HF 1456 1914 S89* Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924006824753 FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN LOANS Address prepared by WILLARD STRAIGHT President, American Asiatic Association For the National Foreign ' Trade Convention Washington, D. G-, May 27th and 28th, 1914 NEW YORK 1914 FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN LOANS. The United States is rapidly becoming an industrial as well as an agricultural country. For the first time since the Civil War destroyed our merchant marine and the construction of the great transcontinental railroads demanded our concentrated energy, we are actively in- teresting ourselves in the extension of our export trade, in the hope that we may penetrate, or create, new and more capacious markets. For the successful accomplishment of this purpose we need a credit machinery which will adequately finance the manufacture and distribution of our products and which will "carry" these goods until they are paid for by the pur- chasers. This financing of the transition from the producer tO' the consumer is, in the case of ordinary commercial trans- actions, handled automatically as a matter of banking rou- tine. The purchaser may settle at once or arrange for sixty or ninety days, — or perhaps six months, — credit from the merchant, and the merchant, in turn, is either "carried" by his bankers or by the manufacturer who would, in the latter case, also be obliged to rely upon the bank for the necessary accommodation. When the purchaser, however, desires credit for a period of from five to sixty years, it is no longer an ordinary banking transaction ; and it be- comes necessary for him to obtain funds by the sale, on the market, of stocks or bonds rather than by discounting com- mercial paper. In other words, the purchaser, instead of obtaining credit from the merchant, the manufacturer or the banker, through the banker as his agent, borrows from the in- vesting pubhc. Most of the countries which are now rapidly develop- ing their resources and which cannot themselves finance such development, must secure money in this way. If we expect to realize the full possibilities of our export trade, we must, by our readiness to purchase foreign bond issues, be able to extend to foreign purchasers the accomodation which they now obtain in the markets of our competitors. This, roughly, is the prc^blem of the foreign loan and foreign trade. Its satisfactory solution, which is of vital interest to our merchants and manufacturers, depends pri- marily upon the attitude of the American investors who, while they may not directly benefit by the increased sale of particular American commodities will, in addition to the return on their investment, share in the ensuing general prosperity. This paper is especially concerned with the direct bear- ing of foreign loans on our export trade. It is impossible adequately to treat this subject, however, without ana- lyzing the general aspects of international finance. We must distinguish between foreign securities pur- chased solely as an investment and foreign loans which, in addition to their investment value, bring to the lender certain collateral advantages. Under the first classifi- cation should be included, for example, railway bonds or stocks, issued in the United States, but purchased in Eu- rope for investment or for speculative purposes. In the same category would fall bonds issued by the Russian, Spanish or other Governments, which, though politically and financially independent, require for their development larger amounts than they themselves are able to supply. Foreign holders of such bonds or stocks do not attempt to share in the management of the American railway corporation and are powerless to control the action of the Russian, Spanish or other Government, whose needs they have financed. Such loans, therefore, are judged according to their investment value. Under the second classification would fall, loans issued on behalf of a foreign government or corporation in the markets of the bankers who negotiate the loan. These may be roughly classified as follows: (i) Loans secured upon revenues which are collected under the supervision of the lenders, as in the case of certain loans to Greece, Turkey, Egypt, China, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo. (2) Loans, the proceeds 6f which are expended under the supervision of the lenders, as in the case of certain loans to Turkey, China and Egypt; or (3) Loans, the proceeds of which are utilized to pur- chase goods manufactured by the lender, as in the case of certain loans to Russia and Spain, to various of the South American Republics, to Turkey and to China. Loans of the foregoing character, besides the return to the actual subscriber thereto, assure certain advantages to the Government or industry of the lending nation, which are shared directly or indirectly by the investing public. France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Belgium, Switzerland and Holland, are the chief lending nations. Switzerland and Holland are concerned primarily with investing their surplus capital. The British, German, and Belgian — even the Russian and Japanese — and partic- ularly the French, Governments, however, have recognized the value of their investing power as a political instrument in the great diplomatic struggle in which all are engaged to secure markets for their foreign trade. The great European nations are so well prepared for war that none dare to fight, except under the most extreme provocation, as was proved by their success in not be- coming embroiled in the Balkan war. They have, there- fore evolved a system of co-operative international finance, under which they maintain stable conditions, favorable to trade development, and secure an equality of commercial opportunity for their nationals, in the countries whose political independence has been impaired by financial debauchery. Thus in Egypt and Turkey the foreign debt is administered by commissions, representing the English, German, French, Russian, Austrian and Italian bankers, acting under the direction of their respective governments. Thanks to a similar arrangement which is still in force, Greek credit was re-established in 1908, and although there is no foreign debt commission, practically the same rela- tion now exists between China and the lending powers. A highly efficient mechanism of economic production has only a potential value. The aggressive strength of a nation depends on its political and financial stability, and its international position upon its investing power and the disposition of its government effectively to rep- resent its citizens or subjects and to assist in the extension of their trade. The great lending nations recognize both these facts. They utilize their investing power as a national asset. By building up the weaker nation through financial reorganiza- tion and the development of its resources, they create for themselves a financial and political influence which they convert to their commercial advantage. In this task Gov- vernment, bankers, merchants and manufacturers, supported by the investing public, which the Government represents, and of which the bankers, merchants and manufacturers are an integral part, co-operate for the common good. The political and commercial importance of foreign loans, if not most clearly appreciated, is at least most effectively utilized by the French Government, which counts upon the absorbing power of the French investor as a factor more potent even than the French Army or Navy, in the maintenance .of the diplomatic prestige of France and in the extension of French foreign trade. No foreign loan can be quoted on the Paris Bourse without the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as the Minister of Finance. In Germany, although the Government does not form- ally sanction a foreign loan before a quotation is granted, the great bankers work in close co-operation with the Foreign Office; and no loan of which the Government does not approve is apt to be listed on the Berlin, Hamburg or Frankfort Stock Exchange. In England, while the Foreign Office encourages and supports foreign loans, there have been frequent instances in which foreign issues have been listed on the Stock Exchange despite governmental opposition. The United States became a world power on the con- clusion of the war with Spain. We have only recently developed an investment capacity, the potentialities of which we do not appreciate, although we have already, without evolving any general policy, attempted to utilize it both for the maintenance of order and for the extension of our trade. The first instance, as far as the author is aware, in which the American Government took official cognizance of the political importance of foreign loans, was under the Piatt Amendment, which provides that the Cuban Govern- ment shall not increase its indebtedness until it has first satisfied the American Government that such increase will not, by creating an excessive charge upon the Cuban rev- enues, prejudice the financial stability of that Republic. In making the stipulation, the American Government desired to preclude foreign financial domination and to safeguard the credit of the Cuban Republic, in order that the people of the United States, as well as the Cubans, might benefit by the development of the resources of the Island. In the case of Santo Domingo, our Government as- sumed much the same position as that taken by the Eu- ropean Powers with respect to Turkey and Egypt, and latterly with respect to China. The finances of the Domin- ican Republic were reorganized and its foreign debt con- solidated by means of an American loan, and the collection of the revenues hypothecated as security therefor was placed under American supervision. While similar ar- rangements were proposed, but not consummated, with Hon- duras, they were successfully effected with Nicaragua. Corrupt Governments of the countries bordering the Caribbean Sea have, in times past, sold their national birth-right to foreign concessionaires. They themselves were not able, or apparently willing, honestly to admin- ister their finances and, unable to borrow for their devel- opment on ordinary "financial" terms, they were obliged Lo give additional inducements, which have threatened to impair their sovereign rights. When they defaulted on their interest payments, their European creditors have in comparatively few instances attempted to collect their debts by force. Yet these debtor nations have not escaped the penalty of improvidence, for their credit cannot be restored until they meet their obligations. This situation has be- come increasingly embarrassing to the United States. Dr. Henry Jones Ford, in a paper entitled "Disorderly States," in the Atlantic Monthly for May, points out that President Wilson, in his speech before the Southern Com- mercial Congress at Mobile, has supplemented the "Mon- roe" by the "Wilson," Doctrine. The former was aimed at military or territorial aggression. The latter serves notice on those who would attempt to dominate American States by financial means. President Wilson anticipated the day when, through the beneficent influence of the United States, the weaker South and Central American States would be enabled to borrow on their national credit and no longer be obliged to grant concessions. These nations derive practi- cally their entire income from their customs dues. Possession of the custom-houses, therefore, is the aim of each recurrent revolution. President Wilson's object can only be attained by placing these collectorates under foreign supervision, as has already been done in Santo Domingo and Nicaragua. Such action would assure a regular revenue amply sufficient to meet the service of the loans which these republics now need. Without such security, except in the case of rail- ways which the lenders could control, neither European nor American bankers will loan money to these countries on ordinary financial terms. The profit on investment must be proportionate to the risk involved. These nations, however, must not be permitted to utilize the Monroe Doctrine to protect themselves from the consequences of financial profligacy. We cannot refuse to permit foreign Governments to collect the debts due their subjects, unless we ourselves are willing to insure their payment: If we insist that the European countries shall not intervene, the United States must assume a cor- responding responsibility. If we object to the enforcement of the mortgage, we must act as receivers ourselves, and must either by Congressional enactment guarantee the foreign debt of these countries, or by diplomatic arrange- ments and by utilizing the services of American bankers, bring about financial reorganization by the establishment of reliable customs collectorates. If the first of these alternatives were adopted, the United States Government, in case of default, would be obliged either itself to pay the debts of the recalcitrant rep- uiblics, or by intervention to force them to meet their obligations. If the second, the chance of default would be minimized if nqt entirely avoided by assuring in ad- vance a sufficient and safe revenue. If we desir.e, therefore, to avoid complications with the European powers and develop our own export and import trade in the Caribbean Sea, we must, by means of foreign loans, establish ourselves as the guardians of the financial stability as well as the territorial integrity of some of our southern neighbors. In China, the Administration of President Taft at- tempted a task of a somewhat more ambitious character. The balance of power in the Far East, to which China owed and still owes her continued existence as a nation, has for some years, and is now, largely maintained by the nice adjustment of the financial and commercial, and there- fore political, interests of the great powers. It is to the advantage of all that none should exercise a dominating in- fluence. It is to their mutual interest to maintain the "open door" and share in the general Chinese trade, rather than by the seizure of territory to endeavor to monopolize the commerce of any particular region. President Taft desired to assist in the maintenance of the "open door," by securing for the United States a voice in this council of nations, the weight of whose influence depends primarily upon the extent of their material interest. He wished also to gain for American manufacturers a share in the profits of China's industrial development. He, therefore, induced a group of American bankers to establish an organization in China with a view to securing for this country a par- ticipation in Chinese loans. It was hoped that, owing to the approval of the Government and the reputation of the bankers concerned, an American investment in China might be created, and American influence be established upon a sQund economic basis, as well as upon the friend- ship and goodwill which had been gained by the work of American missionaries and educators. The time for this undertaking, however, was nqt yet ripe. The Taft Administration was accused of supporting an American banking monopoly and of co-qperating with European financiers in the exploitation of China. With the apparent hearty approval of the American public. President Wilson denounced the policy which had been adopted by his pred- ecessor. Foreign bonds have never been a popular investment in this country. It was hoped that a market for this class of security might gradually have been created. The action of the Administration, with respect to the Chinese Reor- ganization Loan made this task more difficult, and develop- ments in the Mexican situation have not encouraged the investor to take an interest in foreign loans. Because of the circumstances above set forth, as well as because of the generally unsatisfactory market conditions, American bankers have recently been obliged to refuse to undertake a number of South American and Chinese loans, the issue of which, in this country, would have strengthened the influence of our Government in the borrowing countries, and the proceeds of some of which would have been directly expended in the purchase of American materials. This then is the situation by which we are confronted. Our Government is stable ; our credit is good ; we can finance our domestic neefds, and are able to obtain trom the European markets much of the fluid capital which we require. We are in a position analogous to that of the 10 prosperqus merchant who, while borrowing from his banker to extend his plant and to finance his business, employs his surplus in advertising ahd in developing new markets. Germany, whose situation is similar to our own, while obtaining commercial accommodation in London or Paris, has utilized its investing power to increase German political influence and German trade throughout the world. We ourselves have reached a point where we must be less introspective and seriously consider the possibilities of developing our trade in a similar manner. This, doubt- less, will be admitted. It remains to devise means by which this purpose can be accomplished. Merchants and manu- facturers blame the bankers for lack of enterprise. The bankers are inclined to blame the Government, and the Government, in turn, looks to the banker, the merchant and the manufacturer to take the initiative. Under present conditions, if the market is good, Amer- ican bankers will doubtless from time to time be ready, by attempting to sell foreign securities, to aid our merchants and manufacturers. The Department of Commerce is specifically charged by Congress to encourage foreign commerce, and our Dip- lomatic and Consular officials show commendable zeal in their efforts to aid the development of our export trade. Such undertakings, therefore, would doubtless receive of- ficial approval and assistance. In the present state of public opinion, however, any administration may be attacked if it utilizes the power of the Government for the profit of private interests, no matter what indirect advantage might accrue to the country as a whole. There are those who would even urge the separation of business and politics. The one is the vitals, the other the brain of the nation. Attempted segregation will result in disaster. In this country we have, perhaps, in times past, suffered from indigestion. There are those who claim that we are now afflicted by brainstorm. Neither condi- tion is salutary. We pride ourselves on being a practical people, tempered by idealism. If this estimate is just we II should have the intelligence to recognize, and the imagina- tion constructively to deal with, facts. Governments to-day, although some are still autocratic, are no longer purely personal. International relations are concerned, not with the conflicting ambitions of sovereigns, but with the economic development of nations. Contem- porary struggles are for markets in which to sell — rather than for territory to exploit — between bankers, merchants and manufacturers, and not between the armed forces which are now maintained as a guarantee against war, rather than as instruments of aggression. International trade and finance, therefore, are the focal points of international pol- itics, just as our own business life, upon which we all depend for our well-being, furnishes us with our most important domestic problems. We recognize that the prosperity of the nation depends upon the business success of the individuals who form its component parts : the capitalist seeking investment, the merchant seeking trade and the laboring man who will benefit by the increased demand for the fruits of his labor. Our Government concerns itself with adjusting the domestic affairs of its citizens, and it should actively exert itself in conserving and extending their interests abroad. There should be effective co-operation between the Government, the bankers, the merchants, the manufacturers and the public. Such concerted action is particularly es- sential in matters affecting our international position. We should aim to develop public opinion to approve the use of our national investing power for the extension of our trade. This would enable the Government to adopt a def- inite policy and to declare that proper diplomatic support would be given to promoters and investors in foreign loans, the terms of which had been submitted to and approved by the Departments of State and Commerce. It might be objected that in enunciating such a policy the Government would pledge itself to use the Army and Navy to extract interest payments due individual Amer- ican investors. Such a contention, however, is scarcely justified. Just as debtors prisons have been abolished in civilized coun- tries, so international opinion deprecates the collection of debts by military pressure. Private contracts are enforced by the courts, and international differences, thanks to the increasing recognition of the economic waste of war, are now generally adjusted by diplomacy and arbitration. The creditor nations employ their lending power to develop the resources and strengthen the credit of their clients. It is. no longer considered sound finance to debauch a weaker Government by encouraging it to borrow ; to create a mort- gage which will ultimately be foreclosed by the seizure of territory. The British, German and French Govern- ments insist that their bankers demand certain loan con- ditions, not because they desire to extend their political control, but because through assuring financial stability they hope to avoid the necessity of intervention. Debtor nations, therefore, increasingly realize that they must main- tain their credit if they desire to expend borrowed funds free from the supervision of the lender. They are aware also that repudiation of their debts, or failure to meet obligations when due, will prevent them from obtaining funds on "financial" terms, not in one only, but in all the money markets of the world. The world's lending capacity depends upon the investing power of the creditor nations, not upon the accumulations of a few individuals. Money is highly sensitive : active in times of peace, timorous in the face of any form of military activity. It is becoming increasingly evident, therefore, that because of its inter- national character and its democratic foundation, world- finance must be regarded as a guarantee of world-peace and commercial development, rather than the means by which the stronger are enabled to exploit the weaker na- tions. The Government of the United States is each year being drawn farther into the vortex of world politics. As a nation we are seemingly not yet conscious that the very development which has resulted from our irresistible energy and restless ambition imposes upon us greatly increased 13 responsibilities to ourselves and to the nations with whom we are obliged by mutual interest to deal. We have hitherto stood somewhat aloof, but this is no longer possible. Our enterprise has carried our interests beyond the seas. The present tariff, as President Wilson has stated, will stimulate our commercial and industrial genius by forcing us to meet the keen test of world com- petition. The Government, therefore, should co-ordinate the foreign trade activities of the nation. American di- plomacy should stand sponsor for those whose resources and character guarantee the honorable performance of their obligations. Our export trade has been constantly in- creasing because the American merchant and manufacturer give "a dollar's worth of service with a dollar's worth of goods." This should assure to them the assistance of our Government in extending their activities. Such assist- ance should now be forthcoming in connection with the development of our foreign trade by means of foreign loans. 14 Cornell University Library HF 1456 1914.S89 Foreign trade and foreign loans :address 3 1924 006 824 753 «i.,™i