreement to assume and pay the debt, the promisor has made that debt his own, has become prima- rily liable for its discharge, and has assumed an independent duty of pay- ment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor. Ackley v. Par- menter, 98 N. Y. 425; White v. Rin- toul, 108 N. Y. 222 ; 15 N. E. Rep. 318. In such a case the debt has become that of the new party promising. His promise is not to pay the debt of an- other, but his own. As between him and the primary debtor, the latter has become practically a surety, entitled to require the payment to be made by his transferee. The consideration of the primary debt by the transfer of the money or property into which that consideration had been in effect merged may be said to have been shifted over to the new promisor, who thereby comes under a duty of pay- ment as obvious as if such original consideration had passed directly to him." 8 8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 674 (note 6), 678, 679, notes ; Fosters. Napier, 74 Ala. 393; Boykin v. Doh- londe, 37 Ala. 577; Marx v. Bell, 48 Ala. 497 ; Clark v. Jones, 87 Ala. 474; 6 So. Rep. 362. §515 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 607 the lumber until the tenant guarantied payment therefor, and the seller charged the lumber to the landlord, and, on failing to collect from him, sued him and the tenant, it was held that the promise of the tenant was a contract to answer the debt of another, and void, because not in writing. 1 An agreement between two creditors of a common debtor, that each will share the loss, if any, which the other sustains on his claim against such debtor, is a "promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person," within the statute of frauds. 2 § 515. Illustrations of original agreements. — In the follow- ing cases the promise has been held binding without writing; where the debtor has put into the hands of the promisor the amount of his debt; 8 or transferred to him property equivalent; 4 1 Webb v. Hawkins Lumber Co. (1893), 101 Ala. 630; 14 So. Rep. 407. 8 Spear v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 156 111. 555 ; 41 N. E. Eep. 164, per Phillips, J. ; "The principal question presented for consideration is whether the al- leged agreement between Spear and the bank, as alleged in the bill, is with- in that provision of the statute of frauds and perjuries, 'that no action shall be brought * * * whereby to charge the defendants upon any special prom- ise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person,' unless the promise be in writing, and signed by the person to be charged. The de- termination of this question is depend- ent on whether the agreement is an original and independent one, or whether collateral to the agreement of another person, whereby the promise is to answer for the debt or default of that other. In the first case, it is not within the statute ; in the second, it is. Eddy v. Roberts, 17 111. 505 ; Res- seter v. Waterman, 151 111. 169; 37 N. E. Rep. 875. The question whether an agreement is an original and inde- pendent one is often attended with much difficulty in its determination. In this case Thompson & McLean were primarily liable, and the principal debtors, and, if the agreement was made as claimed, their liability was in no manner changed thereby . By their discharge of their indebtedness, neither party to the agreement would have had to pay any sum to the other, even if the agreement had been in writing, and a sufficient consideration for the promise of each to the other. The promise, if any was made by the bank, was a collateral promise. There was no change in the original indebt- edness, the original debtors remaining liable to the original creditors, pre- cisely the same as when the indebted- ness was originallycontracted." 3 Robinson v. Gilman, 43 N. H. 485; Hilton v. Dinsmore, 21 Maine, 410; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 ; Blunt v. Boyd, 3 Barb. 209. ' 4 Skelton v. Brewster, 8 John. 376 (delivered goods) ; Gold v. Phillips, 10 John. 412 (conveyed land) ; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 ; 9 Cow. 639 ; Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend. 235 ; Bark- er v. Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45; Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133 ; Alger v. Scoville, 1 Gray, 391; Preble v. Baldwin, 6 Cush. 549 ; Todd v. Tobey, 29 Maine, 219 ; Dearborn v. Parks, 5 Maine, 81 ; 608 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. §516 or something of equivalent advantage to himself, 1 or where the promisee has transferred or released to the promisor some interest in the property of the debtor; 2 as a lien given by law to the seller for the price of goods sold, but not delivered; 8 or to a landlord upon the goods of his tenant for rent; 4 or where the promisee has released to the promisor and holder of the property an attachment, or a trustee process; 6 or where he has released to the promisor the right to attach property of the debtor, 6 or to bring a suit to enforce a lien.' A promise to answer for a party not legally competent to contract need not be in writing. The liability of the party for whom the guar- anty is given must be a legal liability to bring it within the statute, 8 and there must be a clearly denned liability of the third person. 9 § 516. Where the promisor holds the debtor's funds, or where the old debt is extinguished. — Where the person prom- ising to pay the debt receives funds or property of the debtor Bird v. Gamman (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 883 ; Browning v. Stallard, 5 Taunt. 450 ; Wait v. Wait, 28 Vt. 350 ; Olm- stead v. Greenly, 18 John. 12 (money and property placed in hands of de- fendant to provide for paying the debt) ; Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend. 317; Gardiner v. Hopkins, 5 Wend. 23; King v. Despard, 5 Wend. 277 ; Whit- beck v. Whitbeck, 9 Cow. 266 ; Bailey v. Bailey (1883), 56 Vt. 398 (convey- ance of property to defendant) ; Mer- rill a. Englesby, 28 Vt. 150; Smith v. Est. of Rogers, 35 Vt. 140. "Walker v. Taylor, 6 C. & P. 752 (license to keep a public house). 2 Barrell v. Trussell, 4 Taunt. 117 ; Tomlinson v. Gill, Ambler, 330. 3 Fitzgerald v. Dressier, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 885. i Williams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886 Slingerland v. Morse, 7 John. 463 Thomas v. Williams, 10 B. & C. 664 Edwards v. Kelly, 6 M. & S. 204 Bampton v. Paulin, 4 Bing. 264 Stephens v. Pell, 2 C. & M. 710. 6 Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641. 6 Lampson v. Hobart, 28 Vt. 697. ' Fish v. Thomas, 5 Gray, 45. 8 Harris v. Huntbach, 1 Burr. 373 ; Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467, where a father requested a merchant to as- sist his minor son in business and promised verbally to indemnify him against any loss he might incur in so doing. 9 In an Ohio case, the defendant, who was a stockholder, and also pres- ident of a corporation, being desirous to have the stock of the corporation taken, verbally promised the plaint- iff that if he would subscribe and pay $500 into the capital stock of the corporation, he should receive fifteen per cent, on that amount within one year. It was held that this was not a contract to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, but an original undertaking, and no dividend having been declared or earned within a year, the defendant was held liable upon his promise. Moorehouse v. Crangle, 36 Ohio St. 130; 38 Am. Rep. 564. §516 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. 609 for the purpose of paying his debt, and, thus holding the debt- or's funds or property, promises the creditor to pay the debt, such promise is held to be an original one and good, although not in writing, because the party promises substantially to pay his own debt, and not that of another; and, although the debtor still remains liable, his relation is not so much that of a principal in the transaction, but rather that of a surety for the party who has promised to pay his debt. 1 The cases which decide that, where a creditor holds a security for his debt, and surrenders it to a third person for his own benefit, upon his promise to be answerable for the debt, stand upon the same principle. 2 When, by the new promise, the old debt is extinguished, as where the creditor gives up his claim on the original debtor and accepts the new promise in lieu thereof, the promise is not within the statute; it is not then a promise to pay the debt of another, but an original contract. 8 If the contract is such that, either by its terms, or by legal opera- tion, it substantially transfers the debt to the promisor, it is not within the statute.' 1 Dillaby v. Wilcox (1891), 60 Conn. 71; Fullam v. Adams (1864), 37 Vt. 391 ; Mason v. Wilson (1881), 84 N. C. 51 ; 37 Am. Rep. 612 ; Cock v. Moore, 18 Hun, 31; Dock v. Boyd, 93 Pa. 92; Wynn's Admr. v. Wood, 97 Pa. St. 216; Bailey v. Bailey, 56 Vt. 398; Walden v. Karr, 88 111. 49 ; Woodruff v. Scaife (1887), 83 Ala. 152; Lee v. Fontaine, 10 Ala. 755 ; Maule v. Buck- nell (1865), 50 Pa. St. 39. 2 The early case of Williams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886, was the starting point of this class of cases. In that case the landlord was about distrain- ing for rent, and the defendant, a broker, who was employed to sell the goods, promised to pay the rent if the plaintiff would forbear to distrain. The object and purpose of the prom- ise were not to pay the debt of another, but to obtain a transfer of 39 the plaintiff's interest in the goods. Lord Mansfield said the defendant was a trustee for all the creditors. Castling v. Aubert (1802), 2 East, 325 (a leading case) ; Walker v. Tay- lor, 6 Car. and P. 752; Hughes v. Fisher (1887), 10 Colo. 383; Allen v. Thompson, 10 N. H. 32. 8 Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. 488 Maule v. Bucknell, 50 Pa. St. 39 Booth v. Eighmie (1875), 60 N. Y. 238 Watson v. Jacobs (1857), 29 Vt. 169 Walker v. Penniman, 8 Gray, 233 Skelton v. Brewster, 8 John. 376 Packer v. Benton, 35 Conn. 343; Mul- crone v. Amer. Lumber Co. (1885), 55 Mich. 622 ; Anderson v. Davis, 9 Vt. 136; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596; Shaffer v. Ryan, 84 Ind. 140 ; Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Salk. 27; Smith's Lead- ing Case and notes. 4 Cross v. Bichardson, 30 Vt. 641. 610 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §517 § 517. Relinquishment of lien — The modern rule. — Where a creditor has a lien on his debtor's property, and a third person, having a subordinate lien, or other interest in the same prop- erty, promises the creditor to pay the debt in consideration of the relinquishment of the lien, which thus inures to the promisor's benefit, the statute does not apply. The old rule was that a verbal promise to pay another's debt would be sup- ported by a mere surrender of a lien on the property of the original debtor, whether made for his benefit or that of the new promisor. The current of modern authority, however, sustains the view that the new promisor must have an inter- est of some kind in the property to which the lien attached, so that the surrender will inure to his benefit. 1 1 Westmoreland v. Porter (1883), 75 Ala. 452; Dexter v. Blanchard (1865), 11 Allen (Mass.) 365; Mallory v. Gil- lett(1860), 21 N. Y. 412. In this case the plaintiff had in his possession a canal boat belonging to A., and, hav- ing a lien upon it for repairs made by him, he delivered it to A. at the defendant's request, and upon his verbal promise to pay the amount due. There was no pretence that the defendant's promise was given or ac- cepted as a substitute for the original demand, or that such demand was in any manner extinguished. It was held that, there being no new con- sideration moving to the defendant, his promise was void. The follow- ing, among other cases, were referred to and commented upon : Barker v. Birt, 10 Mees. & W. 61 ; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & E. 309 ; Barrell v. Trussell, 4 Taunt. 117; Meredith v. Short, 1 Salk. 25; Castling v. Aubert, 2 East, 325 ; Walker v. Taylor, 6 Cor. & P. 752 ; Williams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886; Houlditch v. Milne, 3 Esp. 86; Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. 883; Bampton v. Paulin, 4 Bing. 264; Ste- phens v. Pell, 2 Cromp. & Mees. 710; Read v. Nash, 1 Wils. 305; Fish v. Hutchinson, 2 Wils. 94; Clancy v. Piggott, 2 Ad. & E. 473 ; Tomlinson v. Gell, 6 Ad. & E. 564. The modern doctrine upon the subject is said to derive its origin from Nelson v. Boyn- ton (1841) , 3 Mete. 396. The creditor in that case sued his debtor and seized his property under an attachment. The defendant promised to pay the debt in consideration of a discontin- uance of the suit. The suit was dis- continued accordingly, and the lien of the attachment was thereby lost, but the debt remained against the origi- nal debtor. It was held, Shaw, C. J., delivering the opinion, that the prom- ise was void, not being in writing. He stated that "cases are not considered as coming within the statute when the party promising has for his object a benefit which he did not before en- joy, accruing immediately to himself; but, where the object of the promise is to obtain the release of the person or property of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to him, it is within the statute." Wills v. Brown (1875), 118 Mass. 137 ; Burr v. Wilcox (1866), 13 Allen (Mass.) 269; Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 478 ; Dunbar v. Smith (1880), 66 Ala. 490 (action on bill of exchange) ; Crawford v. King (1876), 54 Ind. 6; Scott v. White (1874), 71 111. 287; Borchsenius v. Canutson, 100 111. 82 ; Power v. RaD- § 518 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. 611 § 518. Independent promise releasing another. — An inde- pendent promise absolutely to pay the debt of another, and! not on condition of his default, and which in fact releases him, is not a promise to pay the debt of another within the meaning of the Kentucky statute of frauds. 1 Where one of two creditors of a firm agrees with the other that he will pay the latter 's debt if he will not sue the firm and garnish funds which the promisee has in his control as treasurer of a com- pany which is indebted to such firm, and the promisee there- upon discharges such firm, the promise is not within the statute of frauds. 2 Where defendants contracted to build a road for a railway company, but sublet the contract to others, who assigned to defendants all money due the laborers, and defendants agreed to pay to the laborers the amount assigned, and the subcontractors abandoned the work, and gave time checks to the laborers and plaintiff bought the time-checks, and defendants promised to pay them, whereupon plaintiff, with defendants' knowledge, released the subcontractors, it was held that defendants were liable upon the promise, and that the agreement was not within the statute of frauds." kin, 114 111. 52 ; Throop on Verbal also shows that, by the terms of the Agreements, § 594. agreement, appellant became prima- 1 Fain v. Turner (Ky. 1895), 29 S. rily and unconditionally liable, and W. Eep. 628, per Lewis, J.: "If, Burns & Dillon, the original debtors, however, it could be regarded as a were discharged. In such a case the debt due from any person, still, ac- statute of frauds does not apply, cording to uniform construction of the Warren v. Smith, 24 Texas, 484." statute by this court, the promise by 3 Gleason v. Fitzgerald (Mich. 1895), Mrs. Rolinda Turner would not be in- 63 N. W. Eep. 512, Grant, J. . "The hibited, because whoever, if any per- case is controlled by Mulcrone v. son, may have owed them, was re- American Lumber Co., 55 Mich. 622; leased, and hers was an independent 22 N. W. Eep. 67." InUphamc. Clute promise to pay absolutely, not on con- (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 317, an dition of default or misdoing of an- order was drawn by M. on defendant, other. Waggener v. Bells, 4 T. B. in favor of plaintiff, and defendant at Mon. 8; Day v. Cloe, 4 Bush, 563; the time was indebted to M., and the Myles v. Myles, 6 Bush, 237." amount of the order, when collected, ' First Nat. Bank v. Border (Texas was to be applied on the indebtedness App. 1895), 29 S. W. Eep. 659, Kesy, of M. to plaintiff; but there was no J. : " As to the statute of frauds, the novation, nor was there a previous petition does not disclose that the agreement to accept the order. Held, promise sued on was verbal, and not that an oral acceptance thereof was in writing. But, if it had done so, it within Howell's Annotated Statutes, 612 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §510 § 519. Del credere commission. — It was formerly held that the contract of a factor binding hirn in the terms implied in a del credere commission was a collateral obligation and within the statute, 1 but the later cases do not so hold. The under- § 6185, which makes invalid the oral promise to pay the debt of another. Montgomery, J., said: "The case can not be distinguished from Pfaff v. Cummings, 67 Mich. 143; 34 N. W. Eep. 281, which is very similar in its facts. In that case it was said by Mr. Justice Campbell: 'We have two statutes of frauds which govern the suit, both on the special and on the common counts. One makes invalid the unwritten promise to pay the debt of another [ citing Howell's Annotated Statutes, §6185, subd. 2], and the other forbids action on any unwritten acceptance [citing Howell's Anno- tated Statutes, § 1583J.' Plaintiff re- lies on Mitts v. McMorran, 64 Mich. 664; 31 N. W. Eep. 521. In that case there was a precedent arrangement between Boynton, the debtor, and Mitts, by which Boynton agreed to give the order, and an agreement by McMorran to accept the order. The order was then obtained, and present- ed to McMorran, who verbally prom- ised to pay the same. The payment, by the terms of the order, was to be made out of means of Boynton which were to come into the hands of Mc- Morran ; the case showing that Boyn- ton had assigned to McMorran a con- tract upon which a sum of money was to become due to Boynton, and that this assignment was as security for advances to be made by McMorran. The court says: 'If the testimony showed only that McMorran promised to pay Boynton's indebtedness to Mitts when he received certain mon- eys from Pittsburgh which belonged to himself, the promise would have been collateral, and void under the statute of frauds. But there was evi- dence which tended to show that Boynton had placed in defendant's hands a fund or means of obtaining money belonging to Boynton, and at Boynton's request, and by the consent of Mitts, defendant promised Mitts to pay him the debt which Boynton owed him out of the money which should be received by him, belonging to Boynton. This would be an original promise, and not within the statute of frauds.' So it has been held in other cases that where the verbal promise to accept an order is in effect a prom- ise to disburse funds held by the drawee for the purpose, or where the acceptance is conditional on having funds of the drawer on hand, such verbal promise is enforcible. Sturges v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 75 111. 595; Hughes v. Fisher, 10 Colo. 383 ; 15 Pac. Eep. 702 ; Comstock v. Norton,36 Mich. 277. But no such state of facts is shown in the present record. Here we have the simple case of an order drawn by a creditor upon his debtor, and a verbal acceptance. There is no novation. There is no agreement to disburse funds belonging to the drawer, by the drawee, and we think the case clearly falls within the prohibition of the statute." 1 Morris u.Cleasby, 1 M. & Sel. 576; Peele v. Northcote, 7 Taunt. 478. A del credere commission is one under which the agent, in consideration of an additional premium, engages to in- sure to his principal not only the sol- vency of the debtor, but the punctual discharge of the debt ; and he is lia- ble in the first instance, without any demand from the debtor. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 497. § 520 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 613 taking of the factor is to answer for the solvency of the buyers of the goods. He becomes liable to pay to the principal the amount of the purchase-money, if the buyers fail to pay it when it becomes due, and his engagement is held to be an original and absolute one and not within the statute. 1 Al- though the factor may sue the purchaser in his own name the principal has also the right to sue. This, however, does not convert an express original undertaking of the factor with his principal, absolutely to pay the debt at maturity, into a col- lateral and conditional agreement to pay it if the purchaser does not." § 520. As to contracts of indemnity. — There is an important difference between a contract of guaranty and one of indemnity. The former is a collateral undertaking, and presupposes some contract or transaction to which it is collateral.' A contract of indemnity is generally held to be an original one and not within the statute, although there has been much conflict of authority on the question, produced in no inconsiderable degree by the conflicting decisions of the English courts. 4 The reason- 1 Bradley v. Richardson (1851), 23 stance." This ruling was followed in Vt. 720; Suman v. Inman (1878), 6 England, in Couturier v. Hastie, 8 Mo. App. 384; Wolff v. Koppel, 5 Exch. 40, where Parke, J., speaks of Hill, 458 ; 2 Denio, 368. In this the decision as a very able one, and case Judge Curran said: "It may adopts the reasoningin the case. Wick- not be strictly correct to call the con- ham v. Wickham, 2 K. & J. 478; tract of a factor a guaranty in the or- Swan v. Nesmith, 7 Pick. 220 ; Os- dinary sense of the word. * * * borne v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307; 57 Am. He takes an additional commission, Bep. 55; Story on Agency, § 215. however, and adds to his obligation 2 Sherwood v. Stone, 14 N. Y. 267. that he will make no sales except to 'Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 315; persons absolutely solvent; in legal Dole B.Young, 24 Pick. 250; Taylor effect, that he will be liable for the v. Taylor, 64 Ind. 356 ; Story on Prom- loss which his conduct may bring up- issory Notes, § 457. on the plaintiff, without the onus of 4 Jones v. Bacon (1893), 72 Hun, proving negligence. The merchant 506; Anderson v. Spence (1880), 72 holds the goods and will not part with Ind. 315 ; 37 Am. Bep. 162. The old them to the factor without this ex- case of Winckworth v. Mills, 2 Esp. traordinary stipulation, and a com- 484, held that a promise of indemnity mission is paid to him for entering was within the statute, but in Thomas into it. What is this, after all, but v. Cook (1828), 8 B. & C. 728, the con- another form of selling the goods? Its trary doctrine was declared. Bayley, consequences are the same in sub- J., said: "A promise to indemnify 614 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §521 ing of the courts, which hold that the promise of indemnity is not within the statute, is not always the same. The more common one is, that the promise must be made to the creditor, to be within the statute; that a promise to the debtor to pay his debt to the creditor, or to a surety to indemnify him for becoming surety for a third person to a fourth, is an original and not a collateral undertaking when the promisee acts solely on the promise of the promisor. 1 § 521. Oral promise to indemnify guarantor not within the Statute. — An oral promise by one person to indemnify another for becoming a guarantor for a third is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing, and the assumption of does not, as it appears to me, fall either within the words or the policy of the statute of frauds." This case was overruled in Green v. Cresswell (1839), 10 A. & E. 453. The doctrine of Green v. Cresswell was in turn overthrown in Reader v. Kingham (1862), 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344, and Wildes v. Dudlow (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 198, and the doctrine in England is now that a promise to indemnify the promisee for becoming surety for an- other is not within the statute, and the same doctrine generally prevails in this country. 'Demeritt v. Bickford, 58 N. H. 523, citing authorities; Throop on Verbal Agreements, §§ 361, 427, et seq.; Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360; Jones v. Shorter, 1 Ga. 294; Mills v. Brown, 11 Iowa, 314 (prom- ise to indemnify one if he will be surety for another) ; Hoggatt v. Thom- as (1883), 35 La. Ann. 298 (one surety binding himself to hold a cosurety harmless) ; Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250 (oral agreement to pay note) ; Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657 (promise of defendant to indem- nify the plaintiff from the consequen- ces of his agreement to pay a mer- cantile firm for goods delivered to another who was the purchaser) ; Ap- gar v. Hiler, 24 N. J. Law, 812 (prom- ise of surety to cosurety) ; Aldridge v. Ames, 9 Gray, 76 (promise to in- demnify another from his liability as bail for a third person) ; Potter v. Brown, 35 Mich. 274 (promise to pay note) ; Comstock v. Morton, 36 Mich. 277; Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt. 205; Jones v. Letcher, 13 B. Mon. 363; Smith v. Sayward, 5 Greenl. (Maine) 504; Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467; Vogel v. Melms, 31 Wis. 306. Contra, Brand v. Whelan (1885), 18 111. App. 186; Ferrell v. Maxwell (1876), 28 Ohio St. 383 (a promise of indemnity by one not a party to an obligation to induce another to become surety thereon) ; May v. Williams (1883), 61 Miss. 125; 48 Am. Rep. 80 (to indem- nify a person for becoming surety on another's bail bond, citing cases); Bissig v. Britton, 59 Mo. 204; Simp- son v. Nance, 1 Spears (S. C), 4; Ma- cey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438; Nu- gent?;. Wolfe, 111 Pa. St. 471; 56 Am. Rep. 291; Hollowbush's Estate, 13 Phila. 217. Even in cases where Green v. Cresswell, 10 A. & E. 453, is upheld the doctrine that a new con- sideration inuring to the benefit of the promisor will take the case out of the statute is countenanced. §521 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 615 the responsibility is a sufficient consideration for the promise. 1 So, also, a promise to indemnify one for becoming the surety on the note of another is an original promise, and not within the statue of frauds. 2 A negotiable promissory note imports con- sideration, and, when made as collateral security, sufficiently 1 Jones v. Bacon (1895>, 145 N. Y. 446, per Andrews, 0. J. : "The oral promise of the defendant's testator to the plaintiff was, in substance, a promise of indemnity in case the plaintiff would become indorser on the note of Kingsbury to the banking firm of McKechnie & Co. for a debt of Kingsbury to the bank. The plaintiff thereupon indorsed the note of Kingsbury to the bank, and has been compelled to pay thereon the sum of about $16,000, Kingsbury hav- ing made default and being insolvent. This is a statement of the facts in the simplest form, and the question arises whether the oral promise by the de- fendant's testator to indemnify the plaintiff was void under the statute of frauds, as being a promise to 'answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.' 2 Eev. St. 135, § 2, sub. 2. This is no longer an open question in this state. It was decided in Chapinr. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657, that a promise by one person to indemnify another for becoming a guaranty for a third is not within the statute and need not be in writing, and that the assumption of the responsibilty was a sufficient consideration for the prom- ise. The doctrine of Chapina. Merrill, 4 Wend., was approved in Mallory v. Gillett, 12 N. Y. 412, in Sanders v. Gil- lespie, 59 N. Y. 250, and Tighe v. Mor- rison, 116 N. Y. 263, and in other cases in this court. The same doctrine now prevails in the English courts. Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728; Reader v. Kingham, 13 Com. Beneh N. S. 344; Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 198. We do not deem it proper to re- open the discussion or to refer to cases where a different view has pre- vailed." 2 George v. Hoskins (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 406, per Poynter, J. : "It is an original undertaking, not within the statute of frauds, and enforcible although the promise be a verbal one. Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon. 376. It is also held in Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276, that a promise of indem- nity to one if he will become the surety of another is an original promise, not within the statute of frauds. We might extend the discussion further, but as this court has so often in its opinions marked the distinction be- tween a promise to answer for the debt of another and a promise made to the debtor, and has also so fully shown promises which are original undertakings and not within the stat- ute of frauds, we deem a further dis- cussion of the question unnecessary, except to cite, for the purpose of sus- taining our views, Jones v. Letcher, 13 B. Mon. 363; Williams v. Rogers, 14 Bush, 776; Spadone v. Reed, 7 Bush, 455 ; North v. Robinson, 1 Duv. 71; Brashear v. Moran, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 417. However, we will notice the case of Jones v. Walker, 13 B. Mon. 356, which is relied upon by counsel for appellant as sustaining his conten- tion that the promise, if made, was within the statute of frauds. Judge Marshall delivered the opinion of the court in that case, as he did in Dunn v. West, 5 B. Mon. 376, and Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Mon. 276, but makes no reference to either, show- ing he did not regard the cause as analogous, or that there was any conflict between them. Jones v. 616 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §522 expresses the consideration, so as in this respect to comply with the statute of frauds. 1 § 522. The same subject continued. — The Nebraska doctrine is that, in this country, the weight of authority is in favor of the rule that the verbal promise of a first person to a second person, to indemnify him if he will become surety for a third person for the debt of the latter to a fourth person, is not a promise on the part of the first person to answer for the debt of the third person, and is not within the statute of frauds. 2 Walker was an action, on a verbal promise which a third party made to the creditor that he would pay him a debt due by another. It is distinctive- ly an action on a verbal promise to pay the debt of another, and very properly held to be within the statute of frauds." 'Nichols, etc., Co. v. Dedrick (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 1110. 2 Minick v. Huff (1894) , 41 Neb. 516 ; 59 N. W. "Rep. 795, Ragan, C. . "The following cases, and perhaps others, sustain the rule stated. Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250; Yale „. Ed- gerton, 14 Minn. 194 (Gil. 144) ; Goetz v. Foos, 14 Minn. 265 (Gil. 196) ; Horn v. Bray, 51 Ind. 555 ; Mills v. Brown, 11 Iowa, 314; Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399; Vogel u.Melms.Sl Wis. 306; Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48; Pot- ter v. Brown, 35 Mich. 274; Perley v. Spring, 12 Mass. 297; Chapin v. Lap- ham, 20 Pick. 467; Alclrich v. Ames, 9 Gray, 76; Apgar's Admrs. t\ Hiler, 24 N. J. Law, 812. These cases fol- lowed the doctrine of the English case. Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728. On the other hand, such a prom- ise is held to be within the statute in Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 219 ; Kel- sey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St. 340; and these cases, and others like them, fol- low the doctrine of the English case. Green v. Cresswell, 10 Adol. & E. 453. We think the cases fi'St above cited as sustaining the rule are in accord with the weight of authority, both in this country and in England, and we cheerfully follow those cases." In Smith v. Delaney (1894), 64 Conn. 264; 29 Atl. Rep. 496, Fenn, J., said: "The main inquiry, upon the facts found, is whether the contract therein stated is within the statute of frauds. The law upon this subject, namely, whether contracts of indemnity are special promises to answer for the de- fault or miscarriage of another, or are original undertakings, has been cor- rectly said (8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 673), to be 'in a state of hopeless confusion, arising almost wholly from the different views taken of the scope of the statute. Where Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn. & C. 728, is law, and the statute is confined to contracts of suretyship, results are reached entirely different from those obtained where Green v. Cresswell, 10 Adol. & E. 453, is followed, and con- tracts of indemnity are included in its scope.' In favor of the view of Green v. Cresswell, that contracts of indemnity are within the statute, the case of Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. St. 471 ; 4 Atl. Rep. 15, cited by the de- fendant, and in favor of the opposite view, held in Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728, the case of Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, cited by the plaintiff, may be regarded as among the leading authorities. Doubt- less, in England, the latter case of Green v. Cresswell, 10 A. & E. 453, has been practically overruled. §523 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 617 § 523. Agreements in consideration of marriage. — What- ever may have been the earlier decisions upon the question, 1 the law is now well settled that a promise to marry is not a promise "in consideration of marriage" so as to require it to be evidenced by writing, under the statute of frauds. 2 A dis- and the authority of Thomas v. Cook, Holcomb was expressly stated to rest. 8 B. & C. 728, fully restored. Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Eq. 198 ; Yorkshire Wagon Co. v. Maclure, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 478. Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728, is also followed in a majority of the American states. Browne on Stat- ute of Frauds, § 161c. But it is unneces- sary to examine the authorities else- where, more at large, because the question is not now a new one in our own jurisdiction. The cases of Stock- ing v. Sage, 1 Conn. 519; Marcy v. Crawford, 16 Conn. 549 ; Reed v. Hol- comb, 31 Conn. 360, and Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464 — all bear more or less directly upon the question be- fore us; and, although Reed v. Hol- comb, 31 Conn. 360, and Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464, have been thought by various courts and text- writers to be somewhat in conflict, we do not so think, but that, from a fair examination of both, the true rule, to which both are consistent, may be discovered. In Reed v. Hol- comb, 31 Conn. 360, where the plaint- iff indorsed a note of a third party, at the request of the defendant, and upon his oral promise to see it paid, and to save him harmless if it was not paid by the makers, it was held that the statute of frauds did not apply to the case. In Clement's Appeal, in which no reference was made, either by counsel on either side or by the court, to Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. S60, Braiuerd indorsed notes for Goodwin, at the request of his father, and on the lather's oral promise to save him harmless. It was held that this promise was void under the stat- ute of frauds, because not in writing. The distinction between the two cases was the principle ua -wtdch Reed v. In Clement's Appeal, 52 Conn. 464, although the promisor was the father of the maker of the notes, and, as such, actuated by parental affection, he had no legal or pecuniary interest whatever, so far as the record dis- closed, in the transaction. In Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360, the trans- action was for the benefit of the de- fendant. Without consulting the plaintiff he had taken the note of a firm indebted to him, payable to the order of the plaintiff, doing so for the purpose of getting the plaintiff's in- dorsement, that he might get the note discounted at the bank." 1 Philpott v. Wallet, 3 Lev. 66 ; Skin. 24; overruled by Cork v. Baker, 1 Str. 34, and Harrison v. Cage, 1 Lord Ray. 386. 2 Short v. Stotts (1877), 58 Ind. 29; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495 ; Cay- lor v. Roe (1884), 99 Ind. 1 ; Wilbur v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600 ; Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland. (Md.) 284; Morgan v. Yar- borough, 5 La. Ann. 316; Hoitt v. Moulton, 21 N. H. 586; Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515; Withers v. Rich- ardson, 5T. B. Mon. 94; 17 Am. Dec. 44; Nichols v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 373; Blackburn v. Mann, 85 111. 222. The reason of the provision requiring agreements in consideration of mar- riage to be in writing is to prevent promises thoughtlessly made or art- fully procured during courtship from being perverted into deliberate and solemn engagements, conferring a right to compel performance. Dunn a.Tharp, 4 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 7. In New York and many other states mu- tual promises to marry are in terms excepted from the statute. 618 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §524 tinction has been made between agreements in consideration of marriage and agreements in contemplation of marriage. Where parties, contemplating marriage, agreed that certain promissory notes which were held by the woman against the man should not be extinguished by the marriage, but should remain her separate property, collectible out of his estate, if she would forbear to insist on their payment before marriage; it was held that the antenuptial promise was made in con- sideration of forbearance, and not in consideration of mar- riage, and was not within the statute. 1 § 524. The same subject continued. — Antenuptial contracts. — All promises or agreements made in consideration of mar- riage, whether between the parties to the marriage, or with a third person, must be in writing or no action can be main- tained upon them, either in the way of enforcing them, or for damages for a breach of them. 2 Antenuptial contracts, by 1 Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154; Rain- bolt v. East, 56 Ind. 538. Letters or correspondence before marriage may furnish the written evidence of the agreement required. Peck v. Vande- mark (1885), 99 N. Y. 29; Logan v. Wienholt, 1 CI. & Fin. 611 ; Hammers- ley v. DeBiel, 12 CI. & Fin. 45 ; Moor- house v. Colvin, 15 Beav. 341 ; Kin- nard v. Daniel, 13 B. Mon. 496. Wharton on Evidence, § 872. Mar- riage is not such a part performance as will take the case out of the stat- ute. Bradley v. Saddler (1875), 54 Ga. 681; Henry v. Henry (1875), 27 Ohio St. 121 ; Finch v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501 ; Brown v. Conger, 8 Hun, 625 ; Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 564 ; Red- ding v. Wilkes, 3 Brown Ch. R. 400; Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618; Hammersley v. DeBiel, 12 CI. & F. 45; Lassence v, Tierney, 1 McN. & G. 551 ; Caton v. Caton, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 137, L. R. 2 H. L. 127; Crane v. Gough, 4 Md. 316; Story's Equity, § 768. 2 Brenner v. Brenner, 48 Ind. 262; Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 564, where the woman promised before marriage to release a judgment recovered against the man. Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio St. 121, where a woman own- ing lands promised a man that if he would marry her and make certain improvements on the lands, she would convey the lands to him. Dygert v. Remer Schnider (1865), 32 N. Y. 629 (agreement to pay debts). Cushman v. Burritt, 14 N. Y. Week. Dig. 59, where a man promised to pay a woman two thousand dollars if she would marry him. In re Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257, where the wife of a lunatic applied for an allowance for support of her daughter by a former marriage on the ground of an alleged antenuptial agreement. Ennis v. Ennis, 48 Hun, 11 ; White v. Bigelow, 154 Mass. 593 (alleged oral agreement not sustained) ; Chase a. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359; Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 TT. S. 479; Deshon v. Wood (1888), 148 Mass. 132 (oral promise ; bill in equity by assignee in insolvency to recover §525 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 619 which the parties agree to anticipate the general law control- ling the marital relation and make a law in that regard to suit themselves, are within the statute and are not enforcible in law or equity unless in writing. 1 Where there has been no fraud and no agreement to reduce the settlement to writing there can be no departure from the statutory rule. If the wife has placed reliance solely upon the honor or promise of the husband no relief can be afforded. 8 § 525. Antenuptial parol agreements reduced to writing after marriage. — It has been held in many cases that, if there be a written agreement after marriage, in pursuance of a pa- rol agreement before marriage, this takes the case out of tbe statute, 8 but such subsequent written instrument, although good between the parties, is not valid against intervening creditors or innocent purchasers.' certain bonds as transferred in fraud of creditors) ; Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Wms. 65 ; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. Jr. 67 (construction of a letter as not amounting to an absolute agree- ment to give a marriage portion). 1 Eainbolt v. East (1877) ,56 Ind. 538 ; 26 Am. Rep. 40; Mallory v. Mallory (1891), 92 Ky. 316, criticising Suther- land v. Sutherland, 5 Bush, 591, which sustained an oral antenuptial contract that neither party was to interfere with the other's property, there being no creditors; Potts v. Merrit, 14 B. Mon. 406; Caylor v. Roe (1884), 99 Ind. 1; Galbreath «. Cook, 30 Ark. 417 ; Peck v. Vander- mark, 99 N. Y. 29. 2 Hannon v. Hounihan (1888), 85 Va. 429. The surrender and release of rights to be acquired by the in- tended wife by the marriage relation must be regarded with the most rigid scrutiny and courts of equity will interpose to set aside an instrument executed between parties who stand in confidential relations, when there is evidence showing fraud or undue influence. Pierce v. Pierce (1877), 17 N. Y. 154. 8 Surcome v. Pinniger, 3 De G. M. & G. 571 ; Taylor v. Beech, 1 Ves. Sen. 297; Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618; 1 Str. 236; Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew, 1; Hammersley o. DeBiel, 12 CI. & F. 45; Cooper v. Wormald, 27 Beav. 266 ; Argenbright v. Campbell, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 144; Ex parte Whitehead (1885), L. R. 14 Q. B\ Div. 419; Agnew's Statute of Fraud, 135. It was held in McAnnul- ty v. McAnnulty (1886), 120 111. 226, that the reduction to writing after marriage of a verbal antenuptial con- tract did not take it out of the stat- ute. "Doubtless, a verbal antenuptial agreement might, under special cir- cumstances, be enforced in equity, in order to prevent the party invoking the statute from perpetrating a fraud upon the other party,'-' per Mulkey, ,T. 4 Albert v. Winn, 5 Md. 66, holding that the subsequent written instru- ment does not relate back so as to make the original parol contract the contract. Wood v. Savage, 2 Doug. 620 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 526 § 526. Contracts relating to lands. — A contract relating to real estate, to be binding at law must be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized; 1 and the statute is equally binding on courts of equity as courts of law. 2 An equity in lands is as much within the statute as the legal title, and it is no more competent to convey the one by parol than the other. 8 (Mich.) 316, holding that a voluntary postnuptial settlement upon a wife, by a husband indebted at the time, is void against the existing creditors, and an alleged parol antenuptial promise can not be given in evidence to sus- tain it. Reade v. Livingstone, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (opinion by Chancellor Kent, reviewing authorities) ; Borst v. Co- rey, 16 Barb. 136 ; Izard v. Izard, Bai- ley Eq. (S. C.) 228; Davidson v. Graves, Riley Eq. (S. C.) 219 ; Smith v. Greer, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 118; Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh (Va.), 29; Satterthwaite v. Emley, 3 Green Ch. (N. J.) 489; Andrews u. Jones, 10 Ala. 400; Warden v. Jones (1857), 2 De G. & J. 76, disapproving Dundas o. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196; 2 Cox Ch. 235, which is cited as holding that a postnuptial settlement reciting the antenuptial agreement was good even against creditors. Warden v. Jones, 2 De G. & J. 76, was an appeal from the decision of the master of the rolls, setting aside a postnuptial settlement as fraudulent against the creditors of the settlor. Lord Chancellor Cran- worth said: "Lord Thurlow decided, in Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, that such a settlement is good, and on that decision I will only remark that, if it be a correct view of the law, the whole policy of the statute is defeated. It can not be enough merely to say ip writing that there was a previuus parol agreement. It must be proved that there was such an agreement, and to let in such proof is precisely what the statute meant to forbid." Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 374. 1 Blood v. Hardy, 15 Maine, 61. Where a conveyance of certain lands and personal property was made by a father to his two sons, they verbally agreeing that after their father's death they would convey the same property to a sister, or pay her three hundred dollars, it was held that the promise could not be enforced. The promise being in the alternative, to pay money or convey land, does not exempt it from the operation of the statute. Patterson v. Cunningham, 12 Maine, 506. 2 Purcell v. Miner (1866), 4 Wall. 513. "Nevertheless, courts of equity have, in many instances, relaxed the rigid requirements of the statute ; but it has always been done for the pur- pose of hindering the statute made to prevent frauds from becoming the instrument of fraud/' per Grier, J. Courts of equity decr&e a specific per- formance of parol contracts relating to the sale of lands, where there has been a part performance of the con- tract. Bat the ground of relief there, in such cases, is fraud. Lane v. Shack- ford, 5 N. H. 130; Phillips v. Thomp- son, 1 John. Ch. 131 ; Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Vesey Jr. 341. 3 Conner v. Tippett (1880), 57 Miss. 594 ; Scott v. McFarland, 13 Mass. 309 ; Marble v. Marble, 5 N. H. 374; Kel- ley v. Stanbery, 13 Ohio, 408. "If there is any case that calls more than another upon the courts to insist upon §527 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 621 A contract for the exchange of lands stands on the same foot- ing as a contract for their sale. 1 It seems to be clear that the statute has made it necessary that a partition of lands must be effected by writing; 2 but in some states a parol partition fol- lowed by possession in accordance therewith, and the exercise of acts of exclusive ownership is legal and binding. 8 § 527. Invalid verbal contracts as to land. — An unexecuted verbal agreement for the conveyance of land, without more, is invalid, and unenf orcible. 1 A sublease of a portion of a build- the salutary provisions of this useful statute being enforced, it is in the case of the release of an equity of re- demption." Chancellor Zabriskie in VanKeuren v. McLaughlin, 19 N. J. Eq. 187. ' l Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513 ; Conner v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594 ; Moss o. Culver, 64 Pa. St. 414. 2 Ballou v. Hale, 47 N. H. 347; Por- ter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 33; Lloyd v. Con- over, 25 N. J. Law, 47; Medlin v. Steel, 75 N. C. 154 ; John u. Sabattis, 69 Maine, 473; Eoberts on Frauds, § 284. 3 Wood v. Fleet (1867), 36 N. Y. 499, citing cases showing an un- broken current of decisions. Ver- bal partitions between tenants in common are valid at law, at least for some purposes, in Illinois, Missis- sippi, Texas, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, but even in these states the partition must be followed by possession, and in most of them by such acts of occupation as would be sufficient to secure a decree for spe- cific performance in equity. Shepard v. Rinks, 78 111. 188; Pipes v. Buck- ner, 51 Miss. 848 ; Stuart v. Baker, 17 Texas, 417; Moore v. Kerr, 46 Ind. 468 ; Long's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 151 ; Buzzell v. Gallagher, 28 Wis. 678; Wood on Frauds, § 229. 1 Cleveland v. Evans 5 S. Dak. 53; 58 N. W. Rep. 8, Kellam, J. : " Such an agreement, to wit : a verbal agree- ment for the purpose named, is by sections 3544 and 3617, Compiled Laws, declared to be invalid — that is, not binding upon the parties; not en- forcible. See Andrews' Law Dic- tionary, p. 1080. In McLaughlin o. Wheeler, 1 S. Dak. 497; 47 N. W. Rep. 816, we held that where, in a contest between the principal and agent, evidence of verbal authority to the agent to contract concerning land was offered and received without ob- jection, no motion being made at any time to strike it out, and on motion for new trial it was still unobjected to, there was a waiver of appellant's right to object that such oral agreement was not binding on him; that, after con- senting to try the case upon that theory, and allowing judgment to be entered without any intimation that he was unwilling to be bound by his oral authority to the agent, he could not, in this court, for the first time make the point that he was not bound by such oral authority. Au- thorization by parol was not unlawful, and the principal might make it good against himself by thus consenting to it. But in this case respondent did object, and raised the question at the first opportunity. The demurrer ad- mits that the parties did agree orally that appellant should give and re- pondent should accept the described real estate in lieu of money. The agreement was never executed. 622 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §527 ing, given by one holding a lease on the entire building for a term of five years, is a conveyance of an "interest in lands," within the Michigan statute, providing that no interest in lands, other than leases for one year, shall be conveyed by parol. 1 The principles of law growing out of the Alabama statute of frauds in reference to contracts for the sale of land or any interest therein have been fully discussed in the de- cisions of that state. It is well settled that the form of the writing required by the statute is not material. The contract may be evidenced by one writing or more. It may be shown entirely by written correspondence. Whatever form the agree- ment may assume, if the writing or writings, viewed as a whole, constitute, in essence or substance, upon their face, a note or memorandum in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged, or his agent lawfully authorized in writing, showing who the contracting parties are, the subject- matter of the sale, and the consideration, the statute is satis- fied. 2 If the several writings, viewed in the light of the situa- Whether the unexecuted agreement constituted a defense to an action for the money would depend, we think, upon whether, under the facts pleaded, the contract was enforcible by the appellant. Our statute, by the sections already referred to, declares that such an agreement is invalid. If invalid, it can not be enforced by or against either party to it. The rule is that where, on the face of a pleading, upon which specific performance is claimed, it appears that the agreement was oral, the pleading is demurrable. Randall v. Howard, 2 Black, 585; Howard v. Brower, 37 Ohio St. 402; Walker v. Locke, 5 Cush. 90 ; Cham- bers «. Le Compte, 9 Mo. 575; Max- well on Code Pleading, 376. Judge Story says the doctrine is firmly es- tablished 'that, even where the an- swer confesses the parol agreement, if it insists by way of defense upon the protection of the statute, the de- fense must prevail as a competent bar.' 1 Story on Equitable Juris- prudence, § 757. Such oral contracts are never enforced, unless other con- ditions exist which bring the case within some of the exceptions in which courts of equity relax the rule to prevent fraud and imposition." And see also, Fargusson v. Duluth Imp. Co. (1894), 56 Minn. 222; 57 N. W.Rep. 480. 'Fratcher v. Smith (Mich. 195), 62 N. W. Rep. 832. 2 Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345; Carter b. Shorter, 57 Ala. 253 ; Knox v. King, 36 Ala. 367. In cases of single instruments their sufficiency is generally of easy determination. Greater difficulties arise when the re- quired evidence of the contract is sought to be produced by the adjust- ment and adaptation to each other of several letters and writings contain- ing the negotiatings of the parties, and the supposed culmination of these ne- gotiations in a binding agreement of sale. In cases of this character it is certainly not essential that the party charged should have subscribed each §527 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. 623 tion and circumstances of the parties at the time they were written, clearly relate to, and connect themselves with, each other, and when their contents are adjusted to each other there appears to have been clearly made known the names of the contracting parties, the subject-matter of the sale, and the con- sideration, and if it appears that all this has received the sanc- tion of the subscription of the party sought to be charged, or some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized in writing, the statute requirement in reference to subscription, as well as all other particulars, is met. 1 paper forming a link in the chain of evidence. 1 White v. Breen (Ala. 1896), 19 So. Eep. 59, denying rehearing of decision of April 12, 1894. In this case it ap- peared that defendant wrote to a cer- tain person to find a purchaser for his property in a certain city. Said per- son answered that he was not a real estate agent, but that he would place the property in the hands of an agent, and afterwards wrote that he had placed the property, particularly de- scribing it, in the hands of an agent for sale. Said agent wrote to defend- ant that he had a customer who would, on specified terms, take the property, naming the streets upon which the same was situated. Defendant replied, conferring authority to sell. The property referred to was all that the defendant owned in said city. It was held that the correspondence with said person, with the other letters es- tablished said agent's power of attor- ney, and sufficiently described the land to satisfy the statute of frauds. Head, J., said: "We said the sev- eral writings must, upon their faces, clearly relate to, and connect them- selves with, each other. The rule, however, does not necessarily require express mention in one document of another, or in each of all the others ; and this statement, we conceive, does not modify the rule, when properly interpreted, as it is stated in Knox ». King, 36 Ala. 367, viz. : 'When the memorandum in writing is itself in- complete, it can not derive aid from another writing, unless the memoran- dum refer to the other writing;' and that 'oral evidence can not be re- ceived to connect the two or to sup- ply the wanting link.' This last rule is subject to the exception which ob- tains generally in the construction of written contracts, — that the situation and circumstances of the parties may be looked to, when necessary, to aid in arriving at the meaning of what they have written. An explanation of these rules will be found in Jenkins v. Harrison, 66 Ala. 345. We are of opinion that when all the writings ad- duced, viewed together, in the light of the situation and circumstances of the parties at the time they were written, show unmistakably that they relate to the same matter and constitute sev- eral parts of one connected transac- tion, so that the mind can come to no other reasonable conclusion, from the evidence, so afforded, than that they were each written with reference to those concurrent or preceding, then there is such a reference of the one to the other as satisfies the rule, although reference in express termB does not appear. The rule is one founded in reason; and when, as practical men, we look at the writings, and see, in- 624 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 528 § 528. Cases not within the statute — Constructive trusts. — Where a person, old and ignorant, under representations by the grantee, in whom he had implicit confidence, that it was the best course to pursue to avoid liability on a false claim, conveys land, receiving an oral assurance from the grantee that he will reconveyon request, the grantee having, however, no intention to reconvey, the agreement to reconvey is not within the statute of frauds; since, in such a case, the con- structive trust growing out of the grantee's fraud is excepted from the operation of the statute of frauds. 1 But covenants relating to the management and sale of real estate, contained in a declaration of trust which was signed only by the trustee, can not, in case of resulting trusts, be considered as covenants or limitations of their estates, on the part of the other persons for whose benefit the trusts are declared. Nor does their accept- ance of the declaration of trust, in such cases, dispense with the necessity of their signatures, under the statute of frauds, hering in them, evidence which en- tirely satisfies the mind that they all relate to one general transaction, there ia no reason why they should not be so considered. There is in such case a direct reference of the one to the other, within the meaning of the law. The application of the principle to the facts of this case will illustrate our meaning. The case of Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 TJ. S. 289, aptly illustrates it. These rules of law re- lating to the form of the agreement, and by which several papers may be considered as bearing a connection with each other, apply as well to the creation of a power of attorney to sell lands as to the requisite note or memorandum of the contract of sale; but in other respects the characteris- tics of the two (the power of attorney, and the note or memorandum of the contract) are essentially different, and controlled by different principles. r Jnlike the former, the present statute requires the authority of an agent to subscribe the note or memoran- dum of the contract for the sale of land for his principal to be conferred in writing. No form or method of execution of the power of at- torney is prescribed. It may be in any form clearly showing the agent's authority, and be executed according to any recognized common law method of executing written instru- ments. The power may be general, to sell any lands of the principal to any purchaser upon any terms ; or it may be partly general and partly special or limited, as to sell particular land to any purchaser on any terms, or particular land to any purchaser on particular terms ; or it may be entirely special, as to sell particular land to a particular purchaser on particular terms. In either case, the agent, keeping within the scope of his author- ity, may make the contract and exe- cute the necessary written evidence binding his principal to its perform- ance." 1 Rozell v. "Vansyckle, 11 Wash. 79; 39 Pac. Rep. 270. §529 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 625 when the declaration is claimed to limit, or give an interest in, their equitable estates, which arose independently of the declaration of trust. 1 Agreements between adjoining owners, establishing the boundary between their lands, is not within the statute of frauds. 8 Where a husband acknowledges in writing the receipt of a deed in fulfillment of the contract of sale made to his wife, such transaction was not in the nature of a parol contract, and void for the statute of frauds, but a ratification of the transfer of title to his wife. 3 § 529. What not an interest in land — Mortgagee's inter- est. — A parol agreement to execute a conveyance of land on payment of the amount for which the land had, by deed abso- lute, been taken as security, is not an agreement, within the statute of frauds, for sale of an interest in lands.* 1 Adams v. Carey (N. J. Eq. 1895) ; 31 Atl. Eep. 600, Emery, V. C. : "The other owners, in accepting this declara- tion of trust and acting on it, if they did so, would not, it seems to me, thereby make Carey's covenant their covenant for all purposes, or sup- ply the defect of the writings required to be signed by them under the stat- ute of frauds, in order to give any in- terest in or power over their equitable estates. This is not the case where the grant of an estate is made, by the deed creating it, subject to a condition or covenant to be performed by the grantee, and where the acceptance of the estate by the deed containing the covenant of the grantee makes it his covenant, although he did not formal- ly execute it. The covenant, there- fore, in my view, was a covenant of Carey alone, and, as against the other equitable owners, can not be made to operate as a covenant or grant against them on their estates, in the absence of the writing on their part required by the statute of frauds. To the extent that the parties have acted under the declaration, they are equal- 40 ly bound, of course; but a court of equity should, it seems to me, on the application of any equitable owner, interested adversely to the trustee, give him the benefit of his whole equitable estate in the lands, subject only to such lawful restrictions there- on as have been authorized in writing signed by him. Under this view of his rights, the complainant has, there- fore, an equitable estate in these lands, which would entitle him to a partition, and I shall so advise, with- out determining the further questions raised by the complainant as to the construction and validity of the pro- visions of Carey's covenants in the declaration of trust." 2 Ferguson v. Crick (Ky. 1893), 23 S. W. Rep. 668; Grigsby v. Combs (Ky.), 21 S. W. Eep. 37. 3 Merson v. Merson, 101 Mich. 55; 59 N. W. Eep. 441. 4 Mussey v. Bates (1893) , 65 Vt. 449 ; 27 Atl. Eep. 167, per Munson, J.. "There is a diversity of opinion upon the question whether a mortgagee's interest is one that may be transferred or discharged by parol. In Massa- 626 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §530 § 530. Part performance. — Where plaintiff's testator stated to the husband of defendant, his sister, that he intended to give her a home, and told him to build on certain land a house costing a certain sum, and he would pay for it, and the hus- band built a house costing more than the amount named by chusetts and in Maine it is held that this interest is within the statute of frauds; that it will not pass by a parol assignment ; and that an oral promise to relinquish it can not be enforced. Wardens. Adams, 15 Mass. 233; Hunt v. Maynard, 6 Pick. 489; Mitchell v. Burnham, 44 Maine, 286; Leavitt v. Pratt, 53 Maine, 147; Phil- lips v. Leavitt, 54 Maine, 405. On the other hand, it is held in many states that the interest of the mortgagee is not within the statute, and that it may be transferred or discharged by oral contract. Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N. H. 420; Ackla v. Ackla, 6 Pa. St. 228 ; Howard v. Gresham, 27 Ga. 347 ; Green v. Hart, 1 Johns. 580. So there is authority for holding that a mort- gagee's interest may be both trans- ferred and discharged by parol. It is said by some text-writers that the tendency of the decisions is decidedly in favor of this holding. Brown on Statute of Frauds, §65. It would doubtless be inconsistent with the views adopted in this state to hold that a parol transfer of a mortgagee's interest could avail the transferee in a suit at law. It has indeed been held, but without discussion, and in reliance upon the decision of a court whose holdings on this subject are not entirely in harmony with ours, that an oral agreement to release a portion of the mortgaged premises upon a payment of a portion of the debt secured can not be enforced be- cause of the statute. Merrill v. Pease, 51 Vt. 556. But in the case under consideration the security was appor- tionable by the terms of the defeas- ance ; so that the agreement to convey that part of the property apportioned to the amount of the debt to be paid was simply an agreement to discharge a mortgage by deed upon tender of satisfaction. It thus appears that the question for decision is whether an agreement to execute a deed of the mortgaged property upon the payment of the mortgage debt is a contract for the sale of an interest in lands. It is certain that the mortgagee's interest, whatever name may be given it, is terminated by the payment of the debt secured, without action on the part of the mortgagee. When the debt is paid, the right of the mort- gagee is extinguished, and the land becomes free by operation of law. No conveyance from the mortgagee is necessary to perfect the mortgagor's estate. There is nothing in the mort- gagee to be reconveyed to the mort- gagor. Whatever is done by way of discharge or release is done to furnish evidence of what has already been fully accomplished by the payment. The methods specially provided by statute for the discharge of mortgages are not treated as exceptions to the provision regulating the conveyance of estates in land, for they are not regarded as passing an interest in land. An unconditional deed having been given in this case, it was essen- tial that the discharge be by deed; but the agreement to execute a deed upon payment was an agreement to give the mortgagor the proper evi- dence of his having extinguished the mortgagee's interest, and not an agree- ment for the conveyance of an interest inland." 530 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 627 the testator, paying the excess himself, and made other per- manent improvements, to testator's knowledge, and, afterwards, when the husband was contemplating moving, testator told him that, if defendant left the house, she would forfeit her right to it, whereupon he remained, it was held that there was such part performance as took testator's agreement out of the statute, although the rental value of the premises during defendant's occupancy exceeded the amount expended by the husband. 1 A parol partition of land between coheirs, carried out and followed by actual possession in severalty of the sev- eral parcels, will be enforced, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, on the ground of part performance, when the partition is equitable, and the parties acted understandingly. 2 1 Young v. Overbaugh (1895), 145 N. Y. 158; 39 N. E. Rep. 712, per Gray, J. : " In Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34, which was an action of ejectment, and where the defense was a parol promise to give the land to the defendant, accompanied by an actual delivery and possession by him, Grover, J., said: 'The ques- tion, then, is whether a parol promise by one owning lands to give the same to another will be enforced in equity, when the promisee has been induced by the promise to go into possession, and, with the knowledge of the prom- isor, make comparatively large ex- penditures in permanent improve- ments upon the land. * * * In the case supposed there has been no part performance of the contract, strictly speaking, except the taking possession, no part of the purchase- money having been paid ; and yet the cases are numerous where perform- ance of such contracts has been de- creed in equity, where possession has been taken under the contract, and large expenditures upon permanent improvements made.' Again, hesays: 'Expenditures made upon permanent improvements upon land with the knowledge of the owner, induced by his promise, made to the party mak- ing the expenditure, to give the land to such party, constitute, in equity, a consideration for the promise.' It was said by Parker, J"., in Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 327,330: 'If the promisee, on the faith of the promise, does some act, or enters into some en- gagement, which the promise justified, and which a breach of the promise would make very injurious to him, this equity might regard as confirming and establishing the promise, in much the same way as a consideration for it would.' In such a case as this, to constitute a good consideration in equity, it is, of course, essential that it be substantial in the sense that the promise shall rest upon a performance by the promisee, which evidences ac- ceptance of and reliance upon the promise, and consists in expending moneys in permanent improvements upon the land. In this case it may well have been, as found, that some of the expenditures made by the de- fendant upon the property were such as a householder would ordinarily make, or were trivial in their nature ; but they do not influence the character of the others." 2 Whittemore v. Cope, 11 Utah, 344; 40 Pac. Eep. 256, King, J.: "That a parol partition, carried out and fol- 628 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §531 § 531. Parol contract for sale of land and possession trans- ferred. — When a purchaser of land goes into immediate pos- session, and gives his vendor a note for the price, which con- tains a description of the land, and all essential terms of the contract, the sale is taken out of the statute of frauds, although the vendor did not execute a deed to the purchaser. 1 And where a verbal agreement for the sale of land is afterwards ex- ecuted by the exchange of the deed and a note for the price, a subsequent verbal compromise relative to the amount to be paid for the land in lieu of the amount named in such note is not within the statute of frauds. 2 Where plaintiff agreed that, if defendant should buy at auction land owned by her and lowed by actual possession in severalty of the several parcels, is valid, and will be enforced, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, on the theory that it has been removed from its opera- tion by part performance." 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 668, and cases cited; Freeman on Cotenancies, § 402; Tomlin v. Hilyard, 43 111. 300; Ebert v. Wood, 1 Bin. 216; Welchel v. Thompson, 39 Ga, 559; McMahan v. McMahan, 13 Pa. St. 376; Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah, 249 ; 26 Pac. Rep. 300. "While the legal title might not, per- haps, be considered as passing by a parol partition, unless after a posses- sion sufficiently long to justify the presumption of a deed, yet the parol partition, followed by several posses- sion, would leave each cotenant seized of the legal title to one-half of his allotment, and the equitable title to the other half, and, by a bill in chan- cery, could compel from his cotenant a conveyance of the legal title accord- ing to the terms of the partition." Tomlin v. Hilyard, 43 111. 300. In the case of Ayres v. Jack, 7 Utah, 249, the oral partition of lands herein described was sustained. 1 Reynolds v. Kirk (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Rep. 95, per Haralson, J. : "His purchase from Stephens was not void under the statute of frauds. He went into immediate possession, and has been holding and claiming it ever since, making annual crops and erect- ing improvements on it. He executed and delivered his promissory note to his vendor, bearing date the 14th Jan- uary, 1889, a few days after the pur- chase, for $400, the purchase price of the land, payable on the 25th Decem- ber following, reciting that it was in consideration of the land, on which he then lived, describing the same land that is mentioned in the bill. This was sufficient to take it out of the statute of frauds. It contains the essential terms of the contract — de- scribes the land sold, the price to be paid, and the date of the payment — all expressed with such certainty as that they may be understood from the writing itself, which was signed by the purchaser, the complainant. It was, on the payment or tender of the purchase-money, capable of spe- cific enforcement. Adams t>. McMil- lan, 7 Port. (Ala.) 73; Carter ». Shorter, 57 Ala. 253 ; Heflin v. Mil- ton, 69 Ala. 354; Phillips v. Adams, 70 Ala. 373; Lakeside Land Co. o. Dromgoole, 89 Ala. 505; 7 So. Rep. 444; Nelson v. Shelby, etc., Improve- ment Co., 96 Ala. 515; 11 So. Rep. 695." 2 Johnson v. Clarkson (Texas App. 1894), 30 S. W. Rep. 71. §532 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 629 her daughter, he could have plaintiff's share at a certain price, regardless of what was bid at the sale, and the land was bid in by defendant at a price greater than the agreed price; it was held, in an action for the greater price, after a deed to the land had been made, that it could not be claimed that the agreement, being by parol, was not binding on plaintiff. 1 § 532. Parol contract for sale of land — Purchaser's posses- sion. — In order that possession of land by the purchaser may take a parol contract for its sale and purchase out of the stat- ute of frauds, it must appear that such possession was taken under and by virtue of the contract, and with the vendor's knowl- edge and consent. 2 Accordingly it is no defense to an action on a 1 Gardner v. Gardner (Mich. 1895) , 63 N. W. Eep. 988, Long, J.: "It is contended that the oral agreement was void, under the statute of frauds, and that, therefore, plaintiff was not estopped from asserting her right to the full consideration recited in her deed. The consideration recited in a deed is not conclusive, hut can after- wards be inquired into. Mowrey v. Vandling, 9 Mich. 39; Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich. 410. The case does not fall within the statute of frauds. The conveyance has been made. It is not a suit upon an oral contract for the sale of land, but an action for the purchase price." '■ Neal v. Neal, 69 Ind. 419; Barnett v. Washington Glass Co., 12 Ind. App. 631 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 1102. Defendant and others, desiring to locate a factory near C, agreed with an improvement company to purchase a number of lots at a fixed price from lands thereafter to be acquired. The improvement company contracted with plaintiff cor- poration for the factory, sold it land on which to build the factory, and agreed to furnish purchasers for one hundred and fifty of the lots at the prices agreed on with defendant and the other subscribers to the fund. Plaintiff platted the land, and threw it open. Defendant went on it, selected a lot by number, and took possession of it as his choice, but did not remain in possession, or exercise any ownership over it. His choice was recorded by the sec- retary of the subscribers' meeting, and the lot withdrawn from selection. Plaintiff did not thereafter claim pos- session or exercise control over the lot, was not present at the subscri- bers' meeting, and had no knowledge that defendant had taken possession. The contract of purchase gave defend- ant no right to the lot until he settled for it and received a deed. It was held that the possession of defend- ant was not a sufficient part perform- ance to take the parol contract for the purchase of the lot out of the statute of frauds. Gavin, J., said: "We are of opinion that, under these findings, the possession was not taken under the contract, nor with the vendor's consent. Under such circumstances, the appellee had no right of recovery. Swales v. Jackson, 126 Ind. 282; 26 N. E. Eep. 62; Johnson v. Pontious, 118 Ind. 270 ; 20 N. E. Eep. 792 ; Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96 ; Eucker v. Steel- man, 73 Ind. 396 ; Moore v. Higbee, 45 Ind. 487." 630 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 5.33, 534 duebill given for the price of a lease-hold interest sold to one who was already in possession, and thereafter remained in pos- session, that the contract of sale did not comply with the stat- ute of frauds. 1 § 533. Parol sales of land in North Carolina. — Under the North Carolina code, which requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing, signed by "the party to be charged there- with," a contract signed by the vendor only binds him, but not the vendee. 2 But where a parol contract for the sale of land is repudiated by the vendor, the vendee may recover the amount he has paid thereunder. 3 A parol contract for the sale of land is void only at the instance of the party who is entitled to and who actually does plead the statute of frauds. Where the vendee in a parol contract for the sale of land repudiates the same, he can not recover money paid thereunder from the ven- dor, who is able and willing to perform his part of the agree- ment. Where the vendee in a parol contract for the sale of land repudiates the same, he can not, in an action brought twelve months thereafter, recover money paid on such con- tract, although the vendor has disposed of the property, and is therefore unable to convey to the vendee. 4 § 534. Executed oral lease — Statute to be pleaded. — Where in an action for rent due on a contract of lease defendant neither denies the contract nor pleads the statute of frauds, the 1 McMahon v. Jacoway (Ala. 1895), lowed to and does plead the statute, 17 So. Eep. 39, Coleman, J. : "The and neither party who repudiates the following decisions are conclusive of contract can take any advantage or the question: Rhodes v. Storr, 7 Ala. benefit under it. The repudiator is 346; Worthington v. McRoberts, 7 left in the condition in which he finds Ala. 814; Gillespie v. Battle, 15 Ala. himself at the time of the abandon- 276; Donaldsons. Waters, 35 Ala. 107; ment. The plaintiff can not recov- Nelson v. Shelby, etc., Improvement er in assumpsit, because it is admit- Co., 96 Ala. 515; 11 So. Rep. 695." ted that it had a special contract, 2 Love v. "Welch, 97 N. C. 200; 2 S. and, so long as it exists, it can not E. Rep. 242. fall back on the common counts. a Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N. C. 254. The cases of Green v. North Car., etc., 4 Durham, etc., Land Co. v. Guth- Railroad, 77 N. C. 95, and Foust v. rie, 116 N. C. 381; 21 S. E. Rep. 952, Shoffner, Phil. Eq. 242, are on 'all per Faircloth, C. J.: "A parol con- fours' with the case before us. In the tract for land is not void, except at first case, it was agreed verbally that the instance of the party who is al- defendant would convey a certain tract §534 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 631 statute is unavailing as a defense. 1 The complete performance of the contract by one contracting party forecloses his adver- sary from interposing the statute of frauds as a defense. 2 Thus, where a lessee enters into possession of premises under an oral lease, he can not surrender the premises and defeat an action for rent subsequently accruing by reliance on the statute of frauds. 3 So, also, an oral lease, under which possession is taken, and monthly rent paid for two years, is not a contract for the sale of an interest in land, within the statute of frauds. 4 of land to the plaintiff as soon as he ■would deliver to defendant an agreed number of cords of wood. Plaint- iff delivered a part of the wood and quit, and sued defendant for the value of so much wood as he had delivered. Defendant said : 'I am ready and able to give you a good title to the land as soon as you perform your part of the contract,' and the court held that plaintiff could not recover." 1 Bless v. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647 ; 31 S. W. Rep. 938, Sherwood, J. : " The an- swer does not deny the contract of renting, nor does it admit it and plead the statute of frauds as a defense. Now, the rule is well settled in this state that where, in circumstances like the present, a, party would take advantage of the statute of frauds, he must either deny the contract or else admit it and plead the statute. De- fendants were therefore in no position to successfully raise the invalidity of the contract by reason of its noncon- formity with that statute. Wildbahn v. Robidoux, 11 Mo. 660; Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Allen v. Richard, 83 Mo. 55." 2 Blanton v. Knox, 3 Mo. 342; Pitcher v. Wilson, 5 Mo. 46; Suggett v. Cason, 26 Mo. 221 ; Self v. Cordell, 45 Mo. 345; McConnell . Read, 99 N. Y. 609. See note to McCormick's Appeal, 98 Am. Dec. 197. Contra, Everhart's App., 106 Pa. St. 349; Bird v. Morrison (1860), 12 Wis. 138; Walker v. Herring, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 678. There is a dictum in Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616, to the effect that such an agreement must be in writing, for which Story on Partnership, § 83, is cited as authority, and in Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sum. 435, it was so held by that distinguished jurist. The great weight of modern authority is, however, in support of the rule as given in the text. § 546 THE STATUTE OF FKAUDS. dence, without the necessity of a written agreement, has been generally followed, and, although there are some decisions to the contrary, it may now be said to be the prevailing rule upon that subject. The cases proceed upon the theory that the real estate of a partnership is treated and administered in equity or between partners and for all the purposes of the partnership, as personal property and partnership assets. 1 Although a part- nership in land may be proved by parol evidence, yet an agree- ment by one of the parties to retire and to assign his share in the partnership assets is an agreement to assign an interest in land. 2 § 546. The same subject continued. — A verbal contract for the formation of a partnership to purchase standing timber is void. 3 So also, an oral contract between the members of a co- partnership to convey firm realty from one to the other is void. 4 1 An agreement to join in the pur- chase of land must be in writing. Par- sons v. Phelan (1883), 134 Mass. 109; Morton v. Nelson (1893), 145 111. 586; 32 N. E. Rep. 916; Slevin v. Wallace (1892), 64 Hun, 288. 2 Gray v. Smith (1889), L. R. 43 Ch. Div. 208. 3 McMillen v. Pratt, 89 Wis. 612; 62 N. W. Rep. 588, per Pinney, J. : "It is obvious that the objection that the agreement is within the statute of frauds (Revised Statutes, §2302), and void, is well taken, and that no action at law for the recovery of damages for its breach can be maintained. Bran- deis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 158 ; Levy v. Brush, 45 N.Y. 589. An agreement for a partnership in real estate is void, unless in writing (Bird v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 138) ; and a sale of standing timber, and an agreement to buy it, are within the statute (Daniels v. Bailey, 43 Wis. 566). The distinction between the case of Treat v. Hiles, 68 Wis. 344; 32 N. W. Rep. 517, and the present case, is obvious. In Treat v. Hiles the real estate to be purchased was not, nor was any interest in it, to become partnership property, and the agreement was simply a partnership or an agreement for a partnership for working the stone quarry on the land of one of the parties. And Hill v. Palmer, 56 Wis. 123; 14 N. W. Rep. 20, is in principle the same. The agreement here was for the purchase of an interest in real estate (Babcock v. Read, 99 N. Y. 609; 1 N. E. Rep. 141 ; Daniels v. Bailey, supra) ; and not merely for sharing in the profits or losses of a contemplated specula- tion in such property. We have not been referred to any case where a recovery at law of damages for breach of a verbal contract, such as this, has been sustained; and the following cases, we think, sustain the conclu- sion at which we have arrived. Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589; Dunphy v. Ryan, 116 IT. S. 491; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486 ; Parsons v. Phelan, 134 Mass. 109 ; Horsey v. Graham, L. R. 5 C. P. 9 ; Raub v. Smith, 61 Mich. 543; 28 N. W. Rep. 676; Brosnan v. McKee, 63 Mich. 454; 30 N. W. Rep. 107; Bailey v. Hemenway, 147 Mass. 326; 17 N. E. Rep. 645." 4 Brewer v. Cropp, 10 Wash. 136 ; 38 Pac. Rep. 866, Scott, J. ; " While the 646 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §547 § 547. Agreements not to be performed within a year. — The clause of the statute in regard to agreements "not to be per- formed within the space of one year from the making thereof" means to include any agreement which, by a fair and reason- able interpretation of the terms used by the parties, and in view of all the circumstances existing at the time, does not admit of its performance, according to its language and intention, within a year from the time of its making. 1 In order to bring a parol contract within this clause, it must either have been ex- pressly stipulated by the parties, or it must appear to have been understood by them that it was not to be performed within a year, and this stipulation or understanding must be absolute and certain, and not depend on any contingency. 8 If an agree- xeal estate owned by the partnership is regarded as personal property for some purposes, it is an equitable con- version only, and the requirements of the law relating to conveyances of land must be observed in disposing of it. T. Parson on Partnership (4th ed.), §§269, 270, 272; Davis v. Chris- tian, 15 Gratt. 11; Piatt v. Oliver, 3 McLean, 27; Fed. Cas. No. 11,116; Moreau v. Saffarans, 3 Sneed, 596; Miller v. Proctor, 20 Ohio St. 442. An oral contract to convey real estate is not binding here; Nichols v. Opper- mann, 6 Wash. 618 ; 34 Pac. 162 ; and we see no reason to exempt partner- ship lands from this rule. Every reason which supports such a holding as to the transfer of real estate by an individual applies with equal force to land held by a partnership." ' Warner v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (1893), 54 Fed. Rep. 922; 4 C. C. A. 673; Wooldridge v. Stern (1890), 42 Fed. Rep. 311; Heflin v. Milton (1881), 69 Ala. 354. The mischief meant to be prevented was the leav- ing to memory the terms of a contract for a longer time than a year. The persons might die who were to prove it, or they might lose their faithful recollection of the terms of it. Boy- dell ». Drummond, 11 East, 142; Smith v. Westall, 1 Lord Ray. 316; Baillett v. Wheeler, 44 Barb. 162. 2 Roberts v. Summit Park Co. (1893), 72 Hun, 458; Hinkle v. Fisher (1885), 104 Ind. 84; Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142. Justice Miller, in Mc- Pherson v. Cox (1877), 96 U. S. 404, says: "The statute of frauds applies only to contracts which, by the terms, are not to be performed within a year. * * In other words, to make a pa- rol contract void, it must be apparent that it was the understanding of the parties that it was not to be performed within a year from the time it was made." Walker v. Johnson, 96 U. S. 424 ; Hall v. Solomon (1892), 61 Conn. 476; Aiken v. Nogle (1891), 47 Kan. 96; Railway Co. v. Whitley (1891), 54 Ark. 199; Warren, etc., Co. n. Hol- brook (1890), 118 N. Y. 587; Van Woert v. Albany, etc., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 538; Durham v. Hiatt (1890), 127 Ind. 514; Marley v. Noblett, 42 Ind. 85; Wilson v. Bay, 13 Ind. 1; Hodges v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 9 R. I. 482; Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 118 Mass. 279 ; Larimer v. Kelley, 10 Kan. 298; Blackburn v. Mann, 85 111. 222; Green v. Pennsylvania Steel Co. (1891), 75 Md. 109. "The statute of §548 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 647 ment is capable of being performed within a year from the making thereof, the statute does not apply although it is not actually performed until after that period, and although the parties may have intended that its operations should extend through a longer period. 1 The presumptions are all in favor of the validity of the contract, and oral agreements have been upheld in numerous instances where the parties must have ex- pected that they would not be performed within a year, on the ground that consistently with their terms they could be fully performed within that time. 2 § 548. The same subject continued. — A promise not to be performed within a year within the meaning of the Kentucky statute of frauds is only one which is necessarily not to be per- formed within the year. 8 Accordingly an agreement not to re- move stock from a county, and not to dispose of real estate there situate, is a valid consideration for an agreement to ex- tend a note. Suqh agreement, being susceptible of perform- ance within a year, is not within the statute of frauds.* frauds plainly means an agreement not to be performed within the space of a year, and expressly and specific- ally so agreed. * * It does not extend to cases where the thing only may be performed within the year." Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. (1762) 1278. 1 See the leading case of Peter v. Compton, Skinner, 353, and notes in 1 Smith's Leading Cases (9 Am. ed.), 586. In that case the defendant made an oral agreement with the plaintiff that, in consideration of one guinea, then paid him by the plaintiff, he would pay the plaintiff a certain great- er sum upon the day of his marriage. The marriage did not happen within the year, but it was held that an ac- tion would lie, although the contract was not reduced to writing, as there was nothing in the contract which rendered it incapable of being per- formed within the year. 8 Wooldridge v. Stern (1890), 42 Fed. Rep. 311; Osment v. McElrath (1886), 68 Cal. 466; Sutphen v. Sut- phen (1883), 30 Kan. 510; Cole v. Singerly (1883), 60 Md. 348; Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 488; The Blair, etc., Co. v. Walker, 39 Iowa, 406 ; Kent v. Kent (1875), 62 N. Y. 560; Gault v. Brown (1868), 48 N. H. 183; Blanding v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 239; Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Texas, 42; Seddon a. Eosenbaum, 85 Va. 928; 3 L. Rep. Ann. 337 ; English and American de- cisions collected, and notes to Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208; 93 Am. Dec. 85. 3 Fain v. Turner (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 628; Howard v. Burgen, 4 Dana (Ky.), 137. 4 Jones v. Green (Texas App. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 1087. In Jackson Iron Co. v. Negaunee Co. (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 298, Ricks, J., said: "We are of opinion that if any contract can be said to have i arisen from the con- versation above stated, it was within the statute of frauds of Michigan, 648 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 549' § 549. The Texas doctrine. — The Texas statute of frauds provides that no action shall be brought "upon any agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof," "unless the promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memoran- dum thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person by him thereunto law- fully authorized." 1 It has been held by the Texas supreme court, affirming the judgment of the court of appeals of that state, that a verbal agreement by a railroad company to issue once a year for ten years an annual pass to a person and his family and to stop its trains during that time at his house, was not an agreement not to be performed within a year within the statute of frauds, since it was to be performed within a year upon the contingency of the death of such person and his family within that time. 2 which renders unenforcible every agreement not in writing that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. Howell's Annotated Statutes, § 6185. Giving the evidence the construction most favorable for the plaintiff, the contract was an agreement by the de- fendant to pay during the life of the contract at least $2,500 a year for the privilege of taking the iron ore and using it, in consideration of the plaint- iff's agreement to forbear to forfeit the rights of the Union Company under the contract, and thereby to prevent the defendant company from continu- ing its operation under its contract with the Union Company. This was certainly an agreement on the part of the defendant to do something which, by its terms, could not be performed within a year, for both contracts had at least ten years to run. Even if it can be said that the plaintiff could and did fully perform within a year on its part that which formed the con- sideration of the defendant's promise, namely, the forbearance to terminate the contract for a reasonable time, this was not, in Michigan, such a part performance as would take the case out of the statute of frauds. Whip- ple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369; Perkins v. Clay, 54N.H.518; Emery r. Smith, 46 N. H. 151; Frary v. Sterling, 99 Mass. 461 ; Reinheimer v. Carter, 31 Ohio St. 579; Pierce v. Estate of Payne, 28 Vt. 34; Lockwood v. Barnes, 3 Hill, 128; Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio, 87; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 45, etc.; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 286." 1 Section 4, subsection 6. 2 Weatherford, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (Texas, 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 859. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed by the Texas supreme court, and Denman, J., delivered the following opinion : "Some learned courts, whose reasoning is difficult to answer, have given effect to that clause of the statute under con- sideration here by holding it ap- plicable to that numerous class of cases where the contract or agree- ment of the party sought to be ' charged therewith ' in the partic- §550 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 649 § 550. Illustrations— Cases within the statute.— The statute applies when from the language used it must necessarily be ular suit was not to be performed within the year, though the prom- ise of the other party was per- formable within the year, or the consideration executed. Pierce v. Estate of Payne, 28 Vt. 34; Shee- ny v. Adarene, 41 Vt. 541; Parks v. Francis, 50 Vt. 626; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208; Frary v. Ster- ling, 99 Mass. 461; Bartlett v. Wheeler, 44 Barb. 162; Reinheimer v. Carter, 31 Ohio St. 579; Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio, 87. Under the view we have taken of this case, it does not become necessary for us to determine now which of these two conflicting lines of decisions we will follow. It seems to be well settled that where there is a contingency ex- pressed upon the face of the contract or implied from the circumstances, upon the happening of which within a year the contract or agreement will be performed, the contract is not within the statute, though it be clear that it can not be performed within a year, except in the event the contin- gency happens. Thus an agreement to give an annual pass over a railroad during life is performable by the hap- pening of the implied contingency of the death of the donee within the year, and is not within the statute. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. English, 38 Kan. 110; 16 Pac. Rep. 82. So an agreement to support a child or children until ma- jority will be performed upon the happening of the implied contingency of the death of such child or children within the year, and is therefore not within the statute. Peters v. West- borough, 19 Pick. 364 ; Wiggins' Adm'r v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252. So an agreement not to do business at a certain place will be performed upon the death of the party so agreeing, within a year, and therefore is not within the statute. Lyon v. King, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 411; Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray, 168; Hill v. Jamieson, 16 Ind. 125; Foster v. McO'Blenis, 18 Mo. 88. So an agreement to support one dur- ing life may be performed upon the contingency of the death of the per- son to be supported, and is not within the statute. Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis. 223 ; Carr v. McCarthy, 70 Mich. 258 ; 38 N. W. Rep. 241 ; Hutchinson v. Hutch- inson, 46 Maine, 154 ; Howard's Adm'r v. Burgen, 4 Dana, 137; Burney v. Ball, 24 Ga. 505. Some courts have undertaken to draw a distinction be- tween that class of contracts or agree- ments to do or refrain from doing a thing during life and that class of contracts or agreements to do or re- frain from doing a thing for a stipu- lated period of years, holding that where the former will be performed upon the happening within the year of the implied contingency of death, the statute does not apply to the latter class, although performable upon the happening of the same contingency within the year. The reason given is that by the terms of the contract the parties in the latter class contemplate that the same will not be performed within a year. Mallett v. Lewis, 61 Miss. 105. Thus, according to this reasoning, an agreement to give A. an annual pass for life is not within the statute, because performable within the year upon the happening of the contingency of A.'s death within that time, while an agreement to give him a pass for ten years is within the stat- ute, for, although the contract would appear to be performable within a year upon the happening of the con- tingency of A.'s death within that time, still the parties contemplated by the terms of the agreement that it would not be performable within a 650 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 550 understood that performance of the undertaking within the year is absolutely and of necessity impossible, or, what amounts to the same thing, is distinctly contrary to the in- year. According to the same reason- ing, a contract to give A. an annual pass for ten years would be within the statute, although it is clear the contract would be performed upon A.'s death within a year, while a con- tract to give A. an annual pass for ten years, provided the contract shall be considered performed if A. die within a year, would not be within the stat- ute ; for in the first case the parties by their contract contemplated that it would not be performed within a year, whereas, in the latter case, they, by their contract, contemplated its per- formance within a year if A. should die within that time. AVe think this reasoning untenable, and not justified by the statute. If the contingency is beyond the control of the parties, and one that may, in the usual course of events, happen within the year, whereby the contract will be per- formed, the law will presume that the parties contemplated its happen- ing, whether they mention it in the contract or not. Peters v. Westbor- ough, 19 Pick. 364; Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476; Peter v. Compton, Skin. 353; Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burrows, 1278; Wells v. Horton, 4 Bing. 40. The statute only applies to contracts 'not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof.' If the contingency is such that its hap- pening may bring the performance within a year,the contract is not within the terms of the statute and this is true whether the parties at the time had in mind the happening of the contin- gency or not. The existence of the contingency in this class of cases, and not the fact that the parties may or may not have contemplated its hap- pening, is what prevents the agree- ment from coming within the scope of the statute. Applying these princi- ples to the case under consideration, we think it clear that the contract above set out was not within the stat- ute. The agreement to give the pass and stop the trains was personal to Wood and family. He could not trans- fer it. In case of his death within the year, the obligation of the com- pany to him would have been per- formed, and no right thereunder would have passed to his heirs or ex- ecutors. If it be held that each mem- ber of his family had an interest in the agreement, the same result would have followed the death of such mem- ber or all of them within the year. If the agreement had been to give Wood a pass for life, it would, under the above authorities, not have been with- in the statute, and we can see no good reason for holding it to be within the statute because his right could not have extended beyond ten years. The happening of the contingency of death of himself and family within a year would have performed the con- tract in one case as certainly as in the other. The judgment is affirmed." The lower court's opinion was as fol- lows : "We think that the trial court correctly held that the verbal agree- ment declared upon was not, under the attendant facts, within the statute. Mr. Wood, in his work on the Statute of Frauds (§279), states the follow- ing rule applicable to this subject as deduced from the weight of authority : 'In England and most of the states of this country it is held that the statute only applies to contracts which are not to be performed by either side within a year, and therefore, where a contract has been completely per- formed on one side within the year, the case will not be within the stat- ute.' Cases cited by him, including Miller v. Roberts, 18 Texas, 16, seem $550 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 651 tent. 1 Thus a contract to do any act at a time more than a year distant, as to pay off an incumbrance that will not mature for more than a year, 2 to deliver a crop that can not be grown within a year, 3 to form a partnership to be continued beyond one year, 4 or a contract for service for a period of more than a year, or for a year, the service to begin at a future day, 8 comes within the statute and must, in consequence thereof,* be in writing. to support the text. See also, Bland- ing v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 239; 66 Am. Dec. 720; Westfall v. Perry (Texas Civ. App.), 23 S. W. Eep. 740. Here it seems that, within the year, the contract had been completely per- formed on the part of the appellee. In settlement of his judgment against the company for $1,000, he accepted the sum of $800 then paid, and the agreement of the appellant to issue the annual pass and to stop its trains as indicated. This performance was contemporaneous with the agree- ment, and was therefore within the year. The judgment was in truth satisfied by the payment to the plaint- iff of $800 in cash, and by the agree- ment of the latter to accept the free transportation, and the further con- sideration of the stopping of appel- lant's trains. This promise, and not the compliance therewith by the ap- pellant, was accepted by the appel- lee as in discharge of the judgment. Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Texas, 73; 15 S. W. Eep. 556; Jen- nings v. City of Fort Worth, 7 Texas Civ. App. 329; 26 S. W. Eep. 927. As the contract sued upon is not within the statute of frauds, we order an af- firmance of the judgment." 'Sogers v. Brightman, 10 Wis. 55. A eontract to clear land within three years, and seed down one acre the first, one acre the second, and one acre the third year, was held to be within the statute. Herrin v. Butters, 20 Maine, 119. The court said, in that case : "It is urged that the defendant might have cleared up the land and seeded it down in one year, and there- by performed his contract. * * We are not to inquire what, by possibility, the defendant might have done by way of fulfilling his contract. We must look to the contract itself, and see what he was bound to do, and what, according to the terms of the contract, it was the understanding that he should do. Was it the under- standing and intention of the parties that the contract might be performed within one year? If not, the case is clearly with the defendant." See also, Saunders v. Kastenbine, 6 B. Mon. 17; Hinckley v. Southgate, 11 Vt. 428; Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 266. An agreement to pay money by annual intallments is within the statute. Parks v. Francis, 50 Vt. 626. Also a contract to pay at intervals of less than a year, the whole period of payment to ex- tend beyond the year. Hill v. Hooper, 1 Gray, 131; Tiernan v. Granger, 65 111. 351. An agreement to pay money after the lapse of a year for land to be presently conveyed. Kellogg v. Clark (1881), 23 Hun, 393; Marcy v. Marcy (1864), 9 Allen, 8. 2 Curtis v. Sage, 35 111. 22. 3 Holloway v. Hampton, 4 B. Mon. 415. 4 Wahl et al. v. Barnum (1889), 116 N. Y. 87; Morris v. Peckham (1883), 51 Conn. 128. 6 Hartwell v. Young (1893) , 67 Hun, 472; Billington v. Cahill (1889), 51 Hun, 132; Blanck v. Littell (1880), 9 Daly (N.Y.), 268; Drummond v. Bur- 652 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §551 § 551. Illustrations — Cases not within the statute. — A con- tract which may or may not be performed within a year depending on a contingency, for example, a contract to sup- port a person during life, 1 or to work for another during his rell, 13 Wend. 307; La Du-King Mfg. Co. v. La Du (1887), 36 Minn. 473; Freeman v. Foss (1887), 145 Mass. 361; Meyer v. Roberts (1885), 46 Ark. 80; Sutcliffe v. Atlantic Mills (1882), 13 R. I. 480; McElroy v. Ludlum (1880), 32 N. J.Eq. 828; Wm. Butcher Steel Works v. Atkinson (1873), 68 111. 421; Kleeman v. Collins (1872), 9 Bush, 460; Comes v. Lamson, 16 Conn. 246; Bernier v. Cabot Manfg. Co., 71 Maine, 506; Tuttle v. Swett, 31 Maine, 555; Shumate v. Farlow (1890), 125 Ind. 359; Lee's Ad- ministrator v. Hill (1891), 87 Va. 497 ; Smith v. Theobald (1887), 86 Ky. 141 ; Girard v. Richmond, 2 C. B. 835. The year is to be computed from the day of making the contract. Brace- girdle v. Heald, 1 B. & Aid. 722. A contract made one day to begin the next is within the statute. Billing- ton r. Cahill (1889), 51 Hun, 132. But see Dickson v. Frisbee, 52 Ala. 165, which excluded the day of making, the decision being based upon the de- cision in the case of Cawthorne v. Cordrey (1863), 13 C. B. (N. S.) 406. An agreement to pay an annuity is within the statute. Sweet v. Lee, 3 M. & G. (42 E. C. L. R.) 452. The possibility of defeasance does not make it less a contract not to be per- formed within the year. Packet Co. «. Sickles (1866), 5 Wall. 580. The contract was to use a certain inven- tion on a boat for twelve years, if the boat should last so long. Gray, C. J., in Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, doubts if this decision can be recon- ciled with the general current of au- thority. Birch v. Earl of Liverpool, 9 Barn. & C. 392. 1 Carr v. McCarthy (1888), 70 Mich. 258; Thorp v. Stewart (1887), 44 Hun, 232 ; Hutchinson v, Hutchinson (1858), 46 Maine, 154; Burney v. Ball (1858), 24 Ga. 505 ; Harper v. Harper, 57 Ind. 547; Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis. 223; Howard v. Burgen, 4 Dana, 137; Mur- phy v. O'Sullivan, 18 Ir. Jur. (11 N. S.) 111. In the English case of Souch v. Strawbridge (1846), 2 C. B. 808; 10 Jur. 357 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 170, a. con- tract to maintain a child so long as the defendant pleased was held not to be within the statute; also Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476, and Wiggins v. Keizer (1855), 6 Ind. 252, a contract to educate and support a child. Hill v. Jamieson(1861), 16 Ind. 125. Where a limit is fixed to the duration of the agreement such as the attainment of majority by a minor, the rule is not well settled as to whether the statute applies. Many American cases rec- ognize the contingency of death as sufficient to take the case out of the statute where the contract is to sup- port a person for a term of years named. In Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364, it was held that an agree- ment to support a child twelve years old until she became eighteen was not within the statute, as the death of the child within the year would put an end to the contract. Wool- dridge v . Stern (1890), 42 Fed. Rep. 311, and McKinney v. McCloskey (1878), 8 Daly (N. Y.), 368, affirmed by the court of appeals 76 N. Y. 594, where the contract was to support a child until its majority and it was held that the statute did not apply. Pit contra Goodrich v. Johnson(1879), 66 Ind. 258, and Van Schoyck v. Backus, 9 Hun, 68. In Farrington v. Donohoe, 1 Ir. Rep. C. L. 675, it was § 552 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 653 life, 1 does not come within the statute, as the person whose life is involved may die within a year. Nor does it apply to a contract where there is no stipulation as to any fixed time for its performance, and where further performance may cease at the option of either party, 8 nor to a contract for a year's service when the time is not fixed for its commencement, 8 nor to a contract of partnership without any fixed time for its continuance.' § 552. Further illustrations — Cases not within the statute. — It has been held that the statute does not apply to a contract to refrain from a certain course of action for an indefinite period, 5 as never to practice medicine in a certain town, 6 or not held an agreement to support a child then five years of age until she could do for herself was within the statute. In McGregor v. McGregor (1888), L. E. 21 Q. B. Div. 424, the decision in Mur- phy v. O'Sullivan, 18 Ir. Jur. (11 N. S.) Ill, was referred to as correct doctrine, viz , that a contract to maintain a child for life was not within the statute. In Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 204, a promise to pay for the services of a youth 16 years of age when he became of age was held to be within the stat- ute. See also, Baker v. Lauterbach (1887), 68 Md. 64. Cf. Reed on Statute of Frauds, § 204. A contract for the payment of a specific amount monthly until a definite period, that is, when the youngest child should become of age within the statute. Deaton v. Tenn., etc., Co. (1874), 12 Heis. 650. 1 Pennsylvania Co. v. Doland, 6 Ind. App. 109; 32 N. E. Eep. 802; Updike v. Ten Broeck (1866), 32 N. J. Law,105, 116. In Ely v. Positive Assur. Co. (1875), L. R. 1 Ex. D. 20, an agreement to employ a solicitor for life subject to removal for misconduct was held to be within the statute, a ruling which is against the general current of Ameri- can decisions. 2 Blake v, Voight (1892), 134 N. Y. 69 ; Trustees of First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 305; 28 N. Y. 153; Kent v. Kent (1875), 62 N. Y. 560; Walker v. Wil- mington, etc., R. Co. (1886), 26 S. C. 80; Blakeney v. Goode (1876), 30 Ohio St. 350; Esty v. Aldridge(1865), 46 N. H. 127; Sherman v. Champlain Trans. Co. (1858), 31 Vt. 162. 3 Russell v. Slade, 12 Conn. 455. Where a contract for service is silent as to the time when the service is to commence, the presumption is that it is to commence forthwith. Hearne v. Chadbourne (1876), 65 Maine, 302. 4 Jordon v. Miller, 75 Va. 442. The statute does not apply to a hiring from year to year (Beeston v. Col- ly er (1827), 12 Moore, 552; 4 Bing. 309) , nor to a contract for service for an indefinite time, the services under it to be compensated for in half-yearly payments (Moore v. Fox, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 244), nor to a contract to work for another as long as they are mutu- ally satisfied (Greene v. Harris, 9 R. I. 401). 5 Perkins v. Clay (1874), 54 N. H. 518; Worthy v. Jones (1858), 11 Gray, 168; Foster v. McO'Blenis (1853), 18 Mo. 88. 6 Blanchard v. Weeks (1861), 34 Vt. 589; Blanding v. Sargent (1856), 33 N. H. 239. 654 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 552 to engage in the livery business in a certain town indefinite- ly, 1 nor to a contract of insurance, being a promise to pay upon the happening of an event which may occur within a year; 2 nor to a promise to pay when money is received from a third person; 3 nor to a contract to be performed on the death of one of the parties, or of a third person; 4 nor to an agree- ment to take stock and pay when the company is incorporated; 5 nor to marry within three or four years, 6 or at the end of a voyage expected to last about eighteen months; 7 or upon res- toration to health. 8 1 Lyon v. King (1846), 11 Mete. 411. To relinquish the trade and business of a butcher in and around the village of K., Richardson c. Pierce (1862), 7 R. I. 330. An agreement not to en- gage in a rival business, Welz v. Rhodius, 87 Ind. 1. It was held in Doyle v. Dixon (1867), 97 Mass. 208, that an agreement not to engage in a certain kind of business, at a particu- lar place, for a specified number of years, is not within the statute. Gray, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: "It has accordingly been repeatedly held by this court that an agreement not hereafter to carry on a certain business at a par- ticular place was not within the stat- ute. * * * An agreement not to engage in a certain kind of business at a particular place for a specified number of years is within the same principle ; for whether a man agrees not to do a thing for his life, or never to do it, or only not to do it for a cer- tain number of years, it is in either form an agreement by which he does not promise that anything shall be done after his death, and the per- formance is therefore completed with his life." In the case of Davey v. Shannon, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 81, a verbal promise not to engage thereafter in a certain trade was held to be within the statute. This decision is contrary to the current of authority and was overruled by McGregor v. McGregor (1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. Div. 424. 2 Wiebler v. Milwaukee, etc., Ins. Co. (18S3), 30 Minn. 464; Walker v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 56 Maine, 371. As to validity of parol contracts of insurance; 2 Parsons on Maritime Law, 19 ; Parsons on Mercantile Law, 403. s Artcher v. Zeh, 5 Hill, 200; Hedges v. Strong, 3 Ore. 18. 4 Frost v. Tarr (1876), 53 Ind. 390; Sword v. Keith (1875), 31 Mich. 247; Riddle v. Backus (1874), 38 Iowa, 81; Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strobh. Law (S. C), 196. 5 Bullock v. Falmouth, etc., Road Co. (1887), 85 Ky. 185. 6 Paris v. Strong (1875), 57 Ind. 339; Lawrences. Cooke (1868), 56 Maine, 187; Brick v. Gannar, 36 Hun, 52, holding that the year clause does not apply in New York to promises to marry and distinguishing Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515; Nichols v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 373; and Lawrence v. Cooke, 56 Maine, 186. 'Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495. 8 McConahey v. Griffey (1891), 82 Iowa, 564. A contract to labor for five years, or so long as A. shall be agent of a company, not within the statute. Roberts v. Rockbottom Co., 7 Mete. 46. In view of the length courts have gone in relieving parties from the operation of the statutes, § 553 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 655 § 553. Performance on one side within a year. — In England the rule prevails that the statute does not extend to contracts which are wholly executed on one side, or which may be ex- ecuted on one side within a year, but only to contracts which, as a whole, are not to be executed within that time. In other words, that performance by one party within the year takes the case out of the statute, however many years may have to elapse before the agreement is performed by the other party. This doctrine is based upon the decision rendered in the Court of King's Bench in 1832, in the case of Donellan v. Read, 1 which has been followed and approved in subsequent cases to an extent which has established it as a rule of law in that country. 2 In this country, however, there has been a conflict of opinion upon this question. The English rule has been sustained more generally, especially in the southern and western states; 8 but other courts of high repute, especially in Vermont, Massa- chusetts and New York, 4 hold to the contrary. The question Bell, J., remarked in Blanding v. Sargent, 33 N. H. 239, that, "These decisions are almost equivalent to a repeal of this clause of the statute." See also, Rogers o. Brightman, 10 Wis. 55, in which the court used the following language: "The course of decisions upon this act presents the most striking example of the liberties courts have taken with positive stat- utes which exist. But great excuse may be found in the inherent diffi- culty of establishing any exact inter- pretation which shall be applicable in all cases, and in the temptation to hold it inapplicable upon slight grounds, growing out of the hardship in many instances in applying it." 1 Donellan o. Bead, 3 Barn. & Ad. 899. 2 Cherry v. Heming (1849), 4 Exch. Rep. 631; Smith v. Neale (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.)67; Bevanu. Can- (1885), 1 Cababe & Ellis, 499 ; Miles v. New Zealand, etc. (1886), L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 266; 54 L. J. Rep. Eq. 1035. 'Lowman v. Sheets (1890), 124 Ind. 416; Durfee v. O'Brien (1888), 16 R. I. 213 ; Dant v. Head (1890) , 90 Ky. 255 ; Seddon v. Rosenbaum (1889), 85 Va. 928; Grace v. Lynch (1891), 80 Wis. 166; McClellan v. Sanford (1870), 26 Wis. 595; Holbrook v. Armstrong (1833), 10 Maine, 31; Perkins v. Clay (1874), 54 N. H. 518; Blanding v. Sar- gent (1856), 33 N. H. 239 (but see Emery v. Smith, contra, 46 N. H. 151) ; Berryi>.Doremus(1863),30 N.J. Law, 399 ; Smalley v. Greene (1879),52 Iowa, 241; Hoyle v. Bush (1883), 14 Mo. App. 408; Self v. Cordell (1870), 45 Mo. 345 ; Horner v. Frazier, 65 Md. 1 ; Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476 ; Rake v. Pope, 7 Ala. 161 ; Johnson v. Wat- son, 1 Ga. 348; Compton v. Martin, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 14 ; Curtis v. Sage, 35 111. 22; Fraser v. Gates, 118 111. 99; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. English, 38 Kan. 110. 4 Pierce v. Estate of Payne (1855), 28 Vt. 34; Frary v. Sterling (1888), 99 Mass. 461 ; Marcy v. Marcy, 9 Allen, 8; Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83; Kel- logg v. Clark (1881), 23 Hun, 393; 656 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §554 turns upon the construction of the words "not to be per- formed." In the cases in which the English rule is sustained these words are construed as meaning not to be performed on either side; whereas it is held in the other cases that perform- ance by one party is not performance of the agreement, and that, in any view, the part of the contract sued upon comes within the statute, for which the part performed is only the consideration. 1 This is a question distinct from the doctrine of part performance, which arises only in equity, and does not affect contracts within the statute of frauds, other than those respecting lands. 2 § 554. Contracts for the sale of goods, wares and merchan- dise — Executory sales. — Notwithstanding the decisions of the courts in the earlier cases, 3 it is now the settled rule that Broadwell v. Getinan, 2 Demo, 87; Bartlett v. Wheeler, 44 Barb. 162; Weir v. Hill, 2 Lans. 278; Whipple v. Parker (1874), 29 Mich. 369; Rein- heirner e. Carter (1877), 31 Ohio St. 579 (criticising the doctrine). 1 In the case of Duff v. Snider, 54 Miss. 245, the question was said to be merely one of pleading, if confined to promises to pay money when the con- sideration has been received by the defendant. To the same effect, Dur- fee v. O'Brien, 16 R. I. 213. Cf. Browne on Statute of Frauds, §§ 289, 290. The author expresses a doubt as to the soundness of the views by which the English courts have been governed. Also, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 586 ; notes in case of Peters v. Compton, Skin. 353; 1 Smith's L. C. 614 (351) ; Smith on Contracts, 126. Redfield, C. J., in an able exposition of the subject, in Pierce v. Estate of Payne, 28 Vt. 34, says : "If the contract has been performed on one side in such a manner that the performance goes to the benefit of the other party, whether this was done within the year or not, it undoubtedly lays the foundation of a recovery against the party benefited by such performance, But when the contract, on the part ol this party, was not to be performed within one year from the time it was made, the recovery is not upon the contract, but upon the quantum meruit or valebat, or upon money counts. It is a recovery back of the considera- tion of a contract upon which no ac- tion will lie, and which has been re- pudiated by the other party. * * * But the payment or performance of the consideration of an agreement or contract, within any section of the statute of frauds, never takes it out of the statute ; if it were so, no contract upon an executed consideration would ever come within the statute." 2 Britain v. Rossiter (1879), L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 123; Osborne v. Kimball (1889), 41 Kan. 187; Smith's Equity, 660. 'Towers v. Osborne (1724), 1 Stra. 506; Clayton v. Andrews (1767), 4 Burr. 2101. These decisions were overruled in Rondeau v. Wyatt (1792), 2 H. Bl. R. 63. In that case Lord El- lenborough said : " It is singular that an idea could ever prevail that this section of the statute was only appli- §555 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 657 executory contracts are within the statute, and are not taken out of it by the mere circumstance that the goods are not ready for delivery. 1 § 555. Contracts for sale of goods distinguished from con- tracts for work and labor. — One of the difficult questions which arise under this clause of the statute is to determine whether the contract is for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, or where the article is not in existence at the time, whether it is for work and labor. The distinctions made have in some in- stances been extremely nice, and it is difficult, if not impos- sible, to reconcile all the determinations, or to frame a general rule. The difficulty arises from "the infinitely various shades of different contracts." 2 If the article existed at the time of the contract in the condition in which it is to be delivered it is regarded as a contract of sale, but if what is contemplated by the agreement is the peculiar skill, labor or care of the maker then the contract is for work and labor, and need not be proved by a note in writing. 3 A contract to paint a portrait cable to cases where the bargain was immediate, for it seems plain, from the words made use of, that it was meant to regulate executory as well as other contracts." The statute has since settled the matter in England. Lord Tenterden's Act (1829), Stat. 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, § 7, extended the stat- ute of frauds "to all contracts for the sale of goods, * * notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be de- livered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery." *Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn. 508, (an agreement for the purchase and sale of sewing machines) ; Carman v. Smick, 15 N. J. Law, 252 ; Bennett v. Hull, 10 John. 364; Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685 ; Edwards v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 Maine, 379; Burrell v. High- 42 leyman, 33 Mo. App. 183; Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94; Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294. "The reasons upon which the policy of the statute rests apply with greater force to ex- ecutory than to executed contracts. In the former there is opened a wider field for fraud than in the latter. * * Comparatively little litigation can grow out of an executed contract — the execution concludes in most cases the rights of parties ; whereas, where contracts are to be consummated, misconstructions of what they are, imperfect compliance, or total failure to comply, are fruitful sources of liti- gation." Cason v. Cheely, 6 Ga. 554. 2 Gardner v. Joy, 9 Mete. 177; At- water v. Hough, 29 Conn. 508. 8 Prescott v. Locke (1871), 51 N. H. 94; Hight v. Eipley, 19 Maine, 137. This was an action for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a contract for the delivery of a stipu- lated quantity of hoe shanks to be 658 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 555 of a child for its parents was held not to be a sale of chattels, the skill and labor of the artist being the essential considera- tions. 1 The fact that the article contracted for does not exist at the time of the contract, but is to be made or manufactured, will not necessarily take the case out of the statute, as when a person stipulates for the sale of articles which he is habit- ually making. 2 A contract to purchase flax straw to be raised from forty-five bushels of flax seed was held to be a contract of sale and not for labor or skill in producing the straw. 3 A test in some cases is held to be whether the person, contract- ing to take the article, is bound to receive one which may be bought or procured by the other party after the contract, and if he is, that it is a case of sale. 4 When the contract is to fur- nish material and manufacture the article according to speci- fications furnished or a model selected, and when without the special contract the thing would never have been manufactured in the particular manner, shape or condition it was, it has been held that the contract is essentially for special skill, labor or furnished "as soon as practicable" agreeably to certain patterns ; held a contract for manufacture. Abbott v. Gilchrist, 38 Maine, 260; Crockett v. Scribner, 64 Maine, 447. 1 Turner v. Mason (1887), 65 Mich. 602; 32 N. W. Rep. 846. But see Isaacs v. Hardy, 1 Cabebe & E. 287. "Where the labor and service are the essential considerations, as in case of the manufacture of a thing not in esse, the statute does not apply, but where the labor and services are only inci- dental to a subject-matter in esse, the statute applies. Story on Sales, §260; Clay v. Yates (1856), 25 L. J. Ex. 237 ; 1 H. & N. 73 (case of a printer em- ployed to print a book). See Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272. In Iowa it is provided by law (Code, § 3665) that this clause does not apply "when the article of personal property sold is not at the time of the contract owned by the vendor, and ready for delivery, but labor, skill or money are necessa- ry to be expended in producing or procuring the same." Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 306. 2 Edwards v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 Maine, 379; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Mete. 353. The court, per Shaw, C. J., said: " The distinction we be- lieve is now well understood. When a person stipulates for the future sale of articles which he is habitually mak- ing, and which at the time are not made or finished, it is essentially a contract of sale and not a contract for labor; otherwise when the article is made pursuant to the agreement." Smith v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 4 Keyes, 180. 3 Brown v. Sanborn (1875), 21 Minn. 402. In Cason v. Cheely, 6 Ga. 554 (a contract for a crop of cotton entered into after the crop was planted to be delivered as soon as it could be gath- ered and prepared for market held a contract for the sale of goods and with- in the statute. ' Edwards v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 Maine, 379. § 556 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 659 workmanship. 1 In Massachusetts where the agreement was to build a carriage for a party who was to take it when finished and pay for it, it was held that this was not a contract of sale within the meaning of the statute. The rule was laid down that when the contract is a contract of sale, either of an article then existing, or of articles which the vendor usually has for sale in the course of his business, the statute applies whether the contract is to be executed at a future time or to be executed immediately. But where it is an agreement with a workman, to put materials together and construct an article for the em- ployer, whether at an agreed price or not, although in common parlance it may be called a purchase and sale of the article, to be completed in futuro, it is not a sale until an actual or con- structive delivery and acceptance. 2 § 556. The English rule. — The rule which now prevails in England was laid down in the case of Lee v. (jrriffin, 3 in which it was held that a contract to make a set of artificial teeth was a contract for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise. As then stated, in order to ascertain whether the action should be brought for goods sold and delivered, or for work and labor done and materials provided, the particular contract entered into between the parties must be looked at. If the subject- matter is such that it will result in the sale of a chattel to be afterwards delivered, then the action must be for goods sold and delivered. Reference is had to the time of delivery as con- 1 Meincke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, citing the time in solido, and where such ar- cases. tide is to be made according to order, 2 Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205 ; and as a thing distinguished from the Gardner v. Joy, 9 Mete. 177, where the general business of the maker, then agreement was for the delivery of can- such contract is in substance and ef- dles which were not then in existence, feet not for a sale but for work and Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, af- materials. When the work and labor firming Mixerw. Howarth,21 Pick.205 ; is the substantial object contracted for, Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478. although such work and labor is to be In New Jersey in the case of Finney expended on the materials of the par- v. Apgar (1865), 31 N. J. Law, 266, it ty who is to furnish the article at a was stated that the weight of author- given price, such contract is not for a ity deduced from the English and sale, and consequently not within the American cases seemed to establish statute. the general rule that where a contract 8 Decided in the Queen's Bench in is made for an article not existing at 1861, Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best & S. 272. 660 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. §§ 557, 558 templated by the parties. If at that time it is a chattel it is enough according to this rule. If the work and labor be be- stowed in such a manner that the result is not anything which can properly be said to be the subject of sale, the action is for work and labor. 1 § 557. The rule in New York. — It is held in New York, by a long course of decisions, that an agreement for the sale of any commodity not in existence at the time, but which the vendor is to manufacture or put in a condition to be delivered, such as flour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be made from iron belonging to the manufacturer, is not a contract of sale. Stress is laid on the word sale. 2 § 558. Shares in corporations and choses in action. — In England it is held that contracts for the sale of shares in a corporation are not within the scope of the seventeenth section of the statute. 3 In this country they have been held to be in- cluded in the term "goods, wares and merchandise;" 4 and the 'Wolfenden v. Wilson, 33 TJ. C. Q. B. 442 ; cases collected and rule stated as follows : "If the contract is intended to result in transferring for a price, from B. to A., a chattel in which A. had no previous property, it is a contract for the sale of a chattel." Benjamin on Sales (6 Am. ed., Ben- nett's), §103, et seq. 2 Cooke v. Millard (1875), 65 N. Y. 352, in which the authorities upon the subject are collated and the different views in regard thereto of the En- glish, Massachusetts and New York courts pointed out, distinguishing the following cases: Parsons v. Loucks (1871), 48 N. Y. 17 (a contract to manufacture and deliver 20,000 pounds of paper) ; Sewall v. Fitch (1828), 8 Cow. 215 (to make 300 casks of nails) ; Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258; Kim- berly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, ques- tioning Mead v. Case, 33 Barb. 202. The court refers to the rule enunciated in Lee v. Griffin, 1 Best & S. 272, with approval, and says per Dwight, C. : "Were the subject now open to full discussion upon principle, no more convenient and easily understood rule could be adopted than that enunciated in Lee v. Griffin. * * It is too late to adopt it in full in this state. So far as authoritative decisions have gone, they must be respected, even at the expense of sound principle.'' 3 Humble v. Mitchell, 11 A. & E. 205 (banking company) ; Tempest v. Kilner, 3 C. B. 249 (railway shares) ; Bowlby r. Bell, 3 C. B. 284 (ibid); Diincuit?). Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189 (ibid), 4 Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. 9 (lead- ing case). Shaw, C. J., delivering the opinion, said: "There is nothing in the nature of stocks or shares in companies which in reason or sound policy should exempt contracts in re- spect to them from those reasonable restrictions, designed by the statute to prevent frauds in the pile of other commodities. On the con \rary, these § 559 THE STATUTK OF FRAUDS. 661 doctrine has been extended in some states so as to include the sale of promissory notes. 1 But in New Hampshire promissory notes were held not to be goods, wares or merchandise within the meaning of the statute. 2 The words of the statute have not been extended beyond securities which are subjects of com- mon sale and barter, and which have a visible and palpable form; therefore, an agreement for the sale of an interest in an invention before letters patent are obtained was held not to be within the statute. 3 § 559. Receipt and acceptance. — If the contract is oral, and no part of the price is paid by the vendee, there must not only be a delivery of the goods, or a part of them, by the vendor, but a receipt and acceptance of the same by the vendee to pass companies have become so numerous, so large an amount of the property of the community is now invested in them. * * * There seems to be peculiar reason for extending the provisions of the statute to them." Boardman v. Cutter, 128 Mass. 388; North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; Pray v. Mitchell, 60 Maine, 430; Colvin v. Williams, 3 H. & J. (Md.) 38 (bank stock); Fay v. "Wheeler, 44 Vt. 292; Fine*;. Hornsby, 2 Mo. App. 61. Sale of shares of stock in a company not yet organized held not within the stat- ute. Green v. Brookins 23 Mich. 48. In Meehan v. Sharp (1890), 151 Mass. 564, the plaintiff had a certifi- cate showing that he was the ben- eficial owner of fifty shares of stock in a corporation. The shares had not been issued, but were held in pool, and were to be issued when- ever the board of directors should vote to authorize a delivery of them. The court said : " It is at least doubt- ful whether the contract, which was for the sale of stock that had not been regularly issued, can properly be brought within the statute." The statute of New York includes "things in action;" that of Florida and some other states is extended to sales of " personal property." 1 Baldwin v. Williams, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 365; Gooch v. Holmes, 41 Maine, 523 (bank bills) ; Riggs v. Magruder, 2 Cr. C. C. 143 (notes of a private bank). 2 Whittemore v. Gibbs, 24 N. H. 484. "A promissory note is neither goods, wares nor merchandise, in the common and ordinary sense of these terms. It is one by giving them a broad and unusual signification, that bills of exchange and notes of hand can be included." Per Eastman, J. See also, Vawter v. Griffin, 40 Ind. 593. The Indiana statute omits the words "wares or merchandise." 3 Somerby u. Buntin (1875), 118 Mass. 279. "Before letters patent are obtained, the invention exists only in right, and neither that right nor any evidence of it has any outward form which is capable of being transferred or delivered in specie, or which upon any construction, however liberal, can be considered as goods, wares and merchandise." In a. contract for the sale of gold this article is regarded as a commodity, not as money. Peabody v. Speyers (1874), 56 N. Y. 230. 662 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 559 the title or to make the vendee liable for the price. 1 An accept- ance of part of the goods is sufficient, although the rest are not in existence at the time of the contract. 2 The statute does not fix or limit the time when the acceptance and actual receipt of the goods must take place, in order to make the contract valid; the acceptance and receipt may be after the sale. The authori- ties allow of an "oral order of one day and an acceptance at another." 3 It is not necessary that the acceptance should fol- low or be contemporaneous with the receipt of the goods. The acceptance may take place prior to the receipt or thereafter. 4 To constitute a delivery and acceptance, such as the statute re- quires, something more than mere words is necessary. Super- 1 Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449 ; 7 Am. Rep. 461 ; Maxwell v. Brown, 39 Me. 98; Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124; Richardson v. Squires, 37 Vt. 640; Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211; Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615; Shep- herd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49 ; Denmead v. Glass, 30 Ga. 637 ; Jones v. Mechan- ics Bank, 29 Md. 287 ; Smith v. Hud- son, 6 B. & S. 431; Hinde v. White- house, 7 East, 558. If the contract be for specified goods, the accept- ance takes place at the time of the bargain and the same evidence that proves the bargain will prove an acceptance. Cusack v. Robinson, 1 B. & S. 299. In Phillips v. Bistolli, 2 B. & C. 511, the property was sold by an auctioneer and delivered to the purchaser, who after detaining it three or four minutes handed it back saying he was mistaken as to the price. The vendor refused to receive the prop- erty, and the jury found that the ex- cuse was false in fact. The verdict was set aside ; the court saying that to satisfy the statute there must be a delivery by the vendor, with an in- tention of investing the right of pos- session in the vendee, and there must be an actual acceptance by the latter with the intent of taking possession as owner. 2 "If a man enters into an entire agreement for goods made, and for others to be made, his accepting part of the goods made is evidence of his having entered into the agreement." Scott v. Eastern, etc., Ry. Co., 12 M. & W. 33, per Alderson, B. 3 Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. 61 ; Mc- Knight v. Dunlop, 5N. Y. 537. Where the plaintiff, by a verbal agreement, in June, purchased 5,000 bushels of bar- ley malt of the defendant, at a fixed price, to be paid for by the plaintiff's note, whenever ?1,000 worth of the malt should be delivered. The de- fendant, in August and September, delivered about 1,400 bushels in pur- suance of the agreement and refused to deliver the residue. Held, that the contract was valid, and that the plain- tiff was entitled to damages for the non-delivery of the residue of the 5,000 bushels. Marsh v. Hyde, 3 Gray, 331 ; Davis v. Moore, 13 Maine, 424; Buckingham v. Osborne, 44 Conn. 133 ; Schmidt t>. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529. "Cusack v. Robinson (1861), 1 B. & S. 299; Bog Lead Mining Co. v. Mon- tague, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 481; Cross «\ O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661. In Saunders v. Topp (1849), 4 Ex. .390, it was doubted whether "acceptance" could precede "actual receipt," but that doubt was removed by Cusack v. Rob- inson, 1 B. & S. 299. §559 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 663 added to the language of the contract, there must be some act of the parties amounting to a transfer of the possession and an acceptance thereof by the buyer. 1 In this country the language of the decisions is that there must be "acts of such a character as to place the property unequivocally within the power and under the exclusive dominion of the buyer, as absolute owner, discharged of all lien for the price." 2 If the contract provides that the absolute legal title is not to pass until payment, there may still be such a receipt and acceptance as will take the case out of the statute. Thus, where a sewing-machine was sold to be paid for in monthly installments, and it was 'Ham v. Van Orden, 4 Hun, 709; Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449; Dole v. Stimpson, 21 Pick. 384 ; Temp- est v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Aid. 680 ; Bas- sett v. Camp, 54 Vt. 232 ; Nicholle v. Plume, 1 C. & P. 272. "Hinchman v. Lincoln (1887), 124 IT. S. 38; Marsh v. Rouse (1871), 44 N. Y. 643; Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519; Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. (1 Com.) 261 ; 49 Am. Dec. 316, and notes. Where the cases are col- lected, in that case the plaintiff and defendant bargained respecting the sale by the former to the latter of a quantity of lumber, piled apart from other lumber, on a dock, and in view of the parties at the time of the bar- gain, and which had before that time been measured and inspected. The parties having agreed as to the price, the plaintiff said to the defendant, "the lumber is yours . " The defendant then told the plaintiff to get the inspector's bill and take it to one House, who would pay the amount. This was done the next day and payment refused. The price was over fifty dollars. It was held, in an action to recover the price that there was no delivery and acceptance of the lumber within the meaning of the statute. This case is regarded as a leading authority on the subject in the state of New York, and has been uniformly followed there, and is recognized and sup- ported by the decisions of the highest courts in many other states. Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354 ; Malone v. Plato, 22 Cal. 103 ; Edwards v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 54 Maine, 105; Mat- thiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon's Ad- ministrator, 38 N. J. Law, 541. In Knight v. Mann, 120 Mass. 219, by the terms of the contract the buyer was to send for the goods which were picked out in accord with his orders and placed ready for delivery, and seen by buyer, who promised to send for them. They were destroyed by fire before he did so ; it was held there had been no such unequivocal act of acceptance as would take the case out of the statute. No receipt and ac- ceptance unless vendor's lien is aban- doned. Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36. "To constitute delivery the pos- session must have been parted with by the owner, so as to deprive him of the right of lien," per Parke, B Smith v. Surman (1829), 9 B. & Cr, 561 ; Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321 Hanson v. Armitage, 5 B. & Aid. 557 Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428 Holmes v. Hoskins (1854), 9 Ex. 753 Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37, but see Wright v. Percival, 8 L. J. R. Q. B. (N. S.) 258; Dodsley v. Varley, 12 A. & E. 632, considered overruled as to lien. 664 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. § 560 agreed that the machine should remain the property of the vendor until the last installment was paid and the machine was delivered and accepted at the time of the contract, it was held that the acceptance of the machine by the vendee was a suf- ficient acceptance under the statute. 1 In this case payment is a condition precedent, and until performance property is not vested in the vendee, but remains in the vendor, subject to be divested by the performance of the condition. 8 § 560. The same subject continued. — When the seller gives to the buyer the actual control of the goods, and the buyer ac- cepts such control, he has actually received them. Such a re- ceipt is often evidence of acceptance, but it is not the same thing. The receipt by the buyer is often for the purpose of seeing whether he will accept or not. 3 An acceptance to satisfy the statute has been held to mean some act done, after the vendee has exercised, or had the means of exercising, his right of rejection. 4 He may refuse or neglect to accept unreason- ably, assigning insufficient reasons, or giving no reason at all; the question is not why he did not, or whether he ought to accept, but whether he did accept. And whether he has ac- cepted is to be determined in every case by his acts. 5 Where the goods are sold by sample, that fact must be considered as an element in the case in determining whether the buyer has taken actual or constructive possession as owner, so as to 'Pinkhamu. Mattox (1873), 53 N. H. (1865), 6 B. & S. 431. "Acceptance 600. means something more than receipt." 2 Armington v. Houston (1866), 38 Taylor v. Smith (1893), L. E. 2 Q. B. Vt. 448; Goodwin r. May, 23 Ga. 205; 65. There is no acceptance unless the Shireman v. Jackson, 14 Ind. 459; purchaser has exercised his option to Bailey v. Harris, 8 Iowa, 331 ; Patton receive the goods or not, or done v. McCane, 15 B. Mem. 555; Hussey v. something that has deprived him of Thornton, 4 Mass. 405. his option. Oilman ■». Hill, 36 N. H. 3 Blackburn on Sale, 23; Kent v. 311; Gorham v. Fisher, 30 Vt. 428. Huskinson, 3 B. & P. 233 (receipt but If the goods are made to order very no acceptance) . decisive acts will be required to prove ' J Hunt v. Hecht (1853), 8 Ex.814; acceptance before they are finished 22 L. J. Ex. 293, per Martin, B. Caul- and ready for delivery. Maberley v. kins et al. v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449; Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99. Coombs ». Bristol, etc., Ry. Co. (1858), 5 Knight v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143. 3 H. & N. 510; Smith v. Hudson §580 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 665 indicate an acceptance thereby. 1 In the case of an executory contract for the future sale and delivery of goods of a specified quality, in the absence of express warranty the quality is a part of the description of the thing agreed to be sold, and the vendor is bound to furnish articles corresponding with the de- scription. If he tenders articles of an inferior quality the pur- chaser is not bound to accept them. It has been held that if he does accept them, he is, in the absence of fraud, deemed to have assented that they correspond with the description, and is concluded from subsequently questioning it. This imposed upon the vendee the duty of inspection before acceptance if he wishes to save his rights in case the goods are of inferior quality. 2 But where the question is whether the contract has been fulfilled, it is sufficient to show an acceptance and actual receipt of a part of the thing sold, even though it does not pre- clude the purchaser from refusing to accept the residue of the goods, if it clearly appears that they do not conform to the contract. 3 1 Rernick ». Sanford, 120 Mass. 309 ; Gardner v. Grout, 2 C. B. N. S. 340. If the buyer has received and retained a sample of the goods, the statute will be satisfied if the sample was actually a part of the goods sold. Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558; Klinitz v. Surry, 5 Esp. 267 ; Talver v. West, Holt (N. P.) 178; Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671. Where tea was sold by sample and a chest of it delivered to the buyer and after opening it he undertook to return it, the court ruled that to sat- isfy the statute there must be a de- livery of the tea by the plaintiff with the intention of vesting the possession in the defendant, and that there must be an actual acceptance by the latter with the intention of keeping it if it agreed with the sample. And it ap- pearing that the tea did agree with the sample, then certain acts, such as weighing the tea, agreeing upon the price, and delivering it into the pos- session of the defendant without ob- jection from him at the time, would be such a delivery, acceptance and receipt as to satisfy the statute and make the contract valid. 2 Pierson v. Crooks (1889), 115 N.Y. 539; Pope v. Allis (1885), 115 U. S. 363. In Bacon v. Eccles (1877), 43 Wis. 227, the vendee insures the goods in transitu, pays the freight, and in- tending to accept the goods if found to be such as ordered, takes them into his possession for examination, and then within a reasonable time refuses to accept them, as not according to order. Held, that there was not an acceptance within the meaning of the statute, if the goods are not in fact such as the order called for. 3 Garfield v. Paris (1877), 96 U. S. 557; Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428, leading case, holding that there may be an acceptance and receipt "with- out the buyer having examined the goods or done anything to preclude him from contending that they do not correspond with the contract" ; Kibble y.Gpugh, 38 L. T. Rep.(N. S.)204 (goods 666 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §561 § 561. Further illustrations. — The act or conduct on the part of the buyer to constitute acceptance must be such as would reasonably lead the seller to think the goods are accept- ed, and this may be by retention of them for such a time as might reasonably lead to that conclusion. 1 The vendee, hav- ing an election to repudiate the delivery, must do it within a reasonable time, or he is bound by the acquiescence as an ac- ceptance. 8 The mere use of an article on trial may in some cases be contemplated by the parties as a means of ascertain- ing whether it corresponds in quality with the article agreed to be furnished. In such cases mere use will not constitute an acceptance. 3 If a chattel is sold and delivered upon condition that it shall be returned to the seller at a fixed price, in a cer- tain event, and the buyer agrees so to return it, it has been held that such agreement is not for a resale of the chattel, and so not within the statute. 4 Where goods had been sold and equal to sample) ; Rickardw. Moore, 38 ance is not used in the statute accord- L. T. Eep. (N. S.) 841, C. A. (goods not equal to sample) ; Paget). Morgan, L.R. 15 Q. B. D. 228, in which Brett, M. R., said, referring to Kibble v. Gough, 38 L. T. Bep. (N. S.) 204: "It was then pointed out that there must be under the statute both an ac- ceptance and an actual receipt, but such acceptance need not be an abso- lute acceptance"; Hewes v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472; ]7 Am. Rep. 578; Tower v. Tudhope, 37 U. C. Q. B. 200 ; Strong v. Dodds, 47 Vt. 348, where the court, per Ross, J., said: "No doubt some confusion in the cases deciding what would or would not constitute an ac- ceptance by the purchaser, within the meaning of the statute, has arisen by not clearly distinguishing an accept- ance by the purchaser that will re- move the statute disability from an acceptance that amounts to a waiver at common law by the purchaser of his right to object to the goods be- cause they do not answer to the order in quantity or quality." In Taylor r. Smith (1893), L. R. 2 Q. B. 65, in which the above mentioned cases were con- sidered, Lord Herschell said : "Accept- ing to its common acceptation and in what precise sense it is used has never been determined." 1 Bowes v. Pontifex, 3 F. & F. 739; Downs v. Marsh, 29 Conn. 409; Cop- lay Iron Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232. 2 Hirshhorn v. Stewart, 49 Iowa, 418; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314; Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539. It was said by Lord Ellenborough, in Fisher v. Samuda, 1 Camp. 190, that "it was the duty of a purchaser of any commodity, immediately on discover- ing that it was not according to order, and unfit for the purpose intended, to return it to his vendor, or give him notice to take it back.'' Similar lan- guage was used by the same judge in Hopkins v. Appleby, 1 Stark. 388; Coleman v. Gibson, 1 M. & R. 168; Parker v. Wallis, 5 E. &B. 21. 3 Pierson v. Crooks (1889), 115 N. Y. 539; Curtis v. Pugh, 10 Q. B. Ill (question whether the article was dealt with by vendee so as to consti- tute acceptance). MVilliams v. Burgess, 10 A. & E. 499. §562 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 667 delivered, and a part used and appropriated by the vendee, and by a subsequent agreement between the parties the vendor was to "buy back" the property, it was held not a modification or rescission of the original contract simply, but a new contract required to be in writing or accompanied by a delivery to take it out of the statute. 1 § 562. Constructive delivery and acceptance. — The delivery may be actual or symbolical. Where the goods are so situated as not to admit of actual delivery, the sale will be valid with- out it. Where the articles sold are ponderous, a symbolical or constructive delivery will be equivalent in its effect to an act- ual one. When goods sold are in a warehouse, the delivery of the key has been deemed sufficient. The delivery of wine in a cellar is held to be made by a delivery of the keys of the cel- lar. The title to a ship at sea may pass by a delivery of the bill of sale. 2 The circumstances held tantamount to an actual delivery ought, however, to be so strong and unequivocal as to leave no doubt of the intent of the parties. 3 If the goods are 1 Blanchard v. Trim (1868), 38 N. Y. 225. "Where the title of the vendee has not been perfected for any rea- son, where there has not been a per- fect delivery, where fraud has oc- curred, or where the contract in any respect remains executory, the idea of a rescission is quite appropriate." Per Hunt, Ch. J. 2 Bicker v. Cross, 5 N. H. 570; Vin- ing v. Gilbreth, 39 Maine, 496; Cur- rie v. Anderson, 2 E. & E. 592; Ben- ford v. Schell, 55 Pa. St. 393 (delivery of keys of a safe sold, and of the room in which it stood) ; Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 John. 335 (delivery of keys) ; Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 389 (ship at sea) ; Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 287 (sale of vessel by bill of sale) ; Pratt v. Parkman, 24 Pick. 42 (delivery of bill of lading, etc.); Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Maine, 286 (sale of logs) ; Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320 (discussing the subject of de- livery of warehouse receipts). In Meredith v. Meigh, 2 E. & B. 364, Erie, J., says: "I have no doubt that the bill of lading, which is the symbol of property, may be so received and dealt with as to be equivalent to an actual receipt of the property itself." Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192 (the bulk of the commodity precluded actual delivery) . 3 An agreement with the vendor about the storage of the goods, and the delivery by him of the import entry to the agent of the vendee, were held not to be sufficiently certain to amount to a constructive delivery, or to afford an indicium of ownership in Bailey v. Ogden, 3 John. 399; 3 Am. Dec. 509, a leading case on the statute of frauds and frequently cited in New York and elsewhere. Proctorv. Jones, 2 Carr & P. 532. "It is the intention of the statute that there should be as complete a delivery as can be accord- ing to the nature of the article." In Boardman v. Spooner, 95 Mass. 353, 668 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 562 in the custody of a third person as bailee of the seller, the possession is changed as soon as such custodian, with the au- thority and consent of the seller, becomes the bailee of the buyer. 1 The vendor may be the agent of the vendee to receive the goods, as where they are so situated that the vendee can rightfully take possession at his pleasure, but by mutual con- sent they are retained in the custody of the vendor. 8 There may also be a constructive acceptance under the statute, such as may arise from the vendee dealing with the goods as owner. 3 it was held that the acceptance of a bill of goods in a warehouse in New York, with an order on the ware- houseman for their delivery without notice to the warehouseman, was not an acceptance or receipt of the goods which would take the sale out of the operation of the statute. In Farina v. Home, 16 M. & W. 119, where the seller indorsed and delivered to the buyer a document by which the bailee of goods agreed to deliver them to the seller or his indorsee, it was held that there was no actual receipt by the buyer until the bailee "at- torned" to him. Bentall v. Burn, 3 B. & C. 423. 1 Searle v. Keeves, 2 Esp. 598; Sim- monds ■„. Humble, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 258; Blackburn on Sale, 28, 29. 2 Castle v. Sworder, 29 L. J. R. Ex. 235; 30 L. J. R. Ex. 310; Means e. Williamson, 37 Maine, 556; Marvin v. Wallia, 6 E. & B. 726; Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 458 ; Barrett < . God- dard, 3 Mason, 107. But if the vendor dots not part with his lien there is no delivery. Rodgers v. Jones, 129 Mass. 420 ; Sjfford v. McDonough, 120 Mass. 200; Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & (J. 37. 3 Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197; Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49; Pass v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192; Garfield?.'. Paris, 96 U. S. 557; Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. & Bl. 21; Baines v. Jevons, 7 Car. & P. 288; Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99 ; Currie v. Anderson, 2 El. & El. 592; Marshall v. Green, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 35 ; Robinson v. Gordon, 23 Up. Can. Q. B. 143. "If the vendee does any act to the goods, of wrong if he is not the owner of the goods, and of right if he is the owner of the goods, the doing of that act is evidence that he has accepted them." Erie, J., in Parker v. Wallis, 5E. &B. 21. Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192, which was assumpsit for a stack of ha3'. The plaintiff was put to the proof of the delivery of it, which he maintained by showing that the de- fendant had sold a part of the hay to one who had taken it away. This was held sufficient to prove that the defendant had the possession ; inas- much as he had made a valid sale of the hay, and dealt with the property as his own. Directing silverware to be engraved with the buyer's name be- fore delivery has been held a good ac- ceptance. Walker v. Boulton, 3 U. C. Q. B. (O. S.) 252. To directing an al- teration in a carriage and taking it out for a drive. Beaumont v. Bren- geri, 5 C. B. 301. Green v. Merriam, 28 Vt. 801, is an authority for the doctrine that all that a purchaser need to do to accept personal property sold by parol so as to remove the statute disability is to assume control over the property. If the goods, at the time of the bargain, are on the § 563 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 669 § 563. Delivery to a carrier. — Acceptance and receipt nniy be through an authorized agent. But a common carrier, whether selected by the seller or the buyer, to whom the goods are entrusted without express instructions to do any- thing but to carry and deliver them to the buyer, is no more than an agent to carry and deliver the goods, and has no im- plied authority to do the acts required to constitute an accept- ance and receipt on the part of the buyer. 1 Where an agent of a business firm called upon a party with samples of goods, and articles were selected which the party agreed to take, the goods to be shipped by a designated express company, and they were accordingly shipped, and a bill of the goods sent to the purchaser, who declined to receive them on the ground that they were not like the samples, it was held that the sole duty of the carrier was to receive and transport the goods, and there was no implied authority from the buyer to accept the goods for him.* But it has been held that when the goods have been accepted by the buyer, so as to answer that portion of the statute which requires acceptance, a delivery to a car- land of a third person (such person delivery to the carrier was insufficient not having the custody of them as to show an acceptance by the vendee, bailee), or are in some public place to Norman v. Phillips, 14 M. & W. 277, which buyer and seller have equal in which the effect of the delivery of right of access, it seems that the pos- goods at a railway station, to be for- session, as well as the title, may be warded to the vendee in pursuance of transferred by the mere agreement of the terms of a verbal contract of sale, the parties to that effect. Tansley v. was discussed, and a verdict for the Turner, 2 Bing. N. C. 151; Coopers, plaintiff , founded upon such a delivery Bill, 3 H. & C. 722. and upon the additional fact that the 1 Snow v. Warner, 10 Mete. 132; vendor sent an invoice to the vendee, Pierson v. Crooks (1889), 115 N. Y. which he retained for several weeks, 539; Frostburg Mining Co. v. New was set aside. In Morton v. Tibbett, England Glass Co., 9 Cush. 115 ; Kei- 15 Q. B. 428, the defendant sent a wert v. Meyer, 62 Ind. 587; 30 Am. carrier for the grain purchased by Rep. 206; Quintard^. Bacon, 99 Mass. sample, and previous to its arrival re- 185 ; Nicholson v. Bower, 1 B. & E. 172 ; sold it by the same sample, before he Johnson v. Cuttle (1870), 105 Mass. had inspected it ; and it was held that 447; Rodgers v. Phillips (1869), 40 its receipt by the carrier was not an N. Y. 519; Maxwell v. Brown, 39 acceptance, but that his resale of it Maine, 98, in which, after an exami- was evidence of an acceptance, nation and reference to the English s Allard v. Greasert, 61 N. Y. 1. authorities, the court held that the 670 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 564 rier selected by the buyer will answer that portion of the stat- ute which requires the buyer to receive. 1 § 564. Delivery which takes contract out of the statute The fact that logs were banked and marked with the vendee's name ready to be put in the river, under a verbal contract that they were to be paid for when put in the river, is not a suffi- cient delivery to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. And payment for logs sold under a verbal contract after the con- tract was made is not a sufficient payment of some part of the purchase-money "at the time" to take the contract out of the statute of frauds, when the logs were not delivered. 8 But where one orally contracting to buy goods, on being told by the seller to take them, directs a third person to do so, the latter, upon doing so, is not liable for their value to the seller, his receipt of the goods having the effect of taking the contract of sale out of the stat- ute of frauds. 3 And a payment by one for the pasturage of a 1 Allard v. Greasert (1874), 61 N. Y. 1; Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661; Wilcox Silver Plate Co. v. Green, 72 N.Y. 17. 2 Crosby Hardwood Co. v. Trester, 90 Wis. 412; 63 N. W. Rep. 1057, per Newman, J. : "It is clear that the con- tract for the sale of the logs by Thomp- son to Darwin was void for want of compliance with the statute of frauds, and was binding on neither party. It was an agreement for the sale of prop- erty for the price of more than $50. It was not in writing. Nor was there any delivery or payment at the time. Revised Statutes, § 2308. Logs to be got out are merchandise which is within the statute. Hanson v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622 ; 25 N. W. Rep. 530. The agreement of sale, being void, could not be made valid by the mere pay- ment, or tender, of even the entire purchase-money, afterwards. For that purpose there must be a delivery and acceptance of the logs as well ; or there must be a distinct renewal of, or as- sent to, the terms of the original agree- ment, so as to make the payment ap- ply on a present and not on a past agreement of sale. Bates v. Chesebro, 32 Wis. 594; 36 Wis. 636; Paine v. Fulton, 34 Wis. 83; Kerkhof v. Paper Co., 68 Wis. 674; 32 N. W. Rep. 766. Whether there was payment is con- troverted. But it is not claimed that there was ever any delivery to or ac- ceptance of these logs by any person representing the plaintiff, or through whom it claims to derive title, nor any later agreement of sale." See also, Shaw Lumber Co. v. Manville (Idaho 1895), 39Pac. Rep. 559. 3 Moore v. Hays, 12 Ind. App. 476; 40 N. E. Rep. 638, per Gavin, J.: "It is undoubtedly true that the parol con- tract was invalid and unenforcible (not void— Morrisons. Collier, 79 Ind. 417; Dixon v. Duke, 85 Ind. 434) un- til executed by the receipt of the goods by the purchaser ; and, had the sale been revoked by Moore prior to the receipt of the goods, then no rights could have been acquired under it. But the parol contract of sale was ac- 565 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 671 colt after his purchase thereof, the seller having previously paid therefor, constitutes a constructive delivery of the colt. 1 § 565. Question for the jury. — It is the general rule that it is a question for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the acts which the buyer does or forbears to do amount to a re- ceipt and acceptance within the terms of the statute. 2 And any acts of the parties indicative of ownership by the vendee may be given in evidence to show the receipt and acceptance. 3 companied with an express direction and license to get the corn from a cer- tain pen. In pursuance of this license the corn was taken by Hays under authority from Carmichael. The corn having been thus taken under the ex- press license and permission of Moore, he can not afterwards say that Hays was a wrong-doer, and sue him as such. That is what is being done here, in effect, the tort being waived. Where standing trees are sold by parol, the contract is unenforcible ; but if the purchaser, in execution of it, and before revocation by the land- owner, cut down the trees, he is en- titled to hold them. Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488; Cool v. Peters, etc., Box Co., 87 Ind. 531. As claimed by coun- sel, mere words would not consti- tute a delivery. Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253. But there was here much more than mere words. There was actual receipt of the goods by the purchaser, or by another under his direction, which amounts to the same thing. Neither do the facts bring it within the rule invoked by appellant, that where anything remains to be done by the seller, such as weighing or measuring, the title does not pass. Commercial, etc., Bank v. Gillett, 90 Ind. 268 ; Fordice v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7; 28 N. E. Eep. 303." In Burchinell v. Smidle, 5 Colo. App.417 ; 38 Pac. Eep. 1097, plaintiff bought a restaurant, and paid full considera- tion therefor. "When the bill of sale was made and the purchase price paid, the vendor went with plaintiff to the restaurant, and gave plaintiff possession, and, after notifying the help of the sale, went away, and plaintiff assumed control. Defendant's officers then came, and took possession of the place, under attachments against the vendor. The vendor's name never was on the outside of the restaurant, the only sign there being one desig- nating it "Jim's Place," and this sign had been allowed to remain as it was. The bills of fare had not been changed. It was held that there was such a change of possession as would satisfy the statute of fraud. 1 Stockwell v. Baird (Del. 1895), 31 Atl. Eep. 811. 2 Hinchman v. Lincoln (1887), 124 U. S. 38; Bushell v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442; Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428; Borrowscale v. Bosworth, 99 Mass. 378, 381; Taylor v. Mueller, 30 Minn. 343; 44 Am. Rep. 199 ; Stone v. Browning, 68 N. Y. 598; Bass v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192; Burrows v. Whit- aker, 71 N. Y. 291; Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671. ''The question in regard to what constitutes » delivery under the statute, and what constitutes an acceptance, is rather one of fact for the jury than of law for the court." Per Cole, J. 'Garfield v. Paris (1877), 96 U.S. 557; Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 285. The burden of proof to show acceptance is on the party setting up the contract. 672 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 566 But when the facts in relation to a contract of sale alleged to be within the statute are not in dispute, it belongs to the court to determine their legal effect. 1 § 566. Earnest or part payment. — Earnest and part pay- ment are two distinct things, each of which is sufficient to give validity to a parol contract under the seventeenth section of the statute. 2 Where part payment is made in order to ren- der the contract binding, it is not required that such payment shall be shown by writing. The statute leaves the parties to prove payment by such proof as they may have, but actual part payment is required. A mere agreement to pay or to ap- ply in payment is not sufficient. 3 Part payment does not re- Remick v. Sanford, 120 Mass. 309. A sale of. personal property and a re- ceipt acknowledging payment, with delivery of a portion, do not necessa- rily transfer to the vendee title in the whole property sold. The inten- tion of the parties in the delivery is to govern, and the jury must find what that was. Pratt v. Chase, 40 Maine, 269. "It is not impossible but that some of the subtle and nice distinctions raised and adopted in ref- erence to the matter of acceptance, of which Chancellor Kent complained — 2 Kent's Commentaries, 495 — and some of the apparent if not real con- fusion and conflict in the English cases since that time, might have been avoided had the question of ac- ceptance, which, in its essence, is purely a question of fact, been uni- formly sent to the jury under suitable instructions as to the law. I am sat- isfied that the most careful examina- tion of the great mass of cases, when the fact of acceptance has been deter- mined one way or the other by the court, will not result in the discovery of any uniform rule ; that such exami- nation can be little more useful or sat- isfactory than the examination of a thousand verdicts relating to the same subject-matter, together with the r ■ i- dence upon which they were found." Per Ladd, J., in Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600. 1 Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49; Norman v. Phillips, 14 M. & W. 277; Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Aid. 321; Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Aid. 630; Carter v. Toussaint, 5 B. & Aid. 855 ; Hanson v. Armitage, 5 B. & Aid. 557; Thompson v. Maceroni, 3 B. & C. 1; Holmes v. Hoskins, 9 Ex. 753; Hunt v. Hecht, 8 Ex. 814; Coombs v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co., 3 H. & N. 510. 2 The practice of giving something to signify the conclusion of the con- tract, sometimes a sum of money, sometimes a ring or other object, to be repaid or redelivered on the com- pletion of the contract, appears to be one of great antiquity. It was fa- miliar to the law of Rome and was an old common law mode of binding a bargain to show that the parties were "in earnest." Howe v. Smith (1884), L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 89; Blenkin- sop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597. 3 Dow v. Worthen (1864), 37 Vt. 108; Edgerton v. Hodge (1869), 41 Vt. 676; Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMa- hon (1876), 38 N. J. Law, 536. "The object was to have something pass between the parties besides mere words." Artcher v. Zeh, 5 Hill. 200. § 567 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 673 quire the actual passing of money from the vendee to the ven- dor. The giving of a check is not absolute payment, but when it is received as such, and is afterwards paid, it becomes a good and valid payment as of the time when it was given. 1 The payment may be made in property or in the discharge of an existing debt, in whole or in part, due from the vendor to the purchaser. 2 In the latter case the agreement must be car- ried into effect by some act which shall be obligatory upon the purchaser, and enable the vendor to enforce the contract of sale. The note should be delivered up and canceled, or if not fully paid, an indorsement should be made upon it in writing, which shall operate effectually as an extinguishment pro tanto. Or if the money is to be applied to pay an open account, in whole or in part, the creditor and purchaser should part with some written evidence of such application, which shall bind him and put it into the power of his debtor and vendor to en- force the contract. This, or something like this, is necessary to bring the case within the statute. 3 § 567. Auctioneer's sale. — A sale by auction is within the statute, and the auctioneer, who makes the sale, is the agent of In Walker v. Nussey, 16 M. & W. hands of a third party as a forfeiture 302 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 120, it was verbally to be paid over to the party who was agreed that the debt which the ven- ready to perform the contract, if the dee owed the vendor of four pounds other party neglected to do so, it was and over should go in part payment held that the deposit was not an for leather. It was contended that the earnest to bind the bargain, nor part credit on the invoice was sufficient to payment, within the statute that take the case out of the statute, but it earnest was regarded as a part pay- was held not. "Where one of the ment of the price. Howe v. Hay- terms of an oral bargain is for the ward (1871), 108 Mass. 54. To the same seller to take something in part pay- effect, Noakes v. Morey, 30 Ind. 103. ment, that term can not alone be A pecuniary deposit upon a purchase equivalent to part- payment." PerAl- is to be considered as a payment in derson, B. part of the purchase-money and not 1 Hunter v. Wetsell, 17 Hun, 135. as a mere pledge. Ockenden v. Hen- 2 Dow i'. Worthen, 37 Vt. 108; Bra- ly, E. B. & E. 485. The question as bin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 519. to the right of the purchaser to the re- 3 Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 519. turn of the deposit money must, in Where parties made an oral contract each case, be a question of the condi- for the sale of property and each of tions of the contract. Howe v. Smith them deposited the sum of $200 in the (1884), L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 89. 43 674 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §§ 568, 569 both parties, and has authority to sign the promise, contract, or agreement, or a memorandum or note thereof, for the party to be charged therewith. 1 The actual agreement is constituted by the bidding on the one part, and acceptance of it by the auctioneer on the other; the auctioneer is the agent for the vendor in setting up the property for sale, in receiving the bid- dings for it, and accepting that of the highest bidder, and -thus concluding the bargain. He is agent for the highest bidder in recording his bidding. 2 § 568. Judicial sales. — Judicial sales are not within the statute, and are binding upon the purchaser without any writ- ten contract or memorandum of the terms of sale. The sale is made by the court, through the sheriff acting as its officer. The sheriff in such a case is under no duty to bind himself per- sonally, or to demand that the bidder shall be bound to him personally. By bidding he subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and in effect becomes a party to the proceeding, and he may be compelled to complete his purchase by an order of the court, and by its process for contempt, if necessary. 3 § 569. Form of the memorandum. — The form of the memo- randum is not material so long as it complies with the require- ment of the statute. 4 But the writing must within itself, or by a reference to other writings, state the whole contract so clearly that parol proof is not required to ascertain what it is. 5 The 1 Morton v. Dean, 13 Mete. 385; Da- N. Y. 567; Hegeman *. Johnson, 35 vis v. Rowell, 2 Pick. 64; Cleaves v. Barb. 200; Cazet v. Hubbell, 36 N. Y. Foss, 4 Greenl. 1 ; McComb v. Wright, 677 ; Miller v. Collyer, 36 Barb. 250 4 John. Ch. 659; Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. Matter of Davis, 7 Daly (N. Y.),l & Ad. 443; Hicks v. Whitmore, 12 Emley v. Drumm, 36 Pa. St. 123 Wend. 548; O'Donnell v. Leeman King v. Gunnison, 4 Pa. St. 171 ; War- (1857), 43 Maine, 158; Emmerson v. field?). Dorsey, 39 Md. 299; Armstrong Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38; Pike v. Balch, -u. Yroman, 11 Minn. 220; Halleck v. 38 Maine, 302; Blagden v. Bradbear, Guy, 9 Cal. 181 ; Fulton v. Moore, 25 12 Ves. 466; Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mas. Pa. St. 468; Attorney General v. Day, 0. C. 414; Ken worthy v. Schofield, 2 1 Ves. Sen. 218. B. & C. 945, overruling Simon v. Meti- 4 Clason v. Bailey, 14 John. 484. vier, 1 Wm. Bl. 599. 5 North v. Mendel (1884), 73 Ga. 400; 2 Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Ired. Cushman v. Burritt (1882), 14 N. Y. 590. Week. Dig. 59; Wright i;.Weeks(1862), 3 Andrews v. O'Mahoney (1889), 112 25 N. Y. 153 ; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 John. §569 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 675 note or memorandum of the contract is not the contract itself but the evidence by which it is to be proved, and may be made later than the contract. 1 A receipt acknowledging the purchase- money is sufficient, if it contains the requisites to constitute it valid evidence of an agreement. 2 A bill of parcels, although not the contract itself, may amount to a note or memorandum of the contract within the meaning of the statute. 8 Any document signed by the party to be charged containing the terms of the contract will suffice, as a letter to a third party, a will, or an affidavit in a different matter. 4 An entry in its book of minutes of a resolution passed by the governing or legislative body of a municipal corporation, expressing the terms of a contract signed by the clerk, is held a satisfactory compliance with the statute. 5 An auctioneer is, as we have seen, deemed the agent of both parties, and his memorandum, entered in his own book, is taken to be a memorandum in writing, binding upon both parties, because by them respectively authorized. 6 399; Buck u.Pickwell, 27 Vt. 157; Watt D.Wisconsin Cranberry Co. (1884), 63 Iowa, 730; Fry v. Piatt, 32 Kan. 62. "The meaning of the statute is, to re- duce contracts to a certainty, in order to avoid perjury on the one hand and fraud on the other; and, therefore both in this court and the courts of common law, where an agreement has been reduced to such a certainty, and the substance of the statute has been complied with in the material part, the forms have never been insisted upon." Lord Hardwicke in Welford v. Beazely, 3 Atk. 503. 1 Williams v. Robinson, 73 Maine, 186; Johnson v. Trinity Church Soc, 11 Allen, 123: "If the original con- tract was itself in writing signed by both parties, that would be the bind- ing instrument, and no subsequent memorandum signed by one party could have any effect." Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 102; Parton v. Crofts, 33 L. J. E. C. P. 189. 1 Evans v. Prothero, 1 De G. M. & G. 572 ; Camp v. Moreman, 84 Ky . 635 ; Voorheis v. Eiting (Ky. 1893), 22 S.W. Eep. 80. 3 Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238. 4 hire Hoyle (1893), L. B. 1 Ch. 84; Coothfj. Jackson, 6Ves. Jr. 12; Bark- worth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 153 (affidavit) ; Gibson v. Holland, L. E. 1 C. P. 1, where the subject is fully considered ; Peabody u.Speyers (1874), 56 N. Y. 230. 5 Argus Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 55 N.Y. 495 ; Chase ». Lowell, 7 Gray, 33 (record of a resolution of city council) ; Tufts v. Plymouth, etc., Co., 14 Allen, 407 (record of votes sufficient to bind corporation). In Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653, the defend- ant made the note of the sale in his own book, and got the agent of the plaintiff to sign it and the defendant retained the book, held sufficient memorandum. 6 Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502. So also, in the case of a broker, Cod- dington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436. See also, § 567, supra. 676 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 570 § 570. The contents of the memorandum. — The memoran- dum must contain within itself, or by some reference to other written evidence, the names of the vendor and vendee, and all the essential terms and conditions of the contract, expressed with such reasonable certainty that they may be understood from the memorandum and other written evidence referred to without aid from parol testimony. 1 No more particular de- scription is necessary under the statute in a contract for the sale of real estate, than in one relating to personal property. In each, to constitute a bargain and sale, or a contract which will be specifically enforced in equity, the subject-matter there- of must be identified. 2 Where the only writings consisted in correspondence between the defendant and the agent of the plaintiff, and the only description of the land was in a letter from the plaintiff's agent to the defendant in which it was called "your land," the correspondence was held insufficient as it did not disclose what land nor where it was situated. 3 The time and place of delivery are material stipulations in contracts for the purchase and delivery of chattels, and when stipulated must appear in the memorandum. But if the time and place are not agreed upon the memorandum will be construed as a contract for delivery in a reasonable time and at the vendor's customary place. 4 The memorandum is fatally defective if it 'Williams v. Robinson, 73 Maine, N. H. 157; Wheeler v. Collier, Moo 186; Smiths. Shell (1884), 82 Mo. 215; & M. 123; Champion v. Plummer, 1 52 Am. Rep. 365; Parkhurst v. Van Bos. & P. N. R. 252; Anderson*, Cortlandt, 1 John. Ch. 273; Abel v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399. Radcliff, 13 John. 297 (an agreement 2 Hurley *. Brown, 98 Mass. 545 to lease land without specifying for Sherer v. Trowbridge, 135 Mass. 500 what term held void for uncertainty) ; Whelan v. Sullivan, 102 Mass. 204 Brown v. Whipple (1877), 58 N. H. Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444 229; Williams v. Morris, 95 TJ. S. 444; Bishop v. Fletcher, 48 Mich. 555 Gault v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636. "It Pierson v. Ballard, 32 Minn. 263 must contain the essential elements of Scarritt v. St. John's Church, 7 Mo the contract, expressed with such de- App. 174; Webster v. Clark, 60 N. H gree of certainty that it may be un- 36 ; Ferguson v. Staver, 33 Pa. St. 411 derstood without recourse to parol evi- Johnson v. Granger, 51 Texas, 42 dence to show the intention of the Sharlow v. Cotterell, 20 L. R. Ch parties." Browne on Statute of Frauds, Div. 90. § 371. The names of the parties must 3 Taylor v. Allen (1889), 40 Minn appear. Coddingtons. Goddard (1860), 433. 16 Gray, 436; Grafton v. Cummings, 'Smith v. Shell (1884), 82 Mo. 215 99 U. S. 100; Sherburne v. Shaw, 1 § 571 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 677 does not disclose the price, as that is an essential ingredient in the contract of sale. 1 But where no price is fixed upon, aeon- tract may be complete and binding, and the law will infer that the parties intended a reasonable price. 2 Where an auctioneer entered in his sales book the names of the vendor and pur- chaser, the subject-matter of the sale and the amount of the purchase-money, but omitted any reference to the particulars or conditions subject to which the sale was made, the memo- randum was held insufficient. 8 A memorandum written by a broker employed to make the purchase containing the sub- stance of the agreement, thus: "February 29, bought for Isaac Clason, of Bailey and Voorhees, three thousand bushels of good merchantable rye, deliverable from 5th to 15th of April next, at one dollar per bushel, and payable on deliv- ery" is sufficient. Here are the names of the parties, the sub- ject-matter of the sale, the time of delivery, the price, and the time of payment, and the fact stated that a sale had been made.* § 571. The same subject continued. — Under the Indiana statute of frauds it is essential that the note or memorandum of a contract of bargain and sale of goods shall contain within itself a description of the property agreed to be sold, by which J Blagden ■». Bradbear, 12 Vea. 466; The writing was defective in two re- Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685 ; Parkhurst spects. It did not locate the land nor v. Van Oortlandt, 1 John. Ch. 273; name the price, and extrinsic evi- Holmes v. Evans, 48 Miss. 247 ; Ash- dence could not supply the data for croft v. Butterworth (1884), 136 Mass. there was no foundation in the writ- 511; Phelps o. Stillings (1881), 60 N. ing to place it upon. Barickman v. H.505. Kuykendall, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 21; 2 Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837; Ace- Banks v. Harris Mfg. Co. (1884), 20 balu. Levy, 10 Bing. 376; Hoadly v. Fed. Rep. 667, where the traveling McLaine, 10 Bing. 482 ; Norton v. Gale agent of the defendant addressed to (1880), 95111. 533 (arbitration). his principals an order, "Send to O. s Eishtoni). Whatmore (1878), L. E. W. S. Banks; terms, net 30 days; 8Ch. D. 467 ; Kenworthy v. Schofield, freight allowed," signed by him as 2 B. & 0.945; Pierce v. Corf, L. E. 9 agent and followed by a list of the Q, B. 210. merchandise desired, with prices and 4 Clason v. Bailey, 14 John. 484. A directions for shipping signed by the memorandum as follows : "Eeceived, plaintiff. It was held that the paper the 18th of December, 1837, of J. H. was, upon its face, merely an order, $500 in full for one hundred acres of and not a memorandum of sale signed land, in part payment," and signed by the defendant or his agent, by the defendant, was held insufficient. 678 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. §571 it can be known or identified, of the price to be paid for it, of the party who sells it, and of the party who buys it. It is set- tled to be indispensable that the written memorandum should show, not only who is the person to be charged, but also who is the party in whose favor he is charged. 1 1 Peoria Sugar Co. v. Babcock Co. (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 892, in this case a memorandum in the form: "2/17. 15 cars mx. glucose, $1.17> 2 . Our guar- antee price. Shipment: Feby., March. L. J. E. Peoria Grape Sugar Co." — is insufficient to sustain an action under the Indiana statute of frauds, provid- ing that no contract of sale of goods, over $50 in value, shall be valid un- less some note or memorandum in writing is made and signed by the party to be charged, such memoran- dum failing to disclose the name of one party to the contract, and being indefinite as to the quantity of glucose, and the price. Baker, J., said: "The name of the party to be charged is required by the statute to be signed, so that there can be no question of the necessity of his name in the writing. But the authorities have equally established that the name, or a suffi- cient description, of the other party is indispensable, because without it no contract is shown, inasmuch as a stipulation or promise by one does not bind him, save only to the person to whom the promise was made, and, until that person's name is shown, it is impossible to say that the writing contains a memorandum of the bar- gain. In Grafton v. Oummings, 99 TJ. S. 100, 107, it appeared that the purchaser of property at auction signed an agreement which did not mention the name of the seller. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, say: 'The statute not only requires that the agreement on which the action is brought, or some memoran- dum thereof, shall be signed by the party to be charged, but that the agreement or memorandum shall be in writing. In an agreement of sale there can be no contract without both a vendor and a vendee. There can be no purchase without a seller. There must be a sufficient description of the thing sold and of the price to be paid for it. It is, therefore, an essential element of a contract in writing that it shall contain within itself a description of the thing sold, by which it can be known or identi- fied, of the price to be paid for it, of the party who sells it, and the party who buys it. * * * The name of the vendor, or some designation of him which could be recognized with- out parol proof extraneous to the instrument, was an essential part of that instrument to its validity.' In Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen, 474, the contract was to deliver to plaintiff certain iron. Bigelow, C. J., said: 'It is urged that the paper doe^s not disclose which of the parties is the purchaser and which is the seller, and that no purchaser is in fact named in the paper. This would he a fatal objection, if well founded. There can be no valid memorandum of a contract which does not show who are the contracting parties.' In the case of Eidgway v. Ingram, 50 Ind. 145, the requisites of the note or memorandum in writing referred to in the statute of frauds were consid- ered by the court, and it was there said by Worden, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, that: 'A memo- randum in order to be sufficient within the statute, must state the contract with such reasonable certainty that its terms may be understood from the §572 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 679 § 572. Sale of realty in Texas and Kentucky— The mem- orandum. — The Texas statute provides that no action shall be brought in any of the courts upon any contract for the sale of real estate, unless the promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party charged therewith, or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized. 1 Tha memorandum required must contain all the essential terms of the agreement, so that parol evidence shall not be required to supply any substantive feature which has been omitted. It must embrace the substance of the contract, though it need not describe its terms in a complete and detailed manner. If what the parties have really assented to can be gathered from the writing, and is not left to the recollection of witnesses, it is sufficient. 2 But a paper acknowledging receipt from the husband of the signers' deceased mother of a specified sum in full payment and satisfaction of the amount due them from their mother's estate, is not sufficient as a memorandum, with- writing itself, without recourse to parol proof.' The case of Lee v. Hills, 66 Ind. 474, involved a counter- claim founded upon a memorandum in writing. The counter-claim was for the recovery of damages for the fail- ure to deliver certain personal prop- erty sold by the plaintiff to the defend- ant. It was alleged that by the mutual mistake of the parties, the word 'sold' was omitted from before the name of the counter-claimant. It was held that the memorandum, the word 'sold ' being omitted, was not a note or memorandum in writing of the bargain within the meaning of the statute of frauds, and that parol evidence was not admissible to sup- ply the omitted word in the memoran- dum. The case of AVilstach v. Heyd, 122 Ind. 574; 23 N. E. Rep. 963, was an action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a contract for the sale of a lot evidenced by a memoran- dum in writing. The memorandum of sale was as follows : '$200. New Albany, April 23d, 1887. Received of J. B. Wilstach two hundred dol- lars as part purchase-money of a lot at $2,560. Balance twenty-three hun- dred and sixty dollars. Geo. Heyd, Admr. Est. Jacob Heyd.' And there were indorsed on the reverse side these words: 'The lot No. 14 Ekin ave.' It was held that the memoran- dum was insufficient." 1 Texas Revised Statutes, art. 2464. 2 Pomeroy on Specific Performance, § 85 ; Watson v. Baker, 71 Texas, 739 ; 9 S. W. Rep. 867 ; Johnson v. Granger, 51 Texas, 42; Peters v. Phillips, 19 Texas, 70; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 371 ; Reed on Statute of Frauds, 392 ; Parkhurst v. Van Cort- landt, 1 Johns. Ch. 274; Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444 ; Pipkin v. James, 1 Humph. 327; Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227; 26 Am. Dec. 657; Joseph v. Holt, 37 Cal. 250; Ham v. Johnson, 55 Minn. 115; 56 N. W. Rep. 584; Clipson v. Villars, 151 111. 165; 37 N. E. Rep. 695. 680 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §572 in the statute of frauds, of a contract of sale of their interest in land inherited from their mother. 1 A contract for the sale of real estate, signed only by the vendor, which is sufficient, under the Kentucky statute, to bind him, will support an action against the vendee for the purchase price, although he has not signed the contract. 8 1 Munk v. Weidner (Texas App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 409, Neill, J.. " No contract, agreement or promise to sell land, or anything else, appears from the instrumeut. If any was made between the parties, it rests en- tirely upon parol, for no evidence of it is found in the receipt." 2 Moore i'.Chenault(Ky. App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 140, Paynter, J. : "The vendor is the party vested with title. It is he who can assume a liability which will compel him to convey the title to the property to the vendee. It is he alone who can sign such writing as will divest him of title. The law intended him to be protected in his right to his property until he volun- tarily disposed of it by a writing. It did not intend that he should be placed in the power of perjurers, to take it from him by proving a parol sale. It is the vendor who is 'to be charged' with the contract of sale. To make the vendee liable for the pur- chase-money, when the contract of sale is in writing, it is not necessary for him to sign any obligation to pay the price of the land. The only con- tract the vendee could be expected to sign, in such a transaction, would be an obligation to pay the price of the land. Suppose the vendee, in this case, had signed the writing exhibited. It would simply be evidencing by a writing a liability which the law had imposed the instant the contract of sale was made, and the necessary writing executed by the vendor. Such signing would not have lessened or increased his liability. Neither could it have added to or diminished that of the vendor. To do so was wholly un- necessary, to take the case out of the statute. In the case of Ellis v. Dead- man, 4 Bibb, 466, this court held that a receipt for part of the purchase- money, signed by the vendor, specify- ing the terms of sale, would have been such a memorandum of the agreement as would have taken the case out of the provision of the statute. In the more recent case of Tyler v. Onzts, 93 K) r . 331 ; 20 S. W. Rep. 256, this court announced the same doctrine, holding that either party could maintain an action on a receipt for purchase-money signed by the vendor alone, specifying the term of contract. In the case of Lewis v. Grimes, 7. J. J. Marsh. 336, the ven- dor, Lewis, alone, had signed the writing evidencing the sale. The con- tract price was $2,000, but for which the vendee, Grimes, had executed no obligation. The action was to recover the purchase-money. The vendee re- lied upon the statute. The court held that the vendor was entitled to re- cover, and, among other things, said : 'See 2 Saunders on Pleading and Evi- dence, 903 ; and such seems to have been virtually the decision of this court in the case of McDowel v. Delap, 2 A. K. Marsh. 33. That was an action of assumpsit by a vendor of land against his vendee for the price. The defendant succeeded, as he ought to have done, because there was no written memorial of the sale, and be- cause, therefore, there was no legal consideration for the promise to pay the stipulated price. But in the opinion delivered this court said that, as the contract of sale was not obligatory on §573 THE STATUTE OF KKAUDS. 681 § 573. What is a sufficient memorandum in other states. — Where the memorandum executed by defendant described the lots, acknowledged the receipt of the money as part of the pur- chase price, and declared the trust and the taking of the title by defendant, it was held, that recovery by plaintiff was not prevented by the statute of frauds. 1 And where an agent, who the plaintiff, such an agreement was consequently not a sufficient or valid consideration for the promise on the part of the defendant, and also that it was certainly necessary to produce in evidence some memorandum in writing of the agreement signed by the plaintiff, or some one duly author- ized by him. Here is a plain in- timation that if the plaintiff, who was the vendor, had been bound by a proper memorandum in writing, he could have maintained assumpsit against the vendee for the promised price, even though the defendant had signed no memorandum in writing; and the record in the case of Hopkins v. Alvis,2A.K. Marsh. 374, shows that the same point was involved, and was necessarily decided judicially and ex- pressly in the same way.' " 1 Waterbury v. Fisher, 5 Colo. App. 362; 38 Pac. Rep. 846, Reed, J.: "The memorandum executed by the party to be charged, describes the property; admits the receipt of the money as part of the purchase price ; declares the trust and the taking of the title. It is true it does not state the cost of the property, nor the pro- portion the amount paid bore to the whole purchase price, but it did state the amount for which he was charge- able. The memorandum made the transaction an express trust. Without the memorandum the law would have made it a resulting trust, that could have been established by parol. See Knox v. McFarran, 4 Colo. 586; Learned v. Tritch, 6 Colo. 440 ; Lips- comb v. Nichols, 6 Colo. 290; Kayser v. Maugham, 8 Colo. 232 ; 6 Pac. Rep. 803 ; Meagher v. Reed, 14 Colo. 335 ; 24 Pac. Rep. 681. We think the mem- orandum sufficient to establish the trust, under the statute of frauds, and that the party seeking to enforce it, with the written memorandum, should not, by reason of the statute, be placed in a worse position than if there had been no written acknowledgment. The object of the statute was to prevent frauds, not to allow a party to perpe- trate them, shielded by the statute. See Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 445 Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469 Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De Gex & J. 16 Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208. As was clearly said by Lord Alvanley in Den- ton v. Davies, 18 Ves. 499 : 'It is not required by statute that a trust should be created by a writing, * * * but that there should be evidence in writ- ing proving that there was such a trust.' Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 447 ; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex F. & J. 139. Proof of the trust may be made by letters and informal docu- ments, and parol evidence admitted to apply them. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696 ; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G.,F.& J. 139 ; Certainly, under the authorities, the writing was sufficient to establish the existence of the trust." In Nugent v. Smith (1893), 85 Maine, 433, it is held that a memorandum in writing of the following form is sufficient, within the statute of frauds: "Bath, April 10, 1890. Mary E. Nugent bought of Frances B. Smith, house and land on Winter street, number 21, owned and occupied by said Frances B. Smith, 682 THE STATUTE OF FKAUDS. §574 was orally appointed by a married woman with her husband's sanction, purchased land at auction, and the auctioneer made a memorandum in his book of the purchaser's name and terms of sale, the purchase is binding on the woman, as the transac- tion is not within the statute of frauds. 1 § 574. Whether the memorandum must show the considera- tion. — The rule was for the first time announced in England, in Wain v. Warlters, 2 that the memorandum must contain the lor one thousand dollars. Paid one hundred dollars on account. Frances B. Smith." 1 Moore v. Taylor, 81 Md. 644 ; 32 Atl. Kep. 320, Bryan, J.: "The written agreement which the heirs made for a sale by auction was valid and compe- tent. A question is made as to the binding effect of the purchase upon Mrs. Jenifer, she being a married woman. The fourth section of the Statute of frauds enacts that contracts for the sale of land shall be in writing and 'signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person there- unto by him lawfully authorized.' A marked difference is to be noted between the language thus used and that of the first section, in which it is required that certain estates in land shall be made or created by writing 'signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writ- ing.' The text-books and decided cases have directed particular atten- tion to this difference between the two sections, and to its necessary con- sequences. Browne on the Statute of Frauds states the result of the cases to be that the agent for signing may, in all the cases enumerated in the fourth section, be appointed without writing, unless the memorandum to be signed is to be sealed also, in which case the power must be conferred by an instrument of equal dignity. Section 370a. And when at a public sale land is knocked down to the highest bidder by the auctioneer, it is conclusively settled that he becomes the agent of both buyer and seller, and that the memorandum required by the statute of frauds is complete when he makes in his book an entry of the purchaser's name and the terms of sale. Sing- stack's Bx'rs v. Harding, 4 Har. & J. 186; Ijams v. Hoffman, 1 Md. 423; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 351. Longnecker was the agent of Mrs. Jenifer and Mrs. Taylor to bid for this land, appointed by the sanction of Mrs. Jenifer's husband. He bid it off for them, and the memorandum in writing was duly made by the auc- tioneer. Nothing more is required to make the contract of sale binding un- der the statute of frauds." 2 Wain v. Warlters (1804), 5 East, 10. The agreement in that case was as follows: "Messrs. Wain & Co.. I will engage to pay you by half past four this day fifty-six pounds and expenses on bill that amount on Hall. (Signed) John "Warl- ters, and dated No. 2 Cornhill. April 30, 1803. Lord Ellenborough said: "And indeed it seems necessary for effectuating the object of the statute that the consideration should be set down in writing as well as the prom- ise, for otherwise the consideration might be illegal, or the promise might have been made upon a condition precedent, which the party charged may not afterward be able to prove, §574 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 683 consideration for the promise, and was based mainly upon the assumption that the word "agreement" was used in its strict legal, and not in its popular sense. 1 This rule has been fol- lowed in England in a long series of cases. 2 In the courts in this country there has been a contrariety of opinion upon this point, depending to some extent upon the language of the statutes in the different states. In some states the statute ex- pressly provides that the consideration need not appear in the memorandum, while in others the statute requires the consid- eration to appear. 8 The weight of American authority would seem to preponderate against the rule, even where the con- struction depends on the legal meaning of the word "agree- ment."* The words "for value received" sufficiently express the omission of which would mate- rially vary the promise by turning that into an absolute promise which was only a conditional one." 2 Smith's Leading Cases, Wain v. Warl- ters, 5 East, 10. 1 Osborne v. Baker (1885), 34 Minn. 307. Lawrence, J., said, in Wain v. Warlters, 5 East, 10: "If the question had arisen merely on the first part of the clause, I conceive that it would only have been necessary that the promise should have been stated in writing ; but it goes on to direct that no person shall be charged on such promise, unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof — that is, of the agreement — be in writ- ing ; which shows that the word agree- ment was meant to be used in a sense different from promise, and that some- thing besides the mere promise was required to be stated. And, as the consideration for the promise is part of the agreement, that ought also to be stated in writing." 2 Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & Aid. 595; Jenkins v. Reynolds, 3 Brod. & Bing. 14; Morley v. Boothley, 3 Bing. 107; Hawes v. Armstrong, 1 Bing. N. C. 761 ; Cole v. Dyer, 1 Cro. & Jer. 461; James v. Williams, 3 Nev. & Man. 196; Clancy v. Piggott, 4 Nev. & Man. 496 ; Raikes v. Todd, 8 Adol. & Ell. 846; Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & Gr. 452. But by statutes 19 and 20 Vic, c. 97 (1856), a memorandum of a guaranty need not state the consid- eration. Holmes v. Durkee, 1 Ca- babe & E. 23. 8 It was held, in Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142, that the reasoning of the judges in the cases in which they had decided that the consideration ought to be in writing turned upon the word "agreement," and that this reasoning did not apply where the word "promise" was introduced. 4 Britton v. Angier, 48 N. H. 420 ; Davis v. Tift (1883), 70 Ga. 52; Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Reed v. Ev- ans, 17 Ohio, 128; Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292; Smith v. Ide, 3 Vt. 290; Thornburg v. Masten (1883), 88 N. C. 293; Fulton v. Robinson, 55 Texas, 401; Landers v. Barlow (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 836. Contra, Hutton v. Padgett, 26 Md. 228; Nichols v. Al- len, 23 Minn. 542; Drake v. Seaman (1884), 97 N. Y. 230 (an elaborate dis- cussion of the present New York law). The states of Illinois, Indi- ana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachu- setts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jer- 684 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §575 the consideration to amount to a compliance with the require- ments of the law. This seems to be so, both in those states whose statute expressly requires the consideration to be ex- pressed and in those whose courts follow the doctrine of Wain v. Warlters. 1 § 575. Correspondence as evidence of the contract.-^The principle is well established that a complete contract binding under the statute may be gathered from letters, writings and telegrams between the parties relating to the subject-matter of the contract, and so connected with each other that they may be fairly said to constitute one paper relating to the contract. 2 sey, and Virginia provide that the consideration need not be stated. Stimson's American Statute Law, § 4142. 1 5 East, 10 ; Osborne v. Baker (1885) , 34 Minn. 307 ; Miller v. Cook, 23 K Y. 495, and cases cited ; Dahlman v. Ham- mel, 45 Wis. 466; Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413; Edelen v. Gough, 5 Gill. 103; Brooks v. Morgan, 1 Harrington (Del.), 123; Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Maine, 394 ; Lapham v. Barrett, 1 Vt. 247 ; McMorris v. Herndon, 2 Bailey L. (S.C.) 56. The text-writers also gener- ally state the law to be that the words "for value received" sufficiently ex- press the consideration. 3 Parsons on Contracts, 16 ; Brandt on Suretyship, § 84 ; Daniel on Negotiable Instru- ments, § 1767 ; Baylies on Sureties, 87. It has been held that, if the consider- ation expressed was a fictitious one, it was sufficient. Happe v. Stout, 2 Cal. 460. 2 Ryan v. United States (1889), 136 U. S. 68; Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289, 292-; Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 250; Case v. Hastings, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 125 ; Long v. Millar, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 450, 456; Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; Sahdilands v. Marsh, 2 Barn. & Aid. 673 ; Gaston v. Frankum, 2 DeG. & S. 561 ; Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444; Byrne v. Mar- shall, 44 Ala. 355 ; Esmay v. Gorton, 18 111.483; Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind. 1; O'Donnell v. Leeman, 43 Maine, 158; Druryu. Young, 58 Md. 546; Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227; Packard v. Put- man, 57 N. H. 43 ; Wright v. Weeks, 25 N. Y. 153; Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230; Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100 ; Freeland v. Ritz (1891), 154 Mass. 257 ; Peck u.Vandemark, 99 N.Y. 29; Louisville Asphalt, etc., Co. v. Lorick, 29 S. C. 533; Fitzmaurice v. Bayley, 9 H. L. Cas. 78; Baumann v. James, L. R.3 Ch. 508 ; Shardlow r.Cot- terell, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 280; L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 90 ; Studds v. Watson, 28 Ch. Div. 305; Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. Div. 205. Where parties negotiated for the exchange of certain real estate and defendant was to pay a sum agreed upon as the difference in the values of the land to be exchanged, the receipt and the check held to con- stitute the contract. Raubitschek o. Blank (1880), 80N. Y. 478. A telegram properly identified is equivalent to a letter. McBlain i\ Cross, 25 Law T. R. (N. S.) 804; Murphy v. Thompson, 28 IT. C. C. P. 233; Coupland v. Arrow- smith, 18 Law T. R. (N. S.) 755: Dil- worth v. Bostwick, 1 Sweeny (N. Y.), 581 ; Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., 18 U. C. Q. B. 60. "We must look, I §576 THE STATUTE OP FRAUDS. 685 § 576. Bought and sold notes — "Slip contracts." — The bought and sold notes of a broker, when they correspond and state all the terms of the bargain, are held to be a sufficient memorandum. 1 " Slip contracts " in the form prescribed by the rules and regulations of the New York Cotton Exchange, showing upon their face that the purchasers named therein bought cotton, stating the quantity sold, the price, the name of purchasers and the sellers, the latter designated by fictitious names, were held to satisfy the statute. Parol evidence is ad- missible to show who are the parties represented by the ficti- tious names for whose account the sales were made. 2 think, in the case of each communica- tion, at the papers delivered by the party who sent the message, not at the transcript of the message taken through the wire at the other end of the wire, with all the chances of mis- takes in apprehending and noting the signals and in transcribing for de- livery," per Robinson, C. J. "Suydam v. Clark, 2 Sandf. 133; Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. 459 ; Davis ». Shields, 26 Wend. 341 ; Parton v. Crofts (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 189; Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. 436; Gregson v. Ruck, 4 Q. B. 737 ; Greeley Bernham Co. v. Capen (1886), 23 Mo. App. 301 ; Sievewright v. Archibald, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 286; 17 Q. B. 103, where the subject was elaborately dis- cussed. There was a discrepancy in that case between the bought and sold notes. The diversity was held to avoid the contract. It has been fre- quently said by English judges that brokers' bought and sold notes were in their origin merely copies of the entries in their books, per Lord Ellen- borough, in Heyman v. Neale, 2 Camp, 337; per Abbott, C. J., in Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C. -36; per Lord Campbell, in Sievewright v. Archibald (1851), 17 Q. B. 103; but this view is not adopted by Blackburn (Blackburn on Sale, 86) . Bought and sold notes are not peculiar to brokers. They appear to be in familiar use in England between buyer and seller, where no broker intervenes, the seller delivering to the buyer a sold note and the buyer delivering to the seller a bought note. Buxton v. Rust, L. R. 7 Ex. 1 ; Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 7 M. & G. 882; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B.&C. 360. When a broker intervenes he does for the parties respectively what each would otherwise do for himself, that is, he makes out and signs a sold note on behalf of the sel- ler, and a bought note on behalf of the buyer. Moore v. Campbell, 10 Ex. 323. In one important particular a bought or sold note made by a broker seems to differ from one delivered by buyer to seller directly or vice versa, viz.. that while the former can seldom or never be more than a memorandum of a verbal contract, the latter may be a contract in writing. Langdell's Cases on Sales, Index, 1036, 1037. 2 Bibb v. Allen (1893), 149 TJ. S.481. The slip contracts were in the follow- ing form : "New York, Nov. 10, 1886. — B. 10, ac. Albert ; 10 ac. Alexander ; 5 ac. Andrew. Seller, , Buyer, Zerega & White. On contract subject to rules and regulations of New York Cotton Exchange,twenty-five hundred bales of cotton. Jan. 1 delivery ; price 8.99. Per Z. and White, seven- ty-five." 686 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. §577 § 577. Insufficient -writings to take contract out of statute. — While two or more papers, executed as parts of one transac- tion involving the sale of personal property, which was not delivered or paid for, may be construed together to ascertain whether the transaction is within the statute of frauds, under the Iowa code, providing that no evidence of a contract for the sale of personalty is competent, where the property is not de- livered nor paid for, unless it be in writing, evidence of the contract, not found in the writing, can not be supplied by parol. And a dated list of personal property, showing merely the price of each item thereof, and signed by the agent of the seller only, in connection with a letter from the seller to the buyer, giving the terms upon which the goods will be shipped, is not sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. 1 rule that the evidence necessary to take a contract out of the statute of frauds must all be furnished by the writings, parol evidence not being ad- missible to supply evidence not found in them. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 268; Watt v. Wisconsin Cranberry Co., 63 Iowa, 730; 18 N. W. Rep. 898; Vaughan v. Smith, 58 Iowa, 553 ; 12 N. W. Rep. 604; 3 Phillipps on Evi- dence, 351 ; 8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 722. A memorandum of sale in some respects similar to the first of the two papers we have copied was con- sidered in Salmon, etc., Manufactur- ing Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446, and held sufficient with parol evidence to take the case out of the statute. The doctrine of that case was ques- tioned in Grafton v. Cummings, 99 IT. S. 100, and does not appear to be supported by the weight of authority. However that may be, it is not con- trolling in this state. Our statute pro- vides that no evidence of contracts such as that alleged in this case is competent unless it be in writing, and signed by the party charged, or by his lawfully authorized agent. The first writing we have set out as written in the order book of the defendants. 1 American Oak Leather Co. v. Por- ter (Iowa, 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 658, Robinson, J.: "Section 3663 of the code is as follows: 'Except when otherwise specially provided, no evi- dence of the contracts enumerated in the next succeeding section is com- petent unless it be in writing and signed by the party charged or by his lawfully authorized agent.' Among the contracts enumerated in the next succeeding section are 'those in rela- tion to the sale of personal property, when no part of the property is deliv- ered and no part of the price is paid.' None of the personal property in con- troversy in this action was delivered, and no part of the price has been paid. It is the general rule that two or more papers which have been executed as parts of one transaction may be read and construed together, in order to ascertain the scope and effect of the transaction, and ascertain whether it is within the statute of frauds. Lee v. Mahoney, 9 Iowa, 344 ; Myers v. Mun- son, 65 Iowa, 423 ; 21 N. W.' 759; Sal- mon, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446 ; Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289; Olson v. Sharpless, 53 Minn. 91 ; 55 N.W. Rep. 125. It is also the general §578 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 687 § 578. The signature. — Much liberality has been used in re- gard to this requirement of the statute. 1 The signature is held valid and binding, 'though made with the initials of the party only, and parol evidence is admissible to explain and apply them. 2 The statute is satisfied by the mark of the person to be charged, or any figure or designation, if the party affixing in- tends to be bound thereby. 3 It is not even essential that the party to be charged should have affixed either signature, ini- tial, or mark of any kind, with his own hand, if his name be even printed with his authority, and the printed signature be intended to bind, it will be sufficient. 4 If the name appears in the memorandum, and is applicable to the whole substance of the writing, and is put there by the party, or by his au- It is true that parol evidence is ad- missible to show the meaning of tech- nical terms and trade symbols used in the instrument, which were sanc- tioned by usage in the business in which they were used, and which must have been understood by the parties in interest. But, if such evi- dence be admitted, and the facts shown to be as claimed by the plain- tiff.and if it be conceded that the in- strument was signed by the agent of the plaintiff, still a contract would not be shown. Even with the aids men- tioned the writing would fail to show who was the buyer, who the seller, or that an agreement to sell anything had been made. The instrument is in form neither a contract nor an order. If it was the latter, an accept- ance by the plaintiff was required to make a contract. McCormick, etc., Machine Co. v. Eichardson, 89 Iowa, 525 ; 56 N.W. Rep. 682. If the letter we have set out refers to the first instru- ment, it is treated as an order, and there is no evidence in writing that the instrument was ever more than an unaccepted offer to purchase. We con- clude that the case is within the stat- ute of frauds." 1 Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83. 2 Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen, 474. The words "your affectionate mother" at the end of a letter, held insufficient as a signature. Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2. 3 Helshaw v. Langley, 11 L. J. Ch. 17 ; Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio, 471 ; Brown v. Butchers' Bank, 6 Hill, 443 ; Weston v. Myers, 33 111. 424; McFar- son's Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 503 ; Hubert v. Moreau, 2 Car. & P. 528. A mere scrawl held sufficient. Baker v. Den- ing, 8 A. & E. 94. An agreement annexed to conditions of sale by auc- tion, to which D. (an illiterate person) had put his mark, held a good memo- randum within the statute. Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Irish, 590. 4 Drury v. Young (1882), 58 Md. 546, an instructive case. Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286, where the seller filled the blank in a printed bill of parcels with the name of the pur- chaser, and delivered it to him. But in Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 353, where the purchaser stamped his name and a date on the bill of parcels, without delivering it to the seller, in the absence of evidence to show that he had adopted such a stamp as a sig- nature and had affixed it to the instru- ment with the intent to bind himself, held an insufficient memorandum. 688 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 579 thority, it is immaterial in what part of the instrument it ap- pears, whether at the top, in the middle, or at the bottom. 1 A memorandum of a contract for the purchase of goods, written by a broker, employed to make the purchase, with a lead pen- cil, in his book, in the presence of the vendor, the names of the vendor and vendee, and the terms of purchase being in the body of the memorandum, but not subscribed by the par- ties, was held to be sufficient. 2 But the signature must be in- tended to govern the whole contract, otherwise its position may make a difference. 8 There is no difference between the fourth and seventeenth sections of the statute caused by the use of the word "party" in the one and "parties" in the other; in either case, in the absence of special provisions in local statutes, the memorandum need be signed only by the "party" to be charged.* § 579. Oral variation of written agreement. — The general rule is, that no verbal agreements between the parties to a written contract, made before orat the time of the execution of such contract, are admissible to vary its terms or to effect its construction. All such verbal agreements are considered as 1 Drury u. Young (1882), 58 Md. 546; Wend. 341; McGivern v. Fleming Evans v. Hoare (1892), L. R. 1 Q. B. (1884), 12 Daly, 289. 593; Hawkins *. Chace, 19 Pick. 502; 3 Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 127. Knight v. Croekford, 1 Esp. 190 ; Saun- « Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East, 307 ; derson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & Pul. 238; Liverpool Borough Bank v. Eccles, 4 Barry v. Coombe, 1 Pet. 640 ; Higdon H. & N. 138 ; Bank of British America v. Thomas, 1 H. &. G. 152. v. Simpson, 24 IT. C. C. P. 357; Kizer 2 Clason v. Bailey, 14 John. 484. v. Lock, 9 Ala. 269; Vassault v. Ed- With respect to the rule that an auc- wards, 43 Cal. 458; Welden v. Porter, tioneer is the agent of both the ven- 4 Houst. (Del.) 236; Brandon Mfg. dor and the vendee, and that his tak- Co. v. Morse, 48 Vt. 322; Linton v. ing down the name of a purchaser in Williams, 25 Ga. 391 ; Perkins i>. Had- any form of memorandum connected sell, 50 111. 216; Cook v. Anderson, 20 with and clearly referring to the con- Ind. 15; Williams v. Robinson, 73 ditions of sale is a sufficient signature Maine, 186; Dresel v. Jordan, 104 to satisfy the statute. See note 3 to Mass. 407; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. Buckmaster v. Harrot, 7 Ves. 341 ; 418 ; Marqueze v. Caldwell, 48 Miss. Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Ir. 590. When 23 ; Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. the agreement is required to be "sub- 388; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Loomis, scribed" by the terms of the statute, 11 Paige, 431 ; Mizell v. Burnett, 4 the signature, to be binding, must be Jones L. (N. C.) 249; Johnston v. at the foot. Davis v. Shields, 26 Cowan, 59 Pa. St. 275; Sheid v. Stamps, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 172. §579 THE STATUTE OE FRAUDS. 689 merged in the written contract. 1 It is held that a contract for the sale of lands can not rest partly in writing and partly in parol. If new terms are sought to be ingrafted upon the orig- inal contract they must be reduced to writing; otherwise the modified agreement can not be proved. 2 To allow a party to sue partly on a written and partly on an oral agreement would be in direct contravention of the statute; 8 but it has been held that in defense to an action on a written contract, the defend- ant may show that he has performed it according to the terms of a subsequent parol agreement. 4 Upon this question the au- ^"There is no rule of evidence bet- ter settled than that which declares that parol evidence is inadmissi- ble to contradict or substantially vary the legal import of a writ- ten agreement. Such testimony is not only contrary to the statute of frauds, but to the maxims of the com- mon law ; and the rules of evidence on this, as on most other points, are the same in courts of law and of equity." Chancellor Kent in Stevens v. Cooper, 1 John. Ch. 425. 2 Heisley u. Swanstrom (1889), 40 Minn. 196. This is the more generally received doctrine as respects contracts required to be in writing by the stat- ute of frauds in contradistinction to other classes of contracts. Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28; Blood v. Good- rich, 9 Wend. 68; 24 Am. Dec. 121; Dana v. Hancock, 30 Vt. 616 ; Abell v. Munson (1869), 18 Mich. 305; 100 Am. Dec. 165 and cases cited ; Ladd v. King, 1 R. I. 224; 51 Am. Dec. 624; Brown v. Sanborn, 21 Minn. 402; Hewitt v. Brown, 21 Minn. 163; Stowell v. Eobinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 928 ; 1 Chitty on Contracts, 154 ; 1 Ad- dison on Contracts, § 201. In Espy v. Anderson, 14 Pa. St. 308, the court per Coulter, J-., said: "A written agreement respecting the sale of land can not be altered by parol testimony. If it could the statute of frauds and 44 perjuries would be of no practical use, nor answer any beneficial purpose." In the leading case of Goss v. Lord Nu- gent^ B.& Ad. 58, Lord Denman,C. J., said: "We tbink the object of the statute of frauds was to exclude all oral evidence as to contracts for the sale of lands, and that any contract which is sought to be enforced must be proved by writing only." 3 Whittier v. Dana (1865), 10 Allen, 326. "When the law requires the contract to be in writing it means that the complete contract must be proved by the writing. That is not a written contract that is not self-sustaining," per Lowrie, J., in Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. St. 180. 4 In Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 486, which was a suit for breach of written agreement to manufacture and deliver weekly to the plaintiff a certain quantity of cloth at a certain price per yard on eight months' credit, it was held that the defendant might give in evidence, as a good defense, a subsequent parol agreement between him and the plaintiff, made on a legal consideration, by which the terms of payment were varied, and that the plaintiff had refused to perform the parol agreement. Negley v. Jeffers, 28 Ohio St. 90; Marsh v. Bellew, 45 Wis. 36; Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31, where the plaintiff would have paid 690 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 580 thorities are conflicting, but the weight of authority is against the admission of parol evidence to modify the time of payment or performance of contracts within the statute. 1 § 580. Parol discharge of written agreement. — It was stated by Lord Chancellor Eldon as clearly settled that an agreement in writing may be dissolved by parol. 2 But the evidence in such cases is good only as a defense to a bill for a specific per- formance, and is totally inadmissible, at law or equity, as a ground to compel a performance in specie. 3 Such a defense the money within the time limited in the written contract if the defend- ant had not orally agreed to substitute another time. The defendant refused to receive the money at the substi- tuted time and set up non-perform- ance by the plaintiff within the time originally limited, which the defend- ant had occasioned by his own act ; held that the defense could not be maintained. 1 The leading English case in sup- port of the admissibility of such evi- dence is Cuff v. Penn, 1 M. & S. 21, decided by Lord Ellenborough in 1813. This was overruled in Stead t>.Dawber,2 Per. & Dav.447 ; 10 Ad.& E. 57. In Hickman v. Haynes (1875) L. P. 10 C. P. 598, Lindley, J., after reviewing the cases of Noble v. AVard, L. R. 1 Ex. 117 ; in error L. E. 2 Ex. 135; Stead v. Darber, 10 Ad. & E. 57; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W. 109 ; Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58; and Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 928. "The result of these cases ap- pears to be that neither a plaintiff nor a defendant can at law avail himself of a parol agreement to vary or en- large the time for performing a con- tract previously entered into in writ- ing and required so to be by the stat- ute of frauds." In Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68, the court, per Savage, Ch.J., says: "There are cases when the time of performance of a written contract may be enlarged by parol, but I apprehend that doctrine does not apply to contracts for the convey- ance of land, or to any other contract, where the contract itself would not have been valid if made by parol." Swain v. Seamens (1869), 9 Wall. 254; Atlee v. Bartholomew (1887), 69 Wis. 43. In Massachusetts it is held that if part of an agreement is void under the statute of frauds, this does not avoid or annul other parts of the agreement which are separable from it and not founded upon it. Rand a. Mather, 11 Cush. 1 ; 59 Am. Dec. 131, and note. 2 Coles v. Trecothick (1804), 9 Ves. Jr. 234. This must be understood as applying either to a complete verbal abandonment of the whole contract, or at least to parol variations so acted upon that the original agreement could not be enforced without injustice to one party. Price v. Dyer, 17 Ves. 356; Harvey v. Grabham, 5 A. & E. 01. 3 Chancellor Kent in Stevens v. Cooper, 1 John. Ch. 425. In the case of Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. & A. 38, the court, perDenman, C. J., observed that the statute did not say that all contracts concerning the sale of lands should be in writing, but only that no action should be brought unless they were in writing; and that as there was no clause in the act which re- § 581 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 691 must be established with the greatest clearness and precision, and the circumstances of waiver and abandonment must amount to a total dissolution of the contract, placing the par- ties in the same situation in which they stood before the agree- ment was entered into. 1 § 581. When parol evidence may be resorted to. — Parol evi- dence may be resorted to in aid of the writing, where an am- biguity exists in respect to the property intended to be sold, or to which the contract relates. 2 Where the writing disclosed an agreement for the sale of "a house and lot of land situated on Amity street," there being several such, parol evidence was admitted to show that there was only one which the defendant had any right to convey, and that the parties had been in treaty for the sale and purchase of it. The court held that the subject-matter of the contract might thus be identified, and, when so ascertained, the writing might be construed to apply to it. 8 Parol evidence is admissible to identify documents to which the signed paper refers. 4 What was said and done by the parties, at or about the time the written agreement was en- tered into, may be given in evidence, in explanation, or to cor- quired the dissolution of such con- vie's house," with all its fixtures, was tracts to be in writing, it should rather to be bought for £14,000. The objec- seem that a written contract concern- tion was taken that there was no cer- ing the sale of lands might still be tain description of the property. The waived and abandoned by a new agree- master of the rolls said: "The de- ment not in writing, and so as to pre- fendant speaks of 'Sir. Ogilvie's vent either party from recovering in house,' and agrees 'to give £14,000 for an action on the contract which was the premises,' and parol evidence has in writing. Long v. Hartwell (1870), always been admitted in such a case 34 N. J. Law, 116. " Oral evidence is to show to what house and to what admissible to reform a written instru- premises the treaty related." ment, or to subvert or overthrow it 3 Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545. entirely, but not to vary or alter it." Parol evidence is admissible to ex- Van Syckel v. Dalrymple (1880) , 32 plain latent ambiguities and to apply N. J. Eq. 233. Also to show that no the instrument to the subject-matter, contract was intended or was only to Williams v. Morris (1877), 95 U. S. be binding upon the happening of a 444 ; Barry v. Ooombe, 1 Pet. 640. certain event. Rogers v. Hadley, 2 4 Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. C. H. & C. 227 ; Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. 238 ; Baumann v. James, L. R. 3 Ch. & B. 370. 508 ; Long v. Millar, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. Robinson v. Page, 3 Russ. 114. 450; Cave v. Hastings, L. R. 7 Q. B. 2 Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413; Div. 125; Freeland v. Ritz (1891), 154 Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 52. This Mass. 257. was a contract by which "Mr. Ogil- 692 THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. § 582 rect a mistake of the scrivener. 1 Where the initials were not given, the designation being "Price, the son of Price," the entire Christian name was supplied by parol evidence. 2 Where a written instrument contains no date, parol evidence is ad- missible to show when it was written. 3 The authority of one person to sign for another need itself not be proved by written evidence, but may be proved by parol evidence. 4 Where tech- nical words are used in a written agreement, or abbreviations, parol evidence is admissible to show their meaning. It is competent to show what significance is attached to ambiguous terms by reputation or usage of trade. The object of admit- ting proof of usage is that effect may be given to the contract according to the intent of the parties. 6 § 582. Remedy for services rendered under voidable con- tract. — Where a person has rendered services under a verbal contract which comes within the statute, he may recover upon a quantum meruit, upon an implied agreement that the em- ployer will pay for such services what they are fairly and rea- sonably worth. So also, if property has been transferred un- der a contract voidable under the statute, the value may be re- covered under a quantum valebat. 6 A person who has received 'Espyt'. Anderson, 14 Pa. St. 308. he must be authorized in writing when 2 Price v. Page, 4 Ves. Jr. 680. the contract relates to real estate. 'Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Ad. & E. Stimson's American Stat. Law, §4140. 934. 5 Hart b. Hammett, 18 Vt. 127; 'Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502. Stoops v. Smith, 100 Mass. 63; Banks If such proof were incompetent, a v. Harris Mfg. Co. (1884), 20 Fed. broker might make a memorandum of Pep. 667 ; Wright c. Weeks, 25 N. Y. a contract wholly different from that 153; Cross?'. Eglin, 2 B. & Ad. 106; which he was authorized to sign, and Salman Falls Man. Co. v. Goddard, 14 thereby preclude all proof that no How. 446. such contract was ever made. Cod- 6 Hartwell r. Young (1893), 67 Hun, dingtonn. Goddard, 16 Gray, 436; Pitts 472;Dunphy r. Ryan (1885), 116 U. v. Beckett, 13 M. & W. 743. Ex- S. 491 ; Wolke v. Fleming (1885), 103 cept where the statute otherwise Ind. 105; Baker r. Lauterbach (1887), provides the agent may be appointed 68 Md. 64 ; Patten v. Hicks (1872), 43 by parol. Coles ■«. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Cal. 509; Shute y.Dorr, 5 Wend. 204; 234. In some of the states, the statute Ray v. Young, 13 Texas, 550; Gray v. expressly provides that the memoran- Hill, Ryan & Moody, 420 ; Wetherbee dum must be signed by the party to v. Potter, 99,Mass 354; Clark B.Terry, be charged, or by some person by him 25 Conn. 395 ; Williams v. Bemis, 108 authorized in writing and in several Mass. 91. The measure of damages is §583 TIIK STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 693 a benefit under such an agreement, and then repudiates it, is held to pay for that which he has received. The plaintiff in the action is entitled to recover what is due him, or the bal- ance that is due arising out of the transaction between the par- ties. If the suit is to recover the value of lands conveyed, and there has been part performance by the party refusing to complete the contract, that is to be considered in determining what is due. If payments have been made they must be de- ducted from the amount to be recovered for the value of the land. And if the land was not to be paid for in money, but by furnishing support and maintenance, and there has been a partial performance in this respect, the value of such partial performance to the plaintiff must be allowed by him. 1 § 583. As to pleading the statute. — The statute of frauds is a shield which a party may use or not for his protection, just as he may use the statute of limitations. It is not available to a party unless specifically pleaded. In New York, 2 if the com- the value of the services, and the contract does not control. Rose- paugh v. Vredenburgh (1878), 16 Hun, 60; Day v. New York, etc., R. Co., 51 N. Y. 583; Erben *. Lorillard (1895), 19 N. Y. 299; "William Butcher Steel Works v. At- kinson, 68 111. 421 ; Emery v. Smith, 46 N. H. 151. Contra, Fuller v. Rice (1884), 52 Mich. 435 ; La Du-King, etc., Co. v. La Du (1887), 36 Minn. 473. Cf. Sedgwick on Damages, § 651. The contract may be referred to in con- sidering the amount of compensation which may be recovered. Shumate •. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379; v. Nutt, 13 La. Ann. 117; Hughes v. Parsons v. Trask, 7 Gray, 473. Klingender, 14 La. Ann. 52; Whiston 2 Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Maine, 58 ; v. Stodder, 8 Martin (La.), 05 ; Trasher AVasserboehr v. Boulier, 84 Maine, v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 234; 165; Bliss v. Brainard, 41 N. H. 256; DeSobry v. DeLaistre, 2 Harr. & J. Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253. (Md.) 191; Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 3 Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H.379; Mass. 358; Blanohard v. Russell, 13 Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; 2 Kent's Mass. 1; Tappan v. Poor, 15 Mass. Commentaries, 457; Story on Conflict 419; Inhabitants of West Cambridge of Laws, § 244. v. Lexington, 1 Pick. 506. 4 Waltersfl.Whitlock,9Fla.86;Saul 5 Torrey v. Corliss, 33 Maine, 333; u.HisCreditors,17Martin(5N.S.),569; Banchor v. Cilley, 38 Maine, 553; Or- Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946; Groves cutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray, 536. $591 THE LAW OF PLACE. 709 goods, or if the goods are to be delivered in the place where the sale is prohibited. 1 § 591. Intention of parties. — Where the parties to a contract live under different systems of law, questions as to which of those systems must be applied to the construction of the con- tract or any part of it depend upon the mutual intention of the parties, either as expressed in the contract or as derivable by fair implication from its terms. Although an arbitration clause in which the arbiter is unnamed is invalid according to the law of Scotland, yet if the intention of the parties to a con- tract made in England in which such a clause is contained is that the clause should be interpreted according to the law of England, there is no reason why the Scotch courts should not give effect to it, as this rule does not appear to rest upon any es- sential considerations of public policy. 2 "Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379; Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Maine, 58; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Lindsey v. Stone, 123 Mass. 332; Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Maine, 120. This princi- ple is illustrated in the case of Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Maine, 210, which was an action to recover money lent to be used for gambling purposes, and the distinction is there drawn between the mere loaning of money with a knowledge it is to be so used, and a loan made with the express under- standing, intention and purpose that it is to be used to gamble with. 2 Hamlyn e.TaliskerDistillery (1894), L. R. A. C. 202 ; 6 The Beports,188, per Lord Chancellor Herschel : "In the present case it appears to me that the language of the arbitration clause in- dicates very clearly that the parties intended that the rights under that clause should be determined according to the law of England. As I have said, the contract was made there ; one of the parties was residing there. Where under such circumstances the parties agree that any dispute arising out of their contract shall be ' settled by arbitration by two members of the London Corn Exchange or their um- pire in the usual way,' it seems to me that they have indicated as clearly as it is possible to do, their intention that that particular stipulation, which is a part of the contract between them, shall be interpreted according to, and governed by the law, not of Scotland, but of England; and I am aware of nothing that stands in the way of the intention of the parties thus indicated by the contract they entered into being carried into effect. The contract with reference to arbi- tration would have been absolutely null and void, if it were to be gov- erned by the law of Scotland. That can not have been the intention of the parties ; it is not reasonable to at- tribute that intention to them, if the contract may be otherwise construed ; and, for the reasons which I have given, I see no difficulty whatever in construing the contract between the parties as an indication that the con- tract, or that term of it, was to be governed and regulated by the law of England. But then it iB said that the 710 THE LAW OF PLACE. §592 § 59<2. The place of performance. — If, by the terms or na- ture of the contract, it appears that it was to be executed in another country, then the place of making the contract becomes immaterial, and the law of the place where the contract is to be performed governs in determining the rights of the parties. 1 If a contract is made in one state or country, and it is to be performed in another, it will be presumed that it was entered into with reference to the laws of the latter, and those laws will be resorted to in ascertaining the validity, obligation and effect Scotch court is asked to enforce a law which is against the public policy of the law of Scotland, and that although the parties may have so contracted, the courts in Scotland can not be bound to enforce a contract which is against the policy of their law. My Lords, I should be prepared to admit that an agreement which was against a fundamental principle of the law of Scotland, founded on considerations of public policy, could not be relied upon and insisted upon in the courts of Scotland ; and if, according to the law of Scotland, the courts never al- lowed their jurisdiction to try the merits of a case to be interfered with by an arbitration clause, there would be considerable force in the contention which is insisted upon by the re- spondents. But that is not the case. The courts in Scotland recognize the right of the parties to a contract to de- termine that any disputes under it shall be settled, not in the ordinary course of litigation, but by an arbitra- tion tribunal selected by the parties. If in the present case the arbitrators had been named, the courts in Scot- land would have recognized and given effect to and enforced the arbitration clause, and would by reason of it have declined to enter upon a trial of the merits of the case. That being so, I have been unable to understand upon what fundamental principle of public policy it can be said to rest as a foun- dation, that where an arbitrator is not named an agreement between the par- ties to refer a matter to arbitration ought not to be enforced." 1 Fanning v. Consequa, 17 John. 511 ; Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648; Lewis v. Headley, 36 111. 433; Mal- pica v. McKown, 1 La. 248. In Way- man v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 48, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the prin- ciple as one of universal law that "in every forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made." And in Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, Lord Mansfield said: "The law of the place can never be the rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by which it is to be governed." In Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65, Chief Justice Taney said: "The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place to be executed in an- other is well settled. They are to be governed by the law of the place of performance." Don v. Lippmann, 5 C. & F. 1 ; Fergusson v. Fyffe, 8 C. & F. 121 ; Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 81 ; Burchard v. Dunbar, 82 111. 450; Waverly Natl. Bank v. Hall (1892), 150 Pa. St. 466 (contract for the loan of money made in Pennsyl- vania, the business to be conducted in New York). § 593 THE LAW OF PLACE. 711 of the contract. 1 Hence, when the parties enter into a con- tract in one place, to be performed in another, the matters of payment, tender or release will be governed by the lex loci so- lutionis.* If no place of performance is expressly stated or implied from the terms of the contract, the law of the place where it is made will govern. 8 When a part of a contract is to be performed in one country and a part in another, each part is to be governed by the law of the place where it is per- formable. 4 Where there is a conflict of possible applicatory laws the parties are presumed to have made part of their agree- ment that law which is most favorable to its performance. 5 § 593. Performance governed by what law. — A New York life insurance company issued a policy, the application for which was made and signed in the state of Washington, and transmitted to New York. The policy was written in New York and transmitted to Washington, where it was delivered to the insured, and the first premium was collected. The policy provided that the premiums, and the insurance when it accrued, should be paid in New York, and that proof of death should be made there. The application, which, by the terms of the policy, was made part thereof, declared that it was made subject to the charter of the insurance company and the laws of New York. It was held that the contract, as to all matters relating to its performance, was governed by the law of New 'Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266; view to discovering from it the true Smith v. Smith, 2 John. 235; Story on intention of the parties. * * * Ste- Conflict of Laws, § 280. reotyped rules laid down by judicial B Harrison •«. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648; writers cannot, therefore.be accepted Thompson v. Ketebam, 4 John. 285; as infallible canons of interpretation Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. Law, 285 ; in these days when commercial trans- Strieker v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176. actions have altered in character and 8 Pomeroy v. Ainesworth, 22 Barb, increased in complexity, and there 118. can be no hard-and-fast rule by which 'Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb, to construe the multiform commercial 118. "It may be said that the con- agreements with which in modern tract is partly to be performed in one times we have to deal," per Bowen, place and partly in another. In such L. J., in Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais a case the only certain guide is to be (1884), L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 589; Daniel found in applying sound ideas of busi- on Negotiable Instruments, § 879. ness, convenience and sense to the 6 Wharton on Conflict of Laws, language of the contract itself, with a § 429. 712 THE LAW OF PLACE. §593 York, and was therefore subject to a statute of that state, making it a condition of the right of the company to forfeit the policy for non-payment of premiums that a certain notice of the accruing of premiums should be given, notwithstanding the policy contained a waiver of any other notice than the terms of the policy itself. 1 But it seems that a contract of 1 Phinney v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 493, per Hanford, J.: "This subject of the law of the place of contracts has received atten- tion from the Supreme Court of the United States in a number of cases, and the difference between cases where the law of the contract is the law of the place where the contract is entered into and those in which the contract is governed by the law of the place of performance is illustrated in a number of decisions — in some of the older decisions as well as the late ones. One of the clearest expositions of the law is to be found in the opin- ion of Mr. Justice Hunt in the case of S.-udder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406. In the course of the opinion, Jus- tice Hunt makes this statement : 'The rule is often laid down that the law of the place of performance governs the contract. Mr. Parsons, in his treatise on Notes and Bills, uses this language: "If a note or bill be made payable in a particular place, it is to be treated as if made there, without reference to the place at which it is written or signed or dated." Page 324. For the purpose of payment and the incidents of payment, this is a sound proposition. Thus the bill in question is directed to parties resid- ing in St. Louis, Mo., and contains no statement whether it is payable on time or at sight. It is, in law, a sight draft. Whether a sight draft is payable immediately upon presenta- tion, or whether days of grace are allowed, and to what extent, is differ- ently held in different states. The law of Missouri, where this draft is payable, determines that question in the present instance. The time, man- ner, and circumstances of presenta- tion for acceptance or protest, the rate of interest when this is not specified in the bill, are points connected with the payment of the bill ; and are also instances to illustrate the meaning of the rule that the place of performance governs the bill. The same author, however, laws down the rule that the place of making the contract governs as to the formalities necessary to the validity of the contract. Thus, whether a contract shall be in writ- ing, or may be made by parol, is a formality to be determined by the law of the place where it is made. If valid there, the contract is binding, although the law of the place of per- formance may require the contract to be in writing. Dacosta v. Davis, 24 N. J. Law, 319. So when a note was indorsed in New York, although drawn and made payable in France, the indorsee may recover against the payee and indorser upon a failure to accept, although by the laws of France such suit can not be maintained until after default in payment. Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439. So if a note, payable in New York, be given in the state of Illinois, for money there lent, reserving ten per cent, interest, which is legal in that state, the note is valid, although but seven per cent, interest is allowed by the law of the former state. Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 298; Depau v. Hum- phreys, 8 Mart. (N. S.) 1; Chapman 593 THE LAW OF PLACE. 713 subscription to capital stock, made in Maryland, but to be per- formed in the state where the corporation is chartered and domiciled, is to be governed by the laws of such other state. 1 And a life insurance policy issued in Pennsylvania, which con- tains a stipulation that it " is a contract made and to be exe- cuted in the state of New York, and shall be construed only according to the laws" of that state, will be construed as though actually executed and delivered in New York. 2 v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627 ; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65. Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters re- specting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evi- dence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. A careful examina- tion of the well-considered decisions of this country and of England will s'ustain these positions.' That case has been referred to, and the distinc- tion is further brought out in a later decision of the supreme court in Pritchard v. Norton, 106 TJ. S. 124; 1 Sup.Ct. Rep.102. The case of Scudder v. Bank is cited with approval by the supreme court in the opinion of the supreme court in Coghlan v. South Car., etc., R. Co., 142 U. S. 101 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150. The syllabus reads : 'When a contract for the payment of money at a future day, with interest meanwhile payable semi-annually, is made in one place, and is to be per- formed in another, both as to interest and principal, and the interest before maturity is payable according to the legal rate in the place of performance, the presumption is, in the absence of attendant circumstances to show to the contrary, that the principal bears interest after maturity at the same rate.' And that is shown to be so, be- cause the law of the place of perform- ance governs the contract as to the manner of performance. The opinion is by Mr. Justice Harlan, and he re- views a great many decisions, and squarely recognizes the doctrine laid down by Judge Hunt and by Judge Matthews in the cases above referred to, and shows that it is in harmony with the decision of the supreme court by Judge Gray in the case of Liverpool, etc., Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397." 'Fear v. Bartlett, 81 Md. 435; 32 Atl. Rep. 322, Robinson, C. J. : " In dealing with the defendant's subscrip- tion, we have treated it as a Virginia contract. The company was chartered by that state, with its office and place of business in that state, and, although the subscription was made in this state, the contract was to be performed in Virginia, and, this being so, the rights and liabilities of the parties under it are to be determined by the law of that state ; and what we have said as to the right of the defendant to repudiate his subscription on the ground that it was procured through the fraud of the company is strictly in accord with the decision of the court of appeals of that state in Weisiger v. Richmond, etc., Machine Co. (Va.), 20 S. E. Rep. 361." 2 Griesemer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 202; 38 Pac. Rep. 1031, fol- lowed in Griesemer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1894), 38 Pac. Rep. 1034. 714 THE LAW OF PLACE. §§ 594, 595 § 594. The same subject continued. — A written contract for the sale of lumber, to be cut by the seller in Mississippi, and to be inspected, paid for, delivered, and received there, is gov- erned by the laws of that state, both as to its obligation and execution, although made and subscribed in Tennessee. 1 And where a note secured by mortgage on land in Illinois is ex- ecuted in Missouri, and is payable there, and both maker and payee live in Missouri, the right to recover damages on pro- test of the note, and to include these damages in the fore- closure decree, is governed by the law of Missouri. 2 The val- idity of a contract between citizens of the United States, valid by the laws of the United States and of the state where made, is not affected by the customs or laws of the Indians in whose territory it is to be carried out. 3 But in the enforcement of a mortgage on land, the usury law of the state in which the land is situated will govern, the security having been given for the money to be used in the state, although payment of the loan in another state was provided. 4 § 595. Lex fori. — Matters respecting the remedy, such as the character of actions to be instituted, the admissibility of evidence and the mode of redress, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought, for matters of process must 'Hart v. Livermore Mach. Co., 72 So. Rep. 153; 47 La. Ann., it is held Miss. 809; 17 So. Rep. 769, Cooper, C. that the obligation of a surety claimed J. : "Ordinarily, the validity of a con- to arise on a paper executed, and, if tract is determinable by the 'lex loci there is any obligation, to be performed contractus,' but where, by the con- here by him is a Louisiana contract, tract, a different place of performance governed by our law, although the pa- is fixed, the presumption is that the per is designed to be used by a mer- parties, as they lawfully may do, con- chant residing here to obtain credit tract with reference to the law of such from a California merchant, the law of place. Dalton v. Murphy, 30 Miss. 59 Bank of La. v. Williams, 46 Miss. 618 Shacklett v. Polk, 51 Mips. 378 Osgood v. Bauder, 75 Iowa, 550; 39 N W. Rep. 887; 1 Lawyers' Rep. Ann which state is claimed to differ from that of Louisiana on the subject of suretyship. Story on Conflictof Laws, §§ 233, 234, 280, 284; Pritchard v. Nor- ton, 106 TJ. S. 124 ; 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102. 655, and note." 3 Anheuser, etc., Ass'n v. Bond 2 Guigncn v. Union Trust Co., 156 (1895), 66 Fed. Rep. 653. 111. 135; 40 N.E. Rep. 556; South Mo. 4 Meroney «. Atlanta Loan Ass'n Land Co. v. Rhodes, 54 Mo. App. 129. (N. C. 1895), 21 S. E. Rep. 924. In Lachman v. Block (La. Ann.), 17 § 595 THE LAW OP PLAGE. 715 be uniform in the courts of the same country. No forum, in which a remedy is given to foreigners, or upon foreign contracts, is expected to adopt the forms of trial of the foreign country.' Where a contract is made in one country, to be performed in a second, and is enforced in a third, the law of the last alone will govern the case as to the remedy. 2 The laws of the country where the contract was made can only have a reference to the nature of the contract, not to the mode of enforcing it. Whoever comes into a country voluntarily subjects himself to all the laws of that country, and therein to all the remedies directed by those laws, on his particular en- gagements. 8 It is a general principle, admitting of few excep- tions, that in construing contracts made in a foreign country or sister state the courts are governed by the lex loci contractus , as respects the essence of the contract ; that is, the rights ac- quired and the obligations created by it, but the remedy or mode of enforcing it is to conform to the laws of the country or state where the action is instituted. 4 A statute of Massachusetts, providing that in a suit on a usurious contract recovery must be limited to the original demand, less three times the amount of the usurious reserve, applies to the remedy only, and has no force in Vermont. 8 A contract void by the law of the place ^cudder D.Union Nat. Bank, 91 Allister v. Smith, 17 111. 328; Kanaga TJ. S. 406; Pritchard v. Norton (1882), «. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, enforcement 106 U. S. 124; Harrison v. Edwards, of chattel mortgage in foreign juris- 12 Vt. 648. diction, the property before breach of 2 Davis v. Morton, 5 Bush, 160; condition having been removed to Campbell v. Stein, 6 Dow, 116. Ohio, and beyond the jurisdiction of 8 Melan v. De Fitz James, 1 Bos. & P. the state in which the mortgage was 138 ; De la Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. given. 284; Bank of United States v. Don- 5 Suffolk Bank v. Kidder, 12Vt.464. nally, 8 Pet. 361. "We can not, in respect to the reme- 4 Roosa c. Crist (1856), 17 111. 450; dy, notice the statutes of the state in Everett v. Herrin. 46 Maine, 357; which the contract was made;" per Walters 17, Whitlock. 9 Fla. 86: Hef- Bennett, J. "A contract, so far as ferlin 17. Sinsinderfer, 2 Kan. 401 ; concerns its lormal making, is to be Ivey v. Lalland, 42 Miss. 444; Trasher determined by the place where it is v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234. The solemnized, unless the lex situs of lex fori governs in determining the property disposed of otherwise re- mode of trial, including the form of quires; so far as concerns its interpre- pleading, the quality and degree of tation, by the law of the place where evidence, and the mode of redress, its terms are settled, unless the parties Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648 ; Mc- had the usages of another place in 716 THE LAW OF PLACE. § 596 where made, even though it is to be performed in another state, by the laws of which it would be valid, is by the just principles of international law void everywhere, as the courts of no state will enforce the void contracts of another state. 1 Foreign laws can not be taken notice of judicially, but must be proved as facts, and with respect to this subject the several states of the Union are to be considered in relation to each other as foreign nations. 2 § 596. The same subject continued — Statutes of limitation. — The nature, effect and modm operandi of statutes of limita- tions have given rise to much discussion in the courts, and to some conflict of opinion, but in respect to one distinction there has been a pretty general concurrence of sentiment. It is said that such statutes act upon the remedy merely, and not upon the debt, barring the remedy, but not extinguishing the rights. 3 All suits must be brought within the time prescribed by the lex fori, although the law of the country where the con- tract was entered into may allow a much longer time in which to bring an action. 4 The citizens of one state can not be view ; so far as concerns the remedy The statute of 3 and 4 William IV, c. by the law of the place of suit, and so 42, limited the bringing of actions far as concerns its performance by the upon any contract under seal to a law of the place of performance." period of twenty years from the cause Wharton on Conflict of Laws, §401. of action arising. The statutes of lim- 'Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266; itation of the different states are Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cow. 508; founded on the English statutes, but Story on Conflict of Laws, §243. are not uniform in their provisions. 2 Braekett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, They will be found in Wood on Lim- where the services of an attorney itation of Actions. Quantock v. Eng- were rendered in the state of New land, 5 Burr. 2628; Waltermire v. York and it was held that the laws of Westover, 14 N. Y. 16; Billings v. New York were the standard by which Hall, 7 Cal. 1 ; Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. the case must be determined. 248 ; Briscoe v. Anketell, 28 Miss. 361 ; 3 Anson on Contracts, 317. The Ruckmaboye v. Mottiehund, 8 Moore, statute of 21 James 1, c. 16, provided P. C. 4; Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 John, that, "All actions of account, and 263; Power v. Hathaway, 43 Barb, upon the case * * and all actions 214; Miller v. Brenham, 68 N. Y. 83; of debt grounded upon any lending or Le Roy et at. v. Crowninshield, 2 Ma- contract without specialty, all actions son, 151, the principles arising from of debt for arrearages of rent * * the statute of limitations discussed shall be commenced and sued within by Story, J. * * six years next after the cause of 'Paine v. Drew, 44 N. H. 306; Min- such action or suit .nd not after." eral Point R. Co. v. Barron, 83 111.365. §597 THE LAW OF PLACE. 717 barred by the statute of limitations of another state, unless they bring themselves within its jurisdiction. 1 But when the statute of the place where the contract was made operates to extinguish the contract or debt itself, and the contract is sued upon in another state, the statute of the lex loci contractus, and not of the lex fori, controls. 2 § 597. Valid contract not enforcible everywhere. — A con- tract valid where it is made is valid everywhere, but it is not necessarily enforcible everywhere. It may be contrary to the policy of the law of the forum. 3 If the law of the forum re- quires a certain mode of proof, the contract, although valid, can not be enforced in that jurisdiction without the proof re- quired there. This is as true between the states of the Union as it is between Massachusetts and England. 4 Under the Mas- 1 Field v. Dickinson, 3 Ark. 409. In Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407, the question was presented whether a cause of action having accrued in Mis- sissippi, and been completely barred there, the bar of the Mississippi statute might not be pleaded in a court of Louisiana, and the decision was that it could not. "The rule is that the statute of limitations of the country in which the suit is brought may be pleaded to bar a recovery upon a contract made out of its politi- cal jurisdiction, and that the limita- tion of the lex loci contractus can not be." Justice Wayne said further : "It has become the fixed rule of the jus gentium privatum, unalterable, in our opinion, either in the states of the United States, or England, except by legislative enactment." "The only statute of limitations which can be relied on to bar an action, whether brought to enforce a contract or other- wise, is the statute in operation at the time and place when and where the remedy is sought," per Shaw, C. J., in Brigham v. BigeJow, 12 Mete. 268; Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray, 535. Where the statute was he'd no bar to an action on a debt contracted forty years ago in another state, without proof that the defendant had ever been in the state of Massachusetts. Drake v. Found Treasure Min. Co. (1892), 53 Fed. Rep. 474. 'McMerty v. Morrison (1876), 62 Mo. 140; Gans v. Frank, 36 Barb, 320 ; Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153. In Baker v. Stonebaker, 36 Mo. 338, it was held that after the twelve years had expired in Maryland after the rendi- tion of the judgment no recovery could be had upon it in Missouri be- cause the Maryland statute did not merely affect the remedy, but it abso- lutely extinguished the debt. 3 Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. (IT. S.) 371, 375 ; Fed. Cas. No. 16,871 ; Greenwood v Curtis, 6 Mass. 358; Fant v. Miller, 17 Gratt. 47, 62. 4 Hoadley v. Northern Transporta- tion Co., 115 Mass. 304, 306 ; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 134 ; 1 Sup.Ct. Bep. 102; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39 ; Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush, 460; Fant ». Miller, 17 (jratt.47; Hunts. Jones, 12 R. I. 265,266 ; 5fates v. Thom- son, 3 Clark & F. 544, 586, 587; Bain ^.Whitehaven, etc., R, Co. ,3 H.L.Cas.l, 718 THE LAW OF PLACE. t 597 sachusetts statute requiring agreements to make wills to be in writing," an oral agreement, made in Maine by defendant 8 testatrix, to the effect that if plaintiff would leave Maine, and take care of her, she would leave the plaintiff all her property at her death, can not be enforced in Massachusetts, where tes- tatrix died, although the plaintiff has furnished the stipulated consideration. 2 19; Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801. When the law involved is a statute, it is a question of construction whether the law is addressed to the necessary constituent elements or legality of the contract on the one hand, or to the evidence by which it shall be proved on the other. In the former case, the law affects contracts made within the jurisdiction wherever sued, and may affect only them (Drew v. Smith, 59 Maine, 393) ; in the latter, it applies to all suits within the jurisdiction wherever the contracts sued upon were made, and again may have no other effect. It is possible, however, that a statute should affect both valid- ity and remedy by express words, and, this being so, it is possible that words which in terms speak only of one should carry with them an impli- cation also as to the other. For in- stance, in a well known English case, Manle, J., said : "The fourth section of the statute of frauds entirely ap- plies to procedure;" and on this ground it was held that an action could not be maintained upon an oral contract made in France. But he went on : "It may be that the words used, operating on contracts made in England, render them void." Leroux ■o. Brown, 12 C. B. 801, 805, 817. 1 L. 1888, c. 372. 'Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326; 39 N. E. Rep. 1026, Holmes, J. . "The words of the statute before us seem in the first place, and most piain.y, to dea. with the validity and form of the contract. *No agreement * * shall be binding, unless such agreement is in writing.' If taken literally, they are not satisfied by a written memo- randum of the contract ; the contract itself must be made in writing. They are limited, too, to agreements made after the passage of the act — a limita- tion which perhaps would be more likely to be inserted in a law concern- ing the form of a contract than in one which only changed a rule of evi- dence. But we are of opinion that the statute ought not to be limited to its operation on the form of contracts made in this state. The generality of the words alone, 'no agreement,' is not conclusive. But the statute evi- dently embodies a fundamental poli- cy. The ground, of course, is the prevention of fraud and perjury, which are deemed likely to be prac- ticed without this safeguard. The nature of the contract is such that it naturally would be performed or sued upon at the domicile of the promisor. If the policy of Massachusetts makes void an oral contract of this sort made withinthe state.thesame policyforbids that Massachusetts testators should be sued here upon such contract without written evidence, wherever it is made. If we are right in our understanding of the policy established by the legis- lature, it is our duty to carry it out so far as we can do so without coming into conflict with paramount pnncip.es. 'If oral evidence were offered «vaich the lex fort exc.uded, such exclusion, being founded on the desire of p e- venting perjury, might r aim to over- 598 THE LAW OF PLACE. 719 § 598. Matters affecting the remedy The statute of frauds, like the statutes of limitation, is a matter affecting the remedy- merely, and if by the law of the forum no action can be main- tained on a particular oral contract, if made in that country, the like rule will obtain as to a contract made abroad, although it was valid by the law of the place where made. 1 The law of set-off belongs rather to remedy than to substance, and is there- fore regulated by the laws of the state in which the action ia brought, and not by the law of the place where the obligation sued on was made. 2 ride any contrary rule of the lex loci contractus, not only on the ground of its being a question of procedure, but also because of that reservation in favor of any stringent domestic policy,which controls all maxims of private inter- national law.' Westlake on Private International Law (3d ed.), § 208; Wharton on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed.), § 766. The law of the testator's domicile is the law of the will. A con- tract to make a will means an effectual will, and therefore a will good by the law of the domicile. In a sense the place of performance, as well as the forum for a suit in case of breach, is the domicile. We do not draw the con- clusion that, therefore, the validity of all such contracts, wherever sued on, must depend on the law of the domi- cile. That would leave many such contracts in a state of indeterminate validity until the testator's death, as he may change his domicile so long as he can travel. But the consideration shows that the final domicile is more concerned in the policy to be insisted on than any other jurisdiction, and justifies it in framing its rules ac- cordingly. There would be no ques- tion to be argued if the law were in terms a rule of evidence. It is equally open for a state to declare, upon the same considerations which dictate a rule of evidence, that a contract must have certain form, if it is to be en- forced against its inhabitants in its courts. Legislation of this kind, for contracts which thus necessarily reach into the jurisdiction in their opera- tion, hardly goes as far as statutes dealing with substantive liability, which have been upheld." Common- wealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1. 1 Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801 ; 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 247, where the plaintiff sued upon a contract not to be per- formed within a year, made in France and not reduced to writing, the French law not requiring writing in such a case. Story on Conflict of Laws, § 576a. 2 In Story on Conflict of Laws, § 575, it is said: "As to set-off or compen- sation, it is held in the courts of com- mon law that a set-off to any action allowed by the local law is to be treated as part of the remedy; and that therefore it is admissible in claims between persons belonging to different states or countries, although it may not be admissible by the law of the country where the debt which is sued was contracted." 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 375; Davis v. Morton, 5 Bush, 160; Bank of Galli- opolis v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. 599, holding that a set-off not allowed by the laws of Kentucky, where the suit was brought, though allowed by the laws of Ohio, where the contract was made, could not be legally set up by 720 THE LAW OF PLACE. 599 § 599. As to real estate. — It appears to be well settled by tbe laws of every state or country, that the transfer of lands or other heritable property, or the creation of any interest in or lien or incumbrance thereon, must be made according to the lex situs or the local law of the place where the property is situ- ated. And it has been decided that the lex loci rei sitas must also be resorted to for the purpose of determining what is or is not to be considered as real or heritable property, so as to have lo- cality within the intent and meaning of this principle. 1 The law of the situs conclusively governs as to all questions relat- ing to rights, titles and interests in and to the real estate. 2 The lex loci rei sitse determines the validity of mortgages of real property;' and it has been held that a foreclosure in one state of a mortgage upon lands in another has no validity. 1 The effect of a conveyance in effect a mortgage made in New York of lands in West Virginia is to be determined by the laws of wav of defense. Second Nat. Bank v. Hemingray, 31 Ohio St. 168 ; Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698 ; Wharton on Con- flict of Laws, § 788. In Vermont State Bank v. Porter, 5 Day, 316, a bank in- corporated under the laws of Vermont, was, by its charter, bound to receive its own notes in payment of its debts. To avoid the effect of this provision it brought suit in Connecticut against a party who claimed that he might have the benefit of this provision. The court held that the contract being made with reference to the laws of Vermont the right of set-off given by the Vermont law applied. It would appear that the weight of authority is against this doctrine. 1 Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627. "In all the books it is conceded that real property must be transferred according to the law of its locality, because it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of its locality, and because every legal rem- edy in regard to it must be sought there." Per Peckham, J., in Guil- lander v. Howell (1866), 34 N. Y. 657. "Real property can not attend the person of the owner as he goes from one jurisdiction to another. It is fixed, immovable and necessarily un- der the law of the place where il lies." Baum v. Birchall, 150 Pa. St 164. 2 Richardson v. DeGiverville, 10"/ Mo. 422. International comity has nothing to do with titles to real es- tate. They are regulated exclusively by the government where the real es- tate is situated. White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144. Where a resident of Connecticut died leaving real estate in New York, held that the validity of the devise and all questions relat- ing to the title must be determined by the laws and courts of New York irre- spective of the domicile of the testa- tor. 8 Fessendenu. Taft (1888), 65 N. H. 39. 'Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Postal Telegraph Co. (1887), 55 Conn. 334, where there had been a foreclos- ure in New York of a mortgage upon lands in Connecticut. Lindley v. O'Reilly (1888), 50 N. J. Law, 636. § 600 THE LAW OF PLACE. 721 the latter state; but a contract also made in New York between citizens of that state, for the loan of money, to secure the pay- ment of which such conveyance was executed, is to be gov- erned, as to its nature, construction and validity by the laws of New York. 1 § 600. As to personal property. — It is said that personal property or merchandise has no locus sitae, but follows the per- son of the owner, and the generally recognized rule is that his alienation of it is governed by the law of his domicile or of the place where the sale is made, and that such contracts should have in any other state the same interpretation, binding force and validity. 2 This proposition is true in general, but not to its utmost extent, nor without several exceptions." A distinc- tion has been made between debts and movables, the latter be- ing capable of having a situs, while the former, it is said, fol- low the domicile of the owner. 1 1 Klinck v. Price, 4 W.Va. 4. Where money was borrowed and the note made payable in New York but dated in Nebraska where a mortgage to se- cure it was executed on land, the con- tract being usurious by the New York law, was held void. Sands v. Smith, 1 Neb. 108. 2 Dacosta v. Davis, 24 N. J. Law, 319. "It is a clear proposition not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that per- sonal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, both with respect to the disposition of it and with respect to the transmission of it either by succession or by the act of the party. It follows the law of the person." Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black, 665, per Lord Loughborough ; Thom- son v. Advocate General, 12 C. & F. 1. "Our American decisions of inter- confederated law fully sustain this principle." Hoffman v. Carow, 22 46 Wend. 285; Born v. Shaw, 29 Pa. St. 288, question of a sale of personal property which took place in Virginia ; VanBuskirk v. Hartford Fire Tns. Co., 14 Conn. 583. "The law of the domicile of the owner of personal property, as a general rule, determines the validity of every transfer made of it by him." Per Folger, Ch. J., in Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199. "The principle is well settled that a volun- tary conveyance of personal property, good by the law of the place where it was made, passes title wheresoever the property may be situated." Per Miller, J., in Nichols v. Mase (1883), 94 N. Y. 160. 3 Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn. 353. "In one sense, personal property has locality, that is to say, if tangible it has a place in which it is situated, and if invisible, consisting of debts, it may be said to be in the place where the debtor resides." Per Tilghman, C.J. 4 People v. Commissioner of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224. "It is a general princi- ple that debts have no situs. For pur- 722 THE LAW OF PLACE. § 601 § 601. Exceptions to the general rule as to personal prop- erty. — The general principle that a transfer of personal prop- erty, valid by the law of the domicile, is valid everywhere, is subject to exception. It rests on a principle of comity, which yields when the laws and policy of the state where the property is situated has prescribed a different rule of transfer from that of the state where the owner lives. How far the transfer of personal property, lawful in the owner's domicile, will be re- spected in the courts of the country where the property is lo- cated, and a different rule of transfer prevails, is a question on which courts have differed. 1 Every state has a right to regu- late the transfer of property within its limits, and whoever sends property to it impliedly submits to the regulations con- cerning its transfer in force there. 2 But the fiction of law that the domicile of the owner draws to it his personal estate, wherever it may happen to be located, yields whenever it is necessary for the purposes of justice that the actual situs of the thing should be examined. It yields to laws for attaching the estate of non-residents, because such laws necessarily assume that property has a situs, distinct from the owner's domicile. 8 When a sale, mortgage or pledge of goods within the jurisdic- tion of a certain state is made elsewhere, it is not only compe- tent, but reasonable, for the state which has the goods within its power to require them to be dealt with in the same way as would be necessary in a domestic transaction, in order to pass a title which it will recognize as against domestic creditors of the vendor or pledgor. 4 Where a party residing in the state of New York executed and delivered a chattel mortgage on poses of administration and attach- Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive ment in cases of foreign creditors, Works, 93 U. S. 664, holding that the and possibly for some other, they are liability of property to be sold under regarded as located where the debtor legal process, issuing from the courts resides. But for most purposes, es- of the state where it is situated, must pecially for the purposes of assign- be determined by the law of that state ment by the creditor, they follow the rather than the law of the jurisdiction residence of the creditor." Per Car- where the owner lives, penter, J., in Egbert v. Baker (1890), 3 Warner v. Jaffray (1884), 96 N. Y. 58 Conn. 319; Caskie v. Webster, 2 248; Clark v. Tarbell, 58 N. H. 88. Wallace Jr. 131. 4 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139. 1, per Holmes, J. 2 Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199; § 602 THE LAW OF PLACE- 723- property in Illinois, and a creditor, before the mortgage was - recorded and the property delivered, both record and delivery being necessary under the laws of Illinois, sued out a writ of attachment in Illinois and obtained judgment, and the prop- erty was levied upon and sold, it was held that the attachment on the property in Illinois took precedence of the unrecorded mortgage executed in New York, where record was not neces- sary, although the owner of the chattels, the attaching cred- itor and the mortgage creditor were all residents of New York. 1 § 602. Yoluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors. — The general principle is that an owner has the power which is recognized by all civilized, and especially by all commercial, nations, to transfer his property, for a good and valuable con- sideration; and the general disposition of all friendly govern- ments is to give effect to such contracts when not opposed by some great considerations of public policy, or manifestly inju- rious to their own citizens. A fortiori is this true of the sev- eral states of the American Union, which, though foreign to some purposes, are united for many others.* A voluntary as- signment of property for the benefit of creditors, valid by the laws of the state where made, has been held to operate to con- vey personal property, not already subject to liens, in every state where it might be found. In Pennsylvania an assign- ment made in New York where the assignor and assignee were domiciled which contained preferences in favor of cer- 1 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139. "As to property actually situate in Personal property situated in New New Jersey, that state has the con- Jersey was held subject to the local ceded right to legislate , she may de- laws of that state, though the owner clare what alone shall transfer the thereof resided in the state of New title as against her citizens, creditors York. A general assignment with of the assignor. The property is within preferences for the benefit of creditors, her exclusive jurisdiction," per Peck- which was void under the laws of New ham, J. Guillander v. Howell, 34 Jersey, was made in New York, of N. Y. 657. property situated in New Jersey. Sub- 'Means v. Hapgood, 19 Pick. 105. sequently such property was taken in In the absence oi any bankrupt or in- New Jersey under a foreign attach- solvent law, a debtor may lawfully ment and sold ; held, that no title to give a preference to one of his cred- property in New Jersey passed by ltors, if he does not thereby intend to such assignment and the same was defraud the others. Jewell v. Knight subject to the attachment proceedings. (1887), 123 U. S. 426. 724 THE LAW OF PLACE. 602 tain creditors, which preferences were valid by the law of New York, but illegal in Pennsylvania, was held to pass the title to personalty in Pennsylvania fully for all purposes. 1 An assignment, with preferences, made in Utah of personal prop- erty in Idaho, which forbids preferences, was held by the United States Supreme Court in a recent decision, valid in Idaho against an attaching creditor, a corporation existing under the laws of Minnesota. 2 Such assignments have been held, however, ineffectual to pass title to personal property sit- uate in another state, when in contravention of the laws of that state and inconsistent with its policy. 8 'Smith's Appeal (1887), 117 Pa. 30, Paxson, J., citing Smith's Appeal, 104 Pa. 381, said* "It is settled by abun- dant authority that an assignment by a citizen of one state of personal prop- erty located in another state passes the title fully for all purposes. The law of the domicile regulates the trans- fer of personal property." Baltimore and Ohio R, v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287 (an assignment executed by a Virginia corporation in the state of Virginia of property in Maryland sustained) ; Schuler v. Israel (1886), 27 Fed, Rep. 851 (a voluntary assignment in Texas held valid in Missouri, save as it con- flicts with the rights of resident cred- itors) ; Woodward v Brooks, 18 111 App. 150 ; In re Paige, 31 Minn. 136 ; Cook v. Van Horn, 81 Wis. 291; Eddy v, Winchester, 60 N. H. 63 ("the rights of our own citizens not being involved") ; Fay v. Jenks, 78 Mich. 304 ; Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442, Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N, Y, 29 'voluntary assign- ment made by a debtor in Canada) ; Vanderpoel v. Gorman (1894), 140 N. Y 563; 35 N. E. Rep. 933 (validity of assignment made by a New Jersey corporation doing business in New York) ; Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. 335 (an assignment by an insolvent debtor in New York held valid in Massachusetts against a subsequent attachment by a citizen of New York of property in Massachusetts, although such assignment was invalid under the laws of that state) ; Train v. Ken- dall (1884), 137 Mass. 366 (an assign- ment made in another state upheld aa against an attaching creditor of the assignor domiciled in Massachusetts) ; Frank v. Bobbitt, 155 Mass. 112 (a voluntary assignment made in North Carolina valid as against a subsequent attaching creditor in still another state and not a party to the assignment) ; Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 62 ; Eg- bert o. Baker, 58 Conn. 319 ; Chafee v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 71 Maine, 514; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Texas, 372; Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474; Halsted v. Straus, 32 Fed. Rep. 279; Van Wyck t>. Read (1890), 43 Fed. Rep. 716. 2 Barnett v. Kinney (1892), 147 U. S. 476. * Warner v. Jaffray (1884), 96 N. Y. 248; 30 Hun, 326; Varnum v. Camp, 13 N. J. Law, 326. "The true rule of law and public policy is this : that a voluntary assignment made abroad, inconsistent, in substantial respects, with our statute, should not be put in execution here to the detriment of our citizens, but that for all other pur- poses, if valid by the lex loci, it should be carried fully into effect." Beasley, C. J., in Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. Y. Eq. 462. In Illinois a voluntary § 603 THE LAW OF PLACE. 725 § 603. Involuntary assignments under bankrupt and insol- vent laws. — There is a distinction between involuntary trans- fers of property, such as work by operation of law under foreign bankrupt assignments and insolvent laws, and a voluntary conveyance. 1 The reason for the distinction is that a voluntary transfer, if valid where made, ought generally to be valid everywhere, being the exercise of the personal right of the owner to dispose of his property, while an assignment by oper- ation of law has no legal operation out of the state in which the law was passed." It seems to be a pretty well settled doc- trine in this country that a conveyance under foreign bankrupt and insolvent laws can not affect property outside of the state or country in which the law is enacted, and will not prevail against the rights of attaching creditors where the property is situated. 3 The principle was laid down in a case in New York that the statutes of foreign states can have no recognition in other states solely by virtue of the foreign statute, but by comity the statutory title of foreign assignees in bankruptcy is recognized and enforced in other states, when it can be done assignment, with preferences, made in Bugbee, 48 Me. 9 ; Hoyt v. Thompson, another state by a resident thereof, is 5 N. Y. 320, opinion of Paige, J. , Wil- not operative to convey the title to litts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577; Hibernia property in Illinois as against cred- National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. itorsof the assignor residing in Mi- 367; Barth v. Backus (1893), 140 N.Y. nois, who are seeking by attachment 230; 35 N. E. Eep. 425, Wharton on in the courts there to subject such Conflict of Laws, §§ 390, 390a. Judge property to payment of their debts. Story in Conflict of Laws, § 414, lays Henderson v. Schaas (1889), 35 111. down the American doctrine in rela- App. 155. tion to assignments under bankrupt 1 Burrill on Assignments, § 276. proceedings as follows •■ "National 2 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. comity requires us to give effect to 107; Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196; such assignments only so far as may Barth v. Baickus (1893), 140 N. Y. 230; be done without impairing the reme- 35 N. E. Rep. 425; Hanford v. Paine, dies or lessening the securities which 32 Vt. 442. our laws have provided for our citi- 8 In Holmes v. Remsen, 20 John, zens." Chief Justice Marshall in 229, Piatt, J., held that a statutory Harrison v.Sterry, 5Cranch, 289, said: assignment of a debtor's property un- "Foreign bankrupt laws do not oper- der the laws of a foreign country is ate to transfer the property of bank- not equivalent to a voluntary assign- rupts within the United States." ment by the debtor and that such an Booth v. Clark, 17 How. U. S. 322; assignment will not hold good to the Zipcey v. Thompson, 1 Gray, 243 ; City prejudice of the rights of domestic Ins. Co. v. Commercial Bank, 68 111. creditors pursuing their remedy by 351. attachment under our laws. Felch v. 726 THE LAW OF PLACE. §604 without injustice to the citizens thereof and without prejudice to creditors pursuing their remedies under the local statutes, and provided such titles are not in conflict with the laws or public policy of the state. 1 § 604. Promissory notes and bills of exchange. — A promis- sory note payable generally, that is, where no specified place of payment is mentioned, is treated as a note of the place where it is executed, and the rights, duties and obligations growing out of it are to be determined by the laws of that place. 8 When a note was given in Canada, payable on demand, in consider- ation of an antecedent debt contracted in New York, of which state both parties to the note were inhabitants, but were at the time the note was executed and delivered temporarily in Can- ada, it was held that the laws of Canada must govern as to the note. 8 If a bill or note is payable in a particular place it is to be treated as if made there, without reference to the place where it is written, or signed or dated." The naming of a bank 'Matter of Accounting of Waite (1885)-, 99 N.Y. 433, where the authori- ties upon the subject of the rights of foreign statutory trustees are collated and discussed. Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 1 274, a contest between a Massachusetts assignee and a creditor who was also from that state. The court held that although a foreign assignee may be allowed to sue in our courts as a matter of courtesy, yet the courtesy will be denied in all cases where there are claims upon the prop- erty adverse to the assignment, wheth- er the claimants be citizens of that or of some other state. In Cole v. Cun- ningham, 133 CJ. S. 107, Chief Justice Fuller said: "Great contrariety of state decisions exist upon thid general topic, and it may be fairly stated that, as between citizens of the state of the forum, and the assignee appointed under the laws of another state, the claim of the former will be held superior to that of the latter by the courts of the former. While as be- tween the assignee and citizens of his own state and the state of the debtor, the laws of such state will ordinarily be applied in the state of the litigation, unless forbidden by, or inconsistent with, the laws or policy of the latter." See article in 7 Harvard Law Rev. 281, entitled "An Assignment in Insol- vency, and its Effect upon Property and Persons out of the State," by Hollis R. Bailey. 8 Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698; Trim- bey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. C. 151 (note made in Paris, no place of payment being named) ; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 278. s Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253. The note was not made payable in New York, but by legal consequence in Canada, and was immediately after its execution suable in the courts of that country. The preceding contract was extinguished, and the insolvent laws of New York held not to apply. 4 Cutler v. Wright, 22 N. Y. 472. A note made in New York, but dated in § 604 THE LAW OF PLACE. 727 in another state for payment of a note does not always charac- terize the contract as to be governed by the laws of that place. The arrangement may be simply for the convenience of the maker, and have no peculiar effect. 1 In determining the place where an accommodation note is made, the place where it was delivered and negotiated controls, and not the place where it was written, signed or dated. 2 "Where a draft was drawn and dated in Illinois, and accepted and made payable in New York by the drawees residents of New York, and returned by the ac- ceptors to tbe drawer in Illinois for the purpose of being nego- tiated there by him, the understanding being that the draft was to be discounted by a bank in Illinois, it was held that it Florida, and payable there, is governed by the laws of that place. Everett v. "Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 436, holding that the law of the place where the bill was payable controlled as to the lia- bility of the drawer to the indorsee. 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 324; Shoe,etc.,Bank B.Wood, 142 Mass.563; Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525. A note executed and delivered in Michigan on Sunday in payment of goods sold and delivered although payable in Ohio, was held governed l>y the laws of Michigan and void. "Parties can not be allowed to defy our laws, and recover upon a contract void from its inception under our statute, by making the place of pay- ment out of the state." Per Long, J., in Arbuckle v. Eeaume, 96 Mich. 234; 55 N. W. Rep. 808. Artifice is sometimes resorted to in the making of contracts, with a view of evading the laws against usury. To this end a false or fictitious place of performance is sometimes inserted in the writing. Whenever such attempt is made to appear, the courts refuse to lend their sanction to it. Falls v. United States Savings, Loan and Building Co., 97 Ala. 417; 13 So. Rep. 25. 1 Staples v. Nott (1891), 128 N. Y. 403. Where in an action upon a promissory note, dated in Washing- ton, D. C, made payable at a bank in New York, which bore interest at a legal rate where dated but illegal in New York, it appeared that the note was given to take up another note dated in Washington and payable there, which bore the same rate of in- terest. The arrangement for renewal was made in Washington, where the note in suit was drawn and handed to the maker to execute, who took it to his home in New York, where he signed it and the defendant indorsed it. The note was then mailed to plaintiff at Washington. Theindorser set up usury as a defense. It was held untenable, and that the contract was made in the District of Columbia, and to be governed by the laws there, and that the engagement of the in- dorser did not affect the local character of the contract. Opinion by Gray, J., citing Wayne, etc., Bank v. Low, 81 N. Y. 566; Western, etc., Co. v. Kil- derhouse, 87 N. Y. 430 and Sheldon v. Haxtun, 91 N. Y. 124. 2 Connor v. Donnell, 55 Texas, 167; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, §§ 191, 868. 728 THE LAW OF PLACE. §605 was an Illinois contract, and the rights and liabilities of the parties were to be determined by the law of that state. 1 § 605. The same subject continued. — More than one law will apply to the same bill of exchange, which it has been held is to be construed according to the laws of each place at which the contract contemplated that something was to be done by either of the parties. 8 Each successive indorser is liable ac- cording to the law of the place where he indorses, every in- dorsement being treated as a new substantive contract. 3 In an action upon a bill of exchange payable in New York, but drawn and indorsed in New Granada, it was held that the drawer was liable under the law of the place of performance, and the indorser under the law of the place of contract, that is where the indorsement was made. 4 1 Tilden v. Blair, 21 Wall. 241. "The place of payment was doubtless desig- nated for the convenience of the ac- ceptors, or to facilitate the negotia- tion of the draft. But it is a control- ling fact that before the acceptance had any operation, before the instru- ment became a bill, the defendants sent it to Illinois for the purpose of having it negotiated in that state, ne- gotiated it must be presumed, at such a rate of discount as by the law of that state was allowable." Per Strong, J. A bill drawn in Indiana and ac- cepted in Michigan to be discounted in Indiana, and to be paid in Mich- igan, held to be an Indiana contract. Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. Bep. 191. 2 Hibernia, etc., Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 ; Home v. Bouquette, L. B. 3 Q. B. Div. 514. 3 Potter v. Bro wn, 5 East,124 ; Powers v. Lynch, 3 Mass. 77, where Judge Sedgwick held "that the indorser contemplates performance as to him- self, according to the law of the place where he makes the indorsement." Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20. Arti- sans' Bank v. Park Bank, 41 Barb. 599 ; Freese v. Brownell, 35 N. J. Law, 285. "Every indorsement, accommo- dation or otherwise, is essentially an original contract, equivalent to a new note or bill, in favor of the holder and the acceptor or obligor." Trabue v. Short, 18 La. Ann. 257. In Daniels' Negotiable Instruments, it is said; "Therefore each of several and suc- cessive indorsers of a bill or note may contract several and different liabili- ties, each being bound according to the law of the place where his indorse- ment was made. § 899. It is a general rule, that the drawer, indorser and acceptor of a bill are respectively liable for damages, according to the law of the place of drawing, indorsing or accepting, wherever the bill may be payable. Carnegie D.Morrison, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 381 ; Hicks v. Brown, 12 John. 142; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39, promissory note indorsed in blank ; Baxter National Bank v. Talbot, 154 Mass. 213, promissory note indorsed in another state. 'Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y. 436. In Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615, the note in question was made and dated in New York payable in Illinois and 606 THE LAW OF PLACE. 729 § 606. Interest. — It is well settled, as a general rule, that the lex loci contractus must govern the rate of interest where the contract does not provide for its payment in another juris- diction, or when the contract has nothing on its face, and there is nothing attending the making of it indicating that it is to be performed in another jurisdiction. 1 As a contract is to be governed, in respect to its construction and validity, by the law of the place where it is to be performed, if a security is made in one country or state, but is payable in another, the rate of interest, if nothing is said on the subject, is to be regu- lated by the law at the place of payment.' Where a promis- sory note was drawn in Montreal, payable to parties residing in England, "with interest until paid in England," it was held that the plaintiff, on a judgment obtained in New York, was entitled to the English rate of interest, and not to the rate in indorsed there. The indorser was sued in New York and the question was whether the Illinois or New York laws were to control. It was held that under the general rule governing contracts the maker was by the con- tract to perform it in Illinois, but that the indorser was bound by an inde- pendent contract to pay in New York. "The engagement of the indorser, though auxiliary in its character, was an independent contract, and could only be fulfilled by direct payment to the plaintiffs who were residents of the city of New York. The maker reserved the right to pay the note when it matured, at the bank of the appellant in Illinois. A qualified in- dorsement would have secured a simi- lar right to the appellant ; but as he made no such stipulation, in respect to the performance of his own condi- tional engagement, he was bound by the general rule of commercial law to fulfill it at the residence of the plain- tiffs unless he could find them else- where," per Porter, J. 1 Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286. "Cutler v. Wright, 22 N.Y. 472; Fanning v. Consequa, 17 John. 511; Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 81, where the chief justice (Beasley) de- clared the rule to be now entirely indisputable, when the contract was made in one state, and the place of payment, in good faith, made in another. "The elementary principle undoubtedly is that the rate of inter- est, whether stipulated in the contract or given by way of damages for the non-performance, is the interest of the place of payment." Redfield, J., in Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33, where the notes sued on were made at Montreal, Canada, where the makers resided, payable in Albany, New York. Chan- cellor Kent, 2 Kent's Commentaries, 461, declared that this elementary principle was the received doctrine at Westminster Hall, citing Thompson v. Powles, 2 Simons, 194. In Depau v. Humphreys, 8 Martin La. (N. S.) 1, it was decided that where a contract is made in one country, to be performed in another, where the rate of interest is higher than at the place of contract, it may stipulate the higher rate of in- terest. 730 THE LAW OF PLACE. §606 Lower Canada. 1 When, at the place of contract, the rate of interest differs from that of the place of payment, the parties may stipulate for either rate, and the contract will govern, the parties having the right of election as to the law of which place their contract is to be governed. 8 Any rate of interest au- thorized by the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis will be rec- ognized and enforced in the courts of other governments whose laws would make such rate usurious. 3 Where the borrower resid- ed in Ohio, the laws of which state, at the time, allowed parties to contract for any rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent., and the lender resided in Pennsylvania, where six per cent, was the legal rate, it was held that the parties, on a loan of money made in Ohio, had the right to stipulate in the note for interest at ten per cent, per annum, and make the note pay- able in Pennsylvania without thereby rendering the contract usurious. 4 This rule is subject to the qualification that the 'Scofield v. Day, 20 John. 102; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627, where the debtor borrowed money in England upon a bond and mortgage executed in New York, on lands in New York, at the New York rate of interest ; it was held that the usury law of England was no defense. If the contract was made in New York, upon a mortgage there, it was not a violation of the English usury law, though the money was made payable to a creditor in England. Chancellor Walworth concurring in the decision of Depau v. Humphreys, 8 Martin, La. (N.S.) 1. A contract is not void for usu- ry which is made in Wisconsin with a New York bank, for the payment in Wisconsin to said bank of a sum of money, with interest at ten per cent., though the New York law avoids all contracts which provide for payment of more than seven per cent, interest, if the Wisconsin law makes no such provision— the law of the place of performance governing in determin- ing the validity of the contract. Ken- nedy v. Knight, 21 Wis. 340. 2 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51 ; Andrews u. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 298; Bullard v. Thompson, 35 Texas, 313; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194 ; Dan- iel on Negotiable Instruments, §922; Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Texas, 246. "I apprehend that a contract made, bona fide, in one country and to be per- formed in another, and stipulating the higher rate of interest of the lat- ter, is not usurious with reference to the laws of the former country. A contract to be usurious, by our law, must not only be made here, but to be performed here." Per Redfield, J. ; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33. 3 McAllister v. Smith, 17 111. 328; 65 Am. Dec. 651. In Georgia a note payable in Massachusetts which is usurious under the laws of Georgia will not be enforced in Georgia to the extent of the usury. Kilcrease v. Johnson, 85 Ga. 600. 4 Kilgore v. Dempsey (1874), 25 Ohio St. 413. §§ 607, 608 THE LAW OF PLACE. 731 parties act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction is not adopted to disguise its real character. If the contract is void by the law of the place where it is entered into, it is void everywhere. 1 Where a resident of New York made a note there, dated, payable, and intended to be discounted there, specifying no rate of interest, and the note was first negotiated in another state, at a rate of interest lawful there, but unlaw- ful in New York, it was held invalid for usury. 2 § 607. Days of grace. — The days of grace to be allowed on notes or bills of exchange are to be computed according to the usage of the place where they are to be paid, and not of the place where drawn. 3 Where a draft drawn and indorsed in New York on a bank in Connecticut was by its terms payable on a speci- fied day, and it was presented and protested for non-payment on that day, it was held in a suit in New York that the law of Connecticut governed, according to which it was payable with- out grace when due. 4 § 608. Insurance policies. — A contract of insurance is to be governed by the law of the place where its execution was com- pleted, and it became a binding and operative contract, and not necessarily by the law of the place where dated. 6 Where an insurance policy is issued from the office of the company«in one state on the life or property of a person in another, and sent to the local agent in such other state for delivery, con- taining a clause that it is not binding until countersigned and delivered there and the premium paid, the contract is com- pleted in such other state; and its validity must be determined by the laws of that state. 6 1 Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 298; 4 Bowen ». Newell, 13 N. Y. 290. Akera v. Demond, 103 Mass. 318. 5 Beach on Insurance, § 533 ; Wood "Dickinson v. Edwards (1879), 77 on Fire Insurance, § 93. N. Y. 573; Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 6 Cromwell v. Royal Canadian Ins. 259. Co., 49 Md. 366; Daniels v. Hudson 3 Vidal*;. Thompson, 11 Mart. (La.) Eiver Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416, 23 ; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, where the insurance was effected upon 1 Pet. 25 ; Kilgore v. Buckley, 14 property situated in Massachusetts by Conn. 362 ; Bryant v. Edson, 8 Vt. a New York company which had its 325 ; Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361 ; office and principal place of business Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, at Waterford, in that state. The policy § 634. was signed by the president and sec- 732 THE LAW OF PLACE. §609 § 609. The same subject continued. — Where the defendant, a New York corporation, doing business in Missouri, set up as grounds of defense in an action upon a life insurance policy that the contract of insurance was to be governed by the laws of the state of New York, and that therefore, because of non- payment of premium, the insured was entitled to only the sur- render value named in the policy, whereas, if the Missouri law applied, the holder of the policy would be entitled to a much larger amount, under the provisions of the Missouri statute, it was held that it being provided in the application that the con- tract should not take effect until actual payment of first pre- mium, the contract did not become a completed contract until the payment of the premium and the delivery of the policy, and that as these acts were done in Missouri the policy was a Missouri contract and governed by the laws of that state. 1 Do- retary of the company at Waterford, but the negotiation was had by an agent in Massachusetts, and by the terms of the instrument it was not to be valid unless countersigned by the agent. The court, per Shaw, C. J., said: "There can be no doubt that this is a contract made in Massachu- setts and to be governed and con- strued by the laws of this state, for though it was dated in New York and signed by the president and secretary there, yet it took effect as a contract from the counter-signature and de- livery of the policy in Massachusetts." Heebner v. Eagle Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 131. In Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266, where the policy was forwarded by mail from the office of the com- pany in New York to the assured in Ohio, it was held that the contract was made in New York and not in Ohio. Huntley v. Merrill, 32 Barb. 626. In Western v. Genesee Mutual Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 258, where the ap- plication for insurance was signed in Canada, and contained a provision that, if approved by the company, the policy should bear the same date as the application and take effect from that time, the policy signed by the company at its place of business in New York, and sent to the mutual agent of the parties in Canada, to be delivered, was held to be a contract made in New York. "The contract was consummated by the final assent on the part of the company, and upon that event and not upon delivery to the assured, became operative,' 7 per Johnson, J. In re Insurance Co. (1884), 22 Fed. Rep. 109, where the agents of an insurance company doing business in Buffalo, N. Y., at the re- quest of an agent in Canada insured a Canadian vessel. The policy con- taining a receipt for the premium note was delivered in Canada. It was held that the contract was made in Canada and the case was governed by the Canadian law. See also, §§ 593, 594, supra. 1 Equitable, etc., Society v. Clem- ents (1891), 140 IT. S. 226; Gray, J., in delivering the opinion said: Upon this record, the conclusion is inevit- able that the policy never became a completed contract, binding either party to it, until the delivery of the policy and the payment of the first §610 THE LAW OF PLACE. 733 ing business in a state brings the policy within the operation of its laws notwithstanding it may be signed, and the loss made payable in another state. Accordingly a foreign insur- ance company can not withdraw itself from the operation of the statutes of a state in which it does business by the insertion of clauses in the policies. 1 § 610. Contracts of carriers. — The rule that contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state where made, unless it is presumed from their tenor that they were entered into with a view to the laws of some other state, applies to the contract of a carrier to transport goods to a party residing in a different state. 2 Where a railroad company received in Indiana premium in Missouri; and conse- quently that the policy is a Missouri contract and governed by the laws of Missouri. * * * It follows that the insertion, in the policy, of a pro- vision for a different rule of commu- tation from that prescribed by the statute, in case of default of payment of premium after three premiums have been paid, as well as the insertion, in the application, of a clause by which the beneficiary purports to "waive and relinquish all right or claim to any other surrender value than that so provided, whether re- quired by a statute of any state or not," is an ineffectual attempt to evade and nullify the clear words of the statute." 1 Berry v. Knights, etc., Indemnity Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 439; Knights, etc., Indemnity Co. v. Berry, 50 Fed. Rep. fill; 1 C. C. A. 561. In this case a clause in the policy declared in most unequivocal terms that the policy should become null and void "in case of self-destruction of the holder of the policy whether vol- untary or involuntary, sane or in- sane;" while the Missouri statute provided that it should be no de- fense that the insured committed suicide "unless the assured contem- plated suicide at the time he made the application for the policy; and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary is void." Judge Shiras, speaking for the court of appeals, says : "When, therefore, the policy sued on in the present case was issued and delivered to [the assured] in Mis- souri, the clause found therein touch- ing the liability for death by suicide was nugatory, under the provisions of the statutes of Missouri then in force, provided the policy or contract of insurance is of such a nature as to be subject to the section of the statute in question." Fletcher v. New York, etc., Ins. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 526 (decided in New York, etc., Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, on a different question) ; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Robison (1893) , 54 Fed. Rep. 580, where the ap- plication signed by the defendant stated that the "contract shall at all times and places be held and construed to have been made in the city of New- ark, New Jersey," it was held that as the policy did not take effect until the first premium had been paid, the con- tract was to be governed by the law of Iowa, "anything in the application or policy to the contrary notwithstand- ing." See also, §§ 593, 594, supra. 2 Hale v. New Jersey Steam Naviga- tion Co. ,15 Conn. 539 ; First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283. "The true in- quiry is, what was the intent of the parties ? " 734 THE LAW OF PLACE. §610 goods consigned to Leavenworth, in Kansas, and carried them to Chicago, in Illinois, and there delivered them to another railroad company, in whose custody they were destroyed by fire, the supreme court of Illinois held that the case must be governed by the law of Indiana, by which the first company was not liable for the loss of goods after they passed into the custody of the next carrier in the line of transit. 1 In an action brought in New York to recover for the loss of a trunk and its contents, where the baggage was delivered to the carrier in Pennsylvania to be transported to New York, the question was whether the statute of Pennsylvania, defining the liability of railroad corporations upon contracts entered into by them for the transmission of baggage, formed a part of the contract, and it was held that the rights of the parties were to be deter- mined by the laws of New York where the delivery was to be made. 2 1 Pennsylvania Co. v. Fairchild, 69 111. 260; Western, etc.,R.Co. u. Expo- sition Cotton Mills,81 Ga.522. Machin- ery was shipped from Boston to Atlan- ta. The contract in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier was a good contract under the laws of Mas- sachusetts, but not a good contract in Georgia. It was held that it could be enforced in Georgia. Talbott v. Mer- chants' Transportation Co., 41 Iowa, 247. Goods were shipped from Con- necticut to Iowa and lost in Illinois, for which the carrier was sued in j Iowa, where the statute prohibited a common carrier from restricting his liability by contract. It was held that as the exceptions limiting liability were valid in the state where the con- tract was made, and valid in Illinois, where the loss occurred, the contract was valid, and there could be no re- covery for the loss. McDanielo. Chica- go, etc., R., 24 Iowa, 412. Shipment of cattle from a place in Iowa to Chicago. The contract was held to be governed by the law of Iowa as to its validity and interpretation, and the restriction as to liability was valid. Hazel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1891), 82 Iowa, 477, validity of a contract made in another state, but void under the laws of Iowa. 2 Curtis v. Delaware R. Co. (1878), 74 N. Y. 116, per Miller, J.: "The place of final performance of the con- tract being in the city of New York, although the transportation was most- ly through other states, no reason exists why a failure to deliver the baggage should not be controlled by the laws which prevail at the place of delivery. * * No reason exists why a contract to deliver baggage should not be governed by the laws of the place where the baggage is to be de- livered." Where a passenger who had purchased a ticket from a station in New York to New York city, riding on the Erie Railway, a railroad cor- poration created by the laws of New York, was injured in consequence of an accident on a portion of the rail- way which runs through Pennsyl- vania, it was held that the contract of carriage was made with reference to the laws of New York, and that the statute of Pennsylvania, limiting the §611 THE LAW OF PLACE. 735 § 611. Connecting lines of carriers— The English rnle.— A common carrier has power to make a contract to carry to a place beyond the terminus of his own route and thereby render himself liable as such for the whole distance. 1 When a carrier contracts to carry goods to a point beyond the terminus of his own line, and there deliver them, he is liable not only for his own negligence, but also for the connecting carriers throughout the route. The connecting carriers are, in such amount of recovery in similar cases, had no effect upon the damages recov- erable. " The performance was to commence in New York, and to be fully completed in the same state, but liable to breach, partial or entire, in the states of Pennsylvania and New Jer- sey, through which the road of the defendant passed, but whether the contract was broken, and if broken, the consequences of the breach should be determined by the laws of this state. It can not be assumed that the parties intended to subject the contract to the laws of the other states, or that their rights and liabilities should be qualified or varied by any diversities that might exist between the laws of those states and the lex loci con- tractus." Per Allen, J., in Dike D.Erie Ry. Co. (1871), 45 N. Y. 113. 1 Swift v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. (1887), 106 N. Y. 206; Weed v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 19 Wend. 534; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Farmers', etc., Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 23 Vt. 186; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Berry, 68 Pa. St. 272; Law- son's Contracts of Carriers, § 235; Redfield on Carriers, §§ 190-197 , The supreme court of Connecticut has held the contrary doctrine ; Naugatuck R. Co. v. Waterbury Button Co., 24 Conn. 468; Elmore v. Naugatuck R. Co., 23 Conn. 457. Waite, C. J., in delivering a dissenting opinion, said: "The main question involved is, whether a rail- road corporation has power to make a valid contract for the transportation of goods, to any place beyond the termination of their road. * * * If the present railroad corporations do not possess the power to make such a contract, as incidental to their general powers, in my opinion, the business wants of the community, and espe- cially of mercantile men, must soon demand legislative interference and a grant of the requisite authority. In- deed I do not see how the great busi- ness operations of the country can safely be carried on without it." In Root o. Great Western R. Co., 45 N. Y. 524, in speaking of the contract to transport over other lines, the court say : "Such an undertaking may be established by express contract, or by showing that the company held it- self out as a carrier for the entire dis- tance, or received freight for the en- tire distance, or other circumstances indicating an understanding that it was to carry through." The way bill showing the destination of the goods furnishes evidence, whether looked upon as a contract, or as a declaration, or an admission simply. Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123. "As a gen- eral rule the bill of lading given by a carrier to and accepted by the shipper of goods contains the contract for car- riage, and in the absence of fraud, imposition or mistake, the parties are concluded by its terms as there ex- pressed." Per Bradley, J. Jennings v. Grand Trunk Railway of Canada (1891), 127 N. Y. 438. 736 THE LAW OF PLACE. §612 cases, regarded as his agents, for whose acts he is held respon- sible. 1 In England it has been uniformly held that the re- ceipt of goods marked for a place beyond the line of the carrier who receives them, implies a contract on his part to carry them to their final destination, although no connection in business is shown with other carriers beyond, and although the price for the through transportation is not paid in advance. 8 § 612. The American rule. — Some of the states in this country have adopted the English rule, 8 but the general doc- distance, that is prima facie evidence of an undertaking on his part to carry the parcel to the place to which it is directed ; and that the same rule ap- plied, although that place were be- yond the limits within which he in general professed to carry on his trade of a carrier." On a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground of mis- direction it was held in the court of exchequer that there was no misdi- rection. Lord Abinger, C. B., said: "The carriage money being in this case one undivided sum rather sup- ports the inference that, although these carriers carry only a certain dis- tance with their own vehicles, they make subordinate contracts with the other carriers, and are partners inter se as to the carriage money , a fact of which the owner of the goods could know nothing, as he only pays the one entire sum at the end of the jour- ney, which they afterwards divide as they please." Collins v. Bristol and Exeter R. Co., 11 Exch. 790; Bristol, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194 ; Mytton v. Midland Ry. Co., 4 H. & N. 615. The same rule applied to a through contract for the carriage of a passenger and his baggage. Wat- son v. Ambergate, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 497 ; Scothorn v. South Staffordshire Ry. Co., 8 Exch. 341; Coxon v. Great Western Ry. Co , 5 H. & N. 274; Crouch v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 287. 3 The supreme court of Illinois 'Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 48 N. H. 339; Newell e. Smith, 49 Vt. 255, Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Allison, 59 Texas, 193; Bryan v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 11 Bush, 597; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Twiss (1892), 35 Neb. 267 ; Beard v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (1890\ 79 Iowa, 527 ; Atchison, etc., v. Roach, 35 Kan. 740; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647 (suit to recover the value of baggage lost) ; Thompson on Carriers of Passengers, 431 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 145. 2 Muschamp v. Lancaster, etc., Ry. Co. (1841), 8 M. & W. 421 (leading case). Wh,ere a parcel was delivered at Lancaster to the Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway Company, directed to a person in Derbyshire, the person who brought it to the sta- tion offered to pay the freight charges, but the clerk said they had better be paid at the other end on receipt of the parcel. The Lancaster and Pres- ton Junction Railway Company was known to be the proprietor of the line only as far as Preston, The parcel was lost after it was forwarded from Preston. Held, that the Lan- caster and Preston Company was liable. In the court below the learned judge stated to the jury in summing up "that where a common carrier takes into his care a parcel di- rected to a particular place, and does not by positive agreement limit his responsibility to a part only of the § 612 THE LAW OF PLACE. 737 trine as to transportation by connecting lines approved by the United States Supreme Court and. by a majority of the state courts, amounts to this : that each road, confining itself to its common-law liability, is only bound, in the absence of a special contract, to safely carry over its own route and safely deliver to the next succeeding carrier, but that any one of the com- panies may agree that over the whole route its liability shall ex- tend. In the absence of a special agreement to that effect, such liability will not attach. 1 The owner of goods lost or would seem to hold that a railroad company which receives goods to car- ry, marked for a particular destina- tion, although beyond its own line, is prima facie bound to carry them to that place and deliver them there, and that an agreement to that effect is implied by the reception of the goods thus marked. Illinois Central B. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 111. 88; Illi- nois Central E. Co. v. Johnson, 34111. 389 ; Erie Ey. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 111. 239. The courts of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Car- olina and Tennessee also hold that in the absence of a special contract, limit- ing his liability to his own line, the ini- tial carrier remains liable for the safe carriage to and delivery of the goods at their final destination. Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Copeland, 63 Ala. 219 ; 35 Am. Eep. 13; Bennett v. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 403;Hawley v. Screven, 62 Ga. 347; 35 Am. Eep. 126 (trunk lost) ; Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 48 N. H. 339 ; 2 Am. Eep. 242 ; Brad- ford v. South Carolina Eailroad, 7 Eich. L. 201 ; 62 Am. Dec. 411 ; Louis- ville, etc., E. Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 38; 42 Am. Eep. 654 (loss of bag- gage). "The mere acceptance of goods by a common carrier, marked to a destination beyond the terminus of its line, as a matter of law im- ports no absolute undertaking upon the part of the carrier beyond the end of its road, but is a matter of evidence to be submitted to the jury, 47 from which, in connection with other evidence produced, they are to deter- mine, as a question of fact, the real engagement entered into." Per Day, J., in Mulligan v. Illinois Central Ey. Co., 36 Iowa, 181. 1 Myrick v. Michigan Central E. Co. (1882), 107 U. S. 102. "A railroad company is a carrier of goods for the public, and, as such, is bound to carry safely whatever goods are entrusted to it for transportation, within the course of its business, to the end of its route, and there deposit them in a suitable place for their owners or con- signees. If the road of the company connects with other roads, and goods are received for transportation be- yond the termination of its own line, there is superadded to its duty as a common carrier that of a forwarder by the connecting line; that is, to de- liver safely the goods to such line, the next carrier on the route beyond. This forwarding duty arises from the obligation implied in taking the goods for the point beyond its own line. The common law imposes no greater duty than this. If more is expected from the company receiving the ship- ment, there must be a special agree- ment for it." Per Field, J. Eailroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318 ; Eailroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123 (the contract there was to carry through the whole route) ; Elmore v. Naugatuck E. Co., 23 Conn. 457; 63 Am. Dec. 143; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. 738 THE LAW OF PLACE. § 613 damaged while in the custody of the carrier may, in this country, seek his remedy against the intermediate carrier in fault, as well as against the carrier with whom the contract for through carriage was in the first place made. 1 § 613. "Contract tickets." — Where a passenger on a steam- er from Liverpool to Boston purchased a ticket entitled "Pas- senger Contract Ticket," on which was a stipulation that the owners of the ship did not hold themselves responsible for loss or damage to baggage, it was held in Massachusetts that the contract was a British contract, and, being valid where made, would be enforced in Massachusetts, although, if made in the latter place, it would be void as against public policy. A passenger ticket of this kind, containing stipulations de- Co. v. Morton, 61 Ind. 539 , 28 Am. transaction. If the 'initial carrier' Rep. 682; Berg v. Atchison, etc., R. enters into no contract to that effect Co., 30 Kan. 561 , Burroughs v. Nor- he is not so bound. If he does wich, etc., R. Co., 100 Mass. 26 , 1 Am. so bind himself he is liable for the Rep. 78; Grover, etc., Co. v. Missouri default of the connecting carriers." Pacific Ry. Co , 70 Mo. 672; 35 Am. Per Beck, J., in Beard v. St. Louis, Rep. 444; Van Santvoord v. St. John, etc., Ry. Co. (1890), 79 Iowa, 527. In 6 Hill, 157; Root v. Great Western R. Missouri the act of issuing a receipt Co. (1871), 45 N. Y. 524; Illinois Cen- or bill of lading for property to be car- tral R. Co. v. Kerr, 68 Miss. 14; Harris ried beyond its tine is evidence of v. Grand Trunk Ry Co., 15 R 1.371; such a contract. Dirnmitt v. Kansas Hunter v. Southern, etc., Ry. Co., City, etc., R. Co., 103 Mo. 433 (statu- 70 Texas, T.i5 (express exemption); tory regulation). "There is really no Knott v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 98 N great difference between the English C. 73; Hill v Burlington, etc., R. Co., and American doctrine on this subject. 60 Iowa, 196; Clyde v. Hubbard, 88 The one holds that to exempt a car- Pa. St. 358 ; Nutting v. Connecticut, rier from liability beyond its terminus etc., R. Co., 1 Gray, 502; McConnell there must be a special contract to v. Norfolk, etc.. R. Co., 86 Va. 248 (ex- that end. The other that to make press exemption*. See cases cited in the first carrier responsible there extended note to Wells v. Thomas, 72 must be a special contract to that Am. Dec 232; and Miller v. South end. Both admit that the carrier Carolina R. Co., 9 Lawyers' Rep. is not bound to go beyond the ter- Ann. 833; Hutchinson on Carriers, minus, but that he may do so; and if §§149, 149a; Lamson's Contract of he undertakes to do so he is bound Carriers, §§ 238, 240. "If it be true by his undertaking." Per Simpson, that an 'initial carrier,' by which ex- C. J., in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v, Colum- pression we understand the carrier bia, etc., Railroad, 19 S. C. 353. first receiving the goods, is bound ' Anchor Line v. Dater, 68 111. 369; for the default of connecting carri- Barter r. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9; South- ers, it is because of a contract bind- ern Express Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19; ing him to that effect. Such a con- Packard v. Taylor, 35 Ark. 402; Halli- tract may be expressed or implied day v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 74 Mo. from the facts connected with the 159. § 614 THE LAW OF PLACE. 739 termining the rights of the parties in reference to the carriage of the passenger, stands on the same footing as a bill of lading or a shipping receipt, and the party who accepts the contract and avails himself of its provisions was held bound by the conditions expressed in it, whether he read them or not. 1 § 614. Maritime contracts. — A ship in the open sea is re- garded by the law of nations as a part of the territory whose flag such ship carries. Courts have held in many cases that the validity of maritime contracts was to be determined by the law of the flag, that is, of the nation to which the ship belongs. 8 This state of facts is presented: 3 AFrench ship, owned by French- men, was chartered by the master, in pursuance of his general au- thority as such, in a Danish West India island, to a British sub- ject, who knew her to be French, for a voyage from St. Marc, in Hayti, to Havre, London or Liverpool, at the charterer's option, and he shipped a cargo from St. Marc to Liverpool. On the voyage the ship sustained damage from a storm, which compelled 1 Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co. (1891), 153 Mass. 553: The "contract ticket" which was purchased by the plaintiff, a steerage passenger, con- tained elaborate provisions in regard to the rights of the passenger on the voyage, and even went into such de- tail as to give the bill of fare for each meal in the day for every day in the week. It covered with print and writ- ing the greater part of two large quarto pages, and bore the signature of the company, with a blank space for the signature of the passenger. It was entirely unlike the pasteboard tickets which are commonly sold to passengers on railroads. It was held that the plaintiff, by his acceptance and use of the ticket, assented to its terms, whether he read them or not, and that the fact that it was not signed by the plaintiff was immaterial. Pot- ter v. The Majestic (1894 C. 0. A.), 60 Fed. Rep. 624, where the contract was for the transportation of passengers and their baggage from Liverpool to New York. The steamship company claimed that it was not liable to injury to any passenger's baggage arising from perils of the sea, or from negli- gence in navigation of the steamer or any other vessel. The conditions indorsed on the back of the ticket, attempting to relieve the carrier from liability for perils of the sea, held not binding, since it was an attempt to limit the carrier's common law liability by a mere notice not in- corporated into the contract of car- riage. At the bottom of the face of the ticket were the words "See Back," referring the purchaser to "Notice to Passengers" modifying the carrier's liability. Not evidence of a special contract. 2 Wharton on Conflict of Laws, § 356; Wheeler on Modem Law of Carriers, 188; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610. 3 Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115; 6B. &S. 100. 740 THE LAW OF PLACE. § 615 her to put into a Portuguese port. There the master lawfully- borrowed money on bottomry and repaired the ship, and she carried her cargo safe to Liverpool. The bondholder proceed- ed in an English court of admiralty against the ship, freight and cargo, which, being insufficient to satisfy the bond, he brought an action at law to recover the deficiency against the owners of the ship, and they abandoned the ship and freight in such a manner as by the French law absolved them from liability. It was held that the French law governed the case, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover. 1 § 615. Contracts of affreightment. — A contract of affreight- ment, made in an American port by an American shipper with an English steamship company doing business there, for the shipment of goods there and their carriage to and delivery in England, where the freight is payable in English currency, was held by the United States Supreme Court an American contract, and governed by American law, so far as regards the effect of a stipulation exempting the company from responsibility for the negligence of its servants in the course of the voyage. 2 Where 1 The question of the intent of the 2 1 Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix parties was complicated with that of Ins. Co. (1889), 129 U. S. 397, affirm- the lawful authority of the master; ing Phenix Ins. Co. v. Liverpool, etc., and the decision in the Queen's Bench Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 715, affirming Ins. was upon the ground that the extent Co. of 1ST. A. v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 17 of his authority to bind the ship, the Fed. Rep. 377. Gray, J., in deliver- freight or the owners was limited by ing the opinion of the court referring the law of the home port of the ship, to Peninsular and Oriental Co. v. of which her flag was sufficient notice. Shand, 3 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 272, That decision was in accordance with said: "In that case effect was given an earlier one of Mr. Justice Story, in to the law of England, when the Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 365 ; as contract was made and both parties well as with later ones in the privy were English, and must be held to council, on appeal from the high have known the laws of their own court of admiralty, in which the country. In this case the contract validity of a bottomry bond has been was made in this country, between determined by the law prevailing at parties, one residing and the other the home port of the ship, and not by doing business here, and the law of the law of the port where the bond England is a foreign law, which the was given. The Karnak, L. R. 2 P. American shipper is not presumed to C. 505,512; TheGaetano & Maria, L. know." He summed up his conclu- R. 7 P. D. 137. See also, The Barque sion thus: "Each of the bills of lad- Woodland, 7 Benedict, 110, 118; The ing is an American and not an En- Woodland, 14 Blatchford, 499, 503, glish contract, and so far as concerns and 104 U. S. 180. the obligation to carry the goods in 615 THE LAW OF PLACE. 741 a contract was made in Massachusetts between an American citizen and a British company of ship-owners, by which the company undertook to carry certain cattle from Boston to Eng- land in a British ship, and the contract contained express stip- ulations exempting the ship-owners from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence of the master or crew, which clause of the contract was valid by the English law but void by the law of Massachusetts as against public policy, and the cattle were lost by the negligence of the master and crew, it was held in a suit for damages in the English courts 1 that the safety, is to be governed by the American law, and not by the law, municipal or maritime, of any other country. By our law as declared by this court, the stipulation by which the appellant undertook to exempt itself from liability for the negligence of its servant is contrary to public policy and therefore void, and the loss of the ship was a breach of the contract, for which the shipper might maintain a suit against the carrier." In Chartered Bank of India v. Nether- lands Steam Navigation Co., 9 Q. B. Div. 118; 10 Q. B. Div. 521, the goods were shipped at Singapore, an En- glish port, to be carried to a port in Java, in a vessel carrying the Dutch flag, and the contract was held to be governed by the law of England. A rule of law founded on public policy can not be set aside in our own courts by any stipulation to adopt the law of another country. The stipulation in a bill of lading that the liability of the carrier shall be governed by the law of England, is a device to secure an unlawful exemption. The Energia (1893), 56 Fed. Eep. 124. When the British owner of a British ship is pro- ceeded against in an American court by both British and American cargo owners in respect to a loss of cargo occurring in British waters, the extent of his liability is determined by the law of the United States and not of Great Britain. In re State Steamship Co. (1894), 60 Fed. Rep. 1018. 1 In re Missouri Steamship Company (1888), L. E. 42 Ch. Div. 32], affirm- ing the decision of Chitty, J.: Lord Halsbury, L. C, said: "It is abso- lutely impossible to resist the conclu- sion that the parties did contemplate being governed by English law in their contracting relations. If I am to assume that the law of the United States is that this particular stipula- tion now in dispute is of no validity in the United States and can not be enforced, when I find that both the parties to the contract made this stip- ulation a part of the contract into which they entered which is of validity in England and can be enforced, and can not be enforced in the United States, it seems to me to follow irre- sistibly that the contract relations into which the parties entered were such that they intended to be gov- erned and regulated by English law." Fry, L. J., said: "The ship was an English ship; the owners were an English company. England was the place to which the goods were to be brought and the place at which the final completion of the contract was to take place, and what is still more important, the forms of the contract and the bills of lading were English forms. According to the law of Eng- land, the contract would be good in 742 THJE LAW OF PLACE. § 615 English law prevailed, and that the stipulations were valid, on the ground that the contracts were governed by the law of the flag, and on the particular ground that from the special provisions of the contracts themselves it appeared that the parties were contracting with a view to the law of England. the terms in which it stood, whereas, sumed to have been the intent of the according to the law of the United parties was this, that the law which States important terms of the contract would make the contract valid in all would be excluded from it. That is, particulars was the law to regulate the to my mind, a very cogent considera- conduct of the parties." tion to show that what must be pre- CHAPTER XVI. TIME. i 616. Time at law generally of the essence of a contract. 617. Relative to the sale of goods. 618. Conditions precedent. 619. When time is not of the es- sence of a contract. Time not generally regarded in equity as of the essence of a contract. Illustrations. When the property is subject to fluctuations in value. Stipulations in regard to real estate. Question of damages for delay, penalties or liquidated dam- ages. The same subject continued. Illustrations. Stipulation in building con- tracts. 628. The same subject continued — Illustrations of penalties. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. § 629 . The intention of the parties and nature of the agreement — Controlling guides. Fractions of a day in the com- putation of time. Computation of time from a particular day or a particular event. The same subject continued. Time of payment of promissory notes. Day of performance falling on Sunday. Paper maturing on Sundays and holidays where grace^is allowable. The term "month." Constructions of the words "until," "by," "forthwith" and "immediate." The words "from and after." 630. 631. 632. 633. t>34. 635. 636. 637. 638. § 616. Time at law generally of the essence of a contract. — At law, as a general rule, time is deemed of the essence of a contract, and performance is required at the day, or the conse- quence of default may follow. 1 If the vendor, in a contract for the sale of land, is not ready and able to perform his part of the agreement on the day fixed by the contract, the pur- chaser may consider the contract at an end, and stand dis- charged from its obligation. 2 Where a party contracts to per- 1 Cromwell D.Wilkinson, 18 Ind. 365 ; Inman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452 ; Bank of Columbia v. Hag- ner, 1 Pet. 455 (agreement to purchase land) ; Ogden v. Kirby, 79 111. 555 (a subscription to aid in the construction of a railroad to be completed to a cer- tain place by a certain time) . 2 Stowell v. Eobinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 928; Inman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., (743) 744 time. § 616 form certain work or labor in a specified manner, and by a specified time, the time is as much the essence of the contract as the manner in which the work or labor is to be performed. 1 In the contracts of merchants, the time of shipment is the usual and convenient means of fixing the probable time of ar- rival, with a view of providing funds to pay for the goods, or of fulfilling contracts with third persons. A statement de- scriptive of some material incident, such as the time and place of shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded as a warranty, in the sense in which that term is used in insurance and maritime law, that is to say, a condition precedent, upon the failure or non-performance of which the party aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract. 2 "Where a policy of life insurance stipu- lates for the payment of an annual premium by the insured, with a condition to be void on non-payment, time is material and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture, if such be the terms of the con- tract, and courts can not with safety vary the stipulation of the parties by introducing equities for the relief of the insured against their own negligence. 3 12 Wend. 452 ; Sugden on Law of contract, and the work must be per- Vendora, 257. formed within that period." 1 Warren v. Bean, 6 Wis. 120; Allen B Norrington v. Wright, 115 TJ. S. v. Inhabitants of Cooper, 22 Maine, 188; Filley v. Pope, 115 IT. S. 213; 133, where the court declares that Pope v. Porter, 102 N. Y. 366. When "if there was an agreement in the first the contract fixes the time within instance, as to the time within which which it is to be performed, and it the contract was to be performed, and appears from its nature, or the cir- no waiver of it then, at law, time was cumstances connected with its per- of the essence of the contract." The formance, that the parties intended contract in that case was for laying to make the time an essential element out and building a public road, and of the agreement, time will be deemed the work was to be done within that of the essence of the contract, and and the next year. Morrison v. strict compliance therewith will be Wells (1892), 48 Kan. 494, where the compelled. Carter v. Phillips (1887), parties to a written contract condi- 144 Mass. 100. tioned the payment of money upon s New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham the completion of certain work upon (1876), 93 U. S. 24. "Both at com- a building by a time fixed therein, mon law and in chancery, there are Pickering v. Greenwood, 114 Mass. exceptions to this rule, growing out of 479. " The time being stated in the the nature of the thing to be done and contract when the work should be the conduct of the parties. The fa- finished, it was of the essence of the miliar case of part performance, pos- §617 TIME. 745 § 617. Relative to the sale of goods. — Time is usually of the essence of an executory . contract for the sale and subsequent delivery of goods, where no right of property in the same passes by the bargain from the vendor to the purchaser, and the rule in such a case is, that the purchaser is not bound to accept and pay for the goods unless the same are delivered or tendered on the day specified in the contract. 1 A party in New York wrote to parties in Boston, offering to sell them coal, and stating that he had a vessel of 375 tons which he could load on Monday. The Boston parties telegraphed in reply: "Ship that cargo, 375 tons, immediately." The party in New York did not begin to load till nine days afterward, and then shipped a cargo of 392 tons. The Boston parties were not bound to take it. Both the quantity and time of delivery were essential elements of the contract. 2 In the absence of a stipu- lated time for delivery, the law prescribes a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time is a question of fact for the jury to be determined by the circumstances of each case. 8 If from session, etc., in chancery, where time had declined in price, and the quarter- is not of the essence' of the contract, or has been waived by the acquies- cence of the party, is an example of the latter; and the case of contracts for building houses, railroads, or other large and expensive constructions, in which the means of the builder and his labor become combined and af- fixed to the soil, or mixed with mate- rials and money of the owner, often afford examples at law." Phillips, etc., Co. v. Seymour, 91 IT. S. 646, per Miller, J. 1 Jones v. United States, 96 TJ. S. 24. This was upon a contract for the sup- ply of cloth. By the terms of the contract the cloth was to be delivered in installments of a certain number of yards per month. Several install- ments of the cloth were delivered on time and paid for. The mill then burned down. Jones got other parties to make the cloth for him, but his de- livery was delayed beyond the time specified in the contract. In the mean- time cloth of like kind and quality master refused to accept and pay for the balance of the cloth. The court held that time was of the essence of the contract, and the quartermaster was not bound to accept and pay for the cloth. Gath v. Lees, 3 H. & C. 558; Coddington v. Paleologo, L. R. 2 Exch. 193. The plaintiffs contracted to supply the defendants with goods, "delivering on April 17, complete 8th May." The plaintiffs made no de- livery on the 17th, and the defendants on the following day rescinded the contract, and refused subsequent ten- der of the goods. Held that, if on the true construction of the contract, the plaintiffs were bound to commence delivery on the 17th of April, the de- fendants were entitled to rescind for the failure to deliver on that day, but qucere, whether the contract bound the seller to commence delivery on the 17th of April. 2 Eommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327. * Smith on Personal Property, 187 ; Tiedeman on Sales, § 100; Kellam v. 746 TIME. §618 the facts found, or undisputed, in a particular case, the court can draw the conclusion as to whether the time is reasonable or not, by the application of any general principle or definite rule of law, the question is one of law for the court. 1 § 618. Conditions precedent. — "Where time is of the essence of the contract there can be no recovery at law in case of fail- ure to perform within the time stipulated. 8 It is an elementary principle that a party bound to perform a condition precedent can not sue on the contract without proof that he has per- formed that condition. An offer to perform conditions prece- dent is not sufficient. 8 In a contract to aid the construction of a railroad by a subscription, a condition that the road should be put under contract by a certain time was a condition pre- cedent to the right of the company to recover on the contract. 4 McKinstry, 69 N. Y. 264; Pinney v. First Div., etc., E. Co., 19 Minn. 251. 1 Cochran v. Toher, 14 Minn. 385 ; Pinney v. First Div., etc., B. Co., 19 Minn. 251 ; Starkie on Evidence, 769, 770. In Mellish v. Eawdon, 9 Bing. 416, relative to a bill of exchange, Tindal, C. J., said: "Whether there has been in any particular case rea- sonable diligence used, or whether un- necessary delay has occurred, is a mixed question of law and fact, to be decided by the jury acting under the direction of the judge, upon the par- ticular circumstances of each case." 2 Slater v. Emerson, 19 How. 224. The language of the contract was, "in consideration, etc., the said Emerson will complete all the bridge work to be done by him for the Boston and Central Eailroad Company, ready for laying down the iron rails for one track, by the 1st day of December next." That time was an essential part of this contract, was clear from the circumstances under which it was made, and the intent of the parties, as expressed. Justice McLean said : "It is said by some writers that it is impossible to make time of the essence of the contract where damages may compensate for the delay. But this is not correct as a general proposi- tion." Hill v. School District, 17 Maine, 316. "In an action at law, when the question is whether a party has performed a contract requiring that performance shall be made with- in a certain time, the courts can not say that is immaterial which the par- ties, by their contract, have made ma- terial." 3 Gouverneur v. Tillotson, 3 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 348; Jones v. United States, 96 U. S. 24; Dermott v. Jones, 23 How. 220, an action upon a special contract to build a house by a certain day, which was not fulfilled. By the terms of the contract, the performance of the work was a condition precedent to the payment of the money sued for. The case was remanded to the circuit court to be tried upon the com- mon counts for work and labor done and materials furnished. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Bensley (1892), 51 Fed. Eep. 738. 4 Burlington, etc., E. Co. v. Boest- ler, 15 Iowa, 555. "For the principle is laid up among the fundamentals of 619 TIME. 747 In determining whether stipulations as to the time of perform- ing a contract of sale are conditions precedent, the court seeks to discover the intention of the parties, and if time appears, from the language used and the circumstances, to be of the essence of the contract, stipulations in regard to it will be held conditions precedent. 1 Silence on the part of a party to a con- tract may amount to a waiver of the performance of a condi- tion precedent in cases in which such silence is inconsistent with any other explanation. 8 Where one party to a contract demands a strict performance as to time, he must perform, on his part, all the conditions requisite to enable the other party to perform his part, and a failure to do so operates as a waiver of the time provision. 8 § 619. When time is not of the essence of a contract. — In contracts for work or skill, and the materials upon which it is to be bestowed, a statement fixing the time of performance of the contract is not ordinarily of its essence, and a failure to the law that, when a time for the per- formance of an act, or of a condition precedent, is fixed by the contract, the act or condition must, at least in a court of law, be performed within or atthetime." PerDillon.J. Memphis, etc., By. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan. 170, an action upon certain bonds issued by the city of Parsons in aid of the con- struction of a railroad, subject to a condition that the plaintiff should "have its road constructed and in op- eration * * on or before the 1st day of July, 1878." It was held that time was of the essence of the con- tract, and that the failure of the plaintiff to complete the road by the day named was fatal to a recovery, notwithstanding that the road was completed shortly after, and the city received the benefit of it. On a con- tract where time does not constitute its essence, there can be no recovery at law on the agreement, where the performance was not within the time limited, but a subsequent performance and acceptance will authorize a recov- ery on a quantum meruit. Slater v. Em- erson, 19 How. 224. 1 Higgins v. Delaware E. Co., 60 N. Y. 553 ; Benjamin on Sales, § 593. s Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Boest- ler, 15 Iowa, 555. No parol assent or silent acquiescence can destroy the effect of an express condition con- tained in a deed. Jackson v. Crysler, 1 John. Cas. 125. In case of default in a building contract, absolute perform- ance may be waived by allowing the party in default to go on so as to ren- der the other party liable for the con- tract price of the work when com- pleted. Phillips, etc., Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646. When silence imports assent to a contract, see § 644 a Dannat v. Fuller (1890), 120 N. Y. 554 ; Standard Gas Light Co. v. Wood (1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 74; Gallagher v. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438 ; Grube v. Schult- heiss, 57 N. Y. 669. 748 time. § 619 perform within the time stipulated, followed by substantial per- formance after a short delay, will not justify the aggrieved party in repudiating the entire contract,' but will simply give him his action for damages for the breach of the stipulation. 1 A contract by a lithographing company to make and furnish, " in the course of the year," designs of certain buildings of a manufacturing company, with sketches of its trade-marks, to execute engravings, and to embody same on large amounts of stationery, etc., is one for work and labor requiring artistic skill ; and the stipulation as to time was held not of the essence of the contract so as to justify a repudiation thereof, because of a delay in delivery of six or eight days after the expiration of the year. 2 It has been held that an express stipulation in a contract for the construction of a house that it should be com- pleted on a day certain, and that, in case of failure to complete it within the time limited, the builder would forfeit $1,000, would not justify the owner of the land on which the house was constructed in refusing to accept it for a breach of this stipulation, when the house was completed shortly after the time fixed, nor even in retaining the penalty stipulated in the contract, but that he must perform his part of the contract, and that he could retain from or recover of the builder the damages he sustained by the delay and those only. 3 The court may ordinarily compensate for delay in the payment of money by the allowance of interest; hence from mere designation of time for the payment of money there can be no necessary im- plication that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. 4 Time can not be made essential in a contract merely by so declaring, if it would be unconscionable to allow it. Parties may stipulate to make it so, where the stipulation is reasonable ; but, if the stipulation is not reasonable, courts will not regard it. 5 'Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13; 5 Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. Hambley v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 21 193, where, by the terms of the con- Fed. Rep. 541. tract, it was "expressly understood 2 Beck, etc., Co. v. Colorado, etc., and declared that time is and shall Co. (1892), 52 Fed. Rep. 700. be deemed and taken as the very es- 3 Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13. sence of this contract." 4 Dynan v. McCulloch (1889), 46 N. S. Eq. 11. §620 TIME. 749 § 620. Time not generally regarded in equity as of the es- sence of the contract. — The time fixed for performance is not generally considered of the essence of the contract in equity, unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or it necessarily follows from the nature or circumstances of the contract. 1 If it clearly appears to be the intention of the parties to an agreement that time shall be deemed of the essence of the contract it must be so considered in equity. 2 And when parties have deliberately by their agreements or covenants fixed the time for the per- formance of an act, a court of equity will not interfere unless essential justice demands the exercise of its jurisdiction. 8 1 Brett's Leading Cases on Modern Equity, 245; Shinn v. Roberts, 1 Spencer (N.Y.), 435 ; 43 Am. Dec. 636 ; Dynan v. McOnlloch, 46 N. J. Eq. 11. 2 Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68; Oakden v. Pike, 34 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 620; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; Par- kin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59 ; Quinn v. Roath, 37 Conn. 16 ; Baldwin v. Van Vorst, 10 N. J. Eq. 577; Missouri, etc., R. Co. n. Brickley, 21 Kan. 275 ; Stow v. Russell, 36 111. 18 ; Reynolds v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 11 Neb. 186 ; Benedict v. Lynch, 1 John. Ch. 370, specific performance denied; opinion by Chancellor Kent which has been often cited ; note to case in 7 Am. Dec. 484 ; Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 U. S. 403. "But it must affirmatively appear that the parties regarded time or place as an essential element in their agreement, or a court of equity will not so regard it." Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. 94. "Potter v. Tuttle, 22 Conn. 512; Bullock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367. "This equitable doctrine often causes great injustice and positive wrong, and ought not to be extended further than established. But parties aware of this doctrine can always pro- vide that time shall be of the essence of the contract, by stipulating that if not performed within the time it shall not bind the party," per Chancellor Zabriskie. "A court of equity will indeed relieve against, and enforce, specific performance, notwithstanding a failure to keep the dates assigned by the contract, either for completion, or for the steps towards completion, if it can do justice between the parties, and if there is nothing in the 'ex- press stipulations between the parties, the nature of the property, or the sur- rounding circumstances,' which would make it inequitable to interfere with and modify the legal right. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract," per Lord Cairns, L. J., in Tilley v. Thomas, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 61. In Hip- well v. Knight, 1 You. &C.(Exch.) 401, Alderson, B., said: "I do not see, therefore, why, if the parties choose even arbitrarily, provided both of them intended so to do, to stipulate for a particular thing to be done at a particular time, such stipulation is not to be carried, literally, into effect in a court of equity. That is the real contract; the parties had a right to make it. Why, then, should a court of equity interfere to make a new contract, which the parties have not made?" In Grey v, Tubbs, 43 Cal. 359, the contract contained this cove- nant: "In the event of failure to comply with the terms hereof by the 750 TIME. §621 §621. Illustrations. — Where a contractor agrees "not to delay the work any time after the stone is delivered," he can not be held responsible for a delay caused by the failure to de- liver him the stone. 1 When a building contract provides that, in case of delay in the completion of the structure by a certain fixed date, the builder shall pay a forfeit of a certain sum daily during the period of default, other provisions of the contract must be examined and compared, in order to determine upon whom, from the general tenor and provisions of the con- tract, the fault is imposed in causing the delay in the comple- tion of the building. When those other provisions disclose that the builders are to furnish the materials and perform the work, and the architects are to furnish the plans and specifica- parties of the second part (the pur- chaser), the party of the first part shall be released from all obligations, in law or equity, to convey said prop- erty, and said party of the second part shall forfeit all right thereto." Referring to the stipulation, Rhodes, J., said : "It would be difficult to ex- press with greater clearness and cer- tainty than the parties did in this contract, that time is of the essence of the contract. * * Courts of equity have not the power to make contracts for parties, nor to alter those which the parties have deliberately made; and whenever it appears that the par- ties have in fact contracted that if the purchaser make default in the pay- ments, as agreed upon, he shall not be entitled to a conveyance, and shall lose the benefit of his purchase ; and when it also appears that the pur- chaser is without excuse for his de- lay, the courts will not relieve him from the consequences of his default." "Time is originally of the essence of the contract in view of a court of equity whenever it appears to have been part of the real intention of the parties that it should be so, and not to have been inserted as a merely formal part of the contract." Fry on Specific Performance, § 1075. Time may be essential. It is so, whenever the intentions of the parties is clear that the performance of its terms shall be accomplished exactly at the stipulated day." Pomeroy's Equity, § 1408; 2 Beach on Equity Juris- prudence, 662. In England the judi- cature act (36 and 37 Vict., c. 66, § 25) provides as follows : "Stipulations in contracts as to time or otherwise, which would not before the passing of this act have been deemed to be, or to have become, of the essence of such contracts in a court of equity, shall receive in all courts the same con- struction and effect as they would have heretofore received in equity." 1 Taylor v. Netherwood (Va. 1895), 20 S. E. Rep. 888. In Drumm Seed Co. v. McFarland Co. (Texas App. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 93, where the plaintiff agreed to print catalogues of nursery stock for defendant by Jan- uary 1st, upon condition that defend- ant would furnish the manuscript by December 1st, and the manuscript was not furnished until December 21st, plaintiff was released from his original contract as to time ; but, hav- ing elected to proceed, plaintiff was bound to do the work with reasonable dispatch, in the absence of a new con- tract fixing a specific date. § 622 time. 751 tions and superintend the work, it is an easy matter to show- by evidence whether the delay in the completion of the work was caused by the fault of the builders or the architects. 1 The general rule of equity is that time is not of the essence of the contract, unless it clearly appears from the terms of the con- tract, in the light of all the circumstances, that such was the intention of the parties. 2 § 622. Where the property is subject to fluctuations in value. — Time may become of the essence of a contract for the sale of property, not only by the express stipulation of the par- ties, but from the very nature of the property itself, and espe- cially when it is subject to sudden, frequent or great fluctua- tions in value, as in the case of mining property. 3 Contracts for the purchase of stock are of this description, and the reason assigned is, that the daily fluctuations in the price renders a punctual performance of the essence of the contract. 4 "If, therefore," said Alderson, B., "the thing sold be of greater or less value according to the effluxion of time, it is manifest that time is of the essence of the contract; and a stipulation as to time must then be literally complied with in equity as well as in law. 5 1 Mahoney v. Rector, etc., of St. the contract, so that a failure to make Paul's Church (1895), 47 La. Ann. — ; sale of the 95 acres by December 1, 17 So. Rep. 484. 1890, would relieve defendant from "Steele v. Branch, 40 Cal. 3. In any obligation to thereafter release Beverly v. Blackwood, 102 Cal. 83; 36 the mortgage of $9,000. Pac. Rep. 378, defendant traded 840 3 Waterman v. Banks (1892), 144 acres of land to plaintiff for 95 acres : IT. S. 394 ; Brown v. Covillaud, 6 Cal. plaintiff giving a mortgage of $9,000 on 566. the 840 acres to secure a guaranty 4 Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige, that the 95 acres would sell for $23,- 352 ; Macbryde v. Weekes, 22 Beav. 000. Defendant agreed to place the 533; Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & property with certain persons to sell ; St. 590. the mortgage for$9,000to be held "as 5 Hipwell u. Knight, 1 Y. & C. Ex. collateral security until the" $23,000 401 ; Weston v. Savage, L. R. 10 Ch. was paid defendant from sales, and to Div. 736 ; Withy v. Cottle, T. & Russ. be released "at anytime" he received 78; Pollard v. Clayton, 1 K. & J. 462. said $23,000. The agreement also pro- In Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172, vided that "the time of such sale is Story, J., says: "In the first place, to be made on or before the first day there is no doubt that time may be of of December, 1890." It was held the essence of a contract for the sale that time was not of the essence of of property. It may be so by the ex- 752 time. § 623 § 623. Stipulations in regard to real estate. — The doctrine that time is not of the essence of a contract is generally ap- plied in equity to stipulations for the payment of money upon an agreement for the sale and purchase of real estate. The principal grounds of the doctrine are that the rule of common law, requiring performance of every contract at the appointed day, is often harsh and unjust in its operation; and although some time of performance by each party is usually named in any agreement for the sale of land, it is often not regarded by the parties as one of the essential terms of the contract. 1 Time is not to be deemed of the essence of a contract to convey real estate unless made so by its terms, or by implication from the nature of the subject-matter, the object of the contract, or the situation of the parties. 8 Where a contract for the sale of land contained the provision that "in case of the failure of the vendee to make either of the payments, or perform any of the covenants on his part, the vendors, at their option, might declare a forfeiture, and retain all payments previously made, as liqui- dated damages," the court held that these stipulations showed that time was of the essence of the contract. 3 In this country press stipulation of the parties, or it or pay $1,000 of the purchase-money may arise by implication from the as a first payment, on a certain day very nature of the property, or the before the deed was to be given. He avowed objects of the seller or the pur- neither built the house nor paid the chaser." Pomeroy on Contracts, §§384, money. He filed his bill for a specific 385. performance. The specific perform- 1 Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92. "For ance was denied, on the ground that the doctrine of courts of equity is, not it was the intention of the parties to forfeiture, but compensation." Story make the building of the house, or the on Equity Jurisprudence, § 775. payment of the money at the time 2 Austin v, Wacks, 30 Minn. 335. specified, an essential part of the con- Time is not of the essence of a contract tract. " There is no doubt that equity to convey real estate, in the absence may decree a specific performance of of any express provision. Martindale a contract for sale of property, not- v. Waas (1881), 8 Fed. Rep. 854; Bui- withstanding a default in payment lock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367; upon the day specified. The books Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317. are full of instances where such relief 3 Kimball v. Tooke, 70 111. 553. The has been granted, and in many cases only payment that was made on the where there is an express stipulation purchase was the sum of $100, at the of forfeiture. But this relief has al- date of the execution of the agree- ways been afforded upon equitable ment. Wells v. Smith, 7 Paige, 22, principles." Per Bliss, J., in O'Fal- was a case where the vendee agreed Ion v. Kennerly, 45 Mo. 124. to build a house on the lot purchased, § 624 time. 753 time is regarded as more important in respect to the sale of land than in England, because the value of land is more fluctuating here than there. 1 Although there may not be performance at the day, when time has not been made essential, if the delay is excused, and the situation of the parties or of the property is not changed so that injury will result, and the party is reasonably vigilant, the court will relieve from the consequences of the delay and grant a specific performance. Each case must be judged by its own circumstances. 2 The parties to a contract may, by it terms, make the time of performance essentially im- portant, and its observance in that respect requisite to relief, and when that is not so, either of the parties to the contract may, by a reasonable notice to the other party for that pur- pose, render the time of performance as of the essence of the contract and avail himself of forfeiture on default. 3 § 624. Question of damages for delay — Penalties or liqui- dated damages. — It is competent for the parties, in making a contract, to leave the damages, arising from a breach of its pro- visions, to be determined in a court of law, or to specify the amount of such damages in the contract itself. 4 The controversy in the courts as to whether the particular language of a contract in regard to damages is to be construed as a penalty, or liquidated damages, arises mainly from a desire to relieve parties from what, under a different construction, is assumed to be an im- provident and absurd agreement. 5 Where the damages are in their nature wholly indefinite and uncertain, and the parties have mentioned a specific sum as liquidated damages, it will be so regarded, unless it be greatly disproportioned to any probable estimate of the actual damages. 6 1 Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen, 239, 3 Schmidt v. Reed (1892), 132 N. Y. where the plaintiff agreed to pay for 108 ; Myers v. Be Mier, 52 N. Y. 647. land "within ten days" from the date 4 Dwinel v. Brown, 54 Maine, 468; of the contract, it was held that time Wolf v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 64 was of the essence of the contract. Iowa, 380 (contract to construct rail- Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 262 ; Rich- road) . mond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 25 ; Rogers v. 5 Dwinel v. Brown, 54 Maine, 468; Saunders, 16 Maine, 92. Bagley v. Peddie, 16 N. Y. 469. 2 Per Allen, J., in Hubbell v. Von 6 Cotheal v. Talmage, 9 N. Y. 551 ; Schoening, 49 N. Y. 326. Texas, etc., By. Co. v. Rust (1883), 19 48 754 TIME. §625 § 625. The same subject continued. — The parties may agree upon any sum as compensation for the breach of a contract which does not manifestly exceed the amount of the injury suf- fered, but when it is manifestly above that sum and the dam- ages such as can readily be shown, such sum so inserted in the contract will be regarded merely as a penalty to insure prompt payment or performance. 1 Fed. Rep. 239. Contract to build a railroad bridge, providing that the sum of $1,000 per week should be de- ducted from the contract price if its completion or provision for crossing trains was delayed beyond a given date, held a stipulation for liquidated damages. "The general principle upon which the law awards damages is com- pensation for the loss suffered. The amount may be fixed by the parties in advance, but where a lump sum is named by them the court will always look into the question whether this is really liquidated damages or only a penalty, the presumption being that it is the latter. The name by which it is called is of but slight weight, the con- trolling elements being the intent of the parties, and the special circum- stances of the case. The subject has always presented difficulties in the formulation of a general rule, and especially in its application. The books are full of inharmonious decis- ions." Per Mitchell, J., in Keck v. Bieber(1892) ,148 Pa.St. 645 ; King Iron Bridge, etc., Co. v. Pt. Louis, 43 Fed. Rep. 768 ; 10 Lawyers' Rep. Ann. 826, cases collected in note. "Where the sum is agreed to be paid for a single breach of the contract, and the dam- ages are wholly uncertain in amount, and the sum is not apparently dispro- portionate to the injury, all the cases agree that the sum should be recov- ered as the damages liquidated by the parties themselves for the breach. Where the sum is agreed to be paid for any of several breaches of the con- tract, and the damages resulting from any are certain in amount, or there is a fixed rule for measuring them, all the cases agree that the sum should be held as a penalty and the recovery limited to actual damages." Lyman v. Babcock, 40 Wis. 503. "In con- sidering whether a stipulation to pay a sum of money on breach of condi- tion is to be treated as a penalty or as liquidated damages, the test appears to be whether the loss which will accrue to the plaintiff from an in- fringement of the contract can, or can not, be accurately or reasonably calculated in money, antecedently to the breach. If it can be so calculated, then the fixing of a larger sum of mone3 r will be treated as a penalty." Mayne on Damages, 5th ed., 148. Rules determining between liquidated damages and penalties, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, §§441-445. 1 Schofield v. Tompkins, 95 111. 190, where the defendants agreed to buy land of the plaintiff and pay for it by a given day, and that, if they made default, the plaintiff should retain the land and recover the stipulated price as liquidated damages ; the court held that the stipulation must be treated as a stipulation for a penalty. "The fact that the parties fix a sum to he paid, and call it liquidated damages, does not always control the question as to the measure of the recovery for the breach of the contract. Courts will look to see the nature and pur- pose of fixing the amount of damages to be paid. And, if the clause fixing §626 TIME. 755 § 626. Illustrations. — Calling the sum named a penalty or liquidated damages is not conclusive, if the intention appears otherwise, from the consideration of the whole agreement ; if it be doubtful, from the whole agreement, whether it is in- the amount of the damages appears to have been inserted to secure prompt performance of the agreement, it will be treated as a penalty, and no more than the actual damages proved can be recovered." * * * * "To give the language in this case the construc- tion that it is absolute and must be carried out literally, would work the same wrong and oppression that was originally produced by enforcing pay- ment of penal bonds; and for the same reasons this should not be en- forced. But appellant should be left to recover such damages only as he can prove he has sustained by reason of the breach of the contract." Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517 ; Basye v. Am- brose, 28 Mo. 39; Morse v. Eathburn, 42 Mo. 594; Sanders v. Carter (1893), 91 Ga. 450. In Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)427, defendant agreed to fur- nish his biography to plaintiff for pub- lication, within a time fixed, and, for every day's delay beyond that time, to pay |165. On a suit to recover for a delay to furnish the biography for one hundred and sixty-one days, held that the plaintiff could recover only his actual loss. The court said the contract was "so extortionate and un- just that it raises the presumption of deceit and fraud in its inception." 1 Sutherland on Damages, 475, et seq. "The question whether a sum named in a contract, to be paid for a failure to perform, shall be regarded as stip- ulated damages or a penalty, has been frequenty before the courts, and has given them much trouble. The cases can not all be harmonized, and they furnish conspicuous examples of judi- cial efforts to make for parties wiser and more prudent contracts than they had made for themselves. Courts of law have in some cases assumed the functions of courts of equity, and have relieved parties by forced and unnat- ural constructions from stipulations highly penal. Where an amount stip- ulated as liquidated damages would be grossly in excess of the actual dam- ages, they have learned to hold it a penalty. Where the actual damages were uncertain and difficult of ascer- tainment, they have leaned to hold the stipulated amount to have been in- tended as liquidated damages. No form of words has been regarded as controlling; but the fundamental rule, as often announced, is that the con- struction of these stipulations depends, in each case, upon the intent of the parties, as evinced by the entire agree- ment, construed in the light of the circumstances under which it was made." Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N. Y. 45, per Earl, J. Bobeson v. Whitesides, 16 S. & E. 320. "Stip- ulated damages can onty be when there is a clear, unequivocal agree- greement which stipulates for the payment of a certain sum as a liqui- dated satisfaction fixed and agreed upon between the parties for the doing or not doing certain acts particularly expressed in the agreement. * * The contract should be express, or it should be a necessary implication from the nature of the transaction itself. When, however, the non-per- formance can be compensated with money, of which a jury may judge, it is most consonant to reason, and best comports with the understanding of the parties, that the damages should be commensurate with the loss actually sustained." 756 TIME. §626 tended to be a penalty or stipulated damages, it will be con- strued as a penalty, and if it is called a penalty it will be held to be such, unless that construction is overcome hj a very clear intention to the contrary, derived from other parts of the agree- ment. 1 Unless the intent of the parties is very clearly ex- pressed, a forfeiture named for non-fulfillment of a contract, where excessive will not be construed as intended to be liqui- dated damages. Thus when a contract for doing a piece of work in building a vessel stipulated for its completion by a specified time, " under a forfeiture of one hundred dollars a day for each and every day after the above date, until the same is completed," it was held a penalty. 2 If the contract provides 1 Whitfield v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 149; Cheddick v. Marsh, 21 N. J. Law, 463; Shiell v. McNitt, 9 Paige, 101 ; Green v. Price, 13 M. & W. 701. Chief Justice Marshall in Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, said: "In general a sum of money, in gross, to be paid for the non-performance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty. * * * It will not, of course, be con- sidered as liquidated damages. * * * Much stronger is the inference in favor of its being a penalty, when it is expressly reserved as one." Durst v. Swift, 11 Texas, 273, discussion of the rules respecting stipulations for penalties and liquidated damages. 2 Oolwell v. Lawrence, 38 N. Y. 71. "The word 'forfeiture' which is equiv- alent to a penalty is used, which man- ifests that a penalty was intended." "When the parties to a contract, in which the damages to be ascertained, growing out of a breach, are uncertain in amount, mutually agree that a cer- tain sum shall be the damages in case of a failure to perform, and in lan- guage plainly expressive of such agree- ment, I know of no sound principle or rule applicable to the construction of contracts that will enable a court of law to say that they intended something else. Where the sum fixed is greatly disproportionate to the pre- sumed actual damage, probably a court of equity may relieve; but a court of law has no right to errone- ously construe the intention of parties, when clearly expressed in the en- deavor to make better contracts for them than they have made for them- selves. In these as in all other cases, the courts are bound to ascertain and carry into effect the true intent of the parties." Per Wright, J., in Clement v. Cash, 21 N. Y. 253. The words "liquidated damages" are by no means conclusive. Wallis v. Smith (1882), L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 243. It was thought in Eeilly v. Jones, 1 Bing. 302, that they were conclusive, but Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, has shown that they are not. In that case the sum of $1,000 was "declared by the parties to be liquidated and as- certained damages, and not a penalty, or penal sum, or in the nature there- of." Yet, notwithstanding these sweeping words, the court, upon an examination of the contract, decided that the sum must be taken to be a penalty, and that it was for the jury to assess the real damages sustained by reason of the breach of the agree- ment in suit. If it is doubtful whether the sum is intended as a penalty or liquidated damages it will be con- strued as a penalty because the law 626 TIME. 757 that a larger sum shall be paid on the failure of the party to pay a less sum, the larger sum is treated as a penalty. 1 In the case of a contract for the payment of money simply, a stipula- tion to pay a fixed sum in default of performance by the obligor will be regarded as a penalty and not as a covenant for liquidated damages. This rule is based upon the principle that damages for the breach of such contracts are fixed and liquidated by the law, and require no liquidation by the parties. 2 favors mere indemnity. Monmouth Park Assn. v. Wallia Iron Works (1893), 55 N. J. Law, 132. In Orisdee v. Bolton, 3 0. & P. 240, it was held that either phrase "penalty," or "liquidated damages," may be con- trolled, by some other strong consid- eration ; neither, therefore, is abso- lutely conclusive. Best, C. J., also said: "The law relative to liquidated damages has always been in a state of great uncertainty. This has been oc- casioned by judges endeavoring to make for parties a better contract than they have made for themselves." "A court has no more authority to put a different construction on the part of an instrument ascertaining the dam- ages than it has to decide contrary to any other of its clauses." Nilson v. Jonesboro (1893), 57 Ark. 168. A contract between a municipal corpora- tion and parties building a street rail- way, who agreed to "forfeit and pay" $500 in default of its construction within a certain time, the municipal corporation could not in its corporate capacity suffer any injury by a breach of the contract. The court per Mans- field, J., said. "If an actual loss was contemplated by the situation in question it could only, therefore, have been such as would result to the pub- lic; and, as the parties must have known that it was wholly impractica- ble to measure this by any rule of damages, it is reasonable to suppose that they intended to fix by the terms of the contract the precise sum recov- erable for its breach." See article on "Liquidated Damages," by John Prof- fatt (1877), 12 Am. L. Rev. 286. 1 Haldeman v. Jennings, 14 Ark. 329 ; Peine v. Weber, 47 111. 41 ; Morse v. Rathburn, 42 Mo. 594; Adminis- trators of Smith v. Wainwright, 24 Vt. 97; Rutherford v. Stovel, 12 Up. Can. C. P. 9; Astley v. Weldon, 2 B. & P. 354 ; Reynolds v. Bridge, 6 E. & B. 528; 26 L. J. Q. B. 12. 2 Kuhn v. Myers, 37 Iowa, 351. "Liquidated damages are not applica- ble to such case. If they were, they might afford a sure protection for usury, and countenance oppression under the forms of law." Gray v. Crosby, 18 John. 219; Wright v. Dobie (1893), 3 Texas C. App. 194, $500 paid as a "forfeit ;" held that whether the payment was made as a penalty, or as liquidated damages, was a ques- tion of intent to be determined by the jury. "Whether the sum mentioned in an agreement to be paid for a breach is to be treated as a penalty or as liquidated and ascertained dam- ages is a question of law, to be de- cided by the judge upon a considera- tion of the whole instrument." Wilde, C. J., in Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716. 758 time. §§627,628 § 627. Stipulations in building contracts. — The stipulations of parties for specified damages on the breach of a contract to build within a limited time have frequently been enforced by the courts. In a contract to complete a grand-stand for a race- course by a designated day, the contractor agreed to pay the owner one hundred dollars a day for every day that he should be in default after the day stated, which sum was thereby agreed upon, fixed and determined as the damages which the owner would suffer by reason of such default, "and not by way of penalty." It was also agreed that the owner might deduct and retain the same out of any moneys becoming due to the con- tractor under the contract. In this case it was held that the sum of one hundred dollars a day was liquidated damages. 1 § 628. The same subject continued — Illustrations of penal- ties. — Where a building contract specified that twenty dollars should be paid for every day's delay in completing a house, the court held the stipulation to be a penalty, and said that only nominal damages could be recovered in the absence of proof that the owner was injured by the delay. 2 When the damages can 'Monmouth Park Association «.Wal- mand $4,000; held, liquidated dam- lis Iron Works (1893), 55 N. J. Law, ages. In Farnham v. Ross, 2 Hall, 132; in Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 T. R. 167, the covenant was to finish a build- 32, £10 per week for delay in fin- ing by a certain day, under a"pen- ishing the parish church; in Duck- alty of $30 " a day for every day there- worth v. Alison, 1 Mees. & W. 412, after that it should remain unfin- £5 per week for delay in completing ished, to be paid as "liquidated dam- repairs of a warehouse; in Legge v. ages;" held, liquidated damages. Ma- Harlock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for lone v. Philadelphia (1892), 147 Pa. delay in erecting a barn, wagon shed St. 416, contract for erection of a and granary ; in Law v. Local Board bridge, stipulating that the contractors (1892), L. R.1Q.B. 127,£100 and£5per should pay $50 for each day they were week for delay in constructing sewer- in default, as the damages were un- age work; in Ward ». Hudson River certain and not capable of being as- Bldg. Co.,125N.Y. 230; 26 N. E.Rep. certained by any satisfactory rule; 256, $10 a day for delay in erecting held, liquidated damages, dwelling-houses; O'Donnell v. Rosen- z Wilcus v. Kling, 87 111. 107; Con- berg, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 59, a stipula- don v. Kemper, 47 Kan. 126 (erecting tion for $10 a day for every day's delay a party wall and moving a building) ; in completing a building contract. In Brennan v. Clark (1890), 29 Neb. 385 Pearson v. Williams, 26 Wend. 630, a (building a house). In Muldoon v. purchaser of 14 city lots engaged to Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, a statutory rule erect on the lots two brick buildings prevailed. Lloyd's Law of Building, by a certain day, or to pay on de- 106. $ 629 time. 759 be really assessed, and they are fixed by the contract itself at an unconscionable sum, it is the plain duty of a court exercis- ing equity powers to relieve against such injustice, and treat the sum named as a penalty merely. A contract to raise a dwell- ing, the rental value of which was about twenty-five dollars per month, provided that the owner should be paid one hundred and fifty dollars per week after the expiration of the period within which the work was to be completed, the real damage being easily ascertainable, the stipulated sum was unconscionable. 1 In case of failure to complete buildings which are intended to be rented, the amount of damages ordinarily would be the loss of rent. 2 § 629. The intention of the parties and nature of the agree- ment — Controlling guides. — The question whether a sum stip- ulated for in a written contract, to be paid on its breach, is a penalty or liquidated damages, is a question for the court, to be determined by the intention of the parties as drawn from the words of the whole contract, examined in the light of its subject-matter and of its surroundings; in this the court will consider the relation which the sum stipulated bears to the ex- tent of the injury which may be caused by the several breaches provided against, the ease or difficulty of measuring a breach in damages, and such other matters as are legally or necessarily inherent in the transaction. 3 "While the words "forfeit," or 1 Clements v. Schuylkill, etc., B. Co. from the point of an investment, the (1890) , 132 Pa. St. 445. capital was $18,000, and for sixty-five 2 Brennan v. Clark, 29 Neb. 385. In days this capital yielded no income. Cochran v. People's Ry. Co. (1892), Allowing ten per cent.— a large inter- 113 Mo. 359 ; a suit at law for a bal- est on so large a sum — and we find ance on a building contract, where $325 would compensate for the use of the plaintiff agreed to pay $50 for the money, as a loan or mere invest- every day that the building was de- ment." * * * At the rate stipulated layed after a certain time, the amount the damages would have amounted in fixed not being denominated in the a year to a sum almost as large as the contract, either as penalty or liqui- capital invested, or total cost of the dated damages, the court held it a building." In re Newman Ex parte penalty to compel the performance of Capper, L. E. 4 Ch. D. 724 (stipulation the contract. There was a delay of held a penalty), sixty-five days in the completion of 3 March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. St the building. The court, perGantt, J., 335 ; Colwell v. Lawrence, 38 N. Y. 71 aaid: "Applying to this case the Cotheal v. Talmage, 9 N. Y. 551 ordinary tests, is it or not unreasonable Reynolds v. Bridge, 37 Eng. L. &Eq as liquidated damages? Viewing it 122; Magee v. Lavell, L. E. 9 C. P 760 TIME. §629 "forfeiture," "paid sum," or "penalty," used by parties in con- tracts, have sometimes been treated as furnishing a strong, if not conclusive, indication of the intent of the parties, yet it is well settled that the weight to be given to such words will depend on their connection with other parts of the instrument, the na- ture of the agreement, the intention of the parties, and other facts and circumstances. 1 Where there was an agreement for the sale of real estate which contained this stipulation: " The parties to the above agreement doth severally agree to forfeit the sum of five hundred dollars, say five hundred dollars, in case either party fail to comply with the terms of this agree- ment," the word "forfeit" was held to mean "to pay," and al- though the jury found the actual damages were fifty dollars, one-tenth the stipulated sum, the court upon the point re- served, "Whether the defendant was liable for the penalty or for only the actual damages," rendered judgment for the pen- alty. 2 107; Lansing v. Dodd, 45 N. J. Law, 525 ; Cochran v. People's Railway Company (1892), 113 Mo. 359. The use by the parties of the expres- sion "penalty" or "liquidated dam- ages" is not conclusive. The distinc- tion between penalties and liquidated damages depends on the intention of the parties to be gathered from the whole of the contract. If the inten- tion is to secure performance of the contract by the imposition of a fine or penalty, then the sum specified is a penalty ; but if, on the other hand, the intention is to assess the damages for breach of the contract, it is liqui- dated damages," per Lopes, L. J., in Law v. Local Board (1892), 1 Ch. 127. 'De Graff, etc., Co. v. Wickham (1892, Iowa); 52 N. W. Rep. 503 Chamberlain v. Bagley, 11 N. H. 234 Mclntire v. Cagley, 37 Iowa, 676 Wolf v. Des Moines, etc., Railway Co. (1884), 64 Iowa, 380. 2 Streeter v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450; Agnew, J., in delivering the opinion said: " In the earlier cases, the courts gave more weight to the language of the clause designating the sum as a penalty or as liquidated damages. The modern authorities attach greater importance to the meaning and intention of the parties. Yet the intention is not all-controlling, for in some cases the subject-matter and surroundings of the contract will control the intention where equity absolutely demands it. A sum ex- pressly stipulated as liquidated dam- ages will be relieved from, if it is obviously to secure payment of an- other sum capable of being compen- sated by interest. On the other hand, a sum denominated a penalty or for- feiture will be considered liquidated damages, where it is fixed upon by the parties as the measure of the dam- ages, because the nature of the case, the uncertainty of the proof, or the difficulties of reaching the damages by proof, have induced them to make the damages a subject of previous adjustment. In some cases the mag- §630 TIME. 761 § 630. Fractions of a day in the computation of time. — The general rule of law in the computation of time is that frac- tions of a day are not reckoned. 1 But this rule does not pre- vail when it becomes essential for the purpose of justice to as- certain the exact hour or minute. 2 Like most general rules it nitude of the sum, and its proportion to the probable consequence of a breach, will cause it to be looked upon as minatory only. Upon the whole, the only general observation we can make is, that in each case we must look at the language of the con- tract, the intention of the parties as gathered from all its provisions, the subject of the contract and its sur- roundings, the ease or difficulty of measuring the breach in damages, and the sum stipulated, and from the whole gather the view which good conscience and equity ought to take of the case." Mathews v. Sharp, 99 Pa. St. 560; Pennypacker v. Jones (1884), 106 Pa. St. 237; Smith®. Dickenson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 630; Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pul. 346 ; Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141; Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend. 447. The conflict in the decisions on this subject is one to the fact that each case presents new and distinct considerations. Sanders v. Carter (1893), 91 Ga. 450. "The subject- matter of the contract, and the inten- tion of the parties, are the controlling guides. If, from the nature of the agreement, it is clear that any attempt to get at the actual damage would be difficult, if not in vain, then the courts will incline to give the relief which the parties have agreed on. But if, on the other hand, the contract is such that the strict construction of the phraseology would work absurdity or oppression, the use of the term liqui- dated damages will not prevent the courts from inquiring into the actual injury sustained, and doing justice between the parties." Sedgwick on Damages, §396. 1 Inre Railway, etc., Co., L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 204; Field v. Jones, 9 East, 151. Sir William Grant, in Lester v. Gar- land, 15 Ves. 248, says: "Our law re- jects fractions of a day more generally than the civil law does. The effect is to render the day a sort of indivisible point, so that any act done in the compass of it is no more referable to any one than to any other portion of it; but the act and the day are co- extensive, and, therefore, the act can not properly be said to have passed until the day is passed." Wright v. Mills, 4 H. & N. 488; Queen v. St. Mary, 1 El. & Bl. 816. It is settled that acts of congress take effect from their date when no other time is speci- fied, and are operative from the first moment of that day. Fractions of the day are not recognized. Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191 ; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104. The question in that case was whether a certain cargo of goods imported into the United States came under the operation of the act of 1812 imposing double duties, and depended upon the time when the act took effect. The act was approved and signed by the president on the 1st day of July, and the goods were imported on the same day. The court held that the day on which the act was approved was to be included in its operation. 2 Combe v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1423 ; Follett v. Hall, 16 Ohio, 111; Westbrook Manufacturing Co. v. Grant, 60 Maine, 88; Grosvenor v. Magill, 37 111. 239. Generally the law does not regard fractions of a day, except in cases where the hour itself is material. Mitchell v. Schoonover, 16 Ore. 211, 762 TIME. §631 is subject in its application to just and reasonable exceptions. It does not prevail in questions concerning the acts of parties where it becomes necessary to distinguish and ascertain which of several persons has a priority of right, as where a bond and release are executed on the same day. 1 § 631. Computation of time from a particular day, or a par- ticular event. — In the interpretation of contracts, where time is to be computed from a particular day or a particular event, as when an act is to be performed within a specified period from or after a day named, the general rule is to exclude the day thus designated and to include the last day of the speci- citing Marvin v. Marvin, 75 N. Y. 240; Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117; Colum- bia Turnpike Road v. Haywood, 10 Wend. 422; Hughes v. Patton, 12 Wend. 234; Blydenburgh v. Cotheal, 4 N. Y. 418. ' Matter of Welman, 20 Vt. 653 ; Louisville v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 104 U. S. 469. "But this ancient maxim is now chiefly known by its exceptions." Per Lowell, J., in Maine v. Gilman (1882), 11 Fed. Rep. 214. In the matter of Richardson, 2 Story C. C. 571, Story, J., said: "lam aware that it is often laid down that in law there is no fraction of a day. But this doctrine is true only sub modo, and in a limited sense, where it will promote the right and justice of the case. It is a mere legal fiction, and, therefore, like all other fictions, is never allowed to operate against the right and justice of the case. On the contrary, the very truth and facts, in point of time, may always be averred and proved in furtherance of the right and justice of the case ; and there may be even a priority in an in- stant of time; or, in other words, it may have a beginning and an end. The common case put to illustrate the doctrine that there is no fraction in a day is the case when a person arrives at majority. Thus, if a man should be born on the first day of February, at eleven o'clock at night, and should live to the thirty-first day of January, twenty-one years after, and should, at one o'clock of the morning of that day, make his will, and after- wards die by six o'clock in the even- ing of the same day, he will be held to be of age, and his will be ad- judged good. Here the rule is ap- plied in favor of the party, to put a termination to the incapacity of in- fancy. * * * * But many cases may easily be put when the real fact is allowed to prevail, and to be con- clusive. Thus, for example, if a woman makes a deed of her land in the morn- ing and is afterwards married or dies on the same day, the deed is good. So if my ancestor die at five o'clock in the morning and I enter into his lands at six o'clock of the same day, the lease is good. * * * * So that we see that there is no ground of author- ity, and certainly there is no reason to assert, that any such general rule prevails, as that the law does not al- low of fractions of a day. On the con- trary, common sense and common justice equally sustain the propriety of allowing fractions of a day, when- ever it will promote the purposes of substantial justice." Westbrook Man- ufacturing Co. v. Grant, 60 Maine, 88. §631 TIME. 763 fied period. 1 In a leading English case in regard to a lease which was to commence from the day of the date, the matter turned upon the question whether the phrase "to commence from the day of the date " was to be construed as excluding, or in- cluding, the day on which the lease bore date. The court estab- lished the principle that the words when used in an instrument were to receive an inclusive or exclusive sense, according to the intention with which they were used, to be derived from the con- text and subject-matter, and so as to effectuate, and not destroy, the deed of the parties. 2 Many early cases made a distinction be- tween computations from a day or a date and computations from an act done, or from an event. But this distinction does not rest upon a sound principle and in most jurisdictions it is no longer recognized. The tendency of recent decisions is very strongly towards the adoption of a general rule which excludes the day as the terminus a quo in such cases. But this rule is not in- flexible, and in the interpretation of a statute or contract it yields to a manifest purpose or intention in conflict with it. s 1 Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. 177 ; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12, ■which was an action on a promissory note payable on demand. The note was dated February 14, 1839, and the question was whether suit com- menced on the 14th of February, 1845, saved the operation of the statute of limitations. The court held that it did. Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56: "No rule, however, is to be en- forced so sternly as to defeat the in- tent of the parties ; that is paramount to all other considerations, and is al- ways to be carried into effect, if not contrary to law or public policy." Per Foster, J. Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502; Duffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. St. 240 (a lease for one year) ; Weld v. Barker, 153 Pa. St. 465; Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How. Pr. 193. "Time is not, therefore, computed from the hour of the day on which the event happened, to the corresponding hour of the day of performance, but the computation is from the day when the act is done, such day being re- garded as a point of time. The com- putation begins with the expiration of such day. It is thus computed literal- ly from such day, that is, from its close, its ending, its expiration." Per Cowles, J. 2 Pugh (j. Duke of Leeds, Cowp. 714, opinion by Lord Mansfield ; Sands v. Lyons, 18 Conn. 18. In the lead- ing case of Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485, it was held that under a statute authorizing the owner of an equity of redemption, sold on execu- tion and conveyed by an officer, to re- deem it "within one year next after the time of executing" the deed, the day on which the deed was executed was excluded. 3 Per Knowlton, J., Seward v. Hay- den, 150 Mass. 158. The American cases almost uniformly exclude the first day. Teucher v. Hiatt, 23 Iowa, 527; Rand v. Rand, 4 N. H. 267; Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow. 518; 14 Am. Dec. 519; Ex parte Dean, 764 TIME. §§ 632, 633 § 632. The same subject continued. — Where goods were sold to be paid for " in two months time," it was held that the last day was included and the first, the day of the sale, excluded. 1 In the case of a lease granted for twenty-one years from the 25th of March in a particular year, the lease was held to last until the end of the 25th of March of the last year of the lease. 2 The term "an interval of not less than fourteen days" means that there must be an interval of fourteen clear days. 3 § 633. Time of payment of promissory notes. — A note pay- able in a certain number of days is payable on the last day, in the same manner as if that had been specified to be the day of payment. 4 In computing the time when a note, payable at a certain number of months after date, will become due, the rule is to exclude the day of the date from the calculation, and in- clude the day of payment, when no days of grace are allowed. 5 2 Cow. 605; 14 Am. Dec. 521; Portland Bank v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass. 205; Gillespie v. White, 16 John. 117. In Iowa the manner of computing time has been regulated by statute, §4121. "Unless the terms 'clear days' are used, the mode of computing time is by excluding the first day and including the last." Other states have also made similar provision. 'Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. & W. 473. 2 Ackland v. Lutley, 9 Ad. & E. 879. Atkins v. Sleeper, 7 Allen, 487. A lease for a term of years "from the first day of July" was held to begin on the 2d of July. It was stated that the general rule was to include the day where time was computed from an act done, and to exclude the day where it was computed from the day of the act done. Perry v. Provident Life Insurance, etc., Co., 99 Mass. 162, where the policy of insurance re- quired that the computation be made from the time of the act done, viz. . the accident. Where a bond had to be given within six months after the testator's decease, the day of the death of the testator was not reck- oned. Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248. 3 In re Railway Sleepers Supply Co. (1885), L. E. 29 Ch. Div. 204. In Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49, a calen- dar month's notice was required to be given. Alderson, B., said: "Where there is given to a party a certain space of time to do some act, which space of time is included between two other acts to be done by another per- son, both the days of doing those acts ought to be excluded, in order to in- sure to him the whole of that space of time." In Chambers v. Smith, 12 M. & W. 2, the words were "not being less than fifteen days." The court held that the words meant fifteen all days or clear days. In The Queen v. Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E. 173, the statute required a notice of fourteen days at least before a given event. Both the day of the act and that of the event must be excluded. 4 Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. 6 Roehner v. Knickerbocker Life In- surance Co. (1875), 63 N. Y. 160; cit- ing Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Lord Ray. 280 ; Campbell v. French, 6 T. R. 200. § 634 time. 765 When a promissory note is dated on a day of any month, and made payable at a specified number of months after date, with- out days of grace, it accrues due and payable on the same day in the stipulated number of months afterward with the day of the date of the note. 1 If there be several notes of the same date, some payable in six months, some in six months from date, and some in six months after date, they all have the same pay-day. In all of them the day of date is excluded. If dated December 9, they would, with the grace, become pay- able June 12. 2 And if paper is payable at so many days after sight, after demand, or after a particular event, the day of sight, demand, or of the happening of the event, is likewise excluded. 3 If the paper was dated January 1st, and payable thirty days after date, it would fall due, grace included, on the 3d of February, and if the paper was dated February 1st, it would be due, grace included, on the 6th of March, except in leap-year, when the date of payment would be the 5th of March.' § 634. Day of performance falling on Sunday. — For the purpose of performance of a contract, Sunday is considered dies non, and hence, if the last day happens to be Sunday, it is to be regarded as stricken from the calendar, although in- tervening Sundays are to be counted. Performance of a con- tract which matures on Sunday may be exacted on the follow- ing day. 6 This is conformable to a general principle of law, 1 Koehner v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. any time remain unpaid and in arrears Co., 63 N. Y. 160, citing Hartford for the space of thirty days after it Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94; Ripley v. should be payable, the principle Greenleaf, 2 Vt. 129. should become due at the option of 2 Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 Me. the mortgagee. Six months' interest 580. became due July 29, 1891. Payment 3 Sturdy v. Henderson, 4 B. & Aid. was tendered on the 29th of August 592; Loring v. Hailing, 15 John. 120; and refused. The thirty days of grace Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, expired August 28th and the defend- §626. ant's miscalculation, being the result 4 Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, of carelessness, could not be regarded § 316; Serrell v. Rothstein (1892), 49 inequity as a mistake. N. J. Eq. 385, a bill to foreclose a 5 Dies non is an abbreviation of the mortgage. The mortgage contained a phra^edii>snonjuriJirns used to denote proviso that if the interest should at non-judicial days. Porter v. Pierce 766 time. § 635 that where the obligor can not perform a contract according to the literal terms of it, he shall perform it as nearly as possi- ble. 1 The weight of the authorities support the proposition that in case of a non-negotiable note, or a negotiable one with- out days of grace, falling due, according to its face, upon Sun- day, payment can not be required on the preceding Saturday. The following Monday is the proper date for presentment and protest, unless that is also a legal holiday. 2 In the case of a bank check falling due on Sunday, it was held that that day should not be counted, and a compliance with the stipulations of the contract on the next day was deemed in law a perform- ance. 3 In an action upon a policy of life insurance, which was to terminate in case the premium charged should not be paid in advance on or before the day at noon on which the same should become due and payable, it was held that the premium when it became due on Sunday was not payable till Monday. 4 § 635. Paper maturing on Sundays and holidays where grace is allowable. — When days of grace are allowable on a bill or note and the third day falls on Sunday the bill or note is pay- able on the previous Saturday. It is said in such case the note (1890), 120 N. Y. 217; Howard v. Ives, on Saturday and payable one day 1 Hill, 263 ; 2 Wharton on Contracts, after date. Commercial Bank v. Var- 897. No one is bound to do any work num, 49 N. Y. 269. In Patrick v. in performance of his contract on Sun- Faulke, 45 Mo. 312, holding that this day, unless the work by its very rule was not applicable to a mechanic's nature, or by express agreement, is to lien expiring on Sunday, and thatsuch I be done on that day, and can be then lien must be strictly construed against clone, without a breach of the law. 2 the lien holder, and hence that it Parsons on Contracts, 666. would not continue over till Monday. 1 Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. In Kilgour v. Miles, 6 Gill & J. 268, 2 Hirsbfield v. Fort Worth National which was a case of a non-negotiable Bank (1892), 83 Tex. 452; Avery v. note payable in merchandise and fall- Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, which was an ing due on Sunday, the court held action on a note not negotiable which the same rule should be applied as to fell due on Sunday, and the court notes upon which days of grace are held that a tender on Monday was a allowed. good bar to the action. Barrett v. 3 Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; 32 Allen, 10 Ohio, 426, promissory note Am. Dec. 530; 3 Ames's Cases on Bills payable in woolen cloth falling due on and Notes, 294. Sunday. Sanders v. Ochiltree, 5 Por- 4 Hammond v. American Mutual, ter, 73; 30 Am. Dec. 551, a note made etc., Co., 10 Gray, 306. § 636 time. 767 by its terms would be due and payable two days earlier tban Saturday, and that what was originally a mere indulgence to casualty or oversight should not be extended, and that it was more reasonable to take from than to add to a period of time originally allowed as mere grace and favor. 1 The law of the place of payment determines the question of legal holidays. It is generally provided by statute, in the United States, that bills and notes maturing on a holiday shall become due and shall be presented for payment on the day preceding the holi- day. 2 What days are legal holidays are determined by statute law and by the decisions of the courts in the various states. 3 Commencement day at Harvard college is not a holiday, but a usage of any bank, in respect to notes falling due on that day, to make a demand on the maker and give notice to the in- dorser on the day preceding was held to be binding on an in- dorser of a note discounted for him at the bank, who is con- versant of such usage; and whether the note is made payable at such bank or not is immaterial. 4 If grace expires on Sunday, and the Saturday previous is a holiday, such as Christmas day, the note would fall due on the Friday preceding. 5 §636. The term "month." — The term "month," when used in contracts or deeds, must be construed, where the par- 'Farnum v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 92; v. Burr, 2 Cai. Cas. 195 (July 4) ; Shel- Hirschfield v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank don v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129 (July 4). (1892), 83 Texas, 452; Bussard v. 'Christmas is universally regarded Levering, 6 Wheat. 102; Kuntz v. as a legal holiday. The Fourth of July Tempel, 48 Mo. 71 ; Irwin v. Brown, is everywhere regarded so in the 2 Cranch C. C. 314; Sheppard v. United States ; and in many of them Spates, 4 Md. 400; Fleming v. Ful- the twenty-second of February, Deco- ton, 7 Miss. 473; Jackson v. Rich- ration Day, Thanksgiving Day and ards, 2 Cai. R. 343; Ontario Bank v. New Year's Day. In most of the Petrie 3 Wend. 456; West v. Lee, states there are statutes specifying 50 How. Pr. 313 ; Tassell ». Lewis, 1 the legal holidays and prescribing the Lord Ray. 743. The days of grace practice with respect to them ; but, in- upon a bill or note nominally payable dependent of them, usage would de- on Sunday are computed from that termine whether any day was to be day, and not from the preceding Satur- so regarded, and also the regulations day. Wooley v. Clements, 11 Ala. 220. concerning it. 1 Parsons on Notes 2 Randolph on Commercial Paper, and Bills, 403. §§ 1031, 1032; Barlow «. Gregory, 31 4 City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick 414. Conn. 261 (New Year's Day) ; Lewis 5 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 627. 768 time. § 637 ties have not themselves given to it a definition and there is no legislative provision on the subject, to mean calendar, and not lunar months. 1 A different rule rests in England with refer- ence to other than mercantile contracts. In the absence of special circumstances, which may lead to a contrary conclusion, a month is usually held in that country to mean a lunar month, and not calendar month. Such was the general rule in the common law. 2 § 637. Construction of the words "until," "by," "forth- with" and "immediate." — The word "until "may be con- strued either exclusive or inclusive of the day to which it ap- plied, according to the context and subject-matter. 3 Its more obvious meaning requires the exclusion of the day named, but the circumstances and subject-matter of each case presented must determine. Where an act continued the char- ter of a corporation " until the first day of January," it was held that the charter expired on the 31st day of December.' In an action on a policy of insurance for six months from the 14th day of February until the 14th day of August, the ques- tion was whether the 14th day of August was included so as to cover a fire which occurred on that day, and it was held that it was. 5 A contract to complete work "by" a certain time means that it shall be done before that time. Where parties agreed to build a saw-mill and "to have it completed by November next," it was held that the month of November was excluded. 6 1 Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wall. The provision requiring books con- 177; Churchill v. Merchant's Bank, 19 taining the record of assessed valua- Pick. 532 ; Bishop on Contracts, § 1339. tion of real and personal estate to be 2 1 Wood on Limitations, 130; Rex open for examination and correction v. Peekbam, Carth. 406; Rex v. Ad- from the second Monday of January derley, Doug. 462 ; Lacon v. Hooper, 6 until the first day of May, does not T. R. 224; Simpson v. Margitson, 11 Q. include the last day mentioned. B. 23; Strong o.Birchard, 5 Conn. 357; Clarke v. Mayor (1889), 111 N. Y. Bishop on Written Laws, § 105. It is 621. now provided that in all statutes the 5 Isaacs v. Royal Insurance Co., 5 word "month" shall be deemed and L. R. Ex. 296. "If the 14th of Febru- taken to mean calendar month unless ary was included, the 14th of August words be added showing lunar month was not. Otherwise the period of to be intended. 13 & 14 Vic, c. 21. more than six months would be cov- 3 King v. Stevens, 5 East, 244. ered by the policy." Per Martin, B. 1 People t,. Walker, 17 N. Y. 502. 6 Rankin v. Woodworth, 3 P. & W. § 638 time. 769 The words "immediate" or "forthwith" mean a reasonable time in view of the circumstances. Where a policy of insurance re- quired notice of loss by fire to be given to the secretary "forth- with," it was held that the rule meant due diligence under all the circumstances and notice after eighteen days was not, in that case, deemed sufficient. 1 Where a policy of insurance required immediate notice to be given by the assured in case of a loss, and in the great fire in Chicago, on October 9, 1871, the plaintiff's property was burned, notice of the loss given November 13, 1871, was held to have been given in sufficient time, in view of the great derangement in all kinds of business caused by the fire. 2 In giving a construction to terms of this description, some regard must undoubtedly be had to the nature of the act or thing 'to be performed, and the circumstances of the case. Nothing more is imposed upon the party than what is called due diligence 1 , under all the circumstances of the case. There must be no unnecessary procrastination or delay, nothing which the law calls laches. 3 § 638. The words "from and after." — In the construction of the words "from and after," as applied in a contract to a (Pa.)48. "Where a thing is ordered by The settled rule is to construe such a particular day, it is with a view of requirements liberally in favor of the having the use of it on the day. Thus assured, and strictly against the in- a coat is ordered by Sunday with a surer. Piedmont & A. Ins. Co. v. view of wearing it to church." Young, 58 Ala. 476; 29 Am. Rep. 770; 1 Edwards v. Lycoming, etc., Ins. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. John- Co. (1874), 75 Pa. St. 378. ston, 80 Ala. 467; 60 Am. Rep. 112; 2 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. McGin- Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. Mc- nis, 87 111. 70. "Forthwith" in all such Haffie, L. R. 4 Q. B. Div. 670 C. A. policies means without unnecessary de- (construction of the words "as soon as lay, or with reasonable diligence, un- possible") ; Roberts v. Brett, 11 H. L. der the circumstances of the particular C. 337, and 34 L. J. C. P. 241 (as to case. St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 interpretation of "forthwith") ; Strau- Mo. 27S ; 49 Am. Dec.74, where the fire ton v. Wood, 16 Q. B. 638, where the occurred on the 15th and the plaintiffs contract was to deliver goods "forth- hearing of it on the 18th gave notice with," the price being made payable by mail on the 23d, this was held to within fourteen days from the making be a sufficient compliance with a con- of the contract. •dition requiring notice to be given 3 Per Sutherland, J., in Inman v. "forthwith." New York Central Ins. Western Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 452. Co. v. National Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468. 49 770 TIME. § 638 period of time, if the time is computed from an act done, it includes the day on which the act is done; if from a day specified, it excludes the day. 1 Under a contract to pay plaint- iff a certain price for all stamps ordered and delivered by a certain date, which amount is to be full compensation for everything done under the contract, plaintiff agreeing to keep on hand stamps sufficient to meet all orders, the United States is not liable for stamps remaining on hand after expiration of the period, although manufactured and stored under super- vision of a government agent. 2 1 Chicago Title Co. v. Smyth (Iowa, 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 792. " We next inquire as to the proper construction to be given to the words 'from and after April 1, 1893,' as written in this contract. The learned district judge, after noting that the courts have dif- fered in their construction of the words 'from and after,' correctly states the rule to be as sustained by the weight of authority, 'that if it is from an act done it is inclusive, but if from a day it is exclusive.' This statement of the rule is based upon reason as well as authority. If it is from an act done, the time commences immedi- ately upon the act being done. We have a familiar illustration in legis- lative enactments which are to take effect from and after their passage, or from and after publication. In the case of Arnold v. United States, 147 U. S. 494; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406, the question was whether the ad- ditional duties imposed by an act passr-d and which took effect on July 1, 1812, were chargeable upon the car- go of a ship that came within the ju- risdiction of the United States, and within one of its collection districts, on the 1st day of July, 1812. The court says : 'The statute was to take effect from its passage, and it is a gen- eral rule that, where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. ' It was held that the goods were subject to the additional duty. In Arrowsmith v. Hamering, 39 Ohio St. 573, a petition in error was filed on April 18, 1883, without leave of court. On that day an act was passed, and took effect, amending the statute so as to require leave to be first grant- ed. It was held that, by presumption of law, the act took effect from the commencement of that da}', but that such presumption would not prevail where it is in conflict with any right required in actual points of time, or on that day before that act took effect, and that, in such case, the exact time in the day may be shown; that, in the absence of proof that the case was pending on that day before the act was passed and took effect, the pre- sumption of law will prevail that the act took effect from the commence- ment of the day. Mr. Bishop, in his work on Contracts (§ 1343), states the rule thus: 'Where time is computed from an act done, the general rule is to include the day. Where it is com- puted from the day of the act done, the day is excluded.' He adds: 'But it is believed that not all courts will, and none should, adhere to this or any other like technical distinction, in a case where, by disregarding it, they can better carry into effect what, all the consideration being taken into account, is reasonably plain the par- ties meant.' " 2 Continental Bank Note Co. v. Uni- ted States, 154 U. S. 671 ; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1194. CHAPTER XVII. IMPLIED CONTRACTS. )639. Distinction between express §655. and implied contracts. Quasi-contracts or contracts im- 656. plied in law. The same subject continued. 657. Illustrations. Further illustrations. When silence imports assent. Where the law will not imply 658. a contract. 646. The same subject continued. 659. 647. Waiver of tort and suing in as- sumpsit. 660. Liability of corporations on implied contracts. 661. Acceptance of benefits — Gra- tuitous services. 662. Acceptance of benefits where a promise to pay is implied. 663. The same subject continued — Illustrations. Bequest without benefit. 664. Where the law will not imply a promise owing to relation- 665. ship. 666. 654. The same subject continued — Illustrations. 667. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. Parent and child — Rule as to services rendered. Case of a person standing in loco parentis. Exception to the general rule that a child is not entitled to compensation for services to a parent. Contract for services where skill is required. Implied contracts of profes- sional men. Recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact. Effect of negligence upon the right of recovery. Recovery of money paid under mistake of law. Ignorantia juris neminem ex- cusat — Exception in the case of ignorance of a foreign law. Recovery of money paid under duress or compulsion. Voluntary payment of taxes. Recovery of illegal taxes paid under compulsion. Effect of a protest. § 639. Distinction between express and implied contracts. — The term "implied contract" is generally used to denote a promise which the law, from the existence of certain facts, presumes that a party has made. 1 An implied contract is where the intention of the parties may be gathered from their acts and from surrounding circumstances, as distinguished from an express contract, where a party stipulates in direct 1 Swift's Digest, 182. (771) 772 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §639 terms, verbally or in writing. 1 Implied contracts, it has been said, are such as reason and justice dictate, and which the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform, and, upon this presumption, makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-performance. 2 But all true contracts grow out of the intentions of the parties to transactions, and are dictated only by their mutual and accordant wills. When this intention is expressed the contract is called an express one. When it is not expressed, it may be inferred, implied or pre- sumed, from circumstances as really existing, and then the contract, thus ascertained, is called an implied one. 3 Both ex- press and implied contracts are founded upon the actual agree- ments of the parties, the only distinction being in the charac- ter of the evidence by which the contract is proved. 4 An express contract is proved by an actual agreement; an implied contract by circumstances and the general course of dealing between the parties. 6 People, etc., v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144. See 20 Am. Jur. 5. "The inten- tion of the parties to any particular transaction may be gathered from their acts and deeds, in connection with the surrounding circumstances, as well as from their words ; and the law therefore implies from the silent language of men's conduct and actions, contracts and promises as forcible and binding as those that are made by express words, or through the medium of written memorials." 1 Addison on Contracts, 23. "A great mass of human transactions depends upon im- plied contracts ; upon contracts which are not written, but which grow out of the acts of the parties. In such cases the parties are supposed to have made those stipulations, which, as honest, fair, and just men, they ought to have made." Marshall, Oh. J., in Ogden ». Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 341. 2 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 150; People v. Bennett, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 343; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, A promise will be implied when equity and good conscience require one, even though none was expressly made. Turner v. Jones, 1 Lans. 147. 3 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465, per Lowrie, J. ; Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345. The consent of the par- ties is of the essence of a contract. But this consent may be manifested in different ways. When it is mani- fested by words, the contract is styled express. When it is manifested by conduct, or by signs which are not words, the contract is styled implied, or more properly , tacit. 3 Austin on Jurisprudence, 223. 4 Keel v. Larkin, 72 Ala. 493; Chil- cott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502; City Council of Montgomery v. Montgom- ery Water Works Co. (1884), 77 Ala. 248; (action by water-works company against municipal corporation for breach of contract). 5 Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B.& Ad.415, per Lord Tenterden, C. J. ; Story on Contracts, § 11 ; Keener on Quasi Contracts, 5. An implied promise or § 640 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 773 § 640. Quasi-contracts or contracts implied in law. — There is a distinction between contracts which may be implied from the acts of parties where there was an intention to contract, al- though not expressed, which have been called " contracts im- plied in fact," and contracts implied in law, where there is no intention to create a contract, and no agreement of the party, but where the law has imposed an obligation which is enforced as if it were an obligation arising ex contractu. 1 In this class of cases the law prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons between whom circumstances have arisen which make it just that one should have a right, and the other should be subject to a liability similar to the rights and liabilities in certain cases of express contract. Thus, if one man has obtained money from another, through the medium of oppression, imposition, extortion or deceit, or by the commission of a trespass, such money may be recovered back, for the law implies a promise from the wrong-doer to restore it to the rightful owner, although it is obvious that this is the opposite of his intention. 8 Im- plied or constructive contracts of this class are more properly called gwasi-contracts. 8 contract is but an express promise ment were designated by the Roman proved by circumstantial evidence, jurists as quasi ex contractu, as spring- per Allen, J., in McCoun v. New ing neither from a contract nor delict York, etc., E. Co., 50 N. Y. 176. "The and yet making a nearer approach to difference between express and im- the former character than the latter, plied contracts is merely a difference in Hare on Contracts, 103. the mode of proof." Church ^.Imperial 2 People v. Speir, 77 N. Y. 144. Gas Light and Coke Co., 6 Ad.&E. 846, 3 "It has been usual with English per Lord Denman, C. J. "The ex- critics to identify the gaasi-contracts pression 'implied contract' is perhaps with'implied contracts ; but this is an open to objection in that it seems to error, for implied contracts are true admit that an entire contract in all contracts, which quasi-contracts are its parts may be implied. The par- not. In implied [contracts, acts and ties to a contract can never be implied, circumstances are the symbols of the nor the subject-matter, nor the con- same ingredients which are symbol- sideration. These must be shown, ized, in express contracts, by words. But the promise which is necessary * * But a ^wasi-contract is not a to complete a contract may be im- contract at all. The commonest sam- plied," per Andrews, J., in Davis o. pie of the class is the relation subsist- Town of Seymour (1890) , 59 Conn. 531. ing between two persons, one of whom 1 Inhabitants of Milford v. Common- has paid money to the other through wealth, 144 Mass. 64. Obligations hav- mistake. The law, consulting the ing a lawful source other than agree- interests of morality, imposes an obli- 774 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §641 § 641. The same subject continued. — The term "implied contract" is sometimes used to designate legal obligations, which, in fact, are not contracts at all, but are considered so only by a legal fiction for the sake of the remedy. 1 A judg- ment for damages, estimated in money, is sometimes called a specialty or contract of record, because it establishes a legal obligation to pay the amount recovered, and, by a fiction of law a promise to pay is implied where such legal obligation exists. It is on this principle that an action ex contractu will lie upon a judgment. 2 If the party obtain the money of an- other by mistake, it is his duty to refund it, not from any agreement on his part, but from the general obligation to do justice, which rests upon all persons. 8 As it has been customary to regard all obligations as arising ex contractu or ex delicto, it is readily seen why obligations created by law should have been treated as contracts.* gation on the receiver to refund ; but the very nature of the transaction indicates that it is not a contract, in- asmuch as the convention, the most essential ingredient of contract, is wanting." Maine's Ancient Law, 3d Am. ed., 332. " In contracts it is the consent of the contracting parties which produces the obligation, in §M«si-contracts there is not any con- sent. The law alone, or natural equity, produces the obligation by rendering obligatory the fact from which it results. Therefore, these facts are called 5M«si-contracts, because without being contracts, they produce obliga- tions in the same manner as actual." 1 Pothier on Obligations, [114]. Prof. Keener in substituting the term ' ' quasi- contract" for the term "contract im- plied in law" has followed the lead of Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir Will- iam Anson. He states that quasi- contracts may be said in general to be founded: 1. Upon a record; 2. Upon a statutory, or official, or cus- tomary duty; 3. Upon the doctrine that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Keener on ^Masi-Contracts, 16. 1 Bixby v. Moor, 51 N. H. 402. "The idea of a contract implied in law is a legal fiction, invented and used for the sake of the remedy, to enforce the performance of a legal duty." Com- mercial Bank v. Pfeiffer, 22 Hun, 327. 2 Louisiana v. Mayor, 109 U. S. 285. 3 Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450. 4 Prof. J. B. Ames on "Implied As- sumpsit," 2 Harvard Law Rev. 64. "A statute liability wants all the ele- ments of a contract, consideration and mutuality as well as the assent of the parties." Per Allen, J., in McCoun v. New York, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176. "In the action of as- sumpsit, as the word assumpsit im- plies, whether it be special or in- debitatus assumpsit, a promise must always be alleged, and at one time it was an allegation which had to be proved. It was only natural, there- fore, that the courts in using a purely contractual remedy to give relief in a § 642 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 775 § 642. Illustrations. — Where one person renders services for another, which are known to and accepted by him, the law or- dinarily implies a promise to pay therefor. 1 Where one person employs another to labor for him, or to render him other services, or where a guest enters an inn and takes refreshment or lodging, although nothing is stipulated concerning price or payment, the law is said to imply a contract and a promise to' pay a reasonable sum for the refreshments or services re- ceived. 8 The possession and beneficial enjoyment of real prop- class of cases possessing none of the elements of contract should have re- sorted to fictions to justify such a course. This was done in the exten- sion of assumpsit to quasi-contract, and the insuperable difficulty of proving a promise where none existed was met by the statement that 'the law implied a promise.' The state- ment that the law imposed the obliga- tion would not have met the difficul- ties of the situation, since the action of assumpsit presupposed the exist- ence of a promise. The fiction of a promise was adopted then in this class of cases solely that the remedy of assumpsit might be used to cover a class of cases where, in fact, there was no promise." Keener on Quasi- Contracts, 14. In Sceva v. True, 53 N. H. 627, Ladd, J., said: "There is a class of legal rights, with their cor- relative legal duties, analogous to the obligationes quasi ex contractu of the civil law which seem to lie in the re- gion between contracts on the one hand, and torts on the other, and to call for the application of a remedy not strictly furnished either by ac- tions ex contractu, or actions ex delicto. The common law supplies no action of duty, as it does of assumpsit and trespass; and hence the somewhat awkward contrivance of this fiction to apply the remedy of assumpsit where there is no true contract, and mo promise to support it." 1 McGarvy v. Eoods, 73 Iowa, 363 ; Cowan v. Musgrave, 73 Iowa, 384; Blount v. Guthrie, 99 N. C. 93 ; Mc- Millan v. Page, 71 Wis. 655; Johnson u.The Frank S. Hall, 38 Fed. Rep. 258 ; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 76 Ala. 303. Where a railroad company has been carrying the mails and receiving pay therefor, no express contract being proven, the law implies a contract. Railroad Co. v. United States, 101 U. S. 543. Where services are ren- dered by one person to another and knowingly accepted, unless there is something in the relation of the par ties, the nature of the services ren- dered, or other circumstances to rebut the presumption, the law will presume an obligation to pay therefor. Hood v. League (1894), 102 Ala. 228; 14 So. Rep. 572. 2 20 Am. Jour. 5. Sir William Blackstone gives this example of an implied contract : "If I employ any person to do any business for me or to perform any work, the law implies that I undertook or contracted to pay him as much as his labor deserves." 2 Com. 443; Lewis v. Trickey, 20 Barb. 387 ; Weston v. Davis, 24 Maine, 374. An acceptance of beneficial serv- ices raises an implied assumpsit. Don- ovan v. Halsey, etc., Engine Co., 58 Mich. 38. One who employs another to perform certain services for his benefit, without any agreement as to terms, im- pliedly agrees to pay reasonable com- 776 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 643 erty with the permission of the owner is ordinarily sufficient to sustain an action upon an implied agreement for use and occupation. 1 On a purchase of goods, upon which no price is fixed, the law implies that the buyer will pay a reasonable price for them. 2 Where the government, in emergencies, takes private property into its use, a contract to re-imburse the owner is implied. 3 Where a telephone was left on premises by par- ties, who sold the business conducted on said premises, and the telephone was used by the purchasers of the business, a duty to make compensation arose from the circumstances, and a contract to do so will be implied. 4 Where an invalid woman not a relative was received into a family, and furnished a room with board and nursing, the law raised an implied con- tract that she was to pay the reasonable value of the boarding and nursing. 5 Ordinarily it is enough for a party claiming compensation for services rendered without any express con- tract, to show them to have been performed with the knowl- edge and assent of the defendant, and their value, in order to recover such value. 6 § 643. Farther illustrations. — There is an implied contract with a common carrier, wharfinger, warehouse keeper, or other bailee, to be answerable for the goods intrusted to their care, and with builders and their workmen that they perform their business in a workman-like manner. 7 The law implies a pensation for the services. Humes v. United States v. Gill, 20 Wall. 517 Decatur, etc., Co. (1893), 98 Ala. 461; (where the government used hay be- 13 So. Rep. 368. longing to a person); Schillinger v. 1 Osgood v. Dewey, 13 Johns. 240; United States, 24 Ct. CI. 278. Coito. Planer, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 140; 4 McSorley v. Faulkner (1892), 18 Baxter v. West, 5 Daly, 460; Collyer N. Y. Supl. 460. v. Collyer, 113 N. Y. 442. 6 McQueen v. Wilson, Admr. (1892), 2 Hoadly v. McLaine, 10 Bing. 482. 51 Mo. App. 138. "It is clear that acontractfor the sale 6 Page v. Marsh, 36 N. H. 305. of a commodity, in which the price is 7 Boster v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. left uncertain, is, in law, a contract Co. (1892), 36 W. Va. 318 (contract of for what the goods shall be found to common carrier in transporting pas- be reasonably worth," per Tindal, sengers) ; Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 C. J. Wend. 158 (contract of common car- 8 United States v. Russell, 13 Wall, rier to carry goods) ; 1 Comyn on Con- 623 (seizure of steamers under a mili- tracts, 6. tary emergency during the rebellion) ; § 643 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 777 promise on the part of a principal to indemnify a surety. 1 Where one person, at the request of another, becomes surety for a third, the law raises an implied promise of indemnity on the part of the one at whose request the contract was entered into. 8 Whenever necessaries are supplied to a person who, by reason of disability, can not himself contract, as in case of a lunatic, the law implies an obligation on the part of such person to pay for such necessaries out of his own property. 8 An infant is held liable for necessaries furnished in the ab- sence of an express contract. The law implies a promise to pay, from the necessity of his situation, just as in the case- of a lunatic' If a person furnishes necessaries to a wife, the law implies a promise on the part of the husband to pay there- for. 5 1 Martin v. Ellerbe's Adm'r, 70 Ala. 326; Brandt on Suretyship, § 205. " When courts of law, a long time since, fell in line with a part of the jurisdiction of chancery, and substi- tuted the equitable remedy of an action of assumpsit upon the common money counts for the more dilatory and ex- pensive proceeding by a bill in equity in certain cases, they permitted the person thus standing in the situation of surety, who had been compelled to pay money for the principal debtor, to recover it back again from the person who ought to have paid it, in this equitable action of assumpsit as for money paid, laid out and expended for his use and benefit." Hunt v. Amidon, 4 Hill, 345. 2 Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y. 571. The law implies a contract between cosureties to contribute ratably to- wards discharging any liability in- curred on behalf of the principal. Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Den. 61; John- son v. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363, In Tobias v. Rogers, 13 N. Y. 59, the surety was held not liable to contribute because relieved from liability by a discharge in bankruptcy. While the court held that contribution was not founded on contract, it was said that the law fol- lowing equity will imply a promise to contribute in order to afford a remedy. 3 Rhodes v. Rhodes (1890), L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 94. " It is asked, Can there be an implied contract by a person who can not himself contract in express terms? The answer is, that what the law implies on the part of such a person is an obligation, which has been im- properly termed a contract, to repay money spent in supplying necessaries. I think that the expression ' implied ' contract is erroneous and very unfor- tunate." Per Cotton, L. J. 4 Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527 ; Parsons v. Keys, 43 Texas, 557; Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. 403; Eppersons. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45. 5 Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538 ; Eiler v. Crull, 99 Ind. 375. A man under a duty to supply his wife with necessaries, and who fails to per- form it, can not escape liability to one who does furnish her with necessaries upon the ground that he gave notice that he would not be responsible for them. Watkins v. De Armond (1883), 89 Ind. 553. When a parent is willing to support his infant child, and a rela- tive, without his request but with his 778 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 644 § 644. When silence imports assent. — In the case of con- tracts which are made by the acts of the parties, and not by proposal and acceptance in words, silence, to give consent, must be silence under such circumstances as amounts to ac- quiescence. 1 Whether the silence of a person, with a knowl- edge that another was doing valuable work for his benefit, and with the expectation of payment, indicates that consent which gives rise to the inference of a contract, must be determined by the circumstances of each case. In an action torecoyerthe value of one-half of a party wall, erected partly on the estate of the plaintiff and partly on that of the defendant, the jury might infer a promise on the part of the defendant to pay, if the plaintiff undertook and completed the building of the wall with the expectation that the defendant would pay him for it, and the defendant had reason to know that the plaintiff was so acting with that expectation, and allowed him to'so act without objection. 8 There are some cases so free from ambiguity that a court can legally presume the intention of the parties by their actions; but in all cases of doubt it is well settled to be a matter proper for the determination of a jury to determine from the evidence whether a promise can be inferred or not.' assent, receives the child into his 2 Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513. In family and supports it as a child of his Bailey v. Rutjes, 86 N. C. 517, it is own, no agreement of the father to said: "It is unquestionably true that pay for such support can be implied, if, in the absence of all express un- Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502. In derstanding, one stands by in silence the case of Van Valkinburgh v. Wat- (and much more if he actively encour- son, 13 John. 480, it is said that when ages) and sees work done, or material the infant is sub potestate parentis, furnished for work upon premises be- there must be a clear and culpable longing to him, and of which he must omission of duty on the part of the necessarily get the benefit, and 'after- parent to afford support, in order to wards he does accept and enjoy it, a authorize any other person to act for promise to pay the value thereof may and charge the expense to the parent, be inferred, and ordinarily will be." 1 Anson on Contracts, 16. The And whether the circumstances are silence of either party will import or are not sufficient to justify the in- assent to the terms of a contract, ference of an implied contract, is a whenever it would have been incum- fact to be determined by the jury, bent on him to express his dissent, Campbells. Day, 90 111. 363; T^jcott if he did not agree thereto, or where v. Grace, 12 111. App. 639. his silence is explicable only by the 3 Hart v. Hart's Adm'r, 41 Mo. 441 ; presumption of his assent. 1 Story on Godfrey v. Haynes, 74 Maine, 96; Contracts, §491. Keel v. Larkin (1882), 72 Ala. 493; § 645 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 779 Each case must be governed by the facts and circumstances developed. 1 § 645. When the law will not imply a contract. — The law will not imply a promise when there is a subsisting express agreement covering the same subject, whether such agreement be verbal or in writing. Lord Kenyon, C. J., said in Cutter v. Powell: 2 "That where parties have come to an express con- tract none can be implied has prevailed so long as to be re- duced to an axiom in the law." If a written contract exists it takes precedence of all others, and forms the only contract be- tween the parties during the time of its existence. 8 There can be no implied contract to pay rent for use and occupation of premises where there is a written lease. 4 Where services have been performed under an express contract an action to recover compensation for such services must be founded on that con- tract and on that only, unless in consequence of the fault or consent of the defendant. 5 The existence of an express con- Oatfleld v. Waring, 14 John. 188; Hart v. Boiler, 15 S. & E. 162; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 519. 'Botkin v. Mclntyre, 81 Mo. 557. When the conduct of the parties is ambiguous, or the testimony conflict- ing, it is always a question for the jury to determine whether or not there was a mutual agreement or understanding. Seals v. Edmondson, 73 Ala. 295. 2 6 T.R.324 ; Toussaint u.Martinnant, 2 T. B. 100; Draper v. Randolph, 4 Harr. (Del.) 454; Browne. Fales, 139 Mass. 21 ; Mass. General Hospital v. Fairbanks, 129 Mass. 78; Ford v. Mc- Vay, 55 111. 119; Galloway v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 330; Lynch v. Onon- daga Salt Co., 64 Barb. 558; Vande- karr v. Vandekarr, 11 Johns. 122; Creighton v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio St. 447; Preston v. Yates, 24 Hun, 534; Lindersmith v. South Missouri Land Co., 31 Mo. App. 258; Work v. Beach (1889), 53 Hun, 7. "As in physics, two solid bodies can not occupy the same space at the same time, so in law and common sense, there can not be an express and an implied contract for the same thing, existing at the same time. This is an axiomatic truth." Walker v. Brown, 28 111. 378. Where the parties have made an express contract the law will not imply and raise a contract differ- ent from that which the parties have entered into, except upon some farther transaction between the parties. Brit- ton ti. Turner, 6 N. H. 481. 'North v. Nichols, 37 Conn. 375. "For there can be but one contract at the same time between the same par- ties touching the same thing," per Park, J. 4 North v. Nichols, 37 Conn. 375. 5 A member of the society of Shak- ers who rendered services to said society for twelve years, having signed a covenant on becoming a member that he would contribute his services to the society and not make any claim therefor, can not recover on an im- 780 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §§ 646, 647 tract for hire for one year, at a stated weekly compensatiou, ex- cluded any implied agreement or understanding about wages, and the contract price can not be increased without a further agreement to that effect between the parties. 1 § 646. The same subject continued. — The rule that where there is an express contract the law will not imply one, is only applicable to those cases in which the express contract and that implied by law relate to the same subject-matter, and where the provisions of the express contract are intended to control and supersede those which would otherwise be raised by implica- tion. 2 When an express promise is the same as the law implies, an action lies on either of them. 3 In the case of a surety who had a written promise of indemnity from the principal, and sued on the implied promise, it was held that as the written contract contained nothing more than what the law would im- ply, the plaintiff might make use of his written promise or sue on his implied promise as he pleased. 4 Where both parties have departed from the special contract suit can be maintained on the implied promise. 6 A contract will not be implied when an express contract would for any reason be invalid. 6 No con- tract can be implied from the acts of parties, or result by law from benefits received, but such as the same parties were com- petent expressly to enter into. 7 A mere moral obligation is not a sufficient consideration to raise an implied promise. 8 § 647. Waiver of tort and suing in assumpsit. — Obligations are created in consequence of frauds or negligence, and in either case the law compels reparation and permits the tort to be waived. 9 - A carrier's breach of duty relating to the carriage implied promise for the value of his 4 Gibbs v. Bryant, 1 Pick. 118. services. Waite v. Merrill, 4 Greenl. 5 Goodrich v. Lafflin, 1 Pick. 57; La- 102. due v. Seymour, 24 Wend. 60. 'Schurr«. Savigny (1891), 85 Mich. 6 Chase v. Second Ave. R. Co., 97 144. N. Y. 384; 49 Am. Rep. 531. s Commercial Bank v. Pfeiffer, 22 7 Church v. Imperial Gas Light and Hun, 327. Coke Co., 6 Ad. & E. 846, per Lord 3 Princeton, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Denman, C. J. Gulick, 16 N. J. Law, 161; Maynard 8 Newlin v. Duncan, 1 Harr. (Del.) v. Tidball, 2 Wis. 34 ; Bank of Colum- 204. bia v . Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299; Corn- 9 Peopleo. Speir, 77N.Y.144. "Thus wall v. Gould, 4 Pick. 444. it is an actionable wrong to retain $ 647 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 781 of passengers may be treated as a violation of contract and declared as in assumpsit, or may be treated as a tort. 1 One whose goods have been taken from him or detained unlaw- fully, whereby he has a right to an action of trespass or trover, may, if the wrong-doer sell the goods and receive tbe money, waive the tort, affirm the sale, and have an action for money had and received for the proceeds. 2 It has been held by many courts of high authority that assumpsit can not be maintained unless the property of which the plaintiff has been deprived has been converted into money, or an equivalent thereto. 3 Other cases hold that if the defendant has in any manner con- verted the property to his use, suit may be maintained as an implied contract. The weight of authority in this country is in favor of the right to waive the tort, even in such a case.' money paid by mistake, or on a con- sideration which has failed, and the like, but in the eighteenth century the fiction of a promise ' implied in law' to repay the money so held was introduced, and afforded 'a very ex- tensive and beneficial remedy, appli- cable to almost every case where the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bono he ought to refund,' and even to cases where goods taken or retained by wrong had been con- verted into money. The plaintiff was said to 'waive the tort' for the pur- pose of suing in assumpsit on the ficti- tious contract." Webb's Pollock on Torts, 659. The doctrine of waiver of tort is simply a question of the elec- tion of remedies. Keener on Quasi- Contracts, 159 ; Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370. 'Boster v. Chesapeake, etc., Ey. Co. (1892), 36 W. Va. 318; Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158. 2 Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Lindon ■v. Hooper, Cowp. 414 ; Lightly v. Clous- ton, 1 Taunt. 112 ; Cummings v. Noyes, 10 Mass. 433; Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 234; Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120; Eodgers v. Maw, 15 M. & W. 444; Oughton v. Seppings, 1 B. & Ad. 241 ; Buckland v. Johnson, 15 C. B. 145; 23 L. J. (C. P.) 204; Smith v. Baker, L. E. 8 C. P. 350. 8 Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285, leading case in this country ; Barlow v. Stal- worth, 27 Ga. 517; Saville v. Welch, 58 Vt. 683 ; Emerson v. McNamara, 41 Maine, 565; Paine v. McClinchy, 56 Maine, 50; Androscoggin, etc., Co. v. Metcalf , 65 Maine, 40 ; Smith v. Smith, 43 N. H. 536; Fuller v. Duren, 36 Ala. 73 ; Isaacs v. Hermann, 49 Miss. 449. 4 Terry v. Munger (1890), 121 N. Y. 161 ; Abbott v. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353 ; Evans v. Miller, 58 Miss. 120 ; Budd v. Hiler, 27 N. J. Law, 43; Barker v. Cory, 15 Ohio, 9; Tightmeyer v. Mon- gold, 20 Kan. 90; Norden v. Jones. 33 Wis. 600; Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich. 41 ; Lehmann v. Schmidt, 87 Cal. 15; Newton Manufacturing Co. v. White, 53 Ga. 395; Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Chew, 67 111. 378 ; Morford v. White, 53 Ind. 547; Aldine Manufacturing Co. v. Barnard, 84 Mich. 632; Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416; Walker v. Duncan, 68 Wis. 624; Ferrill v. Mooney, 33 Texas, 219; Cooley on Torts, 95. 782 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §648 The contract implied is one to pay the value of the property, as if it had been sold to the wrong-doer by the owner. 1 § 648. Liability of corporations on implied contracts. — Chancellor Kent says, the doctrine that corporations can be bound, by implied contracts, to be deduced by inference from corporate acts, without either a vote, or deed, or writing, is generally established in this country with great clearness and solidity of argument. 2 Thus a contract was implied on the part of a city, which was bound to support its paupers, and which had refused to pay a person who had furnished a pauper with necessaries.' All duties imposed upon a corporation by law, and all services performed at its request, raise implied prom- ises binding on the corporation, if, of course, no statute is thereby infringed. 4 The general principle of the liability of corporations on an implied contract, where the law presumes a contract to restore money or property obtained by mistake or without authority of law, is supported by a large number of authorities. 6 In California, where the municipal officers con- 1 Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577 ; Cum- mings v. Voroe, 3 Hill, 283; Spoors. Newell, 3 Hill, 307 ; Pomeroy's Reme- dies, §§ 567, 568, 569. Where defend- ants were charged with detaching and carrying away from a mill the ma- chinery and using it for themselves it was held upon a, perusal of the com- plaint that the action was of a nature ex contractu and not ex delicto for the wrong done plaintiff by the conver- sion of the property. Goodwin v. ftriffis, 88 N. Y. 629. ' 2 2 Kent's Commentaries, 291 ; Pe- terson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449; Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299 (1813. leading case). In The Harlem Gas Light Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 3 Eobt. 100, affirmed in 33 N. Y. 309, it was held that a mu- nicipal body is subject, like an indi- vidual, to liability for benefits enjoyed under an executed contract, although voidable or even void. McCloskey v. City of Albany, 7 Hun, 472 (wood furnished an alms-house) ; San Fran- cisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453, opinion of Field, J. ; Mayor of Nashville v. Toney, 10 Lea, 643 (care of indigent sick) ; Rider v. Union In- dia Rubber Co., 28 N. Y. 379 (use of property) . 3 Seagraves v. Alton, 13 111. 366; Eckman v. Township of Brady (1890), 81 Mich. 70. In Tomlinson v.Bentall, 5 Barn. & Cress. 738, the parish was held liable for a surgeon's attendance upon a pauper, incurred after due notice to the overseer of the poor, and neglect by the parish officers to provide the necessary relief. 4 Mr. Justice Story to Mr. Justice Coleridge, 2 Story's Life and Letters, 335 ; Angell and Ames on Corpora- tions, § 238; Low v. Connecticut, etc., Railroad, 45 N. H. 370. 5 Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348 ; Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U.S. 294; Mayor, etc., of Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Bank of U. S. v. Dand- § 649 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 783 veyed real estate by virtue of an ordinance which was void, it was held that the sales were absolutely void, that no title passed to the supposed purchasers, and that the corporation was liable in an action brought by thern to recover the pur- chase-money, although that money had already been appropri- ated for municipal purposes. 1 Where labor has been performed for a corporation with the knowledge of the directors and gen- eral manager, the corporation will be bound to pay a quantum meruit, in the absence of any express contract under which the labor was performed. 2 But implied contracts cannot be raised against a municipal corporation where, by its charter, it can only contract in a prescribed way, except it be a promise for money received or property appropriated under the contract. 3 § 649. Acceptance of benefits — Gratuitous services. — "A mere voluntary courtesy will not have consideration to uphold an assumpsit." 4 For it is not reasonable, it has been said, that one man should do another a kindness, and then charge him with a recompense. 5 The law will not permit what was in- ridge, 12 Wheat. 64; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341 ; Albany City Nat. Bank v. Albany, 92 N. Y. 363; Moore v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 73 N. Y. 238, and other cases cited in 1 Beach on Public Corporations, § 226. 1 Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590. 2 Goodwin v. Union Screw Co., 34 N. H. 378; Donovan v. Halsey Fire Engine Co., 58 Mich. 38, where it was held that although the by-laws provided that no debt could be con- tracted except by order of the board of directors the corporation was liable for services performed for its benefit and with its knowledge. 3 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 459, citing McSpedon v. Mayor of New York, 7 Bosw. (N. Y.) 601 ; Mc- Cracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65. In a New York case where sewers were furnished under an unau- thorized contract, the court held that the contractor could not recover on the express contract, but indicated that "if, as alleged, the city has ob- tained his property without authority, but has used and received the avails of it, it would seem that independently of the express contract an implied contract would arise to make compen- sation." Nelson v. Mayor, etc., 63 N. Y. 535. Where a municipal body is required to make certain contracts in a prescribed way, and forbidden to make them in any other way, there is left no room for an implied obliga- tion. Richardson v. County of Grant, 27 Fed. Rep. 495. Per Woods, J. 4 Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hob. 105b; 1 Smith's Leading Cases (9th Am. ed.), 281. Any act done for an- other without his request is deemed in law a voluntary courtesy, for which no action can be maintained. Forbis v. Inman (1892), 23 Ore. 68. 6 Osborne o. Rogers, 1 Saund. 264. 784 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §649 tended at the time as an act of kindness or courtesy to be sub- sequently converted into the foundation of a pecuniary de- mand. 1 Where there is a spontaneous service as an act of kindness and no request, or where the circumstances account for the transaction on some ground, more probable than that of a promise of recompense, no promise will be implied. 8 If a man humanely bestows his labor, and even risks his life, in voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor's house from fire, the law considers the service rendered as gratuitous, and it there- fore forms no ground of action. 3 The mere acceptance of such beneficial services rendered without a request, and without any subsequent promise to pay for the same, creates no obligation to pay. 4 No person can make another his debtor against his will, 1 Cole v. Clark (1893), 85 Maine, 336. In Caldwell v. Eneas, 2 Mills (S. C), 348, it was held that work in repairing the fences of another voluntarily done and without the request of such per- son, could not be recovered for. Hort v. Norton, 1 McCord (S. C), 22. Ex- tra services rendered without the re- quest or knowledge of the employer to be treated as gratuitous. No one is bound to pay for volunteered services rendered under circumstances which do not fairly indicate an expectation of reward. Coe v. "Wager, 42 Mich. 49; Covel v. Turner (1889), 74 Mich. 408 (an old man living with a friend, doing chores, etc. No bargain was made, and nothing said about terms of employment) ; St. Jude's Church v. VanDenberg, 31 Mich. 287 (volun- tary services as sexton) ; Boston v. District of Columbia, 19 Ct. of CI. 31. 2 Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345 ; Lange v. Kaiser, 34 Mich. 317; Otis v. Jones, 21 Wend. 394; Ingraham v. Gilbert, 20 Barb. 151 ; Jones v. Woods, 76 Pa. St. 408; Cicotte v. Corpora- tion, etc., of Church of St. Anne, 60 Mich. 552; Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. Black, 254; Smart v. Guard- ians of the Poor, 36 E. L. & E. 496. If a person invite a stranger to his house, he can not turn around and make him a debtor for food, attend- ance, or necessaries furnished him. Mariner v. Collins, 5 Harr. 290. 3 Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 John. 28. Services rendered voluntarily to preserve another man's property from destruction by flood are presumed to be gratuitous. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Turcan, 46 La. 155 ; 15 So. Bep. 187. 4 Tascott v. Grace ( 1883) , 12 111. App. 639; Wightman v. United States, 23 Ct. CI. 144 (extra services of mail contractor). Where parties were in the habit of rendering mutual serv- ices to each other without any agree- ment as to payment, and although, during the time, they had pecuniary transactions to a considerable amount, their services were not brought, or in- tended to be brought, into their ac- counts, the services will be regarded as matters of mutual accommodation, for which neither party intended to make any charge against the other. Potter v. Carpenter, 76 N. Y. 157. Where there is no legal obligation a subsequent promise will not make the defendant liable. Dearborn v. Bow- man, 3 Mete. 155; Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207. If the consideration be § 650 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 785 and a voluntary payment of the debt of another, without his knowledge or consent, the party paying being under no legal obligation to pay, will ordinarily be regarded a gratuity, and the money can not be recovered back. 1 If a person renders a service without intending to charge for the same, and this is so understood by the other party, no recovery can be had for such service. 8 But where one is induced under a mistake of fact, through the fraud or concealment of another, to render valu- able services to the latter, he may recover the reasonable value thereof, though they were rendered without any expectation at the time of being paid for. 8 § 650. Acceptance of benefits where a promise to pay is im- plied. — Where there is no relationship between the parties and one accepts and retains the beneficial results of another's serv- ices, which he had no reason to suppose were gratuitous, and which he could or not accept at his option, the law will imply a previous request for the services and a promise to pay what they were reasonably worth. 4 If a man build a house upon past, and the party derives no benefit from it, or if he was not legally bound to pay, or if the services were in- tended to be gratuitous at the time they were rendered, in the absence of a previous request, the subsequent promise would be nudum pactum. But if the consideration be past, and the party derives a benefit, or if he is le- gally bound to pay, the subsequent promise implies a previous request. Forbis v. Inman (1892), 23 Ore. 68. 1 Beard v. Horton (1888), 86 Ala. 202; Breneman's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 641. "When one volunteers to pay a debt for another, the latter is under no obligations to reimburse it.'' 2 Goode v. United States (1890) , 25 Ct. CI. -261. "Where one intrudes his services upon another against his will, and without his assent express or im- plied, no recovery can be had there- for. Fox v. Sloo, 10 La. Ann. 11 ; Utica, etc., Ry. Co. v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 265. 50 'Boardman v. "Ward (1889), 40 Minn. 399; Rickard v. Stanton, 16 Wend. 25. 4 Linn v. Linderoth (1890), 40 111. App. 320; Chamness «. Cox (1891), 2 Ind. App. 485; Ford v. "Ward, 26 Ark. 360; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539; Moreland Township v. Davidson Township, 71 Pa. St. 371 ; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bensley, 51 Fed. Rep. 738; DeWolf v. City of Chicago, 26 111. 444; Shelton v. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 84; Laude v. Seymour, 24 "Wend. 60; Lockwood v. Robbins, 125 Ind. 398; Nimmo v. "Walker, 14 La. Ann. 581; Allen's Admx. v. Richmond College, 41 Mo. 302; In re Cooper (1894), 6 Misc. R. (N. Y.) 501; 27 N. Y. Supi. 425; McQueen v. Wilson (1892), 51 Mo. App. 1 38. Although a request to do cer- tain work may not have been satisfac- torily proved against a corporation sued upon a aii/t°itum meruit, yet if the plaintiff in good iait'n and with full knowledge on the part of the defend- 786 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 651 the land of another, with his assent, the law raises an obliga- tion on his part to pay its value, since he has been benefited to that extent, and, if he did not intend to pay, it was his duty to forbid its construction, or at least to give notice that he would not be chargeable. So, if he had expressly contracted to pay for the house, provided it were built in a certain manner and within a certain time, and he accepted it, although it was not built in the manner or within the time contracted for, he is bound to pay its value, not exceeding the contract price, less any damages he may have suffered by reason of the failure of the other party to comply with the exact conditions of the con- tract. 1 If a man serves a stranger in the capacity of clerk, or of a menial servant, or servant in husbandry, for a continued period, the law presumes that the service has been rendered in fulfillment of a contract of hiring and service, and if the party has served without anything having been said as to wages, the law presumes that there was a contract for customary and rea- sonable wages. 2 If services are rendered in expectation of re- muneration by a legacy, and there is nothing in the conduct or language of the person benefited bj r the services to induce such an expectation, they are deemed voluntary and gratuitous. 3 But where, from the circumstances of the case, it is manifest that it was understood by both parties that compensation should be made by will, and none is made, an action lies to recover what the services were reasonably worth.* § 651. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — Where a publisher of a newspaper forwards his newspaper weekly, by ant, did the work and the defendant such cases, an express hiring must he availed itself of the fruits of plaintiffs proved in order to support a claim for labor it is liable to the extent of the wages. Bennett v. Stephens, 8 Ore. benefit received. Thomas v. Walnut 444. Land, etc., Co. (1890), 43 Mo. App. 'Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. 653. 161 ; Osborn v. Governors of Guy's 'Vanderbilt v. Eagle Iron Works, Hospital, 2 Str.728 ; Swires v. Parsons, 25 Wend. 665. 5 W. & S. 357; Hartman's Appeal, 3 2 If a poor person is taken out of Grant's Cas. (Pa.) 271. charity and provided with food, lodg- 4 Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. St. 475 ; ing, clothing and other necessaries, Jones v. Jincey, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 708; and set to work, no contract of hiring Shakespeare v. Markham, 10 Hun,, and service is implied therefrom. In 311. § 652 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 787 mail, directed in the usual manner to a party who is not a reg- ular subscriber therefor, and such party takes the newspaper from the post-office, and pays the postage, and the publisher demands payment therefor at the usual times and rates, and the party taking the paper refuses to pay therefor, saying he is not a subscriber, but continues, after such demand, to receive the newspaper as before, the law will imply a promise to pay by such party, according to the usual terms of such publica- tion. 1 A consulting surgeon who, at the request of the attend- ing surgeon, rendered services to a patient with his consent, may recover from the patient, upon an implied promise, the value of such services, notwithstanding an agreement between the patient and the attending surgeon that the latter should pay for such services, if the consulting surgeon did not ex- pressly or impliedly assent to such agreement. 2 A similar rul- ing was made in regard to the services of assisting attorneys who were brought into the case by an attorney who had agreed to defend the action and pay all attorney's fees. The parties receiving the benefit of the assisting attorney's services were held liable to pay for the same, on the ground that the services were performed with their knowledge and consent, the assist- ing attorneys not knowing of the agreement referred to. 3 § 652. Request without benefit. — Even though services are rendered at the request of another, yet, if they are not ren- dered for his benefit, and there is no legal liability upon him to have such labor performed, and the request, in view of the circumstances, does not necessarily imply an employment or promise to pay by the person making the request, an action can not be predicated against him upon the naked request. 4 An implied promise to pay is not raised against a person who requests a physician to perform services for a patient, unless the relation of that person to the patient is such as raises a 1 Fogg v. Portsmouth Atheneum, 44 paper longer." Ward v. Powell, 3 N. H. 115; 82 Am. Dec. 191. "If the Harr. (Del.) 379. defendants would have avoided the 2 Garrey v. Stadler (1886), 67 Wis. liability to pay the plaintiffs, they 512. might reasonably have returned the 3 McCrary v. Ruddick, 33 Iowa, 521. paper to the plaintiffs, or given them l Wood on Master and Servant, § 69. notice that they declined to take the 788 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 653 legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay for the services. When a husband calls in a physician to attend upon his wife, or where a father calls in a physician to attend upon his minor child, the law implies a promise on his part to pay the reasonable value of the services, because there is a legal obligation on his part to furnish necessaries for the patient's benefit, but no such implication arises where one calls in a physician to attend upon a stranger, or upon one to whom he is under no legal obligation to furnish necessaries. 1 It has been held that a special request by a father to a physician to attend upon his son, then of full age, but lying sick at the father's house, raised no implied promise on the part of the father to pay for the services rendered. 2 A master who re- quests a physician to perform services for his servant does not impliedly promise to pay for them. 3 § 653. Where the law will not imply a promise owing to relationship. — Ordinarily, where services are rendered and voluntarily accepted, the law will imply a promise upon the part of the recipient to pay for them ; but where services are rendered by members of a family, living in one household, to each other, or necessaries are supplied by one near relation to another, the law will presume that they were gratuitous favors merely, prompted by friendship, kindness and the relationship between them.' And in such case, before the person rendering the service can recover, the express promise of the party served must be shown or such facts and circumstances as will au- 1 Meisenbach v. Southern Cooper- attend his brother would not render age Co. (1891), 45 Mo. App. 232. him liable to pay for such attendance. 2 Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y. 256; Dunbar v. Williams, 10 John. 249. Boyd v. Sappington, 4 Watts, 247. In 3 Jesserich v. Walruff (1892), 51 Mo. Smith v. Watson, 14 Vt. 332, the de- App. 270. fendant requested the plaintiff to ren- 4 The rule is well settled and re- der medical service to his brother, but peatedly reiterated by the legal au- it did not appear that he told the thorities that, as 'between near rela- plaintiffthat he would pay him for the tions, board furnished and services services, or that he said anything to rendered do not raise an implied him, or did anything from which the promise to pay for the same, as in the plaintiff could fairly infer that he in- case of strangers. In re Perris Estate tended to pay for such services. The (1893), 5 Misc. (N. Y.) 149; 25 N. Y. court held that the mere fact that the Snpl. 716; Terry v. Bale, 1 Dem. defendant calls upon the plaintiff to (N. Y.) 452. 653 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 789 thorize the jury to find that the services were rendered in the expectation by one of receiving, and by the other of making compensation therefor. 1 The relation of parent and child, step-parent and step-child, brother and sister, or the like, existing between persons living together in the same household, creates a strong presumption that no payment or compensation was intended to be made for services rendered by one to the other, beyond that received at the time they were rendered, and the person claiming pay for services, in such a case, must overcome that presumption by clear, direct and pos- itive proof that the relation between the parties was that of debtor and creditor, or servant and master. 2 Where a party 1 Cowan v. Musgrave (1887), 73 Iowa, 384 ; Scully v. Scully, 28 Iowa, 548. The law is thus aptly stated by Judge Scott, in Smith v. Myers, 19 Mo. 433 : "The general rule is that, whenever service is rendered and received, a contract of hiring or an obligation to pay will be presumed. This is an un- doubted rule between strangers. But a relationship between the parties may exist such as will cause the pre- sumption that the services are acts of gratuitous kindness and affection. The degree of the relationship may strengthen or diminish the implica- tion according to its proximity or re- moteness." In Lantz v. Frey and Wife, 19 Pa. 366, Lowrie, J., says: "When individuals stand to each oth- er in a family relation, as distin- guished from that of master and serv- ant, the law implies no contract for wages." The closer the family rela- tion, the stronger is the presumption that the services are gratuitous. Woods v. Land, 30 Mo. App. 176; Quigly v. Harold, 22 111. App. 269; Lynn v. Smith, 35 Hun, 275 (case of husband and wife.) 2 In Havens v. Havens, 3 N. Y. Supl. 219, cases are cited and the rule reiterated that no recovery can be had for services rendered by and be- tween near relatives living on the same premises in common, or as mem- bers of the same family, without prov- ing an express promise to pay, or proving such facts or circumstances as to make such inference plain. Davies v. Davies, 9 C. &. P. 87 ; Fitch v. Peck- ham, 16 Vt. 150; Davis v. Goodenow, 27 Vt. 715 (action brought by a grand- child to recover for services rendered to her grandfather) ; Keegan v. Estate of Malone, 62 Iowa, 208 (brother and sister) ; Hall «. Finch's Administrator, 29 Wis. 278 (brother and sister) ; Bun- dy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 116 (brother-in- law and sister-in-law) ; Collars. Patter- son (1891), 137 111. 403, where a claim- ant against an estate performed house- hold services for the deceased, who was the husband of the claimant's aunt ; Morris v. Simpson, Executor, 3 Houst. 568 (suit of a nephew against his uncle for board) ; Hays ». McCon- nell, 42 Ind. 285 (suit of a niece against an uncle for services) ; Cantine v. Phillips, 5 Harr. 428 (no contract im- plied for payment of board between father and daughter, or daughter's husband living in the father's house) ; Ellis v. Cary, Administrator, 74 Wis. 176 (services rendered by a step-daugh- ter) ; Wall's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 460 (services of niece for uncle, claim based on parol promise of uncle to provide for her at his death). Some 790 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 654 went to live in her brother-in-law's family and was received and entertained there, not as a member of the family, but as a boarder, and the board was furnished with the hope of com- pensation, on the one hand, and the expectation to award it upon the other, a liability was created for payment of such board. 1 § 654. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — In an action of assumpsit by a party for board and attendance of his wife's mother during sickness, she having been taken sick while on a visit to his house, and furnished with board and attendance for about four or five weeks, and dying soon after her return to her son's house, where she usually resided, it was held that the estate was not liable for food, attendance and necessaries furnished, and that if the son-in-law meant to charge her therefor he ought to have given her notice. 2 Where a girl lived with her grandfather for nine years without any contract as regards compensation, and besides performing household duties rendered assistance in the transaction of his business, claim for compensation made against the estate at her grandfather's death was disallowed, although there was evi- dence of declarations by the grandfather that she should be courts speak of the exception to the Dupue referred to the principle as ap- general rule as restricted to cases plying to all cases where the parties where a relationship in blood exists, stand, in relation to each other, of In Updike v. Titus, 2 Beas. (N. J.) support on one side and services on 151, Chancellor Green said: "The law the other, citing "Williams v. Hutchin- implies no promise to pay for services son, 3 N. Y. 312, and Robinson v. rendered by members of a family to Cushman, 2 Denio, 1-19. each other, whether by children, pa- 1 Huffman v. "Wyrick (1892), 5 Ind. rents, grandparents, brother, step-chil- App. 183. In an action to recover for dren or other relatives." In Disbrow services rendered as nurse to an aunt, v. Durand (1892), 54 N. J. Law, 343, who was an invalid for several years it was held that the family relation immediately preceding her death, and contemplated in the exception is not part of the time quite helpless, it was limited merely by propinquity of kin- held that it was not to be inferred, dred, and that the exception stands simply from the relation which ex- upon a reason which logically extends isted between the parties, that the it to all members of a household, how- services were intended to be gratui- ever remote their relationship, and tous, and were rendered with no view even to those who, though not of kin, of compensation. Bouic v. Maught stand in the situation of kindred in (1892), 76 Md. 440. one household. In Horner v. Web- 2 Mariner v. Collins, 5 Harr. 290. ster, 33 N. J. Law, 387, Mr. Justice ■§ 655 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 791 well paid for her services. 1 Where persons, having gone through a form of marriage, live together as man and wife, and the woman, after the man's death, learns for the first time that he had a wife living and not divorced from him, she can not recover from his administrator for her services as house-keeper under an implied contract. The relations of the parties, and the circumstances under which the work was per- formed, negative any implication of an agreement or promise that it should be paid for. 2 Where a man and woman mutu- ally agreed to live together as husband and wife without being married, and continued the unlawful relation about thirteen years, the woman can not recover on an implied promise for services rendered in keeping house in that relation or for money delivered to the defendant to be used towards paying their family expenses. 3 § 655. Parent and child — Rule as to services rendered. — If a stranger is in the employment of another a contract of hir- ing is inferred, but if a son is in the employment of his father no such contract is inferred. 4 The law will not imply an agreement on the part of a parent to pay his daughter, who is living in his family, wages for ordinary services, such as 1 Barhite's Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 404. bind him the same as though he had In regard to these declarations, the made the promise himself, court said: "These, however, were 2 Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370. but the loose declarations which can 3 Brown v. Tattle, 80 Maine, 162. If almost always be proved in such cases, there had been an express promise and refer to future intentions, which the court would not enforce it as the may mean a provision by will, or parties were living together in un- other benefit, to be conferred in some lawful relations, and the services ren- other manner." Harris v. Smith dered and the money furnished were (1889), 79 Mich. 54. Where a step- in futherance thereof. White v. Buss, daughter claimed compensation for 3 Cush. 448 ; Gilmore v. Woodcock, 69 services rendered in the family for Maine, 118. her step-father, a promise by her 4 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465; mother that she should receive com- Guenther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439, pensation made in the presence of the where a step-son continued to reside step-father will not bind him unless in the family of his step-father after he knew that she continued her serv- coming of age. Sprague v. Waldo, 38 ice in reliance upon the promise. Vt. 139, where a son-in-law took up That would be such an acquiescence his abode with his father-in-law. in the arrangement on his part as to 792 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §655 house-keeping. 1 Where the relation of parent and child is shown to exist the law will not presume any other. 8 The par- ent is not legally entitled to the earnings of his children after they arrive at majority, nor is he legally bound to support them; yet if they live with him as members of his family with- out any contract or understanding that he shall pay for their services, or receive pay for their maintenance, the law will not imply a promise to pay on either side. 3 The presumption is that the child renders the services gratuitously, or in consider- ation of having a home with his parents, of being furnished with board and clothing, and of receiving care and attention in case of sickness. In order to sustain an action for compen- sation for services by a child against the father it must be shown by the evidence that a contract existed between the par- ties to pay for such services. 4 The declaration of the parent 1 Barrett v. Barrett, 5 Ore. 411 ; Dye v. Kerr, 15 Barb. 444; Gardner «. Schooley, 25 N. J. Eq. 150. 2 Munger v. Manger, 33 N. H. 581. A son or daughter residing with a parent does not cease to be a member of the family when they respectively arrive at the age of twenty-one or eighteen from that fact alone. Chica- go, etc., Ey. Co. v. Chisholm, 79 111. 584; Putnam v. Town, 34 Vt. 429, where the child after attaining major- ity continues to reside in the father's family and work for him, the law will not imply any change in the relation. In order to entitle the son to recover for such services there must be proof either of an express agreement, or that both parties understood that they were to be paid for. Mosteller's Ap- peal, 30 Pa. St. 473 ; Pellage v. Pillage, 32 Wis. 136; Tyler v. Burrington, 39 Wis. 376; Pritchard v. Pritchard, 69 Wis. 373. Care of an aged and infirm father by a daughter is usually dic- tated by the better instincts of a com- mon humanity, and is so rarely be- stowed upon contract that no implied contract can be predicated upon its bestowal or receipt. Wright v. Senn Estate (1891), 85 Mich. 191. 3 Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312; Guffin v. First Nat. Bank, 74 111. 259 ; Stock v. Stoltz (1891), 137 111. 349 ; McCormick v. McCormick (1891), 1 Ind. App.594; Brock v. Cox (1889), 38 Mo. App. 40 (where a mother, on ac- count of her infirmities, leaves her own home and goes to that of her daugh- ter). In the absence of special stat- utes to the contrary, the father-in-law is not obliged in this country to main- tain his step-children and is not en- titled to their earnings. Schouler's Domestic Relations, §237. 4 Hall v. Finch, 29 Wis. 278 ; Mur- phy v. Murphy (1890), 1 S. Dak. 316; O'Kelly v. Faulkner (1893), 92 Ga. 521 ; 17 S. E. Rep. 847. In Titman v. Titman, 04 Pa. 4S0, the claim was for services rendered by the plaintiff to her father when she was eighteen years of age. Judge Sharswood said : "The presumption, prima facie, was undoubtedly against the plaintiff's claim, and the onus was therefore on her to show by clear and distinct evi- dence, a contract by her father to pay § 656 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 793 that his child should be well paid for her services, or that she de- served pay, and that he intended to provide for her is not to be regarded as a contract or evidence that such a contract existed. 1 § 656. Case of a person standing in loco parentis. — The same rule applies to children by adoption as to children by blood. 8 Where the services are rendered to one standing in loco parentis, there is no implied promise to pay for them, although such pre- sumption may be overcome by the facts and circumstances of the case. 8 her wages." Spitzmiller o. Fisher (1889) , 77 Iowa, 289, where a young woman performed services in her father's family without any contract ; Ionia, etc., Savings Bank v. McLean (1891), 84 Mich. 625; Bonneyw.Hay- dock,40N.J.Eq.513(son-in-law) ; Saw- yer Hebard's Estate, 58 Vt. 375 ; (the same) Coe v. Wager, 42 Mich. 49 (the same) ; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229 (son) ; McGarvy v. Roods, 73 Iowa, 363 (daughter after becoming of age) ; Smith v. Smith's Admr., 30 N. J. Eq. 564 (same) ; Penter v. Roberts (1892), 51 Mo. App. 222 (a son living apart from his father performs service, presumption that they are gratuitous) ; Wilkes v. Cornelius, 21 Ore. 348 (claim by a child against the estate of a deceased parent for board and lodg- ings furnished the latter) ; Young's Estate(1892),148Pa.St.573;24Atl.Rep. 124 (a son-in-law's claim against the estate of a decedent based principally upon services rendered by his wife rests upon the same footing as that of any other child or member of the fam- ily) . The rule that as between parent and child there can be no recovery for services, boarding and the like, in the absence of an express contract to pay therefor, does not apply to a son-in- law who boards his father-in-law. Perkins v. Hasbrouck, Admr. (1893), 155 Pa. St. 494. In Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107, it was said by Strong, J. . "Our observation of common usage does not convince us that fathers-in- law permanently board with sons-in- law without any understanding that compensation shall be made. The case, therefore, is not within the ex- ception." Reynolds v. Reynolds (1892), 92 Ky. 556. In Dodson v. McAdams, 96 N. C. 149, the granddaughter sued for services and it was shown that the testator said she was a good girl, and should be paid for her work. The re- covery was denied. 2 Mountain v. Fisher, 22 Wis. 93. 3 Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 258. The weight of authority establishes the doctrine that when a person, through kindness or charity, has re- ceived an orphan child into his fam- ily, and treats it as a member of his family, he stands towards it in loco parentis, so long as it remains in his family, and he is bound for the main- tenance, care and education of such child, and entitled to its services with- out other compensation, unless he has otherwise stipulated. Schrimpf v. Set- tegast, 36 Texas, 296 ; Hogg v. Laster (1892), 56 Ark. 382. The appellee was left an orphan at about the age of ten years, without means, and at the re- quest of a neighbor was taken by the appellant into his family, fed, clothed and sent to school. During her minor- ity she rendered services in household work and continued to do so after she became of age. The suit was brought 794 IMPLIED CONTEACTS. § 657 § 657. Exception to the general rule that a child is not en- titled to compensation for services to a parent. — If it is mani- fest from the circumstances that a child ought to receive com- pensation for his services, and it is not a case in which it was expected that the services should be performed on account of mere filial duty and affection, a promise may be inferred, and the child be entitled to recover the value of the services ren- dered. 1 The circumstances must be of such a nature and char- acter as to overcome the presumption arising from the relation- ship of the parties, and justify the inference that compensation was intended. 2 The presumption as between father and son is only a prima facie bar to a recovery, which may be overcome by proof that shows that the presumption does not apply, and that the parties mutually understood that payment was to be made. 3 The courts make a distinction between cases where the child has become of age, been away from home, estab- lished a business and supported himself, and then returns upon the request of the parent, and one where the child has continued to live with the parent after arriving at age, and has never had any other home.' Circumstances which show an unusual burden assumed by the son, or special advantages reaped by the father, are sometimes favorably construed in the to recover 39 months' services after Mo. 441 ; Seavey v. Seavey, 37 N. H. she attained her majority. There was 125; Ridgway v. English, 22 N. J. no express contract. The jury ought to Law, 409. be instructed that if, under all the cir- 4 Marion v. Farnan (1893), 68 Hun, cumstances of the case, including the 383; Robnett v. Robnett (1891), 43 relation the parties bear to each other, 111. App. 191. As was said in Free- the services were of such a nature as man v. Freeman, 66 111. 53. "After to lead to a reasonable belief that the leaving, the presumption arises that parties understood that they were to be he thenceforth intended to labor and paid for, they should find an implied accumulate property for himself, and promise to that effect. when he returned at the solicitation of 1 Hilbish v. Hilbish, 71 Ind. 27; the father it is but a reasonable pre- Story v. Story (1890), 1 Ind. App. 284. sumption the father intended to pay, 2 Smith v. Denman, 48 Ind. 65. A and he to receive pay for the labor." parent may make a valid contract with Wilsey v. Franklin (1890), 57 Hun, a child to pay for support and care, 382, where a daughter, for many years and there is no presumption of law after becoming of age, ceased to be a arising from the relationship against member of her mother's family, and the existence of such a contract. Ul- went back to live with her mother, at richw. TJlrich (1892), 136 N. Y. 120. her mother's solicitation, to do the 3 Wood on Master and Servant (2d work of nurse, housekeeper and serv- ed.), §75; Hart v. Hart's Admr., 41 ant. $ 658 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 795 child's favor. 1 Where a son breaking up at home and remov- ing himself and family to the residence of his infirm father, upon an express promise by the latter to will him his home- place if he would attend to and take care of him for life, per- formed his part of the agreement, but the father, having be- come insane, failed to make his promised will, it was held that the son could recover of the administrator, upon a quantum meruit, the actual value of his services. 2 § 658. Contracts for services where skill is required. — If a man undertakes any trust, office or employment, the law raises a promise on his part to perform his undertaking with integri- ty, diligence and skill, and if he injures his employer by want of either of these qualities, he is liable to an action on his im- plied contract for reparation. 3 Where a man holds himself out to the world as a person of skill and competency in any particular trade or calling, and is employed to perform work in that trade or calling, the law implies a contract on his part to do the work in a skillful and workmanlike manner. 4 But if the employer has in any manner acquiesced in the im- proper or inferior work, or has suffered the other party to per- form it and taken it off his hands, he is bound to pay for whatever benefit or advantage he has derived from the work. 5 1 Adams v. Adams' Admr., 23 Ind. will necessarily depend upon its own SO, where the son assumed entire con- special circumstances. Harts. Hart's trol and management of the business, Admr., 41 Mo. 441; Guild v. Guild, worked the farm, and added largely Admr. ,15 Pick. 129. Actionbyadaugh- to the family profits by his successful ter against the administrator of her management. Brown v. Knapp, 79 father's estate. Held competent for N. Y. 136 ; Schouler's Domestic Eela- the jury to infer a promise from all the tions, § 269. circumstances. If the services were 2 The amount must not exceed the of such a nature as to lead to a reason- value of the home-place, and he must able belief that it was the understand- account for and have deducted, from ing of the parties that pecuniary com- the full amount he was entitled to, all pensation should be made for them, he had received from the property of then the jury should find an implied the father over and above what was promise, and a quantum meruit. necessary for the support and main- s Comyn on Contracts, 5. tenance of the latter during his life- l Hall v. Cannon, 4 Harr. 360. time. Hudson v. Hudson (1891), 87 5 Hall v. Cannon, 4 Harr. 360. If a Ga.678. It is impossible to lay down price was stipulated, the party recov- precise or accurate rules to govern all ers in proportion to that price, sub- the cases which may arise. Each case ject to deductions for any defective- 796 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 659 Where a man works by the day he is required to exercise ordi- nary care and skill, and to do his work in an ordinary, fair, workmanlike manner, and, if he does not, he can not recover as wages the value of work properly done, but the employer is entitled to a deduction for any defect in the labor, or in the manner of its performance. 1 A person contracting to perform services for another agrees to exercise such care and diligence in his employment as men of common care and prudence usually exercise in their own business of a similar kind. 2 Reasonable skill constitutes the measure of the engagement and responsibility in regard to the work undertaken by him, unless he has professed to the highest degree of skill in regard to it, and expressly engaged to do it in the best manner. If a party is employed in a particular business or work, who is known to the party employing him not to possess any skill in it, or that it is not and never has been his particular art, busi- ness or employment, and the employer, with full notice or knowledge of that fact, trusts him with the undertaking, the party so employed is bound only for a reasonable exercise of the skill which he possesses, or the judgment which he can employ in it, and if any loss ensues from his want of due skill in it, he is not in law chargeable with it or liable for it. 3 A dentist is required to use a reasonable degree of care and skill in the manufacture and fitting of artificial teeth. 4 § 659. Implied contracts of professional men. — The contract of a physician or surgeon, as implied in law, is that he pos- sesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience which is ordinarily possessed by others of his profession, that he will use ordinary care and diligence in the treatment of the case committed to him, and that he will use his best judg- ness ; if not, he recovers on the quart- ble amount of care, and a failure in fnhi meruit. these respects prevents them from re- 1 Eaton v. Woolly, 28 Wis. 628. covering the contract price, hut only 2 Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460. what the labor is reasonably worth. All persons impliedly undertake, when Parker v. Piatt, 74 111. 430. they engage to do work, that they 3 McCombs v. Megratten, 3 Houst. have a reasonable amount of skill in 35. the employment, and that they will 4 Simondsu. Henry, 39 Maine, 155. use it, and also engage for a reasona- $ 660 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 797 ment, in all cases of doubt, as to the best course of treatment. 1 Accordingly an attorney is liable for the want of ordinary skill and care in the management of the business intrusted to him. The want of ordinary care and skill in such a person is gross negligence. But where a given time is allowed by law for the performance of an act, and the attorney performs the act with- in that time, he can not be held responsible for negligence. It is a fair presumption that he acts according to the in- structions of his client, unless in a case of such gross negli- gence that a violation may be inferred. 2 § 660. Recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact. — It is a well-settled principle that if a party, through some mistake, misapprehension or forgetfulness of the facts, receives money to which he is not justly and legally entitled, and which he ought not in foro conscientiss. to retain, the law regards him as the receiver and holder of the money for the use of the lawful owner of it, and raises an implied promise on his part to. pay over the amount to such owner, and if the money be withheld from the owner, an action for money had and received may be maintained. 3 An error of fact takes 'Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H. 460; degree of care and skill. He does Seare v. Prentice, 8 East, 347; Slater not undertake, if he is an attorney, v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359; Moore v. that at all events you shall gain your Mourgue, Cowp. 479 ; Grannisw. Bran- case, nor does a surgeon undertake don, 5 Day, 260; Mertz v. Detweiler, that he will perform a cure; nor does 8 W. & S. 376; Landon v. Humphry, he undertake to use the highest possi- 9 Conn. 209 ; Hathorn v. Richmond ble degree of skill." (1876), 48 Vt. 557 (setting a broken 8 Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I. 242. The limb). A surgeon is responsible for principle of the common law, as to an injury done to a patient through the engagement of the professional the want of proper skill in his appren- man, for a reasonable degree of skill tice, but in an action against him the and no more, has been settled in the plaintiff must show that the injury case of attorneys in Pitt v. Yalden, 4 was produced by such want of skill, Burr. 2060; Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & and it is not to be inferred. Hancke C. 738 ; Russel v. Palmer, 2 Wils. 325 ; v. Hooper, 7 Car. & P. 81, per Tindal, Hunter v. Caldwell, 16 L. Jour. Q. B. C. J. ; Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 274; Purves v. Landell, 12 C. & Pin. 253 (action against a surgeon for mal- 91; Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440; practice). In Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 Stimpson v. Sprague, 6 Greenl. (Me.) Car. & P. 475, Tyndal, C. J., said: 470; Crooker v. Hutchinson, 1 Vt. 73. "Every person who enters into a 8 George's Creek, etc., Co. i\ Count \ learned prof ession undertakes to bring Commissioners, 59 Md. 255 ; Newsome to the exercise of it a reasonable i: Graham, 10 B. & C. 234; Worley v. 798 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §660 place when some fact which really exists is unknown, or some fact is supposed to exist which really does not exist. 1 Where there has beeu an accounting and settlement between parties on the basis of merchant's book entries, and afterwards an error is discovered in the account by crediting a single item twice or wrongly adding a column of figures, an action at law will lie to recover the balance paid by reason of such mistake. 2 An indorser of a note was allowed to recover money paid by him under the mistaken belief that the note had been duly presented for payment ; s but courts do not relieve against every mistake a party may make in his business transactions. A mistake in a matter of fact to be a ground of relief must be of a material nature, inducing or influencing the agreement, or in some matter to which the contract is to be applied. 4 Money paid by mistake of fact can not be reclaimed when the defendant received it in good faith, in satisfaction of an equitable claim, nor when it was due in honor and conscience. 5 If it appear that the party paying has received and enjoyed a benefit or consideration, he will not be aided by a court of Moore (1884), 97 Ind. 15 (mistake in the computation of interest) ; Waite v. Leggett, 8 Cow. 195 ; Stanley Rule, etc., Co. v. Bailey, 45 Conn. 464; Citi- zens' Bank v. Grafiin, 31 Md. 507; "Walker v. Mock, 39 Ala. 568; Durkin v. Cranston, 7 John. 442; Burr v. Yee- der, 3 Wend. 412; Milnes v. Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671 ; Chatfield t>. Paxton, 2 East, 471 n. ; Marriot v. Hampton, 3 Smith's Leading Cases (9th Am. ed.), 1686. 1 Calkins v. Griswold, 11 Hun, 208. But where a person is truly acquainted with the existence or non-existence of facts, but is ignorant of the legal con- sequences he is under an error of law. Mowatt & Wright, 1 Wend. 355. 2 Davis v. Krum, 12 Mo. App. 279; Buddy. Eyermann, 10 Mo. App. 437; Hanson v. Jones, 20 Mo. App. 595. 3 Talbot v. National Bank of the Commonwealth, 129 Mass. 67. 4 Buffalo v. O'Malley (1884), 61 Wis. 255, action to recover the sum of $40, alleged to have been overpaid for the transportation of tan-bark. At the place of shipment it measured sixty- three cords, and three cords were al- lowed for shrinkage on repiling. On being repiled at Duluth in the manner customary there, it measured but forty cords. In Southwick v. First Nat. Bank, 84 N. Y. 420, Earl, J., said: "It is not every mistake that will lay the ground-work for relief. It must be a mistake as to some fact, not remotely, but directly, bearing upon the act against which relief is sought. If it were the rule to relieve against mis- takes as to remote, or what are some- times called extrinsic, facts, great un- certainty and confusion would attend business transactions." See article by Prof. W. A. Keener on Recovery of Money Paid under Mistake of Fact, 1 Harvard Law Rev. 211. 5 Moore v. Eddowes, 2 Ad. & E. 133 ; Farmer v. Arundel, 2 Wm. Bl. 824. 661 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 799 equity in recovering back that which he has paid, but which he could not have been compelled to pay had he resisted in the outset. 1 § 661. Effect of negligence npon the right of recovery. — If the money be paid under the impression of the truth of a fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back, however careless the party paying may have been in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the facts. 2 Some authorities, on the contrary, seem to countenance the doctrine that a recovery can not be had where the party paying has ac- cess to information which he, by his own laches, neglects to acquire. 8 But it is generally held that the fact of the plaintiff's mistake having been caused by his own negligence will not, in the absence of other facts, bar a recovery. 4 And negligence 1 City of Louisville v. Zanone,l Mete. (Ky.) 151. 2 Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54; Koontz v. Central Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275 ; Alston v. Kichardson, 51 Texas, 1 ; Fraker v. Little, 24 Kan. 598. 3 West a. Houston, 4 Harr. 170; Pe- terborough v. Lancaster, 14 N. H. 382 ; Wheeler v. Hatheway, 58 Mich. 77 ; Buffalo v. O'Mally, 61 Wis. 255 ; Brum- mittu. McGuire (1890), 107 N. C. 351. 4 Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 70. In Milnes v. Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671, Bayley, J., said: "If a party pay money under a mistake of the real facts, and no laches is imputable to him, in respect of his omitting to avail himself of the means of knowledge within his power, he may recover back such money." But the rule on this subject has ceased to be thus lim- ited. 2 Chitty on Contracts, 11 Am. ed. 930. Money paid under a mistake by the payor, as to a material fact, may be recovered by him, though at the time of making such payment he possessed, but neglected to use, the means of ascertaining the actual fact. Brown v. College Corner, etc., Co., 56 Ind. 110. "If, in consequence of such mutual mistake, one party has received the property of the other, he must refund, and this, without refer- ence to vigilance or negligence. * * In case of bargains and sales the rule is applicable, mgilantibus non dormi- entibus leges subveniunt," per Hunt, Ch. J., in Kingston Bank v. El- tinge, 40 N. Y. 391. "It is well set- tled by recent decisions that money paid to the holder of a check or draft drawn without funds may be recov- ered back, if paid by the drawee un- der a mistake of fact, and though the rule was originally subject to the lim- itation that it must be shown that the party seeking to recover back had been guilty of no negligence, it is now held that the plaintiff in such cases is not precluded from recovery by laches in not availing himself of the means of knowledge in his power," per Colt, J., in Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Na- tional Eagle Bank, 101 Mass. 281. Where the teller of a bank saw fit to pay a check without taking the pre- caution to inform himself of the state of the account of the drawer whose balance on deposit was not sufficient to meet it, it was held that there was 800 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §662 will not bar a recovery where the defendant can be put in statu quo. 1 When the situation of the party receiving the money has been changed in consequence of the payment, and it would be inequitable to allow a recovery, the payment can not be re- called. In such a case, the person making the payment must bear the loss occasioned by his own negligence/ § 662. Recovery of money paid under mistake of law. — Gen- erally money paid under a mistake of law can not be recovered, although it is against conscience for the defendant to retain it. 8 nothing in the transaction which bore the character of a mistake of facts, in a legal sense, but only that of laches, and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the money back. Boylston Nat. Bank v. Richardson, 101 Mass. 287. 1 Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray, 518; Lawrence v. American Nat. Bank, 54 N. Y. 432; Devine v. Edwards, 101 111. 138 ; Koontz ». Cen- tral Nat. Bank, 51 Mo. 275 ; Wilson v. Barker, 50 Maine, 447. 2 Walker v. Conant (1887), 65 Mich. 194; Mayer v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 455. 3 Bilbie ». Lumley, 2 East, 469 ; Flower v. Lance, 59 N. Y. 603 (no le- gal right on the part of the creditor to demand payment in gold) ; Real Es- tate Savings Institution v. Linder, 74 Pa. St. 371; Norris v. Blethen, 19 Maine, 348; Regan v. Baldwin, 126 Mass. 485; 30 Am. Rep. 689; Eaton v. Eaton, 35 N. J. Law, 290; Natchem. Natcher, 47 Pa. St. 496; Markley v. Stevens, 89 Pa. St. 279; Claflinu. Mc- Donough, 33 Mo. 412; Campbell v. Clark (1891), 44 Mo. App. 249; Beene v. Collenberger, 38 Ala. 647 ; Galves- ton Co. v. Gorham, 49 Texas, 279; Rogers v. Ingham, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 351 ; Lowry v. Bourdieu, Dougl. 467 ; Bris- bane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143 (a lead- ing case on the subject). When both parties possess equal knowledge of the facts, or possess equal means of ob- taining such knowledge, and one of them voluntarily pays a claim made against him by the other, the money so paid can not be recovered back. Parker v. Lancaster (1892), 84 Maine, 512. In Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674, Sutherland, J., said: "Although there are few dicta of eminent judges to the contrary, I consider the current or weight of authorities as clearly es- tablishing the position, that when money is paid with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances upon which it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it can not be recovered back upon the ground that the party supposed he was bound in law to pay it, when in truth he was not. He shall not be permitted to al- lege his ignorance of law; and it shall be considered a voluntary pay- ment." In Ray v. Bank of Kentucky, 3B. Mon.510, Ewing, C. J., said: "It has long been a controverted ques- tion, whether a party could avail himself of his mistake or ignorance of the law, merely as a ground to ex- onerate himself from his civil obliga- tion, or to rescind an executed con- tract, or recover back money paid. Able authorities, in England and in the American states, may be found upon both sides of the question," and it was held that where money had been paid under a clear and palpable mistake of either law or fact, essen- tially bearing upon and affecting the contract, without cause or considera- § 663 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 801 The general principle is that where a party with full knowl- edge, actual or imputed, of the facts, there being no duress, fraud or extortion, voluntarily pays money upon a demand, al- though not enforcible against him, he can not recover it back. 1 Accordingly a party who overpaid to a building association in dues, premium and interest, cannot recover it back in action, where it was a voluntary payment, in ignorance of the law, and received in good faith. 2 And where an administrator paid money to a distributee of his intestate, with full knowledge of the facts, but under a mistake of law, it was held that he could not recover it unless it was necessary for the payment of the debts of the intestate. 8 § 663. Ignorantia juris neminem excnsat — Exception in the case of ignorance of a foreign law. — When the party alleges merely a mistake of law, the maxim applies, ignorantia juris neminem excusat. 1 It is a rule of quiet as well as of good faith, and precludes the courts being occupied in undoing tbe arrangements of parties, which they have voluntarily made, and into which they have not been drawn by fraud or accident, or by any excusable ignorance of their legal rights and liabili- ties. 5 An exception has been made to this rule where a mis- take was made as to the law of the jurisdiction foreign to the plaintiff and to the jurisdiction in which the action was brought; 6 also where, although the action was brought in the tion, and which in law, honor or pie of the common law for many conscience was not due and payable, years, per Gilchrist, J., in Peterbor- it may be recovered back. ough v. Lancaster, 14 N. H. 382. Every 1 Schwarzenbach v. Odorless Exca- man is supposed to know the law, and vating Apparatus Co. (1885), 65 Md. if he voluntarily makes a payment 34; Potomac Coal Co.». Cumberland, which the law would not compel him etc., E. Co., 38 Md. 226 (to recover to make, he can not afterwards assign back freights paid in excess of proper his ignorance of the law as the reason rates) . why the state should furnish him with 2 Dilzer v. Building Assn. (1892 legal remedies to recover it back. Pa.), 39 Leg. Int. 383. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), 809. 3 Shriver v. Garrison (1887), 30 W. 6 Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed. 810. Va. 456. 6 Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112, where 4 Ege v. Koontz, 3 Pa. St. 109. This the plaintiff had paid money to the maxim is a fundamental one, and has defendant under a mistake as to the always been received, with some few law of New York, exceptions, as an elementary prinei- 51 802 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 664 jurisdiction about whose law the mistake was made, the mis- take was made out of the jurisdiction and by one residing else- where. 1 Thus where the plaintiff, living in Missouri, made a payment under an erroneous and mistaken belief that the trans- action in question was a valid and binding sale under the laws of Nebraska, he was allowed to recover back. 2 § 664. Recovery of money paid under duress or compulsion. — It is well settled that money extorted or involuntarily paid under duress or unlawful compulsion may be recovered back . 3 To enable the party making the compulsory payment to recover it, the compulsion must have been illegal, unjust or oppressive. 4 To constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as suf- ficient to make a payment involuntary, there must be some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed or believed to be possessed by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another, from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making the payment. As stated by the court of appeals of Maryland, the doctrine established by the authorities is, that " a payment is not to be regarded as compulsory, unless made to emancipate the person or property from an actual and existing duress im- posed upon it by the party to whom the money is paid." 5 A 1 Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodge, 8 tion was one of those oases in which Barb. 233. "The plaintiffs then stand money paid might be recovered back, in precisely the same situation as Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 837. though the money had been paid by Action against a carrier who had re- them under a mistake as to material fused to deliver goods without pay- facts. Ignorance of the law of a for- ment of an exorbitant remuneration, eign government is ignorance of fact, Mowattv.Wright, 1 Wend. 355; Chase and in this respect the statute laws of v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134; 20 Am. the other states of this Union are for- Dec. 352; Atkinson v. Denby, 6 H. & eign laws. And this proceeds upon N. 778; (money obtained by extor- the principle that foreign laws are tion) ; Voiersu. Stout, -t Bush, 572 (ex- matters to be proved, like other facts, torting note and coercing payment by before even courts can notice them," military duress); 1 Barsons on Con- per Johnson, J. tracts, 395. 2 Lyle v. Shinnebarger, 17 Mo. App. 4 Dickerman v. Lord, 21 Iowa, 338, 66. "When one misunderstands or per Dillon, J. : "To constitute duress mistakes a foreign law, it is consid- of imprisonment, the imprisonment ered ignorantia facti excusat." must be unlawful." 1 Salk. 68. 3 In Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 5 Mayor, etc., v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 143, Gibbs, J., mentions that extor- (Md.), 425; 45 Am. Dec. 145, and 064 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 803 payment by a person to free his goods from an attachment put on for the purpose of extorting money, by one who knows that he has no cause of action, is not voluntary, but compulsory, and may be recovered back. 1 A person under sentence until a fine is paid is under duress, and the payment of an illegal fine, under such circumstances, is not deemed voluntary, and may be recovered back. 2 Threats constitute duress where they cause reasonable apprehension of loss of life, or of some great bodily harm, or of imprisonment. 3 But mere fear that one will be sued does not constitute compulsion, so as to enable the party paying money to recover it back. 4 If a shipper of goods by a common carrier pays illegal rates, such payment is not volun- tory in the legal sense, and the shipper may maintain his ac- tion for money had and received, to recover back the illegal charge. 5 notes; Brumagin v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Radich v. Hutchins (1877), 95 U. S. 210. " Where the money was paid upon a wrongful demand, to save the party paying from some great or irreparable mischief or damage from which he could not be saved but by the payment of the sum wrongfully demanded, it can be recovered back." Corkle v. Maxwell, 3 Blatchf . 413, per Ingersoll, J. 1 Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364; Adams v. Reeve's, 68 N. C. 134. What is and what is not duress of goods fully discussed. Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569. 2 Devlin ^.United States, 12 Ct. of CI. 266, where a citizen was tried and con- victed in 1865 by a military commis- sion and sentenced to ten years' im- prisonment and a fine of $10,000. While imprisoned United States bonds were received from him by the jailer and sold, and the sum of $10,000 was re- tained from the proceeds as payment of the fine. The fine was illegally im- posed, and the suit was brought in the nature of an action of indebitatus as- sumpsit for money had and received. Pitt v. Coomes, 2 A. & E. 459. Pitt had been arrested, while privileged as in attendance on the court, and had, in order to obtain his liberty, paid into court, under a judge's order, the amount for which he was sued. The court ordered it to be restored to him. "The arrest," said Lord Den- man, C. J., "was, we think, illegal. The consequence is that the money was improperly extorted." 3 Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150 ; Har- mon v. Harmon, 61 Maine, 227; 14 Am. Rep. 556; Feller v. Green, 26 Mich. 70; Bane v. Detrick, 52 111. 19; Cooley on Torts, 506. 4 Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73 ; Matthews v. Smith, 67 N. C. 374; City of Muscatine v. Keokuk Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 185; Higgins v. Brown, 78 Maine, 473 ; Hilborn v. Bucknam, 78 Maine, 482; Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224. 5 Mobile, etc., Ry. Co. v. Steiner (1878), 61 Ala. 559; Parker v. Great Western R. Co., 7 Man. & G. 253; Chicago and Alton R. Co. v. Chicago, etc.,Coal Co.,79 I11.121,where the court, in reply to the objection that the money was voluntarily paid, said: "It 804 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. §665 § 665. Voluntary payment of taxes. — A voluntary payment of an assessment made under a mistake of law, but with full knowledge of the facts and not induced by any fraud or im- proper conduct on the part of the payee, can not be recovered back. 1 In order to justify a recovery by the tax-payer, it is not only necessary that the assessment be void, and that the cor- poration actually receive the money, but it is also necessary that the payment be made involuntarily and under compulsion. 2 All payments of taxes are supposed to be voluntary until the contrary is made to appear. 3 Money illegally or erroneously, can hardly be said that these enhanced charges were voluntarily paid by ap- pellees. It was a case of life or death with them, as they had no other means of conveying their coals to the markets offered by the Illinois Cen- tral, and were bound to accede to any terms appellants might impose. They were under a sort of moral duress, by submitting to which appellants have received money from them which in equity and good conscience they ought not to retain." Gartoni). Bristol, etc., Ey. Co. (1861), 1 Best & S. 112; 101 Eng. Com. Law, 112, in the Queen's Bench. In Kenneth v. South Caro- lina R. Co., 15 Rich. 284; 98 Am. Dec. 382, it was held that assumpsit for money had and received would not lie against a railroad company to recover charges for transportation in excess of those which by law the carrier is permitted to exact when such charges are paid voluntarily without objection or protest, or notice of discontent, and after the service had been fully performed and the property was out of the possession of and beyond the control of the carrier. 'Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester (1890), 122 N. Y. 285; Sowles v. Soule, 59 Vt. 131; Lester v. Mayor, etc., 29 Md. 415; City of Houston v. Feeser (1890), 76 Texas, 365; Phillips v. Jef- ferson Co., 5 Kan. 412; Borough of Allentown v. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421 ; Town Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400; Elston v . Chicago, 40 111. 514; Smith v. Redrleld, 27 Maine, 145; Town of Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552; Powell v. Board of Su- pervisors St. Croix Co., 46 Wis. 210; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 944, et seq. 2 1 Beach on Public Corporations, § 234. An action will not lie for the recovery of money voluntarily paid, although under protest, upon a sewer assessment which is merely irregular, and because of which irregularity the collection might have been enjoined. Newcomb v. Davenport (1892), 86 Iowa, 291. In Winter v. City Council, 65 Ala. 403, it was held that, to sup- port an action for money had and re- ceived against a municipal corpora- tion, to recover from it the amount of taxes illegally assessed and collected, two facts must concur, namely, first, a want of authority for the imposition and collection of the tax, rendering the proceeding not merely irregular, but void; and second, a payment un- der compulsion or under duress of person or property. 3 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), 810. Where a municipality, in good faith, but under a misapprehension of the law, demands a greater sum than it is legally entitled to, for a license to carry on a particular business, a per- son, who, with knowledge of the facts, pays the sum demanded, can not recover back the excess. City of § 666 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 805 but voluntarily, paid for license taxes can not be recovered back. 1 And the mere fact that the collector might have en- forced payment will not make a payment involuntary when he was taking no steps to collect and making no threats. 2 § 666. Recovery of illegal taxes paid under compulsion. — Where an illegal and void tax is paid to prevent a seizure and sale of the tax-payer's property to one having apparent color- able or formal authority to make such seizure and sale, if the danger is imminent and the payment is made under protest, the money so paid may be recovered back. 3 If a demand for Blackwell on Tax Titles (5th ed.), §328; Hilliard on Taxation, 421; Burroughs on Taxation, 267; Town Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400; De Fremery v. Austin, 53 Cal. 380; Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563 ; Kimball v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 1 Brad. (111. App.) 209; Lau- man v. County of Des Moines, 29 Iowa, 310; First Nat. Bank v. Watkins, 21 Mich. 483; City of Grand Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367 ; Tuttle v. Ever- ett, 51 Miss. 27 ; 24 Am. Bep. 622 ; City of Vicksburg v. Butler, 56 Miss. 72 ; Union Ry. Co. v. Skinner, 9 Mo. App. 189. In Union Bank v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 51 Barb. 159, the trial court held that payment of an il- legal tax, under a notice from the receiver of taxes that unless paid a penalty would be imposed by way of interest, and a warrant would be is- sued, was a voluntary payment. The Commissioner of Appeals, in Union Nat. Bank v. Mayor, etc., 51 N. Y. 638, held that such payment was not voluntary, and reversed the decision, following Bank of Commonwealth v. The Mayor, 43 N. Y. 184. In Boston Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Mete. 181, it was held that "payment of taxes to a collector who has a tax bill and warrant in the form prescribed by law, is to be regarded as compulsory payment, and if such taxes were as- sessed without authority, they may be recovered back in an action for money Camden v. Green (1892), 54 N. J. Law, 591. 1 Grimley v. Santa Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Cook v. City of Boston, 9 Allen, 393. In Sharp v. Carthage (1891), 48 Mo. App. 26, where the city voted against the sale of intoxi- cating liquors after a license had been obtained, it was held that the dram- shop keeper was entitled to recover from the city an appropriate part of the money paid for the license. 2 Wilson v. Pelton (1883), 40 Ohio St. 306. In Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73, where the legislature had imposed a poll-tax on all foreign immigrants coming by sea into the state, and after the law had been thirty years in operation, it was de- clared to be contrary to the Federal constitution and the plaintiff sought to recover back the toll paid under it, it was held that a payment of taxes is not compulsory because made under a threat, express or implied, that the legal remedies for it will be resorted to. "There is no pretence that the defendant's officers did any more than demanded the tax under a sup- posed authority of the law, and this is no more a compulsion than where an individual demands a supposed right. The threat that is supposed to underlie such demands is a legally harmless one." Per Lowrie, J. 'Cooley on Taxation (2ded.),814; 806 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 667 the tax has been made under a warrant in the officer's hands, though no threat to levy has been made, the payment will be deemed involuntary. 1 Any payment is to be regarded as invol- untary which is made under a claim involving the use of force as an alternative. 2 The rule was stated by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, as follows: "When, therefore, a party not liable to taxation is called upon peremptorily to pay upon such a warrant, and he can save himself and his property in no other way than by paying the illegal demand, he may give notice that he so pays it by duress and not voluntarily, and, by showing that he is not liable, recover it back as money had and received." 8 Upon this theory the payment of a water license, under threat of turning off the water in case of continued refusal, was held payment under compulsion. 4 § 667. Effect of a protest. — A payment of an illegal demand with a full knowledge of all the facts which render such de- mand illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release the person or property from de- tention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of the person or property, must be deemed voluntary. And the fact that the party, at the time of making the payment, files a written pro- test does not make the payment involuntary. 5 A mere protest had and received, although the party the party intends to institute suit to made no protest before payment." test the validity of the tax, it may be In Allen v. Burlington, 45 Vt. 202, the recovered back of the collector in an court says: "If the plaintiff was con- action for money had and received, strained to pay the tax to save his unless the statute prescribes some property from distress, and to avoid a other remedy, or has annexed other penalty and costs, it was not a volun- conditions to the right to sue. State tary payment." Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204. 'Parcher D.Marathon Co., 52 Wis. 4 Westlake & Button v. St. Louis 388; 38 Am. Rep. 745. A party who, (1882), 77 Mo. 47; Panton v. Duluth when threatened with a distress, pays Gas & W. Co., 50 Minn. 175. an illegal tax under protest and notice 5 Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of suit, may maintain an action to re- (1878), 98 U. S. 541 (suit to recover cover it back. Grim v. Weissenberg back taxes paid by the Union Pacific School District, 57 Pa. St. 434. Railroad Company upon certain lands 2 Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich. 118. in Nebraska) ;Lamborn D.CountyCom- 3 Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7. missioners, 97 U. S. 181,; Comniis- When the tax paid is illegally as- sioners of Wabaunsee County v. sessed, and is paid under" protest, Walker, 8 Kan. 431; Bowman v. Boyd under compulsion, or with notice that (1892), 21 Nev. 281. § 667 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. 807 against a charge does not entitle the party who voluntarily and without duress or compulsion pays it to recover it back. 1 A protest is available only in cases of payment under duress or coercion, or when undue advantage is taken of the party's situation. It is merely notice to the party receiving the pay- ment, that,' if the demand is illegal in whole, or in any specified particular, he may be subjected to an action for the recovery back of the amount to which objection is made, and if an action be brought, the protest is only available as evidence of the fact of compulsion. 2 Statutes in some of the states have, however, changed the rule to some extent, and provide for a 1 Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press, etc., Co., 53 Texas, 172. Protest can never make that involuntary which in its absence would be voluntary. Wea- sel v. D. S. B. Johnston, etc., Co. (1893),3 N.Dak. 160 ; 54 N.W. Rep. 922. It has been repeatedly held that a mere protest, when payment was not made to save arrest, or the seizure or sale of goods or in submission to pro- cess that might immediately have been enforced, would not relieve the payment of its presumed voluntary character. Peebles v. Pittsburgh, 101 Pa. St. 304; City of Muscatine v. Keokuk, etc., Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 185 ; Durham v. Board of Commissioners, 95 Ind. 182 ; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 810. 8 McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365 ; 70 Am. Dec. 655 ; Brumagin v. Tilling- hast, 18 Cal. 265; 79 Am. Dec. 176. In Fleetwood v. City of New York, 2 Sandf.475, Sandford, J., said: "Where there is no legal compulsion, a party yielding to the assertion of an adverse claim can not detract from the force of his concession by saying 'I object' or 'I protest,' atthe same time that he actually pays the claim. The pay- ment nullifies the protest as effectually as it obviates the previous denial and contestion of the claim." Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134; 20 Am. Dec. 352; Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370; Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Wyandotte Co., 16 Kan.587 ; City of Detroit D.Mar- tin, 34 Mich. 170; 22 Am. Rep. 512; Shane D.St. Paul, 26 Minn. 543; Await v. Eutaw, etc., Assn., 34 Md. 435 ; Pat- terson v. Cox, 25 Ind. 261 ; Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125. "There are, no doubt, cases to be found in which the language of the court, if separated from the facts of the particular case under consideration, would seem to imply that a protest alone was suf- ficient to show that the payment was not voluntary, but on examination it will be found that the protest was used to give effect to the other attend- ing circumstances," per Waite, C. J., in Railroad Co. v. Commissioners (1878), 98 IT. S. 541, citing Elliott ». Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137; Bend^. Hoyt, 13 Pet. 263 (customs cases, payments made to release goods held for duties) ; Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1 (internal revenue tax cases, where the provisions of the internal revenue acts warranted the conclusion that congress intended to give the tax- payer such remedy) ; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75. A protest made after payment is unavailing. Mar- riott v. Brune, 9 How. 619. 808 IMPLIED CONTRACTS. § 667 a recovery in all cases of the payment of an illegal tax, pro- vided that at the time of such payment a formal protest was made as the statute prescribed. 1 1 Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 813. In knowledge of the illegality, though he Kentucky a party may recover back made no proteBt. City of Louisville taxes illegally assessed paid without v.Zanone, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 151. CHAPTER XVIII. JOINT CONTRACTS . §668. Joint and joint and several §679. Where the deceased joint contracts. debtor is surety. 669. Illustrations. 680. When a surety's estate is held 670. Joint contracts in Louisiana — liable. Mortgage as indivisible. 681. Partnership contracts. 671. The interest of the parties. 682. Contribution among joint deb- 672. The intention of the par- tors. ties. 683. Contribution among sureties. 673. Liability of joint obligors. 684. Actions on joint contracts. 674. Contracts of subscription. 685. Actions on joint and several 675. Effect of release of one joint contracts. debtor. 686. Judgments on joint contracts. 676. The same subject continued. 687. The same subject continued. 677. Effect of death of joint contrac- 688. Statutory modification of the tor at law. common law rules. 678. The rule in equity. 689. The same subject continued. § 668. Joint and joint and several contracts. — Contracts may be joint, or several, or they may be joint and several. Where an obligation is undertaken by two or more persons, or a right is given to two or more, the general legal presumption is that it is a joint obligation, or a joint right as the case may require. Where the subject-matter of the contract is entire, as where the contract is to pay an entire sum to several persons, it is solely a joint contract. 1 The introduction into a contract of terms expressly joint will entail a joint liability, although the parties would have been otherwise only severally liable; on the other hand, where words of severalty are introduced in the contract or agreement, the parties thereby incurring liabil- ity must have the benefit resulting from them. 2 If the con- tract made by several persons purports simply to bind them- selves or to covenant without more, the obligation, or 1 1 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 76. 2 Mansell v. Burredge, 7 T. R. 348 ; Lee v. Nixon, 1 A. & E. 201. (809) 810 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 669 covenant is taken to be joint only, and not several; if the con- tract purports that they bind themselves, or covenant severally, the liability is separate; if they purport to bind themselves jointly and severally, or to bind themselves and each of them, or to covenant for themselves and each of them, using both joint and several words, the liability is both joint and several. 1 Where several persons stipulate for the performance of a partic- ular act the law implies that they are bound jointly and not sev- erally, and there must be express words in order to create a several responsibility. 2 It is the tendency of the law to regard an obligation undertaken by several parties as joint, when there are no express words indicating a several obligation. 8 A promise, the subject-matter of which is entire, and which is joint in its terms and object, can not be made several by any doubtful implication or limitation. When several persons signed a writing which purported, by its terms, to be a joint agreement to indemnify the plaintiff for becoming bail, but an- nexed to each of their signatures a character and figuring indi- cating different sums in dollars and cents, it was held that the contract was not thereby rendered several. 1 § 669. Illustrations. — If several persons bind themselves by these words: "We promise to pay" a certain sum of money, it creates a joint obligation. It is to be performed not by one of the obligors, but by all of them. 5 And a note signed by more than one person, and beginning "we promise," is joint only. 5 But if an instrument worded in the singular is executed by sev- eral, the obligation is a joint and several one, and those who execute it may be sued either separately or together. 7 A promis- 1 1 Lawson's Rights, Remedies and 4 McCullis v. Thurston, 27 Vt. 596. Practice, § 2387 ; Leake on Contracts, 6 Mayor of New Orleans v. Ripley, 456; Simpson v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31. 5 La. 121; 25 Am. Dec. 175. "If two, z Alpaugh v. Wood, 53 N.J. Law, three, or more bind themselves in an 638; Forster v. Taylor, 3 Camp 49; obligation thus, obligamus nos, and City of London Gas Co. v. Nicholls, 2 say no more, the obligation is and C. & P. 365; 1 Chitty on Pleading (16 shall be taken to be joint only, and Am. ed.), 48 ; Broom on Parties, § 154. not several." Sheppard's Touchstone 3 1 Parsons on Contracts, 11 ; Note to of Common Assurances, 375. Carter v. Carter, 2 Day, 442; 2 Am. 6 Barnett v. Juday, 38 Ind. 86. Dec. 113; Elliott v. Bell (1893), 37 W. 7 Marsh v. Ward, Peake (N. P.) Cas. Va. 834. 177; Clerk v. Blackstock, Holt(N.P.), § 670 JOINT CONTRACTS. 811 sory note in form "I promise to pay," etc., and subscribed by two persons, is a joint and several note. 1 And so also is one signed by two makers, and running, "we or either of us prom- ise to pay.'" If three are bound in a bond by these words: "We bind ourselves, and each of us jointly," it is a joint obli- gation, for the word "jointly" makes the obligation "joint," which the word "each" can not make several. 3 Where the ob- ligatory part of a bond is in these words: "We are holden and bound unto M. C. in the sum of five hundred dollars, for the payment of which we bind ourselves and each of us," it is a joint and several bond, on which an action may be brought against one of the obligors separately. 4 A bond in this, form: Know all men that we, A. as principal and B., C. and D. as sureties, are bound unto the people in the several sums affixed to our names, viz.: B. in the sum of ten thousand dollars, C. in the sum of five thousand dollars, D. in the sum of three thousand dollars, etc., "for the which payment, well and truly to be made, we severally bind ourselves, our heirs," etc., was held to be an instrument embracing several distinct obliga- tions, each of which is a joint obligation of the principal and one surety, and not joint and several. 6 § 670. Joint contracts in Louisiana — Mortgage as indivis- ible. — A note containing simply the promise of the makers to pay is merely their joint obligation, binding each only for his proportion of the debt, under the provisions of the Louisiana civil code, and not solidary, binding each for the whole debt, as 474; Van Alstyne v. VanSlycl^ 10 Dec. 113. A bond running thus : "For Barb. 383. The civil code of California which sums respectively, unto the follows this rule and provides that "a said state of California, in the man- promise made in the singular number, ner and in the proportions herein- but executed by several persons, is pre- after set forth, bind ourselves, our sumed to be joint and several." §1660. and each of our heirs, executors, and 1 Hemmenway v. Stone, 7 Mass. 58; administrators, jointly and severally, Monson v. Drakeley, 40 Conn. 552; firmly by these presents" is a joint Maiden v. Webster, 30 Ind. 317 ; Part- and several bond. "We certainly ridge v. Colby, 19 Barb. 248 ; Solomon know of no words more apt to express v. Hopkins (1891), 61 Conn. 47. that idea than those used. They have 8 Poguerc. Clark, 25 111.333; Harvey been long used for that purpose." v. Irvine, 11 Iowa, 82. People v. Love, 25 Cal. 520. 8 1 Addison on Contracts, 38. 6 People v. Hartley, 21 Cal. 585. 4 Carter v. Carter, 2 Day, 442 ; 2 Am. 812 JOINT CONTRACTS. 670 solidarity must be expressly stipulated. 1 Under a mortgage not stipulating against indivisibility, as authorized by the Louisiana civil code, declaring that a mortgage is in its nature indivisible, the whole debt is payable out of the whole property, even though the debt be joint and therefore divisible, at least where the consideration was the price of movable property which be- came by the purchase indivisibly incorporated with the land mortgaged, and where the mortgage remains in the hands of the original holder. 2 1 Louisiana Civil Code, arts. 2080, 2086, 2093. 2 Groves v. Sentell (1894), 153 U. S. 465; 14 Sup. Ct. Eep. 898, "White, J.: "This provision of the Louisiana code was derived from the Code Napo- leon, where its identical language is found. Code Napoleon, art. 2114. The mortgage in this case contains nothing on its face which takes it out of the general rule. The parties sev- erally declare that they are indebted, etc., and that they do hereby mort- gage to and in favor of the said Roset- ta Rhea, represented herein by her attorney in fact, the property de- scribed in the deed. There is no stip- ulation in the act showing in the re- motest degree an intention to mort- gage separately an undivided half of the property for an undivided half of the debt. Thus, on the face of the act, it is a mortgage of the whole property for the whole debt. It was in the power of the contracting parties to have stipulated against indivisibil- ity, and that they failed to do so is self-evident. The provision of the code is that indivisibility is 'in the nature of a mortgage;" therefore not of its essence. The commentators on the Code Napoleon agree that indivis- ibility can be avoided even where the parties join in a common act of mort- gage by stipulating that the mortgage is to be divisible. Laurent, in his 'Principes de Droit Civil Francais,' thus states the rule: 'All the author- ities teach the doctrine that the law, in saying that a mortgage is indivisible by its nature, intends simply thereby to declare that it is not so indivisible in its essence. From this it is con- cluded that parties may, by their con- ventions, stipulate to the contrary. The right of the parties to make such agreements, in relation to the divisi- bility of the mortgage, as they deem proper, can not be denied, because indivisibility rests upon intention.' Vol. 30, p. 159. See also, Rodiere 'On Indivisibility,' par. 466. Paul Pont, in his treatise 'On Privileges and Mortgages,' thus states it: 'The words "in the nature of" have a sig- nificance which is applied to them sometimes in other provisions of the law. Thus, the law says that indivis- ibility is in the nature of a mortgage in the same way that it is provided that warranty is in the nature, not in the essence, of contract of sale ; and, because indivisibility is purely a mat- ter of intention, it can be controlled by the will of the parties.' Vol. 1, p. 321, pars. 331, 332. These exposi- tions of the civil law writers are per- suasive as to the proper construction of the Louisiana code. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U. S. 707,728; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962. Indeed, by the strong- est possible analogy, they have been adopted by the Louisiana courts. Thus, a vendor's privilege, under the law of Louisiana, is 'in the nature' of the contract of sale. The rule there §671 JOINT CONTRACTS. 813 § 671. The interest of the parties. — Where the language is ambiguous, the contract shall be taken to be joint or several, as to this privilege is that, where a sale is made, and the privilege is not excluded by express agreement or by implications clearly deducible from the language of the parties, it is im- plied to exist, as it is of the 'nature of the contract.' Boner v. Mahle, 3 La. Ann. 600. The parties, then, having had the power, in contracting the mortgage, to exclude indivisibility, and not having done so, indivisibility applies, not alone as a result of their silence, but also because, being the general rule and of the nature of the contract, it exists unless excluded by the express terms or by plain 'impli- cation deducible from the contract.' It is urged, however, that, as the obli- gation secured by the mortgage was joint, therefore the mortgage itself must necessarily have been joint. The proposition confounds the nature of the principal obligation with that of the accessory contract of mortgage. That the divisibility of a debt does not necessarily import the divisi- bility of the mortgage securing it is unanimously held by the civil-law writers. 'Under the theory of the law, the indivisibility of the mortgage has no reference to the nature of the principal obligation. Thus, there may be a division of the obligation either between joint creditors or joint debt- ors, or between the heirs of joint cred- itors and joint debtors.' Paul Pont, vol. 1, p. 33. Laurent, in speaking on the same subject, says : 'Thus, if the debt is discharged in part, or is divisible, it has no influence whatever upon the mortgage. This will subsist in its entirety, although the debt may be extinguished in part, and although a third possessor of the immovable mortgaged may be liable only person- ally for a portion of the debt. We thu3 see that the indivisibility of the mortgage does not render the obliga- tion itself indivisible. Where the ob- ligations are joint, they may be di- vided, actively or passively, between the heirs of the creditor and the heirs of the debtor.' Laurent, vol. 30, p. 151, par. 177. See also, Rodiere, p. 167, et seq. The whole subject was at an early date considered by the French court of cassation. Certain persons gave a power of attorney to an agent, authorizing him to contract a debt and consent a mortgage. The agent bor- rowed the money and gave the mort- gage. When the mortgage came to be enforced, the debtors defended on the ground that the agent bad consented a solidary debt when he had only the power to consent a joint one ; that, therefore, not only was the debt joint, but the mortgage securing it divisible. The court found that the power only authorized the contracting of a joint debt ; but it held that as the power authorized the agent to consent a mort- gage, and the mortgage was in its nature indivisible, the debt was joint; but the indivisible mortgage securing it remained and was in force. Cassa- tion, May 6, 1818, referred to and quoted in Paul Pont, vol. 1, p. 328. It hasbeencontendedthatadifferentrule has been established in Louisiana. We are referred, in support of this propo- sition, to Walton v. Lizardi, 15 La. 588, andErwin v. Greene, 5 Rob. (La.) 70. These cases, instead of support- ing the contention, we think refute it. In the Walton Case several persons had bought separate undivided por- tions of a square of ground. To evi- dence their obligations to pay the pur- chase price they issued their separate notes for their respective shares, and secured them by one act of mortgage upon the property. Some of the pur- chasers paid their notes, and others 814 JOINT CONTRACTS. §671 according to the interest of the parties and the nature of the cause of action. 1 It has been held that when the legal interest in a covenant and in the cause of action thereon is joint, the covenant is joint, although it may, in its terms, be several or joint and several. 2 The nature, and especially the entireness did not. Foreclosure proceedings were commenced upon the unpaid notes against the whole property, and the issue presented was whether the mortgage was divisible or indivisible. The court held, after a critical exam- ination of the contract, that upon its face it stipulated that the mortgage should be divisible, and not indivisi- ble. It said that each of the parties had given his separate notes for his separate obligation, and that the agree- ment between them and the vendor was that the notes should be secured by a special mortgage on 'each of the lots for which the same should be given in payment.' The language of the mortgage in that case was as fol- lows : ' Vi'e, in order to secure the fol- lowing described notes, jointly effect, mortgage and hypothecate ; ' again : 'And the said purchasers, each in pro- portion of their respective shares and interest in said property, do hereby confess judgment in favor of said par- ties;' again: ' Now, the said parties do hereby agree that a sale of said ground shall be made in favor of * * * and in the following propor- tions.' The facts clearly justified the court in saying : ' From the particular care which the parties appear to have taken to distinguish their proportion- ate interest in the property, as well as in the payments for which they respectively gave their separate ob- ligations,' their intention was clear to create a divisible, and not an indivisible mortgage. The facts in Erwin v. Greene, 5 Rob. (La.) 70, were very similar to those just re- ferred to. There the court said: 'Each of the obligors promised to pay his portion of the price for which he gave his separate notes, and each took care to distinguish and designate the proportion of their respective interests in the property.' These cases, by con- verse reasoning, confirm the rule of indivisibility as applied to the con- tract with which we are dealing. In- deed, we think this contract is con- trolled, not by the foregoing cases, but by Potts v. Blanchard, 19 La. Ann. 167, and Stewarts. Buard, 23 La. Ann. 411." 1 Goldsmith v. Sachs (1882), 17 Fed. Eep. 726. If the interest is joint, all the covenantees must join in bring- ing the action, and words of severalty shall not prevail. Servante v. James, 10 B. & C. 410; Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353; Broom on Parties, § 7. 2 Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, 376, where the covenants were not in terms either joint or several, and there rules were laid down, citing Broom on Parties, 8: "Where the covenant is, in its terms, several, but the interest of the covenantees is joint, they must join in suing upon the covenant; (2) Where the covenant is, in its terms, expressly and posi- tively joint, the covenantees must join in an action upon the covenant, although as between themselves their interest is several; (3) Where the language of the covenant is capable of being so construed, it shall be taken to be joint or several according to the interest of the covenantees." Brad- burne v. Botfield, 14 M. & W. 559; Scott v. Godwin, 1 B. & P. 67 ; James v. Emery, 8 Taunt. 245; Wakefield v. Brown, 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 209; Mag- nay v. Edwards, 13 C. B. 479; Pughv. §672 JOINT CONTRACTS. 815 of the consideration, is of great importance in determining whether the promise be joint or several, because, if the consid- eration move from many persons jointly, then the promise is joint; if from many persons, but from each severally, then the promise is several. 1 § 672. The intention of the parties. — Whether the contract is joint or several, or joint and several, is one of intention. 8 The contract must be considered as a whole, and if, upon such consideration, the intention of the parties becomes apparent, it must prevail over the literal interpretation of detached words, phrases and clauses. 3 A contract which is plainly meant to be several is not to be treated as joint merely because several persons have signed it on one side or the other. 4 When persons engage for the performance of distinct and several du- ties, mere words of plurality, such as "we bind ourselves," Stringfield, 3 C. B. N. S. 2. It has been held that a contract is to be con- strued solely according to the interest of the parties. " The better doctrine would seem to be, that a contract is to be construed, first, according to its express words, if they be clear and unambiguous, and not according to the interest of the parties where it conflicts with such terms; second, according to the interest, where the words are ambiguous and susceptible of different constructions." Story on Contracts, §33b. 1 Beck v. Pounds, 20 Ga. 36 ; 1 Par- sons on Contracts, 19, citing Bell v. Chaplain, Hardres, 321. 2 Lawson on Contracts, § 116. Wheth- er a bond be joint, or joint and sev- eral, or several only, must be de- termined primarily by its terms. If these are distinct and express, and leave no room for doubt, they must control the construction to be placed on the instrument. If, however, the obligation be ambiguous and liable to different constructions the question must be settled by considerations of the interests of the obligors, and, of course, of their intentions. Murfree on Official Bonds, § 236. 8 Landwerlen i>. Wheeler, 106 Ind. 523 ; Jacobs v. Spalding, 71 Wis. 177. In the construction of contracts, the court will look at all the circumstances of the case, and ascertain by reason- able inference what the parties must have understood and mutually ex- pected at the time of making of the contract. Dwelley v. Dwelley, 143 Mass. 509. In contracts which are not reduced to writing, the courts will look into the special circumstances of the case and the situation of the par- ties, as well as into the consideration itself, in order to determine whether the interest be joint or several, and how the action should be brought; and if the parties have, by their acts, manifested an intention to treat the contract as several and not joint, it will be so held to be. Story on Con- tracts, § 33j. 4 Larkin v. Butterfield, 29 Mich. 254. Covenants are to be construed accord- ing to their spirit and intent. Ludlow v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 228. 816 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 673 will not make the contract joint. 1 Where a contract describes the parties on one side as principal and sureties, and stipulates that the principal shall perform the obligations and receive the pay, while the sureties shall only be liable for liquidated dam- ages on his default, it is, in effect, a severable contract, and the sureties need not be joined as plaintiffs in a suit upon it.' § 673. Liability of joint obligors. — The liability of obligors on an obligation that is joint only, is in the absence of statutory modification strictly aggregate. 3 Each obligor is bound, insolido, for the whole undertaking. 4 It is incident to every joint con- tract that all are bound to its performance. Each and every one of the contractors stipulates that the contracts shall be performed by all. If two persons hire a carriage without a driver, and it be broken by the negligence of one who at- tempts to drive it, both would be liable, although the other was passive and free from blame. And where several persons jointly hire a carriage, horses and driver, and it is a part of the con- tract that the carriage should be driven by the driver alone, then to permit a stranger to drive it or to drive it themselves, would be a violation of the contract, and for any damage aris- ing out of the breach of the joint contract all are liable. 6 Each party to a joint contract is severally liable in one sense, that is, if sued severally and he does not plead in abatement, he is liable to pay the entire debt, but he is not severally liable in the same sense as he is on a joint and several bond, which in- strument, although on one piece of parchment or paper, in ef- fect comprises the joint bond of all and the several bonds of each of the obligors. 6 1 1 Addison on Contracts (Am. ed. * Allin v. Shadburne's Executor, 1 by Morgan), 86; Collins v. Prosser, 1 Dana, 68; 25 Am. Dec. 121; Clark v. B. & C. 682. Eawson, 2 Denio, 135; Eipley v. "Widnere. "Western Union Tel. Co. Crooker, 47 Maine, 370; Slocum e. (1882), 47 Mich. 612. By the terms Fairchild, 7 Hill, 292; Field v. Eunk, of the contract the sureties were 22 N. J. Law, 525. neither promisors nor promisees ex- 6 O'Brien v. Bound, 2 Speer Law (S. cept in the separate clause relating to C.) 495 ; 42 Am. Dec. 384. liquidated damages. 6 Per Parke, B., in King v. Hoare, "Murfree on Official Bonds, § 238. 13 M. & W. 493. §674 JOINT CONTRACTS. 817 § 674. Contracts of subscription. — Where a number of per- sons, for a good consideration, sign a subscription paper, agreeing to pay a certain sum, and by its terms each sub- scriber is to be liable only for the amount set opposite his name, the contract is several. 1 In an instrument reading: "The following rates of tuition we, the subscribers, agree to pay the proposed teacher at the expiration of the term," the rates of tuition being given and the names of the subscribers, with the number of scholars entered by each, it was held that the liability of the subscribers was several, and not joint. 2 A paper reading, "We, the undersigned, promise to pay the fol- lowing subscriptions for a new church," etc., followed by names, opposite which are different amounts, was held to be the several and not the joint obligation of the subscribers. 8 In a case involving the construction of a contract to build a butter and cheese factory, where sixty-one persons subscribed the contract for various amounts, it was held that, notwith- standing the use of the words "we agree to pay," the contract was several, and not joint.' Where several subscribers to the 1 Darnall v. Lyon (1892 Texas App.) ; 19 S. W. Rep. 506; Gibbons v. v. Bente (1892), 51Minn. 499 ; 22 Law- yers' Rep. Ann.80 and note ;Robertson v. March, 4 111. 198, "we promise to pay the sum annexed to each of our names." Moss v. Wilson, 40 Cal. 159; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537. "We agree to pay the sum set to our re- spective names." Carter v. Carter, 14 Pick. 424 ; Gait's Executor v. Swain, 9Gratt. 633; 60 Am. Dec. 311. The wording of such contracts is usually such as to make them several, but even when the language has been doubtful the construction has been that each subscription was separate. 2 Beck v. Pounds, 20 Ga. 36. "That each employer designed to obligate himself to pay for the tuition of every other patron's pupils, no one, for a moment, can believe, ' ' per Lumpkin , J. 3 Landwerlen v. Wheeler, 106 Tnd. 523. In this case there was no state- 52 ment limiting the liability of each subscriber to the amounts opposite each name, but opposite each name were the amounts subscribed by the different parties. The paper and the manner of the subscriptions clearly indicated the intention of all the par- ties that each subscriber should be liable and only liable for the amount by him subscribed. "Where a person signed the paper, and put down oppo- site his name the amount subscribed, he just as plainly declared that that was the amount for which he was to be liable, as if in the body of the paper it had been stated that each subscriber was to be liable for the amount opposite his name." 4 Davis, etc., Co. v. Barber (1892), 51 Fed. Rep. 148, disapproving Davis v. Shaper, 50 Fed. Rep. 764. In Gib- bons v. Grinsel (1891), 79 Wis. 365, :-. similar contract was held to be several . It was said: "The manifest purpose 818 JOINT CONTRACTS. §675 stock of a railroad company sign the same subscription agree- ment, the obligation is construed to be several, and not joint. 1 Each subscription is an independent undertaking, and in no way affected by the terms of other subscriptions. 2 § 675. Effect of release of one joint debtor. — The strict com- mon law rule is, that if two persons be bound jointly or joint- ly and severally in an obligation, and the obligee voluntarily and unconditionally releases one of them, both are discharged, and either may plead the release in bar, 3 because the debt is entire, and when once satisfied or released can no longer be en- forced against any party to it. 4 But the release, in order to operate to discharge the other promisors from their liability on the contract, must be a technical release under seal. 5 The legal was that each such subscriber should thus pay the amount of his particular subscription, and not that he should become liable jointly with all the other subscribers for the aggregate amount of all subscriptions. In other words, the amount which each sub- scriber thus agreed to pay was lim- ited to the amount which he thus sub- scribed, otherwise a few responsible subscribers might be made liable for numerous irresponsible subscribers." Davis v. Belford, 70 Mich. 120 (sim- ilar contract held to be several) ; Frost v. Williams (1892), 2 S. Dak. 457 (contract with a number of farm- ers to build a cheese factory). 1 Price v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 18 Ind. 137. "These stock sub- scriptions, though in form joint con- tracts, are intended to be, and are to be treated as several, and each stock- holder is liable simply for the amount opposite his own name." 2 Connecticut, etc., R. Co. v. Bailey, 24 Vt. 465; Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Patrick, 2 Abbott App. Dec. 72; 1 Wood on Railway Law, 57. Subscrip- tions to corporate stock are separate contracts. Whittlesey v. Frantz, 74 N.Y. 456. 3 Sheppard's Touchstone, 337; §383, supra. The release of one joint or joint and several promisor is, generally speaking, a release of all. Maslin's Exrs. v. Hiett (1892), 37 W. Va. 15; Tuckerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581; Rowley v. Stoddard, 7 Johns. 207; Peasley ». Boatwright, 2 Leigh, 195; Berry v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 9; 43 Am. Dec. 584, and note ; Bishop on Con- tracts, §§ 869, 870. MViggin v. Tudor, 23 Pick. 434; Goodnow v. Smith, 18 Pick. 414. A receipt, under seal, given by the obligee of a joint obligation to one of the joint obligors, in full satisfaction for his liability on said joint obliga- tion, releases all of the obligors, and oral evidence is inadmissible to show that the obligee did not intend to release them all. Hale v. Spaulding, 145 Mass. 482. 5 Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305. It is well settled, that a technical release to one of several joint obligors, whether they are bound jointly, or jointly and severally, discharges the others and may be pleaded in bar. Ludlow v. McCrea, 1 Wend. 228, per Sutherland, J. Seligman v. Pinet (1889), 78 Mich. 50, discharge of a §675 JOINT CONTRACTS. 819 operation of a release of one of two or more joint debtors may be restrained by an express provision in the instrument that it shall not operate as to the other. 1 Equity gives to a release operation according to the intention of the parties and the justice of the case. This equitable rule now prevails, and a release is to be construed according to the intention of the par- ties, and the object and purpose of the instrument, and that intent will limit and control its operation. 8 When several per- sons are jointly indebted, and one of them pays his specific share of the debt, and it is received and receipted for by the creditor as such, such payment will not exonerate the party paying from his liability for the residue of the debt. Not- withstanding such receipt, the parties to the contract will re- main jointly bound, to the extent of what is unpaid, in the same manner as if no such specific payment had been made. 3 debt just as good without a seal as with it. It has been held in England, that an act of the creditor, though by parol, which discharges one of two or more joint debtors, will discharge both or all, though the contract be in writing. Nicholson v. Eevill, 4 Ad. & Ell. 675. The rule is different in this country ; here a release by parol to one joint debtor will not operate as a discharge to other debtors jointly liable, and can only be pleaded by the debtor to whom it is given. Har- rison v. Close, 2 Johns. 448; Rowley v. Stoddard, 7 Johns. 207 ; De Zeng v. Bailey, 9 Wend. 336 ; Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537. But see Seligman v. Pinet (1889), 78 Mich. 50. 1 Hood u. Hayward, 124 N. Y. 1 Kirby v. Taylor, 6 John. Ch. 242 Hosack v. Rogers, 25 Wend. 313 Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. St. 168 ; Yates -». Donaldson, 5 Md. 389; 61 Am. Dec. 283, and note ; Edwards v. Varick, 5 Denio, 664 ; North v. Wakefield, 13 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 536; Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & B. 38 ; Exparte Good, 5 Ch. Div. 46 ; Harbeck v. Pupin, 23 Abb. New Cas. 190, 194, n. , decisions of New York courts and forms collected; 2 Chitty on Contracts (11 Am. ed.), 1154, etseq. 2 Whittemore v. Judd, etc., Co., 124 N. Y. 565; 21 Am. St. Rep. 708; Ben- ton v. Mullen (1881), 61 N. H. 125. 3 Ripley v. Crooker, 47 Maine, 370 ; Eldred v. Peterson, 80 Iowa, 264, part payment. A parol agreement by the payee of a note to release one of three makers as to two-thirds of the debt, and permit the other portion to be paid in a certain manner, is a release of the other two makers upon their payment of their proportionate shares. Seligman v. Pinet, 78 Mich. 50. Sev- eral debtors being jointly liable for a debt, an agreement by the creditor to release one from further payment and from liability for contribution does not discharge the others. Benton v. Mullen, 61 N. H. 125. Payment by one debtor of a judgment recovered against all of several joint debtors extinguishes the whole recovery. Caldwell v. Martin, 29 S. C. 22; Har- beck v. Vanderbilt, 20 N. Y. 395. 820 JOINT CONTRACTS. §676 § 676. The same subject continued. — If a joint agreement is invalid or incapable of enforcement against all of its makers, it is invalid and incapable of enforcement against any one or more of them. 1 Accordingly an action can not be maintained against one of three joint obligors on allegations that the other two have paid their shares of the amount due. And a fraudu- lent conveyance by a joint obligor will not be set aside as long as there is a legal remedy against the other joint obligors. 6 1 Bennett u. Morse (Colo. App. 1894), 39 Pac. Rep. 582. In Davis Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 10 Ind. App. 364; 37 N. E. Rep. 818, plaintiff's assignor contract- ed to build a factory for $5,200. The contract provided that the "under- signed" subscribers would pay the amount when the factory was com- pleted, and that they would incorpo- rate with a capital stock of not less than $5,200, to be issued to the sub- scribers according to their paid-up in- terests, each stockholder to be liable only for the amount subscribed by him. No person subscribed for more than two shares of $100 each. It was held that such contract was several, and not joint. In Shipman v. Straits- ville Co. (1895), 158 U. S. 356; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 886, Brown, J., said: "The court below was of opinion that the contract in question was a several one as between Shipman and the three other parties, and hence that an action would lie in favor of either of these parties without joining the others. Three separate actions were in fact brought against him. There is nothing in the con- tract indicating that the three parties were connected in any way, except that each was to furnish an equal quantity of coal. They are spoken of in the contract as 'the other three par- ties,' as if it were intended that each of them should stand for himself. If either of them had failed to furnish his quota of coal, Shipman might have brought an action against him ; but it is clear that, if he had sued them jointly for such default, the two others might answer that they had done all that they agreed to do, and could not be held liable for the de- fault of the third. These parties did not agree to furnish any definite amount of coal, hut merely that they would ship the defendant the product of their mines in equal quantities. Separate orders were given by Ship- man, and separate bills were rendered by the companies for coal shipped upon such orders ; and there is noth- ing to indicate that either of the par- ties to the contract treated it as in- volving a joint liability. Hall v. Leigh, 8 Cranch, 50." 2 Eller v. Lacy, 137 Ind. 436 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 1088, Hackney, J. : "The failure of Eller to contribute to such pay- ments neither changed the character of the contract nor created a construc- tion of it, nor did that fact release the other obligors from the payment of the whole sum due from time to time by the terms of the contract. It is unnecessary that we should inti- mate an opinion as to whether a con- struction by the parties of a plain and unambiguous contract may prevail as against the only possible construction or legal interpretation its terms will permit. If the obligation is joint, there is not only no action stated for the claim to a personal judgment for the $200 against Eller upon the obligation, but there could be no cause for setting aside a conveyance ^ 677 JOINT CONTRACTS. 821 But where two or more parties, by their concurrent wrong-do- ing, cause injury to a third person, they are jointly and sev- erally liable, and the injured party may, at his option, insti- tute an action and recover against one or all of those contrib- uting to the injury. 1 § 677. Effect of death of joint contractor at law. — On the death of a joint contractor, at common law, the liability of the deceased on the contract absolutely ceases. His representatives are not liable to any action at law ; the surviving contractors alone remain liable, and they only can be sued. 2 Upon the death of one of the makers of a joint note his representatives are, at law, discharged, and the survivor alone can be sued. 3 But in case of a several contract, or of a contract joint and several, the executor or administrator of one of the parties, deceased, could be sued in a separate action, but not jointly with the sur- vivors, because he was to be charged de bonis testatoris and they de bonis propriis.* of his property without exhausting those who were, as to such sum, liable jointly with him. As long as the le- gal remedy existed against part of the joint debtors, equity would not ex- tend its relief as to another of such debtors. This is elemental, but our attention has fallen upon two cases involving the exact question before us. Wales v. Lawrence, 36 N. J. Eq. 207; Randolph v. Daly, 16 N.J. Eq. 313." 'City of Kansas City'u. Slangstrom, 53 Kan. 431 ; 36 Pac. Rep. 706, John- ston, J. : "It is optional with the in- jured party to proceed against one or all of those contributing to the injury, as any one who aids and assists in com- mitting the wrong is liable for the whole. "Westbrook v. Mize, 35 Kan. 299; 10 Pac. Rep. 881; Fish v. Street, 27 Kan. 270; Sharpe v. Williams, 41 Kan. 56 ; 20 Pac. Rep. 497 ; Hillman v. Newington, 57 Oal. 56; Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Mass. 491." 8 Godson v. Good, 6 Taunt. 587; Foster v. Hooper, 2 Mass. 572; New Haven, etc., Co. w.Hayden, 119 Mass. 361 ; Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Denio, 61 ; Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y. 363; Burgoyne v. Ohio, etc., Co., 5 Ohio St. 586; Seaman v. Slater, 18 Fed. Rep. 485; Hawkins v. Ball's Admrs., 18 B. Mon. 816 ; 668 Am.Dec.761, note. This rule was a necessary conclusion from the technical conception of a joint liability or right at the common law, as one, single, indivisible right or liability. 3 Pomeroy's Equity Juris- prudence, § 1301. In Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 530, Judge Paige remarks : "In case of a joint contract, if one of the parties dies, his executor or adminis- trator is at law discharged from lia- bility, and the survivor alone can be sued." 3 Towers v. Moor, 2 Vern. 98 ; Simp- son v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31 ; Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373; Boykin v. Watson's Admrs., 1 Const. Tr. (S. C.) 157; Stevens v. Catlin (189L), 44 111. App. 114. 4 Seaman o. Slater, 18 Fed. Rep. 485; Mattison v. Childs, 5 Colo. 78; New Haven, etc., Co. v. Hayden, 119 Mass. 361. 822 JOINT CONTRACTS. §678 § 678. The rule in equity. — But while, at law, the death of a joint contractor terminates his liability, and the surviving joint contractors alone remain liable, the doctrine of equity is different. In equity, therefore, upon the death of one joint contractor, the liability does not rest solely upon the survivors, but may be enforced against the estate of the decedent. 1 This equitable doctrine has been incorporated into the statutes of sev- eral of the states. In some states the statute provides that if one of several joint contractors dies, his estate may be charged, as if the contract had been joint and several, that is, by an ac- tion against the personal representative alone. 2 And in a number of states there are statutes, expressly authorizing an 1 Simpson v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31 ; Ex parte Kendall, 17 Ves. 514; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174 ; Voor- his v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124. The the- ory upon which the estate of a joint debtor is held bound in equity, is that the obligation is joint and sev- eral in equity, although joint in form and only joint in law. In cases where there is an obligation to pay the debt irrespective of the joint obligation, equity will conclusively presume that the parties intended that the contract should have been and was intended to be made joint and several, but was joint in form, by mistake. Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1 ; United States v. Price, 9 How. 83. In Pickersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140, the court say: "The court will not vary the legal ef- fect of the instrument by making it several as well as joint, unless it can see either by independent testimony or from the nature of the transaction itself that the parties concerned in- tended to create a separate as well as a joint liability. If through fraud, ignorance or mistake, the joint obli- gation does not express the meaning of the parties, it will be reformed so as to conform to it. This has been done where there is a previous equity which gives the obligee the right to a several indemnity from each of the obligors as in the case of money loaned to both of them. There a court of equity will enforce the obligation against the representatives of a de- ceased obligor, although the bond be joint and not several, on the ground th?t the lending to both creates a moral obligation in both to pay, and the reasonable presumption is the parties intended their contract to be joint and several, but through fraud, ignorance, mistake or want of skill failed to accomplish the object." The equitable rule is not settled in Eng- land, professedly based upon the no- tion that all joint liabilities at law are in equity joint and several, that the creditor has his option at all times either to sue the survivors alone at law, or to sue the representatives of the deceased debtor in equity, whether the survivors are solvent or no' 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1301. 2 Curtis v. Mansfield, 11 Cush. 152; Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145; Thompson v. Johnson. 4W N. S. Law, 220. §679 JOINT CONTRACTS. 823 action to be brought against the survivors and the personal representatives of the deceased joint contractor. 1 § 679. Where the deceased joint debtor is surety. — While the courts have been disposed to treat a joint obligation as joint and several in equity under peculiar circumstances, this rule is not applied as against a surety. 8 It is a rule of the common law that if a joint obligor dying be a surety, not liable for the debt irrespective of the joint obligation, his estate is absolutely discharged, both at law and in equity, the survivor only being liable. 8 And it makes no difference that the surety died after a joint judgment against him and the principal. 4 1 Pomeroy on Remedies, §§ 118, 303. Ranney, C. J., in Burgoyne v. Ohio, etc., Co., 5 Ohio St. 586, referring to the Ohio statute, said : "This statute effected an entire abrogation of the common law principle to which allu- sion has been made, and left the es- tate of the joint debtor liable to every legal remedy as fully as though the contract had been joint and several." In Indiana it has been held that the code of procedure, by abolishing the distinctions between legal and equita- ble actions, and introducing the equitable doctrines concerning par- ties, and providing for the severance of the judgment, has, without any special provision on the subject, in- troduced this equitable rule into the law. Daily v. Robinson, 86 Ind. 382; Corbaley v. State, 81 Ind. 62; Eaton v. Burns, 31 Ind! 390 ; Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82. 2 Pickersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140 and cases cited ; Risley v. Brown, 67 N. Y. 160. 8 Towers v. Moor, 2 Vern. 98 ; Simp- son v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31 ; Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Denio, 61 ; Baskin v. An- drews (1889), 53 Hun, 95 (Mr. Baskin having died before the enactment of section 758, New York Code of Civil Procedure, the rule applicable to this case is the one existing at com- mon law) ; Getty v. Binsse, 49 N. Y. 385; 10 Am. Rep. 379; Wood v. Fisk, 63 N. Y. 245; 20 Am. Rep. 528; Davis v. Van Buren, 72 N. Y. 587; Randall v. Sackett, 77 N. Y. 480 ; Sumner o. Powell, 2 Mer. 30 ; Jones v. Beach, 2 De G. M. & G. 886; 3 Pomeroy's Eq- uity Jurisprudence, § 1302. 4 United States v. Price, 9 How. 83, where there was a joint and several bond, but judgment had been recov- ered against all the obligors, and aft- erwards the surety died. As the cred- itor had elected to treat the obligors as joint debtors, he could not proceed in equity against the surety's estate. The court says: "The obligation of a surety arises only from positive con- tract. The liability is construed strictly both at law and in equity, and the lia- bility of the surety can not be extend- ed by implication beyond the terms of his contract. If he contracts jointly with his principal, it is a legal conse- quence, known to all parties, that his personal estate will be discharged in case he should die before his princi- pal." In Chard v. Hamilton (1890), 56 Hun, 259, affirmed 125 N. Y. 777, it was held that, where the obligatory part of the bond was as follows : "For which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, firmly 824 JOINT CONTRACTS. §§ 680, 681 § 680. When a surety's estate is held liable. — When the surety or guarantor in a joint obligation is directly benefited from the contract, his estate will not be discharged from lia- bility. 1 Accordingly, if the surety participates in the considera- tion for which the joint obligation was made, his estate is liable. And, if the consideration for which the joint obligation was given was the discharge of a prior obligation on which the surety was liable, such discharge would be sufficient to render the estate of the surety liable. 2 Where in some states all causes of ac- tion founded on contract survive, the estate of a deceased sure- ty on a joint, but not several, promissory note will not be dis- charged from liability. 3 § 681. Partnership contracts. — Contracts made by partners are joint. Each copartner is bound for the entire amount due by these presents," etc., the words binding the executors and adminis- trators of the obligors were of no moment in the construction of the instrument. The doctrine was held, in Royal Ins. Co. ■«. Davies, 40 Iowa, 469; 20 Am. Rep. 581, where the bond stipulated that the surety bound himself, his "heirs, executors and administrators," that death did not limit liability of surety. In In- diana, the death of a surety on a joint promissory note does not dis- charge his estate from liability upon the note, the common law rule having never been a part of the law of that state. Hudelson v. Armstrong, 70 Ind. 99. In Susong v. Vaiden (1878), 10 S. C. 247; 30 Am. Rep. 50, it was held that, where a joint note is executed by a principal, and by a surety not otherwise liable, and the latter dies, leaving the principal surviving, his estate is not discharged from the ob- ligation. "Since the adoption of the code of procedure, which, in conform- ity to the requirement of the consti- tution, has provided that justice shall }>" administered in a uniform mode of pl-jading, without distinction between law and equity, we can see no reason why the representatives of a deceased co-obligor, who was a mere surety, may not be joined with the surviving obligor in an action upon a joint bond or note, as in this case." Per Mclver, C. J. 'Richardson v. Draper, 87 N. Y. 337, affirming 23 Hun, 188. The death of a joint obligor only discharges his obligation in a case where it appears that he was a mere surety, who re- ceived no benefit whatever from the joint obligation ; where a benefit was secured, and there was a moral obli- gation to pay, the rule was held not to apply. "It is difficult to perceive why the estate of a Burety, who was a joint obligor, upon whose credit and re- sponsibility mainly the obligee loaned his money, should be discharged by the death of the surety. It would seem that in good conscience and sound morals, and upon principles of natural justice, it should respond, and bear the loss, if any, rather than the obligee, who trusted the surety," per Earl, J. 2 Boyd v. Bell, 69 Texas, 735. 8 Brandt on Suretyship, § 140. § 681 JOINT CONTRACTS. 825 on copartnership contracts, and this obligation is so far sev- eral that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the non-join- der of his copartners, a recovery may be had against him for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against the copartners may be enforced against the property of each. 1 A joint and several note by all the members of a firm is not strictly a partnership note nor has it the same ef- fect. 2 A note made by one partner, and beginning, "I prom- ise to pay," but signed with the name of the firm, was held binding on the partnership, as meaning, "I, one of the part- ners, promise on behalf of the firm," etc. 3 If a note be signed by a person in the name of a firm, whether that name repre- sents in form more than one person, as "A. & Co." or only one person, as "A.," it is in both cases the joint note of the firm, and all the partners will be bound, whether the language be "I" or "we promise." 1 In partnership, while the estate of each partner, both deceased and survivors, is charged with the partnership liabilities, yet there is supposed to be a part- nership estate from which they should be liquidated. The death of a partner dissolves the partnership, and the estate goes at once into liquidation in the hands of the survivors; their first duty is to provide for the liabilities of the firm, and like other administrators, they hold the partnership assets in trust for that purpose. 5 1 Mason ». Eldred, 6 Wall. 231. "The eral cases have come before the New law merchant, which is now a part of York court of appeals in regard to the the common law, recognizes partner- joint liability of partners, and it is ships as (^Mcm'-corporations. They are there held that the personal represen- something between individuals and tative of a deceased partner can not corporations, and are not governed be sued by the creditor. Voorhis v. altogether by the laws applicable to Childs, 17 N. Y. 354, leading case, either, but by their own law." Par- elaborate opinion by Selden, J., af- sons on Partnership, § 114. firmed by Richter v. Poffenhausen, 42 2 Freeman u. Campbell, 55 Cal. 197 ; N. Y. 373 ; Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124. Ex parte Weston, 12 Mete. 1; Parsons The English courts proceed upon the on Partnership, § 141. theory that partnership obligations 3 Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns. 544. should be treated as joint and several 4 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, while those of New York regard them | 94. as joint only with the legal incidents. 6 Bliss on Code Pleading, § 106. Sev- Bliss on Code Pleading, § 107, note. 826 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 682 § 682. Contribution among joint debtors. — Where two or more persons are jointly liable to pay a claim, and one of them pays the whole of it, either voluntarily or by compulsion of le- gal process, he may recover from the others the proportion of the claim that each ought to pay. 1 The doctrine of contribu- tion rests upon the broad principle of justice, that when one has discharged a debt or obligation, which others were equally bound with him to discharge, and thus removed a common burden, the others who have received a benefit ought, in con- science, to refund to him a ratable proportion. 2 The doctrine of contribution applies equally between original contractors, that is, those jointly bound on their own account — not copartners — as it does between cosureties, that is, those jointly bound to answer for the debt or default of another. 3 There must be a fixed and positive obligation to pay. 4 If a party has voluntarily paid money on a void note or obligation, he can not maintain an action for contribution. 5 Nor when he pays a claim barred by the statute of limitations. 6 Where one of two defendants in a joint judgment pays it, but not with the intention of dis- charging it, he may enforce the judgment against the code- fendant for his legal proportion of the debt. 7 Generally one wrong-doer, who has been compelled to pay the damages done by several who co-operated with him in the wrongful act, can not proceed for contribution against those who co-operated 1 Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; party has paid a judgment against Harbach v. Elder, 18 Pa. St. 33; him for an entire demand, to which a Booth v. Farmers, etc., Bank, 74 person not party to a suit was jointly N. Y. 228. liable, he can not maintain action 2 Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331. against such person for contribution. 3 Chipman v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 130; Story on Contracts, § 33 q. Contribu- Sadler v. Nixon, 5 Barn. & Ad. 936; tion among joint principles. Hender- Snyder v. Kirtley, 35 Mo. 423 ; Finlay son v. McDuffe, 5 N. H. 38 ; 20 Am. ■v. Stewart, 56 Pa. St. 183. Dec. 557; Peaslee v. Breed, 10 N. H. 4 Pitt v. Purssord, 8 Mees. & W. 538 ; 489 ; 34 Am. Dec. 178 ; Mills v. Hyde, Frith v. Sprague, 14 Mass. 455. 19 Vt. 59; 46 Am. Dec. 177 and notes. 5 Russell v. Failor, 1 Ohio St. 327. Suit by one joint promisor against 6 Williamson v. Rees, 15 Ohio, 572; another for excess paid by him beyond Williamson v. Collins, 17 Ohio, 354. his share. Fletcher v. Grover, 11 'AVood v. Merritt, 2 Bosw. 368; N. H. 368 ; 35 Am. Dec. 497 ; Mills & Parker v. Ellis, 2 Sand. 223; Murray Hyde, 19 Vt. 59; 46 Am. Dec. 177. v. Bogert, 14 Johns. 318, where a §683 JOINT CONTRACTS. 827 with him. 1 But where there was no intentional wrong, or vio- lation of law, the rule does not apply. 8 § 683. Contribution among sureties. — An action at law will lie by one surety who has paid more than his share to recover contribution from his cosurety. 8 The death of one of several cosureties on a joint undertaking does not relieve his estate from the liability of contribution among the cosureties. If one cosurety, either before or after the death, pays the debt, he is entitled to a contribution from the estate of the deceased cosurety. 4 The law implies a contract between the sureties, originating at the time they executed the obligation by which they became such, to contribute ratably towards discharging any liability which they incur in behalf of their principal, and in the case of death of either of them, the obligation devolves upon his legal representatives, the same as any other contract made by him, the breach of which occurs after his death. 6 1 Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633; Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 ; Ache- son v. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1 ; Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18. 2 Achesar v. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455. 3 Rindge v. Baker,57 N.Y. 209 ; 15 Am. Rep. 475; Morrison v. Poyntz, 7 Dana, 307 ; 32 Am. Dec. 92 ; Crisfield v. Murdock (1891), 127 N. Y. 315; Burge on Suretyship, 384. "The right to contribution has been considered as depending rather upon a principle of equity than upon contract; but it may well be considered as resting alike on both for its foundation ; for although generally there is no ex- press agreement entered into between joint sureties, yet from the uniform and almost universal understanding which seems to pervade the whole community, that from the circum- stance alone of their agreeing to be, and becoming accordingly cosureties of the principal, they mutually be- come bound to each other to divide and equalize any loss that may arise therefrom to each other, or any of them, it may with great propriety be said that there is at least an implied contract." Agnew v. Bell, 4 Watts (Pa.), 31. Per Kennedy, J. Right of surety to enforce contribution from another. Cases collected in note to Gross v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 226 ; 10 Am. St. Rep. 635, note. 4 Dussol v. Bruguiere, 50 Cal. 456. 5 Bachelder v. Fiske, 17 Mass. 464; Wood v. Leland, 1 Mete. 387 ; Barry u.Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462; Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Denio, 61; Johnson v. Harvey (1881), 84 N. Y. 363. Contra, Waters v. Riley, 2 Har. & G. 305. The last named case was expressly disap- proved in Bradley v. Burwell, 84 N. Y. 363, and Johnson u.Harvey, 3Denio, 61. In Bradley v. Burwell, Jewett, J., said : "I think that the law implies a con- tract between cosureties to contribute ratably towards discharging any lia- bility which they may incur in behalf of their principal, such contract origi- nating at the time they executed the principal obligation ; that these re- sults, by implication of law, a prom- ise on the part of the principal to 82S JOINT CONTRACTS. § 684 The weight of authority is, that successive accommodation in- dorsers of negotiable instruments are not, in the absence of an agreement to that effect, cosureties, nor liable to contribution as between each other. 1 § 684. Actions on joint contracts. — An instrument can only be sued upon in the manner in which the parties have made themselves liable. If the words show that they meant to ren- der themselves liable separately and not jointly, then they must be sued severally. 2 Where there is a plurality of debtors and the undertaking is joint, unless they waive the advantage, by not interposing a plea in abatement, they must be sued jointly, provided neither has been discharged by opera- tion of a bankrupt or insolvent law, or is not liable on the ground of infancy. 3 Where an obligation is made to sev- indemnify his sureties; and also, in like manner, a mutual promise be- tween the sureties to contribute pro- portionately towards indemnifying each other against such liability, and that such implication does not take its origin from the subsequent payment of the money. * * * The right of action as between the sureties grows out of the original implied agreement, that if one shall be compelled to pay the whole or a disproportionate part of the debt the other will pay such sum as will make the common burden equal. In case of the death of either, this obligation devolves upon his legal representatives. In this respect it is like any other contract made by one in his life-time to pay money at a future time, absolutely or contingently, who dies before the occurrence of any breach of the contract." A valuable ar- ticle upon the contribution of sureties between themselves, where there are no special equities between them, may be found in 10 Central Law Journal, 264. 1 Sherrod v. Rhodes, 5 Ala. 683; Mc- Carty v. Roots, 21 How. (U. S.) 432; McCune v. Belt, 45 Mo. 174; Hillegas v. Stephenson, 75 Mo. 118; McGurka. Huggett, 56 Mich. 187; Phillips v. Plato, 42 Hun, 189; Armstrong v. Harshman, 61 Ind. 52. Contra, Dan- iel v. McRae, 2 Hawk. N. C. 590; Stovall v. Border, etc., Bank, 78 Va. 188 ; Janson v. Paxton, 22 Up. Can. (C. P.) 505; Brandt on Suretyship, §260. 2 Lee v. Nixon, 1 A. & E. 201, per Lord Denman, C. J. ; 3 Robinson's Practice, 99. 3 Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459; Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, 497; Eccleston v. Clipsham, 1 Saund. 153, note 1 ; Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 964; Foley v. Addenbrooke, 4 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 197. Where the contract is not several, nor joint and several, but joint merely, the action on it, if there be two obligors, and both of them living at the time of ac- tion brought, must necessarily be a joint action against both. Newman v. Graham, 3 Munf. 187. Where a suit is brought against three joint con- tractors, and the writ is served on two only, the two, by pleading the gen- eral issue, waive their right to object to the want of service on the third. Bartlett v. Robbins, 5 Mete. 184. § 684 JOINT CONTRACTS. 829 eral persons jointly all the obligees must join in an action to enforce it. 1 Thus all the parties jointly insured in a policy of insurance should join in an action to recover for a loss. 2 All the payees in a note must join in an action thereon, unless it has been assigned to a less number of them. 3 And all the joint obligees of a bond are necessary parties plaintiff in an action for its breach. They are joint proprietors, and one must have as much right as the other to say and determine when suit shall be brought and when it shall be compromised or settled with- out suit. Neither can sue alone for his proportion. 4 And there can be no recovery, except for damages in which all such obligees are interested. 6 In assumpsit, the non-joinder of a copromisor as defendant can only be taken advantage of by plea in abatement; but the non-joinder of a copromisee as plaintiff is ground for a non-suit. 6 If one joint contractor is sued alone, and does not plead in abatement the non-joinder of the other, and judgment is rendered against the one sued, it merges the cause of action against him, and, unless otherwise provided by statute, inasmuch as the two are no longer jointly liable, prevents 1 a subsequent recovery against the other joint contractor.' When the contract was made with cultural Fire Ins. Co., 53 Mich. 238; several persons, whether it was un- Tate v. Citizens' Mutual Fire Ins. der seal, or in writing but not under Co., 13 Gray, 79. seal, or by parol, if their legal inter- 8 Yell v. Snow, 24 Ark. 554. It is est were joint, they must all, if living, however otherwise where the note is join in an action in form ex contractu joint and several. Curtis v. Bowrie, for the breach of it, although the cov- 2 McLean, 374. enant with them was in terms joint 'Ryan v. Riddle (1883), 78 Mo. and several. 1 Chitty on Pleading 521; Sweigart v. Berk, 8 S. & R. 308; 10 Am. ed.), 9. 1 Parsons on Contracts, 13. 'Ohnsorg v. Turner (1888), 33 Mo. 5 Burns v. Follansbee (1886), 20 111. ipp. 486 ; Clark v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; App. 41. A joint owner of a cause of Dewey v. Carey, 60 Mo. 224; Henry v. action can not introduce a new joint Mt. Pleasant Tp., 70 Mo. 500. Nothing owner into the contract by individual is better settled than the rule that assignment. Learned v. Ayres, 41 on an undertaking to two, both must Mich. 677. join in an action on it; otherwise 6 Holyokea. Loud, 69 Maine, 59; 2 there is no cause of action. It is a Greenleaf on Evidence, § 110. part of the contract that both shall 'Cowley v. Patch, 120 Mass. 137; sue. Rainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310. Purvis v. Butler, 87 Mich. 248, effect 2 Blanchard v. Dyer, 21 Maine, 111; of non-joinder. 38 Am. Dec. 253; Monaghan v. Agri- 830 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 685 § 685. Actions on joint and several contracts. — Contracts which are joint and several may be regarded as furnishing two distinct remedies, one by a joint action against all the obligors and the other by a several action against each. 1 The only dif- ference between a contract merely joint and one joint and sev- eral, as respects the right of the holder of the one or the other in pursuing his remedy, is, that on the first he is obliged to sue all the living promisors, whereas on the latter he has the right to elect between one and all of them. Having made his election, the contract becomes, so far as the rules of law appli- cable to his remedy are concerned, purely several or purely joint ; and he is no longer at liberty to consider it other than what he has made it by his own determination. 2 If the plaint- iff obtains a joint judgment, he can not afterwards sue the promisors or obligors separately, for the reason that the con- tract or bond is merged in the judgment, nor can he maintain a joint action after he has recovered judgment against one of the parties in a separate action, as the prior judgment is a waiver of his right to pursue a joint remedy. 3 The action, if brought by virtue of the common law, is to be against all the obligors jointly, or one of them singly, and not against any intermediate number, unless some obligor or obligors shall have died, in which case the death of him, or them, must be stated in the declaration. 4 'People v. Harrison, 82 111. 84; two or more are bound jointly and Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46; severally, the obligee may elect to Cummings v. People, 50 111. 132. In sue them jointly or severally. United a joint and several contract the con- States v. Archer, 1 Wall. Jr. 173. The tract contains distinct engagements, creditor is bound by his election in that of each contractor individually, treating a joint and several contract and that of all jointly, and different either as joint or several. United remedies may be pursued upon each. States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35; Winslow Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231. v. Herrick, 9 Mich. 380 ; United States 2 Gibbons v. Surber, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) v. Payne, 17 How. Prac. 407; Downey 155. On a joint and several bond, v. Farmers' &M. Bank, 13 S. &R. 288 suit may be brought against one of 8 Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347 the sureties without joining another 4 Leftwich v. Berkeley, 1 H. & M with him. Poullain v. Brown, 80 Ga. 61 ; Saunders v. Wood, 1 Munf 27 ; and a suit may be brought against 406 ; Newell v. Wood, 1 Munf. 555 a surety without joining the principal. Amis o. Smith, 16 Pet. 303. When People v. Butler, 74 Mich. 643. The an obligation is joint and several, it law appears to be well settled, that if can not be treated as several as to §686 JOINT CONTRACTS. 831 § 686. Judgments on joint contracts. — At common law, in a joint action, whether upon a joint or a joint and several con- tract, or upon several distinct contracts, the general rule was that there could be no judgment except for or against all of the defendants. 1 Where the plaintiff treats the contract as joint by suing the makers jointly, the rule of recovery in actions upon joint contracts must govern." The statutes of most of the states have changed the common law rule. 3 This general rule was, however, subject to this exception: if one or more of the de- fendants pleaded infancy or coverture, or discharge in bank- ruptcy, these pleas, being inconsistent with the averment in the declaration of an original joint contract, the plaintiff could enter a nolle prosequi as to such defendants, and recover judg- ment against the other defendants. 4 A judgment against one of several makers of a note, without process against the others, some and joint as to the rest. Streat- fleld v. Halliday, 3 T. R. 779; Cabell v. Vaughan, 1 Wm. Saund. 291 ; Presi- dent of Bank v. Treat, 6 Greenl. 207. All must be proceeded against jointly, or each severally, subject to certain exceptions, as where one is an in- fant, or has been discharged in bank- ruptcy. Fay v. Jenks, 78 Mich. 312. In California, under the code, in an action upon a joint and several con- tract, the plaintiff may, at his election, sue one or more, or all, of the parties severally liable. Code Civ. Proc, § 383. Hurlbutt v. Spaulding, etc., Co. (1892), 93 Cal. 55; People v. Love, 25 Cal. 520. In many states the law provides that when two or more per- sons are bound by contract, whether jointly only or jointly and severally or severally only, the action may at the p'jiintiffs option be brought against any or all of them. Stimson's Ameri- can Statute Law, §5015. 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 43 ; Mi- nor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46 ; Brown v. Tuttle (1888), 27 111. App. 389; Enterprise, etc., Co. v. Bradley (1885), 17 111. App. 509; Midkifi v. Lusher, 27 W. Va. 439 (the judgment being a joint judgment ; if set aside as to one of the defendants, it would have to be set aside as to both) ; Proc- tor o. Lewis, 50 Mich. 329 ; Fisk v. Henarie, 14 Ore. 29 (rule changed by the code) ; Gibbons v. Surber, 4 Blackf. 155; Aten v. Brown, 14 111. App. 451; Murdy v. McCutcheon, 95 Pa. St. 435; Woodward v. Newhall, 1 Pick. 500; Netso v. Foss, 21 Fla. 143; Wootters v. Kauffman, 67 Texas, 488. 2 Gould v. Sternburg, 69 111. 531. 3 Carmien v. Whitaker, 36 Ind. 509; Erwin v. Scotten, 40 Ind. 389; Moore v. Estes, 79 Ky. 282; Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68; Stedekeru. Bernard, 102 N. Y. 327; Lee v. Basey, 85 Ind. 543 ; Sawin v. Kenny, 93 IT. S. 289 ; Black on Judgments, § 82. 4 Westheimeru. Craig (1892), 76 Md. 399; 25 Atl. Rep. 419. The exception is where the defense is personal, as infancy, or bankruptcy, or the like. Fuller v. Robb, 26 111. 246; Enterprise Distilling Co. v. Bradley, 17 111. App. 509. Exception where one of the joint promisors resides without the jurisdic- tion. West v. Furbish, 67 Maine, 17. 832 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 687 releases those who are not sued. 1 In some of the states, in derogation of the common law rule, a distinction is taken be- tween joint contracts and such as are joint and several, the courts holding that, in an action upon the latter species of obli- gation, the plaintiff may enter a nolle prosequi against one of the defendants and proceed to judgment against the others. 2 § 687. The same subject continued. — The doctrine at com- mon law is that a judgment against one or more of several joint debtors absolutely discharges the others from all liability on the joint contract. 3 Where all the defendants are brought into court, judgment rendered by agreement against one is tantamount to a dismissal as to the others. 4 When the con- tract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause of ac- tion is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of the par- ties not sued with those against whom the judgment is recov- ered being extinguished, their entire liability is gone. They can not be sued separately, for they have incurred no separate obligation ; they can not be sued jointly with the others, be- cause judgment has already been recovered against the latter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the same cause. 5 Thesupreme court of Pennsylvania has held that a judg- 1 Mitchell v. Brewster, 28 111. 163; 5 Mason v. Eldred (1867), 6 Wall. Bell v. State, 7 Blackf. (Tnd.) 33, a 231, overruling Sheehy v. Mandeville, judgment against one defendant on 6 Cranch, 254;Laueri>. Bandow (1879), an action on contract against two is er- 48 "Wis. 638 ; Bowen v. Hastings, 47 roneous unless there is a suggestion of Wis. 232; Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. "not found" as to the other. 148; King v. Hoare, 13 Mees. & W. 2 Peyton v. Scott, 2 How. (Miss.) 494. The decision in the case of 870; 1 Black on Judgments, § 206. Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 254, s Wooters v. Smith, 56 Texas, 198; to the contrary has been distinctly Martin v. Baugh (1890), 1 Ind. App. overruled in this country and in Eng- 20; Cowley v. Patch, 120 Mass. 137; land. In Wann v. McNulty, 2 Gil- Candee v. Smith, 93 N. Y. 349 ; Smith man, 355, the supreme court of Illinois v. Black, 9 S. & R. 142; 11 Am. Dec. commented upon the case and de- 686. See generally article by G. C. clined to follow it as authority. Fer- H. Corliss on "Joint Debtors," 36 rail v. Bradford, 2 Fla. 508; 50 Am. Albany Law J. 245, 265. Dec. 293. It is the right of persons 4 Henry v. Gibson, 55 Mo. 570. Ver- jointly liable to pay a debt to insist diet for a defendant who pleads pay- on being sued together. If then there ment in a suit against him and an- are three persons so liable, and the other on their joint note discharges creditor sues two of them, and those both. Lenoir v. Moore, 61 Miss. 400. two make no objection, the creditor § 688 JOINT CONTRACTS. 833 ment recovered against one of two partners is a bar to a sub- sequent suit against both, although the new defendant was a dormant partner at the time of the contract, and was not dis- covered until after the judgment. 1 The rule that judgment re- covered against one of two joint contractors is a bar to an ac- tion against the other, applies equally when one of the joint contractors is a married woman, contracting in respect of her separate property. 2 A judgment in favor of one or more joint debtors, who were served with process, is no bar to a suit against some not served, particularly when those not served are non-residents. 3 And there are several cases which hold that where the joint debtors live in different jurisdictions, judgment against one of them in one jurisdiction is no bar to a subse- quent action against the other or both in another jurisdiction. 4 § 688. Statutory modifications of the common law rules. — Joint contracts, or contracts which would be joint by the com- mon law, are in many states declared to be construed as joint and several. 5 The rules of the common law, as it prevails in may recover judgment against those two. But should he afterwards bring a farther action against the third, that third may justly contend that the three should be sued together. By recovering judgment against two in the same cause of action the creditor has disabled himself from suing the third in the way in which the third has a right to be sued. Kendall v. Hamilton, L. E. 4 App. Cas. 504, per Earl Cairns, L. C. The rule here laid down does not apply where the par- ties are severally as well as jointly bound, and the recovery of a judg- ment against one is no bar to an action against the other, until the judgment has been satisfied. Vestry of Bermondsley v. Ramsey, L. E. 6 0. P. 247. 1 Smith v. Black, 9 S. &E. 142. "No principle," said the court, "is better settled than that a judgment once ren- dered absorbs and merges the whole cause of action, and that neither the 53 matter nor the parties can be severed, unless indeed where the cause of action is joint and several, which, cer- tainly, actions against partners are not." z Hoare v. Niblett, L. E. (1891), 1 Q. B. 781. 3 Larison v. Hager(1890), 44 Fed. Eep. 49; Merriman v. Barker (1889), 121 Ind. 74. A judgment against one of the joint-makers of a note does not merge the cause of action and bar a separate action against the other maker where he is a non-resident, and not made a party to the former suit. 4 Dennett ». Chick, 2 Greenl. 191 ; 11 Am. Dec. 59; Alcocku. Little, 9 N. H. 259; 32 Am. Dec. 357; West v. Fur- bish, 67 Maine, 17. 5 Stimson's American Statute Law, § 4113. The common law rules as to joint or several liability upon con- tracts are directly, or in effect, abol- ished in the states of Kentucky ,i 834 JOINT CONTRACTS. § 689 this country and in England, except as the same have been modified by statute, are very strict in requiring service of pro- cess upon all the defendants in an action on a demand against joint obligors or partners. If any of the joint defendants were beyond seas, or could not be found, so that it was impossible to reach them by the process of the court, the proper mode thereon was to institute proceedings of outlawry against them; and after a judgment of outlawry had been rendered, the plaintiff could then obtain a separate judgment against the defendants before the court. 1 Statutes have been passed in most of the states, and in all in which the code system of pleading prevails, which provide that when action is commenced against two or more defendants, jointly or severally liable on a con- tract, and the summons is served on one or more of the de- fendants, but not on all, the plaintiff may proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants. 2 And a recovery may be had against one de- fendant alone, in a proper case, notwithstanding another of the debtors has been released by the plaintiff upon a com- promise. 8 § 689. The same subject continued. — In most of the states acts called "joint debtor acts " provide that judgment may be given "for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants," and usually contain a provision that "in an action against several defend- ants the court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper." 4 Under these statutes, if a plaintiff commences an action against two or more Arkansas, Missouri, North Carolina 2 Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; and Colorado. Bliss on Code Plead- 44 Am. Dec. 562, 570, note, ing, §93. Belleville Savings Bank v. 8 >Eossu. Jerome, 10 Bosw. 220. Winslow (1887), 30 Fed. Rep. 488, 4 Code of New York, § 274; Ohio under the Missouri statute providing Code of Civil Procedure, § 371 ; Cali- that "all contracts which, by common fornia Code of Civil Procedure, law, are joint only, shall be construed §§ 578, 579 ; Iowa Code, § 1815 ; Wis- to be joint and several." Wiley v. consin Code, § 184; Arkansas Code, Holmes, 28 Mo. 286 ; 75 Am. Dec. 126. §§ 400, 401 ; Wagner on Missouri Rtat- 1 Edwards v. Carter, 1 Stra. 473; utes, p. 1019, § 32; 1 Black on Judg- Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160. ments, § 208. §689 JOINT CONTRACTS. 835 defendants upon a joint obligation, he is no longer compelled to establish a joint cause of action against all, but a judgment may be taken against the party or parties shown to be liable, when the others are not liable.' 1 Richardson v. Jones, 58 Ind. 240. Various effects and consequences are attributed to such judgments in the states in which they are rendered. Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. 8. 160 ; Blodget v. Morris, 14 N. Y. 482; Ah Lep v. Gong Choy, 13 Ore. 205 ; Lampkin v. Chisom, 10 Ohio St. 450; Hubbell v. Woolf, 15 Ind. 204; Longstreet a. Rea, 52 Ala. 195; Eyre v. Cook, 9 Iowa, 185 ; Stafford v. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535. A judgment may be entered against any one or more of several defendants wherever a several suit might have been brought, or a several judgment on the facts of the case would be proper. Van Ness v. Corkins, 12 Wis. 186; Bonesteel v. Todd, 9 Mich. 371. Action brought against two parties, one of whom was alone served with process. He produced the record of a judgment recovered against himself and his codefendant under the joint debtor act of New York, process in that state having been served upon his codefendant alone. The court said: " We can not, therefore, regard the liability as extinguished. And, inasmuch as the new action must be based upon the original claim, while, as in the case of foreign judgment at common law, it may be of no great importance whether the action may be brought in form upon the judg- ment or on the previous debt, it is certainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy." Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 514, where the court of ap- peal of New York considered the ef- fect of a judgment recovered under the joint debtor act of that state upon the original demand, Bronson, J., said: " It is said that the original de- mand was merged in and extinguished by the judgment, and, consequently, that the plaintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That would undoubtedly be so if both the defendants had been before the court in the original action. But the joint debtor act creates an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving effect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the rights of all par- ties, the plaintiff must be allowed to sue on the original demand." CHAPTER XIX. FART PERFORMANCE. §690. The rule at law. §696. 691. Part performance an equitable doctrine. 697. 692. Basis upon which the doctrine rests. 698. 693. Quantum meruit for part per- formed. 699. 694. When no recovery for part 700. performance. 701. 695. What acts do not constitute part performance. Acts of part performance — Pos- session. Continuance of possession — Landlord and tenant. Improvements. Where the consideration is labor and services. Marriage. Parol gifts of land. § 690. The rule at law. — The rule is well settled that a part performance of a verbal contract within the statute of frauds has no effect at law to take the case out of its provisions. 1 In 1 Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis, etc., Co. (1892), 142 111. 171; Lane v. Shackford, 5 N. H. 130; Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134; Adams v. Towns- end, 1 Mete. 483; Brown u. Pollard (1893), 89 Va. 696; Thomas v. Dick- inson, 14 Barb. 90; Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio, 51 ; Seymour v. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239; Hunt v. Coe, 15 Iowa, 197; Eaton v. Whitaker, 18 Conn. 222; 44 Am. Dec. 586; Hibbard v. Whitney, 13 Vt. 21 ; Barnes v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 130 Mass. 388 ; Brock- way v. Thomas, 36 Ark. 518. Part performance of a parol contract for the sale of real estate does not entitle either party to sustain an action at law for damages suffered from non- performance. Norton v. Preston, 15 Maine, 14; 32 Am. Dec. 128. It was said by Mr. Justice Buller, "that, as it is settled in equity that a part performance takes it out of the stat- ute, the same rule shall hold in law." (836) Brodie v. St. Paul, 1 Ves. Jr. 326. In O'Herlihy v. Hedges, 1 Sch. & Lef. 123, Mr. Justice Buller's opinion is stated to be wrong, and Kent, C. J., said, in Jackson v. Pierce, 2 Johns. 222, "there is such a dictum of Justice Buller, while sitting in chancery, but it has never been received as law." The reasons for the distinction be- tween an action at law upon such a contract for damages and the specific enforcement thereof by a court of equity are stated by the supreme court of Massachusetts, in Kidder v. Hunt, 1 Pick. 328; 11 Am. Dec. 183: "The contract declared upon is ad- mitted to be within the statute of frauds, since it relates to an interest in land, and is not in writing. It is provided by statute that no ac- tion shall be maintained upon such a contract. But it is said that, as part performance of the contract is averred, and, as courts of chancery will decree $ 691 PART PERFORMANCE. 837 general, when a contract within the statute of frauds has been in part executed by one party, there is a remedy to a certain extent in a court of law, in case the other party fraudulently refuses to execute the contract on his part. Thus if money has been paid, it may be recovered ; if labor has been performed, compensation for it may be obtained. 1 § 691. Part performance an equitable doctrine. — The rule has long been established that, in equity, a contract relating to lands may be taken out of the operation of the statute of frauds by part performance. 2 The doctrine in England is ap- plied only in cases concerning lands. In Britain v. Rossiter 3 it was sought to apply it to a contract of service. When the provisions of the judicature act of 1873 came into force, which enable the high court and court of appeal to recognize all equitable duties appearing in the course of any matter before them, and to grant all remedies in respect of any legal or equitable claim, and which provide that where "there is any conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of common law, with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail," it was thought possible that the equitable doc- trine of part performance might become applicable to contracts a specific performance of a parol con- quent cases in Massachusetts. Dix v. tract if there has been a part perform- Marcy, 116 Mass. 416; Williams v. ance, as here, as we have no court of Bemis, 108 Mass. 91 ; Thompson v. chancery with power to decree a spe- Gould, 20 Pick. 134. Part perform- cific performance in such cases, the ance of a verbal contract, void by the plaintiff may at least recover damages statute of frauds, has no effect at law for the breach of such contract. * * to take the case out of its provisions, Perhaps, in the case of a parol con- but is only a grant for equitable relief, tract respecting land, where the party Warner v. Texas, etc., Ey. Co., 54 Fed. has been put to expense as to his part Eep. 922 (1893) ; 4 0. C. A. 673. of the contract under circumstances 'Sherburne v. Fuller, 5 Mass. 133; which would amount to fraud by the Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342; Burlin- other party, case might lie for dam- game v. Burlingame, 7 Cow. 92. ages forthe fraud, as was intimated in 2 Maddison v. Alderson, L. E. 8 Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342, but this App. Cas. 467; Brett's Leading Cases action is brought upon the contract it- in Modern Equity, 98 ; Lester v. Fox- self, and to sustain' it would be indi- croft, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1027 (768) ; 2 rectly to give efficacy to a contract Beach on Modern Equity Jurispru- which the legislature says shall have dence, §613, and cases cited, none." This case has been several 3 Britain v. Eossiter, 48 L. J. Q. B. times cited with approval in subse- 362; L. E. 11 Q. B. Div. 123. 838 PART PERFORMANCE. §692 other than those to which courts of equity had been in the habit of applying it. The court of appeal, however, refused to extend the application of the doctrine to any cases in which equity had not applied it, holding that the contrary ruling would be to construe the judicature acts as conferring new rights, whereas they only change the procedure. 1 In this coun- try, the tendency is to give it a wider scope. 2 The doctrine has no application to contracts that, by their terms, can not be performed within one year from the making thereof. 8 § 692. Basis upon which the doctrine rests. — The basis upon which the doctrine rests is, that when a verbal contract has been made, which should have been in writing, under the statute of frauds, and one party has knowingly aided or permitted the other to go on and do acts in part performance of the agree- ment, in full reliance upon such agreement as a valid and binding contract, and which would not have been done without 1 Smith on Contracts, 99. In the case cited it was said by Thesinger, L. J. : "I confess that on principle I do not see why a similar doctrine should not be applied to a case of a contract of service; and as the doc- trine of equity is based upon the theory that the court will not allow a fraud on the part of one party to a contract on the faith of which another party has altered his position, I do not see why a similar doctrine should not comprehend a contract of service. At the same time, I feel that doctrines of this nature are not to be unwar- rantably extended, and that we ought not to go further than the decisions of courts of equity as to the principles of relief, and as to the instances to which the doctrine of part performance is to be applied." McManus v. Cooke (1887), L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 681, in which it was said : ' 'The doctrine of part per- formance of a parol agreement, which enables proof of it to be given notwith- standing the statute of frauds, though principally applied in the case of con- tracts for the sale or purchase of land, or for the acquisition of an interest in land, has not been confined to those cases. Probably it would be more accurate to say it applies to all cases in which a court of equity would entertain a suit for specific perform- ance if the alleged contract had been in writing.'' The doctrine of part performance making valid a contract void by the statute applies only to contracts relating to land. McElroy v. Ludlum, 32 N. J. Eq. 828; 3 Pom- eroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1409 ; Pomeroy on Specific Performance, §101. 2 Birdsall v. Birdsall, 52 Wis. 208, where equity disregarded the statute on the ground of part performance where a person had been induced by a promise of employment to give up his business and incur expense in traveling, etc., on the faith of the promise to employ. 3 Wahl v. Barnum (1889), 116 N. Y. 87; "Wolke v. Fleming (1885), 103 Ind. 105; Osborne v. Kimball (1889), 41 Kan. 187. 692 PART PERFORMANCE. 839 the agreement, find are of such a nature as to change the rela- tions of the parties, and to prevent a restoration to their former condition, or an adequate compensation for the loss by a judg- ment at law for damages, then it would be a virtual fraud in the first party to interpose the statute of frauds as a bar to the completion of the contract, and thus secure for himself all the benefits of the acts already done in part performance, while the other party would not only lose all advantage from the bargain but would be left without adequate remedy for its failure, or com- pensation for what he had done in pursuance of it. To prevent the success of such a palpable fraud, equity interposes under these circumstances and compels the entire completion of the con- tract by decreeing its specific execution. 1 The underlying principle is that where one of the contracting parties has been induced or allowed to alter his situation on the faith of an oral agreement within the statute, to such an extent that it would be a fraud on the part of the other party to set up its invalid- ity, equity will make the case an exception to the statute. 8 That is, equity will not permit the statute, the purpose of which was to prevent fraud, to be used as a means of commit- ting it. 3 ' Barrett v. Geisinger (1893), 148 111. 98, per Bailey, J. ; Von Trotha v. Bamberger (1890), 15 Colo. l;Pom- eroy on Specific Performance, § 104. Equity will not interpose unless a fraud will result. Sullivan v. O'Neal (1886), 66 Texas, 433. 2 Brown v. Hoag (1886), 35 Minn. 373. Nothing can be considered as a part performance such as to take the case out of the statute, unless it puts the party performing into a situation which is a fraud upon him, unless the agreement is fully performed. Bur- nett v. Blackmar, 43 Ga. 569; Bryan v. Southwestern R. Co., 37 Ga. 26. In Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1, Mr. Jus- tice Davis said: "The statute of frauds requires a contract concerning real estate to be in writing, but courts of equity, whether wisely or not it is too late now to inquire, have stepped in and relaxed the rigidity of this rule, and hold that a part performance re- moves the bar of the statute, on the ground that it is a fraud for the ven- dor to insist on the absence of a writ- ten instrument when he had per- mitted the contract to be partly exe- cuted." Riggles v. Erney (1894), 154 TJ. S. 244; Murphy v. Whitney (1893), 69 Hun, 573. 3 Slingerland v. Slingerland (1888), 39 Minn. 197. Mr. Pomeroy says: "A plaintiff can not, in the face of the statute, prove a verbal contract by parol evidence, and then show that it has been partly performed. This course of proceeding would be a vir- tual repeal of the statute. He must first prove acts done by himself or on his behalf, which point unmistakably to a contract between himself and the defendant, which can not, in the or- 840 PART PERFORMANCE. 693 § 693. Quantum meruit for part performed. — It is a rule that has been applied in a certain class of cases that if there has been a special contract, and the plaintiff has performed part of it according to its terms, and has been prevented by the act of the defendant from completing it, he may recover upon the quantum meruit the reasonable price of the services already performed. 1 Accordingly in an action on a quantum meruit to recover the price of logs sold, if in the original contract a method of scaling and measurement was agreed upon as con- clusive, the vendor is bound by such method as to the logs he delivers, although the purchaser has put it out of the vendor's power to make a full delivery. 8 Where the plaintiffs agreed, dinary course of human conduct be accounted for in any other manner than as having been done in pur- suance of a contract, and which would not have been done without an existing contract ; and although these acts of part performance can not, of themselves, indicate all the terms of the agreement sought to be enforced, they must be consistent with it, and in conformity with its provisions when these shall have been shown by the subsequent parol evidence." Specific Performance, 154. 1 Hemminger v. Western Assurance Co., 95 Mich. 355; McGregor v. Ross, 96 Mich. 103. 2 Eakright v. Torrent (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 293, Montgomery, J. : "Does it result, in a case where a party to such a contract as the present is entitled to sue and recover upon the quantum meruit, that such a stipu- lation as that contained in the present contract, relating to the scale, may be wholly set aside? If the breach of this contract by defendant had been a refusal to pay when the work was completed, there can be no doubt that the stipulation would be binding. 13 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1034; Johnson v. Howard, 20 Minn. 370 'Gil. 322) ; Malone v. Gates, 87 Mich. 332; 49 N. W. Rep. 638. There is a dictum in Chapman v. Dease, 34 Mich. 375, which tends to sustain the view adopted by the circuit judge. But no such holding Mas necessary to the de- termination of the question in that case, as the case turned upon the point that the contract between the parties did not give the scaler the right to determine the percentages of different qualities contained in the logs, and that was the question to which the testimony was directed. Unless the defendant is to be pun- ished beyond the actual damages sus- tained by the plaintiff for a breach of the contract, we can see no good rea- son why the scale fixed by agreement of the parties should not be controll- ing whenever the quantity becomes the subject of judicial inquiry in a suit between the parties. If it be said that it does sometimes result under the rule permitting a recovery under the quantum meruit that the defendant ia punished by being compelled to pay more than the contract price, the an- swer is that this is permitted upon the theory that it is one means of measuring the damages of the plaint- iff, and, in case of a non-severable con- tract, perhaps the only means. But the stipulation relative to scaling is a rule of evidence established by the parties, and no logical reason has § 694 PART PERFORMANCE. 841 for a gross sum, to furnish defendant the entire wood for the inside finish of a house, the wood for two rooms to be first-class mahogany, and when the wood for these two rooms was deliv- ered, the defendant objected to it as not being first-class ma- hogany; but the plaintiffs, insisting that it was, agreed that if the defendant would use it, and it proved not to be first- class mahogany, he need not pay anything for it, and the wood, upon being used in the rooms, proved to be inferior to the quality contracted for, it was held, in an action to recover the contract price for the entire job, that defendant was entitled to have deducted the reasonable value of the wood for the two rooms of the quality contracted therefor, and not merely the value of the inferior wood actually furnished. 1 § 694. Where no recovery for part performance. — Where it appeared that the defendant made an offer to excavate and dredge a trench for a bulkhead, the material to be deposited in- shore, which was accepted, but upon commencing the work he was prevented by the shore-inspector from making such de- posits, and after continuing work for awhile he abandoned it, been suggested why this rule of evi- other rule is well illustrated in this dence should not control on the trial case. Loose testimony, based upon of any issue which may arise between an inspection of the stumps left upon the parties where the subject-matter the ground is admitted, and guesswork to be determined is that which they as to the number of logs per thousand themselves have fixed a. means of de- which a proper scale would show was termining. The rule is analogous to permitted to overcome the actual scale that which makes the written evi- of the scalers mutually agreed upon ; dence of a contract the controlling and and the jury was, under the instruc- only admissible evidence. In fact, in tions, authorized to accept this testi- practice, the scale is entered in writ- mony, even though the scaler com- ing, and the opportunity to obtain mitted no fraud, and though no error correct information oftentimes passes as to the number of logs was pointed by when the scale is entered and the out, and though no actual scale sub- logs barked or put afloat. The con- sequently made showed even any er- tract has been to this extent acted ror in judgment. We think it would upon and executed by both parties, be unjust to permit this kind of testi- and the scale established and reduced mony to overcome that which the par- te writing becomes the superior, and, ties themselves have seen fit to fix as we think, conclusive evidence upon the only competent testimony to de- the subject, in the absence of fraud or termine the identical question which such gross error as is referred to in the jury is called to pass upon." Malone v. Gates, 87 Mich. 332; 49 1 Wheaton v. Lund (Minn. 1895), 63 N. W Rep. 638. The danger of any N. W. Rep. 251. 842 PART PERFORMANCE. § 695 claiming that there was a failure to perform on plaintiff's part in not securing for him the right to dump inshore, and at the time of the abandonment cribs had been built, and others were per- mitted to so deposit material, it was held that there was no justi- fication for the abandonment, and that defendant was not entitled to payment for the work actually done. 1 So also, a clause in a building contract giving the owner the right to terminate it if the contractors neglect or refuse to furnish skillful workmen and proper materials, and that, in such case, if the expense of completion shall exceed the unpaid balance of the contract price, the contractors shall pay the difference, does not authorize the owner to pay any amount he may choose for the work and hold the contractors for the excess, but limits him to such sum as is reasonably necessary to complete in accordance with the contract. 2 So also one who contracts to drill a well which will furnish plenty of water can not recover therefor when sufficient water is not obtained. 3 § 695. What acts do not constitute part performance. — Where there is an oral contract to convey lands the mere pay- ment of a part or even the whole of the purchase price will not of itself take the case out of the operation of the statute for the money may be recovered back by an action at law. 4 But the * Cronin v. Tebo, 144 N. Y. 660; 39 sometimes seem to work a hardship to N. E. Rep. 344, affirming 71 Hun, 59. one of the contracting parties." 2 Charlton v. Scoville (1895), 144 4 Minis v. Chandler, 21 S. C. 480; N. Y . 691 ; 39 N. E. Rep. 394, affirming Baker v. Wiswell, 17 Neb. 52 ; Towns- 68 Hun, 348. end v. Fenton (1884), 32 Minn. 482; 3 Jackson v. Cresswell (Iowa 1894), Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506; 61 N. W. Rep. 383, per Kinne, J. . "If Boozer v. Teague, 27 S. C. 348 ; Wood he had a hard contract, it was his own v. Jones, 35 Texas, 64; Ann Berta fault. The contract was of his own Lodge v. Laverton, 42 Texas, 18; Ja- seeking, and he himself dictated its mison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. St. 52; Tem- terms. He was an experienced man pie v. Johnson, 71 111. 13; Frazer v. in the business of drilling wells. He Gates, 118 111. 99; Neal v. Gregory, 19 must have known that the procuring Fla. 356; Junkins i\ Lovelace, 72 Ala. of plenty of water was a matter of 303 ; Humphries v. Green, L. R. 10 Q. much uncertainty. He, therefore, took B.Div. 148; Lydick r. Holland (1884), the chances of being able to fully com- 83 Mo. 703 ; Crabill v. Marsh, 38 Ohio ply with his contract in that respect. St. 331; Suman v. Springnte, 67 Ind. Wecannot relieve parties from obliga- 115; Forrester v. Flores, 64 Cal. 24; tions voluntarily entered into, even Nibert v. Baghurst (1890), 47 N. J. though the enforcement of them may Eq. 201 ; Dunckel v. Dunckel (1890), § 696 PART PERFORMANCE. 843 rule is otherwise where a party has paid money on the con- tract, and a recovery of the money would not restore him to his former situation. 1 Acts, preparatory or ancillary to an agreement, although attended with expense, are not considered acts of part performance. Thus, the delivery of abstracts of title, giving orders for conveyances, going to view an estate, putting deed in solicitor's hands to prepare a conveyance, sur- veying and similar acts, do not have the effect of taking the case out of the interdiction of the statute. 2 § 696. Acts of part performance — Possession. — The acts of part performance to satisfy this principle must be done in pur- suance of the contract, and must alter the relations of the par- ties. The most important acts which constitute a sufficient part performance are actual possession, permanent and valu- able improvements, and these two combined. 3 Possession 56 Hun, 25. Otherwise in Iowa by statute. Stem v. Nysonger, 69 Iowa, 512 ; Nan v. Jackman, 58 Iowa, 359. The code provides that the statute shall not apply "where the purchase- money, or any part thereof, has been received by the vendor." § 3665. So too, Alabama, § 1732. It was formerly held that the payment of a poriic- of the purchase-money was sufficient to take a verbal contract for the sale of land out from the operation of the statute. Afterwards the courts re- fused to recognize any such distinc- tion. Clinana. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22, per Lord Redesdale ; Townsend v. Houston, 1 Harr. 532 ; 27 Am. Dec. 732, note discussing the question ; Waterman on Specific Performance of Contracts, § 268 ; Browne on Stat- ute of Frauds, § 461. In parol agree- ments for the sale, of lands, payment of the contract price by the purchaser is not of itself sufficient part perform- ance to take the case out of the stat- ute, for the reason that money can be recovered back with interest by way of damages for its detention. Brown v. Brown (1881), 33 N. J. Eq. 650; Hughes ». Morris, 2 De G. M. & G. 349 ; Glass v. Hurlbert, 102 Mass. 24; Cole v. Potts, 10 N. J. Eq. 67; Green v. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32. 1 Malins v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 403; Moore v. Gordon (1884), 44 Ark. 334; Cooper v. Monroe (1894), 77 Hun, 1. 2 1 White & Tudor's Leading Cases (1886), notes to Lester v. Foxcroft, J. i _ T '. Cas. in Eq. 1027; Brett's Lead- ing Cac^s, No. 101 ; Cooth v. Jack- son, 6 Ves. 12; Thynne v. Earl of Glengall, 2 H. L. Cas. 131 ; Monta- cute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618 ; Col- grove v. Solomon, 34 Mich. 494 ; Gra- ham v. Theis, 47 Ga. 479 (tendering a deed) ; Sands v. Thompson, 43 Ind. 18 (the same) ; Clerk v. Wright, 1 Atk. 12 (giving orders to have conveyances drawn and going to view the estate) ; Phillips t>. Edwards, 33 Beav. 440 (preparing a lease) ; Smith v. Smith, 1 Rich. Eq. 130 (delivering an abstract of title and giving instructions to pre- pare deeds) ; Redding v. Wilkes, 3 Bro. C. C. 400 (putting a deed into the hands of a solicitor to prepare a conveyance of the estate). 3 Burns v. Daggett, 141 Mass. 368; 844 PART PERFORMANCE. §696 alone under some circumstances without payment or other acts of ownership has been held sufficient part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land to take the case out of the statute. 1 In order that possession shall operate as part performance it must be a visible, notorious, and exclusive possession taken under the parol contract. 2 Possession must be taken with the actual or constructive assent of the vendor. The mere re- maining silent, while seeing the purchaser take possession of the land agreed to be sold, and make improvements on it for the purpose for which it was purchased, without remonstrance, might be deemed an assent. 8 The vendor, after he has seen the purchaser in possession and making expenditures upon the 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, §1409. Chancellor Kent says : "Gen- erally, it may be observed, delivery of possession is part performance." 4 Kent's Commentaries, 451, and among the cases to which he refers in sup- port of the. proposition is the Earl of Aylesford's Case, 2 Stra. 783. In that case there was a parol agreement for a lease of twenty-one years ; the lessee had entered and enjoyed the premises six years. The bill was brought by the lessor, to compel the lessee to execute a counterpart to the lease, for the residue of the term. The defendant pleaded the statute of frauds, but the plea was overruled on the ground of part performance. 2 Danforth v. Laney, 28 Ala. 274; Arrington v. Porter, 47 Ala. 714; Pin- dall v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249; McCarger v. Rood, 47 Cal. 138; Jefferson v. Jef- ferson, 96 111. 551; Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh (1891), 131 Ind. 288; Rucker v. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396 ; An- derson v. Simpson, 2] Iowa, 399 ; Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Mich. 112; Jamison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. St. 52; Seaman v. Ascherman, 51 Wis. 678; Coles v. Pilkington, L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 174; Christy v. Barnhart, 14 Pa. St. 260; 53 Am. Dec. 538, and notes; Calan- chini v. Branstetter (1890), 84 Cal. 249. Admission into possession, hav- ing unequivocal reference to the con- tract, has always been considered an act of part performance. Green v. Jones, 76 Maine, 563; Morphett u. Jones, 1 Swans. 172. "Taking pos- session under a parol agreement and in compliance with the provisions of such agreement, accompanied by other acts which can not be recalled so as to place the party taking possession in the same situation in which he was in before, has always been held to take such agreement out of the operation of the statute of frauds." Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407; Miller v. Ball, 64 N. Y. 286; Young v. Overbaugh (1894), 76 Hun, 151. 2 Brown v. Lord, 7 Ore. 302 ; Moore v. Small, 19 Pa. St. 461 (notorious) ; Charpiot v. Sigerson, 25 Mo. 63 (no- torious) ; Frye v. Shepler, 7 Pa. St. 91 (exclusive) ; Haslet v. Haslet, 6 Watts. 464 (exclusive) ; Barnes v. Bos- ton, etc., R., 130 Mass. 388 (in pursu- ance of the contract) ; Ham v. Good- rich, 33 N. H. 32; Cole v. Potts, 1« N. J. Eq. 67; Welsh v. Bayurd, 21 N. J. Eq. 186; Peckham v. Barker, 8 R. I. 17 ; Wood v. Thornly , 58 111. 464 ; Judy v. Gilbert, 77 Ind. 96. 3 Waterman on Specific Perform- ance, § 261 ; Nibertu. Baghurst (1890), 47 N. J. Eq. 201. §697 PAKT PERFORMANCE. 845 land for a long time, will not be permitted to allege that he is not in by virtue of the contract. 1 § 697. Continuance of possession — Landlord and tenant. — Mere continuance of possession does not constitute part per- formance. There must be a radical change in the attitude of the contracting parties towards each other, a change consisting of acts done, a notorious change which itself indicates that some contract has been made between the parties. 2 Possession taken under a prior contract and merely continued under the oral one is not sufficient. 3 Where one is in possession of land as a tenant at the time he verbally contracts to purchase the premises, his subsequent possession will be presumed to be under the lease, unless it be clearly shown to result from the subsequent agreement. 1 If a tenant in possession verbally contracts with the owner for a new term, his merely continuing in possession after the making of the alleged contract is not an act of part performance within the meaning of the rule, so 'Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 Wend. 638; Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34; Howe v. Rogers, 32 Texas, 218; Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513; Moore v. Higbee, 45 Ind. 487; Gregory v. Mighell, 18 Ves. 328; Millard v. Har- vey, 34 Beav. 237; Lord v. Under- dunck, 1 Sandf . Ob. 46. 2 Emmel v. Hayes (1890), 102 Mo. 186. In Andrew u.Babcock (1893), 63 Conn. 109, Fenn, J., said: "Some of the most recent cases, however, un- doubtedly hold that possession alone is not sufficient. But on examina- tion we think most of the cases capa- ble of being reconciled and made con- sistent on this principle that, while possession alone of land, under a ver- bal contract, when delivered to a ven- dee or lessee with the consent of the vendor or lessor, or with such knowl- edge as would imply consent, and un- der such circumstances that it can naturally and reasonably be accounted for only by the supposition of some contract, instead of any other rela- tion between the parties, thus clearly indicating the commencement of a new estate or interest in the land on the part of the possessor, is a sufficient act of part performance to take the case out of the statute, yet the mere physical fact of possession is not suf- ficient. 'When the possession is not a new fact, but is the continuation of a former similar condition, as when it is by a tenant after the expiration of his term alleging a verbal contract to renew or to convey, the intent' (to carry out and execute the agreement) 'must be proved by some further act which clearly shows that possession must be accounted for by the new re- lation, and can not be referred to the previous holding.' " Pomeroy on Spe- cific Performance, § 116. 3 Lamme v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560; Felton v. Smith, 84 Ind. 485. 4 Bigler v. Baker (1894), 140 Neb. 325; 58 W. Rep. 1026. 846 PAET PERFORMANCE. §698 as to justify a decree for a lease according to the contract ;' be- cause in such a case his possession may be referable to the old lease, and does not unequivocally refer to and result from the agreement. 2 But if the tenant goes on and makes extensive improvements that are inconsistent with the old relation, the rule is otherwise. 3 Where a tenant already in possession made a verbal contract with his landlord for a thirty-year lease, and made improvements on the faith of it, or had them made by a sublessee, it was held that he was entitled to specific per- formance, by virtue of the improvements, although he was in possession when the contract was made. 4 § 698. Improvements. — Expenditures made on improve, ments upon the land constitute a part performance which will take a parol agreement relating to the sale or leasing thereof out of the statute, especially where such improvements are in- capable of compensation by damages. 5 Improvements relied 1 Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 476, and cases cited. In Recknagle v. Schmaltz, 72 Iowa, 63, it was held that possession alone was not suffi- cient, because the plaintiff was occupy- ing the land as a tenant or employe of the intestate at the time of the alleged contract. In Swales v. Jackson, 126 Ind. 282, it was held that, "where the vendees were already occupying the land as tenants or as former owners, and continued in possession after the parol contract was made, there is no such taking of possession as will bring the case within the exception of the statute of frauds. To bring a parol contract for the sale of real estate within the exception to the statute, there must be an open and visible change of possession under the con- tract." 2 Mahana v. Blunt, 20 Iowa, 142; Rosenthal v. Freeburger, 26 Md. 75. 8 Spalding v. Couzelman, 30 Mo. 177. They must of course be of such a marked and important character as to be not naturally reconcilable with the continuance of the old relation. Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 480. In Brennan v. Balton, 2 Dru. & War. 349, Chancellor Sugden said that, where the improvements which were made, and the alleged expenditure by the tenant, were no more than what would take place in the ordinary course of husbandry, it would be against all authority to say that such acts amounted to part performance. 4 Williams v. Evans, 19 L. R. Eq. 547 ; 13 Moak's Eng. Reports, 490. 6 Hoffman v. Fett, 39 Cal. 109; Bur- lingame v. Rowland (1888), 77 Cal. 315; Green v. Finin, 35 Conn. 178; Tate v. Jones, 16 Fla. 216; McDowell v. Lucas, 97 111. 489 ; Laird v. Allen, 82 111. 43; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576; Casler v. Thompson, 4 N. J. Eq. 59; Moss v. Culver, 64 Pa. St. 414; Detrick v. Sharrar, 95 Pa. St. 521; Johnson v. Bowden, 37 Texas, 621 ; Hunkins v. Hunkins, 65 N. H. 95; Lowry v. Bumngton, 6 W. Va. 249; Ingles v. Patterson, 36 Wis. 373; Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1 ; Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254; Wetmore v. White, 2 Caine's Cas. 87; 2 Am. Dec. § 698 PART PERFORMANCE. 847 upon to constitute a part performance must be valuable, per- manently beneficial to the estate, and involving a sacrifice to the purchaser who made them. 1 The building of a party-wall under a parol agreement that the adjacent owner will pay for one-half of as much as he shall use when he builds is a part performance taking the case out of the statute. 2 Slight and temporary erections for the tenant's own convenience give no equity. 8 Improvements to constitute part performance need not necessarily consist of erections on land, but may arise from skill and labor bestowed in cultivation. 4 Where a parol contract was made for the rent of a plantation, and the defend- ant went into possession of the place in pursuance of the con- tract and cultivated it for the year, this was held such a part performance of the contract as took it out of the operation of the statute in an action brought for the rent. 5 !123, note ; TJngley v. TJngley, L. R. 4 Oh. Div. 73. "A principle of com- mon justice forbids that one shall be permitted to lead another to act upon a contract of purchase with him, and incur expenses by reason of it, and then, upon some pretext of a defect in a matter of form, refuse compliance with its provisions, and thus deprive the purchaser of the benefit of his labor and expenditures." Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. McAlpine (1888), 129 U. 8. 305, per Field, J. In Pom- eroy on Specific Performance of Con- tracts, § 126, numerous cases are cited to sustain the general proposition that "the making of valuable permanent improvements on the land by the vendee or lessee, in pursuance of the agreement, and with the knowledge of the other party, is always consid- ered to be the strongest and most unequivocal act of part performance by which a verbal contract to sell or convey or to lease is taken out of the statute." 1 Hamilton v. Jones, 3 Gill & J. 127 ; Davenport v. Mason, 15 Mass. 85; Wack v. Sorber, 2 Wharton, 387; 30 Am. Dec. 269; Gallagher v. Gallagher (1888), 31 W. Va. 9. "Rawson v. Bell, 46 Ga. 19. In Rindge v. Baker, 57 N. Y. 209, where under a parol agreement between two adjoining proprietors to jointly build a party wall, one-half on the premises of each, the parties went on and built a portion of the wall, it was held that one party, who had prepared his materials and planned his building in view of and relying upon the perform- ance of the contract, upon the refusal of the other to proceed, is not limited to an action for specific performance, but may, after notice to the other, complete the wall, and recover of the other one-half the expense. Such an action is not purely an action at law, but is one of equitable cognizance, it being not for a breach of the parol contract, but for money by way of performance. 3 Young v. Glendenning, 6 Watts, 509, per Gibson, C. J. 'Waterman on Specific Perform- ance, § 282. 6 Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512. 848 PART PERFORMANCE. § 699 § 699. Where the consideration is labor and services. — Where there is an agreement to convey land, and the consid- eration is paid in services of such a character that their value may be estimated and liquidated in money, so as to measur- ably make the vendee whole, it is not an act of part perform- ance which will take the case out of the statute. 1 But where the labor and services are of such a peculiar character that it is impossible to estimate their value by any pecuniary standard, and the vendor did not intend so to estimate them, the labor and services will constitute part performance. 2 When the con- sideration of an agreement to convey land by a father to his daughter was nearly forty years of domestic service rendered for him at his request, it was held that, inasmuch as the bar of the statute of limitations could be interposed to cut off more than seven-eighths of the claim if the party was left to a suit at law to recover compensation, fraud would result, unless the agreement was carried into effect; and the case was brought within the reason of the rule "that nothing is to be considered as a part performance which does not put a party in a situa- tion which is a fraud upon him, unless the agreement be fully performed." 8 1 Slingerland v. Slingerland (1888), moneys laid out in improvements 39 Minn. 197. upon the land sold." In Davison v. 2 Rhodes *. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. 246, a father 279, where two brothers, one having agreed with his son, on the latter a family and the other being single, attaining his majority, that if he would owned a farm in common on which remain at home and take care of the they had always lived together. The family he would, at his death, leave unmarried brother, being subject to him the farm. The son performed epileptic fits, made a verbal agree- his part of the agreement, and spe- ment with his other brother to give cific performance was decreed, on the him all his property, provided he ground of part performance. Sutton would take care of him as long as he v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101; Sharkey v. lived. The married brother and fam- McDermott (1887), 91 Mo. 647 ; Hiatt ily took care of the unmarried brother v. Williams, 72 Mo. 214; Lloyd v. up to the time of his death. It was Holienback (1893), 98 Mich. 203 held that this constituted such a part Twiss v. George, 33 Mich. 253 ; John performance as to relieve a parol con- son v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332 tract from the operation of the stat- Brown v. Sutton (1888), 129 IT. S. 238 ute. "The case is clearly within the "Warren v. Warren (1883), 105 111 rule which governs courts of equity in 568. A contract to leave property to carrying parol agreements into effect an adopted child as an heir is taken where possession has been taken or out of the statute of frauds by per- 700 PART PERFORMANCE. 849 § 700. Marriage. — Contracts made upon the consideration of marriage if verbal are capable of partial performance so as to be taken out of the operation of the statute. 1 Marriage it- self is not part performance and does not take a parol agree- ment to convey lands in consideration of the marriage out of the statute. 8 But in connection with other acts it may be a sufficient part performance upon which to base the equitable jurisdiction, and secure the enforcement of such agreements. 8 Taking possession and making permanent improvements by the husband and wife are held a sufficient part performance of an antenuptial verbal promise by the father of the husband, to convey land to the wife made in consideration of the in- tended marriage.* Where a father gave his daughter verbally a house as a marriage portion previous to her marriage, it was held that the delivery of the property to the daughter, in pur- suance of the gift, and the fulfillment of the condition on formance on the part of the child. Wright v. Wright (1894), 99 Mich. 170. In Pond o. Sheean (1890), 132 111. 312, it was held that where a per- son took a child to raise as a member of his family and made a parol prom- ise to give the child all his property on his death and that of his wife the performance on the part of the child did not take it out of the statute. Austin v. Davis (1891), 128 Ind. 472, to the same effect. 1 Pomeroy on Specific Performance, §101. 2 Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106; 11 Am. St. Eep. 244 ; Oaton v. Caton, L. E. 1 Ch. App. Oas. 137. In Ungley v. Ungley, L. E. 4 Ch. Div. 73, Malins, V. C, said: "I must say in this case as I have said on similar occasions before, that the decisions are to be regretted which have uniformly held that marriage is not part performance, so as to take parol contracts out of the statute." With reference to this subject, Story says: "The subsequent marriage is not deemed a part per- formance, taking the case out of the 54 statute, contrary to the rule which prevails in other cases of contract. In this respect it is always treated as a peculiar case standing on its own ground." 1 Story's Equity Jurispru- dence, §768; Atherley on Marriage, 90. 3 Gough v. Crane, 3 Md. Ch. 119; Crane v. Grough, 4 Md. 316. In Ham- mersley v. De Biel, 12 CI. & Fin. 45, the lady's father and her intended husband made a verbal agreement prior to the marriage, by which the father agreed to settle certain prop- erty on his daughter, and the hus- band agreed to settle a certain joint- ure upon her. The intended husband executed his settlement as he had promised, and the marriage took place. It was held by Lord Chan- cellor Cottenham, that this execution of the settlement in pursuance of his contract by the husband, being an act done by him over and above the mar- riage, was a sufficient part perform- ance to take the father's verbal agreement out of the statute. 4 Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1. 850 PART PERFORMANCE. §701 which it was to attach by the consummation of the marriage, withdrew the contract from the reach of the statute of frauds. There were two ingredients which relieved the parol agreement from the operation of the statute, performance of the consid- eration, and a change of possession under the contract. 1 § 701. Parol gifts of land. — Equity will protect a parol gift of land equally with a parol agreement to sell it, if accom- panied by possession, and the donee induced by the promise to give it has made valuable improvements on the property. 2 But possession taken in pursuance of a verbal gift is not alone sufficient part performance, 3 there being no valuable consider- ation, and possession in such a case not being inconsistent with permission simply to occupy the land. 4 Besides such possession there must be improvements not capable of compen- sation in damages. 6 Nor do improvements tend directly to es- *Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill (Md.), 13S; 43 Am. Dec. 306. In Ungley v. Ungley, L. E. 4 Ch. Div. 73, Malins, V. C, said: "I should say, therefore, that if A. is about to marry, and proves a promise on behalf of the in- tended "wife's father that he will give him a house on his marriage, that is a void contract, because it is not in writing, but if that promise is followed upon the marriage by possession, that simple fact, if it be for an hour only, ought, in my opinion, as being a part performance of the promise,to take the case out of the statute of frauds, and the party who has got the contract thus perfected by part performance is in just as good a situation as if he had a contract in writing by the father, say- ing that 'in consideration of the mar- riage, I will give or settle upon you a house.' " In Surcome v. Pinniger, 3 De G.M. & G. 571, where afather,on the marriage of his daughter, promised to give certain leaseholds, and then after the marriage let his son-in-law into possession, gave him the title deeds, and allowed him to expend money on the land, the case was held to be tak- en out of the statute. 2 Halsey v. Peters (1884), 79 Va. 60; Erie, etc., Ry. Co. v. Knowles, 117 Pa. St. 77; Hunter v. Mills, 29 S. C. 72; Beall v. Clark, 71 Ga. 818; Irwin v. Dyke, 114 111. 302; West v. Bundy, 78 Mo. 407; Newkirk v. Marshall, 35 Kan. 77; Dawson v. McFaddin, 22 Neb. 131. In Lessee of Syler v. Eck- hart, 1 Binney, 378, Tilghman, C. J., said: " We see no material difference between a sale and a gift, because it certainly would be fraudulent conduct in a parent to make a gift which he knew to be void, and thus entice his child into a great expenditure of money and labor of which he meant to reap the benefit himself." Hiuynn v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97. As between a father and son, or a son- in-law, possession of the land alone is not sufficient to entitle the donee to specific performance. Anderson v. Scott (1888), 94 Mo. 637. 4 Stewart v. Stewart, 3 Watts, 253; Pinckard v. Pinckard, 23 Ala. 649. 5 Ballard v. Ward, 89Pa.St.358. The expenditure in money or labor in the improvement of the land induced by the donor's promise to give the land § 701 PART PERFORMANCE. 851 tablish the principal fact, and where the improvements are merely such as are essential to the use of the land they have but little weight as corroborative evidence. 1 If the expenditure has been trivial, or does not appear to have been induced by or founded upon the gift, or has been compensated for by the past profits of the land, or admits of an adequate compensa- tion from other sources, it will not be sufficient. 2 The gift must be proved clearly and distinctly, and the proof that the donee actually expended money under and on the faith of it must be of equal clearness. 3 Where a son goes into possession of his father's land, and makes improvements, a jury is not to infer from that, in the absence of other evidence, that the father gave him the land. And loose declarations of the father, in casual conversations, calling it his son's property, without any explanation how it came to be his, are not sufficient evi- dence of a gift. 4 to the party making the expenditure constitutes, in equity, a consideration for the promise and the promise will be enforced. Crosbie v. McDoual, 13 Ves. 148; Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34; Seavey v. Drake, 62 N. H. 393. 1 Cox v. Cox, 26 Pa. St. 375. Mere repairs not sufficient. Gallagher v. Gallagher, 31 W. Va. 9. 2 Wack v. Sorber, 2 Wharton, 387. The improvements, as they were called, were at most equal in value only to a year's rent, and the donee had the premises five years. Besides, the improvements were not such as added to the permanent value of the land,, consisting, as they did, in re- pairs of fences, and the erection of a shed for a cow-stable. "These at- tempts to turn an experimental in- vestiture of possession into a sale, or gift executed, are of such repeated oc- currence as to require the courts to hold a strict hand over them." Per curiam. 8 Allison v. Burns (1884), 107 Pa. St. 50; Truman v. Truman (1890), 79 Iowa, 506. 4 Hugus v. Walker, 12 Pa. St. 173. " It is so natural for parents to help • their children by giving them the use of a farm or house, and then to call it theirs, that no gift or sale of the property can be inferred from such circumstance. * * The very nature of the relation, therefore, requires the contracts between parents and chil- dren to be proved by a kind of evi- dence that is very different from that which may be sufficient between strangers." Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. St. 365. Per Lowrie, J. CHAPTER XX. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §702. The intention of the parties §724. Construction by parties — Es- the cardinal rule. toppel. 703. Intent as ascertained from the 725. Parol evidence to show the language used. construction of the party. 704. Construing written contracts 726. The rule contra proferentem. when oral evidence excluded. 727. Grants. 705. The same subject continued. 728. Contracts partly written and 706. Superseding the old by a new partly printed. contract. 729. The same subject continued. 707. Error of the parties. 730. Punctuation. 708. Reasonable construction to be 731. Whether a contract is entire or adopted. severable. 709. The contract to be upheld if 732. Whether a contract is sever- possible. able or joint. 710. Necessary implications. 733. The same subject continued — 711. The whole contract to be con- Illustrations. sidered. 734. Laws, customs and usages. 712. Construing particular clauses. 735. Construction of deeds. 713. Reading two instruments as 736. The same subject continued. one. 737. Construction of insurance pol- ' 714. "Words to be given their ordi- icies. nary meaning. 738. The same subject continued. 715. When the ordinary sense will 739. Building contracts. not control. 740. Parol evidence admissible 716. Technical words. when. 717. Where the contract is capable 741. The same subject continued. of two meanings. 742. Latent and patent ambiguities. 718. Repugnancy. 743. Function of judge and jury re- 719. Effect to be allowed to sur- spectively. rounding circumstances. 744. The same subject continued. 720. The same subject continued. 745. The same subject continued — 721. Construction by the parties. Oral contracts. 722. The same subject continued. 746. Contracts of sale or return of 723. The object of construction. sale or bailment. § 702. The intention of the parties the cardinal rule. — It is a cardinal rule in the construction of all contracts that the in- tention of the parties is to be inquired into, nnd, if not for- (852) 702 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 853 bidden by law, is to be effectuated. 1 The great object, and in- deed the only foundation, of all rules for the construction of contracts is to come at the intention of the parties. 8 Mr. Broom, translating a fundamental maxim, says: "A liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties." s Written contracts should be so construed as to give effect to them, rather than the contrary, and when they are informal, illiterate and unskillfully drawn, the intent is to be ascertained, if possible, without regard to technical rules, by construing the words as they were understood by the par- ties, resort being had to every part of the instrument, and the intent when thus ascertained is the governing rule. 4 To ascer- tain the intention, regard must be had to the nature of the in- strument itself, the condition of the parties executing it, and the objects which they had in view. 5 The words employed, if capable of more than one meaning, are to be given that mean- ing which it is apparent the parties intended them to have. 6 'Bradley v. Washington, etc., Co., 13 Pet. 89; Walters v. Morrow, 1 Houst. (Del.) 527; Mauran v. Bullus, 16 Pet. 528 (construction of a letter of guarantee) ; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94; Mathews v. Phelps, 61 Mich. 327; 1 Am. St. Rep. 581 ; Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 31 ; 2 Am. St. Rep. 362; Field v. Leiter, 118 111. 17; Flagg v. Eames, 40 Vt. 16; Hawes v. Smith, 12 Maine, 429; Don- ahue v. McNulty, 24 Cal. 411 ; 85 Am. Dec. 78 ; Melick v. Pidcock, 44 N. J. Eq. 525; 6 Am. St. Rep. 901 ; Edwards *. Bowden, 99 N. C. 80; 6 Am. St. Rep. 487; Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159; Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527; Dwight v. German, etc., Insurance Co., 103 N. Y. 341 ; Williamson v, Mc- Clure, 37 Pa. St. 402 ; McConnell v. New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 273. 2 Gray v. Clark, 11 Vt. 583. The rule most conspicuous and wide-reach- ing of all is that a written contract shall be so interpreted, as, if possible, to carry out what the parties meant. Bishop on Contracts, § 380. a Broom's Legal Maxims, *p. 540. 4 Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227; 26 Am. Dec. 657. 6 5 Lawson's Rights, Remedies and Practice, § 2316 ; McConnel v. Mur- phy, L. R. 5 P. C. 203. 6 Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129. The construction is to be accord- ing to the intention appearing by the words. Calcutta and Burmah Steam Nav. v. De Mattos, 32 L. J. Q. B. 322. According to the intent apparent on the face as far as words will admit. Williams v. Gray, 67 Eng. C. L. R. 730 (9 C. B.); Pensacola Gas Co. v. Lotze's Sons, 23 Fla. 368; Belch v. Miller, 32 Mo. App. 387 ; Crocker v. Hill, 61 N. H. 345 ; Benjamin's Suc- cession, 39 La. Ann. 612. The inten- tion of the parties is to be derived from the terms and subject-matter and not from the statements of one party 854 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §703 § 703. Intent as ascertained by the language used. — If the contract was reduced to writing, the language of the instru- ment, if lucid, is the best evidence of the intent. 1 The con- struction should be such as to give effect to the intention of the parties as gathered from the words used. 2 The language of a written contract, while it is in force, is the only legitimate evidence of what the parties intended and understood by it. 3 And it will be presumed that the writing expresses the whole contract. 4 The court can not import words into a contract which would make it materially different in a vital particular from what it is. 5 A party to a contract may reasonably be held bound by what he fairly expressed in the terms used, whether he in- tended what he expressed or not. 6 The law will presume that a person meant what his language, by its terms, and under the circumstances under which it was used, would be fairly under- as to what may have been his under- light of surrounding circumstances, in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the parties, but as they have constituted the •writing to be the only outward and visible expression of their meaning, no other words are to be added to it, or substituted in its stead. The duty of the courts in such cases is to ascer- tain, not what the parties may have secretly intended, as contradistin- guished from what their words ex- press, but what is the meaning of the words they may have used." 1 Green- leaf on Evidence, § 277. 4 Farraru. Hinch, 20 111. 646; Mer- chants Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 62 111. 242 ; Harding v. Commercial Loan Co., 84 111. 251 ; Wight v. Sampter, 127 111. 167. 5 Gavinzel u. Crump (1874), 22 Wall. 308 (construction of a bond) ; Robin- son v. Stow, 39 111. 568; Fitzgerald v. Staples, 88 111. 234. 6 William Cramp & Sons, Ship, etc., Building Co. v. Sloan, 21 Fed. Rep. 561. A contractor must stand by the words of his contract, even if he does not read it. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45. standing. Meinhardt v. Mode, 22 Fla. 279. 1 Rogers v. Atkinson, 1 Ga. 12 ; Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527 ; Greene v. Day, 34 Iowa, 328; Robb v. Ban- croft, 13 Kan. 123 ; McLellan v. Cum- berland Bank, 24 Maine, 566 ; Jeffrey v. Grant, 37 Maine, 236; Mumford v. McPherson, 1 Johns. 363 ; Westcott v. Thompson, 18 N. Y. 367; Dent v. North American Steamship Co., 49 N. Y. 390; Heirs of Watrous v. Mc- Kie, 54 Texas, 65; Bearss v. Ford, 108 111. 16. 2 Stout u.Whitney,12 111.218 ; Tracy u. Chicago, 24 111. 500; Streeter v. Street- er, 43 111. 155; Wilson v. Marlow, 66 111. 385; Walker v, Douglas, 70 111. 445; Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. 28; Hill v. Parker, 10 111. App. 323 ; Chest- nut v. Chestnut, 15 111. App. 390. The meaning and intention of the parties to a contract is to be ascertained from the face of the instrument and by the application of common sense to the particular case. Green v. Town of Dyersburg, 2 Flip. 472. 3 West Haven Water Co. v. Red- field (1889), 58 Conn. 39. "The writ- ing, it is true, may be read by the § 704 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 855 stood to mean, and this presumption can not be rebutted by proof that he intended something more or different, which he made no attempt to express, and which a person dealing with him neither understood nor had reason to understand. 1 Ac- cordingly, a prior verbal contract will be merged in a subse- quent written one. 2 § 704. Construing written contracts — When oral evidence excluded. — A plain written contract must, therefore, be con- strued according to its terms, whatever the result may be. s And such terms should be taken in their natural, popular and obvious meaning, where there is nothing in the contract itself or the attending circumstances which shows that the parties in- tended to use them in some particular or technical sense. Thus, where a contract between a city and a water company pro- vided that the latter should put in such further number of fire hy- drants upon street mains as might be ordered by the city council, "provided that the cost and expense of all such further num- ber of hydrants and of the putting in of the same shall be paid by said city," it was held that the city was liable only for the actual sum expended by the company in putting in such hy- drants, and not for what such work was reasonably worth. 4 Oral evidence is not admissible to explain or limit the construc- tion of the word "incompatibility," when stated among the grounds for discharge provided in a written contract of employ- ment. 5 Thus, where one takes charge of a farm under a contract 1 Clark o. Lillie, 39 Vt. 405 ; Locke therein, and not according to the v. Sioux City & P. R., 46 Iowa, 109; views of its meaning entertained by Meriam v. Piner City Lumber Co., the parties drawing it; and a court 23 Minn. 314. will not change plain language of the 2 Carr v. Hays, 110 Ind. 408; 9 West, contract in order to conform it to a Rep. 183; Stuebben v. Granger, 63 mistaken notion of its meaning, enter- Mich. 306; Stoddard?;. Nelson, 17 tained by the person executing it, in Ore. 417; Welz v. Rhodius, 87 Ind. 1, the absence of proof of fraud, acci- and cases cited. dent, or mistake." Wadsworth v. 'Preston v. Smith, 156 111.359; 40 Smith, 43 Iowa, 439. N. E. Rep. 949; and see Einstein v. i Bull r. City of Quincy, 155 111. 566; Rochester Gas Co., 146 N.Y. 46 ; 40 N. 40 N. E. Rep. 1035. E. Rep. 631, 633 ; Sirk u. Ela, 163 Mass. 5 Gray v. Shepard (Oct. 1895), 147 394; 40 N. E. Rep. 183. "A contract N. Y. 177, per Andrew, C. J. : " The it to be understood according to the plaintiff, by the evidence offered, meaning of the language employed sought to limit the meaning of a word 856 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §705 which provides that he "is to receive five per cent, of the money used or collected," the contract will be construed as al- lowing him five per cent, of all disbursements made in accord- ance with the terms of the contract, as well as five per cent, of all moneys collected. 1 § 705. The same subject continued. — Where a clause in a contract, having been left unfinished, is meaningless, the court will not supply supposed omissions to give it legal ef- fect. 2 And whether a contract for the sale of goods was in- tended as such, or was a mere banter, and so understood by the parties, is for the jury. 3 But in a contract between two sisters, providing that, should either of them die before the other with- out a "living heir," the survivor should become sole owner of a note held by them jointly, the words " living heir" should be construed to mean issue.* An instruction wherein the court in common use, the only indefinite- ness of meaning consisting in its wide application, and which for that very reason, as may be inferred, was in- troduced into the contract. The ele- ments and qualities which may create incompatibility between persons elude exact definition, so varied are the cir- cumstances and so dependent is such a state of feeling upon education, habits of thought and peculiarities of character. It must be assumed that the parties understood the wide sig- nification of the word and used it understandingly. The service to be rendered involved mutual confidence between the parties and intimate per- sonal association. Want of harmony between them for any cause would be likely to interfere with the newspaper enterprise and made the insertion of this ground for discharge natural and reasonable. The word is not a word of art, or of technical or local mean- ing, or having two distinct meanings, circumstances which have been held to justify parol evidence of the mean- ing of a word used in a written con- tract. Greenleaf on Evidence, § 295. The largeness of the meaning of the term used in the contract is no reason for limiting the interpretation, nor does it furnish any reason for permit- ting parol evidence in explanation." 1 Whitmore v. Nelson (Texas App. 18951, 29 S. W. Rep. 521. 2 Sinclair v. Hicks, 116 N. C. 606; 21 S. E. Rep. 395. s Theiss ».Weiss,166Pa. St. 9 ; 31 Atl. Rep. 63, Green, J. : "The case, in its circumstances, is very much like the case of Brown v. Finney, 53 Pa. St. 373, which received the condemna- tion and reversal of this court after a verdict of two thousand dollars had been recovered in the court below." 'Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531; 21 S. E. Rep. 202, Avery, J. ; "In the con- nection in which they appear, the words 'living heir' were manifestly intended to mean issue, and we will so interpret them in construing the agreement. Howell v. Knight, 100 N. C. 254 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 721 ; Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N. C. 62. To say that one sister died 'without a living heir,' and at the same time leaving a sur- viving sister, would be palpably ab- $706 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 857 undertook to construe a contract with reference to all the cir- cumstances which the evidence tended to establish, and left it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances assumed had been established, is not objectionable, as leaving the whole construction of a written contract to the jury. 1 § 706. Superseding the old by a new contract. — An agree- ment to furnish gas to plaintiff at his residence "for ordinary purposes," for twenty years, entitles him to gas for a gas cook stove subsequently acquired, although, at the time of making the contract, such stoves were not in use. 2 A new contract surd, unless we construe 'heir' to mean 'issue.' " As to the construc- tion of an ambiguous contract most strongly against the party proffering it, see Bascom v. Smith, 164 Mass. 61 ; 41 N. E. Rep. 130. 1 Bascom v. Smith, 164 Mass. 61 ; 41 N. E. Eep. 130. 2 Graves v. Key City Gas Co. (Iowa, 1895), 61 N. W. Rep. 937, Given, C. J.; "The first question discussed is whether the words 'all gas for ordi- nary purposes,' as found in said reso- lution, were intended as a limitation upon the appliances and quantity to be used, or only upon the appliances. This intention we are to ascertain from the language employed, con- strued in the light of the subject of the contract and the surrounding cir- cumstances. The language we have quoted. The subject-matter is the supplying of gas to plaintiff for use in his street lamps and residence, and the surrounding circumstances are in substance these : Plaintiff's residence is large, having thirty-two rooms, and so constructed, with basement, dining- room, etc., as to require an unusually large supply of gas to light it. His family was such that a number of dif- ferent rooms were occupied and lighted in the evenings. In addition to the gas used for lighting, he had two street lamps in front of his resi- dence, a small heater in the dining- room, and a gas log in the library. This gas log was used a large part of the time in cold and chilly or damp weather at its full capacity, and con- sumed nearly sixty cubic feet per hour. It is manifest that, at and for years prior to the making of this con- tract, plaintiff was a large consumer of the gas manufactured at his works. Several of the men employed in con- nection with the works continued in their positions after the sale to the defendant; several who became active in. the organization of the defendant company, and, as officers in its man- agement, were familiar with the size of plaintiff's residence, the appliances used in consuming gas, the purposes for which used, and that a large amount was being used. There being no meter attached, the amount con- sumed could only be known in a gen- eral way. We have much discussion as to what defendant's officers knew as to the amount of gas consumed by plaintiff at and prior to the contract, and how far defendant should be bound thereby. We are in no doubt but those who made this agreement on the part of the defendant knew of the appliances being used by the plaintiff, the purposes for which he used gas, and that he was a large con- sumer. It was under these circum- 858 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 707 with reference to the subject-matter of a former one does not supersede the former, and destroy its obligations, except in so far as the new one is inconsistent therewith, when it is evident from an inspection of the contracts, and from an examination of the circumstances, that the parties did not intend the new contract to supersede the old, but intended it as supplementary thereto. 1 Thus, where a contract consisted partly of corre- spondence, and one of the letters was lost, and many of the details of the contract were left to implication or inference, it was for the jury to say whether the contract was an independ- ent one, or was supplementary to another contract, previously made between the same persons. 2 § 707. Error of the parties. — There is no equitable construc- tion of an agreement distinct from its legal construction. 3 The error of the parties can not control the effect of the instrument where its meaning is clear. 4 And an instrument must stand as written if deliberately adopted by the parties, although they mistook its legal intent, the mistake being one of law merely. 5 Courts will not assume to make a contract for the parties which they did not choose to make for themselves. 6 Where a written stances and with this knowledge that s Scott „ Liverpool, 5 Jur. N. S. 105; the defendant agreed to furnish 27 L. J. Ch. 230; 3 DeG. & J. 334, per plaintiff with 'all gas for ordinary Lord Chelmsford, L. C. purposes,' including the gas log and i Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 "Wall, street lamps. Aside from the lamps (Tj. S.) 367; Citizens', etc., Insurance and log, the purposes contemplated c . v. Doll, 35 Md. 89. were ordinary domestic purposes. 5 Holmes v. Hall, 8 Mich. 66; 77 Therefore it must have been contem- Am. Dec. 444. The construction of a plated that plaintiff might use any contract does not depend upon what appliance used in consuming gas for each party thought, but upon what ordinary domestic purposes. The con- both agreed. Brunhild v. Freeman, tract had twenty years to run. There- 77 N. C. 128. The construction of a fore it was not intended to limit contract is matter of law, and if a plaintiff to the appliances then in use, party acts upon a mistaken view of but to permit the use of any that his rights under a contract, he is no might thereafter be adapted to the more entitled to relief in equity than use of gas for ordinary domestic pur- he would be to recover at law. Mid. P° ses -" land, etc., Co. v. Johnson, 6 H. L. 'TJhligu. Barnum, 43 Neb. 584; 61 C. 798. N. W. Rep. 749. * County of Morgan „. Allen, 103 2 Holm v. Colman, 89 Wis. 233 ; 61 U. S. 515. N. W. Rep. 767. § 708 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 859 contract has an apparent meaning at variance with its real meaning, it may bind the author of the ambiguity contrary to its real meaning, if this meaning was so obscurely expressed that the other party was likely to be misled and was misled, and if the circumstances entitled him to timely notice of his mistake and notice was not given. 1 What one party to a con- tract understands or believes is not to govern its construction unless such understanding or belief was induced by the con- duct or declaration of the other party. 2 The language used by either party is to receive such a construction as he at the time supposed the other party would give to it, or such a construc- tion as the other party was fairly justified in giving to it. 8 A distinction is to be observed between the construction of a con- tract and the correction of a mistake. If there is a mistake in a written contract so that it does not express the intention of the parties, equity will reform it so as to make it carry out that intention .* Accordingly, where it is apparent upon the face of a written instrument that a mere clerical error has been made, and it is also apparent from the face of the instrument what the correction should be to make it as intended, the court will correct such error by construction. 6 § 708. Reasonable construction to be adopted. — A reasona- ble construction should be given every contract, for it should not be presumed that the parties intended anything either senseless or absurd. 6 A rigid adherence to the letter often leads to erroneous results, and misinterprets the meaning of the parties. 7 Inconsistent clauses must be construed accord- ing to the subject-matter and the motive, and the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must pre- vail over the strictness of the letter. 8 The fact that the con- 'Hill v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 79 name in the condition of a bond); Ga. 105. Wood v. Cochrane, 39 Vt. 544. 2 Bank v. Kennedy, 17 Wall. 19. 6 Buckingham v. Jackson, 4 Biss. 9 Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40; Gun- 295; Blitz v. Union Steamboat Co., 51 nisonu. Bancroft, 11 Vt. 490. Mich. 558; Robinson v. Bullock, 58 4 1 Beach on Modern Equity Juris- Ala. 618. prudence, 40, 63 and cases cited. 7 Keed v. Insurance Co. (1877), 95 5 Richmond v. Woodard, 32 Vt. 833 IT. S. 23. (error consisted in writing the wrong 8 Bent v. Alexander, 15 Mo. App. 860 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §709 struction contended for would make the contract unreasonable, and place one of the parties at the mercy of the other, may be taken into consideration. 1 A clause or a word may be rejected which is irreconcilable with the nature of the contract or the general design of the parties; 2 or to which no meaning can be assigned in view of the connection in which it is used, and of the whole instrument. 3 § 709. The contract to be upheld if possible. — The general rule is that a contract should, if possible, be so construed as to render it binding on both parties and not so as to render it oppressive or inequitable as to either party. 4 Thus an agree- ment by a railroad company, with one owning land adjacent to its track, that, if he would build a coal tipple and a trestle therefrom to its track, it would construct a switch thereon, and thereafter deliver coal to him there, does not contain an implication that the switch shall be perpetual. 5 An applica- 181; Russell ». Merrifield (1891), 131 Lnd. 148 (wrong word used through inadvertence); Findley v. Armstrong (1883), 23 W. Va. 113 (where the lan- guage was unmeaning and contradic- tory). 1 Little v. Banks (1894), 77 Hun, 511, citing, Russell v. Allerton, 108 N. Y. 288 ; Jugla v. Trouttet, 120 N. Y. 21 ; Wright v. Reusens, 133 N. Y. 298. 2 Stockton v. Turner, 7 J. J. Marsh. 192; Buck v. Burk, 18 N. Y. 337. 'Tucker v. Meeks, 2 Sweeny, 736; Decorah v. Kesselmeier, 45 Iowa, 166. 4 Nute v. American Glucose Co., 55 Kan. 225; 40 Pac. Rep. 279. 5 Jones v. Newport News, etc., Co. (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 736, per Taft, J. : "It is not alleged that either the de- fendant or its predecessor agreed to keep the switch in the main line for any definite time, or that either ex- pressly agreed to keep it there for- ever. The plaintiff contends that, nothing having been said as to the time, the implication is that the switch was to be maintained at all times, i. e. forever. Such a construction is quite at variance with the views of the su- preme court, as expressed in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. City of Marshall, 136 U. S. 393; 10 J>up. Ct. Rep. 846. In that case the city of Marshall filed a bill in equity to enforce an agreement with the railroad company under which it had given the railroad com- pany $300,000 in county bonds and sixty-six acres of land in the city lim- its, and the company, in consideration of the donation, agreed 'to perma- nently establish its eastern terminus and Texas office at the city of Mar- shall, and to establish and construct at said city the main machine shops and car works of said railroad com- pany.' It was held that the contract on the part of the railroad company was satisfied and performed when the company had established and kept a depot and offices at Marshall, and set in operation said car works and ma- chine shops there, and kept them going for eight years, and until the interests of the railway company and 709 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 861 tion to a broker for a loan of money for a certain time and rate of interest, the principal and interest payable at such place as the lender may appoint, to be secured by note and trust deed in the broker's "usual form," does not bind the applicant to agree to pay in gold coin, although that provision appears in the forms used by the broker, where it is not shown that the existence of such provision was known to the applicant. 1 The the public demanded a removal of all or part of these subjects of the con- tract to some other place; that the word 'permanent,' in the contract, was to be construed with reference to the subject-matter of the contract, and, under the circumstances of the case, it was complied with by the es- tablishment of the shops, with no in- tention at the time of removing or abandoning them ; that if the contract were to be interpreted as one to main- tain forever the eastern terminus and the shops and Texas office at Mar- shall, without regard to the con- venience of the public, it would be- come a contract that could not be enforced in equity. In this case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, and referring to the contract, said: 'But it did not amount to a covenant that the company would never cease to make its eastern terminus at Mar- shall ; that it would forever keep up the depot at that place ; that it would for all time continue to have its ma- chine shops and car shops there ; and that, whatever might be the changes of time and circumstances of railroad rivalry and assistance, these things alone should remain forever un- changeable. Such a contract, while we do not say that it would be void on the ground of public policy, is un- doubtedly so far objectionable as ob- structing improvements and changes which might be for the public inter- est, and is so far a hindrance in the way of what might be necessary for the advantage of the railroad itself, and of the community which enjoyed its benefits, that we must look the whole contract over critically before we decide that it bears such an imper- ative and such a remarkable mean- ing.' In the light of this construction of an express agreement to locate and maintain a depot permanently at a town on the line of a railroad, it would seem clear that we should not imply in a contract for a private switch connection a term that shall Joe per- petual, and thus forever limit the dis- cretion of the directors to deal with a subject which may seriously affect the convenience or safety of the public in its use of the road." 1 Peabody v. Dewey 153 111. 657; 39 N. E. Rep. 977, per Wilkin, C. J.: "Appellants proved on the trial that on July 23, 1890, and for about nine months prior thereto, the only blank forms of notes and trust deeds used by them for securing loans were like those filled out and presented to the defendants, containing the 'gold-coin clause' ; and they insist that the words of the application, 'As security for such loan, we will give a joint and several principal note, and interest notes, and a mortgage or trust deed (in your usual form), conveying,' etc., were an agreement to give notes and mortgage or trust deed providing for payment 'in gold coin of the United States of the present standard weight and fineness.' Appellees were allowed to prove, over objection, that formerly, and for several years, ap- pellants had used forms without the 862 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §710 rule is universal that general words in a contract are strength- ened by exceptions, and weakened by enumeration. 1 § 710. Necessary implications. — What is implied in a con- tract is as much a part of it as what is expressed. 2 The writing 'gold-coin clause' ; that on two or three occasions, in the years 1885 and 1886, Dewey made loans from them, signing applications precisely like the one in question, and executing notes and mortgages therefor in the form then used, making the last payment thereon to appellants by bank check ; also that he examined two mortgages executed upon their forms about two years prior to the application. On these facts appellees insist that, when Dewey signed the application, he un- derstood, and was justifiable in un- derstanding, that the words meant no more than that the notes were to be payable in the usual way, and so secured by a mortgage or trust deed. Mere fact that the applicants agreed to give a mortgage or trust deed in a particular form did not of itself bind them to make payments upon unusual terms and conditions, although print- ed in those forms. The application is for a loan of $250,000 for five years, * * * at 6 per cent, interest per annum, payable half-yearly, and prin- cipal and interest payable at such place as the lender may appoint.' This clearly means, payable in any money which could be legally offered for that purpose. To say that, by agreeing to give notes and mortgage or trust deed in the other parties' usual form to secure them, they bound themselves to pay in gold coin of the United States, etc., because that un- usual condition was printed in those forms, but unknown to them, is most unreasonable, and can find no support in the law of contracts. Any one sign- ing this application would reasonably understand the words in parentheses to refer to the form of the mortgage or trust deed, and not to the particu- lar kind of money in which the notes were to be payable. In the argu ment, counsel for appellants treat those words as synonymous with 'upon the terms and conditions set forth in your usual form' ; and they liken it to cases in which a written contract refers to and makes the terms and conditions of another instrument a part of it. Manifestly there is no analogy between that ctass ci cases and this. It is undoubtedly the duty of a party to acquaint himself with the terms of a contract to which he is a party before he enters into it, and, if other instruments or agreements are made a part of the contract, he is bound to know the terms and condi- tions of such instrument or agree- ment; but, as seen, no such agree- ment is here shown." •Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147. And see, Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37, 90. Ac- cording to Lord Bacon "all words, whether they be in deeds or statutes, if they be general and not express and precise, shall be restrained into the fitness of the matter and the person." Broom's Legal Maxims, 646. See also, Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Ld. Raym. 235; Moore v. Magrath, Cowp. 9; Roe v. Vernon, 5 East, 51 ; Morrell v. Fisher, 4 Exch. 591; Wood v. Rowcliffe, 6 Exch. 407. *Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 222; Dean D.Clark (1894), 80 Hun, 80; Jones v. Turner (1894), 80 Hun, 157; Currier v. Boston and Maine R., 34 N. I-I. 498; Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114; Lawler v. Murphy (1890), 58 Conn. 294. § 711 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 863 must be understood as containing all that may be fairly im- plied from the language used. 1 There are very few contracts which contain all of the intentions of the parties. There are implied conditions along with which the express terms must be read in order to obtain the real meaning of the parties.' If there is a contract for the sale of goods, and no time is pro- vided for delivery, the law adds that delivery must be made within a reasonable time; whatever consequent and incident is in common sense appurtenant to its terms the parties must have understood and intended should be attached. 8 Although nec- essary implication is as much a part of an instrument as if that which is so implied was plainly expressed, yet omissions or de- fects in written instruments can not be supplied by virtue of that rule, unless the implication results from the language employed in the instrument, or is indispensable to carry the intention of the parties into effect.* The expression of one or more things of a class or kind in a contract is by implication the exclusion of all not expressed. 6 § 711. The whole contract to be considered. — A written con- tract should be read as a whole ; all its provisions are to be considered, and the general design must not be frustrated by allowing too much force to single words or clauses. 6 A single 1 Jones v. Kent, 80 N. Y. 585 ; Tall- some, they have expressed all the man v. Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584; Rog- conditions by which they intend to be ers v. Smith, 47 N". Y. 324; Nicoll v. bound under that instrument." Asp- Sands (1892), 131 N. Y. 19. din v. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671, per Lord 2 Rogers v. Sheerer (1885), 77 Maine, Denman, C. J. 323. 6 Brown v. Slater, 16 Conn. 192; 3 Robinson v. Bullock, 58 Ala. 618. Tracy v. Chicago, 24 111. 500; Chase v. 4 Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Bradley, 26 Maine, 531; Merrill v. Coal Co., 8 "Wall. 276. Gore, 29 Maine, 346; Smith v. Daven- 5 Finley v. Steele, 23 111. 56. And port, 34 Maine, 520; Hewitt v. Wheel- this, even if the law would have im- er, 22 Conn. 557 ; Chapman v. See- plied all, if none had been ehumerat- comb, 36 Maine, 102 ; Heywood v. Per- ed. Stettauer v. Hamlin, 97 111. 312; rin, 10 Pick. 228; Goosey v. Goosey Hammerquist v. Swensson (1891), 44 48 Miss. 210; Salmon Palls Manfg 111. App. 627. " Where parties have Co. v. Portsmouth Co., 46 N. H. 249 entered into written engagements Hamilton v. Taylor, 18 N. Y. 358 with expressed stipulations, it is Richards v. Warring, 39 Barb. 42 manifestly not desirable to extend Stewart v. Lang, 37 Pa. St. 201 ; Mon- them by any implications; the pre- mouth Park Association v. Wallis Iron sumption is that, having expressed Works, 55 N. J. Law, 132. 864 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 712 sentence should not be construed alone, but should be con- sidered with reference to the context. 1 The construction should make the whole consistent, giving all parts their due weight. 2 Force and effect should be given to all the words employed by the parties where that is possible. 8 And one part of the agree- ment may be resorted to to explain the meaning of the lan- guage or expressions of another part. 4 Where the words in the operative part of the instrument are of doubtful meaning, the recitals preceding the doubtful part may be used as a test to discover the intention of the parties and fix the meaning of the words. 6 This simply means that the entire language shall be considered, that included in the recitals as well as that in- cluded in the operative part of the instrument, and from the whole to ascertain the intention of the parties. 6 Where the contract is a bond the condition should be considered in the construction of the obligatory part.' In construing a contract entered into by correspondence, the whole correspondence must be considered. 8 § 712. Construing particular clauses. — In the interpretation of any particular clause of a contract, the court is required to examine the entire contract, and may also consider the rela- 1 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., Ellenborough said: "It is a true rule Eailroad, 29 Fed. Rep. 546. The of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties must be ascer- meaning of the parties, in any partie- tained by the tenor of the writing, ular part of an instrument, may be and not by looking at a part. Board- collected ex antecedentibus et conse- man v. Reed, 6 Pet. 328; Baron v. quentibus. Every part of it may be Placide, 7 La. Ann. 229; Metcalf v. brought into action in order to collect Taylor, 36 Maine, 28; Heywood v. from the whole one uniform and con- Heywood, 42 Maine, 229; Hazleton, sistent sense, if that may be done." etc., Coal Co. v. Buck Mountain Coal 4 Pensacola Gas Co. v. Lotze's Sons, Co., 57 Pa. St. 301. 23 Fla. 368; 2 So. Rep. 609; Stout v. 2 Railroad Co. v. Railway Co., 44 Whitney, 12 111. 218; Belch v. Miller, Ohio St. 287. And see, Bent v. Alex- 32 Mo. App. 387. ander, 15 Mo. App. 181 ; Chrisman v. 5 Walker v. Tucker, 70 111. 527. State Ins. Co., 16 Ore. 283; Cravens^. 6 Burgess v. Badger (1888), 124 111. Eagle Cotton Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6; 16 288. 16 Am. St. Rep. 298. ' Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Aurora, 99 3 Railroad v. Bartlett, 120 111. 603; 111.205. Bowman v. Long, 89 111. 19. In Bar- 8 United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. ton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 530, Lord 53. §712 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 865 tions of the parties, their connection with the subject-matter of the contract, and the circumstances under which it was made. 1 1 Chicago, R. I., etc., R. Co. v. Den- ver &R.G.R. Co., 143U.S.596; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 479; Knox Co. v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 147 U. S. 91 ; 13 Sup.Ct. Rep.267. In Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hoyt,89Wis. 314; 62 N. W. Rep. 189, a contract hy which defendants agreed to sell to plaintiff's assignor a controlling inter- est in the stock of certain railroad companies contained a clause by which defendants agreed that the capital stock of such companies was "subject only to a first mortgage of ■f 17,000 per mile, issued orto be issued, " on an aggregate mileage of 362J£ miles of main line completed railway, and an equipment mortgage of 1400,000, issued, or to be issued, and that, with the exception of such indebtedness, such companies had no other indebt- edness. It was held that defendants agreed that the indebtedness of such companies should not exceed $17,000 per mile of the mainline of completed road. Cassoday, J., said: "Putting ourselves in the shoes of the parties at the time of making the contract, and remembering that the first mort- gage was not only to secure bonds which had been issued, but such as should thereafter be issued, up to the time of closing the deal, and hence that the amount of such indebtedness was not only then unknown to the purchaser, but unascertainable by either party, and it is very obvious that a purchaser of ordinary prudence would naturally exact, and the sellers willingly make, some stipulation as to the limit of such indebtedness at the time when the deal should be closed. In our judgment, the third paragraph of the contract does contain such a stipulation. Had the parties intend- ed that the amount of the first mort- gage should be mentioned merely by 55 way of description, then the para- graph should have stopped with such mention, but it did not. On the con- trary, it declares, in effect, that the capital stock of the three companies was 'subject only' to a first mort- gage at the rate of $17,000 per mile of the 'main line of completed railway, issued or to be issued.' Then, after providing, in effect, that the three roads should be 'subject further to an equipment mortgage of $400,000, issued or to be issued,' and operating liabilities to an amount not exceeding the cash assets and operating supplies, it declares, in effect, 'that, with the exception of the above indebtedness, said railroad companies shall have * * * no other indebtedness, and that all the tracks, depots, real estate and equipment, except the equip- ment represented by the equipment mbrtgage aforesaid, shall likewise be free from any debt or incum- brances, except as above specified.' " In Wood v. Lindley, 12 Ind. App. 258 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 283, Davis, J., collects several general rules of construction : "The rule of interpretation found in Bishop on Contracts, § 384, is as fol- lows : 'Every clause, and even every word, should, when possible, have as- signed to it some meaning. It is not allowable to presume or to concede, when avoidable, that the parties in a solemn transaction have employed language idly.' Pollock on Contracts, 438. The surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties when the contract was made, when its terms are of doubtful or ambiguous meaning, may be considered for the purpose of arriving at the true inten- tion. Indpls. Cabinet Co. v. Herrman, 7 Ind. App. 462; 34 N. E. Rep. 579; Reissner v. Oxley, 80 Ind. 580, 584. 866 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §713 § 713. Reading two instruments as one. — Where two con- tracts relating to the same subject-matter are made at the same One of the rules of construction is that in any writing 'general words shall be restrained unto the fitness of the mat- ter and the persons ;' and 'when there is a particular recital in a deed, and general words follow, the general words shall be qualified by the partic- ular recital.' Burns v. Singer Mfg. Co., 87 Ind. 541, 548. The applica- tion of this rule is limited to cases where, 'from other covenants in the same deed, it is plainly and irresisti- bly to be inferred that the party could not have intended to use the words in the general sense which they impart.' Pollock on Contracts, 436, 437. The rule here applicable was correctly stated by Judge Lotz in Guaranty, etc., Association v. Rutan, 6 Ind. App. 83, 87 ; 33 N. E. Rep. 210 : 'The primary object in the construction of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties at the mo- ment their minds assented to the same proposition. In the absence of the averments of any extrinsic mat- ter, courts are confined to the con- tract as written. Evansvillle, etc., R. Co. v. Meeds, 11 Ind. 273 ; Beard v. Lofton, 102 Ind. 408; 2 N. E. Rep. 129. But this rule does not preclude the court from considering the situa- tion and relation of the contracting parties, the objects to be accomplished, and the motives they had in the deal- ing with each other. He who inter- prets should, as nearly as possible, put himself in the position of the par- ties at the time the contract was exe- cuted, lie should consider the sub- ject-matter of the agreement, and the knowledge of it which the parties pos- sessed, the objects to be accomplished, and the motives which they bad in dealing with each other. The whole writing should be considered, also, in determining the meaning of any of its parts.' " In Central Trust Co. v. Condon (1895), 67 Fed. Rep.84,thequestionwas whether the contractor was bound by the contract to furnish rolling-stock as well as construct the railroad. On this point Taft, J., said: "In the re- cital the desire of the railroad com- pany to contract 'for the making and construction of its railroad' is referred to. In the first clause Eager agrees to build and complete the railroad, and the company agrees that he may build it according to specifications (which never appear to have been made). In the second and third clauses reference is made to the 'railroad herein agreed to be constructed.' By the fifth clause the payment under the contract is to be for the railroad 'constructed and to be hereafter constructed,' and the bonds which constitute the final pay- ment are to be paid 'whenever each mile of road is built and ready for the operation of trains.' These expres- sions are utterly inconsistent with the idea that Eager was bound to fur- nish the rolling-stock in addition to completely constructing the road. The second half of the second clause, in- serted manifestly for the purpose of merging the contract of the North Georgia Construction Company in this one of Eager, does refer to 'all works, materials and plants heretofore con- structed, equipped and provided, now in use in or about the construction or operation of the railroad,' but this clause does not necessarily include rolling-stock, although it may not necessarily exclude it. Rolling-stock is usually not referred to either as 'works' or 'plant' or 'materials.' Works and plant which must be fur- nished in the building of a road are as. necessary in the operation of the road as rolling-stock, so that ' operation' does not necessarily imply that the works, plant, or materials referred to were rolling-stock. In the fourth §713 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 867 time, they form but one contract, and are to be construed to- gether. 1 Thus where the making of a note is accompanied by clause of the contract the company agrees to execute a mortgage to secure the bonds to be issued as compensa- tion for Eager's building the road, and also to issue additional mortgages necessary to secure any first or other mortgage bonds issued to aid in the construction or equipment of the road. Just what the bonds were which the additional mortgages were expected to secure is not quite clear. Certainly so obscure a sentence can not be held to impose on Eager an obligation to equip the road, when the clause in which his obligations are denned excludes such an idea. But it may be suggested that the feature of the contract by which all the available assets of the company were to be delivered to him to pay for his work, leaving nothing to the company to buy rolling-stock, made it reasonable and probable that he should furnish the rolling-stock, and requires this effect to be given to the contract, if possible. This road was built as an extension of the Marietta and North Georgia Railway, with an immediate consolidation in view, and it would not be unreason- able to suppose that the parties to this contract looked to the latter road for aid in this respect. The agreement in the fourth clause of the contract that the company would give an additional mortgage to secure bonds issued to aid in the equipment of its road suggests that the parties then had some plan for the issuance of other bonds by the the Marietta and North Georgia Rail- way to pay for equipment of this road, also to be secured by mortgage on this road. However this may be, the court can not disregard the plain limitations imposed by the language used, and expand an agreement to build and construct into an agreement to con- struct and furnish rolling-stock." 1 Gregory v. Marks, Fed. Cas. No. 5802, 8 Biss. 44; 4 L. & Eq. Rep. 283; 9 Chicago Leg. News, 394 (7th IT. S. Cir.) (111. 1877), where a claim in a trust deed provided that the indebtedness secured thereby was to become wholly due and payable in case of default in the payment of in- terest. It was held that the note and the trust deed, being contemporane- ous, must be construed together, and that, if default was made in the pay- ment of interest, the whole indebted- ness became due. Woodward v. Jewell (1885), 25 Fed. Rep. 689; Whitehurst v. Boyd, 8 Ala. 375; Byrne v. Marshall, 44 Ala. 355; Den- by v. Graff, 10 111. App. 195; Allen v. Nofsinger, 13 Ind. 494; Makepeace v. Harvard College, 10 Pick. 298; Hill v. Huntress, 43 N. H. 480; Knowlesu. Toone, 96 N. Y. 534 ; Church v. Broun, 21 N. Y. 315; Pepper v. Haight, 20 Barb. 429; Hamilton v. Taylor, 18 N. Y. 358; Norton v. Kearney, 10 Wis. 443; Chrisman v. State Ins. Co., 16 Ore. 283; Dean v. Lawham, 7 Ore. 422; Chambers v. Marks, 93 Ala. 412; Hagerty v. White, 69 Wis. 317; Liv- ington v. Story, 11 Pet. 351 ; Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338 ; Marsh v. Dodge, 66 N. Y. 533 ; Meriden Britannia Co. v. Zingsen, 48 N. Y. 247; Draper v. Snow, 20 N. Y. 331 ; Gaffney v. Hicks, 131 Mass. 124; Avery v. Bushnell, 123 Mass. 349; Collins v. Delaporte, 115 Mass. 159; Washburn, etc., Co. v. Salisbury, 152 Mass. 346 ; Galena, etc., Railroad v. Barrett, 95 111. 467; Gam- mon v. Freeman, 31 Maine, 243; Strong v. Barnes, 11 Vt. 221 ; Reed u. Field, 15 Vt. 672 ; Cumming v. Antes, 19 Pa. St. 287 ; Keiryon v. Nichols, 1 R. I. 411 ; In re Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 44 L. J. Ch. 683; Hannig v. Mueller (1892), 82 Wis. 235 (deed and bond) ; Carr v. Hays (1886), 110 Ind t 868 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 714 an agreement in relation thereto, the note and the agreement are to be taken together and form one entire transaction. 1 A chattel mortgage on buildings in course of erection and upon a leasehold interest, an assignment of the lease, and a contract between the parties in relation to the subject-matter, all exe- cuted on the same day, will be construed together in determin- ing the rights of the parties thereunder. 2 Where a contract has reference to another paper for its terms, the effect is the same as if the words of the paper referred to were inserted in the contract. 8 Where two papers are executed in duplicate, one of the parties signing one of the papers and the other party sign- ing the other, both papers together are to be treated as one document. 1 For the purpose of arriving at the intent of the parties both copies of the contract sued on purporting to have been made in duplicate, but varying in terms, are to be con- strued together. 5 Where parties make several contracts con- cerning the same subject-matter, but upon different dates and inconsistent with each other, the latest must control their re- spective rights and liabilities as far as it goes. 6 § 714. Words to be given their ordinary meaning. — A con- tract written in clear and common language should be con- strued according to the ordinary acceptation of the words. 7 Words free from ambiguity should be given their plain and 408; 25 Cent. L. Jour. 32; Herbst v. 71; Bradley v. Marshall, 54 111. 173; Lowe, 65 Wis. 316; Dudgeon v. Hag- Denby v. Graff, 10 111. App. 195. gart, 17 Mich. 273, where a large num- * Edling v. Bradford (1890), 30 Neb. ber of cases on this point are collect- 593. ed; Coughran v. Bigelow (1893), 9 3 Adams v. Hill, 16 Maine, 215. Utah, 260 (contract and a bond re- 4 Richmond, etc., Co. v. Shomo f erring to the contract construed to- (1892), 90 Ga. 496. gether); Hennessy v. Gore, 35 111. 6 Shelmire v. Williams and Clark App. 594 (promissory notes and deed Fertilizer Co. (1893), 68 Hun, 196. of trust). The fact that they bear dif- 6 Loper v. United States, 13 Ct. of ferent dates is immaterial if the con- CI. 269. tract is not carried into effect until 'Gove v. Downer (1886), 59 Vt. 139; both are executed. Knowlesu.Toone, 7 Atl. Rep. 463; 9 Eastern Rep. 65; 96 N. Y. 534; Neill v. Chessen, 15 111. Knowlton v. Oliver (1886), 28 Fed. App. 266. * Rep. 516; Stearns v. Sweet, 78 111. 1 Bailey v. Cromwell, 3 Scam. (111.) 446; Supreme Council v. Curd, 111 § 715 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 869 ordinary meaning. 1 They should be construed according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless from the context of the instrument, and the intention of the parties to be collected from it, they appear to be used in a different sense, or unless in their strict sense they are incapable of being carried into effect; subject, however, to this, that the meaning of a particu- lar word may be shown by parol evidence to be different, in some particular place, trade or business from its proper and ordinary signification. 2 Where a word has a general, well- defined, well-known meaning, such meaning can not be con- trolled by a local custom. 8 But, whenever particular words or clauses appear to have been introduced with a purpose of re- stricting the general language, that effect will be given to them. 1 And words are not to be taken in their broadest sense if they are equally appropriate in a sense limited to the object and intent of the contract. 5 § 715. When the ordinary sense will not control. — According- ly, the ordinary sense will not control when the context shows that the parties could not have used the word in such a sense. 6 111. 284 ; Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. word "gas;" Price v. Livingstone, 28; Railroad Companies v. Schutte, L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 679; Scott v. Bour- 103 U. S. 118; Nash v. Drisco, 51 dillion, 5 B. & P. (2 New R.) 213; Maine, 417; Ricker v. Fairbanks, 40 Roberts v. Brett, 34 L. J. C. P. 241; Maine, 43; Trowbridge v. Dean, 40 Tielens v. Hooper, 5 Exch. 830. Mich. 687; Brown v. Brown, 8 Mete. s Galena Insurance Co. v. Kupfer, (Mass.) 573; Willmering v. McGaugh- 28 111. 332. A special term, like the ey, 30 Iowa, 205 ; Ripley v. Mtna. Ins. word "assessment," in a contract Co., 30 N. Y. 136 ; Silberman v. Clark, relating to assessments on real estate, 96 N. Y. 522 ; Holt v. Collyer, L. R. 16 construed in view of the meaning fixed Ch. Div. 718. by usage, and the cause of legislation. 1 Buchanan v. Andrew, 2 L. R. H. Stephani v. Catholic Bishop, 2 111. L. Sc. App. 286. "The first rule to App. 249. lay down is that words are to be un- 4 Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169; Holmes derstood in their plain and literal v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503; Vaughan v. meaning." Anson on Contracts, 252 ; Porter, 16 Vt. 266; Baxter u. State, 9 1 Chitty on Contracts (11th Am. ed.), Wis. 38. 113; Smith on Contracts, 561. 5 Hoffman v. Mtna, Ins. Co., 32 2 Mallan v. May, 13 M. & W. 511, N. Y. 405; Harper «. New York City per Pollock, C. B. ; Kirby v. Wabash, Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 441 ; Kelley v. Up- etc, R. Co., 109 111. 412; Stanley v. ton, 5 Duer, 336; Livingston v. Stick- Western Ins. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 71, les, 7 Hill, 255. question as to the meaning of the 6 Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall. 492. 870 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 716 Where the intention requires, a word or phrase may be disre- garded or given a construction contrary to the ordinary mean- ing. Thus the word "and" is often construed to mean "or." 1 Where a word has a defined statutory meaning, this meaning will be taken to be its ordinary and common meaning, and courts will assume that it is used by contracting parties in its statutory sense. 2 However terms may be understood in their ordinary sense, if the parties have attached other or unusual, or arbitrary, meaning to them, to be derived from their fair interpretation in the contract, they have the right so to em- ploy them. But to accomplish such purpose, and to vary the common understanding, the meaning ought to be plain and free from reasonable doubt. 8 § 716. Technical words. — Technical words are to be inter- preted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate, 4 unless clearly used in a differ- ent sense. 5 In construing a contract, the court will use the terms employed according to their popular signification, if to apply them according to technical or scientific rules would defeat the manifest intention of the parties. 6 If it appears that a term used in a contract has an established meaning among those engaged in the business to which the contract has reference, and, unless it is given that meaning, is indefi- nite and equivocal, it should be treated, in interpreting the 'Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bartlett, ties to that contract, be understood in 120 111. 603. Lord Ellenborough, in some other and peculiar sense." Robertson v. French, 4 East, 135, says 2 Green v. Moffett, 22 Mo. 529, where that the "words of every agreement a statute fixed the meaning of the are to be understood in their plain, word "ton." ordinary and popular sense, unless s McCoy v. Erie & Western Trans, they have generally, in respect to the Co., 42 Md. 498. subject-matter, as by the known 4 Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40; usages of trade, or the like, acquired Gauch v. St. Louis, etc., Ins. Co., 88 a peculiar sense distinct from the 111. 251 ; Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 popular sense of the same words, or Watts, 89; Potter v. Phenix Ins. Co. unless the context evidently points (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 382. out that they must, in the particular s Wynkoop v. Cowing, 21 111. 570. instance, and in order to effectuate 6 Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Veeder, 17 the immediate intention of the par- Ohio, 385. § 717 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 871 contract, as used according to that understanding. 1 Mercan- tile contracts are to be understood in their ordinary mercantile meaning. 8 Commercial letters are not to be construed upon the same principle as bonds, but ought to receive a fair and reasonable interpretation, according to the true import of the terms, or to what is fairly to be presumed to have been the understanding of the parties. 3 Bonds are entered into with caution, and often after taking legal advice. They contain the entire contract, beyond which courts rarely look for cir- cumstances to aid in their construction; and, if there be sureties bound by them, and the meaning is doubtful, the con- struction is restricted and made most favorable to the sureties.* When terms of law are used in denning the obligations as- sumed by the parties, their technical legal sense should be preferred. 6 § 717. Where the contract is capable of two meanings. — Where a contract is fairly open to two constructions, by one of which it would be lawful and by the other unlawful, the former must be adopted. 6 The presumption is in favor of the legality of contracts. The law does not assume an intention to violate the law, nor will an agreement be adjudged to be illegal where 'Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. 'Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169; Law- Ewing (1890), 42 Fed. Eep. 198, rence v. McCalmon, 2 How. 426, stat- where the contract was with defend- ing the principles which should gov- ant for his services as a base-ball em the construction of commercial player. The case turned upon the guarantees, meaning and effect of the clause 4 Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169. which gave the club the "right tore- 5 Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts serve" the defendant for the season 89; Findley v. Findley, 11 Gratt. 434 next ensuing. "The promise of a 6 Walters v. McGuigan, 72 Wis. 155 base-ball player to reserve himself Belden v. Burke (1893), 72 Hun, 51 for a particular club for a given sea- Coyne v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 386 son would hardly, without more, con- Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790 ; Mer- vey any definite meaning of the rill v. Melchior, 30 Miss. 516; Chitten- understanding of the parties." den v. French, 21 111. 598; Pitney v. 2 Hawes v. Smith, 12 Maine, 429. Bolton, 45 N. J. Eq. 639; Easton v. A guarantee is a mercantile instru- Mitchell, 21 111. App. 189; Hobbs v. ment, and to be construed according McLean, 117 U. S. 567; Shore v. Wil- to what is fairly to be presumed to son, 9 01. & F. 355; Best's Evidence, have been the understanding of the 6 Eng. ed., 1st Am. ed., §§346, 347; parties, without any strict technical Wharton on Evidence, §§ 1249, 1250. nicety. Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 482. 872 CONSTRUCTION OP CONTRACTS. § 718 it is capable of a construction which will uphold it and make it valid. 1 When, therefore, a contract is capable of two con- structions, such construction shall be adopted as will render the contract capable of execution, rather than render it inoperative and void. 2 § 718. Repugnancy. — Clauses or words which appear repug- nant to each other must, if practicable, receive such an inter- pretation as will give them operation consistent with the gen- eral purpose. 3 Words which in view of the purpose of the transaction are meaningless or inconsistent with the manifest intent may be rejected as surplusage, if without them the con- tract may be sustained, and be given effect according to the intent. 4 Where two clauses, apparently repugnant, may be reconciled by any reasonable construction, or by regarding one as a qualification of the other, that construction must be given, because it can not be assumed that the parties intended to insert inconsistent provisions. 5 Effort should be made to reconcile each provision with every other, because the whole agreement, must, if possible, stand. 6 The court may disregard one part 1 Lorillard a. Clyde (1881), 86 N. Y. 3 City of Decorah v. Kesselmeier, 384, per Andrews, J. ; Muir v. City of 45 Iowa, 166; Ward v. Whitney, 8 Glasgow Bank, 4 L. E. 4 App. Cas. 337. N. Y. 442 ; Casler v. Conn. Mut. Life A contract susceptible of two construe- Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 427 ; Harper v. New tions will not upon demurrer be given York City Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 441. the construction which will make it 4 Walker v. Douglas, 70 111. 445 ; illegal and void. Standard Oil Co. v. Holmes v. Parker, 25 111. App. 225. Schofleld, 16 Abb. N. Cas. (N.Y.)372. « Miller v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 90 2 Field v. Leiter, llfflll. 17 ; Sheffler N. Y. 430. v. Nadelhoffer, 133 111. 536; 23 Am. 6 Coyne v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 386; St. Rep. 626; Cravens u.Eagle Cotton Holmes v. Hubbard, 60 N. Y. 183; Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6; 16 Am. St. Rep. Moore v. Griffen, 22 Maine, 350. 298; Hughes v. Lane, 11 111. 123; 50 In Barhydt v. Ellis, 45 N. Y. 107, Am. Dec. 436; Thrall v. Newell, 19 Rapallo, J., said: "Effect must be "Vt. 202; 47 Am. Dec. 682; Powers v. given, if possible, to every part of Clarke, 127 NY. 417; Lincoln v. Field, an agreement, and it is only when 54 Ark. 471; Brown v. Slater, 16 Conn, there is an inconsistency, or repug- 192; Steinspring v. Bennett, 16 La. nancy which is totally irreconcilable Ann. 201 ; Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. that a discrimination will be made as 443; Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300; to which part will be made to yield to Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501; another." Benedict v. Ocean Ins. Hunt v. Elliott, 80 Ind. 245; Mills v. Co., 31 N. Y. 389; Stewart v. Lang, Dunham L. L. (1891), 1 Ch. 576. 37 Pa. St. 201. § 719 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 873 of the instrument in which there is a mistake, when the in- tent is clear from other parts of the instrument. 1 Thus an absurd and repugnant clause in a bill of exchange may be re- jected as surplusage. 8 § 719. Effect to be allowed to surrounding circumstances. — Where the language of an instrument is ambiguous and sus- ceptible of more than one construction, that construction will be adopted which, in the light of surrounding circumstances and upon a view of the whole instrument, is in accordance with the apparent intent of the parties. 3 In order to arrive at the intention of the parties, inquiry may be made as to their situation at the time the contract was entered into, and the purpose to be accomplished by its execution. 4 Previous and cotemporary transactions and facts may be taken into con- sideration to ascertain the subject-matter and the sense in which the parties have used particular terms, but not to modify the plain language. 5 In the construction of contracts, it is the duty of the court to put itself as near as may be in the situa- tion of the parties, and, from a consideration of the surround- ing circumstances and the occasion and apparent object of the parties, determine therefrom the meaning and intent of the language employed in framing their agreement. 6 It is proper to look at all the surrounding circumstances and the pre-existing relation between the parties, and then to see what they mean when they speak. 7 Courts are entitled to place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so to judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of •Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jayns, 87 6 Smith *. Kerr (1888), 108 N. Y. 111.199. 31; 2 Am. St. Rep. 362; Mathews v. 2 Henschel v. Mahler, 3 Hill, 132; 3 Phelps, 61 Mich. 327; 1 Am. St. Rep. Den. 428. 581 ; Merriam v. United States, 107 3 Springsteen v. Samson, 32 N. Y. U. S. 437. 703; United States v. Gibbons, 109 U. 7 Matter of the New York, etc., R. S. 200. Co., 49 N. Y. 414; Nash v. Towne, 4 Vincennes v. Citizens' Gas Light 5 Wall. 689; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. Co. (1892), 132 Ind. 114; Illges v. v. Columbus, etc., Ry. Co., 8 Biss. Dexter, 77 Ga. 36. 456 ; Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 6 Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 23. 168. 874 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 720 the language to the things described. 1 Accordingly an indemnity- bond given to a sheriff may be read in the light of surrounding circumstances, in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the parties. 2 But the rule of viewing a contract in the light of surrounding circumstances is a rule of inter- pretation merely, and does not permit the making of a new- contract, nor a reformation of it, nor a disregard of its terms. It authorizes only a just construction of those terms and a fair inference as to the common understanding of both the con- tracting parties. 3 An obscure and ambiguous oral contract may be interpreted in the light of the conversations of the parties making it. 4 § 720. The same subject continued. — Where the language of a contract is susceptible of two meanings, the court will in- fer the intention of the parties, and their relative rights and obligations, from the circumstances attending the transaction. 6 In construing such a contract, courts are not only required to look at the language employed, but at the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, and thus avail themselves of the same light which the parties possessed when the contract was made. 6 1 Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123. A 437 ; Brawley v. United States, 96 U, contract made within the Confed- S. 168; Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 689; erate States during the war of 1861- Barreda v. Silsbee, 21 How. (U. S.) 65 to pay a certain sum in "dollars," 146, 161 ; Shore v. Wilson, 9 CI. & F. without specifying the kind of cur- 355 ; MacDonald v. Longbottom, 1 Fl. rency in which payment was to be & El. 977; Carr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & made, maybe shown by the nature of S. 407. In McMillen v. Pratt, 89 Wis. the transaction and the attendant cir- 612; 62 N. W. Rep. 588, Pinney, J., cumstances, as well as by the language said: "For the purpose of deterniin- of the contract itself, to have contem- ing whether the defendant was bound plated payment in Confederate cur- to cut and deliver from the lands de- rency. Kives v. Duke, 105 U. S. 132. scribed in the contract, as an entirety, 2 Bancroft v. Winspear, 44 Barb, to McMillen & Co., twenty-five niil- 209; Griffiths v. Hardenbergh, 41 N. lion feet of logs and timber of the Y. 464. kind and quality therein specified, or 8 Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518. only one-half of the amount thereon 4 Jennings v. Whitehead, etc., Co., of that kind and quality, whatever 138 Mass. 594. that amount might be, less than that 6 United States v. Gibbons, 109 TJ. S. quantity, the deed from Pratt to Mc- 200 ; 3 Sup. Ct. Eep. 117. Millen & Co., the notes, the contract, 6 Merriam v. United States, 107 IT. S. and the two mortgages executed by §721 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 875 § 721. Construction by the parties. — If the words or terms of a contract are equivocal, resort may be had to the circum- stances under which the contract was executed, and to the con- temporaneous construction given to the contract by the parties, as evidenced by possession or similar acts. 1 The subsequent acts are admitted to show how the parties understood their contract and are a practical construction of it. 2 It makes no Pratt to McMillen & Co., which were all executed at the same time, and all related to the same subject, must be considered and read together. It is ■evident that they not only relate to the same subject-matter, but repre- sent a single transaction. They must therefore be considered and construed together in arriving at what the par- ties intended by what they have thus expressed. Elphinstone's Bules for the Interpretation of Deeds, 6 ; Smith ■». Chadwick.L. E. 20 Ch. Div. 27. This is really a familiar rule, and there has been no contention against it. The situation of the parties and the sub- ject-matter with which the parties were dealing, and the circumstances attending the transaction, are also to be considered, so that the court may be placed in the situation of the par- ties, so far as may be, so as to con- sider the transaction in the same light and as far as possible from the same standpoint from which the parties must have regarded it ; for, when the language of a contract is susceptible of two meanings, the court will infer the intention of the parties from the circumstances attending the transac- tion so far as they throw any light upon the language used. Chicago, etc., Eailway Co. v. Hoyt, 89 Wis. 314; 62 N. W. Eep. 189 ; Barreda v. Silsbee, 21 How. 146, 161 ; Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S. 437; 2 Sup. Ct. Eep. 536; Chicago E. I.&P. Ey.ii. Denver & E. G. E. Co., 143 V. S. 596; 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 479. And the manner in which the parties have dealt with and treated the subject-matter, and the construction they have placed on the instrument, with the actual or pre- sumed knowledge or assent of each other, often have an important bear- ing on the subject. Knox Co. v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 147 U. S. 91, 100; 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 267." 'Whiten. Amsden, 67 Vt. 1; 30 Atl. Eep. 972. 2 Gray v. Clark, 11 Vt. 583 ; Barkers. Troy,etc.,RairroadCo.,27 Vt.766; Ver- mont, etc., E. Co. v. Vermont C. E. Co., 34 Vt. 1 ; Hammerquist v. Swens- son (1891), 44 111. App. 627. In Chap- man v. Bluck (1838), 5 Scott's Eeports, 515, Tindal, J., says: "But we are also at liberty to look at the acts of the par- ties, than which there can not be a better means of ascertaining their in- tention;" and Park, J., after laying down the general rule as given by Lord Ellenborough, "that the inten- tion of the parties, as declared by the words of the instrument, must govern the construction," adds that subse- quent acts and declarations of the par- ties may be looked to in aid of the construction. Where the language is ambiguous, the practical interpreta- tion of it by the parties is entitled to great, if not controlling influence. Topliff v. Topliff, 122 IT. S. 121; Chi- cago ». Sheldon, 9 Wall. (IT. S.) 50; Coleman v. Grubb, 23 Pa. St. 393 ; St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121 ; Syms v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 153 ; Mayor v. N. Y. Eefrigerating Con- struction Co. (1894) (N. Y.), 8 Misc. 61; 59 State Rep. 295; 28N.Y. Supl. 876 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §721 difference whether those acts are contemporaneous or subse- quent. It is allowable to look to them for assistance in ascer- taining the true meaning of the agreement. 1 It is a familiar doctrine that when the terms of an agreement are in any re- spect doubtful or uncertain, and the parties to it have, by their own conduct, placed a construction upon it which is reason- able, such construction will be adopted by the court, 2 because it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties, where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract. 3 Thus where a con- tract provided that a theater should be operated as "a strictly first-class place of amusement," the court, in order to deter- mine whether there has been a breach of this condition, will take, as a standard of first-class attractions, one which the par- 614, citing Power v. Village of Athens, 26 Hun, 282 ; Easton v. Pickersgill, 55 N. Y. 310. The practical construction put upon a contract by the parties to it, is sometimes almost conclusive as to its meaning. Nicoll v. Sands (1892), 131 N. Y. 19; Woolseyu. Funke, 121 N. Y. 87. 1 Vermont Street M. E. Church v. Brose, 104 111. 208. 2 Burgess v. Badger (1888), 124 111. 288 ; Davis v. Sexton, 35 111. App. 407 ; Dwelley v. Dwelley, 143 Mass. 509. In ordinary cases a practical construc- tion given to a contract by the parties will be adopted by the courts as the correct one. Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106; Johnson v. Gibson, 78 Ind. 282, and authorities cited; Willcuts v. Northwestern, etc., Ins. Co., 81 Ind. 300; Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Nex- sen, 84 Ind. 347; 43 Am. Rep. 91; Franklin, etc., Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 93 Ind. 7 ; City of Indianapolis v. Kings- bury,101 Ind. 200 ; 51Am.Eep.749 ; City of Vincennes v. Citizens' Gaslight, etc., Co ., 132 Ind. 114 ; Gronstadt v. Withoff (1884), 21 Fed. Rep. 253; Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N. J. Law, 137; Stone v. Clark, 1 Mete. (Mass.), 378; Nickerson v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 3 McCrary U. S. 455 ; Butler v. Moses, 43 Ohio St. 166 ; Forbes o.Watt, L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 214. In Thompson v. Prouty, 27 Vt. 14, Bennet, J., in speaking of whether a contract should have a certain con- struction, says: "I, for one, should have some doubt ; * * * but, the defendant having given a different, practical construction to it, we are disposed to adopt his in that partic- ular." "We think that the practical construction which the parties put upon the terms of their own contract, and according to which the work was done, must prevail over the literal meaning of the contract, according to which the defendant seeks to obtain a deduction in the contract price." Dis- trict of Columbia v. Gallaher (1888), 124 U. S. 505, per Matthews, J. "There is no surer way to find out what par- ties meant than to see what they have done." Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 269, per Swayne, J. 3 Deutmann v. Kilpatrick (1891), 46 Mo. App. 624; Mathews v. Danahy, 26 Mo. App. 660; Sedalia Brewing Co. v. Sedalia Waterworks Co., 34 Mo. App. 49. § 722 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 877 ties themselves thought first-class. 1 And where mail-transporta- tion service has been rendered in a certain way for nearly twelve years, under three successive contracts, the court will adopt the construction given by the parties, although in the abstract inclined to a different one. 8 § 722. The same subject continued. — But where the contract is free from ambiguity, and its meaning is clear in the eye of the law, such mode of construction is inadmissible. 3 The practical construction of a contract adopted by the parties thereto will not control or override language that is so plain as to admit of no controversy as to its meaning. In such cases the intent of the parties must be determined by the language employed, rather than by their acts ; but if the language em- ployed is of doubtful import, or if the contract contains no provisions on a given point, or if it fails to define with cer- tainty the duties of the parties with respect to a particular mat- ter or in a given emergency, then it is proper to consider how the parties have construed the instrument with respect to such debatable points. 4 In holding that the acts of the parties per- formed under a written contract are admissible for the purpose of ascertaining the construction placed upon it, there is no en- croachment upon the rule that contemporaneous parol evidence is not admissible to vary a written instrument, for acts done in execution of the contract are subsequent in time to the exe- cution of the instrument, and different from mere verbal state- ments. 5 If the contract was not written, its nature and terms must be ascertained as matter of fact from the conversations, * Leavitt». Windsor, etc., Co. (1893), 254, where a contract between two 54 Fed. Rep. 439; 4 0. C. A. 425. railway companies operating a joint 2 Carr v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 152. line did not expressly provide how 8 Davis v. Shafer (1892), 50 Fed. cars should be obtained or supplied Eep. 764; Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 for the use of the line. The fact that Wall. 367; Michael v. St. Louis, etc., one company for several years paid Insurance Co., 17 Mo. App. 23; Cris- the other for the use of its cars was man v. Hodges, 75 Mo. 413 ; Miller v. considered as a construction placed Dunlap, 22 Mo. App. 97; St. Paul, on the contract by the parties and en- etc, R. v. Blackmar, 44 Minn. 514. forced accordingly. 4 Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Wa- 6 Lyles v. Lescher (1886), 108 Ind. bash, etc., Ry. Co. (1888) , 34 Fed. Rep. 382. 878 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 723 negotiations and acts of the parties by whom it was made. 1 Where the terms of a parol agreement are in doubt, the acts of the parties in the execution of it are the best guides for its in- terpretation. 2 Where one party to a contract writes the other stating his construction of it, and the latter makes no reply, he may be taken as acquiescing in that construction. 3 § 723. The object of construction. — The great object, and in- deed the only foundation, of all rules of construction of contracts is to come at the intention of the parties. If the words or terms of a contract are equivocal, resort may always be had to the circumstances under which the contract was executed, and to the contemporaneous construction given to the contract by the parties, as evidenced by possession or similar acts. The subsequent acts of the parties have always been admitted to show how the parties understood their contract, and as a prac- tical construction of it. 1 It is only when the terms of the con- tract are ambiguous that this rule of construction is resorted to, and then the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the contract; but a reference to the situation of the parties and the subject-matter, under the circumstances, is always proper. 6 The practical construction placed upon a 1 Massey v. Belisle, 2 Ired. L. 170; portion of the water power created Edwards v. Goldsmith, 16 Pa. St. 43. for the purpose of being stored and 2 Robbing v. Kimball (1892), 55 used by the parties owning the mid- Ark. 414; 29 Am. St. Rep. 45. Aver- die and lower privileges. The de- bal agreement will be construed ac- scription is by reference to former cording to the facts and circumstances deeds, and adding thereto : 'Together of the. case. Arbuckle v. Smith, 74 with the various shops, mills, dwelling Mich. 568; Thompsons. Andrus, 73 houses, and other buildings thereon Mich. 551. standing, and the steam engine, boiler, s Bourland v. Gibson, 7 111. App. and appurtenances thereto belonging, 227. and the main shafting in said build- 4 Gray v. Clark, 11 "Vt. 583 ; Thomp- ings, and all the water power ; mean- son v. Prouty, 27 Vt. 14; Barker v. ing to convey,' etc. "We think this Troy, etc., Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 766; description covers the water power Vermont & C. R. Co. v. Vermont C. R. which belongs and is appurtenant to Co., 34 Vt. 1. the other property conveyed, and not 6 White v. Amsden, 67 Vt. 1 ; 30 to all the water power created by the Atl. Rep. 972, per Taft, J.: "In the great dam. There is no description mortgage under which defendant of the great dam, or the water power claims, there is no reference in the created by it, and no reference to it ; description, in express terms, to that and when we take into considera- §723 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 879 contract in the performance of it by the parties who made it should in case of doubt have great weight in its construction by the courts; but the construction placed upon it by the suc- cessors of those who made it or by public officers is entitled to much less weight. 1 tion the circumstances connected with the great dam and the middle power, we think it is apparent that the parties intended to convey only the water power connected with the buildings at the upper dam, without infringing upon any of the rights which the middle and lower powers had under the by-laws of the corpo- ration, to which all of the convey- ances theretofore were subject. The defendant took possession of the up- per power in December, 1884, and, during the following year, made re- pairs upon the great dam, and claimed that the middle and lower powers were chargeable with one-half of the amount paid for such repairs, upon the basis of the values of the three re- spective powers, which he claimed to be as follows: The upper power, five-tenths ; the middle power, three- tenths; and the lower power, two- tenths, and the owner of the middle and lower power paid the respective amounts, in accordance with the de- fendant's claim. This act of the de- fendant, as late as the year 1885, in- dicated the practical construction that he put upon the deed under which he claims title, for it was only by force of the by-laws that he could call upon the lower powers to con- tribute to the repairs of the great dam. Upon the construction of the deed in question, the remarks of Ben- nett, J., in Thompson v. Prouty, 27 Vt. 14, are quite apropos. In speak- ing of whether a contract should have a certain construction, he says: 'I, for one, should have some doubt ; * * * but, the defendant having given a different, practical construc- tion to it, we are disposed to adopt his in that particular.' " 1 City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Gas Co. (Ohio, 1895), 41 N. E. Eep. 239, Burket, J. : "There is some looseness of expression in some of the reported cases as to what course of dealing will supply a practical construction. The case of Robinson v. United States, 13 "Wall. 363, cited and relied upon in Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. By. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 254, as a case of practical construction, is a case in- volving the admission of evidence as to the existence of a custom in trade, and is not at all founded upon the doctrine of practical construction. To have any value as a practical construc- tion, the course of dealing should be uniform, unquestioned, and fully con- curred in by both parties. A right claimed by one party, and from time to time denied or disputed by the other, although, for the time being, conceded, "can not, from such conces- sions, be regarded as established. And when, as in this case, each con- cession for over two years is coupled with an admission by both parties that the right claimed is in dispute, it is clear that such concessions can not be used to establish the right. It is not every captious doubt as to the meaning of a written instrument that will warrant a court in concluding that the instrument is ambiguous, and therefore to disregard its words, and seek the intention of the parties in the course of business growing out of an attempted performance. The most exact and skillfully drawn document may, by able counsel, be so construed as to create what would seem to be 880 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §724 § 724. Construction by parties — Estoppel. — When the lan- guage of a written contract is so equivocal or ambiguous as to be open to either of two interpretations, parol evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties, showing the construction put upon it by them, is admissible. 1 A contract for the un- reasonable doubts, when in fact it is perfectly clear to the parties, and, aside from the strained construction of counsel, also to the court. In such cases it is the duty of courts to disre- gard the strained construction of coun- sel, and to enforce the instrument ac- cording to the reasonable, plain, and manifest intention of the parties. Business does not usually deal in fine- drawn distinctions, but in plain, practical transactions. The reason of the rule of practical construction has its origin in the presumption that the parties to the contract, at and after the making thereof, knew what they meant by the words used, and that their acts and conduct in the perform- ance thereof are consistent with their knowledge and understanding, and that, therefore, their acts and conduct show the sense in which the words were used and understood by them. In such cases acts sometimes speak louder than words. But the reason of the rule ceases when the acts or conduct are not those of the parties who made the contract, and are not presumed to know in their own minds what was in fact meant by the words used. The acts and conduct of the parties following after the parties who made the contract must, in the nature of the case, be only their own con- struction of the words used, and not an acting out of the understanding of the words by the parties who used them. The same is true of public of- ficers. They may put their own con- struction upon the words used, but in so doing they are not acting out the mental understanding of the sense in which th» words were used by those who made the contract or written in- strument." 1 Engel v. Scott, etc., Lumber Co. (Minn. 1895), 61 N. W. Rep. 825. In Strepponev. Lennon (1894), 143 N. Y. 626, Finch, J., says: "Evidence was given, under objection, to show what the parties themselves meant and understood by the disputed language, and also what it meant in the usage of the trade ; the defendant insisting that such proof was inadmissible, be- cause the written contract required plaintiff to furnish the brick, and, needing no explanation, could not be contradicted; while the plaintiff in- sists that the writing requiring him to do the brickwork did not include the furnishing of the material, and at all events was sufficiently ambiguous to justify a parol explanation. An agree- ment to 'do' an amount of 'brickwork 1 may mean simply to perform the work of laying the brick, or, in addition, to furnish the brick as well as lay them. A recurrence to another part of the contract throws some light upon the interpretation. The plaintiff, in agree- ing to do the stonework, describes it as 'masonwork,' but adds, 'and fur- nish all the building stone for same.' He evidently understood that mason- work meant only the labor, unless coupled with an agreement to furnish the materials; and, since no such agreement accompanied the proposi- tion to do the brickwork, it is a nat- ural supposition that only the labor was intended. Plaintiff called upon defendant for cement, which the lat- ter furnished, and concedes he was to furnish, and in exactly the same manner he was called upon to fur- §725 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 881 provement of a street provided that, to prevent all disputes and litigation, the city engineer's decision as to the work shall be final and conclusive. It was held that ojie of the parties could not avoid being bound by the engineer's decision by showing merely that he was negligent and made mistakes. 1 Where the terms of a contract were not clear as to whether royalties on ore were to be computed when the ore was wet or dry, the acceptance by the mine owner for seven years of set- tlements on a dry weight, with full knowledge of the facts, estops him to claim a different construction. 2 § 725. Parol evidence to show the construction of the par- ties. — Parol evidence is admissible to show the contempora- neous understanding of the parties to a written contract of the words "to work a street," as used therein. 8 nish, and did furnish, the brick, mak- ing no objection and expressing no surprise; and in making payments he seriously overpaid the plaintiff if the latter was to be charged with the brick. The plaintiff's construction is, therefore, both the possible and rea- sonable one, and at all events shows that the contract language, if not con- clusive in plaintiff's favor, was at least ambiguous and open to explanation." InPaxton v. Smith, 41 Neb. 56; 59 N. W. Eep. 690, Post, J., said: "A preliminary question, with respect to the character of the instrument through which King claims, may be briefly disposed of. Said contract has, from the first, been, by both parties, "treated as a mortgage from McClain & Sons to King ; and, in the plaintiffs in error's mortgage, it is recited that it is 'subject to a mortgage given August 26, 1889'— evidently, the con- tract with King. The construction thus adopted by the parties will be adhered to by this court. School Dist. ■v. Estes, 13 Neb. 52; 13 N. W. Eep. 16; Eathbun v. McConnell, 27 Neb. 239; 42 N. W. Eep. 1042." See also, Hillu. Duluth City,57 Minn. 231 ; 58 N. 56 W. Eep. 992; Webster v. Clark, 34 Fla.637 ; 16 So. Eep.601,605 ; Matchette v. Colburn, 166 Pa. St. 265; 31 Atl. Eep. 74. 1 Bowman v. Stewart,165 Pa. St. 394; 30 Atl. Eep. 988,per White, J. : "When the parties agreed to make his decis- ion final and conclusive, they waived the risk of negligence and mistakes. The principle governing cases of this kind has been sustained by numerous decisions, from Monongahel a Naviga- tion Co. v. Fenlon, 4 Watts & S. 205, to Hartupeea. City of Pittsburgh, 131 Pa. St. 535; 19 Atl. Eep. 507." 2 American Manganese Co. v. Vir- ginia, etc., Co. (Va. 1895), 21 S. E. Eep. 466. 3 In re Curtis, 64 Conn. 501 ; 30 Atl. Eep. 769, per Anderson, C. J. : "The controversy turned on the meaning to be given to the expression 'to work a street,' as used in that contract. Cur- tis claimed that it was a business or a trade term, and that the arbitrators should take judicial notice of its meaning ; or, if they were not able to do so, that only expert testimony was admissible to inform them of its mean- ing. Castle, on the other hand, 882 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §726 § 726. The rale contra proferentem. — If there is any am- biguity in the language used, it must be construed against the party using it. 1 The reason of the rule contra proferentem is claimed that the expression was not a trade or business term, but was an ex- pression used by them in the contract with a special meaning, perfectly un- derstood by the parties, and agreed upon by them at the time the contract was made, and offered parol testimony of what that special meaning was. To this Curtis objected, but the arbi- trators admitted it. We understand that there are cases in which parol testi- mony is admissible to show the con- temporaneous understanding of the parties to a, contract of the meaning of the terms used by them in the con- tract. Thus in Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, it was held competent to show that the parties to a written con- tract by the word 'dollars' intended Confederate dollars, and not lawful dollars of the United States. This de- cision was applied and extended in the Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548. In Excelsior Needle Co. v. Smith, 61 Conn. 56-64; 23 Atl. Rep. 693, it is clearly implied that, if the term'needle business' had been used in a special sense by the parties in their contract, such sense might have been shown by parol. In Macdonald v. Longbottom, 1 El. & El. 977, the defendant, by a written contract, had purchased of the plaintiffs, who were farmers, a quan- tity of wool which was described in the contract simply as 'your wool.' Some time previously a conversation had taken place in which the plaintiffs stated that they had a quantity of wool consisting partly of their own clip and partly of wool they had con- tracted to buy of other farmers. In an action for not accepting the wool, this conversation was held admissible in evidence for the purpose of explain- ing what the parties meant by the term 'your wool.' In Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F. 355, 566, the chief justice, Tindal, in giving the opinion, says: 'The true interpretation, however, of every instrument, being manifestly that which will make the instru- ment speak the intention of the party at the time it was made, it has al- ways has been considered as an ex- ception, or, perhaps, to speak more precisely, not so much an exception from, as a corollary to, the general rule above stated, that where any doubt arises upon the true sense and meaning of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application under the surrounding circumstances, the sense and meaning of the lan- guage may be investigated and ascer- tained by evidence dehors the instru- ment itself ; for both reason and com- mon sense agree that by no other means can the language of the instru- ment be made to speak the real mind of the party.' See also, Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27 ; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. Cases of this kind are an- alogous to latent ambiguities. But they are something more than such ambiguities. In these cases the parol testimony is used, not only to explain the surrounding circumstances, but also to enable the court to look in up- on the mind of the contracting par- ties, and to read the written words of their contract in that very sense in which they wrote them." 1 Chambers v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 387; Edsall v. Camden, etc., Co., 50 N. Y. 661 ; Cobb v. McElroy, 79 Iowa, 603. In the common law, this rule of construction, at the present day, has a very limited operation. Metcalf on Contracts, 360. § 726 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 883 that men may be supposed to take care of themselves, and that he who gives, and chooses the words by which he gives, ought to be held to a strict interpretation of them, rather than he who only accepts. 1 Where a charter-party is prepared by the charterers of a vessel, and contains a clause manifestly inserted for their benefit, ambiguities, if any there are in its phrasing, should be resolved against them. 2 A vendor is bound to ex- press himself clearly as to the extent of his obligations, and an obscure or ambiguous clause must be interpreted against him. 3 This rule is not properly applicable to any case but one of strict equivocation, where the words used will bear either one of two or more interpretations equally well. In such a case, if there be no other legitimate mode of determining the equi- poise, this rule might well enough decide the case. 4 If the language of the promisor is capable of a double interpretation, it is to be interpreted in the sense in which he had reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee. 5 Where the words may have been used .in an enlarged or restricted sense, they will in general be construed in the sense most beneficial to the promisee, 6 or covenantee. The words of a covenant are to be taken most strongly against the covenantor, but that must be qualified by the observation that a due regard must be paid to the intention of the parties as collected from the whole context of the instrument. 7 Contracts are to be construed liberally in favor of the public, when the subject-matter concerns the in- terest of the public. 8 ' 1 Mayer v. Isaac, 6M.&W. 605, per 5 Hoffman v. Mtna, Fire Ins. Co., Alderson, B. 32 N. Y. 405; 88 American Decisions, 2 MacAndrews v. Mignano (1893), 337; Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40; 14 U. S. App. 10. He who is obliged White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505; Fowkes ought to speak clearly, or otherwise, v. Manchester, etc., Assurance Asso- in general, the other party has a right ciation, 3 B. & S. 917. to explain the clause to his own ad van- 6 Belden v. Burke (1894), 72 Hun, tage. 1 Powell on Contracts, 395. 51 ; Hoffman v. .dEtna Fire Ins. Co., 3 Delogny v. Mercer, 43 La. Ann. 205. 32 N. Y. 405 ; Paul v. Travelers' Ins. 4 Adams v. "Warner, 23 Vt. 395, per Co., 112 N. Y. 472; 8 Am. St. Rep. Eedfield, J. This rule is the last to 758. be resorted to, and is never to be 'Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13, relied upon but where all other rules per Lord Eldon ; Earl of Shrewsbury of exposition of words fail. Bacon v. Gould, 2 B. & Aid. 487. Max. Keg., 3 ; Patterson v. Gage, 11 8 Joy v. St. Louis (1890), 138 U. S. 1. Colo. 50. 884 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §727 § 727. Grants. — The construction of grants should be favor- able to the grantee. 1 That doubtful words and provisions are to be taken most strongly against the grantor is an ancient principle of the common law, 2 inasmuch as the fault is as- sumed to be in the grantor, and he shall not take advantage of a difficulty which he has himself created. 3 A more liberal rule of construction is allowable in interpreting a grant from one state or political community to another than is permitted in interpreting a private grant. 4 The grant of a patent for a useful invention under the laws of the United States is not the exercise of any prerogative to confer upon the subject exclu- sive property in that which would otherwise be of common right. It more nearly resembles a contract, which, under the authority conferred by the constitution, Congress authorizes to be entered into between the government and the inventor, securing to him for a limited time the exclusive enjoyment of the practice of his invention, for disclosing his secret and 'Doe v. Williams, 1 H. Bl. 25; Winslow u. Patten, 34 Maine, 25. The king's grant is taken most strongly in favor of the king and against the grantee. Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 223, 243 ; Att. Gen. v. Ewelme Hospital, 17 Beav. 366 ; Carroll v. Norwood, 5 Harr. & J. 155 ; Clough v. Bowman, 15 N. H. 504; Sanborn v. Clough, 40 N. H. 316 ; Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 436 ; Dodge v. Walley, 22 Cal. 224. 2 Hogg's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 479; Watson v. Boylston, 5 Mass. 411 ; Marshall v. Niles, 8 Conn. 369; Pike v. Munroe, 36 Maine, 309. 3 "It is a well known rule in the construction of private grants, if the meaning of the words be doubtful, to construe them most strongly against the grantor." Story, J., in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 589 ; Lincoln ... Wilder, 29 Maine, 169 ; Cocheco, etc., Co. o.Whittier, 10 N. H. 305 ; Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98. Jes- sel, M. R., in Taylor v. Corporation of St. Helens, L.R. 6 Ch. D. 264, says : "I do not see how, according to the now established rules of construction as settled by the house of lords, in the well known case of Grey v. Pear- son (6 H. L. C.61), followed by Rod- dy v. Fitzgerald (6 H. L. C. 823), and Abbott v. Middleton (7 H. L. C. 68), that maxim can be considered as hav- ing any force at the present day. The rule is to find out the meaning of the instrument according to the ordinary and proper rules of construction. If we can thus find out its meaning we do not want the maxim. If, on the other hand, we can not find out its meaning, then the instrument is void for uncertainty, and in that case it may be said that the instrument is construed in favor of the grantor, for the grant is annulled." 4 State of Indiana v. Milk, 11 Biss. 197 (1882), Gresham, J. § 728 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 885 relinquishing his invention to the public at the end of the term. 1 § 728. Contracts partly written and partly printed. — In the construction of an instrument partly written and partly print- ed, greater weight is to be attached to the written than to the printed parts, but they must, if possible, be reconciled. 2 The written portions are presumed from the circumstance of their special and deliberate insertion by the parties to embrace the real meaning and intent. 8 While the written provision of a contract should prevail over one which is inconsistent with it, and which is part of a printed form adopted for general use, yet only so far as it is apparent that the parties intended to modify or disregard the printed stipulations will the latter give way. 4 The rule is only resorted to from necessity when the written and printed clauses can not be reconciled. 5 Under a contract by which defendant agreed to sell and deliver "all the hops grown on his farm, not to exceed fifteen acres, now un- der cultivation, for the term of three years," the words "now under cultivation" being printed in the form and the rest in writing, and defendant had at the time only eight acres under cultivation, but in the last of the three years had more, but less than fifteen acres, it was held that the buyer was entitled to receive, the additional product, the written words "all the hops grown" being taken to control. 6 1 Attorney - General v. Rumford "Chadsey v. Guion (1884), 97 N. Y. Chemical Works, 32 Fed. Rep. 608, 333. The written words are the terms Shepley, J. selected by the parties themselves to 2 Bolman v. Lohman, 79 Ala. 63 ; express their meaning in the particu- Hill v. Miller, 76 N. Y. 32; Bryant lar case. Duffield v. Hue, 129 Pa. St. v. Poughkeepsie, etc., Ins. Co., 17 94. A printed billhead can not be N. Y. 200; Harper v. Alb. Mut. Ins. allowed to control, modify or alter Co., 17 N. Y. 194; Harper v. N. Y. the terms of a contract which is clear- City Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 441; Amer. ly expressed in writing below it. Express Co. v. Pinckney, 29 111. 392 ; Sturm v. Boker, 150 IT. S. 312 ; Schenck Gilbert v. Stockman, 76 Wis. 62; 20 v. Saunders, 13 Gray, 37. Am. St. Rep. 23, where written por- 4 Frost's, etc., Lumber Works u.Mil- tion of contract for sale of land was lers', etc., Insurance Co., 37 Minn. inconsistent with the printed form 300; 5 Am. St. Rep. 846. upon which the contract was drawn. 5 Miller v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Thornton v. Sheffield, etc., R.,84 Ala. Co., 90 N. Y. 430; Barhydt v. Ellis, 45 109; Holmes v. Parker, 25 111. App. N. Y. 107. 225; Dick v. Ireland, 130 Pa. St. 299. 6 Hutt v. Zimmer (1894), 78 Hun, 23. 886 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §§729, 730 § 729. The same subject continued. — Where there is a con- flict or inconsistency between the written and printed parts of a contract the written part will control. 1 Accordingly a printed billhead can not be allowed to control, modify, or alter the terms of a contract which is clearly expressed in writing be- low it. 8 § 730. Punctuation. — The punctuation of a written contract may be looked to, as affording light upon the meaning of the parties, but is never permitted to overturn the plain meaning of the instrument. 3 Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a writing. It may be resorted to when all other means fail, but the court will first take the instru- ment by the four corners in order to ascertain its meaning, and, if it is apparent, the punctuation will not change it. 4 In Magee v. Lavell, L. R. 9 0. P. 107, Coleridge, J., said: "If a contract be partly printed and partly written, the relative value to be assigned to the parts, on account of their different form, is a question of construction for the court to determine with refer- ence to the particular circumstances." In Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518, where the written recital of a bond differed from the printed condition, Finch, J., said: "This ambiguity it was proper to solve by throwing upon the language used the light of sur- rounding circumstances." 'Murray v. Pillsbury, 59 Minn. 85; 60 N. W. Rep. 844. 2 Sturm v. Boker (1893), 150 U. S. 312; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99, Jackson, J.: "In Schenck v. Saunders, 13 Gray (Mass.), 37, there were unsigned bills like those in the present case. The supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking by Bigelow, J., held that the transaction was not a sale, and that 'the bills of parcels which were sent from time to time with the mer- chandise were susceptible of explana- tion by parol evidence, and did not change the terms.of the written agree- ment under which the property was sent to Howe. They were sent only as memoranda of the amount and value of the merchandise transmitted. Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. 267.' 'An invoice,' as said by this court in Dows v. Nat.,etc.,Bank, 91 U.S. 618,'isnota bill of sale, nor is it evidence of a sale. It is a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity, or cost of the goods, or price of the things invoiced, and it is as appropriate to a bailment as a sale. Hence, standing alone, it is never regarded as evidence of title.' " 3 Osborn v. Farwell, 87 111. 89 ; Bunn v. Wells, 94 N. C. 67 ; Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1. Punctuation does not control. English v. McNair, 34 Ala. 40; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., R., 29 Fed. Rep. 546. Neither do rules of grammar. Nettleton v. Billings, 13 N. H. 446 ; Tucker v. Meeks, 2 Sweeny, 736 ; Gray v. Clark, 11 Vt. 583 ; North- rup v. Smothers (1890), 39 111. App. 588. Strict rules of grammar will not control a writing made by men who are not grammarians. Watson v. Blaine, 12 S. & R. 131 ; 14 Am. Dec. 669. 4 Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41. § 731 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 887 Words must be taken to express the meaning of the parties to a contract, and punctuation may aid in ascertaining the true reading; but its absence can not vitiate the contract, and the meaning of the words may be ascertained without its aid. 1 When the meaning of a clause in an instrument is doubtful, the court may insert punctuation as a means of showing what construction the words are capable of, and if, by such aid, the court is enabled to see that the language can bear an interpre- tation which will make the whole instrument rational and self- consistent, it is bound to adopt that interpretation in prefer- ence to another which would attribute to the parties an inten- tion utterly capricious, insensible and absurd. 8 § 731. Whether a contract is entire or severable. — A familiar and well settled principle of the common law is that an entire contract can not be apportioned. 8 The good sense and reason- abless of the particular case must always guide and govern courts in determining whether a contract is divisible or entire.* The question depends, to some extent, upon the intention of the parties, and this must be discovered in each case by con- sidering the language employed and the subject-matter of the contract. 5 No precise rule can be laid down for the solution of the question. When the price is expressly apportioned by the contract, or the apportionment may be implied by law, to each item to be performed, the contract will generally be held to be severable. 6 A contract consisting of several distinct items and founded on a consideration which is apportioned to each item, is severable. 7 Thus, if A enters into a contract to supply machinery to B for a certain price, and to keep it in order for a yearly payment, he becomes entitled to recover the price of the 1 White v. Smith, 33 Pa. St. 186 ; 75 the law will not make provision for Am. Dec. 589 ; Ketchum v. Spurlock, exigencies which the parties have 34 W. Va. 597. neglected to provide for themselves. *Inre Denny's Estate, 8 Ir. R. Eq. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §470. Series, 427; Burgess v. Badger, 124111. 4 Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567; 288. 11 Am. Rep. 509; Jones v. Dunn, 3 3 The reason seems to be, that as "Watts & S. 109. the contract is founded upon a con- 5 Southwell v. Beezley, 5 Ore. 458. sideration dependent upon the entire 6 More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251. performance of the act, and if from 7 Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer, 66 Pa. any cause it is not wholly performed, St. 351. the casus fceoieris does not arise, and 888 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 732 machinery as soon as he delivers it, without waiting for the performance of the rest of the contract. 1 But if the consider- ation to be paid is single and entire, the contract must be held to be entire, although the subject thereof may consist of several distinct and wholly independent items. 2 In a fire insurance policy, where the performance is a gross sum, the contract is held to be entire and not divisible, although the amount of in- surance on the different items is fixed in the policy. 8 § 732. Whether a contract is several or joint. — Plaintiff contracted to build for defendants a factory for a sum specified, defendants stipulating that "we, the subscribers hereto," agree to pay for the factory when completed. The contract provided that defendants, as soon as the sum specified was sub- scribed, should incorporate with a capital stock of not less than the amount subscribed, to be issued to the subscribers in pro- portion to the amount of their paid-up interest, and that each stockholder should be only liable for the amount subscribed by him. It was held that the contract was a several contract with each subscriber, to the amount of his subscription, and not a joint contract, by which each subscriber became liable for the whole contract price of the factory. 4 A contract by a 1 Eapalje & Lawrence Law Die- 48 N. W. Eep. 255, and which was tionary; Merchant Banking Co. v. held to be a several contract. A con- Phoenix, etc., Steel Co., L. B. 5. Ch. tract in the identical language of the Div. 205. one before us was construed by the s Fullmer v. Poust (1893), 155 Pa. supreme court of Michigan to be sev- St. 275. eral and not joint. Davis, etc., Mfg. s Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 69 Co. v. Murray, 60 N. W. Eep. 437. Iowa, 202; Plath v. Minnesota, etc., Such was the conclusion reached by Association, 23 Minn. 479. the federal court in the case of Davis, 4 DavisBldg.,etc.,Co.w. Cupp,89 Wis. etc., Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 51 Fed. Eep. 673; 62 N. W. Eep. 520, Winslow, 148." In Davis Bldg., etc., Co. v. J. : "We construe the building con- Jones (1895), 66 Fed. Eep. 124, Thay- tract to be a several contract with er, J., said: "This contract, or one each subscriber to the amount of his nearly identical with it in form, has subscription, and not as a joint con- been before the courts for construction tract, by which each subscriber would on several previous occasions, and the become liable for the whole consider- question whether the subscribers ation. Although not in the same Ian- thereby bound themselves jointly to guage, the purport of the contract is pay the full contract price, or sever- much the same as the one construed ally to pay the sums by them respec- in Gibbons v. Grinsel, 79 Wis. 365; tively subscribed, has been consid- §732 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 889 dairyman to ship whatever milk he may have, at a certain price per gallon, for a year, is a several contract. 1 To make a contract a personal one, requiring individual performance by the contracting party, the contract must itself show, or inevita- bly suggest, that a personal confidence or trust was reposed in him. 2 ered at length, and often decided. In the following cases it was held that the contract simply required each subscriber to pay the amount of his individual subscription: Davis v. Bel- ford, 70 Mich. 120; 37 N. W. Rep. 919; Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Barber, 51 Fed. Rep. 148; Gibbons v. Grinsel, 79 Wis. 365; 48 N. W. Rep. 255 ; Davis & Rankin Co. v. Hillsboro Co., 10 Ind. App. 42; 37 N. E. Rep. 549; Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 10 Ind. App. 364 ; 37 N. E. Rep. 818 ; Davis, etc., Mfg. Co. v. McKinney, 11 Ind. App. 696; 38 N. E. Rep. 1093; Frost ». Williams, 2 S. D. 457; 50 N. W. Rep. 964, — while in the following case the contrary view was taken, and the contract was held to impose a joint liability : Davis v. Shafer, 50 Fed. Rep. 764. It is worthy of notice, however, that in the case last cited (Davis v. Shafer) the conclusion reached, that the contract imposed a joint liability, was influenced to some extent by the view entertained by the court of the effect of a local stat- ute of the state of Missouri, where the contract was executed. Revised Stat- utes of Missouri, § 2384. We have felt constrained to concur in the views taken in those cases, above cited, which hold that the liability imposed by the contract is several, and not joint.'' 1 McLaughlin v. Hess, 164 Pa. St. 570; 30 Atl. Rep. 491. 2 Nixon v. Zuricalday (1895), 144 N. Y. 300; 39 N. E. Rep. 340, per Gray, J. : "In order that a contract shall bear the impress of being a per- sonal contract, or one which involves personal considerations, something must appear from it, or it must in- evitably suggest that a personal con- fidence or trust was reposed in the person contracted with. Such was the case in Stevens v. Benning, 1 Kay & J. 168. In that case Vice Chancellor Wood suggested a case which aptly shows how the inference of a personal trust can be made from the transaction itself. He says: 'Take, for instance, the case of a merchant in the West Indies consigning goods to a person in London, for the pur- pose of having them sold there ; such person alone would have a right to sell them.' No such element can be presumed to enter into the transaction in question. There was no such duty necessarily or inferentially devolved upon the defendants as to permit the court to presume that any personal confidence was involved, or that the exercise of some personal skill on their part was expected. In view of the manner of a sale at auction, and what would ordinarily be done, that would be an irrational presumption. In the case of Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, cited by the learned trial judge, the defendants' contract to furnish the 'Wachtel Opera Troupe' could only be fully performed by the appearance of the great tenor singer himself, who gave his name to the company, and whose presence was of the essence of the contract as of the success of a performance. So in Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197, the contract with the mechanic contem- 890 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §§ 733, 734 § 733. The same subject continued — Illustrations. — A con- tract for the sale of several distinct things, as for the sale of a town lot and personal property, but all for one consideration, is an entire contract, and not divisible except by the consent of both parties thereto, and the making of a new contract. 1 Where the mate of a ship engaged for a voyage at thirty guin- eas, and died during the voyage, it was held that at law there could be no apportionment of the wages/ A contract to hire a person for a year for a certain sum per week, payable week- ly, is entire and indivisible. 8 The common law rule of the non-apportionment of contracts which are entire is simply a rule of construction founded upon the intention of the parties, and not a rule of law controlling such intention. Conse- quently, parties may by apt words make contracts which shall be apportionable." § 734. Laws, customs and usages. — The laws which exist at the time and place of making a contract, and at the place where it is to be performed, affecting its validity and con- plated his personal services, because tire contract. Larkin v. Hecksher, 51 not only it was 'evident, both from N. J. Law, 133. A contract for a spe- the nature of the business and the cific service at an agreed price is en- amount of compensation agreed to be tire, and the price does not become paid him,' but, as Judge Allen adds, payable until the service is wholly 'it is also manifest from the evidence rendered. Rockwell v. Newton, 44 on both sides. The business of pot- Conn. 333. making required skill and experience 4 2 Parsons on Contracts, 521. As * * * The execution of the work to entire and separable contracts and required his consent and personal su- apportionments, see Huey v. Grin- pervision and labor.' " nell, 50 111. 179; Shinn v. Bodine, 60 ^cheland v. Erpelding, 6 Ore. 258. Pa. St. 182; Allen v. Brown, 43 Ga. 2 Cutters Powell, 6 T. R. 320. 305; Coburn v. Hartford, 38 Conn. 3 01mstead v. Bach (1893), 78 Md. 290; Hollis v. Chapman, 36 Texas, 1; 132; 22 Lawyer's Rep. Ann. 74. The McDaniels v. Whitney, 38 Iowa, 60; plaintiff was employed at $50 per Maryland Fertilizing, etc., Co., v. Lo- week, payable weekly, and it was ex- rentz, 44 Md. 218; Clark v. Sawyer, pressly provided that this employ- 121 Mass. 224; Quigley v. Dellaas, 82 ment and this weekly payment of Pa. St. 267 ; Scott v. Kittanning Coal wages should continue for one year. Co., 89 Pa. St. 231; Butler v. Butler, It was not fifty -two separate inde- 77 N. Y. 472 ; Burckhardt v. Burck- pendent contracts, but one indivisible hardt, 36 Ohio St. 261 ; Murphy v. St. agreement, covering the period of a Louis, 8 Mo. App. 483; Tenny v. Mul- year. A hiring for one year with vaney, 8 Ore. 129. monthly payment of wages is an en- § 734 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 891 struction, enter into and form a part of it. 1 Parties mak- ing contracts must be considered as looking to the municipal law for remedies to enforce their rights, hence this law must be considered as entering into and forming part of the obliga- tion. To explain an equivocal and obscure expression resort may be had to the well-defined and known usages of trade as an aid in reaching a true interpretation. 3 Parties who con- tract on a subject-matter concerning which known usages pre- vail, by implication incorporate them into their agreements, if nothing is said to the contrary. Where a party agreed to de- liver so many bushels of "first quality clear barley," the con- tract not stating whether the barley was to be delivered in sacks or in bulk, i. e., loose, it was held that evidence was properly received to show a usage of trade to deliver in sacks, such evidence tending not to contradict the agreement, but only to give it precision on an important point, where by its terms it had been left undefined. 4 The allowance of days of grace is a usage which pervades the whole commercial world. It is universally understood to enter into every bill or note of a mercantile character, and to form so completely a part of the contract that the bill does not become due in fact or in law on the day mentioned on its face, but on the last day of grace. 6 Parol evidence of custom is generally admissible to enable the court to arrive at the real meaning of the parties, who are naturally presumed to have contracted in conformity with the known 1 Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314. ted in a great variety of commercial 2 Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790. cases. See note to Wigglesworth v. 8 South Bend Iron Works v. Cottrell Dallison, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 9th (1887), 31 Fed. Rep. 254; Bullock v. Am. ed., 842, 872, where the cases are Finley (1886), 28 Fed. Eep. 514. collected. Proof of usage can be re- 4 Robinson v. United States, 13 ceived to show the intention or under- Wall. 363. "The ancient, established, standing of the parties only in the ab- uniform, and known custom of per- sence of a special agreement, or to sons engaged in any trade, makes a explain the terms of a written con- law for that trade, although it is not tract. Tilley v. County of Cook, applicable to other trades. It is their 103 U. S. 155 ; Hutchinson v. Tatham, way of doing business. It is the rule L. R. 8 C. P. 482 ; Field v. Lelean, 30 to which all who enter that trade are L. J. Ex. 168; B ay water v. Richard- understood to consent." Wilcocks v. son, 1 Ad. & E. 508. Phillips, 1 Wall. Jr. 47, per Bald- 5 Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 win, J. Barnard v. Kellogg (1870), 10 Pet. 25. Wall. 383. This principle is illustra- 892 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §735 and established usage. 1 Where the language used is plain and its meaning free from obscurity, proof of custom or usage, in contradiction thereof, is not admissible. 2 "Usage," said Lord Lyndhurst, "maybe admissible to explain what is doubt- ful, but it is never admitted to contradict what is plain." s § 735. Construction of deeds. — The construction of deeds follows the rules of law in regard to the construction of other contracts in writing. 4 A deed of conveyance, like all other instruments, will be read by the court in the sense of the meaning of the parties. The intention will prevail whenever such intention is unmistakably manifested, having regard to all parts of the instrument, unless the law requires the use of technical terms to effectuate such intention, or unless such in- tent is contrary to legal rules. 5 In determining the meaning 1 Bliven v. New England Screw Co., 23 How. 420, per Clifford, J. 2 South Bend Iron Works v. Cot- trell, 31 Fed. Eep. 254, per Shiras, J. ; Moran v. Prather,23 Wall.492. 3 Blackett v. Royal Exeh. Assur. Co., 2 Cromp. & J. 244. "Every legal contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties making it. And, usage, when it is reasonable, uniform, well settled, not in opposition to fixed rules of law, not in contradiction of the express terms of the contract, is deemed to form a part of the contract and to enter into the intention of the parties, when it is so far established and so far known to the parties that it must be supposed that their contract was made in reference to it." Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464; Newhall v. Appleton (1889), 114 N. Y. 140; Star- kie on Evidence, 637, 710; 1 Green- leaf on Evidence, §§ 292, 294; Broom's Legal Maxims, 682, 889, 890 ; 2 Par- sons on Contracts, 541. 1 5 Lawson's Rights, Remedies and Practice, § 2282. It is an established rule of interpretation of deeds that the intention of the parties should control, unless inconsistent with some rule of law. Bunn v. Wells, 94 N. C. 67. 6 Sisson v. Donnelly, 36 N. J. Law, 432; Allen v. Hoi ton, 20 Pick. 458; Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; Walsh v, Trevanion, 15 Ad. & El. N. S. 733; Moore v. Magrath, 1 Cowp. 9; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Lord Ray. 235. In the often quoted case of Lord Say and Seal's Case, 10 Mod. 40, an omission, by an evident mistake, of the name of the grantor in a deed of bargain and sale, was supplied by intendment, and the court was of opinion that this deed passed the freehold, because such was the intention of it. In Chol- mondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 1, Sir T. Plumer, master of the rolls, says: "That the primary object of inquiry is the intention of the par- ties, and that where that is on the face of the instrument, clearly and satisfactorily ascertained, and found not to be contrary to any rule of law, the court is bound, if the words will admit of a construction conformable to the intention, to adopt that con- struction, however contrary it maybe to technical meaning and inference." $ 735 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 893 of the parties, recourse must be had to the whole instrument, the granting part, the covenants, the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, as well as the manner of signing. 1 The intention as gathered from the whole instrument must prevail. Although in one part formal and apt words of conveyance be used, if, from other parts of the writing taken and compared together, it appears that a mere agreement for a conveyance is all that was intended, this intent must prevail. 2 Inconsisten- cies are to be reconciled if possible. If there are two clauses which are so repugnant as not to stand together, the first is held to prevail over the last, unless there is some special rea- son to the contrary. 8 But, between an introductory clause and the granting clause, the latter determines what interest is intended to be granted.' The rules of construction applied in cases of repugnancy give effect to every part of a deed, when consistent with the rules of law and the intention of the parties. When this is impossible, the part which is repug- nant to the intention is rejected; and, whenever the language used is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the courts will look at the circumstances existing at the time of the trans- action, such as the situation of the parties, the subject-matter of the conveyance, and the acts of the parties contemporaneous with and subsequent to the deed. To this extent extraneous evidence is admissible to aid in the construction. 6 If it is ap- parent that the grantor has used a technical word to express an idea different from its technical signification, a court will construe it according to the intention of the grantor. 6 1 Inhabitants of Nobleboro v. Clark give the apparent construction. Sta- (1878), 68 Maine, 87. ton v. Mullis, 92 N. C. 623. * Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338. 4 Webb v. Webb, 29 Ala. 588. 3 Waterman v. Andrews, 14 R. I. 5 Waterman v. Andrews, 14 R. I. 589; Sheppard's Touchstone of Com- 589; Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow. 195; mon Assurance, 88; Brown's Legal Bradley v. Washington, etc., Packet Maxims, 580. Judge Metcalf remarks Co., 13 Pet. 89; Winnipisseogee, etc., in 23 American Jurist, 277, that this Co. v. Perley, 46 N. H. 83; Bell v. rule has very little operation in mod- Woodward, 46 N. H. 315; Gibson v. ern times, a reason to the contrary Tyson, 5 Watts, 34. being almost always found. The 6 Central Pacific R. Co. v. Beal, 47 clauses may be transposed so as to Cal. 151. 894 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 736 § 736. The same subject continued. — In construing deeds, no regard is had to punctuation, since no estate ought to depend upon the insertion or omission of a comma or semi- colon. 1 The grammatical sense is not adhered to where a contrary intent is apparent. 8 If a deed will inure several ways, the grantee may elect which way to take it. 3 Thus it was held that a lease to one, "to hold for seven, fourteen, or twenty- one years," gave to the lessee, and him alone, the option at which of the periods named the lease should terminate. 4 A conveyance of land, by necessary legal consequence, conveys the buildings thereon, and evidence will not be received of a contrary intention on the part of the grantor. 5 The grant of a house passes the land on which it stands. 6 The grant of "a well" carries the land itself which it occupies.' Where a deed can not operate in the way intended by the parties, it will be construed so as to operate in some other way, if possible. 8 If the description in a conveyance be so uncertain that it can not be known what estate was intended, the conveyance is void. But in a deed poll, where there is doubt, the construction must be against the grantor. 9 A deed is not to be held void for uncer- tainty, if by any reasonable construction it can be made avail- able. Parol evidence can not be admitted to contradict or '3 Washburn on Real Property, 628; Shephard's Touchstone, 90. By the Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41 ; Doe v. grant of a mill, the land under the Martin, 4 T. R. 39. mill and adjacent thereto, so far as 2 Hancock v. Watson, 18 Cal. 137 ; necessary to its use, and commonly Jackson v. Topping, 1 Wend. 388. used with it, will pass by implication. "Omitted words may be supplied, Forbush v. Lombard, 13 Mete. 109. repugnant words may be rejected, 'Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray, 107. words may be transposed, and false In this respect differing none from grammar or incorrect spelling may be the term "house,"' or "barn," or disregarded, if the intention of the " mill," or "cottage," or "wharf," or parties sufficiently appears from the "town-pound," all of which are context." Elphinstone on Interpre- familiar instances of a conveyance of tation of Deeds, Rule 17. a fee in land by a general term of 3 Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Johns. 375; description, applicable only to the Esty v. Baker, 50 Maine, 325 ; Melvin purpose for which the land is used at v. Proprietors of the Locks, etc., 5 the time of the grant. Metc - 15 - 8 2 Greenleaf & Cruise on Real 4 Dann v. Spurrier, 3 B. & P. 399. Property, 601, § 33. 6 Ishamu. Morgan, 9 Conn. 374. 9 Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass. 6 Wilson v. Hunter, 14 Wis. 683; 196. See §569. § 737 CONSTRUCTION OP CONTRACTS. 895 control the language of a deed, but latent ambiguities may be explained by such evidence. 1 § 737. Construction of insurance policies. — Policies of insur- ance are governed by the same rules applicable to other simple contracts. 2 When the terms of the policy are explicit they must control. Contracts of this kind are to be construed fairly, and according to the words in which the parties have contracted." When the policy contains plain and unambiguous language, courts must look to it alone to find the intention and meaning of the parties, and parol proof is inadmissible. 4 A policy of in- surance is to be construed as a whole. One part is to be elu- cidated by another, so as to reconcile them, if possible, to one common intent or design, and so as to carry out the intention of both parties, as gathered from the whole instrument. 3 Reference is to be had to the presumption that it was entered into in good faith by the parties, to effectuate the evident pur- pose for which it was made. 6 Words will be given their plain, natural and obvious meaning, unless it appears that it was not the intention of the parties that they should have such meaning. 7 Ambiguous words may be construed by extrinsic 1 3 Washburn on Real Property, liamson v. Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire 426. Ab to parol evidence being ad- Ins. Co., 26 Upp. Can. C. P. 266; Cu- missible to vary the consideration sack v. Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Low. Can. expressed in a deed. O'Neale v. Jur. 97 (a marine policy) ; State Ins. Lodge, 3 Harris & McHenry, 433 ; Co. v. Hughes, 10 Lea, 461 ; Miller v. 1 Am. Dec. 377, and note; note to Ins. Co., 12 W. Va. 116; Johnson v. Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 3 Am. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 39 Dec. 304, 306. See § 581. Wis. 87 (a marine policy). 2 St. John v. American, etc., Ins. s Belle. Western, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Co., 13 N. Y. 31; 64 Am. Dec. 529; Robinson (La.), 423; 39 Am. Dec. 542. Beach on Law of Insurance, § 650. As 4 Hough v. People's Ins. Co. (1872), to construction of policies see, Pied- 36 Md. 398. mont & Arlington Life Insurance Co. 5 Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. v. Young, 58 Ala. 476; Insurance Co. 404; Merchants Ins. Co. v. Edmond, of North America v. Garland, 108 111. 17 Gratt. (Va.) 138; Wood on Fire 220 ; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scam- Insurance, § 69. mon, 100 111. 644 ; Schroeder v. Trade 6 Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. 404. Ins. ' Co. of Camden, 109 111. 157 ; * Supreme Council of R. T. of T. Brigham v. Home Ins. Co., 131 Mass. v. Curd, 111 111. 284; Moore v. Phoe- 319; Arkell v. Commerce Ins. Co., 69 nix Ins. Co., 62 N. H. 240; the word N. Y. 191; Stout v. Commercial Union "void" has not required by usage a Assurance Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 554; Wil- different signification from the ordi- 896 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §738 evidence of accompanying circumstances, and the usages of the business in which the property insured was employed. 1 § 738. The same subject continued. — Insurance policies are liberally construed in favor of the assured and exceptions therein are strictly construed against the underwriters. 2 If there is a seeming inconsistency between two provisions, the courts will endeavor to give effect to both; if the meaning is ambig- uous, that interpretation will be adopted which is most favor- able to the insured. 3 Conditions providing for disabilities and forfeitures are to receive, when the intent is doubtful, a strict construction against those for whose benefit they are intro- duced.' No rule in the interpretation of a policy is more fully established, or more imperative and controlling, than that which declares that in all cases it must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, so as not to defeat, without a plain nary one. In Herrman v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184, the subject for construction was a condition in a fire insurance policy that the policy should be void if the premises became "va- cant and unoccupied." Earl, J., said: The words "should not be taken in any technical or narrow sense. They need not be taken in the sense in which they may have been understood by underwriters, as both parties to the contract were not underwriters, sup- posed to be familiar with the meaning of such words when used in the busi- ness of fire insurance. But they must be taken in their ordinary sense as commonly used and understood." 1 New York Belting & Packing Co. v. Washington Fire Ins. Co. (1863), 10 Bosw. 428. 2 Western Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 32 Pa. St. 351; 75 Am. Dec. 561; Grant v. Lexington, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Ind. 23; 61 Am. Dec. 74 ; Brink v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 49 Vt. 442. 8 Allen v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 473; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Drach, 101 Pa. St. 278 ; Grandin v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 107 Pa. St. 26; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212; Com- monwealth Ins. Co. v. Berger, 42 Pa. St. 285; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Up- degraff, 43 Pa. St. 350; McClure v. Watertown Ins. Co., 90 Pa. St. 277; Teutonia Ins. Co. v. Mund, 102 Pa. St. 89 ; Burkhard v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 102 Pa. St. 262 ; Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Deckard (1891), 3 Ind. App. 361; Rogers v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ,121 Ind.570 ; Wallace v. German-American Ins. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 742. As the insurance company prepares the contract, and embodies in it such conditions as it deems proper, it is in duty bound to use language so plain and clear that the insured can not mistake or be misled as to the burdens and duties imposed upon him. Wood on Insur- ance, 140. 4 Blumer v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 622; Wakefield v. Orient Ins. Co. of Hartford, 50 Wis. 532. Courts of equity lean strongly in favor of grant- ing relief from forfeitures. Smith v. Mariner, 5 Wis. 551; 68 Am. Dec. 73, and extended note thereto. § 739 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 897 necessity, his claim to the indemnity, which, in making the insurance, it was his object to secure. 1 Where one stipulation is printed, and the other written, if repugnant, the written stipulation will prevail, 2 although both will be upheld if possi- ble. 8 If the words in the policy have received a judicial con- struction, and also a peculiar commercial construction by usage at variance with such judicial construction, the judicial construction is to control. 4 § 739. Building contracts. — The general rule, which requires that written agreements be followed according to the intention of the parties and the true spirit and meaning of the stipula- tions, applies to building contracts. 6 All prior agreements in respect to changes of specifications are regarded as merged in the contract as signed. 6 Where specifications are attached to a building contract at the time of signing, they are merged into the contract and become part of it. 7 Where a building con- tract provided a mode of determining as to extras, and the specifications, referred to by and made a part of it, provided a different and inconsistent mode, it was held that the contract prevailed. 8 A letter annexed to a written contract to do all the 1 May on Insurance, § 175. "Courts 5 Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181; will not be astute to find ways to work Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94; & forfeiture of a contract of insur- White v. Oliver, 36 Maine, 92 ; Nolan ance ; rather they will strive to uphold v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Ellis a. it, and will construe conditions and Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52. provisions in a policy strongly against 6 Coey v. Lehman, 79 111. 173 ; Me- an underwriter, and will incline to Cormick, etc., Co. v. Wilson, 39 Minn, uphold the agreement." Hennessey 467; Taylor v. Fox, 16 Mo. App. 527; v. Manhattan, etc., Co., 28 Hun, 98; Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102; McMaster v. Ins. Co. of North Amer- Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494. ica 55 N. Y. 222. ' City of Lake View v. MacKitchie, ^Niagara Ins. Co. v. De Graff, 12 134 111. 203; Smith v. Flanders, 129 Mich. 124; Coster v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Mass. 322; DermotU. Jones, 2 Wall. 1. 2 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 51; Consoli- Actual annexation of specification to dated F. Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. the contract is not necessary, how- 59; Schroeder v. Stock, etc., Ins. Co., ever. Cook v. Allen, 67 N. Y. 578; 46 Mo. 174; Frederick Co. Mut. Ins. New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert, Co. v. Deford, 38 Md. 404; Blake v. etc., E. Co., 91 N. Y. 153. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Gray, 265. 8 Meyer v. Berlandi (1893), 53 Minn. 8 Stokes v. Cox, 1 H. & N. 533. 59. " It is to be presumed the plans 4 Bargett v. Orient, etc., Ins. Co., 3 and specifications were prepared first, Bos. (N. Y.) 385. and that what the parties set down in 57 ' 898 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 740 painting on certain houses agreeably to annexed specifications, signed by the painter, showing the kind and quality of the materials to be used and how they were to be applied, is a specification within the meaning of the contract, and becomes a part of it and is to be construed therewith. 1 If the original contract is deviated from in so many matters that it can hardly be regarded as controlling the parties, the original contract is treated as abandoned, and a new contract is implied to pay the fair or reasonable value of the work or materials, but the provisions of the special contract should govern as far as it ap- plies. 2 Work performed " on " a building may include work in reference or relative to it. 3 The rule obtains that a written contract, whether simple or under seal, can not be varied by parol evidence, but the meaning of particular phrases, technical words and provincialisms may be explained by parol testimony. 4 § 740. Parol evidence admissible when. — When parties re- duce their agreement to writing, the written contract is pre- sumed to contain the whole contract as agreed upon between the parties, and in the absence of fraud, mistake or accident, parol evidence will not be admitted to vary or contradict the writing. 5 While parol evidence is not admissible to vary or change the terms of a written contract, it is frequently ad- the contract is the last expression of 4 Lloyd's Law of Building, § 3 ; Mar- what their minds settled down to on quis v. Lauretson, 76 Iowa, 23. the matter, and also because, it being 5 State v. Hoshaw, 98 Mo. 358; Hills matter of contract, the natural place v. Rix, 43 Minn. 543 ; Burch v. Ali- tor it, and where one would naturally gusta, etc., R. Co., 80 Ga. 296 ; Appeal look for it, is in the contract, and not of Cornwall, etc., R. Co., 11 Am. St. in the specifications.'' Per Gilfillan, Rep. 893, note. "The rule that a C. J. formal written contract, which ap- 1 McGeragle v. Broemel, 53 N. J. pears to be complete, will be pre- Law, 59. sumed to be the repository of the 2 Boodyu. Rutland, etc., Railroad, 24 final intentions of the parties, in re- Vt. 660; McKinney v. Springer, 3 Ind. gard to the subject-matter of the 59 ; Goldsmith v. Hand, 26 Ohio St. 101. agreement, and that it excludes proof "Where a contract has been repudi- of any prior or contemporaneous pa- ated by both parties, it ceases to be rol stipulations which would contra- the criterion for measuring the rights diet the writing, is abundantly set- and liabilities of the parties to it." tied, and should not, on account of Ford ii. Smith, 25 Ga, 675. its importance, be relaxed in any de- 3 Smith v, Molleson (1893), 74 Hun, gree." Singer Mfg. Co. v. Forsyth, 606. 108 Ind. 334. §741 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 899 missible for the purpose of ascertaining what was the intention of the parties, or the meaning which they intended to attach to the expressions used in the contract. 1 There are cases in which it is admissible to show the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms used in the contract. 2 Thus it was held competent to show that the parties to a written con- tract by the word "dollars" intended Confederate dollars, and not lawful money of the United States. 3 Where the defendant, by a written contract, had purchased of the plaintiffs, who were farmers, a quantity of wool, described in the contract sim- ply as "your wool," a conversation which had taken place some time previous was held admissible in evidence for the purpose of explaining what the parties meant by the term "your wool."* § 741. The same subject continued. — Parol evidence is ad- missible in explanation of a written contract to show the situ- 1 Rhodes v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 426. *In re Curtis (1894), 64 Conn. 501; 30 Atl. Rep. 769. "Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; The Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall. 548. 1 Macdonald v. Longbottom, 1 El. & El . 977. In Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark & F. 355, 566, Tindal, C. J., in delivering the opinion, said: "Where any doubt arises upon the true sense and mean- ing of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application under the surrounding circumstances, the sense and meaning of the language may be investigated and ascertained by evidence dehors the instrument it- self, for both reason and common sense agree that by no other means can the language of the instrument be made to speak the real mind of the party." Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. In Ex- celsior Needle Co. v. Smith (1891), 61 Conn. 56, where the defendant upon the trial offered evidence of a conver- sation between the agent of the plaint- iffs and himself before the written agreement was made, as to the kind and nature of the employment that would be given him under the agree- ment, it was held that, so far as the evidence went to contradict, alter or add to the written agreement it was inadmissible, but that it was admissi- ble so far as it tended to show the surrounding circumstances at the time the agreement was made. The rule, that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the legal operation of a written instrument, is not the law of Penn- sylvania. We have got far away from that rule. We permit a deed absolute on its face to be proved a mortgage. We receive parol evidence to rebut a presumption or an equity — to supply deficiencies in the written agreement — to explain ambiguities in the subject- matter of writings — to prevent frauds and to correct mistakes," per Wood- ward, J. Chalfant v. Williams (1859), 35 Pa. St. 212 ; Bank v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. St. 275 ; 49 Am. Dec. 561 ; Rearich v. Swinehart, 11 Pa. St. 233; 51 Am. Dec. 540, and note. 900 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. § 742 ation of the parties, the object in view, and the consideration, but not to contradict or control the same. 1 Parol proof may be given of any or all of the circumstances surrounding|the trans- action showing the relation of the parties to each other, their knowledge of the subject-matter of the contract, and the state or condition of that subject-matter as bearing on the intention of the parties which may suggest a meaning where none was apparent before, or which may show what construction shall be placed upon the language used which is susceptible of more than one interpretation. 2 In such cases, the parol testimony is used, not only to explain the surrounding circumstances, but also to enable the court to look in upon the mind of the contracting parties, and to read the written words of their con- tract in the sense in which they wrote them. 3 It is an excep- tion to the general rule that parol evidence can not be intro- duced to vary, modify or contradict a written contract, which allows parol evidence to be introduced to show the true consid- eration of a deed. 4 § 742. Latent and patent ambiguities. — The rule as to the admissibility of evidence to explain ambiguities, including equivocations, is commonly stated as follows: "In a written instrument, if there be a patent ambiguity, it never is allowed to be explained by verbal evidence, although a latent ambiguity is so. 6 A patent ambiguity is when the ambiguity arises from the fact that the parties have expressed inconsistent intentions 1 Baldwin v. Carter, 17 Conn. 201; v. "Wilson, 12 Colo. 65. Or to show 42 Am. Dec. 735. the situation and knowledge of the 2 Phelps u.Clasen, 3 Nat. Bank. Keg. parties at the time of entering into a 22 (87) . Such evidence is admissible written contract, McDonald v. Unaka to show the real nature and charac- Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38. Or to prove ter of the consideration of a contract, the facts connected with the prepara- Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352; Moses v. tion of a deed, Louisville, etc., R. Co. Hatfield, 27 S. C. 324; Collar v. Col- v. Power, 119 Ind. 269. lar, 75 Mich. 414; First Nat. Bank v. 8 In re Curtis (1894), 64 Conn. 501, Snyder, 79 Iowa, 191. Or to explain 30 Atl. Rep. 769. and supply omissions, Pickett v. Fer- 4 See §576, note, supra. NotetoCarr guson, 86 Tenn. 642. Or to explain o.Hays, 25 Cent. Law Jour. 35; "Welz descriptions, Van Home v. Clark, 126 v. Rhodius, 87 Ind. 1. Pa. St. 411; Black v. Pratt, etc., Co., 6 Smith on Contracts, 49; Elphin- 85 Ala. 504 ; Central Irrigation Dis- stone's Interpretation of Deeds, 112, trict v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351 ; Rhodes 113. § 743 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 901 on the face of the instrument. 1 A latent ambiguity is where you show that words apply equally to two different things or subject-matters, and then evidence is admissible to show which of them was the thing or subject-matter intended. 2 A gift of "my gold watch" to "the son of A." appears unambiguous, and it is not till it appears from extrinsic evidence that A. has two sons, or that the person has two gold watches, that the equivocation becomes manifest. 3 To render a deed or other instrument ambiguous or void for uncertain de- scription, the ambiguity must be patent, and appear on its face; but when the deed or instrument appears certain and without ambiguity, and the uncertainty arises by matter out- side the instrument, then it contains a latent ambiguity, and may be explained by the application of extrinsic evidence. 4 Courts do not solve patent ambiguities, but treat the am- biguous provisions as inoperative and void. 5 If in cases of latent ambiguity the intent of the parties is not ascertained, the instrument is void for uncertainty. 6 § 743. Function of judge and jury respectively — Written instruments are to receive their construction from the courts, and, for the purpose of ascertaining their meaning, are never submitted to the jury.' The meaning of particular words is for the court, except in cases where there is evidence that a 1 A patent ambiguity is that which blank the amount that was to be paid remains uncertain after all the evi- to the defendant to terminate the dence of surrounding circumstances lease; patent ambiguity), and collateral facts, admissible under 8 Elphinstone's Interpretation of proper rules of evidence, is exhausted. Deeds, 102, 103. Kretschmer v. Hard (1893), 18 Colo. i Hardy v. Matthews, 38 Mo. 121. 223 5 Linney v. Wood, 66 Texas, 22. 2 Smith v. Jeffryes, 15 Mees & W. 6 Richardson v. "Watson, 4 B. & Ad. 561, per Alderson, B. ; Webster v. 787. Atkinson 4 N. H. 21; Storer v. Free- ' Wason v. Eowe, 16 Vt. 525, per man 6 Mass. 435; Jackson v. Sill, 11 Hebard, J.: "It is a wise and well Johns 201 See on the subject of established rule of law that the true patent and latent ambiguity: Camp- construction of written contracts is to bell v Johnson, 44 Mo. 247; Bell v. be declared by the court, and not sub- Woodward, 46 N. H. 315; Pipers, mitted to the finding of a jury." Em- True, 36 Cal. 606; Vandevoort „. ery v. Owings, 6 Gill, 191, per Dor- Dewey (1886), 42 Hun, 68 (defect in sey, J. a lease in omitting to insert in the 902 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS . § 743 particular word was used in a sense peculiar to a particular trade or business, or that its meaning depends on the usage of a particular place. 1 If a doubt arises upon the construction of a phrase in a written instrument, it is to be decided by the court upon inspection, and not by the jury. 2 Where a written con- tract has been lost, and parol evidence of its contents has been received, its construction is still for the court, and not for the jury. 8 In an action on a written contract, it is, therefore, error for the court to allow the question as to what was the contract to go to the jury. 4 It is for the court to determine the legal effect of a promissory note, and it is error to leave the construction to a jury. 5 Where, by a written agree- ment, the plaintiff undertook to do work to some houses of the defendant in South street and Southampton street, and it was proven that the defendant had no houses in Soutbampton street at the time of the agreement, and the judge asked the jury whether the parties meant to describe houses in South street only, and whether the insertion of the word "and" in the agreement was a mistake, it was held to be a misdirection to leave it to the jury to say what was the inten- tion of the parties. 6 Where the contract is ambiguous in any of its terms, and the ambiguity can be solved by reference to other parts of the contract, or surrounding circumstances which are uncontroverted by the evidence, it is the duty of the court to solve the ambiguity, and to declare the true mean- ing of the contract. But where the ambiguity can not be 1 Simpson v. Margitson, 11 Q. B. 23. v. Bailey, 24 S. C. 493 ; State v. Fort, The construction of a contract, unless 24 S. C. 510 ; Dwight v. Germania Life there is something peculiar to the Ins. Co., 103 N. Y. 341 ; Brady v. Cas- words, "by reason of the custom of the sidy, 104 N. Y. 147. But where the trade to which the contract relates, is making of the contract is in dispute, for the court. Bowes v. Shand, 2 L. it is for the jury to say whether it is R. App. Cas. 455, per Lord Cairns, established. Folsom v. Cook, 115 Pa. Written contract to be construed by 539; 9 Atl. Rep. 93. the court. Phillips v. Aflalo, 43 Eng. z Rex v. Hucks, 1 Stark. 424. C. L. R. 436 ; (4 M. & G. 846) ; Nash v, 8 Berwick v. Horsfall, 4 C. B. N. S. Drisco, 51 Maine, 417; Monadnock 450. Railroad v. Felt, 52 N. H. 379; Will- * Miller v. Dunlap (1886), 22 Mo. iams ti. Waters, 36 Ga. 454; State v. App. 97. Lefaivre, 53 Mo. 470; Chicago Cheese s Terry v. Shively, 64 Ind. 106. Co. v. Fogg (1892), 53 Fed. Rep. 72; 6 Hitchin v. Groom, 17 L. J. C. P. Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 622; Arnold 145; 5 C. B. 515. 5 744 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 903 solved by reference to other parts of the contract, and the sur- rounding circumstances are controverted, the court should charge the jury hypothetically as to the true interpretation of the contract. 1 § 744. The same subject continued.— It is the duty of the jury to take the construction from the court, either absolutely, if there be no words to be construed, as words of art or phrases used in commerce, and no surrounding circumstances to be ascertained ; or, conditionally, when those words or circum- stances are necessarily referred to them/ Where a writing is obscure or ambiguous by reason of its containing unfamiliar abbreviations, or where it is obscurely written, or partially erased, so as to be uncertain and ambiguous, it is proper to leave it to the jury to ascertain its meaning. 3 But where the ambiguity is in the words of the writing themselves, the court must determine the meaning if it can be done. 4 When writ- ten instruments contain technical terms, or words used in a sense peculiar to some particular art, trade, or business, it is proper to leave it to the jury to ascertain and determine the sense in which such terms are employed. 5 If there are peculiar 1 Deutmann v. Kilpatrick (1891), 46 being of that character evidence show- Mo. App. 624 ; Fruin v. Crystal R., 89 ing what was the intention of the par- Mo. 397 ; Shickle v. Chouteau, etc., Co., ties was required to remove it. 10 Mo. App. 241, affirmed 84 Mo. z Neilson v. Harford, 8 M.&W. 823, 161; Ginnuth v. Blankenship (Texas per Parke, B. (action on the case for App. 1894), 28 S. W. Rep. 828, where the infringement of a patent), the court below construed a provision 8 Holland v. Long, 57 Ga. 36 ; Paine in a contract which was near the bor- v. Ringold, 43 Mich. 341. der line of uncertainty and ambiguity, 4 Morrell r. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402. and in its charge to the jury gave it a 5 Simpson v. Margitson, 11 Ad. & certain meaning. It was held that the El. N. S. 23; 63 Eng. Com. Law, 23; court should have left the construe- Hutchinsonw. Bowker, 5 M.& W. 535,- tion of the contract in this respect to Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123; Mc- the jury. The uncertainty or ambi- Avoy v. Long, 13 111. 147; Williams v. guity did not arise from the meaning to Woods, 16 Md. 220; Prather v. Ross, be given to the words used, but sprung 17 Ind. 495 ; Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick, from the fact as to what claims or 150; Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray, 251; persons were embraced or not em- Sellars v. Johnson, 65 N. C. 104. In braced within the meaning of the ex- Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402, Lord pression, "excepting those subscribers Abinger, C. B., said: "One case in taking stock," etc., and the ambiguity which the effect of a written document 904 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §745 expressions which have, in particular places or trades, a known meaning attached to them, it is for the jury to say what the meaning of these expressions is, but for the court to decide what the meaning of the contract is. 1 What is the true in- terpretation, however, of mercantile phrases in commercial correspondence is not always a question of law, but may in many cases be properly left to the jury to decide, where the phrases admit of different meanings. 8 § 745. Oral contracts. — Where a contract is oral, the question what the contract is must, if controverted, be tried by the jury as a question of fact, but where the terms of a contract are undisputed, its construction and effect, where the contract is oral as well as where it is written, are to be deter- mined by the court. 3 When the terms of a parol agreement are given, and are unambiguous, its interpretation is as much must be left to a jury is where it re- quires parol evidence to explain it, as in the ordinary case of mercantile con- tracts in which peculiar terms and ab- breviations are employed." 1 Hutchison v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535; Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. 150; Brown v. Orland, 36 Maine, 376 ; Burn- ham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 496; Taliaferro v. Cundiff, 33 Texas, 415. Questions as to the meaning of particular words used in a special sense in a written in- strument are for the jury. Pitney v. Glen's Falls Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 6. What was intended by "a first-class long raft-line" as used in a towing con- tract is for the jury. Stevenson v. Michigan Log -Towing Co. (Mich. 1894), 61 N. W. Rep. 536. 2 Fagin v. Connoly, 25 Mo. 94; 69 Am. Dec. 450, and note. Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of the court in Brown „. McGran, 14 Pet. 479, said: "It is certainly true, as a general thing, that the interpretation of written instruments properly be- longs to the court, and not to the jury. But there certainly are cases in which, from the different senses of the words used, or their obscure and indeter- minate reference to unexplained cir- cumstances, the true interpretation of the language may be left to the con- sideration of the jury for the purpose of carrying into effect the real inten- tion of the parties. This is especially applicable to cases of commercial correspondence, where the real objects and intentions and agreements of the parties are often to be arrived at only by allusions to circumstances which are but imperfectly developed. 3 Globe Works v. Wright, 106 Mass. 207 ; Guptill r. Damon, 42 Maine, 271 ; Bradbury v. Marbury, 12 Ala. 520; Moore v. Garwood, 4 Exch. 681 ; Perth Amboy Manufacturing Co. v. Condit, 21 N. J. Law, 659; Rogers v. Colt, 21 N. J. Law, 704; Brown v. Hatton, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 319; Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 402; Begg v. Forbes, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 508. It is for the jury to determine in what sense several terms having no accepted legal signifi- cation were used by the parties in an oral agreement for a sale. Becker v. Holm, 87 Wis. 86; 61 N. W. Rep. 307. § 746 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 905 a question of law for the court as the interpretation of an unambiguous written instrument. 1 Where the contract is oral the terms of the agreement are a matter of fact, and if those terms be obscure, or equivocal, or are susceptible of explana- tion from extrinsic evidence, it is for the jury to find the meaning of the terms employed, but the effect of a parol agree- ment, when its terms are given and its meaning fixed, is as much a question of law as the construction of a written agree- ment. 2 Exceptional cases arise where the contract rests partly in correspondence and partly in oral communications, in which it is held that the question whether or not there is a contract is a question for the jury. 3 Statements and conduct of the parties subsequent to a conversation in which it is alleged that a contract was made are competent only as they tend to show what was their real understanding as to that transaction, and not for the purpose of controlling or in any way changing the effect of the conversation. 4 § 746. Contracts of sale or return — Of sale or bailment. — The class of contracts known as contracts of "sale or return" exist where the privilege of purchase or return is not dependent upon the character or quality of the property sold, but rests entirely upon the option of the purchase to retain or return. In this class of cases the title passes to the purchaser, subject to his option to return the property within a time specified, or a reasonable time; and if before the expiration of such time, or the exercise of the option given, the property is destroyed, even by inevitable accident, the buyer is responsible for the price. 5 The recognized distinction between bailment and sale 1 Norton ». Higbee, 38 Mo. App. 467; to determine the legal effect of the Willardu.SiegelGasFixtureCo.(1891;, contract. Elliott u.Wanamaker (1893), 47 Mo. App. 1. Where a contract is 155 Pa. St. 67. oral, its construction is for the jury. 2 Spragins D.White (1891), 108 N. 0. Holmes v. Chartiers Oil Co. (1890), 138 449. Pa. St. 546. The construction of an 3 Scanlan v. Hodges (1892), 52 Fed. oral contract is for the jury where Rep. 354. there is any doubt about its terms. 4 Potter v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1894), The province of the jury is to settle 63 Fed. Rep. 382. disputed questions of fact. If no such 5 Sturm v. Boker , 150 U. S. 312, pei- disputed facts exist there is nothing Jackson, J.: "The true distinction is for them to do, and it is for the court pointed out by Wells, J., in Hunt v. 906 CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. §746 is that, when the identical article is to be returned in the same or in some altered form, the contract is one of bailment, and the title to the property is not changed. On the other hand, when there is no obligation to return the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return another thing of value, he becomes a debtor to make the return, and the title to the prop- erty is changed. In such a case the transaction is a sale. 1 Wyman, 100 Mass. 196, as follows: 'An option to purchase if he liked is essentially different from an option to return a purchase if he should not like. In one case, the title will not pass until the option is determined. In the other, the property passes at once, subject to the right to rescind and return.' The cases cited and re- lied on by the defendants (Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493, 494; Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436, 455 ; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 578, 581), involved contracts of 'sale or re- turn,' in which there was a sale fol- lowed by a destruction of the property before the option of the purchaser had expired, or had been exercised. It was properly held in these cases that the goods were at the risk of the pur- chaser pending the exercise of the option, and that he was responsible for the loss of the goods, or the price to be paid therefor." 1 Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110. In the case of Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 196, the bailee was to re- turn the property (a horse) in as good condition as he received it, by a desig- nated time. The property was so in- jured, without fault on his part, that it could not be returned within the time agreed upon, and no attempt was made to return it. Still, it was held that he was not responsible for the property. The court said : "A mere failure to return the horse within the time agreed may be a breach of con- tract upon which the plaintiff is en- titled to an appropriate remedy, but has no such legal effect as to convert the bailment into a sale. It might be an evidence of a determination by the defendant of his option to purchase, but it would be only evidence. In this case, the accident to the horse, before an opportunity was had for trial in order to determine the option, deprives it of all force, even as evi- dence." And see Walker v. Butterick, 105 Mass. 237. In Middleton v. Stone, 111 Pa. St. 589; 4 Atl. Rep. 523, A. delivered to B. two colts, under a con- tract that B. should safely keep and sell them, if possible, before a certain date, for A. — he fixing a minimum price to be received by him, and in addition thereto one-half of all money obtained above that price, to the ex- tent of 525 — and, if not sold, to return the animals in good condition. Held, that this was not a sale, but a bail- ment, and it was error, therefore, to overrule the offer of B. to show that the colts were sick when they were delivered to him; that one of them died ; and that he then offered to return the other to A., who refused to receive it. It was held that the horses were at the risk of A. CHAPTER XXI. CUSTOM AND USAGE. 747. Custom as an element of con- tracts — General rule. §759. 748. Mississippi doctrine. 760. 749. Such custom illustrated — Knowledge of custom. 761. 750. Established custom defined. 762. 751. Knowledge of general custom presumed — As to railroads. 763. 752. The same subject continued- 764. Question for jury. 765. 753. Express contract not to be con tradicted or varied — Princi- /66. pal and agent. 767. 754. The South Carolina rule. 755 Custom not to be contrary to 768. law — Railway and banking 769. customs. 756. Custom to be reasonable. 770. 757. Plain terms not to be varied by custom. 758. Proving custom as to measure- ment, etc., where contract si- lent. Commercial usage defined and considered. The same subject continued. Knowledge of local usage es- sential. Agent's knowledge imputed to principal — Bill of lading. How usage may be proved. The same subject continued. Personal customs or habits. Usage as to authority of insur- ance agents. Custom construed — Charter- party — Demurrage. Relating to brokers. Banking custom as to collec- tions — Evidence. Excluding custom by notice — Pleading custom. § 747. Custom as an element of contracts — General rule. — To be permitted to establish a custom, and make it operative upon a contract in any given case, it must be reasonable, not against the law or public policy, not opposed to any express term of the contract, and must be so generally known as to justify the presumption that the parties knew of it and con- tracted in reference to it. 1 It is well settled that proof of local 1 Desha v. Holland, 12 Ala. 513 ; Herring v. Skaggs, 73 Ala. 446 ; East Smith v. Rice, 56 Ala. 417; Mobile, Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 etc., R. Co. v. Jay, 61 Ala. 247; Anto- Ala. 596; Wilkinson v. Williamson, mar'chi i>. Russell, 63 Ala. 356; Powell 76 Ala. 163; Barlow v. Lambert, 28 v. Thompson, 80 Ala. 51 ; Haas v. Ala. 704. Hadmon, 83 Ala. 174; 3 So. Rep. 302; 908 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 747 usages will not raise a presumption of knowledge of their exist- ence on the part of one engaged generally in the business to which they pertain in a certain city, at least where the domi- cile of the party sought to be charged is elsewhere; or, in other words, in order to create even a prima facie presumption that a party has knowledge of a usage incident to a particular business about which he is engaged, the usage must be shown to be a general one in that business, in such sort as that it would be unreasonable to suppose he was ignorant of it. 1 Ac- cordingly, on an issue as to the existence of a general cus- tom in a certain place, as claimed by plaintiff, and as to its effect on a contract between plaintiff and defendant, an in- struction was erroneous which ignored all inquiry as to the length of time the custom had prevailed, and as to defendant's knowledge of its existence, or opportunity of acquiring such knowledge. 2 A traveling salesman, selling by sample, for credit or cash, to be paid on receipt of the goods, has no im- plied authority to collect the money agreed to be paid, and a custom in the town in which the goods were sold to pay such salesman is not binding on non-resident principals, in the ab- sence of evidence of notice to them of such custom. 3 1 German-American Ins. Co. v. Com- change or affect the rights of tha mercial Fire Ins. Co. (1891), 95 Ala. principals, unless it had also been 469; 11 So. Kep. 117. proved that they had notice of it. 2 Buyck v. Schwing (1893), 100 Ala. German-American Ins. Co. v. Com- 355; 14 So. Rep. 48. mercial Fire Ins. Co., 95 Ala. 469. 3 Simon v. Johnson (1893), 101 This was not only not proved, but Ala. 368; 13 So. Rep. 491, per Me- there was no evidence adduced which Clellan, J.: "It is insisted in this legitimately tended to prove it. The case that the payment was authorized only facts relied on as having such a and justified by a custom prevailing tendency is that some years previously generally in the town of Geneva the defendant had purchased a bill of (where the contract of sale was made, goods from a firm in New Orleans; the goods delivered subsequently, and paid the bill at maturity to the travel the price paid, also subsequently, to ing salesman who took the order; in- the agent) for payments to be made formed the firm of the fact; that they in this way. The plaintiffs, whom did not dissent from or object to this this agent was representing, lived and mode of payment ; and that one mem- carried on their business in New Or- ber of that firm is now a member of leans. Conceding that the usage itself the plaintiff's firm. It is, we think, was established by the evidence, it too clear for discussion that, as proof did not authorize or justify the pay- of this one isolated transaction would ment to the agent, or in any manner be no evidence of the alleged custom, § 748 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 909 § 748. Mississippi doctrine. — The Mississippi doctrine is that a custom in regard to a certain business existing among all the persons engaged therein in a city is a general custom, with reference to which it will be presumed, in the absence of rebutting evidence, that contracts touching the business were entered into. 1 so notice of it would be no evidence of notice of such custom." 1 Burbridge v. Gumbel, 72 Miss. 371 ; 16 So. Rep. 792, per Whitfield, J.: "The offer of the defendants was to show not only that it was the custom of the cotton factors in the New Or- leans market, but also the custom of cotton factors generally, to imply in- structions as to insuring cotton only to the season or cotton year in which such instructions were given. The testimony offered was to show, not a purely local custom, but a general one, and should have gone to the jury, under proper charges. Even if the offer had been to prove only the custom of the cotton factors in New Orleans, the testimony should have been received. Says Mr. Lawson, in his work on Customs and Usages (pages 40, 41, § 17): 'Knowledge of a usage is necessary in every case in order to bind a person by its terms. Sometimes this notice must be ex- pressly proved, and sometimes from its generality and notoriety the law raises the presumption that it was known. It is therefore only as af- fecting the question of notice that the generality of the usage becomes ma- terial. And as express notice is diffi- cult to prove, because in the majority of cases nothing has been said by the parties in their negotiations about the usage, it is obvious that in the greatest number of instances it be- comes absolutely necessary to prove such a usage as the law will presume the party intended to be bound by ; and, consequently, in all these cases the generality of the custom becomes vital, and the rule that a usage must be general is applied by the courts with rigor. It becomes, therefore, of importance to determine what the courts understand by this rule. And, in the first place, it is settled that a usage may be "general," as this term is used here, notwithstanding that it is confined to a particular city, town, or village. It may be generally known in that city, town, or village, and be understood by all persons dealing there, and yet it may not ex- ist in any place beyond. But the usage of a single house or of one per- son only is insufficient. * * * A particular banking usage must apply to a place rather than to a particular bank. It must be the rule of all the banks in the place, or it can not be a valid usage.' Again in §24, the author quotes approvingly from Mayor, etc., of Pittsburgh v. O'Neill, 1 Pa. St. 342 : ' Alltradeshavetheir usages, and, when acontractismadewithaman about the business of his craft, it is framed on the basis of its usage, which becomes a part of it, except when its place is occupied by particular stipulations' — and refers to many instances, illus- trative, where, 'the usage being proved, it was held not material that the proof did not show, in addition, that the party to be affected by it had express notice of it,' but 'it would be pre- sumed' that they had notice. Sewell v. Corp, 1 Car. & P. 392 ; Given u.Char- ron, 15 Md. 502 ; Lyon ^.George, 44 Md. 295. In Couch v. Watson Coal Co., 48 Iowa, 17, the same doctrine is ex- 910 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §749 § 749. Such custom illustrated — Knowledge of custom. — Where the purchaser of Smyrna canary seed refused to re- ceive it at New York, not because of its deficiency as to quan- tity or quality, but simply because it was not brought by the specified steamer of shipment, the Aleppo, but by the Aura- nia, to which it was transferred at Liverpool, it was held on appeal to be error to reject the seller's offer to show by the broker who negotiated the sale of the seed that there were not at the time, and never had been, freight steamers sailing di- rect from Turkey to New York, and that the invariable cus- tom known to all persons engaged in the trade was to carry such goods to Liverpool and there trans-ship them to a steamer for New York. It was also held on appeal that this offered evidence was not contradictory to the broker's note of sale, but rather explained it, and enabled the court to choose between two possible constructions of it, and therefore should have been admitted. 1 But in an action for a balance due for work as trim- pressly stated, saying : ' If it had been shown that operators of mines in this state, similarly situated, and using substantially the same kind of ma- chinery, generally constructed cages with bonnets, it could be reasonably presumed that defendant had knowl- edge of such custom,' etc. So, in section 18, Mr. Lawson says that, in the case of particular usages, knowledge 'is to be shown by express proof or by evi- dence of their generality;' using the word ' generality ' in the sense ex- plained by him in section 17. And he concludes (section 24) : ' If a party closes his eyes and shuts his ears to what is universally known in his com- munity by others, he will not be al- lowed to shelter himself under a plea of ignorance.' If, therefore, defend- ants could show the custom of the cotton factors of the New Orleans market to be as insisted, they should have been allowed to do so. If they succeeded in showing such established, uniform, certain custom there, among other cotton factors in that market, a presumption would arise (under the au- thorities svpra and the following cases, cited in note 1 to section 17, to wit Gleason u. Walsh, 43 Maine, 397 Thompson v. Hamilton, 12 Pick. 426 Perkins v. Jordan, 35 Maine, 23, and Clark v. Baker, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 186) from a custom thus general in that market that the plaintiffs (themselves cotton factors in that market) knew of that custom, and contracted with ref- erence to it — a presumption which plaintiffs might, if they could, rebut, all the testimony touching which cus- tom, in all its aspects, should have been submitted to the jury, the triors of the facts. See also, note to Wig- glesworth v, Dallison, 1 Smith's Lead- ding Oases, 9 Am. ed. 842; Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539." 1 Iasigi v. Eosenstein (1894), 141 N. Y. 414; 36 N. E. Rep. 509, per Finch, J.: "This evidence was re- jected, and a verdict rendered for the defendants, which the general term has affirmed. That affirmance is put upon the ground that the terms of the § 749 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 911 mer in defendant's saw-mill, evidence that certain trimmers in defendant's employ worked under a contract containing a con- dition that a part of their wages was to be retained by de- contract provide for a shipment on a named steamer from Turkey direct to New York; that an arrival of the goods at the latter port by the Aleppo is essential matter of description, and a condition precedent to the buyer's obligation to accept; and that the usage or custom sought to be proved would contradict the terms of the contract, and for that reason is inad- missible. There is no doubt of the general rule, and it may be conceded, for the present, to cover matters of description which are seemingly un- important, but the question here is as to the application of the rule to the facts. The broker's notes do not, in explicit terms, require a shipment direct, and in the same steamer, from Turkey to New York. Such a con- struction is matter of inference from words which do not necessarily and inevitably involve that inference. The steamer of shipment must be the Aleppo, from Turkey. The steamer of arrival is not identified. It may or may not be the one first mentioned, or another and different one. If it must mean the Aleppo, and can mean no other, the general term were right ; but if it may mean the steamer of arrival, even though not the Aleppo, then there is an ambiguity — a doubt about the real contract intention — which may be solved by proof of cus- tom and usage. I think that is the truth. Observe the language of prim- ary description — that intended to identify the goods, and prescribing the date and character of the ship- ment. There are two elements pro- vided : First, the property bought is to be ' good merchantable Smyrna canary seed;' and, second, 'March steamer shipment from Turkey.' That ends the description of what was agreed to be bought, for the note goes at once to the question of price, and other details of the contract. Plainly, for some reason, the parties contented themselves with saying simply 'ship- ment from Turkey,' and omitted to add 'to New York,' or other words indicating a direct or unbroken voy- age ; and this omission occurs in the formal description of the goods, and where it was not to be expected if a direct voyage was meant. The note then passes to other details. One is ' goods to be taken from dock on arrival of steamer, when ready for delivery.' This sentence, most cer- tainly, was no part of the description of the goods bought, and was not intended to qualify or affect that de- scription. It merely made a delivery on the dock, from the steamer having the goods, a sufficient delivery. It does not say what steamer, or dictate that it must be the Aleppo. The final provision, 'Name of steamer to be given soon as known,' undoubtedly refers back to steamer of shipment. But it is said that, in all the terms of the broker's note, but one steamer is referred to. That, however, is the precise question. Was only one re- ferred to? The language admits of the possibility that two were referred to — the steamer of shipment and the steamer of arrival — and it is in view of that possible doubt as to the real purpose and intention of the parties that the evidence of usage and custom was offered. The moment it is shown that there was no steamer sailing direct from Turkey to New York ; that all importations from that country by steam came first to Liverpool, and were there trans-shipped, and that the 912 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 750 fendant, and forfeited to it if they should leave its employ before the end of the sawing season, and that it was defend- ant's custom to retain part of the wages of all its employes, is incompetent to show that plaintiff worked under such a contract, in the absence of testimony that he had any knowl- edge of such custom. 1 § 750. Established custom defined. — At the common law, a custom was not an established one unless it was shown to have existed from time immemorial. By the more recent law, the true test of such a custom is its having existed a sufficient length of time to have become generally known, and to war- rant the jury in finding that the contracts were made in refer- ence to it. 8 No person can be made liable by reason of a custom except when it is shown that he had knowledge of the custom. In cases where the custom is a limited or special one, actual knowledge must be proved, and every custom is a limited or special one until it is shown to have existed long enough to sustain the test above stated. 3 When, in an action for a speci- goods bought, if transported by steam, In Deane v. Everrett, 90 Iowa, 294; must come and could come in no 57 N. W. Rep. 874, Rothrock, J., said: other way; and that both parties and "A number of witnesses were called their broker knew the fact — all doubt by the defendant by which it was and ambiguity disappear. We see at sought to prove that there was a cus- once that the provision for delivery, torn or usage of wholesale merchants which says simply 'steamer,' does not by which their traveling agents were and can not mean the Aleppo, was authorized to bind their principals by not so intended or understood, but fixing the price of goods sold. None refers to the steamer of arrival after of these witnesses claimed to have the necessary and contemplated trans- any knowledge of any such custom or shipment at Liverpool. The proof usage in the sale of iron safes. This does not contradict the note. It sim- was sufficient ground for rejecting the ply explains it, and enables us to evidence. We do not determine choose between two possible construe- whether such evidence would be cona- tions, either of which the instrument petent in any case." will bear. We think the evidence 2 Powell v. Bradlee, 9 Gill & J. should have been admitted, and that (Md.) 220; Burroughs v. Langley, for the error in excluding it the judg- 10 Md. 248 ; Smiths. Wright, 1 Caines, ment should be reversed and a new 43; Treadwellu. Union Insurance Co., trial granted; costs to abide the 6 Cow. 270; Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn, event." 410; Bliven v. New England, etc., 1 Brunnell v. Hudson Sawmill Co. Screw Co., 23 How. 420. (1893), 86 Wis. 587 ; 57 N.W. Rep. 364; " Smith v. Phipps (1894), 65 Conn. and see Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 76. 302. $ 751 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 913 fied contract price per foot for drilling wells, plaintiff claims to recover under a custom of the trade for drilling wells that were started and abandoned on account of striking solid bottom, in addition to those that were completed, an instruction that some evidence was offered from which it was claimed that the jury would find such a custom existed, and that, if they found there was such a known and established custom in the trade, the parties would be presumed to have contracted with the custom in view, and they might allow the claim, but it must be a universal, certain and general usage and custom of the trade, is erroneous in not stating what must be proved to show that a custom is a known and established one, and in treating the presumption that might be drawn from such a custom as one of law. 1 § 751. Knowledge of general custom presumed — As to rail- roads. — Where a custom is found to be general and notorious, and to have the other requisites of a valid custom, it is a con- clusion of law that the parties must have contracted with ref- erence to it, and their knowledge is conclusively presumed. 2 A person dealing at a particular market will be taken to have dealt according to the known general custom and usage of that market, and, if he employs another to act for him in buy- ing or selling at such market, he will be held as intending that the business should be conducted according to such gen- eral usage and custom, and such has been held to be the rule whether he in fact knows of the custom or not. 3 Where a 1 Smith v. Phipps (1894), 65 Conn, was a general, known, and established 302; 32 Atl. Rep. 367, per Andrews, one." C. J. : "This instruction seems to us 2 Hostetter v. Park, 137 U. S. 30; 11 to have been insufficient for the guid- Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. And see also, Par- ance of the jury, in that it does not sons on Contracts (7th ed.), 675. state what must be proved in order to s Union Stock Yard Co. v. Mallory, show that a custom is a known and etc., Co., 157 111. 554; 41 N. E. Rep. established one, and also in treating 888, following Samuels v. Oliver, 130 the presumption which might be 111. 73. And also see, Bailey v. Bens- drawn from such a custom as one of ley, 87 111. 556; Doane v. Dunham, 79 law. There was no evidence that the 111. 131 ; Lyons v. Culbertson, 83 111. defendant had any actual knowledge 33 ; Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 111. 44 ; of the custom, and she was liable, if at Home Ins. Co. v. Favorite, 46 111. 233. all, by reason of the custom, because it 58 914 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 751 contract of shipment by rail does not define what shall consti- tute a car load, a general custom among railroad men and shippers, by which a car load is made to consist of a certain number of pounds, governs the contract. 1 It is the usage in this country for all railroad companies receiving cars from other roads to make necessary repairs at their own expense, unless the car is inspected and branded as defective when received. In consequence of such usage, a company which claims cars belonging to another road, and, pending a judicial determination of the title thereto, is, by agreement, permitted to retain and use them subject to a rental in case the de- cision is against it, can not, after such decision, set off against the rental any claim for the cost of repairs. 2 A foreign man- ufacturer employing an agent to solicit orders is bound by a general custom which authorizes such agent to accept orders without conference with their principals, although he may have no actual knowledge of the custom. 3 And where the payee of a draft selects a bank as his collecting agent, he is presumed to know the methods by which such transactions are effected through general banking customs, and actual ignorance of them is of no avail as an excuse. 4 1 Good v. Chicago, etc., E. Co. local customs, holding that, as to a (Iowa, Oct. 1894), 60 N. W. Rep. 631, local custom, knowledge of it must be per Granger, C. J. : "See, in our own shown, and as to the general custom, state, for quite an extended discussion when established by evidence, that it on the subject of a custom affecting only raises a presumption which the the construction of a contract, Pil- party may overcome by showing that mer v. Branch of State Bank, 16 he actually had no knowledge of it. Iowa, 321. And see, Bindskoff v. Our conclusion is that if the parties Barrett, 14 Iowa, 101. Neither of do not by their contract define what these cases is against the rule we shall be a car load, the general cus- announce. They deal with local cus- torn, where there is one, prevails, and, toms, ;md with facts as to which when proven, it conclusively, rather the party sought to be bound by the than presumptively, fixes the terms custom would not be presumed to of the contract." understand there was a custom, so 2 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., that, in the absence of an inquiry to B. Co. (l. Q !)2), 50 Fed. Rep. 857. know what it was, he would be bound 3 Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343; by it. It will be seen by a reference 54 N. W. Rep. 50. to the instructions quoted that the 4 Howard v. Walker (1892), 92 Term, court deals with both general and 452; 21 S. W. Rep. 897. § 752 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 915 § 752. The same subject continued— Question for jury.— When a custom is general, every person who makes a contract is presumed to know the custom, and it enters into the con- tract and binds him ; but, where it is a purely local custom, a stranger to the locality where it exists can not be bound by it, unless knowledge of the custom is proven. 1 It is for the jury, under proper instructions from the court, to take all the evi- dence in the case — that as to the existence, duration, and other characteristic of the custom or usage, and that as to the knowl- edge thereof by the parties — and therefrom to determine wheth- er there is shown a custom of such age and character that the presumption of law will arise that the parties knew of and contracted with reference to it, or whether the usage is so local and particular as that knowledge in the party to be charged must be shown affirmatively or may be negatived. 2 There are some usages so general as to be deemed to have become a part of the common law so that no one can be heard to profess ig- norance of them. On the other hand, there are usages so re- stricted to locality, or trade, or business, that ignorance of them constitutes a valid reason why a party may not be held to have contracted with reference to them. 3 Thus, where a physi- 1 Horan v. Strachan, 86 Ga. 408. approved, in the court's statement, of 2 Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464 ; 10 the 'foundation of the whole doctrine Am. Rep. 407, a case reviewing Bar- of custom and usage,' and in which nard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, and case the mode of showing knowledge Dodge v. Favor, 15 Gray, 82. See, to is not passed on, except as to opin- the same effect, Sampson v. Gazzam, ions. In Dodge v. Favor, 15 Gray, 82, 6 Port. 123 ; 30 Am. Dec. 578, where the it is stated (page 83) that'they did not court say : "Where a custom or usage offer to prove by direct testimony that is proved to exist in relation to a par- the plaintiff knew of this custom, but ticular trade or pursuit, if it be gen- contended that they could satisfy the eral, all persons engaged therein are jury on the evidence in the case that presumed to contract in reference to he knew of it.' This was allowed. It such usage." See also, Andrews v. went to the jury. In Barnard v. Kel- Roach, 3 Ala. 590; 37 Am. Dec. 718; logg, 10 Wall. 383, the point decided Mooney v. Howard Insurance Co., was that the rule of caveat emptor could 138 Mass. 375 ; and the authorities in not be annulled by proof of custom to note to Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190 ; the contrary, on the familiar princi- 11 Am. St. Rep. 627, 633; 21 N. E. pie that custom can not be shown Rep. 160. The evidence must not be when it contravenes the law." of opinions, as in Shackelford v. New " Booth, etc., Granite Co. v. Baird Orleans, etc., Co., 37 Miss. 202, where (1895), 87 Hun, 452; 34 N. Y. Supl. the general doctrine is recognized and 392. 916 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 753 cian employs another to assist him in a case, evidence is not admissible of a custom prevailing among the physicians of the city and vicinity that, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, the physician so employed is to obtain his compensation from the patient, it not being shown that the custom was known to him or so general that knowledge and adoption of it might be presumed. 1 But in an action on a con- tract for the manufacture of candy boxes, evidence is admis- sible as to the mode in which such boxes are made and printed in the candy trade, in the absence of a special direction as to the mode of printing. 2 § 753. Express contract not to be contradicted or varied — Principal and agent. — Usage will not be permitted as between principal and agent, or as between principal and third persons having notice of them, to contravene express instructions to the agent, or an express contract contrary to the usage. 3 Where an agent, authorized to buy cedar logs, stated at the time of making an arrangement to pay for supplies furnished to the seller out of the money due him that he had no authority to make debts, the principal was not bound, although there was a local custom that agents authorized to buy logs should have authority to make such agreements. 4 Where a contract to build a house calls for a good three-coat plastering, it is inadmis- sible to show, in an action for the balance due on the contract, that it is the custom of plasterers in that vicinity to slight their work, and do "drawn work," which is two-coat work, when three-coat work is contracted for. 5 Where a sale of coffee was in writing, and no mention made of samples, the seller could not show a custom making it the duty of buyers of coffee to accept or reject it immediately after the receipt of overland 1 Fitzgerald v. Hanson, 16 Mont.474; go below 45 or 46 per cent. And see 41 Pac. Rep. 230. Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. St. 70. 2 Gair v. Auerbach (Com. PI. 1895), s Simmons v. Law, 3 Keyes (N. Y.), 34 N. Y. Supl. 3. In Guillon v. Earn- 217; Fox v. Parker, 44 Barb. 541 ; Wig- shaw,169Pa.St.463;32Atl. Rep.545,it glesworth v. Dallison, 1 Doug. 201; 2 was held to be error to reject evidence Rice on Evidence, § 349. ofiered to plaintiff of a custom in 4 American Lead Pencil Co. v. Wolfe Spain in sales of iron ore to fix a (1892), 11 So. Rep. 488; 30 Fla. 360. standard of 50 per cent, with a sliding 6 Cook v. Hawkins (1891), 16 S. W. scale, and that the purchaser was Rep. 8; 54 Ark. 423. obliged to receive the ore if it did not § 754 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 917 samples, and that, consequently, the buyer had accepted the coffee by retaining such samples for two days, because to allow the admission of such a custom would, in effect, alter the contract in a particular material to defendants' rights ' A charter-party of a vessel to a safe port can not be controlled by evidence of a custom to consider safe a particular port which, in fact, is not reasonably safe, because to admit such custom in evidence would contradict the charter-party and would therefore be incompe- tent as matter of law. 2 In an action against a propeller for breach of a contract to make as many trips as possible, because she towed more than two vessels, the construction of the con- tract can not be varied by evidence of a custom for propellers of her class to tow at times as many as five vessels, where it is not shown that they always tow more than one or two. 3 § 754. The South Carolina rule. — The South Carolina rule is that evidence of custom and usage is not admissible to explain or vary the terms of an express contract, whether writ- ten or verbal, unambiguous in its terms, unless to show the meaning of certain terms used in such contract, which, by well-established custom or long usage, have acquired a mean- ing different from that which they primarily bear, for the rea- son that when parties, in making a contract, use terms which, by usage or custom, have acquired a certain meaning, they must, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be as- sumed to have used such terms in such acquired sense. 4 ^'Donohue v. Leggett (1892), 31 Milling Co. v. Minneapolis Elevator N. E. Rep. 269; 134 N. Y. 40. Co.,44Minn.l53;46N.W.Rep.306, the 2 The Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474 ; Barnard question was whether the title to oer- v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Hayton v. tain grain sold vested in the vendee. Irwin, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 130. By the terms of the contract of sale 3 The Oregon v. Pittsburg Iron Co. the grain was sold for 'cash on de- (1893), 55 Fed. Rep. 666. livery,' which had not been complied 4 In Fairly u. Wappoo Mills (S. Car. with; but vendee sought to sustain 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 108, the court his claim by proof of a custom pre- said: "In the absence of any au- vailing in that locality, whereby the thority in this state upon this ques- title was regarded as having passed tion (for we do not think the case of when certain things were done, what- Mordecai v. Jacobi, 12 Rich. Law, ever might be the terms of the sale 547, throws any light upon the ques- agreed upon by the parties. But the tion), we are compelled to resort to court said: 'A local usage can not be the authorities elsewhere. In Globe proved to contradict a contract. * * 91S CUSTOM AND USAGE. §755 § 755. Custom not to be contrary to law — Railway and bank- ing customs. — A usage or custom can not be invoked by a party and introduced into a contract, as an element of it, if it is con- If, by the contract of sale of this wheat, it was for cash on delivery, the usage can not make it a sale on a credit.' In Page v. Cole, 120 Mass. 37, the action was to recover damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of a 'milk-route,' and evidence as to the meaning and effect which that term had acquired by usage prevail- ing in that locality was held compe- tent. In Walls ». Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, the action was to recover the amount due plaintiff for plastering which he had contracted to do at sc much per square yard, and it was held competent to prove that the cus- tom was to measure the openings for windows and doors, as well as the solid walls. In that case it was said that: 'Every legal contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the intention of the parties ; and usage, when it is reasonable, uniform, and well settled, not in opposition to fixed rules of law, not in contradiction to the express terms of the contract [italics ours] , is deemed to form a part of the contract, and to enter into the inten- tions of the parties.' In Hinton v. Locke, 5 Hill, 437, the action was on a contract to pay the plaintiff so much per day for his services, and it was held competent to show that the uni- versal custom in that locality was to count a day as 10 hours. Of course, the term 'day' could not be regarded as meaning 24 hours, and hence it was competent to show how many hours were regarded as a day. In that case, however, Branson, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, expressly disapproves of the case of Smith v. Wilson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 728, where, upon a contract to pay so much a thousand for all the rabbits in a certain warren, it was held com- petent to show that in that part of the country the custom was to con- strue the term 'thousand' as meaning 100 dozen or 1,200, because he said that would be allowing the custom to contradict the express terms of the contract. His language is : 'No usage or custom can be set up for the pur- pose of controlling the rules of law. Nor is such evidence admissible where it contradicts the agreement of the par- ties.' In Ware v. Hay ward Rubber Co., 3 Allen, 84, the plaintiff claimed one- half commissions on goods consigned to him for sale, but not sold, and turned over to consignor, basing his claim upon a custom prevailing in that locality. Held, that evidence of such a custom was incompetent. Chapman, J., in delivering the opin- ion of the court, used this language : 'This being a written and express contract, the evidence offered in re- spect to the usage of commission mer- chants to charge one-half commis- sions when goods consigned to them in the ordinary way for sale are taken back is not applicable to this case, for an express contract can not be con- trolled or varied by usage.' And this was the point upon which the case turned. In Ford v. Tirrell, 9 Gray, 401, the action was upon a contract to build an octagon cellar wall at 11 cents per foot, and the question was as to the mode of measurement to be adopted in order to ascertain the amount of work done. The court seems to have held that, as the con- tract was silent as to the mode of measurement, it was competent to introduce evidence as to the custom or usage in such cases by which the mode of measurement should ho de- § 755 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 919 trary to law . Accordingly a failure to comply with the Texas stat- ute requiring railroad companies to deliver freight,upon a tender by the owner of the freight charges, as shown by the bill of lad- termined : citing 1 Greenleaf on Evi- dence, § 292. In Barton v. McKel- way, 22 N. J. Law, 165, the action was on a written contract for the delivery of a specified number of morus multi- caulis trees, of not less than one foot in height, and the question was as to the mode of measuring the height of the trees. Held, that it was compe- tent to show that it was the universal custom prevailing among dealers in such articles to measure only the ripe, hard wood, rejecting the green, im- mature top. The court, in its opinion, says that the true office of such evi- dence is 'to interpret tb.3 otherwise indeterminate intention of the par- ties, and the nature and extent of their contract, and fix and explain the meaning of words.' In Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. 346, the question was as to when — at what hour — a lease from the 1st of May to the 1st of May in a succeeding year terminated ; and it was held competent to show that, by universal custom, such a lease would terminate at 12 it, on the 1st of May. In Grant v. Maddox, 15 Mees. & W. 737, the court went as far as in any other case which we have exam- ined. In that case the action was upon a contract to pay the plaintiff, for her services as an opera singer, so much per week for each week in the three years for which she engaged ; and the controversy was as to whether plaintiff was entitled to receive the stipulated sum for each week during the whole of the three years, or only for each week during the theatrical season of those years. The court held that it was competent to prove a custom by which a year was regarded as only the theatrical season, and not the whole calendar year. In Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417, the question was whether a purchaser of grain in the city of New York, negotiated by a broker, would be discharged by the payment of the purchase price to the broker. Held, that he would not, as the broker's agency terminates when he makes the sale, and he has no au- thority to receive the purchase-money, and that evidence of any local usage in New York to the contrary was not admissible to control the general rule of law. In Bower v. Jones, 8 Bing.65, 21 E.C. L. 447, it was held that, where there was an express agreement that the principal should be responsible for bad debts, proof that the custom of the trade was that commissions should not be allowed on bad debts could not be received, because in violation of the express terms of the agreement. From this review of the cases cited above, as well as from the examina- tion of others, which we have not deemed it necessary to cite, it is ob- vious there is not entire harmony in the decisions. Our next inquiry is whether the contract which consti- tutes the basis of this action is of such a character as to require or war- rant a resort to evidence of custom or usage in order to explain any ambi- guity therein, or to interpret the mean- ing of terms used therein which have acquired some secondary meaning. We are unable to discover any am- biguity in the terms of the contract. The amount of the article sold, the price, the times of delivery and the time and mode of payment are all distinctly specified; and we are equally unable to discover any terms used therein which require any interpreta- tion." 920 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §755 ing, is not excused by the refusal of the owner to surrender the hill of lading, or to give an indemnity bond in lieu of such surrender; and it is immaterial that there is a general custom among railroads requiring the surrender of the bill of lad- ing. 1 It has been held in Alabama that evidence of a general custom of passing checks payable to an existing person or bearer, by delivery only, will not affect the operation of the Alabama statute providing that all bills or notes payable to an existing person or bearer must be construed as if payable to such person or order. 2 A custom can not make a contract where there is none, nor prevent the effect of settled rules of law. 3 A party can not invoke and have the benefit of a local usage inconsistent with the law merchant which he himself ^ulf, etc., R. Co. v. McCown (Texas 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 435, per Collard, J.: "Upon both points the court was correct. The carrier can not refuse to deliver freight on the ground that the bill of lading is not sur- rendered to him. Dwyer v. Gulf, etc., Ry . Co., 69 Texas,707 ; 7 S.W. Rep. 504. Nor can he require an indemnity bond upon failure of the owner to sur- render it. It can not coerce the owner into giving indemnity for refusal to do what the law declares he is not bound to do. The law protects him in the refusal, and the carrier can not force burdens upon him because he insists upon his rights. As to cus- tom: It can not deprive one of a legal right without his consent and without compensation ; it can not make contracts for parties ; it can in some cases construe the terms used in a contract ; but it is not a good cus- tom if it is unreasonable, or contrary to law. The custom contended for can not be enforced. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fagan, 72 Texas, 127 ; 9 S. W. Rep. 749 ; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 251." 2 First. Nat. Bank v. Nelson (Ala. 1894), 16 So. Rep. 707, Haralson, J.: "It has been argued that by the gen- eral custom, bank checks, when paya- ble to an existing person or bearer, pass from hand to hand by delivery merely, and are payable to the holder without indorsement, and that this circumstance shows the construction which the general public has placed upon this statute — a fact, as urged, which should have great weight with courts in determining the true con- struction of this statute. It is not to be denied, that if the meaning of words of a statute be uncertain, usage may be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting them (Lawson on Usages and Customs 462, § 223; South. St. Const., § 308) ; but popular disregard of a statute, or a custom opposed to it, will not repeal it ; and a custom or usage which would contradict the commands of a statute ought not to be considered. Lawson on Usages and Customs, § 216; South. St. Const., § 137; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. His- song, 99 Ala. 187; 13 So. Rep. 211; East Tenn., etc., R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596; Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704." 'National Bank v, Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686; Bliven v. New Eng., etc., Co., 23 How. 420; Adams ». Goddard, 48 Maine, 212; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 663; Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 497 ; Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 155. § 755 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 921 had ceased to observe. Thus, plaintiffs doing a banking busi- ness, after abandoning a practice to give notice of the dis- honor of notes by mail notwithstanding that the indorser and holder lived in the same town, could not rely on such cus- tom, even though it continued to prevail among other banks; and an allegation by plaintiffs, doing a banking business, that a general custom prevailed among all the local banks to give notices of dishonor by mail, notwithstanding that the in- dorser and holder lived in the same town, is not supported by proof of a practice prevailing among other banks, in which plaint- iffs did not participate. 1 Where a check is payable to a named person or bearer, and the payee indorses it in blank and de- livers it to a bank and receives credit for it, in an action by the indorsee against the maker, evidence that, by a custom among bankers, where a check is drawn on a bank and pre- sented to another bank, it is passed to the credit of the cus- tomer, but that the credit so given is treated as a receipt for the check, and not as a payment, is inadmissible, as the in- dorsement and check evidence the agreement between the payee and indorsee, and the transfer of the check is governed by the law merchant. 2 In North Carolina, a local custom of merchants, warranting the taking of interest greater than that allowed by statute, can not be allowed to supersede or modify the statute. 3 A custom on the part of a carrier or of carriers generally at a particular place to deliver goods to one other than the consignee, who merely holds the bill of lading with- out any indorsement, does not justify such delivery, as the carrier is bound by law to deliver only to the person who has title to the bill of lading. 4 Proof of a custom is not ad- 1 Isbell v. Lewis, 98 Ala. 550 ; 13 So. not authorize or justify the carrier in Rep. 335. delivering the consignment to such 2 Shaw v. Jacobs (Iowa 1893), 55 person. Hutchinson on Carriers, §344; N. W. Rep. 333. 2 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 3 Gore v, Lewis (1891), 109 N. C. 230, 231. The obligation to deliver 539; 13 S. E. Eep. 909. only to the party having title to the 'Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bark- bill of lading is imposed by law on house, 100 Ala. 543; 13 So. Rep. 534, the carrier, and is absolute. Any per McClellan, J.: "A bill of lading custom of a particular carrier or of does not pass by delivery, and the carriers generally at a particular place possession of it by one other than the to make deliveries to persons merely consignee without indorsement will in possession of the bill of lading is a 922 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 756 missible to enlarge the powers of officers whose authority is defined by statute. 1 A usage of trade for banks to take pledges from factors as security for the payment of the general bal- ance of account between them, of goods known to be held by them as factors, is unlawful, and can not be invoked by the parties. 2 § 756. Customs to be reasonable. — Evidence to show that an agreement in writing to serve as traveling salesman im- poses upon the salesman, according to the usages and customs of trade, the duty of making up samples necessary for his busi- ness, is admissible in an action for breach of such contract. 8 Parties are bound to act in reference to a reasonable custom, although they have not expressly agreed to do so. 4 In an ac- bad custom, and can not be adduced in evidence to exempt such carrier or carriers from liability for deliveries to wrong persons." 'Walters e. Senf (1893), 115 Mo. 524; 22 S. W. Rep. 511; Walters v. Brooks (1893), 115 Mo. 534; 22 S. W. Rep. 514. 2 Allen v. St. Louis Bank, 120 U. S. 20, per Gray, J.: "The usage can not aid the plaintiff because it was contrary to law in that it undertook to alter the nature of the contract be- tween the factors and their princi- pals which authorizes them to sell but not to pledge and in that it would sustain a pledge by a factor of the goods of several principals to secure the payment of his own general bal- ance of account to a third person. Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499; New- bold v. Wright, 4 Rawle, 195; Leh- man u.Marshall,47 Ala. 362 ; Leuckhart v. Cooper, 3 Bing. N. 0. 99; Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. L. 802." 3 Brown v. Baldwin & Gleason Co. (1891), 13 N. Y. Supl. 893. A coke manufacturing company agreed by written contract to furnish to defend- ant at his furnaces fifteen cars of coke per day for six months at an agreed price per ton. The coke com- pany, however, were "not to be held in damages for the railroad company's failure to supply transportation." It was held that the contract was sub- ject to a custom prevailing among coke producers of that region, and known to both parties, to distribute, in case of shortage of cars, all the cars received proportionately among the orders on hand ; and defendant had no ground of complaint if he received his proper proportion of cars during the period of the shortage. McKee- frey v. Connellsville Coke Co. (1893), 56 Fed. Rep. 212, and see Howard v. Walker (1892), 92 Tenn. 452, as to banking customs in collecting drafts for customers. 4 In Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Zider (1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 908, it appeared that an employe of a car company, working on one of its cars placed on the side track of a railroad, was killed by the railroad company's switching engine running into the car. In an action against the railroad company therefor, the complaint alleged that the car company's unfinished cars were accustomed to be placed, with defendant's knowledge and consent § 756 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 923 tion on a contract under which plaintiff excavated earth and rock from defendant's lots, and which provided that he should be paid on estimates made by a surveyor, it was not error to permit plaintiff to prove the custom of surveyors in making allowances to excavators on their being obliged to excavate below the depth mentioned in the contract to reach a level, where such custom was a reasonable one, and known to both parties before entering into the contract. 1 A local custom that insurance agents, after the termination of their agency, may cancel any of the policies issued through them, and trans- fer the insurance to other companies represented by them, is unreasonable, and subversive of the principles governing the relation of principal and agent, and is therefore void and in- admissible in evidence. 2 on its side tracks, to be there finished and made ready for shipment. It was held that evidence of an agreement between the companies for the use by the car company of the side tracks as a delivery track, but not for construct- ing or completing cars thereon, was immaterial, as it was not inconsistent with the alleged custom, and the rail- road company would be bound to act in reference to such custom, whether it originated in an agreement or grew up independently. 1 Pucci v. Barney (Com. PI. N. Y. 1893), 21 N. Y. Supl. 1099. "Merchants' Ins. Co. ■y.Prince(1892), 52 N. W. Hep. 131 ; 50 Minn. 53. In Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 155, Woods, J., said: "The custom cer- tainly did not bind the party who offered prizes for plans after having paid the prizes to pay also for plans which he never used and for the superintendence of a building, which he never erected merely because he had selected a particular plan, and announced his purpose to build in accordance with it. If such were the custom of architects in Chicago it was an absurd and unreasonable custom, and therefore not binding. United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83." In an action on a contract for the erec- tion of a house, defendant pleaded a set-off for failure to build the same in a workmanlike manner. Defendant's evidence showed that the floors were not level ; that the windows were not vertical, nor at equal heights from the floor, though intended to be on the same level ; that they had embrasures above them ; that bricks were put in the outer wall that had to be removed ; and that one room had so many holes in the wall that daylight could be seen at seventeen different places. Plaintiffs' evidence was that the house was constructed according to the local custom, but did not greatly qualify the facts shown by defendant. It was held that an instruction that "if a man in a given section of country con- tracts to build a house in a workman- like manner, that means a house built in a workmanlike manner, construed according to the customs and usages of the section of country i n which the con- tract is made," was erroneous, since a custom that justifies the erection of a house in the manner shown by de- fendant's evidence is unreasonable. Anderson v. Whittaker (1892), 11 So. 924 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 757 § 757. Plain terms not to be varied by custom. — Where the words and terms of a contract are not technical, but are in common use and have a well-defined meaning, they are not to be explained or varied, or a different meaning given to them, by the evidence of any custom or usage whatever. Thus, where a contract of sale names a price "f. o. b. cars" at a cer- tain place, although evidence is admissible to show what these letters mean, it can not be shown by proof of custom or other- wise that these letters have a meaning or effect different from what would have attached to the full words "free on board" if they had been inserted in the contract. 1 In an action for a Rep. 919; 97 Ala. 690, per McClellan, J.: "The usage relied on ia one which honest men would deem unfair and unrighteous and hence is not reasonable. Paxton v. Courtnay, 2 Foster & T. 131 ; Metcalf v. Weld, 14 Gray, 210; Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81." 1 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Hull Coke Co. (1894), 101 Ala. 446; 14 So. Rep. 672, 680, per McClellan, J.: "The trial court admitted evidence of a gen- eral custom in the coke trade, in line with plaintiff's contention, to the effect that, under contracts like this, it was upon the buyer to advance the freight, and take a credit for the ag- gregate of such bills paid during a month on settlement the tenth day of the succeeding month, and, upon the writings and this extrinsic evidence, submitted it to the jury to determine what the contract was in this regard. The action of the court on this subject clearly and confessedly can be sus- tained only on the assumption that the expressed or implied terms of the contract, as reduced to writing, were ambiguous in respect to this matter. We think this assumption is not justi- fied by the language theparties haveset down in the writings. It was mainly, if not entirely rested, upon the use of the letters 'f. o. b.' in the connection shown above. These were supposed to be of such doubtful meaning as to- authorize and require a resort to ex- traneous evidence in their interpreta- tion. We do not so understand the principle on which the court acted. These letters have long been used, and have now come into such general use in contracts of sale, where the property sold is to be transported, that their significance is a matter of common knowledge, and hence of judicial cognizance. It is commonly known, and therefore courts must be held to know, that these are but the initial letters of three several words, and that these words, in connections like this, are 'free on board.' And even were it conceded that courts do not judicially know what they stand for and mean, and evidence aliunde is resorted to, as in this case, such evidence could go no fur- ther than to supply the missing let- ters of the words of which these letters are by such evidence shown to be the initials. The necessity, in other words, to show by extrinsic evidence what the full words are, is met when the completed words are put before the court ; and it affords no occasion or jus- tification for giving, by proof of custom or usage, or other extrinsic fact, a dif- ferent meaning or operation to them than would have attached to them had they been originally inserted in ful) § 757 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 925 breach of warranty upon a sale of baled cotton, a usage of the trade as to a buyer's returning cotton found defective, and as to the notice required to lay a claim for damages, is not admis- sible for the purpose of showing that the conduct of plaintiff, in the writings. Thus, in a case where parol evidence was admitted to show that the letters 'C. O. D.' (and which are not better understood than the letters 'f. o. b.') in a receipt given by an express company for a package to be transported by it, were the ini- tials of the words 'Collect on deliv- ery,' the court held, these words being proved, it was not competent to prove by parol what the full words meant, or to change their natural sig- nificance and effect in the case by evidence of custom or usage, or of previous dealings between the parties, so as to relieve the carrier from the du- ty of collecting the price of the goods from, before delivering them to, the consignee. American Express Co. v. Lesem, 39 111. 312. And in another case where the carrier, the Adams Express Company, was under a con- tract to carry goods from New York to Boston, the package was marked thus: 'A. King, Windsor, N. S., C. O. D. $375, from Turner's Express, Boston, Mass.;' and in the receipt given for the goods was contained the directions as marked on the package. The package was delivered to Turn- er's Express at Boston, by the Adams Express Company, without collecting therefor. The consignor sued the lat- ter company, alleging a breach of the contract, and on the trial 'the de- fendant was allowed to prove that the whole direction meant that Turner's Express should collect of the consignee; also, what was the custom existing among express com- panies receiving packages with a C. O. D. from connecting lines.' It was held by the court of appeals that the admission of this evidence was er- roneous ; that 'while it was competent to give parol evidence to explain the meaning of the letters "C. 0. D.," and thus remove all ambiguity, the contract, being thus made clear, could not be varied; that the additional words, being of familiar and ordinary, and not of technical, use, and having a well-defined meaning, could not be explained or varied, or a different meaning given them, nor was it com- petent to prove a custom or usage inconsistent therewith.' Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200. As has been indicated, our own opinion is that the meaning of the letters 'C. 0. D.,' in express carriage contracts, and 'f. o. b.,' in contracts like that involved in the case at bar, is a matter of judicial knowledge, and that parol evidence is not needed or admissible in their inter- pretation. State v. Intoxicating Liq- uors, 73 Maine, 278 ; United States Ex- press Co. v. Keefer, 59 Ind. 263 ; Mose- ley v. Mastin, 37 Ala. 216. But, wheth- er the words of which the letters are initials are filled in by drawing upon judicial knowledge or by extrinsic evi- dence, the effect and result are the same. The perfected words, in either case, are inserted in the writing, in- stead of the letters, and the instru- ment is to be read and construed pre- cisely as if the words had been origi- nally embodied in it. These plain terms of the contract can not be changed or varied in any way by evi- dence of a custom existing in the coke trade, according to which the purcha- ser is to pay freight charges." 926 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §758 who knew of such usage, was not consistent with the exist- ence of the claim made by him in the action. 1 § 758. Proving custom as to measurement, etc., where con- tract silent. — Where a written contract for laying brick is in con- troversy, and it is silent as to the method of measuring the quan- tity of the brick, parol evidence is admissible to show the custom in respect to such measurement. 2 So also, where, in an action 1 Gage Mfg. Co. v. Woodward (1891), 17 R. I. 464; 23 Atl. Rep. 16. Til- linghast, J., quoted from 3 Kent's Commentaries, 260, note b, that parol evidence to explain by custom and usage is admissible "if the words used in the contract be technical, local, generic, indefinite or equivocal. If there be no such ingredient of uncer- tainty, then the evidence is not ad- missible " — citing Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446; Blackett v. Royal, etc., Assurance Co., 2 Cromp. & J. 244; Fowler v. Mtna, etc., Insurance Co., 7 Wend. 270; Dow v. Whetten, 8 Wend. 160; Astor v. Union Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202; Coit v. Commercial Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 385; Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, 390; Dawson v. Kittle, 4 Hill, 107; Collender ■«. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200. And see The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567, Fed. Cas. No. 11657, where Story, J., reflected upon the habit of varying the liabilities of parties to contracts by setting up par- ticular usages. 2 Richlands Glass Co. v. Heltebeitel (Va. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 806, Riley, J.: "As the contract in this case contains no stipulation as to the method by which the quantity of bricks was to be ascertained for set- tlement, but is silent, or at least am- biguous, in that respect, parol evi- dence was admissible to show whether there was any agreement between the parties as to this matter, and, if so, what it was, and, if there was no agreement between them, then to show what was the custom of the lo- cality where the contract was made, or the usage of trade, and with refer- ence to which, in the absence of any special agreement, they are to be deemed to have contracted. In Lowe v. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 179, the con- tract was to furnish and lay bricks at a certain price per 1,000. The contro- versy there was as to the proper mode of counting, as in the case at bar. The court held that evidence was admissi- ble to show a custom to estimate the quantity of bricks by a measurement of the walls on a uniform rule, based on the size of the bricks, and deduct- ing for openings in the walls, but not for chimneys or jambs. In Ford v. Tirrell, 9 Gray, 401, the contract was to build the wall of an octangular cel- lar at the rate of 11 cents per foot. The only question was as to the mode of measurement. It was held that, the agreement as to the compensation being equivocal and obscure, it was competent to prove a local usage of measuring cellar walls, in order to in- terpret the meaning of the language, and to ascertain the extent of the contract. Hinton v. Locke, 5 Hill, 437, was an action on a contract by which the defendant had promised to pay to the plaintiff, who was a car- penter, 12 shillings per day for every man employed by him in repairing the defendant's house. The parties differed as to how many hours made a day's work ; that is, what should be the measurement of the day. It was held that parol evidence was admissi- ble to show that, by a universal usage § 758 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 927 to foreclose a mechanic's lien on an irrigating ditch, the con- tract for the construction of the ditch was silent as to the basis of estimates of work and labor, testimony of custom was admis- sible. 1 And in an action for the price of tobacco, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties in regard to the manner of ascertaining the net weight, it was held competent for plaintiffs to show that, according to the custom of the tobacco trade, defendant was required to take it at the last ascertained weight, looking to plaintiffs to make good any loss or dimi- nution." Where the plaintiff sold to the defendant granite blocks at specified prices per "square yard," with the under- standing that they were to be used in the construction of a sewer, and there was no express agreement as to how the num- ber of "square yards" should be determined, whether by a measurement of the area of the completed stone work in the sewer, or by taking the aggregate measurement of the faces of among carpenters, ten hours' labor constituted a day's work. So that the plaintiff was entitled to charge 1)4, days for every 24 hours within which the men worked 12 hours and a half. In Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, the plaintiff had contracted to do the plastering work of the defendant's house, in Buffalo, at a certain price per square yard. He charged and claimed pay for the full surface of the walls, without deduction for doors, windows, cornices, and base boards, while the defendant contended that under the contract he was only to pay for the plaster actually laid on. Evi- dence of a custom among plasterers in Buffalo to measure and charge for the entire surface of the walls, with- out deductions for doors, windows, cornices, and base boards, was held to be proper. It is shown by the tes- timony in this case that, at the mak- ing of the contract, nothing was said as to the manner by which the quan- tity of bricks was to be ascertained ; and it is further shown by the testi- mony that, where there is no stipula- tion as to the mode by which the quantity of bricks is to be ascertained, it is to be done, according to the cus- tom of the locality and the usage of trade, by measuring the work, and al- lowing 22 bricks to the cubic foot. It was also proved that the appellee had previously laid bricks on other build- ings for the same person who repre- sented the appellant company in making the contract in this case, and that the quantity of bricks was ascer- tained by measurement, and the ap- pellee settled with accordingly. The court, therefore, did not err in over- ruling the objections of the appellant to the parol testimony in the cause on the ground that it tended to contra- dict the written contract between the parties, and in holding that the com- plainant was entitled to have the num- ber of bricks in the glass factory laid by contract work estimated and paid for by measurement, computing the same at 22 bricks to the cubic foot." 1 Bradbury v. Butler (1892), 1 Colo. App. 430; 29 Pac. Bep. 463. 2 Thompson v. Brannin (1893), 94 Ky. 490; 21 S. W. Bep. 1057. 928 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 759 the blocks, it was held, in an action for the price of the blocks, that the circumstances with reference to which the contract was made might be considered for the purpose of discovering the real intention of the parties, and that proof' of a local cus- tom under such circumstances, to measure stone in the com- pleted structure, was admissible, although such a custom had not been pleaded. 1 And in an action for mason work, at a specified price per perch, where the dispute is as to the num- ber of perches contained in the work, a uniform, universal and notorious custom of measurement among masons is bind- ing, although the result of such measurement is greater than the actual contents. 2 § 759. Commercial usage defined and considered. — Usage comprehends the habits, modes, and course of dealing, which are generally observed, either in any particular branch of trade or in all mercantile transactions. A usage must be established, known, certain, and uniform, and reasonable, and not con- trary to law. The office of a usage is to interpret the other- wise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to fix and to ex- plain the meaning of words and expressions of doubtful or various senses. 3 Custom or usage r^ay be proved, not only to 1 Breen v. Moran (1892), 51 Minn, plaintiffs, though knowing of such 525 ; 53 N. W. Rep. 7P5. And see custom, had failed and neglected to Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, that the do, in consequence of which the pota- local usage in such a case need not toes were destroyed. It was held that ordinarily be pleaded. See Lowe v. it was proper to admit evidence of Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 179. such custom, if known to plaintiffs at 2 McCullough v. Ashbridge (1893), the time the contract was made, as 155 Pa. St. 166; 26 Atl. Rep. 10. such contract was silent as to the con- Plaintiffs entered into a written con- signee or place of destination of the tract to purchase a large quantity of potatoes, or who should furnish the potatoes on Brown's island, paying boat on which they should be shipped, part of the purchase price. Subse- Holmes v. Whitaker, 23 Ore. 319; 31 quently high waters destroyed thepo- Pac. Rep. 705. tatoes, and plaintiffs then brought 3 Woldert v. Arledge, 4 Texas C. suit to recover back the amount of App. 692; 23 S. W. Rep. 1052: "A money paid. Defendants answered usage of trade, of which all dealers by a counter-claim, stating that it is in that line of trade are bound to the custom for the purchasers of po- take notice, must be known, must be tatoes on such island to furnish a boat uniform and certain. In this case the for their shipment, and notify tbe plaintiff insisted that by the usage of seller when it will be there, which the trade a car load of bacon meant § 759 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 929 explain the meaning of terms to which is affixed a peculiar and technical meaning, but also to supply evidence of the in- tention of the parties regarding matters as to which their con- twenty-five thousand pounds, while the defendant insisted that by usage a car load meant twenty thousand pounds. The court, under this state of case, should have submitted under instructions, in conformity with the law as above outlined, the issue of the existence or non-existence of a usage obtaining among those engaged in the bacon trade at Kansas City, which fixed and determined the quantity of bacon contained in a car load ; and, if the jury found that such usage did exist, and that it determined the num- ber of pounds of bacon by the ex- pression ' a car load of bacon ' to be twenty-five thousand, their verdict should have been for the plaintiff, if they further found from the evidence that the plaintiff was able and ready to deliver the bacon free of charge on the cars at Kansas City at the times mentioned in the correspondence be- tween the parties, for transmission to Crockett, Tex., on defendant's ac- count ; and, on the other hand, if the jury found that by the usage of the trade of that city a car load of bacon meant twenty thousand pounds, the verdict should have been for the de- fendant; and so, if the jury found that there was no established usage obtaining among those engaged in the bacon trade at Kansas City, by which the number of pounds contained in a car load was fixed and determined, the verdict should have been for the defendant. If there be no usage de- termining the number of pounds of bacon intended by the expression 'a car load,' then the correspondence be- tween the plaintiff and the defendant can not be held to constitute a con- tract binding between them, because 59 both the proposal to purchase and the acceptance of the proposals were in- definite as to the quantity of the com- modity which was the subject of their negotiations. If the usage fixed the number of pounds to a car load to be twenty thousand, the plaintiff should not recover, because he tendered for execution a contract different from the one created by the telegrams, and this gave the defendant the privilege of declining to make a purchase on any terms with the plaintiff. The lat- ter not having complied with the terms of defendant's proposal, he had the right to refuse to treat further with the plaintiff. If, however, a usage exists which fixes the term ' a car load' to mean any number of pounds between certain limits, and twenty- five thousand pounds be within those limits, the plaintiff would be entitled to a recovery if he was able and ready to deliver the bacon at the place and at the times and on the terms pro- posed by him in his correspondence with the defendant. But no such is- sue as this was raised by the plead- ings or the evidence. The court did not err, as contended by appellant, in refusing to instruct the jury that the correspondence between the parties established a contract binding upon them. As we have seen, a usage must be shown to exist in the place where the contract is to be executed, and that place, in this case, is Kansas City. Evidence, therefore, tending to show the habit and custom of individuals engaged in business at Crockett, in conducting that business at Crockett, was immaterial and irrelevant, and should not have been submitted to the jury." 930 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §760 tract makes an insufficient provision. Thus when tbe sellers of logs, and those who have a right to collect toll on them, after stipulating for measurement by " board measure," do not choose to express their intention, in the contract, as to the mode of establishing the board measure, custom and usage will be admitted to supply the omission. 1 § 760. The same subject continued. — In an action on an ac- count for polished marble slabs, ordered by defendant to be of a specified thickness, plaintiff may show that in the marble trade such an order means slabs of the stated thickness as they come from the saw, and does not require them to be of such thickness when prepared for use. And this admission of evi- dence as to usage is not inconsistent with the general rule that a written contract is not to be contradicted or varied by parol evidence. 2 The customer of a warehouseman is liable 1 Destrehan D.Louisiana LumberCo., 45 La. Ann. 920; 13 So. Rep. 230, per Breaux, J. : "There is no possibility of determining the board measure of each log without reference to rules of measurement established by custom. The act contains no statement upon the subject. Both as relates to the 'average diameter' and to defective logs, the parties not having agreed, custom must be consulted in deter- mining the number of boards each log will yield. If 'board measure' had been omitted from the contract, the question would arise as to the actual dimensions of a round log, without allowing for saw kerfs, worthless saps, crooked or otherwise defective logs ; but, being inserted in the act, it must be determined by reference to custom, and the actual quantity of lumber must be ascertained which a log will produce under a competent sawyer.'' 2 Evans v. Western Brass Mfg. Co., 118 Mo. 548; 24 8. W. Rep. 175, per Black, C. J. : "The general rule un- doubtedly is that parol evidence can not be admitted to contradict, add to, or vary a written contract; and it is the duty of the court to construe the writing. Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo. 266 ; Black River LumberCo. D.Warner, 93 Mo. 374; 6S.W. Rep.210; State v. Ho- shaw, 98 Mo. 358; 11 S. W. Rep. 759. But it is equally well settled that proof of usage is often admitted to interpret the meaning of the language used, for under many circumstances the parties may be supposed to contract with reference to a usage or custom, as they are presumed to use words in their ordinary signification. 1 Green- leaf on Evidence, § 292. < The courts,' says Starkie, ' have long allowed mer- cantile instruments to be expounded according to the usage and customs of merchants, who have a style and lan- guage peculiar to themselves, of which usage and custom are the legitimate interpreters.' Starkie on Evidence (10th ed.), p. 701. Hence it has been held by this court that it may be shown, by way of a general and well-established custom, that two packs of shingles of a certain size con- stitute a thousand. Soutier v. Keller- man, 18 Mo. 509. See also, Blair v. Corby, 37 Mo. 313; Kimball v. Braw- § 761 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 931 for his proportionate share in the expenses incurred by the warehouseman in prosecuting suits for the recovery of insur- ance money for goods destroyed in the warehouse, where the customer is chargeable with knowledge of a general custom of warehousemen to keep a customer's goods insured in open pol- icies, in favor of the warehousemen, on goods held in trust, and to charge each customer for such insurance at a certain monthly rate on his goods covered by such policies. 1 § 761. Knowledge of local usage essential. — A custom among underwriters in New York city to class certain stores as distinct buildings for purposes of insurance, and to in- sure them severally as separate risks, is not binding on an in- surance company domiciled in Alabama, without proof that the latter had knowledge of such custom when a contract was made with another company for re-insurance in that city. e So ner, 47 Mo. 398; Fruin v. Crystal R. Co.,89Mo. 397; 14 S.W.Rep.557; Wolff v. Campbell, 110 Mo. 114; 19 S. W. Rep. 622; Robinson v. United States, 13 Wall. 363. It is true, as some of the cases just cited show, that usage can not be permitted to control the terms of a special contract by introducing something which is repugnant to or inconsistent with the contract. But it does not follow that evidence of usage can only be received where the words of the contract are ambiguous. Such evidence is often received to show that words are used in a sense different from their ordi- nary meaning, as in Soutierw. Keller- man, supra. Such evidence is received on the theory that the parties knew of the usage or custom, and contracted in reference to it, and in such cases the evidence does not add to or con- tradict the language used, but simply interprets and explains its meaning. It was therefore competent for the plaintiffs to show that in the marble trade an order for slabs of a specified thickness, prepared for use, means slabs of the stated thickness as they come from the saw ; and, the evidence being admissible, there was no error in refusing to instruct it out of the case, for that is what the refused in- struction seeks to do. A custom or usage, to be of any avail, ought to be shown to be well established, but the defendant did not seek to have this matter explained by instructions. We do not know what the evidence of the alleged custom and usage was, for very little of it is preserved in the bill of exceptions. Although such evidence ought to be admitted with care, still we can not say the court erred in admitting the evidence or in refusing the instruction." 1 Buyck v. Schwing (1893), 100 Ala. 355; 14 So. Rep. 48. 2 German- American Insurance Co. v. Commercial Fire Insurance Co. (1891), 11 So. Rep. 117; 95 Ala. 469, per McClellan, J. : "No general usage is proved and the defendant can not be held beyond the terms of its con- tract dissociated from any effect of the alleged usage. Cobb v. Lime Rock, etc., Ins. Co., 58 Maine, 326; East Tennes- see R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596; 932 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §762 also, a steamboat company, in contracting, through its agent, to pay plaintiff and his assistants an agreed sum per day to clear a river of snags for navigation purposes, is not chargeable with knowledge of a local custom existing among lumbermen to pay the board of their men in cleaning out streams for the purposes of running logs, even though the agent resided in that vicinity. In order to bind the company in such a case, if the custom was not made known to its agent when the con- tract was made, it must appear that defendant or its agent had been engaged in a business, before the contract was made, in some manner connected with the business in which the cus- tom is sought to be established. 1 In an action for the price of goods sold, evidence by plaintiff of its custom of dealing, and that defendant knew it, is admissible to show the meaning of the term "net" weight. 8 § 762. Agent's knowledge imputed to principal — Bill of lading. — A bill of lading must be assumed to have been made between the parties to it with reference to a settled usage of Smith v. Rice, 56 Ala. 417 ; Herring v. Skaggs, 73 Ala. 446 ; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Child v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Sandf. 26." And see Holmes a, Whitaker, 23 Ore. 319 ; 31 Pac. Rep. 705. A Wisconsin corporation, owning a cattle ranch in Wyoming, appointed an agent in Wyoming, with power to hire and pay for necessary help, and pay current expenses with money re- mitted on his statement, and to care for and round up the cattle, and ship them, when fit for market, to Chicago, in care of a particular commission house. It was held, in replevin by said corporation to recover cattle pur- chased by defendants from the agent, that evidence that it was the custom or usage of managers of cattle com- panies doing business in Wyoming to aell the cattle from the ranches of such companies was inadmissible, in the absence of proof that the plaintiff had knowledge of such usage. Mil- waukee Invest. Co. v. Johnston (1892) , 35 Neb. 554 ; 53 N. W. Rep. 475, where in favor of the rule that a usage may be proved if so well settled as to create a reasonable presumption that it was known to both parties the court cited Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530 ; Paine v. Smith, 33 Minn. 495; Globe Milling Co. v. Minneapolis Elevator Co., 44 Minn. 153 ; Corcoran v. Chess, 131 Pa. St. 356; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 ; Power v. Kane, 5 Wis. 265 ; Hall v. Storrs, 7 Wis. 253 ; Pickert v. Marston, 68 Wis. 465; Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158; Steamboat Keystone v. Moies, 28 Mo. 243 ; Steele v. McTyer, 31 Ala. 667; Reynolds v. Continental Insur- ance Co., 36 Mich. 132. 1 Pennell v. Delta Transp. Co. (1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 1049; 94 Mich. 247. And see also Van Hoesen v. Cameron, 54 Mich. 609. 2 Nonantum Worsted Co. v. North Adams Manufg. Co. (1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 293; 156 Mass. 331. And see McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke Co. (1893), 56 Fed. Rep. 212. 762 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 933 trade existing at the place where it was entered into, if such usage does not contradict, but is explanatory of it. In such a case, a shipper of merchandise, having knowledge of such a usage when he receives a bill of lading, is as much bound by it as he would be if it were written in the bill of lading; and, if the shipment is made by an agent of the shipper, the agent's knowledge of the usage is to be imputed to and is binding upon his principal. 1 1 Robertson v. National Steamship Co. (1893), 139 N. Y. 416. Per Earl, J.: "If we read the shipping bill alone it is not entirely certain that the merchandise was to be transported from Havre to London all the way by water on board the steamer. The language in the bill of lading is, 'to be forwarded by the steamer Wolf to London ,' and in a real sense goods received on board the Wolf may be said to have been forwarded by that steamer to London by carrying them to Southampton, and then sending them by rail to London. The bill seems to provide for a carriage upon land, as it exempted the defendant from loss or injury from perils by land transportation of any kind, and the only land transportation upon this route was from Southampton to Lon- don. Thus it appears that the ship- pers and the defendant, when they made the contract, contemplated not only a carriage upon water, but upon land also. But when the circum- stances surrounding the making of the contract for the carriage are consider- ed, it becomes entirely plain that the parties contemplated a contract for a carriage by the Wolf to Southampton, and thence by rail to London. TheLon- don and Southwestern Railroad Com- pany had a regular line of transporta- tion from Havre to London, by steam- er to Southampton and thence by rail to London, and for that purpose they had three vessels, making three trips weekly between those points, of which the Wolf was one. Those ves- sels never went further than South- ampton, and the London and South- western Railroad Company never carried any goods by water to London, and neither did the defendant, and the business had been carried on this way for many years, and the mode of doing it was notorious and well known. It was advertised in the newspapers at Havre, and was specified in way bills used in Havre by the agents of the London and Southwestern Railroad Company in the transaction of its business. The mode of doing the business was such, and so open and notorious, that it must have been known generally at Havre, and particularly by persons there dealing with the agents of the defendant and of the London and Southwestern Railroad Company. It must be assumed that the contract be- tween the parties was made with reference to this well known usage, and it is binding upon the shippers just as if written in the bill of lading. In this particular case the proof of the usage does not contradict the bill of lading, but is simply explanatory of it. (Hostetter v. Gray, 11 Fed. Rep. 179; Lowry v. Russell, 8 Pick. 360; Phillips on Insurance [5th ed.], § 980.) In Lowrey v. Russell, it was held that a 'bill of lading, like other contracts, is to be construed according to the in- tention of the parties. Usage of trade is always presumed to be within the knowledge of the parties, and their 934 CUSTOM AND USAGE. § 763 § 763. How usage may be proved. — Custom or usage is a matter of fact, not of opinion. It is proved, not by the opin- ions of witnesses, but from facts within their knowledge, ob- tained by observation of what is practiced by themselves and others in the trade or business to which it relates. 1 It is no contracts are supposed to be made with reference to it.' But it is said that the owner of this merchandise was J. Kalmes, Jr., living at Ham- burgh ; that it does not appear that he made the contract at Havre ; that he can not be supposed to have known the usage, and that he can not, there- fore, be bound thereby, and that as to him it can not be read into the con- tract of transportation. There are four complete answers to this posi- tion: (1) If Kalmes was the owner and shipper of this merchandise it was incumbent upon him to show that he was ignorant of this notorious and uniform usage. Johnson v. De Pey- ster, 50 N. Y.666. (2) It does not appear that he owned this merchandise at the time the contract for transportation was made. In the bill of lading Isabelle and Munster are described as the shippers from whom the merchandise was received, and with whom the contract for its transportation was made. They did not contract as agents or, so far as the record shows, disclose any agency. After the bill of lading was issued to them they in- dorsed it to another party and that par- ty indorsed it to Kalmes, and it appears by the invoice of the goods obtained from the custom-house and proved upon the trial, that the plaintiff bought the merchandise of Kalmes at Ham- burgh, on the 12th of June, four days after the bill of lading was issued to Isabelle and Munster. It appears, theref ore, prima facie, that Isabelle and Munster were the owners of the goods, and that Kalmes became the pur- chaser from them by indorsement and assignment of the bill of lading. (3) But if Isabelle and Munster were not the owners they made the contract as principals, disclosing to the defendant no agency, and giving up no principal. Therefore, the de- fendant has the right to treat them as principals, and the contract, as to its force and effect, must be construed precisely as if they were principals, and not agents. But, if we assume, which is the only other alternative, that they were the agents of Kalmes and made the contract really for his benefit, he being the owner of the merchandise, then he is affected by the same knowledge which they pos- sessed, and if the law attributes knowledge of this usage to them at the time they made the contract for their principal, then the same knowl- edge must be attributed to him, and binds him. Therefore, in any view that can be taken of this case, if the parties when they entered into this contract of carriage did it with knowl- edge of this uniform and notorious usage, then the owner or owners of the merchandise and the plaintiff who claims under them, were bound by it." 1 Haskins r. Warren, 115 Mass. 514. Usage must be proved by evidence of facts, not by mere speculative opin- ions, and by witnesses who have had frequent and actual experience of the usage, and who do not speak from re- port alone, and they must speak as to the course of the particular trade. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 248, 251, 252, citing. As to the difference be- tween a local and general usage in re- spect to the sufficiency of the proof § 763 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 935 valid objection to the competency of a witness that his knowl- edge is derived from his own business, if the knowledge thus derived is sufficiently extensive to enable him to testify to the fact of usage. 1 A person who has purchased and shipped po- tatoes from a certain island, and can testify to a custom in shipping potatoes therefrom from his own experience and his observation of the practice of others for three years, as well as one who has lived on the island for ten years, raising and selling potatoes during that time, is competent to testify to such custom. 2 Although the existence of a usage may be es- tablished by the uncontradicted testimony of one witness, when he is explicit as to its duration, certainty and notoriety, the testimony of an insurance broker as to the authority of agents in a certain locality to make binding preliminary con- tracts, which is based wholly on the practice of his own office, is not sufficient to go to the jury. 3 It has also been held that required, see Booth, etc., Granite Co. v. Baird (1895), 84 Hun, 452; 34 N. Y. Supl. 392 ; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N.Y. 464. 1 Hamilton v. Nickerson, 13 Allen, 351. 2 Holmes v. Whitaker (1892) , 31 Pac. Rep. 705; 23 Ore. 319. 'Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman (1893), 54 Fed. Rep. 839, per Taft, J. : "It is well settled that a usage or cus- tom, to affect the construction of con- tracts, or to extend the apparent au- thority of agents beyond their actual authority, must be uniform, notorious and well defined. Black v. Ashley, 80 Mich. 90; 44 N. W. Rep. 1120; Reynolds ». Continental Insurance Co., 36 Mich. 131 ; Schurr v. Savigny , 85 Mich. 144 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 547 ; String- field v, Vivian, 63 Mich. 681 ; Lamb v. Henderson,63 Mich. 302 ; 29 N.W. Rep. 732; Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83. The evidence of usage shown in the record is not at all satis- factory, and does not fulfill the re- quirements above named. In answer to a leading question, Ralph does say that there was a well-defined usage in Detroit that applications for insur- ance to take effect at once, if accepted by local agents, bound the company ; but his cross-examination clearly dis- closes that his evidence is based rather on his opinion of what the local agent's authority ought to be than the knowledge that the existence of such authority was recognized, no- toriously and uniformly, in Detroit. He virtually admits that his knowl- edge of agents' authority is largely confined to his own office. His opin- ion of the usage is based on the fact that when an application is filed for insurance to date from the day of the application, a policy is subsequently returned to the applicant dated ac- cordingly. It has been held that such action by the company is not a recog- nition of the right of the local agent to bind the company by a preliminary contract, unless it has been brought home to the company that before is- suing the policy the agent has at- tempted so to do. Morse v. St. Paul, etc., Insurance Co., 21 Minn. 407." 936 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §§ 764, 7G5 the rules of the chamber of commerce established for the pur- pose of maintaining uniformity in commercial usages of the place are admissible to show the existence or non-existence of a particular usage in that place. 1 § 764. The same subject continued. — But a person is not competent to testify as to an alleged custom of trade, unless he is either engaged in such trade, or it is shown that he knows what the custom is. 2 A custom is not shown to be established where the testimony of the witnesses who aver that the custom exists is met by an almost equal number of witnesses, with equal facilities of knowing, who testify to never having heard of such custom. 3 Where a witness has testified that the strik- ing out of the name in a bank pass-book was not, in his opin- ion, done at the bank, it is incompetent to prove what the cus- tom of the bank was in the matter. 4 § 765. Personal customs or habits. — Where it is shown to be the general custom for local agents selling mill machinery to warrant the same, the buyer may recover from the principal for a breach of the agent's warranty. 5 In a case of doubt as to what a person has done, it may be considered more probable 1 Kershaw v. Wright, 115 Mass. 361. transported, the determination rest- 2 Kugelman v. Levy (Com. PI. 1893), ing with the receiving company, and 24 N. Y. Supl. 559. the amount received in one way or 3 The Harbinger (1892), 50 Fed. Rep. the other constantly varying. It was 941. The evidence as to an alleged held that no controlling custom was custom of railroad companies oper- shown. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. ating connecting lines, to receive from Northern Pac. R. Co. (1892), 51 Fed. each other and transport freight in Rep. 465. the cars in which it was tendered, i O'Brien v. Weiler (1893), 68 Hun, showed that, except where the cars of 64; 22 N. Y. Supl. 627. the receiving company were all in 5 Larson u.Aultnmn Co., 86 "Wis. 281; use, or where the freight would suf- 56 N. "W. Rep. 915. In Eastern Gran- fer by being transferred, the question ite Co. v. Heini, 89 Iowa, 698; 57 N. whether the freight should be so re- W. Rep. 437, Rothrock, J., said: ceivedor should be transferred to the "Evidence that it is usual to use the cars of the receiving company was, as Latin letter in German inscriptions a general rule, dependent upon con- on granite monuments is admissible tracts between the companies, or to show compliance with a contract upon circumstances, such as the con- for erection of a granite monument, dition and equipment of the cars and inscriptions thereon to be in Ger' the road over which they were to be man." 766 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 937 that he has done what he has been in the habit of doing than that he has acted otherwise ; hence, the particular habit or custom of an individual may be shown where there is conflict- ing evidence as to whether he has or has not done some act material to the issue. 1 § 766. Usage as to authority of insurance agents. — A well- defined local usage, whereby marine insurance agents can make binding contracts to take effect on the day of applica- tion, without consulting their superiors, is presumably known to a foreign company engaged for years in insurance business at the place where the usage obtains, and is sufficient to pre- vail over the private instructions of such agents when the in- sured is in ignorance thereof, and is without notice of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry. 2 An offer to show a gen- eral custom by which general agents of life insurance com- panies exercised an authority to grant short credits on first premiums, without offering to show that the custom prevailed in the issuance of a policy which provided that it should not go into effect until the premium had actually been paid, and 1 Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo. 107; 36 Pac. Rep. 848; Law- son on Usages and Customs, § 46 ; State ». Manchester & L. K. Co., 52 N. H. 528. 2 Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman (1893), 54 Fed. Eep. 839, per Taft, J. : "If such a definite usage in respect to local agents of foreign insurance com- panies had been proved the Green- wich Insurance Company would have been charged with notice of it, and by establishing Ward as its local agent the company would have given him apparent authority to bind it in ac- cordance with that usage, if reason- able. Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36 Fisher v. Sargent, 10 Cush. 250 Graves „. Legg, 2 Hurl. & N. 210 Mechem on Agency, § 281. The evi- dence discloses that the Greenwich Insurance Company had been doing a marine insurance business in De- troit for 10 years at least, and it could be fairly presumed that the company was familiar with any local usage obtaining there in the insurance busi- ness. If, as testified by several wit- nesses, millions of dollars of insur- ance were placed on the day of sail- ing, it would be extraordinary if vessel-owners would consent to an arrangement by which no insurance should be binding on their vessels until time enough had elapsed after the day of sailing for their applica- tions to be forwarded to the general agents of the insurance companies at distant points, and by them approved, with the arbitrary right thus secured to the insurance companies, in case of a loss meantime, to reject the applica- tion. A usage by which local agents could make binding preliminary con- tracts for the company would seem to us, therefore, to be reasonable." 938 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §767 expressly stated that the agent could not waive the stipulation, is properly rejected in the case of such a policy. 1 § 767. Custom construed — Charter-party — Demurrage. — The construction of a custom as to the discharge of merchandise from a vessel, which affects the payment of demurrage for a delay of the vessel, is not to be governed by another usage in relation to the sale of the merchandise ; thus, in a charter- party the words "to discharge with customary dispatch, cargo to be * * * discharged according to the custom of the port," do not include a custom whereby all cargoes of fruit are sold at auction by one firm, not more than one cargo being sold in one day, and no cargo being discharged until it has been thus sold, since such custom manifestly has its origin in the sale, and not in the discharging of cargoes; and for demurrage caused by such a custom the cargo is liable. 2 A custom of the 1 Smith v. Provident Assurance So- ciety (1895), 65 Fed. Rep. 765. And see also, Greenwich Insurance Co. v. Waterman (1892), 54 Fed. Rep. 839. 2 Milburn v. Thirty, etc., Boxes Or- anges and Lemons (1893), 57 Fed. Rep. 236, Lacombe, J.; "There is no ques- tion of fact in this case. The existence of the custom set up in defense is con- ceded, and the only point to be decided is whether it is imported into the con- tract between the parties by the lan- guage they have used. The learned dis- trict judge did not discuss this point in the brief memorandum he filed with his decision. He had precisely the same custom before him, however, in the case of Liverpool, etc., Steam Co.u. Suitter, 17 Fed. Rep. 695, and there held that the existence of such usage of trade did not affect the right of the ship-owner to insist upon reasonable promptness in discharging; that it was 'unreasonable, and contrary to public policy, to permit the time of discharging a ship of her cargo to de- pend upon the ability of a single auc- tion house, in the accumulation of business and of other engagements, to effect a sale of such cargo for the own- ers thereof.' The question whether a clause in the charter-party provid- ing for 'discharge with customary dis- patch' was affected by a substantially similar custom at the port of New Or- leans, where it was the practice of fruit dealers to receive their fruit from the vessels no faster than they could sell it at the wharves, was also carefully considered by the district and circuit courts in the eastern dis- trict of Louisiana. Lindsay v. Cusi- mano, 10 Fed. Rep. 302; 12 Fed. Rep. 503, 505. Jt was therein held as fol- lows : 'The obligations of the owners and charterers, where the charter- party is silent as to time to be occu- pied in discharging, are reciprocal; each shall use "reasonable dispatch." This obligation is here qualified by changing "reasonable" into "custom- ary" dispatch. This enlarges the source of delay, and makes it include all those usages at the port of delivery which the carrier can not control — such as the working hours, the order in which vessels must come up to the wharf, the o"haervanc^ of holidays, $ 767 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 939 port of Mobile, by which vessels taking on additional cargo at a deeper anchorage bear the cost of lightering, although not so notorious or so acquiesced in as to have the force of law, is binding on a vessel whose charter-party provides that the cus- tom of the port is to be observed in all cases not especially pro- vided for. 1 the allowance of three days to obtain a berth, provided one can not be sooner obtained ; but here their force stops. They can not be held to in- clude any delay which is purely vol- untary on the part of the charterers, although such delay is customary in the fruit trade. The phrase must be confined in its meaning to excuse the parties for want of opportunity by reason of the custom prevailing at the port. This is the substance of the de- cision in Kearon v. Pearson, 7 Hurl. & N. 386. There the question was as to the meaning of the words "usual dispatch" as applied to loading. Mar- tin, B., before whom the case was tried, whose ruling was affirmed by all the judges, says, page 387 : "They meant that the vessel should be loaded with the usual dispatch of persons who have a cargo ready at Liverpool for loading." Here these words "cus- tomary dispatch" meant the usual dispatch of persons who are ready to receive a cargo, and exclude all cus- toms in accordance with which these charterers might claim the right to decline to receive, simply because it was more advantageous to postpone. * * * Delivery should take place with dispatch, limited or qualified by the customs prevailing at the port of delivery, which created barriers not under the control of the party who here urges them.' Lindsay v. Cusi- mano, 10 Fed. Eep. 303. The distinc- tion thus pointed out is a sound one. The custom here set up to sell only one fruit cargo a day, and none on Satur- days, is not an outgrowth of the busi- ness of discharging ships, but rather of the business of selling their cargoes. It is manifestly intended to prevent a glut in the market, to keep up prices by holding back newly-arrived fruit till the earlier arrivals have been ab- sorbed by the consumer. It does not interfere with a discharge of the ship, as did the customs as to hours and times of labor, as to routine of access to a single elevator, as to a second change of berth, which have been held appli- cable in the cases cited by the appel- lant. The consignee could have dis- charged this cargo in seasonable weather on January 2 and 3, removed it from the dock and warehoused it ; and, when the only excuse he gives for not doing so is that, by the custom of his trade, he could not sell it in the ordinary way to consumers until other fruit had been first so sold, he may not turn the ship into a temporary warehouse to hold his goods until he finds a market for them. We do not determine whether the custom of sell- ing fruit by a single firm of auction- eers, and in restricted quantities, which seems to have existed many years, is or is not reasonable, but do hold it is not the kind of custom which the use of the phrase 'custom- ary dispatch in discharging' imports into the contract of affreightment be- tween the parties, being concerned, not with the business of discharging, but with the business of selling, and not creating any impediment to a discharge with dispatch, which the charterer would not have overcome by the use of mere ordinary diligence." i Nordaas v. Hubbard (1892), 48 Fed. Eep. 921. 940 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §§ 768, 769 § 768. Relating to brokers. — A person who employs a broker must be supposed to give him authority to act as other brokers act, whether he himself is or is not acquainted with brokers' rules. 1 A person who deals in a certain market must ordina- rily be taken to deal according to the custom of that market, and this is the rule, although he deal through an agent or broker. 2 Where a broker represents that he has certain stock in his possession, when, in fact, he has no such stock, and a sale is closed on the faith of this representation, in an action to recover the price paid, evidence of a custom among brokers to sell stock in their own name, and to become personally liable to perform the contract, is inadmissible, for the alleged cus- tom is irrelevant to the actual issue. 3 And so evidence of the custom of brokers, when collateral security is put up as a margin, and the account becomes reduced sufficiently to jeop- ardize it, to advertise and sell the collateral, and charge the customer with the balance, is properly excluded where the broker sells his customer's stocks upon the latter's express or' der, and not to protect himself from a shrinking margin. 4 A custom of dealers in bonds and stocks, whereby an option to sell at the end of a given period expires on the last day of such period, does not apply to the case of an option to de- mand a rescission of the sale of bonds and stocks after their obligatory retention for a year by the purchaser. 5 § 769. Banking custom as to collections — Evidence. — The custom of banks in regard to making collections and remitting therefor is so well established, and has become so universally known, that knowledge thereof must be imputed to the courts; and they are therefore required to take judicial notice of the fact that a bank, when it makes a collection for a foreign cor- respondent, never, unless specially directed so to do, remits the specie collected, but takes the specie to its own use, and 1 Sutton v. Tatham, 10 Ad. & El. 27 ; 114 ; 19 S. W. Eep. 622. And see also, Greaves v. Legg, 11 Exch. 642. Kimball v. Brawner, 47 Mo. 398. 8 Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1 Exch. l De Cordova v. Barnum (1892), 130 425 - N. Y. 615 ; 29 N. E. Kep. 1099. 8 Wolff v. Campbell (1892), 110 Mo. 6 Weld v. Barker (1893), 153 Pa. St. 465; 26 Atl. Eep. 239. § 770 CUSTOM AND USAGE. 941 sends its draft or certificate of deposit to such correspondent. 1 And where plaintiff sued the receiver of a bank for the amount of a draft collected by it, and claimed that the bank held the amount in trust for plaintiffs at the time of its suspension, it was held to be a reversible error for the court below to exclude evidence of the general banking custom above mentioned. 2 A banking custom, however, to be binding must be general as to place, and not confined to a particular bank, and must have become notorious. 3 § 770. Excluding custom by notice— Pleading custom.— In an action against a warehouse company for the value of tobac- co destroyed by fire while deposited with it, where plaintiff alleged a custom that warehousemen should insure their cus- tomers' tobacco, and that plaintiff deposited his tobacco with defendant with reference to such custom, it is proper to charge that, if defendant notified plaintiff that the tobacco was held at the warehouse at plaintiff's risk, and plaintiff acquiesced there- in, the finding should be for defendant, although there was such a custom as was alleged. 4 In the absence of evidence that the contract between an engineer and his employer prohibited the engineer from employing his assistants, evidence is com- 1 Morse on Banks and Banking, § 248 ; the paper in question to ascertain them Jockuschu.Towsey, 51 Texas, 129; Ma- if unknown. Such is the established rine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252 ; doctrine of this court as laid down in Marine Bank v. Rushmore, 28111. 463; Eenner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Tinkham v. Heyworth, 31 111. 519. In Wheat. 581 ; Mills v. United States Fowler v. Brantly, 14 Pet. 318, the Bank, 11 Wheat. 431 ; Bank of Wash- court laid down the following rule in ington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25." respect to the binding force of bank- 2 Bowman v. First Nat. Bank (1894), ing customs as to the discount of 9 Wash. 614; 38 Pac. Rep. 211. notes: "The known customs of the s Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539, bank and its ordinary modes of trans- per McLean, J. : "It must be the rule acting business, including the pre- of all the banks of the place, or it can scribed forms of notes offered for dis- not consistently be called a usage. If count, were matters of proof and en- every bank could establish its own tered into the contract ; and the par- usage, the confusion and uncertainty ties to it must be understood as hav- would greatly exceed any local con- ing governed themselves by such cus- venience resulting from the arrange- toms and modes of doing business; ment." and this whether they had actual knowl- 'Western Warehouse Co. v. Hayes edge of them or not, and it was espe- (Ky. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 738. cially the duty of all those dealing for 942 CUSTOM AND USAGE. §770 petent to show that it was the custom for engineers to hire their assistants, in order to establish the relation of master and servant between the engineer's employer and his assistant. 1 A guarantor of the payment of freight bills, which may become due to a railroad company from a certain shipper, is not re- lieved from any part of his liability because the company failed to enforce against such shipper its custom of collecting its bills weekly. 2 A custom must be pleaded, or evidence of it is not admissible to make it a part of the contract sued upon. 8 1 White v. San Antonio Waterworks Co. (Texas App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 252, James, C. J. : "We are of opinion that there was evidence from which the jury might have found that Willis was an employe of the Waterworks Com- pany in respect to the pump house and machinery, and, there being no evi- dence of a contract which excluded the power of this employe to employ as- sistants, it was competent for plaintiff to show that his employment carried with it this power, by proving that by a universal custom men employed as he was exercised the power. Lawson on Usages and Customs, 371 ; Moore v. Kennedy, 81 Texas, 144; 16 S. W. Rep. 740; Mechem on Agency, § 281; Harrell v. Zimpleman, 66 Texas, 292; 17 S. W. Rep. 478; Birmingham, etc., Manufacturing Co. v. Gross, 97 Ala. 220; 12 So. Rep. 36." z Philadelphia R. Co. v. Snowdon, 166 Pa. St. 263; 30 Atl. Rep. 1129. 3 Anderson v. Rogge (Texas App. 1894), 28 S. W Rep. 106. CHAPTER XXII. CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 771. Ending or changing contracts § 780. Effect of parol modification of by conduct. written contract. 772. Election between ending and 781. Parol extension or waiver of enforcing contract — Right to time of performance, abandon. 782. Explaining written receipt by 773. Effect of death — Of destruc- parol evidence. tion of subject of contract. 783. Where time of the essence — 774. The same subject continued — Abandonment — Waiver of Exceptions. condition. 775. Revoking agency by death. 784. Writing not to be varied by 776. Varying or terminating written contemporaneous oral agree- by subsequent oral contracts. ment. 777. As to the consideration of the 785. Cases where contracts have parol contract. been held not terminated or 778. Writing ended by parol al- modified by parol. though not thus to be varied 786. Novation. —Statute of frauds. 787. The same subject continued. 779. Terminating contracts under 788. Breaking contract of sale by seal by parol. sale to another. § 771. Ending or changing contracts by conduct.— The evi- dence that a written contract has been abandoned and termi- nated may be supplied by the conduct and acts of parties, as well as by their words. 1 A contract between plaintiff and de- fendant provided that defendant might terminate the con- tract at any time upon five days' notice, and, in such case, plaintiff should be entitled to payment for work done, and also to a certain sum as liquidated damages. It was held that a finding that the contract had been terminated by defendant was supported by a finding of fact sustained by proof that de- fendant ordered plaintiff to discontinue work, and refused thereafter to allow him to continue. 2 Where a contract pro- » Peeples «. McTeer (1891), 35 S. C. 63 Hun, 628 ; 17 N. Y. Supl. 714. And 610 ; 14 S. E. Rep. 828. see also, Porter v. Swan, 17 NY. bupl. 2 Curnan v. Delaware R. Co. (1892), 351. (94??) 944 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 771 vided that a corporation should employ a certain patentee for ten years, subject to termination by either party on one year's notice, or by the patentee's death or inability to act, and that, in the event of the contract's termination, the corporation might use his patents on payment of a royalty, it was held that a wrongful discharge of the patentee, although a breach of contract, did not terminate the contract so as to render the corporation liable to pay the royalty. 1 An agreement not to sell stock in a corporation without giving the other party no- tice provided that it should terminate when either of the par- ties thereto should have parted with his interest. It was held that, where a party to the agreement indorsed on her certifi- cate of stock a transfer of the stock to her sons, with the knowledge of the other parties to the agreement, and the trans- fer was noted on the stock book of the corporation, the agree- ment was terminated, although no new certificate of stock is- sued to the sons. 2 In an action for milk sold and delivered, defendant counter-claimed for damages sustained by reason of plaintiff's failure to deliver at the place agreed. It appeared that defendant received the milk at a substituted locality for five months without objection, and renewed his contract for another year without dissent as to the place of delivery. It was held that defendant's course constituted an implied as- sent to a modification of the agreement, and that the objection that the change in the contract was invalid for want of con- sideration was not tenable. 3 Contracts which are binding upon a party upon the condition that others also sign be- come operative as soon as the others sign, and, one having signed, can not revoke it after it becomes operative without 1 Miller v. Union Switch Oo. (1892) , in, and for about forty years they, and 132 N. Y. 562; 29 N. E. Rep. 964; those claiming under them, held pos- Johnson v. Union Switch Co., 129 session and conducted themselves in N. Y. 653. accordance with the adjustment of the 2 In re Argus Oo. (1893), 138 N. Y. boundaries of their land as set forth 557, 575; 34 N. E. Rep. 388. in such verdict, it was held that their 3 Gibson v. Donnelly (1891), 13 N. Y. rights and privileges under an anterior Supl. 808. And see Tallman v. Earle contract had ceased. Bascom v. Can- (1891), 13 N. Y. Supl. 805. Where the non (1893), 158 Pa. St. 225; 27 Atl. parties to an ejectment suit performed Rep. 968. all the conditions of the verdict there- $ 772 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 945 the consent of the others bound with him, and as to whom the contract is binding because of his obligation. 1 § 772. Election between ending and enforcing contract — Right to abandon. — By bringing an action or taking legal steps to enforce a contract, a party elects not to rescind the contract on account of anything then known to him, and such election is conclusive against him. 2 Where a party to whom several notes are payable, under a contract, gives written no- tice that he " terminates and rescinds" the contract because of the non-payment of some of the notes, but at the same time returns only the notes that are not yet due, it has been held that the notice should be construed as terminating the contract as to the future only, and not as rescinding it so as to cut off the accrued rights on the notes that are due, and that in such a case the word rescind is to be regarded as mere tautology and synonymous with the word terminate. 8 Where one of the parties to a written executory contract renounces and refuses to perform it, the other party may, at his election, act upon the assumption of a breach before the time of performance arrives and treat it as abandoned for the future.* But, on the other hand, he may elect to keep the contract in force for the pur- pose for which it was made, and in such case his own obliga- tion, as well as that of the other party, will continue until the time of performance. 5 Where a person agrees to sell the fur- 1 Currents. Fulton, 10 Ind.App. 617; 4 Windmuller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 38 N. E. Rep. 419; Cravens v. Eagle 674. Cotton Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6; 21 N. E. 5 Bernstein v. Meech (1891), 130 Eep. 981. N. Y. 354, per Bradley, J. : "What- 2 Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y. 387, ever view may have been taken of per Danforth, J. : " By bringing the the defendants' right to treat the con- first action after knowledge of the tract as at an end, they disposed of fraud the plaintiffs waived the right that question by their letter to him. to disaffirm the contract and the de- By this it appeared that the defend- fendants may hold them to their elec- ants elected to keep the contract in tion. The principle applied in Equi- force. This operated alike upon the table, etc., Foundry Co. e. Hersee, 103 rights of both parties and the plaintiff N. Y. 25, and Hays v. Midas, 104 N. Y. was justified in so understanding it." 602, require this construction." Johnstone v. Milling, L. R. 16 Q. B. 'Hurst v. Trow's Printing Co., 30 D. 460; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Abb. N. C. 1. Exch. Ill; Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. 6 St. 541. 946 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 773 niture in his hotel at an appraisement to be made by a third party, and, while present himself, refuses to allow the pur- chaser to be present, the latter has the right to abandon the agreement. 1 § 773. Effect of death — Of destruction of subject of con- tract. — The general doctrine is, that when a party voluntarily undertakes to do a thing without qualification, performance is not excused because, by inevitable accident or other contin- gency not foreseen, it becomes impossible for him to do the act or thing which he agreed to do. 2 It is, however, now well settled that when performance depends on the continued exist- ence of a given person or thing, and such continued existence was assumed as the basis of the agreement, the death of the person or the destruction of the thing puts an end to the obli- gation. Executory contracts for personal services, for the sale of specific chattels, or the use of a building, are held to fall with- in this principle. 3 The cases just referred to are not exceptions to the rule that contracts voluntarily made are to be enforced, but' the courts, in accordance with the manifest intention, con- strue the contract as subject to an implied condition that the person or thing shall be in existence when the time of per- formance arrives. 1 Thus an obligation in a contract providing for the organization of a corporation, and that defendant shall have the management of it, and in consideration shall guar- anty plaintiff a dividend of not less than seven per cent, per annum for seven years, terminates prima facie with the disso- lution of the corporation. 5 It is a general rule, also, that if, "Tibbetts v. Sartwell (N. H. 1893), worth, L. R. 4 Q. B. 127; Jones v. 29 Atl. Rep. 411. See also, Hook v. United States, 96 U. S. 24." Philbrick, 23 N. H. 288. 3 Dexter u. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62; 2 Lorillard!). Clyde (1894), 142 N.Y. People v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 456; 37 N. E. Rep. 489, per Andrews, 91 N. Y. 174; Taylor v. Caldwell, 113 C. J.. "This doctrine protects the E. C. L. 826. integrity of contracts, and one of the 4 Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N. Y. 456. reasons assigned in its support in the 6 Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N. Y. 456, early case of Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, per Andrews, C. J. : "The question 26, is that, as against such contingen- whether the obligation of the defend- cies, the party could have provided ants under their guaranty continued by his contract. See Harmony v. in force as to the part of the seven Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99; Ford v. Cotes- years unexpired at the time of the §773 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 947 after a contract is made, the law interferes, and makes subse- quent performance impossible, the party is held to be ex- dissolution of the corporation, in the absence of any responsible agency of either party for the causes which led to the dissolution, must be determined by the intention of the parties as as- certained from the language of the contract, and, if ambiguous, from Buch language and the surrounding circumstances. It is incontrovertible that the right to manage the business of the corporation and to earn and to receive the commissions on freight were the considerations upon which the guaranty rested. The plaintiff conceded these rights to the Clydesfor this equivalent. The defendants could receive the benefits of the con- tract only in case the corporation should continue in being during the running of the guaranty. The death of the corporation would terminate their management; prevent their earning commissions; the business would end, and the court, in adminis- tering the assets, would return to each party his proportion of the capital re- maining for distribution. The death or dissolution of the corporation would withdraw all the capital invested, so far as it remained, and take awaj' for the future the whole consideration upon which the guaranty was based. There would thereafter be no corpora- tion earning or capable of earning dividends, and nothing left upon which the obligation to pay them could be predicated. It must be con- ceded that it is difficult to draw the line and to determine the exact limita- tions of the principle. When the ex- ecutory contract relates to specific chattels, and the subject-matter is destroyed without fault of the party, the implied condition arises, and ex- cuses performance. But where the contract is based on the assumed ex- istence and continuance of a certain condition, or upon the continuance of a subject-matter which, however, is not the direct object of the con- tract, is the principle in such cases excluded? The present case illus- trates what we have in mind. The contract in question was not with the corporation whose life was extin- guished by the judgment of dissolu- tion. But the guaranty assumed that the corporation would continue in ex- istence during the seven years period. The liability which the defendants as- sumed was in consideration of the benefits which might accrue to them from the management of the trans- portation business of the corporation during that period. Upon the as- sumption that the death of the cor- poration was brought about without their fault, were they thereafter bound? Is the doctrine of implied condition less applicable than it would be if the contract had been between the de- fendants and the corporation? If, in the one case, the contract, so far as it was unexecuted, would be terminated, did not the happening of the same event terminate the engagement of these parties, based on the assumed continuance of the corporation in life? There is, in the present case, we think, an element which strengthens the conclusion we have reached, that the obligation of the contract termin- ated prima facie with the dissolution of the corporation. There is some- thing more than an implied and wholly unexpressed condition that the corporation should continue in life during the seven years. It is the fair construction of the language of the contract itself. The contract was not unilateral. It contains mutual stipulations. These mutual stipula- tions, by their terms, look to the con- tinuance of the corporation, and the 948 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 774 cused. 1 The rule just laid down is the more readily applied where such interference of the law is at the suit of the oppos- ing party. Thus where the corporation above referred to was dissolved in an action brought nominally by the people, but really instituted by plaintiff, on the ground of technical breaches of corporate duty, in which plaintiff himself partici- pated, and which would have been corrected if made known to the corporation, and which plaintiff was under no obligation to the state to disclose, the act of plaintiff, as between the par- ties, must be deemed to have been the cause of the dissolution, and defendant is not estopped to set it up as a defense/ § 774. The same subject continued. — Exceptions. — Where the contract with deceased is executory, and the personal rep- resentative can sufficiently execute all that the deceased could have done, he may do so and enforce the contract. 3 Accordingly, if a purchaser orders goods and dies before the time of deliv- ery, his executors must receive and pay for them, although the particular purpose of the purchase was defeated by the purchaser's death. 4 A contract for hiring for a year to do ordinary farm work is not terminated by the employer's death before the year expires, and, where the employe con- tinues to do the work without objection by the executors, 1 he may recover of them the full contract price for the year's work when completed. 5 But, in such a case, the servant's death would operate to end the contract and excuse its per- formance, as the servant alone could perform it, and his representatives could recover for services performed. 6 mutual obligations into which the ices are subject to this implied con- parties entered are qualified by this dition, that the person shall be able understanding." at the time appointed to perform 1 Jones v. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412. them ; and if he dies, or without fault 2 Lorillard v. Clyde (1894), 142 N.Y. on the part of the covenantor be- 456. comes disabled, the obligation to per- 8 Parsons on Contracts, 131. form is extinguished. People v. Man- 4 Martin v. Hunt, 1 Allen, 418. ning, 8 Cow. 297; Jones v. Judd, 4 5 Lacy v. Getman, 35 Han, 46. N. Y. 412; Clark v. Gilbert, 26 N. Y. 6 Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197; 279; Gray v. Murray, 3 Johns. Ch. Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40, per Al- 167." len, J . : " Contracts for personal serv- §§ 775, 776 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 949 § 775. Revoking agency by death.— The power of an agent to collect and receive rents falling due to his principal ceases upon the death of the latter, unless the agency is coupled with an interest, and payment made thereafter to the agent does not bind the estate of the principal, although made in ignorance of such death. And the fact that the agent is entitled to com- missions on rents collected does not give him such an interest as will continue his power after death of his principal ; the in- terest which will have this effect must be an interest in the thing itself, that is, in the property or the rents as such. 1 There would seem to be an incongruity in the law of agency with re- spect to the effect of a revocation of the agent's powers by the act of the principal himself and a revocation produced by his death, as, in the former case, the revocation does not affect third parties, dealing with the agent in good faith, without notice. 2 § 776. Varying or terminating written by subsequent oral contracts. — In Indiana the rule has been laid down that writ- ten contracts may be modified or rescinded by parol at any time after their execution. 8 Thus, in an action against a railroad company for breach of a contract to transport cattle, evidence of conversations between plaintiff and defendant is admissible to prove that a written contract for transportation was abandoned and the shipment made under a subsequent parol contract. 4 Par- 1 Farmers' Loan Co. v. Wilson death without notice to them. The (1893), 139 N. Y. 284, per O'Brien, J. : case of an agency coupled with an in- "The rule is well settled by authority terest is made an exception to the that the power of an agent to collect rule. Grapel v. Hodges, 112 N. Y. 419 ; and receive payment of rents fall- Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, ing due to his principal, when such 204." power is not coupled with an interest, 2 Claflin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301; terminates and ceases upon the death Williams u.'Birbeck, Hoff. Ch. 359; of the principal, and that payment Blake v. Garwood, 42 N. J. Eq. 276; made thereafter to the agent does not Wharton on Agency, §§ 99-104; Story bind the estate of the principal,though on Agency, § 470. the payment be made in ignorance of 8 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Levy (1890), the principal's death. Weberw. Bridg- 127 Ind. 168; 26 N. E. Rep. 773, per man, 113 N. Y. 600. The rule seems Coffey, J., citing: Billingsley v. Strat- to have originated in the presumption ton, 11 Ind. 396; Ward v. Walton, 4 that those who deal with an agent Ind. 75; Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282. knowingly assume the risk that his 'Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Levy, 127 authority may be terminated by Ind. 168. 950 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 777 ties who have made written contracts may vary them afterwards, as much as they please, by parol, if the nature of the agree- ment is not such that the law requires them to be in writing. 1 Where plaintiff agreed to sell logs to defendant, to be delivered at defendant's mill, and subsequently they agreed that those then in the river should be accepted where they were, with a certain reduction from the price, and defendant took possession under such arrangement, the second contract abrogates the first, and is to be treated as though there had been no other contract. 8 Where a written building contract was so vague and indefinite that most of the details of the work were left unpro- vided for, and had to be supplied orally as the work progressed, in order to carry it out satisfactorily to the parties, it was held not improper to instruct the jury that they might regard the written contract as altered and annulled by the conversations between the parties. 3 A provision in a building contract that no new work or work of any kind shall be considered as extra, unless a separate written estimate for the same, before it is commenced, shall be submitted by the contractor and the sig- nature of the owner be obtained to it, may be subsequently waived by the parties by parol. 4 § 777. As to the consideration of the parol contract. — Where the parties had entered into a written contract for the erec- tion and furnishing of a mill, parol evidence of a subsequent conversation between the parties, tending to show that, in and by such conversation, it was arranged and agreed that the party who built the mill would accept the obligation of a cor- poration to be subsequently organized, in the place of that of the original promisor, and substitute the one for the other, 'Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 622; 24 within the statute of frauds maybe N. W. Rep. 638. See also, Seaman v. waived, dissolved or annulled by a O'Hara, 29 Mich. 66 ; Westchester In- subsequent parol agreement. Goss v. surance Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143; Lord Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58, 75 ; Cum- Boger Williams Insurance Co. v. Car- mings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 486." rington, 43 Mich. 252; 5 N. W. Bep. 2 Tingleyu. Fairhaven Land Co., 303 ; Kimmerle v. Hass, 53 Mich. 341 ; 9 Wash. 34 ; 36 Pac. Bep. 1098. 19 N. W. Rep. 26. In Proctor v. s Green v. Paul (1893), 155 Pa. St. Thompson, 13 Abb. N. C. 340, Bum- 126; 25 Atl. Bep. 867. sey, J., says: "It can not be dis- 4 McLeod v. Genius, 31 Neb. 1; 47 puted that a contract in writing not N. W. Bep. 473. § 778 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 951 is inadmissible, as such agreement was unexecuted and with- out consideration. 1 A written contract can be modified by a writing signed only by one of the parties thereto, who thereby surrenders a portion of tbe consideration to be paid to him. 2 And a substituted parol agreement, followed by actual perform- ance, whether made and executed before or after breach of a covenant in the original contract, is a good accord and satis- faction of the covenant. So also, a new agreement, although without performance, if based on a good consideration, will be a satisfaction if so accepted. 3 § 778. Writing ended by parol although not thus to be va- ried — Statute of frauds. — The substance of a contract valid only because in writing as required by the statute of frauds can not be varied by parol. 1 But a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, for example, a contract for the sale of land, may be rescinded or extinguished by a subsequent parol agreement. 5 A different rule would seem to have obtained in England. 6 A parol agreement between a husband after his 1 Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Galloway 5 S. D. 205; 58 N. W. Rep. 565. 8 Bray v. Loomer (1892), 61 Conn. 456; 23 Atl. Rep. 831. In this case plaintiffs entered into a written con- tract with defendants, giving the lat- ter the right to use a certain patent, upon payment to plaintiffs of twenty- five cents a dozen, as royalty, on the articles manufactured. Subsequently plaintiffs signed a paper allowing de- fendants "fifteen cents per dozen out of said royalty" towards advertising, and agreed to allow them to retain out of said license fee of twenty-five cents per dozen the sum of fifteen cents per dozen, as payment to them for adver- tising to be done by them, so that the net license for which defendants shall pay plaintiffs "shall be ten cents per dozen, and no more," and defendants " may retain fifteen cents per dozen out of the sum due by statement, and the balance of ten cents per dozen shall be in full of royalties due " plaintiffs. It was held that the con- tract was an unconditional modifica- tion of the original contract, and that ten cents per dozen was full payment thereunder. 3 McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1 ; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528; Lat- timore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 ; Dear- born v. Cross, 7 Cow. 48; Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574. 4 Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216. 5 Proctor v. Thompson, 13 Abb. N. C. 340, where Bumsey, J., cites Boyce v. McCulloch, 3 Watts & S. 429; Byno v. Darby, 20 N. J. Eq. 231 ; Bowman v. Cunningham, 78 111. 48; Arrington v. Porter, 47 Ala. 714; Eaffensberger v. Cullison, 28 Pa. St. 426, in support of the text. And see Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31 ; Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 486. 6 Stead v. Dawber, 10 Ad. & El. 57; Harvey v. Grabham, 5 Ad. & El. 61 ; Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 928; Moore v. Campbell, 10 952 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 779 wife's death and the guardian of minor heirs that the former might have dower in the premises leased to him by the guardian is void as a modification of the written lease by parol; and the fact that the lease was accepted in reliance upon such parol agreement does not estop the ward from denying its validity where it appears the husband knew that the probate court re- fused to permit the guardian to give a lease which recognized the right of dower, since the ward can not be estopped by an act of the guardian which the husband knew to be unauthor- ized. 1 § 779. Terminating contracts under seal by parol. — In Mich- igan a contract under seal may be canceled by parol agree- ment. 2 And in New York a contract under seal may be can- celed by a substituted parol agreement followed by actual performance. 3 A sealed executory contract can not be released or rescinded by a parol executory contract, but after breach of a sealed contract a right of action may be waived or released by a new parol contract in relation to the same subject-matter or by any valid parol executed contract. 4 The Illinois rule is that a contract under seal can not be changed by parol. 5 Thus, where, by an instrument under seal, a party was given the right to elect to lease freight grounds in perpetuity within a certain definite territory, it was held that the instrument could not be altered by parol so as to extend the right of elec- tion to different territory. 6 And where defendant by a sealed Exch. 323; Noble v. Ward, L. R. 1 111. App. 313; Kinsley v. Charnley, 33 Exch. 117; L. R. 2 Exch. 135. 111. App. 553. •Heisen v. Heisen (1893), 145 111. 6 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Baltimore, 658; 34 N. E. Rep. 597. etc., R. Co., 23 111. App. 531, per Mo- 2 Blagborneu. Hunger, 101Mich.375; ran, J.: "This is the well-settled rule 59 N. W. Rep. 657. But see, Roe v. in this state, whatever departures Conneley, 74 N. Y. 201, where it is may have been taken in other juris- questioned if a lease for ten years un- dictions. In Loach v. Farnum, 90 111. der seal can be canceled and sur- 367, this rule was applied to exclude rendered by an instrument not under from evidence a writing not under sea l- seal, but signed by the lessees, pur- 3 McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1. porting to ' alter the monthly rent 4 Delacroix v. Bulkley, 13 Wend. 71 ; fixed by the lease under seal, and up- Suydam v. Jones, 10 Wend. 181, 184; on which the suit was based; and in Kaye v. Waghorne, 1 Taunt. 428. Hume v. Taylor, 63 111. 43, it was ap- 6 Albrecht v. Kraisinger (1892), 44 plied where a contract under seal was § 780 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 953 contract appointed plaintiff sole agent to sell his farm, and then having himself found a purchaser, procured from plaintiff a written release from such contract on his agreeing to pay one per cent, of the purchase price, it was held that the sealed contract could not be changed by parol, and that plaintiff was not enti- tled to commissions on the sale. 1 The doctrine that a con- tract under seal can not be changed by a parol agreement does not apply to a change in the instrument itself by the direction or consent of the parties to it, for, in such a case, there is no parol agreement existing independent of the written instru- ment. 2 § 780. Effect of parol modification of written contract. — A material modification of a written contract by a subsequent parol agreement reduces the whole to parol, and the written contract can be used no further than to mark the terms and extent of the new stipulations. 8 "Where, in an action by a purchaser for breach of a written contract for the sale of goods, it appears that, on the subsequent written proposal of different terms by defendant, and the oral assent thereto by plaintiff, the contract sued on was superseded, and another substituted which is not declared on, plaintiff is not entitled to recover. 4 made to deliver sixteen hundred hogs 3 Malone v. Philadelphia E. Co. of a certain weight and quality, and (1893), 157 Pa. St. 430; 27 Atl. Eep. it was sought to show that the parties 756, following Vicary v. Moore, 2 made a new parol contract, by which Watts (Pa.), 451. it was agreed that a less number than 'King v. Faist, 161 Mass. 449; 37 one thousand hogs would be received N. E. Eep. 456, per Barker, J. . "The in full compliance with the original plaintiff contends that it is not clear contract. In such case the parol con- that the terms of February 27th were tract, modifying the sealed one, was declined by the defendants, and that denied effect upon the well-settled the real situation is that a modifica- rule of the common law, that an ex- tion of an original contract had been ecutory contract under seal can not suggested by the defendants, and ef- be modified or varied by a parol agree- fected by his assent to the offer stated ment." in their letter of March 3d, and that 1 Gilbert v. Coons, 37 111. App. 448. he might declare upon the instrument z Kneedler u. Anderson (1892), 43 of February 27th as a written contract, 111. App. 317; Collins v. Collins, 51 and, under his declaration, offer proof Miss. 311 ; Woolley v. Constant, 4 of the subsequent modification. The Johns. 54; Speake v. United States, 9 question of pleading here raised has Cranch, 28. not been discussed in our decisions 954 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 781 § 781. Parol extension or waiver of time of performance. — The time for performance of a written contract may be extended or enlarged by parol, but a sufficient consideration of each pa- rol contract must be shown or the courts will not enforce it. 1 And where the time of performance of a written contract is ex- tended by a subsequent parol agreement mutual acts to be per- formed by the parties may constitute a sufficient consideration of the parol agreement. 2 After a bond and mortgage under seal have become due a promise to extend the time of pay- ment may be shown by parol. 3 And where in such a case the which have dealt with the doctrine that the terms of a written contract may be varied by a subsequent oral agreement. See Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 486; Loring v. Alden, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 576; Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31; Blasdell v. Souther, 6 Gray, 149; Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 204 ; Palmer v. Stock- well, 9 Gray, 237; Rockwood v. Wal- cott, 3 Allen, 458; Lerned v. Wanne- macher, 9 Allen, 412 ; Whittier v. Dana, 10 Allen, 326; Stults v. New- hall, 118 Mass. 98; Ballou v. Billings, 136 Mass. 307; Emery v. Boston, etc., Insurance Co. ,138 Mass. 398; Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 440 ; 1 N.E.Rep. 122 ; Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261 ; 2 N. E. Rep. 776. Our statute is that the declaration must state the sub- stantial facts necessary to constitute the cause of action. Pub. St. c. 167, § 2, cl. 3. This is consistent with the old rule of pleading that matters which should come more properly from the other side -need not be stated, it being enough for each party to make out his own case. Comyn's Digest, 'Pleader,' c. 81; 1 Chitty on Pleading, 222. If the plaintiff's case could stand solely on the instrument of February 27th as a written contract of the defendants, which they had refused or failed to perform, and he was not compelled in order to show his own right of action to rely upon a subsequent modification of its terms, and so could treat the new agreement merely as a defense which must fail because it had not been performed by the defendants (see Whittier v. Dana, 10 Allen, 326), and was not substituted for the original (see Stults v. Newhall, 118 Mass. 98, and Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 440), it would not be neces- sary for him to state in his declaration either the subsequent agreement or its breach, for neither of those facts are in that case necessary constituents of his cause of action ; and, if the defendant should prove the subsequent agree- ment as a defense, he could rebut that defense by proof that the new agree- ment was not in substitution, and that it had not been performed, although there was no such averment in his declaration." 1 Parker v. Jameson, 32 N. J. Eq. 222; French v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 279, 281. 2 North v. Kizer, 72 111. 172; "Wads- worth v. Thompson, 3 Gilm. (111.) 423; Baker v. "Whiteside, 1 111. 174. s Van Syckel v. O'Hearn (1892), 50 N. J. Eq. 173; 24 Atl. Rep. 1024, per Bird, V. C. . "I think all of the au- thorities in this state hold the time for performance of every such contract may be extended by parol. Bigelow v. Rommelt, 24 N. J. Eq. 115; Tomp- kins !•, Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. 338; Maryott v. Renton, 21 N. J. Eq. 381 ; ■§ 782 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 955 action of the party to whom the promise was made was con- trolled by it, and he took title to the real estate covered by the mortgage relying upon it, a court of equity will apply the doc- trine of estoppel and refuse to aid the mortgagee if he attempts to foreclose his mortgage before the expiration of the period named. 1 The time of performance of a written contract may be waived as well as extended by parol. Accordingly a written contract for the sale of land on monthly payments may be changed by parol so as to allow the purchaser to pay the entire considera- tion at once, and to demand an immediate delivery of the deed. 8 And where plaintiff contracts to complete a house "ready for oc- cupancy" within sixty days, according to plans which do not require the finishing of the second story and putting on the last coat of paint, the effect of a subsequent contract, made after the sixty days have expired, to do the additional work, for an ex- tra payment, is to waive the original stipulation to complete the work at a certain time, and substitute a stipulation for completion within a reasonable time. 3 § 782. Explaining written receipt by parol evidence. — A re- ceipt is not usually conclusive as between the immediate parties, and is not within the rule which excludes parol evidence to Stryker v. Vanderbilt, 25 N. J. Law, Hummer, 18 N. J. Eq. 83, 90; Miller 482; Bell v. Romaine, 30 N. J. Eq. 24; v. Chitwood, 2 N. J. Eq. 199; Lee v. Sharp v. Wyckofi, 39 N. J. Eq. 376; Kirkpatrick, 14 N. J. Eq. 264,267; Cox Measurall v. Pearce (N. J. Eq.), 3 v. Bennet, 13 N. J. Law, 165; Conti- Atl. Rep. 92; King v. Morford, 1 N. J. nental Bank v. National Bank, 50 Eq. 274 ; Stoutenburgh v. Tompkins, 9 N. Y. 575. " N. J. Eq. 332; Baldwins. Salter, 8 2 Anderson v. Moore (1893), 145 111. Paige, 473; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 61; 33 N. E. Pep. 848. Johns. 330." 3 Cornish v. Suydam, 79 Ala. 620 ; 13 1 Van Syckel v. O'Hearn, 50 N. J. So. Rep. 118, per McClellan, J.: "Of Eq. 173, per Bird, V. C. . " In such course, the parties had a right to alter case, although no consideration or and modify the original contract, and benefit accrues to the person making to make the second one by mutual the promise, he is the author of the consent, and without any new consid- very condition of affairs which stands eration, and by such alteration or new in his way, and it is most equitable agreement either expressly or im- that the court should say that they pliedly to waive any right either would shall so stand. Martin v. Bighter, 10 otherwise have had. Robinson v. N. J. Eq. 510 ; Church v. Florence Iron Bullock, 66 Ala. 548 ; Young v. Fuller, Works, 45 N. J. Law, 129; Bank v. 29 Ala. 464; Badders v. Davis, 88 Pulmer, 31 N. J. Law, 55 ; Huffman v. Ala. 367 ; 6 So. Rep. 834." 956 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 783 vary the terms of a written instrument; and, where the pur- poses of the receipt are expressed in short and seemingly in- complete terms, parol evidence is admissible to explain the nature of the transaction. 1 § 783. Where time of the essence — Abandonment — Waiver of conditi'on. — In mercantile contracts time is of the essence. A statement descriptive of the subject-matter or of some material incident, such as the time or place of shipment, is generally to be regarded as a warranty or condition precedent upon the fail- ure or non-performance of which the party aggrieved may repu- diate and abandon the whole contract. 2 Where there is a writ- ten contract by which one of the parties agrees to construct a building for a certain price by a certain time, a waiver of the provision as to the time for its completion is not a waiver or abandonment of other features of the contract. 3 A supplemen- tary written contract which alters the original in respect to de- livery only does not abrogate it and does not prevent an action on it for its breach. 4 Where a contract for the 6ale of a lumber plant provided for a reduction in price in case of a shortage in the timber, it was held that a further reduction made where the shortage exceeded expectation did not amount to an aban- donment of the contract. 5 1 Osborne v. Stringham, 4 S. D. 593; U.S. 40; Lowberu. Bangs, 2 Wall.728; 57 N. W. Rep. 776. Per Fuller, J.: Bowes v. Shand, L. R. 2 App. Cas. "In the case before us we are inclined 455 ; Behn v. Burness, 3 Best & S. 751. to believe that the element of uncer- And see Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216, tainty enters into the receipt, and where Danforth, J., said: "It can that the intention of the parties that not be doubted that the omission to the note be given and held as collat- furnish iron shipped in December or eral to such balance as might be found January, authorized defendant to re- due on settlement is not repugnant to scind the contract." Welsh v. Goss- the recitals of the paper, and that ler, 89 N. Y. 540. parol evidence is admissible and com- s Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v. Wood- petent to explain the nature of the worth (1890), 26 Fla. 368; Phillips, transaction. Compiled Laws, §3562; etc., Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646; Smith v. Holland, 61 N. Y. 635; Mc- Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y. 388; Clelland v. James, 33 Iowa, 571 ; D. Cooke v. Murphy, 70 111. 96. M. Osborne & Co. v. Stringham, 4 Meylert v. Gas, etc., Co., 14 N. Y. 1 S. D. 406; 47 N. W. Rep. 408, and Supl. 148. cases there cited." s Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 35 111, 2 Norrington D.Wright, 115 TJ. S. App. 449. 188, 203; "Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 $ 784 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 957 § 784. Writing not to be varied by contemporaneous oral agreements. — A written contract can not be varied by an oral agreement made substantially at the same time. 1 A party can not be relieved from express and definite conditions volun- tarily inserted in a written contract, on the mere ground that, at the time of executing the contract, verbal conditions were agreed to, contradicting the writing. 2 A release by a son of all his interest in the estate of his father, given him by his father's will, is not a bar to an action by the son against the executor on a promissory note given the son by the father in his life-time, and not mentioned in the release; and oral evi- dence is incompetent to show that the claim in such an action was understood at the time to be embraced in the settlement and release; 3 for this would be to engraft upon the written contract an additional oral stipulation founded upon the same consideration and entered into at the same time, and would be contrary to settled rules. 4 And evidence of a parol agreement and understanding antecedent to or contemporaneous with the execution of an instrument under seal is not admissible to vary its terms. 5 The rule that the true consideration of a writ- ten contract may be shown by parol does not authorize oral stipulations to be added to a written contract under the claim that such oral agreement was part of the consideration. 6 Where husband and wife enter into clear, unambiguous writ- ten agreement for the purpose of perpetuating a parol ante- nuptial agreement, such written agreement will be deemed to ■McGuinness v. Shannon (1891), * St. Vrain Stone Co. v. Denver, etc. t 154 Mass. 86, per Allen, J.. "It must E. Co. (1893), 18 Colo. 211; 32 Pac. therefore be treated as an oral agree- Eep. 827. ment which was inconsistent with the 8 Frost v. Brigham, 139 Mass. 43. written one, and was made substan- 4 Doyle v. Dixon, 12 Allen, 576, 579. tially at the same time, and it can not 5 Barnett v. Barnes, 73 111. 216; have the effect to vary it. It was not Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Holzgrafe, 53 an alteration of the written contract 111. 516; Strehl v. D'Evers, 66 111. 77; by a subsequent new oral one between Loach v. Farnum, 90 111.367; Gable the parties, and in this respect it v. Wetherholt, 116 111. 313; Wilson r. closely resembles Clark v. Haughton, Deen, 74 N. Y. 531. 12 Grav, 38, 41. See also, Doyle u. 6 Brintnall [». Briggs, 87 Iowa, 538; Dixon," 12 Allen, 576; Fitz v, Comey, 54 N. W. Eep. 531 ; Mast v. Pearce, 58 118 Mass. 100; Frost v. Brigham, 139 Iowa, 579. Mass. 43." 958 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 785 have merged all their parol negotiations made at and before its execution, and, not having been questioned by them during their joint lives, will not be modified afterwards. 1 § 785. Cases where contracts have been held not termi- nated or modified by parol. — Where a contract by which plaintiffs agreed to mine iron ore from defendant's mine by the caving system gave defendant the right of terminating the contract whenever it should decide that such system of mining was "prejudicial to the future welfare and development of said mine," it was held that this gave defendant no right arbitrarily to terminate the contract, and, having stopped plain- tiffs from continuing the work, without even pretending to have determined that the system would be prejudicial, it was liable in damage for breach of the contract. 2 Where a con- tract for the construction of a railroad provides that measure- ments, classification, and estimates shall be made in determin- ing the price to be paid, but that no alteration of the contract will be allowed unless in writing signed by the parties, a promise of the arbitrator, during the progress of the work, to 1 Claypool v. Jaqua (1893), 135 Ind. only when it determined that the cav- 499. And see also, McAnnulty v. ing system was 'prejudicial to the McAnnulty, 120 111. 26. future welfare and development of 2 Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble(1894), the mine,' and that there is no pre- 153 U. S. 540 ; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876, per tense that it ever made such determi- Brewer, J. : "The first objection to any nation. On the contrary, the 3efend- recovery under this claim is that by the ant set up as a defense that the very terms of the contract the defend- plaintiffs abandoned the work, and ant was at liberty to terminate it at thus broke the contract, and that it any time, and hence it is insisted that, suffered great damage thereby, and even if it did so, plaintiffs were not on the trial the whole scope of its entitled to recover any profits which testimony in this respect was in de- they might have made had it not been nial of the charge that it had stopped terminated; that coupled with the the plaintiffs from continuing the right to terminate was a special pro- mining of ore, or in any manner vision, to wit, an award of referees sought to terminate the contract. For for estimating the damages which the aught that appears to the contrary in plaintiffs should sustain in conse- this record, the defendant now, as quence of such termination, and that ever, believes that the caving system no attempt to secure such an award is not only not prejudicial, but the was alleged or proved. To this it may best method of working the mine, and be replied that the contract did not broke the contract with plaintiffs only give to the defendant a right arbi- for the sake of giving it to another trarily to terminate the contract, but party." § 785 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 959 classify a certain part as solid rock, rather than loose rock, does not modify the contract. 1 Where a lease for oil and gas mining contained a covenant that the lessee should commence operations within three months, or thereafter pay lessor a specified sum annually until work was commenced, it was held that the fact that operations in the neighborhood demonstrated that a well on the property would be of no avail did not release lessee from his obligations ; and that a provision of the lease that failure of the lessee to make a payment when due should render the lease null and void, and not binding on either party, did not make the lease void, except at the option of the lessor. In an action on such lease by the lessor, defendant alleged a contemporaneous parol agreement that the lessee should have the right to terminate the lease at any time when satisfied that there was no oil or gas in the leased land, and, as well for the protection of the lessee as of the lessor, there was inserted in the lease that failure of the lessee to make a pay- ment when due should render the lease null and void and not binding on either party, and that but for such agree- ment, and the belief of the lessee that it was substantially expressed in the lease, he would not have signed it. It was held that this was the mere assertion that the lessee thought the language used gave him the right to terminate, and was therefore no ground for relief. 2 The fact that, at a vendee's request, several deeds were executed to him and his wife by the owners of the land, instead of a joint deed to himself, as called for by contract, does not affect the validity of the con- tract, nor constitute a parol modification thereof. 8 So also, » O'Donnell v. Henry (1892), 44 La. "These acts of the appellees were but Ann 845 ; 11 So. Eep. 245. an effort to comply with the terms of 2 Cochran v. Pew, 159 Pa. St. 184 ; 28 the contract, and were performed an Atl Rep. 219 ; Leatherman t>.01iver,151 this manner at the instance of the ap- Pa St 646 ; 25 Atl. Rep. 309 ; Phillips v. pellant ; and he can no more complain Vandergrift, 146 Pa. St. 357; 23 Atl. of the waiver of his rights under the Rep. 347 ; Jones v. Western, etc., Gas contract, and an effort at his request Co 146 Pa St. 204; Ogden v. Hatry, to convey the lands as he desired, 145 Pa. St. 640; Bay*. Wert, etc.. Gas than he could deny the payment of Co 138 Pa. St. 576; Wells v. Manu- the purchase-money under the con- facturers',etc.,GasCo.,130Pa.St.222; tract if he had procured the convey- Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. St. 491. ance to be made to another Browne » Tewksbury „.Howard,138 Ind. 103 ; on the Statute Frauds, §§ 424-426. 37 N. E. Rep. 355, per Hackney, J. : 960 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. § 786 where a contract for the construction of a county court-house provided that the county might make any alterations in the specifications, and that such alterations should not make the contract void, it was held that the fact that the county, under agreement with the contractor, changed the window lintels from stone to railroad iron did not affect the obligation of the sureties on his bond, as there was in fact no change of the contract, but rather a careful compliance with it. 1 § 786. Novation. — Novation according to the civil code of California is made by contract and is subject to the general rules relating to contracts. It is effected by the substitution of a new obligation between the same parties with intent to extin- guish the old one; by the substitution of a new debtor in the place of the old one with intent to release the latter; or by the substitution of a new creditor in the place of the old one with intent to transfer the rights of the latter to the former. 2 A transfer of property by the maker of a note to a third person in order that the note may be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, although made with the payee's consent, will not constitute a novation unless the payee accepted the third person as his debtor in the place of the maker and released the maker from any liability on the note. 3 Where one enters into a 'Howard County v. Baker, 119 Mo. Co. v. Negaunee Co. (1895), 65 Fed. 397; 24 S. W. Rep. 200, per Gantt, Rep. 298, Ricks, J., said: "The new P. J.: "But it is a clear misconcep- contract did not take the place of or tion of this change to call it a change satisfy the old contract. The chief of the contract. On the contrary, it difference between them was that the was a scrupulous compliance with defendant had no right to mine soft the terms of the contract. The con- ores while the Union Company had tract stipulated for the change, and, that right and retained it. Both could when made, it was as much a part of have occupied land of the Jackson the agreement as if it had been in- Iron Company and conducted opera- serted at first. It in no sense changed tions under the two contracts. Under the obligation of the contractor or his the contract between the Union Ore sureties. Rude v. Mitchell, 97 Mo. Concentrator Company and the 365; 11 S.W. Rep. 225; Ashenbroedel Negaunee Concentrating Company, Club v. Finlay, 53 Mo. App. 256 ; Hay- therefore, the former made a partial den v. Cook, 34 Neb. 670; 52 N. W. assignment of its rights under the first Rep. 165-167." contract between it and the plaintiff. §§ 1531, 1532. The plaintiff was in no sense a party "Pimentalw. Marques, 109 Cal. 406; to the second contract. The second 42 Pac. Rep. 159. In Jackson Iron contract was a partial transfer of rights § "87 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 961 contract to employ another at a fixed rate for a time certain, and afterwards disposes of the business in which the services are to be rendered to a third person, and such third person re- tains the servant in his employment and pays him at the con- tract rate for several months, this is sufficient evidence of no- vation to charge such third person with the obligations of the contract. In such case the original employer and his vendee are not jointly liable for services performed after the novation; but if they are sued jointly, and a cause of action against the vendee is pleaded and proved, he can not be heard to object be- cause judgment was also rendered against the vendor; nor can the misjoinder in such a case be raised by general demurrer or objection to evidence, on the ground that a cause of action is not stated. 1 "Where several persons', who have jointly entered into a building contract, withdraw, and one of them makes a new contract to complete the work, he is thereby released from liability under the former agreement;' and, since the release of one joint obligor releases all, the prior contract is terminated. 8 § 787. The same subject continued. — Novation can exist only by the mutual consent and agreement of all the inter- ested parties. When, however, the dissolution of an old firm occurs, and a new firm agrees to assume the liabilities of the old, but slight circumstances are required to justify finding an intention on the part of a creditor of the old firm, who has no- and a division of the obligations of agreed to pay the sum of two thousand the Union Company between it and five hundred dollars per annum, and defendant, but without any new and for which consideration the plaintiff distinct agreement on the part of the absolved the Union Company from plaintiff confirming or permitting a the obligations of the first contract, novation. It is true, as contended, and accepted the defendant as the that the defendant under the last con- obligee under that contract. We, tract did pay the amount of the month- therefore, fully concur with the trial ly installments in pursuance of its con- judge that there was no novation to tract with the Union Company, and support the first count of the declara- that it did that to prevent default and tion." forfeiture by the Union Company, and 1 Culbertson Power Co. v. Wildman, to protect itself ; but it can not be in- 45 Neb. 663 ; 63 N. W. Rep. 947. ferred from that fact that the plaintiff 2 Brodeck v. Farnum, 11 Wash. 665; and defendant entered into a contract 40 Pac. Rep. 189. by which the defendant assumed and 61 962 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. §788 tice of the dissolution and agreement, to accept the liability of the new instead of the old firm. 1 Where the payee of a note accepts it from the maker in satisfaction of the debt of another, and then assigns the debt to him without recourse, there is a complete novation of the debt. 2 But the fact that a duebill was given by the holder thereof to another, to be transferred to a third person, for the purpose of accomplishing a novation of the debt, is no defense to an action thereon where there is no evidence that it was so transferred. 3 § 788. Breaking contract of sale by sale to another. — Where a party, having contracted to do a thing upon a given day, before the day of performance arrives repudiates his contract, or voluntarily puts it out of his power to perform, the other party to the contract may treat it as rescinded, and bring his action for the breach immediately and without awaiting the 1 Tysen v. Somerville, 35 Fla. 219 ; 17 So. Rep. 5G7, Taylor, J. : "In the ab- sence of assent on the part of B. and his release of A., there is no privity of contract as between B. and 0. that will support an action by B. against C. upon the latter's promise to A. 1 Parsons on Contracts (7th ed.), p. 244 et seq., and citations ; Murphy v. Han- rahan, 50 Wis. 485 ; 7 N. W. Rep. 436 Trimble ... Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378 Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235 Bilborough v. Holmes, 5 Ch. Div. 255 Butterfield v. Hartshorn, 7N.H. 345 Ford v. Adams, 2 Barb. 349. See as to novation where a new firm agrees to accept the liabilities of an old firm, Register v. Dodge, 19 Blatchf. 79 ; 6 Fed. Rep. 6; 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 107." 2 Morse v. Wilcoxson (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Rep. 612, per Paynter, J.: "When appellees executed their note to the appellant for what she claimed Galbraith owed her, there was a com- plete novation of the debt. No recov- ery can be had against Galbraith by the appellant. So far as she was con- cerned, his debt was fully paid, as much so as if it had been paid in money. This is not a case of a debtor who paid it pleading usury, neither does the answer state any facts which show that Galbraith is indebted to the appellee Wilcoxson on account of having paid his debt due the appel- lant. It appears she bought the land, and was effected with notice (by the mortgage being duly recorded) that the appellant's mortgage was against the land. It is proper to presume, with absence of an allegation to the contrary, that she had actual notice of its existence, and assumed its pay- ment when she purchased the land. Assuming this to be true, notwith- standing appellant assigned without recourse, the debt which she held against Galbraith, appellee Mrs. Wil- coxson acquired no right to such debt, as it was extinguished when she exe- cuted the note to appellant. It was, in effect, paying part of the purchase- money." 3 Argyle Co. v. McNeill, 153 111. 669; 39 N. E. Rep. 1102. § 788 CHANGE AND TERMINATION. 963 stipulated day. It has, however, been held in California that a conveyance of land to a third person by one bound by an executory contract to convey it to another at a future date is not a breach of such contract, and does not entitle such other to treat the contract as abandoned before the time of perform- ance arrives, since, when the time of performance comes, the vendor may be able to furnish a good title. 1 1 Garberino v. Eoberts, 109 Cal. 125 ; 41 Pac. Rep. 857, Van Fleet, J. : " The question here is whether the mere fact that defendant conveyed the lot under the circumstances alleged had the effect to put it without his power to perform at the future date agreed upon, since it is not alleged that de- fendant has repudiated his contract, or refused to carry it out, unless the fact of conveying the lot to another is the legal equivalent of such repudia- tion. In Joyce v. Shafer, 97 Cal. 335 ; 32 Pac. Rep. 320,— a case of precisely the same character as the present, — it was held that the conveyance by the vendor of the land contracted for to a third party before the time for per- formance of the contract of sale is not a breach of that contract, and does not entitle the purchaser to treat the contract as abandoned or rescind- ed before the time of performance ar- rives. ' One may sell land,' says the court in that case, 'which he does not own, and yet be able, when the time of performance arrives, to furnish a good title. In the meantime the pur- chaser would not be at liberty to dis- affirm the contract on the ground that then the vendor was unable to make a good title. It would be incumbent upon him to offer to perform, or to show that at the time of performance the vendor could not furnish the title.' And in Shively v. Semi-Tropic, etc., Water Co., 99 Cal. 259; 33 Pac. Rep. 848, — another action of like character and purpose, — it is said : ' Rescission or abandonment of the contract by defendant gives plaint- iff his cause of action, but a transfer of the land to third parties of itself does not constitute such abandon- ment or rescission. It does not nec- essarily follow from such transfer that defendant has placed it out of his power to comply with the terms of the contract. Such transfer creates no breach of the contract. Non con- stat but plaintiff's rights were express- ly reserved by its terms. Defendant, as yet, has not defaulted, and might not suffer default when the balance of the purchase price was tendered and a deed demanded ; and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the money paid until he shows the default of the defendant. This question was direct- ly presented in Joyce v. Shafer, 97 Cal. 335; 32 Pac. 320, and it was there held that a conveyance by the vendor was not a breach of the contract, and a demurrer was sustained to the com- plaint for that reason. We are en- tirely satisfied with the principle laid down in that case.' " CHAPTER XXIII. RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 789. Equity jurisdiction — Damages as remedy. §811. 790. Eescission to prevent multi- plicity of suits. 812. 791. Eescission compared witli ref- ormation. 813. 792. Restoring benefits on rescind- 814. ing contract. 815. 793. Restoring the consideration. 794. Keeping tender good. 816. 795. Requisite joinder. 796. Rescission by vendor with for- feiture against vendee. 817. 797. Rescission for expressions of opinion — Future promise. 818. 798. The same subject continued — 819. If parties in confidence. 820. 799. Concealment — Represent a- tions of value — Warranty. 821. 800. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous. 822. 801. Rescission for mistake of law. 823. 802. Where one party only igno- rant. 824. 803. Rescinding release of legacy — Mistake of law — Conceal- 825. ment. 826. 804. Fraudulent representations. 827. 805. The same subject continued. 806. Further illustrations. 828. 807. Estate not liable to purchaser for executor's representa- 829. tions — Restoration . 830. 808. Rescinding coal lease for mutu- al mistake — Lessee's laches. 831. 809. Sale of ground rent — Mistake of law. 832. 810. Rescission for fraud. 833. Fraud of vendee, although he pays consideration. Election by defrauded pur- chaser — acquiescence . Rescission for purchaser's fraud. The same subject continued. Rescinding sale of goods for buyer's fraud. Fraud must be proved as al- leged. Party put on inquiry — Want of diligence. Negligent execution of instru- ment. Proof of fraud — Diligence. Laches in rescinding by one knowing his rights. Unreasonable delay. Rescission for fraud — For in- adequate consideration. Deed of trust by husband or wife. Effect of ratification. Where persons are in confi- dential relations. Physician and patient. Rescinding deed of trust from wife to husband or son. The same subject continued — Suit by heirs. Rescission by married woman. Parents' deeds to children. Voluntary deed from father to son. Deed of gift by old man — Con- fidential relation. Conveyances by lunatics and drunkards. § 789 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 965 J 834. Test of grantor's capacity. 835. Evidence of incapacity — Facts versus opinions. 836. Conveyances by erratic per- sons. 837. Where agent sells trust estate to own wife. 838. Stifling competition at judicial sale. 839. Canceling mortgage— Want of consideration. 840. The same subject continued — Security overvalued. 841. Deed given for illegal pur- pose — Exception. § 842. Where parties were in illicit relation. 843. Parties in pari delicto. 844. The same subject continued. 845. Rescission for non-perform- ance. 846. Deed defrauding cotenants. 847. Directors' contracts for their own benefit. 848. Rescinding note procured by fraud — Enjoining transfer. 849. Rescission of sale where price payable in installments. §789. Equity jurisdiction — Damages as remedy The breach of promises by a vendor that the vendee shall have the keeping of the cattle connected with a creamery, whereby he would be able to earn money to pay deferred payments, and that large railway improvements will soon be erected near the land, does not entitle the vendee to rescind the contract, he being left to his action at law for damages, fraudulent rep- resentations not being ground for the rescission of a sale where it is not shown that the representations, if true, would have inured to the vendee's pecuniary advantage. 1 An equi- 1 Moore v. Cross, 87 Texas, 557; 29 S. W. Rep. 1051, Brown, J. : "It is not shown that plaintiff could have made profit out of the business, even if that would be considered in this connection. Moore guarantied that a railway, round-house, and machine shops would be built near the block, which has not been done, except that a railroad has been built near there. The proof does not show that the property was worth less without these improvements than it would have been with them, nor that plaintiff would have derived any pecuniary benefit from their construction. If the promises of Moore be considered as representations fraudulently made, they belong to that class of frauds for which there is no redress in court, because there was no pecuniary in- jury resulting from them, and courts do not undertake to deal with the breach of moral obligations. Bigelow on Frauds, p. 540; Lemmon », Han- ley, 28 Texas, 219 ; Bremond v. Mc- Lean, 45 Texas, 10. It does not ap- pear from the evidence that the al- leged promises constituted any part of the consideration for the exchange of the property. If, however, they were the consideration and had been inserted in the deed in the terms stated in the conclusions of fact, their breach would not afford ground for canceling the deed, but the party must resort to his action for damages, if any. Mayer ». Swift, 73 Texas, 367 ; 11 S. W. Rep. 378; Chicago, etc., Railway Co. v. Titterington, 84 Texas, 218; 19 S.W. Rep. 472." 966 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. §789 table action to cancel an executed sale of stock, and to recover it back, on the ground that the buyer, by false representations, obtained it for a nominal price, will not lie where the stock has no special value to the seller apart from its money value, and where the damages can readily be ascertained, and where plaintiffs purchased stock at an executor's sale, and afterwards defendant, one of the executors, represented that the stock was worthless, but that he would like to have it as a relic of the estate, and plaintiffs sold it to him for a nominal sum, it was held that, as plaintiffs had means of information concerning the value of the stock, and made investigation before selling to defendant, the latter could not be regarded as a trustee ex maleficio for plaintiffs, although his representations were fraudulent. 1 1 Edelman v. Latshaw,159 Pa.St.644 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 475, per curiam: "In Mc- Gowan v. Remington, 12 Pa. St. 56, Judge Bell, in speaking of cases for the recovery of chattels by a proceed- ing in equity, said: 'The precise ground of this jurisdiction is said to be the same as that upon which the spe- cific performance of an agreement is enforced, namely, that fruition of the thing, the subject of the agree- ment, is the object, the failure of which would be but illy supplied by an award of damages ; and that chan- cery always interferes where, from the nature of the subject, or the im- mediate object of the parties, no con- venient measure of damages can be ascertained, or where nothing could answer the justice of the case but the performance of a contract in specie.' There are exceptions to the well-set- tled principle of law that equity will not enforce specific execution of contracts relating to chattels, as was ruled in Foil's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 434 ; Appeal of Goodwin Gas Stove and Me- ter Co., 117 Pa. St. 514; 12 Atl Rep. 736, and other cases ; but we fail to find that plaintiffs have brought them- selves within any of the excepted cases. * * * * Can the bill be sustained upon the ground that the defendant Latshaw was a trustee ex maleficio, or upon the ground that he had practiced a fraud in procuring the stocks? He occupied no fiduciary relation to the plaintiffs. "What he said at the executors' sale had noth- ing to do with plaintiffs' purchase, and after that he was acting towards them as an individual, and their relations were simply that of vendor and ven- dee. He was not bound to disclose his knowledge of the value of the stocks, provided he did not make fraudulent representations, or sup- press the truth when it was his duty to speak. It thus appears that plaint- iffs had means of information open to them, and that they investigated the matter. How can it be said, there- fore, that they relied on Mr. Latshaw's representations as to value rather than on their own knowledge ? In Clap- ham v. Shillito, 7 Beav. 146, it was ruled that 'cases have frequently oc- curred in which, upon entering into contracts, misrepresentations made by one party have not been in any de- gree relied on by the other party. If the party to whom the representations § 790 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 967 § 790. Rescission to prevent multiplicity of suits.— A bill by a land-owner to cancel numerous tax deeds, held by differ- ent persons under a sale made by the commissioner of school were made himself resorted to the proper means of verification before he entered into the contract, it may ap- pear that he relied on the result of his own investigation and inquiry, and not upon the representations made to him by the other party.' In the case under consideration, plaintiffs held the stocks for four years, had made investigation, and must have been convinced, without any representa- tions from Latshaw, that the stocks were worthless. It is also stated in Adams on Equity, 356, that a mere misstatement by the buyer of his mo- tive in purchasing, or in limiting the amount of his offer, will not bring the case within the class of cases in which equity will grant relief ; and for this he cites Vernon r. Keys, 12 East, 632, where the vendee 'falsely and deceit- fully represented to the vendor that he was about to enter into partnership in the same trade with other persons whose names he would not disclose, and that these persons would not con- sent to his giving the plaintiff more for his interest than a certain sum, whereas, in truth, neither A. and B., with whom he was then about to enter into partnership, nor any other intended partners of his, had refused to give more than that sum, but had then agreed with the defendant that he should make the best terms he could with the plaintiff, and would have given him a larger sum ; and, in fact, the defend- ant charged them with a larger price in account for the purchase of plaint- iff's interest.' Held, that an action on the case did not lie for this false and deceitful representation by the bidder of the seller's probability of getting a better price for his property, for it was either a mere false represen- tation, or at most a gratis dictum, of the bidder upon a matter which he was not under any legal obligation to the seller to disclose with accuracy, and on which it was the folly of the seller to rely. There is another rea- son which is fatal to the plaintiffs' contention. It is apparent that plaint- iffs are seeking to recover damages for their loss, and not to recover the specific chattels sold. It is not alleged nor shown that the stocks have to them any especial value apart from their money value, and plaintiffs will be placed in statu quo when they are paid what they have lost in money. In Mackintosh v. Tracy, 4 Brewst. 59, it was held that 'in cases of fraud, es- pecially where the fraud relates to sales of personal chattels, and where the relief sought is merely compensa- tion in damages, if the remedy at law is adequate, relief is not ordinarily granted in equity.' See also, 2 Parsons on Contracts, p. 782. We are of the opinion that the master did not err in dismissing the bill." InDakinu. Rum- sey ( Mich . 1895) , 62 N . W . Rep . 990, in an action to set aside a sale for fraud, it appeared that, duringthe litigation over decedent's estate, defendants pur- chased complainant's interest in the residue of such estate, after the pay- ment of legacies, for $2,000 ; that com- plainant had heard the will read, knew the amount of the legacies, and had opportunity to know the value of the estate ; and that he had offered to sell his share for SI ,500, to save the ex- pense of litigation. It was held that such sale was valid, and it was im- material that defendants were heavy gainers by the transaction. 968 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 790 lands in one proceeding to forfeit the lands for taxes, may be maintained as a bill to remove cloud from title, and on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits, where all the parties claim under a common source of title. 1 Where a receipt was given by the orator for money left with him in trust by a father for his two children, and the orator became indebted to the father, and gave a note covering the money specified in the receipt and the additional debt, and paid the note in full to the father's administrator, and the receipt was not surren- dered, and the children brought separate actions, returnable in different counties, for the money specified therein, it was held that equity jurisdiction to decree cancellation will not be exer- cised where the orator has a remedy at law in the actions pend- ing, and that such a case presents no such multiplicity of suits as to require equitable interference on that ground. 8 'Ulman v. Iaeger (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 980. 2 Druon v. Sullivan, 66 Vt. 609; 30 Atl. Rep. 98, per Munson, J.. "The jurisdiction of equity to grant the remedy of cancellation is exclusive and unquestioned. Its jurisdiction in this behalf will always be exercised when the remedy is sought for the protection or support of an equitable i right or interest. But when the rem- edy is sought in aid of a right which is available in a suit at law the juris- diction will not be exercised, unless the legal remedy is deemed inade- quate. Pomeroy on Equity Jurispru- dence, §§ 221, 303, 914, 1363, 1377. It is true that a defense available at law, and in its nature adequate, is some- times deemed an insufficient remedy, because of dangers which may arise from a delay in the prosecution of the claim. But no room is left for an ex- ercise of the jurisdiction on this ground when there is an action at law pending, in which the defense can be made without delay. Pom- eroy on Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 179, 1363; Bank of Bellows Falls v. Rut- land & B. R. Co., 28 Vt. 470. The facts stated in this bill will afford the orator a complete defense in the suits pending at law, and, if he is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of equity, it must be upon the ground that judg- ments at law would not give him ade- quate protection. The orator insists that the suits brought against him, while proper for the recovery of the demands evidenced by the receipt, are of such a character that their de- termination will not protect him from further danger if the receipt be suf- fered to remain uncanceled. In cases where negotiable securities are claimed to have been obtained by fraud or conversion, the remedy of cancellation will not ordinarily be granted, unless applied for before the paper has ma- tured. Some of the circumstances which may induce a court of equity to grant this protection against negotia- ble paper which has matured were con- sidered in Town of Glustenbury v. Mc- Donald, 44 Vt. 450. It is said to be a rule generally adopted that a bill will not be sustained to cancel an executory, non-negotiable, personal contract, where the wrong complained of may be set up as a defense at law, unless §§ 791, 792 rescission and cancellation. 969 § 791. Rescission compared with reformation. — The power to open a written contract and let in equities which the com- plainant may be able to show is well established to exist in all courts of equity. At first the power seems to have been more generally exercised in those cases wherein the complainant al- leged that the contract, as executed, did not express the real purpose and agreement of the parties, and he sought to modify what it contained or to insert what was essential to the express- ion of the true agreement according to his contention. But now, according to the authorities, the power will be exercised with equal readiness where a party seeks either to reform a con- tract to express the actual intention of the parties, or where he seeks the cancellation of an instrument as an entirety because it is not an agreement which the defendant has the right to enforce. 1 § 792. Restoring benefits on rescinding contract. — A party seeking to rescind a contract for fraud must tender back to the other party whatever of value he received for the property which he seeks to recover. And, if, upon the discovery of fraud, he fails to offer to return whatever of value he has received un- der the contract, he affirms the contract. 2 It is a familiar rule that one who seeks the rescission of a contract on the there are special circumstances which the law, as contended by counsel, that would prevent the defense from being where a party to a contract seeks to available, adequate and complete. It avoid it for fraud, or asks to rescind is not claimed that the case presented it on the ground of fraud, he must by the bill discloses any circumstances tender back to the other party what- of this character, except such as arise ever of value he received for the prop- from the fact that the instrument is erty which he seeks to recover by the one that need not be specially de- rescission. Haase v. Mitchell, 58 Ind. clared upon." 213; Watson, etc., Mining Co. v. Cas- 1 Wilson v. Morris, 4 Colo. App. 242 ; teel, 68 Ind. 476 ; Hanna v. Shields, 34 36 Pac.Rep. 248 ; Brainard v. Holsaple, Ind. 84. If a party, upon the discovery 4 G. Greene, 485 ; Bray v. Comer, 82 of fraud in the procuring of a contract, Ala. 183; 1 So. Eep. 77; Gibbons v. fails to return, or offer to return, what- Dunn, 46 Mich. 146 ; 9 N. W. Bep. 140 ; ever of property or thing of value he Jackson v. Wood, 88 Mo. 76; Boberts has received under the contract, he ■a. Derby, 68 Hun, 299 ; 23 N. Y. thereby affirms the contract, and can Supl. 34. not afterwards be heard to complain. 2 Balue v. Taylor, 136 Ind. 368; 36 Shaw v. Barnhart, 17 Ind. 183; Gat- N. E. Bep. 269, per Dailey, J. : " It is ling v. Newell, 9 Ind. 572." 970 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 792 ground of fraud must, as a condition precedent to bringing the action, restore or offer to restore the consideration received by him. 1 Thus, in order that*a note may be rescinded for fraud, the maker must account for the benefits he has received in the transaction. 2 Where the plaintiff in a suit to set aside a mort- gage tenders a quitclaim deed of land conveyed to her as a part of the same transaction, the court can compel a conveyance as the price of a decree in her favor. 8 In an action by a corpora- tion against a former stockholder to recover money paid him by its president for his stock on an ultra vires purchase thereof for plaintiff, the complaint does not state a cause of action, 1 Bowden v. Achor,95 Ga.243 ; 22 S.E. Rep.254. In Strodder v. Southern Gran- ite Co. (1894), 19 S. E. Rep. 1022, it was intimated, but not decided, that there might be an exception to the general rule resulting from inability to restore by reason of poverty. In O'Callaghan v. Lowndes (1895), 66 Fed. Rep. 356, Lacombe, J., said: "One who has been induced by fraud or by duress to enter into a contract may rescind it, but when the contract has been exe- cuted by a delivery of property in ac- cordance with its terms he can rescind only upon putting or offering to put the opposite party in as good a situa- tion as he was before. 'A party can not rescind a contract, and yet re- tain any portion of the consideration. * * * (He) can not derive any ben- efit from it, and yet rescind the con- tract It. must be nullified in toto, or not at all. It can not be enforced in part and rescinded in part.' Perley v. Balch, 23 Pick. 283. See also, Shep- herd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455; Norton «.Young, 3 Greenl. 30; and 8 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 806." 2 Templeton v. Green (Texas C.App. 1894), 25 S.W. Rep. 1073, per Head, J. : "If it be conceded that his right to re- scission had not thereby been entirely lost, which we do not decide (Snow v. Alley, 144 Mass. 546; 11 N. E. Rep. 764), it is clear that this could only be allowed upon an offer upon his part to do equity by accounting for the value of the benefits he had thus received. Life Association v. Goode, 71 Texas 90; 8 S. W. Rep. 639. This appellant failed to do, either in his pleadings or in the evidence introduced. These re- marks apply with equal force to the plea of total failure of consideration. As we have seen, there was no total failure, and no basis was furnished from which a partial failure could be estimated." 3 Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1; 25 S. W. Rep. 359, per Sherwood, J.: "Plaintiff could not procure the can- cellation of the first, and still retain the benefits of the second; nor would the trial court allow her to do so, in the event a decree went for her. More- over, plaintiff, in her petition, recog- nized this, in which she tendered to Carter a quitclaim deed for the prop- erty that he had conveyed to her; and under this tender the circuit court could have compelled a conveyance, and made it the price of the decree it gave her. Whelan v. Reilly, 61 Mo. 565, and cases cited ; Dwen v. Blake, 44 111. 135, and cases cited." § 793 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 971 if it fail to show that plaintiff has returned or offered to return the stock. 1 § 793. Restoring the consideration.— The rule that he who seeks to rescind a contract of sale must first offer to return the property received, and place the other party in the position he formerly occupied, as far as practicable, prevails equally at the civil and common law; but it presupposes the idea that there are persons to whom the offer or transfer may be success- fully made. Where a father conveyed his farm to a son in con- sideration of his note for about one-tenth of the farm's value, and his promise to maintain the father during his life, and the note was not paid, and the father was supported while the son lived, but when he died his heirs refused to carry out the contract for the father's support, it was held that the father was en- titled to judgment canceling the contract, and revesting him with title to the farm; and the mere fact that the father failed to tender the note before suit would not defeat his recovery, since no one to whom he could have tendered it could have re- stored the land. 2 A vendor of land need not, before bringing 1 Bank of San Luis Obispo v. Wicker- on rescission, liable to refund all sham, 99 Cal. 655; 34 Pac. Rep. 444, per money which he had received from DeHaven, J.: "Counsel for plaintiff defendant under the contract, and that do not dispute the general proposi- defendant, in rescinding such con- tion that, to entitle one to rescind a tract, properly offered to convey all contract, he must restore to the other his title in the land under the contract party everything of value received to plaintiff, who was the legal holder from him under such contract ; but it of the contract, and for whose benefit is claimed by them that the stock was it was made. extinguished by the sale, and there- 2 Cree v. Sherfy, 138 Ind. 354; 37 N. fore can not be legally returned, and E. Rep. 787, per curiam: "A contract that all defendant Wickersham can to support is a contract for personal justly claim is to receive in the state- services. It can not be performed by ment of the account demanded in the another unless the person receiving complaint a credit for the value of the support consents to receive it; such stock at the time of the sale. We and, if the person who is to furnish do not agree with counsel upon this the support die, then his heirs, execu- point." In Freeman w.Kieffer, 101 Cal. tors, or administrators must keep it. 254; 35 Pac. Rep. 767, a land company, As appears from the complaint and as plaintiff 's agent, induced defendant the finding of the court, the chief by fraud to contract to purchase land, consideration for the conveyance was and then assigned the contract to the home comfort of the grantor and plaintiff, who accepted the benefit his support in declining years. While thereof. It was held that plaintiff was, the decedent lived, the contract was 972 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 793 suit for a rescission of the sale and the cancellation of the deed for fraud, tender to defendant the consideration received by him; but it is sufficient if he offer in his petition to restore to defendant what he received, as the rights of the parties can be fully adjusted by the decree. 1 Where purchasers of a vine- faithfully kept. After his death the widow and children and aged father remained together for two weeks, when the widow and children, over his advice and objection, abandoned the home, and removed to her moth- er's residence four miles away, and never returned to look after or care for the appellee, leaving him as the sole occupant of the premises. The appellants having refused to remain and execute the agreement they are in no better situation than the grantee would occupy if he were alive and had deserted the father. It would not be pretended that, if the son had forsaken the father under the cir- cumstances, he would have any stand- ing in a court of equity. It is the province of a court of conscience, when asked for relief — a right of action having arisen to one of the parties — ■ to place the survivors as nearly in the position, relatively, they would have occupied but for the death, as it was possible to do. 'Act of God inures as excuse and relief to both parties to a contract. If it legally releases the one from executing a work he has un- dertaken, it equally protects the other from paying for more than has been done.' Doster v. Brown, 25 Ga. 24; 71 Am. Dec. 153. The case we are now considering presents many features of resemblance to that of Richter v. Rich- ter, 111 Ind. 456, 461 ; 12 N. E. Rep. 698, in which this court says: 'The grantee having abandoned the land without sufficient excuse, and without offering to perform a continuous and fixed duty which rested upon him, no demand for performance was neces- sary in order to entitle the grantor to re-enter. Abandoning the land, under the circumstances, must be regarded as equivalent to such a renunciation of the contract as authorized the grantor to enter, and treat the ar- rangement as at an end.' In the care- fully considered case of Lindsay v. Glass, 119 Ind. 301; 21 N. E. Rep. 897, it is said : 'One who accepts the property of a sister or a parent, and agrees, in consideration thereof, to furnish a home, with suitable main- tenance and support, does not per- form his contract fairly, and accord- ing to its spirit, by simply furnishing shelter and subsistence. A home is something in addition to a roof over one's head, with food and drink sup- plied by strangers.' " 1 Garza v. Scott, 5 Texas 0. App. 289; 24 S.W. Rep. 89, per Neill, J. : "In such a case it is sufficient for the plaintiff to offer in his petition to restore to the defendant what he has received, and the rights of the parties can be fully ad- justed and protected in the decree to be entered. 1 Bigelow on Fraud, 76, 82; Gould v. Gayuga, etc., Bank, 86 N. Y. 75 ; Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N. Y. 670. There was an express offer in plaint- iff's petition to restore the defendant Maltzberger the property deeded to him, and this was sufficient, so far as the tenderis concerned, to enablethem to maintain their equitable action for a rescission of the alleged fraudulent contract. Brown v. Insurance Co., 117 Mass. 479; Gould v. Gayuga, etc., Bank, 86 N. Y. 75. At law a party can not maintain an action to recover what he has parted with upon a con- tract into which he was induced to enter by fraud without first restoring § 794 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 973 yard, who gave back a mortgage for a balance of the price, have destroyed a considerable portion of the grape vines, and the premises are not in as good condition as when purchased, a rescission will not be decreed in their favor absolutely, but the fraudulent vendor will be given his option to accept the amount due on the mortgage, less the damages assessed to the purchasers, or to rescind, and return the purchase-money, less such sum as will compensate him for the deterioration in the value of the farm. 1 § 794. Keeping tender good — The general rule is that where a party seeks to rescind a contract on the ground of mistake or fraud, and thereby seeks to relieve himself of the burdens imposed by the contract, he should not be permitted to retain the benefits of the contract to the detriment of the other party to the transaction. Seeking equity, he must do equity. Ac- cordingly a suit to rescind a release of a claim for personal in- , juries can not be maintained without tendering back the money paid as a consideration therefor, and keeping the tender good, because in such a case the court can not protect the interests of the other party without requiring from plaintiff repayment or such an effectual tender. 2 or offering in good faith to restore to the one party is freed from the per- the defendant what he obtained from formance of the contract on his part him by virtue of the contract ; and it without being compelled to restore or is evident that the trial court was led account for the money or other thing into its erroneous ruling by this prin- of value which he received by means ciple of law, which has no application of the contract which he now repu- to equitable actions for rescission." diates. If the contract is of such a 'Lurch v. Holder (N. J. Eq. 1893), nature that by means thereof one 27 Atl. Rep. 81. party thereto is induced to pay a 2 Vandervelden v. Chicago, etc., R. given sum of money to the other Co. (1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 54, per which he would not have paid except Shiras, J.: "The purpose of the for tbe inducement of the contract, general rule is to enable the court to and after the payment of the money, do justice to both parties, so that, if the party receiving the money seeks the contract is set aside at the request to rescind the contract, it is clear of one party, the court may be able to that, in justice and equity, he should restore the other party to the position be required to repay the money as he occupied before the contract was a condition of rescission. There is a entered into, or otherwise the court class of cases wherein the facts are may be made the instrument whereby such that the court, without a repay- great wrong may be wrought, in that ment or tender on part of the plaintiff, 974 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 795 § 795. Requisite joinder. — He who would rescind a contract must put the other party in as good a situation as he was be- fore, otherwise he can not do it. And his complaint, framed with this object, must state facts showing that he has performed or offered to perform on his part every act necessary to thus place the defendant. Where a complaint alleged that defendants, by fraudulent practices, induced plaintiff to purchase property from them for twice what it is worth, and that part payment thereof had been made, and notes and mortgages given for the residue, it was held insufficient to maintain an action for the cancella- tion of the notes and mortgages, where the property received was worth more than the part payment made, without offering to put the vendors in statu quo. 1 A part of several joint pur- has it within its power to protect fully the interests of the other party in case of rescission, and in such cases the court may proceed to a hearing without requiring repayment or a tender. Illustrations of this class of cases may be found in Thackrah v. Haas, 119 U. S 499 ; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 311, and Billings v. Aspen, etc., Smelting Co., 3 CO. A. 69 ; 52 Fed. Rep. 250. The difference between that class of cases and the one at bar is marked and 1 radical. This case is not one which involves the sale and transfer of prop- erty, wherein the court of equity hav- ing control over the property, and the distribution of the proceeds thereof, can adjust and protect the equities and rights of the parties. In this case, when the question of settlement was in treaty between the parties, the one party asserted a right of recovery against the other for personal injuries received, and the other denied all liability whatever. Under these cir- cumstances, the defendant company was willing to compromise, and there- by buy its peace. The money was paid for the purpose of avoiding, not only the risk of damages being recov- ered by the plaintiff, but also to save the costs and expenses of litigation, even if the result should be favorable to the company. If the court, with- out requiring a repayment of the money paid on the settlement, or the equivalent, should hear the issue as to the validity of the settlement, and decree a rescission of the contract, then the plaintiff could prosecute his law action, and therein litigate the question of original liability. If the judgment was adverse to him on that question, he would still have in his possession the money paid him to pro- cure a settlement, and thus, in effect, the company would have been de- prived of all the benefits of the settle- ment without having secured to it the return of the money which it paid to secure the settlement." 1 Buena Vista, etc., Co.. v. Tuohy, 107 Cal. 243; 40 Pac. Rep. 386, Searls, C. . "A party defrauded may rescind and restore within a reasonable time all of value which he has received un- der the contract, or he may affirm it and sue for damages. Gifford v. Car- vill, 29 Cal. 589 ; Herrin v. Libbey, 36 Maine, 357; Burton v. Stewart, 3 Wend. 236; Burbank r. Dennis, 101 Cal. 90; 35 Pac. Rep. 444. In the case last cited, this court held, in sub- stance, that where a promoter of a §795 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 975 chasers of chattels can not ask for a rescission of the sale with- out the joinder of the other purchasers in an offer to return the goods. 1 corporation has been guilty of fraud, the company may elect to set aside the contract or to recover the pro- moter's secret profits. This is not an action to recover the secret profits made by the defendants as promoters of the corporation. No accounting of such profits is sought. No rescission of the conveyance is averred or asked for. The theory of the complaint is : (1) That defendants were promoters of the corporation plaintiff. (2) As such promoters, they were guilty of fraudulent practices, whereby plaint- iff was induced to purchase property for $72,000, which was only worth $36,000, and to pay therefor $10,000 in cash, and to give their notes secured by mortgages for the residue of $62,- 000. (3) That these notes and mort- gages being fraudulent, plaintiff may •etain the property conveyed to it so worth $36,000, and maintain an equi- table action for the cancellation of Ihe notes and mortgages without fur- ther compensation for the property purchased. Conceding the facts in support of this theory to be well stated, they do not entitle plaintiff to recover." In Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Redfield (Colo. 1895), 40 Pac. Eep. 195, Thomson, J., said: "There can be no decree for cancellation or re- scission in this action, because the complaint contains no offer to account or pay for the use which the plaintiff has had of the water rights. He who asks equity must do equity. The plaintiff can not repudiate his con- tract, and still retain the benefits which he has derived from it, and his desire to restore what he has received must appear in his complaint, or he has no standing in a court of equity." 1 Robinson v. Siple, 129 Mo. 208 ; 31 S. W. Rep. 788, per Burgess, J.. "The rule is that a party desiring to rescind a contract must tender back whatever of value he has received, and place the other contracting party in statu quo, otherwise the contract will not be rescinded. This is in ac- cord with the soundest rules of equity and justice, and is of universal appli- cation, unless the other party, by some act or omission of his own, has rendered it impossible for the party desiring to rescind to return the prop- erty received by him. Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio, 69 ; Hammond v. Pen- nock, 61 N. Y. 145. In the case in hand, defendants Siple, Siple and Beanblossom were unable to rescind and return the property without the concurrence of their co-defendant, W. H. Robinson, who not only re- fused to rescind the contract, but had taken and disposed of a number of the horses, so that it was impossible that plaintiff could have been placed in statu quo. In Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. 315, Sherwood, J., in speaking for the court, said : ' Smith was in no condition to exercise the right of rescission, even had he elected promptly so to do, and for the obvious reason aforesaid, that, holding only an undivided three-fourths of the property contracted to be conveyed, it was out of his power to have re- stored Atkinson to his statu quo,— an absolute condition precedent to the exercise of the right of rescission, whether exercised with or without the intervention of the courts.' See also, Estes v. Reynolds, 75 Mo. 563. But it is argued by counsel for de- fendants that plaintiff, through the wrongful acts of W. H. Robinson, his agent, placed defendants in such a 976 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 796 § 796. Rescission by vendor with forfeiture against vendee. — Where a contract for the sale of land provided that, if the vendee failed to pay the price or the interest thereon within a time specified, the vendor might at his option rescind the contract, and that all improvements and payments made by the vendee should thereupon be forfeited, it was held that the contract was a conditional sale, and, in the absence of fraud, could not be construed as an equitable mortgage, so as to relieve the vendee from forfeiture on rescission by the vendor for default in payment of interest. 1 Where lands were forfeited position that they could not rescind, or restore all of the property, and that under such circumstances the law did not require them to do that which plaintiff himself had rendered impos- sible. This position, if borne out by the evidence, is perhaps true, but is untenable in this case, for the reason, as we have before said, that W. H. Robinson was not the agent of the plaintiff, and even if, in any possible way, he could be considered as acting as the agent of plaintiff in the sale of the horses, — which we do not admit, — there was not one scintilla of evi- dence tending to show that any such agency existed after they were pur- chased. On the discovery of the fraud, defendants had the right to stand by the contract, and sue the party from whom the horses were purchased for damages for the fraud practiced upon them, or to rescind the contract. They chose the latter course, and, in order to avail them- selves of this right, it was a pre- requisite that they place the other party in statu quo. Moreover, they should have acted promptly upon the discovery of the fraud. Taylor t>. Short, 107 Mo. 384; 17 S. W. Rep. 970; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 356; Hart v. Handlin, 43 Mo. 171 ; Dough- erty v. Stamps, 43 Mo. 243; Estes v. Reynolds and Melton v. Smith, 65 Mo. 315. This they did not do. The judg- ment was clearly for the proper party, and should be affirmed." 1 Pease v. Baxter, 12 "Wash. 567 ; 41 Pac. Rep. 899, Denbar, J. : "This case was substantially before the court in Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178 ; and it was there decided that under the provision of a contract for sale of land, that, in case the purchaser fails to pay promptly the monthly install- ments provided for after a demand of thirty days, the vendor could declare the contract forfeited, was entitled to enter upon and repossess himself of the premises, and thereupon the contract should be at an end, there was a forfeiture of the payments made ; and it was further decided that under such contract, if any of the monthly payments were not made by the purchaser when due, it was not a waiver of the vendor's right of forfeit- ure that he did not declare it until three payments had become due. The contract in the case cited is not nearly so explicit as that in the one at bar. While it is true that the courts will not supply language to create a for- feiture where the forfeiture is not specially provided for by the parties themselves, yet it seems to us that it was the clear, unequivocal intention of the parties to this contract that the payments made by the appellants should be forfeited, in case the re- spondents elected so to do, upon the § 793 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 977 through failure to enter the same for taxation as provided by the constitution of West Virginia, it was held that a deed from the state would not be set aside upon the ground that the com- plainant had been deprived of his property without due process of law, because the forfeiture is in that event a nullity, and non-performance of the contract by the appellants. * * * To prevent any misconception of the right of the vendor to elect to rescind this con- tract, the draftsman of the contract went beyond the ordinary form of words employed in such cases, and provided that they might, at their mere option, rescind this contract; and it was not left for the courts to de- termine the rights of the parties when once the vendor had elected to rescind, but it is especially provided that in such cases all payments and all im- provements on said premises thereto- fore made should be forfeited to said party of the first part. It is claimed that the question of the equitable right of the vendee was not raised before this court in the case of Red- dish v. Smith, supra; but while it is true that the subject was not dis- cussed under the head of 'equitable mortgages,' as it is by the learned counsel in this case, the equitable in- terests of the vendee were contended for in that case, and the principle dis- cussed was the same, viz., the right of the vendor to rescind the contract and enforce the forfeiture provided for. A great number of cases have been cited by the respondents to sustain their contention, all of which we have care- fully examined, but none of them, we think, are in point. Most of them re- fer to the proposition which we have just spoken of in relation to the con- struction of deeds, and in none of them is there construed a contract which bears any relation whatever to the contract in question. It is true, in Fisk v. Stewart, 24 Minn. 97, the 62 court held that 'when the real nature of a transaction between parties is confessedly that of a loan of money advanced upon the security of real es- tate granted to the party making the loan, whatever the form of the instru- ment taken as the security, it is al- ways treated in equity as a mortgage,' to which is annexed as an inseparable incident the right to an equity of redemption. But it is not confessedly a loan in this case, but, according to the terms of the contract, it was a sale of real estate, and the case cited does not bear upon the questions involved in the case at bar. In Gale v. Morris, 29 N. J. Eq. 222, which was an action to reform a mortgage, the court held that an equitable mortgage could arise from an unsuccessful attempt to make a valid mortgage deed ; and this is simply in accordance with the law which we noticed above, that, where it was shown conclusively that it was the intention of the parties that the instrument in question should be a mortgage instead of a deed, the courts ■ would construe it to be a mortgage; and none of the cases cited go further than this. No case is cited by either side which is directly in point, and we must conclude that the presump- tion has always obtained in all courts that where a contract was plain and specific in its terms, and no fraud is alleged, the contract must be enforced. As was said by the court in Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284: 'It is a harsh proceeding on his (appellant's) part, but it is according to his contract, which must be enforced if he insists upon it.' " 978 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 797 complainant has an adequate remedy at law Even if the school commissioner of the state sells forfeited lands as waste lands, when he has no right to do so, the former owner has no rights therein which he can enforce in a court of equity; because the sale is either void, in which case there is an adequate legal remedy, or it is merely irregular, in which case relief must be had in the state court in which the proceedings for sale were had ; and a court of equity will not be disposed to exercise any merely dis- cretionary powers in order to relieve from statutory forfeiture lands which for thirty years have paid no taxes, and have not been reported for taxation as required by law, especially when the owner does not now offer to pay the same, or aver an intention to do so, but merely seeks to set aside certain convey- ances, which he alleges will embarrass him in the exercise of his right to redeem, in case he should elect to do so. 1 Where the consideration of a deed conveying a right of way to a rail- road company was, as expressed in the deed itself, the benefits which were expected to accrue to the land-owner from the con- struction of the contemplated railroad, and there was an express promise on the part of the company to construct the road, by virtue of which promise the conveyance was procured, and also a parol license to cut cross-ties induced, a breach of the contract by failing to construct the road, abandoning work upon it, and selling out to a rival company, with intent that the whole enterprise should be suppressed and forever aban- doned, constitutes a cause of action in behalf of the lancl-owner to the extent, at least, of having decreed a cancellation of the conveyance, and of having awarded to him compensation for any damage done to the land by severing timber and cross- ties therefrom, and digging up the soil, or by other means, while the work of construction was in progress. 2 § 797. Rescission for expressions of opinion — Future prom- ise. — Fraudulent expressions of opinion are generally insuffi- cient to justify the rescission of a contract executed and acted 1 Read v. Dingess (1894), 60 Fed. 2 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Atkinson, Rep. 21. And see also, MoClure v. 94 Ga. 780; 21 S. E. Rep. 1010. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561, 578. § 797 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 979 on by the parties. 1 An action for rescission for fraud can not be predicated upon a promise to do something in the future, although the party qromising had no intention of fulfilling the promise at the time it was made. 2 And the purchaser of a lot of land from a company is not entitled to rescind the sale, or to damages because of the expression by the grantor's agent, at the time of the sale, of his belief that certain improvements would be made on land controlled by the company, which were in fact not made, where such agent believed his statements to be true, and made no engagement to carry out the purposes expressed. 8 But where a railroad company, desiring to run its road through a certain farm, represented to the owner of the farm that it would change the location of its road from that in- dicated by the preliminary survey so as to run it along a cer- tain slough, and upon the strength of that representation the owner agreed to give a deed of the right, of way, and the company built its line according to said survey, and it did not appear that it ever intended to build it along the slough, it was held that the false representations as to the location of the road avoided the contract, and that where a written contract is at- tacked on the ground of fraud, parol evidence is admissible to show the fraud. 4 'Johansson v. Stephanson, 154 TJ. S. 'Joseph v. Decatur Land Imp. Co., 625; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1180. 102 Ala. 346; 14 So. Rep. 739. 2 Balue v. Taylor, 136 Ind. 368; 36 'Grand Tower R. Co. v. Walton, N.E.Rep. 269,perDailey,J.: "Coun- 150 111. 428; 37 N. E. Rep. 920, per sel also reminds us that representa- curiam: "It is, however, claimed tions upon which an action of fraud that the representation made to ap- can be predicated must be of alleged pellee establishes only a future inten- existing facts, and not upon a promise tion on the part of the railway com- to do something in the future, al- pany to make the change of route; though the party promising had no and, it is said, a representation, al- intention of fulfilling the promise at though it may be false, as to a matter the time it was made. Bennett v. Mc- of intention, does notconstitute fraud ; Intire, 121 Ind. 231 ; 23 N. E. Rep. 78 ; and in support of this position we are Caylor v. Roe, 99 Ind. 1 ; Fry v. Day, referred to Kerr on Fraud and Mis- 97 Ind. 348. The foregoing principles take (page 88) , where the author says : enunciated by counsel are elementary. 'As distinguished from a false repre- Applying these tests to the complaint sentation of a fact, the false represen- under consideration, it is manifest tation as to a matter of intention, not that it would not be sufficient to con- amounting to a matter of fact, though stitute a cause of action for a rescission it may have influenced a transaction, of the contract between the parties." is not a fraud at law, nor does it 980 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 798 § 798. The same subject continued— If parties in confidence. — A statement by a vendee of land, for the purpose of induc- ing another to indorse his note, and take the contract in his name as security therefor, that the vendee expected to resell the land at an advanced price, is a mere opinion and can not be made a basis of a charge of fraud in defense to an action by the vendee against the indorser for interest due. The in- dorser is not entitled to a rescission thereof because there ex- isted an agreement, undisclosed to the indorser, between the vendor and vendee, that he should have a certain discount from the agreed price in case of his procuring a purchaser, where such indorser was informed of all the facts as to the value of the land, and how much it would cost him if he should be compelled to take it because of the vendee's de- fault. 1 Where plaintiff listed bis land with defendant, a real estate agent, for exchange, and, relying on defendant's repre- sentation that certain land of his was worth as much as plaint- iff's, exchanged his land therefor, his deed to defendant will be canceled where defendant grossly misrepresented the value of his land; since plaintiff has a right to rely on defendant's rep- resentations because of the fiduciary relations existing between them. 2 But where there is no relation of trust or confidence afford grounds for relief in equity.' It this rule of evidence has no applica- is, however, plain that the represen- tion here. Where it is sought to im- tations here involved do not fall with- peach a, written contract for fraud, in in the rule indicated by the author, a court of equity, parol evidence is Here was an agreement to locate the admissible for that purpose. Van road at a definite, specified place, on Buskirk v. Day, 32 111. 260; Race v. the part of the railroad company. It Weston, 86111. 92; Wilson v. Haecker, was not a mere statement of an inten- 85 111. 349." tion to do an act in the future, but a 1 Spence v. Geilfuss, 89 Wis. 499; 62 contract to change the locution, in N. W. Rep. 529. consideration of which the appellee 2 Shute v. Johnson, 25 Ore. 59; 34 agreed to give the right of way. It is Pac. Rep. 965, per Moore, J. : "Thede- also claimed that parol evidence was fendant contends that, admitting he not admissible to vary or change the made representations as to the value terms of the written contract executed of his property as alleged by plaintiffs, by appellee. Where parties have re- they were mere expressions of opin- duced their contract to writing, the ion, not amounting to a warranty, rule is well established that parol upon which the plaintiff had no right evidence is not admissible to vary or to rely, and for any damages arising change the terms of the contract. But therefrom, equity will not afford re- § 799 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 981 existing between the parties, a mere false representation of value by a vendor, where no warranty is intended, is no ground of relief to the purchaser; 1 if, however, the representations were intended to be the statement of a fact, to be understood and re- lied upon as such, relief will be granted to the purchaser who has been injured thereby, and the question should be left to the jury to say whether the representations were mere expres- sions of opinion as to value or the statement of a material fact. 2 § 799. Concealment — Representations of value — Warranty. — False representations, to be fraudulent, must be a false state- ment of acts, positively made, not mere matters of erroneous opinions. A concealment to afford ground of rescission for fraud must be a willful suppression of such facts in regard to the subject-matter of the contract as the party making it is bound to disclose. 3 If the value of property can be ascertained by ordinary inspection, the maxim "caveat emptor" applies; but such maxim does not apply when any particular skill is required to ascertain it, and affirmations of value in such cases may be relied upon. Where a person makes an affirmation of value which is the inducement to a purchase, within the principle of the decisions it is a warranty; or, where state- ments of value are attended with statements as to the elements lief. * * * * The plaintiff had count, and for his own benefit, treated listed his property with the defend- with his principal or cestui que trust, ant for exchange, and by thus creat- might rob him with impunity. Such ing him his agent for that purpose is not the law, and this fiduciary re- established a relation of trust and lation furnishes an exception to the confidence between them ; and it be- general rule that the affirmation of came the duty of the defendant, so value of property made by a vendor to long as this relation continued, to secure a sale is but the mere expres- correctly inform the plaintiff as to the sion of an opinion, and upon which character and value of the property the vendee can not rely, because it is offered ; and this relation did not customary in selling property to make cease when the defendant offered his such statements of overvaluation." own property in exchange for that of ^Kent'sCommentaries^SS;]. Bige- the plaintiff. To hold that this rela- low on Frauds, 4191 ; Medbury ». Wat- tion between them had terminated son, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 246; Rockafellow when the defendant offered to trade v. Baker, 41 Pa. St. 319. his own property would be to hold 2 Homer v. Perkins, 124 Mass. 431. that any person acting in a fiduciary s Rison v. Newberry (Va. 1894), 18 capacity, when he, on his own ac- S. E. Rep. 916. 982 KESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § S00 that go to make up the value, which are false, they are not to be treated as statements of opinion, but of material facts. 1 But, as a general rule, a statement by a vendor or his agent in regard to the value of land is merely an expression of opin- ion, and not a representation of a fact upon the falsity of which an action to rescind may be based. 2 Representations as to the effectiveness of a mechanical equivalent, made to a person ex- perienced in the sale of the article, who has every chance to make tests, and the opinion of an expert to guide him, although in fact false, are no ground for equitable rescission of a sale of the patent right. 3 § 800. The same subject continued — Miscellaneous. — A bill for the rescission of the purchase of a silver mine on the ground of fraud alleged that defendant represented that the ore therein contained a certain average of pure silver, making it very valuable, whereas in fact the average was so low that it was worthless ; and that defendant had "salted" the samples which complainant took from the mine, and upon the faith of whose analysis the purchase was made, by fraudulently mixing native silver therewith. It was held that, where the latter al- legation is sustained, defendant can not shelter himself behind the plea that his representations were mere expressions of opinion as to the value of the mine. 4 Where the defendant 1 Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill the misrepresentation of a fact and the (N. Y.), 63; Hubbellu. Meigs, 50N.Y. expression of an opinion is peculiarly 480. applicable in the sale of a property so z Nostrum v. Hallidaj', 39 Neb. 828; speculative and uncertain as a silver 58 N. W. Rep. 429. mine. In Jennings v. Broughton, 17 3 Wade v. Ringo, 122 Mo. 322; 25 Beav. 234, which was a case brought S. W. Rep. 901. to set aside the sale of shares in a 4 Mudsill Min. Co. v. Watrous (C. C. mining venture on account of fraud in A. 1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 163, per Lurton, the sale, Knight Bruce, L. J., said: J.: "It is, perhaps, too well settled to 'First, in the statements or repre- admit of controversy that a misrepre- sentations concerning the mine, was sentation, in order to constitute fraud, there any untrue assertion material in must be an affirmative statement of its nature; that is to say, which some material fact, and not a mere ex- taken as true, added substantially to pression of opinion. Gordon v. But- the value or promise of the mine, and ler, 105 U. S. 553; Southern Develop- was not evidently conjectural mere- ment Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S.247; 8 Sup. ly?' The representations made ver- Ct. Rep. 881. This distinction between bally, and which it is alleged were § 800 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 983 bought a patented machine from plaintiff, on the false repre- sentation that the right to use the patent was not disputed, and, on being sued by a patentee, who claimed that the ma- chine infringed his patent, defendant demanded and plaintiff promised to give an indemnifying bond, it was held that such promise was upon a sufficient consideration, and its breach jus- tified defendant in rescinding the contract of sale. 1 Under the California code, providing that "a written instrument, which if left outstanding may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may upon his application be so ad- judged, and ordered to be delivered up and canceled," plaintiff, who granted to defendant the sole and exclusive right to sell a patented machine in certain states, with a provision for the termination of the agreement, in case the latter failed to faith- fully prosecute the introduction or sale of the article, could sue to cancel the agreement when defendant, having made an agreement with the proprietor of a rival machine, with the in- tention that the introduction and sale of plaintiff's machine within a portion of the territory covered by plaintiff's agree- ment should be thereby prevented, repudiated plaintiff's right false, related alone to the average between the legal effect of a represen- richness of the exposed body of ore. tation as to a fact and the expression Though in form the affirmation of a of an opinion, Mr. Pomeroy says: fact, yet, when applied to the subject- ' The reason is very simple. While matter of the negotiation, it was in its the person addressed has a right to very nature conjectural, and amounted rely on any assertion of a fact, he has to an expression of opinion. But this no right to rely upon the mere ex- rule that a mere expression of an pression of an opinion held by the opinion will not constitute fraud must party addressing him, in whatever not be pushed beyond the reason for language such expression be made, the rule. If a false statement is to be He is assumed to be equally able to given immunity because it is mere form his own opinion, and to come to 'puffing' or 'trade talk,' and only the a correct judgment in respect to the expression of an opinion, it is because matter, as the party with whom he is the party to whom the opinion is ad- dealing, and can not justly claim, dressed has no right to rely upon the therefore, to have been misled by the mere expression of an opinion, and is opinion, however erroneous it may assumed to have the ability and op- have been.' Pomeroy on Equity Juris- portunity of forming his own opinion prudence, § 878." and coming to an independent judg- 1 Pratt v. Paris Gaslight Co., 155 111. ment. In speaking of the difference 531 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 1032. 984 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 801 to then terminate the agreement, threatening to obtain an in- junction to restrain sales by plaintiff in such territory. 1 § 801. Rescission for mistake of law. — As a general rule, a mistake of law, pure and simple, is not adequate ground for relief. While this general doctrine prevails in equity as well as at law, equity sometimes exercises its jurisdiction on ac- count of a mistake of law. If the mistake of law is not pure and simple, but is induced or accompanied by other special facts giving rise to an independent equity on behalf of the mistaken person, such as inequitable conduct of the other party, equity will interpose its aid. 2 1 Bradley v. Anglo-Amer. Gas Co., 102 Cal. 627 ; 36 Pao. Rep. 1011. 2 West v. West (Texas App. 1895), 29 S. W. Rep. 242. In this case W. died insolvent, leaving plaintiff, his second wife, one child by her, and several children by a first wife, in- cluding defendant. Defendant, in order to procure from plaintiff a deed of the homestead interest of herself and child, fraudulently represented to her that if she should marry again she would lose all interest in the premises, and promised to care for her child, and also stated that her in- terest was not worth $50, but that he would pay $100 (a grossly inade- quate sum), which he never in fact paid. It was held that, as the mis- take of law under which plaintiff ex- ecuted the deed was due in part to the inequitable conduct of defendant, the deed was void. Neill, J., said: "Upon cases of this character, Mr. Pomeroy says that 'whatever may be the effect of a mistake, pure and simple, there is no doubt that equita- ble relief, affirmative or defensive, will be granted when the ignorance or misapprehension of a party con- cerning the legal effect of a transac- tion in which he engages, or concern- ing his own legal rights, which are to be affected, is induced, procured, aided, or accompanied by inequitable conduct of other parties. It is not necessary that such inequitable con- duct should be intentionally mislead- ing, much less that it should be actual fraud; it is enough that the miscon- ception of law was the result of, or even aided or accompanied by, incor- rect or misleading statements or acts of the other party.' Id., § 817; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 90, 400, 401. Independent of the misrepresenta- tions and false promises of the appel- lee, the parties stood in unequal po- sitions. The appellant, Mary, had been recently left a widow ; had born a child by her husband during her widowhood. After its birth she sought for herself and infant shelter in the late home of her husband, which was withheld from her and oc- cupied by the appellee, who took ad- vantage of her condition and solici- tude for her babe, and, by fraudulent representations and false promises, obtained, without consideration, a deed to her interest in her home. The appellee was a man, and half-brother of the infant, and knew his father's estate was insolvent, and that the deed he obtained was to all his fa- ther's wife could acquire from her husband's estate, save a year's allow- ance, and what might be allowed her § 802 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 985 § 802. Where one party only ignorant. — Where ignorance of the law exists on one side, and that ignorance is known and in lieu of exempt property. By can- celing the deed, the appellee's situa- tion 'will not be changed from what it was before its execution. Even where parties have acted under a mistake of law, though there be no actual fraud, if one is unduly influenced and mis- led by the other to do that which he would not have done but for such in- fluence, and he has, in consequence, conveyed property to another without consideration, equity will, if possible, restore both parties to the same con- dition they were before. Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Maine, 78. It seems to us that the facts alleged by appellant in this case present stronger grounds for the interposition of a court of equity. In the case of Ramey v. Allison, 64 Texas, 697, the defendant sought in her answer to be relieved against her mistake as to the law when she signed a deed of trust by virtue of which her property was Bold. Her mistake re- sulted from the fraudulent and mis- leading representations made to her as to the state of the law in respect to the vital consideration on which alone she could have been induced to sign the instrument. The question of law was a doubtful one. So in this case the question as to the appellant's and her child's interest in the homestead was one upon which lawyers and judges differed. See dissenting opin- ions of Chief Justice Stayton in Zwer- nemann v. Von Rosenberg, 76 Texas, 522, and Childers v. Henderson, 76 Texas, 664. And the court held that 'a contract obtained in such a manner is fraudulently obtained if the representations were fraudulently made, and intended to deceive. If not thus fraudulently conceived and in- tended, they were not the less mislead- ing, and induced a fatal mistake on the party relying on their correctness . In either case the contract is not that of a person giving consent to it under circumstances that will render it bind- ing in equity.' See also, authorities quoted and cited in the opinion. We have concluded that appellant's peti- tion states a cause of action entitling her to equitable relief, and that the judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the cause remanded." In Salinas v. Stillman (1894), 66 Fed. Rep. 677, Congress made an appro- priation to acquire title to the Ft. B. reservation. After the act was passed, seven persons, heirs of one S., brought an action of trespass to try title to the reservation, against K., the commanding officer of the troops stationed thereon, in which several other persons intervened, claiming title. When the case was about to come on for trial, two of the plaintiffs and nearly all the inter- veners entered into an agreement, for the purpose of securing promptly a judgment which would make it possi- ble to give a title acceptable to the United States, and to secure the ap- propriation, by which they undertook to co-operate on the trial in securing a verdict which would vest the title in two of the interveners, and, after such verdict had been secured, and the title passed and money paid, to submit their respective claims to cer- tain arbitrators, who should divide the money between them. This agreement was not communicated to the court. The trial resulted in a ver- dict for the two chosen interveners, the land was conveyed to the govern- ment, and the money paid. Seven years later two of the plaintiffs in the action of trespass, one of whom was a party to the agreement, and an in- 986 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 802 taken advantage of by the other party, the former will be re- lieved. More particularly will this be so if the mistake was encouraged or induced by misrepresentations of the other party. 1 Thus a settlement of a claim for half the amount a party was entitled to, made in ignorance of the law, and upon the fraudulent representations of the other party, who knew of such ignorance, and who knew the rights of the parties, will be set aside. 2 tervener in that action, who was also a party to the agreement, brought this suit to set aside the agreement for mistake, and the judgment in the ac- tion of trespass for mistake, and as a fraud upon the court. The only alle- gation as to mistake was that, for want of counsel and well-considered legal advice, W. (one of the com- plainants) was led into error in sign- ing the agreement. It was held that, in view of the length of time elaps- ing before any attack was made on the proceedings, and the indefinite- ness of the allegation of mistake, no case was made for setting aside the agreement or judgment on the ground of mistake. 1 Bispham on Equity, § 188. 8 Titus v. Rochester German Ins. Co. (Ky. 1895), 31 S. W. Rep. 127, Eastin, J. : "Under the authorities quoted, it is manifest that the com- promise contract sought to be rescind- ed here is within the control of a court of equity and may be set aside. And now, referring to the decision of this court, and to the doctrine es- tablished in this state, it seems to us still clearer that the contract com- plained of, and which was made un- der the circumstances set forth in the petition and admitted by appellee, can not be sustained. In an exhaust- ive opinion, in which the authorities were ably reviewed, by Judge Robert- son, after referring to the difficulty of determining in every case when a, contract was, in fact, made under a mistake of law, it is said: 'When if; can be made perfectly evident that the only consideration of a contract was a mistake as to the legal rights or obligations of the parties, and when there has been no fair compro- mise of bona fide and doubtful claims we do not doubt that the agreement might be avoided on the ground of 3, clear mistake of law, and a total want, therefore, of consideration or mutual- ity.' Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309. In the case of Ray v. Bank, 3 B. Mon. 510, this court re- ferred to and approved the above case, and said: 'Upon the whole, we would remark that whenever, by a clear and palpable mistake of law or fact, essentially bearing upon and af- fecting the contract, money has been paid without cause or consideration, which in law, honor, or conscience, was not due and payable, and which in honor or good conscience ought not to be retained, it was and ou^ht to be recovered back.' Both of these cases are cited with approval in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hop- kins Co., 87 Ky. 605; 9 S. W. Rep. 497, and the doctrine laid down there- in has not been departed from by this court. It will be seen that the ques- tion of fraud did not enter into the decision of either of those cases, but that they are almost entirely based upon the fact that there was no good consideration to uphold the contracts ; that it was not a fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful claims; and § 803 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 987 § 803. Rescinding release of legacy — Mistake of law — Con- cealment. — It is well settled that, where there is a mistake of law on one side, and either positive fraud on the other, or in- equitable, unfair, and deceptive conduct, which tends to con- firm the mistake and conceal the truth, it is the right and duty of equity to award relief. All the cases which deny a remedy for mere mistake of law on one side are careful to add the qualification that there must be no improper conduct on the other. 1 Thus where plaintiff, who was an old man, through a mistake of law supposed that, on the lapse of a legacy caused by the death of a legatee, it went to the deceased legatee's chil- dren, although in fact the plaintiff was entitled to it as the testator's brother and heir, executed to the executor a release of all claims against the estate, it was held that the release was voidable because of the executor's concealment from plaintiff of his legal rights as heir. 2 But where, on the ex- that the money was not in law, honor, or conscience payable, and ought not in honor or good conscience to be re- tained. If, for these reasons, a con- tract made under a clear mistake of law may be set aside, then how much stronger reason is there for annulling the contract under consideration? Not only was this contract, according to this record, as it comes before us, wholly without consideration, and not only was the money surrendered by appellant on his claim not due in law, honor, or conscience, and sur- rendered only under a clear mistake of law, but it is further admitted by the demurrer that this contract was obtained, and that appellant was in- duced to surrender one-half of his claim, by the actual false and fraudu- lent misrepresentations of appellee, knowingly made for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding appellant." 'Silliman v. Wing, 7 Hill, 159; Flynn v. Hurd, 118 N. Y. 19 ; 22 N. E. Eep. 1109; Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester, 122 N. Y. 285 ; 25 N. E. Eep. 408. *Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35; 35 N. E. Eep. 958, per Finch, J. : " There was in this case evi- dence of a studious concealment of the precise point essential to the free and intelligent action of the plaintiff by the executor, in whose position and ability some confidence was re- posed. No effort or suggestion was made by Stephen to rectify the mis- take under which Barclay was acting ; and even the statement of his counsel, made at the last minute, occurred after Barclay was already bound, was directed to Stephen, and not to the plaintiff, and was couched in legal terms, which the latter might not have apprehended even if he had heard them. And that he remained mistaken to the end is 1 indicated by the fact that just before the release was read Barclay asked Stephen to intercede with Martha and Phebe to procure him a larger share, to which Stephen answered merely, 'We will see about that.' So that upon the facts there is evidence to support the finding of Barclay's mistake, and the 988 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 804 ecutor's death, soon after, plaintiff learned his rights from his own counsel, but for more than three years kept silence, al- lowing the administration to proceed, and large payments to be made to the children of the deceased legatee, it was held that he was estopped to recover payments so made after he knew his rights. 1 § 804. Fraudulent representations. — In order to establish a fraudulent representation by a party to a contract which will entitle the other party to a rescission, the latter must show by clear and decisive proof — first, that the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact; second, that such representation is false; third, that such represen- tation was not actually believed by the defendant, on reason- able grounds, to be true; fourth, that it was made with in- tent that it should be acted on; fifth, that it was acted on by the complainant to his damage; and, sixth, that in so acting legal conclusion founded thereon. Mudi more should the rale we have asserted apply in a case where the re- lease is utterly without consideration, and where its true legal effect is sim- ply an authority by Barclay to Stephen to give away the former's property through ignorance on his part of his ownership." 1 Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35 ; 3-3 N. E. Rep. 958, per Finch, J. : "If he intended not to be bound it was his duty to speak, and he had full oppor- tunity to do so. Silence misled to their harm both the administrators and the supposed legatees. The former paid and the latter accepted the money as rightfully payable and due, and the one incurred risk and the other may have spent the money or changed modes of life in consequence, and cer- tainly thereby incurred an unknown and unsuspected obligation, if re- quired to return the fund. Under such circumstances the plaintiff is estopped from a recovery. The moment lie learned his real rights it was his duty to speak. He had full opportunity to speak and he knew that his silence would necessarily mislead the other parties to their harm. Erie County Bank?;. Roop, 48 N. Y. 292; Blair v. Wait, 69 N.Y. 113; Viele v. Judson, 82 N.Y. 32 ; Queen v. Lords of the Treas- ury, 16 Q. B. 357 ; Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143. Indeed, if the case should be reduced down to its simplest ele- ments, and treated from the moment in which Barclay knew his rights on the basis of a mere gift which he had authorized the representatives of the estate to make out of his own share, he could not recover back from the donees the gift so far as executed. It can not be that a gift voluntarily made, without mistake or fraud, can be at will recovered back; and, from the day when Barclay knew that the lapsed share was bis, every payment made to Samuel's daughters was his payment, because made by his direc- tion and authority, with full knowl- edge of both law and facts, and by the assent of his silence during more than three years." § 804 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 989 thereupon the complainant was ignorant of its falsity, and rea- sonably believed it to be true. The first of the foregoing requi- sites excludes such statements as consist merely in an express- ion of an opinion or judgment honestly entertained; and, again, excepting in peculiar cases, it excludes statements by the owner and vendor of property in respect to its value. 1 1 Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S. 247. In Clark v. Reeder (1895), 158 U. S. 505; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849, it appeared that by a con- tract of sale, defendant agreed to convey, with special warranty only, all the land within the exterior boun- daries of a certain survey containing 50,096 acres, more or less, except such of the lands as were found, by subse- quent surveys, to be held by third persons by adverse title and posses- sion, constituting a better title than that of the vendor ; the sale to be by the acre, and not in gross ; part pay- ment to be made when the vendee's attorney should certify the title to be good and valid, which certificate was to be made within thirty days. The certificate was accordingly made, the attorney stating therein that a small part of the survey was covered by an older survey, but that such survey had long been forfeited, and there- fore did not interfere with the ven- dor's title. It was subsequently dis- covered that this older survey in fact covered most of the land included in the contract, but the full extent of the interference was not known by either party at the time, and the evi- dence was insufficient to show any fraudulent misrepresentation or con- cealment on the part of the vendor's agent. It was held that the inter- ference between the surveys consti- tuted no ground for rescission. Clark v. Reeder, 40 Fed. Rep. 513, affirmed. In Bement v. LaDow (1895), 66 Fed. Rep. 185, Coxe, J., said: "It is thought that the third of these prop- ositions should be qualified by the further statement that if the defend- ant conveys the impression that he has actual knowledge of the exist- ence of the facts when he is con- scious that he has no such knowledge, he is as responsible for the injury caused by such representations, to one who believes and acts upon them, as if he had actual knowledge of their falsity. Lehigh, etc., Iron Co. v. Bam- ford, 150 U. S. 665, 673 ; 14 Sup. Jt. Rep. 219 ; Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562. In Slaughters' Admr. v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379, the supreme court said: ' Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their inspection, if the pur- chaser does not avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he has been de- ceived by the vendor's misrepresenta- tions. If, having eyes, he will not see matters directly before them, where no concealment is made or attempted, he will not be entitled to favorable consideration when he complains that he has suffered from his own vol- untary blindness, and been misled by overconfidence in the statements of another.' Farns worth v. Duffner, 142 IT. S. 43; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U. S. 609; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 771. Mere expressions of opinion as to the value of property are not actionable ; they are regarded as ' trade talk' which every man of intelligence receives cum grano salis. Gordon v. Butler, 105 U. S. 553; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217. In Dillman v. Nadlehoffer, 119 111.567; 7 N. E. Rep. 88, 'the defendant 990 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 805 Where the evidence in an action to set aside a deed showed that the conveyance was made in consideration of the transfer to plaintiff of the exclusive right to sell a patent washing ma- chine and wringer ; that defendants represented to plaintiff that a certain firm had agreed to furnish the machines to any one defendants might direct, and that, after the execution of the deed, such firm failed to furnish the machines, and de- fendants failed to convey the exclusive rights named, it was held that the evidence sustained a verdict for the plaintiff. 1 § 805. The same subject continued. — It has been held that material representations which are untrue, although inno- cently made, or the concealment of material facts by mistake or inadvertence, when relied on and which have become the foundation of the existing relations between the parties, operate as a "surprise and imposition," and constitute such fraud as will move a court of equity to decree a rescission of an exec- utory contract. 2 As a rule, all representations which are un- true, and which materially affect the value of the property which forms the subject of the contract, will furnish grounds for a re- scission, even though they may have been made without fraudu- lent intent. 3 Accordingly where one, without fraudulent non- represented to plaintiffs that said im- Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14 App. Oas. 337 provements were his own invention, Arkwrightv. Newbold,L. R.17Ch. Div and that the patents issued thereon 320; Traill v. Baring, 4 De Gex, J. & were genuine and valid, and that they S. 318 ; Ship v. Crosskill, L. R. 10 Eq did not conflict with or infringe upon 73; Cooley on Torts (2d ed.), p. 582 the patents or inventions of any one, Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. St. 52; 17 Atl and particularly those controlled by Rep. 252 ; Chatham Furnace Co.?'. Mof- the Washburn and Moen Manufactur- fatt, 147 Mass. 403; 18 N T . E. Rep. HIS ing Company and J. L. Ellwood or Wells u.McGeoch,71Wis. 196; 35 N.W their licensees.' The court held that Rep. 769 ; De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah, 488 these were expressions of opinion 33 Pac. 217 ; Cotzhausen v. Simon, 47 merely, and not actionable in a court Wis. 103; 1 N. W. Rep. 473; Grant v. of equity in a suit for rescission. Law, 29 Wis. 99; Knowlton v. Amy, 47 Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. Rep. 774." Mich. 204; 10 N. W. Rep. 201 ; Bullitt 'Brady v. Harper (Ky. 1895), 30 S. v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8; 43 N. W. Rep. W. Rep. 6(54. 566 ; Litchfieldu.Hutchinson,117 Mass. 2 1 Beach on Equity Jurisprudence, 195; Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26; 2 §§ 69, 93; 1 Story on Equity, §193; Warvelle on Vendors, §18. Bishop on Contracts, § 662; Clark on 3 2 Warvelle on Vendors, § 18; Al- Contracts, p. 339; 2 Pomeroy on len v. Hart, 72 111. 104; Bennett v. Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 883, 887, 889 ; Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 ; Mulvey v. King, § 806 .RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 991 tion, represents that he holds a fee-simple to land, when in fact he does not, and executes a warranty deed of the same, equity will treat the deed as an executory contract to convey, the rescission of which may be decreed. And where a grantor executes a warranty deed for land of which he does not hold a fee- simple, upon a suit for cancellation of the notes and mortgage given as the purchase price of the same, the grantee need not offer to reconvey. 1 § 806. Further illustrations. — Although defendant believed that his representations as to land, by which he induced plaintiff to make a purchase, were true, and although he told plaintiff that he had never seen the land, and part of the representations consisted of the report of an employe, still, they having been materially false, plaintiff is entitled to a rescission. 8 Where the fraudulent representations alleged 39 Ohio St. 491 ; Wilcox v. Iowa, etc., University, 32 Iowa, 367; Alvarez v. Brannan, 7 Cal. 503. 1 Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah, 480; 40 Pac. Rep. 720, King, J.: "The facts i n this case show that the representa- tions of plaintiffs as to the character of their title to the land were more than mere expressions of opinion. They were affirmations of a material fact, and inducements to the contract. Being untrue and material, they are fraudulent. Cresslert). Rees, 27 Neb. 515; 43 N. W. Rep. 363; Conlan v. Roemer, 52 N. J. Law, 53; 18 Atl. Rep. 858. There is no controversy in regard to the materiality of the representations made respecting the title, nor is it contended that defend- ants did not act in due season, in giv- ing notice of the rescission after the discovery of the defect in the title; but plaintiffs urge that the defendants not having tendered back a deed of the property conveyed, there was no rescission. The rule is, no doubt, that the parties must be placed in statu quo before a rescission can be effectuated. Having decided that the warranty deed executed by the plaintiffs was merely an executory contract, it fol- lows that defendants had nothing to return to plaintiffs in order to place them in statu quo. The referee found that the land described in the war- ranty deed was not owned by plain- tiffs, and the conveyance executed by them certainly created no cloud upon the owner's title, if there was an owner. Plaintiffs conveyed nothing to defendants. Their deed was worth- less, except that it might be the basis of an action in equity for specific per- formance, or the foundation of a suit at law, after reformation, for a breach of the vendor's covenants. Plaintiffs having parted with nothing of value, defendants had nothing to return, and in such case the failure to tender that which was valueless can not be interposed to prevent a rescission of the contract. Bishop on Contracts, § 679." 2 Groppengiesser v. Lake, 103 Cal. 37 ; 36 Pac. Rep. 1036, per Temple, C. : "It does not matter that defendant did not know that what he stated was un- true, or that he believed it to be true. 992 KESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 806 were of material facts conducive to the transaction, such a bill is not defective on the ground that the representations were not such as complainants had a right to rely on, because, by the exercise of diligence, they could have ascertained their falsity. 1 A bill to rescind a contract whereby plaintiffs con- veyed to defendant certain land in consideration of the transfer According to the testimony, his state- ments constituted all the knowledge possessed by plaintiff as to the sub- ject-matter of the sale. As they were untrue in material respects, the plain- tiff, acting promptly, may rescind. Civil Code, § 1572; Alvarez v. Bran- nan, 7 Cal. 503 ; Bank v. Hiatt, 58 Cal. 234. See also, 2 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, § 887." 1 Baker v. Maxwell, 99 Ala. 558 ; 14 So. Eep. 468, per McClellan, J. : "This is manifestly true in regard to the al- leged representations as to the per- sonalty, since it does not appear by the bill that complainants had any means of knowing or ascertaining whether they were false or not ; and, moreover, these representations were such that complainants had a right to rely upon them, unless they knew — not merely had an opportunity of in- forming themselves — that they were untrue. Henry v. Allen, 93 Ala. 197 ; 9 So. Rep. 579. With respect to the al- leged false representations as to the title to the land embraced in the mort- gage, the same doctrine obtains. The representations alleged, being material and conducing to the transaction, are vitiating, notwithstanding the com- plainants might, by the exercise of diligence, have ascertained their fals- ity. They were representations of fact, and not mere expressions of opin- ion. The defendant assured the com- plainants, as a fact, that the mortgagor, at the time of executing the instru- ment, had title to the land, and he even went so far as to give them the means and sources of his information — not opinion — to that effect, stating that he (the defendant) had examined the records of land titles, and therefrom ascertained the fact to be as he repre- sented it. On this state of case, com- plainants were under no duty to in- quire further. They had the right to rely and act on defendant's statements as true, notwithstanding the oppor- tunity was afforded them, by an ex- amination of public records, to ascer- tain to the contrary. "Woodbury v. State, 69 Ala. 242; Griel v. Lomax, 94 Ala. 641 ; 10 So. Rep. 232. In an action to foreclose a mortgage, defend- ants, who are husband and wife, pleaded fraud in the sale to them of the mortgaged premises, consisting of a farm devoted to grape culture, and they asked damages and for a rescis- sion of the sale. The farm was near a town of about one thousand five hun- dred population, and where such in- dustry had been extensive for many years, but was nearly ruined by 'black rot,' which affects the fruit only. De- fendants resided in a distant city, and were familiar with grape culture, and were induced by plaintiff to visit his farm with a view of purchasing it when the fruit was in bloom. De- fendants testified that plaintiff repre- sented that the town had about five thousand population, and that grapes were not affected with black rot. Plaintiff denied making such repre- sentations. It was held that the. de- fense pleaded was established. Lurch v. Holder (N. J. Eq. 1893), 27 Atl. Rep. 81." § 807 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 993 to them of certain chattel and real estate mortgages, on the ground of fraudulent representations of defendant as to the title of the mortgagors to the mortgaged land, and the exist- ence at the time of the mortgaged chattels, is not bad because it shows that the contract is wholly executed. 1 § 807. Estate not liable to purchaser for executor's repre- sentations — Restoration. — A decedent's estate is not liable to one purchasing assets thereof, on the ground that the executor induced the purchase by false representations; nor is it liable on a warranty given by the executor in making the sale. 2 But 1 Baker v. Maxwell, 99 Ala. 558 ; 14 So. Rep. 468, per McClellan, J. : "But other demurrers are in the nature of confession and avoidance. Conceding the fraud charged, and that it con- duced to the result complained of, one position advanced by the demurrers is that no relief can be had on this bill because the contract became and was a wholly executed one, in that com- plainants had made an absolute con- veyance of the land to the defendant, and the latter had fully paid the agreed consideration by transferring and de- livering the mortgages to the vendors, reciting in the indorsement of trans- fer that it was without any recourse whatever on him. The fullest con- cession of the executed character of the contract will not help the appel- lant. No contract can ever stand against an assault seasonably made on the ground that the fraud of one of the parties induced the other to enter into it, merely because everything con- templated by it has been fully done. No transaction can be closed against the vitiating consequence of actual fraud leading to its consummation, if the aggrieved party is diligent in his at- tack upon it. It was long ago decided by this court in line with the uni- versally prevailing doctrine, that 'a misrepresentation by a vendor of land in regard to a material fact, which 63 operated as an inducement to the pur- chase, upon which the vendee had a right to rely, and by which he was actually deceived and injured, is a fraud, and confers upon him the right to avoid the contract, whether exec- utory or executed.' Foster v. Gres- sett, 29 Ala. 393. And there are many cases in our reports where this doc- trine has since been acted on without question." 2 Huffman v. Hendry, 9 Ind. App. 324 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 727, per Davis.C. J. i In Rodman v. Rodman, 54 Ind. 444, the supreme court said : "When prop- erty or money which does not belong to the estate of a decedent may come into possession of a party who hap- pens to be administrator of such es- tate, such party can not, by charging himself, as such administrator, with such property or money, make such property or money a part of the as- sets of his decedent's estate, nor can he, by so doing, render the estate of his decedent, or himself as adminis- trator, liable for such property or money to the lawful owner thereof." In Riley v. Kepler, 94 Ind. 308, this language is used : "If he made false representations in the sale, that was his individual tort, forwhich he alone could be held individually liable." See also, Rose v. Cash, 58 Ind. 278; Holderbaugh v. Turpin, 75 Ind. 84; 994 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 808 if parties acting in good faith make a mutual mistake, either of fact or law, as the result of which an estate under control of the court is benefited, the court, having jurisdiction of the trust, may, in a proper case and in the exercise of a sound dis- cretion, grant the injured party equitable relief; but, as a con- dition precedent to such equitable relief, it would certainly be necessary for him to restore or to offer to return to the estate what he had received, or to show a good reason for his failure to do so. 1 § 808. Rescinding coal lease for mutual mistake — Lessee's laches. — Where it is made apparent that a lease of land was entered into under a mutual mistake as to the existence of a workable vein of coal thereupon, and that an incidental tim- ber contract was induced by the belief that such coal did so exist, which would aid the lessee in his mining operations, the contract should be rescinded not only as to the coal, but as to the timber. 2 But if nothing has been done under the contract for the Mills v. Kuykendall, 2 Blackl. 47; Cornthwaite v. First Nat.Bank, 57 Ind. 268. Whether the claim of appellee sounds in tort, or is founded in contract, the result is the same. In any view that may be taken of the case, it is clear, under the authorities cited, that the estate is not liable for any damages sustained by appellee, growing out of the alleged representations, warran- ties or statements of said administra- trix. 1 Huffman v. Hendry, 9 Ind. App. 324; 36 N. E. Eep. 727. e Bluestone Coal Co. v. Bell (\V. Va. 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 493, per En- glish, J.: "The general principles governing cases of this character are laid down in 15 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 628, as follows: 'In order that a mistake may come within the cognizance of a court of equity, it must be shown to be — First, material, or the moving cause of the complain- ing party's action ; second, mutual, or shared in by both parties to the trans- action; third, unintentional; and, fourth, free from negligence.' It would be difficult to use language which would more accurately de- scribe the mutual mistake which was made by the contracting parties with reference to the coal supposed to un- derlie this land, which acted as the moving cause and inducement to the contract for the timber. In the ab- sence of the coal, the evidence shows there would have been no contract for the timber. This was the founda- tion on which the timber contract rested, and, the foundation having no real existence, the superstructure must fall. Kerr on Fraud and Mis- take, at page 405, says : ' The juris- diction of equity over mistake is ex- ercised much more liberally where the mistake is in matter of fact than where it is in matter of law. The ad- mission of ignorance of fact as a ground of relief is not attended with those inconveniences which seem to be the reason for rejecting ignorance § 809 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 995 period of seventeen years from the date of the contract, the lessor has a right to presume that the contract has been aban- doned, and the lessee or his assigns can not, after having been guilty of such laches, restrain the lessor from cutting and us- ing the timber on the land by enjoining him from cutting and removing the same. 1 § 809. Sale of ground rent — Mistake of law. — Where the defendant owned a ground rent, which she believed irredeem- able, and her son, an attorney, confirmed such belief, and the plaintiff purchased it as irredeemable, on the strength of the defendant's representation to that effect, and took the papers to a title insurance company, which confirmed the belief, and insured the ground rent as irredeemable, and the defendant invested the proceeds, and a few years after the sale the ground rent proved redeemable, it was held that the defend- ant's honest misrepresentation did not harm plaintiff, as he did not rely thereon, and that it would be inequitable to cancel the sale, and compel defendant to suffer a loss in realizing on her investment so as to return the money. So too, equity would not grant relief in such a case, as plaintiff's mistake was one of law. 2 It is not ground for canceling a contract of sale, at the suit of the vendee, that the vendor wrongfully attempt- ed to declare the contract forfeited, where it is not shown that of law as a valid excuse,' etc. And certainly a question of law. Themis- again, in a note on page 416, we find take, then, being one of law, equity it is said that 'nothing is more clear will not grant any relief. The master than the doctrine that a contract does not deem it necessary to cite founded in a mutual mistake of the many cases in support of this proposi- facts constituting the very basis or tion, as he understood the learned essence of it will avoid it.' See Irick counsel for the plaintiffs to admit v. Fulton's Exrs.,3 Gratt. 193." that, if the mistake was one of law, ^luestone Coal Co. v. Bell (W. they were not entitled to the relief Va. 1893), 18 8. E. Eep. 493. And prayed for. If any authorities are see also, Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 necessary to support the master, they Va. 397; Cowan v. Radford Iron Co., can be found in Rankin t>. Mortimere, 83 Va. 547. 7 Watts, 372; McAninch v. Laughlin, 2 Clapp v. Hoffman (Pa. 1894), 28 13 Pa. St. 371; and the later cases. Atl. Rep. 362, per curiam: "The mas- The master is therefore of opinion ter is of opinion that the mistake in that the plaintiff's bill should be dis- this case is a mistake of law. Whether missed, with costs, and he recom- a ground rent is redeemable or not is mends a decree to that effect." 996 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 810 the vendee was injured thereby, and it appears that both par- ties afterwards treated the contract as still subsisting. 1 § 810. Rescission for fraud. — A party to a contract may re- scind the same if the consent of the party rescinding was ob- tained through fraud exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds.' But it is the duty of a party discovering a fraud to take immediate steps for a rescis- sion of his contract. By his ratification of the acts of which he complains, and to which he was a willing party, he is for- ever estopped from setting up such a defense. 3 Accordingly the lessee of a mill, after remaining in possession for a year, can not rescind the lease for fraudulent representations as to the 1 Lundahlv. Hansen, 147 111. 504; 35 N. E. Rep. 741, per Wilkin, J. . "The "weakness of appellant's case lies in the fact that he seeks to rescind and cancel a contract fairly entered into, because of an attempt by the other contracting party to do a thing which he had no right to do, but which was wholly hprmless to him. If he had elected to treat the declaration of for- feiture as an abandonment of the con- tract on the part of appellee, and proceeded to recover back what he had paid under it, he might have in- sisted, with some plausibility, that there was a rescission, but even that he did not see proper to do. We are clearly of the opinion that no suf- ficient cause was shown in the court below for asking the interposition of a court of equity to cancel the agree- ment between these parties. Appel- lant's proper remedy was a bill for specific performance, or an action at law on the contract, for its breach. He may still have one of these remedies, but the decree of the superior court will be affirmed." 2 Taylor v. National Bank (S. D. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 99. See also, § 822, infra. 8 Saunders v. Richard, 35 Fla. 28 ; 16 So. Rep. 679, per curiam: "One is not always relieved from his contract be- cause it is illegal or made upon a void consideration. There are often circum- stances which estop him from setting up such a defense. In Southern, etc., Trust Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla.llO,this court held : 'It is the duty of a party, upon discovering a fraud, to take immediate steps for the rescission of his contract. By his ratification of the acts of which he complains, and to which he was a willing party, he is forever estopped from setting up such a~ defense.' That one is estopped to assert title by rea- son of ratification and acquiescence in a sale is also established in this state in the cases of Chesser v. DePrater, 20 Fla. 691 (text 696); Terrell v. Wey- mouth, 32 Fla. 255 ; 13 So. Rep. 429. In the case of Daniels v. Tearney, 102 XT. S. 415 (text 419) , the Supreme Court of the United States held that a bond sued upon was void because given 'in aid and furtherance of the objects and policy of the ordinance of secession' of the state of Virginia. But it held that the obligor in the bond could not urge its invalidity in defense of the ac- tion, because he had obtained the ben- efit of a stay of execution provided for by the statute under which thebond was given." And see also, Thompson v. Cohen, 127 Mo. 215 ; 29 S. W. Rep. 885. § 811 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 997 condition and capacity of the mill. 1 But mere delay by one party in the execution of an executory contract, whose terms would be satisfied by performance within a reasonable time, does not of itself entitle the other party to rescind. To have this effect, in the absence of an express repudiation, the implica- tion arising from the non-performance of the contract must be inconsistent with its being still in force. 2 In an action for re- scission of a contract for fraudulent representations the de- fendant, if he relies on failure of plaintiff to tender within a reasonable time the return of the property received by him, should raise the issue by demurrer or answer, and can not, after judgment on the issues made upon the merits of the case, for the first time raise such issue on appeal. 8 § 811. Fraud of vendee although he pays consideration.— Where one sells land for half what he considers it worth, upon the false representations of an agent that it was to be used for a certain purpose, which would greatly enhance in value the residue of his property, whereas it was used for another purpose, for which he would not have sold, the sale will be set aside ; and this, even though the grantees may have paid all the land was in fact worth. 4 'Richardson v. Horn, 8 Houst. upheld by proof that the grantor was {Del.) 26; 31 Atl. Rep. 896. in no worse condition than if he had 8 Sea Isle City, etc., Association v. not made it. Something of this kind McTague (N. J. Err. 1895), 31 Atl. was set up in Levick v. Brotherline, Rep. 727. 74 Pa. St. 149, in supposed justiflca- 8 Taylor v. Fulks (Ky. 1895), 29 S. tion of the procurement of a convey- W. Rep. 349. ance by husband and wife of the wife's 4 Williams v. Kerr, 152 Pa. St. 560 ; 25 land, by falsely representing that the Atl. Rep. 618, per Heydrick, J. . "It name of a person to whom the wife is quite true that fraud without the con- alone had previously attempted to currence of injury affords no ground convey was inserted as the grantee, for relief in equity. But it is such in- and that the deed was intended mere- jury as will be redressed, to obtain ly to perfect his title. It was said in from an owner, by a false representa- that case that, although a substantial tion of a fact which he deems material, money consideration was paid as an property which he would not other- inducement to the execution of the wise have parted with upon the terms deed, if the grantor relied upon the which he is thus induced to accept, false representations, and would not If this were not so, a conveyance ob- have executed it if they had known tained by any other fraud than such that the name of the actual grantee as was practiced in this case could be was inserted therein, it was as fraud- 998 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 812 § 812. Election by defrauded purchaser — Acquiescence. — When a purchaser acquires knowledge that he has been de- frauded, he has an election of legal remedies. He may keep the property and sue for damages, or repudiate the contract and demand rescission. These remedies are not concurrent, but inconsistent, and the adoption of one of necessity excludes the other. The rule is well settled in equity that after knowledge of the fraud the party must, within a reasonable time, make an election as to whether he will affirm the trade notwithstanding the fraud, or offer to restore the property and demand the return of his purchase-money. If, after the knowledge of the facts which entitle him to rescind, he deal with the property as owner, it is evidence of his acquiescence and affirmance of the contract. 1 Where the complainant ulently procured as if it had been ob- tained for a nominal consideration; and it was brushed aside as so much waste paper. It was upon the same principle that the sale of a horse pro- cured to be made by a fraudulent con- trivance was avoided in Harner v. Fisher, 58 Pa. St. 453, although the seller was tendered, after delivery of the horse, and upon the day payment of the contract price was agreed to be made, what would have been adjudged the legal equivalent of that price if the transaction had been honest upon the part of the purchaser." 1 Mudsill Mining Co. v. Watrous (0. C. A. 1894), 61 Fed. Rep. 163, per Lurton, J. . "The authorities to this point are numerous, and the principle well settled. The more important cases are: Pence v. Langdon, 99 TJ. S. 578; Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148U.S.360; 13 Sup.Ct.Rep.585 ; Twin- Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. 8. 587; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 ; Cobb v. Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 533; Schiffer v. Dietz, 83 N. Y. 300 ; Lawrence v. Dale, 3 Johns. Ch. 23; Tanner v. Smith, 10 Sim. 410; Gilbert v. Hunnewell, 12 Heisk. 289; Oakes v. Turquand, L. R. 2 H. L. 325. But before a purchaser is compelled to elect whether he will affirm or disaffirm, he must be aware of the facts which raise such an elec- tion. Delay will not defeat his right to relief, unless the fraud was known to him, or ought to have been known by due diligence. In Pence v. Lang- don, 99 U. S. 578, Mr. Justice Swayne, in discussing a question of alleged acquiescence in a fraud, laid down what we deem the true rule upon this question. He said: 'Acquiescence and waiver are always questions of fact. There can be neither without knowledge. The terms import this foundation for such action. One can not waive or acquiesce in a wrong while ignorant it has been committed. Current suspicion and rumor are not enough. There must be knowledge of facts which will enable the party to take effectual action. Nothing short of this will do. But he may not willfully shut his eyes to what he might readily and ought to have known. When fully advised, he must decide and act with reasonable dis- patch. He can not rest until the rights of third persons are changed. Under such circumstances, he loses the right to rescind, and must seek § 813 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 999 purchased a silver mine from defendant, and afterwards dis- covered that the samples by which he had been induced to purchase had been "salted," and he at once attempted to persuade defendant to take the property back, who refused to do so, and complainant then erected a small mill in order to make more complete tests of the quality of the ore, and also sought to discover evidence to convict defendant of the "salting," but did not reach a conviction upon this point until a year after the sale was consummated, and he then filed a bill for rescission, it was held that there was not such a dealing with the property as amounted to a waiver of his right to rescind, and that he was not guilty of laches. 1 A chat- tel mortgage given to secure the price of a stock of goods sold by the mortgagee to the mortgagor can not be set aside on the ground that the sale was procured by the fraud of the mort- gagee, where no attempt is made to rescind the sale itself. 2 § 813. Rescinding for purchaser's fraud. — Where a pur- chaser makes no false statements as to existing facts, to in- duce an owner to sell the land at a very low price, the sale will not be set aside for fraud after the land has become valuable by the construction of a railroad to it. And the purchaser of the land, who lives near it, is under no obligation to disclose to the owner, who resides a long distance from it, the fact that there is a prospect of a railroad being built to the place where the land is situated, even if he have knowledge of such a fact. compensation in damages. But the s Brill v. Rack (Ky. 1893), 23 S. W. wrong-doer can not make extreme vig- Rep. 511. ilance and promptitude conditions of s Burt v. Mason, 97 Mich. 127; 56 rescission. It does not lie in his N. W. Rep. 365. In "Wagner v. Lewis, mouth to complain of delay, unac- 38 Neb. 320; 56 N. W. Rep. 991, it ap- companied by acts of ownership, and peared that plaintiff charged that the by which he has not been affected, purchaser of the farm had made rep- The election to rescind or not to re- resentations that the notes of third scind, once made, is final and conclu- persons given by purchaser were good, sive. The burden of proving knowl- and that he relied upon the same, edge of the fraud and the time of its which representations were untrue, discovery rests upon the defend- The notes proving to be nearly worth- ant.' " less, the vendor of the farm tendered 1 Mudsill Mining Co. v. Watrous, 61 them back, and asked for a rescis- Fed. Rep. 163. sion, and that the title of the farm be 1000 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 814 Where the plaintiffs agreed with a third person to exchange certain land for what purported to be Texas land scrip, and it was understood that they would convey the land to whomso- ever he might designate, and he then sold the land to de- fendant, to whom plaintiffs accordingly made the deed, and the scrip proved worthless, and plaintiffs sought to cancel their deed, it was held that, as neither defendant nor her agent had knowledge of the agreement between plaintiffs and the third person who had acted solely for himself, plaintiffs had no cause of action. 1 § 814. The same subject continued. — Where the plaintiffs lived a thousand miles away from their land, and relied al- most entirely on their warranty deed, and an attorney living near their land told them that the deed to their grantor was forged, their title valueless, and the land of little worth, and, relying on his representations, they quitclaimed for a mere trifle to avoid needless litigation, through which fraud he ob- tained a deed running to a third person, and not to their grantor's predecessor, as they intended, and his statements were false, it was held that the deed would be set aside. 2 reconveyed and quieted in him. The is fraud, — an evil act with an evil in- court below having found in his favor, tent.' 1 Story on Equitable Jurispru- it was held that the judgment was dence, 201.' And again: 'In cases right, and is affirmed. like this, of numerous and complicated 1 Belau v. Bryan, 89 Iowa, 348; 56 facts, the fraud which should vitiate N. W. Rep. 512. is generally sought in vain in any one 2 Robinson v. Reinhart, 137 Ind. 674 ; phase of the case. It lurks almost in- 36 N. E. Rep. 519, per Howard, C. J. . tangibly in the whole transaction. It "In Peter v. Wright, 6 Ind. 183, it was may be deduced, says Kent, not only said by Judge Stuart : 'In what light from deceptive or false representu- the law views such transactions, re- tions, but from facts, incidents, and mains to be seen. In Smith v. Rich- circumstances which may be trivial in ards, 13 Pet. 26, it is, says Judge Bar- themselves, but decisive evidence, in bour, an ancient and well-established the given case, of a fraudulent design, principle that, whenever a. suppres- 2 Kent's Commentaries, 484.' The sio veri occurs, it is sufficient to set land is within a short distance of Chi- aside a conveyance. Judge Story ex- cago, and Stirlen went to Baltimore presses the same thing thus : 'Where armed with full knowledge of all that a party designedly produces a false related to the title. Appellees had impression, in order to mislead, en- little knowledge of the land, or of the trap, or obtain an undue advantage title ; yet it is contended by appel- over another, in every such case there 1 ants that appellees were at fault for 5 815 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1001 § 815. Rescinding sale of goods for buyer's fraud. — A sale of goods induced by fraud is voidable at the vendor's option. On discovering the fraud, he may rescind the contract and re- claim the goods from the fraudulent vendee; and, inasmuch as an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a bona fide pur- chaser, but takes only the defeasible title of his assignor, the vendor in such case may also compel a return of the goods from him. 1 But, when a vendor waits until his vendee, having the title, possession and absolute right of disposition, as his own property, of the merchandise sold to him, has disposed of the same, and then, to obtain an advantage over the cred- itors of the vendee, who is insolvent, and has in the mean- time made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, rescinds the sale induced by fraud, a constructive trust as to the proceeds of the sale of the portion of such merchandise, not better informing themselves be- fore executing the deed, notwithstand- ing Stirlen's solicitations and repre- sentations. The law does not allow the shrewd and designing to thus hide their evil-mindedness behind the ig- norance of their victims. 'Where a man professes to possess full knowl- edge of a fact, and, for the fraudulent purpose of inducing another to act, makes a statement of fact which is untrue, and thus misleads the person "Whom he has induced to act, he is guilty of fraud, although he did not know the statement to be false.' Beth- ell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318. It is also contended that because one of the in- ducements held out to appellees was that Stirlen would bring suit against Cline on his warranty, and thus re- cover for appellees what they had paid for the land, therefore the false representations of fact did not induce the making of the deed from appellees, and were consequently not material representations. 'It is true,' as said in Bethell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318, 'that a promise to do a thing in the future is not fraud, although there may be no intention of fulfilling the promise, for fraud consists in the misrepresenta- tion of an existing fact. But in the present case there is more than a fail- ure to make good a promise. There is deceit, misrepresentation, abuse of confidence, and a wrongful prepara- tion of a written instrument different from that agreed upon. There are facts pleaded showing fraud, and the absence of epithets does the pleading no harm.' This applies to the case at bar. Because Stirlen's promise was not kept, it does not follow that his other misrepresentations were harm- less." 'American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fan- cher(1894), 81 Hun, 56, per Parker, J. : " Burkhalter & Co., upon the de- livery of the sugar to them in pursu- ance of their contract with the plaint- iff, became vested with the title and possession notwithstanding the fraud, subject, however, to the right of the vendor to rescind the contract if it should so elect. Powers v. Benedict, 88 N. Y. 605 ; Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N. Y. 149; Wise v. Grant, HON. Y. 593." 1002 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 815 sold by the vendee prior to the rescission by the vendor of the original sale, will not be held by courts of equity to have been created for the benefit of the vendor. 1 1 American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fan- cher (1894), 81 Hun, 56, per Parker, J.. "Before the plaintiff concluded to rescind the contract, and reclaim the property, that portion of it which is now the subject of controversy was, in the usual course of business, sold and delivered to various customers of the firm, who were purchasers for value and without notice. It was then too late for the plaintiff to re- claim the property. The title and possession had become vested in per- sons protected as a rule of necessity from the original vendor. 'A con- trary principle would endanger the security of commercial transactions and destroy that confidence upon which what is called the usual course of trade materially rests.' (Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570.) Then came the hour of the general assignment, which found the plaintiff apparently content with the then existing rela- tion of debtor and creditor. By the instrument then executed, all of the debtor's property passed to the as- signee for administration and distri- bution. The proceeds of the sugar, necessarily, passed with the other as- sets of Burkhalter & Co. It was their sugar when sold. True, it might have been otherwise had the plaintiff elected to rescind the contract and reclaim the property, but as it did not do this, the vendees in selling it sold their own property, and the proceeds of it belonged to them when the as- signment was made. Then the plaint- iff's relation to Burkhalter & Co., as to the sugar sold, was that of a con- tract creditor, the only difference be- tween it and the other creditors being that fraud entered into the making of the contract between it and the com- mon debtors. But this fraud did not . entitle it to preference over the other creditors in the distribution of assets. Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256. While the cases cited by the text-writers, as we have said, in the main involve questions relating to real estate, there are two classes of cases where the equitable doctrine of constructive trusts has been applied to personalty and the proceeds fol ■ lowed, neither one of which, how- ever, includes a case like the ono under consideration. 1. Where a per- son, having possession of the proper- ty of another towards whom he sus- tains a fiduciary relation, wrongfully disposes of it. 2. Where there is an absence of title in the wrong-doer ab initio. The first class extends to trustees, executors and administrators, directors of corporations, guardians, committee of lunatics, agents using money of their principals, partners using partnership funds, husbands purchasing property with money be- longing to their wives, parents buying property of their children, guardians of their wards, trustees of their cestui que trusts, attorneys of their clients, and all persons who stand in fidu- ciary relations towards others. The following cases, cited on this appeal, are within this class: Holmes v. Gil- man, 138 N. Y. 369; Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696. Re- spondent strongly urges that the case of Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank v. Peters, 123 N. Y. 272, supports this judgment. The court of appeals said in Bosley v. National, etc., Co., 123 N. Y. 550-555: 'It is not in every case of fraud that relief is to be ad- ministered in a court of equity, and it is a well-settled rule that wherever § 816 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1003 § 816. Fraud to be proved as alleged. — It is a familiar prin- ciple, that fraud is a conclusion of law from facts stated and proved. When it is pleaded at law or in equity, the facts out of which it is supposed to arise must be stated. A mere general averment of fraud, without such facts, is not suffi- cient. 1 He who alleges fraud must clearly and distinctly prove the fraud he alleges; the burden is upon him to prove his case as it is alleged in the bill. If the fraud is not strictly and clearly proved, as it is alleged, relief can not be had, although the party against whom relief is sought may not have been perfectly clear in his dealings. Fraud will not be carried by way of relief one tittle beyond the manner in which it is proved to the satisfaction of the court. If a case of actual fraud is alleged by the bill, relief can not be had on the bill by proving only a case of constructive fraud. 2 And if a case of misrepre- sentation is alleged, the rescission of the contract or instrument can not be had on the bill by proving only a case of mistake. 3 a matter respects only a sale of per- sonal chattels, and lies merely in damages, the remedy is at law only. If this had been a sale of a horse to the plaintiff procured by fraud, it would not have been proper for her to resort to an equitable action for re- lief, because an action at law would furnish her an ample remedy and give her all the relief to which she could, under any circumstances, be entitled.' " 1 Loucheim v. First Nat. Bank, 98 Ala. 521 ; 13 So. Eep. 374 ; 3 Brickell's Digest, p. 510, § 31. 2 Reynolds v. Excelsior Coal Co. (Ala. 1893), 14 So. Eep. 573, per Har- alson, J. : "If the bill alleges a case of constructive fraud, and the title to re- lief rests upon that fraud only, the bill will be dismissed, if the fraud, as alleged, is not proved. It can not be allowed to be used for any secondary purpose. Kerr on Fraud and Mis- take, 382 ; Adams v. Thornton, 78 Ala. 489. 'Though the proof may show that complainants are entitled to re- lief, it can not be granted, unless it is shown that they are entitled to it on the grounds stated in the bill.' Simms v. Greer, 83 Ala. 263, 266; 3 So. Rep. 423; Winter v. Merrick, 69 Ala. 86; Munchus v. Harris, 69 Ala. 506; 3 Brickell's Digest, p. 402, § 571." 8 In Porter v. Collins, 90 Ala. 510 ; 8 So. Rep. 80, where the bill sought a rescission of a contract for the sale of land, on the ground of material mis- representation by the vendor pending the negotiations, alleging that they were made either fraudulently or through honest mistake on his part, and the evidence showed only a mu- tual mistake of both parties, the va- riance was held to be fatal. The court said: "The bill, as we have seen, claims rescission solely on the ground of misrepresentations. Its only reference to any supposed mis- take was in connection with and qualification of the allegations of mis- representations. It avers that the transaction was induced by misrepre- sentations on the part of Collins, and 1004 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 817 An action by a vendor to rescind a sale of land for the vendee's fraud is properly dismissed as against a purchaser from the vendee where there is no allegation in the petition charging him with notice of the fraud. 1 § 817. Party put on inquiry — Want of diligence. — Where the two parties to a contract are both intelligent and of busi- ness ability and have the same facilities for knowing the facts upon which the validity of the title in question depends, and the party assailing the contract could have learned those facts by the exercise of ordinary diligence, he can not have the con- tract rescinded for fraud on the ground that he was misin- formed as to those facts by the other party. Thus equity will not relieve defendant, as maker of a note, on the ground of fraud, where it appears that plaintiff was a banker, and de- fendant a lawyer, and both from the east, in San Diego to- gether; that plaintiff offered to sell his stock in a California corporation organized to purchase Mexican lands, and his un- divided interest in a Mexican land contract; that defendant asked if the corporation or an alien could hold the land; that plaintiff replied truthfully that a San Diego law firm versed in Mexican law, whom he had paid for an opinion, had informed him that the corporation could hold the land; that defendant purchased of plaintiff, and gave the note in question; and that defendant could have learned, by exercising a little diligence, that the contract conveyed Mexican lands which could not be held by aliens. 2 Where the defendant, in an action to fore- that these were made either fraudu- 1 Garza v. Scott, 5 Texas App. 289; lently or mistakenly. But, it nowhere 24 S. W. Rep. 89. avers that the sale was the result of 2 Daly v. Brennan, 87 Wis. 36- 57 the mistake of the parties. Misrepre- N. W. Rep. 963, per Winslow, J. : sentation, either intentional or inad- "Defendant was a lawyer, and knew vertent, and not mistake, is made the that, if aliens could not hold land in gravamen of the bill ; and, upon mis- Mexico, the entire scheme was worth- representation and not upon mistake, less. He was in San Diego where the case must turn. Relief can not are lawyers versed in Mexican law. be granted on facts developed in evi- Presumably, had he taken counsel, he dence, but not alleged, any more than would have ascertained the fact that upon facts alleged and not proved." aliens could not hold the lands in Park v. Lide, 90 Ala. 246; 7 So. Rep. question. The means of ascertaining 805. the truth were within his reach equal- § 818 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1005 close a purchase-money mortgage, sought to rescind the pur- chase on the ground of fraudulent representations, and it was found that he had purchased the land from a real estate agent, without the knowledge of the owner, who afterwards ratified the sale; that no representations were made by the owner; that the defendant had resided within a short distance of the land for several years, and had ample opportunity to judge of its value; that he had placed the land on the market after pur- chasing it, and had made no complaint for two years, nor un- til after suit was begun to foreclose the mortgage, it was held that judgment for plaintiff was sustained by the findings. 1 But where, in the course of negotiations for the exchange of property between parties interested therein, material represen- tations of fact are made by one of them, who knows the facts, to the other, who is ignorant thereof, under circumstances cal- culated to mislead, instead of putting him upon inquiry, and such representations are false, and relied on by the latter to his prejudice, an action will lie, 8 § 818. Negligent execution of instrument. — Where one joins her husband in the execution of a paper which she knows is to secure his debt, and which she has advised him to secure, ly with the plaintiff, but he chose to tion to recover from P. ten acres of make no investigation, trusting to the the land, or the value of the same, al- advice given to Daly. He can not leging that P. had misrepresented the now be heard to say that he was de- nature and the amount of the indebt- frauded. He was put upon inquiry, edness, and that one hundred and By the use of even a little diligence thirty acres was sufficient considera- he could have obtained knowledge as tion for the debt assumed. Upon the to the fact, and he chose not to exer- testimony in the record it is held that cise it. Equity even will not relieve the parties stood upon an equal foot- under such circumstances. Mamlock ing; that the nature and amount of v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415; 1 N. W. the debt assumed and the material Rep. 167; Conner v. Welch, 51 Wis. facts in the transaction were equally 431; 8 N. W. Rep. 260." In Patterson within the knowledge of both; and v. Galusha, 53 Kan. 367 ; 36 Pac. Rep. that there was no such deception and 737, it appeared that G., who owned fraud on the part of P. as will defeat a quarter section of land, conveyed the conveyance of the land, or justify one hundred and forty acres of the a recovery in favor of G. Bame to P., in consideration that P. 'Lion v. McGlory, 106 Cal. 623; 40 would assume and pay a mortgage in- Pac. Rep. 12. debtedness which existed against the 2 Lofgren «. Peterson, 54 Minn. 343 ; land. Afterwards G. brought an ac- 56 N. W. Rep. 44. 1006 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 819 and makes no inquiry as to its form or contents, she can not afterwards have it set aside on the ground that she did not know its purport. 1 The party seeking the relief must be rea- sonably free from negligence; and it has been held that, when a party signs a deed without reading it, or, if he can not read, without having it read to him, he can not obtain rescission. The presumption that the minds of the parties did meet can only be rebutted by proof of facts indicating fraud. 2 When one has executed a contract, the bare fact that he did' not read it or know its contents will not relieve him from it, and, if he brings an action to cancel it on the sole ground that the other party has refused to perform it, he must stand on the contract as he executed it. 3 § 819. Proof of fraud — Diligence. — An instrument will not be rescinded on the ground of fraud in its inception unless such fraud is established by satisfactory proof, and is shown to have caused actual injury to the party defrauded. 4 An 1 Sanborn v. Sarnborn (Mich. 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 371. 2 2 Wharton on Negligence, §§932, 1243; Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. §t. 489; Hallenbeck v. Dewitt, 2 John. 404; Link v. Page, 72 Texas, 592; 10 S. W. Eep. 699; De Perez v. Everett, 73 Texas, 434; 11 S. W. Eep. 388. As quoted from Touchstone, in Green- field's Estate, supra, it is said: "If the part)' that is to seal the deed can read himself, and doth not, or, being illiterate or blind, doth not inquire to hear the deed read, or the con- tents thereof declared, in these cases, albeit the deed is contrary to his mind, yet it is good and unavoida- ble." 8 Quimby v. Shearer, 56 Minn. 534 ; 38 N. W. Eep. 155. In Gibson v. Brown (TexasO.App. 1893), 24S.W. Eep. 574, in an action to recover land, in which defendant sought to rescind a deed he had given to plaintiff on the ground of fraud, it appeared that plaintiff, his stepson, with whom he was on good terms, came to him when he was at work, and said that he bad bought his brother's and sister's interest, and that he wanted defendant and his wife to sign the deed also ; that de- fendant replied that he did not have his spectacles, but reckoned it was all right, and, on plaintiff's statement that it should never interfere with defendant or his wife, signed the deed, believing it conveyed only the future interest of plaintiff's brother and sister in the land, and that he was not to be interfered with in the use of the premises. It was held that, even if the defendant did not under- stand the purport of the deed, he was not free from negligence in signing it without reading, and was not entitled to a rescission ; and the fact that de- fendant received no consideration would not invalidate the deed. 4 McCann v. Preston, 79 Md. 223 ; 28 Atl. Eep. 1102, per Eoberts, J.: "Fraud will never be presumed, for it is a maxim well recognized in the law § 820 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1007 application for relief from a purchase on the ground of fraud must be made in a reasonable time. 1 To avoid an instrument for fraud in its execution the evidence of fraud must be clear and the party assailing it must himself be reasonably free from fault or negligence. 2 § 820. Laches in rescinding by one knowing his rights. — A suit by the heir of a married woman to set aside a deed of trust of her separate property by reason of a mistake therein, which gave the husband power after her death to have the fee vested in him and diverted from her heirs, is not barred by acquiescence and laches, except as to such part of the property as he sold, where the husband was entitled to the possession of the property for life by the curtesy, and the heir lived with that 'odiosa et inhonesta non sunt in lege prmsumenda.' It is not only nec- essary to prove fraud, but the fraud practiced must have worked an act- ual injury to the defrauded party. McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439." 1 McCann v. Preston, 79 Md. 223; 28 Atl. Eep. 1102, per Roberts, J. : "If the defendants desired to rescind the con- tract because of its fraudulent charac- ter, they should have done so within a reasonable time. In this case there is no evidence even of dissatisfaction until after the expiration of more than a year. It may be that the defend- ants have not profited by the ex- change which they made, but it by no means follows, as a legal result, that they can now ask the law to re- lieve them from the consequences of a bad bargain." 2 Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Chis- holm (1893), 55 Minn. 374; 57 N. W. Rep. 63, per curiam: "Under the alle- gations in the answer, the defendants undertook to show that there was fraud in the execution of the contract in this : That it was agreed and understood between the parties that the deed to be given should be a quitclaim only, and the contract was not so written. The trial court held that the evidence was not sufficiently clear and satis- factory to establish fraud in the exe- cution of the contract. In this , we think the court did not err, since the rule in such cases is that the party seeking to avoid the contract should himself be reasonably free from negli- gence, and the evidence should be clear and persuasive. 2 Wharton on Evidence, § 932 ; McCall v. Bushnell, 41 Minn. 37 ; 42 N. W. Rep. 545, and cases. Here nearly six years had passed before the trial. The recollec- tion of the defendants was evidently not very distinct, except they felt sure that it was a quitclaim they were to give, and that the agent who pro- cured it so read the contract. They did not read it themselves, nor require it to be read in full, nor ask for a copy, though they had ample oppor- tunity to read it if they chose. The contract calls for a conveyance, but not for a quitclaim or a deed with covenants ; and the defendants allege that they had perfected the title with- in the previous five years. A careful examination of the evidence of the defendants, including the cross-exam- ination, satisfies us that the court was right, and that the evidence was in- sufficient to avoid the instrument." 1008 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 820 and trusted the husband, and he told her that his wife had given him the property, and promised her that, if she outlived him, she would see that he had done her no wrong, -and she brought the suit three months after his death. 1 A person can 1 Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 907, per Green, C: "Mrs. Hall says that she first heard that her sister, Mrs. Otterson, had ex- ecuted this deed of conveyance, after her death ; that Mr. Otterson then told her that her sister had given him the farm ; and that he immediately went on and said : ' Whoever shall outlive me will see that I have never done you or your children any injustice.' She was at the time a member of the Ot- terson family, making her home with them when her sister died, and con- tinuing to live there for some time thereafter. The same diligence is not required between members of the same family as between strangers. Laver v. Fielder, 9 Jur. (TSf. S.) 190. After Mrs. Hall's husband's death, Otterson became her legal adviser, at- tended to her business, and continued not only on terms of friendship, but of confidence, during his life. She had every reason to, and did, put entire trust and reliance in him and his rep- resentations, and there is no reason to think, from the facts as they ap- pear, that her confidence was mis- placed. The unwitnessed will, dated May 20, 1887—24 years after his wife's death — demonstrated, I think, that he really intended to carry out Mrs. Ot- terson's purpose that this property should go to the children of the com- plainant. But it is urged that she had constructive, if not actual, notice from the record of the transfer of the Ottersons to Gowen, and from Gowen to Mr. Otterson. The deed of trust, however, was not put upon record until January, 1864 — 6 years after its date, and nearly one year after Mrs. Otterson's death, and contempora- neous with the conveyance from Gow- en, trustee, to Otterson. It does not appear definitely when the statement that his wife had given him the prop- erty was made by Otterson to Mrs. Hall, but the fair construction of the evidence is that it was soon after her sister's death. But I do not think she was negligent in failing to make an examination of the record. Not only is it probable that, at the time it was put on record, she was acting under the promises of Otterson, but, if she had any knowledge whatever of legal rights, she knew that, independent of the deed, Otterson was entitled, as tenant by the curtesy, to continue in possession of the property. These de- fendants stand in Otterson's shoes. They can not urge, as a bar to the complainant's right of action, » delay in commencing suit, if it has been oc- casioned by the acts or representa- tions of him under whom they claim. They come into court and insist that it is inequitable that the complainant should, after a delay of many years, prosecute her claim ; but, if he whom they represent has been the cause of this procrastination, this appeal to the equitable denial of this court does not lie in their mouths. With his announcement to Mrs. Hall that her sister had given him the farm, he makes her the promise that puts her vigilance to sleep, and it is in conse- quence of his representations that she has remained inactive; and herein this case differs from Wilkinson v. Sherman, 45 N. J. Eq. 413; 18 Atl. Rep. 228. It is said that it would be inequitable to permit this suit to be maintained, because, during the com- plainant's delay in bringing it, wit- § 821 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1009 not be deprived of his remedy in equity on the ground of laches, unless it appears that he had knowledge of his rights. As one can not acquiesce in the performance of an act of which he is ignorant, so one can not be said to neglect the prosecu- tion of a remedy when he has no knowledge that his rights have been invaded, excepting, always, that his want of knowledge is not the result of his own culpable negligence. 1 § 821. Unreasonable delay. — When a party desires to re- scind upon the ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose and ad- here to it. If he be silent, and continue to treat the property as his own, he will be held to have waived the objection, and will be conclusively bound by the contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not occurred. He is not permitted to play fast and loose. Delay and vacillation are fatal to the right which had before subsisted. A court of equity is always reluctant to rescind, unless the parties can be put back in statu quo. If this can not be done, it will give such relief only where the clearest and strongest equity imperatively demands it. 2 A nesses have died and testimony haa is not a little difficult to determine what heen lost. But it appears to me that knowledge is necessary to place the Mr. Otterson has been himself guilty party in the position of negligently de- of laches in this regard. He, being a laying his action. The chancellor, in lawyer of distinction, must be assumed Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 1 Dick. Ch. to have known that the law cast upon 380, says : 'After he has been informed him the burden of proof hereinbefore of facts and circumstances which ap- indicated. It was within his power, prise him of the wrong.' The court, in by suit, to have perpetuated the testi- O'Neill v. Hamill, Beat. 618, says : 'Of mony necessary to establish the deed her being fully apprised of her rights.' as a valid gift, as well as within hers In Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, L. either to have perpetuated the testi- R. 5 P. C. 221, it is described as 'suffi- mony necessary, or to have brought cient knowledge of the fact constitut- suit, to annul it; and he can not in- ing the title to relief.' That it must be voke her delay in that regard as a bar something more than knowledge of the to her action, because, during the in- mere facts which have transpired/ or terval, he has been deprived of testi- papers which may have been executed, mony lost to him by his own neglect, is shown by In re Garnett, L. R. 31 Ch. I am of opinion that these convey- Div. 1." And see Savery v. King, 5 ances, so far as they relate to prop- H. L. 627. erty not conveyed by James Otterson, 2 Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 62. Jr.,inhislifetime,shouldbesetaside." In Schiffer v. Dietz, 83 N. Y. 300, 'Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522; 307, Andrews, J., said: "Theplaint- 28 Atl. Rep. 907, per Green.V. C. : "It 64 1010 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 821 wife who, after she has been abandoned by her husband, con- veys land without his joining in the conveyance, in payment of necessary supplies furnished her by the grantee, although without obtaining permission from the chancellor, as author- ized by the Kentucky statutes, is not entitled, years after- wards, and after the grantee's death, to have the deed can- celed, on the ground that, because of her coverture, no title passed by her conveyance without paying the grantee's estate the value of the supplies. 1 There has, however, never been any fixed, certain period of time within which a defrauded purchaser may not move for rescission. There are many cases in which the lapse of several years after sale and before suit for rescission was held no bar to the prosecution of an action for relief. The true inquiry is, in all cases of iff was entitled, on the discovery of the fraud, to demand a rescission of the sale and conveyance, and the res- toration of the money and securities received by the defendant. But a party entitled to rescind a contract for fraud may deprive himself of this remedy by acquiescence; or where the transaction is a sale of property, by his dealing with the property as owner after the discovery of the fraud. A party claiming to rescind a contract for fraud must act promptly on discovery of the fraud, and restore, or offer to restore, to the other party what he has received under it. He can not thereafter deal with the other party on the footing of an existing contract, or with the property ac- quired under it as his own." See also, Bach v. Tuch, 126 N. Y. 53. In Be- ment v. La Dow(1895), 66 Fed.Rep.185, Coxe, J., said : "In a case quite simi- lar to the case at bar, involving the question of fraudulent representations upon the sale of patents, the supreme court of Illinois held that 'it is not sufficient to allege that the patents are infringements upon others, and worthless, without showing that the complainants have ceased to use the patents or their right to use them has been questioned.' Dillman v. Nadle- hoffer, 119 111. 567. Delay will de- feat the right to relief if the fraud was known to the party alleged to be defrauded or ought to have been known by the exercise of ordinary diligence. After knowledge of the facts which will enable him to take effectual action he must disaffirm the contract with reasonable promptness. He can not willfully shut his eyes and ears to what he might have known and ought to have known. If, after knowledge which would enable him to disaffirm, he deals with the property as his own, accepts advan- tages for himself and deprives the other party of the advantages of ownership, he can not afterwards re- scind. The election to rescind or not to rescind, once made, is final and conclusive." Mudsill Mining Co. v. Watrous, 61 Fed. Rep. 163, 186; Schef- tel r. Hays, 58 Fed. Rep. 457 ; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578 ; Rugan v. Sa- bin, 53 Fed. Rep. 415; Johnston ■«. Standard Mining Co., 148 U. S. 360, 370; 13 Sup.Ct. Rep. 585. 1 Gray v. Shaw (Ky. 1895), 30 S.W. Rep. 402. § 822 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1011 this character, has there been unreasonable delay on the part of one seeking rescission after having information of the fraud- ulent misrepresentation practiced upon him, and on which he relied. 1 § 822. Rescinding for fraud — For inadequate considera- tion. — Equity will rescind a contract for the purchase of land for representations by the seller's agents that there was a de- mand for lots on the land, that a railroad company was about to move its shops to that point, and that a syndicate of promi- nent men had been formed to secure the land, and had offered more than the contract price for the land, where it appeared that the representations were false, and were known to be false by the makers; that the representations were made to plaint- iff's copurchaser, who repeated them to plaintiff and induced him to purchase; that the purchasers believed the representa- tions were true, and that the purchase price was twice the value of the land. 2 The purchaser should have inquired and tested the truth of the representation, but his contributory neg- ligence in not so doing can not be invoked by the seller to save him from liability for the false representations. Equity will not, however, decree costs to the purchaser in such case, be- cause of his carelessness. 3 A deed by a married woman, of land devised to her by her first husband, to a third person, and by him to her husband, on the faith of her husband's false repre- sentations that the land would otherwise be taken from her, and that, on his death, he would devise the same to her chil- 1 Bonner v. Bynum, 72 Miss. 442 ; 18 fendant the next month to the same So. Rep. 82. In this case in an action effect. In November plaintiff in- to rescind a sale of land it appeared spected the land, and on December that in February, 1891, plaintiff 1st again wrote defendant, demand- bought the land without inspecting ing a rescission, and on December it, relying on defendant's representa- 20th filed his bill, the land being then tions as to its quality. In June, 1892, in the same condition as when the plaintiff was informed that defend- sale was made. Held, that plaintiff ant's representations were false, and did not unreasonably delay bringing at once wrote to persons living near the action. the land to ascertain its quality, and 2 Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. St. 204; in September, as soon as he received 27 Atl. Hep. 894. replies from such persons, wrote de- 3 Sutton v. Morgan, 158 Pa. St. 204; fendant for a rescission of the sale, 27 Atl. Eep. 894. and, receiving no answer, wrote de- 1012 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 823 dren by her first husband, will be set aside, where the will of the husband was insufficient to make such dispositions of the land. 1 § 823. Deed of trust by husband or wife. — Where a husband gives a deed of trust on homestead property to secure a debt of his own, he can not sue to cancel it, as not joined in by his wife, without offering to do equity by paying the debt, and the wife's joinder as a party complainant, she having no estate or interest in the land, is not necessary or proper. 2 In an action by a married woman to cancel a deed of trust of her separate 1 Menne v. Menne (Ky. 1894), 25 S. W. Rep. 592. Where, in a suit to rescind, for inadequacy of considera- tion, a sale of a half interest in an oil lease of two hundred acres, the con- sideration being five hundred and fifty dollars in cash, and an additional one hundred dollars in case a well produc- ing daily six or more barrels of oil should be found, it appeared that at the time of the sale there was only one well on the premises, the output of which was variously stated by the witnesses to be from one to eight bar- rels per day, and there were several wells on an adjoining tract, the yield of one of which was very large, and there was evidence that, in the neigh- boring oil lands, good wells and dry holes were found together, and that the value of undeveloped oil lands was always speculative, it was held that the consideration was not in- adequate. Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. St. 263 ; 27 Atl. Rep. 992. In Owen v. Smith, 91 Ga. 564 ; 18 S. E. Rep. 527, it was held that where, according to the face of the conveyance, it is founded upon a mixed consideration, consisting in part of love and affection, and in part of money or services, mere inade- quacy of the latter part is no cause for settingthe conveyance aside, and raises no presumption against the capacity of the maker, or against the good faith and fair dealing of the beneficiary. A widow, who, during the life-time of her husband, voluntarily put herself in loco parentis to his bastard son, and has so continued since her husband's death, may extend her bounty to such son, by a deed of gift, as if he were her own offspring. " s Pounds v. Clarke, 70 Miss. 263; 14 So. Rep. 22, per Woods, J.: "If the husband elects to invoke the aid of a court of equity, rather than resort to a law court, the shadow of the wife's name, as an unnecessary party to the proceeding, will not absolve him from the operation of the rule which re- quires him to do equity before asking relief in equity. Though the convey- ance is invalid, the appellant must be required to do equity, by paying what the conveyance was designed to se- cure, before he can have a court of conscience cancel the invalid instru- ment. The case is readily distin- guishable frcm that of Massey v. Womble, 69 Miss. 347; 11 So. Rep. 188. In that case the husband, who had conveyed without the wife's joinder, was dead, and the wife had succeeded to the headship of the fam- ily, and had an estate in common with her children in the premises. She was a necessary and proper party, and she was under no obligation to pay any debt secured by the invalid conveyance." § 824 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1013 estate, given to secure the payment of a note which she executed with her husband, since deceased, on the ground that her liability on the note was barred by limitations, where it appeared that her personal liability was barred, but that a right of action still survived against the husband's estate, it was held that the bill should be dismissed, as this right of action against the estate of the husband kept alive the security on the land. 1 § 824. Effect of ratification. — Where, after the execution of a deed to his wife, and her subsequent death, the grantor, as guardian of her children, treated the land as theirs and asked lawyers if the deed was sufficient to give them title, stating that, if it was not, he wanted to make it so, it was held that, even if the deed was obtained by undue influence, there was a ratification of it. 2 Whether a contract alleged to have been 'Bell v. Clark, 70 Miss. 603; 14 So. Kep. 318, per Cooper, J.: "Mrs. Dozier is not entitled to any relief against the defendant. She bound her lands for the payment of the debt named in the deed of trust by the deed. She bound herself by the note. Her personal liability has been dis- charged by lapse of time, but the death of Mr. Dozier, who was also personally bound on the note, has preserved the liability of his estate. The note, as to his estate, is yet alive ; and, because it is, the deed of trust upon Mrs. Dozier's land for its se- curity also lives. The specific relief prayed can not be granted ; and un- less, under the prayer for general relief, a decree can be made in favor of the complainants, or some of them, the bill should have been dismissed. It was formerly the rule in equity that no relief could be granted under the general prayer which was incon- sistent with that specially prayed. Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416; Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Walpole v. Lord Orford, 3 Ves. 402; Grimes v. French, 2 Atk. 141 ; Kor- negay -o. Carroway, 2 Dev. Eq. 403. In modern practice the rule is more liberal, and under the general prayer any relief consistent with the bill, and within its scope, may be afforded, though it be inconsistent with the specific relief prayed. Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss. 570 ; Mhoon „. Wil- kerson, 47 Miss. 634. But relief must yet be such as can be afforded on the facts stated, and it must appear that the defendant is fairly apprised by the bill that the relief is sought by the complainant. Weeks v. Thrasher, 52 Miss. 142. Mrs. Dozier is entitled to no relief, and the only relief which could be afforded to Clark, Hood & Co. against the defendant would be incidental to that afforded them as against Mrs. Dozier, the mortgagor. But she is a complainant with them, and not a defendant against whom any relief is prayed. If the bill, as stated, should be taken as confessed against the defendant, it is evident that no proper decree granting relief could be entered." 2 Ellis v. Ellis, 5 Texas C. App. 46 ; 23 S.W.Rep.996. And see, Balue v. Tay- 1014 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 825 obtained by defendant through fraud was ratified by plaintiff after discovery of the fraud is a question for the jury, and in an action to rescind such contract an instruction as to what acts of plaintiff would constitute a ratification is erroneous. 1 § 825. Where persons are in confidential relations. — Where the grantor and grantee sustain relations of trust and confi- dence — which includes not only cases where there exists a formal and technical fiduciary relation, such as guardian and ward, parent and child, attorney and client, principal and agent, but all cases in which confidence is reposed by one party in the other — and the trust is accepted under circumstances which show that the confidence was founded on the intimate personal and business relations existing between the parties, which gave the other party an advantage or superiority, any transaction between them will be closely scrutinized by a court of equity, and relief will be granted against contracts entered into between them, unless the party claiming the benefit of the contract shows, by clear and convincing proof, that he acted with perfect good faith, and did not abuse or betray the confidence reposed in him; and, where the donee is of supe- rior mental capacity, or the donor of weak or feeble intel- lect, the presumption of fraud will require strong evidence to remove it. 8 lor, 136 Ind. 368 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 269 ; would not have been wiser for the Shaw v. Barnhart, 17 Ind. 183. law in all cases to have prohibited 1 Evans u.Goggan, 5 Texas App. 129; them; since there must always be a 23 S. W. Rep. 854. conflict between duty and interest on 2 Waddell v. Lanier, 62 Ala. 347. such occasions." See also, Kyle v. In Boney v. Hollingsworth, 23 Ala. Perdue, 95 Ala. 579 ; 10 So. Rep. 103 ; 690, it was said: "There may be no Burke o. Taylor, 94 Ala. 530; 10 So. fraud, everything may be honest and Rep. 129; 1 Story on Equity Ju- fair; but until the act is satisfactorily risprudence, §§ 307, 315 ; 1 Perry on accounted for, the inference of fraud, Trusts, §§ 168, 194. As illustrative artifice, or abuse of confidence, is so of the rigor of the application of this strong, that we think equity should doctrine in England, the case of An- relieve against it." Of such transac- derson v. Elsworth, 3 Giff. 154, is fre- tions Judge Story said: " And, in- quently referred to, where a voluntary deed, considering the abuses which deed made by a woman "of about may attend any dealings of this sort seventy years of age, and not incom- between principals and agents, a petent, was set aside upon her death doubt has been expressed whether it for the reason that the deed was im- § 826 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1015 § 826. Physician and patient. — A physician who also acts as agent and confidential adviser of his patient, a woman of advanced age, has the burden of proving that a deed convey- ing all her real estate to him, in trust for herself for life, and thereafter to himself, was fairly and honestly obtained, and that the transaction is above suspicion. The fairness of such a transaction is not established by evidence that the physician rendered professional services for a number of years without compensation, where he does not attempt to fix their value, and he will be compelled to reconvey the property discharged of the trust. 1 provident, and because it did not ap- pear affirmatively that she under- stood the whole nature and effect of the deed. This decree was made after the death of the grantor, and in favor of volunteers, although the court found that Elizabeth Marston, the grantor, certainly had a distinct in- tention to give her property to Mary Elsworth, who took it by this deed to the exclusion of all other persons." The question, as Lord Eldon said in Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273, 300, in a similar case, "is not whether she knew what she was doing, had done or proposed to, but how the intention was produced." In Ryan v. Price (Ala. 1895), 17 So. Bep. 734, in an ac- tion to set aside a deed of gift, it ap- peared that plaintiff executed the deed when she was seventy-two years of age, and in feeble health, and that the property conveyed was all she . possessed. Defendant was six years of age, and his father had for many years had control of plaintiff's prop- erty, collecting her rents, paying her taxes and insurance and other bills, and keeping for her what other money she had. Plaintiff was threatened with a lawsuit for slander, and feared that she would be deprived of her property thereby, and asked defend- ant's father for advice, and, as a re- sult of their conference, plaintiff and defendant's father went to her attor- ney, who drew plaintiff's will in favor of defendant, and a few days later they asked the attorney to draw the deed in controversy, which he did, and plaintiff signed it with her mark, and defendant's father procured the judge of probate and a friend of his to take the deed to plaintiff for ac- knowledgment. The attorney testi- fied that, after the death of defend- ant's father, plaintiff came to his office, and inquired if she had made a deed to defendant, stating that she had been so informed, and, when told that she had done so, she expressed great surprise. It was held that the deed should be set aside. 1 Unruh v. Lukens, 166 Pa. 324; 31 Atl. Eep. 110, per curiam: "In Green- field's Estate, 14 Pa. St. 489, the court says: 'While these connections ex- ist, the adviser shall take no benefit to himself, from contracts or other ne- gotiations, without establishing this perfect fairness and adequacy, and that the deed was the deliberate act of the confiding party, after being fully informed of his rights, interest, and duties, and put on his guard against even the suggestion of his own incli- nation.' It was argued by the coun- sel for the defendant, that the serv- ices of Dr. Lukens and the promise of Miss Unruh to compensate him liber- 1016 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 827 § 827. Rescinding deed of trust from wife to husband or son. — Where a wife and her husband, who was a lawyer, execute a deed of trust of her separate property by which he acquires an advantage, the burden is on him to show that she thor- oughly understood its effect, and where it does not appear that she had independent advice, and the deed was complicated, and a cursory reading of it would disclose that during their lives they might jointly do anything with the property, that she might during her life appoint to whom the property should go after the death of herself and husband, and that, in case she failed to appoint, he, surviving her, might by will dispose of it, and that, if neither disposed of it by will, the trustee ally, together, formed such valid con- sideration, and that this conveyance in trust to Dr. Lukens was coupled with an interest which vested in him under the said deed, and which could not be divested by any subsequent action of MissUnruh. It is suggested, however, that, while the reasoning of the counsel may be ordinarily true, the confidential relations existing be- tween Miss Unruh and Dr. Lukens were such as to withdraw this particu- lar conveyance from the operation of ordinary rules, and throw upon theben- eficiary the duty of showing expressly that the arrangement was fair and conscientious, beyond the reach of suspicion. This was not done. The value of the services rendered was not attempted to be proven, nor were the items of such services submitted. It is true, the doctor testified that up- wards of one thousand visits were made necessary by his duties ; but he rested his consideration upon the promise which he alleged was made to him to compensate him by a will, and made no attempt to affix a value to them. It is not necessary to run through the various judgment notes, mortgages, and other conveyances, which were alleged to be frauds, in the law as well as in morals, because the question at issue is, in the mas- ter's view, only that of the existence of the relationship suggested, and the necessity, in consequence of such re- lationship, of proof, beyond the possi- bility of doubt or suspicion, of the fairness of the dealing, and the full knowledge of Miss Unruh as to the re- sult of her act. From the time of Greenfield's Estate this has been the recognized law of the commonwealth, and in Darlington's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 624; 23 Atl. Rep. 1046, the court, in citing Greenfield's Estate, says further, and only in the development of the same principle : 'The confiden- tial relation is not confined to any specific association of the parties to it. It embraces agent and principal, phy- sician and patient.' So that, in the present case, the defendant, Lukens, occupied a relation which was doubly a confidential one. In view of the facts as found, and the law bearing upon those facts, the master has there- fore concluded, and respectfully sub- mits to the court, that the prayers of the bill should be granted, and that the defendant, Benjamin F. Lukens, be directed to reconvey the title to the property in question to the plaint- iff, Emeline Unruh, freed and dis- charged of any and all trusts." § 827 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1017 should hold for her heirs; and such reading would not give the unprofessional mind an idea that, by the words "or the survivor of them" in the power of revocation, it gave the hus- band power on her death to have the fee vested in him and di- verted from her heirs, the deed will not stand against her heirs, both she and her husband having died without disposing of it by will, and he having after her death revoked the trusts and had the fee vested in him. 1 Where a woman of advanced 1 Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522; 28 Atl. Rep. 907, per Green, V. C. : "The rule of equity that 'he who bar- gains, in a matter of advantage, with a person placing confidence in him, is bound to show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence' (Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266), applies with particular force to a transaction by which a husband secures from his wife a portion of her estate. The most dominant of all relations is that of the husband over the wife. There are, of course, exceptional cases when the will of the woman may control. The relation is so close, the trust of the wife so absolute, her dependence so entire, it may be, her fear so ab- ject, while the dominion of the hus- band is so complete, his influence so insidious yet so controlling, that equity regards all such transactions with a jealous care, and subjects them to the severest scrutiny. The greater the af- fection, the more submissive the de- pendence ; the stronger the trust, the more liable is the wife to be subject to the control of the husband, and the more vigilant should the court be in protecting the weak. Farmer v. Far- mer, 39 N. J. Eq. 211, 216; May on Fraudulent Conveyances (Text-Book Series), 483 ; Black v. Black, 30 N. J. Eq. 215, 219; Boyd «. De La Mon- tagnie, 73 N. Y. 498; Weeks v. Haas, 3 Watts & S. 520; Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 298; Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 512 ; McEae v. Battle, 69 N. C. 98; Witbeck v. Witbeck, 25 Mich. 439 ; Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89; Shaffer v. Kugler, 107 Mo. 58; 17 S. W. Rep. 698. Chief Justice Gibson says, in Watson v. Mercer, 6 Serg. & R. 49, with reference to transfers ob- tained from the wife for the purpose of vesting the estate in the husband : ' What honest mind would feel regret that, in the hurry of accomplishment, some circumstance, merely formal, was omitted by which the wife and her family were rescued from his rapacity?' This deed was executed at a critical period of Mrs. Otterson's life. She was in extremely delicate health; it was doubtful if she could survive the peril of her approaching confinement. She was a refined lady, unacquainted with business, relying for its care first on her agents and then on her husband, who, after their marriage, became her agent, and was intrusted by her with the entire man- agement of her estate, and exclusively of the property in question ; in short, she was most dependent on and de- voted to him and his interests, her affection for and attention to him were marked, as was her anxiety to please him. He was a prominent lawyer; so was the selected trustee, who was the husband's intimate friend; and so was also the officer who took the acknowledgment. So far as the evidence shows, this inex- perienced lady was surrounded by these gentlemen, of whose legal abil- ity she must have been aware, in one of whom she reposed the most im- 1018 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 827 years executes to her son-in-law, who had for many years been her confidential adviser, and to her son, a trust deed, by which they were to be benefited, the burden is on them to show that she voluntarily made it, understanding that it gave her no power of revocation. 1 Where, pending an action by the maker of a trust deed to reform it by inserting a power of revocation, and to require the trustees to deliver to plaintiff the trust prop- erty, plaintiff died, and the action was revived and continued in the administrator's name on a supplementary complaint containing an allegation that, prior to the action, plaintiff had revoked the trust deed, which allegation was afterwards, by amendment, inserted in the original complaint, no objection being made thereto in either complaint, it was held that under the pleadings, as so changed, the action would be regarded, not as one to reform the deed to permit revocation, — a power which could be exercised only by the maker, — but as one to plicit confidence, she being without any competent independent adviser. It is a case in which the court should be alert to require the observ- ance of all technical rules applicable. In all transactions between persons occupying relations, whether legal, natural, or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is natur- ally inspired, is presumed, or, in fact, reasonably exists, the burden of proof is thrown upon the person in whom confidence is reposed, and who has acquired an advantage, to show affirm- atively, not only that no deception was practiced therein, no undue in- fluence used, and that all was fair, open, and voluntary, but that it was well understood. Mott v. Mott, 49 N. J. Eq. 192; 22 Atl. Rep. 997; Gib- son v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266 ; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278; Siemon v. Wilson, 3 Edw. Ch. 36 ; Coutts v. Ac- worth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558; Boydii. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498 ; Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 512; Huguenin v. Baseley, 2 White & T. Lead. Oas. Eq. (Text Cook Series), 597, notes. It is essential to the maintenance of a deed of gift that the donor compre- hends the full force and effect of his acts; as Sir George Jessel puts it, 'thoroughly understands what he is about' (Dutton t>. Thompson, 23 Ch. Div. 278, 281), or, in the words of Lord Eldon in Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273, 'with that knowledge of all their effect, nature, and conse- quences which the defendants and the attorney were bound by their duty to communicate to her before she was suffered to execute them.' See also, Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N. J. Eq. 594, 602. It is to establish this thorough understanding that the burden of proof is thrown on the donee in cases of gifts between persons stand- ing in fiduciary relations." 1 Barnard u. Gantz, 140N.Y.249; 35 N. E. Rep. 430; Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91 ; Inre Smith, 95 N. Y.522. See Allen v. Snyder, 100 Mich. 290; 58 N. W. Rep. 997 ; 59 N.W. Rep. 653,where a bill to set aside deeds for mental weak- ness and undue influence was held to be properly dismissed on the evidence. § 828 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1019 make an actual revocation effective, and to recover the prop- erty, in which case, if the power of revocation should have been in the deed, it will be treated as being there. 1 § 828. The same subject continued — Suit by heirs. — A suit by the heirs to set aside, by reason of mistake, a deed of trust from a wife to her husband, being purely of equitable cogni- zance, is not affected by the statute of limitations. 2 The Texas Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249; 35 N. E. Rep. 430. 2 Hall v. Otterson, 52 N. J. Eq. 522 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 907, per Green, V. C. : "The present is a suit purely of equitable cog- nizance. It is founded on that branch of equity jurisdiction which relieves against mistake. As to its subject- matter she would be remediless at law. The case does not fall within the principle that equity applies the bar of the statute to cases where there is both a legal and equitable remedy for the same cause of action. Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 118 ; Smith ». Wood, 42 N. J. Eq. 563; 7 Atl. Rep. 881 ; Kirkpatrick v. McEl- roy, 41 N. J. Eq. 555 ; 7 Atl. Rep. 647 ; 13 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, tit. 'Limitation of Actions,' p. 675, and notes. This defense must rest, there- fore, solely on the application of those rules relating to acquiescence and laches, which the court has always recognized, altogether outside of and independent of the statute of limita- tions. They are the fruit of the maxim that 'equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.' The chancellor has forcibly stated the rule, its reason, and the con- sequences attendant on its disregard, in Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 1 Dick. Ch. 380. The defenses of laches and ac- quiescence are cognate, but not cor- relative. They both spring from the cardinal rule that 'he who seeks equity must do equity.' 'Acquies- cence,' however, properly speaking, relates to inaction during the per- formance of an act. 'Laches' relates to delay after the act is done. Lord Cot- tenham, in Duke of Leeds v. Earl of Amherst, 2 Phil. Ch. 117, says of the use of the term 'acquiescence:' 'If a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing with property in a manner inconsistent with that right, and makes no objection while the act is in progress, he can not afterwards complain. That is the proper sense of theword"acquiescence.'" And thus it is that in such a case an equitable estoppel is raised. Acquiescence here might properly be applied, in favor of purchasers, to the inaction of the complainant while James Otterson, Jr., was selling portions of the property, and those purchasers were spending money in its improvement. 'But,' says Thesiger, L. J., in De Bussche v. Alt, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 286-314, 'when once the act is completed, without any knowledge or assent upon the part of the person whose right is infringed, the matter is to be determined on very different legal considerations. A right of action has then vested in him which at all events, as a general rule, can not be divested without accord and satisfaction or release under seal. Mere submission to the injuries for any time short of the period limited by statute for the enforcement of the right of action can not take away such right, although, under the name of "laches," it may afford a ground for refusing relief under some peculiar 1020 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 829 statute, providing that every personal action "for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought within four years," applies to an action for the rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud. 1 And in South Carolina an action by heirs to set aside their ancestor's deed, as procured from him by fraud, can not be maintained unless brought within six years after he had sufficient information to put him on in- quiry as to the manner in which the deed was procured. 2 § 829. Rescission by married woman. — A conveyance pro- cured from a wife by her husband through threats to take her children away from her, and to prevent her seeing them again may be rescinded as obtained by undue influence. 3 Where a circumstances.' 'Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity,' says Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. ... Hurd, L. R. 5 P. 0. 221, at 293, 'is not an arbitrary or technical doc- trine.' " 1 Evans v. Goggan, 5 Texas C. App. 120 ; 23 S. W. Rep. 854, per Collard, J. . "The question was, when would the right to a rescission be barred? The statute does not specifically provide for it, but provides that every other per- sonal action 'for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, and not afterward.' Re- vised Statutes, art. 3207. It has been decided that the statute of four years applies to an action for rescission of a contract consummated in fraud. Cooper v. Lee, 75 Texas, 114 ; 12 S. W. Rep. 4S3. If, then, the plaintiff is entitled to a rescission, and is not barred by limitation in that action, he would be entitled to complete res- toration of his rights upon rescission. The amount paid on the contract should be restored to him, and its re- covery would not be governed by a different period of limitation from that which would govern the action itself. The two-year statute, as for debt or open account or money had and received, would not apply." 2 Brown v. Brown (S. C. 1895), 22 S. E. Rep. 412. And see Beck v. Searson, 8 Rich. Eq. 130; Kirksey v. Keith, 11 Rich. Eq. 33. 3 Kellogg v. Kellogg, 21 Colo. 11 ; 40 Pac. Rep. 358, Hoyt, C. J.: "He, a strong, vigorous man; she, a weak woman, with two small children cling- ing to her for support. The custody of those children was more precious to her than wealth, and it should not be a matter of surprise that she yielded to his threats, and deeded to him the only property she possessed, out- side of her wearing apparel. The ev- idence shows that the value of this property at the time was not less than i?l,500, while the only consideration paid or promised was the sum of $10, which he gave her to meet hei present necessities. A more uncon- scionable transaction can not well be imagined. Courts of equity always interfere to protect the weak against the strong, and relieve from a convey- ance for an inadequate consideration, extorted by threats sufficient to over- come the will of the grantor. Turner v. Turner, 44 Mo. 535; Anthony «. * 830 KESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1021 deed of voluntary assignment was executed by the members of a firm, the husband and sons of plaintiff, and the latter joined in the deed, so as to convey her separate estate, and she first knew of the insolvency of the firm on the day she executed the paper, which she did only after repeated urging by her hus- band, and representations by him that by so doing she would save the business, and these representations and bis statements then made to her as to the amount of the firm indebtedness turned out to be untrue, and she had no legal advice at the time, and there was no consideration moving from the cred- itors for such conveyance by her, it was held that it was proper to declare void tbe conveyance by her, and to enjoin the as- signee from selling her property so conveyed. 1 § 830. Parents' deeds to children. — Parents of sound mind, in the absence of undue influence, may deed their property to some of their children to the exclusion of others, although there was no money consideration for the conveyance, and the grantors reserved the right of possession during their lives, and a court of equity will not rescind such a deed. 2 But where a man, shortly before his death, undertakes to distribute his property among his wife and children, and executes deeds in favor of some of them, which they obtain possession of without the grantor's consent, and he fails, through feeble- ness, to complete the contemplated distribution, the deeds al- ready executed should be set aside. 3 In an action against a vendee to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud and undue influence, where no fiduciary relations existed between the par- ties, the burden of proof is on plaintiff; and, where no fidu- ciary relations existed between the parties to the sale, and there was no pecuniary distress, or any lack of mental capac- ity on the part of the vendor, who had an equal opportunity with the vendee to know the value of the property, mere inad- equacy of consideration is not ground for rescission. 1 Hutchins, 10 E. I. 165 ; Yard v. Yard, z Hester v. Sample (Iowa, 1895), 63 27 N. J. Eq. 114; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 N. W. Rep. 463. How. 183." 8 McGee v. McGee (Mich. 1895), 63 1 Fleming v. Ogden, 152 Pa. 418; 25 N. W. Eep. 763. A.tl. Rep. 639. 4 Cooper v. Reilly, 90 Wis. 427; 63 1022 KESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 831 § 831. Voluntary deed from father to son. — Where the natu- ral position of parent and child is so changed that the former becomes subject to the dominion of the latter, and where their situation is such that the child has a controlling influence over the will and conduct and interests of the parent, equity will interpose its jurisdiction to set aside instruments executed between them, and, under such circumstances, gifts from par- ents to children will be set aside, unless most satisfactory evi- dence is produced that they were not obtained by undue in- fluence. 1 But the fact that an old man acts under the advice of his son in his ordinary business affairs, and is influenced by his affection for him, does not tend to prove the exercise of undue influence in his execution of a deed to his son. 8 And in such a case his declarations made in the absence of the son to the effect that he had been unduly persuaded to make the conveyance, and that it had been made to defraud his cred- itors, are inadmissible for the purpose of invalidating the deed; because it is no ground for setting aside the deed at the suit N.W. Rep. 885, Newman, J. : "Many, perhaps most, of the circumstances from which fraud is sought to be in- ferred are as fairly susceptible of ex- planation upon a theory of honesty as on a theory of deceit. The strongest circumstance in the case — very nearly the only one — upon which the theory of fraud is urged is what is claimed to be the inadequacy of consideration. But even a great disparity between the value and the price paid is no evi- dence of fraud where both parties have an equal opportunity to know the value. Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265-272 ; 25 N. W. Rep. 42, and cases cited; Prince v. Overholser, 75 Wis. 646; 44 N. W. Rep. 775; Mosher v. Post, 89 Wis. 602; 62 N. W. Rep. 516. Unless inadequacy of consideration is coupled with some other circum- stances, such as weakness of mind, a fiduciary relation, pecuniary distress, or the like, it is no ground for setting aside a sale. Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265." J Burt v. Quisenberry, 132 111.385; Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147; Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533. 2 Francis v. Wilkinson, 147 111. 370; 35 N. E. Rep. 150, per Magmder, J. : "The fraud or undue influence which will render a will or deed invalid must be connected with the execution of the instrument, and operating when it is made. Pooler v. Cristman, 145 111. 405; 34 N. E. Rep. 57; Guild v. Hull, 127 111. 523; 20 N. E. Rep. 665; and, although a father may act under the advice of his son in his ordinary affairs, and may be influenced by that advice, yet such relation and influence do not tend to prove the exercise of undue influence in the execution of a conveyance by the former to the lat- ter. Brownfleld v. Brownfield, 43 111. 148 ; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 111. 397." § 832 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1023 of the grantor's heirs that it was given to defraud creditors, since such a conveyance is good as between the parties. 1 § 832. Deed of gift by old man — Confidential relation. — Where an old, illiterate man makes a deed of gift of a valuable farm, which was practically all of his property, to tbe husband of a niece, with whom he had lived for several years, and who during that time had been his general agent, to the exclusion of a sister, with whom he was on the best of relations, and other nieces and nephews, the burden is on the donee to prove that the gift was the voluntary and deliberate act of the donor, and that he knew at the time he signed it that he was divesting himself of all interest, and transferring it to the donee; and it can not be sustained where, in a suit by the donor's heirs to set it aside for undue influence of the donee and his wife, neither they nor the draughtsman testify, and the notary who took the acknowledgment states that the deed was not, in his presence, read to the donor. 2 1 Francis v. Wilkinson, 147 111. 370, per Magruder, J. : "It is well settled that the declaration of a gran tor when the grantee is not present can not be admitted for the purpose of in- validating the deed. Parties making deeds or wills can not invalidate them by their own parol declarations, made previously or subsequently. Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376 ; Bennett v. Stout, 98 111. 47; Bentley v. O'Bryan, 111 111. 53; Guild v. Hull, 127 111. 523; 20 N. E. Rep. 665; Burt v. Quisenberry, 132111.385. * * * * If such declara- tions made by the father and sons were properly admissible, the fraud upon creditors which they tended to show could in no way operate to the benefit of these complainants, who sue as heirs of the fraudulent grantor. The general rule is that voluntary conveyances, although void as to cred- itors, are valid as to the parties, and can not be set aside by the grantor or his heirs. 1 Story on Equity Juris- prudence, § 371 ; Miller v. Marckle, 21 111.152; Harmon v. Harmon, 63 111. 512 ; Rawson v. Fox, 65 111. 200 ; Camp- bell v. Whitson, 68 111. 240 ; McElroy v. Hiner, 133 111. 156; 24 N. E. Rep. 435." 2 Zimmerman v. Bitner, 79 Md. 115 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 820, per Robison, C. J. : "A good deal has been said as to what constitutes a confidential rela- tion, within the operation of the prin- ciple, but courts have always been careful not to fetter the operation of the principle by undertaking to define its precise limits. The cases of parent and child, guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, principal and agent, are familiar instances in which the principle applies in its strictest sense. But its operation is not con- fined to the dealings and transactions between parties standing in these re- lations, but extends to all relations in which confidence is reposed, and in which dominion and influence result- ing from such confidence may be ex- 1024 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 833 § 833. Conveyances by lunatics and drunkards. — Convey- ances are not now set aside upon the sole ground that the grantor is a lunatic, idiot, or non compos mentis. But persons dealing ercised by one person over another. No part of the jurisdiction of the court is more useful, it has been said, than that which it exercises in watch- ing and controlling transactions be- tween parties standing in a relation of confidence to each other ; and, be- ing founded on the principle of cor- recting abuses of confidence, it ought to be applied to every case in which a confidential relation exists as a fact, where confidence is reposed on the one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534; Tate v. Will- iamson, L. R. 1 Eq. 528; Tate v. Will- iamson, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 55. The broad principle, says Vice Chancellor Wood, on which the court acts in cases of this description, is that wherever there exists such a confidence, of whatever character that confidence may be, as enables the person in whom confidence or trust is reposed to exert influence over the person trusting, the court will not allow any transaction between the parties to stand, unless there has been the full- est and fairest explanation and com- munication of every particular resting in the breast of the one who seeks to establish a contract with the person so trusting him. Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 1 Eq. 528. Tested by these well- established principles, the relations existing between the donor and donee in this case were, beyond question, of such a character as to cast the onus upon Zimmerman, the donee, of prov- ing that the deed of gift was the vol- untary and deliberate act of the donor ; that he knew at the time he signed it that he was thereby divesting himself of all interest in the property, and was in fact transferring his entire in- terest to the donee. In the recent case of Bishop Ames' will (Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 439; 28 Atl. Rep. 400), against the probate of which a caveat was filed on the ground of fraud and undue influence practiced by Mr. and Mrs. Hiss, the beneficiaries under the will, and in the trial of whicli neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hiss offered to testify, we said : 'It is a generally accepted rule of law that the suppression or non-production of pertinent and co- gent evidence necessarily raises a strong presumption against the party who withholds such evidence, where he has it in his power to pro- duce it.' And this we said in a case where there was a caveat to a will, and the burden of proof was upon the caveators. Here we are dealing with a gift to one standing fn a confidential relation to the donor, and upon whom the burden of proof is to show to the satisfaction of the court that it was the vol- untary act of the donor, and was not procured by any influence ex- ercised over him by the donee. To sustain a voluntary deed, upon the proof before us, would be to break down the safeguards which courts of equity have thrown around the deal- ings and transactions of parties stand- ing in a confidential relation to each other; and, instead of shutting the door to temptation, it would invite persons to secure benefits to them- selves, to the detriment of those, the confidence of whom they had be- trayed. The case of Eakle v. Reyn- olds, 54 Md. 305, relied on by the ap- pellant, differs widely from the one now before us. In that case the uncle conveyed to a favorite nephew a farm valued at between twelve and fifteen § 833 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1025 with this class of persons, knowing them to be so, are deemed to have perpetrated a fraud, and in such cases courts of equity- can interfere, and set aside contracts made by them. 1 Where a mortgage conveyance of real estate, and a title acquired by foreclosure proceedings thereunder, are sought to be impeached and declared void, by a subsequent purchaser from the mort- gagor, upon the ground of the mental incapacity of the mort- gagor at the time of the execution of the mortgage, caused by the habitual use of intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to destroy his reasoning faculties, the burden of proving such un- soundness of mind is upon the plaintiff, which he must also show affirmatively existed at the time of the execution of the mortgage; and, in such a case, it must also appear affirma- tively that the transaction was fraudulent, or that undue ad- vantage was taken of the intoxicated vendor, or that such intoxication was produced or procured by the other party, or that he had notice of the vendor's intoxicated condition at the time of the execution of the mortgage. 2 thousand dollars, but he was careful enough to reserve a life estate to him- self. Prior to the deed of gift he had made three wills, in each of which he gave legacies to other relatives, mak- ing his nephew the residuary devisee. He had lived with his uncle from early childhood, and for some time prior to the execution of the deed he had occasionally transacted business for him, and during his uncle's sick- ness had the general management of the farm. Whatever suspicion at- tached to the execution of the volun- tary deed in that case, the donee proved that it was the free and volun- tary act of the donor, and that the latter signed with full knowledge of its import and meaning." 1 Story on Equity Jurisprudence, §227. 2 Youn v. Lamont, 56 Minn. 216 ; 57 N. W. Eep. 478, per Buck, J. : " Mr. Story lays down the rule further: ' That if a purchase is made in good 65 faith, without any knowledge of the incapacity, and no advantage has been taken of the party, courts of equity will not interfere to set aside the contract if injustice will thereby be done to the other side, and the parties can not be placed in statu quo.' Section 228. See Schaps v. Lehner, 54 Minn. 208; 55 N. W. Rep. 911. In Briswell on Insanity, § 413, the rule is laid down that 'a completed contract for the sale of lands made b}' an in- sane vendor without fraud, or notice to the vendee of the grantor's insani- ty, and for a fair consideration, will not be set aside, either at law or equity, in favor of the vendor or his representatives, except the purchase- money be restored to, and the parties fully reinstated in, the condition in which they were prior to the purchase. ' In Lancaster, etc., Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, the bank discounted a note for a lunatic, and he was held liable, and Paxson, J., said : ' It would be an 1026 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 834 § 834. Test of grantor's capacity. — The law upon the sub- ject of capacity and undue influence is that, where the maker of a voluntary conveyance is capable of doing the act, and there is no fraud, no concealment, and no advantage taken, the court will not interpose. 1 The law does not require that persons shall be able to dispose of their property with judg- ment and discretion in order to the validity of a conveyance. It is sufficient if they understand what they are about. 2 And the fact that grantees advised and encouraged the execution of the voluntary deeds does not impair the validity of the instru- ments, unless the free agency of the grantor was destroyed. 3 Where, in an action to cancel a deed made by plaintiff to defendant, it appeared that defendant was the half-brother of plaintiff's husband, who died a few days before the deed was made, and defendant claimed that the deed was made in pur- suance of an understanding between deceased and the parties, and plaintiff claimed that she was so confused, owing to the recent death of her husband, that she did not understand the effect of the deed, and there was evidence of an understanding with deceased that defendant should have the property, and that, after consulting with plaintiff, the defendant, at her sug- gestion, retained her husband's lawyer to draw the deed, which he did, after consulting her as to the details, among which was a provision for an annuity to her secured on the land, and after the execution of the deed, defendant spoke to plaintiff, a very intelligent woman, about a rumor that he had treated her unfairly, and offered to cancel the deed if she was dissatisfied, and plaintiff expressed no dissatisfaction, and defendant first learned that she was dissatisfied from the bringing of the suit, it was held that the evidence did not show that plaintiff, when she executed the deed, did not comprehend its nature. 4 Differ- unreasonable and unjust rule that such s Stone v. Wilbern, 83 111. 105 ; Roe persons should be allowed to obtain the v. Taylor, 45 111. 485. property of innocent parties, and retain 4 Seat v. McWhirter, 93 Tenn . 542 ; 29 both the property and its price.' " S. W. Rep. 220, per McAlister, J.: 1 Hadley v. Latimer, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) "The chancellor, however, found that 537; Coffee v. Ruffin, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) Mrs. Seat was incapable of under- 487. standing and comprehending transac- 2 Paine v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 451. tions of the magnitude of the one in § 835 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1027 ence in the mental capacity of the parties to a contract is not ground for rescission, unless one overreached the other through his superior capacity. And the fact that the vendor is aware that the vendee is without means to make deferred payments is not ground for rescission of the conveyance. 1 § 835. Evidence of incapacity — Facts versus opinions. — A deed by an ignorant woman, of ordinary mental powers, to one of her sons, to the exclusion of the others, on the ground of his kindness and services to her, but without evidence of undue influence practiced upon her, will not be set aside at the instance of the other sons, on the ground of her mental incapacity. 8 Where, in a suit to set aside a deed of a farm, made in consideration of an agreement for support, it appeared that the deceased grantor, an aged widow, although palsied and physically helpless, took care of her money and attended to her business affairs rationally; and that, while her mental condition was generally good, and she appeared to understand the contents of the deed in suit, she was childish and easily influenced, and plaintiff's witnesses, who were acquaintances question, and that she executed the son of his incapacity. Neither is the two deeds ignorantly and without un- fact that plaintiff was a laboring man, derstandmg the real contents and ten- and defendant a trader and specula- or of the same, and without consider- tor, of any importance, or that de- ation, and with the belief that she was fendant knew that plaintiff had no doing an entirely different act by the means except his labor out of which execution of the papers. We are of to pay the debt he was about to con- opinion that the great preponderance tract. It was the business of plaintiff of the evidence is against the finding to determine for himself whether or of the chancellor on the proposition not he could pay the debt before he last announced. We are of opinion contracted it. No one was better Mrs. Seat was fully capable of under- qualified to judge of that matter standing and appreciating what she than plaintiff, and it did not devolve was doing when she made the deeds, upon Moore to guard him against his and did comprehend the nature of the own judgment on that point." transaction." 2 Soberanes v. Soberanes, 106 Oal. 1 ; 1 Moore v. Cross, 87 Texas, 557; 29 39 Pac. Rep. 39; 39 Pac. Rep. 527, Mc- S. W. Rep. 1051, Brown, J. : "Courts Farland, J. : "Whether or not it was can not measure the relative intelli- a proper and commendable thing for gence and business qualifications of her to give all her property to one of parties to a transaction, unless it her children is not a question for reaches the point where it appear, that courts ; that question was with her one has overreached the other by rea- alone." 1028 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 835 and relatives of the grantor, thought her mentally incapable of executing the deed in question, and thirteen witnesses for defendant testified that they had known the grantor for years in a business and social way, and that, notwithstanding her physical infirmities, her mind was sound, it was held that the preponderance of evidence was in defendant's favor, and that a finding that the grantor was incapable of making the deed was erroneous. 1 And, where one went with his muniments of title to his attorney, sought his creditor and proposed a deed of trust, explained and discussed with his attorney the pur- pose of said deed, and, after the attorney had drawn up the deed as instructed, signed it and went before a notary and 1 Pennington v. Stanton, 125 Mo. 658 ; 28 S. W. Rep. 1067. In Henrizi v. Kehr, 90 Wis. 344 ; 63 N. W. Rep. 285, a man seventy-nine years old, infirm in mind and body, nearly blind, and very hard of hearing, who had had a stroke of paralysis, and did not recog- nize any one until informed who the person was, executed to his son, with whom he lived, a satisfaction of a mortgage, which was nearly all his property. The satisfaction was filed immediately, but his other children, who were frequently at the house, knew nothing of it till after his death, eight months later. The notary, who was the only disinterested witness of the transaction, told the son at the time that he doubted if his father was not too weak in mind for transaction of such business, but the son wanted it done. His opinion at the time of the transaction, as well as at the time of testifying, was that the father's mind was "a little short of doing that kind of business." The testimony of the other witnesses against the son was that the father "was not right in his sense any more." The witnesses for the son testified that the father's men- tal condition was very fair, and, in their opinion, he could understand common business transactions. It was held that the evidence showed want of mental capacity. So also, where, in an action by heirs to set aside a deed from a father, eighty-six years old, to his son, it appeared that, when the deed was made, the son agreed that he should pay to the father a sum of money, which should be a lien on the land, and should support the father during his life, and there was evi- dence that the father was feeble, that his hearing and sight were poor, that he was extremely nervous, that his wife and son attended to some of his business, and that he seemed incom- petent to do business, and a daughter testified that, shortly before the deed was made, her father talked about dis- posing of his property among his chil- dren, and told her what he would give each, and that he was going to make the deed in suit, and, when the deed was made, he disposed of other prop- erty among his children, and the law- yer who drew the papers testified that he discussed the different dispositions, and was competent to make a will, and the doctor called in to attend him a few weeks later testified that he did not see anything about him that was not rational, it was held that a finding that there was no evidence of undue influence or mental incapacity was proper. Davis v. Latta (Iowa, 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 17. § 836 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1029 acknowledged it, and the attorney, the creditor and notary- all testified that he was apparently sober during the whole transaction, but several other credible witnesses who had seen him that day, but not during the time of the transaction, tes- tified that, in their opinion, he could not have been sober enough to make a valid conveyance, it was held that the deed was valid. 1 § 836. Conveyance by erratic persons. — In an interesting and instructive case, where on a bill to set aside a deed it ap- peared that the parties, both elderly people, were sister and brother, and that the deed was made after the return of com- plainant's husband, who had separated from her, to the town where she lived, and the complainant testified that defendant told her that her husband had come to get possession of her property, and that she had better execute a paper giving up the control thereof to him; and that she afterwards, at his re- quest, and to protect her from her husband, executed the deed, which gave defendant her property, reserving merely a life es- tate for herself, and the defendant testified that the deed was made by complainant in execution of her long-expressed pur- pose to give him the property on her death, and the person who drew the deed testified that complainant appeared to know what was the purport of the deed, but that defendant did most of the talking in regard to the matter, and the complainant, who was erratic and excitable, had always had the utmost con- fidence in her brother, and had practically left the manage- ment of her affairs to him, and it appeared that he had induced her to agree to an amicable separation from her husband, it was held that the deed should be set aside. 2 1 McGowan v. Brooks (Miss. 1895), tion table, must it not all go for naught 16 So. Rep. 436, Cooper, C. J. : "What if a sufficient number of credible wit- weight should be given to the testimo- nesses testify that, in fact, such per- ny of witnesses that, in their opinions, son did correctly repeat the table to certain facts could not exist, in the face them?" of uncontroverted, positive, and sat- 2 Smith v. Cuddy, 96 Mich. 562; 56 isfactory evidence that the precise N. W. Rep. 89, per McGrath, J.. facts did exist? If a thousand wit- "Under the circumstances of this nesses testify that, in their opinion, a case, the burden was upon the defend- particular person had not sufficient ant to show not only that complain- intelligence to learn the multiplica- ant fully understood the terms, im- 1030 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 837 § 837. Where agent sells trust estate to own wife. — The general rule is that when a trustee of any description, or person acting as agent for others, sells a trust estate, and becomes port, and effect of the instrument executed, but, if her intent was as expressed by that instrument, to show that such intention was not pro- duced by undue influence exerted by himself. Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266 ; Hoghtonu. Hoghton, 11 Eng. Law and Eq. 134 ; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273. Defendant's testimony fails to satisfy us upon either point. Trans- actions of this nature are regarded by co'urts of equity with suspicion, and scrutinized with vigilance. The pre- sumption is against the propriety of the transaction, and, as has been fre- quently said in our own cases, the duty of courts is to refuse judicial sanction to such an instrument until fully satisfied of the fairness of the transaction, and that the instrument is the intelligent act of the person ex- ecuting it. Seeley v. Price, 14 Mich. 541; Witbeck v. Witbeck, 25 Mich. 439; Wartemberg «. Spiegel, 31 Mich. 400; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146; Duncombe v. Richards, 46 Mich. 166 ; 9 N. W. Rep. 149; Jacox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473; Finegan v. Theisen, 92 Mich. 173; 52 N. W. Rep. 619. In Jacox v. Jacox, Mr. Justice Graves says: 'The actual conduct of rela- tives and others at the time in ques- tion towards the individual is gener- ally of much greater value as proof of their conception of his mind or ca- pacity than any term they may em- ploy on the stand to express it.' In the present case, the best of evidence of the incapacity of the complainant in matters of business was the almost absolute control which defendant as- sumed and exercised over her busi- ness affairs. Continuing, Mr. Justice Graves says : 'In case it appears from the facts that there was mental disorder, but not of a high degree, or far advanced, it then becomes mate- rial to inquire into the nature of the transaction, and the influences lead- ing to it; and if the circumstances disclose that the person under the in- firmity, whether through choice, ac- cident, or otherwise, was as matter of fact for the time being in the place of ward of the other party, or was by his own consent, however brought about, in a state of submission to the judg- ment or opinion of the other, a pre- sumption will arise adverse to the justice and equity of the bargain, and the bargainee will be required to show that no advantage was taken, and that in itself the arrangement was not only suitable, fair, and conscientious, but one expedient under the circum- stances, and conducive to the inter- ests of the other.' The decree below must therefore be reversed, and a de- cree entered here for complainant, or- dering a reconveyance, the decree to stand in lieu of such reconveyance, until the same is made, with costs of both courts to complainant." In Field v. Shorb, 99 Cal. 661 ; 34 Pac. Rep. 504, in an action for an accounting and to set aside a gift as made when the donor was insane, it appeared that he was very close in money matters, and uncleanly in habits and dress; that he shrank from the use of water, and objected to changing his soiled clothes ; that he talked of women in an obscene way, and when angry swore badly; that he played on the piano without extracting any music, and then walked around the room in a quaint, unnatural manner. These were his characteristics for months before his death, in August, 1890. It was held that a finding that deceased § 837 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1031 himself interested, either directly or indirectly, in the purchase, the cestui que trust is entitled as a matter of course, at his election, either to have the sale affirmed or set aside, if he acts was sane until July 1st — two days before he made the gift — and in- sane from that time until the date of his death, was against the evidence. In Leggatt v. Leggatt, 14 Mont. 104; 35 Pac. Rep. 724, a conveyance by plaintiff to her brother-in-law, J., through her brother-in-law, R., who was appointed her attorney in fact at the suggestion of J., will be set aside for fraud and collusion, they having, with full knowledge, grossly misrep- resented to her the value of the land and the state of its title, she being ig- norant of the facts and trusting them, and the sale being for a small fraction only of the value of the land. In Buck- ey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168 ; 18 S. E. Rep. 383, it was held that a grantor in a deed may be extremely old, his un- derstanding, memory and mind enfee- Bled and weakened by age, and his action occasionally strange and eccen- tric, and he may not be able to trans- act many affairs of life, yet, if age has not rendered him imbecile, so that he does not tnow the nature and effect of the deed, this does not invalidate the deed. If he be capable, at the time, to know the nature, character, and effect of the particular act, that is sufficient to sustain it, and the court said: "If we look anywhere, we shall find it laid down as law, particularly in Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 584, and Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 661 ; 8 S. E. Rep. 493, that 'old age is not in itself sufficient evidence of in- capacity to make a deed,' and that the presumption of law is always in favor of the sanity, at the time the deed was executed, of a person whose deed is brought in question ; the burden of proof is on him who asserts insanity, unless a previous condition of insani- ty has been established. Jarrett v. Jarrett, supra; Anderson v. Cranmer, 11 W. Va. 562, 584; Hiett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 563; 15 S. E. Rep. 146. 'This presumption is universal, and is not defeated by common report or reputa- tion, or the imputation of friends or relatives, or the old age or feebleness of the subject, or, in short, by any cause except controlling evidence produced.' Buswell on Insanity, § 159. The principle is sound in itself, and settled as a rule that, in the absence of fraud, imposition, or undue influ- ence, mere weakness or feebleness of understanding is not sufficient to over- throw the party's deed. Aiman v. Stout, 42 Pa'. St. 114 ; Cain v. Warford, 33 Md. 23 ; Miller v. Craig, 36 111. 109 ; Maddox v. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512, 528 ; 2 Lomax's Digest, 298; Chancellor Kent in Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 John- son's Ch. 148. Here I will say that no evidence shows, or tends to show, any fraud, undue influence, or even importunity, on the part of these grantees. Although alleged in the bills, there is not the slightest proof, and no contention of that kind is in the brief of counsel. The mental weakness must go further than it does in this case. The mysterious action of the person whose act was involved in Mercer v. Kelso, 4 Gratt. 106, went be- yond that in this case. 'No degree of physical or mental imbecility which does not deprive the party of legal competency to act is of itself sufficient to avoid his contract.' Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212. It must go so far as to disable him from knowing and un- derstanding the nature and effect of his act. 2 Minor's Institutes of Common and Statute Law, 572 ; Bishop on Con- tracts, § 962. His mind may be weak 1032 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 837 upon his election before the rights of third parties have inter- vened. 1 Where an attorney in fact conveys his principal's land to one who immediately conveys it to the attorney's wife, her title is good as against the principal, where no suit is brought to set aside the deeds until she has been in possession and paid taxes for seven consecutive years, since the deed to her is sufficient to give color of title. 2 And one who relies on the statutory title created by seven years' possession and pay- ment of taxes under color of title need not plead laches or the statute of limitations in a suit to set aside the deed which con- stitutes his color of title. And the mere fact that a grantee knew at the time he received his deed that a third person claimed title to the property does not render his purchase an act of bad faith. 3 and debilitated as compared with what it once was, the memory of things en- feebled, the understanding weak, the character and demeanor eccentric, and he may not have capacity to transact all the ordinary business of life; still, if he understands the na- ture of the act he does, recollects the property he is disposing of, and the person to whom he grants it, and how he desires to dispose of it, his act is valid. Nicholas v. Kershner, 20W.Va. 251 ; Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659 ; 8 S. E. Rep. 493." 1 Borders r. Murphy, 125 111. 577; 18 N. E. Rep. 739. 2 Cowards. Coward, 148 111. 268; 35 N. E. Rep. 759. 3 Coward •». Coward, 148 111. 268; 35 N. E. Rep. 759, per Craig, J. . "The complainant claims to be the owner of the lot in controversy, and seeks to set aside two deeds under which defend- ant derives title. The defendant, on the other hand, claims to be the abso- lute owner of the lot, and for the pur- pose of establishing her title and ownership, she reads in evidence a deed from Folts to herself, which is color of title, and makes proof of seven years' possession and payment of taxes under such color of title, which, under the law, establishes title in herself. Under the act of 1839, where the right of entry and right of action are lost by operation of the statute, the party in possession is conclusively presumed to be the owner. Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 111. 649; 22 N. E. Rep. 835. Where the bar of the stat- ute has become absolute, as in this case, and the party entitled to hold the land is in possession, the title ac- quired and held under the statute of limitations is as available for attack as defense, and it may be asserted against the persons claiming the land. Hale p. Gladfelder, 52 111. 91; JIc- Duffee r. Sinnott, 119 111.449; 10 N. E. Rep. 385; Gage v. Hampton, 127 111. 87; 20 N. E. Rep. 12. The de- fendant had the right to prove that she was the owner of the property, and held an absolute title. Whether that title was derived under the limi- tation act of 1839, or whether she ac- quired and held title in some other manner, was a matter of no conse- quence to the complainant ; in other words, it was her right to establish title in any manner she could. In an action at law, where the defendant § 838 EESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1033 § 838. Stifling competition at judicial sale. — In a case where, while an administrator's sale was in progress, one of the bidders made arrangements with the others whereby, in consideration of various agreements made by him, they ceased to bid, and he obtained the property for less than its market value, it was held that the sale was voidable at the suit of the heirs. A delay of six years before bringing suit to set aside such a sale does not constitute laches where the two male heirs were non-residents at the time of the sale, two of the fe- male heirs were invalids, and the third a minor, and none of the heirs knew of the fraudulent acts of the purchaser until a few days before they began the suit. 1 relies on title acquired and held under the limitation laws of the state, he is not required to plead the limitation laws in order that he may establish by proof his title in trust ; and we are aware of no well settled rule which re- quires the defendant to plead the lim- ition laws to enable him to establish title thereunder in a suit in equity. But it is said the defendant did not acquire title in good faith. There is good faith where there is no fraud, and the color of title is not acquired in bad faith. McOonnell v. Street, 17 111. 253; Stubblefield v. Borders, 92 111. 279. Good faith in the acquire- ment of title, within the meaning of the statute, does not require ignorance of adverse claims or defects in the title. Notice, actual or constructive, is of no consequence. Chickering v. Failes, 26 111. 507; Dickenson v. Breeden, 30 111. 279; McCagg v. Heacock, 34 111. 476; Coleman v. Billings, 89 111. 183; County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 111. 84. There may be good faith, notwith- standing actual notice of existing claims or liens or knowledge of legal defects which prevent the title of which there is color from being abso- lute. McCagg v. Heacock, 34 111. 476 ; Brian v. Melton, 125 111. 647; 18 N. E. Bep.318. Underthe authorities cited, it is manifest that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the defendant acquired title in bad faith. She knew that the com- plainant was claiming title to the property; but, as held in the cases cited, notice of existing claims or knowledge of legal defects do not es- tablish bad faith. The deed to her purported on its face to convey title. She was guilty of no fraud in procur- ing it. She believed the deed passed title to her, and we think she acquired title in good faith." 'Ingalls v. Howell, 149 111. 163; 63 N. E. Bep. 1016, per Bailey, J.: "It is a well-recognized rule that where a person desirous of purchasing proper- ty at auction prevents others, by his improper conduct, from bidding against him, and thus succeeds in pur- chasing the property at less than its fair market value, the sale will be set aside. So agreements not to bid at a public auction are in general void, as against public policy, and tending to fraud ; and such agreements — at least when brought about or participated in by the purchaser — will vitiate the sale. Seel Am. &Eng. Encyc. of Law, 997, and authorities cited. As said in Wilson v. Kellogg, 77 111. 47 : 'The law may be regarded as well settled that 1034 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 839 § 839. Canceling mortgage — Want of consideration. — Where a mortgage and bond were delivered with the express under- standing that they should be inoperative until the considera- tion therefor was paid, and were wrongfully recorded without paying the consideration, a cancellation of the bond and mort- gage will be decreed, although in the hands of an innocent purchaser. 1 In an action to cancel a mortgage given defend- the greatest fairness is required of those intrusted by law to conduct ju- dicial sales, and of those who pur- chase at such sales ; and any agree- ment, contract or arrangement en- tered into on the part of the bidders, calculated to stifle competition at the sale, is contrary to public policy, a fraud upon the law, and would vitiate the sale.' See also, Loyd v. Malone, 23 111. 43." 1 Rapps v. Gottlieb, 142 N. Y. 164 ; 36 N. E. Rep. 1052, per Finch, J. : "The rule is conceded that the assignee of the mortgage takes subject to the equities between the original parties, and has no greater rights than the original mortgagee. The mortgage, therefore, was invalid in the hands of the as- signee, because her assignor could not enforce it against the mortgagor. But, while conceding this rule, the ap- pellant claims that there are excep- tions to it, and cites the cases in which the owner of property has neg- ligently, or from over-confidence, clothed another with its apparent ownership, and with seeming author- ity for its transfer, and in which, by estoppel or otherwise, the innocent assignee for value has been protected. Obviously, such an exception, applied to this case, would annihilate the rule, for in all cases of the assign- ment of a mortgage invalid between the original parties its existence, when it ought not to have existed, indicates the negligence or over-confidence re- ferred to as the basis of the exception. None of those cases relate to the trans- fer of a mortgage, which is but a se- curity or lien, and enforcible only in equity, but all of them were instances in which the assignor had the legal title, and the means of transferring itin the most effectual manner. They re- lated to the transfer of a conceded existing legal right, and respected the equities, not between the original par- ties, but between subsequent holders dealing in one way or another with the valid securities. The appellant's chief reliance is upon McNiel v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, and Moore v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41. In neither case was there any question between the original parties. In the one the plaintiffs owned certain shares of bank stock by a title perfectly valid as between them and the corporation of issue, and without any existing equi- ties in favor of the latter. That stock the plaintiffs pledged, and the pledgees made a further transfer to the defend- ant bank ; and all the questions arose, not between the original parties to the stock obligation, but between the subsequent holders. In Moore v. Bank the plaintiff held a certificate of in- debtedness issued by the capitol com- missioners. There was no question of its validity, or of any equity in be- half of the state, but the whole quar- rel was among the transferees, and respecting their dealings with a se- curity concededly valid as between the original parties. It was argued in that case that protection to the as- signee as a holder in good faith and for value would make all non-negotia- § 839 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1035 ant as consideration for the erection of a house for plaintiff, on the ground that the contract for the building had been canceled, the judgment will not be disturbed where there is direct conflict in the evidence as to the cancellation of the contract. 1 ble securities at once negotiable, to which the court retorted: 'Not bo. No one pretends but that the pur- chaser will take the former subject to all defenses valid as to the original parties.' These cases, therefore, in no manner infringe or work excep- tions to the uniform rule that the as- signee of a mortgage has no greater right against the mortgagor than belonged to the original mortgagee. * * * A further argument is made founded upon the doctrine that, where one of two innocent parties must suf- fer from a wrong, he must bear the loss whose action enabled the wrong to be done ; but that doctrine applies only in an emergency. It is good and useful, in its place, but will always make trouble if not kept where it be- longs. Applied to this case, it would, as I have already suggested, destroy the doctrine which we have long and steadily held, that the assignee of a mortgage takes no greater right than belonged to the original mortgagee, for the apparent mortgagor who does not owe the debt and the assignee who has parted with his money may each be innocent, and one must suf- fer, and that one would be the party who signed the mortgage, and set in motion the sequence of results. If it is always remembered that the doc- trine as to innocence on both sides operates only when other solutions are not available, or possibly in aid of proper solutions, very much of need- less confusion will be avoided." 'Blagborne v. Hunger, 101 Mich. 375 ; 59 N. W. Eep. 657. In McOarn v. Wilcox (Mich. 1895), 63 N. W. Eep. 978, it appeared that defendant pur- chased a farm in 1872, a part of the price being paid by his wife, a part by defendant, and the balance with money obtained by mortgaging the property ; and on the same day, after the mortgage was given, defendant conveyed the farm to his wife by war- ranty deed, and subsequently both moved upon the land, and occupied it till the wife's death, in 1892. Some- thing was paid on the mortgage by the wife, and the balance by defend- ant, but, at the latter's request, the mortgage was not discharged ; and, in an action by the wife's heirs brought solely to cancel the mortgage, defend- ant alleged that the deed to his wife was made to protect her for her part of the purchase-money, and was not intended as a gift, and asked that the respective rights of the parties be ad- justed in accordance with the amounts paid on the premises by each. It ap- peared that in 1879 defendant knew that his wife denied that he had any interest in the land. It was held that the mortgage should be discharged, and that defendant's claim, if any, could only be adjudicated by an in- dependent suit in chancery. Grant, J., said: "If it be a fact that Mrs. Wilcox refused to part with her mone)' for the purchase of this land unless a deed was made to her, and he chose to place the title in her, rely- ing upon her to do equity between them when the mortgage was paid, he is entitled to no relief. It is unneces- sary to cite authorities to show that such a transaction would be within the statute of frauds. It is undoubt- edly true that Mrs. Wilcox contrib- uted six hundred dollars to the pur- 1036 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 840 § 840. The same subject continued — Security oyerralued. — Where, in an action to cancel a note and a mortgage, it ap- peared that defendant told plaintiff that the costs in a mali- cious prosecution suit against him would amount to a specified sum and that plaintiff in such suit would compromise for that amount, which defendant would pay, if plaintiff would exe- cute a note for the amount with mortgage security; that plaint- iff executed the note and mortgage for defendant; and that defendant never compromised the suit, or paid any amount in settlement or otherwise, it was held that there was a failure of consideration for the note and mortgage, and that they should be canceled. It is ho defense to such action that plaintiff was illiterate, deaf, and unable to understand well what was said and done when the false representations were made, and the note and mortgage executed, since plaintiff was entitled to rely on defendant's express statements. 1 Where a mortgage com- chase of this land ; that he contributed two hundred and fifty dollars ; and that, by their joint efforts, they paid the mortgage. It is a hardship and probably an injustice that he should now be deprived of any interest in the land, but courts of equity can not ignore the well-settled rules of law. He knew in 1879 that she denied that he had any interest in it. It is conced- ed that the mortgage is paid, and that it is necessary to sell the land in or- der to pay the claims allowed against the estate. It can not sell to advant- age with this mortgage undischarged, for, if it still exists, the amount now due would be more than half the value of the land. The necessity of discharging the mortgage is therefore appare.it. Gilblas' interest, if he has any, can be enforced only in an inde- pendent suit in chancery." 1 Kramer v. Williamson, 135 Ind. 655 ; 35 N. E. Rep. 388, per Dailey, J. : "The appellee, it seems, is not pos- sessed of a very high degree of intel- ligence, and can neither read nor write. Besides his illiteracy, he tes- tified that he was in poor health ; that during his service in the army he be- came and was afflicted with catarrh, deafness and pulmonary trouble ; that he had a headache, and could not well understand. But we do not see how his mental sufferings and physi- cal misfortunes can aid the appellant, who seeks to enforce a contract against him, made while in that con- dition. The contention comes with bad grace, and is placed upon dan- gerous grounds in a court of equity, where the weak and helpless come to demand relief from the avarice, greed and cupidity of shrewd and crafty neighbors. It is a mistaken assump- tion that a false representation made by one of the parties to a contract puts the other on inquiry as to its truth, even where they are on an equal footing. Every contracting par- ty has an absolute right to rely on the express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is known to the op- posite party, and unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual engagement ; and he is under no obligation to in- §841 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1037 pany filed a bill to rescind a mortgage, and secure a return of the money loaned, on the ground of fraud, and afterwards it advertised the premises for sale under the deed of trust, and it did not, however, attempt to make the sale, but pressed its suit for rescission with due speed, it was held that the act of ad- vertising should not be considered an affirmance of the mort- gage. In that instance a number of persons, each doing his part, acted together in procuring a loan from the company upon the security of land which was greatly overvalued, and it was held that the mortgagee was entitled to a rescission of the mortgage, and a decree against all the parties for the return of the money loaned, regardless of what disposition had been made of it, or which of the defendants had executed the papers. 1 §841. Deed given for illegal purpose — Exception. — A person can not have a conveyance made by him set aside on the ground that the consideration was in part the dismissal of a criminal prosecution, and therefore illegal, when he himself procured such dismissal, the prosecution being against him, since he can not thus set up his own illegal act; and where it is vestigate or verify the statements, to the truth of which the other party to the contract, with full means of knowledge, has deliberately pledged his faith. Union Central Insurance Co. v. Huyck, 5 Ind. App. 474 ; 32 N. E. Rep. on page 581 ; Jones v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 14 ; Mead v. Bunn, 32 N.Y.275." 'Watts v. British, etc., Mortgage Co. (1894), 60 Fed. Rep. 483, per Mc- Cormick, J. . "After riling its bill the appellee advertised the mortgaged premises for sale under the deed of trust. The appellants insist that this was an affirmance after a full knowl- edge of the facts. They support this contention by a reference to Grymes v. Sanders, 93 IT. S. 55; McLean v. Clapp, 141 U. S. 429; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29. It is sound doctrine that a party who desires to rescind a contract on the ground of subsequently discovered fraud must announce his purpose as soon as such discovery is fully made, and must adhere to it. He will not be permitted to vacillate, and play fast and loose. In this case the appellee did announce its purpose, endeavored to obtain a rescission and the return of the money without resort to a court of equity, and, failing in that, duly exhibited its bill, and has sped the cause. The sale was not attempted to be made. No other indication of a vacillating purpose is shown. Grant that this act is not adequately ex- plained. Is it, under the circum- stances, to be taken as a conclusive abandonment of appellee's bill, and an affirmance of the contract which by the bill the appellee seeks to have canceled? In our view the adjudged cases and sound reason do not go to that extent." 1038 KESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 841 sought to set aside a conveyance on the ground that the con- sideration was illegal, plaintiff must tender back the purchase- money received by him. 1 Where a woman of seventy years, and illiterate, is induced by her son-in-law and the sureties upon his bond to execute a mortgage to the sureties to indem- nify them on a defalcation by the son-in-law, by holding out to her the anticipated punishment of the latter, without allow- ing her a chance to consult any disinterested friend, the mort- gage will be set aside, 2 and the fact that she executed the 'Teague v. Williams, 6 Texas App. 468; 25 S. W. Rep. 1048, per Lightfoot, C. J. . "If the transaction in procuring the criminal prosecution to be dis- missed, and the payment of the forty dollars to the county attorney, was unlawful, and thereby tainted the whole transaction with fraud, it is fully shown from the evidence that it was done at the instance of appellants, and by their agent and for their ben- efit. They can not be heard, in a court of equity, to allege their own un- lawful acts as a ground for setting aside a settlement and conveyance, especially where they do not offer to do equity by tendering the purchase- money received by them for the prop- erty. Hunt v. Turner, 9 Texas, 385; Glenn v. Mathews, 44 Texas, 400; Jones-w. Williams, 41 Texas, 390 ; Rob- ertson v. Marsh, 42 Texas, 149." 2 Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1 ; 25 S. W. Rep. 359, per Sherwood, J.: "The circumstances of this case clearly bring it within the operation of the principle that condemns and avoids a contract entered into where the obligor is not a free agent ; where he stands in vincnHs; where he is not equal to the task of protecting himself; where the circumstances which surround him at the time are of such extreme neces- sity or of distress that his will is over- come, his free agency destroyed, by some oppression or fraudulent advan- tage or imposition incident to the transaction. In such case a court of equity will protect him by setting aside the contract thus made. 1 Story on Equity Jurisprudence (13th ed.), § 239. In instances like the present, where surprise and sudden action are the chief ingredients, where due delibera- tion is, therefore, wanting, these in- cidents are classed by courts of equity under the head of fraud or imposition. Wherever undue advantage is taken of a party 'under circumstances which mislead, confuse, or disturb the just result of his judgment, and thus ex- pose him to be the victim of the art- ful, the importunate and the cun- ning;' where 'proper time is not al- lowed to the party, and he acts im- providently; if he is importunely pressed ; if those in whom he places confidence make use of strong per- suasions ; if he is not fully aware of the consequences, but is suddenly drawn in to act ; if he is not permitted to consult disinterested friends or counsel before he is called upon to act in circumstances of sudden emergency or unexpected right or acquisition — in these and many like cases, if there has been great inequality in the bar- gain, courts of equity will assist the party upon the ground of fraud, impo- sition, or unconscionable advantage.' 1 Story on Equity Jurisprudence (13th ed.), § 251, and cases cited. Other cases announce the same principle, and its application to like circum- stances are here presented. Turley v. Edwards, 18 Mo. App. 676; Sharon v. § 841 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1039 mortgage with the purpose of shielding her son-in-law from punishment will not bar her from relief on the ground that she was in pari delicto. 1 Where there are different degrees of guilt as between the parties to the fraudulent or illegal trans- action, if one party act under circumstances of oppression, imposition, undue influence, or at great disadvantage with the other party concerned, so that it appears that his guilt is Gager, 46 Conn. 189 ; Foley v. Greene, 14 R. I. 618; Jordan v. Elliot (Pa.), 15 Cent. Law J. 232; Meechu. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 ; 46 N.W. Eep. 383 ; Eadie v. Slhnmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Coffman v. Lookout Bank, 5 Lea, 232 ; Berlien v. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491; 9 S. W. Rep. 916. The true question, as announced by Lord Eldon in Peel v. Blank, 16 Ves. 157, in all such cases is 'whether the mind was not so subdued that, al- though the execution was the free act of that person, it was an act speaking the mind, not of that person, but of another.' In Earle v. Norfolk, etc., Hosiery Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 188, Van Fleet, V. C, aptly epitomizes this whole doc- trine when he says : ' Whatever de- stroys free agency, and constrains the person whose act is brought in judg- ment to do what is against his will, and what he would not have done if left to himself, is undue influence, whether the control be exercised by physical force, threats, importunities, or any other species of mental or physical coercion.' " »Bell v. Campbell, 123 Mo. 1; 25 S. W. Rep. 359, per Sherwood, J.. "It is urged that if the deed of trust and notes executed by plaintiff had been given through fear of Carter's criminal prosecution, and in order to prevent the same, then she stands in pari delicto with the other parties to the transaction, and therefore could have no relief against the enforce- ment of those writings obligatory. There are two answers to this conten- tion: (1) Granting that plaintiff did enter into the contract with that pur- pose in view, she will not be debarred from pursuing her remedy, because she can not, in any event, be regarded as equally culpable with the adversa- ry parties. When this is the case, a court of equity will interfere, and go to the relief of the less guilty party, whose transgression has been brought about by the imposition, undue influ- ence, etc., of the party on whom the burden of the original blameworthi- ness principally rests. 2 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed.), § 942; 1 Story on Equity Jurisprudence (13th ed.), § 300 ; Pinckston v. Brown, 3 Jones Equity (N. C), 494; Kitchens. Green- abaum, 61 Mo. 110. (2) For reasons already given, plaintiff can not be re- garded as having entered into a bind- ing contract that can prejudice her rights." In Thiemann v. Heinze, 120 Mo. 630; 25 S.W. Rep. 533, it appeared plaintiff exchanged his house for de- fendant's half interest in an hotel. The business of the hotel was profita- ble, but defendant knew nothing of its character. Both plaintiff and defend- ant supposed it was reputable. The principal business of the hotel was proper, although some rooms were used for immoral purposes. Defend- ant refused plaintiff's request to re- exchange. Plaintiff ran the hotel prof- itably for six months and then disa- greed with his co-owner and sold out. It was held that plaintiff, who had never complained to defendant of the character of the business, was not en- titled to a rescission of the exchange. 1040 EESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 842 subordinate to that of the defendant, the court in such case may, in exception to the general rule, relieve. 1 § 842. Where parties were in illicit relation. — A bill which rests on the allegation that the complainant's intestate gave a certificate of stock to the defendant in consideration for her living thereafter in illicit relations with him, and which prays for a surrender of such certificate, will be stricken out on mo- tion, because it shows that the contract was illegal and im- moral. 2 1 Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513. 2 Brindley v. Lawton (N. J. Eq. 1895), 31 Atl. Rep. 394, Bird, V. C: "Contracts based upon the considera- tion, either past or future, of illicit sexual intercourse, or stipulating for such future intercourse, or in any manner promoting or furnishing op- portunities for unlawful cohabitation or prostitution. 2 Pomeroy on Con- tracts, § 936 ; 1 Story on Equity Juris- prudence, § 296. That the contract presented by the bill was illegal and immoral is so declared in the bill itself. Will the court aid either party in asking for a rescission? The an- swer to this was in the negative in the case of Ellicott v. Chamberlin, 38 N.J. Eq. 604. In that case, in order to induce the resignation of an execu- tor, he was offered $10,000. After the payment of $5,000 in cash and the as- signment of a bond and mortgage for $1,300, a promissory note was given for the remaining $5,000. After the payment of $2,500 on this note, an ac- tion at law was begun for the recovery of the amount due thereon. A bill was then filed in this court, present- ing the whole transaction, and asking that the action at law be enjoined. The bill was dismissed by the chan- cellor. An appeal was taken. In de- livering the opinion of the court of errors, Mr. Justice Parker used the following language : 'There is no doubt that Mrs. Ellicott could have successfully resisted payment of any part of the money she agreed to give Mr. Chamberlin for the renunciation of his executorship, had she inter- posed defense ; but she chose volun- tarily to pay the greater part of the money, and she can not now recover what she has paid. She was a par- ticipant in an illegal contract for the purpose (as the evidence shows) of obtaining for herself the administra- tion of the estate. If a contract be illegal as against public policy, its in- validity will be a defense while it re- mains unexecuted. If the illegal con- tract be in part performed, and money has been paid in pursuance of it, no action will lie to recover the money back. Smith on Contracts, 259. The law will not assist either party to an illegal contract, and, the parties being in pari delicto, it will leave them where it finds them. If the contract be still executory, it will not enforce it; and, if already executed, it will not restore the price paid nor the property delivered. Setter v. Alvey, 15 Kan. 157. Mrs. Ellicott can not, therefore, compel the payment of the money she gave Mr. Chamberlin on the agreement or on the note, nor can she compel the assignment to her of the Yauger bond and mortgage, as prayed for in her bill. To that extent the contract has been executed. But she can resist the payment of the bal- ance of the note, for which suit has § 843 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1041 § 843. Parties in pari delicto. — Where an owner, during the pendency of a suit against him, and in view of a possible judgment being rendered therein adversely to him, conveys his property to another, with intent to defeat the satisfaction of such judgment as may be recovered against him in the suit, he can not, after judgment in such suit in his favor, have the aid of a court of equity to compel the grantee to reconvey to him the property. 1 While in such a case the fraudulent gran- tee, from a sense of his moral duty, ought to give back the property to him from whom he received it, yet the law, to dis- been brought. Her defense to the note can, however, be made in a court of law, and therefore the suit in the circuit court, already commenced, should notbe enjoined. The bill was properly dismissed by the chancellor without costs. Johns v. Norris, 27 N. J. Eq. 485; Slocum v. Wooley, 43 N. J. Eq. 451 ; 11 Atl. Rep. 264.' " 1 Pride v. Andrew, 51 Ohio St. 405 ; 38 N. E. Eep. 84, per Dickman, 0. J. : "In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 2 MacArthur, 38, an action of slander had been com- menced against the grantor and his wife, and the conveyance was exe- cuted to the defendant to protect the real estate therein described from the result of the action at law, upon an agreement with the defendant that, as soon as the action was dismissed, or decided in favor of the grantor and his wife, he would reconvey the prop- erty to the grantor, his heirs or as- signs. It was held that such an aver- ment was fatal to the bill of com- plaint, and that a court of equity would not interpose to set the convey- ance aside, but would leave the par- ties to the consequences of their own act. It was conceded, however, that a court of equity might assist the grantor where circumstances were shown to exist which recognized its interposition on other grounds of set- tled equity jurisdiction, 'such as fraud 66 in procuring the deed, imposition by the grantee, a violation of some fidu- ciary relation, an abuse of confidence, delusion or the like on the part of the grantor at the time of executing the deed.' See also, Pinckston v. Brown, 3 Jones Eq. 496 ; Boyd v. De La Mon- tagnie, 73 N. Y. 498 ; Freelove v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318; Ford v. Harrington, 16 N. Y. 285 ; Holliway v. Holliway, 77 Mo. 392; Nichols v. McCarthy, 53 Conn. 299 ; 23 Afl. Rep. 93 ; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146. In commenting upon the foregoing and other cases of like tenor, Mr. Wait, in his work on Fraudulent Conveyances (§ 401), very forcibly says : 'While it is possible to deduce from them a general principle that degrees of guilt will be recognized in such transactions, and that grantors may, in certain cases, reclaim the property fraudulently alienated where the transaction was superinduced by the unfair action of a vendee who oc- cupied some relation of confidence which enabled him to unduly influ- ence the vendor, yet a very clear case, with well-defined reasons for except- ing it from the general rule, must be presented. Debtors contemplating fraudulent alienations should draw little encouragement from these ex- ceptional cases, for as a general rule, after passing through the troubled waters of insolvency, they will find 1042 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 844 courage frauds, will not compel him to restore it to the fraud- ulent grantor. 1 § 844. The same subject continued. — Where two persons guilty of participation in an unlawful transaction are in pari delicto, neither a court of law nor a court of equity will aid either to recover or re-invest himself with any title or interest which he, in consideration of such unlawful contract, has vested in the other, but will leave them in the same condition as to vested interests as they, by their own acts, have placed themselves. If such a participator can not recover in a suit at law, on account of the principle embodied in the maxim, "in pari delicto, melior est conditio possidentis," he can have no relief in equity; because a court of equity will not relieve him from the operation of such principle any more than will a court of law, but merely lends its aid in the case of executory contracts, when the circumstances are such that the defensive remedy at law is not equally certain, complete, and adequate as it may be made in equity." Thus, for example, a court of equity will not order that notes given as collateral to a note given in consideration of a gambling debt be delivered up. 3 themselves stripped of the power to contract (both parties were in pari de- reach or recover the secreted property licto); it is one which has been exe- in the hands of their fraudulent gran- cuted, and the consideration given, tees. The ancient rule, 'In pari de- And although, in the former case, the licto melior est conditio possidentis,' is law would not assist one to recover not to be easily uprooted, and must against the other, yet if the contract not be considered as overthrown or is executed, and the property, either abrogated by these cases." special or general, has passed thereby, 1 Swifts. Holdridge, 10 Ohio, 230. the property must remain' — and re- 8 Beer v. Landman (Texas, 1895), 31 fused to allow plaintiff to recover. In S. W. Rep. 805. And see Adams' the leading case of Taylor v. Chester Equity, 175; Pomeroy's Equity Ju- (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 309, it was held risprudence, §§ 937-941, and authori- that the plaintiff, having deposited ties cited. with the defendant the half of a £50 3 Beer v. Landman (Texas, 1895), 31 bank note, as a pledge to secure the S. W. Rep. 805, per Denman, J. : payment for wine, etc., supplied to "Thus Parke, B., in Scarfe v. Morgan plaintiff by defendant in a brothel (1838), 4 Mees. & W. 270, where a kept by her, to be there consumed in mare was delivered by plaintiff to de- a debauch, could not recover such fendant as security for a debt unlaw- half note, the court saying: 'Plaint- fully contracted on Sunday, said: iff 's argument was based upon the hy- 'This is not the case of an executory pothesis that, in spite of the finding §845 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1043 § 845. Rescission for non-performance. — Where a contract between a city and a water- works company fixed the number of hydrants to be rented by the city and the rental thereof, and of the jury, the plaintiff was entitled to recover by virtue of his property in the half note, and that it was the de- fendant alone who set up an immoral transaction as the answer to the plaintiff's claim.' This argument ap- pears to us to be founded upon an en- tirely erroneous view of the facts. The plaintiff, no doubt, was the owner of the note, but he pledged it by way of security for the price of meat and drink provided for, and money ad- vanced to him by the defendant. Had the case rested there, and no pleading raised the question of illegality, a valid pledge would have been created, and a special property conferred upon the defendant in the half note, and the plaintiff could only have recovered by showing payment or a tender of the amount due. In order to get rid of the defense arising from the plea, which set up an existing pledge of the half note, the plaintiff had recourse to the special replication, in which he was obliged to set forth the immoral and illegal character of the contract upon which the half note had been de- posited. It was therefore impossible for him to recover except through the me- dium and by the aid of an illegal trans- action.to which he was himself a party . Under such circumstances, the maxim, 'In pari delicto, potior est conditio pos- sidentis,' clearly applies, and is de- cisive of the case. In the case of King o. Greene (1863), 6 Allen, 139, where plaintiff had pledged his watch to secure an unlawful livery bill, the court refused to allow him to recover the same, saying : 'It is true that the law would not enable the defendant to recover such a debt (Way v. Foster, 1 Allen, 408) ; but neither will it ena- ble the plaintiff to recover back his property given in pledge for the debt, any more than to recover back the money after paying it. In such cases the maxim, "Potior est conditio pos- sidentis," is applicable. The plaintiff has, at least, as little claim to the aid of the law as the defendant.' In Har- ris v. Woodruff (1878), 124 Mass. 205, where plaintiff had delivered a mare to defendant for the purpose of train- ing her for races, the court, after hold- ing that defendant had an implied lien on the mare for such training, on the question of illegal consideration, Gray, C. J., said: 'It is quite clear that, even if the parties were in pari delicto, potior est conditio possidentis; and the law will not assist the plain- tiff to obtain possession of the mare without paying the defendant for his services under the executed contract, by which the general owner had vol- untarily transferred to the defendant a special property in the mare.' The principles applicable to cases of this character will also be found ably dis- cussed by Judge Gray in Hall v. Cor- coran (1871), 107 Mass. 251, and Cran- son v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439. In Frost v. Plumb (1873), 40 Conn. Ill, dis- cussing the principle under considera- tion, and following in the line of the English and Massachusetts cases above cited, the court say: 'We un- derstand the rule to be this: The plaintiff can not recover when it is necessary for him to prove, as a part of his cause of action, his own illegal contract or other illegal transaction ; but if he can show a complete cause of action without being obliged to prove his own illegal act, although such illegal act may incidentally ap- pear, and may be important even as explanatory of other facts in the case, 1044 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 845 provided that the company should furnish sufficient pure water for domestic purposes and for fires, and that the pumps should have a certain pressure power, and a test of the works showed that the pressure was insufficient, that the water from wells was exhausted in a few minutes, and that impure water was then taken from the river, and the city never accepted the works, and the council passed a resolution that they were inadequate to the needs of the city, and directed the city fire department not to use water from the company's hydrants, it was held that the company had not performed the contract, and that the city was entitled to a rescission thereof. 1 And, where the purchaser of goods notifies the sellers and their agent that he will not pay any more drafts according to the terms of sale unless he is given a certain guaranty as to the quality of the goods, not provided for in the contract of sale, the sellers may rescind the contract. 2 But equity will not interfere to cancel a contract where the failure to perform within the stipulated time he may recover. It is sufficient if his cause of action is not essentially founded upon something which is ille- gal. If it is, whatever may be the form of the action, he can not re- cover.' " 1 City of Grand Haven v. Grand Ha- ven Waterworks Co., 99 Mich. 106; 57 N. W. Rep. 1075, per Long, J. : "We think the bill states a case of equita- ble cognizance, and we may add that, on the hearing here, the jurisdiction of a court of equity was admitted. It is very similar in principle to the case of Farmers', etc., Trust Co. v. Gales- burg, 133 U. S. 156; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316. It is for the rescission of a con- tract for non-performance, and as such is within the general jurisdiction of a court of equity. If the alleged con- tract is void, either from intrinsic in- firmity or from failure to perform its terms, it may be so decided in equity. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 698- 700." In Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. St. 178 ; 38 Pac. Rep. 1003, Dunbar, C. J., says: "The rule is thus laid down in 21 Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 77 : 'The right to rescind belongs only to the party who is himself without default. Thus, if one, having sufficient ground therefor, wishes to avoid aeon- tract, but has done some act which hinders performance by the other, or has failed in any way to perform his own part of the stipulation, bis right is thereby lost to him,' citing many cases in support of this proposition In this case, too, the appellants are further precluded by the fact that they have never tendered any por- tion of the amount due the plaintiffs ; and, until that is done, it can scarcely be contended that they would be en- titled to a rescission of the contract. See Drown v. Ingels, 3 Wash. St. 424; 28 Pac. Rep. 759." 2 King v. Faist, 161 Mass. 449; 37 N. E. Rep. 456. And see also, Ballou v. Billings, 136 Mass. 307; Perry v. Quackenbush, 105 Cal. 299; 38 Pac. Rep. 740. § 846 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1045 has been waived by the complainant. 1 So also, where plaint- iff conveys the land on which he is living to his daughter-in- law in consideration of support for life, and leaves the prem- ises without fault on her part, the conveyance will not be set aside, the grantee being ready to perform. 2 § 846. Deed defrauding covenants. — An action to cancel a recorded deed executed to one cotenant pursuant to a power in a will, as being unauthorized by such power, and without consideration, and fraudulent as against the other cotenants- whose rights are prejudiced thereby, is maintainable by them although they are not in possession, and there has been no actual ouster. In such an action plaintiffs may demand judg- ment on the law side of the court for an amount alleged to be due them from the grantee in such conveyance, and may also ask relief on the equity side from the fraud which they allege will render their action fruitless, and the absence from a com- plaint to cancel a conveyance for fraud of a formal demand for judgment for an amount claimed to be due plaintiff from defendant will not prevent a judgment from being rendered therefor on the law side of the court, where the complaint contains other allegations sufficient to warrant such a judgment. 8 In an action to cancel a deed which was 'Kraner v. Chambers (Iowa 1894), revert to R.'s widow, who was not a 61 N. W. Eep. 373. In Hensley v. party. Hensley (Ky. 1895), 30 S. W. Eep. 2 Scott v. Scott, 89 "Wis. 93; 61 N.W. 613, it appeared that E. deeded land Eep. 286. to defendant on condition that the 3 Sires v. Sires, 43 S. C. 256 ; 21 S. E. latter should provide for grantor and Eep. 115, Gary, J. : "If the land was wife during the life of each, and bury owned by the parties aB tenants in them decently, and upon failure so common, then the action of Samuel to do the land was to revert to grantor, W. Sires was an act of wrong, and en- or to his wife in case she survived titled the parties to seek relief in him. R. having died, his heirs sought equity from the alleged fraud upon to have the deed canceled for failure their rights. The views which we on defendant's part to comply with its entertain on this subject are expressed conditions. It was held that the peti- in the case of Miller v. Hughes, 33 tion was properly dismissed, it appear- S. C. 530; 12 S. E. Eep. 419, in which ing that neither E. nor his widow Chief Justice Mclver says: 'The ever complained of non-performance foundation of a cause of action in of the conditions, that plaintiffs had such a case is a fraud, and if the suffered no pecuniary loss, and that plaintiff, after alleging the fraud, in case of cancellation the land would makes further allegations, showing 1046 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 847 delivered in escrow, and fraudulently abstracted from the depositary by the grantee, the grantor is not bound to tender back land conveyed to him by the grantee in exchange, which was to be forfeited on the grantee's failure to perform the con- tract on which his deed was to be delivered to him by the depositary. 1 § 847. Directors' contracts for their own benefit. — The directors of a corporation, without the sanction of the stock- holders, have no power to contract for the corporation with themselves, or for the benefit of themselves, and if they attempt to do so the contract may be rescinded by the corporation or its stockholders not consenting, whether the contract appears that his rights are impaired or de- stroyed by the perpetration of the fraud, then he states a cause of action. Of course, the mere fact that his debt- or has perpetrated a fraud, even of the grossest character, gives him no cause of action ; but when he alleges facts tending to show that his rights are injuriously affected by such fraud, then he states a complete cause of action, which, if established, will en- title him to relief. * * * * But fraud is peculiarly a matter of equita- ble cognizance, and, when fraud is al- leged, and the further allegation is made that such fraud is injurious to the creditor's rights, it seems to us that a court of equity has jurisdiction of such a case. In such a case the creditor does not ask the aid of the court of equity upon the ground that he can obtain no relief at law, but his claim to the aid of equity is based upon the fraud which has been prac- ticed upon him, and from which the court of equity has jurisdiction to re- lieve him. It is not universally true that a plaintiff must show that he has no plain adequate remedy at law be- fore he can invoke the aid of a court of equity, for there are some cases in which the jurisdictions are concurrent, and fraud is one of those matters. * * * * It is further urged that the claim of the plaintiffs, being a plain legal demand, should first be es- tablished by a judgment at law before the aid of equity can be invoked. Whatever embarrassments this might have offered under our former system of judicature, when law and equity were administered by different tribu- nals, can not be felt now, under our present system, especially after the code has provided that both legal and equitable causes of actions may be united in the same complaint.'" 'Jackson v. Lynn (Iowa 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 704, Deemer, J. : "It will be observed that this is not an action to rescind the contract entered into between the parties for fraud, in which event plaintiff would be com- pelled to make tender back of all he had received ; but that it is an action to set aside a stolen deed, in which plaintiff is insisting upon the letter of his contract. There is nothing for him to tender back. Defendant has forfeited all his rights to the deed by failing to perform the conditions which entitled him to it, and under the express terms of the contract plaintiff is entitled to the land in con- troversy, and to the return of the deed without tendering back anything." § 847 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1047 to be fair and just or not. It has been held under such cir- cumstances that the company or its stockholders may rescind a contract requiring the action of the board of directors to make it, whether made in good faith or not, where so many of the directors are interested in the contract, adversely to the company, that the company is not represented by a disinter- ested majority of the directors voting. 1 'Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 111. 301; 40 N. E. Rep. 362, per Carter, J. : "It may be, as contended by appellants, that the settlement of 1872 was the best thing that could have been done at that time for the company, situated as it was ; and doubtless the direct- ors, had they not been interested as and for the creditors in that settle- ment, would have been far better qualified to judge of the interests of the company than any one else could at this late day. But the law is, nevertheless, that they were incapaci- tated to act, by reason of this interest. And the fact remains, also, as shown by the evidence, that, whatever the necessities of the company may have been, the terms of this contract were harsh and inequitable, in respect to the calculation of interest. Interest was not only computed upon unpaid interest as it became due from year to year, but a new principal, composed of interest, was created, and interest computed thereon with annual rests. The company did not owe the amount fixed upon as due at this settlement by the method of computation resort- ed to, and the transaction would, in a court of equity, be regarded as op- pressive and unjust, independent of any statute prohibiting usurious con- tracts. See Bowman v. Neely, 137 111. 443; 27 N. E. Rep. 758, and cases there cited. In the Bowman-Neely case, this court held that an agree- ment, made in advance, to pay com- pound interest, except upon interest coupons, while not usurious, is not enforcible in this state. It is true that it has been held that an agree- ment, made after installments of in- terest have become due, to pay in- terest thereon, is not invalid, but such an agreement to pay simple in- terest on overdue interest is quite a different thing from an agreement to compound such interest retrospect- ively for many years. In Van Ben- schooten v. Lawson, 6 Johns. Ch. 313, Mr. Chancellor Kent held that such compound interest could not be col- lected. He said : ' If the creditor was permitted to exact ' from the debtor a stipulation to pay interest on arrears of interest then due, it would lead to great and inevitable abuse. It would, perhaps, be less mischievous, because the parties would stand upon more equal terms, to allow of such a stipulation for compound interest when the original contract is about to be made. The parties are then inde- pendent of each other. But in the other case the debtor is comparatively dependent, and probably distressed, and the creditor exacts the stipula- tion under the evident advantage of power and superiority. The agree- ment on the part of the defendant to pay compound interest retrospectively does not alter the case, for the max- im, Volenti non fit injuria, does not apply in these cases.' This case waB criticised in Stewart v. Petree, 55 N. Y. 621, but was re-affirmed in Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162. It is unneces- sary, however, in this case, to de- termine whether such an agreement 1048 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 848 § 848. Rescinding note procured by fraud — Enjoining trans- fer. — Where the insolvent holder of a note secured by chattel mortgage has seized the property in order to foreclose, and the note, which was procured by fraud, is not yet due, a court of equity has jurisdiction to cancel the note and mortgage and enjoin the transfer of the note. 1 could be enforced in this state, if made between parties dealing at arm's length ; but we do hold that such an agreement made between a corpora- tion, by its board of directors, on the one hand, and one or more of such directors on the other, is unfair to the corporation and its stockholders, and would lead to great injustice and oppression, and can not be enforced. In transacting the business of the corporation, it is the duty of the di- rectors to act for the highest interest of the corporation and its stock- holders, and not for their own per- sonal advantage ; and a court of equi- ty will set aside an injurious and oppressive contract obtained by a di- rector, in his own interest from the company, even although the com- pany may be represented by a ma- jority of disinterested directors." See also, Gilman, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly, 77 111. 426. 1 Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co. (111. 1895), 40 N. E. Rep. 971, Magruder, J. : "The jurisdiction proceeds upon the ground that, where the enforcement of an instrument would be inequitable and unjust, the party holding it should be compelled to surrender it for cancel- lation. One of the instances in which the jurisdiction is often exercised is in relation to negotiable instruments before their maturity. 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1377 ; 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 695, 700. In such cases an injunction is generally granted against the transferring such an instrument. 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1377, p. 417, note 1. The relief here asked is not only against interference with the property mortgaged, but for the cancellation of a note not yet due, alleged to have been obtained by fraud, and liable to be transferred to an innocent holder, separately from any transfer of the mortgage. A maker of a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage may, by a bill in equity, restrain the insolvent payee thereof from trans- ferring the same before maturity, and from proceeding to foreclose, on the ground of fraud and failure of consid- eration, and may show the real char- acter of the transaction by parol testi- mony. Belohradsky v. Kuhn, 69 111. 547; Petillon v. Noble, 73 111. 567; Carpenter v. Talbot, 33 Fed. Rep. 537; Becker v. Anderson, 6 Neb. 499 ; Lan- ier o. Adams, 72 Ga. 145 ; Mayrant v. Dickerson, Rich. Eq. Cas. 199; Mc- Cormick v. Hartley, 107 Ind. 248; 6 N. E. Rep. 357; Badgett v. Frick, 28 S. C. 176; 5 S. E. Rep. 355. In Nor- man din v. Mackey, 38 Minn. 417; 37 N. "W. Rep. 954, the action was to have a chattel mortgage adjudged to be paid in full and to have the same canceled, and it was there held that the remedy was at law for trespass or conversion, or in replevin. It does not appear in that case that there was a note secured by the mortgage, but it does appear that the debt had been paid, and the time for payment had passed, and the property was in the possession of the mortgagor, so that the application for an injunction against a threatened taking of the property under the mortgage was merely an application to enjoin a trespass. In the case at bar, however, the mortgagee had pos- § 849 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. 1049 § 849. Rescission of sale where price payable in install- ments. — In a contract for the sale of goods, to be executed by a series of deliveries and payments, defaults of either party with reference to one or more of the stipulated acts will not ordinarily discharge the other party from his obligation and entitle him to rescind the contract unless the conduct of the party in default be such as to evince an intention to abandon the contract, or a design no longer to be bound by its terms. 1 Thus when the seller of goods has agreed to deliver them in installments; 2 and the buyer has agreed to pay the price in in- session of the property, having begun the foreclosure by a seizure of it, and the mortgage secured a note not yet due, and both note and mortgage were procured by fraud, and were never legally executed by the mortgagor; and the relief asked is for the cancel- lation, not merely of the mortgage, but of the note also. Other authori- ties referred to by counsel for appel- lants will, upon examination, be found to be distinguishable from this case." 1 Blackburn v. Reilly, 47 N. J. Law, 290. In the case just cited this rule was enforced against the buyer. In Trotter v. Heckscher, 40 N. J. Eq. 612 ; 4 Atl. Rep. 83, the court of chan- cery, and in Otis v. Adams, 56 N. J. Law, 38; 27 Atl. Sep. 1092, the su- preme court enforced it against the seller. 2 Gerli ». Poidebard Mfg. Co. (N. J. Err. 1895), 31 Atl. Eep. 401, Dixon, J. : "That the conduct of the vend- ors in the present case did not evince an intention to abandon the contract, or not to be bound by its terms, ap- pears beyond dispute. They failed to deliver the July installment because it was impossible to do so, offered to deliver other silk which they con- sidered equally valuable, expressed their willingness to come to an equi- table arrangement for their default, and, on the first intimation of a pur- pose on the part of the vendee to re- scind the contract, they protested against the right of rescission, and in- sisted that they should be permitted to make the subsequent deliveries. They showed a design the very oppo- site of repudiation. Nor do we find anything in this contract or the cir- cumstances of the parties from which it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended the_ delivery of each installment of silk to be a condition precedent to the continuing obligation of the contract. So far as appears, the usefulness to the buyer of any in- stallment did not at all depend upon the prompt delivery of prior install- ments, and full indemnity for every default could be secured by action based thereon. So that, under the rule before declared, it would seem that the attempt to rescind was il- legal. The defendant, however, in- sists that the rule is not applicable to the present case, because the seller's fault consisted in failing to do the first thing required to be done in per- formance of the contract; and Nor- rington v. Wright, 115 IT. S. 188; 6 Sup. Ct. Eep. 12, is cited as an au- thority for this distinction. On prin- ciple, I do not see that, for such a purpose, the first act to be done stands upon a different footing from subsequent acts. A default in that 1050 RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION. § 849 stallments which are proportioned to and payable on the de- livery of each installment of goods, default by either party with reference to any one installment will not ordinarily en- title the other party to rescind the contract. does not make it more certain than do other defaults that the party aggrieved can not get exactly what he contract- ed for ; for that default, as well as for others, he may be compensated by suit ; and by that default, as readily as by others, he may obtain an un- conscionable advantage, if he is en- titled to rescind or retain the bar- gain as self-interest may dictate. ***** In Norrington v. Wright, supra, the plaintiff had con- tracted to ship from Europe to the defendant in Philadelphia 1,000 tons of rails in each of the months of February, March, April, May, and June ; in February he had shipped 400 tons, which the defendant had received and paid for, not knowing that less than the required quantity had been shipped ; in March the plaintiff had shipped 885 tons; and the defendant, on learning of these deficiencies, declared the contract terminated. The court held that he was justified in doing so. I am not sure that I perceive definitely the principle on which this decision was rested. But the case seems now to be cited for the following paragraph in the opinion o' the court : ' The seller is bound to deliver the quantity stipu- lated, and has no right * * * to com- pel the buyer to accept a less quanti- ty; * * * and, when the goods are to be shipped in certain proportions monthly, the seller's failure to ship the required quantity in the first month gives the buyer the same right to rescind the whole contract that he would have had if it had been agreed that all the goods should be delivered at once.* I can not but think that there is here some confusion of thought. If a contract of sale requires the delivery of all the goods at once, and the seller tenders only part at the time specified, certainly the buyer may refuse to accept the part; but it is scarcely accurate to say his refusal is based upon a rescission of the contract. He has simply refused to do what he never agreed to do. * * * * We are t nus brought to the real question in all bargains of this nature, whether, on the proper construction of the contract, the per- formance of any particular stipulation by one party is a condition precedent to the continuance of obligation upon the other party ; and logically this must be the question as well with regard to the first stipulation as the subsequent ones. On this question this court adopted the general rule that when the seller has agreed to deliver the goods sold in installments, and the buyer has agreed to pay the price in installments which are proportioned to and payable on the delivery of each installment of goods, then de- fault by either party with reference to any one installment will not ordi- narily entitle the other party to ab- rogate the contract." END OF VOLUME ONE. KF 801 B36 Author Vol. Beach, Charles Fisk Title Copy A Treatise on the modern law v±j: