*17 ^tate College of Agriculture ^t Cornell tHntberSitp 3tbaca, M- S- HE2757 192Ta7™"'"""-'''"^^ "nillimmii^mn"^'"^''^ prosperity; a seri 3 1924 013 693 159 &!;!! A y PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume X] JULY, 1922 [Number 1 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY S. SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, APRIL 28, 1922 EDITED BY T. W. VAN METRE AND PARKER THOMAS MOON PUBLISHED AT THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY , *^ * 116TH Street and Broadway, New Yoik | 13 D £i Fii Y Cofyrigki tgii, by the Academy of Political ScitrnF" JUM 6 (940 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY The Quarterly is published by the Academy and edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. It is devoted to the historical, statistical and comparative study of politics, economics and public law. Its list of contributors includes university and college teachers, politicians, lawyers, journalists and business men in all parts of the United States and European professors and pub- licists. It follows the most important movements of foreign politics but gives chief attention to questions of present in- terest in the United States. On such questions its attitude is nonpartisan. Every article is signed ; and every article, includ- ing those of the editors, expresses simply the personal view of the writer. Each issue contains careful book reviews by specialists, and in March, June and December large numbers of recent publications are characterized in brief book notes. A valuable record of political events throughout the world is printed as a supplement to the September issue. Communications in reference to articles, book reviews and exchanges should be addressed: Managing Editor, Political Science Quarterly, Columbia University, New York City. Intending contributors are requested to retain copies of articles submitted, as the editors disclaim responsibility for the safety of manuscripts. If accompanied by stamps, articles not found available will be returned. The Quarterly is sent, together with the Proceedings, as part at the membership privileges, to all members and subscribing members (libraries, institutions etc.), who pay five dollars annual dues. Single numbers, not including supplement, one dollar. Supplement containing Record of Political Events, one dollar. Back numbers and bound volumes can be obtained at prices quoted upon request. All business communications should be addressed to The Academy of Political Science, Kent Hall, Columbia Univer- sity, N. Y. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume X] JULY, 1922 [No. i RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY A SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, APRIL 28, 1922 EDITED BY T. W. VAN METRE AND PARKER THOMAS MOON THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1922 (,a-^ A, -J cofvright bv The Academy of Poutical Science L:!i. '' ^ ^7o-^ TABLE OF CONTENTS RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY INTRODUCTION PAGE Railroad Regulation under the Transportation Act 3 T. W. Van Metre I LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE TRANSPOR- TATION ACT Railroad Labor and the Labor Problem . .15 Henry R. Seager Functions and Policies of the Railroad Labor Board 19 Frank H. Dixon Labor Policies of the Transportation Act : (a) From the Point of View of Railway Man- agement 29 C. B. Heisertnan (b) From the Point of View of Railroad Em- ployees 39 W. N. Doak (c) From the Standpoint of the Public Group. 49 Henry T. Hunt II RAILWAY POLICIES AND THE GENERAL WELFARE The Farmers and the Railroads , . .63 Henry C. Wallace Transportation Act of 1920 tj Daniel Willard The New Basis of Rate-Making 87 Walker D. Hines III FREIGHT RATES AND BUSINESS REVIVAL How Railroads Adapt Themselves to National Conditions 97 Albert Shav) iii iv TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGB The Transportation Cost in a Basic Industry — Steel Products lor Charles R. Hook How the Railroads May Render Maximum Service. 105 William J. Ctmningham What Railroads are Doing to Increase Economy and Efficiency of Operation 113 R. H. Aishton The Transportation Factor in the Price of Coal. 116 y. D. A. Morrow APPENDIX The Semi-Annual Meeting, 1922, of the Academy of Political Science 129 Samuel McCune Lindsay INTRODUCTION Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013693159 RAILROAD REGULATION UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ACT T. W. VAN METRE Associate Professor of Transportation, Columbia University THE annual meeting of the Academy of Political Science held in New York, November 21-22, 1919, was devoted to a discussion of railroad legislation. At that time it was clear that the period of Federal operation of railroads, which had begun late in December, 1917, was approaching an end, and Congress was wrestling with the problem of formulat- ing a new policy of railroad regulation. It was apparent that there was to be a radical departure from the policy in effect at the time Federal control began. For several years the opinion had been gaining in strength that the system of railroad regu- lation established by the laws passed in 1887, 1906 and 1910 was faulty in principle, and there was an insistent deniand for comprehensive changes. But while there was almost uni- versal dissatisfaction with the old methods of regulation, there was a wide divergence of view as to what the new railroad policy should be. Congress was deluged with " plans ", each plan representing, for the most part, an effort to protect the interests of the group which proposed the plan. At the meet- ing of the Academy in 1919 the leading proposals with respect to railroad legislation were fully discussed. The published proceedings of the meeting ^ constitute a record of the views then held by legislators, railroad managers, shippers, capital- ists, labor leaders and prominent economists. The Trans- portation Act of 1920 showed evidence of the influence of many of the interests represented at that meeting. The Transportation Act has now been in effect twenty-six months, and the Academy has obtained, from the same interests which took part in the discussion of 1919, an appraisal of the influence of the law upon the transportation business of the United States and upon the many other economic activities with which the railroads are closely related. What have beea 1 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, January, 1920. [3] 4 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X the chief results of the Transportation Act? Is the policy embodied in that law superior to the policy which preceded it ? Does the experience of the past two years warrant a belief that we have a reasonably satisfactory system of railroad regulation? Or should the Transportation Act be amended? And if so, in what particulars ? Among the many changes which the Transportation Act made in the railroad policy of the Federal Government there were three of outstanding importance. First, the law con- tained a rule of rate-making for the guidance of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that body being directed to establish a level of rates " so that carriers as a whole (or as a whole in each of such rate groups or territories as the Commission may from time to time designate) will, under honest, efficient and economical management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way, structures and equipment, earn an aggre- gate annual net railway operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the aggregate value of the rail- way property of such carriers held for and used in the service of transportation." The enactment of this rule of rate-making, while something new in Federal legislation, was nevertheless little more than the recognition of a right which the carriers presumably had always possessed. Of much greater signi- ficance was the provision of the law designed to meet the prac- tical problem arising from the application of such a rule of rate-making. A body of rates which would yield a fair return to the carriers as a whole would permit many carriers having exceptional advantages in the way of rich traffic territory, favorable conditions of operation, and well located terminals, to obtain a return " substantially and unreasonably in excess, of a fair return." The recognition of this fact led to the adoption of a principle before unheard-of in Federal law, the recapture or recovery by the government of a portion of the income of those carriers whose earnings might exceed cin amount deemed to be fair and reasonable. It was originally the plan of the Senate to meet the situation created by the unequal earning capacity of strong and weak roads by com- pelling the consolidation of the railroads of the country into a few great systems, which might employ uniform rates on competitive traffic and, at the same time, earn substantially the [4l No. 1] INTRODUCTION 5 same rate of return upon the value of their property. In the final draft of the bill, however, the compulsory feature of the consolidation program was eliminated. The second important feature of the Transportation Act rep- resented an effort to bring into effect a unified, national system of rate regulation, to replace the dual system of state and Federal control. The exercise of mutually exclusive powers by state and federal authorities had long been a fruitful source of controversy, and in many instances conflicting policies of regu- lation had resulted in the creation of those unreasonable dis- criminations the prevention of which had been the chief pur- pose of regulating the railroads. Under the Interstate Com- merce Act, as amended in 1920, when the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that rates imposed by state authority cause any undue discrimination against interstate or foreign com- merce, it may prescribe rates which will remove the discrim- ination ; and such rates must be observed by the carriers, " the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding." The third outstanding feature of the Transportation Act was the provision for the establishment of machinery to deal with labor difficulties on railroads. The law did not make strikes illegal, but it declared it to be the " duty of all carriers and their officers, employees, and agents to exert every reason- able effort and adopt every available means to avoid any inter- ruption of operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees or subordinate officials thereof." The act directed that all disputes be considered, and if possible, decided, by conference between representatives of the carriers and of the employees directly interested. For the adjudication of disputes not capable of being settled by conference it authorized the creation of Railroad Boards of Labor Adjustment, and established the Railroad Labor Board. The Adjustment Boards -were designed to deal with all disputes not involving wages. Because of differences of opinion be- tween employees and managers as to how these Boards should he constituted — whether they should be local, regional or national — they have not been established. The only official labor tribunal to come into existence by virtue of the Trans- portation Act was the Railroad Labor Board, consisting of [5] 6 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X nine members appointed by the President, the members being divided into three equal groups, representing respectively labor, management and the public. The Board was authorized to state what in its opinion constituted reasonable standards of wages and working conditions for railroad labor, being directed to take into consideration the cost of living, the scales of wages in other industries, the hazard of employment, and other relevant circumstances and conditions. The Act did not pro- vide that the decisions of the Board should be binding, and it prescribed no means by which the orders of the Board could be enforced. Many other changes in the system of railroad regulation were made by the Transportation Act. Among the leading changes in policy was the reversal of the attitude of the govern- ment toward the practice of pooling, the fifth section of the Interstate Commerce Act being amended to permit carriers, under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to pool both traffic and earnings. The traditional attitude of the government toward railroad consolidation was also modi- fied. Whereas consolidation had previously been regarded with disfavor, and not infrequently declared illegal, the Interstate Commerce Commission was now directed to prepare a plan for the consolidation of all the railroads of the United States into a limited number of competitive systems; and provision was made that after the Commission had completed its work the carriers might voluntarily enter into consolidations con- forming to the Commission's final plan. The long-and-short- haul rule of the fourth section of the Interstate Commerce Act was amended, though the general principle adopted in 1910 was retained. The Cummins amendment governing the estab- lishment of rules with respect to the liability of the carriers for lost and damaged freight was again modified, to give added protection to shippers. The long-continued agitation for Fed- eral regulation of railroad capitalization at last bore fruit, the new law requiring carriers desiring to issue securities to obtain the approval of all proposed issues by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Unwise and unnecessary extension of railroad facilities was guarded against by requiring compEinies contemplating the construction of new lines to secure from the Interstate Commerce Commission a certificate of public con- [6] No. I] INTRODUCTION 7 venience and necessity. Likewise it was provided that the abandonment of existing railroad facilities could not take place without the consent of the Commission. The membership of the Commission was increased from nine to eleven. In addition to receiving the new powers previously mentioned, the Commission was authorized to establish mini- mum as well as maximum rates; it was given a larger degree of control of car service, and authority to direct the routing and distribution of traffic in times of emergency. It was empowered to require a carrier to permit the use of its termin£il facilities by other carriers, to prescribe equitable divisions of joint earnings, to direct the routing beyond the lines of initial carriers of traffic not routed by shippers, and to exercise a closer supervision over railroad accounts and records. In one respect the authority of the Commission was curtailed, the time of suspension of proposed changes in rates being reduced from 120 days and an additional period of six months to 120 days and an additional period of 30 days. In addition to establishing a new system of railroad regu- lation the Transportation Act made provision for the adjust- ment of the financial relations of the railroads and the government, gave to such carriers as chose to accept it a guaranty of net earnings for the six months following March 1, 1920, equal to one-half the annual rental paid by the gov- ernment during the period of Federal control, and appropriated $300,000,000 out of which railroad companies might secure loans during the first two years of private operation. The twenty-six months that have passed since the enactment of the Transportation Act have witnessed a trial of virtually all those provisions of the law which marked a departure from the former railroad policy. While conditions have not been such as to permit a thoroughly adequate test of the law, there has been sufficient experience to make possible an estimate of its merits and defects. Public interest has centered naturally upon the events con- nected with the three most important features of the Act, those having to do with the application of the rule of rate^ making, the regulation of state rates by Federal authority, and the work of the Railroad Labor Board. The operation of other portions of the law has not, however, been attended with [7] S RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X. insignificant results. The Interstate Commerce Commission made exceedingly eflfective use of its increased powers over car service during the months immediately following the termination of Federal control, when the freight business of the railroads was unusually heavy. The regulation of the issuance of securities by the Commission has done much, on the whole, to allay the fear of a recurrence of the financial operations which in past years brought disaster to owners of railroad stocks and bonds. The Commission has published its tentative plan of railroad consolidation, following the plan prepared, at the Commission's direction, by Professor William Z. Ripley of Harvard University. New forms of bills of lading for domestic and export freight have been adopted, defining more clearly the exact nature of the legal obligations of carriers and shippers. The promulgation of numerous or- ders suspending and cancelling railroad tariffs providing for reductions in charges indicates that the Commission is making use of its new power to establish minimum charges. One of the first important duties which confronted the Com- mission, under the terms of the Transportation Act, was to endeavor to establish a level of railroad charges sufficiently high to give the carriers a fair rate of return. The law stipu- lated that for the two years following March 1, 1920, the Com- mission should take as a fair rate of return a sum equal to 5j^ per cent of the value of the carriers' property, to which might be added, in the discretion of the Commission, one-half of one per cent, to provide for additions and improvements. Late in July, 1920, the Commission ordered a horizontal in- crease of interstate freight rates and passenger fares. Four rate territories were designated, an Eastern, a Southern, a Western, and a Mountain-Pacific. In the Eastern territory the increase of charges for the transportation of freight was 40 per cent, in the Western district 35 per cent, and in each of the other two regions 25 per cent. A twenty-per-cent in- crease of passenger fares was authorized, and a surcharge of 50 per cent imposed upon Pullman fares, the proceeds to go- to the railroad companies. After the authorization of the increase of interstate charges the railroad companies asked the various state railroad and utility commissions to authorize equivalent increases upon [8] No. I] INTRODUCTION g intrastate traffic. In some states the applications of the carriers were granted, in some they were denied with respect to pas- senger fares and granted with respect to freight rates, and in other states the application met with refusals to permit any increase of a substantial nature. The carriers appealed to the Interstate Commerce Commission to order an increase in intra- state charges, where such increases had been denied by state authorities, upon the ground that the disparity between inter- state and intrastate rates resulted in an undue discrimination against interstate commerce. The Commission acceded to the request of the carriers, and in a series of notable decisions ordered an increase of intrastate rates and fares corresponding in general to the increases which it had previously author- ized on interstate business. A number of states challenged the power of the Commission to increase the general level of intrastate rates. In a test case involving the order made with regard to rates in Wisconsin the Supreme Court upheld the action of the Commission, vindicating its right to alter intra- state rates, not only when there was discrimination against a particular person or locality, but when it should find state rates so low, compared with interstate rates, as to prevent the carriers from earning from their intrastate business a reason- , able proportion of the revenue to which, under the terms of the Transportation Act, they are entitled. Of equal importance with the rate-making activities of the Interstate Commerce Commission has been the work of the Railroad Labor Board. For some time before the Trans- portation Act was passed there was much unrest in the ranks of railroad labor. Prices had advanced immoderately since 1915, and while the United States Railroad Administration had been generous in its treatment of labor, the workers felt that the advance in the rate of compensation had not been com- mensurate with the increase in the cost of living. Local dis- turbances seriously impeded the operation of the railroads during the closing months of Federal control, and a general stoppage of work was averted in the spring of 1920 only be- cause of the prospect of a speedy consideration of the wage situation by the Railroad Labor Board. Immediately after the Board was organized it undertook a settlement of the wages question, and on July 20, 1920, it rendered a decision granting to all classes of railroad labor a substantial increase [9] lO RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X of wages, retroactive to May 1. By this decision the annual outlay of the carriers for wages was advanced twenty-two per cent. In the fall of 1920 the railroads found it necessary to take steps to reduce expenses. The business depression which had begun in the summer caused a marked decline in the volume of railroad traffic, and the increased rates granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission fell far short of supply- ing the fair return of six per cent authorized by the Trans- portation Act. The Labor Board was asked not only to authorize a reduction of wages, but to abrogate the working rules and agreements which had been inherited from the Railroad Administration, and which the carriers asserted to be the cause of large annual losses. In 1921 the Labor Board authorized a twelve-per-cent reduction of wages, and it also ordered new working agreements to be adopted to replace those put into effect during the period of Federal control. During the short time of its existence the Board has been exceedingly active, handing down numerous decisions affecting the entire railroad service, and issuing many orders with respect to dis- putes on the lines of individual carriers. One of its most noteworthy achievements was the effective part it took in averting the threatened railroad strike in October, 1921. The operation of the Transportation Act has evoked a great deal of criticism. It was unfortunate that the law had its earliest trial during a period of business depression. It was particularly unfortunate that the large rate increases granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission came at a time when the general level of commodity prices, and especially of the prices of farm products, was steadily declining. While there is little ground for the belief that the increase of transportation rates contributed in any marked degree to the business de- pression, it was inevitable that in many quarters the new rates should be held as the primary cause of the hard times. There have been many demands for the unconditional repeal of the entire rule of rate-making, and there has also been an unfor- tunate tendency to encourage interference with the work of the Interstate Commerce Commission by legislative and execu- tive officials. The work which the Commission has done in the readjustment of rates believed to be unreasonably high and the recent partial revival of business have done much, how- ever, to still the criticism of the rate-making provisions of the [10] No. INTRODUCTION II Transportation Act. So far there has been no recapture of excess earnings from individual carriers, though the Com- mission is now preparing to undertake this work. It is highly probable that the railroads affected will challenge the constitu- tionality of this feature of the law. The carriers of trunk line and of central freight association territories have already called into question the legal right of the Commission to order a general readjustment of the divisions of joint earnings. The invasion by the Federal Government of the right previ- ously exercised by states to regulate intrastate commerce has been more sharply criticised than the rule of rate-making, and an attempt is being made to modify that portion of the law which, according to the Supreme Court, gives the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to adjust the general level of intrastate rates in accordance with the needs of the carriers for revenue. Senator Cummins has said that it was not the intention of the framers of the law to give to the Commission such sweeping power, it being thought that the law would permit the Commission to modify intrastate rates only in cases where the disparity between state and interstate charges re- sulted in discrimination against particular individuals or par- ticular localities. The chief criticism of the Transportation Act has been in connection with the provisions for the adjustment of labor troubles. The Labor Board has met with a comparatively small measure of public approval, and it has not been looked upon with great favor either by the railroad managers or by the railroad employees. Railroad labor unions have achieved a position of much strength in recent years by virtue of the Adamson Law and because of the deferential policy of the Railroad Administration. They have a feeling of confidence in their power to bring to a successful issue a contest with the railroad managers, and consequently they are inclined to regard with disfavor the creation of arbitration tribunals of any character. Because of the business depression the rail- road managers have a large measure of confidence in their ability to dictate terms to their working forces in case of a strike, and many of them feel that the Labor Board is an im- pediment to the speedy readjustment of wages and working rules which in their opinion the present condition of the trans- portation industry justifies. The difference of opinion be- [II] 12 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X tween railroad executives and the Board as to the scope of the Board's jurisdiction has tended to prevent the new tribunal from exercising the influence that was expected. The public, on the whole, has been impressed with the fact that the scale of wages of railroad workers has not declined so rapidly as the scale of wages of workers in other industries, and feeling that high wages have been largely responsible for high rail- road rates, it has been inclined to condemn the Railroad Labor Board for failure to bring about a more expeditious reduction of railroad expenses. The effective action of the Board at the time of the threatened strike in October, 1921, tended, how- ever, greatly to increase its prestige, and gained for it many more friends than it had previously possessed. Perhaps the greatest pretext for criticism of the Labor Board, both by the carriers and by the public, has been the fact that the control of railroad wages has been entrusted to one administrative body and the control of rates to another, without specific provision for close cooperation between the two. The demand for the unconditional abolition of the Labor Board has not been so urgent as the demand that the Board be abolished and its functions vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is not improbable that the Transportation Act will be modified in the not distant future, though with the partial recovery of business and the gradual improvement of the financial position of the carriers the opinion is unquestionably gaining strength that it would be well to leave the law un- disturbed for a time in order to see how it will function under more nearly normal conditions of business than have prevailed during the past two years. At any rate it is not to be ex- pected that the law will be changed as extensively as its sever- est critics desire. It must be remembered that if the law is amended merely so as to eliminate its three most important features the country will be thrown back upon virtually the same railroad policy that existed in 1917. One has only to remember the almost universal condemnation of that policy to understand how unwise it would be to return to it. What- ever has been the criticism of the Transportation Act there are few who will not admit that the policy which it embodies is superior to the former railroad policy. The general accept- ance of this fact affords strong basis for the belief that there will be no hasty and ill-considered changes. [12] PART ONE LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT RAILROAD LABOR AND THE LABOR PROBLEM HENRY R. SEAGER Professor of Political Economy, Columbia University THE primary purpose of the Academy of Political Science is educational. It was founded in recognition of the fact that there is a large and growing body of Ameri- cans who wish really to understand both sides of the questions that concern us as citizens. As a contribution to our educa- tional program these meetings to discuss the Railroads and Business Prosperity are especially significant. They are a deliberately planned follow-up of the similar meetings which the Academy held in November, 1919, on Railroad Legislation. At that time, as you will all recall. Congress was wrestling with the problem of the terms on which the railroads should be turned back to their owners. The sessions of the Academy, then held dealt with every important phase of that subject. Senator Cummins explained the virtues of his bill. Repre- sentative Merritt told why the House bill, the Esch Bill, was a better measure. An interstate commerce commissioner, rail- road executives, railroad labor union officials, spokesmen for shippers, for the stockholders and for the public, and the in- evitable professors, were all given opportunity to present their views. There resulted a volume of Proceedings which contri- buted greatly to the enlightenment of our members, of the public, and even of Congress, as the good features — I will say nothing of the others — of the Transportation Act of 1920, which soon followed, clearly demonstrated. Today we come together to appraise that measure in actual operation. As two years ago, so today, we are still confronted by the railroad labor problem as the most difficult aspect of the whole railroad question. I have been asked to relate the problem to the labor problem in general. The relation seems to me so obvious that I need take but a few minutes of your time to characterize it. The railroads have long been recognized as a business " af- fected with a public interest ", a " public utility ", as the phrase [15] l6 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X goes. This means that while their business is not government business it is also not strictly private business. In recognition of its quasi-public nature we began thirty-five years ago to subject the charges they might impose and the quality of service they must render to regulation through the Interstate Com- merce Commission. Just as the railroads occupy a middle ground between public business and private business, so rail- road employees occupy a middle position between public em- ployees and private employees. We have been very slow in realizing just what this implies. For many years we placed sole reliance on mediation and voluntary arbitration to adjust railroad labor disputes. Even the Transportation Act, while creating the Railroad Labor Board, is vague in its definition of the powers of this Board and provides no adequate sanction for the enforcement of the Board's decisions. This deliberation in recognizing the quasi-public nature of railway employment and extending to railway employees some of the protection as regards certainty and continuity of status and some of the responsibility as regards regularity in the performance of their duties that apply to public employees, reflects the difficulty of the problem. It is well that we are taking ample time to settle the railroad labor problem. It is helpful that the timid steps toward an adequate railroad labor policy in the Transportation Act are being subjected to judicial review, even if some of the decisions seem to weaken rather than to strengthen the labor provisions of that measure. The goal to be aimed at is coming to be more and more clearly perceived by all concerned. As regards the public it is maxi- mum efficiency on the part of the railroad employees and pro- tection against the interruption of railroad service ; as regards the employees it is the " just and reasonable " wages and work- ing conditions prescribed by the Transportation Act, coupled with such participation in the determination of those con- ditions as will call forth loyal and efficient service ; as regards railroad executives it is such degree of control over the oper- ation of the railroads as will enable them to do their work efficiently and to secure the most loyal and efficient cooperation of their fellow employees. As regards the owners of railroad securities it is such an adjustment of labor costs to revenues as will afford them a fair and reasonable return on their bona- fide investments. [16] Na I] RAILROAD LABOR AND THE LABOR PROBLEM y 7 I shall not anticipate the speakers who succeed me by at- tempting to say how this goal is to be attained. But, con- sidering together these different aims, there are two principles which in the future development of our railroad labor policy should, in my judgment, receive clearer recognition. The first is the principle that the operating employees and the shop employees present separate and distinct problems. Con- tinuous service on the part of the operating employees on every division of every reulroad system in the country is essen- tial to the public welfare. This is not true of the shop employees of any railroad. In my opinion only harm and confusion have resulted from trying to apply exactly the same method for adjusting disputes to the operating employees and to the shop employees. Operating employees are quasi-public employees in a sense that entitles them, in return for guarantees of continuous service, to a definite and fully protected status. Shop employees are little, if at all, different as regards the importance of the services they render from private employees in the many private plants which do the same work for the railroads in some sections of the country that is done by the railroad shops in other sections. As I am a strong believer in leaving labor questions to voluntary adjustment, under proper safeguards protecting the right of the individual employee to organize, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by restricting the right of shop employees to strike should they desire, at any rate, unless and until we come to adopt such a policy for other employees in manufacturing and repair plants. On the other hand, if the operating employees should ever again attempt to exercise the right to strike, which they enjoy, there are clear indications that public opinion would demand its curtailment. Such curtailment would be fair and proper only if it were coupled with the adoption of standards as regards wages and working conditions and con- tinuity of employment that made the use of the strike weapon clearly no longer necessary as a means of securing the just and reasonable conditions, which the Transportation Act prescribes. The other principle is that whatever public authority is charged with adjusting disputes involving the operating em- ployees, it must recognize that it is its duty to seek and find some other and better basis for determining wages and work- [17] 1 8 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X ing conditions than reliance on settlements that may be im- posed by railroad executives through their superior power, or that may be wrung from such executives because of the superior power of the organized employees. From this point of view the statement with which the Railroad Labor Board prefaced the first wage decision which it rendered on July 20, 1920, advancing wages for the collective railroad employees of the country, was highly disappointing. It said : " The Board has been unable to find any formula which, applied to the facts, would work out a just and reasonable wage for the many thousands of positions involved in this dispute." The ob- jection to this statement is not that it would have been reason- able to expect the Board to find such a formula after its few weeks' study of the problem but that it implies that no such formula or formulae are to be found. If, instead of contenting itself with such a pessimistic utterance as regards the possi- bility of placing its decisions on a scientific and defensible basis, it had recognized the grounds for distinguishing between operating employees and shop employees, and indicated its determination to seek a proper basis for the determination of the wages and working conditions of operating employees, so that in its decisions rules would in time be laid down which would justify curtailing the right of operating employees to interrupt the railroad service of the country, the public would now entertain a much higher opinion of the Board and much greater confidence in its ability to lead in the solution of the railroad labor problem. [i8] FUNCTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD FRANK H. DIXON Professor of Economics, Princeton University AS a background for our discussion it may be profitable to recall the more significant provisions of the Trans- portation Act of 1920 relating to labor — that portion enacted under the title " Disputes between Carriers and their Employees and Subordinate Officers ". The fundamental purpose of this portion of the statute is revealed in the first sentence of Section 301, which declares it to be the duty of all carriers and their officers and agents to exert every reasonable effort and adopt every available means to avoid any inter- ruption to operation growing out of a dispute between carrier and employees. Uninterrupted transportation is essential to the life and happiness of the people and it is wholly proper that this thought should be kept in the forefront of any legis- lation concerning labor controversies on the railways of the country. Following this general injunction the specific plan is de- veloped. All disputes must be considered, and if possible, must be decided in conference between authorized representa- tives of those directly interested in the dispute. This initial conference usually would take place on the individual railway, but if the dispute were of wider extent, it might conceivably involve many carriers. Failure to reach a decision in such a conference is provided for by boards of reference to whichi the controversy may be sent. In the first place, there are the Railroad Boards of Labor Adjustment. These boards may be established by agreement between carriers and employees. They may be limited to a single line, to a group of carriers, or they may comprise the carriers as a whole. They are to be bipartisan in character. Their jurisdiction is an appellate one, and covers only such disputes as involve grievances, rules or working conditions, but not wages. Such a board, when set up, receives for hear- [19] 20 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X ing any dispute not settled by local conference, upon the appli- cation of any carrier or employee organization, or the petition of not less than one hundred unorganized employees. Further- more, this Board either on its own initiative or upon the request of the national Labor Board, may take jurisdiction whenever it is of the opinion that the dispute is likely sub- stantially to interrupt commerce. Finally, at the apex of the pyramid is the Railroad Labor Board, an arbitration body consisting of three representatives each of labor, the carriers and the public. It takes jurisdiction of disputes concerning working conditions not settled by Ad- justment Boards or concerning which it decides that Adjust- ment Boards have not exhibited due diligence. In case no Adjustment Board has been organized, it takes the place of this subordinate body and receives the dispute on appeal directly from the local conference. So far as wage disputes are concerned, the Railroad Labor Board assumes direct jurisdiction on appeal from the local conference without the intermediation of any Adjustment Board. And it may go further and upon its own initiative suspend the operation of any original decision concerning wages made locally, if it is of the opinion that the decision involves such an increase as will be likely to necessitate a sub- stantial readjustment of the rates of any carrier. Decisions are to be made public by transmittal to the President and to the Commission. If an order of the Board is disobeyed, it may hear and determine the violation and make public its finding. But it has no weapon of enforcement beyond that of publicity. This Board has been in existence for nearly two years, long enough to develop its policy at least in outline and give indi- cation of what are to be its fundamental guiding principles. Certainly it has had a sufficiently varied experience during its brief and busy life to prevent it from sinking to the level of bureaucratic routine. Catapulted into the midst of a situation seething with discontent and threatened outbreak, the Labor Board was compelled at the beginning to act under pressure and without that deliberation that should characterize the decisions of a judicial body. And working under pressure has been the habit of the Board almost continuously since the beginning. It may have made some mistakes. It certainly [20] No. i] THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD 2 1 has not met with universal approbation. But its work should be judged with due consideration of the conditions under which the Board was created and under which it has been compelled to work. In the determination of the reasonableness of wages it was under the guidance of Congress, which laid down seven con- ditions that were to be taken into consideration. Hazard, skill and responsibility were obvious factors, as were character and regularity of employment. Inequalities in previous wage adjustments were certainly pertinent considerations, for until the wage base was determined to be sound and fair, no increases or decreases therefrom could be fairly appraised. But the Board naturally shrank from an investigation that would con- sume much valuable time and carry it far afield, and this factor was given slight attention. Cost of living, which the em- ployees use as an argument for increases when prices are rising and which is taken over by the carriers -when the tide begins to recede, cannot by itself determine the fundamental reason- ableness of an existing wage. It merely indicates the desir- ability of an increase or a decrease from some assumed stand- ard which has been only vaguely fixed, and may not have been reasonable in the beginning. It is worthy of note that Mr. Jewell in his recent presentation before the Labor Board in behalf of the shop crafts, challenged the whole social order and based his plea for an increase of existing wage rates upon the necessity of assuring to the workers an American standard of living. The laborer is worthy of his hire, and this hire must procure for him the opportunity to live in comparative comfort without reference to the financial condition of his employer. No mathematical rule has been discovered for the deter- mination of a reasonable wage. But so long as we maintain our regime of private industry, one of the determining in- fluences that must be accepted by any wage-adjustment board is the first-named of the seven conditions listed in the statute, " the scale of wages paid for similar kinds of work in other industries ". Granted that the statistics of wages have been honestly and intelligently gathered and that no manipulation of wage rates has occurred through undue pressure of com- bined capital, the price that must be paid for similar labor in the open market is one of the conclusive factors in determining [21] 22 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X the reasonableness of a prevailing wage standard. Moreover in connection therewith the Board should adjust wages in harmony with the industrial conditions of each locality. Standardized wages effective over wide areas can with difficulty be defended on any economic basis. Their reason for existence is political and strategic. Testimony submitted by the em- ployees themselves in Chicago recently is a virtual recognition of the need of restoring those differentials between town and city and between one section and another that were largely destroyed during the period of the national agreements. But this wage the carrier should pay irrespective of its financial condition. Mr. Jewell is fundamentally on solid ground in directing the attention of the Board to the standard of living of the laborer and away from the railway's ability to pay. It is not only unfair but also unsound to make the wages of the employees dependent upon the prosperity of the carriers. The public must eventually be made to pay what is necessary to keep capital in business and labor adequately re- warded. But if there is any faltering on the part of the public, it is capital that must bear the brunt, not labor. Of course there are instances, and some of them have been recog- nized by the Labor Board, where railway operation has only been possible through a reduction of the wage standard, but these have been minor instances on small roads, and it is signi- ficant to notice that in the case of the Missouri and North Arkansas, for example, the Board in reducing the wages stipu- lated that capital should receive nothing until wages had been restored to standard. Overemphasis has been put upon the relationship of wages and rates — the argument that wages depend upon the ability of the carrier to pay — by the offer of the railways last October to translate all further reductions in wages into rate reductions. Why such an offer was made it is difficult to say. Possibly it was a strategic move to enlist the shippers on the side of wage reductions. But the practical value of the offer was certainly insignificant. The effect in rate reductions of a decrease of ten per cent in wages would be so small that it would scarcely be recognized even if it had immediate effect upon the move- ment of traffic. But all indications point to the conclusion that reductions in rates would not stimulate traffic movement [22] No. I] THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD 23 to any considerable degree. The trouble lies in the business situation. When business picks up, the height of the freight rate will be in large measure forgotten. Those who are insisting that wages depend upon rates are urging the transfer of the duties of the Labor Board to the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the ground that the agency that determines revenues should be in control of expenses. Their arguments are not impressive. To be sure, there has been a certain amount of jolting in the machinery and the two agencies have not worked as cooperatively £is they might have done. But the combination of the two functions in the one body would not solve any problem. Wages would still have to be considered separately and ought still to be considered ahead of rates if any conclusions of enduring force are to be reached. And, besides, the Commission has enough troubles of its own. A review of the activities of the Labor Board reveals the fact that whereas it was designed as an appellate body to receive only such controversies as could not be settled locally or regionally, which presumably would be few, it has been for most of its life largely a court of original jurisdiction because of the utter failure of the conference and adjustment machinery to produce results. It is probable that the presence of the Labor Board works as a deterrent to quick settlement in con- ference. One of the parties feels that better terms may be secured by appeal and so declines to participate in a local ad- justment, or else makes merely a perfunctory effort toward settlement. The result has been to bury the Board in petty issues with which it should not have had to concern itself. Unsettled controversies of minor character carried over from the federal period occupied much of the time of the Board at the beginning. The failure of the carriers and their employees to get anywhere in the revision of the national agreements threw the burden of readjustment wholly upon the shoulders of the Labor Board. It is true that adjustment boards have been set up in each of the three territories, but thus far they have been confined to men in engine, train, and yard service, and have included only a portion of the carriers. No such boards have been created for settling the problems of the shop crafts, in which the con- ceal 24 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X trcwersies over working conditions are much more numerous than in train service. This failure of carriers and shop craft employees to set up adjustment boards is in part due to the attitude of the railways, which are disposed to distinguish between occupations that are exclusively railway in their char- acter, and those that are similar to commercial employment. Shopmen are merely skilled mechanics. They belong to unions associated with the American Federation of Labor which contains men of the same craft employed in other industries. Questions of policy are decided by vote of the entire union membership and railways have resented the idea that rules for railway shopmen should be made by men engaged in other than railway occupations. Nevertheless, it is evident that means should be devised for encouraging and developing the type of local conference and adjustment that the Act contemplated. Sound principles of labor adjustment demand that removal of misunderstandings and elimination of grievances should be undertaken at the bottom and not at the top. Local conference develops a loyalty to the individual operating organization without which effi- ciency is impossible. Such loyalty is peculiarly needed in the railway industry, in which the geographical extent of oper- ations requires the scattering of employees over a wide territory where they are thrown largely on their own resources. It becomes a question whether the Labor Board has used its influence as vigorously as it might to encourage local adjust- ment. Of course it has compelled compliance with the Act, which has required local conference as a preliminary to an ap- peal to the Board. But there is no indication that it has been unwilling to accept these appeals when made. Why has it not followed the practice of the court which sends back for further deliberation a hung jury? Why could it not refuse to hear an appeal because the conference was obviously per- functory? On the contrary, in the present wage hearing, in- stead of passing upon the merits of Mr. Jewell's plea that genuine conferences had not been held, the Board postponed decision on this issue until after all the evidence should have been offered by both sides. I do not mean to argue with re- spect to this specific issue that the preliminary conferences have not been genuine. Upon that I express no opinion. I [24] No. I] THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD 25 am merely insisting that the Board's general attitude does not betoken any solicitude for the preservation and the enlargement of the powers of the local conference. In fact, there is much to lead one to the conclusion that the Board is magnifying its own powers and is extending them into that field which should be the exclusive possession of the railway executives. To discuss this issue in detail would extend this introductory paper beyond its proper limits. The Board's attitude may be understood by brief reference to a few of the more striking cases. In an issue last September in which a carrier discharged a man because he belonged tO' a union and challenged the power of the Board to interfere in a matter of contract between employer and employee, the Board held that it was required to take jurisdiction of all cases not decided elsewhere, and that it must decide all disputes that were likely to interrupt the operation of the carrier. This all- embracing attitude takes out of the hands of the individual carrier all control of its labor relations when they have reached a stage in conference where disagreement has resulted. For of course any disagreement may conceivably develop into an interruption of traffic. Another illustration of the Board's interpretation of its powers is found in the Erie Railroad case, in which the carrier,, after conference with its employees resulting in a disagreement, restored the rates of pay in effect before the Labor Board's decision of July, 1920. The Board held that the road had na authority to decide when new conditions warranted a change in wages, and expressed its somewhat heated views in the following langauge: This position, of course, renders nugatory and vain the elaborate and costly processes established by the Act and applied by this Board. It sweeps aside at the will of one party a decision arrived at after the presentation of evidence and argument by the many parties to the dispute, accepted by all and now obeyed by substantially all carriers.. It justifies a disregard of the factors specified by Congress for the ascertainment of just and reasonable wages and substitutes for these factors the financial benefit of the carrier. If valid, the intent of Con- gress that conference, reasonableness and justice should be substi- tuted for power, violence and disorder in the settlement of railroad labor disputes is utterly destroyed and legislation enacted after the most careful consideration rendered ridiculous and even fraudulent. If a carrier may arbitrarily reduce wages decided to be reasonable and set aside rules while a party to proceedings with regard to such rules, no reason appears why railroad employees may not announce an im- mediate intention of abandoning the service in concert unless de-. [25] 26 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X mands for increased wages or more favorable working conditions are at once satisfied, provided a trend toward higher living costs shall have appeared or wage scales in similar industries shall have ad- vanced. Such conduct is highly provocative of interruption to traffic and is not only not consistent with the Act, but is thereby clearly condemned and prohibited. No court hcis passed upon this question because the carrier complied with the ruling of the Board, but it is the particular feature of the law to which the most serious objection is raised by railway management. It is clear that under this inter- pretation, management has no power to readjust wages with- out the consent of the employees, and if that is withheld, with- out a hearing and a decision by the Labor Board. It is the contention of railway management that it should have original authority to adjust wages, its action to be subject to review by the Board, which should have power to make its findings retro- active. Without such a procedure, wage-fixing will soon be- come an exclusively governmental function. Finally, there is the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad, which is too familiar to need elaboration here. The Board went further in this instance than in any other controversy of which it has taken jurisdiction, and laid down general rules of procedure which the railway was ordered to follow in choos- ing employee representatives to confer with management con- cerning a plan of labor adjustment. The Board even went so far as to prescribe the form of ballot which the road should use, although this portion of the order was later modified. But it did insist upon certain principles of representation with which the road was not willing to comply. In this respect it apparently exceeded the powers granted it by the statute, for it has within the past fortnight been enjoined by the Federal Court from enforcing its orders against the carrier. The de- cision of Judge Page virtually forbade the Board to interfere with the procedure of the carrier which set up a scheme of employee representation for the handling of local grievances. [I note the prompt announcementthat the Labor Board proposes to appeal this decision. This, of course, is quite proper and quite desirable in order that the actual powers of the Labor Board should be clearly defined by a higher court.] However much we may as individuals sympathize with the underlying purpose that inspired the Labor Board — ^the desire [26] No. I] THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD 27 to permit each employee to be represented by the person or by the organization of his choice, whether this person or organi- zation was local to the Pennsylvania Railroad or not — we must recognize that this position of the Labor Board invades deeply the field of management and is one more step in the direction of robbing the railway executive of that initiative which is essential to efficient operation. I am not one of those who believe that the Labor Board should be abolished. It has much valuable work to do within its proper field. Above all it stands for the settlement of labor problems through the medium of arbitration rather than that of the strike. Uninterrupted transportation, which is at the basis of the present law, is a goal which we must steadily approach. We must accustom the public and labor to the idea of arbitration as a permanent substitute for the strike. Capital and labor should be required to accept service in this industry subject to a limitation upon their freedom of action in the .settlement of their disputes. There would have been no jus- tice in incorporating compulsory arbitration into law in March, 1920, and imposing restrictions upon employees just emerging from government employment, into which they had been thrown without their consent — employees long in service with valuable seniority rights and unfitted by age and experience for any other employment. But the public should announce a future policy of compulsory arbitration, with the purpose of realizing it as speedily as conditions permit. The public must assure the contestants that they have a tribunal in which absolute justice will be meted out. Such a tribunal must offer •a compensation and a tenure sufficient to attract the most com- petent men the country can produce. It must establish a labor •code which assures to labor certain fundamental rights. Such a code the Board itself attempted to lay down last July. This ■code has not met with universal approval, but it gives at least -a basis for discussion. There is not opportunity at this time to discuss the arguments for and against compulsory arbitration. I wish only in reply to those who insist that it is wholly impracticable, to call attention to the influence exerted by the Labor Board and the labor provision of the statute last fall in preventing a nation- wide strike. Notwithstanding the fact that the law contained [27] 28 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X no sanctions and that the only method of protest left for labor against the decision of the Board was the use of the strike weapon, the strike did not take place. It crumbled because in spite of all explanations and protests, labor could not rid itself of the odium of striking against the decision of a body- created by law for the express purpose of settling disputes of this character. Public opinion refused to endorse lawlessness and the gigantic structure of revolt collapsed like a house of cards. With the rights of labor adequately protected by a code sanctioned by law, and with a competent and high-minded arbitration board, there should be no more inherent difficulty in settling labor disputes peaceably than there is in adjusting the ordinary dispute in courts of law. The cry of involuntary servitude, under such circumstances, is not persuasive. Public policy must guarantee justice to the disputants but it must also protect the people at large from the intolerable burdens oi interrupted transportation. [38] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RAILWAY MANAGEMENT C. B. HEISERMAN General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad A DISCUSSION of the labor policies of the Transpor- tation Act from the point of view of railway man- agement is hardly within the province of a member of a railroad legal department, but I shall address my remarks simply to a statement of facts which will authoritatively set forth the policy of the company which I have the honor to serve, and some phases of the controversy with the United States Railroad Labor Board which led to our appeal to the United States Court at Chicago. Section 301 of the Transportation Act declares it to be the duty of all carriers and their officers and employees to exert every reasonable effort and to adopt every available means to avoid any interruption in the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and its employees, or its subordinate officials. All such disputes shall be considered and, if possible, decided in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer by the carriers, or employees, or subordinate officials thereof, directly interested in the dispute. If any dispute is not decided in such confer- ence, it shall be referred by the parties thereto to the Board, which, under the provisions of the title, is authorized to hear and decide such dispute. In Decision No. 119 the Labor Board assumed to terminate the National Agreements, and called upon the officers and system organizations of employees to designate and authorize representatives to confer and decide so much of the disputes relating to working rules and conditions as it might be po-ssible for them to decide in conference, although no dispute as to rules and working conditions had been referred to the Board under the Transportation Act. To this decision the Board attached and assumed to prescribe sixteen principles to govern [29] 30 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X such conference and required such conference to conform thereto. Principle No. 5 declared the right of a lawful organi- zation to act towards lawful objects through representatives of its own choice, whether such representatives were employees of the carrier or not, and declared further that the carrier must agree to such principle. Principle No. 15 declared that the majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine what organization shall represent members of such craft or class. Such organization shall have the right to make an agreement which shall apply to all employees in such craft or class. It was provided, however, that no such agreement shall infringe upon the right of employees not members of the organization representing the majority to present grievances either in person or by representatives of their own choice. While not conceding that the Labor Board had at any time acquired jurisdiction over the National Agreements, or that it had any right or power to revive and perpetuate the same, as it did in Decision No. 119, or that it had power to prescribe the principles which it attached to said Decision No. 119, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company endeavored to comply with the said decision and the said principles. Though not recognizing any obligation so to do, our company called into^ conference its several classes of employees with the view to negotiating with each class, respectively, rules and working conditions to govern and control the relations between it and its employees, in lieu of the National Agreements, which had cesLsed to exist, and to which our company was in no wise a party. There was upon our lines a labor union in the shop crafts known as System Federation No. 90, which is affiliated with and is a branch of the Railway Employees Department of the American Federation of Labor. The officers of System Federation No. 90 proposed to confer with the company and to negotiate rules in accordance with Decision No. 119 of the Railroad Labor Board. Our company refused to negotiate with such officers, but, while recognizing no legal obligation so to do, offered to negotiate with committees of its employees composed of men actually engaged in its service, regardless of whether the members of such committees were or were not members of System Federation No. 90. [30] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 31 It may be here stated that it has been the policy of our company, since the termination of Federal control, to re- establish with its own employees a harmonious relationship, bearing in mind that honest, efficient and economical operation of its lines can be secured only by close and unrestricted co- operation by the management and its employees. To that end it determined that all classes of employees should have a voice in the administration of matters affecting their welfare through representatives of their own selection, provided that such representatives, whether union or non-union men, should be actual employees. The officers of System Federation No. 90 declined to cooperate with the carrier in the selection of com- mittees to represent employees with whom the carrier might negotiate rules and working conditions. Thereupon the com- pany, with the cooperation of certain employees in the shop crafts, though recognizing no legal obligation so to do, pre- pared and distributed to such employees a ballot upon which each employee might designate employee-representatives to confer with the company as to rules and working conditions. After the distribution of such ballots the officers of System Federation No. 90 distributed ballots to all such shop craft employees and warned each such employee not to use the ballot furnished by the carrier, and directed each such employee to vote for System Federation No. 90 as his representative for such conference. Our company recognized the result of the election which it conducted, and thereupon entered into con- ferences as to rules and working conditions with the employee- representatives so chosen. Thereafter System Federation No. 90, by Mr. B. M. Jewell, President, Railway Employees Department, American Feder- ation of Labor, filed with the Labor Board an application for decision, complaining that the carrier had refused to negotiate rules and working conditions with the officers of System Feder- ation No. 90 and was proceeding to negotiate rules and work- ing conditions with committees selected in the manner afore- said, and by reason of the premises had violated Decision No. 119, and particularly Paragraph 2 thereof and Principles 5 and 15 attached to the said decision. Thereafter the Board ren- dered its Decision No. 218, in which it said : " Under the au- thority of the Transportation Act as hereinbefore cited, the [31] 32 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X Labor Board hereby declares that both of said elections on the Pennsylvania System were illegal and that rules negotiated by the alleged representatives selected by either ballot will be void and of no effect, and orders that a new election be held." Thereupon the company made application to the Board to vacate and set aside its said Decision No. 218, expressly deny- ing the right and power of the Board to prescribe principles which must in law govern the carrier and its employees in the making of agreements covering working rules and conditions. Notwithstanding this, however, the company asserted that it had endeavored in negotiations with its employees to adopt and observe such of the said principles as are fundamentally sound and correct. The Board decided that it had acquired full jurisdiction, but it declared " that question is not of prime importance in this case." The Board also declared : " There is no question of the closed or open shop involved in this dispute and no other real matter of principle ; the question involved is merely one of procedure." With these propositions the company took direct issue and represented to the Board that if the question was merely one of procedure the Board had no right or power to set up its judgment or opinion against that of the carrier. Dissatisfaction, whether real or fancied, by certain employees with matters of " mere procedure " should not be tortured into a " dispute " within the purview of Sections 301 and 307 of the Transportation Act. It was claimed that no fear need be entertained of " interruption to the operation of any carrier " because of differences between carrier and employees upon questions of " mere procedure." Disputes under the law, refer- able to the Board, are those of substance and real moment. Reduction of wages, real grievances, unfair, unreasonable, burdensome working rules and conditions are the matters com- prehended by the Transportation Act as prolific of " disputes " which might interrupt transportation, to prevent which the Labor Board was created. The company denied the power of the Board to prescribe an election, or any other method, by which the carrier may ascertain who are the authorized repre- sentatives of its employees; and it averred that it could not accept as advisory the rules and conditions set forth in the Board's decision in the case, especially the form of the ballot [32] Na 1] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 33 and the franchise qualifications fixed and determined by the Board. The company represented that, as the occasion requires, it will accord franchise rights only to its employees in service, or absent upon leave, and will not concede voting qualifications to men who have been laid off or furloughed and who may be engaged in other occupations or who may never return to the service of the carriers. The company denied the power of the Board to compel a conference or to prescribe with what representatives of em- ployees it shall confer, and it declared that it could not accede to the rule prescribed for ascertaining the representative capacity of the spokesmen for unorganized employees. The Board was advised that there were in the service of the carrier at that time approximately 176,000 employees who were inter- ested in and affected by rules covering working conditions, and that 117,176, or 66.5%, of said employees had expressed, by vote or otherwise as a result of conference a desire to negotiate rules and working conditions through employee- representatives, and that accordingly contracts respecting rules and working conditions had been entered into between the carrier and representatives of 149,918 employees apportioned among the several classes named to the Board. These con- tracts were put into full force and effect, and by their terms the parties thereto acquired mutual rights and assumed mutual obligations. We further represented that since the Board had handed down its Decision No. 218 the company had held conferences with representatives of the several crafts with whom contracts had been made for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not, in the light of the said decision, said employees were satisfied with the manner of selecting representatives and with the rules and working conditions actually agreed to; and that as a result of said conferences the said employees, through their repre- sentatives, manifested their satisfaction not only with the man- ner of selecting representatives, but also with the rules and working conditions embodied in the said agreements. The company thereupon asked the Board to vacate and set aside its Decision No. 218 and to find in pursuance of the Transportation Act: (a) that the company had the lawful [33] 34 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X right to establish rules and working conditions in the first instance, either with or without first holding conferences with employees; and (b) that the contracts respecting rules and working conditions theretofore entered into by the carrier and its employees in the shop crafts are now in full force and effect without any further action on the part of the carrier and its employees in the said shop crafts. The Board denied the company a further hearing upon any questions other than those involving matters connected with franchise rights and the election, the decision as to which the Board refused to vacate. Another eff'ort was made by the company to settle peaceably its controversy with the Board, and it respectfully submitted a reply to the Board's last decision, setting forth that the said decision was not responsive to the company's application, and it expressly represented to the Board that the company had not denied and was not now denying the jurisdiction of the Labor Board to hear and decide such disputes as fall within the purview of the Transportation Act, but it denied the right of the Board to invade the domain of management and to assert jurisdiction over grievances of whatsoever kind or character in connection with the employment, the discipline and the discharge of its employees. Section 313 of the Transportation Act provides that the Labor Board, in case it has reason to believe that any decision of the Labor Board is violated by any carrier or employee^ may upon its own motion, after due notice and hearing to all persons directly interested in such violation, determine whether in its opinion such violation has occurred and make public its decision in such manner as it may determine. Upon our failure to comply with its decision the Board cited our company to appear before it in accordance with this section, and we appeared for the purpose of informing the Board that we could not accept as a lawful decision the declaration of the Board that the election under which the employee-representa- tives were chosen was illegal and that the rules and working conditions agreed upon by such employee-representatives and the management were void and of no effect. This position was taken and maintained by the company because it was of the opinion that the Board had no jurisdiction [34] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 35 over the matter which was the subject of the decision. Con- forming to the letter and the spirit of the Transportation Act^ the carrier pledged itself to the principle of collective bargain- ing with its employees by and through the medium of employee- representatives of their own selection, and in good faith and with the cooperation of a large majority of its employees of ail classes entered upon a policy which promised good and last- ing results in promoting harmony of action and full under- standing of conditions between employees and management. A minority of employees, represented by System Federation No. 90, were opposed to employee representation and claimed the right to negotiate concerning rules and working conditions through the shop crafts' labor organization. This the com- pany deemed subversive of its lawful right to deal with its own employees without the intervention of individuals or organizations whose manifest abject is the denial of the funda- mental right of employer and employee to deal in the first instance with one another respecting wages and working con- ditions in which they alone are directly interested. And, again, the company emphasized the fact that in cases of dis- pute in relation to wages and working conditions it has ever been willing to submit the dispute to the Labor Board and to abide by its decision in full acquiescence in and acceptance of the provisions of the Transportation Act. The company stated that it had not " violated " any decision of the Labor Board in the sense that it had set at nought and refused to comply with the lawful pronouncement of the Board ; neither had it " violated " any provision of the Transportation Act nor " defied " the Labor Board or the Congress which created it. On the contrary, the company has conceded the jurisdiction of the Labor Board to hear and decide such dis- putes as fall within the purview of the Transportation Act,, and it is a willing party to several submissions now pending before the Board in the matter of wages and working rules and conditions. The company further stated that in its opinion the Board in its said Decision No. 218 had without warrant of law exercised the functions of an administrative or regulatory body, and as such had assumed to invade the domain of management and to assert jurisdiction over matters solely referable to the func- [35] 36 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X tions of railway management. The company believed the Labor Board to be under the law creating it not an administra- tive but a mediative body, and it pointed to the fact that the chairman of the Board had referred to the Board at one time as an " impartial mediatory body." We further stated that we strongly deprecated any con- troversy with the Board with respect to the powers or juris- diction conferred upon it by the Transportation Act, and, if compliance with the decision had involved no serious conse- quences, the company in order to avoid any controversy on the subject would have submitted to the decision, notwithstand- ing its belief that the Board had assumed a jurisdiction not conferred upon it by Congress. But the company, in the con- sideration of the question as to whether the directions of the decision should be observed, was obliged to determine whether the system of employee representation which it had inaugur- atd was to be impaired and its usefulness and value largely destroyed, or whether in order to avoid non-compliance with the decision it should, in considering and determining what rules governing working conditions should be established, consult with an organization which, the company believes, advocates (a) the closed shop, (b) the sympathetic strike, and (c) limitation of output, and which had been largely instru- mental in framing rules governing the operation of shops dur- ing the period of Federal control. The company asserted that these rules had reduced the efficiency of shop labor on its lines to the extent of at least thirty-five per cent, and attention was called to the fact that the late Judge Prouty, when a member of the Railroad Administration, after an investigation made by him, publicly announced that upon the Pennsylvania Lines East labor upon that system was inefficient as compared with private operation, the percentage of inefficiency in some cases being as much as 33j^%. The company, therefore, respectfully represented to the Board that it should not consider Decision No. 218 as a lawful exercise of its powers and that the carrier should not be held by the Board as having " violated " a lawful decision of the Board ; and the company reasserted its purpose and willingness to comply in all respects with the provisions of the Transpor- tation Act and to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board in all matters cognizable thereunder. [36] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 37 Notwithstanding this appeal, the company was informed that the Board was preparing a decision to be published to the world that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company had violated its de- cision and the law of the land. It was the opinion of the com- pany that the purpose and intent of Section 313 is to induce and impel through the coercive force of public opinion com- pliance by any carrier or person affected by an order of the Labor Board with the terms and provisions of the same, and the company deemed it neither equitable nor just that it should be subjected to such coercive influence in respect to any order of the Board which the Board was without authority to make, and that, consequently, the Board should be restrained by an order of court from subjecting plaintiff to the coercive process prescribed by the said provision of the Transportation Act in respect to the order which the Company had declined to obey because the subject matter thereof was not within the jurisdic- tion of the Board. Thereupon, a petition was filed in the United States Court and Judge Landis granted a temporary restraining order to prevent the publication by the Board that our company had violated any legal decision of the Board or had failed to comply with and observe the provisions of Title III of the Transportation Act. The case finally came on for hearing before Honorable George T. Page, United States Circuit Judge, upon defend- ants' motion to dismiss the bill and a so-called answer which denies none of the averments contained in the petition. For the defendants, it was argued (1) that the Labor Board is an administrative arm of the government over which the courts have no jurisdiction; and (2) that the Board had the power exercised by it under Decisions 119 and 218. The court's find- ing on both points was adverse to the Labor Board's contention. The court decided that " the appointment or method of election of conferees under Section 301 was not one of the func- tions delegated to the Board, and therefore it had not the right to make the regulations provided for in Decision No. 218," and it expressed the " opinion that the purpose of Section 301 was to leave to the carrier and its employees full liberty to get together in their own way." The constitutionality of the act was sustained by the court, [37] 38 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X and in this connection I desire to make it clear that it was and is the declared policy of our board of directors and executive officers not to question the constitutionality of the Labor Board provisions of the Transportation Act so long as the Board exer- cises its functions in accordance with the terms of the act. And in our bill of complaint, we raised the constitutional ques- tion only in the event that the court should find that the Board was acting within its legal powers. If so, it was our claim that the exercise of such power would deprive us of certain constitutional rights. The court sustained our contention that the Board had not properly interpreted the act, and we are satisfied with its finding in all respects. Naturally, we are gratified by Judge Page's decision, not because of any pride of opinion sustained but because it may be known of all men that our company, in objecting to the Labor Board's decision, was actuated by an earnest and well founded desire to protect its legal rights and those of its em- ployees from what we deemed to be an unwarranted assumption of authority on the part of the Labor Board. As in the past, so in the future the Pennsylvania Railroad System will subject itself to the jurisdiction of the Board in strict conformity to the terms of the act, and it will abide by the Board's decisions unless they be of such a character as will necessitate or justify an appeal by the company in an orderly manner to the courts, or to the bar of public opinion. This privilege is enjoyed alike by all carriers and their employees. I desire also to say that no feelings of hostility, personal or official, have been engendered between the Labor Board and our company, and that a fine spirit of cooperation has been displayed by the Board in the taking of steps to secure a judicial and authoritative determination of the legal questions which have been the subject of argument and consideration. [38] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEES W. N. DOAK Vice-President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen SINCE I last had the pleasure of meeting with you, many changes have taken place in the industrial and economic situation of the country, and indeed it is a pleasure for me to be again honored with an invitation to meet with you and discuss briefly the industrial situation from the viewpoint of one who represents railroad employees. However, in ap- pearing before you on this occasion it is in an individual capacity, and the views presented will be more personal than those represented by my organization or any other. The organization that I have the honor of representing is not now, nor has it been, engaged in any of the disputes or the litigation mentioned by the preceding speaker.^ The rela- tions between the railroads and the employees in transportation service are very cordial in every respect and there is no question at present regarding the right of the employees' organization to represent the employees in our classes. Consequently, what I shall have to say at this time will be predicated on the fact that no such controversy exists so far as our group is concerned. Also I would have you bear in mind that we consider the employees engaged in conducting transportation as being some- what differently situated from those engaged in other lines of railroad work. And for that reason we feel that probctbly some special consideration should be given to the employees engaged in this non-competitive occupation as compared with those engaged in a competitive occupation. The public generally has become interested in wages of rail- road employees and in the adjustment of disputes arising be- tween the employer and the employee in the transportation industry. This has been brought about largely by public dis- ' Mr. Heiserman, see pp. 293-302. [39] 40 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X cussion of these questions through the press and on the plat- form, and many different views have been expressed as to the importance of these problems and as to their proper solution. Extreme positions have been taken by those championing the cause of the employer as well as by those advocating the cause of the employee. Many public utterances have been made that tend largely to exaggeration. It is thought by many that such utterances have been largely prompted either by bias or through misinformation. It is therefore a commendable and a very desirable position that has been taken by your Academy in the discussion of these questions to bring together, as far as pos- sible, the different elements, and obtain the different views, in order that you may have as nearly as possible the position of all. There are those who hold that the labor organizations have gone far beyond the bounds of reason and propriety in their demands for wage increases and are unfair in their position in the adjustment of transportation disputes. On the other hand there are those who hold that the transportation com- panies have been exacting and unreasonable in their demands upon the employees. There is still another group that holds that both the carriers and the employees are unreasonable and unfair, and a large percentage of the public who are not fully informed of the facts believe that both the carriers and the employees are extremists and have gone beyond the bounds of reason and fair dealing. As much as I should like to agree with these different ele- ments, I must of necessity disagree with the large majority of the views that have been advanced and hold to a more reason- able and impartial view, one of justice and fair dealing to both the carriers and the employees. However, to arrive at what is right we should insist upon having the facts, and when the facts are produced then a correct judgment can be had. The one great trouble has been that attempts have been made to solve these problems on the basis of colored facts or half- truths for so long that a prejudiced and biased judgment has obtained in many instances. For instance, there are those who believe that the wage level for train and yard service employees should be based on the pre-war level, and there are others who as persistently contend that wages should be based on the war- time basis or one still higher. There are other who hold that [40] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 41 the cost of living should be the prime factor in determining such questions, and that the wage rate should be based upon a standard of living that would afford only the necessaries of life, or in other words, provide enough food to prevent dis- solution of the body, together with only a meager supply of clothing. Others hold that wages of railroad employees should be based upon the ability of the carriers to pay with a trans- portation rate at the lowest possible level. Still there are others who hold that the American public is only interested in having the lowest transportation rate possible, regardless of the financial ability of the carriers or the living conditions of the employees. These are all wrong, and in my judgment the proper and legitimate position is that transportation rates should be fair and reasonable and afford a fair return on capital legitimately invested ; and on the other hand the wages of the employees should be just and adequate to afford a proper American stand- ard of living, which should not only provide food and clothing but allow for recreation, the education of the children, and give the employee the opportunity to lay aside funds for the care of himself and of his dependents in case of old age or dis- ability. Wage standards and levels should be established in- dependent of and separate from transportation rates. Neither should be dependent upon the other. In the discussion of the reestablishment of pre-war levels, oftentimes the fact is not taken into consideration that if the war had not occurred conditions would have compelled a re- adjustment of the wages of transportation employees upward not later than the early part of 1917, because the wage cycle made such a readjustment imperative. If the European War had not come on and the United States had not been drawn into the World War and things had followed their usual course, an adjustment upward of the wages of train and yard service employees would have taken place about the time the United States entered the war. But with the advent of the European War in 1914, which caused a rapid advance in living costs, an adjustment should have taken place about the latter part of 1916. This was of course accelerated by the entry of our coun- try into the war early in 1917, but no readjustment was made in wage rates until nearly the middle of 1918, and as a matter [41] 42 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X of fact a complete and proper adjustment was never had in wage rates until long after the close of the war and then, in so far as train and yard service employees were concerned, did not reach a proper level. No sooner, however, was the last adjustment made than a clamor was started to reduce wages. The unfairness and injustice of this situation had an undesir- able effect on the transportation employees because they had not received any advance at the time the other classes of labor received substantial advances, and at no time had the advance in wages kept pace with the advance in living costs. The public mind was unduly and improperly preyed upon by a system of publicity and propaganda to such an extent that substantial justice was withdrawn from railroad employees and an undesirable and unfair estimate of the true situation arose. Naturally, when such agitation became rampant and the public mind became disturbed, as is always the case in such instances, the railroad employees were placed in a most unfair position, and generally speaking the public was ready to condemn them without a knowledge of the facts. Of course, for the time being the railroad employees felt that they were being unjustly and unfairly criticized and that it was impossible for them to obtain equal rights. They did not feel that the reduction in wages handed them by the United States Railroad Labor Board in 1921 was just and fair under the existing circum- stances, but, rather than have trouble and turmoil, they finally bowed to public sentiment and respected the decision of the Board. Encouraged, as it seemed, by success in obtaining one reduction, the railroads immediately sought further reductions. These the employees bitterly and justifiably resisted. This naturally had a tendency toward creating a fear in the minds of the employees that the governmental agency was being unduly influenced by the false propaganda being freely circulated over the country. At the same time there arose agitation for the repeal of state laws, laxity in enforcement of safety laws, and other agitation for inroads into the conditions of employment of the employees, many of which had been in effect for a quarter of a century or more, and the whole agita- tion was based on the false assumption that a reduction along these lines would result in a corresponding reduction in trans- portation rates. Of course such reductions in rates did not [42] No. 1] LABOk POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 43 follow, therefore the agitation has fallen flat to a great extent, and the public is beginning to take a more sober view of the situation. The unsoundness of the theory that wages should be based on the ability of the carrier to pay is just as apparent as the falsity of the theory that rates can be fixed on a particular rail- road on the basis of the density of traffic handled on that line, because the financial condition and ability to pay of the various railroads is just as diversified as the density of traffic on the particular lines. So the entire theory that a rate structure can be built up on individual systems or parts thereof on the basis of density of traffic, and on other systems or parts thereof on the small amount of traffic handled, is no more unreasonable or un- scientific than the theory that wages should be fixed on the different systems on the financial condition or ability of the roads to pay. In both instances it has long been recognized ty those who have studied the question that a rate structure must be built with the object in view of providing just and reasonable rates in given territories or in the country as a whole, and just so with the wage structure. It must be founded -on a just and reasonable wage, irrespective of the ability of any particular carrier to pay this rate. Unfortunately, beginning with the passage of the Adamson Law in 1916 by the Congress and a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which in substance held that Con- gress had absolute authority over the transportation systems, the railroad labor situation has been the subject of entirely too much agitation and discussion. This has resulted in extreme positions being taken by the various parties interested and has been the cause of entirely too much public alarm and unrest. Despite the much-heralded national peril of disputes on the railroads, there is no more real danger now, so far as a paralysis of transportation is concerned, than there was fifteen or twenty years ago. The plain truth of the matter is, there are certain people who use this question as a pastime and in most instances the matter is exaggerated to the greatest extent. Even if so, there are many worse things that could happen than to have a railroad strike occasionally. For instance, the practice of disseminating false, malicious and misleading statements is worse in its effects than any strike that could possibly take [43] AA RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X place. Ever since the beginning of the railroad business in this country there have been difTerent methods employed for the adjustment of disputes between the railroads and their em- ployees, and for a brief review of these different methods your indulgence is asked for a few moments. When the business was in its infancy, direct contact was had between the employer and the individual employee, but as the industry grew and expanded and more men were employed, individual contact was impossible and the employees were represented in small groups by local committees on different parts of the respective lines. This was extended from time to time until general committees representing the employees were organized to deal with the various operating officials of the lines as a whole. Later, when the railroads began to form group organizations for mutual benefit and protection, their example was followed by group organizations of employees,, the latter generally being represented by the General Chairmen of the systems in such conference, until the eight-hour move- ment was started. It was then ascertained that the railroads were uniting as a whole in opposition to this movement, and finally a national conference committee of the railroads and the employees was agreed upon to handle this matter for the country as a whole. At the time negotiations were in progress, through a multiplicity of advertising, propaganda and other methods, it was pointed out that a national calamity faced the country and that if the eight-hour day became effective the railroads faced immediate bankruptcy, with the result that the National Administration and later Congress intervened and passed what was known as the Adamson Eight-Hour Law. This brought the industrial situation on the railroads into the national limelight. For a number of years there was no Federal agency in existence that dealt with disputes on the railroads. Finally the Mediation and Arbitration Act came into existence. It was amended from time to time and became a real effective agency in the solution of these questions. In fact it afforded a method of accommodation in virtually all disputes until the eight-hour movement was inaugurated. As a matter of fact, there are a great many of us who hold the view that it would not have been a failure in this case had not undesirable publicity become rampant with regard to this question. [44] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT ^5 Immediately following the passage of the Adamson Eight- Hour Law, it became apparent that there were those who did not desire friendly or mutual relations between employer and employee in connection with disputes on the railroads, but who thought that a governmental agency should be established. Many hearings were held before the different committees of Congress, but no conclusion was arrived at up to the time that the United States entered the World War and the railroads were taken over by the Federal Government. Of course one of the first duties devolving upon the United States Railroad Administration was the establishment of an agency to deal with wages and working conditions on the railroads. There was first established the board to investigate and recommend wage increases. This was composed of four public men. After extensive hearings they arrived at the conclusion that substan- tial increases were necessary for the transportation employees. This was followed by the creation of a court of railroad wages and working conditions, bipartisan in character, consisting of six members, three from the railroad employees and three from the railroad management. The duty of this board was to investigate and recommend adjustment in wages and rules, and it continued to function until the railroads were returned to their owners. In addition thereto there were established boards of adjustment, bipartisan in character, to adjust disputes other than those arising over wage questions. These boards were likewise continued until they closed up all cases arising under Federal control. When it became apparent that the railroads were to be re- turned to their owners. Congress directed its attention to the passage of suitable laws, including laws dealing with the ad- justment of wage and other disputes on the railroads. This resulted in the establishment of what is known as the United States Railroad Labor Board, tripartite in character, with three representatives of the public, three of the railroads and three of the employees. In addition to this, the law contained a provision for boards of adjustment, bipartisan and voluntary in character, to handle disputes other than those arising from wage questions. Unfortunately however, such adjustment boards were not established promptly. The result was a general congestion of the docket of the U. S. Railroad Labor Board, [4S] 46 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X and this brought about further criticism and alarm as to the value of the tribunal. During the consideration of this species of legislation, the railroad employees most strenuously opposed the enactment of the tripartite plan, but advocated the establishment of bipartisan boards, with appeal boards or a referee in case of a deadlock. However, despite their opposition, the Transportation Act be- came effective and the United States Railroad Labor Board was created and has now been in existence two years. There has not been sufficient time, in my judgment, to determine the value of the plan, and as a matter of fact a great deal of criticism, whether just or unjust, has been made of this plan. Personally, I have not believed that a tripartite plan is as desirable as a bipartisan plan, and I believe the future will fully justify my position. As a matter of fact, the experience of the past has to a certain extent justified my views with refer- ence to this question. For example, the bipartisan boards deal- ing with the adjustment of disputes on the railroads have in every instance reached a conclusion and with as little criticism as seems possible, whereas the Railroad Labor Board has been the subject of most severe criticism and agitation. My prin- cipal objection to a plan of this kind has been that no industrial court yet known has proved a success. This was true of the thorough trial of this species of legislation made by Australia and the Australasian countries. The so-called Industrial Court of Kansas is going through a most severe test, and I am of the opinion that it is less effective than those systems where the disputants have equal representation, and that it must ulti- mately fail. Compulsory arbitration in this country in the strict sense has not been resorted to in the adjustment of disputes of this character, but instances may be cited which have been tried in foreign countries and proved a failure in each instance. I per- sonally believe that such a law could not be passed in this country and be effective, because it seems repugnant to our form of government. The most effective results in this or any other country, judged by the experiences of the various countries, have been from mediation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration, and the most effective remedy in the form of a law in the United States has [46] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 47 been the Erdman Act, later succeeded by the Newlands Act, which was displaced by the Transportation Act of 1920. Observation and investigation of labor disputes lead me to believe that mediation is the most effective and desirable plan, and when it is coupled with conciliation and voluntary arbitra- tion it is almost certain to afford an accommodation in every instance. Whether or not the United States Railroad Labor Board will succeed and be a satisfactory and effective means of settling labor disputes on the American railroads, depends upon the character, ability and fitness of its members and its freedom from entangling alliances and political entanglements. In the selection and maintenance of this Board partisanship and favoritism must be cast aside, and practical, experienced and impartial men placed thereon. Any interference or undue in- fluence exercised by the Congress or the executive will tend to disrupt and destroy this agency. Mutual respect by the rail- roads, the employees and the public must be given it or it will fail. Likewise its conduct must be such that it will command the respect of each of these parties. It cannot, however, handle all the disputes over wages, rules and conditions of employment and function with any degree of satisfaction, and if it is con- tinued there must of necessity be other and additional agencies established and maintained auxiliary thereto. Penalties for strikes and lockouts in the existing law are not desirable, and in my opinion are objectionable to our form of government. Therefore I consider it wholly unnecessary to place such penalties in the law and I disagree with those who advocate putting so-called " teeth " in the law. This brings us then to specific conclusions as to a proper solution of railroad labor disputes, and I would suggest the following : 1. The reestablishment of the Board of Mediation and Con- ciliation, with the right to bring about, if possible, voluntary arbitration. 2. The establishment of bipartisan boards of adjustment, on which the railroads and the employees are equally represented. 3. The reestablishment of the rights of the respective parties to adjust any dispute by mediation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration if possible, before reference to any board. [47] 48 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X 4. The maintenance, if necessary, of a board to act as referee, which for the time being, until otherwise changed, would be the U. S. Railroad Labor Board; this Board to be appealed to only in case of deadlock by bipartisan boards or in case of failure to adjust any dispute through mediation, conciliation or arbitration. 5. The establishment of a system or plan by which exact facts concerning wages, grievances and conditions of employment may be accurately obtained in a fair and impartial manner. The prohibition by law or otherwise of the circulation of pro- paganda concerning railroad disputes which has the tendency of alarming or inflaming the public mind. [48] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE PUBLIC GROUP HENRY T. HUNT Former Member of the United States Railroad Board A DECISION construing several sections of Title III of the Transportation Act and determining the powers of the Railroad Labor Board has very recently been handed down by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Page, Circuit Judge, writ- ing the opinion. As this decision is the law until modified by higher authority, it may be illuminating to examine it. The Labor Board had, it appears, found that the Pennsyl- vania Railroad had not complied with one of its decisions and was about to publish its finding to that effect. The Pennsyl- vania then applied to Judge Landis for an injunction restrain- ing the Board from such publication, and a temporary order was issued which the Board endeavored to get set aside. After a delay of many months, Judge Page last week rendered his decision refusing to dismiss the injunction. The Labor Board had proceeded against the Pennsylvania as authorized by Section 313, which follows: Section 313. The Labor Board in case it has reason to believe that any decision of the Labor Board or of an adjustment board is violated by any carrier or employee may upon its own motion after due notice and hearing to all persons directly interested in such violation deter- mine whether in its opinion such violation has occurred and make public its decision in such manner as it may determine. The authority conferred by the above section on the Board to publish its finding that railroads or employees have violated its decisions is the only express sanction provided by the Act toward making these decisions effective. Were it not for the procedure set out in this section, a railroad or an organization of employees might issue false propaganda to the effect that it had obeyed the decision or that the decision did not apply to it or that the board had no jurisdiction to make such a decision, [49] JO RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X and sa befuddle the public as to the situation that public opinion could not function. Congress did not give the Board arms to enforce its decisions, but did give it a voice whereby it might charge a recalcitrant with disobedience and convict it before the bar of fair-minded men by means of the marshaling of unassailable facts. In this particular case the injunction issued by the Court has the effect of preventing the board from informing the public as to the facts in the controversy between the Pennsyl- vania Railroad and its shop employees. Official information as to the facts relating to this controversy is of very great importance, at least to the students of politics in industry. It would, therefore, seem to be worth while to examine the decision in detail and to ascertain, if possible, whether it rests upon secure foundations. In order that the decision may be understood, certain recent railroad history must be recited. In March, 1920, a dispute was pending between practically all the railroads and all their employees as to what should constitute reasonable wage rates and reasonable working rules. Representatives of the parties had conferred but could agree on nothing. On April 16, 1920, the entire dispute was submitted by both parties to the Railroad Labor Board for decision. The Board decided the wage portion by Decision 2 of July 20, 1920, but reserved the rules portion for further consideration. By its Decision 119 of April 14, 1921, the Board—" Called upon the officers and System Organizations of employees of each carrier parties hereto to designate and authorize repre- sentatives to confer and to decide so much of this dispute relat- ing to rules and working conditions as it might be pos&ible for them to decide." This Decision 119 was, then, a request made of the carriers and employees to aid the Board to arrive at a decision as to what should constitute reasonable rules and work- ing conditions by agreeing on as many of said rules as they could. A new dispute arose on the Pennsylvania Railroad as to the proper procedure to carry out the Board's request. Certain organizations of its employees contended that representatives should be elected in a cfertain manner, but the railroad com- [5bi No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 51 pany disagreed with this proposal and insisted on carrying on the election in quite a different fashion. The officers of the company and of these organizations of employees conferred on the subject but still failed to agree. Application was then made by the chief executives of the organizations of employees directly interested to the Board for its decision. The company also appeared before the Board, put in its evidence and argued in support of its position. By its Decision No. 218, the Board decided the dispute pre- sented by the employees' organization, which dispute had not been decided in conference, although conference had been had. By this decision the Board established rules of procedure for the election of employees' representatives on the Pennsylvania Railroad in order that the request of the Board in Decision 119 might be carried out. No question was raised by the railroad at the time as to the satisfaction of the requirements for con- ference imposed by another section of the act, Section 301. Afterwards the employees' organizations informed the Board that the Pennsylvania Railroad was not obeying its Decision 218 and accordingly the Board took proceedings under Section 313 to ascertain whether the Pennsylvania had violated this decision. Apparently it determined that the railroad had done so and was about to make its finding public when it was enjoined. Judge Page, in the opening paragraph of his opinion, thus states the case : This is a bill by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company against the Labor Board and its members to enjoin them from functioning as a board generally and specifically from exercising the asserted right to control the selection of the referees provided for in Section 301 of the Transportation Act. Two claims were urged, (i) That the Act is unconstitutional if, and in so far as, it attempts to impose compulsory arbitration, and (2) that the Act gives the Board no right under ex parte submission nor under its ovi^n motion to do any act under Section 301. This statement of the nature of the proceeding does not aptly describe it. The Board was not, as is stated, attempting to exercise the asserted right to control the election of the conferees provided for in Section 301, but was asserting the right to publish a decision finding the carrier had not obeyed its Decision 218. This decision interpreted the " call " of the Board in Decision 119. The conferees on the dispute which [51] 52 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X No. 218 decided had duly conferred and had disagreed. The Board did not attempt to control their selection. The chief executive of one of the parties had applied to the Board for a decision of that dispute. In the controversy vi'hich Decision No. 218 decided, there was no question that the representatives of the employees in that dispute were properly authorized and designated to confer nor that they had conferred and had disagreed. The opinion considers and apparently decides four points as follows: (1) The Labor Board is a body corporate subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and may sue and be sued. (2) The appointment or method of selecting referees under Section 301 was not one of the functions delegated to the Board and therefore it had not the right to make the designation provided for in Decision 218 on pages 8, 9 and 10. (3) As to other matters than those jointly submitted to the Board under Section 301, the decisions of the Board are only advisory, but as to jointly submitted matters legally enforcible. (4) Title III of the Transportation Act is constitutional and confers on the Labor Board the right to prescribe compulsory arbitration and to fix wages under such compulsory arbitration. The language of the court is not altogether distinct and without ambiguity, but it is believed the above constitutes a fair statement of the decision on the points covered by the opinion. The first point needs no particular discussion. It is believed that the decision of the court as to the second point is erroneous. Section 301 of the Transportation Act reads as follows : Section 301. It shall be the duty of all carriers and their officers, employees and agents to exert every reasonable effort to adopt every available means to avoid any interruption to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the em- ployees or subordinate officials thereof. All such disputes shall be considered and, if possible, decided in conference between representa- tives designated and authorized so to confer with the carriers or the employees or subordinate officials thereof directly interested in the dispute. If any dispute is not decided in such conference, it shall be referred by the parties thereto to the Board which under the pro- visions of this title is authorized to hear and decide such dispute. The relevant portions of Section 307 should also be cited : [5»] No. 1] LABOR POLICIES OF THE. TRANSPORTATION ACT 5 j Section 307. (a) . . . Labor Board (i) upon the application of the Chief Executive of any carrier or organization of employees . . . whose members are directly interested in the dispute, (2) . . . (3) upon the Labor Board's own motion if it is of the opinion that the dispute is likely substantially to interrupt commerce, shall receive for hearing and as soon as practicable and with due diligence decide any dispute involving grievances, rules, or working conditions which is not decided as provided in Section 301. . . . (b) The Labor Board (i) upon the application of the Chief Executive of any carrier or organ- ization of employees . . . whose members are directly interested in the dispute ([2) . . . or (3) upon the Labor Board's own motion if it is of the opinion that the dispute is likely substantially to interrupt commerce, shall receive for hearing and as soon as practicable and with due diligence decide all disputes with respect to the wages or salaries of employees ... of carriers not decided as provided in Sec- tion 301. It has always been the construction of the Board and of officers of carriers and of organizations of employees that Section 301 stated the duties of such officers and employees of carriers with reference to railroad labor disputes. They have never understood that Section 301 imposes any duty on the Board. It is also the construction of the Board and of such officers that Section 307 is the section which confers jurisdiction on the Board to decide disputes as to working conditions or as to wages and prescribes the manner in which such disputes shall be presented to the Board. It has also been the belief of the Board that it had power to decide any dispute on which conference had been had or attempted by either party, and which was presented upon the application of the Chief Executives of carriers or of organi- zations of employees, if the dispute involved grievances, rules, or working conditions or wages or salaries of employees. As appears by Decision 218, the Board believes that a dis- pute as to whether representatives were duly designated and authorized to confer was a dispute involving grievances, rules or working conditions which it had power to decide under Section 307. It has been convinced that a dispute relating to the proper designation or authorization of representatives should be interpreted as coming within the meaning of the words " grievances, rules, or working conditions." It could not well decide whether the method adopted in the dispute was a reasonable rule without deciding what a reasonable rule would be. Section 307 (d) provides that all the decisions of the Board in respect to working conditions shall establish stand- [53] 54 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X ards of working conditions which are just and reasonable. A method of selecting representatives to confer is a " working condition ". Experience has shown that controversies as to whether persons claiming to represent a particular class do so are very frequent and of great importance in railroad oper- ation. The right of members of organizations of railroad employees to select their representatives as they see fit and to select whom they see fit is among the most cherished rights of railroad employees. It has been the subject of many con- troversies. Its denial by railroad officers has been a frequent cause of conflict and of discontent. The court's decision in this respect apparently goes to the length of holding that the Board has no power to decide a dispute which concerns only the question whether particular persons claiming to represent a class really do so or to decide what is the correct and legal method of determining who are qualified representatives. This de'nial of power goes to the very essence of Title III. If the Court's decision in this respect is not reversed, it will destroy the efficacy of that title as means to prevent interruption of railroad operation by labor disputes. It would appear to be clear that there can be no dispute cognizable by the Board unless the subject of dispute is adopted as such by an organization of employees or by 100 unorganized employees who are really organized for the purpose of present- ing the dispute. If a carrier may decline to confer with the representatives designated by the organization according to its laws and the Board has no power to decide whether the railroad officers are under a duty to confer with the said repre- sentatives, the effective power remaining to the Board is little more than a power to collate statistics. The court by this decision, has, in my judgment, disemboweled Title III. The right of organizations of employees to select what representa- tives they see fit has been long acquiesced in by practically all the railroads of the United States. The Pennsylvania Rail- road is the only notable exception. In the past this railroad has generally claimed the right to decide with what representa- tives it would confer. The result of this decision, in effect, is to enable the officers of carriers to decide with what persons claiming to be repre- sentatives of employees it will confer. The Board according [54] No. I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 55 to the court has no power to correct their decision. The de- cision destroys the efficacy of Section 301 as a mandate to officers and employees of carriers to confer and to decide their disputes in conference if possible. Naturally the employees can confer only by representatives. If the carrier may decide finally who are representatives of the employees, it is clear that the representatives so designated by the carrier may not be those whom the employees wish to represent them. As the representatives selected by the carriers to represent the em- ployees may not, in fact, represent them, it is clear that the employees will not be bound by the agreements entered into by the representatives recognized only by the railroad officers. There may be conference and agreement between the conferees but the agreement will get nowhere. Railroad employees will not permit railroad officers to select their representatives. It is respectfully urged that the court in this respect is in error. Railroad employees have a right to organize and the members of the organizations have a right to choose such repre- sentatives as they see fit and it is the duty of officers of carriers to confer with the representatives chosen by the members of the said organizations. It must be within the power of the Board to decide whether the representatives claiming to repre- sent the members of organizations do in fact represent them, if the Board is to function. As stated above, the fourth matter decided by the learned judge is that Title III provides for compulsory arbitration and that it is constitutional. Yet it is decided that prior to refer- ence to the Board as arbitrators of the dispute there must be conference between representatives of the parties. It is further decided that one party may recognize whom it pleases as the representatives of the other party and that the Board may not review this decision. Therefore, the court has decided that railroad employees are required by law to confer by representa- tives but that the management can select their representatives ; that the representatives so selected and the management may jointly refer the dispute to the Labor Board; that the repre- sentatives selected by the management to represent the men may present evidence and arguments to the Labor Board ; and that when the Board has heard the representatives selected by the management to represent the management and the repre- [55] 56 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X sentatives selected by the management to represent the men, the Board may decide the matter and the employees of the railroad concerned are bound by law to obey the decision of the Board. Judge Pages states that the decision of the Board on disputes jointly referred by the parties is binding and may be enforced by court proceedings. The dispute must be jointly referred by the parties. And who are the parties? The parties must be the railroad com- pany and the organizations of employees conferring through representatives. Who is to refer the dispute ? The words of Section 301 are " it shall be referred by the parties." The parties to a reference are not the representatives or delegates conferring but the persons or organizations they represent. Under Judge Page's decision it would appear that it is the rep- resentatives who must jointly refer the dispute. If the dispute is referred by the representatives of the management selected to act for the management and the " representatives " appointed by the management to act for the men, what becomes of Section 307? That is the only section conferring any power on the Board to decide disputes. It can act only upon the application of the Chief Executive of any carrier or organization of em- ployees whose members are directly interested in the dispute unless it intervenes on its own motion because the dispute is likely to interrupt commerce substantially. As the carrier can in effect select the representatives of the employees under the court's decision, to get the matter "arbitrated" by the Board it must necessarily also select the Chief Executive of the or- ganization of employees to refer the dispute. It would seem, therefore, that not only has the court in effect rendered organi- zations of employees impotent to select their own representa- tives to confer under Section 301 but it has also in effect author- ized the management to select the Chief Executive for the organizations of employees. The court has apparently author- ized the railroad companies to create organizations of em- ployees of their own to handle rights provided and duties im- posed by Title III. The court decides, however, that the Chief Executive of an organization of employees may make application to the Board for decision of a dispute and that the Board must decide it. [56] Na I] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT ^y In this case, however, the Board's decision is only advisory and can not be enforced by legal proceedings. Probably the Board is also without power to look into the qualifications of the Chief Executive claiming to be such. If the Board may not decide who are qualified conferees it may not decide who are or are not " Chief Executives." Railroad employees must thus receive such wages and work under such working conditions as the Board decides are just and reason- able after hearing representatives of the management only. Section 309 provides : "Any party to any dispute to be con- sidered by the Labor Board shall be entitled to a hearing either in person or by counsel." As apparently under the court's decision the parties to the dispute may consist entirely of repre- sentatives satisfactory only to the management, it is only repre- sentatives of the management who are entitled to such hearing. The opinion finds that the decision of the Board has a different effect according to whether the dispute comes before the Board by joint submission under Section 301 or by appli- cation of the Chief Executive of a party. If by the first method, the decision of the Board is binding and can be en- forced by legal proceedings, if by the second method, the decision is merely advisory. If the carrier goes to the length of selecting a " Chief Executive" as well as representatives for the men, it may get a binding decision. It is believed that this is an error; parties have only one method of getting a dispute before the Board for decision. This one method is set out in 307, viz. by application of the Chief Executive of a carrier or of an organization of employees directly interested or by application of 100 or more unorgan- ized employees. This provision was adopted by Congress in part to avoid the reference of trivial disputes to the Board. It was believed that the Chief Executives of the carriers and of organizations of employees would refer only matters of consequence. Con- gress also understood that the Chief Executives of carriers and of organizations of employees had adopted definite policies with reference to wages and working conditions and it was believed desirable to put them in a position to control reference of disputes. The inference from the court's decision is that the parties [57] 58 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X to the dispute are the representatives conferring. If this is the case, these representatives may apparently, under his de- cision, refer what they wish without reference to the Chief Executive. Thus disputes, for example, between shop fore- men and employees on trivialities may be referred to the Board for decision. The effect of this will be, of course, to swamp the Board with unimportant disputes. The requirement imposed by Congress that the Chief Executive make application im- poses on him the duty of weeding out matters of slight importance. As the Board makes rules and wage rates for almost two million men and its decisions have involved hundreds of mil- lions of dollars, it ought not to be troubled with matters which responsible officers can themselves settle. The judge finds that the Board's decision under an appli- cation not jointly submitted by both parties to a dispute is advisory only. Decision 218 was a decision upon the appli- cation of one party, viz., the labor organization. Hence, under the judge's construction. Decision 218 was advisory only, yet he refuses to dismiss an injunction against the publication of this advisory decision. It seems remarkable that the Board may not even render its advice without doing irreparable in- jury to the Pennsylvania Company. Of course, it may be that the decision is intended to restrain the Board from the expenditure of public money to publish a decision which it had no authority to make. This is not stated, but conceivably it might be rested upon that ground. The argument would be that the law gives the Board the right to decide only disputes involving grievances, rules and working conditions, whereas a dispute which relates to a question whether particular persons are in fact duly designated repre- sentatives of the parties is not a dispute involving grievances, rules and working conditions. Yet it would appear that Congress must have intended a dispute involving those sub- jects to be within the powers of the Board to decide. The paramount object of Congress as is shown by an examination of the entire act was to prevent interruption of operation growing out of disputes between railroads and their employees. Certainly a dispute as to who should be the representatives of employees is one which might well bring about interruption to [58] No. r] LABOR POLICIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 59 operation. When the tribunal created by Congress to decide disputes tending to interrupt operation is prevented from de- ciding one of the main subject matters of disputes, a subject matter which experience has shown is among the most passion- ately asserted and strongly maintained rights of workmen, the power of that tribunal to function effectively is almost fatally injured. It would seem to be clear that Congress intended the Board to have jurisdiction over all disputes tending to interrupt oper- ation ; that a dispute as to what persons are properly recogniz- able by railroad management is one tending to interrupt oper- ations ; that such a dispute involves grievances, rules and work- ing conditions ; that Decision No. 218 of the Board was within this jurisdiction; that the Board had power to determine whether the Company had violated its decision and to publish its decision. It is believed, therefore, that the court should have overruled the injunction instead of continuing it. If this line of reasoning is valid. Judge Page's decision can- not be considered a correct determination of law. It is earn- estly hoped that the Board will take steps to secure a review of this decision by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court. If such action is not taken the discontent already exist- ing in railroad service will be enormously increased. [59] PART TWO RAILWAY POLICIES AND THE GENERAL WELFARE THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS HENRY C. WALLACE Secretary of Agriculture AGRICULTURE is our greatest industry; transportation our second greatest. These two industries are de- pendent upon one another, and the national well- being is dependent upon both. The failure of either to function efficiently results in widespread inconvenience, financial loss, and quite possibly national disaster. Agriculture and railroad transportation have developed together, each making the rapid extension of the other possible, and together they have contributed to the rapid development of the country. Perhaps exploitation is a more truly descriptive term of what has happened through the rapid extension of agriculture and transportation during the past sixty years. Intelligent consideration of the subject assigned to me re- quires a brief historical review. As population increased along our eastern and southern coasts, the farmers pushed up the navigable streams, using them as a means of transporting their surplus to market. Until the middle of the last century the occupation of the land was proceeding in an orderly manner, farming being extended as the need for food increased, and in- dustry following close after as the country settled up and the cost of transporting manufactured products made it more economical to carry the factory closer to the farm. Frontier agriculture and pioneer settlements were based upon the prin- ciple of self-sufficiency, and the commercial surplus was limited to products which were valuable in relation to weight and bulk and could be easily preserved and transported in the pack. Each pioneer farm family itself produced most of the things necessary to its living. The growth of the cities and settle- ments nearer the sea stimulated the desire for transportation of farm products from farther back in the country and led to the building of canals reaching rich agricultural areas. The building of the Erie Canal, for example, made possible the maintenance of the growing population of New York City, since [63] 64 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Voi„ X it lapped the fertile wheat-producing areas and assured an abundant supply of bread at a reasonably low price. The development of rail transportation, the invention of labor-saving farm implements and the liberality of the Gov- ernment in the disposition of its lands resulted in the most remarkable period of agricultural expansion and industrial and urban growth the world has ever seen. In 1860 there were about 30,000 miles of railroads in operation, mostly east of the Mississippi. By 1900 there were almost 200,000 miles. In 1860 there were about 407,000,000 acres of land in farms, much of which was not being intensively cultivated. By 1900 the land in farms had more than doubled, and was being much more thoroughly cultivated. Coincident with this develop- ment of transportation and expansion of agriculture came the improvement in ocean shipping, bringing the markets of Europe closer by at least one-half because of the reduction in shipping rates. Within the lifetime of one generation, there- fore, we opened up a vast agricultural empire and our country became the greatest producer of agricultural surplus in the world. A fertile soil suited to extensive farming operations, the rapid improvement in labor-saving implements, cheap transportation both by rail and water, and ambitious, energetic, hard-working farmers, eager to possess the land, combined to produce a flood of cheap grains and live-stock which brought disaster to the farmers of the east and even compelled import- ant readjustments by farmers in the older settled countries of Europe. Had our railroads been extended into the west only as the growth of our population made necessary an increased supply of food, it is reasonable to suppose that freight charges would have been fixed at figures which would have made sure of operating costs and a fair return upon the capital invested. Under such conditions it is reasonable to suppose further that manufacturing and industry, and with them a consuming popu- lation, would have moved westward following the extension of agriculture. But a different policy was followed. Our people were possessed of a fever to occupy the country. Land grants and subsidies of all sorts were offered for railroad-building, and as these new roads were necessarily dependent for their principal revenue on agricultural tonnage and tonnage on goods [64] No. I] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 65 the farmers would buy, freight rates were based on what the traffic would bear, rather than on what might be shown to be a fair charge for the service rendered based on operating costs and interest on the actual investment. Thus rates on grain were fixed at a point which would not discourage the growing of grain, while rates on live-stock were so adjusted as to come just within the point at which the stockman could better afford to ship than to make his stock walk to market. In those days of western development it was the policy of railroad managers to foster agriculture along their various lines, for the very good reason that they depended upon agriculture for a living. Low rates were made for long hauls of farm products. This gave cheap food to eastern industrial centers and gave the rail- roads long hauls back on manufactured products. The traffic departments of the western roads courted the farmer and stock- man. Their products were moved promptly. In the case of live-stock, the shipping time from western points to the central markets was shorter thirty years ago than it is today. As the country settled up and towns and villages in the west grew into small cities, the policy of low rates for long hauls both of agricultural and manufactured products was continued. Efforts to establish industrial enterprises in great surplus- producing states west of the Mississippi were systematically dis- couraged, even to the extent of making grossly discriminatory rates against such enterprises. Those were the days before government supervision or control of rates. The railroad man- ager was a law unto himself, made rates according to his own sweet will, and made and unmade individuals and communities in his own interest and the interest of his own road. He con- ceived it to be to the advantage of the railroad to keep the farm and the factory as far apart as possible in order that the railroad might haul their respective products the longest pos- sible distances. It was this high-handed policy which caused the enactment of the famous granger laws and later the inter- State commerce law and the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission with government control of rates and practices. In the foregoing I have tried to make clear that western agriculture has been developed on freight rates made with a view to encouraging the movement of farm products long dis- tances to central processing and consuming markets, such rates [65] 66 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X of course being adjusted roughly to the bulk and value of the crop to be moved. It necessarily follows that the character of the farming and the value of the land and improvements were determined by this policy, and that any marked change in the policy, even if adhered to for but a relatively short time, is bound to make necessary profound changes in both agriculture and industry. During the years from 1890 to 1917 the Interstate Commerce Commission was kept busy hearing appeals from shippers for rate changes and adjustments, and during the latter part of that period the railroads made several appeals to the commission to permit substantial advances in rates. The requests from ship- pers were mostly for a more equitable adjustment of rates as between communities or regions and as between commodities, in the effort to remove discriminatory rates which were the in- evitable result of the purely arbitrary and unscientific methods of rate-making which had been followed during the period of exploitation. It was during this period that we began to form a conception of just railroad rates, based not upon what the traffic would bear but upon a fair return to capital actually invested, or the fair value of the property, plus a return suffi- cient to cover operating charges and adequate upkeep under competent management. As a necessary preliminary to the determination of such just rates Congress provided for a com- plete physical valuation of all the railroads of the country, and this stupendous undertaking was begun during the period indicated. When the railroads were taken over by the government it was with the understanding that they should be assured a net return equal to the average net return of the three years just preceding, which happened to be the most prosperous three- year period the roads had ever experienced. No measures were taken to control wages or the other factors which entered into the cost of operation and maintenance. It was simply another way of applying the utterly vicious cost-plus policy and added much to the burden of debt under which our people will be laboring for a generation yet to come. During this period of government operation prices of most commodities rose to the highest point ever known. Intelligent railroad oper- ation, therefore, would have justified increases in freight [66] ^ No. I] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 67 charges fairly comparable with the increases in the values of the commodities, with a view to holding down the amount needed to make good the government guarantee. Some in- creases in rates were made, but not enough to meet the increase in expenses. Costs of operation were permitted to increase almost without hindrance, and in the case of wages, the largest cost item, with government acquiescence and even encourage- ment. Thus when the time came to hand the roads back to their owners they were in such condition that they seemed to require very large increases in freight rates if they were to be kept out of the hands of receivers. Just at the time, therefore, when we were entering the period of severe liquidation and prices of commodities and especially of agricultural products were falling with great rapidity, burdensome rate increases were put in force. The blighting effect upon agriculture can hardly be compre- hended. I would not be understood as suggesting that the increases in freight rates were wholly responsible for the un- precedented depression through which our agriculture has been passing and which for a time threatened a financial disaster of nation-wide scope, but these higher rates contributed ma- terially to this depression and if continued will require changes in agriculture and industry of national and international im- portance. Transportation is an essential part of the process of production. Transportation costs are a part of production costs. Any material advance in the cost of production with- out a corresponding advance in the price received for the pro- duct involves important readjustments. During the past year the farmer has been compelled to accept for his products,, whether grain, live-stock, cotton, wool, or fruits and vegetables,, prices which are on the average no greater than those which prevailed during the pre-war period, meaning by the latter the five-year period 1910-14 inclusive. For a time the prices of some of the coarse grains were as much as forty per cent below the pre-war average, and the prices offered the farmers in some of the vegetable-growing regions were so low that they did not cover the cost of harvesting and preparing for ship- ment. During the same period freight rates on agricultural products have been on an average about eighty per cent above the rates which prevailed before the war. An illuminating [67] 68 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol.. X illustration of just how the farmer is affected by this condition is furnished by the investigations of the Congressional Com- mission of Agricultural Inquiry. Four standard implements needed on the western grain and stock farm are a gang plow, a wagon, a corn-harvester and a grain-binder. On August 1, 1913, the cost of these implements at certain points in Kansas and Nebraska was $490.50, which was equivalent to the farm price of 928 bushels of corn. The freight charge to Chicago on the number of bushels of corn required to purchase these implements at that time was $122.16. On August 15, 1920, the cost of these implements was $944. This charge was cov- ered by the price received for 706 bushels of corn, but the freight charge on the corn was $179.30. On October 15 the cost of the implements had been reduced to $751, but it required the value of no less than 4,191 bushels of corn to purchase them and the freight on the corn was $1,051.41. Similar illustrations in unlimited number can be furnished to show the blighting effect upon agriculture of advances in freight rates without regard to the value of the products to be moved. Perhaps a more understandable way to show the effect upon agriculture of a continuance of the present freight rates is by noting the additional charge per crop-acre which they impose. Under the old rates a great fruit industry was built up in California. It is estimated that the freight charge paid by that State in 1920 was about $64,000,000. The increase in freight rates during the past four years imposes an additional charge per acre on lemons of $187.67, which capitalized at 7 per cent would amount to $2,681 ; on oranges an additional acre tax of $192.38, which capitalized would amount to $2,748.28; on apples $160.87, which capitalized would amount to $2,298.14. Approximately the same burden is imposed upon the fruit industry of the entire northwest and the truck industry of the southwest, the source of a large supply of vegetables of all kinds. In the case of the less valuable crops, such, for example, as corn, wheat, potatoes and cotton, the increased tax per acre imposed by the present freight rates does not seem to be so great when presented in figures, but is in fact relatively as great. For example, the increased rate tax per acre on corn, wheat and oats, and cotton is greater than was the net return [68] No. I] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 69 per acre to the farmer during the pre-war period. In the case of potatoes the increased rate tax per acre in Maine amounts to $31.80, and in Michigan and Louisiana, both great potato- producing regions, the increased rate tax per acre is above $15, which, because of the lower yield, is relatively as great as the increase in Maine. When it is remembered that prior to the war agricultural production yielded to the average farmer nothing more than a fair living, and, indeed, less than this had the farmer demanded a fair interest charge on his money invested in land and farm- ing equipment, the impossibility of maintaining production under the imposition of a rate tax as great as has been indi- cated at once becomes apparent. Either freight rates on agricultural products and on the principal commodities the farmers need to buy must come down quickly to about pre-war levels, or prices of agricultural products must increase suffi- ciently to equal the increasing freight rates, or there will be profound readjustments in agricultural production, and these will involve readjustments in industry as well. Cherishing the hope that present high freight rates are tem- porary, the farmer is struggling to continue his farming oper- ations without material change, and in the meantime casting about for ways by which he may overcome the handicap im- posed upon him. The fruit- and truck-growers of the far west and southwest, for example, are turning to water transporta- tion, and with the better adaptation of vessels to their needs may find in his way some measure of relief from the high freights. The wheat-growers of the west also are using the shorter haul to water for export grains. To illustrate what is happening in this respect, fifty-three per cent of the wheat exported from this country in 1913 went out through the Atlantic and Canadian ports. In 1921, only twenty-four per cent passed through the eastern ports. In 1913, the Gulf ports handled thirty-one per cent of our export wheat, and in 1921 slightly more than fifty-nine per cent. Last year the east-and- west rail lines, which formerly handled the bulk of our grain, were running small trains with light loads, while the north- and-south lines in the surplus-producing country, which had formerly handled less than one-third of our export grain, were hauling long trains, heavily loaded, and our southern ports [69] 70 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X were congested with cars of grain waiting for ships that they might be unloaded. If the American farmer is to compete successfully with the Argentine or the Australasian farmer in the markets of Europe, he must be able to lay his products down in Europe at a cost approximately the same as his competitors. The two principal competitive factors entering into the cost of marketing agri- cultural products in Europe are the cost of production and transportation. I shall not attempt to go into the question of cost of production, but shall confine myself to a comparison of the cost of transportation from the wheat-producing centers of the United States and Argentina to the United Kingdom. It may be well at the outset to point out that while the cost of ocean transportation is an important factor in the cost of marketing agricultural products in foreign countries, it is by no means as important a factor as rail transportation to the sea- board, particularly in the United States, where our producing centers are located much farther from the seaboard than are the producing centers of Argentina, Australia, and other countries that compete with the United States. In Argentina, for ex- timple, the average rail haul from the wheat-producing regions to the seaboard is approximately 435 kilometers, or 261 miles. The cost of carrying 1,000 kilograms (2204.6 pounds) of wheat a distance of 500 kilometers (310.6 miles) is $15.44 Argentine paper, or $0.15 per bushel in United States money on the basis of the prevailing rate of exchange. With an ocean freight rate from Buenos Aires to Liverpool of $5.00 per ton, this would make a rate of $0,134 per bushel, or a combined rail-and-ocean freight rate from the wheat-producing centers of Argentina to the United Kingdom of $0,284. In the United States the export freight rate on wheat from Hutchinson, Kansas, to Galveston, Texas, through which a large part of our wheat is exported, is $0.44^ per 100 pounds, or at the rate of $0,267 per bushel. The ocean freight rate from Galveston to the United Kingdom is $0.21 per 100 pounds, or at the rate of $0,126 per bushel. This makes a combined rail-and-ocean freight rate from Hutchinson, Kansas, to the United Kingdom of $0,393 per bushel, as compared with a total rail-and-ocean freight rate from the wheat-producing centers of Argentina to the United Kingdom of $0,284 per [70] No. I] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 71 bushel. The wheat producer in Argentina thus has an apparent advantage of approximately $0.11 per bushel in the cost of transportation alone. In the case of crops for domestic consumption grown in the great surplus-producing states east of the Rocky Mountains, water transportation is not available. The farmers in these states must use railroads to ship their surplus to market and the continuation of the present high rates must inevitably re- duce the tonnage of coarse grains and hay shipped to the east. We hear some criticism of the agricultural schedules of the tariff bill now under consideration by Congress. In point of fact, the duties proposed to be levied upon the principal agri- cultural products are hardly sufficient to equalize the additional freight tax which already has been imposed upon the farmers of the surplus-producing states. The increase in railroad rates during the past five years has been in effect a differential against our own farmers in favor of the farmers of foreign nations with whom they must compete. A few examples are given below in order to illustrate con- cretely the effect that high freight rates, if continued, are cer- tain to have, not only on farming but on the railroads them- selves. In the case of a cheap bulky commodity like potatoes high transportation costs will have an important effect on the dis- tribution of acreage. At present the commercial production of this crop is more or less concentrated in the northern border states, the central states obtaining much of their supply from those to the north of them. But when the freight rate on potatoes from Bangor, Maine, to New York City increases from 25c a hundred pounds in 1913 to 52j/2C in 1921, a differential is established in favor of the growers in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Connecticut that will undoubtedly increase the acreage in those states and make necessary a reduction of acreage in the State of Maine. This will deprive the railroads of a large and remunerative traffic. These rates have the effect of decreasing the profit on potatoes in Maine by 25c per hundred pounds, which makes it possible for other regions nearer the market to compete. Since 1913 there has been an increase in rates on Michigan potatoes to New York of 29c or just 100%. A continuation of this rate v/ill have the effect of [71] 72 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X decreasing potato acreage in the west and of increasing it in the east, thus cutting off another source of traffic. The effect on the hay trade is similar. This crop can be grown anywhere that farming is possible. Previous to the war the eastern states obtained a large part of their hay from the Middle West. Already rail shipments of hay eastward have been curtailed. The cotton belt has hitherto imported most of the hay it requires. The recent increase in freights has so enhanced the price of hay in the south that cotton-growers, if this high price continues, are resolving to produce their own supplies of this necessary commodity. This will deprive many roads of a large and important traffic. The shipment of fruits and vegetables from the south and from California to eastern and northern cities is an important part of the traffic of many lines of transportation. Even un- der pre-war conditions large quantities of vegetables were produced under glass near these cities for the winter trade, in competition with California and the south. The present rates for transportation will enable more men to succeed in growingj^ vegetables under glass and this will reduce the tonnage of such commodities shipped from California and the south. This tendency is in fact already noticeable. A pound of pork represents about ten pounds of corn, and a pound of butter much more. Every increase in transpor- tation rates tends to induce corn-growers to condense their products into meat and butter, thus reducing the tonnage of farm products delivered to the carriers. The largest yields per acre and the greatest weight per bushel of oats are obtained in our western mountain states. Yet these states have never grown oats except as a supply crop. It is so- cheap a product that it will not bear the cost of transportation to distant markets. The commercial production of oats has therefore always been concentrated about the great market centers. Every increase in cost of transportation tends to emphasize this concentration, thus reducing tonnage. Wheat, because of its higher value per unit of weight, has hitherto been widely grown in the western mountain states. This is the only crop generally available to farmers in that section that is sufficiently high-priced to bear the necessarily [72] No. I] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 73 heavy transportation costs. The enormous increase in these costs in recent years may have the effect of materially reducing: the acreage of wheat in these states. The land thus vacated will go to forage for dairy cows because butter is sufficiently concentrated to stand the cost of getting it to eastern and even to European markets. In so far as this change takes place, and it is in fact actually taking place, the railroads will lose the difference between the freight on the large volume of grain now shipped and the few pounds of butter than can be made from the land vacated by wheat. Fortunately it is not necessary for you to accept merely my opinion as to the effect of high transportation costs on agricul- ture. The accompanying diagram shows the difference in the farm prices of corn, wheat and oats, in the New England States on the one hand, and the West North Central States on the other, by five-year periods from 1871 to 1915, and for 1921. It will be observed that the differences in prices east and west gradually decreased until 1915. Since that time they have greatly increased and are now approximately as wide apart as they were back in the seventies. In the case of oats the differ- ence is actually greater. It will be observed that this great spread in prices between the east and the west since 1915 is coincident with the recent increase in freight rates. While the decrease in these differences was going on because of decrease in transportation costs, there was a rapid reduction in acreage of the cereals in New England, amounting between 1880 and 1909 to 46%. Following the Civil War the differ- ence in prices east and west was sufficiently great to justify the New England dairyman in growing grain for feed; but as the cost of getting grain from the west fell it became more and more advantageous to the New England dairyman to buy his concentrated feed. This accounts for the reduction in the acreage of cereals. That the New England farmer, if present conditions continue, will go back to growing grain is shown by the fact that during the period of high prices prevailing in war times the acreage of wheat in New Hampshire increased from practically nothing to 1,400, and oats increased from 11,000' to 15,000 acres. The acreage of rye more than doubled. In Vermont wheat increased from 700 to 11,000 acres and oats from 71,500 to 83,100 acres. A similar increase occurred in [73] 74 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X Massachusetts. It is true this increase occurred under high transportation rates, but the high prices of farm products at the time made these rates relatively no greater than they had PRICES IN PRODUCING AND CONSUMING SECTIONS COMPARED IHDEX OF FAHH PRICES OF CORH, WHEAT AHD OATS. USITEB STATES. HEW EHGLAm AHD WEST HORTH CENTRAL STATES. 5 YEAR AVERAGES OF DECEMBER FIRST PRICES. 1871-1915 and 1921. 100 -AVERAGE FOR UNITED STATES. Snail figures on chart are actual prices. PRfCE INDf" PRICE INDEX 1871-75 1882-86 I89I-95 I9OI-05 I9II-I5 1921* •Wheat Bonthly average for year. Corn and oats Dec. 1. been before the War. The case is different now, for the prices of farm products are lower. There appears to be no escape from the conclusion that unless there is a material reduction in <;ost of transportation, New England will soon be producing [74] No. i] THE FARMERS AND THE RAILROADS 75 again the concentrated feed she requires. The loss in profit to the railroads this will occasion is no small item to many of the roads supplying this section of the country. To discuss in detail the effects upon agriculture and industry in general of the advances in freight rates of the past four years would require hours and days rather than minutes. In brief, if the present high rates are continued for any length of time their probable effect will be : First, to favor the farmers of South America and Australia at the expense of our own farmers, and all the more so be- cause of the substantial decreases in ocean rates. Second, to keep prices of farm products in the large surplus- producing states at figures lower than are justified by the in- vestment in land and equipment and cost of farm production, except during years of short crops. Third, to prolong the period of dissatisfaction among farm- ers and encourage advocates of economic fallacies of all sorts. Fourth, to improve the position of eastern truck- and fruit- growers, but also to add considerably to the cost of production of milk and dairy products, because of the advanced prices of hay and coarse grains necessarily shipped in from the west. Fifth, gradually to shift industrial enterprises westward, nearer the surplus food producing territory. Sixth, to promote sectional rather than national spirit and make more and more difficult large national policies with re- spect to international affairs. No good citizen can find comfort or satisfaction in con- templating such results. I am not making a special plea for the farmer as against the railroad. The relation between agriculture and transportation is so very intimate and dependent that neither can afford to acquiesce in a condition which seriously affects the other. They must work together in harmony and understanding. The important point I am trying to make is this : That this nation has been built up by a system of low railroad rates designed to encourage the movement of our surplus agricultural crops long distances to manufacturing, industrial and business cen- ters, with a corresponding return haul of manufactured pro- ducts, and that a sudden reversal of this theory of rate-making [75] 76 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X results in great economic injustice and if persisted in will keep us in a state of confusion and agricultural and business uncer- bainty for a prolonged period. The need of permitting the railroads to charge rates sufficiently high to cover reasonable costs of operation and maintenance and yield a fair return upon the capital invested is so obvious that it must at once be conceded. Both commerce and agriculture require efficient transportation. But the folly of undertaking to establish such rates wholly without consideration of their disastrous effect upon agriculture, the greatest industry of the country, is now apparent to everyone. The most hopeful sign at the present time is the apparent recognition of the railroad management that our present high rates cannot be continued without disaster to the railroads themselves, and that rates must come down to a point not far, if any, above the pre-war levels. Railroad management should have the whole-hearted support of all right-minded and clear- thinking people in taking the steps which will make it possible to bring about the necessary reduction. [76] TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1920 DANIEL WILLARD President, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company THE framing of the Transportation Act of 1920 was pre- ceded by one of the most exhaustive investigations ever conducted by Congress, and the Act in its present form undoubtedly reflects the enlightened effort of that body to deal with the American railroad problem in a constructive and effective manner. It is desirable that we have a clear understanding of just what the American railroad problem really is before we attempt to decide how it should be dealt with. What we are in the habit of speaking of as the American railway system is, of course, not a system at all in the sense in which the word " system " is ordinarily used. It is not, for instance, such a system as we have in mind when we speak of the Pennsylvania or Santa Fe Systems, nor is it like the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which latter includes under one general management or supervision a network of wires reaching all parts of the United States. When we speak of the American railway system we have in mind, I suppose, the 1,800 or more separate and independent railroad companies in the United States, owning and operating steam railroads, with a total length of about 265,000 miles, having in the aggregate about 2,500,000 freight cars, about 65,000 locomotives and about 56,000 cars used in passenger train service — all representing a total investment of approximately $20,000,000,000 and giving direct employment to upwards of 2,000,000 persons. The American railroad problem, as it is called, grows out of the question : how can this great aggregate property, represented by an investment of $20,000,000,000, be so developed, main- tained and operated cis to furnish the people with adequate transportation at reasonable rates? The steam railroad has ceased to be a new thing and certain fundamental truths concerning the railroad problem have been so clearly demonstrated that they may now be accepted as estab- [77] 78 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X lished. One of the fundamental truths which I have in mind is this : Whatever policy of ownership, control or operation may- be adopted with reference to our American railroads, it must make satisfactory provision so that in times of emergency it will be possible to mobilize and coordinate promptly all of the physical properties of all the companies in order that the rail- road plant as a whole may be used in the most effective manner possible. Such coordination we know is possible under gov- ernment operation. Such coordination was attempted by the railroads themselves in 1917, and with a much greater degree of success than is generally recognized, through the agency of the Railroad War Board, which they voluntarily established in April of that year. The War Board, however, had no legal status, and as the laws were at that time, its efforts were much hampered and interfered with. A satisfactory settlement of the railroad problem demands among other things that suitable provision be made by law for the prompt mobilization and co- ordination of the railway properties when necessary in the public interest. The Transportation Act of 1920, therefore, specifically pro- vides that in times of emergency the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be authorized to assume direction and control of all the cars and engines of all the railroads in the United States, as if they were in fact owned and controlled by the government, and it authorizes the Commission to take such further steps as may be necessary to give effect to this provision of the Act. It should be borne in mind, however, that this broad authority which the Commission is authorized to assume over private property is to be exercised only in times of emergency. Congress undoubtedly recognized the fact that it is not possible to have complete coordination and unified oper- ation of all the railroads and at the same time have the benefit of competition. The two things are incompatible. It was be- lieved, and I think justifiably so, that while it was necessary in the public interest to provide for the effective mobilization of all the railroad facilities in times of emergency, it was also desirable in the public interest that except in times of emer- gency the individual companies should be given the fullest op- portunity for individual initiative, enterprise and competition. I believe the Transportation Act of 1920 effectively provides [78] Na I] TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1980 yg for that phase of the railroad problem, and my belief is based upon the knowledge that during the fiscal year 1920, when it may be said there was a transportation emergency such as was contemplated in the words of the Act, the American railroads, acting under its provisions and in cooperation with the Inter- state Commerce Commission, so coordinated their efforts that in the aggregate they moved over 447 billion ton-miles during the year. This was 7 billion ton-miles greater than the high- est previous accomplishment, which was in 1918, while the roads were under Federal control. The importance of being able to mobilize promptly all of the railroad facilities in times of emergency is so great that had it not been possible to provide satisfactorily therefor in connection with private ownership and operation, it is altogether likely that Congress would have felt compelled to accept the policy of Government ownership and operation as the only possible alternative. Congress, however, having decided that it was possible under proper legislation effectively to coordinate the railway facilities when necessary, or in times of emergency, and having made suitable provision by law for such coordination, then gave con- sideration to another phase of the railroad problem as related to private ownership and operation. Of course, it is recognized that if we are to have private ownership and operation of the railroads, it can only be had upon a voluntary basis. No one, under institutions such as ours, can be forced against his will to invest his money in rail- roads. At the same time it is recognized that at least $500,000,000, and probably more, must be expended each year by the railroads for new facilities in order that they may pro- vide for the demands of our growing commerce, and unless railway securities can be made so attractive that each year at least $500,000,000 of new capital will seek investment in that direction, then the scheme of private ownership will fail, be- cause we cannot as a people afford to have inadequate trans- portation facilities. But whether railway securities are attrac- tive or not from the investors' point of view depends, of course, upon the rate and dependability of return and the certainty of ultimate recovery of the capital invested. Congress, with a full understanding of this phase of the problem, for the first time laid down for the guidance of the C793 So RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X Interstate Commerce Commission a definite rule to be fol- lowed with reference to the fixing of the rates and charges which the railways might lawfully impose. What Congress m eflFect did was to announce a policy, and in harmony therewith it authorized and directed its agent, the Interstate Commerce Commission, to fix rates and charges so that the railroads as a whole, or as a whole in certain regions or groups, should be able, in connection with honest and efficient management, to earn a net operating income equal as nearly as may be to a fair return upon the value of the property devoted to transportation purposes. Nothing was said in the Act about the rate of return upon the stocks and bonds of the railroads. As a matter of fact there is no mention in the law of either railroad stocks or bonds, nor is there a guarantee of any definite return as some have seemed to think, but simply the statement that the railroads as a whole should be entitled to receive a fair return, if honestly and efficiently managed, upon the value of the property devoted to the public use. However, because the railroads are not all in one compact system, because there are in fact several hundred separate and independent companies, because some roads are more favor- ably located than others, and because it was recognized that different roads running between the same points should, and as a matter of fact must, charge the same rates, it was therefore recognized that rates which might be high enough to yield a fair return to some of the carriers, might not yield an adequate return to others in the same group. It was realized also that the identical rates might yield to still other carriers in the same group a higher return than could be justified from the public point of view. It is essential in the public interest, however, that all the roads, generally speaking, should be able to survive and at the same time properly maintain and enlarge their facilities as circumstances may require. To overcome the difficulties re- sulting from the conditions just referred to, it is provided in the Act that if from rates fixed so as to yield a fair return upon the value of all the roads in a specific group, certain individual companies in the same group should be able to earn more than six per cent upon the value of their property, then in that case one-half of the net operating income earned above six per cent [80] No. I] TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 19S0 gj from rates so fixed should be recoverable by the government. This feature of the Act has been much criticized, and by many has been held to be unconstitutional. Personally, I do not believe it is possible for private ownership of the railroads to endure in this country without such a provision as this in the Act. As a practical matter without such a provision in the Act, I do not believe that politically appointed agencies, in face of the opposition which might be urged, would approve rates high enough to yield a fair return upon the properties as a whole constituting a group for rate-making purposes, when it was clear that from a lower or existing basis of rates one or more companies in the same group could earn an operating in- come in excess of the requirements from an investment point of view. The result would be that while some of the railroads might be very prosperous and others might manage to live, still others less fortunately situated might not be able to survive as commercial enterprises, and consequently they would be un- able to furnish adequate transportation to that part of the public depending upon them for service. It was therefore thought better and more in the public inter- est that rates should be fixed high enough to yield a fair return upon all of the property used for transportation purposes in any particular group of competitive lines, even though some roads might be able to earn a sufficient return on a lower rate basis. Inasmuch, however, as the more fortunate roads would benefit by the higher rate basis necessary to sustain the less fortunate roads, Congress decided that whatever was earned above six per cent upon the property value of any particular road from rates so fixed, should be divided equally between the road and the government. I repeat that in my opinion private ownership and operation of the railroads in this country can not endure without some such provision, nor do I think the provision which I have just referred to is in itself unfair or inequitable. Undoubtedly if it were not for the necessity of the less fortunate roads, the more fortunate ones would not be permitted to charge the higher rates. The very fact that some roads in a group are fortunate enough to be able to earn more than six per cent upon the value of their property, even though part of such excess is recoverable by the government, puts the securities of such companies in a [8i] 82 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X preferred class, and because such companies are permitted to retain one-half of all they can earn above six per cent, there would seem to be ample inducement to stimulate initiative and enterprise. Personally, I approve of this particular feature of the Act, and I venture to express the hope that its constitu- tionality will be upheld in the courts. Otherwise I feel that rates will not be maintained on a basis sufficiently high to sus- tain the roads in general, in which event private ownership and operation of the railroads as a national policy will fail. Congress, having satisfied itself that it was possible under private ownership, with suitable legislation, for the railroads to be coordinated in times of emergency, then addressed itself to the financial phase of the problem, which it undertook to solve by the establishment of a rule for rate-making, as I have shown. There still remained to be dealt with one other important phase of the problem, to which I shall now refer. In no other country in the world do the people make so great a use of the railroads as in ours. The steam railroads in the United States perform a freight service equal to the movement of 4,000 tons one mile per annum for each man, woman and child of our entire population, while the latest figures available show that in Europe the analogous service performed by the railroads is probably less than 600 tons one mile per capita per annum. The greater use made of the railroads by the people in this country is of course influenced largely by the fact that ours is a country of great distances and is also rich in natural and varied resources. It has come about, therefore, that in the City of New York, an an example, the flour used is very likely made from wheat grown on the rich prairies of Minnesota and the Dakotas. The beef which is eaten here was perhaps bred in Texas, developed in Wyoming, fattened in Iowa and dressed in Chicago. Not only do we find upon the tables in New York and Boston salmon caught in the waters on the Pacific Coast and shipped from Seattle, but there will also be found on the tables in Seattle the cod caught in the North Atlantic waters and shipped from Boston. Many similar instances might be cited. In short, it has generally been found advantageous, be- cause more economical, to produce our flour, meats, minerals, forest products etc. where each can be produced or obtained at [82] No. I] TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 19S0 83 the lowest initial cost and then transport them, largely by rail, to the point of ultimate consumption, the entire transportation cost being less than the difference in initial cost of production in different parts of the country. With this in mind it is mani- festly important that there should be regularity and continuity of service by the railroads, and one of the important problems before Congress was to insure if possible such continuity by guarding against interruption of service which might be caused by misunderstandings and disputes arising between the railroad managers and their employees. It was urged by some that this provision of the Act should be so written as to prohibit strikes upon the railroads. It was not possible to enact legislation of that character, nor do I think it would have been wise to enact such legislation at that time. I believe it would be a mistake for Congress to pass a law prohibiting strikes unless we are quite certain that we shall be able to enforce such a law once it has been enacted. Per- sonally I do not believe that we have reached a stage where we can feel confident that such a' law would or could be effec- tively enforced. The matter was., therefore, dealt with, I think, in the wisest way possible under the circumstances. Congress created machinery and set up agencies by virtue of which the employees could feel assured of obtaining just as fair wages and working conditions without striking as they could reason- ably expect to obtain even if they did strike. The Act provides, first, that — It shall be the duty of all carriers and their officers, employees and agents to exert every reasonable effort and adopt every available means to avoid any interruption to the operation of any carrier grow- ing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees or sub- ordinate officials thereof. All such disputes shall be considered and, if possible, decided in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer by the carriers, or by the employees or subordinate officials thereof, directly interested in the dispute. If any dispute is not decided in such conference, it shall be referred by the parties thereto to the Board, which, under the provision of this title, IS authorized to hear and decide such dispute. The Act also provides for the creation of the Board above referred to and in that respect reads as follows : " There is here- by established a board to be known as the Railroad Labor Board and to be composed of nine members." The members of the Labor Board are to be appointed by the E83] 84 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X President. Three of his appointees shall be from men nomin- ated by railroad employees, three shall be from men nominated by the railroad companies, arid three shall be selected by the President himself, as representing in a larger way the general public, and all nine shall be confirmed by the Senate. In fact, Congress has created for this particular purpose a special Labor Court consisting of the same number as the Supreme Court of the United States, appointed in the same way, that is to say, by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and has given the Board or Court a status and dignity in keeping with its im- portance. The Act says that it shall be the duty of the Board to establish rates of pay and standards of working conditions which, in the opinion of the Board, shall be just and reasonable, and in determining the justness and reasonableness of such rates the Board is directed to take into consideration, among other things — 1. The scale of wages paid for similar kinds of work in other industries; 2. The relation between wages and the cost of living; 3. The hazards of the employment; 4. The training and skill required ; 5. The degree of responsibility; 6. The character and regularity of the employment ; and 7. Inequalities of increases in wages or of treatment, the result of previous wage orders or adjustments. It may indeed be said that Congress by this Act has made a preferred class of the railroad workers, because so far as I know this is the first and only time that Congress has ever definitely enacted that any particular class of the people should be given at all times and under all circumstances just and rea- sonable wages and working conditions. Of course. Congress did not do this primarily in the interest of the workers. Con- gress acted only as it had a right to act in the interests of the nation as a whole. Congress acted with a full realization of the importance of an uninterrupted transportation service in a country such as ours, but being unwilling to deprive the work- ers of their right to strike, it sought to provide machinery which would make it unnecessary under any circumstances for the men to stop work in order to obtain just and reasonable t84] No. I] TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1980 gj treatment. In short, Congress provided, or aimed to provide by law, that the railroad workers should at all times be assured of just as good wages ajid just as good working conditions without striking as they could reasonably expect to secure even if they did strike, for it is clear that no one could justify or ex- pect to win a strike for wages or working conditions that would be unjust or unreasonable. This feature of the Act has been much criticised, but I venture to think that during the short time the Act has been in effect, the labor provision has more than justified itself by actual results achieved when viewed in a large way. It may, of course, be said that each one. of the three features of the Act which I have been discussing is in a sense experi- mental. Nevertheless, it is my feeling and firm belief that so far it cannot be said that the experiment has failed in con- nection with any one of the features mentioned. On the con- trary it seems to me that the results so far obtained, when fairly considered, have measurably met the proper expectation of Congress. There are other important features of the Transportation Act to which I have not referred at all, chiefly because of my limited time and because I do not consider them of fundamental importance. One of the provisions which I have in mind has reference to the future grouping of the railroads into a rela- tively small number of strong, competing lines. I am in favor of the general policy so announced. I do not, however, con- sider it of fundamental importance. I believe that the Transportation Act of 1920 affords a work- able basis for the future successful operation of the railroads in the United States, in harmony with our long-established policy of private ownership and operation. That the success of the Act has not yet been thoroughly demonstrated in all of its aspects, I admit. I believe, however, that it would be a great mistake to attempt to amend or change the Act in any of its fundamental features at the present time. I do not think we have yet had sufficient experience under the Act to justify a conclusion that a change is actually necessary or, if necessary, to indicate clearly what the change should be. I firmly believe that if the Act is permitted to remain as it is for a period of five years, and if the railway managers could be assured that [85] 86 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X it would not be changed within that period of time, such knowledge would have a most stimulating and encouraging eflfect, not only upon the railway managers, but upon investors as well, and would in itself go far to assure the success of the Act. Undoubtedly the Act is not perfect in all its details. Nevertheless I believe that in its present form it makes private ownership and operation of the railroads possible, and that too on a basis much to be preferred to the only probable alternative. I urge, therefore, that the Act in its present form be given a fair and sympathetic trial. [86] THE NEW BASIS OF RATE-MAKING WALKER D. HINES Former Director General of Railroads I WANT to express at the outset my cordial belief in the view that the Transportation Act deserves a fair and impartial trial. Even if we were passing through times that were entirely normal, it would still be true that an act adopted with such care and after such prolonged investigation should be given a reasonable time within which to justify its usefulness. But the truth is that we have been passing through times that are wholly abnormal, and the fact that in such times a new and comprehensive piece of legislation may not have brought satisfaction to the interests affected by it is not proof that it is not a forward and constructive step. I do not know of any place in the world where any institution or any scheme of law has brought satisfaction to the people in these war years and the years since the war. So I think we must give to this new and important piece of legislation an opportunity to justify itself when we again get into something approximating normal times. I think it is particularly important to emphasize this neces- sity because it is undoubtedly true that in the period of re- adjustment through which we have been passing, a great part of our population, and that is the agricultural part, has suf- fered most intensely from the unfortunate combination of pre- war prices or less for its products, and of greatly increased freight rates based on the existing much-increased costs of railroad operations. This has been a condition which was bound to produce discontent and it was bound to direct attention to this new legislation as the most obvious reason for the trouble, although in fact, I do not believe that the legislation can be held re- sponsible. Under any other possible scheme of legislation, we would either have had rates approximately as high as the existing rates or we would have had a series of railroad bank- [87] 88 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X ruptcies which would have been infinitely worse for the farm- ers as well as the people in other walks of life. I want to say something about the principle of rate-making which has been put into the Transportation Act. I shall not attempt again to outline the provisions of the Act on this point because Mr. Willard has done that clearly and concisely. I want to emphasize that this new rate basis has been adopted from the standpoint of the public interest and that public inter- est is vitally concerned in the maintenance of this new basis. The provision in the Transportation Act that rates should be so fixed as to produce a fair return upon the aggregate value of railroad property was not put there merely to provide inter- est and dividends for the holders of the existing bonds and stocks of the railroad companies. It was put there for other broad public purposes, in addition to that purpose, and I wish to call attention to some of these other purposes. One aspect of the railroad business is that it employs about two million workmen. In a normal year, I suppose there would be spent by the railroads, if they have a basis of rates that yields a fair return upon their property, from two and three-quarters to three billion dollars in wages. The dis- tribution of that amount to the wage-earners of the country would be a tremendous factor in the prosperity of every class of people in the country. But in practice there is much more fluctuation than is generally appreciated in the amount of rail- road labor and the amount of the railroad pay roll. Even if the wages remain unchanged, there may be very great fluctu- ations in the number of employees, in the amount of work they are called on to do, and hence in the amount of money that is distributed to them as wages. The moment the railroads begin to be apprehensive as to whether they are obtaining enough revenue fairly to protect the interests with the protection of which they are charged, they begin to lay off' their maintenance forces, and maintenance represents close to forty-five per cent of the total operating expenses of the railroad companies. When the maintenance employees are laid off', the purchasing power of themselves and their families is impaired and to a considerable extent dstroyed, and that has a distinctly un- favorable influence upon the general state of business in the country. [88] No. 1] THE NEW BASIS OF RATE-MAKING 89 The moment this condition becomes an influence to cut down general business — and the cutting down of the maintenance program is bound to have that influence — the number of freight trains begins to diminish, the number of employees in the train service is cut down, and you have an additional element which makes for a slowing down of the prosperity of the country. Let us look now at the material which the railroads buy. I suppose it is fair to estimate that in the course of a year under approximately normal conditions, the railroads would buy from a billion eight hundred million to two billion dollars' worth of materials, which are used in the operation of the roads. In addition to this, in normal times, they would ordinarily buy perhaps two or three hundred million dollars' worth of ma- terials for the purposes of new construction. The railroads buy nearly one-third of the soft or bituminous coal that is produced in the country. It has been estimated that they buy about forty per cent of the steel and iron articles produced in the country and that about forty per cent of the country's lumber production goes directly and indirectly into materials used by the railroads. When the reasonable return to the railroads begins to be seriously diminished and there comes to be a cutting-down in these purchases of materials, as there is bound to be when the maintenance program is diminished, or when the construction program is diminished, we have another and very important condition to militate against the prosperity of the country. The various industries of the country, which are dependent so largely upon the railroads, commence limiting their operations, and their employees lose their jobs and their purchasing power. The volume of business diminishes still more and again we have a falling-off" in the amount of freight service and in the number of trains and enginemen employed. We begin to have a cutting-down in the amount of coal that the railroads can consume, with consequent embarrassment to the coal industry and its employees. It follows that the giving of a fair return to enable them to proceed in a normal manner with their operations has a tre- mendously important relation to the public interest with respect to the labor that the railroads employ, with respect to the ma- terials that they use, and with respect to the industries which manufacture these materials, and in all these respects the gen- [89] go RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X eral prosperity of the country is vitally involved. When these factors take an unfavorable turn, there is no class which is more seriously affected than the farming class, which is dependent upon the general prosperity of the country in order to have a satisfactory demand for its products. Another point of vital interest to the public is the adequacy of the railroad service. That involves two considerations : one is that the railroads of this country are not in a condition to handle satisfactorily the amount of business which could be regarded at present as normal. They need much additional equipment and many sorts of improvements in order to meet more satisfactorily the demands of the public for an adequate service. This requires capital. In addition there is a steady growth in the volume of business done in this country. In 1900 the mount of freight traffic carried was double what it was in 1890. In 1910 it was eighty per cent more than in 1900. In 1920 it was sixty per cent more than in 1910. So that we can count upon a continuing and heavy increase in the normal amount of business. I am speaking broadly now and disregarding for the moment the fluctuations that may come in particular years of depression. With this increase in traffic there must be enormous increases in the railroad plant and they cannot be obtained without enormous expenditures of money. I think Mr. Willard estimated only five hundred million dol- lars a year. There will be needed, I believe, eight hundred million to a billion, which can be expended in the further im- provement and extension of the railroads to the distinct advant- age of adequate and efficient service, although I can readily appreciate that if the railroads cannot raise that much addi- tional money to spend, they must, and no doubt they can, by .spending less than that amount, get along with a service less satisfactory than it ought to be. Such enormous amounts of capital cannot be raised unless there is adequate assurance of a fair return to the railroads, and there again we have an important element of public interest underlying the rate-making principle of the Transportation Act. There is still another feature embodied in this rate-making principle of the Transportation Act, and that is, that the Transportation Act was designed to establish a greater certainty as to a fair return for the railroads. [90] No. I] THE NEW BASIS OF RATE-MAKING 91 Prior to the Transportation Act, the attitude of the Govern- ment was restrictive rather than constructive. It merely told the railroads what they should not do, but assumed no obliga- tion to aid in creating a rate basis which would affirmatively assure them a fair return. That contributed to a condition of uncertainty which was unfavorable to the public interest. The Transportation Act for the first time has imposed an affirmative, express duty on the Interstate Commerce Commission to estab- lish a rate basis which, as far as may be, will yield a fair return. This provision was designed to establish a greater certainty, and I think that is one of the most important elements of public interest that is involved in this new conception. I believe as the railroads become better assured of their status there can and will be developed on their part a more confident and steady policy of carrying forward on a more regular and normal basis their maintenance and construction programs. The lack of public interest in maintaining a fair return was always working to make the return uncertain. There was consequently a disposition on the part of the rail- roads to respond very quickly to any unfavorable aspect of general business by promptly cutting down their maintenance and construction programs. That has tremendously accen- tuated the tendencies already working toward depression in general business conditions, so in the past we have had a con- dition where this great institution, which represents the greatest organized purchasing power and the greatest organized source of wages in the country, has been under an influence which caused it, the moment there came to be signs of depression, to convert itself into an agency for increasing that depression. And that picture has another side. When business begins to get better, prices begin to go up and labor begins to get scarce, the railroads, having been forced to cut down their main- tenance and construction programs in times of depression, then have to redouble their efforts in these directions and thereby they become an influence for creating instability by putting up the price, by bidding against each other and the other interests in the country, in order to make up for their deferred programs in times of depression. Further than this, the result of such a policy has been that in a time of returning general business prosperity the railroads have had to use their tracks, equip- [91] 02 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X ment and other facilities very largely for handling their own material and supplies, which on account of their retrenchment policy during the preceding period of depression they had not purchased and distributed while they had ample surplus equip- ment and other facilities. This has led to congestion of busi- ness and has tended to accentuate still further the high prices characteristic of returning prosperity. I strongly believe this new policy of the Transportation Act is calculated in large part to correct these highly unfavorable influences and to enable the railroads, as they begin to feel better assured of the con- tinuance of this new policy, to adopt a more regular policy of maintaining more uniformly in bad times their normal pro- grams of maintenance and construction and thereby help stabilize the conditions of the whole country, rather than be forced into a condition of intensifying unfavorable influences in the direction either of further depression or of undue ex- pansion. I think this result will be one of the most important and salutary effects of the law, and will constitute one of the most striking ways in which this new basis will be in promotion of the public interests. I fully appreciate that the adoption of a policy of carrying forward normal programs of maintenance and construction in times of business depression involves some difficult'complications in the matter of cash, because the railroad maintenance and construction work is largely a cash proposition. All employees engaged in such work must be paid in cash and all materials used in it must be bought for cash or on very short time. Naturally in time of business depression railroad companies cannot generally raise on satisfactory terms large amounts of capital by the issue of stock or of long-term bonds, and they have been quite hesitant to borrow money on short-term paper for carrying forward maintenance and construction work. Nevertheless with increased assurance of a definite and helpful governmental policy I believe the railroad companies could and ought to make further efforts than they have felt justified in making in the past to provide themselves with the necessary cash to carry forward their maintenance and construction work in times of depression when labor is more plentiful and ma- terials are cheaper, and when they have ample equipment and other facilities for handling the work with a minimum of inter- [92] No. I] THE NEW BASIS OF RATE-MAKING 93 ference to their transportation of commercial traffic. Not only ■will this be to their own direct benefit, but it will immensely promote the general public interest, and hence this consider- ation in itself constitutes a highly important justification for the rate-making principle of the Transportation Act. In the last analysis railroad rates will depend upon the cost at which railroad transportation can be carried on. This new rate basis rests on the assumption that this cost is a matter of vital importance. It assumes that the railroads must be economically and efficiently managed. This subject is to be increasingly a matter of scrutiny and concern on the part of the Interstate Commerce Commission. With such scrutiny, and with the efforts on the part of the railroad managements, and with the improvement of conditions generally, I think it is fair to predict that there will be such reduction in the unit cost of railroad operation that'to a large extent the difficulties from which the public has suffered — and no interest has suf- fered more than the farmers — on account of rates out of pro- portion to the cost of the products transported, will be over- come. So believing as I do that this is an important forward step, and being utterly unable to think of any substitute for it which will begin to offer as great promise of adequate service, adequate employment of railroad labor, adequate consumption of materials produced in the country, or as great promise of a definite forward movement in the stabilizing of business of all sorts throughout the country, I certainly wish to add my voice in favor of giving the Transportation Act a thorough and sympathetic trial, and I predict, with great confidence, that it will justify itself when it gets normal times in which to work. [93] PART THREE FREIGHT RATES AND BUSINESS REVIVAL HOW RAILROADS ADAPT THEMSELVES TO NATIONAL CONDITIONS ALBERT SHAW Editor, The Review of Reviews TRANSPORTATION is in itself a specialized form of business which has problems of its own. In its aspect as a distinct interest, the transportation system — of which the railroads constitute the larger framework — is subject constantly to inquiry and discussion from many standpoints. But the railroads thus regarded do not constitute the subject of our meeting of the Academy today. It is the economic situation of the United States, as inseparaibly affected by transportation methods and policies, that is before us for our consideration. It is true that from the standpoint of investment and from that of organization and employment the railroads, with their related industries of service and supply, constitute a foremost economic interest. But railroads are also, as an everyday affair, looked upon by men engaged in every other form of production and exchange as a subordinate but essential factor in their own operations. The producers of wheat and corn, as well as the producers of coal and steel, think of railroads not as a distinct field of investment and of employment but as an agency necessary to their own success. Every business meas- ures its own prosperity in terms of market and price. Trans- portation is in many industries the vital factor in measuring the range of markets. Freight rates go far to determine the habits of whole communities as regards the things that they eat, the houses that they build, the fuel that they consume, and the particular forms of employment that they find profitable. Considerable changes in transportation rates, when such changes come suddenly, are likely to disturb complicated move- ments to such an extent as to create emergencies in some lines of business and to produce sharp and painful crises in others. At such times, the demand for remedies often creates confusion of thought, so that slow and far-reaching policies are suggested [97] 98 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X as cures for transient evils. It happened, as has already been explained by a distinguished speaker, that a greatly delayed advance in freight rates to meet the needs of the railroads took effect at the very time when agricultural prices were rapidly falling by reason of the curtailment of European markets. To advocate a ship canal to connect our Great Lake systern with Europe by way of the St. Lawrence, as a remedy for this particular crisis, would be something like proposing the inven- tion and adoption of new methods of fire prevention at the moment of an actual conflagration. If one is considering the relation of railroads to business prosperity in the more permanent sense, it becomes important to remember that the railroad systems of the past and of the present are merely a concrete expression of the phases of our economic development as we have spread across the country from Atlantic to Pacific. The early railroads followed the lines of pioneering progress, while the later railroads pushed ahead in order to aid more rapidly in the settling of the great West. Nearly all of the problems affecting American railroads are best understood by studying them in close relation to the facts of our economic history, as we have taken vast expanses of new country, opening up agricultural and mineral resources, and creating communities occupied by many millions of settlers. The transportation methods and conditions of the future are also, like those of the past, to be vitally related to changing conditions in the nation's development as a whole. There will always be long-haul business for the railroads in ample volume ; but there will be a relatively increasing intensity of short-haul traffic movement if the country is to continue to expand in a normal and healthy way. Vast surpluses of agricultural pro- duction in the Mississippi Valley and the farther West, in the nature of things, are a temporary phase. Obviously the agri- cultural development of these regions was destined to come first. But the growth of towns and cities, and the transplan- tation of varied industries, were sure to follow. To an increasing extent the bread-stuffs, the beef and poric and the fruits of the central and western States will be con- sumed by populations within their own boundaries. Europe is not destined to live upon the wheat of the United States, nor even upon that of Canada. It is far more important for the [98] NO..V ffOW RAILROADS ADAPT THEMSELVES 99 interior of the country to develop its own transportation sys- tems and expand its own varied economic life than to advocate large expenditures which would look to future markets beyond the Atlantic. The group system as proposed in the new Transportation Act would seem to be in accord with the normal tendencies of the country. We shall continue to have a very large traffic that is national in its scope. New England will make articles that will be sold in every State. The citrous fruits of Florida and California will find consumers everywhere. Natural cen- ters for the production of iron and steel, like Pittsburgh or Birmingham, will hold preeminence and will find markets be- yond their own districts. But the tendency will be towards intensive regional development. The agriculture of the East, which has been abnormally depressed and neglected, will be revived under conditions of a more normal and permanent character. Not more than twenty-five per cent of the fruit- growing capacity of the Eastern States is now utilized. Obviously it is highly important that there should be im- mediate study of freight rates with a view to adjustments for the lightening of specific burdens. But our recent experiences, which have brought distress to wide regions and heavy loss to particular industries, will have been attended by some in- direct advantages. Localities will see the greater relative value of home markets, and will endeavor to import industries rather than to export commodities. It was natural enough that in the earlier period the emphasis should have been placed upon the long-haul. The story of the transcontinental lines, of the eastern trunk lines, of the granger lines, all has to do with the eastward movement of surplus agricultural products and the westward movement of various commodities and supplies. A marked trend toward equalization of average conditions, as our Western States be- came mature, was gradually producing changes of a normal and healthy sort when the great European war reversed all tendencies and created a market condition unknown before in the history of the world. Along with the movement of men and war material to the eastern seaboard, there arose an un- , precedented European demand for food and commodities of all kinds. Price-fixing by Government, and prompt payments [99] JUN «"' :[00 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X through the United States Treasury, made European markets seem the most desirable of all things to Western producers. It has not been easy to accept the fact that this war-time phase was wholly abnormal, that it will never return, and that pros- perity must be found at home or nowhere. One of the greatest benefits that could come to our trans- portation interests themselves would lie in the purchase of railway securities by Western and Southern investors, in order that the definite and conscious control of their own major agencies of travel and traffic movement might become localized. Our program this afternoon is designed to bring the question of freight rates and their relation to general prosperity before us from the standpoint of several practical and theoretical stu- dents of these subjects, who are recognized as authorities in their respective fields. [lOO] THE TRANSPORTATION COST IN A BASIC INDUSTRY— STEEL PRODUCTS CHARLES R. HOOK Vice-President and General Manager, American Rolling Mill Company, Middletown, O. IN talking on the subject " Transportation Costs in Steel Products ", I do not presume to speak for the Steel Industry. However, the figures which I shall present, although applicable to plants making high-finished sheet steel, are, I believe, indicative of what is true with respect to all other steel products. In arriving at the quantity of iron ore, coke and limestone used in the production of one ton of pig iron we have used as a basis the amounts shown by the Southern Ohio pig-iron manufacturers in the ore case before the Interstate Commerce Commission. To make one ton of pig iron, the following quantities of raw material are required: Iron ore 2 gross tons Coke 1.10 net tons Limestone 50 net tons The quantity of pig iron used in the production of one net ton of finished sheets is taken from our own detailed cost sheets. If you will refer to the chart you will observe that we have presented figures showing the accumulated freight in the five principal raw materials in a net ton of finished steel sheets delivered at St. Louis. The city of St. Louis is used only be- cause it is a natural market for a plant in our locality. This freight today is $24.07, in 1914 it was $11.84, showing an increase of $12.23 today over the period at the beginning of the World War. If we deduct the freight from Middletown to St. Louis, which is $6.80, we have $17,271 as the .amount of accumulated freight in these items at Middletown. Sheets which are being delivered on orders taken prior to [lOl] I02 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X this month were sold at $60.00 per net ton ; in other words, this item of $17,271, representing the accumulative freight in only the six items enumerated, is equal to 28.8% of the sales price. 3 si CM i en o 1 — o o o CJ c 1 — Cl c o c c c c 1 — o o 1 c c 4 r 1 — *5 c ~S C I g H' 1 i 5 o « n — as s ss « vt. ■ s "^: 1 § ? Ok ,% . c O b O - 11 ' 5 8 ° § » i 8 " 1 ^■ if i!'? saas s 1 . 1 s s 1 i 5 o a s 2 s a 1 1 i 1 i 1 ? 1 ! I s 1 • c • i ats i 1 s n "" u 1 » o c « O c 5 s c c *> a c r- m s 1 J g o o j ; i ^ s c 2 2 s S i " 1 By reference to page 24 of the Twentieth Annual Report of the United States Steel Corporation, just issued, we find this statement : [102] No. I] TRANSPORTATION COST IN A BASIC INDUSTRY 103 A number of elements in the cost of producing steel show little if any recession from war-time figures, notably that of railroad trans- portation, which on basis of existing rate conditions averages in the case of the subsidiary companies upwards of forty per cent of the total cost of producing steel. If we were to add to the figures we have shown on the chart the freight on all the other materials and supplies used to produce a ton of sheet steel, you can readily see that the state- ment just quoted is certainly conservative as to the facts. In announcing new and lower prices for steel products, going into effect on July 5, 1921, President Grace, of Bethlehem Steel, said : The increase in freight rates has been the largest factor in increas- ing the cost of manufacturing steel products because the making of a ton of finished steel involves the transportation of more than five tons of raw materials. The cost factors next in importance are materials and labor. Taking as an example the price for structural shapes, under the new schedule of prices, 2 cents a pound or $44.80 a gross ton, the comparison with pre-war prices, reflecting concretely the three more important cost factors, is as follows: The increase over pre-war cost in transportation on ore, coal, lime- stone, scrap and miscellaneous supplies amounts to $7.85 per ton of finished steel. The accumulated freight in sheet bars would I believe com- pare very favorably with the freight in structural shapes, yet sheet bars represent only the beginning of operations in the production of finished sheets, so by a little use of the imagina- tion you can readily see what the total transportation cost in a ton of sheet steel would be, if all the materials used in all the operations were included in our figures. It may interest you to know for instance, that in 1920 we used: 5555 Net tons spelter 11335 Net tons sulphuric acid 26173 Net tons fire brick of all kinds. As an illustration of the conditions existing in 1914 as com- pared with today I should like to present the facts with refer- ence to our coal supply. In 1914 the average price of all the coal we bought was 93c per ton at the mine; the freight was $1.15, making a total cost of $2.08 per ton f. o. b. Middletown. [103] I04 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X The freight alone today is $2.24, or 16c more than the freight plus the cost of the coal in 1914. It is our opinion that transportation costs must be liquidated to somewhere near the same percentage above the base of 1914 as is true with respect to steel prices. To secure liquidation of transportation charges, comparable with that which has already taken place in the steel industry, will require a reduc- tion of approximately 28^/2% in present rates. I think I am safe in saying that the steel industry as a whole wants not higher prices but lower costs in order that its surplus production can be sold in the markets of the world in com- petition with our fellow-manufacturers across the water. I am not unmindful of the part railroad wages are playing in the cost of transportation and I submit to you that it is not reasonable to ask the steel worker, who is receiving a wage fifty per cent above base, to buy transportation cost in every- thing he wears and eats when that cost is so largely affected by railroad wages one hundred per cent above base. Until the restoration of approximately the same relation- ship which existed between transportation, fuel, the various basic commodities and wages during the pre-war period is effected, a normal exchange of commodities cannot take place and any attempt to maintain one of the factors of cost at a high level in the face of radical declines in the other factors, is contrary to economic law and its depressing effect is cumulative. [104] HOW THE RAILROADS MAY RENDER MAXIMUM SERVICE WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM Professor of Transportation, Harvard University IN this attempt to suggest a partial answer to the question assigned to me for discussion, I have adopted the view- point of the near future, assuming that the much-desired business revival is not far distant. Under present conditions of subnormal traffic there is no serious question concerning the ability of the railroads to meet the immediate transportation needs, although the standard of service as a whole is lower than that which should obtain in normal times and the scale of freight rates, dislocated as it is by two substantial war-time horizontal increases, is inequitable in many respects and de- mands early revision. We are, however, not so much con- cerned with the immediate present as with the near future when the transportation demands will be much greater and when the capacity of the railroads will perhaps be overtaxed. It is hardly necessary here to dwell upon the fact that rail- road development has been virtually at a standstill since the beginning of the World War. The normal rate of enlarge- ment and improvement in facilities and equipment had been seriously retarded prior to the war when the steady decline in the rate of return on investment prevented the usual income appropriations for betterments and increased the difficulties connected with raising new capital on reasonable terms. It will be recalled that the peak-load of receiverships came in 1915 when about one-sixth of the entire railroad mileage of the country was in the hands of the courts. The additional operating revenues from the large volume of war traffic in 1916 averted the threatened general financial collapse, and the government rentals and guarantees from January 1, 1918, to September 1, 1920, enabled the railroad companies to maintain solvency. Yet, while general bankruptcy was avoided, the program of extension, enlargement and improve- ment was necessarily limited to emergency needs, and when [105] Io6 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X the railroads were again entirely on their own resources from September 1, 1920, the arrearage in deferred but necessary investments in betterments was substantial. Little could be done during the last half of 1920, when the volume of traffic exceeded all previous records, and such plans as were then made for execution in 1921 were necessarily abandoned in greater part in 1921 because of the acute business depression and the serious losses in revenues. Notwithstanding the sub- stantial rate increases of 1920 the net railway operating in- come of 1921 was but little more than one-half of the statutory rate of six per cent contemplated by the Transportation Act as a reasonable return on property value. Various estimates have been made as to the sum necessary to make up the deferred improvements. It is probably close to the mark to set the amount at $1,000,000,000 per year for five or six years. To this should be added a large sum for deferred maintenance chargeable entirely to operating expenses. This need for large capital expenditures was referred to by Mr. Willard this noon who stated that it would be approximately half a billion dollars a year. Mr. Hines thought it might be as much as one billion. It may be recalled that ten or twelve years ago, the late James J. Hill stated that the railroads needed a billion dollars a year for five years for terminal enlargements. My own view is that the larger figure is that which is justifiable, and that the railroads will need during the next four or five years to spend one billion dollars per year for additions and betterments. One billion dollars a year, related to twenty billion dollars property investment, is an increase of only five per cent a year, so that while the sum itself sounds large, it is not so large relatively. Considering the fact that the normal growth in ton-miles over a long series of years has been an increase of one hundred per cent every twelve years, and that passenger miles normally double in approximately fifteen years, it is plainly evident that a consistent and continuous program for increasing traffic capa- city is imperative. Having in mind also the further fact that relatively little has been done to increase traffic capacity during the past decade, the seriousness of the situation is obvious. It is probably true that the traffic of the fall of 1920 was the greatest load that the existing facilities could stand. Since [io6] No. I] RAILROADS RENDER MAXIMUM SERVICE xo; then there have been practically no increases in capacity. In- deed the situation with respect to maintenance, particularly as to freight and passenger car equipment, may be less favorable. If these premises are correct, and I believe that they are, the railroads will have difficulty in rendering satisfactory service when the business revival brings with it a volume of traffic as great or greater than that of two years ago. There is imperative need, therefore, for the expenditure of large sums for additions and betterments. The railroads cannot furnish the maximum of service without such expenditures. The problem then is largely one of finance. With the passage of the Transportation Act and its con- structive rule of rate-making, as well as its recognition of the principle that carriers are entitled to a fair rate of return on property value, and with the rate increase authorized in 1920 by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the purpose of producing a net return of six per cent, it was hoped that sub- stantial progress had been made toward the solution of the financial problem. All calculations, however, were upset by the business depression. Yet it is not proper to interpret the disappointing results of 1921 as an indication that the Trans- portation Act has failed. Its real test must await a return to normal business conditions. My own opinion is that its in- herent soundness will then be demonstrated. I shall digress, if I may, to show how the law of diminish- ing returns can easily explain why the railroads under the high freight rates of 1920 were able to earn only one-half of the rate of return contemplated by the Transportation Act. It will be recalled that the increases authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission were based largely upon estimates made by the railroads, checked and accepted by the Commission. In arriving at those estimates, the amount of the increase was determined by going to the bottom of the income account, and working upward, that is, determining what six per cent on the property value would require, estimating taxes and other items, estimating operating expenses, seeing what the gross operating revenues should be, then finding out how much freight and passenger rates should be increased to bring that gross revenue. The Interstate Commerce Commission then attempted to set rates so as to bring that estimated amount of operating revenue [107] I08 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X which would yield the six per cent contemplated by the Act. It so happened, however, that the volume of traffic upon which the calculation was based was overestimated and some of the expenses were underestimated. Let us assume that that gross revenue is one hundred and that the operating expenses are seventy, leaving the net oper- ating revenue as thirty. Taxes and charges might be as- sumed as five and fifteen, respectively, leaving twenty of taxes and charges to come out of the thirty net operating revenue. That would leave ten as a surplus for the payment of dividends or appropriations. Instead of getting one hundred units of revenue, the rail- roads got less than eighty. For easy figuring, let us assume that they got eighty. That would be a twenty-per-cent de- crease. Expenses could not be reduced twenty per cent with the loss of traffic, because, roughly speaking, only one-half of the expenses will fluctuate with fluctuations in traffic in that degree. If we take that as a basis, one-half of the twenty, or ten per cent, would aff'ect the expenses, bringing the expenses from seventy to sixty-three. The sixty-three expenses, then, would be taken from eighty operating revenues, leaving seven- teen net, instead of thirty. From that seventeen, it would be necessary to deduct twenty for taxes and charges, leaving a deficit of three units instead of a surplus of ten. That is a very simple arithmetical demonstration of the profound eff'ect of a loss in traffic because expenses cannot be trimmed to meet the loss in revenue to the same degree in which that loss in revenue occurred, and besides, taxes and other expenses are constant. That will explain, in greater part, the disappointing results of 1921. It is not an indication of failure of the Trans- portation Act. It is merely the working of economic laws. In the meantime how are the railroads to render maximum service? It seems to me that the answer is: (1) By improvement in management; (2) By better relations with labor; and (3) By patience and tolerance on the part of the public. Without intelligent management, loyal service from em- ployees, and the support of public confidence, satisfactory and economical service is impossible. In whatever degree an im- [108] No. I] RAILROADS RENDER MAXIMUM SERVICE 109 provement is brought about in any one or in all of the three fields, in that degree will progress be made toward the attain- ment of the objective named in the subject of this paper. Public regulation of railroads may have been carried to extremes and in certain particulars such regulation has worked against the best interests of both the public and the railroad owners, yet such criticism as may fairly be directed against regulation applies to policies followed prior to 1920. The Transportation Act of that year marked a new era in which the regulating authorities are charged with new responsibility for the powers which they may wield. Prior to 1920 the spirit of regulation was mainly corrective and punitive. The new law, while continuing the powers of correction and punishment, also recognizes the fact that the prosperity of railroads is es- sential to satisfactory public service and it directs the regulating bodies to exercise their authority so that consideration shall be given, among other things, to the transportation needs of the country and the necessity of enlarging transportation facilities " in order to provide the people of the United States with ade- quate transportation." In return for this public recognition of responsibility and partnership in adequate net earning power, railroad managers should whole-heartedly accept all of the obligations which the Act imposes upon them. In the first place there is the obliga- tion to operate the properties honestly, efficiently and economi- cally. In the second place there is the obligation to recognize the fact that the principle of railroad consolidation is a vital part of the new rate-making rule. A selfish attitude on the part of individual roads in opposing progress toward the eli- mination of the troublesome factor of the weak road, should not be allowed to wreck the most important feature of the new law. I am sorry here to disagree somewhat with Mr. Willard, who, while believing in the principle of consolidation, regards it as not vitally important. It seems to me that it is a vital part of the successful working of the rate-making rule, inasmuch as it is only by consolidation that the so-called weak roads can be strengthened, by being absorbed by the stronger roads. In the third place, there should be a more receptive attitude toward really constructive measures which look toward uni- fication of facilities and pooling of freight equipment. All [109] no RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X such proposals have their defects, some of them serious, but when a plan such as that of common ownership and control of freight cars is so obviously advantageous in principle, an effort should be made to make it workable, rather than to block progress by condemning the whole because of a defect in a part The railroads as a whole quite properly protest against the efforts of those who support the Capper Bill which would eli- minate the rate-making provision of the Transportation Act, yet a few of the railroads will just as surely destroy the effec- tiveness of the law by attacking the principle of recapture of excess earnings, or by appealing to the courts to overthrow the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in a recent important case affecting the division of revenues on joint traffic. The best interests of the railroads as well as those of the public will be served by a whole-hearted acceptance of every part of the Transportation Act to the end that it may have a fair trial under normal conditions. Finally, the railroads as a whole should agree upon and make effective a fair and enlightened policy toward labor, recog- nizing the joint partnership in an ungrudging spirit and with- out antagonism against unions as such. The Transportation Act provides the necessary machinery for the restoration of amicable relations. The responsibility for the failure to get together on important principles cannot be charged entirely to management but it must assume a share. The fear on the part of the unions that some railroads are attempting to use the present opportunity to disrupt their organizations has a very disturbing influence. Economical operation and maxi- mum transportation capacity are impossible while labor rela- tions are strained beyond the legitimate and natural degree of difference in the respective viewpoints of employer and employed. But the remedy is not wholly in the hands of management The public has a right to demand that employees shall recog- nize the relation between loyal and efficient service and econom- ical and satisfactory transportation. Misled by their leaders, an increasingly large proportion of employees believe that railroad management as a whole is corrupt, and their resist- ance to the inevitable deflation in war-time wage rates and restrictive rules is carried to an extreme which, while aimed [no] No. I] RAILROADS RENDER MAXIMUM SERVICE m at management, disregards public interests in the restoration of normal conditions. Just as railroad managers as a whole must recognize their obligations as the operating heads of public utilities, so must the labor leaders and the union mem- bership be brought to a realization of the fact that they too are amenable to the bar of public opinion. The obligation of the railroad managers to pay fair wages is no greater than that of the employees to work efficiently. Finally we come to the obligations of the general public. When Congress, in 1919, considered the many plans for the solution of the railroad problem, it responded to an over- whelming public sentiment by rejecting all proposals looking toward government ownership or operation in any form. Pub- lic opinion was unmistakably in favor of a return to the initia- tive and competition of private ownership and management. The passage of the Transportation Act appeared to wipe the slate clean of public resentment and antagonism because of past abuses and mismanagement, and the railroads were returned to their owners with an encouraging degree of public confidence. Principally because of the disturbing effects of the business depression and the burden of war-inflated freight rates, a large part of the public confidence in railroads has changed into an attitude of criticism and distrust. Much of the criticism is the result of misunderstanding. It is commonly believed that the railroads are working under a guarantee from the govern- ment and that they are not accepting their fair share of the pains of post-war deflation. The eff'ect of freight rates upon the cost of living and upon the marketing of commodities has been unfairly magnified, and the atmosphere is befogged by professional propagandists with a mixture of sophistry, half- truth and misstatement. If we are to find a way out of the dilemma short of gov- ernment ownership it can only be by the exercise of patience and tolerance on the part of the public. They must give the railroads time to adjust their costs to changed conditions and to put their house in order for the hoped-for better times and bigger traffic. The public must exercise moderation and tem- perance in their demands for rate reductions. Just now each group of shippers is insisting that the rates in which it is interested must come down at once without regard to the effect [III] 112 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X upon railroad net income and service. Notwithstanding the fact that the present rate scale is yielding only slightly more than three per cent on property value, certain interests are intent upon cutting the heart out of the Transportation Act by repealing its rate-making clause, and upsetting the equili- brium by curtailing the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over state rates. Unless the public will refrain from encouraging Congress to tinker with the existing laws, and from bringing political pressure to bear upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to make wholesale downward rate adjustments while the rail- roads are barely able to pay taxes and charges, there can be little progress made in putting the transportation machine in order for the heavy traffic load which will probably soon be in sight. Patience and tolerance, and a reasonable degree of con- fidence in the integrity of railroad management, will serve the real and long-time interests of the public much better than impatience, intolerance and distrust. Adequate service and a factor of safety in traffic-carrying capacity are more important than low rates. An insistence upon rates which are unre- munerative will work against the rehabilitation of the railroad properties, prevent the making-up of deferred maintenance and effectually block the flow of income and new capital into imperatively needed and long-delayed improvements and enlargements. [112] WHAT RAILROADS ARE DOING TO INCREASE ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION R. H. AISHTON President, American Railway Association, Chicago; Former Regional Director, Northwestern Region, U. S. Railroad Administration I HAVE been assigned twenty minutes in which to deal with a rather large subject. How large it is, I doubt whether many people realize. For example, in the year 1921 the Class 1 railroads performed the following service. They moved 306 r'n billion tons revenue freight one mile _ 37J^ billion passengers one mile To do this They created I^V billion train miles They earned syi billion dollars They paid operating expense 4K billion dollars There was paid in wages SjV billion dollars, the decrease over pre- vious year being due to depressed business, deferred maintenance and consequent large reduction in number of employees. That is all I shall say regarding billions or millions. It is hard for me to comprehend what a million is, to say nothing of a billion. Let us get down to something we can all under- stand without undue mental strain. I have been allotted twenty minutes. I started talking at 5 :00, I will finish and sit down at 5 :20, and during that twenty minutes this will have hap- pened on the railroads. During the twenty minutes that I am talking the energy developed by the railroads is equivalent to moving a train consisting of a locomotive with ten freight cars carrying 311 tons of revenue-paying freight, with two more freight cars containing 38 tons of Company freight that doesn't produce revenue, with two passenger cars containing 38 paying passengers together with the employees necessary to operate the train, with the necessary postal, baggage and express car. and a little old red caboose, a total of 17 cars, a distance of 37,500 miles, or once and one-half times around the earth at its greatest circumference. What do they get for performlnif thht service? The year 1914 is taken for comparison because tiiSl IJ4 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X it was a year of depression and because it marked the start of the European war, the beginning of all our troubles : In 1914 every 20 minutes the gross earnings were $iiS.347 In 1021 every 20 minutes the gross earnings were .... . . • 209,074 Increase— ^2% In 1914 every 20 minutes the operating expenses were... $83,844 In 1021 every 20 minutes the operating expenses were... 173.0S2 Increase— 107% In 1914 the pay roll for 20 minutes $50,888 In 1921 the pay roll for 20 minutes • • 100,379 Increase — 107% The above figures indicate what the matter is. In addition, the following facts should be considered. In 1914 every 20 minutes there was paid in taxes '. . ^5ii59 In 1921 every 20 minutes there was paid in taxes 10,526 Increase — 104% In 1914 every 20 minutes the net Railway operating in- come, which is the amount left after payment of ex- penses and taxes, was $25,153 In 1920 it practically disappeared, being only • . ; - ; ; • 822 In 1921, however, with an increase of 3,091 millions in investment over 1914, the net operating income every 20 minutes was 22,755 In other words, whereas the book value increased l&% between 1914 and 1921, the net railway operating in- come earned on the investment thus increased actually decreased 9ib%. What are the Railroads doing to bring about economy and efficiency ? In 1921, although the times were depressed, as was the case in 1914.— They handled 7.7% more revenue ton-miles than they did in 1914. They handled 8.0% more passenger-miles. They did it, however, with 10.6% less train-miles, and the train-mile is what creates expense. There must have been ecorK)my and efficiency manifested there, surely. In 1920, with a large business, as compared with 1914, with a light business : — There was an increase of 44% in revenue freight-ton-miles, and about 36% in revenue passenger-miles, and yet this was accomplished with the same train -miles, practically, as in 1914 C114]' No. I] ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION "5 As a matter of fact, it was 300 miles less every twenty minutes than in the 1914 period. Truly a notable record. There isn't a railroad but what has been and is making the strongest individual efforts, through its own organization of experts, to develop new methods of efficiency and economy. I doubt if there is any industry in the country that has any more complete check on the minutest details of its operations, or that has competitive initiative developed to a higher degree, than the transportation companies. The field for economy in the future lies largely, in my opinion, in two main directions : (i) Heavier car loading. One ton more per car load is equivalent to adding 8o,ooo cars to the supply. (2) More mileage per car per day. One mile additional is equivalent to adding zoo,ooo cars to the supply. These two things the railroads and shippers are vitally inter- ested in and they are working cooperatively towards the ulti- mate g^al. Besides this there are, of course, the large intensive developments requiring large capital expenditures that will produce economies. When the time arrives when such ex- penditures can with safety be made with a hope of reasonable return, as great progress will be possible in the future as has taken place in the past. The time limit has now expired. It is 5 :20. Our train has completed its twenty-minute journey once and one-half times around the world ; but while this talk stops the train must still keep going day and night through storm and sunshine, through business depression and great activity, without a hitch but with constantly increasing speed and cargo, if this nation of ours is to continue to expand. THE TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF COAL J. D. A. MORROW Vice-President, National Coal Association, Washington, D. C. SPEAKING as I do as Vice-President of the National Coal Association, which is an organization of bitumin- ous coal producers, what I have to say on the subject of the transportation factor in the price of coal refers particu- larly to bituminous coal and not to anthracite. When the ordinary consumer pays his coal bill he thinks he has paid for coal. As a matter of fact what he has chiefly bought and paid for is transportation service from the coal seam to his furnace room. The discussion of this factor in the cost of coal usually centers about railroad transportation, but in order that you may appreciate more fully the part which the railroad plays in the whole problem of transporta- tion of coal, I want to speak very briefly about some of the transportation problems involved in volume production of coal. Transportation of bituminous coal from the mine to the consumer begins at the face of the coal seam underground, often two or three or four miles from the tipple where the product is dumped into railway cars. Various methods are used in that underground transportation, ranging all the way from primitive haulage by mule or horse in very small mines to splendid motor haulage over miniature electric railway sys- tems in the larger modern mines. If the mine is a drift mine, that is if it goes directly into the hillside, the trains or " trips " of inine wagons are hauled out and dumped directly into rail- way cars. If it is a shaft mine, the wagons are brought to the foot of the shaft, uncoupled, lifted to the surface, and then dumped into railroad cars. Sometimes the mine wagons are dumped at the shaft bottom into skips which bring the coal to the surface. The cost of transporting coal underground upon the mine haulage varies, of course, with many different local conditions, such as the type of haulage used, the grades in the mines, the [ii6] No. I] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF COAL nj length of haul, the extent to which falls of the roof have to be cleaned up, the extent to which bottom conditions necessi- tate repairs to track and increase the track maintenance cost, and similar factors. The range of mine haulage cost is gener- ally between 20 cents and 35 cents per ton, on the basis of present wage scales, out of a total average production cost for 1921 of $2.94 per net ton. There are extremes, of course, above and below those figures, but they represent the general range of transportation costs at the mine at present. Approxi- mately 80% of this haulage cost is direct labor cost in the operation of the mine transportation system. The other 20% is made up of cost of supplies, repair parts and power, and of depreciation on the haulage system. It must be remembered that these railway systems are «iuipped with expensive electric or storage batteries, or with compressed air locomotives, and that many of the mines have a large number of cars underground. They are equipped with heavy steel rails. The operators have the problem of maintenance of track under the adverse conditions common to coal mines, with constant falls of slate and rock from the roof, with other difficulties with roof and bottom, with a certain amount of corrosion from mine water and so on. The main- tenance of way underground is much more difficult than the maintenance of a railway system on top of the ground. All of these factors enter into that cost of underground transporta- tion. Moreover, the mine transportation system is not used twenty-four hours in the day, as is an outdoor railroad system. The second element in the transportation cost of bituminous coal is the railway freight rate. Railway freight rates on bituminous coal at present are approximately 93% higher than in 1913. They range from 90 cents per ton on short hauls to $7.25 per ton on such movements as that from the mines of Utah and Colorado to the Pacific Coast. According to George M. Shriver, Vice-President of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the present average railroad transportation charge on all revenue bituminous coal is $2.27 per ton. Not all of the out- put of bituminous coal bears this transportation charge. Of the total normal production approximately 11% is used at the mines and 89% is shipped away. This 11% is made up as follows : About 3.7% is sold locally to consumers in the vicinity t"7] Il8 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vou X of the mines; 2% is consumed by the mines themselves for power and fuel purposes; and 5.3% is made into coke at the mines. The 89% which is shipped away from the mines moves as follows: 2% by water, chiefly on the Monongahela, Kanawha, Ohio and Mississippi Rivers; and 87% by rail. One-fifth of this 87% is non-revenue railroad fuel coal. This coal is used on the lines of the originating carriers and while it bears a transportation cost, no charge is made by the carrier for the movement of its own fuel supply. This leaves approxi- mately 69.5% of the normal output of bituminous coal as revenue freight, which moves at an average transportation charge of $2.27 per ton. On this coal the total railroad freight charge is something over $780,000,0.00 annually at the present freight rates. It is of interest here to call attention to the further fact that this 69.5% of bituminous coal which bears a definite rail- , road transportation charge is made up of 9% distributed through retail coal dealers to household and small industrial consumers and 60.5% consumed by carload users of coeJ. The latter consumers, such as railroads upon whose lines there are no coal mines, electric light and power plants, street railways, gas works, by-product coke plants, manufacturing establish- ments of all kinds, exporters of coal and ship bunkering con- cerns, pay the freight on that coal themselves; so that their delivered price is made up of the f. o. b. mine price plus the railroad freight on the coal. For the three months of Janu- ary, February and March, 1922, the general market level of bituminous coal prices for the United States as a whole aver- aged between $2.05 and $2.33 per ton for run of mine coal. By run of mine coal I mean the coal just as it comes to the surface, without any further cleaning or preparation than what it has received from the miners underground. Bituminous coal is sold not only as run of mine but also in a number of different sizes ranging from fine screenings to eight-inch lu^ip. Just as the freight rates on bituminous coal varied from 90c per ton to more than $7.00 per ton according to the haul, so also the open market prices for bituminous coal during the winter ranged from 75 cents per ton for screenings to $5.00: per ton for the highest grade of especially prepared domestic lump coal. [n8] No. T] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF ^ COAL 1 19 Before passing on from the subject of railroad transportation of coal I desire to call your attention to another significant fact. Not only is it true, as I have already pointed out, that the freight charge on coal makes up over one-half of the total delivered cost of coal, but it is also true that the freight charge on coal constitutes a much larger percentage of the total deliv- ered cost than is the case with almost any other commodity, and also that the increases in freight rates granted during and since the war have borne with special hardship upon bitumin- ous coal. These facts may be b^st shown by a few typical illustrations taken from actual shipments before the begin- ning of the strike. Let us compare coal with another bulk basic commodity like cement There is a considerable movement of cement from Allentown, Pennsylvania, to Fairmont, West Virginia. Simi- larly bituminous coal moves in the opposite direction from Fairmont, West Virginia, to Allentown, Pennsylvania. In 1914 the freight rate on a carload of cement was $75.00, or 22.1% of the value of the shipment. The freight rate on a- carload of coal was $87.75, or 58.5% of the value of the shipment. See now how the increases in freight rates between 1914 and 1922 affected these figures. In January, 1922, the freight rate on the cement had been advanced to $142. 5&, and now constituted 41.9% of the value of the cement. Mean- while the freight rate on the coal had been increased to $160.65, or 107.1% of the mine cost of the coal. In other words, while the actual increase in the rate on coal was only $5.40 more than that in the rate on cement, that increase constituted 48.6% of the value of the carload of coal and only 19.9% of the value of the carload of cement. It will be readily seen that if such a relation existed in the case of cheap bulky commodities it would become still more striking in the case of more valuable articles. Without un- necessary details let me quote two other illustrations. Cotton is shipped from Opelika, Alabama, to Birmingham, Alabama, and there is a reverse movement of bituminous coal. In 1914 the freight rate on cotton was 1.4% of the value of the com- modity, while that on coal was 50%. As a result of rate in-- creases. the freight rate on cotton in January, 1922 was 3% of the value of the shipment, while that on bituminous coal [119] J20 RAILROADS AND SUSISESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X was 95.2% of that value. In other words the increase amounted to 1.6% of the value of the cotton, and 45.2% of the value of the coal. On the shipment of automobiles from Detroit to Athens, Ohio, and of bituminous coal from Athens, Ohio, to Detroit, we have the following corresponding figures. In 1914 for automobiles the freight rate was 1.1% of the value of the ship- ment, while on the coal the rate was 63.9% of that value ; in January, 1922, for automobiles the percentage was 2.4% and for bituminous coal 137.2%, showing an increase in the case of automobiles amounting to 1.3% of the value of the ship- ment, and in the case of bituminous coal to no less than 73.3% of the value. These illustrations are sufficient to g^ve force to the point often made, that the transportation charge on coal is so high as to constitute a serious burden upon the consumer, and furthermore that the method of increasing freight rates in recent years has greatly augmented that burden. While bituminous coal for household use constitutes be- tween 11% and 12% of the total output, about 3% out of this 12% is consumed in the vicinity of the mines and does not move on railroad lines. On the remaining 9% freight is paid from the mine to the retail dealer's yard. It then must bear an additional transportation charge, namely, the trans- portation cost of the retail delivery of the coal. Little definite detailed information is available as to this particular item of transportation cost. Inquiry among representative retail deal- ers, however, indicates a range in transportation costs for the delivery of domestic bituminous coal of from 70 cents per ton to $1.75 per ton. The low delivery costs are obtained where large lots are delivered regularly in 5 to 10 ton trucks. The high costs are incurred in small irregular deliveries to house- holders. The difference in the volume of deliveries may double the cost of delivery in summer as compared with winter. It should be clearly understood here that haulage cost is only a part of the cost of retailing coal. Office and yard employees' wages and salaries, insurance premiums, taxes, telephone and telegraph charges, allowance for depreciation of plant and equipment, and losses due to degradation and deterioration of the coal handled, constitute a large part of the total cost of retail coal distribution, just as many other items besides haul- age go to make up the total cost of mining coal. [120] No. I] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR JN THE PRICE OF COAL 121 What is the prospect for a reduction in some of these trans- portation costs in the prices of bituminous coal ? So far as the haulage cost in the mine is concerned, reduc- tions in wage scales at the bituminous mines will, of course, correspondingly reduce the haulage cost of the coal, and there is a constant progressive improvement in mine haulage facili- ties and methods which tend to lower costs. With respect to railway transportation charges on bitumin- ous coal, the Interstate Commerce Commission now ^ has under consideration the evidence submitted in its general inquiry into the present level of freight rates. As railroad operating costs decline we may expect a decline in the railroad trans- portation charges on coal. With respect to the cost of delivery of bituminous coal by retail dealers, so far as wages paid employees of retail coal con- cerns may be reduced, a corresponding reduction in such retail delivery costs may likewise be anticipated. Better methods of distributing household coal may also gradually operate in the same direction. It is frequently suggested that a steadier movement of coal from the mines to the user would materially lower the trans- portation charge. This opinion is predicated on the assump- tion that bituminous coal moves to market with great seasonal irregularity. Examination of the facts, therefore, may be enlightening as to the possible economies in the transportation of coal which might be effected by an equalization of summer and winter movement. I have analyzed the production of bituminous coal as re- ported by the United States Geological Survey month by month for the last nine years, averaging the monthly produc- tion for the six summer months, April to September, in com- parison with the production for the six winter months, from October to March. Such analysis shows that of the total out- put of bituminous coal during these nine years, 48.9% was produced and shipped from the mines in the six summer months and 51.1% in the six winter months. Considered as a whole, therefore, the bituminous coal industry is not at all a seasonal 1 April 28, 1922. The decision handed down by the Interstate Com- merce Commission on May 16, 1922, reduced all freight rates, includ- ing those on bituminous coal, approximately ten per cent, effective July I, 1922. [121] 122 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X industry ; in fact, but few of the great industries of the United States approach it in steadiness of operation. Whatever economies might be expected from an equalization of summer and winter movement would necessarily be confined to par- ticular coal-mining districts where the movement of coal is seasonal. I realize that a general statement for the industry as a whole, and a general average for the industry as a whole, is somewhat like the average temperature of the patients in a hospital. The average may be pretty nearly normal and yet a particular patient may be seriously ill. On the same principle, while the average seasonal variation for the whole bituminous coal industry is low, there is seasonal movement in some mining districts. This is notably true in the western part of the United States, where the chief con- sumption of bituminous coal is in the households and where the requirements of railways and industrial establishments are comparatively small. At this point let me direct attention to the difference in summer and winter consumption of some of our major indus- tries. Studies by the United States Geological Survey indicate that the railways of the United States consume only 10% or 15% more coal in winter than in summer. The great public utilities, gas plants, electrical plants, street railway systems, by-product coke plants and the steel industry show similar very slight differences between summer and winter consumption of coal. The cement-manufacturing industry consumes more coal In the summer months than in winter. Throughout the great Appalachian coal-mining fields, which produce some two- thirds of our total annual output, the great bulk of the pro- duction goes to these transportation and industrial users. The slight decline in their summer demands upon the mines is counterbalanced by the summer shipments up the Great Lakes to the Northwest, and by rail and water both into Canada and into New England for storage against the succeeding winter's requirements. Thus, throughout all these great coal-producing districts there is no important seasonal fluctuation in the pro- duction and shipment of bituminous coal. The studies of the United States Geological Survey already mentioned show that the one striking difl^erence in amount be- [123] No. I] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF COAL 123 tween the summer and the winter consumption of bituminous coal is found in the consumption of households, the domestic users. From a winter maximum of 10,000,000 tons per month, their consumption drops in the summer to but little over 5,000,000 tons per month. Here is a winter maximum five times as great as the summer minimum compared with only 10 to 20% difference in the case of the railways and industrial consumers. Equalization of the summer and winter movement of coal from the bituminous mines, therefore, considered from a prac- tical standpoint and stripped of all optimistic misunderstand- ing, comes simply and squarely down to a question of persuad- ing the domestic consumer to put in his household coal in fairly regular quantities throughout the year. He who would regulate the production of bituminous coal for the purpose of bringing about steady mine production in the interest of coal mine operators, employees and consumers, should understand clearly that the real regulating must be applied not to the mines, but to the domestic user of the product. It is proper at this point to consider what means may be employed to attempt to equalize the shipments of household coal from the mines throughout the year. Seasonal variations in freight rates have been proposed for this purpose. The National Coal Association has neither advocated nor opposed this measure. Operators in some parts of the country favor seasonal freight rates; other operators oppose the project. It is claimed that a spread between summer and winter rates will induce enough householders to buy coal during the summer so that the production of this type of coal and operation of the mines producing it will be stabilized throughout the year. Opponents of this proposal assert that in most districts a very wide spread would have to be employed in order to bring about such a result, because it would have to compensate the consumer for the additional expense entailed in carrying his coal supply for some months and for any degradation of the coal while in storage. In the mining districts which are in most need of summer business, the mines of Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa and Illinois, the coal deteriorates decidedly in storage even in the householders' cellars, while the output of the lignite mines of Colorado, which furnish the fuel of Denver, eastern [133] 124 RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X and western Kansas, and Nebraska, will not store at ail, but must be used fresh from the mines. Opponents also point out that the increased railroad rates on coal in the winter time would have to be paid by those consumers who can least afford to pay the charges, namely: the poorer class, those householders and consumers who have neither the facilities nor the money to permit them to take advantage of the lower summer rates. Such a system, there- fore, would simply penalize these poorer consumers of coal and benefit their richer neighbors at their expense. Railroad offi- cials object that a decided change in freight rates on a given date would result in shipments being withheld just prior to a decrease in freight rates and being increased prior to an ad- vance in rates, with a consequent irregularity of mine and railroad operation in the period immediately preceding and following the change in rates. It has been suggested also that producers of bituminous coal should make a difference in their prices at the mine, reducing the price levels in the spring and gradually increasing them through the summer, so as to persuade the consumer in that manner to take in at least a part of his coal supply during the spring and summer months, thereby stabilizing production. It will be readily seen that much of what has been said as to seasonal variations in freight rates applies here with equal force. In addition, it should be pointed out that competition in the open market normally reduces prices to their lowest levels in the early spring months when demand is at a mini- mum. Since bituminous coal prices are determined by com- petition in the open market no individual operator, or group of operators is any more able to arrange in advance a schedule of prices month by month throughout the year than a grower of hogs in Indiana can determine in advance the price at which he will sell his hogs in different months. It has been found possible for distributors of anthracite coal to put arrangements of this character into effect, but they are dealing with a com- modity which can be stored readily and of which the produc- tion is limited by nature, so that methods of marketing the out- put can be applied there which are wholly impracticable in the case of bituminous coal. It is frequently urged that coal producers should store a [124] No. 1] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF COAL 125 part of their output at the mines in summer and thus render the operation of their properties more stable and regular. This proposal has the defect of being impractical. Coal mines are organized, equipped and operated to send coal forward on a continuous journey from the face of the coal seam to the boiler room of the consumer. The production, transportation and distribution of that coal is obtained at the most economical cost when that movement is uninterrupted. As it comes from the underground mine wagons coal is dumped directly into railroad cars and shipped straight through to the plant or retail yard of the buyer. That is the most economical manner in which coal can be produced and moved. If it is carried two or three miles from the face of the coal seam underground out into the daylight at the mouth of the mine and there dumped on the ground or put into storage bins from which it must be again loaded into cars, there is an increase in the cost of the coal consequent upon the additional handling involved. There is also a certain degradation and deterioration of the product in storage. This stored coal must be sold by the producer who has stored it at a higher price than his freshly mined coal, if he is to avoid a loss on the operation. But on account of the deterioration of the product during storage this stored coal for which he must ask a higher price is a less efficient and less desirable fuel than his freshly mined coal which his salesman can offer at a lower price. If he should attempt to equalize his prices or place a sufficient premium upon his freshly mined coal to allow him to sell his higher-cost storage coal at a discount he will merely invite numerous competitors to take his business away from him through their offers of freshly mined coal at prices below his quotations. In short, a producer who should store considerable quantities of his own coal at the mines would inevitably find himself caught between the competition of his own freshly mined coal and his stor- age coal, and would have to accept an inevitable loss on the transaction in consequence. No sane business man would attempt any such enterprise, nor would he get any sane banker to finance it even if he were foolish enough to try it. The proposal is impracticable for another reason. The m^nes already open have an over-capacity of approximately ["Si ,26 JtAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPBRtTY [Vot. X 40%. In other words, these mines can currently furnish 40% more freshly mined coal than the country needs. In the absence of strikes at the mines the only thing which has ever prevented the mines from meeting all demands of consumers with current daily shipments of freshly mined coal direct from the mine tipples has been the inability of the railway lines to transport the tonnage demanded by consumers. These consumers have never failed to get their coal because of in- ability of the mines to produce it, but only through the in- ability of the railroads to handle it when shipped. Now, if the railroads in time of maximum demand are not able to place railroad cars enough at the mines to carry away the coal that is being mined from day to day, what opportunity would a mine operator have to obtain cars to take coal from storage in addition to shipping his usual daily output? As a matter of fact, there is already a tremendous storage of coal in the United States, not in the mining districts, but where the storage ought to be, namely, in or adjacent to the consuming centers. Consumers and wholesale and retail dis- tributors of coal in the United States have provided facilities in which they regularly store from 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 tons of bituminous coal annually. Just prior to the signing of the Armistice they had stored over 60,000,000 tons and at the beginning of the present strike they had utilized these facili- ties to store approximately 65,000,000 tons, in addition to the amount upon the docks at the head of the lakes. If the capacity of these dodcs is included, the total possible storage by consumers and distributors of coal in the United States exceeds 70,000,000 tons. This is practically all storage by the consumers, who own these great stocks and are, therefore, insured against any raising of prices on this tremendous ton- nage. Storage of this kind has developed wherever it is prac- tical ; that is, wherever the service to the user of the coal in actual practice justifies the investment and the expense of installing and operating the facilities for storage and com-- pensates him for the deterioration of the coal. TTie greatest future saving in the cost of moving coal from the mine to the user will doubtless come not through the adop- tion of artificial devices in the coal industry, but through trans- porting the energy in the coal instead of the coal itself. By [«?6] No. I] TRANSPORTATION FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF COAL 127 this I mean that long-distance, high-tension transmission of electricity and the transmission of gas manufactured from the coal will be the practical means of reducing the transportation cost to the user of the energy of coal. Engineers already look forward to utilizing a large part of the output of bituminous coal at the mines or in the immediate vicinity of the mines and to transmitting from the mines to important consuming centers in the form of electricity or gas the energy thus developed from the most efficient combustion of the coal. They also look forward to a much more general use of gas as a domestic and household heating fuel than at present. Such transmission of energy from the mines would go far to remove coal from the rails of our transportation systems, upon which coal now constitutes approximately one- third of all the freight moved. Improvement in the manufacture of gas from coal, with the consequent wider use of gas as a domestic fuel, is expected to reduce the ultimate cost of heating our dwellings. There is not time here to discuss the details of developments in these directions. Let me merely say that competent authorities be- lieve the future will bring almost revolutionary changes in the transportation of coal through the means just indicated. [i»7l APPENDIX THE SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING (FORTY-SECOND YEAR) OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 28, 1922 The Committee on Arrangements, which also served as the Program Committee, planned for three sessions at this meet- ing to consider the three most important problems growing out of the actual experience of the country with, and operations under, the " Transportation Act, 1920." The Academy, at its Annucil Meeting in November, 1919, had discussed quite fully the railroad problem in all its various aspects at the close of the war and while the railroads were still under Federal control. The very substantial volume on " Railroad Legislation " (Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. VIII, no. 4, Jan., 1920, 268 pp.), which contains the papers and ad- dresses presented at that meeting, gives a good account of the considerations under discussion in Congress while the Trans- portation Act was still in its formative stages. This volume, together with the text of the Transportation Act, 1920 (Act Feb. 28, 1920), which is too voluminous to reproduce here, should be studied as the basis of the program of the meeting of April 28, 1922. The three problems which seemed to the Committee to cover the most important matters of present public interest and to serve as a means of following up the discussion of railroad legislation at the Annual Meeting of the Academy in Novem- ber, 1919, are: (1) The labor provisions of the Transportation Act; (2) The general railway policies of regulation and control with respect to the general or public welfare; (3) Freight rates and business revival. To each of these a special session of the meeting of April 28, 1922, was devoted. The thanks of the Academy are due to the railway executives and to the economists and publicists who have specialized in transportation problems, who gave generously of their time and service in the work of the Committee on Arrangements, and in the preparation of papers and addresses delivered at the meeting. [1*9] RAILROADS AND BUSINESS PROSPERITY [Vol. X COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY, Chairman ex-officio WILLIAM L. RANSOM CHARLES M. SCHWAB HENRY R. SEAGER EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN ALBERT SHAW T. W. VAN METRE PAUL M. WARBURG FRANK J. WARNE 130 FRANK H. DIXON HOWARD ELLIOTT MILTON W. HARRISON ELON HUNTINGTON HOOKER EMORY E. JOHNSON ROBERT S. LOVETT VICTOR MORAWETZ CHARLES P. NEILL PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Volume IX, Number 4, January, 1922 CONSTRUCTIVE EXPERIMEOTS IN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES EDITED BY Parkek Thomas Moon and Sam A. Lewisohn TABLE OF CONTENTS I. PERSONNEL WORK AND COOPERATION WITHIN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS Personnel Work and Cooperation Sam A. Lewisohn Employee Representation and Personnel Work in a Large-Scale Organization Charles B. Seger Stabilizing of Employment on a Diversified Seasonal Industry . . Henry S. Denntson Winning the Confidence of Employees by Taking the Mystery Out of Business S. R. Rectanus Insurance Against Unemployment in a Plant Harold A. Hatch Executive Leadership and Personnel Work in Public Service Corporations ..E.K. Hall Discussion : Owen D. Young, C. J. Hicks and Sidney Blumenthal 11. INDUSTRY-WIDE COOPEKATION Standardization and Cooperation in the Printing Industry Matthew Wall Standardization and Cooperation in the Printing Industry K A. Silcox Joint Relations in an Industry Without Plants Ernest 7 rjj-^ Cooperation Within the Clothing Industry Earl Dean Howard Joint and National Counseling in the Electrical Construction Industry -.L.K. Comstock Cooperation in Industrial Relations in the Leather Goods Industry. ..S.y, Prokesch Discussion : G. J. Anderson III. GOOD WILL AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRY The Value of Good Will and Cooperation in Industry .Herbert C. Hoover The Way to Industrial Peace B. Seebohm Rowntree Good Will and Cooperation in Industry from the Worker's Point of V\evt.ffvgh Frayne Government Counsellors and Efforts to Promote Cooperation James J. Dams The Value of Good WUl in Government Employment Will H. Hays IV. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT AND IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Industrial Relations in Governmental Employment Albert Shaw Personnel Work in the Post Office Department Lee K. Frankel The Rock Island Arsenal Conference Plan Pay son Irwin Job Analysis in Prisons and State Institutions Burdelte G. Lewis Personnel Administration in the Federal Government W. E. Mosher Personnel Activities in Financial Institutions Harry Arthur HepJ V. GOVERNMENTAL AND OTHER ORGANIZED COUNSEL AND INFOR- MATION TO PROMOTE BETTER INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Better Industrial Relations Glenn Frank Philadelphia Plan of Self-Education of Foremen Joseph H. Willits Industrial Counseling Work, N. Y. State Industrial Commission . . . Charles M. Mills What the Chamber of Commerce Can Do for Better Industrial Relations. /f/«*.C.i9;-ozf« What Are the Universities and Technical Schools Doing to Train Their Under-graduates in Industrial Relations Dexter S. Kimball The Manufacturers' Council of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce. . /T. H. Doehler Discussion : H. C. Afetcal/and Henry Harap, and others Appendix— Bibliography Feldman This volume sent post-paid in paper covers for ^^1.50 and cloth-bound at prices quoted on request. .Sent to members of the Academy as part of current membership privileges. Men and women interested in the work of the Academy are invited to become members. There is no initiation fee. Annual dues are ^5.00. Life-mem- bership fee $100. Address, Academy of Political Science, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York City. THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK BOARD OF TRUSTEES President Samuel McCune Lindsay Vice-Presidents Albert Shaw Secretary Parker Thomas Moon Paul M. Warburg Treasurer George A. Plimpton Executive Secretary and Assistant Treasurer Ethel Warner Directors Charles E. Hughes Thomas W. Lamont Adolph Lewisohn V. Everit Macy Ogdbn L. Mills William I,. Ransom Henry R. Seager Edwin R. A. Seligman MuNROE Smith ^ Henry L. Stimson Frank A. Vanderlip Managing Editor of the Political Science QuaHerly Parker Thomas Moon The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, is com- posed of men and women interested in political, economic and social questions. The annual dues are $5. Members re- ceive as part of their membership privileges the current issues of the Political Science Quarterly and the Proceedings of the Acad- emy and are entitled to admission to all meetings, lectures and receptions under the auspices of the Academy. Members and subscribing members are urged to notify the Academy office of any change of address. If members and subscribing members wish to discontinue membership in the Academy notice to that effect should be sent ; otherwise it is assumed that a continuance of the member- ship is expected. Commiunications regarding the Academy should be addressed to the Secretary of the Academy of Political Science, Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York.