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 CIVIL WAR LITERATURE 
 
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 1919 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924081260667 
 
A MEMOIR 
 
 THE LAST YEAR 
 
 WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, 
 
 CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 CONTAIKIKa 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE 'OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS 
 IN THE YEARS 1864 AND 18G5. 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTEITSNT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY,. 
 
 07 IBB f BOTI3IOSAI. ASMT OF THE CONFBCSBATE STATSS. 
 
 DEDICATED 
 
 Co ({|e JHtnut!! i{ iM Kerph J9ca1i, fnfiii fell Sgtiting for Hilittis, Mistit, ai<ti dustier. 
 
 "DEO TINBICE." 
 
 ®or0ttt0 : 
 
 PRINTED BY LOVBLL & GIBSON, YONGE STREET. 
 1866.. . 
 
A MEMOIR 
 
 THE LAST YEAR 
 
 WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, 
 
 CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 coifTAiiriFa 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANBS 
 IN THE YEARS 1864 AND 1865. 
 
 BY 
 « 
 
 LIBUTBNANT-GENEEAL JUBAL A. E_ARLT, 
 
 OF THE PB0TI3I0NAI. ASMS OP TEE COHFBSEBIIB STATES, 
 
 \ DEDICATED 
 
 Sa ifie iUnmri! af t^e heroic Mnti, to^o fell Salting foe liietta, ISisi^t, anH Mstict. 
 
 •DEO riNDIOE:' 
 
 TORONTO: 
 
 PKINTED BT LOVELIi & GIBSON, TONGB STEEET. 
 
 la^. 
 
 5 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Under a solemn sense of duty to my unhappy country, and 
 to the brave soldiers who fought under me, as well as, to 
 myself, the following pages have been written. 
 
 When the question of practical secession from the United 
 States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia, and a 
 member of the Convention called by the authority of the 
 Legislature of that State, I opposed secession with all the 
 ability I possessed, with the hope that the horrors of civil war 
 might be averted, and that a returning sense of duty and 
 justice on the part of the masses of the Northern States, 
 would induce them to respect the rights of the people of the 
 South. While some Northern politicans and editors, who sub- 
 sequently took rank among the most unscrupulous and vindic- 
 tive of our enemies, and now hold me to be a traitor and rebel, 
 were openly and sedulously justifying and encouraging seces- 
 sion, I was labouring honestly and earnestly to preserve the 
 Union. 
 
 As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted against 
 the ordinance of secession on its passage by that body, with 
 the hope that, even then, the collision of arms might be avoi- 
 ded, and some satisfactory adjustment arrived at. The adoption 
 of that ordinance wrung from me bitter tears of grief; but I 
 at once recognized my duty to abide the decision of my native 
 State, and to defend her soil against invasion. Any scruples 
 which I may have entertained as to the right of secession, 
 were soon dispelled by the mad, wicked, and unconstitutional 
 measures of the authorities at Washington, and the frenzied 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 clamour of the people of the North for war upon their former 
 brethren of the South. I then, and ever since have, regarded 
 Abraham Lincoln, his counsellors and supporters, as the^eal 
 traitors who had overthrown the constitution and government 
 of the United States, and established in lieu thereof an odious 
 despotism ; and this opinion I entered on the journal of the 
 Convention when I signed the ordinance of secession. I 
 , recognized the right of resistance and revolution as exercised 
 l?y our fathers in 1776, and, without cavil as to the name by 
 which it was called, 1 entered the military service of my State, 
 willingly, cheerfully, and zealously. 
 
 When the State of Virginia became one of the Confederate 
 States, and her troops were turned over to the Confederate 
 Government, I embraced the cause of the whole Confederacy 
 with equal ardour, and continued in the service, with the de- 
 termination to devote all the energy and talent I possessed 
 to the common defence. I fought through the entire war, 
 without once regretting the course I had pursued; with an 
 abiding faith in the justice of our cause ; and I never saw the 
 moment when I would have been willing to consent to any 
 compromise or settlement short of the absolute independence 
 of my country. 
 
 It was my fortune to participate in most of the great military 
 operations in which the army in Virginia was engaged, both 
 before and after General Lee assumed the command. In the 
 last year of this momentous struggle, I commanded, at differ- 
 ent times, a division and two corps of General Lee's Army, 
 in the campaign from the Rapidan to James River, and, sub- 
 sequently, a separate force which marched into Maryland, 
 threatened Washington City, and then went through an event- 
 ful campaign in the Valley of Virginia. No detailed reports 
 of the operations of these diflferent commands were made 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 before the close of the war, and the campaign in Maryland 
 and the Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much com- 
 ment and misapprehension, I have now written a narrative 
 of the operations of all my commands during the closing year 
 of the war, and lay it before the world as a contribution to 
 the history of our great struggle for independence. In giving 
 that narrative, I have made such statements of the positions 
 and strength of the opposing forces in Virginia, and such re- 
 ference to their general operations, as were necessary to en- 
 able the reader to understand it ; but I do not pretend to 
 detail the operations of other commanders. 
 
 I have not found it necessary to be guilty of the injustice 
 of attempting to pull down the reputation of any of my fellow 
 officers, in order to build up my own. My operations and my 
 campaign stand on their own merits, whatever they may be. 
 Nor, in anything I may have found it necessary to say in re- 
 gard to the conduct of ray ti'oops, do I wish to be understood 
 as, in any way, decrying the soldiers who constituted the 
 ranlt and file of my commands. I believe that the world has 
 never produced a body of men superior, in courage, patriot- 
 ism, and endurance, to the private soldiers of the Confederate 
 armies. I have repeatedly seen those soldiers submit, with 
 cheerfulness, to privations and hardships which would appear 
 to be almost incredible ; and the wild cheers of our brave 
 men, (which were so diiferent from the studied hnirahs of 
 the Yankees,) when their thin lines sent hack opposing hosts 
 of Federal troops, staggering, reeling, and flying, have often 
 tluilled every fibre in ray heart. I have seen, with my own 
 eyes, ragged, barefooted, and hungry Confederate soldiers 
 perform deeds, which, if performed in days of yore by mailed 
 warriours in glittering arraour, would have inspired the harp 
 of the minstrel and the pen of the poet. 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 I do not aspire to the character of a historian, but, having 
 •been a witness of and participator in great events, I have given 
 a statement of what I saw and did, for the use of the future 
 historian. Without breaking the thread of my narrative, as 
 it proceeds, I have given, in notes, comments on some of 
 the errors and inconsistencies committed by the commander 
 of the Federal array, General Grant, and the Federal Se- 
 cretary of War, Mr. Stanton, in their reports made since 
 the close of the war ; also some instances of cruelty and 
 barbarity committed by the Federal commanders, which 
 were brought to my immediate attention, as well as some 
 other matters of interest. 
 
 As was to have been expected, our enemies have flooded 
 the press with sketches and histories, in which all the appli- 
 ances of a meretricious literature have been made use of, 
 to glorify their own cause and its supporters, and to blacken 
 ours. But some Southern writers also, who preferred the 
 pen to the sword or musket, have not been able to resist the 
 temptation to rush into print ; and, accordingly, carping crit- 
 icisms have been written by the light of after events, and 
 even histories of the war attempted by persons, who imagined 
 that the distinctness of their vision was enhanced by distance 
 from the scene of conflict, and an exemption from the dis- 
 turbing elements of whistling bullets and bursting shells. Per- 
 haps other writers of the same class may follow, and various 
 speculations be indulged in, as to the causes of our disasters. 
 As for myself,! have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes 
 of our failure, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tre- 
 mendous odds brought against us. Having had some means of 
 judging, 1 will, however, say that, in ray opinion, both Presi- 
 dent Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did 
 all for the success of our cause which it was possible for mor- 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 lal men to do ; and it is a great privilege and comfort for me 
 so to believe, and to have been able to bring with me into 
 exile a profound love and veneration for those great men. 
 
 In regard to my own services, all I have to say is, that I 
 have the consciousness of having done my duty to my coun- 
 try, to the very best of my ability, and, whatever may be my 
 fate, I would not exchange that consciousness for untold mil- 
 lions. I have come into exile rather than submit to the yoke 
 of the oppressors of my country ; but I have never thought of 
 attributing aught of blame or censure to those true men who, 
 after having nobly done their duty in the dreadful struggle 
 through which we passed, now, that it has gone against us, 
 remain to share the misfortunes of their people, and to aid 
 and comfort them in their trials ; on the contrary, I appreciate 
 and honour their motives. I have not sought refuge in another 
 land from insensibility to the wrongs and sufferings of my own 
 country ; but I feel deeply and continually for them, and could 
 my life secure the redemption of that country, as it has been 
 often risked, so now it would be as freely given for that object. 
 
 There were men born and nurtured in the Southern States, 
 and some of them in my own State, who took sides with our 
 enemies, and aided in desolating and humiliating the land of 
 their own birth, and of the graves of their ancestors. Some 
 of them rose to high positions in the United States Army, and 
 others to high civil positions. I envy them not their dearly 
 bought prosperity. I had rather be the humblest private sol- 
 dier who fought in the ranks of the Confederate Army, and 
 now, maimed ai^d disabled, hobbles on his crutches from 
 house to house, to receive his daily bread from the hands of 
 the grateful women for whose homes he fought, than the 
 highest of those renegades and traitors. Let them enjoy the 
 advantages of their present positions as best they may ! for 
 
VlU PREFACE. 
 
 the deep and bitter execrations of an entire people now attend 
 them, and an immortality of infamy awaits them. As for 
 all the enemies who have overrun or aided in overrunning 
 my country, there is a wide and impassable gulf between us, 
 in which I see the bJood of slaughtered friends, comrades, and 
 countrymen, which all the waters in the firmament above and 
 the seas beneath cannot wash away. Those enemies have 
 undertaken to render our cause odious and infamous ; and 
 among other atrocities committed by them in the effort to do 
 80, an humble subordinate, poor Wirz, has been selected as a 
 victim to a fiendish spirit, and basely murdered under an 
 executive edict, founded on the sentence of a vindictive and 
 illegal tribunal. Let them continue this system ! they are 
 but erecting monuments to their own eternal dishonour, and 
 furnishing finger posts to guide the historian in his researches. 
 They may employ the infamous Holt, with his " Bureau of 
 Military Justice," to sacrifice other victims ,oa the altars of 
 their hatred, and provost marshals, and agents of the " Freed- 
 man's Bureau " may riot in all the license of petty tyranny, but 
 our enemies can no more control the verdict of impartial his- 
 tory, than they can escape that doom which awaits them at 
 the final judgment. 
 
 During the war, slavery was used as a eatch word to 
 arouse the passions of a fanatical mob, and to some extent the 
 prejudices of the civilized world were excited against us ; but 
 the war was not made on our part for slavery, d igh digni- 
 taries in both church and state in Old England, and puritans 
 in New England, had participated in the profits of a trade, by 
 which the ignorant and barbarous natives of Africa were 
 brought from that country ,and sold into slavery in the Amer- 
 ican Colonies. The generation in the Southern States which 
 defended their country in the late war^ found amongst them. 
 
PKEFACE. IX 
 
 in a civilized and christianized condition, 4,000,000 of th^ de- 
 scendants of those degraded Africans. The Almighty Crea- 
 tor of the Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a 
 diflFerent colour and an inferior physical and mental organ- 
 ization. He had not done this from mere caprice or whim, 
 but for wise purposes. An amalgamation of the races was in 
 contravention of His designs, or He would not have made 
 them so different. This immense number of people could not 
 have been transported back to the wilds from which their an- 
 cestors were taken, or if they could have been, it would have 
 resulted in their relapse into barbarism. Reason, common 
 sense, true humanity to the black, as well as the safety of the 
 white race, required that the inferior race should be kept in a 
 state of subordination. The condition of domestic slavery, as 
 it existed in the South, had not only resulted in a great im- 
 provement in the moral and physical condition of the negro 
 race, but had furnished a class of labourers as happy and con- 
 tented as any in the world, if not more so. Their labour had 
 not only developed the immense resources of the immediate 
 country in which they were located, but was the main source 
 of the great prosperity of the United States, and furnished the 
 means for the employment of millions of the working t-.lassos 
 in other countries. Nevertheless, the struggle made by the 
 people of the South was not for the institution of slavery, but 
 for the inestimable right of self-government, against the dom- 
 ination of a fanatical faction at the North ; and slavery was 
 the mere occasion of the development of the antagonism be- 
 tween the two sections. That right of self-government has 
 been lost, and slavery violently abolished. Four millions of 
 blacks have thus been thrown on their own resources, to 
 starve, to die, and to relapse into barbarism; and incon- 
 ceivable miseries have been entailed on the white race. 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 Tiie civilized world will find, too late, that its philanthropy- 
 has been all false, and its religion all wrong on this subject ; 
 and the people of the United States will find that, under the 
 pretence of " saving the life of the nation, and upholding the 
 old flag," they have surrendered their own liberties into the 
 hands of that worst of all tyrants, a body of senseless fanatics. 
 
 When the passions and infatuations of the day shall have 
 been dissipated by time, and all the results of the late war 
 shall have passed into irrevocable history, the future chron- 
 icler of that history will have a most important duty to per- 
 form, and posterity, while pouring over its pages, will be lost 
 in wonder at the follies and crimes committed in this gen- 
 eration. 
 
 My narrative is now given to the public, and the sole merit 
 T claim for it is that of truthfulness. In writing it, I have 
 received material aid from an accurate diary kept by Lieu- 
 tenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Edward 
 Johnson, who was wiih me during the campaign in Maryland 
 and the Shenandoah Valley until the 12th of August, 1864, 
 and the copious notes of Captain J. Hotchkiss, who acted 
 as Topographical Engineer for the 2nd Corps and the Array 
 of the Valley District, and recorded the events of each day, 
 from the opening of the campaign on the Rapidan in May, 
 1864, until the affair at Waynesboro in March, 1865. 
 
 J. A. EARLY. 
 
 November, 1866. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA PROM THE RAPIDAN TO JAMES' EIVER. 
 
 Fatce 
 
 Introduction... „ ]3 
 
 Battles of the Wilderness — Operations of Early's Division 16 
 
 Battles of Spottsylvania Court House — Operations of HUl's Corps .... 22 
 
 Hanover Junction — Operations of Early's Division 28 
 
 Battles of Cold Harbour — Operations of Ewell's Corps 30 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA. 
 
 Introduction 37 
 
 March to Lyndiburg and Pursuit of Hunter 42 
 
 March down the Valley and Operations in the Lower Valley and 
 
 Maryland _... 51 
 
 Battle of Monocacy 67 
 
 Operations in front of Washington and recrossiiig the Potomac 59 
 
 Return to the Valley and Operations there 66 
 
 Battle of Kemstown 69 
 
 Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania— Burning of Chambers- 
 burg 70 
 
 Retreat to Fisher's Hill and subsequent Operations until the Battle 
 
 of Winchester 75 
 
 Battle of Winchester 89 
 
 Affair at Fisher's Hill 98 
 
 Retreat up the Valley and Operations until the Battle of Cedar Creek. 100 
 
 Battle of Cedar Creek or Belle Grove , 105 
 
 Close of the Valley Campaign 121 
 
 Operations in 1865 129 
 
 Conclusion 137 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. Letter from General Lee 139 
 
 B. Statistics showing the relative strength of the two Sections during 
 
 the War 141 
 
EURATA. 
 
 Page 20, liae 18 from the top, for Johnston's read Johnson's, 
 
 Page 24, line 28 from the top, and bottom line of note, for Malone read 
 Mahone, 
 
 Page 40, line 2 from the top, for KearnatoWn read Kernatown. 
 
 Page T3, lines 7 and 8 from the top, for Rodes' Ramseur's read Bodes' 
 and Ramseur's. 
 
 Page 78, line 13 from the top) for 28th read 20th. 
 
€AMPAia:N' m yirgiota, 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 RAPID AN TO JAMES RIVER. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 On the 3rd of May, 1864, the positions of the Confederate 
 Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army under Lieu- 
 tenaat-General Grant, in Virginia, were as follows : General 
 Lee held the southern bank of the Rapidan River, in Orange 
 County, with his right resting near the niouth of Mine Run, 
 and his left extending to Liberty Mills on the road from 
 Gordonsville (via Madison Court House) to the Shenandoah 
 Valley ; while the crossings of the river on the right, and the 
 roads on the left were watched by cavalry : Ewell's corps 
 was on the right, Hill's on the left, and two divisions of Long- 
 street's corps were encamped in the rear, near Gordonsville. 
 Grant's army (composed ol the Army of the Potomac under 
 Meade, and the 9th corps under Burnside,) occupied the north 
 banks of the Rapidan and Robinson rivers ; the main body 
 being encamped in Culpepper County, and on the Rappa- 
 hannock River. 
 
 I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed 
 60,000 effective men of all arms. The report of the Federal 
 Secretary of War, Stanton, shows that the " available force 
 present for dutv, May 1st 1864," in Grant's army, was 141,166, 
 to wit : In the Army of the Potomac 120,386, and in the 9th 
 corps 20,780. The draft in the United States was being 
 energetically enforced, and volunteering had been greatly 
 
14 INTRODtrCTIOlW. 
 
 stimulated by high bounties. The North-Western States had 
 tendered large bodies of troops to serve ofle hundred days, in 
 order to relieve other troops on garrison and local duty, and 
 this enabled Grant to pat in the field a large number of troops 
 which had been employed on that kind of duty. It was known 
 that he was receiving heavy reinforcements up to the very time 
 of his movement on the 4th of May, and afterwards ; so that 
 the statement of his force on the Tst of May, by Stanton, does 
 not cover the whole force with which he Commenced the 
 campaign. Moreover, Secretary Stanton's report shows that 
 there were, in the Department of Washington and the Middle 
 Department, 47,751 available men for duty, the chief part of 
 which, he says, was called to the front after the campaign 
 began, " in order to repair the losses of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac;" and Grant says that, at Spottsylvania Court House, 
 "the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th [of May,] were con- 
 sumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments from Washington." His army, therefore, must have 
 numbered very nearly, if not quite, 2100,000 mea, before a 
 junction was effected with Butler. 
 
 On the 4th of May, it was discovered that (Grant's Array 
 was moving towards Germana Ford on the Rapid an, which 
 was ten or twelve miles from our right. This movement had 
 begun on the night of the 3rd, and the enemy succeeded in 
 seizing the ford, and effecting a crossing, as the river was 
 guarded at that point by only a small cavalry picket. Tbe 
 direct road from Germana Ford to Richmond passes by 
 Spottsylvania Court House, and when Grant had effected hia 
 crossing, he was nearer to Richmond than General Lee was. 
 From Orange Court House, near which were General Lee*g 
 headquarters, there are two nearly parallel roads running 
 eastwardly to Fredericksburg — the one which is nearest to tbe 
 river being called " The old Stone Pike," and the other "Tbe 
 Plank Road." The road from Germana Ford to Spottsylvania 
 Court House, crosses the old Stone Pike at the " Old Wilder- 
 ness Tavern," and two or three miles further on, it crosses the 
 Plank Road. 
 
INTBODUCTION. 15 
 
 As soon as it was ascertained that Grant's movement was a 
 serious one, preparations were made to meet him, and the 
 troops of General Lee's Army were put in motion — Ewell's 
 corps moving on the old Stone Pike, and Hill's corps on the 
 Plank Road ; into which latter road Longstreet's force also 
 came, from his camp near Gordonsville. 
 
 Ewell's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed 
 Mine Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles be- 
 yond, on the afternoon of the 4th. When the rest of the corps 
 moved, my division and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division 
 were left to watch the fords of the Rapidan, until relieved 
 by cavalry. As soon as this was done, I moved to the posi- 
 tion occupied by the rest of the corps, carrying Ramseur with 
 me. 
 
 Ewell's corps contained three divisions of infantry, to wit : 
 Johnson^s, Rodes', and my own (Early's). At this time, one 
 of my brigades (Hoke's) was absent, having been with Hoke 
 in North Carolina ; and I had only three present, to wit : 
 Hays', Pegram's, and Gordon's. One of Rodes' brigades 
 (R. D. Johnston's) was at Hanover Junction. I had about 
 4,000 muskets for duty ; Johnson about the same number ;, 
 and Rodes (including Johnston's brigade) about 6,000. 
 
BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION. 
 
 On the morning of the 5th, Ewell's corps was put in motioii, 
 my divisi'On bringing lap the rear. A short distance from the 
 Old Wilderness Tavern, and just in advance of the place 
 Vhere a road diverges to the left from the old Stone Pike to 
 the Germana Ford road, the enemy, in heavy force, was en- 
 eduntered, and Jones' brigade, of Johnson's division, and 
 Battle's brigade, of Rodes' division, were driven back in some 
 confusion. My division was ordered up, and formed across the 
 pike ; Gordon's brigade being on the right of the road. This 
 brigade, as soon as it was brought into line, was ordered for- 
 ward, and advanced, through a dense pine thicket, in gallant 
 style. In conjunction with Daniels', Doles', and Ramseur's 
 brigades, of Rodes' division, it drove the enemy bacli with 
 heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners, and gaining 
 a commanding position on the right. Johnson, at the same 
 time, was heavily engaged in his front ; his division being on 
 the left of the pike, and extending across the road to the Ger- 
 mana Ford road, which has been mentioned. After the ene- 
 my had been repulsed, Hays' brigade was sent to Johnson's 
 left, in order to participate in a forward movement ; and it 
 did move forward, some half-a-mile or so, encountering the 
 enemy in force ; but, from some mistake, not meeting with 
 the expected co-operation, except from one regiment of Jones' 
 brigade (the 25th. Va.), the most of which was captured, it 
 was drawn back to Johnson's line, and took position on his 
 left. 
 
 Pegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take position 
 on Hays' left ; and, ]ust before night, a very heavy attack 
 was made on its front, which was repulsed with severe loss 
 to the enemy. In this affair, General Pegrara received a 
 
BATTLES QF THE WILDERNESS. 17 
 
 severe wound in the leg, which disabled him for the field for 
 some months. 
 
 During the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing along 
 the whole line, several attempts having been made by the 
 enemy, without success, to regain the position from which he 
 had been driven j and the fighting extended to General Lee's 
 right, on the Plank Road. Gordon occupied the position 
 which he had gained, on the right, until after dark, when he 
 was withdrawn to the extreme left, and his place occupied by 
 part of Rodes' division. 
 
 The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight, con- 
 sisted of the 5th. corps, under Warren ; but other troops were 
 brought to his! assistance. At the close of the day, Ewell's 
 corps had captured over a thousand prisoners, besides inflict- 
 ing on the enemy very heavy losses in killed and wounded. 
 Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned by the enemy, 
 just in front of the point at which Johnson's right and Rodes' 
 left joined, and were subsequently secured by our troops. 
 
 After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the right, 
 the whole of my division was on the left of the road diver- 
 ging from the pike, in extension of Johnson's line. AH my 
 brigades had behaved handsomely ; and Gordon's advance, 
 at the time of the confusion, in the beginning of the fight, 
 was made with great energy and dispatch, and was just in 
 time to prevent a serious disaster. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was resumed, 
 and a very heavy attack was made on the front occupied by 
 Pegram's brigade (now under the command of Colonel Hoff- 
 mao, of the 31st Virginia Regiment) ; but it was handsomely 
 repulsed, as were several subsequent attacks at the same 
 point. 
 
 These attacks were so persistent, that two regiments of 
 Johnson!?.. division were moved to the rear of Pegram's bri- 
 gade, for the purpose of supporting it ; and, when an ofier 
 was made to relieve it, under the apprehension that its am- 
 munition might be exhausted, the men of that gallant brigade 
 begged that they naight be allowed to retain their position. 
 
18 BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 Stating that they were getting along very well indeed, and 
 wanted no help. 
 During the morning, the fact was communicated to Gene- 
 • ral Ewell, by our cavalry scouts, that a column of the ene- 
 my's infantry was moving between our left and the river, 
 with the apparent purpose of turning our left flank ; and in- 
 formation was also received that Burnside's corps had crossed 
 the river, and was in rear erf the enemy's right. I received 
 directions to watch this column, and take steps to prevent its 
 getting to our rear ; and Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' divisi- 
 on, w~hich had just arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent 
 to me for that purpose. This brigade, with some artillery, 
 was put in position, some distance to my left, so as to 
 command some bye-roads coming in from the river. In 
 the meantime General Gordon had sent out a scouting 
 party on foot, which discovered what was supposed to be 
 the enemy's right ffank resting in the woods, in front of 
 my division ; and, during my absence while posting Johnston's 
 brigade, he reported the fact to Greneral Ewell, and suggested 
 the propriety of attacking this flank oi the enemy with his. 
 brigade, which was not engaged. On my return, the subject 
 was mentioned to me by General Ewell, and I stated to him 
 the danger and risk of making the attack under the circum- 
 stances, as a column was threatening our left flank, and 
 Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's flank on which 
 the attack was suggested. General Ewell concurred with 
 me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the attempt at that 
 time was obvious, as we had no reserves, and, if it failed, 
 and the enemy showed any enterprise, a serious disaster 
 would befall, not only our corps, but General Lee's whole army. 
 In the afternoon, when the column threatening our left had 
 been withdrawn, and it had been ascertained that Burnside 
 had gone to Grant's left, on account of the heavy fighting on 
 that flank, at my suggestion. General Ewell ordered the move- 
 ment which Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it 
 with Gordon's brigade supported by Johnston's, and to follow 
 it up, if successful, with the rest of my division. Gordon's 
 
BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 19 
 
 brigade was accordingly formed in line near the edge of 
 the woods in which the enemy's right rested, and Johnston's 
 in the rear, with orders to follow Gordon and obey his orders. 
 I posted my Adjutant General, Major John W. Daniel, with a 
 courier, in a position to be communicated with by Gordon, so 
 as to inform me of the success attending the movement, and 
 enable me to put in the other brigades at the right time. As 
 soon as Gordon started, which was a very short time before' 
 sunset, I rode to my line and threw forward Pegram's brigade' 
 in a position to move when required. In the meantime Gor- 
 don had become engaged, and, while Pegram's brigade was 
 being formed in line, I saw some of Gordon's men coming 
 back in confusion, and Colonel Evans, of the 31st Georgia 
 Regiment, endeavoring to rally them. Colonel Evans informed 
 me that his regiment, which was on Gordon's right, had 
 struck the enemy's breastworks and had given way. I im- 
 mediately ordered Pegram's brigade forward, and directed 
 Colonel Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a dense 
 thicket of underbrush, but it crossed the road running through 
 Johnston's line, and struck the enemy's works, and one of the 
 regiments, the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Terrill, got 
 possession of part of the line, when Colonel Hoffman ordered 
 the brigade to retire, as it was getting dark, and there was 
 much confusion produced by the difficulties of the advance. 
 Gordon had struck the enemy's right flank behind breastworks, 
 and a part of his brigade was thrown into disorder. In going 
 through the woods, Johnston had obliqued too much and 
 passed to Gordon's left, getting in rear of the enemy. Major 
 Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeavored to get to 
 him, when, finding the condition of things, he attempted to 
 lead one of Pegram's regiments to his assistance, and was 
 shot down while behaving with great gallantry, receiving a 
 wound in the leg which has permanently disabled him. Not- 
 withstanding the confusion in part of his brigade, Gordon 
 succeeded in throwing the enemy's right flank into great con- 
 fusion, capturing two brigadier generals (Seymour and Shaler), 
 aad several hundred prisoners, all of the 6th Corps, under 
 
m BATTI-ES OF THE WIt-DEBlVEaB. 
 
 Sedgwick. The advance of Pegram's brigade, and the de- 
 monstration of Johnston's brigade in the rear, where it en- 
 countered a part af the enenjy's force and captured some 
 prisoners, contributed materially to the result. It was fortanatey 
 however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy,, 
 if he had been able to discover the disorder on oar side, might 
 have brought up fresh trQ€^ and availed himself of our con- 
 dition. As it was, doubtless,, the lateness of the hour caused 
 him to- be surprised, and the approaching darkness increased 
 the confusion in his ranks, as he could not see the 
 strength of the attacking force, and probably imagined it to 
 be much more formidable than it really was. AH of the bri- 
 gades engaged in the attack were drawn back, and formed 
 on a new line in front of the old one, and obliquely to it. 
 
 At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made, 
 which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line 
 of works in front of my whole line, and a good portion of 
 Johnston's. Between the lines,, a large number of his dead 
 had been left, and, at his breastworks, a large number of 
 muskets and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was 
 every indication of great confusion. It was not till then, that 
 We ascertained the full extent of the success attending the 
 movement of the evening before. The enemy had entirely 
 abandoned the left side of the road, across which Johnson's 
 line extended, and my division and a part of bis were thrown 
 forward, occupying a part of the abandoned works on the 
 right of the road, and leaving all those on t^ie left in our rear. 
 This rendered our line straight, the left having been pre- 
 viouisly thrown back, making a curve. 
 
 During this day there was some skirmishing, but no serious 
 fighting in my front. The loss in my division during the 
 fighting in the Wilderness was comparatively light. 
 
 On the morning of the Stb, it was discovered that the er»emy 
 was leaving our front and moving towards Spottsylvania 
 Court House. General Lee's army was also put in motion ; 
 EwelPs Corps moviiig along the line occupied by our troops 
 on the day before, until it reached the Rank Road, where it 
 
BATTLES OF THK WILDERNESS. 21 
 
 Struck across to Shady Grove, which is on the road from 
 Orange Court House to Spottsylvania Court House. 
 
 On reaching the Plank Road, I received through General 
 A. P. Hill, who was sick and unable to remain on duty, an 
 order from General Lee, transferring Hays' brigade from my 
 division to Johnson's, in order thai it might be consolidated 
 with anotlier Louisiana brigade in that division, whose Briga- 
 dier-General had been killed at the Wilderness, and Johnston's 
 brigade from Rodes' division to mine ; and assigning me to 
 the temporary command of Hill's corps, which was still in 
 position across the Plank Road, and was to bring up the rear. 
 I accordingly turned over the command of my division to 
 Gordon, the senior Brigadier left with it, and assumed com- 
 mand of Hill's corps.* 
 
 •In his official report. Grant says : " Early on the 5th, the advance corps, the 
 fith, Majgr-General G. K. Warren commanding, met and engaged the enemy 
 outside his entrenchments near Mine Kun ; " and further on he says : " On the 
 morning of the llh, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind 
 his entrenched lines, with pickets to the front covering a part of the battle field. 
 Prom this it was evident to my mind that the two days fighting had satisfied 
 him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwilh- 
 atauding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack t'ehmdhis 
 works •' In mentioning his movement towards Spottsylvania Court House, he 
 says : "But the enemy having beo.'me aware of our movement, and having the 
 shorter line, was enabled to reach there first." If these statements were true, ttie 
 only legitimate inference is. that Generq,! Lee had an ^nrrenched lino on, or near 
 I\Iine Run, previou^ly established | that the battle commenced immediately in 
 front of the works on this line ; and that, after the two days fighting, he: had 
 fallen behind them to await an attack. Whereas the fact is, that the only 
 entrenched line on, or near, Mine Bun, was that made^ on its west bank, when 
 Meade crossed the river at the end of November 18(13, and which was used for 
 that occasion only. The fighting in the Wilderness began eight or ten miles east 
 of that line, and at no time during tiiat fighting was it used for any purpose. 
 The ' entrenched lines " occupied by our arniy on the morning of the 7th, were 
 slight temporary works thrown up, on, or in front of the battle field, though it 
 is probable that, at some points, the line may not have been as far to the front 
 as our troops had advanced ; as, in taking it, regard was necessarily had to the 
 conformation of the ground. On our left, as will be seen above, the line was 
 advanced in front of Grant's own line of the previous day. 
 
 Grant says General Lee had the advantage of position As the latter had to 
 move from his lines on the Rapidan and attack Graut in the Wilderness, how 
 
BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
 HOUSE. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF HILL'S COUPS. 
 
 Hill's Corps was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's, and 
 Mahone's (formerly Anderson's) divisions of infantry, and 
 three battalions of artillery under Colonel Walker. When I 
 took command of it, the infantry numbered about 13,000 
 muskets for duty. 
 
 General Lee's orders to me, were to move by Todd's 
 tavern along the Brock Road to Spottsylvania Court House, as 
 soon as our front was clear of the enemy. In order to get 
 into that road, it was necessary to reopen an old one leading 
 from Hill's right, by which I was enabled to take a cross road 
 leading into the road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern. 
 The waggon trains and all the artillery, except one battalion, 
 were sent around by Shady Grove. About a mile from the 
 road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern, the enemy's 
 cavalry videtles were encountered, and Mahone's division 
 was thrown forward to develope the enemy's force and 
 position. Mahone encountered a force of infantry, which had 
 moved up from Todd's tavern towards Shady Grove, and 
 had quite a brisk engagement with it, causing it to fall back 
 rapidly towards the former place. At the same time, General 
 Hampton, who had commnnicated with me, after I left the 
 Plank Road, moved with his cavalry on my right and struck 
 
 happened it that he was enabled to get the advantage of position, after the 
 two days fighting? He also says that General Lee was enabled to reach 
 Spottsylvania Court House, first, because he had the shorter line. The fact is, 
 that, as the two armies lay in their position* at the Wilderness, their lines were 
 parallel to the road to Spottsylvania Court House. Grant had the possession of 
 the direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had to move 
 on the circuitous route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled to arrive there first 
 with part of his infantry, because his cavalry held Grant's advance in check for 
 nearly an entire day, 
 
BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. 23 
 
 the enemy on the flank and rear ; but on account of want of 
 knowledge of the country on our part, and the approach of 
 darkness, the enemy was enabled to make his escape. This 
 affair developed the fact that the enemy was in possession of 
 Todd's tavern and the Brock Road, and a continuation of my 
 march would have led though his entire array. We bivouacked 
 for the night, at the place from whicli Mahone had driven the 
 enemy, and a force was thrown oat towards Todd's tavern, 
 which was about a mile distant. 
 
 Very early next morning, (the 9th,) I received an order from 
 General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the Shady Grove 
 road towards Spottsylvannia Court House, which I did, 
 crossing a small river called the Po, twice. After reaching 
 the rear of the position occupied by the other two corps, I was 
 ordered to Spottsylvannia Court House, to take position on 
 the right, and cover the road from that place to Fredericksburg. 
 No enemy appeared in my front on this day, except at a dis- 
 tance on the Fredericksburg Road. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 10th, I was ordered to move 
 one of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of the Po 
 on the Shady Grove Road ; and to move with another divi- 
 sion, to the rear and left, by the way of Spottsylvannia Old 
 Court House, and drive back a column of the enemy which 
 had crossed the Po and taken possession of the Shady Grove 
 Road, thus threatening our rear and endangering our trains, 
 which were on the road leading by the Old Court House to 
 Louisa Court House, 
 
 Our line was then north of the Po, with its left. Fields' 
 division of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream, just 
 above the crossing of the Shady Grove Road. The whole of 
 the enemy's force was also north of the Po, prior to this 
 movement of his. Mahouf^'s division was sent to occupy the 
 banks of the Po on Field's left, while, with Heth's division 
 and a battalion of artillery, I moved to the rear, crossing the 
 Po on the Louisa Court House Road, and then following that 
 road until we reached one coming in from Waite's Shop on 
 the Shady Grove Road. After moving about a mile on this 
 
34 BATTLES OF SPOT^TSYLVANIA C. H. 
 
 road, we met Hampton ^adually falling back before the 
 enemy, who had pushed out a colamn of infantry considerably 
 to the rear of our line. This column was, in turn, forced 
 back to the position on the Shady Grove Road, which was 
 occupied by what was reported to be Hancock's corps. 
 Following up and crossing a small stream juat below a mill 
 pond, we succeeded in reaching Waite's Shop, from whence 
 an attack was made on the enemy, and the entire force 
 which had crossed the Po was driven back with a loss of one 
 piece of artillery, which fell into our hands, and a consid- 
 erable number in killed and wounded. This relieved us 
 from a very threatening danger, as the position the enemy 
 had attained would have enabled him to completely enfilade 
 Field's position, and get possession of the line of our com- 
 munications to the rear, within a very short distance of which 
 he was, when met by the force which drove him back. In 
 this affair, Heth's division behaved very handsomely, all of 
 the brigades, (Cook's, Davis', Kirkland's, and Walker's,) 
 being engaged in the attack. General H. H. Walker had 
 the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the fool, which 
 rendered amputation necessary, but, otherwise, our loss was 
 slight. A s soon as the road was cleared, Mahone's division 
 crossed the Po, but it was not practicable to pursue the affair 
 further, as the north bank of the stream at this point was 
 covered by a heavily entrenched line, with a number of 
 batteries, and night was approaching. 
 
 On the morning of the 11th, Heth was moved back to 
 Spoltsylvaiiia Court House, and Malone was left to occupy 
 the position on the Shady Grove Road, from which the enemy 
 had been driven.* 
 
 My line on the right had been connected with Ewell's 
 
 * It will be seen, that after this affair, I held, for a time, both of General 
 Lee's flanks, wtiich was rather an anomaly, but it could not be ayoided, as we 
 had no reserves, and the two other corps, being immediately in front of the enemy 
 in line of battle, and almost constantly engaged, could not be moved without 
 great risk. It was absDlutely necessary to occupy the position held on the left 
 by Malone, to avoid a renewal of the danger from which we bad escaped. 
 
BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. 25 
 
 right, and covered the Fredericksburg Road, as also the road 
 leading from Spottsylvannia Court House across the Ny into 
 the road from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Wilcox 
 was on my left uniting with Ewell, and Heth joined him. 
 The enemy had extended his lines across ihe Fredericksburg 
 Road, but there was no fighting on this front on the 10th or 
 1 1th, except some artillery firing. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 11th, the enemy was demonstrating 
 to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession of Shady Grove 
 and the road from thence to Louisa Court House. General 
 Hampton reported a column of infantry moving up the Po, 
 and I was ordered by General Lee to take possession of Shady 
 Grove, by light next morning, and hold it against the enemy. 
 To aid in that purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's division, 
 (Thomas' and Scales') were moved from the right, and 
 Mahone was ordered to move before light to Shady Grove ; 
 but during the night it was discovered that the movement to 
 our left was a feint, and that there was a real movement of 
 the enemy towards our right. 
 
 Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's 
 brigades were returned to him, and at dawn, Mahone's divi- 
 sion was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that 
 division to cover the crossing of the Po on Field's left. On 
 this morning, the enemy made a very heavy attacic on Ewell's 
 front, and broke the line where it was occupied by Johnson's 
 division. A portion of the attacking force swept along John- 
 son's line to Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt 
 movement on the part of Brigadier General Lane, who was 
 on that flank. As soon as the firing was heard, General 
 Wilcox sent Thomas' and Scales' brigades to Lane's assist- 
 ance, and they arrived just as Lane's brigade had repulsed 
 this body of the enemy, and they pursued it for a short dis- 
 tance. As soon as Mahone's division arrived from the left, 
 Perrin's and Harris' brigades of that division, and subse- 
 quently, McGowan's brigade of Wilcox's division were sent 
 to General Ewell's assistance, and were carried into action 
 under his orders. Brigadier General Perrln was killed, 
 
36 BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLTANIA C. H. 
 
 and Brigadier General McGowan severely wounded, while 
 gallantly leading tlieir respeclivb brigades into action; and 
 all the brigades sent to Ewell's assistance suffered severely. 
 Sabsequently, on the same day, under orders from General 
 Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division, and Mahone's own 
 brigade (under Colonel Weisiger), were thrown to the front, 
 for the purpose of moving to the left, and attacking the fiank 
 of the column of the enemy which had broken Ewell's line, 
 to relieve the pressure on him, and, if possible, recover the 
 part of the line which had been lost. Lane's brigade com- 
 menced the movement and had not proceeded far, when it 
 encountered and attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my 
 line, the 9th corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a 
 salient on my front. Lane captured over three hundred 
 prisoners, and three battle flags, and his attack on the enemy's 
 flank, taking him by surprise, no doubt, contributed materially 
 to his repulse. Mahone's brigade did not become seriously 
 engaged. The attacking column which Lane encountered, 
 got up to within a very short distance of a salient defended 
 by Walker's brigade of Heth's division, under Colonel Mayo, 
 before it was discovered, as there was a pine thicket in front, 
 under cover of which the advance was made. A heavy fire 
 of musketry from Walker's brigade, and Thomas' which was 
 on its left, and a fire of artillery from a considerable number 
 of guns on Heth's line, were opened With tremendous effect 
 upon the attacking column, and it was driven back with 
 heavy loss, leaving its dead in front of our works. This affair 
 took place under the eye of General Lee himself. In the 
 afternoon, another attempt was made to carry out the contem- 
 plated flank movement, with Mahone's brigade, and Cook's 
 brigade of Heth's division, to be followed up by the other 
 troops under my command ; but it was discovered that the 
 enemy had one or more entrenched lines in our front, to the 
 fire from which our flanking column would have been ex- 
 posed. Moreover, the ground between the lines was very 
 rough, being full of rugged ravines and covered with thick 
 pines and other growth.; and it was thought advisable to 
 
BATTiiES or SPOTTSYLVANIA C, H. ST 
 
 desist from the attempt. The two brigades which were to 
 have comraenced the movement, were then thrown to the 
 front on both sides of the Fredericicsburg road, and, passing 
 over two lines of breastworlis, defended by a strong force of 
 skirmishers, developed the existence of a third and much 
 stronger line in rear, which would have afforded an almost 
 insuperable obstacle to the proposed flank mo\ement This 
 closed the operations of the corps under my command oii the 
 memorable 12th of May. 
 
 Between that day and the 19th, there was no serious attack 
 on my front, but much manoeuvring by the enemy. General 
 Mahone made two or three reconnoissances to the front, which 
 disclosed the fact that the enemy was gradually moving to 
 our right. In making one of them, he encountered a body of 
 the enemy which had got possession of Gayle's house, on the left 
 of the road leading from our right towards the Fredericksburg 
 and Hanover Junction road, at which a portion of our cavalry, 
 under Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previously 
 posted, and drove it back across the Ny.* Another recon- 
 noissance, handsomely made by Brigadier General Wright, 
 who had been brought from the left, ascertained that a heavy 
 force of the enemy was between the Ny and the Po, in front 
 of my right, which was held by Mahone, and was along the 
 road towards Hanover Junction. To meet this movement of 
 the enemy. Fields' division was brought from the left and 
 placed on my right. 
 
 On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against the* 
 enemy's right, and to Create a diversion in his favour, Thomas' 
 brigade was thrown forward, and drove the enemy into his 
 works in front of the salient, against which Burnside's attack 
 had been made on the 12th, while the whole corps was held 
 
 • The Mattapony EiTer, wbicb, by Ua junction witb the Pamunkey, forms 
 York River, ia formed by the confluence of four strcama, called respectively, the 
 " Mat," " Ta," " Po," and " Ny," The Ny ia north and east of Spottsylvannia 
 Court House, and behind it the enemy did ^ost of bis manoeuvring in ny front. 
 It unites witb the Po, a few miles to the east and south of Spottsylvannia Court 
 House, and both.itrcams are difilcalt to eiosa, ezeept where there are bridges. 
 
28 BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLTANIA C. H. 
 
 in readiness to co-operate with Ewell, should his attack prove 
 successful ; but, as he was compelled to retire, Thomas was 
 withdrawn. 
 
 Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and Wilcox's 
 fronts; and, on the afternoon of the 21st, Wilcox was sent 
 out on the road leading from Mahone's front across the Ny, 
 with two of his brigades to feel the enemy, and found him 
 still in force behind entrenched lines, and had a brisk engage- 
 ment with that force. 
 
 While Wilcox was absent, an order was received by me, 
 from General Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command 
 of his corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once, 
 and thus terminated my connection with this corps, which I 
 had commanded during all the trying scenes around Spott- 
 sylvannia Court House. The officers and men of the corps 
 had all behaved well, and contributed, in no little degree, to 
 the result by which Grant was compelled to wait six days for 
 reinforcements from Washington, before he could resume the 
 offensive, or make another of his flank movements to get be- 
 tween General Lee's army and Richmond. 
 
 HANOVER JUNCTION. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION. 
 
 The movement of the enemy to get between our army and 
 
 Richmond had been discovered, and, on the afternoon of the 
 
 21st, Ewell's corps was put in motion towards Hanover 
 
 Junction.* After turning over to General Hill, the command 
 
 •Hanover Junction is about 22 miles from Richmond, and is at the intersection 
 of the Richmond Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad with the Central rail- 
 road from Richmond west, via Gordonsville and Staunton. It is on the direct 
 road both from Spotts^Ivanuia Court House and Fredericksburg to Richmond. 
 The North Anna River ia north of the Junction abont tiro miles, and the South 
 Anna about three miles south of it. These two streams unite south of east, and 
 a few miles from the Junction, and form the Pamunkey River. 
 
OPERATIONS AT HANOVER JUNCTION. 29 
 
 of his corps, I rode in the direction taken by Ewell'a corps, 
 and overtook it, a short time before day on the morning of the 
 22nd. Hoke's brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis, this 
 day joined us from Petersburg, and an order was issued trans- 
 ferring Gordon's brigade, now under the command of Brigadier 
 General Evans, to Johnson's division, which was placed 
 under the command of General Gordon, who had been made 
 a Major General. This left me in command of three brigades, 
 to wit ; Pegram's, Hoke's, and Johnston's, all of which were 
 very much reduced in strength. My Adjutant General, Major 
 Daniel, had been disabled for life by a wound received at the 
 Wilderness, and my Inspector General, Major Samuel Hale, 
 had been mortally wounded at Spottsylvannia Court House, 
 on the 12th, while serving with the division and acting with 
 great gallantry during the disorder which ensued after Ewell's 
 line was broken. Both were serious losses to me. 
 
 On this day, (the 22nd), we moved to Hanover Junction, and, 
 next day my division was posted on the extreme right, cover- 
 ing a ferry two or three miles below the railroad bridge across 
 the North Anna. While at Hanover Junction my division 
 was not engaged. At one time it was moved towards our 
 left, for the purpose of supporting a part of the line on which 
 an attack was expected, and moved back again without being 
 required. It was, subsequently, placed temporarily on the 
 left of the corps, relieving Rodes' division and a part of Fields' 
 while the line was being remodelled, and then took position 
 on the right again. 
 
 During , the night of the 26th, the enemy again withdrew 
 from our front.* 
 
 •At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Long- 
 street's corps, and Breckinridge witli two small brigades of infantry, and a 
 battalion of artillery. These, with Hoke's brigade, were the first and only rein- 
 forcements received by General Lee since the opening of the campaign. Yet, 
 Grant's immense army, notwithstanding the advantage gained by it on the 12th 
 of May, bad been so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days at Spott- 
 sylvannia Court House for reinforcements from Washington, before it could 
 resume the offensive. Breckinridge's infantry numbered less than 3000 muskets ; 
 yet, Grant puts it at 16000, and he makes an absurd attempt to cast the wbole- 
 O 
 
BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 
 
 OPERATIONS OP EWELL'S CORPS. 
 
 On the 37th, the enemy having withdrawn to the north bank 
 of the north Anna, and commenced another flank movement 
 by moving down the north bank of the Pamunkey, Ewell's 
 corps, now under my command, by reason of General Ewell's 
 sickness, was moved across the South Anna over the bridge 
 of the Central railroad, and by a place called " Merry Oaks,'' 
 leaving Ashland on the Richmond Fredericksburg and Poto- 
 mac railroad to the right, and bivouacked for the night at 
 Hughes' cross road, the intersection of the road from Ashland 
 to Atlee's station on the Central railroad with the road from 
 the Merry Oaks to Richmond. Next morning I moved by 
 Atlee's station to Hundley's corner, at the intersection of the 
 road from Hanover Town, (the point at which Grant crossed 
 the Pamunkey,) by Polte Green Church, to Richmond, with 
 the road from Atlee's station, by Old Church in Hanover 
 County, to the White House, on the Pamunkey. This is the 
 point from which GeneralJackson commenced hisfamous attack 
 on McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862, and it was very im- 
 portant that it should be occupied, as it intercepted Grant's 
 direct march towards Richmond. All these movements were 
 made under orders from General Lee. 
 
 My troops were placed in position, covering the road by 
 Pole Creen Church, and also the<road to Old Church, with my 
 right resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running 
 
 blame for the failure of the campai^, bo far, on Bntler ; to immolate whom he 
 makes a digression in his account of the operations at Hanover Junction, and 
 ssljb: " The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed 
 itself up at Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not 
 all the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the Army 
 of the Potomac." He therefore determined to try another flank moTement, and 
 to get more reinforcements from the army at Bermuda Hundreds. 
 
BATTLES OF COLD HARBOTJH. 31 
 
 towards Mechanicsville and into the Chickahominy. Brig- 
 adier General Ramseur of Rodes' division, was this day 
 assigned to the command of my division. E well's corps, the 
 2nd of the Army of Northern Virginia, now numbered less 
 than 9,000 muskets for duty, its loss, on the 12th of May, hav- 
 ing been very heavy. 
 
 On the 29th, the enemy having crossed the Tottopotomoy, 
 (a creek running just north of Pole Green church, and east- 
 ward to the Paraunkey,) appeared in my front on both roads, 
 and there was some skirmishing, but no heavy fighting. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 30th, in accordance with orders 
 from General Lee, I moved to the right across Beaver Dam, 
 to the road from Old Church to Mechanicsville, and thence 
 along that road towards Old Church, until we reached Bethesda 
 Church. At this point the enemy was encountered, and his 
 troops which occupied the road, were driven by Rodes' divi- 
 sion towards the road from Hundley's corner, which unites 
 with the road from Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Church. 
 Pegram's brigade, under the command of Colonel Edward 
 Willis of the 12th Georgia regiment, was sent forward, with 
 one of Rodes' brigades on its right, to feel the enemy, and 
 ascertain his strength ; but, meeting with a heavy force behind 
 breastworks, it was compelled to retire, with the loss of some 
 valuable officers and men, and among them were Colonel 
 Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel Terrill of the 13th 
 Virginia regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Watkins of the 
 52nd Virginia regiment, killed. This movement' showed that 
 the enemy was moving to our right ilank, and at night, I with- 
 drew a short distance on the Mechanicsville road, covering it 
 with my force. When I made the movement from Hundley's 
 corner, my position at that place was occupied by a part of 
 Longstreet's corps, under Anderson. 
 
 On the next morning, my troops were placed in position on 
 the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to Mechanicsville, 
 but Rodes was subsequently moved to the west side of the 
 ereek. 
 
 Grant's movement to our right, towards Cold Harbour, was 
 
32 BATTLES OF COLD HARBOCH. 
 
 continued on the 31st, and the 1st of June, and corresponding 
 movements were made by General Lee to meet him, my com- 
 mand retaining its position with a heavy force in its front. 
 
 On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, eKcept Heth's division 
 of Hill's corps, had moved to the right, and, in the after- 
 noon of that day, Rodes' division moved forward, along the 
 road from Hundley's corner towards Old Church, and drove 
 the enemy from his entrenchments, now occupied with heavy 
 skirmish lines, and forced back his left towards Bethesda 
 Church, where there was a heavy force. Gordon swung 
 round so as to keep pace with Rodes, and Heth co-operated, 
 following Rodes and taking position on his left flank. In this 
 movement there was some heavy fighting and several hun- 
 dred prisoners were taken by us. Brigadier-General Doles, 
 a gallant officer of Rodes' division, was killed, but otherwise 
 our loss was not severe. 
 
 On the next day (the 3rd.), when Grant made an attack at 
 Cold Harbour in which he suffered very heavily, there were 
 repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those on Cook's 
 brigade, of Heth's division, being especially heavy, but all of 
 them were repulsed. There was also heavy skirmishing on 
 Gordon's front. During the day, Heth's left was threatened 
 by the enemy's cavalry, but it was keptofFby Walker's brigade 
 under Colonel Fry, which covered that flank, and also repulsed 
 an eflbrt of the enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As it was 
 necessary that Heth's division should join its corps on the right, 
 and my flank in this position was very much exposed, I with- 
 drew at the close of the day to the line previously occupied, 
 and next morning Heth moved to the right. 
 
 My right now connected with the left of Longstreet's corps 
 under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently evacu- 
 ated his position at Bethesda Church and his lines in my front, 
 and, having no opposing force to keep my troops in their lines, 
 I made two efforts to attack the enemy on his right flank and 
 rear. The first was made on the 6th, when I crossed the 
 Matadaquean (a small stream, running through wide swamps 
 in the enemy's rear), and got in rear of his right flank, driving 
 
BATTLES or COLD HARBOUR. 33 
 
 in his skirmishers until we came to a swamp, which could be 
 crossed only on a narrow causeway defended by an entrenched 
 line with artillery. General Anderson was to have co-operated 
 with me, by moving down the other side of the Matadaquean, 
 but the division sent for that purpose did not reach the position 
 from which I started until near night, and I was therefore 
 compelled to retire as my position was too much exposed. 
 
 On the next day (the 7th.), a reconnoissance made in front of 
 Anderson's line, showed that the greater part of it was uncov- 
 ered, and, in accordance with instructions from General Lee, 
 1 moved in front of, and between it and the Matadaquean, until 
 my progress was arrested by a ravine and swamp which pre- 
 vented any further advance, but a number of pieces of artillery 
 were opened upon the enemy's position in flank and reverse, 
 so as to favour a movement from Anderson's front, which had 
 been ordered but was not made ; and at night I retired from 
 this position to the rear of our lines. 
 
 Since the fighting at the Wilderness, Grant had made it an 
 invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear, with a 
 perfect network of entrenchments, and all his movements were 
 made under cover of such works. It was therefore very diffi- 
 cult to get at him. 
 
 On the 11th., ray command was moved to the rear of Hill's 
 line, near Gaines' Mill ; and, on the 12th , I received orders 
 to move, with the 2nd. corps, to the Shenadoah Valley, to 
 meet Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection with the 
 campaign from the Rapidan to James River. 
 
 When I moved, on the morning of the 13th., Grant had al- 
 ready put his array in motion to join Butler, on James River, 
 a position which he could have reached, from his camps on 
 the north of the Rapidan, by railroad and transports, without 
 the loss of a man. In attempting to force his way by land, he 
 had already lost, in killed and wounded, more men than were 
 in General Lee's entire army ; and he was compelled to give 
 up, in despair, the attempt to reach Richmond in that way.* 
 
 • Grant, ia describing liis morement from Spottsylvania Court House to Han- 
 orer Junction, sajs ; " But the eoBmy again having the shorter line, and being in 
 
34 NOTE ON THE REPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON. 
 
 possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North-Anna in adranoe 
 of us, and took position behind it." And, when he speaks of his final determina- 
 tion to join Butler, he says : '' After the Battle of the Wilderness it was evident 
 that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risk with the army 
 he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or, feebly 
 on the offensiTe, immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, 
 he could retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was wil- 
 ling to make, all could not be accomplished that I designed north of Rich- 
 mond." 
 
 Mr. Secretary Stanton, with a keenness of strategic acumen which is alto- 
 gether unparalleled, says : "Forty three days of desperate fighting or march- 
 ing, by day and night, forced back the rebel army from the Eapidan to their en- 
 trenchments around Richmond, and carried the Army of the Potomac to the 
 south side of James River. The strength of the enemy's force when the 
 campaign opened, or the extent of his loss, is not known to this Department. 
 Any inequality between Lee's army and the Army of the Potomac, was fully 
 compensated by the advantage of position." 
 
 We are left in the dark whether it was the desperate fighting or the desperate 
 marching which did all this ; but, however that may be, it was a wonderful 
 achievement, especially when it is considered that the Army of the Potomac 
 nught have been carried to the south side of James River by transports, and 
 Lee's army thereby forced back to the entrenchments around Richmond, with- 
 out the " Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching, by day and 
 night," and without the loss of men sustained by Grant There are some who 
 think Stanton is slyly making fun of Grant ; but, if he is not, and is in dead 
 earnest, the question naturally arises, in the mind of one not as gifted as the 
 Federal Secretary of War: How happened it that, if Lee was being constantly 
 forced back, for forty-three days, over a distance of more than eighty miles, he 
 always had the shorter line, and posses-ion of the main roads, and got the ad- 
 vantage of position, and had time to fortify it ? 
 
 I happen to know that General Lee always had the greaiest anjsiety to strike 
 at Grant, in the open field ; and I should like to know when it was that the 
 latter operated on the defensive, or offensive either, except behind, or immedi- 
 ately in front of, far better entrenchments than General Lee's army, with its 
 limited means, was able to make. An inspection of the battle-fields, from the 
 Rapidan to the James, will show that Grant's army did a vast deal more dig- 
 ging than General Lee's. 
 
 ^e truth is, that the one commander was a great captain, and perfect master 
 of his art, while the other had none of the requisites of a great captain, but 
 merely possessed the most ordinary brute courage, and had the control of un- 
 limited numbers and means. Tet, it is claimed that Grant fights and writes 
 better than Alexander, and Hannibal, and Csesar, and Napoleon, and all the 
 rest ; and when, in the exercise of his great powers of composition, he turns 
 the batteries of his rhetoric on Butler, I say, in his own classic languoge, " Go 
 in I " You can't hit him a lick amiss 1 I cannot, however, but be amused at 
 the effort to make Butler the soape-goat ; and cannot help thinking that Grant 
 ought to have known, beforehand, that he (Butler) was unfit to make war, ex- 
 
NOTE ON THE REPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON, 35 
 
 cept on defenceless women and children, and that the trophies valued by him 
 were not those won at the cannon's mouth. 
 
 Grant, in his report, has enunciated the leading principles of his strategy, 
 and he is certainly entitled to the credit of having practised them, if not to the 
 merit of originality. They were : " First, to' use the greatest number of troops 
 practicable against the armed force of the enemy ; " and, "^ Second, to hammer 
 continuously against the armed force of the enemy, and his resources, until, by 
 mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left to him but an 
 equal submission, with the loyal section of our common country, to the consti- 
 tution and laws of the land." (Alas I what has become of the constitution and 
 laws?) This latter principle was more concisely and forcibly expressed by Mr. 
 Lincoln, when he declared his purpose to ''lieep a-pegging," The plain Eng- 
 lish of the whole idea was to continue raising troops, and to oppose them, in 
 overwhelming numbers, to the Confederate Army, until the latter should wear 
 itself out whipping them, when a newly-recruited army might '' go in and 
 win.'' And, this was actually what tool: place in regard to General Lee's 
 army. 
 
 Grant having established his fame as a writer, as well as fighter, I presume 
 he will give the world the benefit of his ideas, and publish a work on strategy, 
 which I would suggest ought to be called " The Lincoln-Grant or Pegging- 
 Hammer Art of War." 
 
 He has made some observations, in his report, about the advantages of inte- 
 rior lines of communication, supposed to be possessed by the Confederate com- 
 manders, which are more specious than sound. The Mississippi River divided 
 the Confederacy into two parts, and the immense naval power of the enemy 
 enabled him to render communication across that river, after the loss of New 
 Orleans and Memphis, always difBcult, and finally to get entire possession of it. 
 On the eastern side of it, the railroad communications were barely sufficient for 
 the transportation of supplies, and the transportation of tioops over them was 
 always tedious and difficult. The Ohio River, in the West, and the Potomac, in 
 the East, with the mountains of Western Virginia, rendered it impossible for an 
 invading army to march into the enemy's country, except at one or two fords 
 on the Potomac, just east of the Blue Ridge, and two or three fords above Har- 
 per's Ferry, The possession of the seas, and the blockade of our ports, as well 
 as the possession of the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Potomac Rivers, with the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
 Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee, enabled the enemy to transport 
 troops, from the most remote points, with more ease and rapidity than they 
 could be transported over the railroads under the control of the Confederate 
 Government, all of which were in bad condition. The enemy, therefore, in 
 fact had all the advantages of interior lines ; that is, rapidity of communica- 
 tion and concentration, with the advantage, also, of unrestricted communica- 
 tion with all the world, which his naval power gave him. 
 
CAMPAIG]^ m MARYLAIS^D 
 
 AND 
 
 THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA. 
 
 INTRODU CTION. 
 
 The Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces all 
 that country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany 
 Mountains, which unite at its south-western end. 
 
 The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley of 
 Virginia, embraces the Counties of Augusta, Rockingham, 
 Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jefferson and 
 Berkeley. This Valley is bounded on the north by the Potomac, 
 on the south by the County of Rockbridge, on the east by the 
 Blue Ridge, and on the west by the Great North Mountain 
 and its ranges. 
 
 The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches, called, 
 respectively, the " North Fork " and the " South Fork," which 
 unite near Front Royal in Warren County. The North Fork 
 rises in the Great North Mountain, and runs eastwardly to 
 within a short distance of New Market in Shenandoah County, 
 and thence north-east by Mount Jackson to Strasburg, where 
 it turns east to Front Royal. The South Fork is formed by 
 the union of North River, Middle River, and South River. 
 North River and Middle River, running from the west, unite 
 near Mount Meridian in Augusta County. South River rises 
 in the south-eastern part of Augusta, and runs by Waynesboro, 
 along the western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port Republic in 
 Rockingham, where it unites with the stream formed by the 
 
38 INTRODUCTIOPC. 
 
 junction of the North and Middle Rivers, a few miles above. 
 From Port Republic, the South Fork of the Shenandoah runs 
 north-east, through the eastern border of Rockingham and the 
 county of Page, to Front Royal in Warren County. 
 
 The North Fork and South Fork are separated by the Mas- 
 sanutten Mountain, which is connected with no other mount- 
 ain, but terminates abruptly at both ends. Its northern end is 
 washed at its base, just below Strasburg, by the North Fork. 
 Its southern end terminates near the road between Harrison- 
 burg and Conrad's Store on the South Fork, at which latter 
 place the road through Swift Run" Gap in the Blue Ridge 
 crosses that stream. Two valleys are thus formed, the one 
 on the North Fork being called " The Main Valley," and the 
 other on the South Fork, and embracing the County of Page 
 and part of the County of Warren, being usually known by 
 the name of " The Luray Valley." The Luray Valley unites 
 wilh the Main Valley at both ends of the mountain. There is 
 a good road across Massanutten Mountain, from one valley 
 1o the other, through a gap near New-Market. South of this 
 gap there is no road across the mountain, and north of it the 
 roads are very rugged and not practicable for the march of a 
 large army with its trains. At the northern or lower end of 
 Massanutten Mountain, and between two branches of it, is a 
 valley called " Powell's Fort Valley " or more commonly 
 " The Fort." This valley is accessible only by the very rugged 
 roads over the mountain which have been mentioned, and 
 through a ravine at its lower end. From its isolated position, 
 it was not the theatre of military operations of any consequence, 
 but merely furnished a refuge for deserters, stragglers, and 
 fugitives from the battle fields. 
 
 From Front Royal, the Shenandoah River runs along the 
 western base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's Ferry, where it 
 unites with the Potomac, which here bursts through the 
 raoimtains. The mountain in extension of the range of the 
 Blue Ridge from this point through Maryland and Pennsyl- 
 vania is called " South Mountain." 
 
 Strictly speaking, the County of Berkeley and the greater 
 
INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the Shenandoah. 
 The Opequon, rising south-west of Winchester, and crossing 
 the Valley Pike four or five miles south of that place, turns to 
 the north and empties into the Potomac some distance above 
 its junction with the Shenandoah; the greater part of Fred- 
 erick and nearly the whole of Berkeley being on the western 
 side of the Opequon. 
 
 Little North Mountain, called in the lower valley " North 
 Mountain," runs north-east, through the western portions of 
 Shenandoah, Frederick and Berkeley Counties, to the Potomac. 
 At its northern end, where it is called North Mountain, it 
 separates the waters of the Opequon from those of Back Creek. 
 
 Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of Little 
 North Mountain, and running north-east along its western base, 
 passes through that mountain, four or five miles from Stras- 
 burg, and, then making a circuit, empties into the North Fork 
 of the Shenandoah, about two miles below Strasburg. 
 
 The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac at 
 Harper's Ferry, and, passing through Martinsburg in Berkeley 
 County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs up the 
 Potomac, crossing the South Branch of that river near its 
 mouth, and tiien the North Branch to Cumberland in Mary- 
 land. From this place it runs into Virginia again and, passing 
 through North Western Virginia, strikes the Ohio River by 
 two stems terminating at Wheeling and Parkersburg respect- 
 ively. 
 
 There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, 
 called " The Winchester and Potomac Railroad," and also 
 one from Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad, through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge, by Front 
 Royal and Strasburg, to Mount Jackson, called " The 
 Manassas Gap Railroad ; " but both of these roads were torn up 
 and rendered unserviceable in the year 1862, under the orders 
 of General Jackson. 
 
 From Staunton in Augusta County, there is a fine mac- 
 adamized road called " The Valley Pike," running through 
 Mount Sydney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg, New Market, 
 
40 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Mount Jackson, Edinburg, Woodstock, Strasburg, Middle- 
 town, Newtown, Bartonsville and Kearnstown to Winchester 
 in Frederick County, and crossing Middle River seven miles 
 from Staunton, North River at Mount Crawford eighteen miles 
 from Staunton, the North Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount 
 Jackson, Cedar Creek between Strasburg and Middletown, 
 and the Opequon at Bartonsville, four or five miles from Win- 
 chester. There is also another road west of the Valley Pike, 
 connecting these several villages, called the " Back Road," 
 and, in some places, another road between the Valley Pike 
 and the Back Road, which is called the " Middle Road." 
 
 From Winchester there is a macadamized road, via Martins- 
 burg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Maryland, and 
 another, via Berryville in Clarke County, and Charlestown in 
 Jefferson County, to Harper's Ferry. There is also a good 
 pike from Winchester to Front Royal, which crosses both forks 
 of the Shenandoah just above their junction ; and from Front 
 Royal there are good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the 
 way of Conrad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg and 
 Staunton. 
 
 From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing through 
 Lexington, in Rockbridge Counfy, and Buchanan, in Botte- 
 tourte County, to several points on the Virginia and Tennessee 
 Railroad ; and others direct from Staunton and Lexington to 
 Lynchburg. 
 
 The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through the 
 Blue-Ridge, with a tunnel, at Rock-fish Gap, and runs 
 through Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly, to Jackson's 
 River, which is one of the head-streams of James River. 
 
 This description of the country is given in order to render 
 the following narrative intelligible without too much repe- 
 tition. 
 
 In the spring of 1864, before the opening of the campaign, 
 the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by the Federal 
 troops, under Major-General Sigel, with his head-quarters at 
 Winchester, while the upper Valley w^s held by Brigadier- 
 General Imboden, of the Confederate Army, with one brigade 
 
INTRODUCTION. 41 
 
 of cavalry, or mounted infantry, and a battery of artillery. 
 When the campaign, opened, Sigel moved up the Valley, and 
 Major-General Breckenridge moved from South-Western Vir- 
 ginia, with two brigades of infantry and a battalion of aMil- 
 lery, to meet him. Breckenridge,^ having .united his forces 
 with Imboden's, met and defeated Sigel, at New Market, on 
 the 1 5th day of May, driving him back towards Winchester. 
 Breckenridge then crossed the Blue Ridge, and joined Gene- 
 ral Lee, at Hanover Junction, with his two brigades of infan- 
 try and the battalion of artillery. Subsequently, the Federal 
 General Hunter organized another and larger force than 
 Sigel's, and moved up the Valley ; and, on the 5th day of 
 June, defeated Brigadier-General William E. Jones, at Pied- 
 mont, between Port Republic and. ^taunton — Jones' force 
 being composed of a very small body of infantry, and a 
 cavalry force which had been brought from South-Western 
 Virginia, after Breckenridge's departure from the Valley. 
 Jones was killed, and the remnant of his force, under Briga- 
 dier-General Vaughan, fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's 
 force then united with another column which had moved 
 from Lewisburg, in Western Virginia, under the Federal 
 General Crook. As soon as information was received of 
 Jones' defeat and death, Breckenridge was sent back to the 
 Valley, with the force he had brought with h m. 
 
MARCH TO LYXCHBURG, AND PURSUIT OF 
 HUNTER. 
 
 On the 12th of June, while the 2nd Corps (E well's) of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Gaines' Mill, in 
 rear of Hill's line at Cold Harbour, I received verbal orders 
 from General Lee, to hold the corps, with two of the batta- 
 lions of artillery attached to it, in readiness to move to the 
 Shenandoah Valley. Nelson's and Braxton's battalions were 
 selected, and Brigadier-General Long was ordered to accom- 
 pany me as Chief of Artillery. After dark, on the same day, 
 written instructions were given me by General Lee, by 
 which I was directed to move, with the force designated, at 
 3 o'clock next morning, for the Valley, by the way of Louisa 
 C.H. and Charlottesville, and through Brown's or Swift Run 
 Gap in the Blue Ridge, as I might find most advisable ; to 
 strike Hunter's force in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it ; 
 then to move down the valley, cross the Potomac near Lees- 
 burg in Loudon County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as I 
 might find most practicable, and threaten Washington City. 
 I was further directed to communicate with General Brecken- 
 ridge, who would co-operate with me in the attack on Hun- 
 ter, and the expedition into Maryland. 
 
 At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between Char- 
 lottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry force 
 from Hunter's army ; and those between Richmond and 
 Charlottesville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry, from 
 Grant's army ; so that there was no communication with 
 Breckenridge. Hunter was supposed to be at Staunton with 
 his whole force, and Breckenridge was supposed to be at 
 Waynesboro, or Rock-fish Gap. If such had been the case, 
 the route designated by General Lee would have carried me 
 into the Valley in Hunter's rear. 
 ' The 2nd Corps now numbered a little over 8,000 muskets 
 
MARCH TO LYNCHBURG. 43 
 
 for duly. It had been on active and arduous service in the 
 field for forty days, and had been engaged in all the great 
 battles from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour, sustaining very 
 heavy losses at Spottsylvania C.H., where it lost nearly an 
 entire division, including its commander, Major-General 
 Johnson, who was made prisoner. Of the Brigadier-Generals 
 with it at the commencement of the campaign, only one re- 
 mained in command of his brigade. Two (Gordcm and 
 Ramseur) had been made Major-Generals ; one (G. H. Steu- 
 art) had been captured ; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. Walker, 
 and R. D. Johnston) had been severely wounded ; and four 
 (Stafford, J. M. Jones, Daniel, and Doles) had beeti killed in 
 action. Constant exposure to the weather, a limited supply 
 of provisions, and two weeks' service in the swamps north of 
 the Chickahominy had told on the health of the men. Divi- 
 sions were not stronger than brigades ought to have been, nor 
 brigades than regiments. 
 
 On the morning of the ISth, at two o'clock, we commen- 
 ced the march; and, on the 16th, arrived at the Rivanna 
 River, near Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles 
 in four days.* 
 
 From Louisa C.H. I had sent a dispatch to Gordonsville, 
 to be forwarded, by telegraph, to Breckenridge ; and, on my 
 arrival at Charlottesville, on the 16th, to which place I rode 
 in advance of the troops. I received a telegram from him, 
 
 • On the 15th,, we passed over the ground, near TreTillian's depot, on which 
 Hampton and Sheridan had fought, on the 11th, and 12th. Hampton had de- 
 feated Sheridan, and was then in pursuit of him. Grant claims, in his repoit, 
 that, on the 11th., Sheridan drove our cavalry " from the field, in complete 
 rout ; " and says, when he advanced towards Gordonsville, on the 12th., " he 
 found the enemy reinforced hy infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, 
 about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to succf ssfuUy assault." 
 
 This is as thoroughly a fancy sketch as can well be manufactured. There 
 was not an infantry soldier in arms nearer the scene of action than with Gene- 
 ral Lee's army, near Cold Harbour ; and, the " well-constructed rifle-pits " 
 were nothing more than rails put up in the manner in which cav^ry were ac- 
 customed to arrange them to prevent a charge. . Sheridan mistook some of 
 Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for infantry; and the 
 Statement was made to cover his defeat. 
 
44 MARCH TO LYNCHBUHG. 
 
 dated at Lynchburg, informing me .that Hunter was then in 
 Bedford County, about twenty miles from that place, and 
 moving on it. 
 
 The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and 
 Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the 
 enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. The distance be- 
 tween the two places was sixty miles, and there were no 
 trains at Charlottesville, except one which belonged to the 
 Central road, and was about starting for Waynesboro. I or- 
 dered this to be detained, and immediately directed, by tele- 
 gram, all the trains of the two roads to be sent to me with all 
 dispatch, for the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynch- 
 burg. The trains were not in readiness to take the troops on 
 board until sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only 
 enough were furnished to transport about half of my infantry. 
 Ramseur's division, one brigade of Gordon's division, and 
 part of another were put on the trains, as soon as they were 
 ready, and started for Lynchburg. Rodes' division, and 
 the residue of Gordon's, were ordered to move along the 
 railroad, to meet the trains on their return. The artillery 
 and waggon-trains had been started on the ordinary roads, 
 at daylight. 
 
 I accompanied Ramseur's division, going on the front train, 
 but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that 
 I did not reach Lynch burg runtil about one o'clock in the after- 
 noon, and the other trains were much later. I found General 
 Breckmridge in bed, suffering from an injury received by the 
 fall of a horse killed under him in action near Cold Harbour. 
 He had moved from Rockfish Gap to Lynchburg by a forced 
 march, as soon as Hunter's movement towards that place was 
 discovered. When I showed him my instructions, he very 
 readily and cordially offered to co-operate with me, and serve 
 under my command. 
 
 Hunter's advance fron Staunton had been impeded by a 
 brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier General McCausland, 
 which had been managed with great skill, and kept in his 
 front all the way, and he was reported to be then advancing 
 
OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBURG. 45 
 
 on the old stone turnpike from Liberty in Bedford County by 
 New London, and watched by Imboden with a small force of 
 cavalry. 
 
 As General Breckenridge was unable to go out, at his re- 
 quest, General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in town, had 
 made arrangements for the defence of the city, with such 
 troops as were at hand. Brigadier General Hays, who was 
 an invalid from a wound received at Spottsylvannia Court 
 House, had tendered his services and also aided in making 
 arrangements for the defence. I rode out with General Hill 
 to examine the line selected by him, and make a reconnois- 
 sance of the country in front. Slight works had been hastily 
 thrown up on College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest 
 roads from Liberty, which were manned by Breckenridge's 
 infantry and the dismounted cavalry of the command which 
 had been with Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids 
 from the hospitals, and the cadets from the Military Institute 
 at Lexington, occupied other parts of the line. An inspection 
 satisfied me that, while this arrangement was the best which 
 conld be made under the circumstances in which General 
 Hill found himself, yet it would leave the town exposed to 
 the fire of the enemy's artillery, should he advance to the 
 attack, and I therefore determined to meet the enemy with my 
 troops in front. 
 
 We found Imboden about four miles out pn the turnpike,, 
 near an old Quaker church, to which position he had been 
 gradually forced back by the enemy's infantry. My troops, 
 as they arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to 
 bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out 
 on this road, and two brigades of Ramaeur's division arrived 
 just in time to be thrown across the road, at a redoubt about 
 two miles from the city, as Imboden's command was driven 
 back by vastly superior numbers. These brigades, with 
 two pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested the progress 
 of the enemy, and Ramseur's other brigade, and the part 
 of Gordon's division which had arrived, took position on- 
 the same line. The enemy opened a heavy fire of artilfery 
 
46 OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBURG, 
 
 on us, but, as night soon came on, he went into camp 
 in our front.* 
 
 On my arrival at Lynchburg, orders had been given for the 
 immediate return oi the trains for the rest of my infantry, and 
 I expected -it to arrive by the morning of the 18th, but it did 
 not get to Lynchburg until late in the afternoon of that day. 
 Hunter's force was considerably larger than mine would have 
 been, had it all been up, and as it was of the utmost conse- 
 quence to the army at Richmond that he should not get into 
 Lynchburg, I did not feel justified in attacking him until I 
 could do so with a fair prospect of success. I contented 
 myself therefore with acting on the defensive on the 18th, 
 throwing Breckenridge's infantry and a part of his artillery on 
 the front line, while that adopted by General Hill was oc- 
 cupied by the dismounted cavalry and the irregulEir troops. 
 During the day, there was artillery firing and skirmishing 
 along the line, and, in the afternoon, an attack was made on 
 our line, to the right of the turnpike, which was handsomely 
 repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. A demonstra- 
 tion of the enemy's cavalry on the Forest road, was checked 
 by part of Breckenridge's infantry under Wharton, and Mc- 
 Causland's cavalry. 
 
 On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day. Major 
 Generals Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the former to 
 command the infantry and dismounted cavalry of Brecken- 
 
 • Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most remarkable, and 
 can only bq accounted for by the fact, that indalgei(ce in potty acts of malignity 
 and outrage upon private citizens was more congenial to his nature than bold 
 operations in the field. He had defeated Jones' small force at Piedmont about 
 ten miles' from Staunton, on the 6th, and united with Crook on the 8th, yet he 
 did not arrive in front of Lynchburg until near night on the 17th. The route 
 from Staunton to Lynchburg by which he moved, which was by Lexington, 
 Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter, and Liberty, is about one hundred miles in dis- 
 tance. It is true McCausland had delayed his progress by keeping constantly 
 in his front, but an energetic advance would have brushed away McCansland'a 
 small force, and Lynchburg, with all its manufacturing establishments and 
 stores, would have fallen before assistance arrived. A subsequent passage over 
 the greater part of the same route showed how Hunter bad been employed. 
 
PURSUIT OF HUNTEK. 47 
 
 ridge's command, and the latter to command the cavalry. The 
 mounted cavalry consisted of the remnants of several brigades 
 divided into two commands, one under Imboden, andlhe other 
 under McCausland. It was badly mounted and armed, and 
 its efficiency much impaired by the defeat at Piedmont, and the 
 arduous service it had recently gone through. 
 
 As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the 
 railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up, arrange- 
 ments were made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the 
 19th, but, sometime after midnight, it was discovered that he 
 was moving, though it was not known whether he was 
 retreating, or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the south 
 where it was vulnerable, or to attempt to join Grant on the 
 south side of James River, Pursuit could not, therefore, be 
 made at once, as a mistake, if either of the last two objects 
 had been contemplated, would have been fatal . At light, how- 
 ever, the pursuit commenced, the 2nd Corps moving along the 
 turnpike, over which it was discovered Hunter was retreating, 
 and Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest road, 
 while Ransom was ordered to move on the right of Elzey, 
 with McCausland's cavalry, and endeavour to strike the 
 enemy at Liberty or the Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who was 
 on the ro^d from Lynchburg to Campbell Court House, to 
 watch a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had moved in 
 that direction the day before, was to have moved on the left 
 towards Liberty, but orders did not reach him in time. The 
 enemy's rear was overtaken at Liberty, twenty-five miles from 
 Lynchburg, just before night, and driven through that place, 
 after a brisk skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The days march 
 on the old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible. 
 McCausland had taken the wrong road and did not reach Lib- 
 erty until after the enemy had been driven through the town. 
 It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated on 
 the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had advanced, 
 but had taken the road to Buford's depot, at the foot of the 
 Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go either by Salem, 
 Fincastle, or Buchanan. Ransom was, therefore, ordered to 
 
48 PCRStriT OF HUIVTEE. 
 
 take the route, next day, by the Peaks of Otter, and endeavour 
 to intercept the enemy should he move by Buchanan or Fin- 
 castle. The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of 
 the 20th, and on our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's 
 rear guard was seen going into the mountain on the road 
 towards Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my 
 aide, Lieutenaat Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to that 
 place, with orders to Ransom to move for Salem. Lieutenant 
 Pitzer was also instructed to ride all night and send directions, 
 by courier from Fincastle, and telegraph from Salem, to have 
 the road through the mountains to Lewisburg and South 
 Western Virginia blockaded. The enemy was pursued into 
 the mountains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession 
 of the crest of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position 
 commanding a gorge, through which the road passes, where 
 it was impossible for a regiment to move in line. I had 
 endeavoured to ascertain if there was not another way across the 
 mountain by which I could get around the enemy, but all the 
 men, except the old ones, had gotten out of the way, and the 
 latter, as well as the women and children, were in such a 
 state of distress and alarm, that no reliable information could 
 be obtained from them. We tried to throw forces up the 
 sides of the mountains to get at the enemy, but they were so 
 rugged that night came on before anything could be accom- 
 plished, and we had to desist, though not until a very late 
 hour in the night. 
 
 By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent with orders 
 to General Rodes, who was to be in the lead next morning, 
 there was some delay in his movement on the 21st, but the 
 pursuit was resumed very shortly atter sun rise. At the Big 
 Lick, it was ascertained that the enemy had turned off from 
 Salem towards Lewisburg, on a road which passes through 
 the mountains at a narrow pass called the " Hanging Rock," 
 and my column was immediately turned towards that point, 
 but on arriving there it was ascertained that the enemy's rear 
 guard had passed through the gorge. McCausland had struck 
 his column at this point and captured ten pieces of artillery, 
 
PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 49 
 
 some waggons, and a number of prisoners ; but, the enemy- 
 having brought up a heavy force, McCausland was compelled 
 to fall back, carrying off, however, the prisoners, and a part 
 of the artillery, and disabling the rest so that it could not be 
 removed. As the enemy had got into the mountains, where 
 nothing useful could be accomplished by pursuit, I did not 
 deem it proper to continue it farther. A great part of my 
 command had had nothing to eat for the last two days, except 
 a little bacon which was obtained at Liberty. The cooking 
 utensils were in the trains, and the eifort to have bread baked 
 at Lynchburg had failed. Neither the waggon trains, nor the 
 artillery of the 2nd corps, were up, and I knew that the 
 country, through which Hunter's route led for forty or fifty 
 miles, was, for the most part, a desolate mountain region ; 
 and that his troops were taking everything in the way of pro- 
 visions and forage which they could lay their hands on. My 
 field officers, except those of Breckenridge's command, were 
 on foot, as their horses could not be transported on the trains 
 from Charlottesville. I had seen our soldiers endure a great 
 deal, but there was a limit to the endurance even of Confed- 
 erate soldiers. A stern chase with infantry is a very difficult 
 one, and Hunter's men were marching for their lives, his 
 disabled being carried in his provision train which was now 
 empty. My cavalry was not strong enough to accomplish 
 anything of importance, and a further pursuit eould only have 
 resulted in disaster to my command from want of provisions 
 and forage. 
 
 I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as I 
 knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and he 
 w^as, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to 
 South Western Virginia, he would have done us incalculable 
 mischief, as there were no troops of any consequence in that 
 quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, there- 
 fore, have been compelled to follow him.* 
 
 • Grant, in hia report says : " General Hunter, owing to a want of ammuni- 
 tion to give battle, retired ijrom before the place " (Lynchbuirg). This is a little 
 
50 PtTRSUIT OP HUNTER, 
 
 My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days 
 pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the 
 Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest since leaving 
 Gaines' Mill. I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22nd, so 
 as to enable the waggons and artillery to get up, and prepare 
 the men for the lohg march before them. Imboden had come 
 up, following on the road through Salem after the enemy, and 
 the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to watch the enemy 
 and annoy him as he passed through the mountains towards- 
 Lewisburg, and also ascertain whether he would endeavour 
 to get into the valley towards Lexington or Staunton. 
 
 remarkable, as it appears that this expedition had been long contemplated and 
 was one of the prominent features of the campaign of 1864. Sheridan, witli his- 
 cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at Lynchburg, and the two together 
 were to have destroyed General Lee's communications and depots of supplies,, 
 and then hare joined Grant Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so 
 important an expedition with an insufficient Bupply of ammunition 7 He had 
 only fought the battle of Piedmont with a part of his force, and it was not a 
 very severe one, as Jones' force was a small one and composed mostly of 
 cavalry. Crook's column not being there was not engaged. Had Sheridan 
 defeated Hampton at Trevillian's, he would have reached Lynchburg after 
 destroying the railroad on the way, and I could not have reached there in time 
 to do any gopd. But Hampton defeated Sheridan, and the latter saw " infantry'' 
 " too strong to successfully assault." Had Hunter moved on Lynchburg 
 with energy, that place would have fallen before it was possible for me to get 
 there. But he tarried on the way for purposes which will hereafter appear, 
 and when he reached there, his heart failed him and he was afraid to fight an 
 inferior force, and then there was discovered, " A want of ammunition to give- 
 battle." 
 
MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
 IN THE LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND. 
 
 At Lynchburg, I had received a telegram from General 
 Lee, directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to return 
 to his army or carry out the original plan, as I might deem 
 rtiost expedient under the circumstances in which I found my- 
 self. After the pursuit had ceased, I received another dispatch 
 from him, submitting it to.my judgment whether the condition 
 of my troops would permit the expedition across the Potomac 
 to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibility of 
 continuing it. On the 23rd, the march was resumed and we 
 reached Buchanan that night, where we struck again the route 
 over which Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's cavalry moved 
 
 * The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-rending. 
 Houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without shelter. 
 The country had been stripped of proTisions and many families left without a 
 morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been cut to peices, and old men and 
 women and children robbed of all the clothing they had except that on their 
 backs. Ladies trunks had been rifled and their dresses torn to peices in mere 
 wantonness. Even the negro girls had lost their little fineryi We now had 
 renewed evidences of the outrages committed by Hunter's orders inhuming and 
 plundering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number of bouses to which 
 the torch had been applied by his orders. At Lexington he had burned the 
 Military Institute, with all of its contents, including its library and scientific 
 apparatus ; and Washington College had been plundered and the statue of 
 Washington stolen. The residence of Bx-Qovernor Letcher at that place had 
 been burned by orders, and but a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and her family 
 to leave the house. In the same county a most excellent christian gentleman, a 
 Ur. Creigh, had been hung, because, on a former occasion, he had killed a strag- 
 gling and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of insulting and outraging 
 the ladies of his family. These are but some of the outarges committed by Hunter 
 or hie orders, and I will not insult the memory of the ancient barbarians of the North 
 by calling them " acts of Vandalism." If those old barbarians were savage and 
 cruel, they at least had the manliness and daring of rude soldiers, with occasional 
 traits of magnanimity. Hunter's deeds were those of a malignant and cowardly 
 fanatic, who was better qualified to make war upon helpless women and children 
 than upon armed soldiers. The time consumed in the perpretratipn of those 
 deeds, was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries, and factories 
 which were so necessary to our army at Bichmoud. 
 
52 MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY. 
 
 by Clifton Forge, through the western part of Rockbridge, to 
 keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain if he should attempt 
 to get into the Valley again. 
 
 On the 26thj I reached Staunton in advance of the troops, 
 and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing 
 transportation and getting provisions from Waynesboro, to 
 which point they had been sent over the railroad. Some of 
 the guns and a number of the horses belonging to the artillery 
 were now unfit for service, and the best of each were selected, 
 atid about a battalion taken from Breckenridge's artillery, 
 under Lt. Col. King, to accompany us, in addition to the two 
 battalions brought with the 2nd Corps. The rest were left 
 behind with a portion of the officers and men in charge of 
 them. The dismounted cavalry had been permitted to send 
 for their horses which had been recruiting, and Col. Bradley T. 
 Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a battalion of 
 Maryland Cavalry, was assigned to the command of Jones' 
 brigade, with the temporary rank of Brigadier General, that 
 brigade having been reorganized and the two Maryland bat- 
 talions attached toil. General Breckenridge had accompanied 
 us from Lynchburg, and, to give him a command commensu- 
 rate with his proper one, and at the same time enable me to con- 
 trol the cavalry more readily, Gordon's division of infantry 
 was assigned to his command in addition to the one under 
 Elzey, and Ransom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered to 
 report to me directly. Major General Elzey was relieved 
 from duty at his own request, and the division under him, 
 was left under the temporary command of Brigadier General 
 Vaughan. 
 
 The official reports at this place showed about two thousand 
 mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which was composed of 
 four small brigades, to wit : Imboden's, McCausland's, Jack- 
 son's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Vaughan's had not been 
 mounted but the horses had been sent for from South-western 
 Virginia. The official reports of the infantry showed 10,000 
 muskets for duty, including Vaughan's dismounted cavalry. 
 Nearly, if not quite half of the company officers and men were 
 
MARCH DOWN THE VALLKY. 53 
 
 barefooted or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent from 
 Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Richmond, 
 requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they had not arrived. 
 
 Another telegram was received here from Gen. Lee, stating 
 that the circumstances under which my original orders were 
 .given had changed, and again submitting it to tfly judgment, 
 in the altered state of things, whether the movement down the 
 Valley and across the Potomac should be made. The acces- 
 sion to my command from Breckenridge's forces had not been 
 as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on account of 
 the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at Piedmont, 
 and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg from Rock- 
 fish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original design at 
 all hazards, and telegraphed to General Lee my purpose to 
 continue the movement. 
 
 The march was resumed on the 28th with five days rations 
 in the waggons and two days in haversacks, empty waggons 
 being left to bring the shoes when they arrived. Imboden was 
 sent through Brock's Gap in the Great North Mountain to the 
 Valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, with his brigade 
 of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, to destroy the rail- 
 road bridge over that stream and all the bridges on the Balti- 
 more and Ohio rail-road from that point to Martinsburg. The 
 telegraph line was repaired to New-Market as we marched 
 down the Valley, and communications kept up with that point 
 by signal stations. On the 2nd of July we reached Winchester,* 
 
 * On this day we passed through Newtown where several houses, including 
 that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by Hunter's orders, because a part 
 of Mosby's command had attacked a train of supplies for Sigel's force, at this 
 place. The original order was to burn the whole town, but the officer sent to 
 execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of his superior, and another had 
 been sent who but partially executed it, after having forced the people to take 
 an oath of allegiance to the United States to save their bouses. IMosby's battal- 
 ion, though called '• guerillas" by the enemy, was a regular organization in the 
 Confederate Army, and was merely serving on detached duty under Gener.il 
 Lee's orders. The attack on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and the 
 order to burn Newtown, and the burning of the houses mentioned were most 
 wanton, cruel, unjustifiable, and cowardly. 
 
54 OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 
 
 and I here received a dispatch from General Lee, directing me to 
 remain in the lower Valley until everything was in readiness to 
 cross the Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad 
 and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as far as possible. This 
 was in accordance with my previous determination, and its 
 policy was obvious. My provisions were nearly exhausted • 
 and it I had moved through Loudon, it would have been neces- 
 sary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have it ground, as 
 neither bread nor flour could be otherwise obtained ; which 
 would have caused much greater delay than was required on 
 the other route, where we could take provisions from the en- 
 emy. Moreover unless the Baltimore and Ohio railroad was 
 torn up, the enemy would have been able to move troops from 
 the West over that road to Washington. 
 
 On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across 
 North Mountain, to move down Back Creek, and burn the 
 tailroad bridge at its mouth, and then to move by North 
 Mountain depot to Haynesville, on the road from Martinsburg 
 to Wiliiamspori ; and, early on the morning of the 3rd, Brad- 
 ley Johnson was tent by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the 
 railroad at Kearneysville, east of Martinsburg, and unite with 
 McCausland, at Haynesville, so as to cut oif the retreat of 
 Sigel, who was at Martinsburg with a considerable force. 
 Breckenridge moved, on the same morning, direct for Mar- 
 tinsburg, with his command preceded by Gilmor's battalion 
 of cavalry, while I moved, with Rodes' and Ramseur's divi- 
 sions, over the route taken by Johnson, to Leetown. On the 
 approach of Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmish- 
 ing, evacuated Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable 
 stores, which fell into our hands. McCausland burned the 
 bridge over Back Creek, captured the guard at North Moun- 
 tain depot, and succeeded in reaching Haynesville ; but John- 
 son encountered a force at Leetown, under Mulligan, which, 
 after hard fighting, he drove across the railroad, when, Sigel 
 having united with Mulligan, Jolmson's command was forced 
 back, just before night, on Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, 
 which had arrived at Leetown,) after a march of twenty-four 
 
OPERATIONS IN MARFLANO. 55 
 
 miles. It was too late, and these divisioas were too much 
 exhausted, to go after the enemy ; and, during the night, Si- 
 gel retreated across the Potomac, at Shepherdstown, to Mary- 
 land Heights. 
 
 Oil the 4th, Shepherdstown was occupied by a part of Ran- 
 som's cavalry. Rodes' and Raraseur's divisions moved to 
 Harper's Ferry, and the, enemy was driven from Bolivar 
 Heights, and the Village of Bolivar, to an inner line of 
 works under the cover of the guns from Maryland Heights. 
 Breckenridge, after burning the railroad bridges at Martins- 
 burg, and across the Opequon, moved to Dufiield's depot, five 
 miles from Harper's Ferry, destroying the road as he moved. 
 During the night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's 
 Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the 
 Potomac. 
 
 It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry, 
 except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by 
 the heavy guns on Maryland Heights^ and the 5th was spent 
 by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that 
 place. In the afternoon, Breckenridge's command crossed 
 the river at Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was ad- 
 vanced over the Antietam, towards Maryland Heights. At 
 night, considerable stores, which had been abandoned at 
 Harper's Ferry, were secured ; and, before day, Rodes' and 
 Ramseur's divisions moved to Shepherdstown, and crossed 
 the Potomac early on the 6th, Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's 
 division, being left to occupy Harper's Ferry with skir- 
 mishers. 
 
 On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced towards 
 Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works. 
 Working parties were employed in destroying tlie aqueduct 
 of the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and canal- 
 boats. 
 
 On the 7th, Rodes moved through Rohersville, on the road 
 to Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skirmished with 
 a small force of the enemy, while Breckenridge demonstrated 
 against Maryland Heights, with Gordon's division, supported 
 
I OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND. 
 
 ' his other division, now under Brigadier-General Echols, 
 ho had reported for duty. 
 
 While these operations were going on, McCausland had 
 icupied Hagerstown, and levied a contribution of ||20,000, 
 id Boonsboro had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. On 
 e 6th I received a ietfer from General Lee, by special 
 purier, informing me that, on the 12th, an effort would be 
 ade to release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing 
 e to take steps to unite them with my command, if the at- 
 mpt was successful ; but I was not informed of the manner 
 which the attempt would be made — General Lee stating 
 at he was not, himself, advised of the particulars. 
 My desire had been to manoeuvre the enemy out of Mary- 
 nd Heights, so as to enable me to move directly from Har- 
 ir's Ferry for Washington ; but he had taken refuge in his 
 rongly-fortified works, and, as they could not be approached 
 ithout great difficulty, and an attempt to carry them by 
 isault would have resulted in greater loss than the advan- 
 ge to be gained would justify, I determined to move 
 rough the gaps of South Mountain to the north of the 
 eights. On the 7th, the greater portion of the cavalry was 
 int across the mountain, in the direction of Frederick ; and, 
 at night, the expected shoes having arrived and been dis- 
 ibuted, orders were given for a general move next morn- 
 ig ; and an officer (Lieut. -Col. Goodwin, of a Louisiana 
 egiment) was ordered back to Winchester, witli a small 
 ciard, to collect the stragglers at that place, and prevent 
 lem from following. 
 
 Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South Branch of 
 le Potomac, and partially destroyed the bridge, but had not 
 icceeded in dislodging the guard from the bock-house at 
 lat place. He had been taken sick, and very little had been 
 3compiished by the expedition ; and his brigade, now under 
 le command of Colonel George H. Smith, had returned. 
 Early on the morning of the 8th, the whole force moved ; 
 ,odes, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson ; Breckenridge, 
 nough Fox's Gap ; and Ramseur, with the trains, through 
 
Battle or moxocacy. 67 
 
 Boonsboro Gap, followed by Lewis' brigade, which had star- 
 ted from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the 
 trestle-work on the railroad, and the stores which had not 
 been brought off. Breckenridge and Ramseur encamped 
 near Middletown, and Rodes near Jefferson. Ransom had 
 occupied Catoctan Mountain, oetween Middletown and Fre- 
 derick, with his cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a 
 body of the enemy at the latter place. McCausland was or- 
 dered to move to the right, in the afternoon, and the next day 
 cut the telegraph and railroad between Maryland Heights 
 and Washington and Baltimore — cross the Monocacy, and, if 
 possible, occupy the railroad bridge over that stream, at the 
 Junction near Frederick. 
 
 Early on the 9th, Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry, 
 and a battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of Frede- 
 rick, with orders to strike the railroads from Baltimore to 
 Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gun- 
 powder, also to cut the railroad between Washington and 
 Baltimore, and threaten the latter place ; and then to move 
 towards Point Lookout, for the purpose of releasing the priso- 
 ners, if we should succeed in getting into Washington. The 
 other troops also moved forward towards Monocacy Junction, 
 and Ramseur's division passed through Frederick, driving a 
 force of skirmishers before it. 
 
 BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 
 
 The enemy, in considerable force under General Lew 
 Wallace, was found strongly posted on the eastern bank of the 
 Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork and two block 
 houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge 
 on the Georgetown pike. Ramseur's division was deployed 
 in front of the enemy, after driving his skirmishers across the 
 river, and several batteries were put in position, when a sharp 
 
58 BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 
 
 artillei-y fire opened from both sides. Rodes' division had 
 come up from Jefferson and was placed on Ramseur's left, 
 covering the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the 
 Monocacy above the Junction Breckenridge's command, 
 with the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the 
 Junction, while the residue of the cavalry was watching a 
 force of the enemy's cavalry which had followed from Mary- 
 land Heights. The enemy's position was too strong, and the 
 difficulties of crossing the Monocacy under fire too great, to 
 attack in front without greater loss than I was willing to inc^ur. 
 I therefore made an examination in person to find a point at 
 which the river could be crossed, so as to take the enemy in 
 flank. While I was engaged in making this examination to 
 my right, I discovered McCausland in the act of crossing the 
 river with his brigade. As soon as he crossed, he dismounted 
 his men, and advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, 
 wliich he threw into confusion, and he came very near captur- 
 ing a battery of artillery, but the enemy concentrated on him, 
 and he was gradually forced back obstinately contesting the 
 ground. McCausland's movement, .which was very brilliant- 
 ly executed, solved the problem for me, and, as soon as I 
 discovered it, orders were sent to Breckenridge to move up 
 rapidly with Gordon's division to McCausland's assistance, 
 and to follow up his attack. This division crossed at the same 
 place, and Gordon was ordered to move forward and strike 
 the enemy on his left flank, and drive him from the position 
 commanding the crossings in Ramseur's front, so as to enable 
 the latter to cross. This movement was executed under the 
 personal superintendence of General Breckenridge, and, while 
 Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front, the attack was 
 made by Gordon in gallant style, and, with the aid of several 
 pieces of King's artillery which had been crossed over, and 
 Nelson's artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy 
 into great confusion and forced him from his position. Ram- 
 seur immediately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued 
 the enemy's flying forces, and Rodes crossed on the left and 
 joined in the pursuit. Echol's division which had been left 
 
BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 59 
 
 to guard the trains, was ordered up during the engagement, but 
 was not needed. The pursuit was soon discontinued, as 
 Wallace's entire force had taken the road towards Baltimore, 
 and I did not want prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 
 8000 or 10,000 men, and it was ascertained that one division 
 of the 6th corps (Rickett's) from Grant's army, was in the 
 fight. Between 600 and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into 
 our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 
 very heavy. Our loss in killed and wounded was about 700, 
 and among them were brigadier General Evans wounded, and 
 Colonel Lamar of the 61st Georgia regiment, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Tavener, of the 17th Virginia cavalry, and Lieutenant 
 Hobson, of Nelson's artillery, killed. The action closed 
 about sunset, and we had marched fourteen miles before it 
 commenced. All the troops and trains were crossed over the 
 Monocacy that night, so as to resume the march early next 
 day. Such of our wounded as could not be moved in ambu- 
 lances or otherwise, were sent to the hospitals at Frederick 
 under charge of competent medical officers, and our dead 
 were buried. During the operations at Monocacy, a contri- 
 bution of $200,000 in money was levied on the city of Fred- 
 erick, and some needed supplies were obtained. 
 
 OPERATIQNS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON, AND 
 RECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 
 
 On the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and we 
 bivouacked four nodles from Rockville, on the Georgetown 
 pike, having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's division, 
 which had~ remained behind for a short time to protect a 
 working party engaged in destroying the railroad bridge, was 
 detained for a time in driving oif the party of cavalry which 
 had been following from Maryland Heights, and did not get 
 
60 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OP WASHINGTON. 
 
 Up until one o'clock at night. McCausland, moving in front 
 on this day, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before him, 
 and had quite a brisk engagement at Rockville, where he 
 encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy. 
 
 We moved at daylight on the 11th; McCausland moving 
 on the Georgetown piJce, while the infantry, preceeded by Im- 
 boden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at 
 Rockville, so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by 
 Silver Spring into Washington. Jackson's cavalry moved on 
 the left flank. The previous day had been very warm, and 
 the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain 
 for several weeks. The heat during the night had been very 
 oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained. This day 
 was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring. 
 While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating 
 cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaus- 
 tion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I 
 pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the forti- 
 fications around Washington before they could -be manned. 
 Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works 
 on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed 
 them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived 
 in sight of Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon, 
 when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned. 
 
 Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately order- 
 ed to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skir- 
 mishers, and move into the works if he could. My whole 
 column was then moving by flank, which was the only practi- 
 cable mode of marching on the road we were on, and before 
 Rodes' division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of dust 
 in the rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a 
 column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and 
 skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire 
 was opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated 
 our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and 
 it became necessary to reconnoitre. 
 
 Rode's skirmishers w6re thrown to the front, driving those of 
 
OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 61 
 
 ihe enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to 
 examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was prac- 
 ticable to carry them by assault. They were found to be 
 exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be 
 enclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works 
 in front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the 
 whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and 
 strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been 
 felled within cannon range all around and left on Ihe ground, 
 making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach 
 was raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, 
 running through a deep ravine which had been rendered 
 impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and 
 beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike which had 
 been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as 
 the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same 
 impregnable character. The position was naturally strong 
 for defence, and the examination shewed, what might have 
 been expected, that every appliance of science and unlimited 
 means had been used to render the fortifications around 
 Washington as strong as possible. This reconnoissance con- 
 sumed the balance of the day. 
 
 The rapid marching, which had broken down a number of 
 the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous expo- 
 sure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to be 
 collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded 
 at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had 
 reduced my infantry to about 8,000 muskets. Of those 
 remaining, a very large number were greatly exhausted by 
 the last two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, 
 and I was satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifi- 
 cations, that not more than one third of my force could have 
 been carried into action. I had about forty pieces of field 
 artillery, of which the largest were 12 pounder Napoleons, 
 besides a few pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry. 
 McCausland reported the works on the Georgetown pike too 
 strongly manned for him to assault. We could not move to 
 
62 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 
 
 the right or the left without its being discovered from a signal 
 station on the top of the " Soldiers' Home," which overlooked 
 the country, and the enemy would have been enabled to 
 move in his works to meet us. Under the circumstances, to 
 have rusiied my men blindly against the fortifications, with- 
 out understanding the state of things, would have been worse 
 than folly. If we had any friends in Washington, none of 
 them came out to give us information, and this satisfied me 
 that the place was not undefended. I knew Ihat troops had 
 arrived from Grant's army, for prisoners had been captured 
 from Rickett's division of the 6th corps at Monocacy. From 
 Sharpsburg I had sent a message to Mosby, by one of his 
 men, requesting him to cross the Potomac below Harper's 
 Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph, and endeavour to find 
 out the condition of things in Washington, but he had not 
 crossed the river and I had received no information from him. 
 A northern paper, which was obtained, gave the information 
 that Hunter, after moving up the Ohio River in steamboats, 
 was passing o\^r the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and I 
 knew that he would be at Harper's Ferry soon, as Imboden 
 had done very little damage to the road west of Martinsburg. 
 After dark on the 11th, I held a consultation with Major 
 Generals Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which 
 I stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and 
 the necessity of doing something immediately, as the proba- 
 bility was that the passes of the South Mountain and the 
 fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. 
 After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to 
 abandon the project of capturing Washington, I determined to 
 make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morn- 
 ing, unless some imformation should be received before that 
 time showing its impracticability,and so informed those officers. 
 During the night a dispatch was received from Gfen. Bradley 
 Johnson from near Baltimore, informing me that he had receiv- 
 ed information, from a reliable sourcCj that two corps had ar- 
 rived from Gen. Grant's army, and that his whole army was 
 probably in motion. This caused me to delay the attack until 
 
OPERATIONS IN FRONT OP WASHINGTON. 63 
 
 I could examine the works again, and, as soon as it was liglit 
 enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined 
 with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly, to give up all hopes 
 of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the 
 dome of the Capitol, and given the Federal authorities a ter- 
 rible fright. 
 
 Grant in his report says, in regard to the condition of things 
 when I moved towards Washington : " The garrisons of Balti- 
 more and Washington were at this time made up of heavy 
 artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from 
 the invalid corps." And, in regard to the force of Wallace at 
 Monocacy, he says ; "His force was not sufficient to ensure 
 success, but he fought ihe enemy nevertheless, and although 
 it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy 
 and thereby served to enable Gen. Wright to reach Washington 
 with two divisions of the 6th Corps, and the advance of the 
 19th Corps, before him." Stanton says in his report : " Here 
 (at Washington) they (we) were met by troops from the Army 
 ol the Potomac, consisting of the 6th Corps under General 
 Wright, a part of the 8th Corps under Genferal Gilmore, and a 
 part of the 19th Corps, just arrived from New Orleans under 
 General Emory." Taking Grant's statement of the troops 
 which had arrived from his army as the most reliable, they 
 were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least 
 until others could arrive. But, in addition to those which 
 had already arrived, there were the detachments from the in- 
 valid corps, called, I believe, the " Veteran Reserves " (of 
 which I was informed there were about 5,000), the heavy ar- 
 tillery regiments, the hundred days' men, and, I suppose, the 
 part of the 8th corps mentioned by Stanton. To all these 
 may be added the local troops, or militia, and the government 
 employees. Some of the northern papers stated that, be- 
 tween Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city; 
 but on Saturday I was fighting at Monocacy, thirty-five 
 miles ftotfl Washington, a force which I could not leave in 
 my rear ; and, after disposing of that force and moving as 
 rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in 
 
64 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 
 
 front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and 
 then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring 
 them up into line. I had then made a march, over the circui- 
 tous route by Charlottesville, Lynchburg, and Salem, down 
 the Valley, -and through the passes of the South Mountain, 
 which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with Hunter's, 
 Sigel's, and Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I 
 believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war — 
 the unopposed marauding excursion of the freebooter Sher- 
 man through Georgia, not excepted. My small force had 
 been thrown up to the very walls of the Federal Capital, north 
 of a river which could not be forded at any point within 40 
 miles, and with a heavy force and the South Mountain in my 
 rear — the passes through which mountain could be held by a 
 small number of trOops. A glance at the map, when it is re- 
 collected that the Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to 
 Washington for the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent 
 reader to wonder, not why I failed to take Washington, but 
 why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the 
 small force under my command. It was supposed by some, 
 who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the 
 lower Valley longer than was necessary ; but, an examination 
 of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment 
 was spent in idleness, but that every one was employed in 
 making some arrangement,- or removing some difficulty in my 
 way, which it was necessary to make or remove, so as to en- 
 able me to advance with a prospect of success. I could not 
 move across the Potomac and through the passes of the South 
 Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven from, or 
 safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights. 
 
 After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington, I 
 determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 
 12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain 
 longer would cause the loss of my en|;ire force. 
 
 Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on 
 the Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, 
 and started for Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to 
 
RECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 65 
 
 return. The attempt to release the prisoners of which I was 
 informed by General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had 
 recseived notice of it in some way. Major Harry Gilmor, who 
 burned the bridge over the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia 
 road, captured Major General Franklin on a train at that point, 
 but he was permitted to escape, either by the carelessness or 
 exhaustion of the guard placed over him, before I was inform- 
 ed of the capture. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitring force was 
 sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was 
 driven back by Rodes' division with but slight loss to us. 
 About dark we commenced retiring and did so without moles- 
 tation.* Passing through Rockville and Poolsville, we crossed 
 the Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg in Loudon 
 County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners 
 captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety. There 
 was some skirmishing in the rear between our cavalry and 
 that of the enemy which was following, and, on the afternoon 
 of the 14th, there was some artillery firing by the enemy, across 
 the river, at our cavalry which was watching the fords. 
 Besides the money levied in Hagerstown and Frederick, 
 which was subsequently very useful in obtaining supplies, we 
 brought off quite a large number of beef cattle, and the cavalry 
 obtained a nnmber of horses, some being also procured for the 
 artillery, f 
 
 * Grant says : "On the 12th, a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of 
 Port Stevens to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish 
 ensued, in which we lost 280 in liiHed and wounded. The enemy's loss was 
 probably greater. He commenced retiring during the night." In regard to tlie 
 game affair, Stanton says ; " By these troops (Wright's, Gilmore's, and Emory's) 
 the enemy was was driven back from Washington and retreated hastily to Vir- 
 ginia, pursued by our forces under General Wri.'ht." Grant's statement is cor- 
 rect, with the exception of the estimate he places on our loss. Comment on 
 Stanton's is unneccessary when it is compared witn that of Grant. 
 
 t On the night of the 12th, the house of Postmaster General Blair near Silver 
 Spring was burned, and It was assumed by the enemy that it was bnrned by my 
 orders. The fact is, that I had nothing to do with it, and do not yet know how 
 the burning occurred. Though I believed that retaliation was fully justified by 
 the previous acts of the enemy, yet 1 did not wish to incur the risk of any license 
 
RETURN TO THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
 THERE. 
 
 We rested, on the 14th. and 15lh., near Leesburg; and, on 
 the morning of the 16th., resumed the march to the Valley, 
 through Sincker's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Hunter had ai-ri- 
 ved at Harper's Ferry, and united with Sigel, and the whole 
 force had moved from that place, under Crook, to Hillsboro, 
 in Loudon, and a body of cavalry from it made a dash on 
 our train, as we were moving towards the Valley, and suc- 
 ceeded in setting fire to a few waggons, but was soon driven 
 off by troops from Rodes? and Ramseur's divisions, and one 
 piece of artillery was captured from the enemy. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th., we crossed the Shenandoah, 
 at Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, and took position near 
 Berryville — Breckenridge covering the ford at the ferry, and 
 
 on the part of my troops, and it was obviously impolitic to set the house on fire 
 when we were retiring, as it amounted to notice of our movement. Some of my 
 officers thought the burning was done by some person in the neighborhood, who 
 took advantage of our presence to commit the act with impunity. It may have 
 been occasioned by a shell from the enemy's guns, some of which went in that 
 direction late in the day, or it may have been ths act of some of my men ; and a. 
 number of them had abundant provocation for the act, in the sight of their own 
 devastated homes as they marched down the Valley on Hunter's track. In retalia- 
 tion for the burning of this house, two Federal gunboats with a body of soldiers 
 on board were sent up the Rappahannock River, on which there was not a Con- 
 federate soldier, to burn the house of the widow of the brother of the Hon. Ji.mes 
 A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, and she and her little children 
 were turned out of doors, and the house with all its contents consigned to the 
 flames. A card was left, signed by Butler or his order, stating that the house 
 was burned in retaliation for the burning of the Hon . Montgomery Blair's house. 
 This retaliation upon a widowed lady and her orphan children, by a combined 
 military and naval expedition, was worthy of the agent selected, and the cause 
 in which he was engaged. But, though it was very congenial to his nature, I 
 do not regard Butler as alone responsible for this act. The odium of it should 
 a,ttach to his superiors Lincoln and Grant, he being the favourite of the former, 
 and the subordinate of the latter, and at that time, serving under his immediate 
 orders. 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 67 
 
 the river above and below, and Rodes' and Ramseur's divi- 
 sijns the roads from Harper's Ferry. 
 
 On the 18th, the enemy, having moved through Snicker's 
 Gap, appeared on the banks of the Shenandoah, and there 
 was some skirmishing. In the afternoon, a heavy column of 
 his infantry made a dash at Parker's Ford, one mile below 
 the ferry, and crossed over, after driving back the picket of 
 one hundred men at that point. Breckenridge moved Gor- 
 don's and Echol's divisions to the front, and held the enemy 
 in check, while Rodes' division was brought up from the left, 
 and attacked and drove him across the river, with heavy loss, 
 and in great confusion. 
 
 On the 19th, the enemy's main body still occupied the 
 eastern bank of the Shenandoah, and smaller columns moved 
 up and down the river, to effect a crossing. Imboden, with 
 his own and McCausland's cavalry, resisted and repulsed 
 one of these columns, which attempted to cross at Berry's 
 Ferry, with considerable loss to the enemy. The horses of 
 Vaughan's ^cavalry having been brought from South-western 
 Virginia, his small force had been now mounted. On this 
 day I received information that a column under Averill was 
 moving from Martinsburg towards Winchester, and, as the po- 
 sition I held near Berryville left my trains exposed to expedi- 
 tions in the rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I de- 
 termined to concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to en- 
 able me to put the trains in safety, and then move out and 
 attack the enemy. This movement was commenced on the 
 night of the 19th ; Ramseur's division, with a battery of ar- 
 tillery, being sent to Winchester, to cover that place against 
 Averill, while the stores, and the sick and wounded were 
 being removed, and the other divisions moving through Mill- 
 wood and White Post to the Valley Pike at Newtown and 
 Middletown. 
 
 Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching Aver- 
 ill, and, on the afternoon of the 20th., it was reported to Ge- 
 neral Ramseur, by General Vaughan, that Averill was at Ste- 
 phenson's depot, with an inferior force, which could be cap- 
 
68 OPERATIONS IN THE VALLET. 
 
 tured, and Ramseur moved out from Winchester to atfacfc 
 him ; but, relying on the accuracy of the information he had 
 received, General Ramseur did not take the proper precau- 
 tions in advancing, and his division, while moving by the 
 flank, was suddenly met by a larger force, under Averill, ad- 
 vancing in line of battle, and the result was that Ramseui's 
 force was thrown into confusion, and compelled to retire, 
 with the loss of four pieces of artillery, and a number in 
 killlsd and wounded — Brigadier-Generals Lewis and Lilly 
 being among the wounded, and Col. Board, of the 58th Vir- 
 ginia Regiment, among the killed. Colonel Jackson made a 
 vigorous charge with his cavalry, which enabled Ramseur to 
 rally his men, restore order, and arrest the progress of Averill 
 before he reached Winchester. The error committed, on this 
 occasion, by this most gallant officer, was nobly retrieved in 
 the subsequent part of the campaign. I received, at New- 
 town, the news of Ramseur's misfortune, and immediately 
 moved to his assistance with Rodes' division ; but, on arri- 
 ving at Winchester, I found that the enemy, after being 
 checked, had fallen back a short distance ; and, as another 
 and much larger column was moving through B<?rryville, [ 
 did not go after Averill, but moved the whole command to 
 Newtown — the stores, and such of the wounded and sick as 
 could be transported, having been gotten off. 
 
 On the 21st., my whole infantry force was concentrated 
 near Middletown ; and, on the 22nd., it was moved across 
 Cedar Creek, towards Strasburg, and so posted as to cover 
 all the roads from the direction of Winchester. 
 
 A report having been sent to me, from Mt. Jackson, that a 
 force of the enemy was moving from the Valley of the South 
 Branch of the Potomac to that place, Imboden was sent to 
 ascertain its truth, and it proved to be false. We rested on 
 the 23rd., while waiting to ascertain the movements of the 
 enemy, and during the day a report was received from the 
 cavalry in front, that a large portion of the force sent after us 
 from Washington, was returning, and that Crook and Averill 
 had united, and were at Kernstown, near Winchester. 
 
BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. 
 
 On the recpplion of the foregoing information, 1 determined 
 to attack the enemy at once ; and, early on the morning of 
 the 24th., my whole force was put in motion for Winchester. 
 The enemy, under Crook, consisting of the " Army of West 
 Virginia," and including Hunter's and Sigel's forces, and 
 Averill's cavalry, was found in position at Kernstown, on 
 the same ground occupied by Shields, at the time of General 
 Jackson's fight with him, on the 22nd of March, 1862. Ram- 
 seur's division was sent to the left, at Bartonsville, to get 
 around the enemy^s right flank, while the other divisions 
 moved along the Valley Pike, and formed on each side of it. 
 Ransotn's cavalry was oriJered to move in two columns ; one 
 on the right, along the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; 
 and the other on the left, and west of Winchester, so as to 
 unite in rear of the latter place, and cut off the enemy's re- 
 treat. Afler the enemy's skirmishers were driven in, it was 
 discovered that his left flank, extending through Kernstown, 
 was exposed, and General Brcckenridge wa-; ordered to 
 move Echol's division, now under Brig.-Gen. Wharton under 
 cover of some ravines on our right, and attack that flank. 
 This movement, which was made under Gen. Brcckenridge's 
 personal superintendence, was hand>om(;ly executed, and the 
 attacking division struck the enemy's left flank in open 
 ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole, line into great 
 confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and the rout 
 of the enemy became complete. He was pursued, by the in- 
 fantry and artillery, through and beyond Winchester; and 
 the pursuit was continued by Rodes' division to Stephenson's 
 depot, six miles from Winchester — this division then having 
 marched twenty-seven miles from its position west ot Stras- 
 burg. The cavalry had not been moved according to my 
 orders ; and the enemy, having the advantage of an open 
 country and a wide macadamized road, was enabled to make 
 
70 BATTLE OF KBRNSTOWW. 
 
 his escape with his artillery and most of his waggons. Ge- 
 neral Ransom had been in very bad health since he reported 
 to me at Lynchburg, and unable to take the active command 
 in the field ; and all my operations had been impeded for the 
 want of an efficient and energetic cavalry commander. I 
 think, if I had had one on this occasion, the greater part of 
 the enemy's force would have been captured or destroyed, for 
 the rout was thorough. Our loss, in this action, was very 
 light. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was severe, 
 and two or three hundred prisoners fell into our hands ; and, 
 among them, Colonel Mulligan, in command of a division, 
 mortally wounded. The infantry was too much exhausted to 
 continue the pursuit on the 25th., and only moved to Bunker 
 Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. The pursuit was con- 
 tinued by our cavalry, and the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry 
 was encountered at Martinsburg ; but, after slight skirmish- 
 ings it evacuated the place. The whole defeated force crossed 
 the Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland Heights and Har- 
 per's Ferry. The road from Winchester, via Martinsburg, to 
 Williamsport, was strewed with debris of the rapid retreat — 
 twelve caissons and seventy-two waggons having been aban- 
 doned, and most of them burned * 
 
 EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYL- 
 VANIA—BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.' 
 
 On the 26lh we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to 
 the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroyng 
 the railroad, it having been repaired since we passed over it 
 
 * Grant in his report entirely ignores this battle, in which the enenay's forces, 
 were superior to mine, and merely says : — " About the 25th, it became evident 
 that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and 
 the 6th corps which was at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of 
 Harper's Ferry." 
 
EXPEDITION INTO MAKYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 71 
 
 at the beginning of the month. While at Martinsburg, it was 
 ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again 
 indulging in his favourite mode of waifare, and that, after his 
 return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among 
 other outrages, the private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, 
 a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr, Alexander R. Boteler, 
 an ex-member of the Confederate Congress as well as of the 
 United States Congress, and Edmund I. Lee, a distant relative 
 of General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with their contents, 
 had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given 
 for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns 
 in the South, as well as private country houses, had been 
 burned by the Federal troops, and the accounts had been 
 heralded forth in some of the Northern papers in terms of 
 exultation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were 
 received with apathy by others. I now came to the conclu- 
 sion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and 
 that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to 
 its enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation. I did 
 not. select the cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater 
 claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occur- 
 red within the limits of the country covered by my command, 
 and were brought more immediately to my attention.* 
 
 The .town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected 
 
 *Ihad often seen delieate ladies, who had been plundered, insulted, and 
 rendered desolate by the acts of our most atronious enemies, and while they did 
 not call for it, yet, in the anguished expressions of their features while narrating 
 their misfortunes, there was a mnte appeal to every manly sentiment of my 
 bosom for. retribution, which I could no longer withstand. On my passage 
 through the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to rae, with tears in 
 her eyes, " Our lot is a hard one aad we see no peace, but there are a few green 
 spots in our lives, and they are, when the Confederate soldiers come along and 
 we can do something for them." May God defend and bless those noble women 
 of the Valley, who so often ministered to the wounded, sick, and dying Con- 
 federate soldiers, and gave their last morsel of bread to the hungry! They 
 bore with heroic courage, the privations, sufferings, persecutions, and dangers, 
 to which the war' which was constantly waged in their midst exposed them, and 
 upon no portion of the Southern people did the disasters which finally befell our 
 army and country, fall with more crushing effect than upon them. 
 
12 EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCaus- 
 land was ordered to proceed, with his brigade and that of 
 Johnson and a battery of artillery, to that place, and demand 
 of the municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold, or 
 $500,000 in United States currency, as a compensation for the 
 destruction of the houses named and their contents ; and, in 
 default of payment, to lay thc-t town in ashes, in retaliation for 
 the burning of those houses and others in Virginia, as well as 
 for the tovi^ns which had been burned in other Southern Slates. 
 A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal 
 authorities, and they were informed what would be the result 
 of a failure or refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the 
 people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, 
 by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped 
 that the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, 
 and open the eyes of the people of other towns at the North, 
 to the necessity of urging upon their government the adoption 
 of a different policy. McCausland was also directed to pro- 
 ceed from Chambersburg towards Cumberland in Maryland, 
 and levy contributions in money upon that and other towns 
 able to bear them, and if possible destroy the machinery at the 
 coal pits near Cumberland, and the machine shops, depots, and 
 bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a? far as practicable. 
 On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac near Clear 
 Spring, above Williamsport, and I moved with Rodes' and 
 Ramseur's divisions and Vaughan's cavalry to the latter place, 
 while Imboden demonstrated with his and Jackson's cavalry 
 towards Harper's Ferry, in order to withdraw attention from 
 McCausland. Breckenridge remained at Martinsburg and 
 continued the destruction of the railroad. Vaughan drove a 
 force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown, 
 where he captured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with 
 supplies. One of Rodes' brigades was crossed over at Williams- 
 port and subsequently withdrawn. On the 30th, McCausland 
 being wejl under way, I moved back to Martinsburg, and on 
 the 31st the whole infantry force was moved to Bunker Hill, 
 where we reinained on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August. 
 
EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 73 
 
 On the 4th, in order to enable MeCaasland to retire from 
 Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had 
 been reinforced by the 6th and 19th corps, and had been 
 oscillating between Harper's Ferry and Monoeacy Junction, 
 in a state of uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac with 
 the infantry and Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry, while Im- 
 boden demonstrated towards Harper's Ferry. On the 5th Rodes' 
 Ramseur's divisions crossed at Williamsport and took position 
 near St. James' College, and Vaughan's cava-lry went into 
 Hagerstown. Breckenbridge, with his command, and Jack- 
 son's cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took position at 
 Sharpsburg. This position is in full view from Maryland 
 Heights, and a cavalry force was sent out by the enemy to 
 re'connoitre, which, after skirmishing with Jackson's cavalry, 
 was driven off by the sharpshooters of Gordon's division. On 
 the 6th, the whole force recrossed the Potomac at Williams- 
 port, and moved towards Martinsburg; and on the 7th we 
 returned to Bunker Hilh* 
 
 * While at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground on which the 
 battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam as it is called by the enemy, w^is fought, and I 
 was surprised to see how few traces remained of that great battle. In the woods 
 at the famous Dunkard or Tunker Church, where, from personal observation at 
 the battle, I expected to find the trees terribly broken and battered, a stranger 
 would find difficulty in identifying the marks of the bullets and shells.' 
 
 I will take occasion here to say that the public, North or South, has never 
 known how small was the force with which General Lee fought that battle. 
 McClellan's estimate is very wide of the mark. From personal observation and 
 conversation with other officers engaged, including General Lee himself, I am 
 satisfied that the latter was not able to carry 30,(^00 men into action. The ex- 
 haustion of our men, in the battles around Richmond, the subsequent battles near 
 Manassas, and on the march to Maryland, when they were for days without 
 anything to eat except green corn, was so great that the straggling was fright- 
 ful before we crossed the Potomac. As an instance of our weakness, and a re- 
 miniscence worthy of being recorded, which was brought very forcibly to my 
 mind while riding over the ground, I will state the following facts : In the 
 early part of the day, all of General Jackson's troops on the field except my 
 brigade (A. P. Hill bad not then arrived from Harper's Perry) were driven from 
 the field in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with his division. 
 My brigade, which was on the extreme left supporting some artillery with which 
 Stuart was operating, and had not been engaged, was sent for by Gen, Jackson 
 and posted in the left of the woods at the Bunkard Ohurch, Hood was alsp 
 
74 BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG. 
 
 On the 30lh of July McCanaland reached Chambersburg, 
 and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the au- 
 thorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The 
 demand was not complied with, the people stating that they 
 were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Fed- 
 eral force was approaching. The policy pursued by pur army 
 on former occasions had been So lenient, that they did not 
 suppose the threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped 
 for speedy relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry 
 out his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in 
 ashes.* He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but, 
 on approaching that town, he found it defended by a force 
 under Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he withdrew 
 towards Hiimpshire County in Virginia, and crossed the Po- 
 tomac near the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the 
 
 forced back, and then the enemy advanced to this woods — Sumner's Corps, 
 Which was fresh, adirancing on our left flanlc. My brigade then numbering 
 about luOO men for duty, with two or three hnnred men of Jackson's own divi- 
 sion, who had been rallied by Colonels Grigsby and Stafiford, and when there 
 was an interval of at least one half a mile between us and any other part of our 
 line, held Sumner's Corps in check for some time, until Green's division of 
 Mansfield's Corps penetrated into the interval in the woods between us and the 
 rest of our line, when I was compelled to move by the flank and attack it. That 
 division was driven out of the woods by my brigade, while Grigsby and Stafford 
 skirmished with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and, with the 
 aid of three brigades — to wit : Anderson's, Semmes', and Barksdale's — which had 
 just arrived to our assistance, drove it from the woods in great confusion, and 
 with heavy loss. So great was the disparity in the forces at this point that the 
 wounded officers who were captured, were greatly mortified, and commenced 
 making excuses by stating that the troops in their front were raw troops who 
 stampeded and produced confusion in their ranks. McGlellan, in hia report, 
 says that Sumner's Corps and Green's division enconnteredj in this woods, "over- 
 whelming numbers behind breastworks," and he assigns the heavy losses and 
 consequent demoralization in Sumner's Corps, as one of the reasons for not re- 
 newing the fight on the 18th. We had no breastworks or anything like them in 
 that woods on the 17th, and, on our part, it was a stand np fight there altogether. 
 The slight breastworks subsequently seen by McClellan were made on the 18th 
 when we were expecting a renewal of the battle, 
 
 * For this act, I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply 
 executing my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the 
 lapse of time which has occurred, and the resnlt of the war, 1 am perfectly satis- 
 fied with my conduct on this occasion, and see no reason to regret it. 
 
DEFEAT OF m'caUSLAND. 75 
 
 garrison at that place and partially destroying the railroad 
 bridge. He then invested the post on the railroad at New 
 Creek, but finding it too strongly fortified to take by assault, 
 he moved to Moorefield in Hardy County, near which |)lace 
 he halted to rest and recruit his men and horses, as the com- 
 mand was now considered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, 
 had been pursuing from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, 
 and Johnson's brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on 
 the morning of the 7th of August, and routed by Averill's force. 
 This resulted also in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and 
 the loss of the artillery (4 pieces) and about 300 prisoners 
 from the whole command. The balance of the command 
 made its way to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much 
 weakened. This affair had a very damaging effect upon my 
 cavalry for the rest of the campaign.* 
 
 RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL, AND SUBSEQUENT 
 OPERATIONS, UNTIL THE BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 
 
 On the 9th., Imboden reported that a large force had been 
 concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6ih., 19th., 
 and Crook's corps, under a new commander, and that it was 
 moving towards Berryviile, to our right. The new comman- 
 der proved to be Major-General Sheridan, from Grant's army. 
 On the 10th., we moved from Bunker Hill to the east of Win- 
 chester, to cover the roads from Charlestown and Berryviile 
 to that place ; and Ramseur's division was moved to Win- 
 
 ♦ Grant gaya, in reference to this expedition under McCausland : " They were 
 met and defeated by General Eelly ; and, with diminished numbers, escaped 
 into the mountains of West Virginia ; " and he makeg no allusion whatever to 
 Averill's affair. There Was no defeat by Kelly, but there was one by Averill, as 
 I have stated. This shows how loose Grant is as to his facta So far as we were 
 concerned, the defeat by Averill was worse than it could hare been by Eelly. 
 
76 
 
 Chester, to cover that place against a force reported to be ad- 
 vancing from the west ; but, this report proving untrue, it 
 was subsequently moved to the junction of the Millwood and 
 Front Royal roads. On the morning of the 11th., it was dis- 
 covered that the enemy was moving to our right, on the east 
 of the Opequon, and my troops, which had been formed in 
 line of battle covering Winchester, were moved to the right, 
 towards Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the Val- 
 ley Pike. Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body of the 
 enemy's cavalry on the Millwood Road, and drove it back. 
 Imboden's and Vaughan's brigades had a severe fight with 
 another body of cavalry at the double toll-gate, at the inter- 
 section of the Front Royal road with the road from White 
 Post to Newtown ; and it was discovered that there had been 
 a considerable accessjon to that arm from Grant's armyj 
 Just before night, Gordon had heavy skirmishing, near New- 
 town, with a large force of cavalry, which advanced on the 
 road from the double toll-gate, and drove it off. We en- 
 camped near Newtown ; and, on the morning of the 12th., 
 moved to Hupp's Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Greek. 
 Finding that the enemy was advancing in much heavier force 
 than I had yet encountered, 1 determined to take position at 
 Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg, and await his attack there. 
 Imboden, with his brigade, was sent to the Luray Valley, to 
 watch that route; and, in the afternoon, we moved to Fisher's 
 Hill. I had received information a few days before, from 
 General Lee, that General Anderson had moved with. Ker- 
 shaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's division of cavalry 
 to Culpepper C.H. ; and I sent a dispatch to Anderson, in- 
 forming him of the state of things, and requesting him to 
 move to Front Royal, so as to guard the Luray Valley. 
 
 Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek, 
 on the 12th., and there was some skirmishing with it. My 
 troops were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on 
 the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and the left extending to- 
 wards Little North Mountain ; and we awaited the advance 
 of the enemy. General Anderson moved to Front Royal, in 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 
 
 11 
 
 compliance with my request, and took position to prevent an 
 advance of the enemy on that route. Shortly after I took 
 position at Fisher's Hill, Major-Genera] Lomax reported to 
 me to relieve Ransom, in command of the cavalry, and Mc- 
 Causland and Johnson joined us with the i^emnants of their 
 brigades. Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill, within oux 
 view, for several days, and .^ome severe skirmishing ensued. 
 
 Upon taking ppsitioa at Fisher's Hill, I had established a 
 signal-station on^the end of Three Top Mountain, a brancli p£ 
 Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg, which pverlaolied 
 both camps and enabled me to communicate readily with. 
 General Anderson,, in the Luray Valley. A small force from 
 Sheridan's army ascended the mountain and drove off our 
 signal-men, and possession was .taken of the station by the 
 en^my, who was in tufn driven, away ; when sevej;al small 
 but severe fights ensued over the station, possession of it 
 being finally gained arul held by a fo^ce of one hupdred men, 
 under C,aptain Keller of .pordpn'!^, division. , 
 
 On thie morniijg of the, 17th., jt ,^vas discovered that the 
 enemy was falling back, and I immediately moved forward 
 in pursuit, requesting General And^rsop, by signal, to cross 
 the river at Front Royal,, and, move towards Winchester., 
 Just before night, the enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry^ 
 reported to be a division, was encountered between Kerns- 
 town azid Winchester, and driven through thp latter place, 
 after a sharp engagement, jr. which Wharton's division, 
 moved to the left and attacked the enemy's infantry, and 
 drove it from a strong position on Bower's Hill, south of Win- 
 chester, while Ranasevir engaged ;it in front, and Gordon ad- 
 vanced against the cavalry on the right.* 
 
 • When Hunter was relieved I hskd hgped ,^hat an end, was put, to. his nioiie.of 
 warfare, Ijut I had now to learn how the i}e,w commaBder ..proposed to parr;^ on, 
 (jie ^yar in behalf o£ " the best g9vernmep,t^ the world, ever saw," |(bo called). 
 Sherid£ip Jiad commenced burping. Jbaras, inille, and stacks of ^ajij. grain and 
 hay^jijja.the yhole country wa^, snioliing , Among many others,, the bain of a 
 respectable farmer near Newtown, whose name was Chrisman, ha^beijn burne^ 
 within a few steps of his house, and the latter saved with great difficulty, not- 
 G 
 
78 OPEHATIONS IW THE LOWER TAI/LEY. 
 
 On the 1 8th we took position to cover Winchester, and Gen. 
 Anderson came up with Kershaw's division of infantry, Cut- 
 shaw's battalion of Artillery, and two brigades ol cavalry under 
 Fitz Lee. General Anderson ranked me, but he declined to 
 take command, and offered to co-operate in any movement I 
 might suggest. We had now discovered thai Torbert's and 
 Wilson's divisions of cavalry from Grant's army had joined 
 Sheridan's force, and that the latter was very large. 
 
 On the 19th, my main force moved to Banker Hill and 
 Lomax's cavalry made reconnoissances to Martinsburg and 
 Shepherdstown, while Anderson's whole force remained near 
 Winchester. 
 
 On the 28th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the 
 enemy's on the Opeqnon, and on the 2l8t, by concert, there was 
 a general movement towards Harper's Ferry — my command 
 moving through Smithfield towards Charlestown, and An- 
 derson's on the direct road by Summit Point. A body of the 
 enemy's cavalry was driven from the Opequon, and was pur- 
 sued by part of our cavalry towards Summit Point. I encoun- 
 tered Sheridan's main force near Cameron's depot, about three 
 
 withstanding the iact that Mr. Cbrismsn bad received from General Torbert, in 
 command of the Federal earaliy, a written protection stating that for some 
 weeks he bad taken care of, and showed great Icindneaa to, a badly-wonnded 
 Federal soldier. In passing through Middletuwn, J was informed that one of 
 mj soldiers bad been tried and bung as a spy. Tbe grare at the foot of the 
 gallows was opened, and tbe body was recognized by his brother and tbe offi- 
 cers of bis company as a prirate of the 5«b ITortb Carolina Begiment. This 
 man had been found by the enemy, in Middletown, in attendance on a Confede- 
 rate soldier whose leg was amputated, and he bad claimed to be a citizen, but a 
 paper was found on bis person showing that he bad been formerly detailed as a 
 nurse in tbe hospital. On this state of facts, he was hung ns a spy. He was 
 not employed in any such capacity, and be was so illiterate, not being able to 
 read or write, that his appearance and evident want of intelligence precluded 
 the idea of bis being so employed. I would have retaliated at once by hanging 
 a commissioned officer, but the enquiry which I made furnished some reason for 
 beliering that tbe man had remained behind, and'endearoared to pass for a citi- 
 zen to avoid service in oar army ; and I did not thercfbre wish to risk the livas 
 of my officers dad men who were Stt the tramfa hands, tiy making his a'esse for 
 fetaliation. His esecntitfn 'by the 'enemy, ht^evfer, %as'none th« leM waaton 
 Md barbarotit. 
 
OPERATIOIffl IN THE LOWER TALLET. 79 
 
 miles from Chiarlestown, in a position which he commenced 
 fortifying at once. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions were ad- 
 vanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing ensued and 
 was continued until night, but I waited for General Anderson 
 to arrive before making a general attack. He encountered 
 Wilson's division of cavalry at Summit Point, and, after driv- 
 ing it off, went into camp at that place. At light next morning, 
 it was discovered that the enemy had retired during the night, 
 and his rear guard of cavalry was driven tbrongh Charlestown 
 towards Hatl-town, where Sheridan had taken a strong position 
 under the protection of the heavy guns on Maryland Heights. 
 I demonstrated on the enemy's front on the SSnd, 23rd, and 
 24th, and there was some skirmishing. General Anderson 
 then consented to take my position in front of Gharlestown and 
 amuse the enemy with Kershaw's division of infantry, support- 
 ed by McCausland's brigade of cavalry on the left and a regi- 
 ment of Fitz Lee's cavalry on the right, while I moved with 
 my infantry and artilleiy to Shepherdstown, and Fitz Lee with 
 the rest of the cavalry to Williamsport, as if to cross into 
 Maryland, in order to keep up the fear of an invasion of Mary- 
 land and Pennsylvania. 
 
 On the 25th Fitz Lee started by the way of Leetown and 
 Martinsburg to Williamsport, and I moved through Leetown 
 and crossed the /railroad at Kearneysville to Shepherdstown.. 
 After Fitz Lee had passed on, I encountered a very large force 
 of the enemy's cavatey between Leetown and Kearneysville,. 
 which was moving out with several days forage and rations 
 for a raid in our rear. After a sharp engagement with small' 
 arms and artillery, this force was driven back through Shep- 
 herdstown, where we came very near surrounding and ctipluring 
 a considerable portion of it, but it succeded in making its escape 
 across the Potomac. Gordon's division, which was moved 
 around to intercept the enemy, became heavily engaged, and 
 cut off the reireat.of part of bis foroe 1^ one road, but it made 
 its way down the river to the ford by another and thus escaped. 
 In this affair, a valuable officer. Colonel Mon^han of the 6th. 
 Lonisiana Regifsent, was killed. Fitz Lee reached Williams- 
 
80 OPERATIONS IS THE LOV^EW TALLET. 
 
 pprt, and had some skirmishing across the river at thai place, 
 and then moved to Shepherdstown. ' ' 
 
 , On the 26th I moved to Leetown, and on the 27th I moved 
 bacli to Bunker Hill ; wliile Anderson, who had confronted 
 Sheridan, during thje two days of my absence, with but a; di- 
 vision of infantry and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry, 
 inoved to Stephenson's Depot. »■••' '■ "i'* 
 
 On the 28th, our cavalry^ which had been left holding a line 
 frpm Charlestown to Shepherdstown, was compelled to retire 
 a,cross the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with 
 the enemy's cavalry at Smithfield. On the 29th, the enemy's 
 cavalry Riossed the Opequon neat Smithfield, driving in our 
 cavalry pickets, when 1 advanced to the front with a part of my 
 infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and, 
 after a very sharp artillery duel, a portion of my command was 
 crossed .over and pursued the enemy through SmithfielS to- 
 wards Charlestown. Wethen retired, leaving a command of 
 cavalry at Smithfield, but it was compelled to recross the 
 Opequon, pn the advance, of a heavy force from the direction 
 of Charlestown. ■ i'» • l^' 
 
 Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 3 1st there were some 
 demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the Opepuon, 
 which were met by ours. On this day, (Slat), -'Anderson moved 
 to Winchester, and Rodes with his division went to Martins- 
 burg on a reppnnoissance, drovd a force of the enemy's cav- 
 alry from that place, interrupted the prbpaTations for repairing 
 the railroad, and then returned-. tu< "in ■ 
 
 There was quiet on the, 1st, but, on the 2nd, I broke up my 
 camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three divisions of in- 
 fantry aqd part of McCausland's cavalry under Col. Ferguson, 
 across the country towards Summit Point, on a reconnoissance, 
 while the trains under thei protection of Rodes^ division were 
 moved to Stephenson's depot. After I had' crossed the Ope- 
 quon and was pioving towards Summit Point, Averill's cav- 
 alry attack;ed and drove back, in some confusion, first Vau- 
 ghan's, and then JohnsGn.'s cavalry, which were on the Mar- 
 tinsburg road, a^d the Opequon, biit Rodes returned towards' 
 
QPiEJRATlONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 8l 
 
 Bunker Hill and drove the enemy back in turn. ' This affair 
 arrested my march and I recrossed the Opequon and moved to 
 Stephenson's depot, where I established' rriy canip. 
 
 On the 3rd, Rodes moved to Bunker Hill in support of Lo- 
 max'scavalry, and drove the enemy's cavalry from and beyond 
 that place. 
 
 A letter had been received from General Lee, requesting 
 that Kershaw's division should be returned to him, as he wafe 
 very much in need of troops, and, after consultation with me. 
 Gen. Anderson determined to recross the Blue Ridge with that 
 division and Fitz Lee's cavalry. On the 3rd, he moved to- 
 wards Berry villa for the purpose of crossing the mountain at 
 Ashby's Gap, and I was to have moved towards Charlestown 
 n^xt day, to occupy the enetny's attention during Anderson's 
 n^ovement. Sheridan, however, had started two divisions of 
 cavalry through Berryville and White Post, on a raid to our 
 rear, and his main force had moved towards Berryville. An- 
 derson encountered Crook's corps at the latter place, and after 
 a sharp engagement drove it back on the main body. Re- 
 ceiving Jnfprmation of this affair, I moved at daylight next 
 moining, with three divisions, to Anderson's assistance, Gor- 
 don's division being left to cover Winchester. I found Ker- 
 shaw's division extended out in a strong skirmish line con- 
 fronting Sheridan's main force, which had taken position in 
 rear of Berryville, across the road from Charlestown to that 
 place, and was busily fortifying, while the cavalry force which 
 had started on the raid was returning and passing between 
 Berryville and the river to Sheridan's rear. As may be sup- 
 posed, Andergoii's position was one of great peril, if the enemy 
 had possessed any enterprise, and it presented the appearance 
 of the most extreme audacity, for him. thus to confront a force 
 so vastly superior to , his own, while, too, his trains were at 
 the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it. 
 Placing one of my divisions in line on Kershaw's left, J moved 
 with the other two along the enemy's front towards his right, 
 for the purpose of reconnoitring and attacking that flank, if 
 a suitable opportunity offered.. After moving in this way for 
 
0% OPERATIONS IN THK LOWEB TALI.ET. 
 
 two miles, I reached an elevated positicMi from which the en- 
 emy's line was visible, and within artillery range of it. I at 
 first thought that I had reached his right flank, and was about 
 making arrangements to attack it, when casting my eye to my 
 left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach with the aid of 
 field glasses, a line extending towards Summit Point. The 
 positioQ the enemy occupied, was a strong one, and he was 
 busily engaged fortifying it, having already madie considerable 
 progress. It was not until I had had this view that I re- 
 alized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that 
 his line was too long for me to get around his flank, and the 
 position was too strong to attack in &ont, I returned and in- 
 formed General Anderson of the condition of things. After 
 consultation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack 
 the enemy in his entrenched lines, and we determined to move 
 our forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he 
 would not move out of his works. The waggon trains were 
 sent back early next morning (the 6th) towards Winchester, 
 and, about an hour by sun, Kershaw's division, whose place 
 had been taken by one of my divisions, moved towards the 
 same point About two o'clock in the afternoon my troops 
 were withdrawn, and moved back to Stephenson's depot. 
 This withdrawal was made while the skirmishers were in 
 close proximity and firing at each other; yet there was no 
 effort on the part of the enemy to molest ns. Just as my front 
 division (Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove 
 back, and pursued for some distance, Averill's cavalry, which 
 was forcing, towards Winchester, that part of our cavalry 
 which had been watching the Martinsburg road. 
 
 It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry 
 made demonstrations on the Martinsburg Road, and the Ope- 
 qu(m at several points and was repulsed. 
 
 On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment 
 of the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below Brucetown, 
 burned some mills, and retreated before a division of infantry 
 sent out to meet it. 
 
 On the 10th, my infantry moved by Banker Hill to Darke» 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE LO'WER TALIiET. 83 
 
 ville and encountered a considerable force of the enemy's cav- 
 alry, which was driven o^ and then pursued by Lomax through 
 Martinsburg across the Opequon. We then returned to Bunk- 
 er Hill and the next day to Stephenson's depot, and there was 
 quiet on the 12th. 
 
 On the 13th, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, reported 
 to be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from Sum- 
 mit Point and drove in our pickets from the Opequon, when 
 two divisions of uifantry were advanced to the front, driving 
 the enemy across the Opequon again. A very sharp artillery 
 duel across the creek then took place, and some of my in- 
 fantry crossed over, when the enemy retired. 
 
 On the 14th, General Anderson again started, with Kershaw's 
 division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross the Blue 
 Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and was not molested. 
 Fitz Lee's cavalry was left with me, a^d Ramseur's division 
 was moved to Winchester to ocoupy Kershaw's position. 
 
 There was an affair between one of Kershaw's brigades and 
 a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at Fisher's 
 Hill and Anderson at Front Royal, in which some prisoners 
 were lost ; an4 two affairs in which the outposts from Ker- 
 shaw's command were attacked and captured by the enemy's 
 cavalry, one in front of Winchester and the other in front of 
 Charlestown ; which I have not undertaken to detail, as they 
 occurred when General Anderson was controlling the opera- 
 tions of that division, but it is proper to refer to them here as 
 part of the operations in the Valley. 
 
 On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp undis- 
 turbed. 
 
 The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows : 
 Ramseur's division and Nelson's battalion of artillery were on 
 the road from Berryville to Winchester, one mile from the 
 latter place. Rodes', Gordon's, and Wharton's divisions, (the 
 last two being under Breckenridge,) and Braxton's and King's 
 battalions of artillery were at Stephenson's depot on the Win- 
 chester and Potomac railroad, which is six miles from Win- 
 chester. Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the Ope> 
 
84 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 
 
 quon^ and on my left from that stream to North Mounta,in, 
 while Fitz Lee's cavalry wafchecj the right, having small 
 pickets across to the Shenandoah. Four, principal roads, frqm 
 positions held by the enemy, centered at Stephenson's depot, to 
 wit: the TMartinsbiirg road, the road from Charlestown via 
 ,Smithfield,, the ro9,d from the same place via'^ummit Point, 
 and thie road from Berryville via Jordan's Springs. Sheridan's 
 mqin force was near Berryville, at the entrenched .position 
 which has been mentioned, while Averill -v^^as at Martinsburg 
 w^ith a, division of cavalry. Berryville is ten miles from Win- 
 chester, nearly east, and Martinsburg twenty two miles nearly 
 north. The crossing of the Opeqnon on the Berryville road 
 is four or five miles from Winchester. From Berryville 
 there are 'two good roads to Front ttoyal, via Miihvood and 
 White Post,and from Millwood therS is a macadamized road to 
 Winchester, 'arid also good roads ^ia White Post to the Valley 
 Pike- at Newtown and Middletown, the last two roads nmning^ 
 east of the Opequon. The whole country is very open, being 
 a limestone country which is thickly settled and well cleared, 
 arid affords great facilities for the movement of troops and the. 
 operations of cavalry.' From the enemy's fdrtifications on 
 Maryland Heights, the country north and east of Winchester, 
 and the main roads through it, are exposed to view. 
 
 The relative positions which we occupied rendered my 
 communications io the- rear very much ' exposed, but I could 
 riot avoid it without giving up the lower Valley. The object 
 of my presence there was to keep up a threatening attitude 
 towards Maryland and Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of 
 the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and the Chesapeake and 
 Ohio canal, as well as to keep as large a force as possible 
 from Grant's army to defend the Federal Capital. Had Sheri- 
 dan, by a prompt movement, throvni his whole force on the 
 line of my communications, I -tvould have been Compelled to 
 attempt to cut my way thi'ough, as there was no esbape for 
 me to the right oi- left, and my force was too weak to cross 
 the Potomac while he Was in my rear. I kfle-vv my' danger, 
 but I could occupy no other position that would have enabled 
 
POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 85 
 
 me. to accomplish the .desired object. Iflb^d moved up the 
 Valley at all, I qould not have stopped short of New Market, 
 for between thai; place and the country in which I was there 
 was no forage for my horses; and, this would have enabled 
 the enemy to resume the use of the railroad an^ canal, and 
 return all the troops from. Grant's army to .him. Being com- 
 pelled to occupy _ the position where I was, ^rid being aware 
 of its danger as .well as apprized of the^ fact, that very great 
 odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my 
 forces so'a^ to display- them ^at different points with great 
 rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they were 
 much larger than they really were. The events of the last 
 month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me 
 was withoutf enterprise, ^nd ppssessed an excessive caution 
 which arpounled to timidity. If it was his policy to produce 
 the rmpregs^piji thati his, force ,w^as,too weak to fight me, he did 
 not succeed, but.if^t was to convince me that he was not an 
 _able or energetic commander, hi.s strategy was a complete 
 success, and subsequent i^v^nts have not changed my opinion. 
 My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divi- 
 sions of the 2nd. Corps of tlje Army ol Northern Virginia, and 
 Whartonls division of| Breckenridge's command. The 2nd 
 Qqrp? numbered a little over 8000 muskets when it was 
 detached in pursuit of Hunter, and it had now been reduced 
 tp, ^Jjouf, 7000 muskets, by long and rapid marches and the 
 various, engagements and sl^ii;m,ishes in, which it had partici- 
 pated. Wha,r1tpn's division had begji reduced to about 1700 
 musiiests^y the same causes. - Making a gmall allowance for 
 ^letails an(J those u^fil for duly, 1 had abput 8,500 muskets for 
 duty. I .^liept ,1 r^tu^ne4 ..from Maryland, my cavalry cor^- 
 sisted of the^ remnants of five small brigades, to wit: Im- 
 bpden's, McCausland's, Johnson's, Jackson's, and Vaushan's. 
 Vau£<han's had now beep ordered tp South Western Virginia, 
 most of the nie,n having left withojit permission. The surpri^^e 
 and rout of McCausland's and Jphijspn's brigades by Averill 
 at Mpqre^eid, had .re.gulted jfi thp .Ipss pf ^considerable 
 nuriiber of hPrses and inen, and suoh had been the loss in all 
 
86 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 
 
 the brigades, in the various fights and skirmishes in which 
 they had been engaged, that the whole of this cavalry, now 
 nnder Lomax, numbered only about 1700 mounted men. 
 Fitz Lee had brought with him two brigades, to wit : Wick- 
 ham's, and Lomax's old brigade (now under Colonel Payne), 
 numbering about 1200 mounted men. I had the three battal- 
 ions of artillery which had been with me near Washington, 
 and Fitz Lee had brought a few pieces of horse artillery. 
 When I speak of divisions and brigades of my troops, it must 
 be understood that they were mere skeletons of those organi- 
 zations. 
 
 Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been 
 obtained principally from the lower Valley and the counties 
 ■jyest of it, and the money which was obtained by contribu- 
 tions in Maryland was used for that purpose. Nearly the 
 whole of our bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and 
 then having it ground, by details from my command, and it 
 sometimes happened that while my troops were fighting, the 
 very flour which was to furnish them with bread for their next 
 meal was being ground under the protection of their guns. 
 Latterly our flour had been obtained from the upper Valley, 
 but also by details sent for that purpose. The horses and 
 mules, including the cavalry horses, were sustained almo&t 
 entirely by grazing. 
 
 I have no means of stating with accuracy Sheridan's force, 
 and can only form an estimate from such data as I have been 
 able to procure. Citizens who had seen his force, stated that 
 it was the largest which they had ever seen in the Valley on 
 either side, and some estimated it as high as 60,000 or 70,000, 
 but of course I made allowance for the usual exaggeration of 
 inexperienced men. My estimate is from the following data : 
 In Grant's letter to Hunter, dated at Monocacy, August 5th, 
 1864, and contained in the report of the former, is the follow- 
 ing statement : " In detailing such a force, the brigade of 
 cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville, may be 
 taken into account. There are now on their way to join you 
 three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 
 
POSITIONS AND STRKNOTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 87 
 
 5,000 men and horses." Sheridan relieved Hunter on ihe 
 6th, and Grant says in his report, " On the 7th of August, the 
 Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, 
 Washington, and the Susquehanna were constituted into the 
 Middle Military divisiMi, and Major General Sheridan was 
 assfgned to the temporary command of the same. Two 
 divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and 
 Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. 
 The first reached him at Harper's Ferry on the 1 1th of August." 
 Before this cavalry was sent to the Valley, there was already 
 a division there commanded by Averill, besides some detach- 
 ments which belonged to the department of West Virginia. 
 A book containing the official reports of the chief surgeon of 
 the cavalry corps of Sheridan's army, which was subsequently 
 captured at Cedar Creek on the 19th of October, showed that 
 there were present for duty in that corps, during the first week 
 in September, over 11,000 men, and present for duty during 
 Ihe week ending the 17th day of September, 10,100 men 
 The extracts from Grant's report go to confirm this statement, 
 as, if three brigades numbered at least 5,000 men and horses, 
 the two divisions, when the whole of them arrived, with 
 Averill's cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000. I think, 
 therefore, that I can safely estimate Sheridan's cavalry at the 
 battle of Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000. 
 His infantry consisted of the 6th, 19th, and Crook's corps, the 
 latter being composed of the " Army of West Virginia," and 
 one division of the 8th corps. The report of Secretary Stanton 
 shows that there was in the department of which the " Middle 
 Military division " was composed, the following " available 
 force present for duty May 1st, 1864," to wit : 
 
 " Department of Washington 43,124. 
 
 " Department of West Virginia 30,782. 
 
 " Department of the Susquehanna 2,970." 
 
 " Middle Department 5,627."^ 
 
 making an aggregate of 81,603 ; but, as the Federal Secretary 
 of War in the same report says, " In order to repair the losses 
 of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force 
 
 " 
 
88 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 
 
 designed to guard tlie Middle Deparlment and the Depart- 
 ment of Washington was called forward to the front," w^ 
 may assume tha^ 40,000 mei^ w^re.psed' fpr.that purpose, 
 which would leave 41,503, minus the losses in Ijattle befqijB 
 Sheridan relieveji. Hunter, in the Middle Military divisipn, 
 exclusive of the, 6th and 19th, corps, and the cavalry from 
 Grant's array. The infantry of the Army of the, Potomac was 
 composed of the 2nd, 3th, and ,6th corps, on the 1st of May 
 1864, and Stanton says the " available force present for duty " 
 in that army on that day, was 130,386 men. Allowing 30,000 
 for the artillery and, cavalry of thatr army,, which would, be a 
 very liberal allowance, and there would still b0 left 90,385 
 infantry ; and it is fair to assume that the 6th corps numbered 
 oue third of the infantry, that is, 30,000 men on the 1st of 
 May ] 864. If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been 
 such as to reduce the 6th corps to less than 10,000 men, not- 
 withstanding the reinforcements and recruits received, the 
 carniige in Grant's army must have been frightful indeed. 
 The 19th corps was just from the Department of the Gulf and 
 had not gone through a bloody campaign. A communication 
 which was among the papers captured s-t Cedar Creek, in 
 noticing some statement of a newspaper correspondent in 
 regard to the conduct of^that corps at Winchester, designated 
 it as " a vile sjander on 12,000 of the best soldiers in the 
 Union army.", In view of the foregoing data, without count- 
 ing the. troops in the Middle Department andithe Departments 
 of Washington and the Susquehanna, and making liberal 
 allowances lor losses iri battle, and for troops detained on post 
 and garrison ,duly in the; Department of West Virginia, '1 
 think that I may assume jthajt 8,heridan. had.at least 35,000 
 infantry against rne. , The troops of the fith corps and of the 
 Department. of We§t. Virginia, Alone, >^ithout counting the 
 19th corps,, numbered on the 1st of May 1864, 60,7^2. If 
 with the 19th corps, Sheridan did not have 35,000 infantry 
 remaining from this force, what hsjd ib^come of the balance? 
 Sheridan's artifkry very greatly outnurnbered mine, both in 
 men and guns. 
 
EXPEDITION to MARTINSBCBG. 89 
 
 Having been informed that a force was at work on the rail- 
 road at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of 
 September, with Rodes' and Gordon's division, and Braxton's 
 artillery, to Bunker Hill, atid, onthe morning of the 18th, with 
 Gordon's division and a part of the artillery to Martinsburg, 
 preceded by a part of Lomax's cavalry. Averill's division of 
 cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the 
 direction of Charlestown, and we then returned to Bunker 
 Hill. Gordon wa's left at Bunker Hill, with ordeirs to move 
 to Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' 
 division mdved to the latter place that night, to which I also 
 returned. ' At Martinsburg, where the eAcmy had a telegraph 
 office, I learned that Grant was with Sh'6ridan that day, and I 
 expected 'an early move. 
 
 Battle: of vvinches.7:er. 
 
 At light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets at 
 the crossing of the Opequoii on the Berry villa Foad were driven 
 in, and infoirtnation haH^ing been sent mk of that fact, I imme- 
 diately ordered all the troops kt Stephenson's depot to be in 
 readiness to move,' directions being given for Gordon, who ha4, 
 arrived frbrri Bunker Hill, to 'move at once, but, by some mis- 
 take on the pa!rt' of my staff officer, the latter order was not 
 delivered to General Breckenridse or Gordon. I rode at once 
 to Ramseur's position, and found his ^rciops in line across lh.e 
 Berry ville road skirijiishing with the enemy. Before reaching 
 this pointj I had ascertained that Gordon was not moving, and 
 sent back for him, and nq^ (JisCjdvering that il^e enemy 's advance 
 ■yVas'a real on^ and in heavy force, I sent orders for Brecken- 
 ridge and Rodes to move up as rapidly as'bos'slblel The 
 position occupied by Ramseur, wap about one mile and a half 
 out from Winchester, oil' Ein elevated plateau between Abra- 
 riarii's Creek' arid Red Buii Run. AtirSfiam's creek crosses the 
 
90 BATTLE OF WUrCHESTEB. 
 
 Valley Pike one mile south of Winchester, and then crosses 
 the Front Koyal road about the same distance south-east of the 
 town, and, running eastwardly, on the southern side of the 
 Berryville road, crosses that road a short distance before it 
 empties into the Opequon. Red Bud Run crosses the Mar- 
 tinsburg road about a mile apd a half north of Winchester, and 
 runs eastwardly, on the northern side of the Berryville road, to 
 the Opequon. Ramseur was therefore in the obtuse angle 
 formed by the Martinsburg and FrOnt Royal roads. In front 
 of and to the right of him, for some distance, the country was 
 open. Abraham's Creek runs through a deep valley, and be- 
 yond it, on the right, is high open ground, at the intersection 
 of the Front Royal and Millwood roads. To Ramseur's left, 
 the country sloped off to the Red Bud, and there were some 
 patches of woods which afforded cover for troops. To the 
 north of the Red Bud, the country is very open, affording fa- 
 cilities for the movement of any kind of troops. Towards the 
 Opequon, on the front, the Berryville road runs through a ravine 
 with hills and woods on each side, which enabled the enemy 
 to move his troops under cover, and mask them out of range of 
 artillery. Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line, 
 covering the approaches as far as practicable, and Lomax with 
 Jackson's cavalry and part of Johnson's was on the right, 
 watching the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal 
 road beyond, while Fitz Lee was on the left, across the Red 
 Bud, with his cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and a 
 detachment of Johnson's cavalry watched the interval between 
 Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. These troops held the 
 eneniy's main force in check until Gordon's and Rodes' di- 
 visions arrived from Stephenson's depot. Gordon's division 
 arrived first, a little after ten o'clock, A.M., and was placed 
 under cover in rear of a piece of woods behind the interval be- 
 tween Ramseur's line and the Red Bud, the detachment of 
 Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the right. Knowing 
 that it would not do for us to await the shock of the enemy's 
 attack, Gordon was directed to examine the ground on theleA, 
 , with a view to attacking a force of the enemky which had taken 
 
BATTLE or triNCHESTEB. 91 
 
 position in a piece of wood in front of him, and while he waa 
 so engaged, Rodes arrived with three of his brigades, and was 
 directed to form on Gordon's right in rear of another piece of 
 woods. While this movement was being executed, we dis- 
 covered very heavy colamns of the enemy, which had been 
 massed under cover between the Red Bud and the Berryville 
 road, moving to attack Ramseur on his left flank, while an- 
 other force pressed him in front. It was a moment of imminent 
 and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for Ramseur's di- 
 vision, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to with- 
 stand the immense force advancing against it. The only 
 chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon upon the flank of 
 the advancing columns, and they were ordered forward at 
 once to the attack. They advanced in most gallant style 
 through the woods into the open ground, and attacked with 
 great vigour, while Nelson's artillery on the right, and Brax- 
 ton's on the left, opened a destructive fire. But Evans' Brigade 
 of Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our 
 infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and 
 was forced back tlirough the woods from behind which it had 
 advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, 
 and to within musket range of seven pieces of Braxton's ar- 
 tillery which were without support. This caused a pause in 
 our advance and the position was most critical, for it was ap- 
 parent that unless this force was driven back the day was lost. 
 Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely 
 stood their ground, and, under the personal superintendence of 
 Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, my 
 then Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy. 
 This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy stag- 
 gered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle flag 
 on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot. 
 Just then, Battle's brigade of Rodes' division, wnioh had ar- 
 rived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to 
 the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept 
 through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans' 
 brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge. Our ad- 
 
92 BATTLE OF WlSCHfi^tER. 
 
 vance, which had been suspended for a moment, was resumed, 
 and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into great 
 confusion and driven from the field. This attacking force of 
 the enemy proved to be the 6th and 19th corps, and it was a 
 grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter dis- 
 order before my two divisions, numbering a very little over 
 5,000 muskets. Ramseur's division had received the shock of 
 the enemy's attack, and been' forced back a little, but soon re- 
 covered itself. Lomax, on the right, had held the enemy's 
 cavalry in check, and, with a part of his force, had made a 
 gallant charge against a body of infantry, when' Ramseur's line 
 was being forced back, thus aiding the latter in recovering 
 from the momentary disorder. Fitz Lee on the left, from across 
 thelRed Bud, had poured a galling fire into the enemy's col- 
 umns with his sharpshooters and horse artillery, while Nelsi n's 
 and Braxton's battalions had performed wonders. This affair 
 occurred about 11, A.M., and a splendid victory had been 
 gained. The ground in front was strewn with the enemy's 
 dead and wounded, and soine prisoneus had been taken. But 
 dn our side. Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very' 
 moment of triumph, while condufcting the attack of his di- 
 vision with great gallantry and skill; and this Was a hedvy 
 blow to me. Brigadier General Godwin of Ramseur's division 
 had been killed, and Brigadier General Ifork of Gordon's di- 
 vision had lost an arm. Other brave men and officers had fal- 
 len, and we could illy bear the loss of any of them. Had I 
 then had a body of fresh troops to push our victory, the day- 
 would have been ours, but'in this action, iri'the early part of 
 the day, I had present only abouf 7,000 muskets, about 2,000 
 cavalry, arid two battalions of artillery with about 30 guns ; 
 and they had all be^n engaged. Wharton's' division and 
 King's artillery had not tirrivedy and' Imboden's cavalry under 
 Colonel Smith, and McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, 
 were watching the enemy's cavalry on the left, on the Mar- 
 tinsburg road 'an.d'the Opequon. The en^niy, had a fi;esh corps 
 which had not been engaged, and there remained Kis heavy 
 force of cavalry. Our lines were 'now formed across from 
 
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 93 
 
 Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated. The 
 enemy was still to be seen in front in formidable force, and, 
 away to our right, across Abraham's creek, at the junction of 
 the Front Royal and Millwood roads, he had massed a di- 
 vision of cavalry with some artillery, overlapping us at least a 
 mile, while the country M'as open between this force and the 
 Valley Pike, and the Cedar Creek Pike back of the latter ; 
 which roads furnished my only means of retreat in the event 
 of disaster. My line did not reach the Front Royal road on 
 the right, or the Martinsbuig road on the left. 
 
 When the order was sent for the troops to move from Ste- 
 phenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to the front, 
 with Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a cavalry 
 force which had driven our pickets from the Opequon on the 
 Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily en- 
 gaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several de- 
 termined charges of his cavalry, while its own flanks were in 
 great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and a 
 column of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on the 
 left. After much difficulty and some hard fighting. Gen. Breck- 
 enridge succeeded in extricating his force, and moving up the 
 Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field 
 until about two o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along 
 the line, and the reports from the front were that the enemy 
 was massing for another attack, but it was impossible to tell 
 where it would fall. As the danger from the enemy's cavalry 
 on the right was very great and Lomax's force very weak 
 Wickham's brigade of Fitz Lee's cavalry had been sent from 
 the left to Lomax's assistance. When Wharton's division 
 arrived, Patton's brigade of that division was ^eft to aid Fitz 
 Lee in guarding the Martinsburg road, against the force of cav- 
 alry which was advancing on that road watched by Lornax's 
 two small brigades ; and the rest of the division was formed in 
 rear of Rodes' division in the centre, in order to be moved to 
 any point that might be attacked. Late in the afternoon, two 
 divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which 
 
94 BATTLE or WINCHESTER. 
 
 had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook*» 
 corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time 
 on that flank, oti the north side of Red Bud, and^ before this 
 overwhelming force, Patton's brigade of infantry and Payne's 
 brigade of cavalry under Fitz Lee were forced back. A con- 
 siderable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along the 
 Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus getting 
 in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two oilier brigades 
 were moved in double quick time to the left and rear, and,, 
 making a gallant charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the aid 
 of King's artillery, and some of Braxton's guns which were 
 turned to the rear, succeeded in driving it back. The division 
 was then thrown into line by General Breckenridge, in rear 
 of our left and at right angles with the Martinsburg road, and 
 another charge of the enemy's cavalry was handsomely repul- 
 sed. But many of the men on our front line, hearing the fire 
 in the rear, and thinking they were flanked and about to be 
 cut off", commenced falling back, thus producing great confu- 
 sion. At the sameiime, Crook advanced against our left, and 
 Gordon threw Evans' brigade into line to meet him, but the 
 disorder in the front line became so great, that, after an obstin- 
 ate resistance, that brigade was compelled ta retire also. The 
 whole front line had now given way, but a large portion of 
 the men were rallied and formed behind an indifferent line of 
 breastworks, which had been made just outside of W^inchester 
 during the first year of the.warj and, with the aid of the ar- 
 tillery which was brought back to this position, the progress 
 of the enemy's infantry was arrested. Wharton's division 
 maintained its organization on the left, and Ramseur fell back 
 in good order on the right. Wickham's brigade of cavalry had 
 been brought from the right, and was in position on Fort Hill 
 just outside of Winchester on the west. Just after the advance 
 of the enemy's infantry was checked by our artillery, it was 
 reported to me that the enemy had got around our right flank, 
 and %s I kne^Whis A$;as perfectly practicable and was expect- 
 ing such a inovemaiij4t.from the cavalry on the Front Royal 
 road, I gave the ovder to retire, but instantly discovering that 
 
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 95 
 
 the supposed force of the enemy was Ramseur's division, 
 which had merely moved back to keep in line with the other 
 troops, I gave the order for the latler to return to the- works 
 before they had moved twenty paces. This order was 
 obeyed by Wharton's division, but not so well by the others. 
 The enemy's cavalry force however was too large for us, and 
 having the advantage of open ground, it again succeeded in 
 getting around our left, producing great confusion, for which 
 there was no remedy. Nothing was now left for us but to 
 retire through Winchester, and Ramseur's division, which 
 maintained its organization, was moved on the east of the 
 town to the south side of it, and put in position forming the 
 basis for a new line, while the other troops moved back through 
 the town. Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse 
 artillery on Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked the 
 pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the new line was form- 
 ed, the enemy's advance was checked until night-fall, and we 
 then retired to Newtown without serious molestation. Lomax 
 had held the enemy's cavalry on the Front Royal road in 
 check, and a foeble attempt at pursuit was repulsed by Ram- 
 seur near Kernstown. 
 
 As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent for the 
 removal of the trains, stores, and sick and wounded in the 
 hospitals, to Fisher's Hiil, over the Cedar Creek Pike and the 
 Back Road. This was done with safety, and all the wounded^ 
 except such as were not in a condition to be moved, and those 
 which had not been brought from the field, were carried to 
 the rear. 
 
 This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's 
 front, had lasted from daylight until dark, and, at the close of 
 it, we had been forced back two miles, after having repulsed 
 the enemy's first attack with great slaughter to him, and sub- 
 sequently contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed 
 obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have had it, 
 but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, which 
 alone gave it to him. 
 
 Three pieces of King's artillery, from which the horses were- 
 
96 BATTLE OP WmCHESTEH. 
 
 shot, and which therefore could not be brought off, were lost 
 but the enemy claimed five, and, if he captured- that number 
 two were lost by the cavalry and not reported to me. My losi 
 in killed, wounded, and prisoners,' was severe for the size o 
 my force, but it was only a fraction of that claimed by th« 
 enemy. Owing to its obedience to orders in retarning to th( 
 works, the heaviest loss of prisoners was in Wharton's division 
 Among the killed, were Major General Kodes and Brigadie: 
 General Godwin. Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a bri 
 gade, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of th« 
 enemy. Major General Fitz Lee was severely wounded, anc 
 Brigadier General York lost an arm. In Major General Rodes 
 I had to regret the loss, not only of a most accomplished, skiL 
 lul, and gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance 
 but also of a personal friend, whose counsels had been of grea 
 service to me in the trying circumstances with which I hac 
 found myself surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's 
 and patriot's duly to his country, and his memory will long be 
 cherished by his comrades. General Godwin and "Colonel 
 Patton were both most gallant and efficient officers, and theii 
 loss was deeply felt, as was that of all the brave officers anc 
 men who fell in this battle. The enemy's loss in killed anc 
 wounded was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into ou) 
 hands. 
 
 A skilful and energetic commander of the enemy's force! 
 would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could havt 
 reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole 
 force ; and, later in the day, when the battle had turneei agains 
 us, with the immense superiority in cavalry which Sheridar 
 had, and the advantage of the open country, would have de 
 stroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. As 
 it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers ane: 
 equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had los 
 a few pieces of artillery and some very valuable officers anc 
 men, but the main part of my force, and all my trains hac 
 been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 
 far greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I cat 
 
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 97 
 
 but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the inca- 
 pacity of my opponent.* 
 
 • The enemy has called this battle, " The Battle of the Opequon," but I know 
 no claim it has to that title, unless it be in the fact that, after his repulse in the 
 fore part of the day, some of his troops ran back across that si ream. I have 
 always thought that Instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been 
 cashiered for this battle. He seems to be a sort of pet of Grant's, and I give 
 the following extracts from the report of the latter, to show the strange incon- 
 sistency of which he is guilty to magnify Sheridan's services. In his Monocacy 
 letter to Hunter, Grant says : " Prom Harper's Ferry if it is found that the 
 enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north following 
 him and attacking him wherever found ; follow him if driven south of the Poto- 
 mac as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a 
 small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detach- 
 ing under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders 
 and drive them to thc^ir homes." And further on in the same letter, he says : 
 "Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want 
 to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes." 
 When Sheridan relieved Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be 
 turned over to him, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined him ; yet 
 Grant says in regard to Sheridan's operations: "His operations during the 
 month of August and the fore part of September, were both of an offensive and 
 defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the 
 cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement 
 took place. The two armies lay in such a position, the enemy on the west bank 
 of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berry ville 
 — that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to 
 the enemy the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before 
 another army could be interposed to check him. Under these oircumstanc.-s, I 
 hesitated aboui allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the 
 Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were 
 both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensablly necessary to us, and 
 the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Marylandfrom continuously threat- 
 ened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing 
 to telegraph the order for an attack^ without knowing more than I did of Gen. 
 Sheridan's feelings aa to what would be the probable result, I left City Point 
 on the 15th of September to visit him at his head-quarters, to decide after con- 
 ference with him what should be done. I met him at Cliarlestown, and he 
 pointed out so directly how each army lay, what he would do the moment he was 
 authorized, and expressed such confidence of success that I saw there were but 
 two words of instruction necessary — go in." In the Iteter to Hunter there is no 
 hesitation about the initiative, and yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned 
 over to Sheridan fqr his guidance, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently 
 sent to him, and the further fact that he had been operating both on the offensive 
 and deft-nsive, during August and the fore part of September, the impression is 
 sought to be made, that his ardour was restrained by some sort of orders, of 
 which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is very curious, and 
 
AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL. 
 
 At light on the morning of the 20lh, my troops moved to 
 Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy, and again 
 took position at that point on the old line -Wharton's division 
 being on the right, then Gordon's, Ramseur's and Rodes', in 
 the order in U'hich they are mentioned. Fitz Lee's cavalry, 
 now under Brigadier-Gtneral Wickham, was sent np the 
 Luray Valley to a narrow pass at Millford, 1o try and hold that 
 valley against' the enemy's cavalry. General Ramseur was 
 transferred to the command <.f Rodes' division, and Brigadier- 
 General Pegram, who had reported for duty about the 1st of 
 August, and been in command of his brigade since that time, 
 was left in command of the division previously commanded 
 by Ramseur. My infantry was not able to occupy the whole 
 line at Fisher's Hill, notwithstanding it was extended out in 
 an attenuated line, wiih considerable intervals. The greater 
 part of Lomax's cavalry was therefore dismounted, and placed 
 on Ramseur's leit, near Little North Mountain, but the line 
 could not then be fully occupied. 
 
 This was the only position in the whole Valley where a de- 
 fensive line could be taken against an enemy movin:^ up the 
 Valley, and it had several weak points. To have retired be- 
 yond this point, WDuld have rendered it necessary for me to 
 fall back to some of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, at the upper 
 part of the Valley, and I determined therefore to make a show 
 
 Grant's admissioa of liis hesilRtion in allowing the i itiative to be talten, and tliB 
 BtatemeDt that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio 
 Canal were so obstructed, and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland so 
 constantly threatened, as to corapol him to throw off that hesitation, convey a 
 great compliment to the efficiency of my small force. The railroad is twenty- 
 two miles from Winchester at the nearest point, and the canal over thirty and 
 north of the Potomac, whie Sheridan was much nearer tu both. That Grant 
 did find it necepsiry to say to Sheridiin: "go in I " I can well believe, but that 
 the latter was panting for the utterance of that classic phrase, I must be allowed 
 to regard as apocryphal. 
 
99 
 
 of a stand here, with the hope that the enemy would be deterred 
 fiom attacking me in this position, as had been the case in 
 Aui<ust. 
 
 On the second day after our arrival at this place, General 
 Breckenridge received orders I'rora Richmond, by telegraph, 
 to return to South Western Virginia, and I lost the benefit of 
 his services. He had ably co-operated with me, and our per- 
 sonal relations had been of the most pleasant character. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 2Uth, Sheridan's forces appeared 'on 
 the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill, 
 and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22nd, were consumed 
 by him in reconnoitring and gradually moving his forces to 
 my front under cover of breast works. After some sharp skir- 
 mishing, he attained a strong position immediately in my front 
 and fortified it, and 1 began to think he was satisfied with the 
 advantage he had gained and would not probably press it fur- 
 ther ; but on the afternoon of the 22nd, I discovered that an- 
 other attack was contemplated, and orders were given for my 
 troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not strong 
 «nough to resist a determined assault. Just before sunset, 
 however. Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on the 
 side of Little North Mountain, and under cover of the woods, 
 forced back Lomax's dismounted cavalry, and advanced against 
 Ramseur's left. Ramseur made an attempt to meet this move- 
 ment by throwing his brigades successively into line to the 
 left, and Wharton's division wis sent for from the right but it 
 ■did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line 
 in the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement produced 
 «ome disorder in both divisions, and as soon as it was observed 
 by the enemy, he advanced along his whole line, and the mis- 
 •chief could not be remedied. After a very brief contest, my 
 whole force retired in considerable confusion, but the men and 
 officers of the artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting 
 to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and 
 order them to withdraw their guns, before they would move. 
 In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads lead- 
 ing from their positions into the Pike were so rugged, that 
 
100 AFFAIR AT FISHER's HILL. 
 
 eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigorous pur- 
 suit was not made, and my force fell back through Woodstock 
 to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the trains being car- 
 ried off in safety. 
 
 Our foss in killed and wounded in this affair was slight, 
 but some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the most of 
 whom were captured while attempting to make their way 
 across the North Fork to Massannutten Mountain, under the 
 impression that the enemy had possession of the "Valley Pike 
 in our rear. I had the misfortune to lose my Adjutant Gen- 
 eral, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Pendleton, a gallant and effi- 
 cient young officer, who had served on General Jackson's staff 
 during his Valley campaign, and subsequently to the time of 
 the latter's death. Colonel Pendleton fell mortally wounded 
 about dark, while posting a force across the Pike, a little in 
 rear of Fisher's Hill, to check the enemy. He was acting with 
 his accustomed gallantry, and his loss was deeply felt and 
 regretted.* 
 
 RETREAT UP THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
 UNTIL THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 
 
 On the morning of the 23rd, I moved back to Mount Jackson, 
 where I halted to enable the sick and wounded, and the hos- 
 pital stores at that place to be carried off. In the afternoon 
 Averill's division of cavalry came up in pursuit, and after 
 
 * In his account of the battle of Winchester, Grant says : " The enemy rallied 
 and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked 
 and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th." This mnkes Sheridan parsue 
 and attack with great promptness and energy, if it were true, but it will be seen 
 that ihe attack was not made until late on the afternoon of the 8i'd day after th» 
 battle at Winchester,''and that the movement on my left flank was again made 
 by Crook. If Sheridan had not had subordinates of more ability and energy 
 than himself, I should probably have had to write a different history of my Val- 
 ley campaign. 
 
KETREAT UP THE VALLEY. 101 
 
 some heavy skirmishing was driven back. I then moved to 
 Rude's Hill between Mount Jackson and Newmarket. 
 
 On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's cavalry 
 crossed the North Fork below Mount Jackson, and attempted 
 to get around my right flank, but was held in check. The 
 enemy's infantry soon appeared at Mount Jackson, and com- 
 menced moving around my left flank, on the opposite side of 
 the river from that on which my left rested. As the country 
 was entirely open, and Rude's Hill an elevated position, I 
 could see the whole movement of the enemy, and as soon as 
 it was fully developed, I commenced retiring in line of battle, 
 and in that manner retired through New Market to a point at 
 which the road to Port Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine 
 miles from Rude's Hill. This movement was made through 
 aa entirely open country, and at every mile or two a halt was 
 made, and artillery opened on the enemy, who was pursuing, 
 which compelled him to commence deploying into line, when 
 the retreat would be resumed. In this retreat, under fire in 
 line, which is so trying to a retiring force, and tests the best 
 qualities of the soldier, the conduct of my troops was most 
 admirable, and they preserved perfect order and their line 
 intact, notwithstanding their diminished numbers, and the 
 fact that the enemy was pursuing in full force, and, every 
 now and then, dashing up with horse artillery under the 
 support of cavalry, and opening on the retiring lines. At 
 the last halt, which was at a place called " Tenth Legion," 
 near where the Port Republic road leaves the Pike, and was a 
 little before sunset, I determined to resist any further advance, 
 so as to enable my trains to get on the Port Republic road ; 
 and skirmishers were sentout and artillery opened on the advan- 
 cing enemy, but, after some skirmishing, he went into carrjp in 
 our view, and beyond the reach of our guns. At this point, a 
 gallant oflScer of artillery. Captain Massie, was killed by a shell. 
 As soon as it was dark, we retired five miles on the Port Re- 
 public road and bivouacked In the morning Lomax's cavalry 
 had been posted to our left, on the Middle and Back roads 
 from Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, but it was forced back 
 
102 RETREAT UP THE VALLET. 
 
 by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry, and retired to the 
 latter place in considerable disorder. Wiekhaiii's brigade had 
 been' sent for iVoin the Luray Valley to join me through the 
 New-Market Gap. but it arrived at that gap just as we were 
 retiring through New-Market, and orders were sent for it to 
 return lo the Luray Valley, and join me at Port Republic. In 
 the meantime, Payne's small brigade had been driven from 
 Milliord by two divisions of cavalry under Tqrbert, which had 
 moved up the Luray Valley and subsequently joined -Sher- 
 idan through the New-Market Gap. This cavalry had been 
 detained by Wickham with his and Payne'? brigades, at Mill- 
 ford, a sufficient time to enable us to pass New-Market in safe- 
 ty. If, however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by Con- 
 rad's slore, we would have been in a critical condition. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th, we moved towards Port Repub- 
 lic, which is in the fork of the South Fork and South River, 
 and where the road through Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge 
 crosses those rivers, in order to unite with Kershaw's division 
 which had been ordered to join me from Culpepper C. H. 
 We crossed the River below the junction, and took p'>sition be- 
 tween Port Republic and Brown's Gap. Fitz Loe's and Lo- 
 max's cavalry joined us here, and on the 26lh, Kershaw's di- 
 vision with Culshaw's battalion of artillery came up, after 
 having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and 
 repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry. 
 There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the iJ6th 
 witii the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance 
 towards Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk 
 fighting ill which artillery was used 
 
 Huv.ng ascertained that the enemy's infantry had halted at 
 Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27lh I moved out and 
 drove a division of his cavalry from Port Republic, and then 
 encamped in the fork of the rivers. • I here learned that two 
 divisions of cavalry under Torbert had been sent through 
 Staunton to Waynesboro, and were engaged in destroying the 
 railroad bridge at the latter place, and the tunnel through the 
 Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, and, on the 28ih, I moved for 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER VALLEY. 103 
 
 those points. In making this Tnovement I had the whole of 
 the enemy's infantry on my right, while one division of cav- 
 alry was in my rear and two in my front, and on the left was 
 the Blue Ridge. 1 had therefore to move with great circum- 
 spection.— Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South 
 River, near the mountain, to gel between the en?my and Rock- 
 fish Gap, while the infantry moved in two col,umns, one up 
 South River with the trains guarded in front by Pegram's 
 and VVharlon's divisions, and in rear by Ramseur's division, 
 and the other, composed of Kershaw's and Gordon's divisions 
 with the artillery, on ihe riglit through Mount Meridian, Pied- 
 mont, and New Hope. Mc. ausland's cavalry, under Col- 
 onel Ferguson, was left to blockade and hold Brown'- Gap, 
 while Lomax, with the rest of his cavalry and Payne's bri- 
 gade, watched the right flank and rear. Wickham's brigade, 
 having got between Kockfish Gap and Waynesboro, drove the 
 enemy's working parties from the latter place, and took posi- 
 tion on a ridge in front of it, when a sharp artillery fight 
 ensued. Pegram's division, diiving a small body of cavalry 
 before it, arrived just at night and advanced upon the enemy, 
 when he retired in great haste, taking the roads through Staun- 
 ton and west of the Valley Pike, back to the main body. A 
 company of reserves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, 
 w^hich had been employed on special duty at Staunton, had 
 moved to Rockfi&h Gap, and another company of reserves 
 from Charlottesville, with two pieces of artillery, had moved 
 to the same point, and when the enemy advanced towards the 
 tunnel and before he got in range of the guns, they were 
 opened, and he retired to Waynesboro. 
 
 On the 29lh and 30th, we rested at Waynesboro, and an 
 engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge which 
 had been but partially destroyed. 
 
 On the 1st of October, I moved my whole force aeross the 
 country to Mount Sidney on the Valley Pike, and took posi- 
 tion lietween that j^lace ai)d Norlh River, the enemy's forces 
 having been concentrated around Harrisonburg, and on the 
 norlh bankol the river. In this position we remained until 
 
04 OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER TALLET. 
 
 le 6th, awaiting the arrival of Rosser's brigade of cavalry 
 ?^hich was on its way from General Lee's army. In the 
 leantime there was Jbme skirmishing with the enemy's cav- 
 Iry op the North River, at the bridge near Mount Crawford 
 nd at Bridgewater above.* 
 
 On the 5lh, Rosser's brigade arrived and was temporarily 
 ttached to Fitz Lee's division, of which Rosser was given 
 tie command, as Brigadier-General Wickham had resigned, 
 i'he horses of Rosser's brigade had been so much reduced by 
 irevious hard service and the long march from Richmond, that 
 he brigade did not exceed six hundred mounted men for duty 
 vhen it joined me Kershaw's division numbered 2700 mus- 
 ets for duty, and he haa brought with him Cutshaw's bat- 
 ilion of artillery. These reinforcements about made up my 
 3sses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and I determined to 
 ttack the enemy in his position at Harrisonburg, and for that 
 lurpose made a reconnoissance on the 6th, biit on the morning 
 f the 6th, it was discovered that he had retired during the 
 light down the Valley, f 
 
 • Grant says that, after the fight at Fisher's Hill, " Shfcidan pursued him with 
 rent energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge." 
 rith how much energy the pursuit was made, and how much truth there is in 
 le statement that I was driven through "Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the 
 aps of the Blue Ridge," will be seen from the foregoing account. A portion, of 
 ly cavalry passed through Harrisonburg, but none of my othMjttoops, and none 
 F them through Staunton, and { did not leave the Valley at ally Had Sheridan 
 oved his infantry to Port Republic, I would have been compelled to retire 
 irough Brown's Gap to get provisions and forage, and jt would have been im- 
 ossible for me to return to the Valley until he evacuated the upper part of it. 
 
 t While Sheridan's forces were near Harrisonburg and mine "were watching 
 lem, three of our cavalry scouts, in their uniforms and with arms, got around 
 is lines near a little town called Dayton and encountered Lieutenant Meigs, a 
 ederal Engineer officer, with two soldiers. Tliese parties came upon each other 
 iddenly, and Lieutenant Meigs was ordered to surrender by one of our scouts 
 I which he replied by shooting and wounding the scout, who in his turn fired 
 lid liilled the Lieutenant. One of the men with Lieutenant Meigs was captured 
 ad the other escaped. For this act Sheridan ordered the town of Dayton to 
 e burned, but for some reason that order was counteimanded, and another 
 ibstituted for burning a lame number of private houses In the neighborhood, 
 ■hich was executed, thus inflicting on non-combatants and women and chll- 
 ren a most wanton and cruel punishment for a justifiable act of war. 
 
MOTEMEMT DOWN THE VALLEY. 105 
 
 When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I 
 moved forward at once and arrived at JNew Market with my 
 infantry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the Back and 
 Middle roads in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, which was 
 engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat 
 and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, while Lomax 
 also moved forward on the Valley Pike and the roads east 
 of it. I halted at New Market with the infantry, but Rosser 
 and Lomax moved down the Valley in pursuit, and skirmished 
 successfully with the enemy's cavalry on the 8th ; but on the 
 9th they encountered his whole cavalry force at Tom's Brook, 
 in rear of Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were 
 driven back in considerable confusion, with a loss of some 
 pieces of artillery, — nine were reported to me as the number 
 » lost, but Grant claims eleven. Rosser rallied his command 
 on the Back Roadj at Columbia furnace opposite Edinburg, 
 but a part of the enemy's cavalry swept along the Pike to 
 Mount Jackson, and then retired on the approach of a part of 
 my infantry. On the 10th, Rosser established his line of 
 pickets across the Valley from Columbia furnaue to Edinburg, 
 and on the 11th Lomax was sent to the Luray Valley to 
 take position at Millford. 
 
 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK OR BELLE GROVE. 
 
 Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of 
 his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley again on the 
 12th. On the morning of the 13th we reached Fisher's Hill, 
 and I moved with part of my command to Hupp's Hill, 
 between Strasburg and Cedar Creek, for the purpose of 
 reconnoitring. The enemy was found posted on the North 
 bank of Cedar Creek in strong force, and, while we were 
 observing him, without displaying any of my force except a 
 small body of cavalry, a division of his infantry was moved 
 
06 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 
 
 ut to his left and stacked arms in an open field, when a 
 attery of artillery was run out suddenly and opened on this 
 ivision, scattering it in great confusion. The enemy then 
 isplayed a large force, and sent a division across the creek 
 J capture the guns which had opened on him, but, when it 
 ad advanced near enough, Conner's brigade of Kershaw's 
 ivision was sent forward lo meet this division, and, after a 
 harp contest, drove it back in considerable confusion and 
 rhh severe loss. Conner's brigade behaved very handsomely 
 ideed, but unfortunately, after the enemy had neen entirely 
 jpulsed, Brigadier-General Conner, a most accomplished 
 nd gallant officer, lost his leg by a shell from the opposite 
 ide of the creek. Some prisoners were taken from the enemy 
 1 this affair, and Colonel Wells, the division commander, 
 dl into our hands mortally wounded. The object of the 
 jconnoissance having been accomplished, I moved back to 
 isher's Hill, and I subsequently learned that the 6th corps 
 ad started for Grant's army but was brought back alter this 
 (fair. 
 
 I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th observing the 
 lemy, with the hope that he would move back from his very 
 rong position on the north of Cedar Creek, and that we 
 'ould be able to get at him in a different position, but he did 
 ot give any indications of an intention to move, nor did he 
 irince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions 
 ere in sight of each other. Jn the meantime there was some 
 drmishing at Hupp's Hill, and some with the cavalry at 
 edar Creek on the Back Road. On the 16lh Rosser's scouts 
 ported a brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the 
 ack Road, and detached from the rest of his force, and Hosser 
 as permitted to go that night, with a brigade of infantry 
 ounted behind the same number of cavalry, to attempt the 
 irprise and capture of the camp. He succeeded in surround- 
 g and surprising the camp, but it proved lo be that of only 
 strong picket, the whole of which was captured — the brigade 
 iving moved its location. 
 At light on the morning of the 17th, the whole of my troops 
 
BATTLE OF CEDAR CHEEK, 107 
 
 were moved out in front of our lines, for the purpose of cover- 
 ing Rosser's return in case of ditliculty, and, after he had 
 returned, General Gordon was sent with a brigade of his 
 division to Hupp's Hill, for the purpose of ascertaining by 
 close inspection whether the enemy's position was fortified, 
 and he returned with the information that it was. I was now 
 compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or 
 attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him 
 from it, and I determined to attack. As I was not strong 
 enough to attack the fortified position in front, I determined 
 to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by 
 surprise if I could. After General Gordon's return from 
 Hupp's Hill, he and Captain Holchkiss, my topographical 
 engineer, were sent to the signal station on the end of Mass- 
 anutten Mountam, which had been re-established, for the 
 purpose of examining the enemy's position from that point, 
 and General Pegram was ordered to go as near as he could 
 to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank, and see whether 
 it was practicable to surprise him on that flank. Captain 
 Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters after dark, and reported 
 the result of his and General Gordon's examination, and he 
 gave me a sketch of the enemy's position and camps. He 
 informed me that the enemy's left flank, which rested near 
 Cedar Creek, a short distance above itd^pouth, was lightly- 
 picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket on 
 the North Fork of the Shenandoah, below the mouth of the 
 creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, 
 he thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry 
 between the base of the mountain and the river, to a ford 
 below the mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the 
 main body of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on 
 the Back Road to Winchester. The sketch made by Captain 
 Hotchkiss, which proved to be correct, designated the roads 
 in the enemy's rear, and the house of a Mr. Cooley at a 
 favourable point for forming an attacking column, after it 
 cTossed the river, in order to move against the enemy and 
 strike him on the Valley Pike in rear of his works. Upon 
 
108 BATTLE OF CEDAR CRP^EK. 
 
 his information, I determined to attack the enemy by mov 
 ng over the ground designated by Captain Hotchkiss, if 
 t should prove practicable to move a column between the 
 jase of the mouirtain and the river. Next morning, General 
 jordon confirmed the report of Captain Hotchkiss, expressing 
 jonfidence that the attack could be successfully made on the 
 jnemy's left and rear, and General Pegram reported that a 
 novernent on the enemy's right flank would be attended with 
 ^reat difficulty, as the banks of Cedar Creek on that flank 
 ivere high and precipitous and were well guarded. General 
 Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss were then sent to examine 
 ind ascertain the practicability of the route at the base of the 
 nounfain, and General Pegram, at his request, was permitted 
 :o go to the signal station on the mountain to examine the 
 memy's position himself from that point. Directions were 
 jiven, in the meantime, for everything to be in readiness to 
 Tiove that night (the 18th), and the division commanders were 
 •equested to be at my quarters at two o'clock in the afternoon, 
 ,0 receive their final instructions. 
 
 The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the right of 
 he position at Fisher's Hill and around by Strasburg, leaving 
 i considerable body of land between it and the mountain, on 
 svhich are several farms. Whenever Fisher's Hill had been 
 jccupied by us, this -bend of the river had been occupied by a 
 Dortion of our cavalry, to prevent the enemy from turning the 
 right of the position, and it was now occupied by Colonel 
 Payne with his cavalry numbering about 300. In order to 
 nake the contemplated movement, it was necessary to cross 
 ;he river into this bend, and then pass between the foot of the 
 nountain and the river below Strasburg, where the passage 
 [vas very narrow, and cross the river again below the mouth of 
 Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps and position were visible 
 from a signal station on Round Hill in rear of Fisher's Hill, 
 ind had been examined by me from that point, but the dis- 
 ;ance was too great to see with distinctness. From the station 
 Dn the mountain, which immediately overlooked the enemy's 
 left, the view was very distinct, but I could not go to that 
 
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 109 
 
 point myself, as the ascent was very rugged, and it required 
 several hours to go and come, and I could not leave my com- 
 mand for that time. I had therefore, necessarily, to rely on 
 the reports of my officers. 
 
 General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on their return, re- 
 ported the route between the mountain and river, which was 
 a blind path, to be practicable for infantry but not for artillery, 
 and a temporary bridge was constructed under Captain Hotoh- 
 kiss's superintendence, at the first crossing of the river on our 
 right. The plan of attack on which I determined, was to send 
 the three divisions of the 2nd Corps, to wit : Gordon's, Ram- 
 seur's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, over the route 
 which has been specified to the enemy's rear, to make the 
 attack at five o'clock in the morning, which would be a little 
 before day-break — ^to move myself, with Kershaw's and Whar- 
 ton's divisions, and all the artillery, along the Pike through 
 Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank 
 as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Rosser to 
 move with his own and Wic^ham's brigade, on the Back Road 
 across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy's cavalry simul- 
 taneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax should move by 
 Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley Pike, so 
 as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was 
 to judge by the sound of the firing. 
 
 At two o'clock P.M., all the division commanders, except 
 Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain, came to 
 my head-quarters,, and I gave them their instructions. Gordon 
 was directed to cross over into the bend of the river imme- 
 diately after dark, and move to the foot of the mountain, where 
 he wouM rest his troops, and move from there in time to cross 
 the river again and get in position at Cooley's house 'in the 
 enemy's rear, so as to make the attack at the designated hour, 
 and he was instructed, in advancing to the attack, to move for 
 a house on the west side of the Valley Pike called the " Belle 
 Grove House," at which it was known that Sheridan's head- 
 quarters were located. — A guide who knew the country and 
 the roads, was ordered to be sent to General Gordon, and Cdl- 
 I 
 
110 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 
 
 onel Payne was ordered to accompany him with his force of 
 cavalry, and endeavour to capture Sheridan himself. — Rosser 
 was ordered to move before day, in time to attack at five 
 o'clock next morning, and to endeavour to surprise the en- 
 emy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were ordered 
 to move, at one o'clock in the morning, towards Strasburg 
 under my personal superintendence, and the artillery was 
 ordered to concentrate where the Pike passed through the 
 lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the attack, 
 to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill — the movement of the ar- 
 tillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of 
 the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized 
 road. Swords and canteens were directed to be left in campy 
 so as to make as little noise as possible. The division com- 
 manders were particularly admonished as to the necessity for 
 promptness and energy in all their movements, and they were 
 instructed to press the enemy with vigour after he was encount- 
 ered, and to allow him no time to form, but to continue the 
 pursuit until his forces should be completely routed. They 
 were also admonished of the danger to be apprehended from a 
 disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men, and 
 they were enjoined to take every possible precaution against it. 
 Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had 
 started, General Pegram reported to me that he had discovered, 
 from the'signal station on the mountain, what he supposed to 
 be an entrenchment thrown up across the road over which 
 Gordon would have to advance after crossing the river the 
 second time, and that the signal operators had informed him 
 that it had been thrown up since Gordrai and Hotchkiss made 
 their examination ; and he suggested the propriety of attacking 
 the enemy's left flank at the same time Gordon made bis at- 
 tack, as he would probably have more difficulty than bad 
 been anticipated. I adopted this suggestion, and determined 
 to cross Kershaw's diviaitHX over Cedar Creek, at Bowman's 
 Mill, a little above its month, and strike the enemy's left flank 
 simultaneously with the other attacks, of which purpose notice 
 was sent to General Gordon by Gettejral Pegzam.-— At one 
 
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. Ill 
 
 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw and Wharton 
 moved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg Kershaw 
 moved to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and Whar- 
 ton moved along the Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions not 
 to display his forces but avoid the enemy's notice until the at- 
 tack began, when he was to move forward, support the artil- 
 lery when it came up, and send a force to get posession of the 
 bridge on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied Kershaw's 
 division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at half past 
 three o'clock. The moon was now shining and we could see 
 the camps. The division was halted under cover to await the 
 arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out to Kershaw, and 
 the commander of his leading brigade, the enemy's position 
 and described the nature of the ground, and directed them how 
 the attack was to be made and followed up. Kershaw was 
 directed to cross his division over the creek as quietly as pos- 
 sible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and 
 advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork, 
 extending to the right or left as might be necessary. At half 
 past four he was ordered forward, and, a very short time after 
 he started, the firing from Rosser on our left, and the picket 
 firing at the ford at which Gordon was crossing were heard. 
 Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and formed 
 his division as directed, and precisely at five o'clock his leading 
 brigade, with little opposition, swept over the enemy's left work 
 capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the enemy. 
 As soon as this attack was made, I rode as rapidly as possible 
 to the position on Hupp's Hill to which Wharton and the ar- 
 tillery bad been ordered. I found the artillery just arriving, 
 and a very heavy fire of musketry was now heard in the en- 
 emy's rear from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced 
 his skirmishers to the creek capturing some prisoners, but the 
 enemy still held the works on our left of the Pike, command- 
 ing that road and the bridge, and opened with his artillery 
 on us. Our artiilery was immediately brought into action and 
 opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated bis works, and 
 our men from the other columns rushed into them. Just thea 
 
112 B ATTIRE OF CEDAR CREKE.. 
 
 the sun rose, and Wharton's division and the artillery were 
 immediately ordered forward. I rode in advance of them 
 across the creek, and met General Gordon on the opposite hill. 
 Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's works on the 
 right of the Pike, which were occupied by Crook's corps, and 
 he and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their divisions had 
 pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. The rear division 
 of Gordon's column (Pegram's) was crossing the river at the 
 time Kershaw's attack was made, and General Gordon moved 
 rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops and advanced 
 against the enemy with his own division on the left, under 
 Brigadier-General Evans, and Ramseur's on the right, with 
 Pegram's in the rear supporting them. There had been a de- 
 lay of an hour at the river before crossing it, either from a 
 miscalculation of time in the dark, or because the cavalry 
 which was to precede his column had not gotten up, and the 
 delay thus caused, for which no blame is to be attached to 
 General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form his lines 
 after the alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and Gordon's 
 attack, which was after light, was therefore met with greater 
 obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have encoun- 
 tered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, however, 
 pushed his attack with great energy, and the 19th and Crook's 
 corps were in complete route, and their camps, with a number 
 of pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity of small arms, 
 abandoned. The 6th corps, which was on the enemy's right, 
 and some distance from the point attacked, had had time to 
 get under arms and take position so as to arrest our progress. 
 General Gordon briefly informed me of the condition of things 
 and stated that Pegram's division, which had not been pre- 
 viously engaged, had been ordered in. He then rode to take 
 'Command of his division, and I rode forward on the Pike to as- 
 certain the position of the enemy, in order to continue the attack. 
 There was now a heavy fog, and that, with the smoke from the 
 artillery and small arms, so obscured objects that the enemy's po- 
 sition could not be seen ; but I soon came to Generals Ramseur 
 and Pegram, who informed me that Pegram's division had en- 
 
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 113 
 
 countered a division of the 6tli corps on the left of the Valley 
 Pike, and, after a sharp engagement, had driven it back on the 
 main body of that corps, which was in their front in a strong 
 position. They further informed me that their divisions were 
 in line confronting the 6th corps, but that there was a vacancy 
 in the line on their right which ought to be filled. I ordered 
 Wharton's division forward at once, and directed Generals 
 Ramseur and Pegram to put it where it was required. In a 
 very short time, and while I was endeavouring to discover the 
 enemy's line through the obscurity, Wharton's division came 
 back in some confusion, and General Wharton informed me 
 that, in advancing to the position pointed out to him by 
 Generals Ramseur and Pegram, his division had been driven 
 back by the 6th corps, which, he said, was advancing. He 
 pointed out the direction from which he said the enemy was 
 advancing, and some pieces of artillery, which had come up, 
 were brought into action. The fog soon rose sufficiently for 
 us to see the enemy's position on a ridge to the west of 
 Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. After 
 driving back Wharton's division he had not advanced, but 
 opened on us with artillery, and orders were given for con- 
 centrating all our guns on him. In the meantime, a force of 
 cavalry was advancing along the Pike, and through the fields 
 to the right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in 
 great danger, and Wharton was ordered to form his division 
 at once, and take position to hold the enemy's cavalry in 
 check. Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division, which had 
 become separated from the other brigades, was ordered up 
 for the same purpose. Discovering that the 6th corps could 
 not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the 
 approach in that direction was through an open flat and across 
 a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed Captain Powell, 
 serving on General Gordon's staflT, who rode up to me while 
 the artillery was being placed in position, to tell the General 
 to advance against the enemy's right flank, and attack it in 
 conjunction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery was 
 opened from our right ; but as Captain Powell said he did not 
 
114 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 
 
 know where General Gordon was, and expressed some doubt 
 about finding him, immediately after he started, I sent Lieu- 
 tenant Page, of my own staff, with orders for both Generals 
 Gordon and Kershaw to make the attack. In a short time 
 Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20 guns on the enemy, and 
 he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram advanced at 
 once to the position from which the enemy was driven, and 
 just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right, 
 and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north of 
 Middletown, and take position across the Pike against the cav- 
 alry. Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he 
 delivered my order to General Kershaw, but the latter informed 
 him that his division was not in a condition to make the at- 
 tack, as it was very much scattered, and there was a cavalry 
 force threatening him in front. Lieutenant Page also stated 
 that he had seen Gordon's division in Kershaw's rear reform- 
 ing, and that it was also much scattered, and that he had not 
 delivered the order to General Gordon, because he saw that 
 neither his division nor Kershaw's was in a condition to ex- 
 ecute it. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered 
 from the left to supply his place. I then rode to Middletown 
 to make provision against the enemy's cavalry, and discovered 
 a large body of it seriously threatening that fiank, which was 
 very much exposed. Wharton's division and Wofford's brig- 
 ade were put in position on Pegram's right, and several charges 
 of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I had no cavalry on 
 that flank except Payne's very small brigade, which had ac- 
 companied Gordon, and made some captures of prisoners and 
 waggons. Lomax had not arrived, but I received a message 
 from him, informing me that he had crossed the river after 
 some delay from a cavalry force guarding it, and I sent a mes- 
 sage to him requiring him to move to Middletown as quick as 
 possible, but, as I subsequently ascertained, he did not receive 
 thai, message. Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at 
 the appointed time, but he had not been able to surprise iiim, 
 as he was found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to 
 the attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th. There was 
 
BAXTLi: OF CEDAR CREEK. IIS 
 
 now one division of cavalry threatening my right flank, and 
 two were on the left, near the Back Road, held in check by 
 Rosser. The force of the latter was too weak to make any 
 impression on the enemy's cavalry, and all he could do was to 
 watch it. As I passed across Cedar Creek after the enemy 
 was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in the 
 enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions 
 was ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their 
 commands. It was reported to me, subsequently, that a great 
 number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff officers 
 who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were 
 sent to the division commanders to send for their men. 
 
 After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had 
 taken a new position about two miles north of Middletown, 
 and, as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to pre- 
 vent his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the 
 left, for the purpose of ordering an advance. I found Ram- 
 seur and Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not 
 come up. In a short time, however, I found him coming up 
 from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's 
 left, and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his 
 new position — Kershaw and Ramseur being ordered to ad- 
 vance at the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left 
 was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the 
 rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disas- 
 strous, and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the 
 enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the 
 assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gor- 
 don's skirmishers came back reporting a litae of battle in front 
 behind breast works, and General Gordon did not make the at- 
 tack. It was now apparent that it would not do to press my 
 troops further. They had been up all night and were much 
 jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in 
 the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, 
 and the men scattered, and it had required time to reform them. 
 Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the absence of 
 the men engaged in plqndering the enemy's camps. The de- 
 
116 BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 
 
 lay which had unavoidably occurred, had enabled the enen^ 
 to rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force 
 of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our 
 flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance 
 extremely hazardous. I determined, therefore, to try and hold 
 what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off 
 the captured and abandoned artillery, small arms, and wag- 
 gons. A number of bold attempts were made during the sub- 
 sequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our 
 line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in 
 the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ram- 
 seur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ram- 
 seur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my 
 view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion 
 of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between 
 Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, 
 when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades 
 soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to 
 rally his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but 
 without avail. The information of this affair, with exagge- 
 rations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, 
 and their men, under the apprehension- of being flanked, com- 
 menced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was press- 
 ing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's 
 condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing 
 the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right,, 
 but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and 
 rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but the mass of theno 
 resisted all appeals, and contiH«ed to go to the rear without 
 waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disorder. Ram- 
 seur, however, succeeded in retaining with him two or three 
 hundred men of his divis-ion, and Major Goggin of Kershaw's 
 staff, who was in command of Conner's brigade, about the 
 same number from that brigade ; and these men, with six pieces 
 of artillery of Cutshaw's battalion, held the enemy's whole 
 force on our left in check for one hour and a half, until Ram- 
 
 seur was shot down mortally wounded, and the amraunitioQ 
 
 f 
 
BATTLE or CEDAR CREEK. 117 
 
 of those pieces of artilleiy was exhausted. While the latter 
 were being replaced by other guns, the force that had remained 
 •with Ramseur and Goggin gave way also. Pegram's and 
 Wharton's divisions, and Wofford's brigade had remained 
 steadfast on the right, and resisted all efforts of the enemy's 
 cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved to the left 
 without leaving the Pike open to the cavalry, which would 
 have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to rally the men 
 in the rear having failed, I had now nothing left for me but to 
 order these troops to retire also. When they commenced to 
 move, the disorder soon extended to them, but General Pe- 
 gram succeeded in bringing back a portion of his command 
 across Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding the 
 enemy in check, but this small force soon dissolved. A part 
 of Evans' brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a ford 
 above the bridge for a short time, but it followed the example 
 of the rest. I tried to rally the men immediately alter cross- 
 ing Cedar Creek, and at Hupp's Hill, but without success. 
 Could 500 men have been rallied, at either of these places, who 
 would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery 
 and waggons and the greater part of the captured artillery 
 could have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble. 
 As it was, a bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the 
 road between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, just above Stras- 
 burg, where there was no other passway, thereby blocking up 
 all the artillery, ordnance and medical waggons, and ambu- 
 lances which had not passed that point ; and, as there was no 
 force to defend them, they were lost, a very small body of the 
 enemy's cavalry capturing them. 
 
 The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, 
 and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the 
 Back Road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The 
 infantry moved back towards New Market at three o'clock 
 next morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover 
 the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were 
 beyond pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten 
 o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that 
 
118 BATTLE OF CEDAB CREEK. 
 
 place while he was there. He then fell back without moles- 
 tation to bis former position, and established his line on Stony 
 Creek, across from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, seven 
 miles below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at 
 New Market, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and 
 there was an entirely open conntry between the two places, 
 they being very nearly in sight of each other.* 
 
 Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the Front 
 Royal road towards Winchester, under the impression that the 
 enemy was being forced back towards that place, and he did not 
 reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had taken 
 place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the Luray 
 Valley to his former position at Millford, without molestation. 
 
 My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three 
 pieces of artillery, some ordnance and medical waggons and 
 ambulances, which had been carried to the front for the use 
 of the troops on the field, about 1860 in killed and wounded) 
 and something over 1,000 prisoners. Major Geneial Ramseur 
 fell into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him, 
 not only my command, but the country sustained a heavy loss. 
 He was a most gallant and energetic officer whom no disaster 
 appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new 
 
 • Grant says in his account of the battle of Cedar Creek : " The enemy was 
 defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of the most of his artillery and trains, 
 and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army 
 escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Stannton and Lynchburg. 
 Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson." Stanton, who seems to think it his 
 duty to improve on all Grant's statements, says : " The routed forces of the enemy 
 were pursued to Mount Jackson, where he arrived without an organized regiment 
 of his army. All of his artillery, and thousands of prisoners fell into Sheridan's 
 bands. These successes closed military operations in the Shenandoah Valley, 
 and a rebel force appeared there no more during the war." The recklessnes of 
 these statements, of both Grant and Stanton, will appear trom the above narra- 
 tive, as well as from my subsequent operations in the Shenandoah Valley- 
 Would it be believed that this wreck of my army, which fled in such wild disrtay 
 before its pursuers, carried from the battle field 15(i0 prisoners, who were sent 
 to Richmond — subsequently confronted Sheridan's whole force north of Cedar 
 Creek, for two days, without his attacking it, and sent out expeditions which 
 captured two important posts, with over 1000 prisoners and several pieces of 
 artillery, in the limits of Sheridan's command ? Yet such was the case. 
 
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 119 
 
 strength in the midst of confusion and disorder. He fell at 
 his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native state has 
 reason to be proud of his memory. Brigadier General Battle 
 was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other valuable 
 officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured 
 from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and 
 wounded in this action was very heavy. 
 
 This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own 
 troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for, on 
 the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder 
 of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men under- 
 took to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. 
 Had they but waited, the mischief on the left would have been 
 remedied. I have never been able to satisfy myself that the 
 enemy's attack, in the afternoon, was not a demonstration to 
 cover his retreat during the night. It certainly was not a 
 vigorous one, as is shown by the fact that the very small 
 force with Ramseur and Goggin held him in cheek so long ; 
 and the loss in killed and wounded in the division which first 
 gave way, was not heavy, and was the least in numbers of 
 all but one, though it was the third in strength, and its relative 
 loss was the least of all the divisions. I read a sharp lecture 
 to my troops, in an address published to them a few days after 
 the battle, but I have never attributed the result to a want of 
 courage on their part, for I had seen them perform too many 
 prodigies of valour to doubt that. There was an individuality 
 about the Confederate soldier, which caused him to act often 
 in battle according to his own opinions, and thereby impair 
 his own efficiency ; and the tempting bait offered by the rich 
 plunder of the camps of the enemy's well fed, and well clothed 
 troops, was frequently too great for our destitute soldiers, and 
 caused them to pause in the career of victory. 
 
 Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with that of the 
 enemy, the rout in the morning would have been complete ; 
 as it was, I had only about 1200 cavalry on the field under 
 Rosser, and Lomax's force, which numbered less than 1700, 
 did not get up. My infantry and artillery was about the same 
 
120 BATTLE OF CBDAR CBEEK. 
 
 Strength as at Winchester. The reports of the Ordnance offi- 
 cers showed in the hands my troops about 8,800 muskets, in 
 round numbers as follows : in Kershaw's division 2,700, Ram- 
 seur's 2,100, Gordon's 1,700, Pegram's 1,200, and Wharton's 
 1,100. Making a moderate allowance for the men left to guard 
 the camps and the signal station on the mountain, as well as 
 for a few sick and wounded, I went into this battle with about 
 8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery. 
 
 The book containing the reports of the Chief Surgeon of 
 Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been mentioned as cap- 
 tured at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry numbered 
 about 8,700 men for duty a few days previous, and from infor- 
 mation which I had received of reinforcements sent him, in 
 the way of recruits and returned convalescents, I am satisfied 
 that his infantry force was fully as large as at Winchester. 
 Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the 
 fight, and had returned in the afternoon before the change in 
 the fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to 
 change the estimate I had formed of him * 
 
 It may be asked, why with my small force "I made the 
 attack ? I can only say we had been fighting large odds 
 during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of 
 lessening them. It was of the utmost consequence that Sheri- 
 dan should be prevented from sending troops to Grant, and 
 General Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had 
 expressed an earnest desire that a victory should be gained 
 in the Valley if possible, and it could not be gained without 
 fighting for it. I did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy 
 in his camp, and then thought and still think I would have had 
 it, if my directions had been strictly complied with, and my 
 troops had awaited my orders to retire, f 
 
 •The retreat of the main body of hia army had been arrested, and a new line 
 formed behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field ; and he 
 still had Immense odds against me when he made the attack in the afternoon. 
 
 t A silly story was circulated and even published in the papers, that this bat- 
 tle was planned and conducted by one of my subordinates np to a certain point, 
 when my ai rival on the field stopped the pursuit and arrested the victory. No 
 
CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 
 
 After the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my 
 troops remained in their camp for the rest of the month with- 
 out disturbance, but on the 26th of October the enemy's cavalry 
 attacked' Loraax at Millford and, after sharp fighting, was re- 
 pulsed. Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send 
 troops to Grant, and that the Manassas Gap railroad was being 
 repaired, I moved down the Valley again on the 10th of 
 November. I had received no reinforcements except about 
 350 cavalry under General Cosby from Breckenridge's depart- 
 ment in South Western Virginia, some returned convalescents, 
 and several hundred conscripts who had been on details which 
 had been revoked. On the 11th, on our approach to Cedar 
 Creek, it was found that the enemy had fallen back towards 
 Winchester, after having fortified and occupied a position on 
 Hupp's Hill subsequently to ihe battle of Cedar Creek. Col. 
 Payne drove a small body of cavalry through Middletown to 
 Newtown, and I followed him and took position south of the 
 latter place and in view of it. Sheridan's main force was 
 found posted north of Newtown in a position which he was 
 engaged in fortifying. I remained in front of him during the 
 11th and 12th, Rosser being on my left flank on the Back 
 
 officer or soldier on that day received an order from me to halt, unless he was 
 going to the rear. My orders were to press the enemy from the beginning and 
 give him no time to form, and when I found that my troops had halted, I endea- 
 Toured to adrance again, but I discovered it would not do to press them further. 
 Those who have known me from my youth, as well as those who came in contact 
 with me during the war, know that I was not likely to permit any other to plan 
 a battle for me, or assume my duties in any particular. Yet I was always will- 
 ing to receive and adopt valuable suggestions from any of my officers. 
 
 There was another false report, as to my personal habits during the Valley 
 Campaign, which obtained some circulation and credence, but which I would 
 not notice, except for the fact that it was referred to on the floor of the Gonfed- 
 •rate Senate by two members of that body. The utter falsehood of this report 
 was well known to all my staff and General officers, as well as to all others who 
 associated with me. 
 
122 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Road, and Lomax on my right between the Valley Pike and 
 the Front Royal road, with one brigade (McCausland's) at 
 Cedarville on the latter road. Rosser had some skirmishing 
 with the enemy's cavalry on the 11th, and on the 12th two 
 divisions advanced against him, and after a heavy fight tlie 
 enemy was repulsed and some prisoners captured. Colonel 
 Payne, who was operating immediately in my front, likewise 
 had a sharp engagement with a portion of the enemy's cavalry 
 and defeated it. When Rosser was heavily engaged, Lomax 
 was ordered to his assistance with a part of his command, and, 
 daring his absence, late in the afternoon, Powell's division of 
 the enemy's cavalry attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and, 
 after a severe fight, drove him back across the river with the 
 loss of two pieces of artillery. At the time of this affair, a 
 blustering wind was blowing and the firing could not be heard ; 
 and nothing was known of McCauslands misfortune until after 
 we commenced retiring that night. In these cavalry fights, 
 three valuable officers were killed, namely : Lt.-Col. Marshall 
 of Rosser's brigade. Col. Radford of McCausland's brigade, 
 and Capt. Harvie of McCausland's staff". 
 
 Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his position, 
 and showed no disposition to come out of his lines with his 
 infantry, and not being willing to attack him in his entrench- 
 ments, after the reverses I had met with, I determined to retire, 
 as we were beyond the reach of supplies. After dark on the 
 12th, we moved to Fisher's Hill, and next day returned in the 
 direction of New-Market, where we arrived on the 14th, no 
 effort at pursuit being made. I discovered by this movement 
 that no troops had been sent to Grant, and that the project of 
 repairing the Manassas Gap rail-road had been abandoned.* 
 
 Shortly after our return to New-Market, Kershaw's division 
 was returned to General Lee, and Cosby's cavalry to Breck- 
 
 * From Grant's aocount of the battle of Cedar Greek, it wonld be sapposed 
 that the 6th corps was returned to the army of the Potomac immediately after 
 that battle, but the truth is that no troops were sent from Sheridan's army until 
 in December, when the cold weather had put an end toallopeiationi iutbefield 
 by infantry. 
 
CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 123 
 
 enridge. On the 22nd of November two divisions of the en- 
 emy's cavalry advanced to Mount Jackson, after having driven 
 in our cavalry pickets. A part of it crossed over the river into 
 Meem's bottom at the foot of Rude's Hill, but was driven back 
 by a portion of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being 
 pursued by Wickham's brigade, under Colonel Munfprd, to 
 Woodstock. 
 
 On the 27th, Rosser crossed Great North Mountain into Har- 
 dy County, with his own and Payne's brigade, and, about the 
 29th, surprised and captured the fortified post at New Creek, 
 on the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road. At this place, two regi- 
 ments of cavalry with their arms and colours were captured, 
 and eight pieces of artillery and a very large amount of ord- 
 nance, quarter master, and commissary stores fell into our 
 hands. The prisoners, numbering 800, four pieces of artillery, 
 and some waggons and horses, were brought off, the other 
 guns, which were heavy siege pieces, being spiked, and their 
 carriages and a greater part of the stores destroyed. Rosser 
 also brought off several hundred cattle and a large number pf 
 sheep from Ham.pshu:e and Hardy counties. 
 
 This expedition closed the material operations of the cam- 
 paign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley, and, at that time, the 
 enemy held precisely the same portion of that valley, which 
 he held before the opening of the campaign in the spriog, and 
 no more, and the headquarters of his troops weie at the same 
 place, to wit : Winchester. There was this difference how- 
 ever : at the beginning of the campaign, he held it with com- 
 paratively a •smali force, and at the close, he was compelled 
 to employ three corps of infantry and one of cavalry, for that 
 purpose, and to guard the approaches to Washington, Mary- 
 land, and Pennsylvania, When I was detached from General 
 Lee's army, Hunter was advancing on Lynchburg, 170 miles 
 south of Winchester, with a very considerable force, and 
 tiffeatening all ofGeneral Lee's communications with a very 
 serious danger. By a lapid movement, my force had been 
 thrown to Lyndiburg, just in time to arrest HuBter's march 
 into that place, and he had been driven back and foireed to es- 
 
124 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGIf. 
 
 cape into the mountains of Western Virginia, with a loss of 
 ten pieces of artillery, and subsequent terrible suffering to his 
 troops. Maryland and Pennyslvania had been invaded, Wash- 
 ington threatened and thrown into a state of frantic alarm, and 
 Grant had been compelled to detach two corps of infantry and 
 two divisions of cavalry from his army. Five or six thousand 
 prisoners had been captured from the enemy and sent to Rich- 
 mond, and, according to a published statement by Sheridan, 
 his army had lost 13,83 1, in killed and wounded, after he 
 took command of it. Heavy losses had been inflicted on that 
 army by my command, before Sheridan went to the Valley, 
 and the whole loss could not have been far from double my 
 entire force. The enemy moreover had been deprived of the 
 use of the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road, and the Chesq^Pake 
 and Ohio canal, for three months. It is true that I had lost 
 many valuable officers and men, and about 60 pieces of artil- 
 lery, counting those lost by Ramseur and McCausland, and 
 not deducting the 19 pieces captured from the enemy; but I 
 think I may safely state that the fall of Lynchburg with its 
 foundries and factories, and the consequent destruction of 
 General Lee's communications, would have rendered necessary 
 the evacuation of Richmond, and that, therefore, the fall of the 
 latter place had been prevented ; and, by my subsequent ope- 
 rations. Grant's operations against General Lee's army had 
 been materially impeded, and for some time substantially 
 suspended. 
 
 My loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at Winchester and 
 Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and, at Cedar Creek, 
 about 3,000, but the enemy has attempted to magnify it to a 
 much larger jSgure, claiming as prisoners several thousand 
 more than my entire loss. How he makes out his estimate is 
 not for me to explain. He was never scrupulous as to the 
 kinds of persons of whom he made prisoners, and the state- 
 ments of the Federal officers were not always confined to the 
 truth, as the world has probably learned. I know that a num- 
 ber of prisoners fell into the enemy's hands, who did not belong 
 to my command : such as cavalry men on details to get fresh 
 
CLOSE or THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 125 
 
 lioTses, soldiers on leave of absence, conscripts on special de- 
 tails, citizens not in the service, men employed in getting sup- 
 plies for the departments, and stragglers and deserters from 
 other commands. 
 
 My army during the entire campaign had been self sustain- 
 ing, so far as provisions and forage were concerned, and a con- 
 siderable number of beef cattle had been sent to General Lee''s 
 army ; and when the difficulties under which I laboured are 
 considered, I think I may confidently assert that I lad done as 
 well as it was possible for me to do.* 
 
 • Some attempts have been made to compare my campaign in the Vialley with 
 that of General Jackson in the same district, in order to cast censure on me, but 
 such comparison is not necessary for the rindication of the fame of that great 
 leader, and it is most unjust to me, as the circumstances under which we ope- 
 rated were so entirely dissimilar. It was my fortune to serve under General 
 Jackson, after his Yalley campaign until his death, and I have the satisfaction of 
 knowing that I enjoyed his confidence, which was signally shown in bis last of- 
 ficial act towards me ; and no one admires 'his character and reveres his memory 
 more than I do. It is not therefore with any view to detract from his merits, 
 that I mention the following facts, but to show how improper it is to compare 
 our campaigns, with a view of contrasting their merits. 1st. General Jackson 
 did not have the odds opposed to him which I had, and his troops were com- 
 posed entirely of the very best material which entered into the composition of 
 our armies, that is, the men who came out voluntarily in the beginning of the 
 war ; while my command, though comprising all the principal organizations 
 which were with him, did not contain 1,500 of the men who had participated in 
 the first Yalley campaign, and there was a like falling off in the other organi- 
 zations with me, which had not been with General Jackson in that campaign. 
 This was owing to the losses in killed and disabled, and prisoners who wer« not 
 exchanged. Besides the old soldiers whose numbers were so reduced, my com- 
 mand was composed of recruits and conscripts. 2nd. General Jackson's cav- 
 alry was not ontnumbered by the enemy's, and it was far superior in efficiency — 
 Asfaby being a host in himself; while my cavalry was more than trebled in 
 numbers, and far excelled in arms, equipments, and horses, by that of the enemy. 
 3rd. The Valley, at the time of his campaign, was teeming with provisions an4 
 forage from one end to the other ; while my command had very great difficulty 
 in obtaining provisions for the men, and had to rely almost entirely on the grasi 
 in the open fields for forage. 4th. When General Jackson was pressed and had 
 to retire, as well when he fell back before Banks in the spring of 1862, as, later, 
 when he retired before Fremont to prevent Shields from getting in his rear, the 
 condition of the water courses was such as to enable him to stop the advance of 
 one column, by burning the bridges, and then fall upon and defeat another col- 
 umn ; and, when hard pressed, place his troops in a position of security, until a 
 favorable opportunity offered for attacking the enemy; while all the water 
 K 
 
126 CLOSE OF THE VALLET CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Shortly after Rosser's return from the New Creek expedition, 
 Colonel Munford was sent with Wickhara's brigade to the 
 counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to procure forage for his 
 horses, and, cold weather havJiig now set in so as to prevent 
 material operations in the field^ the three divisions of the 2nd 
 Corps were sent, in succession, to general Lee, — Wharton's 
 division, the cavalry, and most of the artillery being retained 
 with me. 
 
 On the 16th of December, I broke up the camp at New-Mar- 
 ket, and moved back towards Staunton, for the purpose of es- 
 tablishing my troops on or near the Central rail-road — Lomax's 
 cavalry, except one brigade left to watch the Luray Valley, 
 having previously moved across the Blue Ridge, so as to be 
 able to procure forage. Cavalry pickets were left in front of 
 New-Market, and telegraphic communications kept up with 
 that place, from which there was communication with the 
 lower Valley, by means of signal stations on the northern end 
 of Massanutten Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue 
 Ridge, which overlooked the enemy's camps and the surround- 
 ing country. 
 
 The troops had barely arrived at their new camps, when 
 information was received that the enemy's cavalry was in 
 motion. On the 19th, Custer's division moved from Win- 
 chester towards Staunton, and, at the same time, two other 
 divisions of cavalry, under Torbert or Merrit, moved across by 
 Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Gordonsville. This 
 information having been sent me by signal and telegraph, 
 Wharton's division was moved, on the 20th, through a hail- 
 storm, towards Harrisonburg, and Rosser ordered to the front 
 with all the cavalry he could collect. Custer's division reach- 
 ed, Lacy's Spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg, on the 
 evening of the SOth, and, next morning before day, Rosser, 
 
 Bouiaes were low and ford»ble, and the whole country was open in my fl^ont, on 
 my flanks, and in my rear, during my entire campaign. These facts do not dB' 
 tract from the merits of General Jackson's campaign in this slightest degree, and 
 far b9.it from me to attempt to obscure bis well eanied and richly deseiredfiame. 
 Ihey only show that I ought not to be condemned for not doing what be ^id. 
 
CLOSE OF THE TALr-KT CAMPAIGIT. 127 
 
 with about (500 men of his own and Payne's brigades, attacked 
 it in camp, and drove it back down the Valley in some con- 
 fusion. Lomax had been advised of the movement towards 
 Gordonsville, and, as soon as Custer was disposed of, Whar- 
 ton's division was moved back, and on the 23rd a portion of 
 it was run on the railroad to Charlottesville — Munford, who 
 had now returned from across the great North Mountain, being 
 ordered to the same place. On my arrival at Charlottesville 
 on the 2Srd, I found that the enemy's two divisions of cavalry, 
 which had crossed the Blue Ridge, had been held in check 
 near Gordonsville by Lomax, until the airival of a brigade of 
 infantry from Richmond, when they retired precipitately. I 
 returned to the Valley and established my head quartcTS at 
 Staunton — Wharton's division and the artillery being encamp- 
 ed east of that place, and Rosser's cavalay west of it ; and 
 thus closed the operations of 1864 with me.* 
 
 • At the close of the year 1864, Grant's plans for the eampai^ in Virgin-a 
 bad been baffled, and he had mereljr attained a position on James River, which 
 he mighHaTe occupied at the beginning of the campaign without opposition. 
 So far as the two armies, with which the campaign was opened, were concerned, 
 he had sustained a defeat, and, if the contest had been between those two armies 
 alone, his would have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, he had the means of 
 reinforcing and recruiting his army to an almost unlimited extent, and there 
 were no means of recruiting General Lee's. Pour years of an unexampled strug- 
 gle had destroyed the finances of the Confederate Government, and exhausted 
 the material out of which an army could be raised. General Lee had performed 
 his task as a military commander, but the Government was unable to furnish 
 him the means of properly continuing the war ; and he had therefore to begin 
 the campaign of 1866 with the remnant of his army of the previous year, while 
 a new draft, and heavy reinforcements from other quarters, had furnished his 
 opponent with a new army and largely increased numbers. The few detailed 
 men sent to General Lee, after the revocation of their details, added nothing to 
 the strength of his army, but were a positive injury to it. The mass of them 
 had desired to keep out of the service, because they had no stomach for the 
 fight, and when forced i-ito it, they but served to disseminate dissatisfaction in 
 the ranks of the army. Some writers who never exposed their own precious 
 persons to the bullets of the enemy, have written very glibly about the desertions 
 from the army. Now God forbid that I should say one word in justification of 
 desertion under any circumstances. I had no toleration for it during the war, 
 and never failed to sanction and order the execution of sentences for the extreme 
 penalty for that offence, when submitted to me ; but some palliation was to be 
 found for the conduct of many of those who did desert, in the fact that they did 
 
128 CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 
 
 SO to go to the aid of their families, who thej knew were Buffering for the neces- 
 saries of life, while many able bodied young men remained at home, in peace 
 and plenty, under exemptions and details. The duty to defend one's country 
 exists independently of any law, and the latter is made to enforce, not create, 
 the obligation. By the law, or the unwise administration of it, a man may be 
 exempted from enforced service, but he cannot be released from the sacred duty 
 of defending his country against invasion. Those able bodied men who flocked 
 abroad to avoid service, and were so blatant in their patriotism when beyond 
 the reach of danger, as I have had occassion to learn in my wanderings, as well 
 as those who sought exemptions and details under the law, with a view to avoid 
 the dangers and hardships of the war, were to all intents and purposes deserters, 
 and morally more criminal than the poor soldier, who, in the agony of his dis- 
 tress for the sufibrings of his wife and little ones at home, yielded to the temp- 
 tation to abandon his colours. There were some cases of exemptions and de- 
 tails, where the persons obtaining them could be more useful at home than in 
 the field, and those who sought them honestly on that account are not subject 
 to the above strictures, but there were many cases where the motives were very 
 different. The men whose names form the roll of honour for the armies of the 
 Confederate States, are those who voluntarily entered the service in the begin- 
 ning of the war, or as soon as they were able to bear arms, and served faithfully 
 to the end, or until killed or disabled ; and I would advise the unmarried among 
 my fair countrywomen to choose their husbands from among the survivors of this 
 class, and not from among the skulkers. By following this advice, they may 
 not obtain as much pelf, but they may rest assured that they will not be the 
 mothers of cowards, and their posterity will have no cause to blush for the con- 
 duct of their progenitors. 
 
OPERATIONS m 1865. 
 
 On the 2nd of January 1865, 1 had a consultation with Gen. 
 Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my position in the 
 Valley, and he told me that he had left me there with the 
 small command which still remained, in order to produce the 
 impression that the force was much larger than it really was, 
 and he instructed me to do the best I could. 
 
 Before I returned from Richmond, Rosser started, with 
 between 300 and 400 picked cavalry, for the post of Beverly 
 in Western Virginia, and, on the 11th, surprised and captured 
 the place, securing over five hundred prisoners and some 
 stores. This expedition was made over a very mountainous 
 country, amid the snows of an unusually severe winter. Rosser's 
 loss was very light, but Lieutenant CoIoneJ Cook of the 8th 
 Virginia cavalry, a most gallant and efficient officer, lost his 
 leg in the attack, and had to be left behind. 
 
 The great drought during the summer of 1864, had made 
 the corn crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as Sheridan 
 had destroyed a considerable quantity of small grain aad hay, 
 I found it impossible to sustain the horses of my cavalry and 
 artillery where they were, and forage could not be obtained 
 from elsewhere. I was therefore compelled to send Fitz Lee's 
 two brigades to General Lee, and Lomax's cavalry was 
 brought from across the Blue Ridge, where the country 
 was exhausted of forage, and sent west into the counties of 
 Pendleton, Highland, Bath, Alleghany, and Greenbrier, where 
 hay could be obtained. Rosser's brigade had to be tempora- 
 rily disbanded, and the men allowed to go to their homes with 
 their horses, to sustain them, with orders to report when called 
 on. — One or two companies, whose homes were down the 
 
130 opERATiojvs m 1865. 
 
 Valley, being required to picket and scout in front of New 
 Market. The men and horses of Lieutenant Colonel King's 
 artillery were sent to South Western Virginia to be wintered, 
 and most of the horses of the other battalions were sent off, 
 under care of some of the men, who undertook to forage them 
 until spring. Nelson's battalion, with some pieces of artillery 
 with their horses, was retained with me, and the remaining 
 officers and men of the other battalions were sent, under the 
 charge of Colonel Carter, to General Lee, to man stationary 
 batteries on his lines. Brigadier General Long, who had been 
 absent on sick leave for some time and had returned, remained 
 with me, and most of the guns which were without horses 
 were sent to Lynchburg by railroad. This was a deplorable 
 state of things, but it could not be avoided, as the horses of 
 the cavalry and artillery would have perished had they been 
 kept in the Valley. 
 
 Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subsequently 
 sent to South Western Virginia, to report to General Echols for 
 special duty, and McNeil's company of partizan rangers and 
 Woodson's company of unattached Missouri cavalry were sent 
 to the County of Hardy— Major Harry Gilraor being likewise 
 ordered to that County, with the remnant of his battalion, to 
 take charge of the whole, and operate against the Baltimore 
 and Ohio railroad ; but he was surprised and captured there, 
 at a private house, soon after his" arrival. Two very small 
 brigades of Wharton's division, and Nelson's battalion with 
 the few pieces of artillery which had been retained, were left 
 as my whole available force, and these were in winter quarters 
 near Fishersville, on the Central railroad between Staunton 
 md Waynesboro. The telegraph to New Market and the 
 lignal stations from there to the lower Valley were kept up, 
 md a few scouts sent to the rear of the enemy, and in this 
 way was my front principally picketed, and I kept advised of 
 he enemy's movements. Henceforth my efficient and ener- 
 getic signal officer, Captain Wilbum, was the commander 
 )f my advance picket line. 
 
 The winter was a severe one, and all material operations 
 
oFEiiATioirs IN 1865. 131 
 
 were suspended until its close. Late in February, Lieutenant 
 Jesse McNeil, who was in command of his father's old company, 
 with forty or fifty men of that company and .Woodson's, made 
 a dash into Cumberland, Maryland, at night, and captured 
 and brought off Major Generals Crook and Kelly with a staff 
 officer of the latter, though there were at the time several thous- 
 and troops in and around Cumberland. The father of this gallant 
 young officer had performed many daring exploits during the 
 war, and had accompanied me into Maryland, doing good ser 
 vice. When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg in October 1864, 
 Captain McNeil had burned the bridge at Edinburg in his 
 rear, and had attacked and captured the guard at the bridge 
 at Mount Jackson, but in this affair he received a very severe 
 wound from which he subsequently died. Lieutenant Baylor 
 of Rosser's brigade, who was in Jefferson County with his 
 company, made one or two dashes on the enemy's outposts 
 during the winter, and, on one occasion, captured a train 
 loaded with supplies, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 
 
 On the 20th of February, an order was issued by Gen. Lee, 
 extending my command over the Department of South West- 
 ern Virginia and East Tennessee, previously commanded by 
 General Breckenridge — the latter having been made Secretary 
 of War. 
 
 On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up the 
 Valley with a heavy force, consisting according to the 
 statement of Grant, in his report, of " two divisions of 
 cavalry, numbering about 5,000 each." I had been informed 
 of the preparations for a movement of some kind, some days 
 previous, and the Information had been telegraphed to General 
 Lee. As soon as Sheridan started, I was informed of the fact 
 by signal and telegraph, and orders were immediately sent by 
 telegraph to Lomax, whose headquarters were at Millboro, on 
 the Central railroad, forty miles west of Staunton, to get to- 
 gether all of his cavalry as soon as possible. Rosser was also 
 directed to collect all of his men that he could, and an order 
 was sent by telegraph to General Echols, in South-western 
 Virginia, to send his brigade by rail to Lynchburg. My own 
 
133 OPERATIONS IX 1865. 
 
 leadqugirters wefe at Staunton, but there were no troops at 
 hat place except a local provost guard, and a company of re- 
 serves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, which was 
 icting under the orders of the Conscript Bureau. Orders were 
 ;herefore given for the immediate removal of all stores from 
 that place, Rosser succeeded in collecting a little over 100 
 men, and with these he attempted to check the enemy at North 
 River, near Mount Grawford,on the 1st of March, but was un- 
 able to do so. On the afternoon of 4hat day, the enemy 
 approached to within three or four miles of Staunton, and I 
 then telegraphed to Lomax to concentrate his cavalry at Pound 
 Grap, in Rockbridge County, and to follow and annoy the 
 snemy should he move towards Lynchburg, and rode out of 
 town towards Waynesboro, after all the stores had been re- 
 moved. 
 
 Wharton and Nelson were ordered to move to Waynesboro 
 by light next morning, and on that morning (the 2nd) their 
 commands were put in position on a ridge covering Waynes- 
 boro on the west, and just outside of the town. My object, in 
 taking this posftion, was to secure the removal of five pieces- 
 of artillery for which there were no horses, and some stores 
 still in Waynesboro, as well as to present a bold front to the 
 enemy, and ascertain the object of his movement, which I 
 could not do very well if I took refuge at once in the moun- 
 tain. The last report for Wharton's command showed 1,200 
 men for duty; but, as it was exceedingly inclement, and 
 raining and freezing, there were not more than 1,000 muskets 
 on the line, and Nelson had six pieces of artillery. I did not 
 intend making my final stand on this ground, yet I was satis- 
 fied that if my men would fight, which I had no reason to 
 doubt, I could hold the enemy in check until night, and then 
 cross the river and take position in Rockfish Gap ; for I had 
 done more difficult things than that during the war. About 
 12 o'clock in the day, it was reported to me that the enemy 
 was advancing, and I rode out at once on the lines, and soon 
 discovered about a brigade of cavalry coming up, on the road 
 from Staunton, on which the artillery opened, when it retired 
 
OPERATIONS IN 1865. 133 
 
 out of range. The enemy manoeuvred for some time in our 
 front, keeping out of reach of our guns until late in the after- 
 noon, when I discovered a force moving to our left. I imme- 
 diately sent a messenger with notice of this fact to General 
 Wharton, who was on that flank, and with orders for him to 
 look out and provide for the enemy's advance ; and another 
 messenger, with notice to the guns on the left, and directions 
 for them to fire towards the advancing force, which could not 
 be seen from where they were. The enemy soon made an 
 attack on our left flank, and I discovered the men on that flank 
 giving back. Just then. General Wharton, who had not re- 
 ceived my message, rode up to me and I pointed out to him 
 the disorder in his line, and ordered him to ride immediately 
 to that point and rectify it. Before he got back, the troops 
 gave way on the left, after making very slight resistance, and 
 soon everything was in a state of confusion and the men com- 
 menced crossing the river. I rode across it myself to try and 
 stop them at the bridge and check the enemy, but they could 
 not be rallied, and the enemy forded the river above and got 
 in our rear. I now saw that everything was lost, and, after 
 the enemy had got between the mountain and the position 
 where I was, and retreat was thus cut off", I rode aside into 
 the woods, and in that way escaped capture. I went to the 
 top of a hill to reconnoitre, and had the mortification of seeing 
 the greater part of my command being carried ofi" as prisoners, 
 and a force of the enemy moving rapidly towards Rockfish Gap. 
 I then rode with the greater part of my staff" and 15 or 20 others, 
 including General Long, across the mountain, north of the Gap, 
 with the hope of arriving at Greenwood depot, to which the 
 stores had been removed, before the enemy reached that place ; 
 but, on getting near it, about dark, we discovered the enemy 
 in possession. We then rode to Jarman's Gap, about three 
 miles from the depot, and remained there all night, as the 
 night was exceedingly dark, and the ice rendered it impossible 
 for us to travel over the rugged roads. 
 
 The only solution of this affair which I can give, is that my 
 men did not fight as I had expected them to do. Had they 
 
134 OFESATIONS IN 1865. 
 
 done so, I am satisfied that the enemy could have been re- 
 pulsed ; and I was and still am of opinion that the attack at 
 Waynesboro was a mere demonstration, to cover a movement 
 to the south towards Lynchburg, Yet some excuse is to be 
 made for my men, as they knew that they were weak and the 
 enemy very strong. 
 
 The greater part of ray command was captured, as was also 
 the artillery, which, with five guns on the cars at Greenwood, 
 made eleven pieces. Very few were killed or wounded on 
 either side. The only person killed on our side, that I have 
 ever heard of, was Colonel William H, Harman, who had for- 
 merly been in the army, but then held a civil appointment ; 
 and he was shot in the streets of Waynesboro, either after he 
 had been made prisoner, as some said, or while he was at- 
 tempting to make his escape after everything was over. My 
 aide, Lieut. Wm. G. Calloway, who had been sent to the left 
 with one of the messages, and my medical director, Surgeon 
 H. McGuire, had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the 
 enemy. All the waggons of Wharton's command were ab- 
 sent getting supplies; but those we had with us, including 
 the ordnance and medical waggons, and my own baggage 
 waggon, fell into the hands of the enemy.* 
 
 On the 3rd, I rode, with the party that was with me, to- 
 
 • Grant, in speaking of this affair, says: "He (Sheridan) entered Staunton 
 on the 2Bd, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro. Thence he pushed 
 on to Waynesboro, where he found the enemy in force in an entrenched 
 position, under General Early, Without stopping to make a reconnois- 
 eance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and 1,600 
 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, wiih horses and caissons complete, 200 
 waggons and teams loaded with subsistence, and 17 battle-fiags, were captur- 
 ed." This is all very brilliant | but, unfortunately for its truth, Sheridan 
 was not at Waynesboro, but was at Staunton, where he had stopped with 
 a part of his force ; while the affair at Waynesboro was conducted by one 
 of his subordinates. The strength of my force has already been stated, and it 
 was not in an entrenched position. I am not able to say how many prisoners 
 were taken, but I know that they were more than my command numbered, as a 
 very considerable number of recently exchanged and paroled prisoners were at 
 the time in the Valley, on leave of absence from General Lee's army. I not 
 only did not have 200 waggons or anything like it, but had no use for them. 
 Where the 17 battle-flags could have be«n gotten, I cannot imagine. 
 
OPERATlONtS IN 1865. 135 
 
 wards Charlottesville ; but, on getting near that place, we 
 found the enemy entering it. We had then to turn back and 
 go by a circuitous route under the mountains to Gordonsville, 
 as the Rivanna River and olher streams were very much swol- 
 len. On arriving at Gordonsville, I found General Wharton, 
 who had made his escape to Charlottesville on the night of the 
 affair at Waynesboro, and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by 
 the way of the Central and Soulh-Side railroads, to take com- 
 mand of Echols' brigade, and aid in the defence of the city. 
 General Long was ordered to report to General Lee at Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 The affair at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from Lynch- 
 burg, which he could have captured without difficulty, had he 
 followed Hunter's route and notjumped at the bait unwillingly 
 offered him, by the capture of my force at the former place. 
 His deflection from the direct route to the one by Charlottes- 
 ville, was without adequate object, and resulted in the aban- 
 donment of the effort to capture Lynchburg, or to cross the 
 James River to the south side. He halted at Charlottesville 
 for two or three days, and then moved towards James River 
 below Lynchburg, when, being unable to cross that river, he 
 crossed over the Rivanna, at its mouth, and then moved by the 
 way of Frederick's Hall on the Central railroad, and Ashland 
 on the R. F. & P. railroad, across the South and North An- 
 nas, and down the Pamunkey to the White House. 
 
 At Gordonsville, about 200 cavalry were collected under 
 Col. Morgan of the 1st. Virginia Cavalry, and, with this force, 
 I watched the enemy for several days while he was at Char- 
 lottesville, and when he was endeavouring to cross the James 
 River. When Sheridan had abandoned this effort, and on the 
 day he reached the vicinity of Ashland, while I was riding on 
 the Louisa Court House and Richmond road, towards the 
 bridge over the South Anna, with about 20 cavalry, I came 
 very near being captured, by a body of 300 cavalry sent after 
 me, but I succeeded in eluding the enemy with most of those 
 who were with me, and reached Richnjond at two o'clock 
 next morning, after passing twice between the enemy's camps 
 
136 OPERATIONS IN 1865. 
 
 and his pickets. My Adjutant General, Captain Moore, how 
 ever, was captured, but made his escape. 
 
 Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his cavalry 
 and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position on the north 
 bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that place. Rosser 
 had collected a part of his brigade and made an attack, near 
 New Market, on the guard which was carrying back the pris- 
 oners captured at Waynesboro, with the view of releasing them, 
 but he did not succeed in that object, though the guard was 
 compelled to retire in great haste. He then moved towards 
 Richmond on Sheridan's track. 
 
 After consultation with General Lee, at his head-quarters 
 near Petersburg, Rosser's and McCausland's brigades were 
 ordered to report to him under the command of General Rosser, 
 and I started for the Valley, by the way of Lynchburg, to reor- 
 ganize what was left of my command. At Lynchburg, a 
 despatch was received from General Echols, stating that 
 Thomas was moving in East Tennessee, and threatening South 
 Western Virginia with a heavy force, and I immediately went 
 on the cars to Wytheville. From that place I went with Gen- 
 eral Echols to Bristol, on the slate line between Virginia and 
 Tennessee, and it was ascertained beyond doubt that some 
 important movement by the enemy was on foot. We then re- 
 turned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in endeavouring 
 to organize the small force in that section, so as to meet the 
 enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 30th March, 
 a telegraphic despatch from General Lee, directing me to turn 
 over the command in South Western Virginia to General 
 Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and informing 
 me that he would address a letter to me at my home. I com- 
 plied at once with this order, and thus terminated my military 
 career. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 30th March, after having turned over 
 the command to General Echols, I rode to Marion in Smythe 
 County, and was taken that night with a cold and cough so 
 violent as to produce hemorrhage from the lungs, and prostrate 
 me for several days in a very dangerous condition. While I 
 was in this situation, a heavy cavalry force under Stoneman, 
 from Thomas' army in .Tennessee, moved through North Car- 
 olina to the east, and a part of it came into Virginia from the 
 main column, and struck the Virginia and Tennessee rail-road 
 at New River, east of Wytheville ; whence, after destroying 
 the bridge, it moved east, cutting off all communication with 
 Richmond, and then crossed over into North Carolina. As 
 soon as I was in a condition to be moved, I was carried on the 
 railroad to Wytheville, and was proceeding thence to my home, 
 in an ambulance under the charge of a surgeon, when I re 
 ceived, most unexpectedly, the news of the surrender of Gen- 
 eral Lee's army. Without the slightest feeling of irreverence, 
 I will say, that the sound of the last trump would not have 
 been more unwelcome to my ears. 
 
 Under the disheartening influence of the sad news I had 
 received, I proceeded to my home, and I subsequently re- 
 ceived a letter from General Lee, dated on the 30th of March, 
 explaining the reasons for relieving me from command. As 
 a copy of that letter has been published in Virginia, without 
 any knowledge or agency on my part, it is appended to this 
 narrative. The letter itself, which was written on the very 
 day of the commencement of the attack on General Lee's lines 
 which resulted in the evacuation of Richmond, and just ten 
 days before the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
 has a historical interest ; for it shows that our great com- 
 mander, even at that late day, was anxiously and earnestly 
 contemplating the continuation of the struggle with unabated 
 
138 CONCIiUSION. 
 
 vigour, and a full determination to make available every ele- 
 ment of success. 
 
 Immediately after the battle of Cedar Creek, I had written 
 a letter to General Lee, stating my willingness to be relieved 
 from command, if he deemed it necessary for the public in- 
 terests, and I should have been content with the course pur- 
 sued towards me, had his letter not contained the expressions 
 of personal ctMifidence in me which it does; for I knew that, 
 in everything he did as commander oi our armies, General 
 Lee was actuated solely by an earnest and ardent desire for 
 the success of the cause of his country. As to those among 
 my countrymen who judged me harshly, 1 have not a word 
 of reproach. When there was so much at stake, it was not 
 unnatural that persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and 
 forming their opinions from the many false reports set afloat 
 in a time of terrible war and public suffering, should pass 
 erroneous and severe judgments on those commanders who 
 met with reverses. 
 
 I was not embraced in the terras of General Lee^a surrender 
 or that of General Johnston, and, as the order relieving me from 
 command had also relieved me from all embarrassment as to 
 the troops which had been under me, as soon as I was in a 
 condition to travel, I started on horse-back for the Trans-Miss- 
 issipi Department, to join the army of General Kirby Smith, 
 should it hold out ; with the hope erf at least meeting an honors 
 able death while fighting under the flag of my country. Before 
 I reached that Department, Smith's army had also been sur- 
 rendered, and, without giving a parole or incurring any obli- 
 gation whatever to the United States authorities, after a long, 
 weary, and dangerous ride from Virginia, through the States of 
 N^orth Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,. Alabama, Missis- 
 sippi, Arkansas and Texas, I finally suceeeded in leaving the 
 country; a voluntary exile rather than submit to the rule of 
 our enemies. 
 
 J. A. EARLY 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE. 
 
 "Hu. Qrs.. C. S. Armies, 
 
 "30th March, 1865. 
 " Lt.-General J. A. Early, Franklin Co., Va. 
 
 " General, — My telegram will have informed you that I deem a 
 change of Commanders in your Department necessary ; but it is due 
 to your zealous and patriotic services that I should explain the reasons 
 that prompted my action. The situation of affairs is snoh that we 
 can neglect no means calculated to devolop the resources we possess 
 to the greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible. To 
 this end, it is essential that we should have thp cheerful and hearty 
 support of the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers, without 
 which our efforts would be embarrassed and our means of resistance 
 weakened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you 
 cannot command the united and willing co-operation which is so 
 essential to success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public 
 and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your 
 influence both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly 
 to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our 
 military operations in S. W. Virginia. While my own confidence in 
 your ability, zeal, and devotion to the cause is unimpaired, I have 
 nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the current 
 of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the 
 service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavour to find a com- 
 mander who would be more likely to develop, the strength and resources 
 of the country, and inspire the soldiers with cenfideDce ; and, to ac- 
 complish this purpose, I thought, it proper to yield my own opinion, 
 and to defer to that of those to whom alone we can look for support. 
 
 I am sure that you mil tmderstaod and appreoiate my motives, and 
 
140 APPENDIX. 
 
 10 one will be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any measures 
 vhich the interests of the country may seem to Vequire, regardless of 
 ill personal considerations. 
 
 Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have 
 ilways supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you 
 aave ever manifested in the service of the country, 
 1 am, very respectfully and truly. 
 
 Your ob't serv't, 
 
 R. E. LEE, 
 
 Gen'l." 
 
 Since the foregoing narrative was written, I have seen, in a news- 
 paper published in the United States, the following communication : — 
 
 " Hd. Qrs., Battalion U. S. Infantry, 
 " Camp near Lynchburg, Va., 
 " Feb. 7, 1866. 
 " C. W. Button, Esq., Editor Lynchburg Virginian. 
 
 " Sir, — I have received a communication from the War Department, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, relative to a newspaper slip, containing a 
 copy of General Lee's letter to General Early, on removing him fro'm 
 Bommand. The letter is dated Headquarters C. S. Armies, March 
 30, addressed to Lieut.-Gen. Early, Franklin C. H., Virginia, and is 
 said to be in your possession, it having appeared in your paper. The 
 Secretary of "War considers that the original letter properly belongs 
 to the Archive office. 
 
 I am directed by Major-General Terry, commanding this Depart- 
 nnent, to procure said letter, and I therefore call your attention to the 
 matter, and request that you deliver to me the original letter in your 
 possession, in compliance with my instructions. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. E. LATIMER, 
 Brevet Major and Captain 11th U. S. Infantry, 
 Commanding Post." 
 
 This demand for General Lee's private letter to me, and the attempt 
 to enforce it by military power, show how wide has been the depart- 
 ure from the original principles of the United States Government, and 
 to what petty and contemptible measures that Government, as at 
 preseut administered, resorts in domineering over a disarmed and 
 
APPENDIX. 141 
 
 belpless people. I haye the pleasure of informing the Hon. Secretary 
 of War, and the keeper of the " Archive Office," that the original 
 letter is in my possession, heyond the reach of prorost marshals and 
 agents of the Freedman's Bureau, or even Holt with his Bureau of 
 Military Justice and his suborners of perjury. . 
 
 STATISTICS SHOWING THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF 
 THE TWO SECTIONS DURING THE WAR. 
 
 The census of the United States for 1860 showed an aggregate free 
 population of 27,IS5,109 ; of this, 488,283 were free blacks, of which 
 the larger proportion were in the Southern States, but it is not neces- 
 sary to consider that element in this estimate, though to do so would 
 make it more favourable for the Confederate States. Of the above 
 27,183,109 of free population, there were in the States forming the 
 Southern Confederacy, as follows : — 
 
 Alabama 629,164 
 
 Arkansas 324,323 
 
 Florida 'Z8,686 
 
 Georgia 595,097 
 
 Kentuckj 930,223 
 
 Louisiana 376,913 
 
 Mississippi 354,699 
 
 Missouri 1,068,362 
 
 North Carolina 661,686 
 
 South Carolina 301,271 
 
 Tennessee 834,063 
 
 Texas 420,661 
 
 Virginia 1,105, 196 
 
 Aggregate 7,670,224 
 
 Kentucky undertook to assume a neutral position, but she was soon 
 overrun by Federal troops, and her government and a very large pro- 
 portion of her population took sides with the North. Those of her 
 citizens who were not awed by Federal bayonets, formed a state gov- 
 ernment and joined the Confederacy — many of }ier young men going 
 into the Confederate army ; but in fact, whatever may have been the 
 sympathies of the people, her moral influence as well as the benefit of 
 her physical strength were given to the Federal Government. The 
 
142 APPENDIX. 
 
 legitimate Government of Missouri sided with the South, as very prob- 
 ably did the majority of her people, but she was also overrun at a very 
 early stage of the war by Federal troops, and her legitimate Govern- 
 ment subverted by force; and the benefit of her resources and physical 
 strength was likewise given to the United States, notwithstanding the 
 fact that a large number of her men joined the Confederate army. 
 Perhaps the number of men added to the strength of the Confederate 
 army from Kentucky and Missouri, did not acceed the accession to the 
 Federal army from Western Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, and some 
 other of the Southern States, and that, in estimating the relative 
 strength of the two parties at the beginning, it would be proper to re- 
 ject Kentucky and Missouri from the estimate of the Confederate 
 strength. The free population of these two States amounted to 
 1,988,575, and without them there would be left on the Confederate 
 side a free population of 5,581,649 against a similar population of 
 21,603,460 on the Federal side, which would make the odds against 
 us very nearly four to one : — but I will divide the population of these 
 States equally between the parties, and this will give a free population 
 of 6,575,937 Confederates, against a similar population of 20,609,172 
 Federals, which makes the odds more than three to one against us in 
 the beginning, without considering the fact that the Northern people 
 had possession of the Government, with the army and navy and all 
 the resources of that Government, while the Confederate States had to 
 organize a new Government, and provide an army and the means of 
 supplying it with arms as well as every thing else. Notwithstanding 
 this immense odds against us, I presume there is scarcely a Confederate, 
 even now, who does not feel confident that if it had been, " hands off 
 and a fair fight," we would have prevailed ; but an immense horde of 
 foreign mercenaries, incited by high bounties and the hope of plunder 
 held out to them, flocked to the Federal army ; and thus was its size 
 continually growing, while the Confederate army had to rely on the 
 original population to keep up its strength. Any accession of troops 
 from Maryland was more than counterbalanced by those obtained from 
 Western Virginia by the Federals, without counting East Tennessee or 
 other quarters. The Federal Government was not satisfied with re- 
 cruiting its army from abroad, but, as the country was overrun, the 
 sojithern negroes were forced into its service, and thus, by the aid of 
 its foreign mercenaries and the negro recruits, it was enabled finally to 
 exhaust the Confederate army. 
 
APPENDIX. 143 
 
 To show the immense strength of the Federal army, the following 
 extracts are taken from the report of the Federal Secretary of War, 
 Stanton, which was sent to the Congress at its session beginning on the 
 first Monday in December, 1865. In that report he says: — 
 
 "Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate 
 national military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred 
 and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to wit : — 
 
 Available force present for duty 662,345 
 
 On detached gervioe in the different military departments. 109,348 
 
 In field hospitals or unfit for duty 41 ,266 
 
 In general hospitals or on sick leave at home 75,978 
 
 Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 66,290 
 
 Absent without leave 15,483 
 
 Grand aggregate 970,710 
 
 "The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, 
 was distributed in the different commands as follows : — 
 
 Department of Washington 42 124 
 
 Army of the Potomac 120,386 
 
 Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59,139 
 
 Department of the South 18,165 
 
 Department of the Gulf 61,866 
 
 Department of Arkansas 23,666 
 
 Department of the Tennessee 74,174 
 
 Department of the Missouri 1 5,770 
 
 Department of the North- West 5,295 
 
 Department of Kansas 4,798 
 
 Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi 476 
 
 Department of the Cumberland 119,948 
 
 Department of the Ohio 35,416 
 
 Northern Department 9,540 
 
 Department of West Virginia 30,782 
 
 Department of the East 2,828 
 
 Department of the Susquehanna 2,970 
 
 Middle Department 5,627 
 
 Ninth Army Corps 20,780 
 
 Department of New Mexico 3,454 
 
 Deprrtment of the Pacific 6,141 
 
 Total 662,345." 
 
 And again : — 
 
 "Official reports show that on the Ist of March, 1865, the aggre- 
 gate military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and 
 sixty-five thousand five hundred and ninety-one, to wit : — 
 
144 APPENDIX. 
 
 Available force present for duty 602,598 
 
 On detached service in the diSFerent military departments. 132,638 
 
 In field hospilj^ls and unfit for duty 36,628 
 
 In general hospitals or on sick leave 143,419 
 
 Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,696' 
 
 Absent without leave 19,683 
 
 Qrand aggregate 966.691 
 
 "This force was augmented on the Ist of May, 1865, by enlist- 
 ments, to the number of one million five hundred and sixteen of all 
 arms, officers and men, (1,000,516)." 
 
 And again he says : — 
 
 " The ' aggregate quotas charged against the several States, 
 under all calls made by the President of the TTnited States, 
 from the 15th day of April, 1861, to the 14th day of April, 
 1865, at Which time drafting and recruiting ceased, was. . 2,759,049 
 
 " The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, 
 and put into service of the United States, in the army, navy, 
 and marine corps, during the above period, was 2,656,553 
 
 " Leaving a deficiency on all calls. When the war closed, of 102,596 " 
 
 This does not include that portion of the Federal forces consisting of 
 the regular army, and the negro troops raised in the Southern States i 
 which were not raised by calls on the States. It is impossible for me 
 to state the number of troops called into the service of the Confed- 
 erate Government dufiog the war, as all its records fell into the hands 
 of the United States authorities, or were destroyed, but I think I can 
 safely assert that the " available force present for duty " in the Fed- 
 eral army, at the beginning or close of the last year of the war, 
 exceeded the entire force called into the Confederate service during the 
 whole war ; and when it is considered that the troops called into the 
 United States service during that time, numbered more than one-third 
 of the entire free population of the Confederate States, men, women 
 and children, the world can appreciate the profound ability of the 
 leaders, and the great heroism of the soldiers, of that army which 
 finally overcame the Confederate army, by the " mere attrition " of 
 numbers, after a prolonged struggle of four years. They can be ex- 
 celled only by the magnanimity of the conquerors. 
 
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