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THE NAVY AND THE NATION 
 
THE NAVY AND THE NATION 
 
 OR 
 
 Naval Warfare and Imperial Defeaxe 
 
 LiEUT.-COL. Sir GEORGE S. CLARKE, K.C.M.G., F.R.S. 
 
 AND 
 
 JAMES R. THURSFIELD, M.A. 
 
 Meya yap to rrj? 6akd(Ta~q<; Kparo^ 
 
 LONDON 
 
 JOHN .MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET 
 
 1897 
 

 Lt/ 
 
 / 
 
 i.^xDoN : 
 
 VRINTED 0V WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS. 
 
The Authors desire to express their grateful thanks to the 
 Proprietors and Editors of the Quarterly and National Rrdews, 
 the Times, iht Naval A/untal, and the United Service^ Magazine, 
 to the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute, and to the Com- 
 mittee of the Royal Artillery Institution, for their permission to 
 republish the following Essays. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I'AGB 
 
 Introduction ... ... ... ... ... i 
 
 Imperial Defence ... ... ... ... 12 
 
 The Navy and the Colonies ... ... ... 41 
 
 Naval Manceuvres and their Lessons ... 51 
 
 Navies and Commerce ... ... ... ... 92 
 
 National Insurance ... ... 105 
 
 The Command of the Sea ... 118 
 
 The Armada ... ... ... 152 
 
 Captain Mahan's Writings ... ... ... 188 
 
 The Jeune 6cole Francaise ... ... ... 199 
 
 The German Strategist at Sea ... ... ... 215 
 
 England and the Mediterranean ... ... 228 
 
 The Training and Supply of Naval Officers ... 243 
 
 Submarine Mines in Relation to War ... 269 
 
 Can England be Invaded? ... ... ... 305 
 
 MAPS AND PLANS. 
 
 la. 
 
 The Mediterranean 
 
 To /ace 228 
 
 I. 
 
 Mobile Bay 
 
 » 275 
 
 IL 
 
 New Orleans ... 
 
 ... „ 276 
 
 III. 
 
 Harwich ... 
 
 „ 293 
 
 IV. 
 
 Port Louis, Mauritius 
 
 ... „ 294 
 
 V. 
 
 Singapore 
 
 On next page to Plate IV. 
 
 VI. 
 
 The Mersey 
 
 ... To face 298 
 
 ^11. 
 
 Chart of the ^VoRLD ... 
 
 At the end. 
 
THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 " England," wrote Sir Walter Raleigh, "is a country that 
 can never be conquered while the sovereigns thereof have 
 the command of the sea." Behind Raleigh lay centuries 
 in which the sterling truth of the principle here enunciated 
 had been amply vindicated. From Saxon times the 
 territorial security of England and the power exerted 
 externally had depended solely upon naval strength. In- 
 vasions, successful or averted, commerce crippled or 
 prosperous, had taught one lesson; but the term "com- 
 mand of the sea" had as yet a restricted application. In 
 the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the North Sea, rival 
 navies had contended for mastery ; but the laws governing 
 naval warfare, the conditions determining naval strength, 
 and the far-reaching scope which that strength confers, had 
 received full illustration. The " influence of sea power 
 upon history " had already been abundantly manifested. 
 
 The age of Elizabeth was a real turning-point in the 
 career of the British nation. The dream of Continental 
 possessions had faded away, and for nearly one hundred 
 and fifty years after the loss of Calais, British troops ceased 
 to figure on European battlefields, although expeditionary 
 forces were frequently employed against isolated points 
 
 B 
 
2 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 on hostile shores. With the exception of a futile effort 
 of James I., military entanglements in European affairs 
 played no further part in the national history till renewed 
 by William III. Meanwhile, the germ of the Royal Navy, 
 originated in the reign of Henry VII., was destined to bear 
 rich fruit The rout of the Armada, presaged by Drake's 
 descent upon Cadiz, carried with it far more than the mere 
 failure of a projected invasion. The great naval Power of 
 the age, the Power which was established in the Americas, 
 and monopolized the ocean commerce of the world, was 
 vanquished on its own element. Henceforth, the New 
 World lay open to British seamen. Where Spanish ships 
 could sail, they, too, could direct their course, Spanish 
 treasure, whether afloat or on shore, became available 
 booty. The way was open for the expansion of England, 
 and the term " command of the sea " began to acquire a 
 wider significance. 
 
 Nothing is more remarkable than the prescience and the 
 instinctive grasp of naval conditions manifested by the 
 great seamen of Elizabeth. To them was given the clear 
 vision of a future in which the Navy of England, dominating 
 the seas, would lay the foundations of Empire. That the 
 rule of the sea was the natural heritage of the British 
 people, that this rule implied security at home and power 
 abroad, that commerce under the aegis of the flag would 
 thrive, and that the naval policy of a commercial Power 
 must be essentially offensive ; these were the articles of a 
 living faith. Ships were clumsy, and the art of sailing had 
 scarcely emerged from infancy. Moderate stress of weather 
 sufficed to paralyze naval action. But the seamen of the 
 sixteenth century knew no doubts or fears, and it was left 
 to generations living in days when the sea had been almost 
 robbed of its terrors to discover the precarious nature of 
 naval defence, and to dilate upon the risks arising from, 
 wind and storm. Confronted with a threatened invasion 
 on a vast scale, having regard to the then military resources 
 of England, Howard and his captains were unanimous in 
 urging that the Armada should be met and fought off the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 coasts of Spain. Ten years before the arrival of the 
 Armada in the Channel, Sir Gilbert Humphrey, pleading 
 with the Queen for the exploration of the North-west 
 Passage, asserted that "no prince's Navy of the world is 
 able to encounter the Queen's Majesty's Navy, as it is at 
 this present ; and yet it should be greatly increased by the 
 traffick ensuing upon this discovery, for it is the long 
 voyages which increase and maintain great shipping." 
 
 The " England " of Raleigh had a population of less 
 than six millions, and a trade insignificant if measured by 
 modern standards. Until after the Union of 1707, Scotland 
 brought no strength to the national cause, while Ireland 
 was a standing source of weakness. The young settlement 
 of Virginia was not founded till 1606, and Jamaica was not 
 wrested from Spain till 1655. Relatively to France, Spain, 
 and Austria, almost to Holland, England was a small State, 
 with few resources. Her one hope of future greatness lay 
 in the manifestation of sea power — in the gifts of what has 
 been styled, with strange oblivion of the plain teaching of 
 history, "the unstable element." The British Empire of 
 to-day embraces eleven millions of square miles, with a 
 population approaching three hundred and fifty millions, 
 and a sea-borne commerce whose annual value is at least 
 ;£' 1, 7 50,000,000 sterling.* This stupendous development of 
 three hundred years has been rendered possible solely by 
 naval agencies. So abundantly has the sturdy faith of the 
 Elizabethan seamen been justified by works. 
 
 Reliance upon the unstable element has found strenuous 
 advocates from the days of Ofifa to our own, but it cannot 
 be said to have supplied the basis of a consistent national 
 policy. Many causes have combined to induce temporary 
 oblivion of the sea, and a full intellectijal and practical 
 acquiescence in the precepts of Raleigh and of Nelson has 
 never been attained. The modern empire of Germany has 
 been created by military force alone. On military force its 
 security absolutely depends, and the fact is firmly gfasped 
 alike by rulers and people. The efficiency of the army is 
 • See below, " Navies and Commerce," pp. 92-104. 
 
4 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 a condition to which all other measures of defence are 
 subservient and for which no patriotic sacrifice is grudged. 
 The Royal Navy is to the British Empire all and far more 
 than her army is to Germany. The military defeat of a 
 great European nation is not and cannot be fatal, or 
 Germany, Austria, and France would not now exist. All 
 are practically self-contained ; none is dependent for very 
 life on sea-borne trade, and for Empire on territory linked 
 together by the sea alone. Naval supremacy, till the 
 sixteenth century, implied the command of home waters 
 and the territorial security of a small island. To the minds 
 of the seamen of Elizabeth it signified the promise of a 
 mighty future. To the British Empire of to-day, it is the 
 only possible guarantee of national existence. Deliberately 
 offensive in its objects three hundred years ago, and un- 
 consciously offensive in the later struggles with Holland, 
 Spain, and France, it is now strictly defensive. The period 
 of expansion at the cost of other Powers ended nearly 
 a century ago, and Great Britain has now no need of and 
 no desire for further aggrandizement of this nature. The 
 sacred duty remains to us of guarding the national honour 
 and handing down our splendid inheritance intact to our 
 descendants. 
 
 The naval history of the world is spread over more than 
 two thousand years, during which the technical conditions 
 of naval warfare have undergone continuous change. Yet 
 the long record is consistent throughout. Naval supre- 
 macy in the contest between Greeks and Pei-sians, Romans 
 and Carthaginians, Great Britain and Spain, Holland, and 
 France, Federals and Confederates, Balmacedists and 
 Congressionalists, China and Japan, conferred the same 
 powers and entailed the same consequences. The element 
 of time alone modifies the aspect of modern maritime 
 operations. In proportion to the speed of fleets, and to 
 their independence of weather, is necessarily the prompt- 
 ness of the results attained by them. Naval battles will be 
 decided now by precisely the same qualities as those which 
 gave victory at the beginning of the century, and almost 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 certainly by the same weapon. There is no essential differ- 
 ence between the defeat of the Armada and the battle of the 
 Yalu. Tactics will now, as formerly, be directed to obtain 
 an advantage in the use of the gun. The means adopted 
 will vary ; but the object remains the same. The command 
 of the isea may, however, be more quickly asserted now than 
 formerly, and will take effect over a wider area. The range 
 of the menace of a superior fleet is increased by reason 
 both of the rapid transmission of intelligence and of the 
 enhanced speed with which that intelligence can be followed 
 up by action. It has been argued that the factor of speed 
 confers equal advantage upon the inferior navy ; but this 
 is not the case. The time required for landing troops, or 
 for operations against an enemy's sea-board, has not been 
 reduced in even approximate proportion to the gain in 
 rapidity of movement at sea. It follows that the menace 
 of an undefeated fleet, even if slightly inferior, or not more 
 than equal, to the force seeking to undertake an act of 
 territorial aggression, is greater now than it was in the 
 days when it proved consistently effective. Again, assum- 
 ing equal strategic ability in the directing heads, it is the 
 superior navy which must gain most from the new power 
 of accomplishing swift and certain combinations, and the 
 results of naval victory or defeat will be felt more quickly 
 and more widely than formerly. Lastly, steam commerce 
 is far less easily assailable than was the shipping which 
 relied for motive power upon sails alone. The latter had 
 a limited choice of courses, and its movements could con- 
 sequently be predicted with tolerable certainty. A sailing 
 ship could not clear a port at nightfall, and be a hundred 
 miles away at daybreak. A group of such vessels menaced 
 by a cruiser could not at once separate on widely divergent 
 courses. A chased sailing ship, if over-matched in speed, 
 had small chance of escape. A steamer once lost sight 
 of at night or in thick weather is practically safe. These 
 and other considerations indicate clearly that in the 
 wars of the future naval supremacy will possess greater 
 intrinsic value than in the past, that commerce is more 
 
° THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 easily protected, and that the command of the sea has 
 now a significance which neither Raleigh nor Nelson 
 could have divined. All modern progress has tended 
 to enhance the power of the naval weapon, and to remove 
 many of the uncertainties by which naval action may 
 have seemed to be beset. The superior fleet was liable 
 to be dispersed and even shattered by a storm which its 
 antagonist might escape. Ships engaged in the observa- 
 tion or the blockade of an enemy's port might be blown 
 far out to sea by the very wind that favoured the egress 
 of that enemy. This cannot now occur, and the reduc- 
 tion of the risks of the sea favours the superior naval 
 power. Coal supply is the new requirement of fleets, and 
 the measure of their potentiality. Given an adverse com- 
 mand of the sea, the difficulties of obtaining coal in distant 
 waters will, to the inferior navy, prove immense, and the 
 superior force thus receives an added advantage. It is 
 true that the home coaling stations of the great Powers 
 are practically unassailable, and that their foreign stations, 
 if adequately garrisoned, would entail considerable expedi- 
 tions for their capture. In distant waters, however, Great 
 Britain has almost a monopoly of coal, which is secure so 
 long as naval supremacy is maintained ; while for the free 
 action of fleets the employment of colliers is essential, and 
 this, in the case of the inferior force, will be attended with 
 risks so great as to cripple, if not to prohibit, the prose- 
 cution of large strategic designs. From every point of 
 view, therefore, enhanced advantages favour " those that 
 be strongest by sea." 
 
 Throughout our long history there have been periods 
 in which the gifts of the sea have been flouted, entailing 
 in some cases a swift Nemesis. Political conditions, 
 oblivion of the teaching of war, or the perverse counsels 
 of individuals in authority, have induced neglect of the 
 national Navy, and encouraged reliance upon subordinate 
 and — for Great Britain — wholly ineffectual measures of 
 defence. War has thus found the country unprepared, 
 and heavy losses, easily avoided, have been entailed. So 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 soon as stern necessity has arisen, the rehabilitation of the 
 fleet has forced itself upon the nation as the one indis- 
 pensable means of guaranteeing territorial security at 
 home and abroad, and of giving effect to the national 
 will. The lesson has been driven home by dire need, 
 and it is not in times of war that reflections as to the 
 uncertainties of naval operations, and the precarious nature 
 of naval defence, have found countenance or even expres- 
 sion. At the beginning of the present century, the nation 
 had learned in the school of experience to trust the Navy. 
 With a long peace came reaction, aided by a strange mis- 
 reading of the lesson of the Crimean and American Wars. 
 Ships had failed before the defences of Sebastopol and 
 Cronstadt — failed, that is to say, in tasks which did not per- 
 tain to a navy. Armies at length achieved a limited result. 
 Fortifications defended by a steadfast garrison, under the 
 direction of a soldier of genius, developed a resisting power 
 which was all the more impressive because in forty years 
 of peace the history of sieges had been forgotten. In the 
 imagination, therefore, of a generation which had not known 
 naval war, armies and fortifications came to be regarded 
 as the main defence of the greatest of maritime States. 
 The Navy, in popular phrase, remained the "first line," 
 since, if afloat, and not dispersed by storms or decoyed 
 away into space, it would probably have the earliest con- 
 tact with an enemy who could attack only over sea. But 
 an army and fortifications were held, after all, to be the 
 real safeguards upon which must ultimately fall the burden 
 of Imperial defence. It was natural, therefore, even logical, 
 that an era of fortification should supervene, and that a 
 policy of passive defence should be tacitly accepted. As 
 naturally, the strength of the Navy was allowed to decline 
 till the annual vote for shipbuilding was equalled or ex- 
 ceeded by that of France, who within a few years of the 
 disasters of 1870-71 began to steadily increase her fleet. 
 It is indisputable that the vast expenditure upon measures 
 of passive defence which was inaugurated in 1859 checked 
 and stunted the growth of the Navy. Too much, however, 
 
8 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 may be made of this point, and the actual expenditure is 
 of small account in comparison with the warping of the 
 national policy and the establishment of false standards, 
 which only a great war can efface. After many millions 
 had been uselessly squandered, the scares of 1878 and of 
 1885 were widely felt. It was realized that the nation was 
 quite unprepared, and that measures of passive defence, 
 however academically satisfactory, were quite unsuited to 
 the needs of war. The contrast between the feeling of 
 insecurity which prevailed in 1878 and 1885, and the calm 
 confidence displayed at the beginning of the present year, 
 supplies an object lesson of peculiar significance. 
 
 Not as part of a consistent scheme of national policy, 
 not on the initiative of a great statesman, was it at length 
 determined to strengthen the fleet. The Naval Defence 
 Act of 1 889 was due to the efforts of writers and speakers, 
 who by appeals to history and to reason aroused the 
 mind of the nation to a sense of peril. For the moment 
 national effort is redirected upon the Navy, and whatever 
 the Admiralty demands will be cheerfully provided. We 
 have again a fleet worthy of the Empire, and the moral effect 
 of the rehabilitation of our waning naval strength has been 
 visibly far-reaching. The phrase " command of the sea " 
 is on every tongue. That naval supremacy, to be quickly 
 asserted on the outbreak of war, is essential to our exist- 
 ence as an Empire, will now be nowhere contested. How 
 deeply the great movement of the last eight years has 
 penetrated cannot be determined. Whether we are in 
 presence of a mere reaction from the fatuous theories to 
 which a long peace had given rise ; whether the abrupt 
 awakening of the nation may not be succeeded by a new 
 period of sleep ; whether the forces which, since 18 15, have 
 tended to draw public attention away from the Navy are 
 definitely arrested or only in abeyance ; whether the dreams 
 of military intervention on European battlefields still 
 linger; all these questions cannot be answered. In the 
 awakened interest in naval affairs and the growing intelli- 
 gence shown in discussion, there appears to be substantial 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 ground for hope. Yet there are not wanting signs that 
 if peace should happily endure, another swing of the 
 pendulum is possible. That the sea communications of 
 the Empire must be held in war ; that if they are so held, 
 territorial security against serious attack both at home and 
 abroad is, ipso facto, provided ; that if they are not so held, 
 no army of any assigned magnitude, and no fortifications 
 of any imagined technical perfection, can avert national 
 ruin ; these are the cardinal principles of Imperial De- 
 fence. " Under the conditions in which it would be possible 
 for a great Power to successfully invade England, nothing 
 could avail her, as the command of the sea being lost, it 
 would not require the landing of a single man upon her 
 shores to bring her to an ignominious capitulation, for by 
 her Navy she must stand or fall." So, in 1 888, wrote three 
 distinguished admirals,* including a past and the present 
 First Naval Lord of the Admiralty. This clear statement 
 applies with equal force to every portion of the Empire. 
 It is, of course, conceivable that India or Canada might 
 be lost, though the command of the sea were retained ; 
 but, on the other hand, if the command of the sea were 
 lost, neither could be defended. By concentrating atten- 
 tion upon what is inaccurately called " home defence," upon 
 the local military problems of India, upon the supposed 
 technical requirements of an individual fortress or the 
 needs of a single colony, first principles are easily obscured. 
 The defence of an Empire such as ours cannot, however, 
 be dealt with in piecemeal fashion, and to the test of great 
 principles each question must be referred. These principles 
 rule all minor issues, though this fact is at present imper- 
 fectly grasped. 
 
 Above and beyond the details of local defence lies the 
 domain of national policy. Here also the necessity of 
 maintaining naval supremacy — vital to us alone among 
 the Powers of the world — ought to dominate every other 
 consideration. Did the inevitable advance of Russia from 
 the Caspian to the frontier of India imperil our naval 
 
 • Sir W. Dowell, Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, and Sir F. Richards. 
 
lo THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 supremacy? If not, of what use were the flood of de- 
 clamation and the protracted diplomatic warfare, each 
 alike undignified and futile, of which the sole result was 
 the estrangement of two nations which have no real cause 
 of disagreement. Is the military occupation of Egypt 
 essential to the command of the sea ? Would a Russian 
 occupation of Constantinople, some twenty-six hours' steam 
 from Sebastopol, compromise our naval position ? Does 
 the tenancy of Cyprus hold out the prospect of any naval 
 advantage in the event of war ? At the root of all these 
 and other matters lies the question of the Navy. If once 
 the determination to hold the command of the sea is per- 
 mitted to supply the basis of the national policy, clear 
 daylight would shine through the mist of doubts and 
 difficulties. 
 
 In the earnest hope of riveting attention upon the 
 question of the Navy, of indicating its wide scope and 
 many ramifications, of warding off reaction, and of helping 
 to provide an assured basis for a great scheme of Imperial 
 policy, these essays have been republished. The writers 
 have long held in common, and often discussed together, 
 the leading views here propounded ; but each is exclu- 
 sively responsible for the original form and substance of 
 the essays to which his initials are attached. The close 
 concurrence of view to which they have been separately 
 led may perhaps serve to enhance the intrinsic weight of 
 their reasoning. The lack of co-operation and of a common 
 design in the original preparation of the essays emphasizes 
 the essential unity of purpose which pervades them. In 
 conjointly revising their work for republication, the writers 
 have, therefore, deliberately refrained from expunging coin- 
 cidences of argument and expression which derive a mutual 
 support from the circumstance that they were entirely 
 undesigned. 
 
 The several subjects here dealt with in disjointed fashion 
 are intimately co-related. One ruling idea permeates all 
 alike. The command of the sea must now be held by 
 Great Britain, and to this condition all others have become 
 
INTRODUCTION. ii 
 
 subordinate. It has been fulfilled in the past, less perhaps 
 by deliberate design than by necessity demonstrated in 
 great wars. We dare not wait for a fresh demonstration, 
 since the national stake in the sea is now far greater than 
 in the days of Nelson. Even if it were possible ultimately 
 to restore the situation, the early losses arising from an 
 initial failure of sea power would now suffice to shake the 
 foundations of the Empire. With deliberate and avowed 
 purpose, therefore, must the required preparations be made. 
 The impulse imparted in 1889 must be sustained, and the 
 more widely the question of the Navy is brought home to 
 the masses at home and in the Colonies, the brighter will 
 be the hopes of the future. Closer than at any period of 
 our history, intimate as Raleigh could not have foreseen, 
 are now the relations between the Navy and the Nation. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 J. R. T. 
 
12 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 IMPERIAL DEFENCE.' 
 
 More than two thousand three hundred years ago a 
 patriot statesman inaugurated a great scheme of national 
 defence, and laid the foundations of an Empire. Seventy- 
 three years later that Empire was shattered, and to the 
 scheme history, in part, ascribes the catastrophe. 
 
 Even before the Persian invasion, the sea power of 
 Athens had conferred upon her a position of marked 
 distinction among the states of ancient Greece, and when 
 the victory of Marathon and the immortal defence of Ther- 
 mopylae proved alike unavailing to arrest the advancing 
 hosts of Xerxes, it was Themistocles, at the head of two 
 hundred Athenian ships, who nevertheless vehemently coun- 
 selled naval resistance. The oracle of Delphi had announced 
 that "when all was lost, a wooden wall should still shelter 
 the Athenians," and Themistocles affected to find in this 
 ambiguous phrase the presage of naval victory. 
 
 Athens was almost deserted when the Persians entered. 
 Her citizens had fled to Troezen and .(Egina, or lingered 
 houseless on the shores of " rock-bound Salamis." The fate 
 of Greece was entrusted to the fleet hemmed in the narrow 
 straits, and no sea-fight was ever more decisive than that 
 which followed. Having signally failed to hold the 
 command of the sea, Xerxes, alarmed for his communica- 
 tions, at once retreated to and across the Hellespont, leaving 
 Mardonius to be defeated in the following year at Plataea. 
 The Persian invasion had disastrously failed, and Herodotus 
 
 * Read at the Royal Colonial Institute, February ii, 1896, and 
 republished by permission of the Council. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 13 
 
 fifty years later could fairly claim that Athens had been 
 "the saviour of Grecian liberty." 
 
 The realization of a great danger barely escaped led to 
 a pacific revolution, of which the fleet, like that of James 
 II., was the principal instrument, and out of the chaos 
 created by the Persian invasion, Aristides set himself to 
 organize a league of national defence. The " Confederacy 
 of Delos " was formed to unite the lonians in preparations 
 to resist the common enemy. Its basis was purely naval ; 
 for in the year 478 B.C., the meaning of the term "command 
 of the sea " was perhaps better understood than in our day, 
 and if the application was practically limited to the Eastern 
 half of the Mediterranean, the principle was at least so 
 clearly recognized as to supply the leading motive of a great 
 national policy. The confederates agreed to an annual 
 contribution of money or ships to be assessed by Aristides, 
 and all were to send delegates to take part in periodical 
 discussions of the affairs of the League. Dominated by 
 Athens, the confederacy was employed to further her 
 ambitions. After the death of Aristides and the banish- 
 ment of Themistocles, Pericles rose to supreme power, and 
 Athens was launched upon her brief career of Empire. 
 " The reward of her superior training," said Thucydides, 
 " was the rule of the sea — a mighty dominion — for it gave 
 her the rule of much fair land beyond its waves, safe from 
 the idle ravages with which the Lacedaemonians might 
 harass Attica, but could never subdue Athens." " Pericles," 
 writes Sir Edward Creasy, " made her trust to her empire 
 of the sea." 
 
 The objects of the Confederacy of Delos were, however, 
 easily forgotten; the tribute increased even when no danger 
 pressed, and the accumulated funds were misapplied to the 
 fortifying of the Imperial city. Dissatisfaction and jealousy 
 grew apace. The outbreak in 435 B.C. of hostiUties between 
 Corinth and her colony Corcyra brought on the Pelopon- 
 nesian war ; while the disastrous failure of the expedition 
 against Syracuse, in 413 B.C., inflicted a deadly blow on 
 Athenian supremacy. The Spartans made common cause 
 
14 THE XAVY AND THE XATIOX. 
 
 with Cyrus, and the capture of the fleet of Conon in the 
 Hellespont at length placed Athens at the mercy of 
 Lysander. 
 
 I have dwelt for a moment on this chapter of history, 
 because the Athenian Empire, like our own, depended 
 entirely upon naval supremacy and a great Colonial system, 
 and because, in the confederacy of Delos, I trace an 
 attempt to solve, by means of statesmanship, a problem 
 analogous to that with which we are now confronted. 
 
 Of all the Colonial systems which the world has known, 
 that of ancient Greece stands nearest to our own ; but the 
 analogy is not by any means complete. The Greek 
 colonies owed their origin to the pressure of population, to 
 strong commercial instincts, and occasionally to civil 
 dissensions. They were politically independent, and the 
 bond of union with the Mother Country was easily broken, 
 so that war with each other or with the parent state was 
 not unusual. They were impelled to maintain navies as a 
 safeguard to the commerce upon which their whole prosperity 
 depended. While contributing to the prestige of the Mother 
 Country, they were not regarded as sources of profit ; nor, 
 prior to the confederacy of Delos, were they organized with 
 a view to national defence. And so slight was the bond 
 that temporary self-interest might impel them to take 
 common action with one another and the parent state, or 
 might act as a severing force. Though claiming descent 
 from a common ancestry, the Greeks were never a 
 homogeneous people. .(Eolians and Achjeans in the mythic 
 age, Dorians and lonians in historic times, formed distinct 
 branches, which were geographically and politically much 
 subdivided ; for the Greek unit was the city rather than 
 the State in the modern sense, and the multiplication of 
 such units tended to differentiation. From the parent city, 
 the colony swarmed off like bees from a hive, and the 
 colony itself, when prosperous, continued the process, till 
 the shores of the Mediterranean were lined with Greek 
 settlements which, though closely adjacent, might be not 
 only politically distinct, but mutually hostile. Sicily alone, 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. i; 
 
 before 550 BC, held no less than twelve such colonies, a 
 single one of which — Syracuse — is said to have had a 
 population exceeding that of Queensland to-day. 
 
 No strong race sentiment united the Greeks as a whole ; 
 no long and glorious common history served to inspire 
 their imagination with the idea of national unity. They 
 were proverbially fickle, and endowed with a fatal genius 
 for intrigue. Themistocles, greatest of Athenian admirals, 
 was able to carry on treasonable correspondence with the 
 Persians, and died a pensioner of Artaxerxes. Pausanias, 
 the great general of Sparta and the victor of Platsea, readily 
 accepted the gold of Xerxes. Under such conditions, it 
 was inevitable that the scheme of national defence which 
 Aristides initiated should end in failure. The problem, 
 difficult for us, was, for the Greeks, insoluble. 
 
 The present development of the British Empire finds no 
 parallel in the world's history. Not only does the scale of 
 the interests at stake enormously exceed all the experience 
 of the past, but the political conditions have no valid counter- 
 part. On the one hand, the sea-borne trade of Greece, 
 Carthage, and Rome in ancient times, and of Spain, 
 Holland, and France in later days, was relatively trivial. 
 On the other hand, self-governing Colonies in any way 
 comparable to Canada, South Africa, and Australasia, 
 have never previously existed. From out of the rich and 
 varied teaching of the past the principles of the defence 
 of a maritime Empire stand forth clear and unchangeable. 
 As to the method of applying those principles, however, no 
 light shines from the pages of history. Our problem is a 
 new one ; since the present conception of a Colony is a 
 growth of the nineteenth century. 
 
 Burke plainly foresaw what has now come to pass, when 
 he wrote — 
 
 " I was ever of opinion that every considerable part of the 
 British dominions should be governed as a free country ; otherwise, 
 I knew that if it grew to strength and was favoured with oppor- 
 tunity, it would soon shake off the yoke intolerable in itself to all 
 liberal minds, and less to be borne from England than from any 
 country in the world." 
 
1 6 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Free institutions established in the Mother Country 
 must, as Burke foretold, be reproduced and extended in 
 her Colonies ; but this knowledge was purchased by the 
 nation at a heavy cost — the loss of America. It is perhaps 
 because France and Germany, our rivals as colonizing 
 powers, have not yet attained to freedom as we under- 
 stand the word, that they have so far entirely failed to 
 create a single real Colony. 
 
 But during the period of greatest stress Great Britain 
 had no Colonies in the modern sense. "America," as 
 Burke stated, " was once, indeed, a great strength to this 
 nation in opportunity of ports, in ships, in provisions, in 
 men. We found her a sound, an active, a vigorous member 
 of the Empire." This " great strength " was, however, 
 potential rather than actual. In the contest for Canada, 
 which formed a memorable episode of the Seven Years' 
 War, the thirteen Colonies of North America did not 
 exert a power proportionate to their population. In the 
 New World a hundred thousand French colonists con- 
 fronted fully two millions of the Anglo-Saxon race ; but 
 the latter were split up into separate communities geo- 
 graphically scattered and not organized for common action. 
 In Virginia and along the Eastern slopes of the Alleghanies 
 there was a fine fighting element composed of Scotch 
 colonists from Ulster ; but Virginia, whose troops had 
 taken part in Braddock's ill-fated expedition, was far from 
 the seat of war in Canada, and preoccupied in holding a 
 long line of frontier against Indian aggression. Pennsylvania 
 objected on principle to fighting, unless it was carried on by 
 other Colonies in her interests. North and South Carolina, 
 and Georgia especially, were in a backward state of 
 development. Practically it was from the New England 
 group of Colonies alone that real aid to the national cause 
 was forthcoming. Republican in sentiment, and occupying 
 a comparatively poor territory, they were intellectually in 
 the van of progress. To them the French in occupation 
 of Canada appeared in the light of a standing menace. 
 As early as 1690 their ships and troops had attacked 
 
nrPERIAL DEFENCE. n 
 
 Quebec, and in co-operation with Commodore Warren's 
 squadron, they had captured Louisburg. At the time of 
 Braddock's disaster, the New Englanders were prosecuting 
 the war with success in Nova Scotia, and later they took 
 part in the abortive operations of General Abercrombie 
 and Lord Loudon. When at length Pitt determined to 
 strike a vigorous blow in North America, New England 
 militia fought under Wolfe in the second siege of Louis- 
 burg, as well as at Quebec, and were present under 
 Amherst in the closing scene of the war at Montreal.* 
 It is nevertheless just to state that the domination of North 
 America by the Anglo-Saxon race was mainly secured by 
 a great effort, naval and military, on the part of the 
 Mother Country, that the Colonies did not contribute to 
 this supremely important result in proportion to their 
 capacity, and that of any true conception of the meaning 
 of Imperial defence there is no sign at this period. The 
 fighting in North America was an incident in the great 
 struggle between Great Britain and France for Colonial 
 supremacy. Colonists on both sides took part, and the 
 French Canadians, better organized and far more united 
 than their rivals, wielded a military strength out of 
 proportion to their small numbers. The British colonists, 
 on the other hand, were neither prepared for united 
 ■ ction, nor unanimous in sentiment. The contest was 
 supported by a part of them only, and was entered upon 
 out of regard to local interests rather than to the claims 
 of higher patriotism. 
 
 In the great war which began in 1775 by hostilities 
 between Great Britain and the North American Colonies, 
 whose most vital interests she had just secured, and ended 
 with the treaty of Versailles in 1783, the national resources 
 were strained to the utmost. In 1 78 1, the people of these two 
 small islands were fighting single-handed against France, 
 Spain, Holland, the revolted Colonies of America, and Hyder 
 Ali in the Carnatic. The great struggle was essentially 
 
 • During the Seven Years' War, the North American colonies 
 raised, clothed, and paid about 25,000 militia. 
 
 C 
 
i8 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 naval, and as Captain Mahan states, "The sea power of 
 Great Britain " was " unequal to the task laid upon it." 
 By the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, American 
 independence was conquered. Throughout this critical 
 period, the British people derived some convenience from 
 their Colonial possessions, but no material aid. In fact, 
 the hostility of the North American Colonies, the direct 
 result of gross impolicy, was alike the origin of the war 
 and the cause of its general insuccess. Unhampered by 
 her revolted Colonies, the Mother Country would have 
 triumphed, even without their active aid, over the 
 European Alliance, and this bitter experience was 
 calculated to effectually blind her imagination to the 
 possibilities of Imperial defence. 
 
 From 1793 to 1814, with a brief interlude. Great Britain 
 was engaged in a new war of vast proportions, in the course 
 of which France, Holland, and Spain were again arrayed 
 against her, and for a time Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, 
 menaced her with the so-called " Armed Neutrality of the 
 North." The wonderful story is told with consummate 
 skill by Captain Mahan, whose books should be read 
 wherever the British flag flies. I borrow from him this 
 eloquent summary : — 
 
 " Great Britain will be seen to enter the war allied with many 
 of the nations of Europe against France. One by one the allies 
 drop away, until the island kingdom, with two-fifths the population 
 of France, and a disaffected Ireland, stands alone face to face 
 with the mighty onset of the Revolution. Again and again she 
 knits the coalitions, which are as often cut asunder by the 
 victorious sword of the French army. Still she stands alone on 
 the defensive, until the destruction of the combined fleets at 
 Trafalgar, and the ascendency of her own navy, due to the 
 immense physical loss, and yet more to the moral annihilation of 
 that of the enemy, enable her to assume the offensive in the 
 Peninsula, after the Spanish uprising — an offensive based absolutely 
 upon her control of the sea." 
 
 The result was victory on sea and land, victory which 
 ushered in an era of peace, conferred a naval prestige still 
 enduring, laid the foundations of the modern Colonial 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 19 
 
 system, and secured its unchecked development. In this 
 gigantic conflict, involving the destinies of the British 
 people, Colonial resources played a subordinate part. The 
 possessions of Great Britain in 1793 were considerable in 
 number. They supplied, in Burke's words, "opportunities 
 of port," provisions and water ; for most of them were 
 geographically convenient in regard to naval operations. 
 Colonial troops fought under the flag in the West Indies, 
 and India rendered valuable assistance, especially in Egypt 
 and Mauritius. But, except in Canada, the British 
 Colonist was not, as yet, a real element of fighting 
 strength. The lost Colonies of North America — then 
 the United States — stood aloof, though driven into in- 
 effectual naval hostilities* with France in 1798, and in 
 1 81 2 they drifted for the second time into conflict with the 
 Mother Country. The preoccupations of British statesmen, 
 and a prevailing ignorance of the question at issue, afford 
 the only excuse for this most unnecessary war, which 
 proved ruinous to the commerce of the United States, and 
 sowed seeds of bitterness not yet sterilized. In this un- 
 fortunate struggle, Canadian Militia proved their fighting 
 capacity. 
 
 Throughout the long war which sprang from the French 
 Revolution, the Colonies seem to have been viewed as 
 outlying portions of the national estate, to be defended, as 
 far as possible, by the Mother Country on the ground of 
 their pecuniary value, and because the loss of territory 
 involved a loss of honour and prestige. Their commerce 
 was practically a British monopoly, and in the main the 
 war, as Napoleon well understood, was a contest for 
 <:ommercial supremacy. As independent sources of national 
 strength, they were as yet unrecognized. 
 
 In the dawn of our colonial era, Newfoundland was 
 regarded as of primary importance. " A successful attack 
 
 * " The mercantile shipping of France had already been so entirely- 
 destroyed by Great Britain, that she suffered far more from the cessa- 
 tion of the carrying trade, which Americans had maintained for her, 
 than from the attacks of the American navy." — Mahan. 
 
20 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 on the Newfoundland fleet," said Raleigh, "would be the 
 greatest misfortune that could befall England," since the 
 fisheries were the " mainstay and support of the Western 
 counties." The commercial centre then shifted to North 
 America. "This great city," said Burke of Bristol in 
 1774, "a main pillar in the commercial interest of Great 
 Britain, must totter on its base by the slightest mistake 
 in our American measures." At the end of the eighteenth 
 century, the West Indies occupied the first position. Their 
 trade was at least one quarter of the total commerce of the 
 United Kingdom. "If our islands should fall," wrote 
 Nelson, " England would be so clamorous for peace that 
 we should humble ourselves." In the West Indies, 
 therefore, hard fighting occurred, in which both com- 
 batants, and the French especially, made use of native 
 troops. 
 
 Since the crowning triumph of British sea power in 
 the wars of the French Revolution, the national condi- 
 tions have undergone an entire change. Captain Mahan 
 has shown that between 1793 and 1800 the total war loss 
 of British trade did not exceed 2 A per cent., and was 
 probably less than 2 per cent. ; but this small result of 
 the immense efforts of our enemies was not the most 
 remarkable feature of the period. As the control of the 
 sea was established by her Navy, the commerce of Great 
 Britain steadily increased. The fresh impetus was actually 
 given during the great conflict, and when in 18 14 a general 
 peace swept away all external hindrances, the way was clear 
 for an enormous commercial and colonial expansion. A 
 total trade of about ;if^ 11 2,000,000 in 1800 has grown to 
 about ;^970,ooo,ooo according to official returns for 1893 ;. 
 but there is reason to believe that the latter figure is quite 
 inadequate, and that, estimated according to the methods 
 applied in the same return to the trade of foreign Powers, 
 the figure should be fully ^2,000,000,000.* It seems 
 certain that about two-thirds of the entire sea-borne com- 
 merce of the world is British. Taking the Suez CanaL 
 * See " Navies and Commerce," p. 92. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 21 
 
 as a gauge, the proportion of the whole traffic credited to 
 the three leading Powers in 1893 was: — 
 
 Great Britain ... ... ... 74-18 per cent. 
 
 Germany ... ... ... 7-43 „ „ 
 
 France 6-53 „ „ 
 
 Returns of steam shipping, which are doubtless trust- 
 worthy, give for 1895 : — 
 
 Steamers. 
 Above 17 knots. Total. 
 Great Britain ... ... ... 90 7185 
 
 Germany ... ... ... 14 912 
 
 France ... ... ... 17 555 
 
 Such figures speak for themselves. The predominance 
 of the British nation in the trade of the world is absolute 
 and unapproached. 
 
 The Colonial development upon which this predominance 
 is largely based has been gigantic. Canada, which became 
 British territory in 1763, has passed successively through 
 a period of military rule, and a Provincial constitution 
 inaugurated in 1791 and greatly extended in 1859, to the 
 powerful Federation established in 1 867. A population of 
 300,000 in 1 8 12 has grown to 5,000,000 ; the public revenue 
 has reached ;^8,ooo,ooo ; an external trade of ;^49,ooo,ooo 
 has been built up. The Cape of Good Hope, restored to 
 the Batavian Republic by the peace of Amiens and re- 
 captured in 1806, has in 90 years become a great self- 
 governing Colony with a population of nearly 2,000,000 and 
 a trade of about ^^2 5,000,000. East Australia, with a single 
 settlement of 9000 souls in 1810, has developed into New 
 South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland, with an aggregate 
 population of more than 2,000,000 and a trade of about 
 ;^8 1, 600,000; New Zealand, British territory only since 
 1840, has already a population of at least 600,000 engaged 
 in developing her rich resources, and in maintaining a trade 
 exceeding ;{r 16,000,000. 
 
 Time does not permit me to run through the roll of our 
 Colonial achievements during this century. In 1800, there 
 was no single self-governing Colony as the term is now 
 
22 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 understood. There are now eleven British communities 
 invested with the control of their affairs— eleven vigorous 
 centres spread over the world, from which radiate the 
 principles of civil liberty transplanted from the Mother 
 Country. 
 
 The change in the point of view from which we regard 
 the Colonies is complete ; and the foresight of Burke has 
 been abundantly justified. "As regards our Colonies," 
 wrote Mr. Gladstone twenty-five years ago, "we have 
 gradually reached the invaluable knowledge that one and 
 the same secret of a free autonomy is a specific alike for 
 the relief of the Mother Country, the masculine and vigorous 
 well-being of the dependency, and the integrity of the 
 Empire." No longer hampered, as in Burke's day, by 
 "prohibitions, guards, penalties, and forfeitures," the 
 Colonies have created a trade of ;£'79,ooo,ooo with foreign 
 countries — a trade previously unknown, and possessing a 
 political importance beyond its intrinsic value. 
 
 The magnificent fabric of the Empire thus rests wholly 
 upon a commercial basis. It does not bear the marks of 
 deliberate design ; it is not the result of accident, but the 
 product of natural forces springing from the genius of a 
 free people. One condition was, however, vital to its con- 
 struction. The instinct of sea power, born in the days of 
 the Saxon kings, and handed down by a long line of great 
 seamen, culminated in the wars of the French revolution. 
 Naval supremacy, finally established at Trafalgar, was 
 the necessary guarantee of secure Colonial development. 
 Under the aegis of the British Navy, too little recognized 
 but all present, that development has attained its present 
 dimensions. The menace remained, though the actual asser- 
 tion of power ended in 1814, and for more than eighty years 
 the vast trade of the Empire has gone free upon the seas. 
 If the hotbed Colonial system, which finds favour and 
 extremely little success in France and Germany, has not 
 commended itself to Great Britain, and if subsidies for 
 secondary objects have not always been forthcoming, the 
 Mother Country has, nevertheless, provided for her Colonies 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 23 
 
 the guarantee to which is due their whole progress and 
 prosperity. The human mind easily forgets to inquire into 
 the causes of accustomed phenomena, and the debt of the 
 Colonies to the Navy is not even now fully recognized. 
 Yet in these eighty years of uninterrupted commerce, there 
 have been many occasions when only the menace of an 
 inadequate fleet stood between the nation and war ; while 
 thanks to naval force alone, the campaign of 1854-5 
 imperilled no Colonial interests. The course of recent 
 events has demonstrated in the most striking way the 
 effects of a substantial increase to the Navy. 
 
 The territorial extent of the Empire has reached 
 il,ooo,CKX) square miles, and embraces half the points of 
 vantage of the world. The subjects of Her Majesty number 
 at least 346,000,000, of whom more than 50,000,000 are 
 of our own race. The aggregate public revenue amounts 
 to ;^i97,ooo,ooo ; the naval and military expenditure to 
 about ;£^S 3,000,000, of which the Colonies account for less 
 than ;^i, 500,000. The land forces number more than a 
 million of armed men, of whom upwards of 453,000 are 
 professional soldiers ; * and, in addition, there are fully 
 300,000 men in the prime of life who have received military 
 training. 
 
 The potential strength and the wealth of resources 
 which the above figures imply are unrivalled, and the 
 British nation, thoroughly organized for defence, would 
 defy aggression. If the national confidence does not as 
 yet correspond to the available strength, the reasons are 
 evident. There is, on the one hand, a wide-spread and 
 a well-founded sense of unreadiness, and on the other hand 
 a curious tendency towards self-disparagement in military 
 affairs. The myriad bayonets of the great Powers of Europe 
 dazzle our imagination ; the tremendous drama of 1870-1 
 haunts our dreams. We unconsciously measure our strength 
 by continental standards, forgetting our own history and 
 our special conditions. While it is naturally the policy 
 
 * Including First Reserves at home, Hyderabad Contingent, and 
 local regiments in India. 
 
24 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 of our rivals to assure us of our impotence, there are, 
 nevertheless, signs that the dormant strength of the British 
 nation is not unmarked, and that the astonishing vigour 
 shown during the last period of trial has not passed wholly 
 out of remembrance. Nations, however, like individuals, 
 are for the most part taken at their own valuation. A 
 Power, rich and prosperous, impelled towards expansion 
 by its inherited instincts, and by the natural vigour of its 
 people, yet regarded by foreign nations as weak and 
 unprepared, must always tempt aggression. The apparent 
 disproportion between the activity displayed in every part 
 of the world, and the organized power at its back, is one 
 of the principal causes of our general unpopularity. 
 
 To confer on the Empire strength proportionate to its 
 means ; to insure such due forethought that its immense 
 resources may be quickly and smoothly made available 
 in the event of war ; to define the obligations of individual 
 members ; to decentralize measures of preparation, while 
 retaining the necessary power of imparting an undivided 
 impulse ; and, by thus firmly welding together the scattered 
 units of the Empire, to inspire universal confidence — these 
 are the objects of national defence. Their full attainment 
 would be the surest guarantee of peace, and in one respect 
 at least the omens are favourable. The old view of Colonies 
 as the property of the Mother Country has disappeared. 
 They are now regarded as integral parts of the Empire, 
 contributing to its resources, its prestige, and its stability. 
 The mutual interdependence of Great and Greater Britain 
 is beginning to be understood. We feel the truth embodied 
 in Sir John Robinson's words : " If Greater Britain should 
 fall to pieces, then God help Great Britain." Mr. Deakin 
 spoke for the whole nation, when he declared that " We 
 cannot imagine any description of circumstances by which 
 the Colonies should be humiliated or their powers lessened, 
 under which the Empire would not be itself humiliated, 
 weakened, and lessened." * 
 
 In a greater or less degree the whole prosperity of all 
 
 * Conference of 1 887. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 25 
 
 the members of the Empire depends upon sea-borne com- 
 merce ; to most of them it is vital. To Canada, to South 
 Africa, and to Australasia, a sustained interruption of 
 ocean communications would mean ruin. India grows 
 more and more sensitive even to minor trade fluctuations. 
 Singapore and Hong-Kong are simply great trade centres 
 in themselves almost resourceless. 
 
 The first postulate of Imperial defence is, therefore, a 
 navy able to maintain open communications. A trade 
 which must continue during war can be protected on the 
 seas alone, and fortified harbours — never of first-rate im- 
 portance to the British nation — have lost value in pro- 
 portion to the necessity for the sustained movements of 
 the mercantile marine. The Empire is the proof that, in 
 the past, the Navy was able on the whole to guard the 
 ocean highways. 
 
 Commerce-destroying is sometimes spoken of as if it were 
 a new object of war, a new form of national peril. It is, in 
 actual fact, the oldest of all methods by which maritime 
 Powers have sought to injure their enemies. Against 
 Great Britain it has been tried over and over again. At 
 the beginning of the present century it was attempted 
 with deliberate purpose, backed by all the force at the 
 disposal of Napoleon. It broke down absolutely, and 
 Napoleon, failing at sea, was driven in despair to invent 
 the so-called " Continental system," which demanded the 
 military domination of Europe for effective accomplishment, 
 and entailed the downfall of the inventor. Nothing stands 
 out more clearly from the pages of history than that 
 successful commerce-destroying is possible only to a Power 
 which, by naval victories or by menace, has established 
 supremacy, physical or moral, over the fighting fleet of 
 its adversary. The idea that an inferior Power, keeping 
 its battleships in port, and declining fleet actions, can, 
 nevertheless, bring the trade of an enemy to a standstill, 
 has no basis either in reason or in experience. 
 
 The Alabama, a slow steamer, wrought easy havoc 
 among sailing ships. Her commander has shown how her 
 
26 THE NA VY AND THE NA TION. 
 
 career might and ought to have been cut short ; but in an}' 
 case the restrictions imposed upon sailing vessels render 
 them indefensible in most waters against the attack of 
 steamships. The great majority of British sailing vessels 
 must be laid up during war with a naval Power, and this is 
 a contingency of which Imperial defence must take account. 
 The steam mercantile fleet of the British Empire is, how- 
 ever, never employed up to its full capacity. We have an 
 available reserve of transporting power,* and in less than 
 a year large numbers of fast steamers could be built. On 
 the other hand, a steam mercantile marine, by the elasticity, 
 of course, open to it, and by its power of dispersion in 
 dangerous waters and of concentration upon points which 
 can be guarded, is far more defensible than was the trade 
 which, under the effective protection of the Navy, throve 
 during the wars of the past. Again, the convoy system 
 can now be applied with advantages formerly unattainable. 
 Finally, the American War has shown the difficulties of 
 maintaining commercial blockades. There were vessels 
 which ran into southern ports almost with the regularity 
 of mail steamers, in spite of the utmost efforts to restrain 
 them, and it should never be forgotten that the Confederate 
 States possessed no sea-going fleet. 
 
 The primary duty of the national Navy may be best 
 defined as " the protection of the sea communications of 
 the Empire." I prefer this definition to any other, because 
 it alone is adequately comprehensive, and because it ex- 
 presses the broad view of the relations of the Navy to the 
 Empire as a whole, and serves to correct the narrow local 
 ideas which occasionally find utterance both at home and 
 in the Colonies. The Navy is and must be essentially the 
 defensive force of the Empire. Its functions cannot be 
 localized ; the national security turns upon its effective 
 action as a single unfettered force. To Australasia, the 
 Channel and Mediterranean Fleets are fully as important 
 
 * In 1885, no less than 102 large steamers were employed in con- 
 veying troops and railway plant to Suakim. The whole sea-going 
 steam tonnage of Russia would not have sufficed for the purpose ; 
 but British trade was quite unaffected. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. rj 
 
 as the squadron in Australasian waters ; the interests of 
 Great Britain are defended in China as well as in the 
 Channel. 
 
 That this view is gaining ground is proved by the 
 following extracts from Colonial newspapers published 
 six thousand five hundred miles apart. The Cape Times 
 has stated — 
 
 " We want to strengthen the fleet, not to split it up and distract 
 its forces. The ideal of the immediate future is not a network of 
 petty Colonial fleets which might be chaffering about differences 
 of opinion in the face of the Mede, like the auxiliary ships of 
 Athens before Salamis. The ideal is that while the central power 
 keeps, as keep it must for many a long day, the responsibility for 
 the defence of the Empire, and wields as with one brain and one 
 arm the great weapon which secures this, the scattered parts that 
 depend on this protection should care also to help with the 
 cost." 
 
 At about the same time the Brisbane Courier referred to 
 "the tremendous importance of the British command of the 
 sea to Australasia," and added — 
 
 " Probably no other community of four millions in the world 
 has so large a commerce exposed to so great an ocean risk. This 
 trade reached its present dimensions, and is growing rapidly now 
 under the shelter of the British flag. It is the strength represented 
 by that flag which has preserved peace on the ocean for us." 
 
 These wise and statesmanlike opinions would not have 
 been forthcoming ten years ago. In them we may surely 
 find grounds of hope for the cause of national defence. 
 
 I do not propose to enter upon the much-vexed question 
 of a general Colonial contribution in aid of the one pre- 
 eminently national force. When once the first principle 
 of Imperial defence is fully understood, this question will 
 resolve itself. The arrangement voluntarily entered upon 
 by the Australasian Colonies, if defective in some respects 
 and conceived in a spirit insufficiently catholic, is neverthe- 
 less a satisfactory sign of an awakening sense of a common 
 interest and a common responsibility. Meanwhile, I may 
 point out that the Navy must be homogeneous in organiza- 
 tion, and controlled during war from a single directing 
 
2S THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 centre. There are some few ports where local small craft 
 might find useful employment ; but the Navy which guards 
 the sea communications and unites the scattered members 
 of the Empire, must be one and indivisible. While the 
 provision and maintenance of sea-going Colonial warships 
 would be an extravagant and an ineffective policy, the 
 scattered units of the Empire can nevertheless afford 
 valuable assistance by improving the " opportunities of 
 ports " and by facilitating the creation of local reserves of 
 men. The resources of the Navy are too much centralized 
 within the United Kingdom. Each naval station should 
 be rendered capable, as far as possible, of supplying in 
 every sense and of repairing the ships of its squadron 
 during a period of war. The present system of manning 
 the Navy is not sufficiently elastic, and there are already 
 in some Colonies quasi-naval forces, and in others excellent 
 material, which if periodically trained on board Her 
 Majesty's ships and drilled on shore to the service of naval 
 armaments, would form invaluable reserves in time of need. 
 Herein lie possibilities of advantage which no other Power 
 possesses in equal measure — possibilities which any scheme 
 of Imperial defence must take into due account. 
 
 As regards the necessary standard of naval strength, it 
 would be improper for me to offer an opinion. I may say, 
 however, that this standard should be based upon the 
 naval resources of our possible enemies, and that calcula- 
 tions by which a proportion is sought to be established 
 between the tonnage of our sea-borne commerce and that 
 of our warships are misleading. Responsible naval authori- 
 ties are well able to tell us what amount of naval force is 
 required to control the navies of the Powers whom we must 
 be prepared to meet, and the recent awakening of public 
 opinion is a guarantee that, for the present at least, there 
 will be no slackening of effort on the part of the Mother 
 Country, One new consideration cannot be passed over. 
 In the wars of the past, our rivals were able to excel us in 
 speed of shipbuilding. This great advantage has now 
 passed to us, and Great Britain alone of all Powers could 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 29 
 
 build and complete a battleship for sea in eighteen months ; 
 while, if, as we are sometimes asked to believe, the naval 
 conflicts of the future are to be decided by small craft, our 
 powers of construction are absolutely unrivalled. 
 
 A Navy able to maintain open communications is not 
 merely the first postulate of national defence, but the prime 
 condition of security. No accumulation of highly trained 
 troops on shore, no fortifications equipped with all the 
 luxuries which modern science offers, will of themselves 
 avail should the sea communications of the Empire be 
 definitely severed. Both are necessary in due measure ; 
 but, if it were the case that the national means ran short, 
 military demands should, as Lord Wolseley has stated, be 
 unhesitatingly set aside. 
 
 A Navy able to keep open the communications of the 
 Empire will, of necessity, suffice to debar an enemy from 
 invasion, whether of the United Kingdom, or of the great 
 self-governing Colonies. Large hostile expeditionary 
 forces cannot be transported across the seas, in face of a 
 superior fleet, without risking the fate of Conflans in 1759, 
 or incurring the disaster which befell Napoleon's Egyptian 
 venture in 1798. In the many projected invasions of this 
 country, British aid has invariably been counted upon. 
 Even Napoleon reckoned, with singular lack of judgment,* 
 on a popular rising in his favour. In none of the members 
 of the Empire could a modern invader pretend to seek 
 effective allies, and one of the principal inducements to 
 accept naval risks has disappeared. 
 
 Small expeditions, directed not to effect territorial con- 
 quests, but to destroy national resources, may, nevertheless, 
 as in the past, evade a superior navy. If launched on 
 distant errands, their task is distinctly more difficult and 
 dangerous now than formerly, in consequence of the 
 restrictions imposed by coal supply ; but we dare not over- 
 look the contingency. Such expeditions, whether accom- 
 panied by troops, or carried out by cruisers, are of the 
 
 • " He did not understand that, though discontented with their 
 Government, they (the Enghsh) were extremely jealous of foreigners." 
 — James. 
 
30 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 nature of raids. Wherever national resources necessary 
 for purpose of war are accumulated, local means of resistance 
 against a raid are needed. Wherever valuable property, 
 easily accessible from the sea, is gathered together, local 
 protection may be desirable.* Thus is justified the fortifi- 
 cation of certain harbours by a Power which depends for 
 existence on naval supremacy. The real defence of those 
 ports lies upon the seas ; but just as the commander of a 
 great field army, operating in a country everywhere travers- 
 able by light cavalry, would provide defences for his 
 depots, so a nation possessing a dominant navy must be 
 prepared against injury by small forces which may evade 
 its warships. The object of an enemy under such con- 
 ditions being merely to effect the maximum damage in the 
 shortest time, and with a minimum risk of becoming com- 
 promised, it follows that the defences to which I refer may 
 always be moderate in scope, but will depend on the 
 geographical propinquity of the possible base of attack. 
 A harbour which could be raided by a force able to 
 retire to the shelter of its own defences on the following 
 day, obviously occupies a different position to one lying 
 four thousand miles from such shelter. 
 
 Here arise a host of technical considerations and details 
 into which I cannot enter. The principle for which I con- 
 tend is, that the entire question of the selection of harbours 
 for defence, and of the nature of the requisite defence, is 
 one which needs to be dealt with on broad Imperial lines. 
 It is not a number of geographically isolated States, with 
 interests only partially coincident, which have to be 
 defended, but a united Empire linked together by a 
 powerful Navy. In times of peace, the objects of the 
 members of this Empire must frequently take a local shape 
 — this is a healthy sign of individual vigour — but Imperial 
 defence recognizes no separation between Colonial interests 
 and those of the United Kingdom. 
 
 * Local protection in this sense is evidently a measure of insurance 
 which each Colony is bound to take into consideration. The means 
 necessary to deny a harbour to a hostile cruiser are simple and 
 inexpensive. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 31 
 
 Great efforts have been made by several of the self- 
 governing Colonies for the fortification of their ports. 
 Large sums have thus been ungrudgingly expended, while 
 other Colonies have freely voted generous contributions 
 for the same purpose. At the same time, the Home 
 Government and that of India has devoted relatively 
 enormous funds to the defences of the ports under their 
 direct charge. The spirit evinced by these measures is 
 altogether admirable, and if the results are not in all 
 cases satisfactory, the cause can be clearly traced to the 
 way in which the several local problems were approached. 
 Coast fortification presents many fascinations, to which 
 the number and variety of its weapons lend force. The 
 question, " How can this port be most efficiently defended ? " 
 leads straight to demands which have no end. Each suc- 
 cessive professor of the art will discover some new defect, 
 or will advocate as essential the adoption of some new 
 weapon. Finality will prove to be unattainable. The 
 principles of national defence, however, require that the 
 question should be put as follows: — "This port belongs 
 to a maritime Empire, which depends for existence on sea- 
 borne trade and open harbours. It cannot be attacked in 
 force till the command of the sea has been lost The naval 
 resources of possible enemies and the position of their bases 
 are known. Hasty raids for purposes of destruction have 
 to be guarded against. Having regard to the geographical 
 position of the port, what permanent defences do you 
 propose?" The difference in the point of view is vital, 
 and it may happen that the expert in matters of fortifi- 
 cation is not well qualified to give an authoritative 
 answer. 
 
 An exaggerated — even a wasteful — capital expenditure 
 on coast defences is in itself a minor evil. Perversion of 
 national aims, and ever-increasing expenditure on sedentary 
 forces which, as history shows, will be of little account in 
 war, constitute the main objection to ill-advised fortifica- 
 tion. The theory, that by means of fortification naval 
 deficiencies can be supplied, is for us distinctly dangerous. 
 
32 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 Happily, there are everywhere signs that this theory is,, 
 for the moment, passing out of favour. 
 
 The means of destruction at the disposal of a hostile 
 ship in an unfortified port are rigidly limited. Shipping 
 may be sunk if accessible to fire or to unresisted boat 
 attack ; dock caissons may be injured, if exposed. Shell 
 may be thrown into a town, but the damage would not 
 be great, and unless means of replenishment were close 
 at hand, nothing approaching to a heavy bombardment 
 would be attempted. In order, therefore, to inflict sub- 
 stantial injury, men must be landed.* Hence arise the 
 immense advantages of possessing an effective military 
 force on shore. Knowing the ground, such a force becomes 
 formidable beyond its numbers to an enemy whose time 
 may be short, and whose ships may be rendered hors de 
 combat by a loss of personnel. Even where coast fortifica- 
 tions are absent, the presence of a trained and well-armed 
 mobile force will confer substantial protection. Where 
 such fortifications exist, they are — unless known to be 
 unprepared — most unlikely to be subjected to direct attack 
 — a process which has rarely commended itself even to the 
 superior naval Power. As on a small scale at Bastia and at 
 Calvi in 1794, and as recently on a large scale at Port Arthur 
 and Wei-hai-wei, it is the back door which is usually 
 selected. In these, as in a hundred other cases, coast 
 defences helplessly fell as a consequence of operations in 
 which their specialist garrisons could play no part. Even, 
 from the local point of view, field troops should be regarded 
 as the most important factor in coast defence. Oblivion 
 of this consideration, induced by the fascinations of fortifi- 
 cation, is by no means confined to the Chinese. 
 
 I have designated the Navy as the defensive force of 
 the Empire, notwithstanding that its action should be 
 strategically offensive, in the sense that it must be enabled,, 
 as in the past, to regard an enemy's coast-line as its 
 
 * The striking experience of Foochow shows the small amount of 
 material damage capable of being inflicted without putting men on 
 shore. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 33 
 
 frontier, and observing his ports, to court fleet actions. 
 The offensive power of a navy, however strong, ends with 
 the shore. We cannot, during a naval war, afford to 
 commit our sailors to operations on land. As in Egypt 
 (1800), in Mauritius (1810), and in numerous other instances, 
 the absolute need of military forces must arise. To facili- 
 tate the task of the Navy in guarding our sea communica- 
 tions, it may be necessary to employ troops for the capture 
 of positions which aid the naval operations of an enemy. 
 There comes a point, at which the employment of military 
 force is alike more economical and more decisive than 
 any action possible to a navy. And, further, a defensive 
 policy will not suffice either to bring war to a rapid con- 
 clusion, or to secure adequate guarantees for a lasting 
 peace. For all these reasons, mobile troops, not sedentary 
 garrisons, are supremely important. " If we be once driven 
 to the defensive," said Raleigh, " farewell might." 
 
 So soon as the Navy has obtained physical or moral 
 supremacy, military force — the real offensive weapon of 
 the nation — is set free for action. The idea of interven- 
 tion in a Continental struggle, by handing over two Army 
 Corps to become appendages of the armed strength of a 
 Power possessing twenty, may be dismissed as a vain 
 dream. It is not thus that the national honour can be 
 guarded, and the national interests secured. Obligations 
 to allies, if such exist, cannot thus be most effectively 
 discharged. On the other hand, in the employment of 
 expeditionary forces — " conjunct expeditions," as they used 
 to be termed — against the outlying possessions of an enemy 
 who is restrained by the Navy from adopting similar 
 measures, a tremendous weapon lies ready to our hands. 
 Immense resources in steam shipping and convenient 
 harbours combine to facilitate over-sea operations, and 
 our military forces, if duly prepared, possess an offensive 
 power out of all proportion to their numerical strength. 
 
 History clearly indicates that the primary duties of the 
 military forces of the Empire in war must be offensive, and 
 that their functions in regard to local defence, whether 
 
 D 
 
34 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 at home or in the Colonies, are subordinate. Modem 
 conditions add force to these considerations. Neverthe- 
 less, for reasons easily understood, this great principle of 
 national policy is little recognized, and defensive ideals- 
 are permitted to inspire our military organization and 
 dictate our measures of preparation. 
 
 During the old wars, the United Kingdom and India 
 alone furnished men and material for equipping over-sea 
 expeditions. The time has come when we may confidently 
 expect the co-operation of Greater Britain in this most 
 important branch of national defence. The armed strength 
 of the Colonies now reaches a total of more than ninety 
 thousand men, and evident strategic advantage lies in the 
 power of operating from distant bases. The patriotic action 
 of New South Wales in 1885 is significant of the new possi- 
 bilities. Many of our Colonial forces are models of their 
 kind, and for warfare of the nature implied, are distinctly 
 better fitted than European conscripts. Other such forces 
 are in a somewhat backward state, and some Colonies 
 neglect to provide themselves with military organizations. 
 Much has, however, been effected of late years in this 
 direction, and the education of national opinion, supple- 
 mented by well-advised assistance from the Mother Country, 
 and supported by energy and tact on the part of Colonial 
 Governors, would bring about great results. Colonel Man 
 has lately described * what has been done in Trinidad ; 
 but, as he has pointed out, this one small island maintained 
 in 1834 a force of four thousand five hundred men, ofificered 
 largely by loyal subjects of alien descent. It is impossible 
 not to believe that in other Colonies — as, for example, 
 Mauritius — excellent material for the formation of military 
 forces only awaits a fostering hand. 
 
 Each Colonial force, however small, should regard itself 
 as an integral portion of a great Imperial organization, 
 and should be prepared, if necessary, to act outside its 
 own territory. From the strategic point of view, Greater 
 Britain maybe divided into spheres of action corresponding. 
 * Paper read at Royal Colonial Institute on December 2, 1895. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 3; 
 
 to the naval stations of the Fleet. All the local forces 
 of the Dominion of Canada, the West Indies, South Africa, 
 Australasia, and China, should in case of necessity be 
 available for service in any part of the naval commands,* 
 to which they severally belong. 
 
 The regular troops of the British army and of India are 
 at all times available for service in any part of the world. 
 In the event of national emergency, the militia should be 
 enabled, by proclamation, to share this distinction, and the 
 employment of volunteer battalions in the Mediterranean 
 garrisons should be facilitated. I believe that this exten- 
 sion of their spheres of usefulness would be welcomed by 
 the forces in question. To accustom them to the contem- 
 plation of a purely defensive rdle, waiting at home for an 
 enemy who cannot arrive till the national cause is already 
 lost, appears a grave mistake. 
 
 There is no fear that local defence would suffer neglect, 
 by the adoption of measures conferring greater elasticity 
 upon our military arrangements. The local view may be 
 safely counted upon to assert itself. If invasion were 
 really impending, it is certain that volunteers would not 
 be sent out of the country. If Melbourne is imperilled, 
 Victorian troops will not be transported to Tasmania. 
 Such contingencies depend entirely on the naval situation, 
 and the real danger is that a too rigid system may prevent 
 a needed reinforcement of the troops of one Colony by 
 those of another ; or that the chance of a strategic stroke 
 of extreme importance to the national cause may be lost 
 by reason of unpreparedness. 
 
 Spheres of action being allotted to Colonial forces, 
 regular troops reinforced by them become available for 
 expeditions which are certain to be necessary in a great 
 war. To regular troops, assisted perhaps by native irreg- 
 ulars, must be entrusted the defence of the land frontier 
 of India. Upon this question I speak with the diffidence 
 
 * Canada, Newfoundland, and the West Indies would thus all 
 belong to the North .American station. I should prefer to add China 
 to the Australasian sphere. 
 
36 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 necessary to one who has not the advantage of knowing 
 the country. I have, however, carefully studied the matter 
 in the light of our many frontier campaigns — campaigns 
 which of late years have been based upon a well-equipped 
 railway system, with the great resources of populous India 
 at its back. Considering the enormous transport required 
 even for operations so limited in scope as those in Chitral, 
 it is my deliberate opinion that for many years Russia will 
 not be in a position to threaten serious invasion. Plans 
 have been lightly sketched by alarmists ; but I do not find 
 any real attempt to show how our Asiatic rival is to procure 
 and to feed the vast number of transport animals necessary 
 for operating in strength across the most difficult frontier 
 in the world. Central Asia cannot compete as a base with 
 India. The long single line of railway which runs from 
 the Caspian to within one hundred and seventy miles of 
 the frontier of Afghanistan is not comparable as a line of 
 military communications to the sea, which can carry the 
 resources of the Empire to the mouth of the Indus. That 
 curious distrust of our military strength to which I have 
 referred, tends to blind us to the great increase of the 
 efficiency of the Indian Army achieved in recent years. 
 We were never so strong in India as now, and so long as 
 internal tranquillity is assured, there are no present grounds 
 for apprehension in this portion of the Empire. Russia 
 has many Asiatic projects in hand ; but for years the 
 invasion of India will not find place among them. On 
 the other hand, full advantage will certainly be taken of 
 the leverage supplied by our fears, which experience has 
 shown to be peculiarly effective. Our policy in regard to 
 Russia has for some years been characterized by a want 
 of dignity, and might well be replaced by a mutual under- 
 standing. 
 
 The long land frontier in North America cannot be 
 passed over in discussing national defence. In spite of 
 recent deplorable events, I do not believe that any valid 
 ground for war between the two kindred races will ever 
 arise. Such a war would be a crime against light and 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 37 
 
 liberty. Its necessary result would be to arrest for a 
 century the progress of that Anglo-Saxon form of freedom 
 of which the whole race is justly proud, and to destroy 
 the brightest hopes of the future. In any case, the defence 
 of her long frontier cannot be left to Canada unaided, and 
 so long as it is her free wish to remain a member of the 
 Empire, she must be and she will be supported with the 
 whole force at our disposal. To state this proposition is, 
 of course, to proclaim the reciprocal obligations of the 
 Dominion. 
 
 It would be easy and utterly useless to present a detailed 
 plan of Imperial defence. We are not prone to adopt 
 paper schemes which possess merely an academic interest, 
 and the practical problem before us cannot be thus solved. 
 It is necessary first to create a body of broadly national 
 opinion, and to lead it in the right direction. Time will 
 do the rest, and the pace cannot be forced. 
 
 The points on which I desire to fix attention may be 
 summarized as follows : — 
 
 1. The recognition of the Navy as the defensive force of 
 the whole Empire — the force which stands between each 
 member and invasion, the force which alone can guard the 
 commerce on which each member depends. In time, such 
 recognition would doubtless assume a practical form, each 
 member of the Empire aiding the national force in the way 
 best suited to its circumstances.* The military contribu- 
 tions of some Crown Colonies, which cannot be fixed on 
 any rational basis, would then terminate. 
 
 2. The adjustment of measures of local defence in con- 
 formity with a definite policy, based upon the special 
 conditions of the Empire. 
 
 3. The encouragement of local forces wherever suitable 
 material exists, such forces to be available for employment 
 in case of need within defined spheres. Assistance in the 
 form of arms to be freely given by the Home Government 
 to the poorer communities. 
 
 • Money contributions do not by any means constitute the only 
 form which such aid might take. The maintenance of naval reserves 
 would in such a case as Newfoundland be preferable. 
 
38 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 4. The welding together of the military forces of the 
 Empire, each unit of which, in addition to its territorial 
 title, should bear a distinguishing number connecting it 
 with a general organization. 
 
 5. The decentralization of naval and military stores, so 
 as to enable the national forces in each sphere to be as far 
 as possible independent on the outbreak of war. The 
 distribution to be made with regard to the nature of the 
 operations which might have to be undertaken. The 
 concentration of materiel of war and its manufacture* 
 in the United Kingdom, which was perhaps necessary at 
 the beginning of the century, is an evil under the changed 
 conditions of to-day. 
 
 6. The provision of machinery for the full discussion and 
 settlement of all questions directly or indirectly bearing 
 upon Imperial defence. The present means are altogether 
 inadequate. Matters affecting several members of the 
 Empire cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by written 
 despatches, and the time has long passed when such matters 
 can be determined by a central authority. Conferences in 
 which local views are personally represented are now 
 essential. 
 
 The principles above stated practically imply the federa- 
 tion of the Empire for purposes of defence. If political 
 federation by groups of Colonies existed, the task would be 
 simplified. There is no reason, however, why organization 
 for Imperial defence should be delayed. 
 
 In each of the five groups a representative body might 
 
 be established holding session each year, and varying its 
 
 place of meeting. Such a body would be in touch with 
 
 local defence committees and in direct communication 
 
 with the standing committee in London, with which the 
 
 Agents-General should be associated. It would have 
 
 proper records and would accumulate information in 
 
 regard to naval and military matters within its sphere.f 
 
 * In this respect India is making great advances, 
 t The centralization of all " intelligence " in London would prove a 
 great drawback in war, and in peace is not without disadvantage. 
 
IMPERIAL DEFENCE. 39 
 
 It would bring questions of defence to a focus, and would 
 take note of all military progress or backsliding. 
 
 Larger questions of national defence could be settled by 
 conferences held in London at regular intervals of five 
 years. The Conference of 1887, though limited in scope, 
 had far-reaching results, in the clearing up of matters 
 effectually obscured by over-much paper. If to such a 
 Conference were submitted the task of filling in the details 
 of the machinery which I have suggested, the work would 
 be successfully accomplished. It is only by taking all the 
 members of the Empire into council that an effective 
 organization for Imperial defence can be attained. To the 
 objection that such conferences would have no executive 
 power, I reply that what is first needed is mutual under- 
 standing in regard to questions of defence, that good-will 
 and an earnest desire to co-operate in upholding the 
 national cause abound, that light and leading alone are 
 needed to enable the immense resources of the Empire to 
 be rendered available for purposes of war, and that the 
 impulse must come from the Mother Country. Meanwhile, 
 it behoves all Colonies to look earnestly to their military 
 forces,* remembering that men trained and equipped for 
 field service are of far more importance to the national 
 cause than fortifications and their many adjuncts. 
 
 The greatest national interest is peace. The spirit of 
 aggression which marks some periods of our history has 
 been exorcised by the development of that commerce upon 
 which our whole prosperity has come to depend. With 
 heavy stakes in every sea and in most lands, with rivals 
 whose unconcealed jealousy casts dark shadows across our 
 onward path, the nation must stand united in the defence 
 of its integrity and its honour, or fall like imperial Athens. 
 
 As Mr. Chamberlain has recently pointed out.f we are 
 
 * The reductions of military expenditure which have taken place 
 in certain Australasian Colonies are to be deplored even from the 
 purely local point of view, apart from national considerations. A 
 State which regards preparation for defence as the readiest subject 
 for its economics is like an individual who, at a moment of temporary 
 financial pressure, abandons, first, his insurance policies. 
 
 t November 6, 1895. 
 
40 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 approaching a new parting of the ways. Irresistible forces 
 are at work which may bring about a consolidation of the 
 national strength, or tend towards national effacement. 
 The old order has changed, and new conditions have arisen 
 which call for practical recognition. We can so organize 
 this great Empire, that the unknown future may be faced 
 with confidence and hope. If we neglect the task, our 
 brilliant history will, before long, close with the despairing 
 epitaph — 
 
 .... Occidit, occidit 
 Spes omnis et fortuna nostri 
 Nominis 
 
 It is for statesmen at home and in the Colonies to make 
 choice between these alternatives. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES.* 
 
 The most probable dissolvent of the Empire is ignorance. 
 A mistake of policy on the part of the Imperial Govern- 
 ment, such as was perpetrated in regard to New Guinea, 
 or such weakness as has been displayed in relation to New- 
 foundland, may well shake the foundations of Colonial 
 allegiance ; but a far greater danger arises in that mutual 
 ignorance of which there have been abundant signs. The 
 generation which is now rising in Australia knows little of 
 the mother country, her history, and her place among the 
 nations. The high pressure of Colonial life allows scant 
 time for the study of Imperial problems, and a certain 
 narrowness of view is the inevitable result. The young 
 communities which are springing up across the seas feel 
 conscious of their vigour, their growing prosperity, and 
 their political capacity. It is perhaps natural that they 
 should not pause to consider the basis on which the whole 
 structure rests — the conditions under which alone they 
 exist. We may smile at the Queensland writer who 
 regards Great Britain as " a composite grandmotherly old 
 wreck, tottering towards an open grave ; " but he is doubt- 
 less in sober earnest. He really believes that this is an 
 accurate description of the first naval Power of the age — 
 a Power which is governing two hundred and fifty millions 
 of people in India, increasing its commercial enterprise 
 every year against all rivals, and exhibiting vigorous 
 activity throughout the world. Clearly there is a deplorable 
 
 • United Service Mai;a:ine, November, 1890. 
 
+2 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 amount of ignorance in Queensland, or rubbish of this kind 
 would not be tolerated for a moment. 
 
 Unfortunately, we at home have little right to cast stones. 
 The generation now uprising, which may be called upon 
 to decide Imperial questions of the first importance, is 
 not being in any way equipped to meet its grave responsi- 
 bilities. One of the first objects of any system of national 
 education should be to teach Imperial geography ; but 
 the School Boards, amid many superfluities, cannot find 
 time to fulfil this obvious requirement, and the middle- 
 class schools are as oblivious of their plain duty. The 
 result is a mutual ignorance, in which lurks danger to the 
 future relations of Great and Greater Britain. 
 
 Some aspects of this ignorance are strikingly brought 
 out in an article on the " Loyalty of the Colonies," pub- 
 lished in the Nineteenth Century of August, 1890, where, 
 in the form of a dialogue between a " Colonist " and 
 a " Globe-trotter," Dr. Bakewell sets forth a variety of 
 opinions, important by reason of his evident conviction. 
 It is well that we should be reminded that after-dinner 
 speeches are not infallible guides to the understanding of 
 real Colonial feeling, and it is most important that we 
 should know not only what that feeling is, but on what 
 it is based. Right or wrong, the views which are put 
 into the mouth of " Colonist " are held in Australia, and 
 appear from time to time in a certain section of the 
 Colonial press. These views are seldom combated, wildly 
 fallacious as they are ; and " Globe-trotter," who has a 
 splendid opportunity thrown open to him, is — like his class 
 generally — perfectly incapable of making use of it. 
 
 According to "Colonist," mere sentiment towards the 
 mother country could not be counted upon as a factor in 
 war. " Has she ever made any sacrifices for our sakes ? " 
 he asks. " She has lent us money, it is true ; but we do 
 not usually feel any specially strong affection for our 
 creditors.'' As a matter of fact, Great Britain is making 
 heavy sacrifices for her colonies every day, as their relatively 
 insignificant military burdens amply testify. If history 
 
THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 43 
 
 has any teaching, sentiment has played an enormous part 
 in the affairs of nations, and must play a still greater 
 part in the future, now that democracies capable of think- 
 ing and acting in mass will feel its sway. It is deep-rooted 
 sentiment alone which enables us to wrangle with the 
 United States to-day in terms which would be perilous 
 in the case of any other great Power, and in the saying 
 of Admiral Josiah Tatnall, that "blood is thicker than 
 water," there lies a profound truth which New Zealand, 
 pace Dr. Bakewell, will abundantly illustrate if the occasion 
 should arise. 
 
 Sentiment may, however, be an insubstantial basis on 
 which to rest the future relations of Great Britain and her 
 Colonies. It cannot be gauged ; it may waver with the 
 passion of the moment. The "purely commercial point 
 of view," which Dr. Blakewell prefers, may be superior 
 in all respects. Here at least we are on solid ground ; for 
 the great principle of self-interest is eternal. Which way 
 lies the self-interest of the Australasian Colonies ? 
 
 Their proper course in the event of war is clear to the 
 mind of " Colonist." " We should declare our independ- 
 ence at once, and with that issue a declaration of neutrality ; 
 neither party would care to attack us, for our naval force, 
 small though it would be " — two second-class torpedo-boats 
 in the case of New Zealand — " would suffice to enable us 
 to obtain respect as independent republics. The Australian 
 navy would be at least as large as that of a South American 
 Republic." This course is evidently safer, " from a purely 
 commercial point of view," than incurring "the risk of 
 having our port towns laid under contribution, and our 
 territory invaded, just for the sake of supplying the British 
 fleet with coals and provisions." And, unfortunately, there 
 are persons capable of accepting this remarkable plan of 
 campaign, so simple, so practical, does it appear. 
 
 Leaving the other Colonies out of the question, New 
 Zealand has an annual export trade of ;£'8,985,ooo, of 
 which no less than £y, 016,000 goes to the mother country.* 
 
 * Figures for 1893, Colonial office list, 1895. In addition, about 
 
44 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 It is by this trade that New Zealand exists. It is thus that 
 she pays the interest on her debt. Destroy this trade, 
 and she is financially ruined. She cannot pay in specie ; if 
 she repudiates, who will lend her another farthing ? Only 
 the Imperial connection, and the guarantee provided by the 
 great Navy of England, have enabled the Australasian 
 Colonies to borrow so cheaply the large sums without 
 which their rapid development would have been impossible. 
 The trade of the mother country with the Australasian 
 Colonies forms a small fraction of the vast total of her 
 commerce ; but to those Colonies it is the life-blood. 
 Their principal markets are within the bounds of the 
 Empire, and new markets are not easily created. Nearly 
 the whole of their exports might be considered con- 
 traband of war — would undoubtedly be so considered by 
 any belligerent by whom advantage could be thus 
 obtained. Again, the ships which carry the commerce 
 on which the whole prosperity of these Colonies depends 
 are almost entirely British,* and as such, liable to capture 
 or destruction, unless transferred to a neutral flag, an 
 operation surrounded with almost insuperable difficulties 
 and requiring a considerable time. There is nothing 
 more certain than that the position of a weak neutral, 
 in whose commerce belligerent interests were involved, 
 would be intolerable. What Power would recognize for 
 a moment the "declaration of neutrality" issued by 
 one of the Australasian Colonies — self-proclaimed a state 
 — with the avowed intention of evading consequences? 
 " To secure respect to a neutral flag," wrote Washington,! 
 " requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate 
 it from insult or aggression," and the bitter experience 
 of the United States amply bore out the truth of his 
 words. Australasia to-day, dependent for existence on 
 
 ;^i,346,ooo goes to other British possessions — who would not all 
 proclaim themselves neutral republics — and about ;£5o2,ooo only to 
 Foreign States. 
 
 * Out of a total tonnage of 1,258,000 which cleared from New 
 Zealand ports in 1893, only 108,000 sailed under foreign flags. 
 
 t Eighth Annual Address, 1796. 
 
THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES, 45 
 
 secure commerce, and maintaining a fleet consisting of 
 one coast-defence turret ship, a wooden frigate, a wooden 
 corvette, and four gun-boats with no coal capacity, would 
 be a laughing-stock to the world under the conditions 
 " Colonist " lays down. Even the blissful security of a 
 South American Republic, which he appears to regard 
 with envy, could not be counted upon. 
 
 While the illusions under which "Colonist" labours are 
 appalling, it must be confessed that " Globe-trotter," in his 
 views as to the potentiality of the British Navy and its war 
 employment, goes far to justify them. The advantages of 
 naval protection, which — so it seems to be believed — will 
 probably be withdrawn in the event of war, may not 
 unnaturally appear dubious. 
 
 It is not much that "Globe-trotter" expects of the 
 Colonies. "They would ... be open to receive any 
 prizes our fleet might make ; they would give shelter, 
 coals, and provisions to the navy ; they would serve as 
 hospital dep6ts for the sick or wounded." This is little 
 more than benevolent neutrality. " In return for this," 
 asks " Colonist," " you would, of course, protect our coasts 
 and ports ? " 
 
 " G. — That would have to be done, in great measure, 
 by yourselves. You see, our fleets would have all their 
 work cut out for them in protecting the coasts of the 
 United Kingdom and the mercantile marine from the 
 enemy's armed cruisers. 
 
 " C. — Then you mean to imply that you could not spare 
 a sufficient naval force to protect us from the enemy's fleet ? 
 
 •• G. — I don't think we could. It would require a very 
 large force to do that. You would have your Australian 
 squadron, of course. 
 
 " C. — Unless it were very urgently required nearer home ? 
 
 " G. — Precisely so. 
 
 ■' C. — Then, my dear sir," etc., etc. 
 
 It is to be hoped that the views of "Globe-trotter" 
 are not wide-spread. The work cut out for the British 
 Navy in war is to find out the enemy wherever he may 
 
46 THE NAVY AND THE XATIOX. 
 
 be, fight him if he will fight, blockade him if he refuses. 
 This is what the Navy has done in the past, and this 
 it is prepared to do again to-day. The peace strength 
 maintained in Australasian waters far exceeds that of any 
 combination of foreign Powers, and is actually greater 
 than is required. Of this strength, seven vessels, forming 
 the fleet to which the Australian Colonies contribute, could 
 not, under any circumstances, be removed without the 
 consent of the Colonial Governments. But according to 
 the only possible principles of naval strategy, naval strength 
 would be developed and maintained where it was needed ; 
 and if any withdrawal from the Australian station to 
 waters nearer home took place, it would necessarily imply 
 that the zone of danger had shifted. The enemies of 
 England, however formidable, cannot be in two places at 
 once, and for any hostile Power to develop considerable 
 naval strength in Australasian waters would be extremely 
 difficult, if not altogether impracticable. There is no portion 
 of the British Empire so secure, no waters from which 
 mercantile steamers could start in such safety. Neglect- 
 ing the Suez Canal route and making straight for the 
 Cape, moderately fast steamers carrying Australasian trade 
 would incur the minimum of war risks. Received at the 
 Cape into the protected zone which the British Navy would 
 establish, the trade of Australasia, in common with that 
 from China and India, would obtain in its onward course 
 the further guardianship, direct and indirect, of the greatest 
 naval Power of the world. 
 
 Why is Australasia thus secure in a special sense .^ 
 " Colonist " has no idea, and " Globe-trotter '' is, of course, 
 unable to enlighten him. Both have some dim idea of the 
 advantages of an Australian squadron ; neither perceives 
 that it is on other squadrons, maintained by the British 
 tax-payer, that the security of the Colonies mainly depends. 
 No possible enemy has a base in the Antarctic circle. No 
 hostile squadron, no expeditionary force capable of facing 
 the most moderately defended port, can ever reach Aus- 
 tralasian waters without trying conclusions with British 
 
THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 47 
 
 fleets, of whose very existence Dr. Bakewell, in common with 
 other Colonial writers, does not appear to be aware. It 
 is on the Channel squadron, the Mediterranean squadron, 
 the Cape squadron, the China squadron, the Indian 
 squadron, that the real security of Australasian coasts and 
 territory depends. The necessary standard of defence of 
 their ports, and the scale of their military preparations, are 
 determined absolutely by distant squadrons to which these 
 Colonies do not contribute a sixpence. Australasia runs no 
 risk whatever of having her "territory invaded," because 
 British ships, thousands of miles from her shores, and all 
 unheeded, guard the only lines of approach in the only 
 possible way. " Fest steht und treu die Wacht am Rhein," 
 sang the Germans in 1870, and the whole nation could 
 realize the idea expressed. As "firm and true" stand 
 ready to-day all over the world the only possible guardians 
 of the British Empire ; but " Globe-trotter," " Colonist," and 
 too many people like them, are totally incapable of under- 
 standing what naval guardianship means. 
 
 So long as the Australasian Colonies are part of the 
 Empire, the whole strength of the great Navy of England, 
 actual and potential, will be put forth to shield their trade 
 and guard their lines of communication with the rest of 
 the world — the only lines by which they can be assailed. 
 Any diminution of our Eastern squadrons will mean, not 
 that the Colonies are to be abandoned, as " Globe-trotter " 
 assumes, but that our enemy is incapable of undertaking 
 distant enterprises, and can be more effectively dealt with 
 nearer home. If that enemy attempts distant enterprises, 
 then can our home squadrons be proportionately reduced, 
 and will promptly follow, as Nelson followed Villeneuve 
 to the West Indies eighty-five years ago, but with the 
 immense advantage of coaling facilities unapproachable 
 by any other Power. 
 
 Coming back, therefore, to the "purely commercial 
 basis," what are the military advantages which the Aus- 
 tralasian Colonies reap so long as they remain part of the 
 Empire ? 
 
48 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 1. Their commerce, which is their very life, receives the 
 protection of the greatest naval Power of the world. 
 
 2. The necessary standard of the local defences of their 
 ports is reduced to a minimum. They require to be able 
 to resist a cruiser raid, and no more ; since no hostile fleet 
 can reach them in force, except on condition of defeating 
 and destroying strong British squadrons. 
 
 3. Military establishments, calculated to resist a large 
 expeditionary force, need not be maintained. 
 
 4. Rumours of French or German aggression in the 
 Pacific need not involve them in increased military expen- 
 diture, and the waste which all scare-measures invariably 
 entail. 
 
 5. Difficulties with Japan or China imply work for the 
 Foreign Office at home, and nothing more. 
 
 6. The Cape, the first halting-place of their main war 
 trade route, is part of themselves. 
 
 7. Protected coaling-stations capable of sheltering their 
 trade stand ready all over the world, without entailing the 
 smallest burden on their finances. 
 
 8. At the worst, war insurance rates will only be those 
 which the mother country might have to pay, and would 
 diminish as soon as the naval might of the Empire had 
 gained time for full development. What would be the 
 insurance rates demanded of a South American Republic 
 at war with a great naval Power ? 
 
 This and more — sentiment, dignity, all the higher attri- 
 butes of which nations are justly proud, being set aside — 
 are now obtained by the Australasian colonies at a cost 
 ludicrously small in proportion. The four principal har- 
 bours of New Zealand are now amply protected, but only 
 because New Zealand is an integral part of the Empire. 
 Victoria has exaggerated her coast defences, and can gain 
 nothing whatever thereby. These colonies have most 
 wisely accepted a share in the maintenance of a special 
 squadron of seven vessels, and no one who examines the 
 bargain fairly can possibly come to the conclusion that it 
 is a bad one from the Colonial business point of view. 
 
THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 49 
 
 No conceivable number of heavy guns or of troops on 
 shore could take the place of these ships. 
 
 The programme which Dr. Bakewell lays down will 
 hardly recommend itself to business men who take the 
 trouble to think out the matter. Australasia lives by sea- 
 borne trade alone ; and a people thus circumstanced must 
 be able to hold their own on the sea, or contemplate 
 ruin. If the whole external trade of the United States 
 were destroyed, as practically happened in 1812-14, 
 temporary suffering would occur ; but ample recupera- 
 tive power would remain. What would become of the 
 Australasian Colonies under similar conditions ? Theanalogy 
 of the United States, which appears to blind the under- 
 standing of some Colonial writers, is false and misleading. 
 Australasia has a splendid future in store for her ; but Nature 
 has inexorably ruled that it cannot be that of the Great 
 Republic. If, then, the Australasian Colonies proclaim their 
 independence, as Dr. Bakewell suggests, they must be 
 prepared to create and maintain a strong navy. Has he 
 any clear idea as to the burden this would throw upon 
 the tax-payers, if, indeed, it is even practicable ? Money 
 alone will not suffice to create sea power. The United 
 States do not find the maintenance of their naval force an 
 easy matter, and the difficulties would be far greater in 
 Australasia. Let business men calculate the cost, and gauge 
 its certain effect upon the whole economic system of these 
 colonies. But Dr. Bakewell would say that Australasia does 
 not need a navy, for nobody "would care to attack us." 
 The grounds on which this extraordinary notion is based 
 are not stated, and there is no lesson in history more clear 
 than that States wholly dependent on commerce disappear 
 if they neglect to maintain adequate navies. Instead of 
 leaving them alone, other Powers destroy them " on purely 
 commercial principles." 
 
 One other fallacy appears to run through the Colonial 
 view, as presented by Dr. Bakewell. It seems to be 
 assumed that Australasia, happy in her remoteness from 
 storm-swept Europe, can stand aloof from the quarrels of 
 
 E 
 
50 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 other Powers, and remain placidly untouched by their 
 restless ambitions. 
 
 It would not be difficult to show that Australasia, 
 whether independent or not, might be nearly affected by 
 the results of a campaign in Afghanistan. "We don't 
 care a solitary straw about India," says " Colonist," with 
 evident conviction and strangely little understanding. New 
 Caledonia and the New Hebrides have, however, a signifi- 
 cance in Colonial eyes, while New Guinea and Samoa 
 might serve to teach a timely lesson. In the event of 
 difficulties with Japan, the new naval Power of the East 
 would be able to dictate terms to independent Australasia. 
 The mere Chinese question would assume an unpleasant 
 aspect for scattered states impotent beyond the little 
 rayon of their harbour defences. Far from attaining 
 the dubious Nirvana of the South American Republics 
 — usually either in a state of revolution or engaged in 
 fighting each other — independent Australasia would in- 
 evitably find herself face to face with strong naval Powers. 
 In such a case, a sorry figure would be presented to the 
 world, and the advantages of the old flag, which " Colonist " 
 so lightly discards, might be realized too late. 
 
 We are naturally prouder of our children than they can 
 be of us, and we believe that there is a higher future before 
 the Australasian Colonies than Dr. Bakewell appears to 
 anticipate. The parallel of a South American Republic 
 scarcely seems to satisfy our ambitions for the great off- 
 shoots to which we are united by bonds inwoven in many 
 thousands of hearts and homes. We reject emphatically 
 the " purely commercial point of view " in regarding our 
 own kith and kin. There is surely a nobler vision than 
 that which Dr. Bakewell unfolds — the vision of an Empire 
 strong because closely knit, supreme upon the seas, and 
 diffusing throughout the world the gifts of commerce. 
 Such an empire can exist only under the aegis of the flag 
 which Dr. Bakewell is prepared to abandon. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
( 5. ) 
 
 NAVAL MANOEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS.* 
 
 " It is on the Navy, under the Good Providence of God, 
 that our Wealth, Prosperity, and Peace depend." In these 
 words, now more than five hundred years old, and still 
 incorporated in the "Articles of War,'' are set forth the 
 true relations of naval policy to national welfare. They 
 were adopted as the motto of the Naval Exhibition of 
 1891, and, inscribed over its main entrance, they may 
 have induced many a visitor to reflect on the nature of 
 sea power and its importance to such a country as ours. 
 Many causes have combined to give to reflections of this 
 order a new significance in the last few years. To our 
 forefathers in the last century they were commonplaces. 
 The countrymen and contemporaries of Boscawen and 
 Hawke, of Howe, Jervis, and Duncan, of Nelson, Comwallis, 
 and CoUingwood, never could have forgotten, as their 
 descendants in these latter days have sometimes allowed 
 themselves to forget, what the Navy has done for England, 
 and what it always must do so long as England holds her 
 high place among the nations. Even if all the manhood 
 of the nation were trained to arms, we should perish, if 
 ever the command of the sea, which the Navy secures to 
 us, were to pass into the hands of a Power with which we 
 were at war. By the Navy we exist, therefore, and with 
 the Navy we must stand or fall. This is no hyperbole, no 
 mere flourish of rhetoric, but sober, indisputable fact. It 
 is far more true at the present moment than it ever was 
 
 * (2tiaricrly Review, April, 1892. 
 
52 THE NAVY AND THE XATIOX. 
 
 in the last century, that the existence of England as a 
 nation is bound up with the supremacy of our fleets at 
 sea. If our forefathers had been content to live an in- 
 glorious and unexpansive existence, they might have dis- 
 pensed with a Navy, and never have felt the inspiration 
 of its glorious exploits. Down to the close of the last 
 century the population of these islands might in the last 
 resort have subsisted on their internal native resources. 
 Maritime commerce was necessary to its increase, but not 
 necessary to its existence. Its expansion has been so vast 
 that maritime commerce is now necessary to its existence. 
 A powerful Navy, a Navy capable of taking and keeping 
 the command of the sea against all who dispute it, is in 
 the last resort the sole and indispensable defence of a 
 nation which subsists on the fruits of a world-wide com- 
 merce, and can subsist by no other means. It may be 
 assumed, we suppose, that a nation which respects and 
 believes in itself, must be prepared to defend itself. We 
 live in a world of human passions and national ambitions. 
 We are not exempt ourselves from the impulses which 
 passion and ambition engender, and the time, when nations 
 can rely on the equity and forbearance of their neighbours 
 for the security of their vital interests, is so far distant as- 
 yet that it is practically out of sight. There are only two 
 alternatives, therefore : either we must leave our possessions 
 — including in that term our maritime commerce and its 
 security — undefended, and run the risk of losing them, or 
 we must adopt such measures for their defence as are 
 manifestly sufficient, or at least not palpably insufficient 
 to protect them. There is no middle course in the matter. 
 A Navy which is not strong enough to defend our vital 
 interests in time of need is not worth its cost, however 
 cheap it may be. A Navy which is strong enough ta 
 defend us is cheap, whatever its cost may be. To a nation 
 situated as England is situated, the dearest Navy she can 
 have is a weak Navy. The only cheap Navy she can have 
 is a Navy strong enough to defend her. 
 
 These considerations are really so elementary that at 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 53 
 
 the close of the great war in 1815 probably no Eng- 
 lishman of sense could have been found to dispute them. 
 That war established the supremacy of England at sea so 
 completely, that during the long peace which followed men 
 began to forget the efforts and sacrifices by which their 
 naval supremacy had been won, and to ignore both the 
 possibilities and the consequences of a different issue. It 
 is probable that between 1820 and 1850, and even for 
 long afterwards, few men really troubled themselves 
 to reflect upon what was meant by England's hold- 
 ing the command of the sea. The phrase in its strict 
 strategic sense was thoughtlessly confounded with the 
 now abandoned claim long advanced by England to "the 
 sovereignty of the seas." This, says Admiral Colomb 
 in his admirable work on "Naval Warfare," was chiefly 
 a civil claim, not a military one. It is long since England 
 gave up her right to insist that every foreign vessel in 
 the Four Seas should "veil her bonnet," that is, lower her 
 topsails, in the presence of a British man-of-war. The 
 command of the sea in its strategic sense has nothing 
 whatever to do with this very arrogant claim. We now 
 regard the whole of the navigable seas of the world, outside 
 the narrow territorial limits of every sea-board Power, as 
 the common highway of all mankind. In time of peace 
 every flag, which represents a civilized Power and a 
 peaceful purpose, has as much right in every part of the 
 open sea as any other. In this sense England has long 
 ago abandoned " the sovereignty of the seas." In time 
 of peace she claims no more than any other Power, and 
 even in time of war she claims nothing against any 
 neutral flag. It is only against the flag of an enemy 
 that her efforts to secure and maintain the command of 
 the sea have been and must be directed. The command 
 of the sea is, in fact, to England in time of war what the 
 inviolability of its frontier is to a Continental Power. The 
 loss of it is to all intents and purposes what invasion is 
 to a Continental Power. The fear of actual invasion is a 
 pure chimera so long as our fleets are able to protect us. 
 
54 THE NAVY AND THE NATIOX. 
 
 No writer who has ever tried to conjure with it has been 
 able to make his reasoning even plausible without assuming 
 to begin with that our fleets have either been annihilated 
 or wafted into space — " decoyed away " is the favourite 
 expression based on a perverse misunderstanding of 
 Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve. On the other hand, the 
 destruction of our fleets would certainly render invasion 
 possible, but would also render it superfluous. An enemy, 
 who knew how to apply the forces at his disposal scientifi- 
 cally and economically, would never dream of invading 
 England, if he could strike a vital blow at her power without 
 risk, and with less cost to himself. War is not an end in 
 itself, and it is now too costly in men and treasure to be 
 prolonged, after victory is secured, for a point of honour, 
 or even for the gratification of national vanity. Its end 
 is peace on terms acceptable to the victor. Let us assume 
 that the fleets of this country have been swept from the 
 seas, and their place taken by the fleets of a victorious 
 enemy. This does not mean that every English ship has 
 been captured or destroyed, but merely that the strategic 
 command of the sea has been wrested from England by 
 her victorious foe — that the fleets of England have been 
 placed in exactly the same strategical position as that in 
 which we must aim at placing the fleets of an enemy if 
 we are to avoid irretrievable disaster. This, and nothing 
 else, is meant by England's loss of the strategic command 
 of the sea. It means that England would be as open to 
 invasion as a continental country would be if its armies 
 had been defeated, and its frontier defences overthrown. 
 But maritime and territorial disaster differ in one important 
 respect. Land invasion only interrupts the internal 
 communications of the districts actually invaded. Out- 
 side the lines of the invader, the direct pressure of war is 
 comparatively slightly felt. It is only by striking at the 
 capital, therefore, that the invader can reap the full fruits 
 of the victory he has won. 
 
 The same reasoning would apply to the case of England 
 if the British Empire were concentrated in the British 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 55 
 
 Islands, and if the population of those islands were self- 
 supporting. So far is this from being the case, that without 
 regarding the security of our transmarine possessions, it 
 is easy to show how an enemy who had vanquished our 
 fleets could quickly reduce us to submission without land- 
 ing a man on our shores. There is always at sea and in 
 transit to or from these shores property belonging to 
 Englishmen which on any given day is worth not less 
 than 200 millions sterling in ships and their cargoes.* An 
 enemy in command of the sea could intercept nearly 
 every shilling of this. The mere pecuniary loss might be 
 borne for a time, perhaps, by a high-spirited nation. But 
 those ships carry either the food which feeds our labourers, 
 the materials which sustain their labour, or the commodities 
 which pay for our supplies. Their disappearance from the 
 sea means therefore the paralysis of our industrial activities. 
 It is not so much actual starvation that we have to fear. 
 There is always food enough in the country to maintain 
 its population for six months or more. But with our mills 
 standing, our forges silent, our furnaces cold, and our 
 mines closed, where is the teeming industrial population 
 of our land to find the wherewithal to buy its food ? 
 There is no arguing with an empty belly. The working 
 man is now in the last resort the arbiter of our fate. Can 
 any one doubt that a Government, which resolved to fight 
 on after the command of the sea had passed into the hands 
 of our enemies, would be swept away like chaff before the 
 wind .'' Matters must never be allowed to come to this 
 pass. Lord Overstone was once asked what would be the 
 effect on the commercial position of England if London 
 were to fall into the hands of a victorious enemy.? He 
 could only answer, " It must never be." It never can occur 
 until our sea power is overthrown ; but the student of naval 
 warfare must unhesitatingly give the same answer if he is 
 asked what would happen if we lost the command of the 
 sea. It must never be. 
 
 * The statistics relative to this matter, and the naval issues affected 
 by them, are examined at length in the next paper, entitled " Navies 
 and Commerce," pp. 92-104. 
 
56 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 How is it that our people have ever allowed themselves 
 to forget these things? Why have our statesmen ever 
 been suffered to ignore them ? Paradoxical as it may 
 seem, we believe that the beginning of the evil is to be 
 traced to the circumstances of the Crimean war. We have 
 known men of great sagacity and intelligence point to the 
 Crimean war as a convincing proof that the days of naval 
 warfare are over. What did the Navy do for us, they have 
 asked, in the Black Sea or in the Baltic } It could not 
 destroy Cronstadt, and it could not take Sebastopol. The 
 truth is, that in the Crimean war the English and French 
 fleets gave as signal an example of the efficacy of sea 
 power as the world has ever seen. They absolutely 
 neutralized the Russian fleet, and established so complete 
 a command of the sea that not only was the maritime 
 commerce of England and France as unmolested as if we 
 had never been at war, but the two Powers were able 
 to send their armies to the shores of the Black Sea 
 and to transport them to the Crimea without losing a 
 single man in warfare. Except by sea, Russia was abso- 
 lutely inaccessible either to England or to France. With- 
 out the command of the Mediterranean no troops could 
 have reached the Dardanelles, and without the command 
 of the Black Sea no armies could ever have landed, still 
 less been maintained in the Crimea. " Of the absolute 
 command of the sea," says Admiral Colomb, "we have 
 but the single historical instance of our own position in 
 the Crimean war. ... If there had been in any part of the 
 world a superior Russian naval force, it would have been 
 impossible for success to have attended the expedition to 
 the Crimea." Indeed, so confident were we in the maritime 
 ascendency established by the fleets of England and 
 France, that we omitted the usual, and in all ordinary 
 cases the indispensable, measure of covering the descent 
 of the allied armies upon the Crimea by sending a naval 
 force to mask the Russian men-of-war in the harbour of 
 Sebastopol. On this point Admiral Colomb remarks that 
 "there is no doubt that in disobedience to the strict rules 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 57 
 
 of naval war, risks were run which were entirely unneces- 
 sary. The chief breach of rule was the neglect to mask 
 the Russian ships at Sebastopol by a sufficient force, 
 thereby leaving the crowded transports open to devastation 
 by a determined onset. There is no doubt but that the 
 risk was known and felt at the time ; but a general 
 absence of understanding that there always had been, and 
 always would be, rule in these matters, placed the whole 
 of the naval defending force with the transports, rather 
 than in watch upon the only force of the enemy which 
 could interfere with them." Thus the only example 
 afforded by history of a command of the sea so absolute 
 as to paralyze the opposing naval force has actually been 
 so misconceived as to engender the belief that sea power 
 is a thing of nothing worth. Because the chief results of 
 the war in the Crimea were obtained by military force, 
 therefore it is assumed that the Navy contributed nothing. 
 In truth it contributed everything by securing the sole 
 condition on which the invasion of the Crimea was pos- 
 sible. No English or French soldier would ever have set 
 foot in the Crimea if the local sea power of Russia had 
 been even approximately equal to that of her assailants. 
 No English or French soldier would ever have left the 
 Crimea, if the Russian fleets could have recovered the 
 command of the Black Sea. 
 
 Turn where we will in the history of the British Empire, 
 we find that it rests solely upon sea power. It was sea 
 power that defeated the Armada. It was sea power that 
 gave us the victory in our long struggle with the Dutch. 
 It was sea power that gave us our Colonies and our 
 commerce. It was sea power that sustained the policy 
 of the elder Pitt, and induced the citizens of London to 
 declare that under his rule they found commerce united 
 with and made to flourish by war. It was sea power that 
 set bounds to the ambitions of Napoleon, and sea power 
 alone can save England if ever she is again in conflict 
 with an enemy capable of disputing her position at sea. 
 The integrity of the British Empire can only be seriously 
 
S8 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 menaced by a Power which can vanquish us at sea. The 
 United Kingdom cannot be invaded unless our sea power 
 is first annihilated. If the matter be rightly considered, 
 the defence, not merely of our own shores but of all our 
 transmarine possessions, is an affair not of local fortifica- 
 tions and forces, but of naval strategy in waters sur- 
 rounding the territories of the great maritime Powers. 
 Napoleon said, paradoxically enough, that he would 
 conquer India on the banks of the Vistula. It is no 
 paradox to say that Australasia must be defended, not in 
 the southern ocean, but in the seas which wash the arsenals 
 of such maritime Powers as may think themselves strong 
 enough to try conclusions with the British Fleet. 
 
 If the foregoing considerations be even approximately 
 sound, it follows that the neglect of her Navy by England 
 would mean the loss of her position among the nations. 
 In a certain sense, perhaps, there is no ground for fearing 
 such neglect. Parliament votes money readily for the 
 maintenance of our fleets, and our naval traditions are still 
 so strong that the tax-payer bears the burden without 
 complaint, though with no very intelligent appreciation of 
 what he is paying for. This is, perhaps, almost inevitable. 
 No man of education would care to avow his total ignor- 
 ance of the broad principles of military strategy. In the 
 domain of naval strategy, on the other hand, not only is 
 such ignorance no reproach, but the mere proposition that 
 naval strategy has its broad and indefeasible principles 
 appears to be regarded in many quarters as the crotchet 
 of a few enthusiasts. We shall soon discover the errors of 
 this if we are ever at war again with a great maritime 
 Power ; in the meanwhile, however, the purpose of these 
 pages will be fully accomplished, if they induce some of 
 our countrymen to regard the affairs of the Navy with that 
 measure of intelligent curiosity which no man of sense and 
 education withholds from the consideration of military affairs. 
 For this purpose very little technical knowledge is really 
 needed. What is required is an intelligent grasp of the 
 conditions which make for sea power, and the principles 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 59 
 
 which govern naval operations. The essential problem of 
 naval strategy is the same to-day as when Greece overthrew 
 the great King at Salamis, when Sparta shattered for a time 
 the Athenian power at Syracuse, when Rome broke the 
 power of Carthage in the Mediterranean, when England 
 successively vanquished Spain, Holland, and France at 
 sea. Strategy aims at concentrating a preponderant force 
 at such critical points that defeat at such points compels 
 the defeated adversary either to abandon his campaign, 
 or, if the reverse is sufficiently decisive, to sue for peace. 
 Tactics occupy a narrower sphere within the domain of 
 strategy, and consist chiefly of the evolutions best adapted 
 either to bring an enemy to action or to elude and parry 
 an attack made in superior force. It follows that the 
 domain of strategy is far less affected than that of tactics 
 by such changes in the methods and instruments of naval 
 warfare as we have witnessed in these latter days. The 
 methods of strategy may change, but its principles remain 
 immutable. With tactics the case is widely different. 
 The history of military tactics is the history of the 
 weapons successively employed. A similar evolution may 
 be traced in naval tactics. When the propelling power 
 was the oar and the weapon of offence was the ram, the 
 normal order of battle was necessarily the line abreast. 
 When sails took the place of oars and artillery superseded 
 the ram, so that the principal weapon of offence was 
 removed from the stem of the ship to its side, the normal 
 order of battle became by parity of necessity the line 
 ahead. Steam has now superseded sails, the ram has 
 been revived, the power, range, and accuracy of artillery 
 have all been immeasurably increased, while at the same 
 time the capacity of a ship to resist its effects has been 
 very considerably, though certainly not proportionally 
 increased, and an entirely new weapon, terribly destructive 
 within certain well-defined limits, and invested with moral 
 terrors probably far in excess of its real offensive capacity, 
 has been added to the naval armoury in the shape of the 
 so-called "automobile" torpedo. The effect of all this is 
 
6o THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 that, if a Rodney or a Nelson were required to take com- 
 mand of a modem fleet in time of war, he would indeed 
 find the broad principles of naval strategy still unchanged, 
 he would still strive to concentrate a preponderant force 
 on points determined to be critical by the same broad 
 principles as those which determined the critical points a 
 hundred years ago ; but his actual methods, both of strategy 
 and of tactics, would be based, not as then on the power 
 of sails and the range of unrifled guns, but on steam, 
 speed, and coal endurance, on the respective powers of 
 the gun and the armour-plate, in the last resort on the 
 torpedo and the ram. 
 
 In default of actual experience in war no better illustra- 
 tion can be found of the relation between naval policy and 
 the true principles of naval warfare than in the history of 
 those "naval manoeuvres," which for the last few years 
 have during each summer attracted the attention of at 
 least a portion of the public to practical naval questions, 
 and encouraged the public discussion of the leading 
 problems involved in them. It is not for the purpose of 
 solving strategic problems in the abstract that naval 
 manoeuvres have been instituted. They throw and can 
 throw very little light on the broad principles of naval 
 strategy, which are to be deduced from history, and are 
 really determined by the very nature of things. But 
 strategic methods, as distinct from strategic principles, are 
 subject to constant change. For instance, the substitution 
 of steam for sails enables a naval commander to determine 
 precisely the number of hours required to transport his 
 fleet from any one point to another. He can also determine 
 with corresponding exactitude the limits of his adversary's 
 movements in any given direction, and, supposing him 
 to be acquainted with the latter's objective, in the direc- 
 tion determined thereby. It follows that the measures 
 which a modern commander would take for securing 
 his strategic object are governed by conditions much 
 more precise and definite than those of his predecessors 
 could have been — the uncertain and indeterminate factor 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 6i 
 
 of the weather having now been to a very considerable 
 extent eliminated. It might therefore be argued with 
 some show of plausibility that naval strategy had been 
 reduced to a question of calculation, that its main 
 problems could be as satisfactorily solved at a desk in 
 the Admiralty, with charts for the field of operations, and 
 pins for the fleets and ships employed, as by the more 
 costly and troublesome method of sending the ships to sea. 
 That is not so, and a very little consideration will explain 
 why it is not so. Because some elements of uncertainty 
 have been eliminated, it does not follow that all have dis- 
 appeared or that new elements of a like character have 
 not been introduced. War is an affair of men, not of 
 machines. The human element cannot be eliminated, 
 the personal equation cannot be neglected. The method 
 of calculation involves the assumption not only that all 
 the elements are determinate, but that all the factors 
 behave exactly as they ought to do, that the fleet at sea 
 is as efficient, as mobile, as free from all misadventure and 
 mishap as the fleet on paper is assumed to be. The only 
 way to obtain an approximation between the behaviour 
 of the actual fleet and that of the ideal fleet is by practice 
 and experiment. A military strategist might argue d. 
 priori that such and such a battalion or brigade ought to 
 be at such a point at such and such a time. They would 
 certainly not be there if they had not previously been 
 trained in the exercises required to give them the neces- 
 sary efficiency, mobility, and endurance. The case of ships 
 and fleets is similar. They are not automata. They are 
 highly organized human machines. Hence ships and their 
 crews require to be trained, assiduously and laboriously, 
 not merely in the ordinary routine of drill, some of which 
 can now be continuously and economically conducted on 
 shore, but in the higher discipline of fleet evolutions and 
 strategic movements. It is impossible to keep them 
 always at sea. The cost would be prohibitive. In the 
 old sailing days the cost of keeping a ship at sea was not 
 much greater, except for the wear and tear of ropes and 
 
62 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 sails, masts and spars, than that of maintaining her in a 
 state of efficiency in harbour. Her crew would have to be 
 maintained in any case. It is very different nowadays. 
 A ship at sea bums coal, and coal is a costly commodity. 
 Its cost amounted to ;£'40,ocx) during the manoeuvres of 
 1890. In time of peace, therefore, we now require a policy 
 of smaller fleets and larger reserves, but reserves ready 
 for immediate service. Readiness for immediate service 
 involves the necessity of frequent practice, — practice in 
 mobilization, and practice in exercises at sea. Periodical 
 naval manoeuvres are thus, as the practice of all naval 
 Powers of the first rank has shown, an indispensable con- 
 dition of naval efficiency ; our ships might be as good and 
 as numerous as ever, and our seamen might be as full as 
 ever of the traditional spirit of the British sailor, but if 
 periodical exercises on a large scale at sea were now to 
 be neglected we should fall back to the position of having 
 what a former First Lord of the Admiralty once allowed 
 himself to describe as little better than dummy ships and 
 a fleet on paper. 
 
 Even so, it might be argued, the necessity of evolutionary 
 exercises is established, but the advantage of strategic 
 mancEuvres is not demonstrated. The truth is that the 
 two are practically inseparable ; and even if they were 
 not, it is manifestly desirable to combine them. Strategic 
 manoeuvres do not interfere, in any disadvantageous sense, 
 with evolutionary exercises, nor with the ordinary routine 
 of a man-of-war at sea. In point of fact, they are for the 
 higher ranks of the service, for the officers in command of 
 ships and the admirals in command of fleets, exactly 
 analogous to the training which evolutionary exercises 
 and man-of-war routine provide for the lower ranks of the 
 service. The hierarchy is continuous and complete : routine 
 for the rank and file, evolutionary exercises for com- 
 manders of ships and officers of the watch, strategic 
 manoeuvres for commanders of fleets, and, in a subordinate 
 sense, for commanders of ships employed on detached 
 service. The routine is never intermitted, though it may 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 63 
 
 on occasion be modified in detail to suit the exigencies 
 of an assumed state of warfare. A period of evolutionary 
 exercises, with no determinate strategic purpose, has 
 always in the practice of recent years preceded the period 
 of strategic manoeuvres proper. But the training of our 
 fleets would manifestly be incomplete if the strategic 
 element were neglected. However strongly we may insist 
 that the broad principles of naval strategy are based upon 
 history and the nature of things, and are therefore un- 
 affected by changes in the methods and instruments of 
 warfare, it would be absurd not to acknowledge that there 
 are many strategic problems only to be solved by actual 
 experiment, many questions concerning the best mode of 
 handling modern warships which can only be determined 
 by direct experience and intelligent observation. 
 
 We may assume, then, that periodical manoeuvres on a 
 large scale, and mainly strategic in character, are neces- 
 sary to the efficiency of the naval service in the conditions 
 of modern naval warfare, and therefore necessary to the 
 security of a nation which depends and must depend 
 upon sea power. They have, besides, other advantages, 
 not to be overlooked. They put the Navy in evidence 
 before the eyes of the nation. For our forefathers in the 
 last century the stern experience of warfare did this. The 
 countrymen of Nelson knew what they owed to the Navy 
 and what the Navy did for them. In the generation which 
 has followed the period of the Crimean War the public 
 attention has, to a very large extent, been withdrawn 
 from the naval problem and concentrated on the military 
 problem. Because the nations of Europe have been con- 
 verted into an assemblage of armed camps, and because 
 four great European wars have determined the destinies 
 of more than as many nations in the last quarter of a 
 century, our countrymen have been led to suppose that 
 their own national security is an affair of armies rather 
 than of navies. We have lost that instinctive sense of 
 dependence upon the Navj', with which our forefathers 
 were endowed, by the stern but glorious teaching of 
 
64 THE XAVV AND THE NATIOX. 
 
 successful war. The higher policy of defence has been 
 given over to the military arm, and though our military 
 administration is notoriously inefficient and incapable, 
 albeit the most costly in the world, it is the War Office, 
 rather than the Admiralty, that is generally assumed ta 
 be primarily responsible for the national security. The 
 assumption would do no great harm if it were not 
 countenanced by policy. It would very quickly be set 
 aside if we were at war with a great European Power, not 
 merely because the nature of things requires us to defend 
 ourselves and attack our enemies at sea, but because our 
 military administration would almost certainly break down 
 more hopelessly and more disastrously than it did in the 
 Crimean War within a few weeks of the outbreak of 
 hostilities.* Nevertheless, the impression is general that 
 the army is our trusty sword and buckler. It is nothing 
 of the kind. It is rather the auxiliary of the Navy, the 
 necessary garrison of an Empire whose main defence is on 
 the sea.t Any attempt to make it more than this is a 
 misconception of the problem of national defence, and a 
 wasteful expenditure on superfluous defences of resources 
 that are so far withdrawn from the legitimate requirements, 
 of the Navy. 
 
 It is worth while to pause for a moment at this point, 
 and to consider one or two simple but conclusive proofs 
 of the justice of this view of the matter. The deplorable 
 expenditure at Portsmouth and elsewhere on elaborate 
 defensive works, which were never necessary, and are now, 
 in many cases, obsolete, is a standing and indefeasible 
 proof But the proof may be generalized as follows. 
 Defence, whether naval or military, may be either active 
 or passive. If we blockade an enemy's fleet in his ports, 
 
 * These are strong words, but, at the time they were written, they 
 were more than justified, by the reports of commissions and com- 
 mittees innumerable, and by the opinion of every military man who 
 cared for the welfare of the British army. There is reason to hope 
 that they are now in some respects out of date. 
 
 t The case of India, which in many respects stands apart, is no real 
 exception to this proposition. We could not land a corporal's guard 
 in India if our sea power were overthrown. 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 65 
 
 and await its issue in order that we may bring it to 
 action ; if we pursue his cruisers from sea to sea, and 
 never quit the scent until they are hunted down ; if we 
 take care that his raiders on our coasts are never left un- 
 molested long enough to enable them to effect their object ; 
 in a word, if we require our Navy, fleets and single ships 
 alike, to do its best to take, bum, sink, or destroy the 
 fleets and ships of the enemy wherever they are found, 
 that is an active defence. A passive defence is one which 
 awaits the attack of the enemy under conditions, either 
 temporary or permanent, most favourable to the defending 
 force, though often inconsistent with a vigorous offensive. 
 It is hardly necessary to point out that the active defence 
 is incomparably the more effective, though its failure is 
 sometimes more disastrous and more overwhelming in its 
 ulterior results than that of the passive defence. Each has its 
 province, but the maritime position of this country imposes 
 on it the absolute necessity of making its defence entirely 
 an active one. How far is this principle recognized in 
 the policy of our military authorities "i The following 
 table will show. It is taken from "The Statesman's Year 
 Book" for 1891, and exhibits the relative strength of 
 the several branches of our military forces maintained for 
 service in the United Kingdom at different periods of the 
 present century : — 
 
 Year. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Artilleiy. 
 
 Engineers. 
 
 Infantry and 
 Special Corps. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1800 
 
 14.003 
 
 6.935 
 
 421 
 
 49,386 
 
 70,745 
 
 181O 
 
 20,405 
 
 16,814 
 
 974 
 
 74.325 
 
 112,518 
 
 1820 
 
 9,900 
 
 4,046 
 
 371 
 
 46,799 
 
 61,116 
 
 1830 
 
 8,036 
 
 4,037 
 
 682 
 
 35,339 
 
 48,094 
 
 1840 
 
 7,190 
 
 4.118 
 
 544 
 
 38,624 
 
 50,476 
 
 1850 
 
 8,108 
 
 7.353 
 
 1,201 
 
 50,415 
 
 67.077 
 
 i860 
 
 11.389 
 
 14,045 
 
 1,707 
 
 62,366 
 
 89.507 
 
 1870 
 
 10,910 
 
 14,469 
 
 2,890 
 
 56,092 
 
 84,361 
 
 1880 
 
 12,672 
 
 18,07s 
 
 5,132 
 
 69.577 
 
 105,546 
 
 1890 
 
 12,470 
 
 17.584 
 
 5.370 
 
 68,682 
 
 104,116 
 
66 THE XAVy AND THE NATION. 
 
 The significance of this table for our purpose resides in 
 the column headed "Engineers" — that is, the branch of 
 the service to which the provision and control of the means 
 of passive defence have been, for the most part, entrusted. 
 Other things being equal, if we find the engineering branch 
 of the army increasing out of all proportion to the other 
 branches, we may regard it as so far an indication of a 
 growing disposition on the part of our military authorities 
 to rely upon passive defence. Now what are the facts .'' 
 In 1800 we had an army of 70,745 men in all, and of these 
 only 421 were engineers. The battle of Trafalgar had 
 not been fought, fears of invasion were beginning to be 
 rife, and if ever a passive defence of our coasts was neces- 
 sary, it must have been then. Yet its requirements were 
 held to be satisfied by a mere handful of engineers. 
 In 1810, when the Peninsular campaigns had begun, the 
 strength of the army had risen to 112,518, yet the number 
 of engineers was still under 1000, though their services 
 in the Peninsula were incessant and multifarious. We need 
 not examine the whole table in detail. The abnormal 
 growth of the engineer branch in these latter days is 
 sufficiently palpable on the face of it. A large allowance 
 must be made of course for the immense development in 
 modern times of those scientific branches of the military 
 art which appertain specially to the profession of an 
 engineer. But no allowance, however liberal, will account 
 for the figures in the table. In 1850 the complement of 
 engineers had increased to 1201, though the numbers of 
 the army were lower by some 3000 than in 1800, when 
 421 engineers were considered sufficient for all the require- 
 ments of national defence. In i860 we trace the influence 
 of the Crimean War. The army had increased to 89,507 
 and the engineers to 1707. In 1870 the army was reduced 
 again to 84,361, but the number of engineers had mounted 
 to 2890. In 1880 we had no less than 5132 engineers out 
 of an army total of 105,456; and in 1890, though the 
 army total had fallen to 104,116, less by 8000 than its 
 total complement in 18 10, the number of engineers had 
 
NAVAL MANOEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 67 
 
 again increased to 5370, more than five times as many as 
 were required by the nation when Wellington was begin- 
 ning his Peninsular campaigns. The meaning of these 
 figures is simply this — that by overlooking the requirements 
 as well as the advantages of active defence, our military 
 authorities have been induced to lay enormous and most 
 disproportionate stress on the requirements of passive 
 defence. Passive defence is the resource of a weak naval 
 Power. For a Power like England, which must hold the 
 command of the sea or perish, it is to a very large extent 
 superfluous, and so far as it is superfluous it is mis- 
 chievous, because it diverts from the Navy resources which 
 properly belong to it. How can we have a Navy strong 
 enough for our needs if our military authorities are 
 allowed to spend millions on defences which logically 
 involve the assumption that the Navy has ceased to exist ? 
 These defences are superfluous so long as the Navy can 
 defend us, and quite useless if the Navy is destroyed. A 
 Power which had overthrown our Navy would easily reduce 
 us to submission without wasting an ounce of powder in 
 the reduction of our coast defences. 
 
 Such are the costly results of an inadequate grasp of 
 the higher policy of defence — such the disastrous conse- 
 quences of ignoring the true relation of the Navy to the 
 problem of national security. It is no slight matter then 
 that the public mind has been directed of late years by a 
 series of object-lessons of the utmost importance and 
 value to a reconsideration of the relative importance, in 
 the special circumstances of the British Empire, of the 
 military and naval problems respectively. Englishmen 
 who think at all on the subject can no longer permit 
 themselves to think that the primary function of the 
 British Navy is to keep the police of the seas. They 
 know, or they ought to know by this time, that every 
 fleet and squadron that England keeps abroad is a definite 
 strategic element in a comprehensive scheme of Imperial 
 defence, and they know also, or ought to know, that the 
 reserves, which we annually mobilize and send to sea in 
 
68 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 home waters, have successively thrown light on some of 
 the main problems of naval strategy and tactics as affected 
 by modern conditions of warfare. We will now briefly 
 examine the history of the manoeuvres from this particular 
 point of view. Each annual series would properly demand 
 a whole essay to itself; but a comprehensive view is not 
 impossible, and may, we trust, be made instructive as well 
 as interesting. 
 
 The manoeuvres began in 1885 in an almost accidental 
 manner. Our relations with Russia had been strained 
 almost to breaking point by what was known at the time as 
 the " Penjdeh incident," and for some weeks war seemed 
 imminent. Naval dispositions for the defence of our interests 
 were quietly made in all parts of the world, and a power- 
 ful but heterogeneous fleet was hastily mobilized in home 
 waters. The cloud of war happily passed away, however ; 
 and the only permanent consequence of its gathering was 
 the inauguration of that system of periodical manoeuvres 
 which has now, it may be hoped, become a permanent feature 
 in the policy of the Admiralty. Sir Geoffrey Hornby, by 
 the universal consent of the naval service the first tactician 
 of his day, was placed in command of the fleet mobilized 
 at home, and was sent to sea with instructions to carry 
 out a series of manoeuvres. At Bantry Bay, which Admiral 
 Hornby made his headquarters at the beginning of the 
 operations, a very instructive series of experiments was 
 carried out in the defence of a protected anchorage against 
 the attack of torpedo boats and other vessels more or 
 less appropriate to such a purpose ; and in particular the 
 total destruction by the Polyphemus without the slightest 
 injury to herself, of a very powerful boom stretched across 
 one of the entrances to the anchorage of Berehaven, 
 afforded something like a decisive test of the efficacy of 
 such means of defence. At a subsequent period of the 
 manoeuvres Admiral Hornby, starting from Blacksod Bay 
 with a portion of the fleet, endeavoured to elude the 
 vigilance of Rear-Admiral Whyte, his second in command, 
 who with the remainder of the fleet was to establish his 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSOXS. 69 
 
 base at Lough Swilly, and to endeavour to prevent an 
 attack of Admiral Hornby either on Greenock or on 
 Belfast. By a brilliant and daring act of seamanship 
 Hornby quitted Blacksod Bay after nightfall in the teeth 
 of a strong gale, and endeavoured so to manoeuvre as to 
 elude his adversary, and to secure a free passage through 
 the North Channel. But among the ships taken up by 
 the Admiralty when war seemed imminent was that swift 
 but ill-fated Atlantic liner the Oregon, and this vessel, 
 commanded by naval officers, was attached to Whyte's 
 squadron. She was so handled as to take full advantage 
 of her exceptional speed, and while keeping touch with 
 the attacking fleet she managed to maintain her communi- 
 cations with Whyte without disclosing her purpose to 
 Hornby. The result was that although Hornby was able 
 to pass the North Channel unmolested, yet he was 
 immediately made aware of the unexpected presence of 
 Whyte's squadron at his heels ; while, but for a failure of 
 speed in some of his ships, which retarded the movements 
 of his fleet, Whyte, who had throughout been informed of 
 his enemy's movements, would have been in a position 
 to frustrate the latter completely. In no subsequent 
 manoeuvres, so far as we are aware, has the importance of 
 fast cruisers acting as scouts, and the direct bearing of 
 their operations, when skilfully conducted, on the whole 
 conduct and issue of a campaign, been more conclusively 
 demonstrated. 
 
 In 1886 there were no manoeuvres proper, though the 
 torpedo operations of Bantry Bay in 1885 were repeated 
 at Milford Haven in a form modified by the experience 
 previously acquired. In 1887 a very large and powerful, 
 though somewhat miscellaneous fleet, was collected at 
 Spithead in celebration of the Queen's Jubilee. This 
 great fleet was subsequently employed in three separate 
 series of manoeuvres, only two of which need engage 
 our attention here, the third being similar in principle 
 to the operations carried out by Admiral Hornby in 
 1885. The two principal series were conducted respectively 
 
70 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 by the late Admiral Hewett against Admiral Fre- 
 mantle, and by Admiral Baird against Admiral Fitzroy. 
 In the former, Hewett operated in defence of the Channel 
 and the mouth of the Thames, while his opponent advanc- 
 ing from the westward was to endeavour to elude the 
 defending fleet, and having done so to occupy the ap- 
 proaches to the Thames. A similar plan of operations, 
 having either Liverpool, Glasgow, or Belfast, for its main 
 objective, was proposed for the attacking squadron of 
 Fitzroy, while Baird, in command of the defending squadron, 
 was to give the best account he could of the squadron of 
 his assailant. In the Channel, Fremantle, advancing from 
 the westward, managed so far to elude his adversary's 
 vigilance as to give his scouts the go-by and to reach the 
 mouth of the Thames in advance of him. But here his 
 advantage, such as it was, proved his undoing. He was 
 destined to afford a capital illustration of the strategic 
 maxim that a serious territorial attack from the sea is 
 so hazardous as to be virtually impracticable, so long as 
 a defending force, not necessarily superior to the assailant, 
 but capable of meeting the latter on something like equal 
 terms, is in the neighbourhood and undefeated. Had 
 Hewett been better supplied with scouts in the shape of 
 a sufficiency of fast cruisers, had his intelligence service 
 on shore and afloat been organized as such a service must 
 be organized in the case of actual war, and as indeed it 
 has been organized in the manoeuvres of subsequent years, 
 or even in default of these conditions, had he, with the 
 slender scouting resources at his command, been a little 
 more fortunate in establishing touch with his enemy at 
 an earlier stage of the proceedings, it is probable that 
 Fremantle would never have been able to reach the 
 Thames at all. Some few brilliant exploits in the way 
 of gathering and conveying intelligence were performed 
 by the cruisers employed, but those were the days before 
 the new naval programme, and the supply of cruisers and 
 scouts was deplorably insufficient. Hence Fremantle was 
 enabled to reach his supposed objective without encountering 
 
MAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. yi 
 
 his adversary. But his apparent success was no real 
 advantage from a strategic point of view. Hewett, though 
 unable to bar his opponent's passage, was close upon 
 his heels, and the invader was practically caught by a 
 superior force in a position among the shoals at the 
 mouth of the Thames so disadvantageous that he was 
 compelled, in order to save his fleet from capture accord- 
 ing to the rules, to retreat precipitately into the North 
 Sea by one channel while Hewett entered the Thames 
 by another. 
 
 The lack of cruisers and its consequence in the failure 
 of intelligence on the one hand, and on the other a fresh 
 and signal illustration of a strategic principle as old as 
 naval warfare, were thus the two salient lessons of this 
 branch of the manoeuvres of 1887. It may be urged, 
 perhaps, that a principle as old as naval warfare needs 
 no fresh illustration. To such an argument two replies 
 may be made. In the first place, the principle in question 
 has often been overlooked. It was the basis of the 
 masterly strategy proposed by Torrington before the battle 
 of Beachy Head, as well as of his tactics in the course of 
 the battle. Admiral Colomb has shown quite conclusively, 
 as it seems to us, that if Torrington's plan of operations 
 had not been overruled by his superiors in London, the 
 battle of Beachy Head need never have been fought and 
 lost, while, if it had been fought on any other principles 
 than those which still governed Torrington's proceedings, 
 it might have resulted in the overthrow of William's 
 throne and the restoration of the Stuart dynasty.* In 
 the second place, it is presumable either that Fremantle 
 himself thought it a practicable operation of naval warfare 
 to strike at the enemy's vital point, while leaving a 
 superior "fleet in being," to borrow Torrington's own 
 phrase, in his immediate rear, or that his superiors at 
 the Admiralty were of that opinion, and gave him 
 
 • The historical and strategic questions here involved are dis- 
 cussed at length in a subsequent paper entitled " The Command of 
 the Sea," p. 118. 
 
72 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 instructions accordingly. In either case an established but 
 forgotten principle was violated, while its truth and bearing 
 were abundantly illustrated in the result. 
 
 It might almost be thought, indeed, as if the framers 
 of the plan of manoeuvres of 1887 must have had in mind 
 the strategic situation which existed at the time of the 
 battle of Beachy Head. It is true that his fleet was 
 inferior to that of his adversary, but in other respects 
 Fremantle might be supposed to represent Tourville : and 
 what Tourville neglected to do, or perhaps was not strong 
 enough to do, namely, to strike at the communications of 
 William, who was at the time in Ireland about to fight 
 the battle of the Boyne, the Admiralty resolved to do by 
 sending a hostile fleet into St. George's Channel. But 
 they exposed this fleet to the risks Tourville would have 
 run had he detached a squadron against William's com- 
 munications. While Torrington held the Channel and 
 succeeded in frustrating Tourville's advance, though he 
 could not fight a decisive battle with any chance of success, 
 Killigrew was making his way from the coast of Spain, 
 and Sir Cloudesley Shovel held St. George's Channel 
 with a small but sufficient force. In the manoeuvres of 
 1887 Baird may be considered to have been entrusted 
 with the task which would have fallen to Killigrew and 
 Shovel had Tourville attempted to threaten St. George's 
 Channel. Fitzroy was allowed to enter the Channel, but 
 not without having been observed by his adversary. A 
 hostile squadron so situated must sooner or later try 
 conclusions with its enemy. There is no escape for it, 
 except by returning as it came and fighting its way out, 
 or by making its way to the northward. In either case, 
 or indeed in any case, it must abandon its objective. So 
 long as the defensive squadron is "in being" and intact, 
 no serious attacks can be made on the coasts, "for," as 
 Torrington wrote, "whilst we observe the French they 
 cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without run- 
 ning a great hazard ; " so that an enterprising commander 
 could wish for nothing better than that his enemy should 
 
NAVAL MANOEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 73 
 
 place himself in the position in which Fitzroy was placed 
 by the Admiralty. As a matter of fact, he was observed, 
 overtaken, and defeated by Baird. It is true that he was 
 hampered by the failure of some of his ships in speed. 
 But the utmost that he could hope to do in any case was 
 to hurry through St. George's Channel at full speed with 
 an enemy superior in force at his heels, and to trust to 
 luck to enable him to force the North Channel and escape 
 into the open sea. With a superior fleet " in being " behind 
 him, any attempt to attack the coasts would have led to 
 certain destruction. 
 
 The main feature of the manoeuvres of 1888 was an 
 experiment in blockade under the conditions of modern 
 naval warfare. For the purpose of this experiment it was 
 assumed that war was imminent between two naval Powers, 
 one, the weaker, represented by Ireland, the other by 
 Great Britain. The enemy was fitting out two fleets in 
 Bantry Bay and Lough Swilly respectively, and two British 
 fleets, with their bases at Milford Haven and Lamlash, 
 were organized for the purpose of blockading him in his 
 ports. Each blockading fleet was superior in strength to the 
 fleet blockaded by it, but the two hostile fleets together were 
 stronger than either of the blockading fleets, and they had 
 the advantage of being in immediate telegraphic communi- 
 cation across Ireland, while the blockading fleets could only 
 communicate directly by means of cruisers sent from one 
 to the other, or indirectly by messages sent to some British 
 port and thence telegraphed to the nearest port in com- 
 munication with the British commanders at sea. Sir George 
 Tryon at Berehaven was in command of the hostile fleets, 
 with Admiral Fitzroy as his second in command at Lough 
 Swilly, while Admiral Baird commanded the two block- 
 ading squadrons, and undertook the blockade of Bantry 
 Bay, with Admiral Rowley as his second in command off 
 Lough Swilly. For several days the blockade was main- 
 tained with apparent success at both places, the tactics 
 adopted consisting of an inshore squadron closely watching 
 the enemy's port with an advance guard of torpedo-boats 
 
74 THE XAVY AND THE XATION. 
 
 and torpedo gun-boats, while a cordon of battle-ships 
 patrolled the outer waters within signalling distance of 
 the inshore squadron. It was made known subsequently, 
 however, that Tryon had been instructed by the Admiralty 
 to make no attempt at breaking the blockade before a 
 certain day, in order that it might be ascertained how far 
 the officers of the blockading squadron could bear the 
 strain imposed upon them by the necessity for incessant 
 vigilance. In the old days of sailing ships an Admiral in 
 command of a blockading squadron knew that, so long as 
 the wind remained in a certain quarter, the enemy could 
 make no attempt to escape, and therefore the vigilance of 
 the blockade might so far be relaxed in those circum- 
 stances. But with steam the conditions are totally changed, 
 and a blockade once established must be continuously 
 maintained without even a moment's relaxation of vigil- 
 ance. The strain imposed upon those concerned in it is 
 thus incessant, and can only be rendered even tolerable 
 by the frequent relief of the ships engaged. In other 
 words, a continuous blockade, if possible at all in modern 
 conditions, necessarily requires that the blockading squadron 
 should be so numerous as to be able frequently to detach 
 some of its ships for the purpose of affording them necessary 
 relief while still maintaining the required superiority over 
 the ships of the enemy. 
 
 There are, indeed, some who think that a close blockade 
 of an enemy's squadron is no longer possible. What is 
 certain is that, before the period of inactivity imposed by 
 the Admiralty on the hostile fleets in 1888 had expired, 
 Rowley had written to Baird to say that his officers and 
 men were so exhausted that he would be compelled to 
 raise the blockade, and though no such specific conclusion 
 had been reached by Baird himself, it may perhaps be 
 assumed that the breaking strain which had been reached 
 by one fleet was not far distant in the other. This proves, 
 however, not that blockades are impossible, but that the 
 methods of blockade adopted in 1888 must be modified 
 in accordance with the experience thus gained. The 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 75 
 
 purpose of a naval as distinct from a commercial blockade 
 is, as Admiral Colomb has well pointed out, not so to seal 
 up the blockaded port as to prevent all ingress and egress, 
 but to secure that the enemy's fleet shall not put to sea 
 without the commander of the blockading fleet immediately 
 becoming aware of his movements. It is not essential to 
 this purpose that the main body of the blockading fleet 
 should always be close at hand ; it is necessary that its 
 position should be so favourable, and its communications 
 so effective, that the enemy, if he attempts to escape, shall 
 not be able to get away without being observed and 
 pursued, nor to establish himself in a position nearer to 
 his presumed objective than that occupied by the blockad- 
 ing squadron. Probably these conditions would best be 
 satisfied by keeping the main force of the blockaders at 
 a convenient distance, where coal and other supplies are 
 accessible, and closely watching the enemy's port with a 
 flotilla of torpedo gunboats of light draft and exceeding 
 swiftness, and sufficiently numerous to admit of frequent 
 relief. It is of course absolutely essential that the com- 
 munications between such an inshore squadron and the 
 main squadron at a distance should be immediate and 
 practically unassailed by the enemy. Where these condi- 
 tions are possible, blockade is still possible, and perhaps 
 not otherwise. 
 
 It is certain at any rate that the blockade of Bantry Bay 
 and Lough Svvilly was a complete failure. It was full of 
 instractive lessons, and of dramatic episodes which abun- 
 dantly displayed the dash and daring of the British naval 
 officer, but it proved to demonstration that the means at 
 Baird's disposal . were, as applied by him, totally inade- 
 quate for the purpose aimed at. In the period of inactivity 
 imposed upon him by the Admiralty, Tryon matured his 
 plans with consummate skill, and as soon as he recovered 
 his freedom of action he carried them out without let or 
 hindrance. Three ships escaped from Bantry Bay almost 
 unobserved by the blockading squadron and joined two other 
 ships, which escaped from Lough Svvilly, at a predetermined 
 
76 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 rendezvous, whence they proceeded to raid upon the 
 north-east coast of Great Britain. The escape from Bere- 
 haven was effected in the night under cover of a brilliant 
 diversion carried out by Tryon, who remained at Bantry 
 Bay, while Fitzroy himself escaped in his flagship from 
 Lough Swilly and took command of the raiding squadron. 
 At daybreak on the following morning the blockade of 
 Bantry Bay was raised. Baird had ascertained that some 
 ships had escaped, though he was not able to pursue them, 
 or to divine their precise purpose, and the presumption 
 being that if they appeared off Lough Swilly they would 
 give Fitzroy the required superiority over his immediate 
 adversary, it became necessary to raise both blockades 
 and to effect a junction with all despatch between the 
 two blockading squadrons. Accordingly, a fast cruiser, 
 the Mersey, having been despatched by the shortest route 
 round the west coast of Ireland to warn Rowley of his 
 danger and appoint a rendezvous with his commander-in- 
 chief, the fastest battle-ships of Baird's squadron were sent 
 on in advance through St. George's Channel to reinforce 
 Rowley, while Baird himself proceeded as rapidly as he 
 could to a rendezvous in Luce Bay. It was necessary in 
 the first instance to save the two fleets from destruction 
 in detail, and this could be done if the Mersey joined 
 Rowley in time to redress the balance at Lough Swilly, 
 and to direct Rowley to fall back in the direction of the 
 fast and powerful squadron advancing through St. George's 
 Channel to reinforce him. The junction of the fleets was 
 effected, but for practical purposes Tryon still remained 
 master of the situation. Recognizing that the force at his 
 disposal did not enable him to afford adequate protection 
 to the northern ports, and that a victorious enemy would 
 have the approaches to London at his mercy if the only 
 " fleet in being " could be induced to leave them uncovered, 
 Baird withdrew as rapidly as he could to the Channel, 
 leaving Rowley to cover Liverpool for a time. Tryon, 
 finding the blockade raised at both points, united the 
 residue of his two squadrons and proceeded to the reduction 
 
NAVAL MAN(EUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 77 
 
 of Liverpool, Baird having in the meanwhile directed 
 Rowley to follow him up the Channel. It may very 
 reasonably be held that Baird's resolve to concentrate his 
 whole force in the neighbourhood of the Downs, though 
 justified perhaps by the circumstances of the time, was 
 not in itself a very sound piece of strategy. Its justifica- 
 tion must be sought in the circumstance that in 1888 no 
 organized system was in force for collecting intelligence 
 along the coasts and transmitting it without delay to the 
 British commander at sea. In default of such a system, 
 Baird, having once lost touch of his enemy, was compelled 
 to assume that the latter would not again be heard of 
 until he was in the near neighbourhood of his objective, 
 wherever that might be ; and, assuming his objective to 
 be the Thames, Baird held it to be his duty to neglect all 
 other parts of the Kingdom and to cover the Thames at 
 all hazards. On the principle, however, that a vigorous 
 offensive is always hazardous and generally hopeless, so 
 long as there is a sufficient " fleet in being " undefeated 
 and within striking distance, it may well be held that, 
 with a better organized system of intelligence, Baird might 
 so have disposed his forces as to afford adequate security 
 to the Thames without leaving Liverpool unprotected. As 
 a matter of fact, an occupation of the mouth of the Thames 
 never entered into Tryon's scheme of operations. He 
 contented himself with the reduction of Liverpool and 
 with certain raids, more theatrical than really effective, 
 questionable in strategy, but fairly in accordance with the 
 rules laid down by the Admiralty, on the north-eastern 
 coasts of Great Britain. 
 
 The two broad lessons of the manoeuvres of 1888 were 
 thus, first, that in modem conditions a blockade to be 
 effective must be conducted by a much larger force in 
 proportion to the blockaded fleet than was thought neces- 
 sary when the scheme of operations was laid down, and 
 that its method must be radically different from that 
 adopted under the same scheme ; and second, that an 
 organized system of coast observation and intelligence is 
 
78 THE XAVY A. YD THE XATIOX. 
 
 absolutely necessary to a defending fleet, if it is to secure 
 the full advantages of that superiority of force which is 
 England's prerogative on the sea, and that mobility which 
 the use of steam has conferred on modern fleets and war- 
 ships. In the sailing days a " fleet in being " at Plymouth, 
 for example, could afford no protection to the Thames 
 against an attack on its approaches by a fleet coming 
 from the North Sea, if easterly winds were prevailing ;. 
 but in modem conditions a commander at Plymouth, 
 well served by swift cruisers certain of establishing 
 instant communication with him as soon as they came 
 within signalling distance of any one of a sufficient 
 number of observing stations established on all parts 
 of the coast, might fairly reckon on receiving intelli- 
 gence of his enemy's movements in time to enable him to 
 frustrate his object. It is true that he could not expect 
 to be able to prevent what may be called fugitive raids 
 made by detached cruisers on defenceless coast-towns at 
 a distance from his base ; but attacks of this kind are 
 far less formidable in reality than they are generally made 
 to appear in the mimic warfare of manoeuvres. They are 
 full of hazard to the attacking force, and in any case they 
 are of little moment in deciding the broad issues of a 
 campaign. We shall see presently to what hazards they 
 are exposed, and by what measures they can be frustrated 
 so long as the defending force retains its superiority at 
 sea — a condition belonging to their essence, because where 
 it is absent a hostile fleet will not waste its time and 
 strength in such enterprises, but will go straight to its 
 main point and objective. 
 
 These two lessons were not lost on the framers of the 
 scheme of manoeuvres of 1889. Again, certain ports in 
 Ireland, Berehaven, and Queenstown, were assumed to be 
 the bases of two divisions of the naval force of a Power 
 supposed to be hostile to Great Britain, and again a 
 superior British fleet was entrusted with the task of de- 
 fending the coasts of Great Britain against maritime attack. 
 Sir George Tryon was this time in command of the British. 
 
NAVAL MAiV(EUVRES AXD THEIR LESSONS. 79 
 
 fleet, while Admiral Baird became in his turn the enemy. 
 The scheme of operations did not contemplate a close 
 blockade as in the previous year ; but Tryon, with his 
 base at Milford Haven and auxiliary squadrons at Lam- 
 lash, Devonport, Portland and the Downs, was required 
 to keep a close watch upon the enemy's movements by 
 means of his cruisers, and while leaving him free to take 
 the sea, so to dispose of his own force as to be able to 
 deny the assailant access to the British coasts and waters. 
 Baird's position was a very difficult one. He was inferior 
 in strength to his opponent, and could not therefore try 
 direct conclusions with him. To force his adversary's 
 guard without fighting an action was therefore almost the 
 only course open to him, and the alternatives presented 
 themselves of either repeating his adversary's strategy of 
 the previous year and making a descent on the north-east 
 coast, or attempting to pass the Channel with a view to 
 attacking the Thames. As might naturally be expected, 
 he chose the latter. Selecting the fastest battleships and 
 cruisers from his two divisions, he combined them in a 
 raiding squadron under Admiral D'Arcy-Irvine. They 
 were to attempt to enter the Channel separately on pre- 
 determined courses, and to make for an appointed rendez- 
 vous in the neighbourhood of Beachy Head. It was hoped 
 that by passing points of special danger in the night, most 
 if not all of the ships engaged in this hazardous enterprise 
 might be able to elude the vigilance of the defending 
 fleet. If they could once get well ahead of Tryon's main 
 squadron they were swift enough to escape individually 
 from any other ships likely to dispute their passage, and 
 strong enough when combined to overpower the squadron 
 placed in the Downs for the purpose of covering the 
 Thames. Even if closely pursued therefore they would be 
 able to escape into the North Sea, though the contem- 
 plated attack on the Thames might be frustrated. Every- 
 thing depended, however, on the ships of the raiding 
 squadron being able to make good their entrance into the 
 Channel without encountering the main force of the 
 
8o THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 defending fleet. Unfortunately for the success of the enter- 
 prise the primary' condition, that of getting past Tryon's 
 main squadron unobserved, was not reahzed. From 
 Falmouth to the neighbourhood of Ushant, Tryon's fleet 
 was spread out in such order as to cover the whole 
 ground without placing the individual ships so far apart 
 as to be unable to communicate with and support each 
 other. Here the several ships composing Baird's raiding 
 squadron were successively encountered. Three were 
 overpowered and captured ; the remainder, including the 
 flagship of D'Arcy-Irvine, made good their escape, having 
 encountered only the slower battleships of Tryon's 
 squadron, and returned to Baird's headquarters at Queens- 
 town, where Baird found them on his own return with his 
 slow battleships from a cruise into the Atlantic, under- 
 taken for the purpose of concealing his whereabouts from 
 his adversary. Thus the enterprise totally failed and 
 ended in crushing disaster — a bitter disappointment, no 
 doubt, to Baird, but on the whole a satisfactory demon- 
 stration of the exceeding difficulty which a hostile force 
 would always encounter in any attempt to enter the 
 Channel and carry on a vigorous offensive in the face of 
 a superior "fleet in being," skilfully disposed with, due 
 regard to the strategic conditions of the case. Baird's 
 plan failed utterly ; and though it would perhaps be too 
 much to say that it deserved to fail, yet it is true that its 
 failure was a better illustration of sound strategic principle 
 than its success could possibly have been. The raiding 
 squadron might, if it had been as lucky as it was unlucky, 
 have managed to get through the Channel and out into 
 the North Sea ; but with a superior fleet behind it, it could 
 never have undertaken any serious offensive enterprise. 
 
 The failure of his ruse, and the loss of three of his most 
 powerful ships, practically exhausted Baird's powers of 
 serious offensive. His cruisers were engaged in preying 
 upon commerce, and were eminently successful in that 
 rather make-believe operation. The Inflexible with 
 the Hecla, and a flotilla of torpedo-boats, had been sent 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 8i 
 
 to Lough Swilly to prepare a protected anchorage against 
 the anticipated return of the original raiding squadron 
 from the North Sea. But the raiding squadron never 
 reached the North Sea : what survived of it after its 
 encounter with Tryon's fleet had returned to Queenstown. 
 Thence it was again despatched by Baird on an enterprise 
 similar to that which Tryon had undertaken in the pre- 
 vious year. It was ordered to pass to the westward and 
 northward, and to raid upon the north-east coast, and 
 since the protected anchorage at Lough Swilly was no 
 longer of any practical service, the Inflexible was at a 
 later date ordered to join the raiding squadron, of which 
 D'Arcy-Irvine again took the command. The second 
 enterprise undertaken by the raiding squadron under 
 D'Arcy-Irvine was not much more successful than the 
 first. Even when reinforced by the Inflexible, the 
 reduced squadron was now no longer so strong or so fast 
 but that its defeat and capture by a superior force de- 
 spatched against it by Tryon was perfectly feasible. 
 Moreover, since the previous year, the Admiralty had 
 established a series of signal and observing stations on 
 the coast, connected by telegraph with headquarters, so 
 that a hostile ship or squadron could not show itself any- 
 where off the coast without the defending Admiral being 
 immediately informed of its character and whereabouts. 
 D'Arcy-Irvine appeared first on the east coast of Scotland 
 and affected to reduce Peterhead, Aberdeen, and Leith, 
 and to destroy the Forth Bridge. This was permissible 
 according to the rules, but scarcely within the possibilities 
 of actual warfare. He next made a demonstration off the 
 Tyne, though it must be acknowledged that the idea of 
 seriously injuring the Elswick works by means of bom- 
 bardment from ships lying off Tynemouth is a mere 
 absurdity. Proceeding southwards he encountered a 
 .superior squadron despatched by Tryon to attack him. 
 The Inflexible was captured, but the Ansoti, the Rear- 
 Admiral's flagship, managed to escape, and by this 
 time the close of the period assigned by the Admiralt\- 
 
 G 
 
82 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 for the duration of hostilities brought the manoeuvres of 
 1889 to an end. 
 
 So far the order of evolution followed by the manceuvres 
 from year to year had been logical and coherent. 
 The mancEuvres of 1885 were experimental and tenta- 
 tive, and the main plan of operations was left to the 
 initiative of the distinguished Admiral in supreme command. 
 In subsequent mancEuvres the Admiralty itself took the 
 initiative, and laid down beforehand the general scheme of 
 operations to be carried out. The manoeuvres of 1887 
 exhibited the risks necessarily encountered by an inferior 
 naval force when it attempts to act on a vigorous offensive 
 in the face of a superior defending force. This lesson was 
 again enforced with still greater significance and cogency 
 by the manoeuvres of 1889, and though the result of the 
 manoeuvres of 1888 might seem to point to an opposite 
 conclusion, inasmuch as Sir George Tryon, after forcing 
 the blockade, was able to reduce Liverpool and to raid 
 upon the north-east coast without molestation from his 
 adversary, yet it must be remembered that the superior 
 fleet, being on that occasion required to maintain a 
 blockade, and having failed in that enterprise, was neither 
 in force nor position to make full and immediate use of 
 its defensive powers at other points of the field of warfare. 
 In any case, moreover, the achievements of Tryon after 
 the blockade was raised were a little wanting in strategic 
 actuality, and his ultimate defeat by Baird, who still 
 retained his superiority of force, could only be a question 
 of time. For the rest the manoeuvres of 1888 showed, 
 not indeed that blockade is impossible in modern condi- 
 tions of warfare, but that its successful conduct and 
 continuance require a force specially adapted to the 
 purpose, and very greatly superior to that of the squadron 
 blockaded. From this point of view the manoeuvres of 
 1889 were full of instruction. Instead of blockading 
 Baird in his protected ports, Tryon was instructed to 
 watch him from his own base, to act on the offensive 
 so far as circumstances might permit, but not so far as 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 83 
 
 to interfere with the primary object of defending the 
 shores of Great Britain against the assault of an enemy 
 permitted and even invited to take the sea. In the result 
 Baird's attack was foiled, and the flower of his fleet was 
 captured. Once more it was shown that an inferior naval 
 force, acting on a vigorous offensive, is exposed to such 
 tremendous risks of defeat, capture, and destruction, that 
 a prudent enemy would be forced to think twice or thrice 
 before he engaged in so desperate an enterprise. 
 
 There is still, however, one thing that an inferior naval 
 force may do, if it is strong enough to take the sea, but 
 not strong enough to act on a vigorous offensive against 
 the coasts of its enemy. It may undertake a giierre de 
 course, as the French term it ; that is, it may endeavour 
 to destroy its enemy's commerce on the seas. This, in 
 fact, is the only thing it can do if, on the one hand, the 
 superior naval power does not think it worth its while to 
 blockade the ports of its enemy, and, on the other, the in- 
 ferior power recognizes and shrinks, as it must, from the 
 tremendous risks inseparable from territorial attacks under 
 the assumed conditions of relative strength. Accordingly 
 the manoeuvres of 1890, still following a logical and 
 coherent order of evolution, were designed to elucidate the 
 strategy to be pursued by a British naval commander in 
 the event of his enemy electing to assail him by means 
 of a guerre de course directed against the maritime trade 
 of Great Britain. A portion of the Atlantic was designated 
 as the trade-route to be attacked. It was purposely selected 
 so as to avoid the main lines of Atlantic traffic which 
 converge upon British ports, and to interfere as little as 
 possible with the actual course of trade, since the mere 
 pretence of capturing merchant-ships peacefully crossing 
 the sea formed no part of the scheme of operations. Sir 
 Michael Culme-Seymour, representing the enemy, with his 
 base at Berehaven, was to start on a given day and to 
 establish and maintain himself on the trade-route, always, 
 however, endeavouring to avoid a general engagement. 
 Sir George Tryon, with his base at Plymouth, was not to 
 
84 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 start with his battleships until twenty-four hours after his 
 adversary had quitted his base, though the cruisers on 
 both sides had been allowed to put to sea simultaneous!)-, 
 when hostilities were regarded as imminent, for the purpose 
 of watching the movements of their respective enemies. 
 It is plain that under the foregoing conditions Culme- 
 Seymour might fully comply with his instructions and yet 
 completely baffle the efforts of his adversary to overtake 
 or discover him by striking the trade-route at or about a 
 point equidistant from Plymouth and Berehaven, and then 
 steering a course along it with Plymouth right astern so 
 long as hostilities lasted. From the point of view of 
 manoeuvres and their object, this was not perhaps " a 
 sporting course to adopt," as his adversary put it in a 
 memorandum issued to his captains at the outset of 
 hostilities ; but considering that Tryon, with his great 
 strategic skill and his long and brilliant experience of 
 manoeuvres, regarded it as a probable course, it may 
 perhaps be assumed that he himself would have adopted 
 it had he been in his adversary's position. In that case it is 
 justified by the concurrence of two very capable naval 
 commanders, for Culme-Seymour adopted the precise 
 strategy attributed to him by his distinguished opponent. 
 The result was that the two opposing fleets never came 
 into collision or even contact with each other at all ; and 
 though Culme-Seymour maintained his position on the 
 trade-route, he only did so by going to a point so distant 
 from that at which, if the route had been a real one, the 
 lines of traffic leading to the British Isles would have 
 converged, that his operations against his supposed enemy's 
 commerce must have been of a very feeble and incon- 
 clusive character. He incidentally demonstrated, however, 
 by taking colliers with him, and supplying himself with 
 coal from them at the back of the Azores, that the opera- 
 tion of coaling a fleet of battleships at sea is a perfectly 
 feasible one, if performed in latitudes where calm weather 
 may be reckoned upon ; and this result, though it was not 
 contemplated by the scheme of manoeuvres, was in itself 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 85 
 
 of considerable importance. On the other hand, Tryon, 
 though the course taken by his adversary made it im- 
 possible for him to bring the latter to an action, or even 
 to discover his whereabouts, was eminently successful in 
 the dispositions he made for the defence of the trade-route 
 within his proper radius of action. He demonstrated the 
 I)aramount importance of Scilly as a naval base for a fleet 
 engaged in such operations as he was required to conduct, 
 and he showed quite conclusively that a naval force 
 inferior to his own could not have attempted to establish 
 itself on the trade-route at or near its point of greatest 
 concentration, without running such risks of detection and 
 defeat as no prudent commander would be justified in 
 running for the sake of a mere guerre de course, un- 
 supported by a fleet of battleships capable of trying 
 conclusions on fairly equal terms with its adversary. Once 
 more the moral and material ascendency of a superior 
 "fleet in being" was abundantly and most instructively 
 demonstrated. 
 
 We must not pass over the torpedo-boat operations, 
 which were a subsidiary but most important feature of the 
 manoeuvres of 1890 ; indeed they would repay well a 
 much more detailed examination. The official pro- 
 gramme stated that " a further subsidiary object of the 
 1890 manoeuvres is to ascertain what form the tactics of 
 torpedo-boats operating from a distant base should assume." 
 The base selected was Aldemey, and the objective points 
 to be assailed were Portland, where a reserve squadron 
 was stationed, and the positions occupied to the westward 
 by Sir George Tryon's sea-going squadron, together with 
 any auxiliaries and colliers attached to it. The squadron 
 at Portland was authorized to protect itself by mines, 
 booms, nets, and such other fixed and mobile defences as 
 were available, and at this point the attack of the torpedo- 
 boats was foiled. But their operations to the westward 
 were so vigorously conducted, so remarkable for the skill, 
 daring, and endurance displayed by the officers engaged, 
 as to show conclusively that the area of offensive operations. 
 
86 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 accessible to torpedo-boats handled by officers who know 
 their business, is so large as to expose the whole of 
 the Channel to the ravages of torpedo-boats issuing from 
 either side. In fact, no radius of action less extended 
 than that represented by the distance between Alderney 
 and Falmouth at the least can be assigned to torpedo- 
 boats properly handled and fought. Tiyon recognized 
 this when he adroitly transferred his base from Falmouth 
 to Scilly, leaving, however, a collier at the former place 
 as a decoy for his enterprising little assailants, and taking 
 care to provide them with a warm reception when they 
 came. But on the first night of Hostilities, when his fleet 
 was tied by the regulations issued for the conduct of the 
 manoeuvres to its anchorage in Plymouth Sound, he had 
 to sustain a spirited and most brilliant attack conducted 
 by torpedo-boats which had left Alderney at nightfall. 
 The result of the attack was- left doubtful by the umpires, 
 who found themselves unable to reconcile the conflicting 
 evidence received by them. But its result, whatever it 
 may have been, was altogether unimportant in comparison 
 with the demonstration it afibrded of the power of the 
 torpedo-boat for mischief over an area largely greater than 
 had ever previously been assigned to it. 
 
 It may here be mentioned that this line of experiment 
 was further pursued in the torpedo-boat operations which 
 formed a distinct and independent feature of the manceuvres 
 of 1891. The bases assigned to the torpedo-boats on this 
 occasion were the Irish ports of St. George's Channel. 
 Their objective was a small squadron of ironclads with 
 cruisers and torpedo gunboats under the late Admiral 
 Long, then a captain, with his base at Milford Haven, and 
 a freedom of range throughout the area accessible to the 
 hostile torpedo-boats. Captain Long, himself a torpedo- 
 expert of great experience and capacity, resolved to make 
 his defence an active rather than a passive one — that is, 
 instead of entrenching himself behind such fixed and 
 mobile defences as are available when a squadron remains 
 at its anchorage, and waiting for torpedo-boats to attack 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 87 
 
 him, he went himself to attack the torpedo-boats. The 
 result abundantly justified the tactics employed. In no 
 single instance during the operations was a torpedo-boat 
 successful in its attack on an ironclad. Of the twenty 
 boats engaged, four were adjudged to have been captured 
 or destroyed, while seventeen separate attacks delivered 
 by the remainder were adjudged to have resulted in the 
 temporary disabling of the boat engaged. Besides this, 
 two of the protecting ships attached to the torpedo-boat 
 bases were destroyed by Captain Long, and the end of the 
 operations left him completely master of the situation. 
 It may be that the rules framed for the conduct of the 
 operations were undesignedly and perhaps unavoidably 
 less favourable to the torpedo-boats than the conditions 
 of actual warfare would be ; but even when full weight 
 is allowed to this consideration, the superiority of active 
 over passive defence remains manifest and indisputable. 
 There are some who think that the supply of torpedo- 
 boats provided by the Admiralty for the British navy is 
 inadequate, and they point with alarm to the superiority 
 in this arm exhibited by France and several other naval 
 Powers. The question is too large and too intricate to 
 be more than glanced at here. But we may say that in 
 our judgment the governing consideration is this : that 
 the torpedo-boat is essentially the weapon of a Power 
 likely to be weaker than its adversary on the sea. Its 
 maximum efficiency is in coast-defence and within a radius 
 of action, much wider indeed than was at one time sup- 
 posed, but still narrow enough as compared with that of 
 a seagoing man-of-war. Within those limits it is very 
 formidable, no doubt ; but in all cases its moral terrors 
 are, as has already been said, probably far in excess of 
 its real offensive capacity. These facts we must recognize 
 and deal with as best we may.* Admiral Long probably 
 showed the best method of dealing with them. But the 
 
 * Since the above was written they h,-i\e been duly recognized by 
 the Admiralty, and dealt with very effectively in the vigorous and 
 successful development of the new class of torpedo-boat destroyers. 
 
88 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 primary operations of the British navy in time of war 
 will be by no means confined to the area accessible to 
 torpedo-boats, nor within that area is the torpedo-boat 
 itself the best weapon for meeting the attack of the 
 torpedo-boat. A Power therefore which multiplies its 
 torpedo-boats is a Power which manifests its intention of 
 relying mainly on a passive defence, and thereby recognizes 
 the probable superiority at sea of such adversaries as it 
 is most likely to encounter. England must never be 
 allowed to sink to the level of such a Power, and there- 
 fore the torpedo-boat may well be regarded as a strictly 
 subordinate, albeit a very important, factor in the naval 
 policy of this country. 
 
 In the principal manoeuvres of 1891 the strategic con- 
 tinuity of evolution hitherto maintained was interrupted 
 in order that a more distinctively tactical character might 
 be given to the operations contemplated. For the reasons 
 already given, the tactical problem is far more profoundly 
 affected than the strategic problem by modern changes 
 in the methods and implements of naval warfare, and just 
 as in actual warfare the field of strategy ultimately narrows 
 itself down to the field of tactics, so in the evolution of 
 manoeuvres tactical operations may well be regarded as 
 the logical sequel to a long series of strategic operations. 
 But the operations of 1891 cannot here be described or 
 criticized in any detail. The official report of the Admiralty 
 had not been published when these pages were written, 
 and though the writer had the advantage of witnessing 
 the operations of the Northern Fleet, he would hesitate 
 to pronounce an opinion on proceedings of which the 
 real nature and bearing were made matters of official 
 confidence.* On the proper disposition of the cruisers 
 attached to a battleship squadron for the combined 
 purposes of wide scouting and rapid communication ; on 
 the best order of battle to be adopted by a squadron of 
 ironclads ; on the relative importance and efficiency, in 
 
 • The report was subsequently published. It was, perhaps, less 
 remarkable for what it said than for what it did not say. 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 89 
 
 respect of rapidity of fire and accuracy of aim, of heavy 
 ordnance and auxiliary armaments respectively ; and on 
 many other points appreciable mainly by experts, it is 
 understood that information of the utmost importance, 
 and often of the most startling novelty, was obtained in 
 the course of the operations ; but such information may 
 very properly be regarded as an arcanum imperii, not to 
 be lightly made public for the information and guidance 
 of our possible enemies, who are all of them very careful 
 to keep what they know on such subjects to themselves. 
 In a most instructive chapter of his "Naval Warfare," 
 Admiral Colomb traces the history of the " Differentiation 
 of Naval Force" in past times, and shows how the stern 
 discipline of warfare in the last century led to a most 
 remarkable simplification of types and uniformity of con- 
 struction. To what extent that lesson has been neglected, 
 amid the bewildering influences of modern scientific 
 invention, may be seen clearly enough in the pages of 
 Captain Eardley Wilmot's excellent work on " The Develop- 
 ment of Navies during the last Half Century." It is not 
 impossible that the manoeuvres of 1891 may lead, as their 
 principal result, to a movement towards that simplification 
 of type which Admiral Colomb has conclusively shown 
 to be a direct result of actual experience in warfare. To 
 say that the day of very big guns is over would probably 
 be an exaggeration. But it is certain, at any rate, that 
 no naval Power, which neglects to determine for itself 
 the relative value and importance of heavy ordnance and 
 auxiliary armaments, and in consequence of that neglect 
 finds itself encumbered with the wrong weapons in the 
 hour of need, will escape serious disaster, even though 
 its fleets be animated by the spirit and genius of Nelson 
 himself. 
 
 Our task is now at an end, but a few words must be 
 added in conclusion. We have seen how our long lack of 
 warlike experience — for which as a nation we cannot be 
 too thankful — has dulled the national tradition of confident 
 dependence on the protection afforded to us by our Navy- 
 
90 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 We have seen how several causes have contributed to the 
 quickening of that tradition, not the least potent being the 
 recognition by the Admiralty, by Parliament, and by the 
 country at large, of annual manoeuvres on a large scale and 
 mainly strategic in character, as a permanent feature of 
 naval policy. We have seen what those manoeuvres have 
 taught us ; how time after time they have illustrated and 
 enforced those indefeasible principles of naval strategy 
 which, in the hands of the naval heroes of the past, have 
 secured for England her glorious position on the sea. The 
 one broad lesson which emerges from the whole survey is 
 the advantage enjoyed by the superior naval force. It 
 was his superiority of force, combined, as must be acknow- 
 ledged, with his skill of disposition, which enabled Tryon 
 to baffle Baird's raid upon the Channel. Again, it was 
 Tryon's superiority of force which drove Culme-Seymour 
 to the back of the Azores, and prevented his attempting 
 to attack the trade-route at the only point where the effect 
 produced was likely to be commensurate with the means 
 employed. Superiority of force enabled Hewett to baffle 
 Fremantle, and Baird to capture Fitzroy. It is true that 
 Baird's superiority of force did not enable him to blockade 
 Tryon and Fitzroy with success in 1888, but the true 
 inference is, not that superiority of force is no advantage, 
 but that in the particular case it was insufficient for the 
 purpose aimed at. Without a superiority of force blockade 
 is impracticable in all cases, the only question being how 
 great the proportionate superiority must be. Of course it 
 is a mere truism to say that, ccEteris paribus, superiority of 
 force gives the material advantage. No one in his senses 
 would dispute the proposition. But the moral advantage 
 enjoyed by the Power which possesses a superiority of 
 naval force is even greater than the material. An inferior 
 force may for a time avoid a collision with its adversary, 
 and yet do immense damage to the maritime commerce 
 of the Power opposed to it. It may even, as our own 
 experience has often shown, fight an action with the odds 
 against it, and win it, if it is better manned, better handled, 
 
NAVAL MANCEUVRES AND THEIR LESSONS. 91 
 
 and better fought than its immediate adversary. But what 
 it cannot do without running risks, which all experience 
 shows to be not only tremendous but deterrent, is to act on a 
 vigorous offensive, and undertake such enterprises as are 
 involved in serious territorial attack, so long as its adversary 
 possesses a superior " fleet in being " strategically so disposed 
 as to be capable of interfering with its movements. Even 
 an inferior "fleet in being" may, as Torrington showed, 
 be so handled as to paralyze the offensive designs of its 
 adversary, though it cannot itself act on a vigorous offensive. 
 In sum, a Power which, like England, relies and must 
 rely on naval defence for its security, must make that 
 defence an active one, must regard its maritime frontiers 
 in time of war as being conterminous with the territorial 
 waters of its adversary. What it requires for this purpose 
 is a Navy so strong as to be incapable of losing the 
 strategic command of the sea, until its leaders and 
 rulers have forgotten the traditions and example of their 
 forefathers. We may rely upon the spirit of the Navy 
 to do for us all that loyalty, devotion, intelligence and 
 capacity can do. We must rely on the spirit of the 
 nation to give our only possible defenders a supply of 
 weapons adequate to their duties and adapted to their 
 needs. 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
92 THE NAVY A^D THE NATION. 
 
 NAVIES AND COMMERCE. 
 
 Ix 1894 a Parliamentary return relating to "Navies and 
 Commerce" was issued by the Admiralty, in continuation 
 of similar returns previously issued. The figures con- 
 tained in this return seemed to me to be so incomplete 
 and otherwise misleading that I sought and obtained 
 the permission of the Editor of the Times to criticise 
 them in a letter which appeared in that journal on Sept. 
 22, 1894. I am not, however, entitled to assume the sole 
 responsibility for the argument involved, because the data 
 on which it was founded were, as was intimated in the 
 letter, furnished to me by a high authority whose identity 
 I am not at liberty to disclose. The return has since been 
 republished in a more or less revised form, with figures 
 applicable to a more recent date. To these later figures 
 some of the criticisms advanced in my original letter do 
 not directly apply. I propose, therefore, in this paper to 
 subject the revised figures to a fresh examination ; and, to 
 make the argument complete, I have obtained leave from 
 the conductors of the Times to reproduce such portions 
 of the original letter as seem to be generally applicable to 
 the case. A few words have been altered here and there 
 for the purpose of defining my meaning more clearly 
 and guarding it from misconstruction ; but the quotations 
 reproduce in substance the text of the original letter. 
 The letter began as follows : — 
 
 "A few days ago, under the suggestive title 'Navies 
 and Commerce,' you printed the principal figures given 
 in a recent Admiralty return, apparently intended to show 
 
NAVIES AND COMMERCE. 93 
 
 the extent of the maritime commercial interests of the 
 British Empire as compared with those of other Powers, 
 and the amount and character of the naval defence 
 provided for the purpose of protecting those interests. 
 On the following day you commented on these figures in 
 a leading article bearing the same title. I should like, 
 with your permission, to offer some further comments from 
 a slightly different point of view. 
 
 " In the first place, I would ask permission to emphasize 
 and expand your own demonstration that the maritime 
 commercial interests of the British Empire differ not 
 merely enormously in degree, as the figures clearly show, 
 but altogether in kind from those of any other Power. 
 England exists by her maritime commerce, and cannot 
 exist in any other way. If she cannot maintain its 
 security in war, as in peace, she must perish — must, that 
 is, accept whatever terms are offered to her by a Power 
 which has made itself her master at sea. This is not 
 directly a question of food. There is always food enough 
 in the country to maintain the population for six months 
 at least. . . . But the daily march of our industry, and with 
 it the whole complex and infinitely delicate process of our 
 national subsistence, depends upon the free entry and 
 egress of our maritime commerce. No other Power in 
 the world is in this condition. All our foreign commerce 
 must reach us by way of the sea. The foreign commerce 
 of any other nation is a trifle in comparison, and so far 
 as it is sea-borne it could, in an emergency, reach its 
 destination through neutral ports and over neutral terri- 
 tory. Hence no foreign Power ever can or will defend 
 its maritime commerce at sea when it is at war with 
 England. It cannot do it, because, as a French writer 
 has said, I'oa'an ne comporte qn'un sml tnattre, and Eng- 
 land in command of the sea will always be mistress of the 
 maritime commerce of her enemies ; it will not do it, 
 because, if ever it wrests the command of the sea from 
 England, it will find a far more effective and deadly 
 weapon of warfare in the destmction of England's 
 
94 
 
 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 commerce than in the defence of its own. For this reason 
 we need not trouble ourselves in the least about the pro- 
 portional relation between the naval expenditure of any 
 Continental Power and its maritime commerce. There is 
 and there can be no organic relation between the two. 
 Continental Powers maintain their navies for the general 
 purposes of maritime defence ; among those purposes the 
 defence of a maritime commerce which would probably 
 disappear from the sea at the outbreak of a war with 
 England — and could disappear from the sea without 
 vitally injuring the Power affected — cannot be included. 
 But a purpose which can and must be included is an 
 attack on the maritime commerce of England. Following 
 Captain Mahan and all the best authorities on naval war- 
 fare and its history, I hold that such an attack, though it 
 may annoy us, cannot ruin us so long as England's com- 
 mand of the sea remains unimpaired. But let us not 
 deceive ourselves in the matter. So far as the maritime 
 preparations of other Powers are more than sufficient for 
 the purposes of local and territorial defence, they can have 
 but one of two objects — either to assail, and, if possible, 
 to overthrow, the maritime supremacy of naval Powers 
 stronger than themselves with which they may be at war, 
 and therefore more especially of England, or, regarding 
 that supremacy as unassailable, to inflict as much damage 
 as possible, by means of a guerre de course, on the maritime 
 commerce of their possible enemies, of whom England, with 
 her vast and indispensable maritime commerce, is, from 
 this point of view, the most assailable. The defence of 
 their own maritime commerce in a naval conflict with 
 England does not and cannot enter into their calculations. 
 They would have no such commerce to defend, and they 
 could not defend it if they had. This is not a matter of 
 argument, but a matter of fact and experience. Admiral 
 Colomb has pointed out in the ' Naval Annual ' ' that in the 
 year 1797, when Sir John Jervis was forced to retire to 
 Lisbon in consequence of the union of the French and 
 Spanish fleets, not a single ship under tJie British flag 
 
NAVIES AND COMMERCE. 95 
 
 cleared from any British for any Mediterranean port! We 
 temporarily lost the command of the Mediterranean, and 
 our flag and our commerce forthwith disappeared from that 
 sea. This and nothing else, is the strategic meaning of 
 the command of the sea. If Sir John Jervis had lost the 
 battle of Cape St. Vincent, our maritime supremacy might 
 have been overthrown as a consequence, and with it our 
 maritime commerce would most certainly have disappeared. 
 We might in those days have recovered from such a blow ; 
 nowadays it would instantly be fatal. Well might Sir 
 John Jervis say, on the morning of that memorable battle, 
 'A victory is very essential to England at this moment.' 
 If ever our maritime supremacy comes to depend again 
 on the issue of a single battle, defeat will mean absolute 
 and instant destruction. 
 
 " If the foregoing considerations are sound, and they are 
 based alike on history and experience and on the best 
 authorities in the interpretation of both, it follows, in the 
 second place, that, while we may neglect the maritime 
 commerce of other Powers altogether, we must entertain 
 no illusions as to the immense extent and vital importance 
 of our own. The figures are certainly significant enough 
 in their bearing on the question of Colonial interests in 
 Imperial defence ; but their significance in this respect is 
 really almost trifling in comparison with that of their im- 
 portance to the people of the United Kingdom. The 
 people of the Colonies have, no doubt, very much to lose 
 by the overthrow of our naval supremacy, but their losses 
 could hardly be irreparable, and they can safely look 
 forward to a future in which they would almost be 
 insignificant. They will not always be as we always must 
 be, absolutely dependent on maritime commerce for exist- 
 ence. How absolute this dependence is is by no means 
 clearly and adequately shown in the returns prepared by 
 the Admiralty. These returns are defective in a variety 
 of important respects, and to that extent they largely and 
 mischievously underrate the volume and value of the 
 maritime interests of the British Empire." 
 
95 
 
 THE NAVY AXD THE N ATI OX. 
 
 It will here be convenient to give in the form and with 
 the explanations issued by the Admiralty such portions 
 of the return of 1895 as are required for my purpose : — 
 
 Countries. 
 
 Aggregate Naval 
 Expenditure. 
 
 Aggregate Tonnage, 
 Mercantile Marine 
 
 (Vessels of loo Tons 
 gross and upwards). 
 
 \'alue of Seaborne 
 Commerce, including 
 Bullion and Specie. 
 
 British Empire: 
 
 L 
 
 Tons. 
 
 £ 
 
 United Kingdom 
 
 16,328,117 (>■) 
 
 12,117,957 
 
 748,521,041 
 
 Indi:i .... 
 
 972,985 («) (/■) 
 
 50,745 (net) * 
 
 66,701,526 (fl) (/-> 
 
 Self-governing' 
 Colonies. 
 
 220,216 (£) 
 
 938,476 (net) * 
 
 83.949,104 (()) 
 
 Other Colonies (/) 
 
 — 
 
 120,007 (net) * 
 
 55,313,920 (,J) (/() 
 
 Total British^ 
 Empire . / 
 
 i7>52i.3i8 
 
 13,227,185 
 
 954,485,591 
 
 France . 
 
 10,825,040 
 
 1,094,752 
 
 294,753.414 
 
 Russia 
 
 5.114-569 
 
 487,681 
 
 69,665,220 (I) 
 
 Germany 
 
 4.318,125 
 
 1,886,812 
 
 150,693,600 \d) 
 
 Italy .... 
 
 3,845.690 
 
 778,941 
 
 44,286,349 
 
 Spain 
 
 937.746 
 
 554.238 
 
 55,105,106 
 
 Austria-Hungary 
 
 1,081,766 
 
 304,970 
 
 24,063,580 (rf) (I) 
 
 Netherlands . 
 
 1,2^4,356 
 
 446,861 
 
 53,372,574 w 
 
 Portugal . . . 
 
 649,944 
 
 103,620 
 
 21,191,000 {c) 
 
 United States . 
 
 S.073.365 
 
 (^) 994,675 (net) ♦ 
 
 393,393,736 
 
 China . . . 
 
 ? 
 
 19,172 
 
 52,757,000 (f) 
 
 Japan . . . 
 
 1. 127.974 
 
 301,101 
 
 29,174,000 
 
 Chile . . . 
 
 50,221 
 
 103,085 
 
 32,324,000 
 
 Brazil ... 
 
 1,592,740 
 
 148,769 
 
 31,304,108 (f) 
 
 Argentine 
 
 526,427 
 
 62,278 
 
 41,746,860 
 
 
 From Lloyd's Uni- 
 
 From Board of Trade 
 
 
 
 versal Register. 'I'liose 
 
 Returns. I'igures for 
 
 
 
 marked * from Board 
 
 Br.izil, from " The 
 
 
 
 of Trade Returns. 
 
 Statesman's Year 
 Book." 
 
 (a) Converted into sterling at the rate of \s. a4- the rupee. 
 
 Xi>) Excluding trade with the United Kingdom, and necessarily counting intcr-colonial 
 trade twice over. 
 
 {<:) Total trade. 
 
 (rf) Approximate only, the returns make no distinction between seaborne and overland 
 trade. 
 
 {.e) Does not include vessels engaged in Lake, River, and Home trade. 
 
 (/) There are no returns for Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Malta. The trade of Hong Kong 
 with countries other than the United Kingdom is estimated at upwards of ;^ 40,000,000. 
 
 (g-) From the "Victorian Year Book, i%3'" 
 
 (4) All figures for the commerce of the Colonies are from Board of Trade Returns. 
 
 («) Of this total. ;Ci5)297.425 was ordinary expenditure ; and ;6i, 030,692 was expenditure 
 under the Naval Defence Fund (outside Navy Votes). 
 
 (A) Includes a contribution of ;£5o,ooo for Her Majesty's ships in Indian waters, and 
 ;C6i,o53 (including ;f 1453 balance of subsidy for iSga-gsJi for Her Majesty's Ships and 
 vessels for the Naval Defence of India. The amount to be paid under the last head will in 
 future be ;C59.6oo annually. The balance represents expenditure on the Royal Indian 
 Marine. The <iuestion as regards the contribution on account of Her Majesty's Ships in 
 Indian waters is now settled, and the payment on acconnt of this service will be;£i/7,ooo 
 for 1895-96, and thenceforward ;^ioo,ooo annually. 
 
 (/) Imports for home consumption and exports of domestic produce only are shown in 
 Board of Trade Returns. 
 
NAVIES AND COMMERCE. 97 
 
 The return for 1895 includes, for the first time, the value 
 of bullion and specie carried at sea, which I noted as absent 
 from its predecessor. But it apparently takes no account 
 of a trade known as the transhipment trade, the share of 
 which for the British Empire I estimated, on the high 
 authority I have indicated, at ;£'io,ooo,ooo each way. It 
 will also be observed that, as regards the Colonies, " there 
 are no returns for Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Malta;'' 
 but that " the trade of Hong Kong with countries other 
 than the United Kingdom is estimated at upwards of 
 £t\0,QOOfXX>y Adding this sum to the transhipment 
 trade, estimated at ;^20,cxx),ooo, we find the total value 
 of the seaborne commerce of the British Empire is still 
 under-estimated in the return by at least ;£^6o,ooo,ooo, and 
 ought to stand, not at ;^9S4,ooo,ooo odd — the figure given 
 in the return — but at ;^ 1,0 14,000,000. 
 
 However, this stupendous figure does not by any means 
 represent the total value of British interests at sea. It 
 will be observed that the aggregate tonnage of the mer- 
 cantile marine of the United Kingdom is given as 
 12,000,000 odd, which is represented as carrying sea- 
 borne commerce to the value of ;£'748,ooo,ooo. On the 
 other hand, of the Powers represented in the return — which 
 are by no means all the maritime Powers, Sweden, Norway, 
 and Denmark, not to mention others, being omitted — the 
 total aggregate tonnage is only 7,000,000 odd, while the 
 total value of their seaborne commerce is not less than 
 ;^ 1, 2 80, 000, 000. Hence it would appear at first sight that 
 England, the greatest of all commercial nations, carries in 
 her own maritime trade a much smaller value of goods per 
 ton of shipping than almost any other Power — and this 
 notwithstanding the fact that she carries far more bullion 
 and specie than any of her rivals, and that this kind of 
 cargo is the least bulky and most valuable of any. This is 
 absurd, on the face of it. The explanation is, as I pointed 
 out in my original letter, that "whereas a very small 
 portion of British maritime commerce is carried in foreign 
 ships, a very large portion of the maritime commerce of 
 
 H 
 
98 THE NAVY AXD THE iXATION. 
 
 the whole world is carried in British ships. Moreover, 
 of the goods carried in these British ships trading from 
 one foreign port to another, no inconsiderable portion is 
 owned in transit by British merchants, although, from the 
 nature of the case, the value of such goods goes to swell 
 the aggregate maritime commerce of other countries." 
 There is, moreover, a large excess in the value of the sea- 
 borne commerce attributed in the return to countries other 
 than the United Kingdom, which is due to the following 
 circumstance. The imports to, and exports from, the 
 United Kingdom are in all cases included in the returns 
 relating to other countries, having been already included 
 in the figures given for the United Kingdom. I find from 
 " Whitaker's Almanack " that the imports and exports in 
 question amount, for the countries included in the return, 
 to about ;^3 80,000,000. Therefore, the net value of the 
 commerce of those countries is not ;^ 1,2 80,000, 000, but 
 ;f900,ooo,ooo. Adding this sum to the value of the sea- 
 borne commerce of the British Empire given in the return 
 as ;£'9 5 0,000,000 odd — though it ought, as I have shown, 
 to be more than ;£' 1,000,000,000 — and dividing the total so 
 obtained by the total amount of mercantile marine tonnage 
 given in the return — 13,000,000 for the British Empire, 
 plus 7,000,000 for the other countries — I find that the 
 average value of goods carried per ton of shipping is 
 approximately £go. It is not necessary for this purpose 
 to take account of unemployed tonnage, whether British 
 or foreign, because its deduction would merely raise the 
 average value of goods carried per ton of shipping without 
 otherwise affecting the calculation. Now, the tonnage of 
 the United Kingdom is 12,000,000, and this would suffice 
 to carry ;£' 1,080,000, 000 worth of goods. According to the 
 return, it only carries about .^750,000,000 worth. I exclude 
 the Colonies from this calculation, because the value of their 
 trade with the United Kingdom is not included in the 
 return. Hence there remains a balance of ;^3 30,000,000' 
 worth of goods carried at sea in British bottoms to be ac- 
 counted for. This represents approximately the amount 
 
NAVIES AXD COMMERCE. 99 
 
 of foreign maritime commerce carried in British bottoms ; 
 and if we taite into account the seaborne commerce of 
 the maritime Powers not included in the return, it will 
 hardly be thought an extravagant estimate to put the 
 total amount at approximately ;^3 50,000,000. 
 
 Probably at least half of this ;£'3 50,000,000 worth of 
 goods carried in British ships for foreign countries is owned 
 by British merchants in transit. But for purposes of 
 maritime defence in time of war it makes little or no 
 difference whether these goods are owned by British or by 
 foreign merchants. It is true that by international law 
 goods owned by a neutral are not liable to capture by a 
 belligerent, even when conveyed in a ship which sails under 
 an enemy's ilag. But the ship itself is liable to capture, 
 and must therefore be protected. If an enemy could seize 
 it he would carry it, cargo and all, to one of his own prize 
 courts, and leave the ownership of the cargo as between 
 neutral and belligerent to be determined by the court. In 
 these circumstances either we should have to guarantee 
 the neutral owner against the capture or detention of his 
 cargo, or we should so far lose the carrying trade between 
 foreign countries which we hold at present. Hence I am 
 entitled to reckon the whole of this ;^3 50,000,000 as a 
 factor of British maritime commerce which must be 
 protected in war. 
 
 It thus appears that, instead of the ;£'9So,ooo,ooo at 
 which the seaborne commerce of the British Empire is 
 estimated in the return, the original figure should stand, as 
 I have shown, at ;^ 1,014,000,000 at least, or, to take round 
 numbers, we may say at ;£'i,020,ooo,ooo. To this there 
 must be added ;^350,ooo,ooo for the value of the maritime 
 commerce of foreign countries which is carried in British 
 bottoms. A further sum of ;£' 132,000,000 odd must be 
 added for the value of the mercantile marine shipping of 
 the British Empire, taking it at the very moderate estimate 
 of p^io per ton ; and I am informed, on the high authority 
 to which I have already referred, that the annual value 
 of securities and other marketable documents carried to 
 
Joo THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 and fro in British ships and owned by British subjects in 
 transit cannot at a moderate estimate be put at less than 
 ^250,000,000. Thus the total value of British commerce at 
 sea stands not at;^950,ooo,ooo odd, but at ;£■!, 750,000,000 at 
 least, and this is the real amount of property afloat which 
 we should have to protect in time of war. 
 
 In this estimate some elements are more or less conjec- 
 tural, and few, if any, are more than approximate. But I 
 have striven to avoid exaggeration in framing it, and 
 probably such errors as it may involve are rather on the 
 side of defect than on that of excess. It is worthy of note 
 that the aggregate naval expenditure of the British Empire 
 is given in the return for 1895 as seventeen and a half 
 millions, so that if we take the value of the maritime 
 interests protected at ;^i,750,ooo,ooo, it appears that the 
 cost of insurance of these stupendous interests is exactly one 
 per cent. The value of the seaborne commerce of France 
 is given in the same return as ;£'294,ooo,ooo odd, and the 
 aggregate naval expenditure as very nearly eleven millions. 
 We must, however, add to the value of French maritime 
 interests given in the return a sum of ^110,000,000 odd to 
 represent the value of French mercantile marine tonnage. 
 It will be seen presently why I add nothing else to the 
 total, and why, for purposes of comparison, a very large 
 amount ought to be subtracted from it. But, taking the 
 value of French maritime interests as ;£'305,ooo,ooo, and 
 the aggregate naval expenditure of France as eleven 
 millions, it appears that the naval defence of French 
 maritime interests costs more than three per cent. A 
 similar calculation applied to the figures given in the 
 return for Russia shows that the cost of Russian maritime 
 insurance expressed in terms of naval expenditure is not less 
 than fifteen per cent. A mere comparison of these figures 
 suffices to place in strong relief the truth of the proposi- 
 tions quoted above from my original letter : — " We need not 
 trouble ourselves in the least about the proportional relation 
 between the naval expenditure of any Continental Power 
 and its maritime commerce. There is no organic relation 
 
NAVIES AND COMMERCE. loi 
 
 between the two. . . . The defence of their own maritime 
 commerce in a naval conflict with England does not enter 
 into the calculations of these Powers. They would have 
 no such commerce to defend, and they could not defend 
 it if they had." But, in truth, the whole comparison is 
 vitiated by a peculiar characteristic of the return on which 
 I commented as follows in 1894 : — 
 
 " There is yet another and very serious error in the 
 returns. As regards India and the Colonies, a note states 
 that trade with the United Kingdom is excluded. Of 
 course if it were included it would be reckoned twice 
 over ; but for purposes of comparison it ought so to be 
 reckoned, since the returns relating to other countries 
 include the trade with the United Kingdom, which has 
 already been included in the trade of the United Kingdom. 
 If any exclusion is to be made on this account, it should 
 be made uniformly in every case, or else the comparison 
 is completely vitiated. There is, moreover, this difference 
 between the maritime trade of the United Kingdom with 
 British Colonies and dependencies, and that of the British 
 Empire with any foreign Power. The latter would cease 
 to exist in the event of war between England and the 
 foreign Power in question, except so far as it could be 
 more or less clandestinely carried on in neutral ships 
 trading to neutral ports. The former, so long as it 
 obtained adequate naval protection, would maintain its 
 volume substantially unimpaired. It might even increase 
 very largely, as it did in the wars of the last century. In 
 order to make the comparison even approximately fair, 
 therefore, we must do one of two things. Either we must 
 deduct the whole trade of Great Britain with foreign 
 Powers from the figures which relate to those foreign 
 Powers — in which case we should reduce the maritime 
 commerce of many foreign Powers to a negligible quantity 
 — or we must add to the figures relating to the British 
 Empire the whole sum which represents the interchange 
 between the United Kingdom and British Colonies and 
 dependencies. Now, I find from " Whitaker's Almanack " 
 
102 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 that the total seaborne trade of India was valued in 
 1892-93 at Rx. 1 96,000,000 odd, so that on the basis of 
 comparison here proposed a sum of ^93,000,000 odd must 
 be added to the maritime interests of the British Empire 
 as estimated in the return in respect of India alone. The 
 corresponding amount assigned in the return to the self- 
 governing Colonies is ;^ 88,000,000 odd, while the sum of 
 :£"55,ooo,ooo odd is assigned to the "other Colonies." Now, 
 " Whitaker's Almanack" gives the exports to and imports 
 from the United Kingdom in 1892 as about ;£■ 2 1,000,000 
 for Canada, as ;^s6,ooo,ooo odd for Australasia, as 
 ;^ 1 9,000,000 odd for the Cape Colony, and very nearly 
 ;£'4,ooo,ooo for Natal. In the same proportion we may 
 add about ;f 50,000,000 as representing the maritime com- 
 merce of the United Kingdom with all the other colonies. 
 
 " Now, I do not contend that in these figures no item 
 is reckoned twice over. But I do contend that no item is 
 reckoned twice over in my way of putting the matter 
 which is not equally reckoned twice over in the Admiralty 
 way of putting the matter in respect of the maritime 
 commerce of every Power other than the British Empire. 
 I do not, for the reasons given above, attach much 
 importance to any comparison between the maritime 
 interests of the British Empire and those of any other 
 Power whatever. The two things are, in my judgment, 
 absolutely incommensurate. You might almost as well 
 compare Niagara with a watering-pot. But, if such com- 
 parisons are to be made, they must be made on a common 
 basis. There is no such common basis in the returns issued 
 by the Admiralty, and, even if there were, I have shown 
 that items of immense importance are left out of the 
 account altogether, so that the total volume of the mari- 
 time interests of Great Britain, estimated in the same way 
 as the maritime interests of other Powers are estimated 
 throughout the return, is made to appear not very much 
 more than half what it ought to be." 
 
 I have not thought it necessary to correct the figures 
 here given in accordance with later returns, because the 
 
NAVIES AND COMMERCE. 103 
 
 estimate is only made for the purposes of comparison on 
 a uniform basis, and for such purposes a very rough 
 approximation suffices. It is true that the approximate 
 net value of the maritime interests of the British Empire 
 cannot, as we have seen, be placed at a much higher figure 
 than ;^ 1,750,000,000, and if this were compared in the 
 return with the net value, similarly estimated, of the 
 maritime interests of other countries, no further correction 
 would be needed. But the return as compiled allows no 
 such comparison to be made. It practically gives the 
 gross value of the seaborne commerce of other countries 
 — in some important cases giving even the total value of 
 imports and exports by sea and land — whereas it excludes 
 altogether from the returns given for the Colonies the 
 value of the commerce interchanged between the United 
 Kingdom and the Colonies. Hence, whatever the com- 
 parison may be worth when properly made — and I confess 
 I do not think it is worth much in any case — it is mani- 
 festly worth less than nothing unless it is made, as it is not 
 made in the return, on a uniform basis. To make it on a uni- 
 form basis it is necessary to add to the net value of British 
 maritime interests, already estimated at ;^i,7SO,ooo,ooo, 
 further sums of ;^93,ooo,ooo for the trade of India with 
 the United Kingdom, of ;^2 1,000,000 for that of Canada, of 
 ^^'56,000,000 for that of Australasia, of ;^23,ooo,ooo for that 
 of South Africa, and of ;i£'50,ooo,ooo for that of the other 
 colonies, making a total of ;^243 000,000 ; or, if a very 
 moderate allowance be made for the growth of Indian 
 and Colonial trade, we may put it in round numbers at 
 ;^2 5 0,000,000. 
 
 Thus, while the net value of British maritime interests is 
 probably not very much more than ;£' 1,7 50,000, 000, yet if we 
 make the estimate on the same basis as that which is taken 
 in the return for all the other countries enumerated, we must 
 put it at ;{^2,ooo,ooo,ooo. The smaller sum approximately 
 represents the real value of the maritime interests we have 
 to defend in time of war ; the larger represents the figure 
 we must take if we wish to determine our rate of maritime 
 
104 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 insurance expressed in terms of naval expenditure, and to 
 compare it with the corresponding rate of other Powers on 
 the basis given in the return. The Navy Estimates for 1896 
 provide for an expenditure of a little under twenty-two 
 millions. This represents an insurance of it per cent, on 
 the gross value of the interests insured. It thus appears 
 that our rate of insurance is rising. But its true measure 
 is a compound of two factors, one of which is the value 
 of the interests to be insured, the other the strength of the 
 hostile forces likely to imperil them in time of war. Now 
 the aggregate naval expenditure of France and Russia 
 is given in the return as less than sixteen millions. In the 
 Navy Estimates of the two countries for 1896 it amounts 
 to over seventeen millions, an increase of six and a quarter 
 per cent. As the bulk of this increase must, as I have 
 shown, be for purposes of attack and not of defence, and 
 as the most salient object of attack must always be the 
 maritime commerce which is the lifeblood of the British 
 Empire, our very existencei would be imperilled if the 
 rate of our maritime insurance had been allowed to remain 
 stationary. 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
NATIONAL INSURANXE.* 
 
 In the United Service Magazine of May, i8go, the late 
 Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon revived an important pro- 
 posal for the " national insurance " of the war risks of the 
 mercantile marine. In the following number, Lord Charles 
 Beresford is stated to have knocked "Sir George's pro- 
 posal to bits," apparently by asking two questions not 
 specially difficult to answer, and by the assumption that 
 the country would never "allow the State to interfere in 
 a matter so entirely commercial." Briefly summed. Sir 
 G. Tryon's contention was that, while "a fleet adequate 
 to our needs, coaling-stations, and strategical harbours, 
 defended and kept as our ships in commission, always 
 ready for war," are necessarily vital to the security of the 
 Empire, there are certain risks arising from the effects of 
 a sudden advance of insurance rates which must be other- 
 wise met. " Our greatest pinch will probably be imme- 
 diately after the first two months of war." To meet these 
 risks, to prepare for this pinch. Sir G. Tryon proposed to 
 create a State system of war insurance, by which premiums 
 would be kept within bounds. The real liability thus 
 incurred would, he considered, be relatively small ; but its 
 acceptance by the State would effectually prevent any 
 transfer on a large scale of British commerce to a neutral 
 flag. On the other hand, Lord Charles Beresford holds 
 that it is "cheaper to the nation" to maintain an adequate 
 fleet, that the initial panic created by the outbreak of war 
 
 * United Serince Magazine, September, 1890. 
 
io6 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 would subside, and that the transfer of British commerce 
 to a neutral flag is beset with difficulties, as is unquestion- 
 ably the case. 
 
 Other combatants subsequently entered the field, and 
 raised side issues of some importance. Mr. Gibson Bowles 
 complains that his predecessors write " from the naval 
 point of view alone," and do not " rise to the ground of the 
 publicist." In his view there is only " one thing needful," 
 and so simple — nothing more than the abrogation of the 
 Declaration of Paris. Mr. Haines, in a paper by no means 
 "tedious," discusses the aspects of privateering from the 
 point of view of International Law, and contemplates with 
 dismay certain recent modifications of that law which this 
 country is regarded as having practically sanctioned. 
 The effect of these various opinions upon a mind which 
 is not naval and cannot aspire to the elevation of the 
 publicist is somewhat bewildering. The proposal which 
 Sir G. Tryon urged with much force appears eminently 
 worthy of being reduced to a practical shape ; but it is 
 stated to have been swept away by another sailor, also 
 dealing with the matter from the naval point of view. 
 Mr. Bowles's panacea is of all the most attractive, for it 
 holds out safety to the Empire, attainable by a stroke of 
 the pen. This very attractiveness, however, suggests 
 suspicion, and it seems desirable to examine "the one 
 thing needful " before accepting it as a final and complete 
 remedy for the prospective ills of war. 
 
 Mr. Bowles, unlike Lord C. Beresford and many naval 
 officers of experience, considers that the Navy of Great 
 Britain would "more than suffice . . . not merely to 
 destroy the enemy's commerce, and to drive his merchant- 
 men from the seas, but also to protect her own commerce 
 and to secure safety for her own merchantmen." * But 
 this power — vital, as we all agree, to the very existence of 
 the Empire — has been gratuitously abandoned by the 
 signing of the Declaration of Paris. It exists no longer 
 since the adoption of " the rule of ' free ship, free goods.' " 
 * This was written in 1890. 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. 107 
 
 The hopelessness of our present position is forcibly 
 summed up in the words — "the Declaration of Paris 
 would ruin our shipowners ; would but very imperfectly 
 protect our merchants ; and would not protect at all the 
 nation at large from starvation, or the nation's fleets from 
 coal famine." The train of reasoning by which this 
 remarkable conclusion is reached can be readily under- 
 stood. "Our merchandise would, under the new rule, fly 
 at once, on the outbreak of war, to neutral bottoms, and 
 our merchantmen would lose all employment." The 
 British Navy would thus be reduced to impotence. There 
 would be nothing for it to capture. It would not, "in all 
 probability, find so much as an enemy to fight with. 
 Why should the enemy fight under these circumstances ? " 
 War with a naval Power thus means total inactivity to 
 the belligerent fleets, while one belligerent, and that 
 curiously enough the one strongest on the seas, is rapidly 
 ruined, merely by the operation of this hyper-dramatic 
 "Scrap of Paper." Obviously, the only course open to 
 us is either to abrogate the Declaration of Paris at once, 
 or get rid of the Navy as a costly encumbrance in peace 
 and a worthless illusion in war. In Mr. Bowles's view, 
 the apotheosis of paper has apparently been reached. 
 
 Before pointing out the contradictions in which this 
 article is hopelessly involved, it will be well to examine 
 the historical basis on which the whole structure rests. 
 This resolves itself into the old misreading of the 
 American Civil War. Two or three small and slow * 
 Confederate steamers succeeded in maintaining themselves 
 on the track of American sailing vessels, and made 
 numerous captures. Notwithstanding that this guerre de 
 course was one of the well-known methods of war recog- 
 nized two centuries previously, the directing head of the 
 I'ederal navy, with ample resources at his disposal, 
 appears to have been incapable of taking any effective 
 
 * " The speed of the Alabama was always overrated by the enemy. 
 She was ordinarily about a ten-knot ship.'' — " Memoirs of Service 
 .•\float." Admiral Raphael Semmes, 1869. 
 
5 P^r cent 
 
 6 
 
 
 . 4i 
 
 
 • 4 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 . I* 
 
 
 io8 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 action. Captain Semmes, the able and successful com- 
 mander of the Sumter and Alabama, has pointed out 
 how easily his operations might have been checked ; and 
 it is a fact that Mr. Bowles's article could never have 
 been written if Mr. Welles, the Secretary of the Federal 
 navy, had possessed any clear ideas of naval strategy.* 
 The depredations of the Alabama caused insurance rates 
 to be fixed at the following figures : — 
 
 North of Europe 
 
 Mediterranean 
 
 India 
 
 Gulf 
 
 West Indies 
 
 Coast 
 
 The carrying trade of the United States passed mainly 
 into British hands, and the publicist has never ceased to 
 misread the moral. The actual fact is indisputable ; but 
 the moral is of another kind. It is essential to Mr. 
 Bowles's argument from history that a great transfer of 
 ships to another flag should have taken place. Cargoes 
 neutralized by some waste-paper process, but carried in 
 the vessels of a belligerent, clearly could not count on 
 the kind of immunity which commerce demands. The 
 accommodating neutrals, who, it is asserted, will obtain 
 all our trade, must, therefore, acquire our ships as a 
 necessary first condition. But no great transfer of American 
 ships appears to have taken place.t The surplus tonnage 
 of the greatest mercantile Power of the world was called 
 into play to supply the needs of American commerce. 
 Other powerful forces were, however, at work. The period 
 chanced to coincide with that of a great conversion of 
 sailing to steam trade, and a large replacement of wooden 
 vessels by those of iron and steel. The United States, 
 in the throes of a terrible convulsion, were evidently less 
 
 * " The old gentleman does not seem once to have thought of so 
 simple a policy as stationing a ship anywhere." — " Memoirs of Service 
 Afloat." Admiral Raphael Semmes, 1869. 
 
 t The ships were laid up in neutral harbours, and Captain Semmes 
 was only able to look longingly at them. 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. 109 
 
 able to carry out the change than the rich neutral Power 
 on this side of the Atlantic. The new steamers were 
 thus almost entirely British, and in the great internal 
 development of the Republic which followed the peace, 
 American capital found more lucrative employment than 
 was offered by competition with Great Britain in the 
 shipping trade. Many writers have held that the United 
 States could regain a full share of that trade at once by 
 the mere abolition of their own navigation laws ; but the 
 shrewdest of business people may be trusted to safeguard 
 their own interests, and it is by no means certain that 
 the time has fully arrived when a diversion of their 
 capital to shipping would be profitable.* 
 
 The real lesson of the American War is very simple. 
 Given a belligerent quite incapable of checking the raids 
 of a few very indifferent cruisers, and a strong neutral Power 
 possessing a far greater mercantile marine with available 
 surplus tonnage, a transfer of carrying trade from the 
 former to the latter is obviously inevitable. Given, further, 
 that a revolution in shipping is occurring at this precise 
 epoch, it is clear that the neutral will reap the benefit. 
 Economic forces were, in fact, ready to come into play, 
 and the disturbance of equilibrium caused by the American 
 War gave them the necessary impetus. The balance 
 having swung over heavily, and the economic forces still 
 making for Great Britain, the rehabilitation of the 
 American carrying trade must necessarily be slow. 
 
 There appears to be no other satisfactory explanation 
 of the historical facts. The senseless war of 18 12-14, 
 into which Great Britain and the United States drifted, 
 "annihilated" t the foreign trade of the latter. Yet that 
 trade recovered itself. The trade of Germany temporarily 
 
 * There are signs that this time will soon be reached, and com- 
 petition in the shipping trade must then be expected. 
 
 t " Their foreign trade anterior to the estrangement from England 
 — twenty-two millions exports, and twenty-eight millions imports — 
 was, literally speaking, annihilated; for in 1814 exports had fallen to 
 j£i,4oo,cxx), and imports to less than three millions." — Professor 
 Seeley. 
 
no THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 disappeared in 1870-71, but quickly revived, and even 
 flourished. Here are two instances, one before and one 
 after the Declaration of Paris, and it seems clear that 
 economic forces ruled the issue. 
 
 Mr. Bowles, however, does not recognize that a great 
 transfer of ships to the neutral flag is essential to his 
 argument. "British merchant ships would at once — not 
 merely on the outbreak, but on the mere rumour of war — 
 cease to find employment," he incautiously writes. Who 
 then will carry on the trade 1 No neutral, or aggregate 
 of neutrals, has either the ships or the men. Of the total 
 tonnage of the world less than ten years ago, about 
 13,200,000 was British, and 11,000,000 foreign. Is it con- 
 ceivable that the eleven millions can do their own work 
 and suddenly take over that of more than thirteen millions 
 in addition .' A wholesale transfer of shipping must, 
 therefore, take place, and such a transfer bristles with 
 difficulties. Lord Charles Beresford has effectively ex- 
 plained the nature of these difficulties, and an able 
 writer in the Edinburgh Review * has dealt with the subject 
 more fully. On this point at least weight must surely be 
 accorded to naval opinion. If it is really true that our 
 great shipowners are contemplating the easy transfer of 
 their vessels to a neutral flag, as Sir A. Forwood has com- 
 placently indicated,! they must have neglected to study 
 the ways and means. It is sufficient to state that no' 
 neutral Power could officer or man a fraction of the vast 
 fleet which it would have to absorb, so that a wholesale 
 transfer of men as well as ships must take place ; that a 
 long period must elapse before a complete revolution in 
 the greater part of the trade of the world could be 
 accomplished ; and that no transfer of men or ships would 
 be recognized by a belligerent if it appeared to have been 
 carried out to avoid capture. This last consideration 
 involves others of much importance. No weak naval 
 Power could possibly become the custodian, temporary or 
 permanent, of the trade of the British Empire. "The 
 * October, 1888. f Speech at Liverpool, 1888. 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. in 
 
 carrying trade of England would, therefore, go to Belgium, 
 to Holland, to Denmark, to Sweden, perhaps to Italy," 
 states Mr. J. Russel Soley,* thus admirably illustrating the 
 effects of the neglect of "the naval point of view." Xo 
 strong naval belligerent would be thwarted by the flag of 
 the first four of these countries if it stood directly in his 
 way, and the receptive neutral would quickly be driven 
 into belligerency. Weak neutrals invariably go to the 
 wall in naval warfare, and, as Mr. Soley himself points 
 out, the United States require a strong navy merely to 
 guard their own neutral rights. What naval strength will 
 be required to guard the vast interests acquired by the 
 Power which may, according to Mr. Bowles, be suddenly 
 invested with the responsibilities of the enormous com- 
 merce of the British Empire } What neutral would be 
 eager to accept these tremendous responsibilities ? 
 
 Mr. Bowles has unfortunately omitted the first logical step 
 necessary to his thesis. It is essential for him to show 
 that an enormous and rapid transfer of British bottoms 
 and British seamen to a neutral flag is practicable, and 
 until he has proved this to the satisfaction of naval authorities 
 cadit qucBstio. On this alone hangs the operation of the 
 dreaded "piece of paper." 
 
 For the rest, his statements are mutually destructive to 
 a surprising extent. The Declaration of Paris, he tells 
 us, has ordained "that neutral bunting should for the first 
 time play a part in belligerent hostilities " {sic) ; but a 
 page later we learn that "Already, in January, 1799, the 
 French Directory had reported to the Consul des Cinq 
 Cents, 'it is unfortunately too true that there is 7tot a 
 single merchant vessel navigating under the French flag. 
 What other means of exportation have we than the 
 employment of neutral vessels?"' In other words, precisely 
 what the Declaration of Paris is stated to have rendered 
 possible " for the first time " occurred in 1 799 ; the only 
 difference being that, in the one case, the weaker naval 
 Power sought the protection of the neutral flag, while in the 
 * Scribnet's Magazine, November, 1889. 
 
112 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 other case we are asked to believe that the strong naval 
 Power will alone suffer. Great Britain, with a naval strength 
 which Mr. Bowles states would suffice, " without any increase 
 at all," to protect her commerce, had she but retained her 
 ■' maritime rights," is nevertheless to see the whole of her 
 commerce pass under an alien flag in the event of war with 
 an inferior naval Power. Supposing that that Power should 
 be France, what is to become of French commerce .■' That, 
 too, must evidently disappear, and the benevolent neutral 
 trustee will have enough on his hands. 
 
 But Mr. Bowles has other paradoxes in store. When 
 the hypothetical neutral — the Mrs. Harris of the publicist 
 — has acquired our ships and decorated them with his flag, 
 it will not, at any rate, protect contraband of war, and Mr. 
 Bowles rightly shows that "corn and coal — the one indis- 
 pensable to our people, the other to our fleets — have con- 
 stantly been held to be contraband of war." The Declara- 
 tion of Paris cannot, therefore, really affect these essentials. 
 Their safe transit between Imperial ports must depend 
 ultimately upon the strength and handling of the great Navy, 
 which we are told would now find no war employment. Food 
 and coal, if they are to be carried on the seas at all, must 
 be thus protected. The ships which are carrying food and 
 coal to-day may as well continue to carry them, since they 
 run no greater risk than any others. Some few functions 
 still remain, therefore, to the British Navy, and considering 
 the large proportion of shipping employed in carrying these 
 necessary commodities, Mr. Bowles's fears seem capable of 
 alleviation. 
 
 It is insurance rates which, thanks to the Declaration 
 of Paris, are to work our ruin. The merchant " would find 
 that if he shipped that merchandise in British ships, he 
 would have to pay a war-risk premium of insurance on his 
 merchandise of at least 5 per cent, or in some cases of from 
 10 to 12 per cent." During the French wars, from which 
 Great Britain emerged triumphant at sea with a commerce 
 enormously increased, insurance rates rose to 12 per cent, 
 with convoy and 20 per cent, without. It is true that 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. H3 
 
 freights were then high ; but war will raise freights, and 
 our neutral legatees would probably not carry at peace 
 rates. " The mere rumour of war " is, we are told, to destroy 
 our carrying trade ; but it has not done so. The Trent 
 affair caused premiums of 5 per cent, to be charged in some 
 cases for war risks, but did not inflict any injury upon our 
 shipping. Assuming premiums to rise to 5 or 10 per cent., 
 Mr. Bowles estimates the liabilities which Sir G. Tryon's 
 proposal would throw upon the State at "from ;£'3 5,000,000 
 to ;^70,ooo,ooo a year on merchandise alone." He has, 
 however, previously told us that he considers the British 
 Navy quite sufficiently powerful to protect our commerce ; 
 and, whatever may be the possible effect of the Declaration 
 of Paris, it has at least provided no immunities for an 
 enemy's armed vessels, by which alone that commerce can 
 be assailed. If Mr. Bowles's view of our naval strength is 
 correct, then evidently Sir George Tryon's scheme saddles 
 the State with no real risks at all. 
 
 How is it possible to reconcile the statements here put 
 forward .' We are told that, " under the old system," 
 British merchants were able to "carry on their trade with 
 all but complete security," and that at the beginning of 
 the century the underwriters of Bombay congratulated 
 Sir E. Pellew on the "ample protection" the commerce 
 of the Indian seas had received. But, as Mr. Haines 
 points out, England lost in the French wars from 1793 to 
 18 1 5 "no fewer than 10,871 merchantmen"; while the 
 Calcutta merchants congratulated the Governor-General 
 on the tardy capture of Mauritius, " which has for so many 
 years past been the source of devastation to the commerce 
 of India to a magnitude almost exceeding belief" The 
 facts are that, in place of the " all but complete security '' 
 which Mr. Bowles fancifully pictures, there were enormous 
 losses ; but the great development of the sea power 
 of Great Britain carried all before it, and left her pre- 
 eminent in commerce as in naval war. This is the clear 
 lesson of all history, and no amount of paper will suffice 
 to change it. If the Empire emerges from the ordeal of 
 
 I 
 
114 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 the next naval war with sea power undiminished, com- 
 merce will flourish with vigour unabated. If that sea 
 power is ever lost, then is the Empire doomed. No naval 
 supremacy can absolutely guarantee commerce from the 
 risks of war, though it is easier — for Great Britain— to 
 defend commerce now than in sailing days ; but the issue 
 of the war will determine the fate of her trade in the 
 future as in the past. The greatest commercial nation 
 of the world issues triumphant from a naval struggle. Its 
 producing and manufacturing powers are unchanged. It 
 can still build shipping at a speed unapproachable by any 
 rival. Its seafaring population, its habits, its deeply rooted 
 traditions remain the same. Yet, Mr. Bowles implies 
 that some commercially far inferior Power will have 
 absorbed and will permanently retain all its trade, under 
 the malefic operation of a piece of paper. Is this really 
 conceivable ? 
 
 All unconsciously, and therefore so much the more 
 effectively, Mr. Bowles has ranged himself on the side of 
 national insurance. He has clearly indicated that there is 
 nothing to fear except the underwriters. The Navy can 
 protect our commerce if only our merchants and ship- 
 owners can be induced to trust to it. Insurance rates, 
 not an enemy's cruisers, are to drive the trade of the 
 Empire under an alien flag ; unexplained forces are to 
 keep it there. All is to be lost because of panic proceed- 
 ings, whose efficacy is problematic, even if their practica- 
 bility on a vast scale could be admitted. 
 
 The proposal which Sir G. Tryon urged exactly meets 
 the exigencies of the case. A system of national insurance 
 properly worked out would avert panic, and abate the 
 unholy craving for an alien flag with which British ship- 
 owners are credited. The risks which the State would 
 assume, will be greater or less according as the only real 
 insurance of the Empire — the Navy — is worthily maintained, 
 or culpably neglected. Given the strong Navy, the war 
 risks to British vessels, navigated in accordance with 
 directions issued by the naval Commanders-in-Chief, would 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. 115 
 
 be a small burden to the State. Under such conditions, 
 even the sailing trade would not wholly disappear in 
 certain waters ; but the immediate effect of war would be 
 a great demand for new fast steamers, and the building 
 yards of the United Kingdom could, under pressure, turn 
 out one million tons of steam shipping in a year. The 
 transfer of trade from sailing vessels to steamers, which 
 is now steadily progressing, would be accelerated. The 
 safety attained by fast steamers bridging the distance be- 
 tween zones swept by British cruisers would be so complete 
 that an immediate stimulus would be given to shipbuilding 
 and marine engineering. The great naval Power which 
 can build the best steamers, at the least cost, in the 
 shortest time, need not fear for the future of its carrying 
 trade. 
 
 Mr. Haines treats the question of the danger of com- 
 merce in war from another standpoint. He rightly shows 
 that the phrase "Privateering is and remains abolished," 
 is practically worthless, and thus deals a side-blow at the 
 Declaration of Paris. The armed mercantile steamer of to- 
 day can be transferred into a legalized vessel of war by a 
 stroke of the pen. The so-called " volunteer fleet " of Russia, 
 and our own swift merchant ships now subsidized, can do 
 all that was open to the privateer of old days, and then, 
 as now, the advantage lies with the Power that can equip, 
 man, maintain, and handle effectively the greatest number 
 of such ships. The sole difference, under modern condi- 
 tions, appears to be that, while the privateer looted for the 
 profit of her owners, the auxiliary armed merchant steamer 
 — call her what you will — -will loot for the State, which, 
 however, by means of the leverage offered by prize-money, 
 can stimulate the energies of officers and crew to any 
 extent that may be needed. The one necessary condition, 
 now as always, is the power of bringing the captured 
 vessel into port. Captain Semmes added nothing to the 
 coffers of the Confederate States ; but, as Mr. Haines points 
 out, simply burned his prizes, after taking out such portions 
 of their cargoes as served to supply his needs. 
 
ii6 THE NAVY AXD THE NATIOX. 
 
 In his admirable work recently published, Captain 
 Mahan clearly shows that the guerre de course can, in the 
 long run, only pay the belligerent who possesses the 
 greatest sea power. While a strong naval belligerent, 
 possessing harbours all over the world, could effect 
 captures, a weaker belligerent not so provided could onlj- 
 hope to destroy vessels and cargoes, and would frequently 
 find much difficulty in disposing of the crews. Whatever 
 the late Admiral Aube may have written, the sentiment of 
 the civilized world will not now stand the deliberate cold- 
 blooded murder of unresisting non-combatants. The 
 killing of prisoners who do not attempt to escape, merely 
 because they are an encumbrance, is not recognized as 
 justifiable at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
 The rdle of the commerce-destroyer is by no means free 
 from difficulties. Suppose that half the cargo of a captured 
 ship is the bond fide property of a formidable neutral ; the 
 captor may take her into port, if he can, and argue the 
 matter. The neutral can then be eventually compensated, 
 though if the early delivery of the goods is necessary to 
 him, or if they are perishable, he will suffer almost as 
 much as if they were destroyed. The point is, however: 
 Will the captains of future Alabamas venture to destroy 
 in such a case .' 
 
 Mr. Haines appears to take international arrangements 
 somewhat too seriously. Inter arma silent leges is a 
 maxim which applies with peculiar force to international 
 law. One law alone prevails in war, and that is to inflict 
 the maximum injury on your enemy with the minimum 
 cost and risk to yourself. There are thus only two 
 practical limitations which control the operations of a 
 belligerent. In the first place, he must not incur the 
 moral reprobation of the civilized world by acts which, if 
 he is the weaker Power, will justify tenfold reprisals, or, 
 if he is the stronger Power, will, nevertheless, sooner or 
 later avenge themselves. In the second place, he must 
 not do anything calculated to array a strong neutral 
 against him. Whatever, therefore, was sanctioned by the 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE. 117 
 
 rules of the naval mancEuvres of 1888 and 1889, these 
 two considerations will govern real war. And, without 
 pausing to consider whether the bombardment of an 
 undefended town is a sufficiently profitable undertaking 
 to tempt a belligerent, it is at least clear that there is a 
 wide moral distinction between such a bombardment, 
 delivered after due warning, and the torpedoing of help- 
 less merchant vessels without seeking to effect capture. 
 
 The broad issues of the naval wars of the future will be 
 as were those of the past. As Carthage fell before the 
 sea power of Rome, so, many hundred years later, fell 
 Holland and Spain ; so will fall Great Britain if her naval 
 pre-eminence is lost. 
 
 " The one thing needful " for the safety of the Empire, 
 and the protection of its commerce in war, is a strong 
 Navy, Fleets maintained at a strength sufficient to meet 
 all probable demands, and reserves ready to provide for 
 rapid expansion on the outbreak of war, are the first 
 necessities of our national existence. Given such fleets, 
 a system of insurance such as Sir George Tryon advocated 
 need involve no real burden upon the State, but would 
 effectually check panic and gain time to make the sea 
 power of Great Britain felt throughout the world. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA.* 
 
 The objects of the Naval Manoeuvres of 1893 were defined 
 in the Official Programme to be "on the part of one side 
 to obtain command of the sea between Great Britain and 
 Ireland, and on the part of the other side to prevent 
 this." The two sides were, for purposes of distinction, 
 designated the Red and the Blue respectively, and it was 
 to the Red side that was assigned the object of obtaining 
 the command of the sea. What was meant by obtaining 
 the command of the sea was further defined as follows : — 
 " If the Blue side has either been defeated or has been 
 compelled to retire to a distance to avoid an engagement, 
 and the Blue torpedo-boats have been destroyed or 
 reduced to inactivity, the Admiral of the Red side is to 
 report by telegraph if he considers that his side has 
 gained command of the sea so that a large expedition 
 may be sent across it." Here we have a clear and 
 authoritative definition of what is meant, in a strategic 
 sense, by the command of the sea. No arbitrary claim 
 to exercise "the dominion of the seas," such as England 
 often advanced in bygone times, can give any assurance 
 of holding the command of the sea in the proper 
 strategic sense. The ships of a foreign Power might in 
 former days be content, as a matter of courtesy, or even 
 as a formal recognition of maritime supremacy, to lower 
 their topsails in the narrow seas in the presence of a 
 British man-of-war. But when any foreign Power felt 
 * Quarterly Review, October, 1893. 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SZ'H. 119 
 
 itself strong enough at sea to dispute the maritime supre- 
 macy of Great Britain, no formal claim to the dominion 
 or sovereignty of the seas would avail to'-^elease Great 
 Britain from the necessity of fighting to f_Jure the com- 
 mand of the sea. In truth, England claimed the sove- 
 reignty of the seas long before she was stronji enough to 
 secure the command of the sea ; and now th \ the com- 
 mand of the sea in the strategic sense is n4;essary to 
 her existence as an Empire, she has long ago abandoned 
 her former claim to the sovereignty of the seas.f 
 
 If then we desire clearly to understand what is meant 
 by the command of the sea in a strategic senhe, it is 
 necessary first to dismiss from our minds all ideav associ- 
 ated with the sovereignty of the seas as formerly claimed 
 by this country. There is very little relation between the 
 two. Yet they have often been confounded by writers of 
 repute. The utmost that can be said is that the one is 
 symbolical of the other ; that from the earliest times the 
 claim of England to the sovereignty of the seas has been 
 the formal and almost instinctive expression of the true 
 conditions of national defence for an island situated like 
 Great Britain. Selden, for example, in his "Mare 
 Clausum," claims the dominion of the sea as an ancient 
 and inseparable appendage to the ownership of the land 
 of Britain ; and he sets forth the limits of this dominion, 
 of which the more important, for our purpose, are those 
 which apply to what are called "the narrow seas." Over 
 
 * In fact, she did so precisely at the moment when the Battle of 
 Trafalgar had, so far as the struggle with Napoleon was concerned, 
 finally and decisively established her strategic command of the sea. 
 " The Battle of Trafalgar having so completely humbled the naval 
 power of France and Spain, suggested to the consideration of the 
 Board of Admiralty, with the approbation of the Government, the 
 omission of that arbitrary and offensive article, which required naval 
 officers to demand the striking of the flag and lowering of the topsail 
 from every foreign ship they might fall in with. That invidious 
 assumption of a right, though submitted to generally by foreigners for 
 some centuries, could not probably have been maintained much longer 
 except at the cannon's mouth ; and it was considered therefore that 
 the proper time had come when it might, both morally and politically, 
 be spontaneously abandoned.' ('Life of Earl Howe,' by Sir John 
 Barrow, chap. vii. p. 200.) 
 
i 
 120 t!^e navy a. yd the xation. 
 
 I 
 these the BriMsh dominion is, according to Selden, com- 
 plete, and ex"']Ends to the east and north as far as the 
 shores of the/bpposite European countries. Here we see 
 the older an^ more conventional idea of the sovereignty 
 of the sea 'gradually passing into the later and more 
 scientific id^a of the command of the sea. Great Britain 
 is an island. Its foreign commerce must pass over the 
 seas, and-Sio enemy can reach it except by crossing the 
 sea. There is no parallel to this in the history of 
 the worlds Great nations have risen by the power of the 
 sea and "have fallen again by the loss of it. But in all 
 such Cilfees sea power was an instrument of expansion, 
 not, aj^in the case of England, a condition of existence. 
 In modern times, as regards England, it has been both. 
 But from the days when England first became a nation, 
 sea power has been the indispensable condition of her 
 existence, whereas it is only in comparatively modern 
 times that it has become an instrument of her Imperial 
 expansion. This indeed is the essential function dis- 
 charged by sea power in the history of civilization. It 
 transmutes a city or a nation into an Imperial dominion. 
 " I cannot fiddle," said Themistocles, " but I can make a 
 small town a great city." The means thereto was sea 
 power. " Consilium Pompeii," says Cicero, " plane Themis- 
 tocleum est ; putat enim qui mari potitur eum rerum potiri." 
 On this Bacon comments : — 
 
 " We see the great effects of battles by sea : the Battle of 
 Actium decided the empire of the world ; the Battle of Lepanto 
 arrested the greatness of the Turk. . . . Thus much is certain : 
 that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as 
 much and as little of the war as he will ; whereas those that be 
 strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits. 
 Surely at this day with us of Europe, the vantage of strength at sea 
 (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great 
 Britain) is great ; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe 
 are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their 
 compass ; and because the wealth of both Indies seems in great 
 part but an accessory to the command of the seas." 
 
 Bacon here dwells upon the advantage of sea power, 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 12 1 
 
 upon its relation to " The True Greatness of Kingdoms 
 and Estates," and this he does with rare insight and preg- 
 nancy. But he does not seize, or at any rate he does not 
 press, the point that, whereas sea power is an advantage 
 to all kingdoms capable of wielding it, it is only to a 
 kingdom, and an empire situated as England and her 
 Empire are situated, that it is an absolute necessity. 
 Here then we see the true relation between the ancient 
 sovereignty of the seas and the modern command of the 
 sea. The sovereignty of the seas was the symbolical 
 expression of England's insular position. The command 
 of the sea is the strategic expression of England's 
 Imperial expansion. Our ancestors knew that except 
 by sea the enemies of England could never reach her. 
 They knew also that her soil had never been invaded 
 except when she was unable to overthrow her foes at sea. 
 They never doubted the truth of what Raleigh puts so 
 quaintly, and withal so forcibly, when he says, " To 
 entertain those that shall assail us, with their own beef 
 in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons, 
 I take to be the wisest way." All this they expressed 
 in their claim to the sovereignty of the seas. We express 
 the same idea in a different way when we insist that the 
 existence of the Empire depends on the capacity of 
 England to secure and maintain the command of the sea. 
 The difference is that the sovereignty of the sea was a 
 continuing claim, always symbolically asserted in the time 
 of peace, but not always strategically sustained in time 
 of war ; whereas the command of the sea is purely a 
 strategic conception, dormant and inoperative in time 
 of peace, but acquiring a vital meaning the moment war 
 is declared. 
 
 What is this meaning? The command of the sea means 
 freedom of military transit in the first place, of commercial 
 transit in the second. The latter is implied in the former 
 as the greater includes the less. Freedom of commercial 
 transit can never be more than precarious until freedom 
 of military transit has been secured, and when that is 
 
122 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 secured commercial transit becomes as free as is compatible 
 with a condition of maritime war. Hence it is strictly 
 true to say that command of the sea means freedom of 
 military transit, or, in still more general terms, strategic 
 freedom of transit. The sea in itself is a barren territory. 
 It is not coveted for itself by any Power, civilized or 
 uncivilized. Its only commercial or economic value is 
 that of its fisheries, and these belong for the most part 
 to its territorial regions, and not to its broad strategic 
 expanse. But the political and strategic value of the 
 sea is its value as a highway. If it could not be traversed 
 by ships, no Power would seek to command it. If it could 
 not be traversed by British ships, the British Empire 
 would cease to exist. 
 
 Furthermore, for the British Empire to continue to exist 
 not only must the sea be traversed by British ships, but 
 in time of war it must be commanded by British ships. 
 Strategic freedom of transit must be secured in order that 
 commercial freedom of transit may be maintained. For 
 England to surrender the command of the sea in time of 
 war would mean two things. It would mean on the one 
 hand that England itself was liable to invasion, and on 
 the other that every transmarine portion of the British 
 Empire was open to military assault ; and as a conse- 
 quence of this it would mean further that the maritime 
 commerce of the Empire had ceased to exist. No other 
 great Power of the. world is exposed in the same degree 
 to these extreme consequences. To any other Power the 
 obtaining of the command of the sea as against England 
 can only be a means to an end, that end being the over- 
 throw of the British Empire. To England it is and must 
 be an end in itself, that end being the highest of all 
 political ends for a nation ; namely, the maintenance of 
 the national existence. If we lost the command of the 
 sea beyond recovery, we might not be immediately invaded, 
 but the bonds of Empire would ipso facto be sundered. 
 We might avert invasion by concession ; but assuredly 
 no concession short of a dismemberment, or even a 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 123 
 
 dissolution of the Empire, would satisfy an enemy who 
 had finally vanquished us at sea. It is thus no rhetorical 
 expression, but a plain statement of essential fact, that by 
 the Navy we must stand or fall. To all other Powers 
 a strong navy is more or less of a luxury, useful for 
 certain subordinate purposes, the chief of which is to act 
 as a counterpoise to the maritime supremacy of England. 
 To England alone, it is from the very nature of the 
 case an absolute and primordial necessity. If no other 
 nation maintained a single warship at sea, England must 
 still hold sufficient command of the sea to secure the 
 communications of the Empire. That condition being 
 satisfied, the superior limit of the naval strength necessary 
 to her security is determined from time to time by the 
 naval strength of her neighbours and possible enemies. 
 Its inferior limit is determined once for all, independently 
 of all comparison with foreign Powers, by the insular 
 position of the kingdom and the world-wide character of 
 the Empire. 
 
 Having thus shown that command of the sea means 
 strategic freedom of maritime transit, military and com- 
 mercial, we may next consider how such freedom is to 
 be secured and maintained. We saw in the programme 
 of the Manoeuvres of 1893 that the criterion of com- 
 mand of the sea was held to be the practicability of 
 sending a large expedition across it. Before he was em- 
 powered to report that he had gained the command of the 
 sea in this sense, the Red Admiral was required either to 
 have defeated the Blue fleets or to have compelled them 
 to retire to a distance to avoid an engagement, and to 
 have destroyed the Blue torpedo-boats, or at least to have 
 reduced them to inactivity. In other words, the command 
 of the sea is in this case taken to mean the destruction, or 
 at least the complete neutralization, of any organized naval 
 force capable of interfering with an enemy's freedom of 
 transit. This is the true and only legitimate sense of the 
 words. In no other way is it possible to establish that 
 strategic freedom of maritime transit which is the final 
 
124 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 cause of all naval warfare. As a matter of fact, for reasons 
 which need not be examined here, the Red Admiral never 
 gained command of the Irish Channel in this sense. At 
 no time during the period of " hostilities " would it have 
 been possible for a large expedition to be sent across from 
 England to Ireland in the conditions assumed to be pre- 
 vailing, of war between the two countries, the shores of 
 Ireland being guarded by a powerful and undefeated fleet. 
 On the contrary, so far from the Red Admiral being able 
 to report that he had gained the command of the sea, he 
 was not even able to prevent the Blue Admiral from 
 claiming the exact reverse. Having swept the Irish 
 Channel from end to end without encountering the main 
 force of his adversary. Admiral Fitzroy, in command of the 
 Blue fleets, telegraphed to the Admiralty in the following 
 terms — " I consider that I have command of the Irish Sea, 
 and that no expedition can cross it." With all respect for 
 the memory of a very distinguished naval officer, we must 
 express the opinion that this was a gratuitous misreading 
 of a very important principle of naval warfare. It con- 
 founded the condition of a disputed command with that of 
 an assured command of the sea. It is true that the Red 
 Admiral was not in a position to defeat the Blue fleets, nor 
 to compel them to retire to a distance in order to avoid an 
 engagement. So far he himself had failed to secure the 
 command of the sea, and assuredly in such circumstances 
 no expedition could have been sent across it. The latter 
 part of Admiral Fitzroy's telegram was therefore perfectly 
 correct ; but, except in this sense, he had no more secured 
 the command of the sea than his adversary had. He had 
 denied to his adversary that strategic freedom of transit 
 which constitutes command of the sea, but he had failed 
 to secure it for himself. He had not defeated the Red 
 fleets, nor compelled them to retire to a distance in order 
 to avoid an engagement ; and this criterion, applied by 
 the Admiralty to the Red fleets, applied with equal force 
 to his own. The very circumstances which made it im- 
 possible for the Red side to send an expedition across the 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 12; 
 
 Irish Sea would have made it equally impossible for the 
 Blue side to send an expedition across in the opposite 
 direction, or to carry out any important naval enterprise 
 against the territory of its adversary. The presence on 
 either side of an undefeated naval force within striking 
 distance rendered the despatch of any such expedition 
 reciprocally impossible. There was no command of the sea 
 on either side, but the exact negation of it on both sides. 
 
 This point will well repay further examination and 
 elucidation. It raises the most fundamental issue of all 
 naval warfare. When we say that England must secure 
 the command of the sea, we do not merely mean that she 
 must render invasion impossible. That is only the nega- 
 tive side of the matter. The positive side is that she must 
 secure her own freedom of maritime transit. In truth, 
 no command of the sea is necessary to secure immunity 
 from invasion. That is secured by the mere existence of 
 the British fleets so long as they are undefeated. But 
 their mere existence, even in what Raleigh calls "equal 
 or answerable strength " to the fleets of an enemy, does 
 not confer upon them the command of the sea. It is 
 certain that no invasion of these islands will ever be 
 attempted until the fleets which defend them have first 
 been defeated and virtually destroyed. It will not suffice 
 merely to " decoy " them away, as some people think was 
 done when Nelson followed Villeneuve to the West Indies. 
 No capable commander would allow himself to be "de- 
 coyed " away, and no fleet could be decoyed away to such 
 a distance that it would be impossible for it to return in 
 time to frustrate the invader's purpose. Napoleon knew 
 this perfectly well, deficient as he was in many respects in 
 what a French naval historian has called le sentiment 
 exact des difficult^ de la marine. He never pretended to 
 think that his scheme of invasion was rendered feasible 
 by the fact that Nelson had followed Villeneuve to the 
 West Indies. Nelson, he knew, was away, but he did not 
 know at what moment he might return. But if Nelson 
 had encountered Villeneuve across the Atlantic and there 
 
126 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 suffered irretrievable defeat, and if, at the same time, 
 Ganteaume had been able to fight and beat Cornwallis 
 off Brest, then, and not till then, might the Boulogne 
 expedition have been launched with some prospects of 
 success. But Villeneuve, closely followed by Nelson, 
 returned across the Atlantic, and finally put into Cadiz 
 without striking the decisive blow. Then Napoleon knew 
 that his scheme of invasion had failed, because it was no 
 longer possible for him to secure that strategic freedom of 
 transit which was indispensable to its success. Accord- 
 ingly, two months before the Battle of Trafalgar was 
 fought, he turned his arms against Austria, and abandoned 
 once for all his plans for the invasion of England. 
 
 Here we see once more, in the light of the last 
 great naval crisis of our history, what is really meant 
 by the command of the sea. The command of the sea 
 was necessary to the success of Napoleon's designs, and 
 because he failed to secure it his designs were irretrievably 
 frustrated. The history of the Armada and its defeat 
 teaches exactly the same lesson. An invincible fleet was 
 to overpower the British naval defence, and to cover the 
 descent upon our shores of Spanish troops massed in 
 Flanders for the purpose. But the Armada was defeated, 
 and the contemplated invasion was thereby rendered im- 
 possible ; and generally it may be asserted, without fear 
 of contradiction, that no military enterprise across the sea 
 is practicable until complete command of the sea has first 
 been secured by the defeat or disablement of all organized 
 naval force capable of disputing the passage. 
 
 We are now in a position to determine whether Admiral 
 Fitzroy was justified in stating that he had gained the 
 command of the Irish Channel. Assuredly he was not. 
 There is no such thing as a partial or incomplete command 
 of the sea ; it is either absolute, or it does not exist. An 
 Admiral who commands a fleet strategically at large, even 
 though it is inferior to its immediate adversary, can always 
 frustrate a serious territorial attack on the country he serves, 
 so long as he has not himself been defeated. But he has 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 127 
 
 no command of the sea himself until he has defeated or 
 disabled the naval forces of his enemy. The annals of 
 naval warfare abound in illustrations of this paramount 
 and fundamental principle. Two such illustrations, those 
 of the Armada and of Napoleon's projected invasion of 
 England, have already been incidentally mentioned. Napo- 
 leon's invasion of Egypt and the disastrous enterprise of 
 Fersano at Lissa are two other cases in point. The com- 
 mand of the sea is what every naval Power must aim at 
 in all naval operations which are not purely defensive ; 
 and no Power can defend any of its transmarine possessions, 
 except so far as they are capable of local defence, against 
 an adversary who holds the command of the sea. 
 
 The history of these islands presents two noteworthy 
 cases, in one of which the principle here represented as 
 indefeasible would appear to have been successfully defied, 
 while in the other it was certainly misapprehended by those 
 who directed the defence of the kingdom. Each of these 
 cases will repay a somewhat close examination. The first 
 is the recovery of Britain for the Roman Empire by Con- 
 stantius, at the close of the third century, after the revolt 
 and death of Carausius. The other is the Battle of Beachy 
 Head and the strategic situation involved in it, which has 
 been so curiously misapprehended by nearly all historians, 
 and has even baffled the sagacity of such a master of the 
 philosophy of naval warfare as Captain Mahan. By 
 making himself master of the Roman fleet, collected at 
 Boulogne for the chastisement of German pirates, Carausius, 
 a daring but treacherous seaman, succeeded in wresting 
 Britain from the Roman Empire, and governed it for ten 
 years as an independent dominion. More than one attempt 
 was made by Rome to overthrow the usurper and recover 
 his dominions for the Empire ; but for a long time he held 
 Boulogne, and once at least he defeated a Roman fleet at 
 sea. 1^'inally he was murdered by his minister AUectus ; 
 " and the assassin, " says Gibbon — 
 
 " succeeded to his power and his danger. But he possessed not 
 equal abilities either to exercise the one, or to repel the other. 
 
12S THE XAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 He beheld with anxious terror the opposite shores of the continent, 
 already filled with arms, with troops, and with vessels ; for Con- 
 stantius had very prudently divided his forces, that he might like- 
 wise divide the attention and resistance of the enemy. The attack 
 was at length made by the principal squadron, which, under the 
 command of the Prefect Asclepiodotus, an officer of distinguished 
 merit, had been assembled at the mouth of the Seine. So imper- 
 fect in those times was the art of navigation, that orators have 
 celebrated the daring courage of the Romans who ventured to set 
 sail with a side wind, and on a stormy day. The weather proved 
 favourable to their enterprise. Under the cover of a thick fog 
 they escaped the fleet of AUectus, which had been stationed off 
 the Isle of Wight to receive them, landed in safety on some part 
 of the western coast, and convinced the Britons that a superiority 
 of naval strength will not always protect their country from 
 foreign invasion." 
 
 This reads, at first sight, like a direct negation of the 
 principle which we have represented as indefeasible, the 
 principle that the command of the sea is an indispensable 
 condition of successful territorial attack. But the story- 
 told by Gibbon appears to be incomplete, and its incom- 
 pleteness goes far to vitiate the historian's comment upon 
 it. In the first place, it is plain that, whatever may have 
 been the case with Carausius, AUectus, his murderer and 
 successor, was regarded by the people of Britain as a mere 
 usurper. There is no evidence that he inspired any impulse 
 of national defence, or that even his Roman subjects were 
 faithful to him. In the second place. Gibbon tells us 
 nothing of what became of the superior fleet of AUectus 
 which Asclepiodotus is represented as successfully evading. 
 It appears to have vanished out of existence, and probably 
 after the death of AUectus, who was defeated and slain in 
 an engagement with the troops of Asclepiodotus, either it 
 was disbanded or it returned to its Roman allegiance. At 
 any rate, it does not appear to have attempted to dispute 
 the passage of Constantius, who set out from Boulogne 
 as soon as he heard of the victory of Asclepiodotus and 
 the death of AUectus. " When Constantius landed on 
 the shores of Kent," says the historian, " he found them 
 covered with obedient subjects. Their acclamations were 
 
THE COMMAXD OF THE SEA. 129 
 
 loud and unanimous, and the virtues of the conqueror may- 
 induce us to believe that they sincerely rejoiced in a 
 revolution which, after a separation of ten years, restored 
 Britain to the body of the Roman Empire." 
 
 We are accordingly by no means disposed to admit that 
 the success of Asclepiodotus and the recoveiy of Britain 
 by the Roman arms were calculated to convince the 
 Britons, then or thereafter, " that a superiority of naval 
 strength will not always protect their country from a 
 foreign invasion." The fleet which failed to protect them 
 was not a national fleet, but a revolted fleet of their con- 
 querors which probably shared their own antipathy to 
 Allectus, and the so-called " foreign invasion " was mani- 
 festly regarded by many of them as a not unwelcome- 
 return of rulers whom they were prepared to obey. In 
 other words, Asclepiodotus, though he had not defeated 
 the fleet of Allectus, had for all practical purposes secured 
 the command of the sea. In truth, the whole history 
 of the revolt of Carausius, and its sequel in the over- 
 throw of Allectus, is a signal illustration of the strategic 
 advantage which belongs to command of the sea. Carau- 
 sius, having first made himself master of the Roman fleet 
 which commanded the Channel, had no difficulty whatever 
 in making himself master of Britain. There he defied 
 the whole power of the Roman Empire until the Romans 
 had constructed a fresh fleet capable of wresting the 
 command of the Channel from the usurper himself, or 
 from his successor. It is true that Asclepiodotus suc- 
 ceeded in landing his troops in Britain without first dis- 
 posing of the fleet of Allectus ; but that the fleet of 
 Allectus was in the end eff"ectually disposed of is proved 
 by the unmolested transit of Constantius, and his complete 
 success in re-establishing the sway of Rome throughout 
 the land. 
 
 Wo turn now to a period of the national history just 
 fourteen centuries later than that which has just engaged 
 our attention. Once in the intervening period was England 
 successfully invaded by William the Conqueror, and once 
 
I30 THE XAVY AXD THE yAT/OA. 
 
 was a threatened conquest averted by the failure of the 
 Spanish Armada to secure the necessary command of 
 the sea. The strategic conditions involved in the defeat 
 of the Armada have already been incidentally noted, and it 
 would not be uninteresting, if space permitted, to consider at 
 some length why it was that William the Conqueror suc- 
 ceeded where the Spanish monarch failed.* But we pass 
 over these cases in order to examine in detail an episode in 
 our naval history which illustrates more than any other 
 the signal failure of our country's historians to appreciate 
 maritime affairs. The Battle of Beachy Head fought on 
 June 30, 1690, by the English and Dutch fleets under 
 Torrington and Evertsen respectively against a superior 
 French fleetunder Tourville,has commonly been represented 
 by historians as one of the most disastrous and even dis- 
 graceful events in all the annals of the British Nav}'. 
 " There has scarcely ever been so sad a day in London,'' 
 writes Macaulay, " as that on which the news of the Battle 
 of Beachy Head arrived. The shame was insupportable ; 
 the peril was imminent." In truth, the shame was great ; 
 but it was, or should have been, that of those who, at a 
 great crisis in the national fortunes, had not provided the 
 nation's defenders at sea with a force sufficient to overcome 
 the forces of the enemy. It was not that of the great 
 strategist who saved his country by the sacrifice of his own 
 immediate reputation, and at the risk of going down to 
 posterity as a mere incapable, if not as a traitor and a 
 poltroon. The peril was imminent ; but if Torrington had 
 listened to the politicians who controlled him and not to 
 his own masterly strategic instincts, the case might have 
 been one, not of imminent peril, but of irretrievable disaster. 
 Torrington, in fact, displayed the rare fortitude of a 
 
 * " The invaders crossed an undefended sea, and found an undefended 
 coast." This was because, as the same writer says, "a formidable 
 English fleet, which by King Harold's orders had been cruising in the 
 Channel to intercept the Normans, had been obliged to disperse 
 temporarily for the purpose of refitting and taking in fresh stores of 
 provisions." (Creasy, " Fifteen Decisive Battles.") Practically, there- 
 fore, the defending fleet was non-existent at the time of the Norman 
 Conquest. 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 13 r 
 
 Fabius, ' Unus qui nobis ciinctando restitnit rem.' Victory 
 was impossible to him, and his sense of duty forbade him 
 to seek a glorious death and an undying fame in defeat. 
 He so fought as to save his country and to ruin his own 
 reputation. Public opinion clamoured for his life, and 
 insisted on his being sent to the Tower. William III., 
 who was doubly indebted to him for his crown and his 
 throne, cashiered him from the naval service, refused to 
 listen to his defence, visited several members of the court- 
 martial which tried and acquitted him with heavy pains 
 and penalties, and broke no less than forty-two officers 
 of the Navy, who, as Entick puts it, " appeared to justify 
 the Earl's courage and conduct." The utmost that the 
 great Whig historian can find to say in his favour is that — 
 
 " there is a higher courage of which Torrington was wholly 
 destitute. He shrank from all responsibility, from the responsi- 
 bility of fighting, and from the responsibility of not fighting ; and 
 he succeeded in finding out a middle way which united all the 
 inconveniences which he wished to avoid. He would conform to 
 the letter of his instructions ; yet he would not put everything to 
 hazard. Some of his ships should skirmish with the enemy ; but 
 the great body of his fleet should not be risked." 
 
 All this is true ; but the high strategic reasons which 
 governed Torrington's conduct are entirely ignored by the 
 historian. Let us closely consider the situation. The 
 country was divided between the partisans of James and 
 the supporters of William. James was in Ireland, where 
 his strength was greatest, and William had gone thither to 
 encounter him, his transit having been covered by a small 
 squadron of six men-of-war in St. George's Channel under 
 the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. The central 
 Government was vested in Mary as Regent, assisted by a 
 council of nine, among whom was Nottingham, Torrington's 
 personal enemy, and Russell, his professional rival. The 
 army was with William in Ireland, and Great Britain 
 could only be defended on land by a hastily levied militia. 
 Its sole effective defence was, as always, the fleet ; and the 
 fleet was, for the moment, insufficient to defend it The 
 
132 THE NAVY AXD THE N ATI OX. 
 
 chief reliance of James was upon the friendship and the 
 forces, naval and military, of Louis XIV. Here was a case 
 in which, beyond all others, the security of England against 
 insurrection at home and invasion from abroad depended 
 on the sufficiency and capacity of her fleets to maintain 
 the command of the sea. Louis XIV. resolved to make a 
 determined effort to wrest this command from his hated 
 adversaries, and by overpowering the English fleet in the 
 Channel to open the way for a successful invasion and a 
 successful insurrection to follow. A great fleet was collected 
 at Brest under the supreme command of Tourville, and a 
 squadron from Toulon under Chateau-Renaud was ordered 
 to join him in the Channel. The intention was to sweep 
 the Channel, to threaten London, so as to foment a Jacobite 
 insurrection in the capital, to land troops in Torbay, and 
 to occupy the Irish Channel in such force as to prevent the 
 return of William and his army. 
 
 All this might have been foreseen, and indeed was 
 foreseen by Torrington if by no one else, and, being fore- 
 seen, the whole scheme might have been frustrated by 
 naval preparations equal to the emergency. In those 
 days ships were so ill-built that fleets could not keep the 
 sea in the winter ; but the designs of Louis were known 
 and foreseen in the preceding winter, when there would 
 still have been time to take measures for defeating them. 
 Torrington himself had foreseen the emergency, and 
 entreated those responsible for the strength of the Navy 
 to provide adequately against it. Up to the preceding 
 autumn he had himself been First Commissioner of the 
 Admiralty ; but he surrendered his post, accepting a com- 
 mand afloat, rather than remain responsible for a state of 
 things of which he clearly saw the danger. Macaulay 
 represents him as having been dismissed as a consequence 
 of an inquiry into the administration of his office, which 
 resulted in the discovery of gross corruption and malver- 
 sation : — 
 
 " No censure was passed on the chief offender, Torrington ■ 
 nor does it appear that a single voice was raised against him.' 
 
THE COM ^r AND OF THE SEA. 13? 
 
 He had personal friends in both parties. He had many popular 
 qualities. Even his vices were not those which excite public 
 hatred. The people readily forgave a courageous open-handed 
 sailor for being too fond of his bottle, his boon companions, and 
 his mistresses, and did not sufficiently consider how great must 
 be the perils of a country of which the safety depends on a man 
 sunk in indolence, stupefied by wine, enervated by licentiousness, 
 ruined by prodigality, and enslaved by sycophants and harlots." 
 
 These are the florid colours with which Macaulay loads 
 his palette. This is the portrait he draws of the man 
 whom his countrymen down to the time of the Battle of 
 Beachy Head continued to regard as the most capable 
 seaman of his time, and whom his brother officers acquitted 
 after the battle, even in the teeth of an exasperated and 
 vindictive public opinion. It does not seem to have 
 occurred to the historian that Torrington may have escaped 
 censure because he was not to blame. It is true that he was 
 removed from the Admiralty, and his namesake and kins- 
 man, Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, was appointed 
 in his place. But this seems to have been done at his 
 own urgent request, and for reasons entirely to his credit. 
 He urged upon the Government that the preparations 
 they proposed to make for meeting the expected attack 
 of the French fleet were in his judgment insufficient ; and 
 finding his remonstrances unheeded, he declined to be 
 responsible for a naval policy which he could not approve. 
 The abuses discovered in the administration of the 
 Admiralty do not seem to have been laid to his personal 
 charge ; and though it was deemed expedient to appoint 
 a new Commission in which he had no place, he was 
 immediately entrusted with the chief command at sea. 
 " Though he had been found an incapable administrator," 
 says Macaulay, " he still stood so high in general estimation 
 as a seaman that the Government was unwilling to lose 
 his services. He was assured that no slight was intended 
 to him. ... In an evil hour for England, he consented to 
 remain at the head of the naval force on which the safety 
 of our coasts depended." 
 
 So history is written. Yet a consideration of facts and 
 
134 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 dates seems to afford a strong presumption that Torrington 
 could, in any case, have been only technically responsible 
 for the abuses discovered at the Admiralt}-. The Board 
 of Admiralty was only constituted at the beginning of 
 1689, and the date of the Gaaette which contains the 
 names of Torrington's colleagues is given by Macaulay as 
 March 11. Early in April, or possibly before the end 
 of March, Herbert, who was only created Earl of Torrington 
 later in the year, was at sea with the fleet, arriving before 
 Cork on April 17. He remained at sea, or at least in 
 command of the fleet, until the end of August, when the 
 fleet under his command was broken up for the winter. 
 It was the bad victualling of this fleet which led to an 
 inquiry, and it was on November 23 that the House of 
 Commons, having by that time been informed of the 
 result of the inquiry, which had been conducted by the 
 King in person at the Treasury, ordered the persons directly 
 incriminated into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms. 
 Shortly after this a new Board of Admiralty was appointed, 
 Torrington being superseded by Pembroke. It is hard 
 to believe that Torrington, who was at sea almost con- 
 tinually from the time of his appointment at the Admiralty 
 until the time when the inquiry was instituted, who must 
 himself have furnished many of the grounds and materials 
 for the inquiry, who was prematurely driven into winter- 
 quarters in August because he was, as Entick says, " in 
 very bad want of beer," * could ever have had any oppor- 
 tunity during his brief and interrupted term of office of 
 showing whether he was a capable or an incapable ad- 
 ministrator. 
 
 The presumption here suggested is converted into some- 
 thing like a certainty by Torrington's own words in his 
 
 * The mention of beer is not without interest. It was almost the 
 only beverage which the seamen of the time and for long afterwards 
 could get at sea. The means of storing water were so inadequate that 
 it was generally undrinkable after a few days at sea, and beer was 
 issued in place of it, being also regarded as a preventive of scurvy in 
 the days before limejuice was obtainable. Lord Hawke's " Memoirs " 
 are full of references to beer, and of complaints of the quality of the 
 beer supplied to the service in his time. 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 135 
 
 defence before the court-martial. He had repeatedly urged 
 on Nottingham, the Secretary of State, that the fleet should 
 be strengthened in view of the threatened attack of the 
 French. Earher, in the year 1690, a French fleet had 
 appeared off Cork, and, had Torrington's warnings been 
 heeded betimes, an English fleet should have been in a 
 position to attack and destroy it, and thereby entirely to 
 frustrate the subsequent enterprise of Tourville. On this 
 Torrington remarks in his defence : — 
 
 " The late insult which some call a disgrace had not only been 
 prevented, but the French put by the possibility, during the whole 
 war, of setting any fleet to sea considerable enough to give us 
 either care or trouble. What excuse can be made for it I do not 
 well know ; but I am sure it is not want of admonition : for I 
 appeal to many concerned in it whether it was not foreseen and 
 foretold several months before the descent of the French, and 
 the time it was made. Lest any of these matters should be laid 
 to my charge, I think it necessary to acquaint this honourable 
 Court, that not seeing matters go so well in the Admiralty as 
 I thought the service required, and that it was not in my power 
 to prevent it, I humbly begged and obtained the King's leave to 
 be dismissed from that Commission, and giving any further 
 attendance at the Board; that since I could not prevent the 
 mischief I might have no share in the blame. ... I am sure the 
 noble Lord [Nottingham], whose province it is, has always by 
 his discourse endeavoured to persuade me to a belief that the 
 French would not come out with a considerable strength. And 
 1 appeal to him, whether I did not tell him, when I had urged 
 many reasons for strengthening our fleet, which he only answered 
 with ' You will be strong enough for the French ; ' ' My Lord, 
 I know my business, and will do my best with what I have ; but 
 pray remember it is not my fault that the fleet is not stronger. 
 I own I am afraid now in winter, whilst the danger may be 
 remedied; and you will be afraid in summer when it is past 
 remedy.' I could say more upon this subject, had I not confined 
 myself to this year." 
 
 It appears from this that Torrington himself asked to be 
 dismissed from the Board of Admiralty, not because he 
 acknowledged his responsibihty for administrative crimes, 
 with which he could have had very little to do, and from 
 which he personally suffered, but because he would not be 
 responsible for a state of things which he regarded as 
 
136 THE NAVY AXD THE iXATIOX. 
 
 menacing to the security of the kingdom. " I know my 
 business, and will do my best with what I have " — there 
 spoke the true spirit of the British Na\')-. "You will be 
 strong enough for the French " — there spoke the light heart 
 of the British politician. The seaman was right, and the 
 minister was wrong. But it was the seaman who was 
 punished for strategy which saved the kingdom, while the 
 minister, whose counsel would have lost it, has ever since 
 remained in possession of the car of history. 
 
 However, Torrington had to make the best of a situation 
 of which he had foreseen and deplored the perils. Let us 
 sec how he did it. Early in the year a fleet of sixteen 
 sail-of-the-Iine under Admiral Killigrew had been sent in 
 charge of a convoy to Cadiz, with orders to prevent, if 
 possible, the exit of the Toulon fleet from the Mediter- 
 ranean, and to follow it up should it effect its escape. This 
 was good strategy in the abstract, but questionable in view 
 of the comparative weakness of the English fleet. In its 
 consequences it was disastrous, for Killigrew, delayed by 
 weather, and by the many pre-occupations, commercial and 
 strategic, involved in his instructions, was unable either 
 to bar the passage of the Toulon fleet or to keep in 
 strategic touch with it during its progress towards the 
 Channel. Hence Chateau-Renaud was able to effect his 
 junction with Tourville unmolested ; while Killigrew did 
 not reach Plymouth until after the Battle of Beachy Head 
 had been fought, when, the French fleet being temporarily 
 supreme in the Channel, he was compelled to carry his 
 squadron into the Hamoaze so as to be out of harm's way. 
 The only other important British force afloat was Sir 
 Cloudesley Shovel's squadron, which had escorted the King 
 to Ireland, and, having done so, received orders to join 
 Torrington. But Tourville, being by this time in the 
 Channel, was gradually forcing Torrington to the eastward. 
 Hence, although fully alive to the strategic value, in 
 certain contingencies, of these outlying squadrons of Killi- 
 grew and Shovel, Torrington was compelled to rely mainl>' 
 on the force under his immediate command, the insufliciency 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 137 
 
 of which he had many months before pointed out and 
 strenuously insisted upon. 
 
 The great but inadequate fleet which Torrington was 
 to command was slowly assembled in the Downs, and 
 Torrington joined it on May 30, his instructions having 
 been signed on the 26th, and delivered to him on the 
 29th.* Even then the Dutch fleet had not reached the 
 rendezvous in the numbers promised ; and more than 
 three weeks later, when Torrington, who had by this time 
 carried his fleet to St. Helen's, wrote to Nottingham, on 
 June 23, to announce Tourville's advance, he said, "We 
 have but eighteen Dutch with us, after all De Witt's 
 great promises." The entrance to the Channel was 
 totally unguarded, and no scouts had been sent out to 
 the westward. But this, though attributed to Torrington 
 as a gross piece of neglect, was not his fault. His ships, 
 insufficient in numbers at the best, were otherwise em- 
 ployed ; and the Dutch, to whom he had entrusted the 
 duty of scouting, had neglected it. Hence, on June 23, 
 the first certain intelligence he received of the advance of 
 the French was the information that they were anchored 
 in great force in Compton Bay on the western side of the 
 Isle of Wight. Three days afterwards, on June 26, he 
 wrote to Nottingham to report that, his force having been 
 strengthened in the meanwhile by the arrival of Evertsen 
 with a reinforcement of Dutch ships, he, with fifty-five 
 men-of-war and twenty fireships, had attempted to bring 
 the French to an action, but that the French Admiral, 
 though superior in force, had declined the engagement. 
 Torrington very soon perceived that his tactics, in thus 
 seeking to take the offensive, were ill-judged and based 
 on a mistaken estimate of the enemy's force ; and he lost 
 no time in summoning a council of war and deciding on 
 a more prudent line of action. He was face to face with 
 a hostile force so superior to his own that he could not 
 
 * These dates are important, because one of the charges made 
 against Torrington was that he delayed to assume the command. " I 
 was," he says, " commanded to stay for my instructions." 
 
138 THE NAVY AND THE XATIOX. 
 
 hope to win a decisive action. He might fight and be 
 beaten, but he knew that to be beaten in such circum- 
 stances was not merely to lose a battle, but to imperil 
 the safety of the kingdom and the stability of the throne. 
 Hence he decided, in unanimous concert with his col- 
 leagues, English and Dutch, of flag-rank, to act on the 
 defensive. A defensive strategy is not congenial to 
 Enghsh naval traditions, nor easily rendered intelligible 
 to a nation accustomed to assert its undisputed supremacy 
 at sea. But in the circumstances in which Torrington 
 found himself, by no fault of his own and in spite of his 
 repeated warnings, it was the only strategy capable of 
 retrieving an almost desperate situation. No more 
 masterly exposition of the true principles and bearings of 
 such a strategy has ever been penned than Torrington 
 hastily jotted down in his immortal despatch to Notting- 
 ham on June 26, 1690 : — 
 
 " I do acknowledge my first intention of attacking them a 
 rashness that will admit of no better excuse than that, though 
 I did believe them stronger than we are, I did not believe it to 
 so great a degree. . . . Their great strength and caution have 
 put soberer thoughts into my head, and have made me very 
 heartily give God thanks they declined the battle yesterday ; and 
 indeed I shall not think myself very unhappy, if 1 can get rid of 
 them without fighting, unless it may be upon equaller terms than 
 for the present I can see any prospect of. I find I am not the 
 only man of that opinion ; for a council of war I called this 
 morning unanimously agreed, we are by all manner of means to 
 shun fighting with them, especially if they have the wind of us ; 
 and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gunfleet, 
 the only place we can with any manner of probability make our 
 party good with them in the condition we are in. We have now 
 had a pretty good view of their fleet, which consists of near if not 
 quite eighty men-of-war fit to lie in a line and thirty fireships ; a 
 strength that puts me besides hopes of success, if we should fight, 
 and really may not only endanger the losing of the fleet, but at 
 least the quiet of our country too ; for if we are beaten, they, being 
 absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many 
 things they dare not attempt while we observe them, and are in a 
 possibility of joining Vice-Admiral Killigrew, and our ships to the 
 westward. If I find a possibility, I will get by them to the west- 
 ward to join those ships ; if not, I mean to follow the result of the 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 139 
 
 council of war. In the mean time I wish there might be speedy 
 orders given to fit out with speed whatever ships of war are in the 
 river of Chatham ; and that the ships to the westward proceed to 
 Portsmouth ; and from thence, if the French come before the river, 
 they may join us over the flats. This is the best advice I can 
 give ; but had I been believed in the winter, the kingdom had not 
 received this insult." 
 
 So wrote the greatest seaman of his age, with a 
 sagacity fully worthy of his consummate seamanship. 
 The politicians in London, however, could not see the 
 matter with his eyes. They persuaded themselves, and, 
 still worse, they persuaded the Queen, that the French 
 fleet which Torrington had reckoned as numbering at 
 least eighty line-of-battle ships had not really "above 
 sixty ships that could stand in a line." They insisted 
 that a battle was necessary, and seemed to think that a 
 victory was possible. They would not see that a defeat 
 would be fatal. Torrington had declared that he meant 
 to watch the French without fighting them — indeed, "by 
 all manner of means to shun fighting with them ; " to get 
 by them to the westward, and join the British ships in 
 that quarter, if possible ; but to observe them always, and 
 " retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the Gun- 
 fleet,* the only place we can with any manner of proba- 
 bility make our party good with them in the condition 
 we are in." These are the true principles of a waiting, 
 observing, defensive strategy. But the Queen and her 
 Council in London would not hear of them. Some of 
 them were for superseding Torrington. All were for 
 insisting that a battle should be fought at once, and 
 Torrington's plan of retiring, "even to the Gunfleet" if 
 necessary, was peremptorily negatived. " So that upon 
 the whole," wrote Nottingham in a despatch, so hastily 
 written that he had no time to take a copy of it — 
 
 " if you should retire to the Gunfleet, the ships from Plymouth, 
 
 * The Gunfleet is an outlying bank off the coast of Essex, north of 
 the Thames. In Torrington's days a large fleet could anchor in safety 
 behind it. But the shifting of the sandbanks has now somewhat 
 diminished its value as an anchorage. 
 
14° THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 if not joined with you, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and all the 
 ships returning from Ireland, and Vice-Admiral Killigrew with 
 that squadron, and a rich fleet of merchantmen will all be exposed 
 to inevitable ruin. And, besides, the French may have oppor- 
 tunity of going with their whole fleet, or sending such part as 
 they think fit to Scotland, where they are expected ; and we have 
 too good reasons to apprehend disturbances." 
 
 With this amazing despatch was enclosed a peremptor\- 
 order from the Queen to fight at the first opportunity : — 
 
 "We apprehend," Mary is made to say, "the consequences of 
 your retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather 
 you should, upon any advantage of the wind, give battle to the 
 enemy than retreat further than is necessary to get an advantage 
 upon the enemy. But in case you find it necessary to go to the 
 westward of the French fleet, in order to the better joining of our 
 ships from Plymouth or any others coming from the westward, 
 we leave it to your discretion, so as you by no means ever lose 
 sight of the French fleet whereby they may have opportunities of 
 making attempts upon the shore, or in the rivers of Medway or 
 Thames, or get away without fighting." 
 
 Between Torrington's despatch, and the despatches of 
 Mary and Nottingham in reply, there lies, as it seems to 
 us, the whole right and wrong of naval strategy, the whole- 
 essence of what pertains to the command of the sea. On 
 this point we can appeal, not indeed to Captain Mahan, 
 the greatest living authority on naval history, and one of 
 the greatest authorities of all time on the broader issues 
 of naval strategy— for Captain Mahan appears in this 
 case to have taken his history from Macaulay and 
 Macaulay's authorities, and never to have examined 
 Torrington's own defence — but to an authority not un- 
 worthy to be ranked with Captain Mahan, that of Admiral 
 Colomb, whose work on " Naval Warfare " stands almost 
 alone in our literature for its firm grasp of sound principle 
 and its lucid exposition of illustrative fact. The following 
 is Admiral Colomb's comment on Nottingham's despatch 
 and its enclosure : — 
 
 " This would be a perverse enough misunderstanding of the 
 situation and of Torrington's view of it, if it stood alone. But 
 the non-sequitur of the enclosure almost takes one's breath away. 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 141 
 
 Nottingham was in the main only repeating what Torrington had 
 put in his mind, but with the inferences turned inside out. The 
 importance of joining, or at least of securing the safety of 
 Killigrew and Shovel, was the matter which dwelt in the foremost 
 place in Torrington's mind, and his main effort, as sketched out, 
 was the endeavour to join them. If he could not pass the French 
 to the westward, but could keep in observation of them to the 
 eastward, his colleagues would be safe enough. For if de 
 Tourville should go west after them, Torrington would follow 
 them up ; if he should detach force sufficient for their destruction, 
 he would weaken himself so much that Torrington might engage 
 him at an advantage. It was just the same with regard to 
 Scotland. If Torrington was forced back — in order to avoid a 
 battle — to the Gunfleet, the French could neither proceed to 
 Scotland in full force nor send a detachment there. First, 
 because they would be unable to shake off Torrington ; and 
 secondly, because if they weakened themselves by detaching, 
 Torrington would fall on the remainder. The one thing certain, 
 both from Torrington's words and Nottingham's, was that the 
 French wished of all things for a general action with the odds 
 in their favour, and this alone was sufficient to prescribe a 
 refusal. The one point on which Nottingham could hang a 
 grain of justification for the extraordinary enclosure which his 
 letter contained, was his estimate of the relative forces watching 
 each other. He assumed them nearly equal. Torrington and 
 his brother Admirals, looking at both fleets when they so decided, 
 were of opinion that the odds were too great to give reasonable 
 hopes of success. What right had any statesman or pohtician in 
 London to treat as fallacious estimates of force so arrived at? 
 But Nottingham did it ; for his letter, written in such haste that 
 he was unable to take a copy of it, enclosed a positive order from 
 the Queen to Torrington to bring the French fleet to action." 
 
 Then, after quoting Mary's order, the Admiral con- 
 tinues — 
 
 '' This order was, of course, Nottingham's, and its wrong- 
 headedness may possibly show itself to the reader who has 
 followed me thus far. There is no sign in it of an understanding 
 of the possibly overwhelming consequences of a lost battle, for 
 it assumes it to be a bad thing to let the French ' get away 
 without fighting.' Nottingham must have got it into his mind, 
 and carried it into the mind of the Queen and her Council, that 
 the well-tried Herbert and his colleague flag-officers were incom- 
 petent cowards, fearing a battle where there were at least fair 
 chances of success, and nothing to follow defeat if it should come. 
 But, as has often happened since, the statesman was found on 
 
143 THE NAVY AND THE NATIOX. 
 
 the quarter-deck, and the rash blunderer at the seat of Govern- 
 ment. There was absolutely nothing to be gained by a battle 
 which could not possibly be a decisive victory, and o^er which 
 from the great numbers engaged, and the limits placed on 
 manceuvring by the character of the ships and the lightness of 
 the wind, the Admirals could have no real control. A complete 
 victory to the enemy, on the odier hand, would, at the very least, 
 have sent the Dutch king back to Holland, if it did not place 
 this kingdom under the orders of the Pope and of Louis. The 
 sailors saw it all well enough. The statesmen neither saw it then 
 nor afterwards." 
 
 By the time the Queen's commands reached him, 
 Torrington, avoiding an engagement, had been forced back 
 by the French to the neighbourhood of Beachy Head. 
 He replied at once to Nottingham, and briefly recapitulated 
 his former reasoning ; but with a true sailor's sense of 
 discipline, he expressed his readiness to obey the orders 
 given him. He insisted that he and his colleagues had 
 rightly estimated the strength of the French, and urged 
 that their tactics showed them to be conscious of their 
 advantage. 
 
 " If they do not think they have the advantage, I am yet to 
 learn what can move them to stay, having for several days had 
 a fair wind to take them off. And, my Lord, notwithstanding 
 your advice from France, I take them to be eighty men-of-war 
 strong. ... I cannot comprehend that Killigrew, the merchant 
 ships. Shovel, or the Plymouth ships, can run much hazard if 
 they take any care of themselves ; for, whilst we observe the 
 French, they cannot make any attempt either upon ships or 
 shore, without running a great hazard ; and if we are beaten, all 
 is exposed to their mercy. 'Tis very possible I reason wrong, 
 but I do assure you I can and will obey. Pray God direct all 
 for the best." 
 
 At daybreak on the morning after receiving his orders, 
 Torrington drew his ships into line, the wind being light 
 from the eastward ; at eight o'clock he made the signal 
 for battle, the French fleet being at the time to leeward 
 and awaiting the attack. The Dutch fleet occupied the 
 van ; Torrington commanded the centre, according to 
 usage; and Delaval, his second in command, who afterwards 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 143 
 
 presided at the court-martial which tried and acquitted his 
 chief, commanded the rear. The tactics ofthe battle, which 
 have been much criticised, only concern us here so far as 
 they illustrate the strategic policy of Torrington. The 
 Dutch from their position suffered most heavily, and this 
 was subsequently made one of the grounds of accusation 
 against Torrington, who was charged with not having duly 
 supported his allies. But Torrington's object was to fight 
 an action and not to suffer defeat. His orders, which were 
 contrary to his own judgment, compelled him to fight, but 
 they could not compel him so to fight as to lose his fleet. 
 Had he seen his way to a decisive victory, he would have 
 fought in a different fashion. There would have been no 
 Battle of Beachy Head, for the French would have been 
 destroyed before ever they weathered the Isle of Wight. 
 Had the Queen's orders permitted him to avoid an action, 
 in accordance with his own judgment and that of his col- 
 leagues, he never would have fought at all. As it was, all 
 he could do was to fight so as not to be beaten, and this 
 he did, although some of the ships under his command, 
 especially those ofthe Dutch, were severely handled by the 
 superior numbers of the French and their well directed 
 fire. 
 
 " I am sure," he said in his defence, " that if I had acted 
 otherwise than I did, the whole fleet had been ruined and I 
 wholly inexcusable ; for I had lost the wind, contrary to the 
 results of the council of war, which was, that we should by all 
 manner of means shun fighting the enemy, if they have the wind 
 of us. . . . Had I made one step towards losing the wind, I had 
 not only acted contrary to the unanimous declared opinion of 
 the council of war, but contrary to my own judgment, declared 
 under my hand. What reflections that might have drawn upon 
 me I humbly submit to the judgment of this honourable Court." 
 
 Two conditions thus governed the whole tactics of the 
 action ; the direction of the wind and the superior numbers 
 of the French. Had it been made a decisive action, it must 
 have ended in a decisive defeat of the only fleet which 
 stood between Great Britain and invasion. To make it an 
 indecisive action it was necessary for the inferior fleet to 
 
144 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 retain the advantage of the wind, and this, in Torrington's 
 judgment, could only be done by fighting as he did. Who 
 shall say that he was wrong ? Certainly those who tried 
 him, being members of his own profession, recorded their 
 conviction that he was right. Probably they knew as well 
 as he did that the action never ought to have been fought, 
 that it was bad strategy to fight it. But the strategy 
 was Nottingham's ; the tactics which averted its worst 
 consequences, though they could not prevent its immediate 
 results assuming the dimensions of a grave disaster, were 
 Torrington's own. We have already quoted Macaulay's 
 strange and misguided comment on these masterly tactics. 
 Admiral Colomb has reflected, in terms not too severe, 
 on the perverse misunderstanding of the statesmen of the 
 time ; but surely the misunderstanding of the modern 
 historian, not to speak of his positive misrepresentations, 
 is even more astounding. We need only set against it 
 the declaration of Torrington himself, a declaration sanc- 
 tioned and endorsed by the unanimous judgment of the 
 Court which tried and acquitted him : — 
 
 " I will not confine any man's judgment to mine, but I am very 
 ready to reason the point of conduct with any man ; but this I 
 may be bold to say, that I have had time and cause enough to 
 think of it j and that, upon my word, were the battle to be fought 
 over again, I do not know how to mend it, under the same 
 circumstances." 
 
 The battle lasted the whole day, and the Dutch ships 
 suffered very severely. As the day advanced the wind 
 dropped, and Torrington, observing this, and also that the 
 set of the tide was against the French, first ordered the 
 Dutch to anchor where they lay, and then, as Entick 
 relates — 
 
 " with his own ship and several others he drove between them and 
 the enemy, and anchored about five in the afternoon, at which time 
 it was calm and the French fleet was driving away with the tide ; 
 however, judging it not safe to renew the fight at so great a disad- 
 vantage, he weighed anchor at nine in the evening and retreated 
 to the eastward, taking advantage of the flood-tide." 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 145 
 
 The next day a council of war was called, and resolved 
 "to endeavour to preserve the fleet by retreating, and 
 rather to destroy the disabled ships, if they should be 
 pressed by the enemy, than to hazard another engagement 
 by protecting them." Some few ships were sacrificed in 
 this way, for the French pursued with some vigour at first ; 
 but in the end Torrington carried the bulk of his fleet into 
 the Thames, where, in Macaulay's words, " he ordered all 
 the buoys to be pulled up, and thus made the navigation 
 so dangerous, that the pursuers could not venture to follow 
 him." 
 
 The panic in London was great when the news of the 
 disaster became known. The English people, who live by 
 sea power, have perhaps seldom fully realized the true 
 conditions of the power by which they live. To them, in 
 1690, a reverse at sea was equivalent to the overthrow of 
 their sea power, and instant measures were taken for a 
 hasty defence against the invasion which every one be- 
 lieved to be imminent. It would have been imminent if 
 Nottingham's counsels had prevailed in the sense and to 
 the extent which he desired. But Torrington had so 
 managed matters that his fleet, although manifestly 
 inferior to its adversary, still remained master of the 
 strategic situation. Tourville could not defeat it, because 
 he could not get at it ; and, so long as it was undefeated, 
 it completely frustrated all serious enterprise on his part. 
 He never attempted to land in force. Having abandoned 
 the pursuit of Torrington, the French retired to the west- 
 ward, and, being compelled by stress of weather to anchor 
 in Torbay, they made a hasty descent on Teignmouth, 
 where the appearance of the local militia quickly scared 
 them away, after they had destroyed two or three defence- 
 less coasting vessels, and carried off a few sheep. " And 
 thus," says Entick, oddly enough, " were the great designs, 
 both of the French and the discontented, entirely baffled 
 by the vigilance of the Queen." It was not the vigilance 
 of the Queen, still less the sagacity of her counsellors, that 
 baffled the enterprises of Tourville and the designs of 
 
 L 
 
146 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Louis XIV., but the strategic insight of Torrington and 
 the consummate skill with which he devised and applied 
 a tactical remedy for the strategic blunders of Notting- 
 ham. Had he been allowed to follow his own counsel 
 and that of his colleagues, and to avoid an engagement 
 with Tourville until he could encounter him on equal 
 terms, not a corporal's guard of the militia need have been 
 set in motion. Tourville could have done nothing without 
 first disposing of Torrington's fleet, and Torrington was 
 resolved to give him no opportunity of doing so. Sooner 
 or later the arrival of Killigrew and Shovel on the scene 
 would have placed Tourville between two fires, and com- 
 pelled him to fight in circumstances in which victory would 
 have been more than doubtful, and defeat would have 
 involved total destruction. Even as it was, with Torrington 
 defeated and driven back, Killigrew and Shovel isolated 
 and practically outside the field of operations, Tourville 
 was completely baffled and returned to Brest, with nothing 
 better to show for his enterprise than the laurels of a 
 barren victory, and the booty of half a dozen sheep and 
 two or three defenceless coasters. The comment of Tor- 
 rington, here as elsewhere, goes straight to the root of the 
 matter : — 
 
 " It is true, the French made no great advantage of their victory, 
 though they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia ; 
 but had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the 
 kingdom had lain open to an invasion. What then would have 
 become of us in the absence of His Majesty and most of the land- 
 forces ? As it was, most men were in fear that the French would 
 invade ; but I was always of another opinion ; for I always said 
 that, whilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make 
 an attempt." 
 
 In the whole chapter of naval strategy, theoretical and 
 practical, there is no article more pregnant or more pro- 
 found in its significance than that which is embodied in 
 this phrase of Torrington's — "a fleet in being." A fleet 
 in being, too large to be treated as a negligible quantity 
 by an adversary opposed to it, is an absolute bar to all 
 serious enterprise, maritime or territorial, on the part of 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 147 
 
 that adversary. ^laritime enterprise on a large scale must 
 necessarily involve a decisive engagement, and this, of 
 course, the commander of the inferior fleet will do his best 
 to avoid. Territorial enterprise, on the other hand, is, as 
 we have seen, the one naval operation of all others which 
 requires an undisputed command of the sea as a condition 
 indispensable not merely to its success but even to its 
 inception. " Whilst we observe the French," said Torring- 
 ton, " they cannot make any attempt either upon ships or 
 shore, without running a great hazard." In the armoury 
 of military strategy there is no single weapon so potent 
 as that of the fleet in being is in the armoury of naval 
 strategy. The advance of an invading army into a hostile 
 territory cannot be prosecuted in the face of an opposing 
 force which bars the way to its objective, until that force 
 has been defeated ; a fortress unreduced which threatens 
 its communications equally paralyzes its advance. A fleet 
 in being discharges both these functions at once. It is 
 more mobile than an army ; it is more difficult to reduce 
 than a fortress ; its passage from place to place leaves no 
 trace behind ; and, except by direct observation, neither 
 easy to sustain nor diflScult to bafifle, its movements cannot 
 be detected. Thus, as occasion serves, it can operate with 
 equal effect either as a strategic bar to the advance of a 
 hostile fleet, or as an unreduced fortress which threatens 
 its communications and its rear ; and it can do this, not 
 at one place only, but wherever the movements and 
 apparent designs of the enemy appear to off"er a strategic 
 opportunity or advantage. 
 
 It may be urged, perhaps, that these conditions and 
 advantages apply with equal or even greater effect to the 
 hostile naval force opposed to the fleet in being and assumed 
 to be superior to it. But that is not so. The objective of 
 a hostile fleet must be one of three things — the principal 
 naval force of its adversary, a detached naval force of its 
 adversary, or some point of territory on which a landing 
 can be effected. Whichever of the three Tourville had 
 elected to pursue, the strategy of Torrington provided an 
 
148 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 effective answer to his design. If Tourville forced him 
 back, he would, while avoiding a battle, so order matters 
 that his own fleet should be placed in a position at once 
 of perfect safety and of commanding observation. If 
 Tourville returned to the westward for the purpose of 
 intercepting the squadrons of Killigrew and Shovel, Tor- 
 rington would follow him and hover upon his flanks and 
 rear. It is true that it was no more difficult for Tourville 
 to baffle observation in these circumstances than it would 
 have been for Torrington in the contrary case. But while 
 Torrington, being inferior to his adversary, and desiring to 
 avoid an engagement, would gain all he wanted by eluding 
 observation, Tourville would gain little in any case, and, 
 not knowing where Torrington was, would be paralyzed 
 for any serious offensive enterprise by the possibility that 
 his adversary might appear in force at the critical moment. 
 This applies still more strongly to the alternative of terri- 
 torial attack. Hence, although the position in which 
 Torrington found himself was one which no patriotic 
 Englishman could ever regard without indignation and 
 alarm, it appears to us to be indisputable that his strategy, 
 as masterly in its conception as it was splendidly steadfast 
 in its prosecution, was the only means whereby his country 
 could be rescued from the perils which environed it. 
 
 It remains to consider the light thrown by the teaching 
 of history and experience on the naval circumstances of 
 our own time. We are not now in the days of the Armada 
 or the Revolution, or even in the days of Nelson. Every- 
 thing has changed in the materials and appliances of naval 
 warfare since the last great naval struggle in which this 
 country was engaged. To what extent have these changes 
 affected the broad issues and conditions of naval strategy ? 
 The answer is, scarcely at all. Command of the sea, in the 
 sense of strategic freedom of maritime transit, is now, as 
 ever, the final cause of all naval warfare. With it, all 
 things are possible which naval warfare can attain ; without 
 it, nothing is attainable. Let us consider the case of 
 England being at war with such a combination of naval 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 149 
 
 Powers, say France and Russia, as would be capable of 
 seriously disputing her supremacy at sea. Such a war 
 might, and probably would, in the long run be decided 
 by strategic issues of the military order ; but strategic 
 issues of the naval order would, most undoubtedly, have 
 to be decided first. The British fleets must be supreme 
 at sea, or the British Empire must fall to pieces. If it 
 were solely a question of the defence of these islands 
 against invasion, the example of Torrington shows un- 
 doubtedly that something less than the command of the 
 sea might for a time suffice for our bare preservation. A 
 " fleet in being," undefeated and able to avoid a decisive 
 engagement, is an absolute bar to invasion across the sea. 
 This is the true function of a fleet in the strategy of an 
 inferior naval Power. But England can never accept the 
 position of an inferior naval Power, because she has not 
 merely her own shores to guard against invasion and 
 insult : she has her Empire to defend. Sea power alone 
 can do this, and command of the sea is the beginning 
 and the end of sea power. In the case supposed, no 
 English strategist would think of attempting to invade 
 the central territories either of France or of Russia. The 
 first thought of an English strategist must be the adequate 
 defence of England's transmarine possessions. France can 
 attack none of these except across the sea ; Russia can 
 attack only one of them, the Indian Empire, by land ; and 
 this, like every other part of the Empire, even the British 
 Isles themselves, must be defended on or across the sea. 
 We should lose India sooner or later if our sea power were 
 overthrown. We could not retain a single one of our 
 transmarine possessions, except by the forbearance of our 
 enemies, if we lost the command of the sea. 
 
 Thus strategic freedom of maritime transit is the primary 
 and indefeasible condition of the defence of the British 
 Empire. Every fleet capable of impairing that freedom 
 must either be defeated or " contained " in the military 
 sense ; so blockaded, that is, that it cannot leave its port of 
 shelter without fighting an action against a superior force. 
 
ISO THE yAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 There are those who maintain that a blockade is imprac- 
 ticable in modern conditions of naval warfare ; and they 
 are probably, at least, so f!ir right, that it is impossible so 
 closely to blockade a port as completely to prevent the 
 occasional and clandestine escape of individual ships. But 
 a blockade at best is only a means to an end ; the end 
 being to bring the enemy to an action, or to nullify the 
 strategic value of his force so long as he declines to fight. 
 So long as that end is attained, therefore, the blockade is 
 effectual for its purpose, notwithstanding the occasional and 
 clandestine escape of individual ships. Only two courses 
 are open to ships which thus break the blockade : either 
 to engage individually in a guerre de course, a campaign 
 of commerce-destroying, or, as some ingenious strategists 
 have suggested, to proceed forthwith to some preconcerted 
 rendezvous, there to constitute an organized fleet capable 
 of acting on the offensive. Now, a guerre de course is 
 always a vexatious incident of naval warfare, and often a 
 very costly one to the naval Power attacked. But it has 
 never yet sufficed by itself to determine the broad strategic 
 issues of maritime conflict ; and, according to Captain 
 Mahan, it never can. It is even doubtful whether in these 
 days of swift steam navigation it is likely to be so destruc- 
 tive as it was in the old sailing days. It is quite certain 
 that it will never overthrow the strategic supremacy of 
 a Power which holds the command of the sea ; that can 
 only be done by the suppression of the organized naval 
 force, strategically distributed in sea-going fleets, which 
 constitutes and embodies that supremacy. On the other 
 hand, the enterprise of forming ships which have broken 
 the blockade into an organized fleet capable of acting on 
 the offensive is necessarily exposed to many hazards and 
 perils. It amounts at best to a redistribution, not to an 
 augmentation, of existing naval force ; and the strategic 
 answer to it is a corresponding redistribution of the forces 
 of the superior adversary. That may or may not be 
 successful in the immediate issue ; it can hardly fail in 
 the long run. Evasion on a large scale may frustrate 
 
THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. 151 
 
 the purpose of a series of blockades, and compel the 
 blockading fleets to concentrate. But command of the 
 sea cannot be wrested from a superior naval Power by 
 evasion ; it can only be won by fighting. The idea that 
 the evading fleet can engage in independent territorial 
 enterprise of serious moment is purely chimerical ; the 
 "fleet in being" forbids it. With a superior force at its 
 heels or on its track fugitive raids are the utmost limit of 
 its ofiensive capacity, and fugitive raids are of little or no 
 strategic moment. 
 
 But, with the command of the sea once assured, the 
 power of England to resist the assault of even so formid- 
 able a combination as that of France and Russia is almost 
 unlimited. As against Russia, the ultimate problem 
 would be mainly a military one, and this we are not con- 
 cerned to discuss ; it must suffice to say that, unless the 
 naval problem is previously resolved in our favour, the 
 military problem must be decided against us. But as 
 against France, the problem is from first to last purely a 
 naval one. Moreover, the command of the sea is not merely 
 the tenure by which alone we hold the Empire: it is also 
 the title, the indefeasible title, by which we can at any 
 time claim the transmarine possessions of any European 
 Power which cannot defeat us at sea. Every Power in 
 the world holds all its transmarine possessions merely as 
 the caretaker of the ultimate naval Power. If England is 
 that Power, every such possession is hers for the trouble 
 of taking it whenever she is at war with the Power which 
 holds it. If she is not, her Empire is at an end, and her 
 very existence as an independent nation must ever be at 
 the mercy of her victorious foes. This, and no less than 
 this, is the strategic meaning of the command of the 
 sea. To the British Empire its possession means security, 
 its loss annihilation. 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
152 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 THE ARMADA.* 
 
 " OCTOGESIMUS octavus mirabilis annus." So ran an 
 ancient and famous prophecy, said to have been first 
 written in German in the fifteenth century, though now 
 only extant in a Latin version of the sixteenth. This 
 prediction, says Bacon, in his essay " Of Prophecies," " was 
 thought accompHshed in the sending of that great fleet — 
 the Spanish fleet that came in eighty-eight — being the 
 greatest in strength, though not in number, of all that 
 ever swam the sea." With the original purport of the 
 prophecy and with its alleged fulfilment we need not 
 concern ourselves. It is, at any rate, certain that the 
 words were written long before the event, and it is equally 
 certain that the event fits their meaning. The coincidence 
 is one which naturally struck men's minds at the time. 
 Three centuries later the prophetic character of the words 
 is of less moment than their historic significance. Un- 
 doubtedly the year 1588 was an annus mirabilis. Two 
 great forces, those of Rome and Protestantism, had long 
 been striving in Europe for the mastery ; and the over- 
 throw of the Armada finally determined that the empire 
 of the sea, with all that it involved, was to pass from a 
 Catholic to a Protestant power. We may admit that the 
 forces which then came into conflict were expressed mainly 
 in terms of politics and not in terms of religion. We may 
 assent to the proposition that the war between Philip and 
 Elizabeth "had its origin in two perfectly clear and mun- 
 dane causes " — the commercial policy adopted and enforced 
 * Quarterly Review, July, 1895. 
 
THE ARMADA. 153 
 
 by the Spanish Government in respect of its West Indian 
 and American settlements, and the countenance and assist- 
 ance given by the English to the Spanish king's rebellious 
 subjects in the Low Countries. But it is equally true to 
 say with Froude that the Armada was "ostentatiously a 
 religious Crusade. The preparations had been attended 
 with peculiar solemnities. In the eyes of the faithful it 
 was to be the execution of Divine justice on a wicked 
 princess and a wicked people. In the eyes of millions whose 
 convictions were less decided, it was an appeal to God's 
 judgment to decide between the Reformation and the Pope." 
 The larger issues involved in the origin and result of 
 this Titanic struggle belong to general history. We are 
 not about to discuss them afresh. They have long ago 
 been decided beyond appeal, not so much by the judgment 
 of men as by the march of events. Die Weltgeschiclite ist 
 das Weltgericht. Things are what they are. The over- 
 throw of the Armada determined once for all the course 
 of human history and the type of modern civilization. So 
 much is clear alike to the plain man, the historian, and 
 the philosopher, and no fresh knowledge of the details of 
 the conflict can alter our estimate either of its fundamental 
 character or of its ulterior results. On the other hand, it 
 is not too much to say that the detailed history of the 
 Armada and its defeat has never yet been adequately 
 written. It has only quite lately become possible so to 
 write it. Froude and Motley in our own time first showed 
 the way. They went to the archives, Spanish and English, 
 and studied them each after his own fashion. In broad 
 outline and general effect the narrative of each leaves 
 little to be desired. But since they wrote, much original 
 material has seen the light. Froude indeed twice returned 
 to the subject which he had treated so brilliantly in his 
 History. When the Spanish Story of the Armada, for 
 which we are indebted to a Spanish naval officer, Captain 
 Duro, was published, it was PYoude who first made that 
 doleful narrative accessible to English readers in one of 
 his fascinating essays. At the very close of his life he 
 
154 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 fused the two sides of the story together in that brilliant 
 series of Oxford lectures which was only published after 
 his death. A great writer of an earlier generation had 
 also taken the Armada for his theme, and his work has 
 opportunely been republished at a time when the great 
 story is once more engaging the attention of all students 
 of naval history. Southey's " Life of Lord Howard of 
 Effingham," says Mr. David Hannay, the able editor of 
 the work in question, contains as full an account of the 
 Armada as could be written on the evidence accessible to 
 him ; and we need not add that, being written by Southey, 
 though it may be superseded, it can never become obsolete. 
 The antiseptic of style preserves good literature from decay ; 
 and Southey, Froude, and Motley will be read when the 
 mere Dryasdust is forgotten. But the functions of Dryas- 
 dust, even of the mere Dryasdust, are not to be despised. 
 His researches are the materials out of which the drama 
 of history is or should be woven. It often happens, 
 however, that the dramatic historian gets the start of 
 Dryasdust. Froude, in particular, with all his dramatic 
 insight, with all his magic of presentation, even with all 
 his labours at the archives, was far too little of a Dryas- 
 dust. Diligently as he toiled at the archives, he was 
 constitutionally incapable of reading them without the 
 aid of his dramatic spectacles. He instinctively selected 
 not what best displayed the truth, but what best suited 
 his immediate purpose ; and with the overmastering 
 rhetorical impulse of a consummate writer, he often un- 
 consciously distorted even what he selected. Hence the 
 conscientious student is compelled to examine, and often 
 to correct, Froude in the light of the original authorities. 
 His picture is correct in the main ; and in colouring, 
 draughtsmanship, and dramatic presentation his composi- 
 tion is a masterpiece. But here and there it is inaccurate 
 in detail — 
 
 " And indeed the arm is wrong. 
 I hardly dare — yet, only you to see. 
 Give the chalk here — quick, thus the line should go ! 
 Ay, but the soul ! he's Rafael ! rub it out ! " 
 
THE ARMADA. 15; 
 
 So must any one feel who endeavours to correct Froude's 
 magnificent picture in the light of more patient or more 
 recent research. But the truth is the truth, and history 
 is not a picture. Until quite lately, however, Froude's 
 narrative as the latest and most dramatic has necessarily 
 held the field. He who would study the history of the 
 Armada independently must have gone direct to the 
 archives themselves. But a new spirit has lately been 
 infused into the study of naval history. Captain Mahan 
 has created the philosophy of the subject. Men are no 
 longer content to regard the history of naval conflict either 
 as a mere episode of general history or as a mere adjunct 
 of military history. The great and pregnant conception 
 of " Sea power " has been expounded with rare genius, and 
 is fast being assimilated by the public mind as a new 
 historical category. In the light of this new category all 
 naval history requires to be reviewed and a great part of 
 it re-written. A noteworthy illustration of this revived 
 interest in naval history is to be found in the formation 
 a few years ago of the Navy Records Society. The Society 
 " has been established for the purpose of printing rare or 
 unpublished works of naval interest," and " aims at render- 
 ing accessible the sources of our naval history, and at 
 elucidating questions of naval archaeology, construction, 
 administration, organization, and social life." In other 
 words, the Society aims at being the Dryasdust and not 
 the dramatist of naval history — at publishing those original 
 documents which are the necessary materials of the historian. 
 There is no need to dwell upon the value of such a society, 
 or upon the importance of the work it has undertaken. 
 The only wonder is that it has not long ago taken a place 
 among the literary institutions of the country. No Power 
 in the world, ancient or modern, has so long or so instructive 
 a naval history as England. Captain Mahan's great work 
 is not upon the naval history of England as such, but upon 
 the " Influence of Sea Power upon History." Yet it 
 practically amounts to a history of the sea power of 
 England. That is not so much from choice as from the 
 
156 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 nature of the case. An analysis of sea power necessarily 
 deals for the most part with the naval history of England, 
 just as a philosophy of modern commerce must needs draw 
 most of its material from the history of English trade. But 
 the naval history of England has never yet been adequately 
 treated as a whole by any native historian. Not only 
 has the required insight been wanting, but the necessary 
 materials have been largely inacessible. The Navy Records 
 Society will supply the latter want. There is abundance 
 of material ready to its hand, and to judge from the 
 admirable performance of Professor Laughton, the learned 
 and judicious editor of the first volumes issued by the 
 Society, containing the State Papers relating to the Defeat 
 of the Armada, there is every reason to anticipate that the 
 publications of the Society will be not less instructive in 
 editorial comment than copious in original material. It 
 is, indeed, almost impertinent to praise Professor Laughton 
 in this connection. The masterly series of naval biographies 
 contributed by him to the " Dictionary of National Bio- 
 graphy" attest his unrivalled knowledge of the facts of 
 naval history and his firm grasp of its philosophy. Both 
 qualities are specially needed in dealing with the history 
 of the Armada ; both are abundantly and most effectively 
 displayed. 
 
 Spain in the sixteenth century was the dominant Power 
 in Europe. The territory ruled by Philip II. was immense ; 
 his military prestige was unrivalled. On the sea, however, 
 he was not unchallenged, in spite of the wealth of the 
 Indies and the still recent glories of Lepanto. The adven- 
 turous mariners of Elizabeth had often flouted his flag and 
 harassed his squadrons on both sides of the Atlantic. But 
 their attacks were for the most part isolated and desultory. 
 The naval warfare of the sailing ship era had not yet 
 differentiated itself as the conflict of ships at sea with 
 definite strategic principles and appropriate tactical 
 methods. It was still regarded as the conflict of troops 
 on shipboard. In like manner the ships themselves were 
 regarded as floating fortresses garrisoned by troops. A 
 
THE ARMADA. 157 
 
 naval battle was a series of hand-to-hand encounters, in 
 which soldiers did the fighting and the sailors only worked 
 the ships. In the Spanish Navy, at any rate, the gun was 
 a despised auxiliary, and the decisive weapons were those 
 of a conflict at close quarters. So long as these conditions 
 prevailed, naval supremacy was held to be mainly a question 
 of military strength. Hence when Philip resolved upon 
 the invasion and conquest of England, it may well have 
 seemed to most contemporary observers that to resolve 
 was to achieve. The enterprise might be a serious one ; 
 but, if seriously undertaken, few would expect it to fail. 
 The military resources of England were no match for the 
 mighty power of Spain. Her naval resources were less 
 unequal, as Professor Laughton conclusively shows, than 
 has generally been supposed ; but they were universally 
 believed at the time to be immeasurably inferior. Over 
 against the mouth of the Thames, Parma, the greatest 
 captain of the age, was encamped in Flanders with an 
 army of veterans. Should he cross the sea, there were no 
 troops in England capable of withstanding him. It was 
 only for him to carry his army over, and the refractory 
 Netherlanders would be subdued in England, as Father 
 Parsons, the Jesuit, said, while England itself would be 
 added to the dominions of the Spanish king, and its people 
 subjected once more to the spiritual sway of Rome. But 
 between Parma's veterans and the shores of England there 
 ran the sea, and neither to Parma nor to any other captain 
 has it ever been given to cross the sea on a military enter- 
 prise except by virtue of sea power. For a military 
 expedition to cross the sea, it is necessary that its leader 
 should command the sea either absolutely or as the result 
 of conflict. He commands it absolutely if there is no 
 enemy afloat capable of disputing his passage — as France 
 may be said to have commanded the sea in 1870-1. Other- 
 wise he only commands it if and when he has defeated and 
 driven off the sea any enemy afloat who is capable of 
 disputing his passage. Command of the sea, as we have 
 pointed out elsewhere,* means strategic freedom of transit 
 • See above, pp. 1 18-15 1. 
 
153 THE NAVY AXD THE XATION. 
 
 and nothing else. A hostile "fleet in being" is its direct 
 and peremptory negation. 
 
 We have been much taken to task in various quarters 
 for insisting with so much emphasis on the " fleet in being." 
 We are nevertheless wholly impenitent in the matter. The 
 phrase, it is true, is not a term of art. It does not determine 
 the issues involved with the cogency of a mathematical 
 demonstration. But it expresses forcibly and picturesquely 
 a fundamental principle of naval strategy, it sums up the 
 teaching of ages of naval history, and it does so in plain 
 language which a plain man can understand, though 
 strategic pedantry may pronounce it to be wanting in pre- 
 cision. He who contemplates a military enterprise of any 
 moment across the sea must first secure freedom of transit for 
 his troops. To do this he must either defeat, mask, or keep 
 at a distance any hostile naval force which is strong enough, if 
 left to itself, to interfere with his movements. In default of 
 one or other of these alternatives, it is safe to say either that 
 his enterprise will not be undertaken or that it will fail. 
 This is the true doctrine of the fleet in being — which is a 
 fleet strategically at large, not itself in assured command 
 of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its 
 adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted 
 to the circumstances of the case. Until such a fleet has been 
 disposed of, no serious enterprise across the sea is possible. 
 In point of fact, command of the sea and a fleet in being are 
 mutually exclusive terms. If command of the sea means 
 freedom of transit, it stands to reason that a force capable 
 of impairing that freedom is ipso facto incompatible with the 
 command of the sea. So long as a hostile fleet is in being, 
 there is no absolute command of the sea ; so soon as 
 command of the sea is established, there is no hostile fleet 
 in being. 
 
 It has been contended that this doctrine is disallowed 
 by the teaching of the late naval war in the East. It 
 is argued that long before the battle of Yalu the Japanese, 
 neglecting the Chinese fleet in being, had successfully 
 landed an army in Corea. A temporary evasion of the 
 
THE ARMADA. 159 
 
 fleet in being is always possible — perhaps in some rare 
 and exceptional cases it may be justified by sound con- 
 siderations of strategy and by a sound estimate of the 
 relative strength of the forces engaged. Napoleon evaded 
 Nelson's fleet when he carried his troops to Egypt. The 
 battle of the Nile was the immediate consequence, and 
 the total discomfiture of the French expedition to Egypt 
 was the ulterior result. If Admiral Ting had been a 
 Nelson, and had commanded a fleet such as Nelson com- 
 manded, the Japanese invasion of Corea must have ended 
 in disaster. But no sooner had the battle of Yalu ended in 
 the retreat of the Chinese squadron to Port Arthur — a result 
 which showed that Admiral Ito had rightly gauged the value 
 of the Chinese fleet in being — than the whole of the 
 strategy of Japan was directed to the destruction of the 
 surviving Chinese fleet — a fleet still in being, although dis- 
 comfited and overmatched. With this object Port Arthur 
 was invested, assaulted, and captured, but not in time to 
 prevent the escape of the Chinese fleet. With this object, 
 again, Wei-hai-wei was, in its turn, invested, assaulted, 
 and taken : and only when what remained of the Chinese 
 fleet was finally surrendered to Japan was the way to 
 Pekin opened and the resistance of China overborne. 
 Even if Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei had held no troops 
 capable of taking the field, it would have been necessary 
 for Japan to reduce them, lest they should serve as shelters 
 to a fleet still in being and still within striking distance 
 of the ulterior Japanese objective. Thus the inexorable 
 conditions of naval warfare asserted themselves. Though 
 the Chinese ships dared not show themselves beyond the 
 range of the guns of their fortresses, yet no serious 
 military enterprise could be undertaken by Japan in the 
 Gulf of Pe-chi-li until the Chinese fleet, crippled and over- 
 matched as it was, had actually ceased to exist. Rarely 
 in the history of naval warfare has the doctrine of the 
 fleet in being been more triumphantly vindicated. 
 
 The foregoing argument, though apparent!}' a digression, 
 is, in reality, strictly germane to the case of the Armada 
 
i6o THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 and its defeat. There were many who thought at the 
 time, as there are perhaps some who think even now, 
 that Parma alone could have undertaken and accomplished 
 the invasion of England. Lord Howard and his comrades 
 never doubted their power to cope with the Spanish fleet, 
 If they had had their way, it would never have crossed 
 the Bay of Biscay. But they feared Parma's troops. 
 Even after he had chased the defeated and flying Armada 
 away to the North, and knew that for that year at any 
 rate nothing more was to be feared from it, Drake wrote 
 to Walsyngham : — 
 
 "We ought much more to have regard unto the Duke of 
 Parma than to the Duke of Sidonia and his ships. . . . My poor 
 opinion is that the Duke of Parma should be vigilantly looked 
 upon for these twenty days, although the army of Spain return 
 not this way ; for of them I have no great doubt." 
 
 Wynter alone among Lord Howard's captains seems to 
 have had a clear grasp of the situation. 
 
 "I suppose," he wrote on June 20, "if the countries of 
 Holland and Zealand did arm forth but only the shipping which 
 the Lord Admiral at his departing delivered unto our Admiral 
 in writing that they would send from those parts to join with us 
 here, and that was thirty-six sail of ships of war, and that it were 
 known to the Prince those did nothing but remain in readiness 
 to go to the seas for the impeaching of his fleet whensoever they 
 did come forth, I should live until I were young again or the 
 Prince would venture to set his ships forth. And again, if her 
 Majesty's ships, and such others as doth but now remain under 
 our Admiral's charge, may be continued in the state we are in 
 and not to be separated, the Prince's forces, being no other than 
 that which he hath in Flanders at this time (upon whom we mean 
 to keep as good watch for their coming forth as possible we can), 
 dare not come to the seas." 
 
 Here is the fleet in being in full operation. The Armada 
 was about to sail when these words were written. In fact, 
 none knew in England but that it had sailed and might 
 appear at any moment in the Channel. But Wynter, a 
 seaman of nearly fifty years' experience, at any rate 
 knew that Parma was powerless for offence not only until 
 
THE ARMADA. l6i 
 
 the Armada had actually appeared, but until it had dis- 
 posed of the forces afloat which held Parma in check. It 
 must be acknowledged, however, that Wynter subsequently 
 abandoned this view, and recommended the fortification 
 of the approaches to the Thames. 
 
 Parma, to do him justice, was under no delusion on the 
 subject ; and Philip, though no seaman himself, was too 
 well advised to think that Parma without a commanding 
 fleet could stir from the shores of Flanders. Parma 
 indeed had to reckon not only with the English naval 
 force stationed in the Straits of Dover, but with those 
 ships of Holland and Zealand on which Wynter, as we 
 have seen, relied. In fact, so far as Parma was concerned 
 the Dutch fleet was the key of the situation. This fact, 
 which is disputed, though on grounds which appear to us 
 to be insufficient, by Froude, is far from adequately recog- 
 nized by Professor Laughton. Motley alone among 
 modern historians appears to have grasped its full strategic 
 significance. Parma, like Napoleon two centuries later, 
 could provide himself with abundance of transport, and, 
 like Napoleon, could exercise his troops in rapidity of 
 embarkation. But beyond this he could do nothing. 
 The Dutch fleet on the one side, the English fleet on the 
 other, held him in their grip. As in 1805, so in 1588, 
 the real and final obstacle to the invasion of England was 
 invisible to the immediate spectators of the conflict. 
 " Those far-distant, storm-beaten ships," writes Captain 
 Mahan in the most impressive passage of his history, 
 " upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between 
 it and the dominion of the world . . . While bodily present 
 before Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon, strategically the 
 British squadrons lay in the Straits of Dover, barring the 
 way against the army of invasion." In a similar spirit, 
 and with a strategic insight which has too often been 
 denied to our own historians, Motley writes : — 
 
 " Farther along the coast, invisible but known to be per- 
 forming a most perilous and vital service, was a squadron of 
 Dutch vessels of all sizes, lining both the inner and the outer 
 
 M 
 
1 62 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 edges of the sandbanks of the Flemish coasts, and swarming in 
 all the estuaries and inlets of that intricate and dangerous cruising 
 ground between Dunkerk and Walcheren. Those fleets of 
 Holland and Zeeland, numbering some one hundred and fifty 
 galleons, sloops, and fly-boats under Warmond, Nassau, Van der 
 Does, de Moor, and Rosendael, lay patiently blockading every 
 possible egress from Newport, or Gravelines, or Sluys, or 
 Flushing, or Dunkerk, and longing to grapple with the Duke 
 of Parma as soon as his fleet of gunboats and hoys, packed with 
 his Spanish and Italian veterans, should venture to set forth upon 
 the sea for their long-prepared exploit." 
 
 A striking confirmation of the justice of this viewr has 
 quite recently come to light in a new volume of Venetian 
 State Papers edited for the Master of the Rolls by Mr. 
 Horatio F. Brown. The Battle of Gravelines, which finally 
 shattered the power of the Armada, and drove it in fugitive 
 disarray into the tempestuous seas of the North, was fought 
 on August 8, according to the continental reckoning of 
 the time, though Professor Laughton prefers to give the 
 date as July 29, in accordance with the old style then in 
 use in England. But the news of this great and unex- 
 pected victory spread through Europe very slowly, and 
 for several weeks many rumours of a decisive Spanish 
 victory were afloat. So persistent and detailed were these 
 rumours that on August 27 the Venetian Senate passed, 
 by an almost unanimous vote, a resolution for congratu- 
 lating the King of Spain on the success of the Armada. 
 Information to the same effect was communicated on the 
 same day to the Pope by the Spanish Ambassador in 
 Rome ; and Giovanni Gritti, the Venetian Ambassador, 
 at once waited on his Holiness to congratulate him on 
 " the good news of the Catholic Armada." But the Pope 
 was incredulous. He had no great belief in the fleets of 
 Spain or in the capacity of Sidonia. He had promised 
 Philip a million of gold, but it was only to be paid on 
 receipt of the news that a landing had been effected in 
 England. On August 20 he had said to Gritti, " talking 
 with his usual frankness for a considerable time " — 
 
 " The King goes trifling with this Armada of his, but the 
 Queen acts in earnest. Were she only a Catholic, she would 
 
THE ARMADA. 163 
 
 be our best beloved, for she has great worth. Just look at 
 Drake ! \Vho is he ? What forces has he ? And yet he burned 
 twenty-five of the King's ships at Gibraltar, and as many again 
 at Lisbon ; he has robbed the flotilla and sacked San Domingo. 
 . . . We are sorry to say it, but we have a poor opinion of this 
 Spanish Armada, and fear some disaster." 
 
 Hence the astute Sixtus V. was not too ready to credit 
 the rumours which had imposed upon the Venetian Senate 
 and thrown it into an ecstasy of congratulation. When he 
 received Gritti's congratulations on the good news, "his 
 Holiness said he did not give it full credence, and that 
 he desired further verification. He pointed out . . . that 
 even if it were true the victory was not very great, for the 
 body of Drake's fleet had escaped. Unless the Duke of 
 Parma and the Duke of Medina effected a juuction, nothing 
 dse mattered much!' 
 
 The sagacity of Sixtus V. was abundantly vindicated in 
 the issue. Parma, as we know, had not and never could 
 have effected his junction with Sidonia, and, as the Pope 
 said — " with his usual frankness " — " nothing else mattered 
 much." The reason why Parma could not effect his junc- 
 tion with Sidonia is given in his own words in a letter 
 written " from Dunquerque " on August 1 2, and published 
 in the same volume of State Papers. A copy of this letter 
 was obtained by Gritti and forwarded to the Venetian 
 Senate. 
 
 "On the 7th came a pilot with news that the Armada was off 
 Calais ; whereupon the Duke of Parma left Bruges to hasten on 
 the embarkation of his troops and to be nearer the Armada. On 
 the morning of the 8th came d'Areco, Secretary to the Duke of 
 Medina Sidonia, with confirmation that the fleet was lying in the 
 roads of S. Jean, close to Calais ; and that although the enemy 
 continued to harass them and fire shots, still the whole fleet was 
 in excellent order and complete, though the Duke had not yet 
 been able to force the enemy to come to an engagement, as the 
 wind was always against him. The Duke of Parma left at once 
 for Nieuport, where the detachment of twelve thousand men were 
 to embark; and then came early to Dunquerque, where everj-- 
 thing was ready, so that within that day the embarkation might 
 have been carried out at Nieuport and at Dunquerque. At 
 this juncture came the Superintendent-General, Don Giorgio 
 
1 64 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 Manrique, with further despatches of the day previous, explaining 
 the danger to which the Armada was exposed if caught by a 
 storm in the Channel, and urging the Duke of Parma to put to 
 sea mth his ships and troops and to effect a junction with the 
 Armada, so that in a body they might attack the enemy's fleet 
 or secure a port for our own. This operation was impossible, 
 owing to the set of the wind, which was such as to prevent even 
 ships specially constructed for navigating those waters from 
 putting out, to say nothing of the enemy's skiffs which barred 
 the egress." 
 
 We shall see in the sequel what and where these enemy's 
 ships were. 
 
 When Philip first began seriously to entertain the idea 
 of invading England, it was not in his plan for Parma and 
 his troops to take part in the enterprise. The Armada 
 was to sail direct from Spain under the command of Santa 
 Cruz in sufficient strength to overcome all opposition, and 
 carrying with it as many troops as were required for the 
 military objects of the expedition. But Santa Cruz, when 
 called upon for his plans, produced a demand for 596 ships 
 of all kinds, of which 150 were to be great ships and 
 galleons, 360 transports, hulks, and despatch boats, 40 
 galleys, and 6 galleasses, and 40 Italian frigates and 
 Neapolitan fehiccke, besides 200 boats for the purpose of 
 landing the army. The men required were 55,000, which, 
 making an allowance for sick and deserters, and for the 
 military defence of the Armada during the invasion, would 
 leave a force of 35,000 for offensive purposes on shore. 
 Adding to these sailors and marines, galley slaves, cavalry, 
 artillery, engineers, staff officers, adventurers, domestic 
 servants, and other non-combatants, the total number of 
 men to be employed and provided for was, in the estimate 
 of Santa Cruz, no less than 94,222. The cost for eight 
 months was estimated at 4,373,500 Spanish crowns. These 
 figures diffisr somewhat from those given by Professor 
 Laughton on the authority of Captain Duro, but they are 
 taken from a " Short Summary of the Supplies required 
 for an Attack on England, calculated for eight months ; 
 forwarded by the Marquis of Santa Cruz to his Catholic 
 
THE ARMADA. 165 
 
 Majesty." A copy of this Summary was obtained by 
 Lippomano, the Venetian Ambassador in Spain, and for- 
 warded by him to the Venetian Senate on August 6, 
 1586. 
 
 " Philip,'' says Professor Laughton, " could not approve a 
 project so vast and so costly ; he resolved on the expedition, but 
 conceived the idea of doing it at a cheaper rate by utilizing the 
 army in the Low Countries. From this grew up the scheme 
 which ultimately took form. The Duke of Parma, in Flanders, 
 was to prepare an army of invasion and a number of flat-bottomed 
 boats to carry it across the sea. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was 
 to bring up the Channel a fleet powerful enough to crush any 
 possible opposition, and carrying a body of troops which, when 
 joined with those under Parma, would form an army at least as 
 numerous as that which Santa Cruz had detailed as sufficient." 
 
 Such was the plan finally adopted ; but many things 
 concurred to delay its execution. In the spring of 1587 
 Drake achieved his famous exploit of " singeing the King 
 of Spain's beard," descending with his fleet on the coast of 
 Spain, destroying thirty-seven ships and a vast quantity 
 of munitions and supplies collected at Cadiz, and insulting 
 Santa Cruz himself at Lisbon. This brilliant feat of arms, 
 which alarmed all Spain, appears to have quickened Philip's 
 resolve to make an end once for all of Elizabeth and her 
 buccaneers, as he called them. The Pope, who had pro- 
 mised him large subventions in certain contingencies, was 
 constantly urging him to action, and Philip in his turn 
 was as constantly urging Santa Cruz to make a start. 
 But the expedition was not ready, and before it was ready 
 the season was so far advanced that Santa Cruz, who knew 
 what naval warfare was, hesitated to undertake the risk. 
 He recommended delay until at least the March of the 
 following year. Before that time came Santa Cruz was 
 dead. He was already advanced in years, and the 
 ruixieties of the expedition, combined with Philip's im- 
 patience and mistrust, had worn him out. Lippomano, 
 the Venetian Ambassador in Spain, forwarded to the 
 Senate a copy of a letter written by the person in whose 
 arms Santa Cruz breathed his last. " I will only say now,' 
 
1 66 THE NAVY AsXD THE NATION. 
 
 writes this anonymous correspondent, "that I frequentl)- 
 heard him sigh and complain that the attacks made upon 
 him at Court were sending him to his grave. It is indeed 
 a death to be deeply lamented for many reasons, and 
 perhaps as time goes on the loss will be seen to be even 
 greater than it looks." 
 
 These words were prophetic. The death of Santa Cruz 
 sealed the fate of the Armada. It is probable that the 
 psychological moment was already passed. Could the 
 xVrmada have sailed in the autumn, Elizabeth would have 
 been found unprepared. "The King of Spain," said the 
 Pope to Gritti in July 1588, "should have listened to our 
 advice last September, when we entered into alliance ; we 
 then told him that he should not delay, but ought to 
 deliver the attack at once, as the Queen was unprepared 
 and unarmed, instead of allowing her time to arm as she 
 has done. At that moment he might have achieved with 
 small forces that which, perhaps, he will not be able to 
 effect even with great forces." But what Santa Cruz 
 might have achieved with the great force he was preparing 
 was beyond the capacity of his successor, Medina Sidonia, 
 to achieve with any forces, however great. Santa Cruz 
 was a seaman of experience, capacity, and renown. Sidonia 
 was no seaman at all. He could neither fight nor plan, 
 and, to do him justice, he never deceived either himself 
 or his master on the score of his own incapacity. On 
 receiving the news of his appointment to the command 
 of the Armada, he wrote to Philip's secretary — 
 
 " My health is bad, and from my small experience of the water 
 I know that I am always seasick. . . . The expedition is on 
 such a scale, and the object is of such high importance, that the 
 person at the head of it ought to understand navigation and 
 sea-fighting, and I know nothing of either. I have not one of 
 those essential qualifications. I have no acquaintances among 
 the officers who are to serve under me. Santa Cruz had infor- 
 mation about the state of things in England; I have none. 
 \Vere I competent otherwise, I should have to act in the dark 
 by the opinions of others, and I cannot tell to whom I may 
 trust ... If you send me, depend upon it I shall have a bad 
 account to render of my trust." 
 
THE ARMADA. 167 
 
 Such a letter, while it does credit to Sidonia's knowledge 
 of himself, or, as Froude suggests, to the cynical candour of 
 his more masculine wife, was assuredly of fatal augury for 
 the issue of a great and arduous enterprise. But Philip was 
 perhaps glad to be rid of a servant who, like Santa Cruz, 
 knew his own mind and took his own course. He selected 
 Sidonia as a man who, having no initiative of his own, 
 would submissively do his bidding. He would fain have 
 commanded the Armada himself ; but that being impossible, 
 he preferred to entrust it to a puppet and not to a man. 
 "Vou are sacrificing yourself," he wrote to Sidonia, "for 
 God's service and mine. I am so anxious that, if I was less 
 occupied at home, I would accompany the fleet myself, and 
 I should be certain that all would go well. Take heart ; 
 you have now an opportunity of showing the extraordinary 
 qualities which God, the Author of all good, has been 
 pleased to bestow upon you." 
 
 Sidonia was appointed, and the Armada was doomed. 
 It might have failed under Santa Cruz. It was certain to 
 fail under his successor in command. Profoundly and justly 
 distrustful of himself, with no experience of the sea, with 
 a fleet formidable in appearance but eminently unfitted 
 for the warfare that was before it, well equipped indeed 
 with fighting men, but ill-found in many essential respects 
 and fraudulently victualled with rotten food and stinking 
 water, with a scheme of strategy radically fault)-, and with 
 a s)-stem of tactics entirely unadapted to the nimble war- 
 fare of his foe, Sidonia was about to encounter the most 
 hardy, experienced, determined, and even desperate race of 
 mariners the world has ever known. The only real danger to 
 England — and in our judgment it was, in spite of Professor 
 Laughton's ingenious apology for Elizabeth's conduct, a 
 very real and almost a fatal one — was that Elizabeth 
 should fail to appreciate the value and strength of her sea 
 power ; that anxious as she was for peace, and not perhaps 
 believing that Philip's intentions were really serious, she 
 should relax her naval preparations, lest by prosecuting 
 them she should bring about the very attack she desired to 
 
i6S THE XAVY AXD THE XATIOK. 
 
 avert. This we believe to be the real clue to the apparent 
 indifference which Elizabeth showed in regard to the 
 strength and equipment of her fleet. On this point Professor 
 Laughton has little difficulty in showing that Froude, who 
 incessantly denounces Elizabeth's parsimony and neglect, 
 constantly overstates his case and as often misunderstands 
 the facts. The mariners of Elizabeth's day were no 
 strangers to rough fare and scanty rations ; they were con- 
 tent with little and accustomed to shift for themselves. 
 Such ships as they had were at any rate tight and trim. 
 Hawkyns had seen to that, according to the repeated testi- 
 mony of Howard, Drake, and others, but he did not on that 
 account escape calumny. The men were willing and eager to 
 fight ; and if they often found their ammunition short at a 
 pinch, they were burning powder at a rate the like of which 
 the world had never before seen. So much may be said, 
 and said quite legitimately, in Elizabeth's defence ; but it 
 does not cover the whole case. Either Elizabeth never 
 realized the magnitude and imminence of the peril, or if 
 she did she thought it more politic to ignore them. On 
 no other hypothesis is it easy to explain the frequent 
 remonstrances of Howard and his captains. " Sparing and 
 war have no affinity together," wrote Howard bitterly 
 enough on April 7, when, if Santa Cruz had not died, the 
 Armada would already have been on its way. That there 
 would be war he had no doubt whatever. A month earlier 
 he had written, on March 10 : — 
 
 " I am sorry Sir F. Drake is not in more readiness than he is. 
 I know the fault is not in him. I pray to God her Majesty may 
 not repent this slack dealings. It had been good he had been 
 ready, though he had but lien on our coast. I am afraid he will 
 not be ready in time, do what can be done. All that cometh 
 out of Spain must concur in one to lie, or else we shall be stirred 
 very shortly with heave and ho. I fear me ere it be long her 
 Majesty will be sorry that she hath believed some as much as 
 she hath done, but it will be very late. . . . For her Majesty's 
 four great ships, I am out of hope to see them abroad, what need 
 soever shall be. If things fall out as it is most likeliest, they 
 shall be to keep Chatham Church when they should serve the 
 turn abroad. . . . Sir, if her Majesty think that her princely 
 
THE ARMADA. 169 
 
 preparation of Sir F. Drake's fleet, and this that I have, should 
 be a hindrance to a peace and that the King of Spain should 
 take it ill, why should not the King of Spain think that her 
 Majesty hath much more cause to think ill of his mighty prepara- 
 tions ? It will peradventure be said that he hath many ways to 
 employ them and not to England. That is easily answered, for 
 it is soon known by the victualling; and he never prepares so 
 many soldiers for the Indies." 
 
 Many similar passages might be quoted, but we have 
 no need of further witness. Howard's words establish the 
 slackness and unreadiness of Elizabeth's preparations, and 
 apparently assign the true cause for them. Other defects 
 in the equipment of the English ships were probably 
 characteristic of the time, and not specially due to Elizabeth's 
 parsimony. But her reluctance to acknowledge the immi- 
 nence of the peril and to put her whole force at sea in 
 order to avert it may perhaps be explained by causes 
 which lay deeper. For months she had been negotiating 
 for peace with Parma. Neither she nor Philip was disposed 
 to fight if acceptable terms could be had without fighting. 
 Philip knew that now that the Queen of Scots was dead 
 no prince in Europe, least of all the Pope, was at all 
 anxious to see England added to the overshadowing 
 dominions of Spain, and he feared that even the success 
 of the Armada might bring him no profit commensurate 
 with its immense and inevitable cost. All this was probably 
 well known to Elizabeth. Even the Pope thought that 
 Philip's ostentatious preparations were intended to be 
 employed rather as a card in the diplomatic game he was 
 playing than as a weapon in actual war. Elizabeth might 
 well think the same, and might quite honestly persuade 
 herself that to make counter-preparations in equally 
 ostentatious fashion would inevitably precipitate the conflict 
 she was genuinely anxious to avoid. Hence the four great 
 ships were made to 'keep Chatham Church' as long as 
 was possible and far longer than was prudent, though they 
 were ultimately ready in time, and many other necessary 
 preparations were not so much culpably neglected as 
 deliberately postponed. It was a defensible policy, but a 
 
I70 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOM. 
 
 dangerous one ; defensible because he who really desires 
 peace — and Elizabeth must have desired peace, for she had 
 little to gain and much to lose by war — must needs avoid 
 a provocative attitude ; but dangerous because, if Philip 
 really meant war, nothing but the sea power of England 
 could save the kingdom from invasion. 
 
 Philip may not have meant war if he could avoid it, but 
 when the menace of the Armada failed to extort from 
 Elizabeth such terms as he could accept, he was left with 
 no alternative. Either Elizabeth must accept his terms or 
 her pride must be humbled by defeat. When in May the 
 negotiations had produced no result, Philip resolved to 
 wait no longer, and the Armada set forth from Lisbon. 
 Its first proceedings were an augury of the fate which 
 awaited it. Baffled at first by contrary winds and after- 
 wards scattered by a storm, Sidonia's clumsy and unwieldy 
 squadrons remained at sea long enough to discover their 
 own nautical deficiencies and the unwholesome quality of 
 their victuals, and then returned to Corunna. Sidonia 
 was for abandoning the enterprise, but Philip was now 
 resolved. Ships were repaired, provisions renewed and 
 crews recruited, and before the middle of July the Armada 
 was again at sea. This time the wind was favourable, the 
 Bay of Biscay was crossed, and the mouth of the Channel 
 was at last reached. Elizabeth's hesitation and her par- 
 simony, whether politic or culpable, had made it impossible 
 for her captains to dispute its passage or to attack it, as 
 they themselves desired, on its own coasts and even in its 
 own ports. The fate of England and of Europe was now 
 to be decided in the narrow waters of the Channel. 
 
 We may refer to Professor Laughton's Introduction for 
 a detailed comparison of the forces engaged. It is there 
 shown conclusively and in detail that, however great the 
 apparent superiority of the Spaniards — a superiority which 
 imposed on all contemporaries not familiar with the sea 
 and its warfare — the real advantage lay in many respects 
 with the English. The Spanish ships were unwieldy and 
 slow to manoeuvre. The English ships were far nimbler 
 
THE ARMADA. 171 
 
 in movement and far more skilfully handled. Number 
 and size of ships told for apparent strength on the one 
 side ; but the balance was more than redressed by superior 
 seamanship, superior gunnery, and incomparably more 
 skilful tactics. And, after all, in spite of hesitations 
 and economies, delays and shortcomings, when the Armada 
 reached the Channel the fleets of England were not unready 
 to receive it. Howard and Drake were at Plymouth with 
 such ships as they could muster and equip. Seymour, 
 with a not inadequate force, was in the narrow seas to the 
 eastward keeping a close watch on Parma. This was a 
 form of passive defence which commended itself little to 
 the fiery spirit of Drake. But it was too late now to 
 pursue the more adventurous but really sounder policy 
 which Drake had recommended to the Council as early as 
 the end of March : — 
 
 " If her Majesty and your Lordships think that the King of 
 Spain meaneth any invasion in England, then doubtless his force 
 is and will be great in Spain; and thereon he will make his 
 groundwork or foundation, whereby the Prince of Parma may 
 have the better entrance, which, in mine own judgment, is most 
 to be feared. But if there may be such a stay or stop made by 
 any means of this fleet in Spain, that they may not come through 
 the seas as conquerors — which, I assure myself, they think to 
 do — then shall the Prince of Parma have such a check thereby 
 as were meet. 
 
 " To prevent this, I think it good that these forces here should 
 be made as strong as to your Honours' wisdoms shall be thought 
 convenient, and that for two special causes : — First, for that they 
 are like to strike the first blow ; and secondly, it will put great 
 and good hearts into her Majesty's loving subjects both abroad 
 and at home ; for that they will be persuaded in conscience that 
 the Lord of all strength will put into her Majesty and her people 
 courage and boldness not to fear any invasion in her own 
 country, but to seek God's enemies and her Majesty's where they 
 may be found j for the Lord is on our side, whereby we may 
 assure ourselves our numbers are greater than theirs. I must 
 crave pardon of your Lordships again and again, for my con- 
 science hath caused me to put my pen to the paper ; and as God 
 in His goodness hath put my hand to the plough, so in His 
 mercy it will never suffer me to turn back from the truth. 
 
 " My very good Lords, next under God's mighty protection, 
 
172 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only and 
 chief means for our good ; wherein I most humbly beseech your 
 good Lordships to persevere as you have begun, for that with 
 fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coast, 
 than a great many more will do here at home ; and the sooner 
 we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." 
 
 Again, on April 28 Drake wrote to the Queen herself, 
 beseeching her to pardon his boldness in the discharge of 
 his conscience, declaring that he desired peace as much as 
 any man, but imploring her to consider that " these great 
 preparations of the Spaniard may be speedily prevented 
 as much as in your Majesty lieth, by sending your forces 
 to encounter them somewhat far off, and more near their 
 own coasts, which will be the better cheap for your Majesty 
 and people and much the dearer for the enemy." Howard 
 was entirely of the same mind. The great seamen of those 
 days never faltered in their grasp of the j^rinciple expressed 
 by Farragut in the maxim, " The more you hurt the enemy, 
 the less he will hurt you." They knew that Philip was 
 preparing a great naval armament, and they knew that 
 the surest way to defeat its object, whatever it might be, 
 was to destroy that armament at sea. It might be going 
 to Ireland, it might be going to Flanders ; but wherever 
 it was going, if it could be caught on its own coasts and 
 there " impeached," its ulterior object would be frustrated. 
 "The opinion," wrote Howard on June 14, "of Sir Francis 
 Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobiser, and others that be 
 men of greatest judgment and experience, as also my own 
 concurring with them in the same, is that the surest way 
 to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast, or 
 in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them." 
 But Elizabeth and her Council could not see matters in 
 this light. Possibly they thought that to send the fleet 
 away, even for the purpose of finding and fighting the 
 enemy, was to expose the country to peril. This is a 
 very common delusion of statesmen who direct naval 
 campaigns without knowledge of the sea, and of theorists 
 on naval warfare who look at it with a military rather 
 than a naval eye. A fleet being essentially a mobile 
 
THE ARMADA. 173 
 
 armament, there are nevertheless many who never can 
 bring themselves to regard this mobility as the deter- 
 mining factor of naval strategy. They want to see the 
 fleet and know that it is there, a visible, tangible, material 
 element of more or less local defence ; and they cannot 
 understand that the true place of a fleet in war is the 
 place, however distant, where it can meet and fight the 
 enemy to the greatest advantage. " Those far-distant, 
 storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never 
 looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world." 
 It was St. Vincent, a seaman, who placed them where 
 they were, and it was Lord Barham, another seaman, who 
 determined their strategic disposition, far away from the 
 shores of England, at the decisive moment when Villeneuve 
 was returning across the Atlantic. But neither a St 
 Vincent nor a Barham was among the Councillors of 
 Elizabeth. "As has often happened since," says Admiral 
 Colomb, in speaking of Torrington's case, " the statesman 
 was found on the quarter-deck, and the rash blunderer at 
 the seat of Government." Not only has it happened since, 
 it had happened a hundred years before. It will happen 
 again some day if Englishmen continue to neglect or allow 
 their rulers to misread the lessons of naval history. 
 
 It may be, however, that Elizabeth, who was still 
 negotiating with Parma, still believed in the possibility 
 of peace. So tortuous and so unscrupulous was the 
 diplomacy of those days, so complex, so subtly disposed, 
 and so craftily handled were the forces at work, that 
 perhaps we shall never know what was her real mind in 
 the matter : whether she really believed in the sincerity 
 of the negotiations and in the near prospect of peace, or 
 whether she was only trying to make Philip believe she 
 believed in them, it almost passes the wit of man, at this 
 distance of time, to determine. But the shrewd sense and 
 plain dealing of men like Howard and his comrades would 
 soon have cut the tangled knot which Elizabeth, with all 
 her patience and all her cunning, failed in the end to un- 
 ravel. " Sir," continues Howard, in the letter quoted 
 
174 THE XAVY ASD THE XATIOX. 
 
 above, " it is very strange that, in this time, the Com- 
 missioners cannot perceive whether they mean a peace 
 without a fraud, or use the same to detract a time for a 
 further device. And if our Commissioners do discover 
 any detraction in them, only to serve their own turns, 
 methinks her Majesty should use the like policy, and 
 devise to beat them with their own rod." 
 
 But Elizabeth and her Council could not or would not 
 see the wisdom of beating them with their own rod, and 
 so far as they did see it they thought they better under- 
 stood the strategy appropriate to the situation than men 
 like Howard, "Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. 
 Frobiser, and others that be men of greatest judgment 
 and experience." On June 9 Walsyngham wrote to 
 Howard on behalf of the Council : — 
 
 " My very good Lord, — Her Majesty, perceiving by your 
 Lordship's late letters to me that you were minded to repair to 
 the Isles of Bayona, if the wind serve, there to abide the Spanish 
 fleet or to discover what course they meant to take, doubting that 
 in case your Lordship should put over so far the said fleet may 
 take some other way, whereby they may escape your Lordship, as 
 by bending their course westward to the altitude of fifty degrees, 
 and then to shoot over to this realm, hath therefore willed me to 
 let your Lordship understand that she thinketh it not convenient 
 that your Lordship should go so far to the south as the said Isles 
 of Bayona, but to ply up and down in some indifferent place 
 between the coast of Spain and this realm, so as you may be able 
 to answer any attempt that the said fleet shall make either against 
 this realm, Ireland, or Scotland." 
 
 Howard had already answered this by anticipation in a 
 letter written on June 13, before Walsynghani's letter had 
 been delivered : — 
 
 " Sir," he said, " I protest, before God, I would I had not a foot 
 of land in England, that the wind would serve us to be abroad ; 
 and yet it is a hard matter and a thing unpossible for us to lie in 
 any place or be anywhere to guard England, Ireland, and Scotland.^'' 
 
 Here is the statesman on the quarter-deck again. The 
 rash blunderers at the Council table could not understand 
 that if you wish to "impeach " a hostile fleet with certainty, 
 
THE AR.^TADA. 175 
 
 you must go where it is certain to be found, not wait for 
 it to appear in some one or other of half a dozen places 
 where, after all, it may never be found, and where, if it 
 does appear, you may not be at hand to "impeach" it. 
 Howard explains this fully in a reply written to Walsyng- 
 ham on June 15 : — 
 
 "Sir, — ^Within three hours after I had written ray letter, which 
 herewith I send you, I received your letter of the 9th of this 
 present by a pursuivant. Which letter I do not a little marvel at ; 
 for thereby you signify that her Majesty, perceiving by a letter I 
 sent you heretofore, that I was minded to go on the coast of Spain, 
 to the Isles of Bayona, her pleasure is that I should not go so far, 
 but only off and on, betwixt the coast of Spain and England ; lest 
 the Spanish fleet should come into the height of fifty, and then 
 should bend their course directly to this realm. 
 
 " Sir, for the meaning we had to go on the coast of Spain, it was 
 deeply debated by those which I think the world doth judge to 
 be men of greatest experience that this realm hath ; which are 
 these : Sir Francis Drake, ]\Ir. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobiser, and Mr. 
 Thomas Fenner ; and I hope her Majesty will not think that we 
 went so rashly to work, or without a principal and choice care and 
 respect of the safety of this realm. We would go on the coast of 
 Spain ; and therefore our ground was, first, to look to that principal ; 
 and if we found they did but linger on their own coast, or that they 
 were put into the Isles of Bayona or the Groyne, then we thought in 
 all men's judgments that be of experience here, it had been most fit 
 to have sought some good way, and the surest we could devise, by 
 the good protection of God, to have defeated them. . . . And if 
 we were to-morrow next on the coast of Spain, I would not land 
 in any place to offend any ; but they should well perceive that we 
 came not to spoil, but to seek out the great force to fight with 
 them ; and so should they have known by message ; which should 
 liave been the surest way and most honourable to her Majesty. 
 But now, as by your directions to lie off and on betwixt England 
 and Spain, the south-west wind, that shall bring them to Scotland 
 or Ireland, shall put us to the leeward. The seas are broad ; but 
 if we had been on their coast, they durst not have put off, to have 
 left us on their backs ; and when they shall come with the south- 
 westerly wind, which must serve them if they go for Ireland or 
 Scotland though we be as high as Cape Clear, yet shall we not 
 be able to go to them as long as the wind shall be westerly. And 
 if we lie so high, then may the Spanish fleet bear with the coast 
 of France, to come for the Isle of Wight ; which for my part, I 
 think, if they come to England, they will attempt. Then are we 
 clean out of the way of any service against them. 
 
176 THE XAVY AND THE XATIOX. 
 
 " But I must and will obey ; and am glad there be such there, as 
 are able to judge what is fitter for us to do, than we here ; but by 
 my instructions which I had, I did think it otherwise. But I will 
 put them up in a bag, and I shall most humbly pray her Majesty 
 to think that that which we meant to do was not rashly determined, 
 and that which shall be done shall be most carefuU)' used by us ; 
 and we will follow and obey her Majesty's commandment. But if 
 we had been now betwixt Spain and England, we had been but in 
 hard case, the storm being so strong and continuing so long as it 
 hath done ; but upon the coast of Spain, we had had a land wind 
 and places of succour. We meant not to have spoiled any town or 
 village ; only we must of necessity water ; and when we lie betwixt 
 both coasts, we must come to this coast to water, for so we are 
 enjoined ; and if the wind do not serve us to come on our own 
 coast, then in what case shall we be, now that we must not go on 
 the coast of Spain ? We lay seven days in the Sleeve, which was 
 as long as we could continue there without danger, as the wind 
 was ; and if some had been with us, they should have seen what 
 a place of danger it is to lie on and off in." 
 
 Thus the true policy of offensive defence was disallowed 
 by the Council and abandoned by Howard. One or two 
 excursions into "the Sleeve" — that is, the sea between 
 Sciily and Ushant — were made, but Howard was driven 
 back as he anticipated by stress of weather, and the short 
 time which elapsed before the appearance of the Armada 
 was occupied in completing such stores and equipments 
 as Elizabeth could be induced to provide. The defensive 
 policy imposed upon Howard against his own judgment 
 was radically faulty and might have been fatal. If the 
 English fleet was not strong enough to "impeach" the 
 Spaniard in his own waters, it was too weak to defend 
 itself and its country at home. It was forbidden to do 
 what its own leaders thought it best able to do, and set 
 to a task which, as being more difficult in itself and far 
 more precarious in its issues, it might have been unable 
 to accomplish. It succeeded in the end, as we know. 
 But that only proves that as it was equal to the more 
 difficult task it must have been more than equal to an 
 undertaking which, as Drake had assured the Queen, 
 "will be the better cheap for your Majesty and people, 
 and much the dearer for the enemy." "The advantage 
 
THE ARMADA. 177 
 
 of time and place," he wrote in another letter, " is half a 
 victory; which being lost is irrecoverable." That advan- 
 tage was lost and was never recovered. The Spaniard was 
 overthrown in the end ; but Elizabeth's strategy can only 
 be defended by allowing that the defeat of Sidonia was 
 the result of his own folly and not of the valour of 
 his foes. 
 
 But if the strategy of Elizabeth and her Council was 
 feeble and inconsequent, that of Philip and Sidonia was 
 positively fatuous. The plan was for the Armada to hold 
 the Straits of Dover while the troops of Parma were 
 transported across under its protection, and reinforced by 
 a large contingent supplied by the Armada itself. To 
 carry out such a plan the first thing to be done was to 
 dispose of any and every hostile fleet in being. Now 
 when Sidonia reached the Channel there were three 
 several and distinct fleets in being to be disposed of 
 
 " There was, as we have seen," says Admiral Colomb in his 
 very judicious and instructive comment on an earlier version of 
 Professor Laughton's Introduction, " Lord Howard's fleet at 
 Plyraourii, Lord Henry Seymour's in the ' narrow seas ' by the 
 Straits of Dover, and Count Justin's blockading Dunkirk and 
 Nicuport. Had Philip ever looked this matter in the face ? Had 
 he in any way prepared his naval forces for division into the 
 necessary four parts, each of sufficient strength — one to mask 
 Lord Howard, one to mask Lord Henry Seymour, a third to defeat 
 and then to mask Count Justin of Nassau, and a fourth to conduct 
 and cover the landing? There is no sign anywhere that ideas so 
 obviously pressing found a place in his mind ; and if Medina 
 Sidonia in any way represented the mind of his master, there must 
 have been a firm belief that in some way or other the descent 
 could proceed to success in the very face of three opposing 
 fleets." 
 
 In point of fact Sidonia's sole idea was to join hands with 
 Parma as soon as possible. Perhaps he was anxious to 
 shift on to the more capable shoulders of Alexander 
 Farnese a responsibility for which he knew himself to be 
 totally unfit. More probably he had no clear idea at all 
 of what he was to do or how he was to do it, except that 
 whether he left three or thirty fleets undefeated behind 
 
 N 
 
178 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 him he was to get to the narrow seas as soon as possible^ 
 where if he could not help Parma it might be possible 
 for Parma to help him. He needed Parma's help very 
 sorely by the time he got there, but he had so ordered 
 matters that no such help was to be had. The fault was 
 with Philip, howeverj quite as much as with Sidonia. 
 The King's final instructions to the latter were not to 
 fight the English unless they attacked him, but to use all 
 expedition in joining hands with Parma ; or as Froude 
 puts it, with perhaps too sarcastic an emphasis — 
 
 " The Duke was not to seek a battle. If he fell in with 
 Drake " — Drake, it must be observed, was in Spanish eyes the 
 leading spirit of the English defence, and his name stands for 
 Howard as well — " he was to take no notice of him, but to thank 
 God, as I )ogberry said to the watchman, that he was rid of a 
 knave. He was to go straight to the North Foreland, and there 
 anchor and communicate with Parma. The experienced admirals 
 who had learnt their trade under Santa Cruz — Martinez de Recalde, 
 Pedro de Valdez, Miguel de Oquendo — strongly urged the 
 securing Plymouth or the Isle of Wight on their way up Channel. 
 This had evidently been Santa Cruz's own design, and the only 
 rational one to follow. Philip did not see it. He did not believe 
 it would prove necessary ; but as to this and as to fighting, he 
 left them, as he knew he must do, a certain discretion." 
 
 These are the instructions of a pedant ; they were 
 executed by a fool. There was no need to tell Sidonia 
 to take no notice of Drake ; it was certain that Drake 
 would take plenty of notice of him. No sooner had the 
 Armada passed Plymouth than Howard and Drake were 
 at its heels, and there they stayed, fighting incessantly 
 whenever the wind gave them a chance, until Sidonia 
 anchored, according to his instructions, at Calais, having 
 had more than enough of the endemoniada gente, as he 
 had already learnt to call them, whom he had been sent 
 to subdue. According to Lippomano, the Venetian 
 Ambassador in Spain, his instructions were, if attacked 
 by the enemy, to fight courageously ; and that, to do him 
 justice, he did. But though he could fight courageously, 
 he could not fight effectively. He was outsailed, out- 
 manoeuvred, and as thoroughly outwitted as a man so 
 
THE ARMADA. 179 
 
 totally without the sort of wits required in a naval com- 
 mander can ever be said to be. If he could have closed 
 with his nimble foes, he might have crushed them. But 
 Howard and Drake knew what they were about. Their 
 strength was in seamanship and in the naval use of artillery. 
 The Spaniards despised the gun and could fight best at 
 close quarters. Howard and Drake never gave them a 
 chance of coming to close quarters. They hovered on the 
 rear and flanks of the Armada, "plucking their feathers 
 little by little," as Howard said on the day of Gravelines, 
 never losing an opportunity and never giving one, until 
 at last their ammunition being expended, they were fain 
 merely to follow and watch the enemy and see him 
 anchor off Calais weary, disheartened, discomfited, and 
 demoralized. 
 
 Thus, to the letter, the instructions of the pedant were 
 executed by the fool. Sidonia had not attacked the 
 enemy ; he had fought courageously when attacked by 
 him. He had anchored in the narrow seas and had 
 opened communications with Parma. Yet he was no 
 nearer his object than when he lay in the Tagus. If he 
 had been a seaman, he would have known that the men 
 who had fought him so desperately, so tenaciously, and 
 withal so skilfully, would never leave him alone while a 
 plank floated beneath them and a shot remained in their 
 lockers. If he could not vanquish them or drive them off, 
 he might as well have been anchored in the Dead Sea as 
 in the Straits of Dover. Whatever his instructions were, 
 he should have known that to leave such a foe behind 
 him was merely sowing the wind to reap the inevitable 
 whirlwind. As to securing Plymouth or the Isle of Wight, 
 he might as well have attempted to seize the North Pole. 
 So far was he from being able to cover Parma's descent 
 upon England, that the first thing he did when he dropped 
 anchor off Calais was to send off messengers to Parma 
 and implore him to come forthwith to his assistance. If 
 he could not defeat Howard and Drake, Seymour and 
 Justin, once for all and all at once — for to this pass had 
 
i8o THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 his futile strategy now brought him — he could get no 
 help from Parma, and Parma could get no help from him. 
 So impossible was it then, and so impossible is it always, 
 to conduct an enterprise which involves command of the 
 sea without first disposing of the hostile fleet in being. 
 
 For Parma himself was in no better case. Another 
 fleet in being, that of Justin of Nassau, held him relent- 
 lessly in check, though Sidonia understood this as little 
 as he understood that Howard and Drake were already 
 his conquerors and his masters. 
 
 " Where was Farnese?" we quote from Motley. " Most impa- 
 tiently the Golden Duke paced the deck of the Saint Martin. 
 Most eagerly were thousands of eyes strained towards the eastern 
 horizon to catch the first glimpse of Parma's flotilla. But the day 
 wore on to its close, and still the same inexplicable and mys- 
 terious silence prevailed. There was utter solitude on the waters 
 in the direction of Gravclines and Dunkerk — not a sail on the sea 
 in the quarter where bustle and activity had been most expected. 
 The mystery was profound, for it had never entered the head of 
 any man in the Armada that Alexander could not come out when 
 he chose." 
 
 Parma was afterwards bitterly attacked at Madrid for 
 what was represented as his betrayal of Sidonia. But he 
 said himself, as we have seen, that the enemy's fleet pre- 
 vented his exit, and whether he meant it or not he 
 certainly spoke the truth. Froude indeed insists that by 
 the enemy's fleet Parma meant the English fleet and not 
 the Dutch ; that he never spoke of the Dutch as enemies, 
 but always as rebels. It does not much matter which he 
 meant. If two terriers are watching a rabbit hole, it is 
 hard to say which of them prevents the exit of the 
 rabbit. It is enough to know that the rabbit cannot bolt. 
 Froude further attempts to show that the Dutch fleet had 
 been driven into the Scheldt by a storm on July 21, and 
 did not issue from it again until after the battle of 
 Gravelines ; but in this he is scarcely successful. Burn- 
 ham, an agent of Walsyngham in the Low Countries, 
 whom Froude cites in proof, says, writing on July 25 : 
 "This last tempest forced all the ships of war in these 
 
THE ARMADA. igi 
 
 countries, that lay before Dunkirk and Nieuport. to come 
 in. . . . But this day it is thought they will all go forth 
 again." Kyllygrew, whom Froude also cites, says, on 
 July 31 : "I understand that Admiral Justinus is gone out 
 already with thirty sail from Flushing." It is true that, 
 as Froude also points out, Howard himself, writing on the 
 evening of July 29, the day on which the battle of Grave- 
 lines was fought, said, "There is not one Flushinger nor 
 Hollander at the seas." But the Dutch fleet, if it was at 
 sea at all, was watching Dunkirk and Xieuport, and of 
 these one is some twelve and the other some thirty miles 
 from Gravelines. On August 6, Seymour, Wynter, and 
 Palmer, writing to the Council, say, "if there were any 
 Flushingers and Hollanders attending about Dunkirk, as 
 it seemeth by your Lordships' letters that there luas ;" and 
 on the same day the States of Zealand addressed a 
 despatch to the Queen, in which they expressly claim 
 "that our fleet, under the charge of Count Justinus of 
 Nassau, being happily arrived and riding ofl" of Dunkirk 
 at the very time of the discovery of the Armada of Spain, 
 the forces of the Prince of Parma, then ready to put to 
 sea, were, by the same, closely locked in and stayed 
 within the said Dunkirk . . . which Prince, although he 
 was ready and his soldiers embarked, he has been and 
 now is so closely locked in by our ships in the havens of 
 Nieuport and Dunkirk, that he will be unable to come 
 out." 
 
 It has been necessary to examine this point at some 
 length, because the strategic action and effect of the 
 Dutch fleet have been too often ignored, or, if not ignored, 
 misunderstood by the historians. As a question of evi- 
 dence, it is still perhaps somewhat uncertain what was the 
 exact position of the Dutch ships at the moment when 
 Sidonia anchored at Calais and sent off message after 
 message, each more urgent than the last, to summon 
 Parma to his rescue. But the uncertainty of the evidence 
 is immaterial to the strategic effect of the Dutch fleet. 
 Parma knew, if Sidonia did not, that until Justin of Nassau 
 
1 82 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 was disposed of, he could not stir. Sidonia had never seen 
 the Dutch ships, and was not seaman enough to know 
 that, whether visible or invisible, they were equally for- 
 midable in menace and equally potent in effect. Even 
 Howard saw nothing of them on the day of Gravelines. 
 But Parma had seen them, and knew what they could do, 
 even if he did not know exactly where they were. So long 
 as the weather kept them in the Scheldt, it would keep 
 him in his havens. If it abated so as to allow him to set 
 forth, he knew that wherever they might be at the moment 
 the}' would pounce upon him like a hawk upon its prey as 
 soon as he had reached the open. Sidonia had summoned 
 him to his rescue against one hostile fleet in the narrow 
 seas. How could he possibly go with another hostile fleet 
 in his rear ? He could give no naval assistance to Sidonia. 
 He could, it is true, furnish transport for the contingent 
 carried by the Armada, but such transport would be a 
 hindrance rather than an assistance, unless the seas to be 
 traversed had first been cleared of all opposing naval force. 
 If Sidonia could not cope at sea with Howard, Drake, and 
 Seymour, still less could Parma cope at sea with even 
 Justin of Nassau alone. Before Sidonia could expect to 
 see Parma afloat he must first crush the endemoniada gente 
 which had plucked his feathers for a week, and driven him 
 all bedraggled, bewildered, and beleaguered into Calais 
 Roads, and then seek out and destroy Justin of Nassau, 
 who, whether in the Scheldt or in the open, was an abso- 
 lute bar to Parma's exit. If he could not do that, he could 
 do nothing. To all intents and purposes he had been 
 defeated the moment he dropped anchor at Calais and 
 sent forth his agonized cry to Parma for help. As has 
 often happened in naval history, the overthrow of Gravelines 
 and the headlong flight of the Armada to the North were 
 only the tactical consummation of a conflict which strategy 
 had decided beforehand in favour of the side which had 
 best mastered the secret of sea power. 
 
 But Howard and his comrades were by no means con- 
 tent with having paralyzed Parma and brought Sidonia 
 
THE ARMADA. 183 
 
 to bay. Their spirit was that of Achilles, Nil actum 
 reputans dum quid superesset agendum. They were plain 
 men and homely strategists, whose one idea of dealing 
 with an enemy was to attack and defeat him. Sidonia 
 was anchored at Calais. They could not attack him in 
 that position, because to do sp they must close with him, 
 and for an action at close quarters their strength was 
 insufficient and their ships were not adapted. He had 
 sought cover like a fox when he is hard pressed, and they 
 resolved to force him again into the open. With this 
 object a device was adopted, as some say, on the sugges- 
 tion of Elizabeth herself, but more probably at the instance 
 of Wynter, whom Howard had summoned with his other 
 lieutenants to a council of war. At any rate, Wynter says 
 himself — 
 
 " Having viewed myself the great and hugeness of the Spanish 
 army, and did consider that it was not possible to remove them 
 but by a device of firing of ships, which would make them to 
 leese the only road which was apt and meetest to serve their 
 purpose, as also an occasion to put many of them in danger of 
 firing, and at the least to make them to leese their cables and 
 anchors, which could not be less than two for every ship, I 
 thought it meet to acquaint my Lord withal . . . and his Lord- 
 ship did like very well of it, and said the next day his Lordship 
 would call a council and put the same in practice." 
 
 Accordingly on July 28, eight ships, which were adjudged 
 good for no other purpose, were duly prepared for firing, 
 and at midnight they were set alight and allowed to drift 
 among the Spanish ships at anchor. " This matter," says 
 Wynter, " did put such terror among the Spanish army that 
 they were fain to let slip their cables and anchors ; and did 
 work, as it did appear great mischief among them by reason 
 of the suddenness of it." It does not appear that any of 
 the Spanish ships were destroyed or seriously injured by 
 fire. But the main object was to inspire terror, and this 
 was most effectually accomplished. Sidonia never after- 
 wards anchored in security until months later he reached 
 the Peninsula with the shattered remnants of the Armada. 
 There was no longer any question of meeting or waiting 
 
i84 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 for Parma ; all he could do was to gather his fleet together 
 and make sail whithersoever the wind might carry him. 
 It carried him along the coast towards Gravelines, and by- 
 daylight Howard, Drake, and Seymour were once more at 
 his heels and upon him. Howard's account of the memor- 
 able day, the day of Gravelipes, is brief but significant : — 
 
 "This morning we drove a galleass ashore before Calais, 
 whither I sent my long boat to board her, where divers of my 
 men were slain, and my lieutenant sore hurt in the taking of her, 
 Ever since we have chased them in fight and distressed them 
 much ; but their fleet consists of mighty ships and great strength ; 
 yet we doubt not, by God's good assistance to press them. . . . 
 Their force is wonderful great and strong ; and yet we pluck 
 their feathers little by little." 
 
 Drake, writing on the same day, is equally brief : — 
 
 " God hath given us so good a day in forcing the enemy so 
 far to leeward as I hope in God the Prince of Parma and the 
 Duke of Sidonia shall not shake hands this few days ; and when- 
 soever they shall meet, I believe neither of them will greatly 
 rejoice of this day's service." 
 
 Wynter shall tell the story at greater length. If we reflect 
 that he was only one of many, all of whom quitted them- 
 selves as manfully as he did, we shall understand the nature 
 of the struggle and the magnitude of its results : — 
 
 " His Lordship, with such as were with him, did bear room 
 after the Spanish fleet, the wind being at the S.S.W., and the 
 Spanish fleet bearing away N.N.E., making into the depth of 
 the channel ; and about nine of the clock in the morning we feat 
 near unto them, being then thwart of Gravelines. They went into 
 a proportion of a half-moon. Their admiral and vice-admiral, 
 they went in the midst, and the greatest number of them ; and 
 there went on each side, inl the wings, their galleasses,|^armados 
 of Portugal, and other good ships, in the whole to the number 
 of sixteen in a wing, which did seem to be of their principal 
 shipping. My fortune was to make choice to charge their 
 starboard wing without shooting of any ordnance until we came 
 within six score of them, and some of our ships did follow me. 
 The said wing found themselves, as it did appear, to be so 
 charged, as by making of haste to run into the body of their 
 fleet, four of them did entangle themselves one aboard the other. 
 One of them recovered himself, and so shrouded himself among 
 
THE ARAfADA. i8; 
 
 the fleet ; the rest, how they were beaten, I will leave it to the 
 report of some of the Spaniards that leapt into the seas and were 
 taken up, and are now in the custody of some of our fleet. 
 
 " The fight continued from nine of the clock until six of the clock 
 at night, in the which time the Spanish army bare away N.N.E. 
 and N. by E., as much as they could keeping company one with 
 another, I assure your Honour in very good order. Great was 
 the spoil and harm that was done unto them, no doubt. I 
 deliver it unto your Honour upon the credit of a poor gentleman 
 that out of my ship there was shot five hundred shot of demi- 
 cannon, culverin, and demi-culverin ; and when I was furthest off in 
 discharging any of the pieces, I was not out of the shot of their 
 harquebus, and most times within speech one of another. And 
 surely every man did well ; and, as I have said, no doubt the 
 slaughter and hurt they received was great, as time will discover 
 it ; and when every man was weary with labour, and our cartridges 
 spent, and munitions wasted — I think in some altogether — we 
 ceased and followed the enemy, he bearing hence still in the 
 course as I have said before." 
 
 One more day of agony, a day on which but for a timely 
 shift of the wind the whole of the Spanish fleet must have 
 been cast away on the flats of Holland, completed Sidonia's 
 discomfiture. Howard and his heroes had at last done 
 their work. Their ammunition was spent and their victuals 
 were exhausted, but they followed their flying enemy until 
 they saw that he had no more stomach for fighting, and was 
 fain to get away as best he could by rounding the north 
 of Scotland and braving the storms of the Atlantic sooner 
 than face the endoiwniada gentc again. 
 
 " After the fight," says Howard, " notwithstanding that our 
 powder and shot was well near all spent, we -set on a brag coun- 
 tenance and gave them chase, as though we wanted nothing, until 
 we had cleared our own coast and some part of Scotland of them. 
 And then, as well to refresh our ships with victuals, whereof most 
 stood in wonderful need, as also in respect of our want of powder 
 and shot, we made for the Frith, and sent certain pinnaces to dog 
 the fleet until they should be pai-t the Isles of Scotland." 
 
 The rest of the woeful story belongs to the tragedy of the 
 conflict, not to its strategy. The latter was at an end when 
 the felicissima Armada— ^ox such, it appears, and not 
 " Invincible," was its official title in Spain — ceased after 
 
1 86 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 Gravelines to be a fleet in being. Howard had destroyed 
 it strategically ; the weather and the sea only completed 
 its material overthrow, Flavit Dens et dissipati sunt, which 
 was long accepted as a true and sufficient account of the 
 whole business, is at least approximately true of its final 
 stages. But the theory that it was a Heaven-sent storm, 
 and not the still more divine gift of bravery and brains 
 equal to the occasion, that overthrew the Armada, is, as 
 Professor Laughton well says, as false as it is childish : — 
 
 " False because the Spanish fleet, after being hounded up 
 Channel, had sustained a crushing defeat in which they lost many 
 ships and thousands of men before they fled to the North ; a defeat 
 so terrible that nothing could induce them to turn on their 
 pursuers ; a defeat which forced them to a headlong flight into the 
 unknown dangers of the Northern seas, rather than face the more 
 certain and now known danger of the English shot. Childish, 
 because in affairs of State Providence works by recognized means, 
 and gives the victory not by disturbing nature and nature's laws, 
 but by giving the favoured nation wise and prudent commanders, 
 skilful and able warriors ; by teaching their hands to war and their 
 fingers to fight." 
 
 JMeya yap to Tr\c OaXaartriJC Kpdrog. This, which is perhaps 
 the first mention of sea power as such in history — it occurs 
 in the first speech of Pericles reported by Thucydides — is 
 the true explanation of the defeat of the Armada by 
 England. It was the growing sea power of England, still 
 unrecognized by the nation and grievously misunderstood 
 by its rulers, that brought the Armada to nought. The 
 men who overthrew Sidonia were not professed strategists. 
 In an age of strenuous action like theirs the practice 
 precedes the theory. Their strategy was implicit and not 
 explicit. The instinct and the experience of consummate 
 but untutored seamanship had taught them all that they 
 needed to know of the strategic secret of the sea. Yet 
 there is scarcely a principle of naval warfare, as interpreted 
 by centuries of subsequent experience, which these men 
 did not implicitly recognize and explicitly illustrate. Act 
 always on the offensive ; find the enemy and fight him ; 
 make his coast your frontier, and never let him cross it 
 
THE ARMADA. 187 
 
 unchallenged ; if you cannot beat him to-day, follow him 
 and fight him to-morrow ; if you do not follow him, he is 
 certain, if he knows his business, to follow and fight you 
 when you have lost the advantage of time and place which 
 is half a victory ; take no thought of his military enterprises 
 until the naval issue is decided ; if you are victorious, or 
 even until you are finally beaten, they cannot be under- 
 taken ; if you are beaten, they cannot be impeached, — 
 these, in plain words, are the eternal maxims of the strategy 
 that makes for sea power. It is because Howard and his 
 comrades understood and applied them, and Philip and 
 Sidonia did not, that the heritage of the world's sea power 
 was taken from Spain and given to England in 1588. It 
 is because these lessons, though often neglected by the 
 English people and their rulers, were never forgotten by 
 English seamen, that the sea power of England grew with- 
 out ceasing from that time forward until it was finally made 
 supreme at Trafalgar by the genius and patriotism of 
 Nelson. No man can say how soon or how stoutly it may 
 be challenged again. Inspired with the memories and the 
 lessons of that rich and splendid history which began at 
 Gravelines and ended at Trafalgar, English seamen may 
 be trusted never to be unworthy of their sires in daring, in 
 endurance, in the noble traditions of naval discipline and 
 obedience, and above all in that native capacity to under- 
 stand and apply the secret of the sea which is at once the 
 sign and the sanction of supreme sea power. But for the 
 nation and its rulers the story of the Armada is fraught 
 with a solemn warning. Howard and his comrades saved 
 Elizabeth in spite of herself. From first to last she never 
 understood that the sea was her sole salvation. If the 
 people of England ever allow themselves to forget what 
 Elizabeth never knew, the sun of their naval glory will set 
 for ever. " Sparing and war have no affinity together." 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 CAPTAIN MAHAN'S WRITINGS.- 
 
 Ever since the publication, in 1890, of his masterly work 
 on "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," Captain 
 Mahan, of the United States Navy, has been recognized by 
 all competent judges, not merely as the most distinguished 
 living writer on naval strategy, but as the originator and 
 first exponent of what may be called the philosophy of 
 naval history. " Historians generally," as he said, " have 
 been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as 
 to it neither special interest nor special knowledge ; and 
 the profound determining influence of maritime strength 
 upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. 
 It is easy to say in a general way that the use 
 and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the 
 history of the world ; it is more troublesome to seek out 
 and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet 
 unless this be done the acknowledgment of general 
 importance remains vague and unsubstantial ; not resting, 
 as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which 
 the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the 
 conditions at the given moments." It is, indeed, not a 
 little singular that our own splendid naval history, the 
 most conspicuous and continuous illustration of sea power 
 and its influence that the world has ever witnessed, has 
 never attracted a native writer to treat it in the com- 
 prehensive and philosophical spirit of which Captain Mahan 
 has given us so signal and so unique an example. Some 
 * Tillies, April i, 1893. 
 
CAPTAiy MAHAN'S WRITINGS. 189 
 
 indeed of our earlier naval historians went to the root 
 of the matter, but few of our great writers on history- 
 have displayed any considerable insight into sea power as 
 such. Some of them have entirely ignored it, and have 
 often completely misrepresented such examples of its 
 manifestation as have inevitably found their way into the 
 general course of their narrative. The popular instinct and 
 the policy of statesmen have indeed been less at fault. 
 The stern discipline of actual war could not fail to determine 
 both in substantially the right direction. It was by sea 
 power that the elder Pitt built up the British Empire, and 
 by sea power that his illustrious son preserved it from 
 overthrow. Alone among the nations of Western Europe 
 England remained unconquered by Napoleon, and finally 
 destroyed him. Wellington, as every one knows, was 
 one of the immediate instruments of his overthrow, but 
 few go on to reflect that the great Wellington himself was 
 but the creature and the instrument of sea power. It was 
 command of the sea that alone gave him access to the 
 Peninsula and enabled him there to maintain the armies 
 that finally subdued France. Hence, if the popular instinct 
 places the hero of Trafalgar on a higher pinnacle than even 
 the hero of Waterloo, it is hard to say that it is at fault. 
 Nelson stands as the symbol and embodiment of that one 
 element of national strength against which the genius of 
 Napoleon spent itself in vain. That element is sea power, 
 as understood and expounded by Captain Mahan, who 
 may, perhaps, have borrowed the term from Thucydides, 
 but is certainly the first modern writer of note who has 
 grasped and interpreted its full meaning. What we learn 
 from Captain Mahan's pages is that, to a country like 
 England, commercial, expansive, and maritime, sea power 
 is not merely an incidental element of national strength, 
 but the very foundation of its being ; that it is as im- 
 possible for l'2ngland not to be the dominant naval Power 
 of the world, as it is for Germany not to rely on the armed 
 manhood of the nation organized for territorial defence. 
 It will be said, perhaps, that this is merely a truism. 
 
I go THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Vet how many among us are there who have ever practi- 
 cally realized the true bearing and purport of this truism ? 
 How many of our historians have ever regarded the 
 national history, to say nothing of the history of the world, 
 from this particular point of view ? Dr. Arnold, as Captain 
 Mahan has observed, notes the parallel between the over- 
 throw of Hannibal by Rome and the overthrow of Napoleon 
 by England, and Sir Edward Creasy presses the coincidence 
 further, pointing out that Spain was, in both cases, the 
 country in which the decisive campaigns were initiated. 
 But neither writer discerned the essential feature of the 
 parallel, namely, that in both cases the mastery of the sea 
 belonged to the victor, and was the determining factor of 
 his final victory. Or, to take another instance from history 
 not our own, Bacon has noted the fact that "the battle 
 of Actium decided the empire of the world ; the battle of 
 Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk." " How 
 did it happen," asks Captain Mahan, pertinently enough, 
 "that in two great contests between the powers of the 
 East and of the West in the Mediterranean, in one of 
 which the empire of the known world was at stake, the 
 opposing fleets met on spots so near each other as 
 Actium and Lepanto? Was this a mere coincidence, 
 or was it due to conditions that recurred, and may recur 
 again ? " So far as we are aware, no historian has either 
 noted the coincidence or attempted an explanation of 
 it. Again, we may ask, with Captain Mahan, " How 
 many look upon the battle of Trafalgar, the crown of 
 Nelson's glory and the seal of his genius, as other than 
 an isolated event of exceptional grandeur? How many 
 ask themselves the strategic question, ' How did the ships 
 come to be just there?' How many realize it to be the 
 final act in a great strategic drama, extending over a year 
 and more, in which two of the greatest leaders that ever 
 lived. Napoleon and Nelson, were pitted against each 
 other? At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve that failed but 
 Napoleon that was vanquished ; not Nelson that won, but 
 England that was saved. And why ? Because Napoleon's 
 
CAPTAIN MAHAN'S WRITINGS. 191 
 
 combinations failed, and Nelson's intuitions and activity- 
 kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and 
 brought it up in time at the decisive moment." Very few 
 historians have ever realized this, though it is well known 
 to students of naval strategy ; and so completely was it 
 hidden from the statesmanship of the time that Pitt was 
 far more depressed by the disaster of Austerlitz than he 
 was elated by the triumph of Trafalgar. It is true that 
 Austerlitz might bear down the spirit of Austria, which 
 had more than once before made peace with the conqueror 
 on its own account, and left England to resist him alone ; 
 but it could not break the power of England. If Napoleon 
 boasted, vainly enough, that he would conquer India on 
 the banks of the Vistula, he must have known that his 
 power to do so was gone for ever when Villeneuve, baffled 
 by Nelson, and defeated but not destroyed, as he should 
 have been, by Calder, turned southward to Cadiz instead 
 of joining hands with Ganteaume at Brest, where Cornwallis, 
 by a strange lapse of strategic insight, was just upon the 
 point of dividing his powerful fleet and rendering each of 
 its squadrons inferior to the adversary. " What a chance 
 has Villeneuve missed I " wrote Napoleon, for once dis- 
 playing a sounder judgment than the great sailors whom 
 he never could vanquish. " He might, by coming upon 
 Brest from a wide sweep to sea, have played hide-and-seek 
 with Calder, and fallen upon Cornwallis ; or else, with his 
 thirty ships, have beaten Calder's twenty, and gained a 
 decided preponderance." It was then that Napoleon aban- 
 doned his long-cherished plan of invading England, and 
 gave immediate orders for the campaign of Austerlitz. 
 England was saved, in fact, before Trafalgar was fought. 
 The strategic game was played out and won when Nelson, 
 having followed and outstripped Villeneuve in his return 
 from the West Indies, handed over his ships to Cornwallis 
 and returned to England himself Trafalgar might never 
 have been fought if Villeneuve had not been goaded into 
 giving battle by the charge of cowardice and by his im- 
 pending supersession by Rosily But Napoleon, though 
 
192 THE XAVY A. YD THE XATIOX. 
 
 deficient, as one of his French critics has observed, in le 
 sentiment exact dcs difficult^ de la marine, was rarely at 
 fault in his estimate of the broad issues of strategy, naval 
 as well as military. He knew well enough that he was 
 foiled in his scheme for invading England before Trafalgar 
 was fought. Some writers have thought that he spoke 
 the truth for once when he told Metternich that the army 
 assembled at Boulogne was always an army against Austria. 
 So it was, in a sense. If he could once have established 
 himself on English shores, with the army of Boulogne intact 
 and the British fleet destroyed, Austria would have troubled 
 him no more. The conquest of England would have given 
 him the dominion of the world. But in no other sense 
 was the army assembled at Boulogne for the purpose of the 
 Austerlitz campaign. That was merely a second string to 
 his bow, to be used only in case the first was rendered 
 unavailable by the genius of Nelson and the naval prowess 
 of Great Britain. In this he was far wiser than Pitt, who 
 saw in Trafalgar no sufficient compensation for Austerlitz. 
 Felix qicipotuit rerum cognoscere causas ! Many historians 
 have told us the splendid tale of England's naval exploits 
 and illustrated the superb steadfastness of her immortal 
 heroes of the sea. Writers like Admiral Colomb have 
 deduced from the narrative the broad and immutable 
 principles of naval strategy. But Captain Mahan is more 
 historical than the strategists, more strategic than the 
 historians, and more philosophical than either. At best 
 the historians, where they have not misconceived the 
 conditions of naval warfare altogether, have regarded it 
 rather as an auxiliary and subordinate element of military 
 strategy than as an independent and co-ordinate, if not 
 supreme, factor in determining the course of history and 
 the fate of nations. Captain Mahan pursues an entirely 
 different and far more philosophical method. He analyzes 
 sea power, its sources, its conditions, and its results. His 
 main purpose is to draw lessons of profit for the people 
 of the United States, to show them what they must aim 
 at, and how they must pursue their aims, should the 
 
CAPTAIN MAHAN'S WRITINGS. 193 
 
 occasion ever again arise in their history for the employ- 
 ment of " statesmanship directing arms." But incidentally 
 he has been compelled by the necessity of the case to 
 examine almost exclusively the naval history of this 
 country, and to do so in the light, not merely of scientific 
 strategy, but of a searching analysis of the causes and 
 conditions which have made for sea power in the case 
 of England. His first work applied this fruitful and 
 instructive method to the naval history of Europe from 
 1660, when the sailing ship era, with its distinctive features, 
 had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revo- 
 lution. The book was at once recognized as a new 
 departure in naval history, and English readers could only 
 regret that the brilliant pen which had analyzed so skil- 
 fully the naval campaigns of Hawke, Howe, and Rodney, 
 of Suffren, De Guichen, and De Grasse, had been laid 
 down before it had reached the heroic period of St. Vincent 
 and of Nelson, and the tremendous drama of the struggle 
 of England against the dominion of Napoleon. Captain 
 Mahan has since removed this cause of regret. His second 
 work deals exclusively with the wars of the Revolution 
 and the Empire, and from the nature of the case it is 
 even more interesting, and not less instructive, than its 
 predecessor. His touch is as firm, he paints on a larger 
 canvas, and his grasp, alike of incident and principle, is 
 not less masterly. The later work ends at the year 
 1812, "a date signalized," as he suggestively says, "by 
 Napoleon's invasion of Russia, which wrecked his empire 
 — or, at least, gave the outward and visible token of the 
 wreck — and also by the outbreak of the war between Great 
 Britain and the United States. To the latter, as a subject 
 of particular national interest, the author hopes in the 
 near future to devote a special study." When this latter 
 work is published we shall have a complete survey of the 
 whole course of naval warfare in the sailing ship era, from 
 the pen of the first writer who has seen the problem 
 steadily, and seen it whole, of the influence of sea power 
 upon history. 
 
 O 
 
194 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 The history of the wars of the Revolution and the 
 Empire has generally been written from the point of view 
 of the statesman and the soldier. The naval historian 
 has been content to dwell on the glories of the First of 
 June, of St. Vincent and Trafalgar, of the Nile and of 
 Copenhagen, without seeing more than their immediate 
 relation to the European military situation. What the 
 historian, naval and general, has for the most part failed 
 to perceive is that from 1793 to 1815 the sea power of 
 England was the one solid barrier which the Revolu- 
 tionary and Napoleonic deluge failed to submerge, as it 
 spread in a devastating flood over the whole of Western 
 Europe, and at one time threatened to assume the pro- 
 portions of a universal cataclysm. It is his profound 
 grasp of this great, but hitherto imperfectly apprehended, 
 truth that gives to Captain Mahan's pages a unity at once 
 intensely dramatic and profoundly scientific, and enables 
 him to display the great central episode of the campaign 
 which ended at Trafalgar as, alike in its immediate issues 
 and its ulterior results, unquestionably the most decisive 
 campaign in modern history. It is true that those ulterior 
 results were not to be realized for many weary and 
 devastating years. It was with a truly prophetic instinct 
 that Pitt exclaimed, as his eye rested on a map of Europe, 
 when a few days before his death he entered his villa at 
 Putney for the last time, " Roll up that map ; it will not 
 be wanted these ten years." It was not wanted for hard 
 upon ten years to come. But, in spite of all that was 
 happening then at Ulm, at Austerlitz, and at Vienna, in 
 spite of all that was destined to happen in the Peninsula, 
 at Moscow, and at Waterloo before the map of Europe 
 could be finally settled at the restoration of peace to the 
 world, Pitt, if his faith and insight had been those of his 
 own prime, and worthy of his country and its sea power, 
 might there and then have placed one finger on the site of 
 Napoleon's camp at Boulogne and another on the scene of 
 Nelson's death at Trafalgar, and said, " Here and now is 
 Napoleon vanquished ; here and now is a barrier set to his 
 
CAPTAIN MAHAX'S WRITIiXGS. 195 
 
 power and his designs, which, so long as England remains 
 a nation, shall never be cast down." * No one has ever 
 shown this more clearly or more conclusively than Captain 
 Mahan. If Napoleon was to succeed, England must be 
 vanquished ; England could only be vanquished, as the 
 other Powers of Europe had been vanquished, by successful 
 invasion ; and Napoleon was far too consummate a master 
 of the art of war not to know that England could never 
 be successfully invaded unless her fleets had first been 
 scattered and overthrown. The enterprise was a desperate 
 one in any case ; but, in certain contingencies and on 
 certain conditions, it might have been successful, as Captain 
 Mahan acknowledges : — 
 
 " Nevertheless, there remained to Napoleon enough chances of 
 success to forbid saying that his enterprise was hopeless. A seaman 
 can scarcely deny that, despite the genius of Nelson and the 
 tenacity of the British officers, it was possible that some favourable 
 concurrence of circumstances might have brought forty or more 
 French ships into the Channel, and given Napoleon the mastery 
 of the Straits for the few days he asked. The verj' removal of the 
 squadrons of observation from before Rochefort and Ferrol, in 
 order to constitute the fleet with which Calder fought Villeneuve, 
 though admirable as a display of generalship, shows that the British 
 Navy, so far as numbers were concerned, was not adequate to 
 perfect security, and might, by some conceivable combination of 
 circumstances, have been outwitted and overwhelmed at the 
 decisive point. 
 
 " The importance attached by the Emperor to his project was 
 not exaggerated. He might, or he might not, succeed ; but if he 
 failed against Great Britain, he failed everywhere. This he, with 
 the intuition of genius, felt ; and to this the record of his after 
 history now bears witness. To the strife of arms with the great 
 
 ♦ Nevertheless it seems probable that Pitt did foresee the salvation 
 of Europe, and even foretold some of its circumstances. As Lord 
 Rosebery finely says, " Even in the wreck of his life, his intrepid 
 foresight survived. Nothing, he said, but a war of patriotism, a 
 national war, could now save Europe, and that war should begin in 
 Spain." Lord Acton has characterized this prediction as one of the 
 most astounding in history. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, has 
 declared that he " sees nothing wonderful " in it. Its anthenticity 
 has l.itely been called in question, and is still the subject of con- 
 troversy. 1 had certainly overlooked it when the passage in the text 
 was written. — J. R. T. 
 
196 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 sea power succeeded the strife of endurance. Amid all the 
 pomp and circumstance of the war which for ten years to come 
 desolated the Continent, amid all the tramping to and fro over 
 Europe of the French armies and their auxiliary legions, there 
 went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of 
 France, that compulsion, whose silence, when once noted, 
 becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of 
 the working of Sea Power. Under it the resources of the Con- 
 tinent wasted more and more with each succeeding year; and 
 Napoleon, amid all the splendour of his Imperial position, was 
 ever needy. To this, and to the immense expenditures required 
 to enforce the Continental system, are to be attributed most of 
 those arbitrary acts which made him the hated of the peoples, for 
 whose enfranchisement he did so much. Lack of revenue and 
 lack of credit, such was the price paid by Napoleon for the 
 Continental system, through which alone, after Trafalgar, he 
 hoped to crush the Power of the Sea. It may be doubted whether, 
 amid all his glory, he ever felt secure after the failure of the inva- 
 sion of England. To borrow his own vigorous words, in the ad- 
 dress to the nation issued before he joined the army, ' To live 
 without commerce, without shipping, without colonies, subjected 
 to the unjust will of our enemies, is to live as Frenchmen should 
 not.' Yet so had France to live throughout his reign, by the will 
 of the one enemy never conquered." 
 
 To the consequences, maritime and strategic, of Trafalgar, 
 and to the commercial policy which it successively com- 
 pelled both combatants to adopt, Captain Mahan devotes 
 two of his most original and instructive chapters, the drift 
 and teaching of which may be best expounded in his own 
 striking words ; — 
 
 " Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of Great Britain, thwarted 
 once and again by the strategic difficulties attendant upon its 
 execution, was finally frustrated when Villeneuve gave up the 
 attempt to reach Brest and headed for Cadiz. On the part of 
 the allies Trafalgar was, in itself, a useless holocaust, precipitated 
 in the end by the despair of the unfortunate admiral, upon whose 
 iiTesolution Napoleon not unjustly visited the anger caused by 
 the wreck of his plans. Villeneuve was perfectly clear-sighted 
 and right in his appreciation of the deficiencies of his com- 
 mand — of the many chances against success. Where he 
 wretchedly failed was in not recognizing the simple duty of 
 obedience — the obligation to persist at all hazards in the part of 
 a great scheme assigned to him, even though it led to the 
 destruction of his whole force. Had he, upon leaving Ferrol, 
 
CAPTAIN MAHAN'S WRITINGS. l()7 
 
 been visited by a little of the desperation which brought him to 
 Trafalgar, the invasion of England might possibly — not probably 
 — have been effected. 
 
 "An event so striking as the battle of Trafalgar becomes, 
 however, to mankind the symbol of all the circumstances — 
 more important, perhaps, but less obvious — which culminate in 
 it. In this sense it may be said that Trafalgar was the cause — 
 as it certainly marked the period — of Napoleon's resolution to 
 crush Great Britain by excluding her commerce from the Con- 
 tinent. Here, therefore, the story of the influence of Sea Power 
 upon this great conflict ceases to follow the strictly naval events, 
 and becomes concerned simply with commerce - destroying, 
 ordinarily a secondary operation of maritime war, but exalted in 
 the later years of Napoleon's reign to be the principal, if not the 
 sole, means of action, 
 
 " To this the two next chapters are devoted. Of these, the first 
 deals with commerce-destroying in the ordinary sense of the words, 
 directed against enemies' property on the high seas ; beginning 
 with the outbreak of war in 1793, and narrating the series of 
 measures by which the Republic sought to break down British 
 commerce and foreshadowed the policy of Napoleon's Berlin 
 and Milan decrees. The second begins with the Berlin decree 
 in 1806 ; and, tracing one by one the steps which carried the 
 Emperor from violence to violence, seeks to show how these 
 found their necessary outcome in the Russian expedition and the 
 fall of the Empire. Detached thus, as far as may be, from the 
 maze of contemporary history in which they are commonly lost, 
 these successive acts of the French Government are seen to form 
 a logical sequence, connected by one motive and dominated by 
 one necessity. The motive is the destruction of Great Britain, 
 the necessity that of self-preservation. Each nation, unassailable 
 on its own element, stood like an impregnable fortress that can be 
 brought to surrender only by the exhaustion of its resources. In 
 this struggle of endurance Napoleon fell" 
 
 We are induced, alike by the immensity of the subject 
 and the novelty of its treatment, to dwell mainly on the 
 broad outlines of Captain Mahan's work and the broad 
 features of his method, without attempting to follow his 
 masterly exposition in detail. The latter is the less neces- 
 sary, perhaps, because the character of the book and the 
 reputation of its author will inevitably and immediately 
 commend it to the attentive study of all who concern 
 themselves seriously with the history of their country and 
 the true conditions of its prosperity and security. By the 
 
198 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 professional student of naval warfare, moreover, whether in 
 its strategical or its tactical aspects, the book will at once 
 be recognized as an altogether indispensable text-book ; 
 for, while his grasp of strategic issues is almost unrivalled, 
 and his insight into the philosophy of naval history is alto- 
 gether unprecedented in naval literature. Captain Mahan 
 never loses an opportunity of pointing the tactical moral 
 wherever the nature of his subject-matter permits or invites 
 him to do so. His luminous exposition abounds in these 
 incidental digressions and illustrations, which give life to, 
 his pages and variety to his narrative, while shedding a 
 flood of suggestive light on many of the still unsolved 
 problems of modern naval warfare. It would be easy to 
 fill many a page with extracts bearing upon this point, and 
 not a few more with illustrations of Captain Mahan's sus- 
 tained force of style and felicity of literary exposition. 
 But we prefer to treat his great work from a central point 
 of view, and to dwell upon its fundamental characteristics ; 
 and we must content ourselves with saying, in conclusion, 
 that, though it might be an exaggeration to compare him 
 with Adam Smith for reach of thought, profundity of insight, 
 and sagacity of speculation, yet it is no more than the truth 
 to say that the spirit in which he has approached the novel 
 and fruitful study of the " Influence of Sea Power upon 
 History" is not unworthy to be compared with that in 
 which the great Scottish thinker approached the study of 
 the " Wealth of Nations." 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
( 199 ) 
 
 THE JEUNE ECOLE FRANCAISE.* 
 
 A WRITER in La Marine de France, the recognized 
 organ of what is known to students of French naval 
 literature as the jeune kole fran^aise, called attention 
 at the time to the fact that, as he alleged, the Italian 
 Naval MancEuvres of 1893 were avowedly based on the 
 views propounded in " Les Guerres Navales de Demain," a 
 work published in 1892 by two distinguished leaders of 
 
 that school, Commandants Z and H. Montdchant, 
 
 whose " Essai de Strat^gie Navale " is the accepted text- 
 book of the school. 
 
 Assuming that the naval war of the future will be 
 mainly a war of coasts, the writers in question seem to 
 think that the problems it presents will be comparatively 
 simple of solution. Both propositions are open to consider- 
 able dispute. Neither can be accepted without large 
 reservations and limitations. An Italian critic of the same 
 manoeuvres, writing in V Italia Militare e Marina, accepted 
 the first and disputed the second. He was perhaps too 
 much absorbed in the naval situation of his own country. 
 It is probable enough that a war between Italy and any 
 other naval Power in the Mediterranean would be, if not 
 essentially a war of coasts, at least capable of being repre- 
 sented as mainly a war of coasts. But this results rather 
 from the geographical situation and relations of the Powers 
 supposed to be in conflict on the sea than from any recent 
 development of the principles of naval strategy or from any 
 recent changes in the methods and appliances of naval 
 
 • Naval Annual, 1S94. 
 
200 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 warfare. All naval warfare involves territorial enterprise, 
 or, at any rate, freedom to undertake territorial enterprise 
 without maritime impediment, as its ulterior end. No 
 Power seeks to command the sea except for the purpose of 
 traversing it in security ; and there is no principle more 
 firmly established by the whole course of naval history 
 than this, that in time of war the sea cannot be traversed 
 in security either for military or for commercial purposes 
 unless the Power which seeks to traverse it has established 
 a strategic command over it. If these views are sound, 
 it follows that, although a naval war between Italy and 
 another iVIediterranean Power is capable of being represented 
 as a war of coasts — because the Mediterranean is, so to speak, 
 all coast, and neither Power would be likely at the outset to 
 attack the extra-Mediterranean possessions of the other — 
 yet it would really be a struggle for the command of the sea 
 affected by the operations. As such its operations would be 
 governed by those broad principles of naval strategy which 
 are essentially immutable, being inherent in the nature of 
 things, and not by any narrower considerations specially 
 founded on the incidents and conditions of a so-called war 
 of coasts. Only in the sense that territorial enterprise 
 across the seas is the iinal cause of all maritime conflict 
 can naval warfare in any case be regarded as a war of 
 coasts ; and whether the coasts to be reciprocally assailed 
 and defended are separated by a few miles or by half the 
 circumference of the globe, the command of the sea between 
 them is essential to the successful attack of either, though 
 not, perhaps, in like measure, to their successful defence. In 
 other words, any Power which seeks to assail another across 
 the sea, but not on the sea, must first secure the command 
 of the sea which separates its own shores from those of its 
 enemy, as a condition precedent of such military enterprise 
 as it contemplates. The ulterior success of the enterprise 
 then becomes for the most part a military and not a naval 
 problem, and depends, as such, not on the naval strength 
 of the Power assailed, which ex hypothesi will have dis- 
 appeared or been rendered strategically of no account. 
 
THE JEUNE tcOLE FRANQAISE. 20 1 
 
 but on the relative military strength and capacity of the two 
 combatants. Thus from one point of view we may call 
 naval warfare a war of coasts ; from another, a struggle for 
 the command of the sea. But to call it a war of coasts is 
 merely to describe it by one of its geographical accidents ; 
 to call it a struggle for the command of the sea is to 
 define its essential nature. 
 
 It is surely a strange misreading of history for any 
 of the countrymen of Persano to regard their Naval 
 Manoeuvres from the point of view of a so-called war of 
 coasts. The disastrous experience of Lissa must have 
 taught them that a war of coasts undertaken in defiance 
 of the historic principles of naval strategy is certain to 
 end in disaster. On the other hand, it is doubtless a 
 sound instinct which leads them to study the naval 
 problems which would arise in the event of a war between 
 Italy and France. This they appear to do without the 
 slightest disguise. Of course England and France do 
 exactly the same thing, and though some disguise is occa- 
 sionally attempted, it never deceives any one. Each pays 
 the other the compliment of thinking it the only Power 
 capable of contending against itself at sea, and each makes 
 its dispositions accordingly. In like manner, Italy must 
 regard France as its only formidable naval rival in the 
 Mediterranean, and must consider how the undoubted 
 superiority of France at sea might best be dealt with by 
 the Italian Navy in the event of war. This, with all 
 respect for the jeune kole and its partisans, is the real 
 naval problem which Italy has to study, and not the untested 
 strategy of a new-fangled guerre des cdtes. 
 
 The plain truth is, however, that whatever the critics 
 of the jeune I'cole may have thought and said, the Italian 
 naval authorities in drawing up the scheme of the man- 
 oeuvres of 1893 based it upon the old-fashioned and time- 
 honoured principles of naval strategy as established by 
 history and experience, and not upon any principles 
 peculiar to the Jeune tfcole. This will be seen at once from 
 the following summary of the plan of operations which is 
 
202 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 taken from a narrative contributed by Commander Garbett, 
 R.N., to the journal of the Royal United Service Institu- 
 tion : — 
 
 The attacking squadron (supposed to be French), under the 
 command of H.R.H. the Duke of Genoa. 
 
 ist Division — 
 Battleships : Lepaiito (flag), Ruggiero di Lauria. 
 Torpedo-cruiser : Euridice and Monzambano. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer : 103, iii, 114, and 131 
 
 2nd Division (Rear-Admiral Corsi) — 
 Battleships : Italia (flag), Andrea Doria. 
 Torpedo-cruiser : Iride. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer: 123, 124, 125, and 126. 
 
 3rd Division (Rear- Admiral Gonzales) — 
 Battleships : Dandolo (flag), Affondatore. 
 Torpedo-cruiser : Goito. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer: 57, 62, 115, and 155. 
 
 The torpedo-avisos Aguila, Sparviero, and the Tevcre, cistern- 
 ship, were also attached to this squadron. 
 
 The defending force, under the command of Vice-Admiral 
 Accini : — 
 
 ist Division — 
 Battleships : Re Umberto (flag), Duilio. 
 Torpedo-cruiser ; Minerva. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer: 59, 65, 72, and 94. 
 
 2nd Division (Rear-Admiral Puliga) — 
 Battleship : Castelfidardo (flag). 
 Protected cruiser : Stromboli. 
 Torpedo-cruiser : Urania. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer: 71, 73, 74, and 137. 
 
 3rd Division (Rear-Admiral Marra) — 
 Protected cruisers : Fieramosea, Vesuvio, 
 Torpedo-cruiser : Aretusa. 
 Torpilleurs-de-haute-mer: 76, 77, gi, and 139. 
 
 The torpedo-avisos Falco, Avvoltoio, and the cistern-ship Pagano, 
 were also attached to this squadron. In addition, twenty-four 
 lirst-class torpedo-boats were commissioned, to assist in the 
 defence of the various ports. 
 
 The limits of the manoeuvre field were fixed by the coast from 
 Ventimiglia to Campanella, in the south of the Gulf of Naples, 
 then by a line drawn from Campanella to the Trapani Islands, 
 from the Trapani Islands passing twenty miles south of Sardinia ; 
 the fourth line was made by the meridian of Ventimiglia. 
 
THE JEUNE tCOLE FRANCAISE. 203 
 
 These limits comprised all Sardinia : the N.E. coast, including 
 Maddalena, was considered Italian soil; the ports on the west 
 coast served as the base of operations for the attacking squadron 
 under the Duke of Genoa. 
 
 The attacking force had the superiority over that of the defence, 
 both in battleships and armament, but the defending ships had 
 the advantage in point of speed. 
 
 The programme of the manceuvres was divided into three 
 phases. 
 
 In the first, from August 5 to the isth, the attacking squadron 
 had as its object to attempt to force the defending fleet to 
 a decisive action, in order to gain the command of the Tyrrhenian 
 Sea ; while the latter, avoiding a battle, was, at the same time, to 
 prevent the enemy from ravaging the coast. 
 
 Genoa, Spezzia, and Maddalena were considered so strong that 
 the enemy could make no effective attack against them. 
 
 In the second phase of the manoeuvres, lasting from August 16 
 to the 26th, the offensive squadron had to atttack the defend- 
 ing force, which was anchored in an open harbour for the purpose 
 of making good repairs. The defending ships on their side were 
 to attempt to escape, and putting to sea to re-form and then take 
 refuge in a better defended port, from whence they could continue 
 to harass the enemy. 
 
 In the third phase, between August 27 and September 6, the 
 hostile squadron had to escort a large convoy of troops, which 
 were destined to be disembarked on the coast of Italy. The 
 convoy at sea was to form a large square, the war-ships forming 
 the angles. The speed was necessarily less than the usual speed 
 of the squadron. 
 
 The object of the defending force was to find and attack the 
 squadron at sea, so as to prevent the disembarkation from being 
 effected. 
 
 The attacking squadron was conveniently designated A 
 and the defending squadron D. A was at Vado when 
 the first phase of the operations began on August 9, and D 
 distributed between Porto San Stefano and Porto Ferrajo. 
 Accini's first move was to send out all his cruisers to scout 
 for the enemy, keeping only his battleships and torpedo- 
 boats in port. The Duke of Genoa also sent out his 
 cruisers, some to scout and some to sever the telegraphic 
 communication between Sardinia and Italy, and destroy 
 a railway bridge on the coast of Tuscany, proceeding with 
 his main body along the north coast of Italy to carry out 
 
204 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 coast-wise operations against railways, telegraphs, signal- 
 stations, and the like, but taking care to give Genoa a 
 wide berth. While he was thus engaged with two divi- 
 sions, the third being employed in scouting and covering 
 his seaward flank, the Aquila reported on the morning of 
 the loth, that the enemy had been sighted to the eastward 
 with a squadron of eight ships, and this was presently 
 confirmed by the Monzmnbano, \\hich had been despatched 
 on an independent raiding expedition. The Duke of 
 Genoa thereupon at once abandoned the operations on 
 which he was engaged, and forming his fleet in order of 
 battle, proceeded to the southward in pursuit of the enemy. 
 This was exactly what Accini wanted ; to draw his adver- 
 sary away from the shore and if possible to entangle him 
 in the narrow waters between the Tuscan islands and the 
 coast, where torpedo-boats could operate to best advantage. 
 The Duke, however, was not to be led into this trap. He 
 kept in the open during the night, shaking off the enemy's 
 observation, and on the morning of the nth appeared off" 
 Civita Vecchia, which he proceeded to bombard. Accini, 
 on the other hand, having lost touch of his adversary, 
 remained for the night at Giglio, where he reassembled 
 his forces. In the morning he sent his third division out 
 to scout, and steaming towards the land, himself received 
 at ten a.m. from the signal-station at Monte Argentaro 
 the information that the enemy had been sighted steaming 
 towards the Roman coast. He accordingly shaped a course 
 for Civita Vecchia with the object of interrupting the bom- 
 bardment. In this he was successful. As soon as the 
 Duke of Genoa perceived his approach, he suspended his 
 fire at the town and formed his fleet for the purpose of 
 attacking Accini. The latter being inferior in strength 
 could fight no action, but he had carried out his immediate 
 purpose of drawing off" his adversary, and having done so, 
 he steamed away again at full speed, the Duke following 
 in pursuit. Accini, having a general superiority of speed, 
 made good his escape, and drawing the Duke away in 
 pursuit, was at least partially and temporarily successful 
 
THE JEUNE iCOLE FRANC A IS E. 205 
 
 in frustrating the bombardment of Civita Vecchia ; which, 
 however, the Duke subsequently resumed by detaching the 
 Affondatore and the Daiidolo for the purpose as soon as 
 Accini was seen to be in full retreat. At this point an 
 armistice was declared, the Duke returning to one of his 
 ports in Sardinia and Accini proceeding to Naples, as if 
 to repair damages, and take in stores, while the cruisers 
 and torpedo-boats of each side were permitted to observe 
 the movements of the other. 
 
 It will scarcely be denied that in this series of operations 
 the guerre des cdtes had shown itself to very little ad- 
 vantage. Accini, though unable to try direct conclusions 
 with his adversary, had twice shown his capacity to control 
 that adversary's movements. It is quite impossible to de- 
 termine the precise strategic value of demonstrations from 
 the sea against railway.s, telegraphs, signal-stations and the 
 like, but it is safe to say that the conditions in which they 
 can attain to decisive importance must be more or less 
 exceptional, and that the value of maritime attack on land 
 fortifications properly constructed and vigorously defended 
 is very apt to be overrated. There is no war without 
 casualties, no making of omelettes without breaking of 
 eggs ; but the fact remains that both the Duke of Genoa's 
 undertakings were interrupted, if not frustrated, by an 
 inferior defending force, and that the close of the opera- 
 tions left the strategic situation very much as it was at 
 the outset. 
 
 Two days later, on August 13, Accini recalled his scouts, 
 and concentrated his force for the defence of Gaeta and 
 Naples. The next evening the enemy was reported in 
 the offing, and Accini found himself caught in a trap. It 
 ■was too late for him to weigh anchor and escape, and 
 early in the morning the Duke of Genoa, entering the 
 Bay of Naples with his whole force, compelled Accini's 
 surrender in accordance with the rules. The accounts at 
 this point are so vague, that it is not easy to understand 
 how this result was brought about. If the armistice 
 established on the evening of the nth was formally 
 
2o6 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 concluded before the Duke of Genoa put to sea again, it 
 is natural to suppose that Accini would be equally free 
 to put to sea at the same time. Having neglected to 
 do so, it is strange that he should have failed to sur- 
 round his anchorage with cruisers and look-outs which 
 might have warned him of the enemy's approach in time 
 to enable him to make his escape. It is odd, again, that, 
 being apprized of the proximity of the enemy in the 
 evening, he should have made no use of his torpedo boats, 
 thirty-four in number, against only fourteen of the enemy, 
 during a night which is stated to have been very dark 
 and somewhat foggy. When the morning came these 
 torpedo boats were employed in somewhat bizarre fashion, 
 according to English ideas, to impede the advance of the 
 attacking fleet, Accini weighing at the same time with 
 his battleships and endeavouring to get away. But the 
 Duke of Genoa was now too close upon him, and his 
 hitherto successful and well-inspired strategy was brought 
 to an ignominious conclusion. This incident, as described, 
 appears to afford very little strategic instruction. With- 
 out knowing the precise causes of Accini's unaccountable 
 failure to detect the enemy's approach in time to secure 
 his own line of retreat, it is impossible to determine how 
 far they were such as are likely to operate with similar 
 disastrous effect in actual warfare. As matters stand, the 
 proceedings wear an air of unreality, and suggest the 
 suspicion that, for reasons possibly rather political than 
 strategic, the result was in some way pre-ordained. 
 
 In the second phase of the manoeuvres Accini's squadron 
 D was anchored, as if for repair, at Gaeta, a more or less 
 unfortified anchorage supposed to be accessible to a 
 powerful attacking squadron. Measures were taken to 
 improvise shore defences, and were doubtless valuable as 
 exercises ; but, as these do not seem materially to have 
 effected the naval result, they need not be closely 
 examined. The anchorage was closed by an immense 
 boom, in which only two passages were left, a northern 
 and a southern, each of which was covered by a shore 
 
THE JEUNE tCOLE FRAXCAISE. laj 
 
 battery, and illuminated on the night of the operations 
 by a powerful beam from a search-light. The roadstead 
 was sown with mines, torpedo-boats and other light craft 
 patrolled the neighbourhood of the boom, and the Aretusa 
 and Minerva were told off to scout in the offing and to 
 watch for the enemy, who was expected to come from the 
 direction of Naples, the night on which the attack was to 
 be made, that of August 22, having been determined and 
 made known beforehand. At nine p.m. Accini ordered 
 his squadron to prepare for sea, and at the same time the 
 approach of the enemy was signalled. An hour later an 
 action was in full progress. The defending cruisers were 
 driven back within the boom, but the torpedo-boats re- 
 mained outside to oppose the enemy's advance. How far 
 they were successful must be purely a matter of conjecture, 
 since the accounts seem to imply that no torpedoes were 
 discharged, and unless this is done, and the results are 
 sifted and recorded, the operations of torpedo-boats in 
 manoeuvres must always be totally devoid of actuality. 
 A portion of his squadron was detached by the Duke of 
 Genoa to attempt to destroy the boom while he led the 
 remainder direct for the southern entrance. This led in 
 the one case to a furious cannonade from the shore, and 
 in both to a sustained onslaught of the defending torpedo- 
 boats, which was held to have checked the enemy's 
 attempt to force the passage. At a preconcerted moment 
 all the search-lights of the defence were suddenly and 
 simultaneously extinguished, and while the engagement 
 was still hotly carried on in the neighbourhood of the 
 south passage the Re Umberio and the Stromboli slipped 
 out through the north passage unperceived and got away 
 to seaward. Shortly afterwards Accini ordered the Duilio, 
 the Fieramosca, and the Castelfidardo to slip their cables 
 and proceed to sea through the southern passage, which 
 by this time was clear, the enemy having been forced back 
 by the defending torpedo boats. This squadron also got 
 clear away without being molested or detected, and subse- 
 quently rejoined its consorts at a preconcerted rendezvous. 
 
2o8 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Thus the second game of the rubber was scored by the 
 D squadron, but the accounts are too meagre for a detailed 
 estimate of the relative skill of the players. There would 
 seem to be many elements of unreality in the operations 
 as described. What is certain is that Accini got away 
 unperceived with the main body of his squadron, and as 
 this W21S his primary object, his success was so far incon- 
 testable. But the operations of the Duke of Genoa are 
 not entirely intelligible. The port in which Accini had 
 taken refuge was supposed to be one not capable of 
 sheltering him against the attack of his adversary. But 
 this being so, there seems to be no reason why the Duke 
 should have allowed himself to be forced back at the 
 critical moment, thus leaving the way open for Accini 's 
 escape — unless, indeed, we assume that the official conven- 
 tions required him to give way before the onslaught of a 
 given number of torpedo-boats. But in that case the plan 
 of operations would seem to have been not very judiciously 
 nor even very fairly framed. If the result was to be deter- 
 mined by the mere presence of a given number of torpedo- 
 boats in a position favourable for attack, then the issue was 
 practically decided in Accini's favour at the outset by 
 giving him the required number of torpedo-boats. If, on 
 the other hand, the result was to be determined by the 
 actual performances of the torpedo-boats, we can form no 
 judgment on the matter without knowing exactly and in 
 detail what those performances were. In any case it is 
 remarkable, perhaps, that no attempt was made by the 
 Duke of Genoa to destroy the boom, and having destroyed 
 it to steam straight for Accini's ships at anchor. A boom 
 must be very strong indeed if it is to stop or damage a 
 battleship steaming against it at full speed. During the 
 operations at Berehaven in 1885 the anchorage was pro- 
 tected by means of a double boom formed of the spars of 
 the ships of the squadron — the Lord Warden, the Agincourt, 
 the Minotaur, the Iron Duke, the Sultan, and others, all at 
 that time ships heavily rigged and sparred — a five-inch steel 
 hawser being rove along each boom and set up taught 
 
THE JEUNE iCOLE FRANCAISE. 209 
 
 by means of kedges. This formidable obstruction was 
 attacked by the Polyphemus. There were no mines out- 
 side the boom, but the ship was to defend herself against 
 six torpedo-boats. The result is recorded in the Naval 
 Annual {ox 1886. "The Polyphemus steamed two miles 
 outside the entrance, and then turned and charged the 
 booms at a speed of seventeen knots. She eluded the tor- 
 pedo-boats which were pursuing her by manoeuvres which 
 were commended by the umpire as admirable and extremely 
 skilful. She succeeded in avoiding the nine or ten 
 torpedoes, which were discharged at her, struck the boom 
 at right angles, and went through it and the five-inch steel 
 hawser, by which it was secured, as if it were packthread. 
 Not the slightest shock was perceptible on board." Many 
 considerations may have prevented a repetition of this 
 performance by any of the ships of the Duke of Genoa's 
 squadron. But there can be little doubt that such things 
 will be frequently attempted in actual warfare and will 
 not unfrequently be successful. 
 
 For the third phase of the operations the two squadrons 
 were differently constituted. Squadron D, under Accini's 
 command, was now reduced to one battleship, the Re 
 Umberto ; three cruisers, the Str emboli, Aretusa, and 
 Minerva ; two " torpedo-avisos," the Nibbio and A vvoltoio, 
 and twenty-two torpedo-boats, and was stationed at Spezzia. 
 Squadron A, under the Duke of Genoa, consisted of eight 
 battleships, the Italia, Lauria, Dandolo, Duilio, Doria, 
 Lepanto, Castelfidardo, and Affondatore ; six cruisers, the 
 Vesuvio, Fierantosca, Monzambano, Enridice, Iride, and 
 Urania; two "torpedo-avisos," Aquila and Sparviero ; 
 twenty-six torpedo-boats, and four vessels without fighting 
 value, to mark the four angles of the area supposed to be 
 occupied by the transports. The head-quarters of squadron 
 A were at Maddalena. The Duke's first move was to send 
 out the Euridice, Iride, Urania, Aquila and Sparviero, to- 
 gether with four torpedo-boats, at full speed to explore, on 
 the one hand, the neighbourhood of Elba and the Piombino 
 Channel, between Elba and the mainland, and, on the 
 
 P 
 
210 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 Other, the roadstead of Gaeta and the bay of Naples. 
 The remainder of the squadron was distributed into four 
 divisions, one of which, the Lepanto, with a contingent of 
 torpedo-boats, remained at the disposition of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, while the rest, consisting of (i) the 
 Italia and Lauria, (2) the Dandolo and Duilio, and (3) the 
 Doria and Fieramosca, each with a contingent of torpedo- 
 boats, were despatched in the first instance to convoy the 
 several contingents of transports from the different parts 
 of the coast where the troops of the invading army were 
 supposed to embark. The Castelfidardo, Affondatore, 
 Vcsiivio, and Monzambano, were told off to cover and 
 mark the four corners of the area, each side of which was 
 four thousand five hundred metres in length, which 
 was supposed to be occupied by the transports. The 
 three contingents of torpedo-boats attached to the three 
 divisions of the squadron covered the front of this area, 
 and the other sides were protected by the three divisions 
 themselves. The precise point of debarkation was left to 
 be determined by circumstances as they arose. 
 
 These dispositions need not here be considered in detail. 
 It suffices to say, in general terms, that the idea of trans- 
 porting a large body of troops across a sea in which a 
 hostile fleet is still strategically at large is altogether 
 inadmissible. Either Accini's squadron was capable of 
 trying conclusions with that of the Duke of Genoa, 
 hampered as the latter would be by the duty of pro- 
 tecting so vast and unwieldy a convoy, or it was not. In 
 the latter alternative there was no problem to be solved. 
 The defending squadron was not strategically at large in 
 any real and practical sense, but had been neutralized by 
 the overwhelming force of the convoying fleet — as the 
 Russian fleet was at the time of the landing in the 
 Crimea — and the required command of the sea had been 
 secured by the invading force before the beginning of the 
 operations. In the other alternative the risks to which 
 the convoy was exposed must have been such that it is 
 3afe to say that they would never be faced by an invading 
 
THE JEUNE ECOLE FRANCAISE. 211 
 
 force in actual war. Nothing but a certainty that each 
 face of the convoy was defended by a force capable of 
 disposing of any force that the enemy could possibly 
 bring to bear on it, could secure the convoy in the cir- 
 cumstances supposed against the imminent and insur- 
 mountable risk of overwhelming disaster. The destruction 
 that a single well-handled warship could cause if it got 
 into the midst of a large and compact convoy, consisting 
 of defenceless transports, loaded with troops, and unaccus- 
 tomed to steam in company or to act in concert, is simply 
 incalculable. On the other hand, if we are to assume that 
 the force detailed for the defence of each face of the 
 ■convoy was more than sufficient to cope with any force 
 that the enemy could bring against it, then no doubt the 
 •command of the sea was secured, and one disposition was 
 just as good as another ; while if we are to assume that 
 the Duke of Genoa when threatened with attack would 
 have time to concentrate the whole of his force on the 
 front likely to be attacked, then the disposition adopted^ 
 a disposition to be abandoned as soon as danger threatened — 
 would appear to be not a little lacking in tactical purpose 
 and actuality. 
 
 Considerations of this order appear to have governed 
 the dispositions of Accini ; but he was not destined to 
 bring his plans to a successful issue. Hostilities were 
 resumed on Sept. i. The Duke of Genoa's scouting 
 squadron was early at sea, but the convoy with its escort 
 did not leave Maddalena till towards evening. A course 
 was shaped towards Monte Cristo, which was reached at 
 daybreak on Sept. 2. Accini's plan was to gain touch 
 with the expedition by means of his cruisers, and then, 
 forcing himself into the midst of the convoy, to do all the 
 damage he could. But he never had an opportunity of 
 putting his plan in execution. At Monte Cristo the Duke 
 was informed by his scouts that Accini was watching the 
 Italian coast to the northward, and awaiting the approach 
 of the expedition in that quarter. The Duke accordingly de- 
 .termined to avoid Accini's chosen position, and, turning his 
 
212 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 back upon him, to attempt a landing at Volturno, between 
 Gaeta and Naples. This was successfully accomplished 
 on the morning of Sept. 3, Volturno being reached with- 
 out interruption or even observation by the enemy, who 
 failed to put in an appearance during the six hours sup- 
 posed to be occupied at Volturno in landing the troops. 
 Nevertheless the Re Umberto, Accini's flagship, had been 
 observed by Admiral Bertelli and the umpire-in-chief on 
 board the Trinacria, off Cape Linaro, a little to the south 
 of Civita Vecchia, on the afternoon of Sept. 2. Cape 
 Linaro is some seventy miles from Monte Cristo, which 
 had been reached by the expedition on the morning of 
 the same day, and the course from Monte Cristo to 
 \'olturno must have taken the attacking squadron within 
 some fifteen miles of the same point. The failure of 
 Accini to find and molest his adversary thus remains to 
 a large extent unexplained and even unintelligible. How- 
 ever this may be, the arrival of the expedition at Volturno 
 brought the operations to a final conclusion. 
 
 It is far from &zsy to discern in what single respect the 
 three series of operations above described can be regarded 
 as illustrating the peculiar and distinctive features of a 
 so-called guerre des cdtes as distinguished from the recog- 
 nized historical characteristics of a struggle for the com- 
 mand of the sea. In the first phase of the operations the 
 Duke of Genoa was twice interrupted in his demonstrations 
 against the coast by the appearance of an inferior defend- 
 ing fleet, and with sound strategic instinct he recognized 
 at once that his real objective was the enemy's fleet, and 
 promptly abandoned his more or less theatrical demonstra- 
 tions against the enemy's coasts. His attack on Accini 
 in the Bay of Naples was strategically sound enough, and 
 may be compared not unprofitably with the Japanese 
 attacks on Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. It represented 
 his conviction that his aggressive designs must be 
 paralyzed so long as the defending fleet remained stra- 
 tegically at large, but its easy success remains for the 
 most part inexplicable in the circumstances as described. 
 
THE JEUNE tCOLE FRANCAISE. 213 
 
 The second phase of the operations, namely, the attack on 
 Accini at Gaeta, appears to have been legitimately con- 
 ceived in the same order of ideas, and to be based on the 
 sound assumption that command of the sea will always 
 be regarded as essential to such freedom of maritime 
 aggression as a superior naval force must seek to possess 
 and exercise. The third phase of the operations was 
 practically based on the assumption of an assured com- 
 mand of the sea. If this proposition is disputed, it must 
 be acknowledged that the whole proceeding was strategi- 
 cally an absolute nullity. In order to render the supposed 
 military expedition even colourably feasible, it was found 
 necessary to reduce Accini's force to a mere skeleton, to 
 add to the force at the Duke of Genoa's disposal all the 
 strength that had been subtracted from Accini's, and to 
 select as the basis of operations a position far nearer to 
 the coasts of Italy than any at the disposal of the enemy 
 suppiosed to be represented — for though Corsica belongs 
 to France, it possesses no inherent military resources 
 capable of sustaining an important maritime expedition, 
 and if selected as the basis of such an expedition, must 
 itself be supplied with the troops required by transport 
 across a sea of which the command is ex hypothesi in dis- 
 pute. Even so, however, with all these advantages in his 
 favour — advantages which no real enemy would be likely 
 to enjoy, at any rate at the outset of hostilities — it wa.s 
 recognized by the Duke of Genoa, as is shown by the 
 whole character of his dispositions, that his undertaking 
 was surrounded by immense difficulties, and at least 
 menaced with overwhelming disaster. He succeeded in 
 traversing the sea without impediment and landing his 
 troops unmolested. But to land an army in an enemy's 
 country is only the first, and not necessarily the most 
 difficult, part of the problem of invasion. Unless its 
 maritime communications are secure, an army so landed 
 is certain sooner or later to perish. If Accini was strong 
 enough to attempt to intercept the expedition, he was 
 also strong enough to interfere with its communications 
 
214 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 after it had landed. Thus it was not enough to elude his 
 force ; he must sooner or later be brought to an action 
 and defeated. In actual warfare this would certainly have 
 to be done before such an expedition was undertaken. 
 In mancEuvres the order may often be inverted with 
 apparent impunity, because the proceedings can always be 
 suspended at a point where the further solution of the 
 problem becomes embarrassing. But the stern reality of 
 war allows no such liberties to be taken ; and those who 
 propose to violate the historic principles of strategy, as 
 established by the experience of ages upon ages of war- 
 fare, must at least be prepared to show where those 
 principles are at fault, and how they can be bettered in 
 the future. There is no single incident in the operations 
 above described which can properly be held to show that 
 a so-called war of coasts, as distinguished from a struggle 
 for the command of the sea in dispute, is indicated as the 
 naval strategy of the future by the methods, instruments, 
 and appliances of modem naval warfare. If the two 
 things are identical, well and good. It i.s merely a question 
 of terms, and on the whole there appears to be no good 
 reason why the new term should be substituted for the 
 old. But if the two things are different, then it still 
 remains to be shown in what respect the new is in any 
 sense better than the old. 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
( 2'5 ) 
 
 THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA.* 
 
 "My situation with this army," wrote Nelson on board 
 H.M.S. Agamemnon in October, 1795, " has convinced 
 me of the futility of Continental alliances. The conduct 
 (jf the Court of Vienna, whatever may be said by the 
 House of Commons to the contrary, is nothing but deception. 
 I am certain, if it appears to that Court to be their 
 interest to make peace with France, it will instantly be 
 done. What is Austria better than Prussia } In one 
 respect, Prussia perhaps is better than Austria : the 
 moment he got our money he finished the farce. Austria, 
 I fear, may induce us to give her more." 
 
 The history of the numerous Continental alliances, 
 their objects, duration, and success during the past two 
 centuries, goes far to prove the truth of Nelson's words. 
 The combinations have been many and peculiar, the 
 defections significant, the achievements chequered. Race 
 sympathies and antipathies, dynastic ambitions and 
 affinities, real and spurious national interests, diplomatic 
 intrigues, mere gold — all have played their part in bring- 
 ing about temporary alliances between the States of 
 Europe. The ever-changing arrangements of colour shown 
 in the kaleidoscope, turned by the hand of time, are not due 
 to mere chance. Certain principles or laws can be traced 
 which must serve as guides of policy to-day. 
 
 Effective alliances mean war — not the maintenance of 
 abstract propositions. War is the only test of their 
 • United Sai'ice Muiraziiie. 
 
2i6 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 solidarity and the only proof that their professed objects 
 are real. The "Triple Alliance" of 1717— Great Britain, 
 France, and Holland — formed to uphold the treaty of 
 Utrecht, became the "Quadruple Alliance" in 17 18 by 
 the adhesion of Austria, whose embroilment with Spain 
 precipitated the war which broke out in the same year. 
 The elder Byng was at once despatched to the Mediter- 
 ranean to shatter the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, and 
 the British Navy, rendering timely aid to Austria and 
 supporting the tardy action of France, played a decisive 
 part in securing the peace of 172 1. The "Armed 
 Neutrality" of 1780, formed by Russia, Prussia, Sweden, 
 Denmark, and Holland, to enforce the rights of neutrals, 
 provided nothing but a paper support to the last-named 
 Power in its disastrous conflict with Great Britain. The 
 "Maritime Confederacy" of 1801, after entaihng upon 
 Denmark the Battle of the Baltic, died with the Emperor 
 Paul. The principal result of the Northern Coalition 
 arising out of the treaty of Tilsit was the bombardment 
 of Copenhagen and the seizure of the Danish fleet. 
 
 Again, the effective maintenance of alliances demands 
 not merely that identity of interests between the contracting 
 Powers shall endure, but that expediency shall dictate a 
 common course to all. This condition can rarely or never 
 be fulfilled during a period of war, as the history of the 
 various coalitions formed against France between 1793 and 
 18 1 5 clearly proves. Nothing could have been more 
 ineffectual than the first of these combinations. Austria 
 and Prussia were mutually jealous. Russia was occupied 
 in crushing Poland. Prussia and Spain retired in 1795, 
 and in the following year the latter Power was at war 
 with England. Holland, forced out of her alliance, became 
 an object of attack. The second coalition brought Russian 
 troops to Italy and to co-operate in the abortive Helder 
 expedition, while Turks shared in England's Egyptian 
 operations. But Austria, after the Hohenlinden campaign 
 of 1800, bound herself to conclude a separate treaty apart 
 from the Allies, and Russia in 1801 headed the Maritime 
 
THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA. 217 
 
 Confederacy directed mainly against England. The third 
 ■coalition was broken by the enforced defection of Austria 
 after Austerlitz, and Prussia, who had stood aloof when her 
 action might have been effective, entered the lists only to 
 lose Jena and suffer temporary effacement. Turkey, the 
 ally of the second coalition, being involved in war with 
 Russia, who deserted it, but temporarily upheld the third. 
 Admiral Duckworth was sent on a futile expedition to the 
 Sea of Marmara, and was joined by the Russian squadron 
 only after his undignified retreat. Yet the same year 
 witnessed the Treaty of Tilsit following Friedland, and 
 the complete withdrawal of Russia from the obligations of 
 the alliance, to be soon followed by active hostility. The 
 fourth coalition of 18 10 was broken up by the defection, 
 after Wagram, of Austria, in whose behalf the ill-fated 
 Walcheren expedition had been undertaken. 
 
 Finally, the slightest study of the history of alliances 
 serves to show the dominating position held by Great 
 Britain. From the days of the League of Augsburg 
 imported into this country by William of Orange, down 
 to the operations against Mehemet Ali in 1840, the com- 
 binations of the Powers, so far as they have shown effective 
 results, owe these results to the direction, the material 
 assistance, and the sustained impulse proceeding from 
 England. Danger to the liberties of Europe, whether 
 threatened by Louis XIV., by Spain, or by Napoleon, was 
 met and averted by the genius and the sea power of 
 England. Of the wars of the French Revolution, Captain 
 Mahan justly states that the Powers of Europe " thought 
 to cope with a mighty spirit by means of elaborate and 
 powerful machinery. . . . The means were insufficient. 
 . . . Fortunately for Europe and for freedom, another 
 spirit, less demonstrative but equally powerful, was already 
 living and animating another great nation peculiarly fitted 
 by position and by the character of its people to grapple 
 with and exhaust all that was vicious and destructive in 
 the French Revolution." Throughout the period of almost 
 continuous war which began in 1689 and ended in 181 5, 
 
2i8 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 there was no effective alliance in which Great Britain did 
 not play a dominating role, none to which she did not 
 bring more than she received. Nor did any other Power 
 show the same tenacity of purpose. Allies fell away as 
 soon as ever their temporary interests appeared to demand 
 peace or a change of sides. England remained staunch 
 to the cause for which she had taken up arms. In this 
 admirable persistency, however, there was no noble striving 
 after an abstract ideal. The maintenance of the balance 
 of power was a convenient pretext of action. The phrase 
 served the usual purpose of phrases ; but England had 
 entered upon an era of colonial expansion, and herein lay 
 the real motive of her action. Whether Marlborough led 
 his composite armies to victory in Flanders, or Wellington 
 sternly forced his steadfast way from Torres Vedras to 
 Paris, whatever were the means adopted, the real object 
 was the suppression of maritime rivals. For this reason 
 France, Spain, and Holland figure as the principal enemies 
 of England, and Prussia, Austria, and Russia as the 
 occasional allies. For this reason also, when the War of 
 American Independence — a purely British quarrel — broke 
 out in 1775, this country was not merely without allies, but 
 became successively involved with France, Spain, and 
 Holland, and menaced by the armed neutrality of Prussia, 
 Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. 
 
 In defiance of the plain teaching of history, and of all 
 the conditions of our present national life, some industrious 
 military writers persistently urge that our salvation is to 
 be found only in the arms of the modern Triple Alliance. 
 With an utter absence of humour they gravely set them- 
 selves to demonstrate the enormous advantages which the 
 Navy of England could bring to the assistance of the 
 Central Powers. The spectacle of Penelope engaged in 
 cataloguing her charms for the instruction of her suitors 
 is not edifying. As to the corresponding advantages 
 which are to accrue to this country, these writers are 
 naturally vague. No one in his senses will be induced to 
 believe that, if Great Britain were unfortunately involved 
 
THE GER.UAU STRATEGIST AT SEA. 219 
 
 in war with France, arising from some colonial dispute, or 
 with Russia on the frontier of Afghanistan, the Central 
 I'owers would move a corporal's guard to her assistance. 
 What possible inducement could exist to intervene in a 
 ^ti^ggle eminently to their advantage, and involving issues 
 wholly outside their interests ? 
 
 Meanwhile, the eager suitors on their side are not in- 
 active. Their English sympathizers facilitate their literary 
 operations in this country, and they naturally have free 
 access to the Press of Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. Their 
 plan of campaign is transparently simple. Assuming the 
 role of disinterested advisers, it is their object to convey 
 frequent warnings of dangers which, so it is intimated, 
 can be averted only by active co-operation with the Triple 
 Alliance. Thus it is sought to work directly upon the 
 fears of England and of Italy, and indirectly upon the 
 former Power through the susceptibilities of the latter. 
 
 Germany has produced military literature of the highest 
 class, though limited in quantity. When, however, the 
 German strategist rashly abandons his roads and railways 
 in order to put to sea, his literary efforts become pitiable. 
 He has no naval history or naval traditions of his own. 
 He has neither time nor opportunity for studying those 
 of other Powers. He can produce an academical treatise 
 of any assigned length on the defence of woods, or the 
 probable effects of the introduction of smokeless powder 
 upon tactics and moral. It is surely his misfortune that 
 the prize for which he elects to compete should be the 
 right to manipulate to his advantage the greatest Navy 
 of the world. 
 
 In studying the literary results of this remarkable com- 
 petition, it seems possible to trace the general idea to its 
 root in the dim annals of the Middle Ages. Baron von 
 Schinkenbaum lived secure in his castle perched on some 
 eminence which "commanded" the surrounding country. 
 All was well until the neighbouring Graf von Blitzenstein 
 conceived the idea of adding a culverin to his armament 
 The Baron's technical advisers at once pointed out that his 
 
220 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 strategic position was gravely "compromised," and that 
 at the least it would be necessary to strengthen his 
 barbican and provide a new bombard. The Graf replied 
 with a machicoulis gallery of improved design. Thus we 
 may easily imagine the simple-minded ancestors of the 
 German strategist to have shaped their military policy ; 
 thus their successor seeks to instruct the greatest naval 
 Power of the age. Fortify a harbour, a promontory, or an 
 island, and you at once " command " a great tract of sea, 
 an extended coast-line, an indefinite Hinterland ; you are, 
 in fact, secure, unless another Power should begin to fortify 
 some point within or near this tract of sea, in which case 
 your position is at once compromised, and only the Triple 
 Alliance can save you. Such precepts, set forth with 
 portentous solemnity, are enjoined upon the countrymen 
 of Nelson. Everywhere throughout the world we appear 
 to be in danger either from want of fortifications or on 
 account of the possible fortifications of other Powers. 
 Thus the Canadian Pacific Railway is recognized as a 
 great imperial resource ; but " fortified bases " are needed 
 for " the defence of the iron road," more than three thousand 
 seven hundred miles in length. We ought to fortify New- 
 foundland, and especially Anticosti, which, " like Heligoland 
 at the mouth of the Elbe, rejoices in a most advantageous 
 position." At the other side of the continent lies Vancouver 
 town, also unfortified, and stated to be " under the disad- 
 vantage of dense fogs and dangerous of entry by means of 
 the Haro Strait, with its island-sown narrows, which limit 
 the ebb and flow of traffic." Yet, in another sentence, we 
 learn that this unfavoured spot is "marvellously adapted 
 to the strategy of a maritime Power 1 " 
 
 Though at present secure in the Far East, we are living 
 in a fool's paradise, for, "as soon as France shall have 
 effectually pacified Tonquin and found a strategic base 
 for operating by land against Indo-China and by sea from 
 the natural harbours of Halong and Saigon, the slender 
 thread of English communications may be considered as 
 virtually severed." The German strategist's conception of 
 
THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA. 221 
 
 the ocean communications of a great naval Power is well 
 illustrated by this sentence. Elsewhere he throws further 
 light upon the point by the statement that the sea route 
 to Suez passes " at less than a spear-throw from the island " 
 of Crete ! Obviously, his mind is confusing maritime com- 
 munications with the tree-begirt roads of the Fatherland. 
 
 Doubtless there are many people in this country who 
 believe that the guns of Gibraltar bar the entrance to the 
 Mediterranean, but the views of such persons do not find 
 expression in military journals. The German strategist, 
 however, has discovered that "until now England barred 
 the passage of Bab-el-Mandeb " by the mere possession 
 of the small island of Perim. This advantage may at any 
 time disappear, since "a glance at the map shows us that 
 some fortifications on the Franco-African promontories of 
 Dumeirah and Siyan, and on the Suba Islands, would 
 transform England's position here into one of insignificance." 
 Such extensive measures are perhaps unnecessary for our 
 undoing, because, as is pointed out, " it is easy to calculate 
 in what wise Obok of the French might well serve to flank 
 the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb strategically, and eventually to 
 command them." In other words, to secure naval command 
 in certain waters is merely a question of fortification ! 
 
 Egj'pt naturally provides many snares for the unsus- 
 pecting strategist, and leads him in addition to a reckless 
 misuse of technical terms. "The geographical features" 
 of this remarkable country, where " the blue waves of the 
 Mediterranean . . . press up the delta of the Nile," and 
 " the Pyramids support the horizon ... not only constitute 
 a strong natural defence for herself, but afford a firm basis 
 for pushing forward offensive operations in every direction 
 of the compass." Yet a few sentences later Egypt is 
 described as an " oasis " in the middle of deserts. There 
 is no country in the world more certain to fall an easy 
 prey to sea power ; none less suited to afford a "firm basis" 
 for " offensive operations," except in the hands of a State 
 holding undisputed command of the Mediterranean and 
 the Red Sea ; none possessing fewer militar)- resources. 
 
222 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 The strategist maladroitly reminds us of the "victor\- 
 of Bonaparte and Kleber at the foot of the Pyramids at 
 the close of the last century." "Do not," he asks, "the 
 words addressed to the Directory by the youthful French 
 general, ' En prenant et en gardant I'Egypte je prends en 
 main les destinies du monde,' constitute a strong testimonj- 
 to the strategic importance of Egypt ? " " En gardant," 
 " je prends en main " — the bitter irony of these words, read 
 in the light of history, does not occur to the strategist. 
 He has doubtless never heard of the "intercepted corre- 
 spondence " of the French, which tells the cruel fate of an 
 army imprisoned by the seas and deserts in this country, 
 so admirably adapted for "pushing forward offensive 
 operations in every direction of the compass." "The 
 defeat of our fleet," wrote Citizen Le P^re on August 5, 
 1798, " in the dreadful action of the ist inst, is a calamity 
 which leaves us here as children totally lost to the mother 
 country. Nothing but peace can restore us to her." " I 
 used to say in Europe," wrote Kleber, "that this country 
 was for France the point dappui, by means of which she 
 might move at will the commercial system of every quarter 
 of the globe ; but to do this effectually a powerful lever 
 is required, and that lever is a navy. Ours has existed. 
 Since that period everything has changed." Napoleon, 
 whose ignorance of everything relating to the sea was 
 always conspicuous, may perhaps have been imbued with 
 the ideas which the German strategist propounds to-day. 
 He may have thought — before August i, 1798 — that Egypt 
 in itself would be a source of strength to any Power which 
 could reach it, that its "commerce" could "sustain its 
 warlike strength ; " in short, that its strategic importance 
 was not purely and solely a question of sea power. 
 
 How far neglect of the dominating factor may carry 
 the strategist is shown by the following remarkable state- 
 ments. " To the trained military eye Egypt presents itself 
 as the eastern bastion of the ill-shaped African continent, 
 a bastion naturally strong and capable of resisting attack. 
 . . . The bastion at once commands the narrow strip of 
 
THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA. 223 
 
 coast extending to Tripoli and the curtain extending 
 along the Libyan desert to the Soudan." "The trained 
 military eye" is evidently a comprehensive organ, as is 
 further proved by the assertion that England "dominates 
 the important angle where Syria joins Asia Minor — the 
 Gulf of Iskenderun — by means of the gift brought home 
 by Beaconsfield from the Berlin Congress, the island of 
 Cyprus." If England "dominates" any portion of the 
 Levant, it is "by means of" the Imperial Navy, not by 
 the lease of the island of Cyprus, which is practically useless 
 for naval purposes and does not even fulfil the strategist's 
 condition of possessing fortifications. Yet " Cyprus in the 
 same manner controls the Anatolian and Syrian coasts. 
 The strategic axis in this maritime region oscillates be- 
 tween Cyprus, Alexandria and Cyprus, Port Said." " What 
 is the chronometer of God ? " asked a quiet voice at the 
 conclusion of the sea-captain's impressive story in the 
 Idle Excursion. What, we may well ask, is an oscillating 
 ■' strategic axis " .' 
 
 The " English padlock " by which the southern entrance 
 of the Red Sea is, was, or might be " secured ; " Aden, the 
 "fortress of rock . . . on which the English leopard cowers;" 
 the " detached fort, Socotra ; " Egypt, that commanding 
 " bastion ; " Cyprus, which " partially, at least, paralyzes 
 the strategic line of operations from Rhodes to Crete" — 
 all are practically of no avail. "As soon as France has 
 deepened the canal from Bordeaux to Narbonne, so that 
 men-of-war can use it, from the day of its opening the 
 nautical centre of gravity of Western Europe will be dis- 
 placed, and the control of the Suez route will lie un- 
 questionably in French hands." Should the strategist 
 eventually discover that this canal passes over a height of 
 six hundred feet and must contain more than a hundred 
 locks, that the works required to enable it to transport large 
 ships of war would be stupendous, that the provision of 
 an adequate water-supply at the summit level would offer 
 enormous difficulties, and that the time required for the 
 transit of a fleet would be inordinate, his general conclusion 
 
224 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 would remain unaltered. The " military eye " discerns 
 other weapons by which British power in the Mediterranean 
 must be destroyed, Already " the security of the West, 
 from the British Islands to Alexandria and Port Said, has 
 suffered seriously since France has hoped more and more 
 to realize the dream of the Mediterranean as a French 
 lake. For in Biserta . . . there stands nearly completed a 
 strong maritime fortification endangering the route of the 
 English army and occupying an incomparable position 
 opposite the neighbouring island of Malta." 
 
 In the view of the strategist, Biserta is capable of 
 revolutionizing all existing naval conditions in the Medi- 
 terranean, and England, menaced in a special sense, must 
 be awakened to a sense of her peril. Vienna, however, 
 has for some time been cognizant of the "vigilance and 
 uneasiness of both the Italians and the English," and is 
 now convinced that the former regard the present state of 
 things as most serious, and believe that its gravity will 
 be " recognized in England ; " for Biserta, though " destined 
 to become the point of concentration of all the French 
 forces in the great unavoidable and decisive struggle," 
 will nevertheless oblige England to "divide its fleet" and 
 "keep two squadrons in readiness, one at Gibraltar and 
 one at Malta." Curiously enough, although the at present 
 non-existent fortifications of Biserta will modify "the 
 balance of power in the Mediterranean ... to the pre- 
 judice of the Triple Alliance," the "Tunisian Question 
 seems destined to strengthen and maintain " that alliance. 
 The Vienna strategist thus appears to be grateful to the 
 menace of Biserta as calculated to check any tendency 
 towards backsliding on the part of Italy. Berlin, on the 
 other hand, supplies specific advice to " proud Albion " to 
 counteract the malefic influence of Biserta by the creation 
 of a fortified naval station in the Zafrin Islands, and at the 
 same time directs Italy to fortify the southern coast of Sicily. 
 
 Such are the opinions which appear and reappear in 
 the section of the European Press which is at the disposal 
 of the Triple Alliance. Their unanimity, even to the 
 
THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA. 225 
 
 turn of a phrase, is remarkable. The fundamental mis- 
 conception of the German strategist runs through all alike. 
 Command of the sea is presented as a mere matter of 
 fortified posts on shore. The very essence of maritime 
 superiority, as demonstrated by the history of two thousand 
 years, is forgotten. To convert Biserta into a great naval 
 port will involve an enormous outlay, and will add little 
 to the offensive power of France. The command of the 
 Mediterranean can be won and held only by successful 
 fleet actions ; in other words, by the Power which main- 
 tains the largest and most efficient fleet in these waters. 
 In so far as Biserta can render assistance in the maintain- 
 ing of a sea-going fleet, it will be a factor to be taken 
 into account. In any case, it can detract nothing from 
 the naval strength which Great Britain could exert, while 
 it will obviously add to the responsibilities of the French 
 fleet. The balance of power at sea is a question of navies, 
 not of fortifications, and the conditions which confer naval 
 supremacy cannot be secured by mere money. 
 
 When, quitting his " bastions," " curtains," and " detached 
 forts," the strategist turns to high policy and dictates the 
 rdle of England in a great European war, we have much 
 reason to be grateful for his candour. The Navy of 
 England is in the first place to guarantee "the German 
 coasts." Then the co-operation of the English fleet with 
 the German Army "will prejudice the extension of 
 Russia's power on her south-west frontier," and "probably 
 . . . prevent a greater despatch of troops from the 
 military districts of Moscow and Kazan to the Asiatic 
 theatre of war." In the Mediterranean, on the other 
 hand, the English fleet, "by the side of" those of Italy 
 and Austria, is to "neutralize or destroy the French 
 Mediterranean fleet." This accomplished, England will 
 at once be "enabled freely to dispose of a great part of 
 her fleet for the defence of her coasts, her trade, her 
 imports, and other objects of the war." The strategist 
 does not pause to explain by whom the coasts of England 
 would in this case be threatened ; but the defence of 
 
 Q 
 
226 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 these coasts is held out as the principal return which the 
 Central Powers are to make for the gift of Her Majesty's 
 Navy. Their security is to be doubly guaranteed, since, 
 not merely will the British fleet "neutralize or destroy" 
 that of the French, but " an advance of the German and 
 Italian armies on the eastern frontier of France would 
 make impossible any great undertaking of the latter 
 Power against England and her coasts." On one point 
 the strategist is naturally clear : " unquestionably the 
 greater advantage " lies " on the side of England." 
 
 The assumptions involved in this simple programme 
 are evident. Either Russia is to make an aggressive 
 movement upon India at a moment when she is embroiled 
 with the Central Powers, or those Powers are to regard 
 such a movement, solely affecting England, as a casus 
 belli ; or England, as a member of the Triple Alliance, is 
 to carry war into Central Asia because of some Russo- 
 Austrian or Franco-German dispute. Failing the fulfil- 
 ment of one or other of these conditions, the prospective 
 advantages held out to England in the Far East dis- 
 appear, and we are thrown back on the promised protec- 
 tion of our coast line. Who shall say that any one of 
 them will be fulfilled .' Can we not, as in the past, guard 
 our shores without foreign assistance ? 
 
 While every species of doubt hangs over the advantages 
 which are held out to us, there is none as to the price to 
 be paid. For a time at least, the splendid fleet of 
 England, with all its complex responsibilities, is to be 
 placed at the disposal of the Central Powers, for objects 
 which may possibly conflict with the national needs and 
 interests. And any purely European quarrel, accidental 
 or designed, is, by reason of the predetermined participa- 
 tion of this country, to be felt in every quarter of the 
 world. No great war in which Great Britain shares can 
 be confined to Europe. 
 
 We shall not accept these terms. The time may come 
 when our entry into a European struggle will be demanded 
 by every consideration of honour and of policy. We 
 
THE GERMAN STRATEGIST AT SEA. 227 
 
 reserve to ourselves the right to determine when that 
 time shall have arrived, and to decide the direction and 
 the scope of our action. Till then, the Triple Alliance, 
 in so far as its aims are peaceful, can count on our 
 sympathy. Its raison d'etre — the perpetuation of the 
 frontier forced upon France in 1871 — is not a British 
 interest. Its present achievements — the rapid impoverish- 
 ment of Italy and the unnatural rapprochement of France 
 and Russia — are not special objects of our desire. Whether 
 the moderation of its ambitions would remain unchanged 
 if the enormous weight of the British Navy were thrown 
 into the scale we do not know. We do know from all 
 history that, unless an alliance is a mere name, no 
 individual member can avert a war which may chance ta 
 suit the policy of others. Meanwhile, the German 
 strategist, as the expert advocate of the Triple Alliance, 
 must be taken seriously. His utterances show him to be 
 in earnest ; their frequency proves his industry. That his 
 knowledge is pitiably inadequate is his misfortune, not 
 his fault. The sea is not his element. Nor can we 
 expect him to understand the conditions of an Empire 
 embodying great self-governing colonies. 
 
 Four hundred years ago, before Europe had heard of 
 the Electorate of Brandenburg or the Duchy of Prussia, a 
 great Englishman wrote as follows : — 
 
 " But this much is certain ; that he that commands the 
 sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as 
 little of the war as he will ; whereas those that be strongest 
 by land are many times in great straits. Surely at this 
 day, with us of Europe the vantage of strength at sea 
 (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of 
 Great Britain) is great." 
 
 In these pregnant words. Bacon lays down the first 
 principles of a great national policy. " He that commands 
 the sea " may not pledge himself in advance to the widely 
 differing aims of "those that be strongest by land." 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
228 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.* 
 
 [The abandonment of the Mediterranean has found advocates in 
 se\ era! quarters ; but this extraordinary proposal has never been 
 publicly set forth with such completeness of detail as in the article 
 here subjected to criticism. This criticism is republished not for the 
 purpose of controversy, but because the dangerous fallacy here dis- 
 cussed is diametrically opposed to the principles which the present 
 volume is intended to uphold.] 
 
 When a writer, speculating in days of peace, bids us 
 abandon a policy which has undergone the test of great 
 wars, abundantly justifying the views of the statesmen 
 and the sailors who have upheld it, he incurs a grave 
 responsibility. The more plausible his statements, the 
 greater should be the suspicion with which they are 
 regarded, since, at the best, he can but offer us personal 
 surmise in place of history. 
 
 Mr. Laird Clowes has brought forward a laudably 
 definite proposal. There are here no half-measures ; 
 everything is detailed. The Mediterranean is to be 
 abandoned alike in peace and in war. The historic 
 waters of the most important sea of the world are 
 no longer to carry the white ensign, except as an occa- 
 sional guest "on a similar footing" to "Brazil." From 
 Gibraltar to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, for three 
 thousand miles of the greatest trade-route of the world, 
 the sea power of the British Empire is to be inoperative. 
 Egypt is to become a French colony ; Tripoli is to share 
 the fate of Tunis ; Malta is handed over to the Pope ; 
 Cyprus reverts to the Porte. In return, we are to be 
 permitted to seize Tangier, and occupy Morocco, west of 
 * Nineteenth Century, April, 1895. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRA.XEAN. 229 
 
 the fifth meridian of West longitude, with a hinterland 
 undefined, and also apparently to annex " the peninsula 
 of Bab-el-Mandeb " and the rugged and worthless promon- 
 tory of Siyan on the Somali coast. 
 
 Such is the scheme which Mr. Laird Clowes has pro- 
 pounded. No doubts or misgivings seem to occur to him ; 
 certitude is stamped upon every sentence. Of argument 
 based on past experience or on reason there is none. His 
 few incidental excursions into history are singularly unfortun- 
 ate. Assertion follows assertion throughout the article with 
 aggravating persistency. He has wholly failed to see that, 
 in demanding that we should break with all the teaching 
 of the past, and deliberately fling to the winds the rich 
 experience of great wars, something more than the ipse 
 dixit of " Nauticus " is required. We claim at least to be 
 reasoned with before taking a leap into Cimmerian dark- 
 ness. " The day for plain speaking has come," he tells 
 us. I agree with him. 
 
 After careful study of this remarkable article, I fail to 
 discover precisely what is the ruling motive. We are led 
 at the outset to believe that pure economy is the object 
 sought. " It is almost hopeless to expect any govern- 
 ment" to give us the " mah'nel zxid personnel" necessary — 
 in Mr. Laird Clowes's view — to hold the Mediterranean. 
 Therefore, apparently, we are to accept the revolution he 
 advocates. Later on, however, we are informed that " mere 
 motives of economy would scarcely . . . justify" us in 
 taking the step, and the tone frequently adopted seems to 
 indicate that, under any circumstances, our best and safest 
 policy would be to adopt this brand new gospel. Our 
 presence in the Mediterranean even appears to arouse 
 Mr. Laird Clowes's resentment. In that sea we possess 
 nothing except what is "valueless and unproductive." 
 " We went in only to protect our commerce against piracy ; 
 we went next ... in self-defence against France and 
 Spain ; " we remained for several alleged reasons, but 
 " the truth is " that our stay is due to " a habit of meddling 
 with other people's business." 
 
230 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 History was never more absolutely travestied. The 
 first British fighting fleet entered the Mediterranean in 
 1 1 94, carrying Richard the First to Palestine, and captur- 
 ing en route Messina and Cyprus. We " went next " in 
 force in 1654, by the orders of Cromwell, "to procure 
 satisfaction from such Princes and States as had either 
 insulted the Government, or injured the commerce of 
 England." * The orders, which Blake carried out to the 
 letter, were by no means confined to the suppression of 
 piracy. Before the end of April, 1655, the great Admiral 
 of the Commonwealth "had taught nations to whom the 
 very name of Enghshmen was a strange sound to respect 
 its honour and its rights. . . . The petty Princes of Italy 
 had been made to feel the power of the Northern 
 Protestants . . . and the distant echo of our guns had 
 startled the Council Chambers of Venice and Constanti- 
 nople." t We "went ne.xt" in force in 1694 to protect 
 our commerce and save Spain, our ally, from the loss of 
 Barcelona and Catalonia. We went again in 1695, risk- 
 ing an inferior force in a successful effort to protect our 
 trade. On the 13th of August, 1704, Sir George Rooke, 
 with a British and Dutch force, won the important victory 
 of Malaga over a superior French fleet, and established a 
 command of the Mediterranean unchallenged for the 
 remaining period of the war. After Byng's failure and 
 retirement to Gibraltar in 1756, Hawke was sent in with 
 orders "to endeavour by all means to destroy the French 
 fleet." % Throughout the long struggle with the French 
 Republic and Empire, the vital necessity of holding on 
 to the Mediterranean was made manifest, notwithstanding 
 that our trade interests were then relatively trivial. 
 Inferiority of force did not deter our admirals from enter- 
 ing it, and, when temporarily abandoned, it was quickly 
 reoccupied. At the beginning of 1798, the French con- 
 trolled the Mediterranean from end to end. At its close, 
 
 * Orders of Cromwell to Blake. 
 
 t " Life of Blake," by Hepworth Dixon. 
 
 j Admiralty orders to Lord Hawke. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 231 
 
 two French ships of the line — both subsequently lost — 
 remained afloat. If Mr. Laird Clowes's "law of self- 
 preservation" had found favour in the days of real 
 national stress, Nelson, with a force inferior to the Toulon 
 fleet, would not have entered the Mediterranean in May, 
 1798, and the battle of the Nile would never have been 
 fought.* We then held on to the Mediterranean simply 
 and solely because we were fighting for our existence as 
 a nation — not engaged in discussing theories — and stern 
 experience had proved the policy to be indefeasible. 
 From the battle of the Nile to the present day we have 
 maintained our position in the great inland sea. No 
 Power of modern Europe has so old an historic claim to 
 use its waters ; not one has a greater record of fighting 
 there performed. Yet Mr. Laird Clowes ventures to 
 describe our position as one of " provocative swagger " on 
 one page, and of disinterested " philanthropy " on another. 
 We are in the Mediterranean to-day (1) because history 
 shows us that we must be there in war ; (2) because our 
 commerce there afloat is enormously greater than that of 
 any other Power ; (3) because no other waters would serve 
 equally well for the training of our fleet. The first reason 
 does not appeal to Mr. Laird Clowes, who is able to 
 assert that "it is absurd to suggest that our interests in 
 the Mediterranean are paramount to those of France, of 
 Italy, and of Spain." Our trade he abandons altogether, 
 after characterizing it as "valueless and unproductive." 
 The Mediterranean as providing excellent training waters 
 for Great Britain — or her possible enemies — has not pre- 
 sented itself to his imagination. 
 
 I cannot, within due limits, hope to deal with the whole 
 of the varied and intricate subjects over which Mr. Laird 
 Clowes lightly ranges. The entire Eastern question, the 
 merits and demerits of the Triple Alliance, the fighting 
 capacity of the Italian navy, and the possible combinations 
 of Mediterranean Powers must be left alone. In laying 
 
 • If Nelson had possessed a few more frigates, Napoleon would 
 almost certainly have been caught, and the history of Europe changed. 
 
:32 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 down the lines of a national policy, we cannot go beyond 
 reasonable probabilities, and the fact that "half a dozen 
 other Powers, including the two most formidable, have 
 well-fortified stations full of ships " in the Mediterranean 
 is scarcely a conclusive reason for our retreat. All these 
 six Powers will certainly not be arrayed against us ; if 
 one of them obtains an ally, it is reasonable, considering 
 the great conflict of interests in these waters, to suppose 
 that we may do likewise. Mr. Laird Clowes has, however, 
 erected an entirely new standard. In his view we have 
 no right to be in the Mediterranean unless we are "abso- 
 lutely unassailable." No more preposterous theory can 
 be imagined. No nation can ever be "absolutely un- 
 assailable" at the outbreak of war, either in the naval oi 
 military sense, and the navy or the army which abandons 
 a position as a matter of course because it is liable to 
 attack has ceased to be a fighting force and has sunk 
 beneath contempt. If, as is urged, we abandon the 
 Mediterranean because we may perhaps have to fight 
 there, our star of empire has already set. 
 
 Other considerations have, however, combined to prompt 
 these curiously eager counsels of retreat. Our interests 
 in these waters are described as inferior to those of Spain ; 
 while our purely Mediterranean commerce is not " essential, 
 happily, to our well-being." The annual total of British trade 
 passing the Straits of Gibraltar is about ;^2 14,000,000, and 
 of this purely Mediterranean commerce is £()'j ,220,000 — 
 far greater, therefore, than our whole Australasian trade. 
 Further, there is a large and growing trade of British 
 colonies with Mediterranean ports.* All this Mr. Laird 
 Clowes proposes to abandon because of some French 
 torpedo-boat stations on the shores of Northern Africa 
 and the Gulf of Lyons. To deal fully with the torpedo- 
 boat question would require an article, and I can only 
 say here that his view is based on pure assumption. I 
 
 * The total British colonial trade with foreign countries passing the 
 Straits of Bab-el- Mandeb is ;£45, 136,000. I believe the figures above 
 given to be below the reality. In any case they do not include the 
 great value of the shipping. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 233 
 
 do not for a moment contend that, at the outset of war, 
 this great trade route can be guaranteed. I assert, how- 
 ever, that, by right of the past, the command of the 
 Mediterranean belongs to Great Britain, in the sense that 
 it must be fought for by any other Power. Should the 
 British Navy win a victory in these waters, or should the 
 French fleet decline to accept battle, it will not be difficult 
 to effectually abate the torpedo-boat menace. 
 
 "We should," Mr. Laird Clowes tells us, "accustom our- 
 selves to do without the Canal to some extent, even in 
 peace-time." He does not pause to explain what he means. 
 Our Indian reliefs can of course be sent round the Cape, 
 if there were any possible object in so doing ; but inexor- 
 able laws, which no theories can change, govern trade 
 routes, and the Suez Canal has dictated the structure of 
 a considerable portion of our steam tonnage. Trade will 
 continue to follow its accustomed lines, and to abandon 
 all attempt to defend it would shake the very foundations 
 of the Empire and imperil the allegiance of great 
 colonies. 
 
 Another remarkable statement must be noticed, because 
 it lies at the root of Mr. Laird Clowes's new "law of self- 
 preservation." "Even if we held both banks of the Suez 
 Canal,* with the entire military force of the Empire, I 
 doubt whether we could prevent a skilful and cunning 
 enemy, no matter how weak he may be, from blocking 
 the passage almost whenever and wherever he might see 
 fit." To prevent foul play, it is merely necessary to pass 
 all mercantile ships through the waterway with a guard 
 on board. Any Power in military possession of Egypt 
 could apply this simple precaution, which requires the 
 very minimum of military force. The point is vital, since 
 our sole real reason for being in Egypt to-day is, by pre- 
 serving internal order, to avert occupation by a foreign 
 Power, which would be able at once to utilize the Canal 
 for its own war vessels and close it to those of an enemy. 
 
 * Serenely oblivious of our large proprietorship in this water-way, 
 Mr. Laird Clowes classes it among ' other people's ditches.' 
 
234 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 A neutral Egypt properly administered would meet all our 
 legitimate requirements, but a French occupation we cannot 
 possibly permit. How this consideration affects Mr. Laird 
 Clowes's readjustment of the balance of power will shortly 
 be seen. 
 
 Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem with which 
 Mr. Laird Clowes deals is as old as naval warfare. It has 
 been successfully solved in the past by our greatest admirals. 
 Nothing has occurred to demand a new and supremely 
 fantastic solution. To control an enemy's fleet, either by 
 defeating it or by confining it in port, is the primary 
 object of naval war. The great sailors of Elizabeth were 
 unanimous as to the method of accomplishing the task. 
 "With fifty sail of shipping," wrote Drake to the Council 
 more than three hundred years ago, "we shall do more 
 good upon their coast than a great many more will do 
 here at home ; and the sooner we are gone, the better we 
 shall be able to impeach them." "The opinion of Sir 
 Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobiser and others, 
 that be men of greatest judgment and experience," wrote 
 Howard to Walsyngham, " is that the surest way to meet 
 with the Spanish Fleet is upon their own coast, or in any 
 harbour of their own. . . . The seas are broad ; but if we 
 had been on their coast they durst not have put off." This 
 has been the guiding principle to the greatest glories of 
 the British navy. Captain Mahan has enforced the lesson 
 throughout his brilliant writings, and has shown, beyond 
 all question, what the naval occupation of the Mediter- 
 ranean implies. The control of the Toulon fleet, which 
 Mr. Laird Clowes now gives up as hopeless, if not un- 
 necessary, is a mere detail in the application of a universal 
 law. St. Vincent and Nelson not only saw that the thing 
 must be done, but succeeded in doing it, and the fact 
 that the abandonment of the inland sea in 1796 was 
 countermanded during its execution, and the occupation 
 restored as soon as possible in spite of our numerical 
 inferiority, is conclusive of a necessity enforced by the 
 demands of war. If Mann had "obeyed his orders," 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 235 
 
 States Mahan, "the battle of Cape St. Vincent would 
 have been fought in the Mediterranean instead of the 
 Atlantic,'' and the results of the victory would have been 
 greatly enhanced. " The expulsion of the English," wrote 
 Napoleon, "has a great effect upon the success of our 
 military operations in Italy." Well might Nelson " lament 
 our present orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable 
 to the dignity of England." * 
 
 Since the days of Nelson two changes have come to pass, 
 (i) France has occupied Algeria, and, by means of the 
 nominal "Regency" but real annexation of Tunis, has 
 become possessed of a thousand miles of the coast-line of 
 Northern Africa. (2) Toulon has, within the last few 
 years only, become the base of the main French fleet. 
 The first of these conditions supplies a powerful argument 
 -against the new scheme ; since, as Captain Mahan has 
 pointed out, the first object of Great Britain should be 
 "to grasp firmly some vital chord t of the enemy's com- 
 munications, and so force him to fight there." This potent 
 lever, which St Vincent and Nelson had not, Mr. Laird 
 Clowes bids us fling aside. The second condition seems 
 to be the real " basis or substratum, what you will," of the 
 entire theory. Were the policy inaugurated by the late 
 Admiral Aube to be changed, and the naval strength of 
 France to be mainly transferred to the Atlantic, the so- 
 called "millstone," together with all the erratic boulders 
 which have accumulated round it, would at once crumble 
 into dust. 
 
 The policy of Mr. Laird Clowes is based upon the 
 negation of an axiom of war. Now, as alwa}s, the only 
 true objective of a navy is an enemy's fleets. Where 
 those fleets are, the British Navy must be, and the pursuit 
 ■of subsidiary objects inevitably entails failure or disaster. 
 Throughout the discursive article under review, I fail to 
 trace the smallest recognition of this elementary truth. If 
 
 • Letter to Mrs. Nelson, October, 1796. 
 
 t I do not assert that this chord is ' vital,' but it is more nearly so 
 than any other accessible to a navy. 
 
236 THE XAVY AA'D THE NATION. 
 
 the plan of substituting a " seal " at the Straits of Gibraltar 
 and Bab-el- Mandeb for the policy which has given to the 
 British Navy all its past glories means anything at all, it 
 is pure defence in regard to the most important portion of 
 the theatre of war. Defence — for the British Empire — 
 spells ruin. 
 
 At the great gates of the Mediterranean and Red Sea 
 we are bidden to maintain an expectant attitude, awaiting 
 an attack close to our fortified ports of Gibraltar and 
 Tangier on the one side, and Aden, Perim, Bab-el-Mandeb, 
 and Siyan on the other. Mr. Laird Clowes speaks much 
 of batteries on shore, destroyers and guardships ; he says 
 singularly little about fighting fleets. The modern theory 
 seems to be that these broad sea-channels may be re- 
 garded as the " defiles " dear to the writer of military 
 text-books — a species of Thermopylae where a small force 
 can effectually oppose a superior fleet. The analogy is 
 false. To "seal" the Straits of Gibraltar requires the 
 constant presence of a fleet capable of defeating any 
 force that can attempt to issue therefrom. Such a fleet 
 must always be ready for action, cruising close at hand 
 in the Atlantic or lying behind its anti-torpedo break- 
 waters ; for the choice of the moment of attack is left with 
 the enemy. No position could be more harassing, more 
 insecure, or more totally opposed to every tradition of 
 successful war. It will occur to most people that the fleet 
 which can accomplish all that is thus demanded might as 
 well be cruising in the Mediterranean with its scouts 
 observing the enemy's ports, free to manceuvre, gaining 
 efficiency every day, gleaning accurate information, and 
 able, when the enemy appears, to choose its own moment 
 of battle. 
 
 Mr. Laird Clowes's proposal, however, goes a great deal 
 further. He applies the same conditions to the Straits of 
 Bab-el-Mandeb, and he hands over Egypt and the Suez 
 Canal to the French. In other words, he enables our 
 rivals, operating on interior lines, to oppose us at the 
 southern end of the Red Sea, with every ship that can 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. lyj 
 
 pass through the deepened Canal. To control the Toulon 
 fleet by the method proposed implies the provision of a 
 naval force double that entailed by the old and proved 
 war policy. The whole case is not even now presented, 
 for he gratuitously provides the French with the finest 
 training waters of the world. Here their whole fleet, 
 with all its mobilized craft, can, on the outbreak of war, 
 be quietly brought up to the highest state of efficiency. 
 What this means, students of Captain Mahan's works are 
 able to judge. 
 
 In spite of one apparently contradictory statement, I 
 consider that I am justified in beheving that Mr. Laird 
 Clowes claims economy in some form for his scheme.* 
 Here, culled from his scattered sentences, are the measures 
 which he calls upon us to undertake at once : — 
 
 (i) Improvement of Gibraltar. 
 
 (2) Provision of breakwaters, docks, fortifications, and 
 garrison at Tangier. 
 
 (3) Occupation of Morocco, west of 5° West longitude, 
 and consequent defence against France of a land frontier 
 of hundreds of miles. 
 
 (4) Fortifications, and therefore great increase of 
 garrison, at Perim. 
 
 (5) Fortification and garrison of promontory of Bab-el- 
 Mandeb. 
 
 (6) Fortification and garrison of the barren rock of 
 Siyan. 
 
 (7) Large development of Bombay as a naval base. 
 For Malta, therefore, Mr. Laird Clowes substitutes four 
 
 new fortresses, which ex hypothesi must be powerfully and 
 permanently garrisoned. I know every corner of Malta, 
 which, in addition to its coast defences, has one of 
 the strongest land-fronts of all the fortresses of the world. 
 Until after a great naval disaster, Malta fulfils Mr. 
 Laird Clowes's condition of being unassailable. I also 
 know Tangier, and I assert that, if we abandon the 
 
 • "To strengthen the Mediterranean fleet to the requisite point 
 would be to incur e.xpenses which," etc. (p. 370). 
 
238 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Mediterranean, and rely on Mr. Laird Clowes's seaU 
 20,000 men and much fortification would be required to 
 defend it. How many troops would be needed to estab- 
 lish and maintain control of Morocco no one can say. 
 The new Red Sea fortresses also may be called upon to 
 resist an attack in practically unlimited strength. They, 
 too, must be strongly fortified and garrisoned. On the 
 whole, I have no hesitation in stating that to carry out 
 Mr. Laird Clowes's programme will require a capital 
 expenditure of at least ten millions sterling and the 
 addition of an Army Corps to our military establishments. 
 Mr. Laird Clowes gives no hint of the dimensions of the 
 "far bigger" naval force which he considers necessary to 
 maintain the traditional policy of England. I cannot, there- 
 fore, frame a balance-sheet, nor can I discuss this involved 
 question. I merely state my firm belief that, so far as 
 France is concerned, we are at this moment perfectly able 
 to make good our position in the Mediterranean, and that 
 every instructed naval ofiicer and politician across the 
 Channel is well aware of the fact. In any case, the proper 
 application of increased expenditure is to the Navy, and 
 not to the frittering away of our strength by increasing an 
 already large number of fortified ports. For, after all, it 
 is upon the Navy alone that the efiicacy of Mr. Laird 
 Clowes's seals and the security of his various new fortresses 
 must ultimately depend. If the Navy is permitted to operate 
 in front of the latter, instead of in rear, they may be dis- 
 pensed with altogether. 
 
 The fatal confusion of ideas which results from ignoring 
 principles is illustrated in the following significant 
 sentence : " The present policy of endeavouring to support 
 the Mediterranean fleet by the Channel squadron is a 
 mere penny-wise and pound-foolish makeshift." Mr. 
 Laird Clowes must surely be aware that the peace strength 
 of our Mediterranean fleet is determined by diplomatic 
 considerations. With a view to avoid the appearance of 
 the "provocative swagger" which he censures, the number 
 of ships is deliberately restricted. At the same time, in 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 239 
 
 accordance with established custom, the Channel squadron 
 visits the Mediterranean every year. I fail to understand 
 what is meant by the phrjise "'endeavouring to support." 
 It has never been possible in all cases to distribute navies 
 in precise accordance with the strategic conditions arising 
 on the outbreak of war, and the Mediterranean fleet has 
 never been kept at war strength. This cheap " makeshift," 
 as Mr. Laird Clowes contemptuously styles it, has the 
 sanction of long experience even in days of storm. I 
 presume him to infer that because the ships ready for 
 mobilization at Toulon would render the French fleet 
 numerically superior to our peace strength in the 
 Mediterranean, our position is necessarily imperilled. 
 Newly mobilized ships, however, require weeks to develop 
 their full fighting powers. From Plymouth, a modern 
 squadron would reach the Mediterranean in four days. 
 There are some persons who appear to believe that a great 
 naval war can break out without any warning whatever. 
 They have not, however, explained the Jttodus operandi, and 
 remembering that a hundred years ago timely information 
 of the proceedings at Toulon was forthcoming, it is 
 inconceivable that in days of communication infinitely 
 multiplied a fleet equipped and ready for action can issue 
 thence as a bolt from the blue. 
 
 That naval wars are decided by fighting fleets, that 
 naval strategy consists in bringing superior force to bear 
 at decisive points, and that such decisive points are the 
 positions, wherever they may be, of an enemy's fighting 
 forces — all these axioms escape Mr. Laird Clowes's 
 recognition. Readers of his article will derive the impres- 
 sion that naval war is an affair of bases, that one fortified 
 Ration neutralizes another — Perim being "admirably 
 situated for holding Obock in check " — and that a modem 
 fleet cannot fight at all unless it has a base close under 
 its lee. We breathe an atmosphere of fortification — 
 " batteries," " heavy guns," " platforms," " munitions," 
 " electric search lights," etc. — in which naval methods and 
 naval traditions are stifled. Passive defence, of the utter 
 
240 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 worthlessness of which China has just furnished a complete 
 illustration, seems to inspire every page. The precepts 
 and the practice of the great masters of naval war, from 
 Drake to Nelson, are ruthlessly discarded. " Recent events 
 in the Yellow Sea indicate clearly how risky it may be 
 for a modem fleet to fight far removed from its bases," 
 although the victorious fleet fought at eight hundred 
 miles and the defeated fleet at one hundred and fifty 
 miles from its base, which the latter reached to be 
 evicted by menace, and ultimately destroyed in another 
 much-fortified harbour. The balance of our naval forces 
 " set free " by Mr. Laird Clowes's scheme, he would " like 
 to see " distributed between the Cape and the East India 
 commands. Why ? Apparently because " the strategical 
 importance of the Cape must increase year by year." The 
 only real strategic points on the seas are, however, the 
 positions of an enemy's squadrons, and how the Cape 
 command can need reinforcement at a time when no 
 possible enemy hcis any serious force in its waters, where, 
 too, according to Mr. Laird Clowes, an enemy could hardly 
 fight " so far removed " from his base, is not explained. 
 
 In conclusion, I will attempt briefly to sum up the situa- 
 tion which Mr. Laird Clowes proposes to create. The 
 Mediterranean from end to end is a French lake. Our 
 naval officers, who once knew its waters better than their 
 rivals, have lost all their experience. The shore of Africa 
 from 5° West longitude to the Southern mouth of the Red 
 Sea is French territory. Egypt is a province of France, 
 which extends far down the western shore of the Red Sea 
 and embraces the vast basin of the Nile. France holds the 
 Suez Canal, and can use it for her own purposes, while 
 denying it to an enemy. The fleet which might havf 
 controlled that of Toulon, covered Port Said, Malta, and 
 Gibraltar, and at the same time cut the important line of 
 communications between France and Algiers, is split into 
 two parts, and relegated to the ignominious task of watching 
 the outlets of the Mediterranean and the Red sea. France 
 can strike in force at either part at pleasure, and may 
 
ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 241 
 
 surprise one part at least. The short route to the East, 
 and to the great French possession and future naval base 
 of Madagascar, is in French hands. Malta, with its splendid 
 defensive advantages and marvellous harbours, bisecting 
 the distance between Toulon and Port Said, is ruled by 
 the Pope. (Is Mr. Laird Clowes really serious in this 
 part of his programme i") Four fortified positions, one of 
 them (Tangier) being peculiarly vulnerable, are open to 
 land attack in any force the French may choose to employ. 
 Great Britain has on her hands Morocco, with a large and 
 intensely fanatical population, and a long land frontier 
 which sooner or later will march with that of France. 
 Finally, when war breaks out, ideal training waters are at 
 the disposal of France in which to perfect the manoeuvring 
 power of her fleets, and work up her raw reserves into 
 full fighting efficiency. 
 
 The above is a simple statement of the results of the 
 "bag and baggage" policy. Mr. Laird Clowes finds here 
 " advantage," relief from burdens, " economy," and " ample 
 compensations." I submit that, if he has removed a 
 " millstone " from our necks, he has replaced it by a minor 
 planet. By the adoption of his plan, the wildest dreams 
 of the French Chauvinist would be realized. The principles 
 successfully applied by Nelson in war are surely safer 
 guides than the theories evolved by Mr. Laird Clowes in 
 peace. 
 
 Above the purely naval aspects of the Mediterranean 
 question stands the point of national honour. Our 
 presence in the great inland sea dates back seven hundred 
 years, and has been almost continuous for two hundred 
 years, and unchallenged for ninety years. A balance of 
 power has arisen, carrying with it international responsi- 
 bilities which we have no right to discard. France, under 
 Mr. Laird Clowes's rearrangement, becomes at once un- 
 disputed mistress of the inland sea, with a great accession of 
 territory and power. To suddenly destroy an equilibrium 
 long existing would in all probability involve a European 
 war. Wo have no right to inflict this risk upon other 
 
 R 
 
242 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 nations ; we are bound in honour by our international 
 responsibilities. 
 
 In the unknown realms of the future lie many problems 
 whose solutions we cannot forecast. The ancient problem 
 of the Mediterranean, however, is as clear as its blue 
 waters. As it was solved in the past, so only can it be 
 solved now and in the years to come. Pure reason and 
 the long experience of great wars unite in pointing the 
 way. National honour, splendid traditions, and the eternal 
 principles of naval strategy alike forbid us to desert our 
 commerce, and that of our colonies, on three thousand 
 miles of the element which we have been taught by 
 successive generations of sea officers to call our own, If 
 we abandon the Mediterranean and hand over to our 
 rival the spoils of a great naval victory, without obliging 
 him to fire a shot, we give to the world the sure signs of 
 that madness which, in the affairs of men and of nations, 
 prefaces ruin. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
( ^43 ) 
 
 THE TRAINING AND SUPPLY OF NAVAL 
 OFFICERS. 
 
 I.» 
 
 The question of the training and supply of naval officers 
 has engaged of late a good deal of public attention. On 
 the one hand, we are told that the supply is miserably in- 
 sufficient ; on the other, that the training of such officers 
 as we possess is ludicrously inadequate and demonstrably 
 below the standard maintained in more than one foreign 
 navy. These two questions are a good deal more closely 
 connected than might at first sight appear. The alleged 
 insufficiency of supply is at least partly accounted for by 
 the fact that out of the total number of officers available 
 for active service an appreciable percentage is constantly 
 absorbed in educational courses of various kinds. I will 
 take the case of lieutenants, for example, as the most 
 numerous and important body of executive officers in the 
 service — the " backbone " of the service, as they are often 
 and very justly called. It appears from the Navy Estimates 
 for 1894-95 that there are 800 lieutenants borne under 
 effective votes for service in her Majesty's Fleet, 39 for 
 service in the Coastguard on shore, and ten for "other 
 services " — the latter being distributed, three under " educa- 
 tional services," two under " scientific services," two under 
 " shipbuilding repairs and maintenance," and three under 
 "armaments." For practical purposes and in round 
 numbers, therefore, it may be assumed that there are in 
 
 * Times, Sept. 13, 1894. 
 
2+4 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 all 850 lieutenants available for service afloat in case of 
 emergency. Forty-nine of these have already been 
 accounted for as employed in the Coastguard and "other 
 services," leaving 800, it might be thought, for active service 
 afloat. Of these 800 only 496, or just 62 per cent., are 
 employed in ships on active service. The remaining 38 
 per cent, are distributed as follows : — In Coastguard ships 
 and tenders, 46 ; in gunnery, torpedo, and training ships, 
 56 ; in stationary ships, 60 ; in surveying ships, 38 ; in 
 troopships. Imperial and Indian, 24 ; in store ships, one ; 
 in drill ships, four; and in reserves, 75. Practically the 
 Coastguard ships and reserves represent a reserve supply 
 of 121 lieutenants immediately available for active service, 
 because, in the event of mobilization, the Coastguard ships 
 would at once receive their full complements and be sent 
 to sea, and the officers employed " in reserves " could also 
 presumably be summoned at once for service afloat. But 
 the remaining 173 are already employed on active service, 
 though they are not employed in seagoing ships of war. 
 Stationary ships employ 60, surveying ships 38, troopships 
 24 ; of the remainder 60 are employed either as students 
 or teachers in gunnery, torpedo, training, and drill ships. 
 No account is taken in this enumeration of officers tem- 
 porarily withdrawn from active service afloat for the pur- 
 pose of study at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich ; 
 nor is it easy to ascertain the precise number of lieutenants 
 so employed. But in the "estimated average number of 
 officers to study at the College during the year 1894-95," 
 given in the Navy Estimates, there are 115" naval officers " 
 proper, and of these a considerable proportion will doubtless 
 be lieutenants. 
 
 It appears, then, that a redistribution of the actual 
 number of lieutenants now in receipt of full pay and 
 employed in various ways hot directly connected with the 
 active service of the Fleet might, without increasing the 
 total number of lieutenants, result in no considerable in- 
 crease in the supply of lieutenants available for active 
 service. I do not advance this as a solution of the problem 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 245 
 
 of the supply of executive officers, but I may at least point 
 to the remarks of a former First Lord of the Admiralty in 
 his statement for 1891 as indicating a direction in which 
 some relief may still be sought and found : — 
 
 " An investigation," wrote Lord George Hamilton, " into the 
 actual duties which engage the naval service shows how large a pro- 
 portion of officers and men are locked up in training establishments 
 and educational courses, and in performing subsidiary work, such 
 as surveying and transport of troops, etc. At the time when the 
 ships in commission were insufficient to give adequate work and 
 training to the officers and men of the Fleet such employment was 
 judicious, but when the number of fighting vessels is so increased 
 as to be more than able to employ and train the peace establish- 
 ments, the employment of very highly trained and instructed men 
 in work of so secondary a nature is a waste of power. I am 
 therefore taking steps to reduce as far as I can the number of 
 officers, men, and boys afloat in non-fighting vessels, and at the 
 same time to shorten the general course of study for officers at the 
 Naval College, and of gunnery and torpedo instruction for all but 
 those who show special aptitude and ability. These changes will 
 in course of time give some relief and increase the number 
 available for foreign reliefs and active service at home." 
 
 The relief here contemplated is not very apparent, in a 
 comparison of the Navy Estimates of 1893-94 with those 
 of 1894-95. In the former year there were 52 lieutenants 
 employed in gunnery, torpedo, and training ships ; in the 
 latter year there were 56. In 1893-94 there were 61 officers 
 employed in stationary ships, and in 1894-95 there were 60 
 — no very appreciable relief, but still a slight move in the 
 right direction. In surveying ships there were 32 in 1893-94 
 and there were 38 in 1894-95. In the trooping service, 
 however, there had been a material gain, 41 lieutenants 
 having been employed in 1893-94 against 24 in 1894-95. 
 Thus on the services enumerated there had been a total 
 gain of 18 lieutenants set free for service in fighting ships, 
 but of these ten, or more than half, had been absorbed for 
 educational and surveying services. Furthermore, the esti- 
 mated number of naval officers to study at Greenwich had 
 increased from 90 in 1893-9410 115 in 1894-95, so that 
 
246 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Greenwich would seem to have absorbed the eight Heu- 
 tenants who constituted the balance of gain obtained from 
 non-fighting ships during the previous year. On the other 
 hand, it is estimated that on the i.st of November, 1894, no 
 fewer than 21 more ships would be in commission than 
 there were in commission on the corresponding date of the 
 previous year. This in itself would require a very con- 
 siderable increase in the number of lieutenants available 
 for active service in fighting ships. It seems manifest, 
 therefore, either that we must move further and far more 
 boldly in the direction indicated by Lord George Hamilton 
 in his statement for 1891, or else that we must forthwith 
 take steps for largely and speedily increasing the number 
 of lieutenants available for active service. Probably both 
 courses will be found to be necessary in the end, but a 
 redistribution of the existing supply would afford the more 
 immediate relief 
 
 I shall be told, of course, that this is to lower the 
 educational standard of the service, which, according to 
 some authorities, is already deplorably low. But the 
 question really is whether a naval officer is better educated 
 ashore or afloat. History tells us, as was pointed out in 
 the Times by "A Student of Naval History" on the 
 anniversary of Trafalgar in 1893, that our naval supremacy 
 was established by the victory of sea training over harbour 
 training. Yet we are asked now to ignore this salutary 
 teaching of experience, and to turn our naval officer into a 
 walking encyclopsediaof science. The following admonition 
 has lately been addressed to " the children of Nelson " : — 
 
 " There is now very little which a naval officer ought not to 
 know. A hundred years ago seamanship, navigation, pilotage, 
 and such elementary gunnery as there was sufficed, with experience, 
 to place him on a par with the heads of his profession either in 
 England or elsewhere ; to-day, in order to raise him out of the 
 ruck, he ought to know, in addition, much of chemistry, steam, 
 law, electricity, pneumatics, hydrostatics, dynamics, metallurgy, 
 and, above all, of current naval literature, home and foreign, 
 together with at least a little of as many other subjects as possible. 
 There is, too, more necessity than ever for him to be a man of 
 
THE TRAINIXG OF NAVAL OFFICERS. i\7 
 
 culture, to be able to read and speak one or two languages besides 
 his own, and to be familiar with modem history and international 
 politics." 
 
 Of course, if this view be accepted, it follows that our 
 whole system of naval training is radically, fundamentally, 
 and almost incurably wrong. The naval officer of the 
 future ought on this assumption to be a man whose whole 
 time is occupied in desk, book, lecture-room, laboratory, 
 and workshop studies, though he might perhaps be per- 
 mitted to go to sea occasionally as a necessary relaxation 
 from the severe strain of his intellectual pursuits on shore, 
 and as a politic concession to the antiquated notion that 
 a seaman is only made at sea. In any case, it stands to 
 reason that, if the naval officer of the future is to acquire 
 the amount of knowledge here contemplated, or anything 
 like it, he must henceforth spend far more of his time on 
 shore, and therefore far less of it at sea than heretofore, 
 I venture to insist, nevertheless, that the true ideal to be 
 aimed at is almost exactly the reverse of this. Whether 
 the age at which the young officer begins his career at sea 
 should be raised or not is a question fairly open to dis- 
 cussion, though I do not propose to discuss it here. But 
 it seems to me that, for such scientific training and general 
 culture as the naval officer needs after his professional 
 career has begun, we must rely mainly on the professional 
 zeal of the class and the native aptitudes of the individual, 
 and must rigidly discard an educational ideal which cannot 
 but have the effect of making many naval officers smatterers, 
 a few of them bookworms, and none of them seamen. The 
 Times has already stated the issue in language which I 
 venture to recall. In an article on the letter of " A Student 
 of Naval History," above referred to, it said : — 
 
 " The naval officer cannot be made a seaman without constant 
 experience of the sea. His proper training ground is the quarter- 
 deck and the bridge of a sea-going ship at sea. It is not the 
 mastery of scientific appliances, nor the chamber and lecture-room 
 study of the sciences on which they depend, that makes a man a 
 seaman of the type of Nelson and his officers. The sea itself is the 
 
248 THE KAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 one element of a seaman's experience that cannot be reduced to 
 book knowledge, and must be assimilated on the quarter-deck. A 
 man is no more made a seaman by scientific study on shore than 
 he is made an athlete by a knowledge of human physiology or of 
 the chemical properties of food." 
 
 This, at any rate, is the view hitherto taken, in theory at 
 least, by the Admiralty, though its practice may seem to be 
 tending more and more to exalt harbour training over sea 
 training. The Regulations of the Royal Naval College at 
 Greenwich declare that " the College is organized to provide 
 for the instruction of naval and marine officers in all 
 branches of theoretical and scientific study bearing upon 
 their profession ; and is intended to give every advantage 
 in respect of scientific education ; but no arrangements 
 exist at all prejudicing the important practical training in 
 the active duties of the profession." Such is the theory 
 of the matter ; the scientific training is made strictly 
 subordinate to the practical training. As a matter of fact, 
 however, all lieutenants who desire to qualify as gunnery 
 or torpedo officers must spend at least one session of nine 
 months at the College in the study of mathematics, physics, 
 chemistry, fortification, marine construction and drawing, 
 and nautical surveying. At the close of the session these 
 officers have to go through further and prolonged practical 
 courses of instruction in the gunnery and torpedo ships, so 
 that lieutenants desirous of qualifying in these branches 
 after having served only one year in that rank at sea have 
 to spend the better part of the next two years on shore. 
 Besides this, a number of lieutenants, not exceeding thirty- 
 five annually, are admitted to the same courses as voluntary 
 students at the Royal Naval College, with a certain latitude 
 of choice in respect of the particular subjects to be studied ; 
 and, on certain conditions of proficiency as tested in the 
 examination, their time spent at the College is reckoned as 
 harbour time on full pay. In special cases of approved 
 diligence and ability such officers are even allowed to spend 
 a second session at the College. 
 
 All this is unquestionably excellent in itself, but it 
 
THE TRAL\'ING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 249 
 
 certainly seems to involve too complete and too prolonged 
 a withdrawal of the naval officer from active duties at sea 
 at a very critical period of his career. The truth is that 
 the problem has never yet been sufficiently considered in 
 this country of devising a system of combined practical and 
 theoretical training adapted to the requirements of the 
 average naval officer. For men of studious aptitudes and 
 exceptional ability the College curriculum is probably not 
 excessive; but it may be doubted whether the average 
 officer and those whose bent is practical rather than studious 
 gain more than they lose by a year spent at the College 
 rather than at sea. If the question be tested by the 
 teaching of history, the conclusion is inevitable and irresis- 
 tible that sea training is immeasurably superior to theoretical 
 study in the education of the naval officer for war. If, on the 
 other hand, it be contended that in a scientific age like the 
 present the naval officer must be scientific before all things, 
 then we must bring the issue so far as we can to the test of 
 actual and present experience. This may be done in a 
 variety of ways. I find, for example, that in the German 
 navy, where the claims of science and theoretical training 
 are perhaps least likely to be overlooked, the operations at 
 sea, associated with the annual manoeuvres, were extended 
 over several months in 1893, beginning as early as April 
 and lasting until the end of the summer. I find that in the 
 American navy the summer programme of the Naval War 
 College — an institution to which we were indebted for the 
 invaluable historical labours of Captain Mahan — is based 
 on a judicious and singularly interesting combination of 
 practical and theoretical training. Theoretical training is 
 not neglected, but it is subordinated to the practical study 
 of a definite strategic problem. I take the following 
 summary description of the programme from an article in 
 the New York Sun : — 
 
 " Its central feature is the study and solution of a great problem 
 in warfare — namely, the methods of meeting and defeating a 
 formidable naval attack against the outer line of the defences of 
 New York, at the eastern extremity of Long Island Sound. Upon 
 
::50 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 this all the summer operations, except the highly important and 
 timely course in international law, will more or less directly bear. 
 The schedule which covers June, July, August, and September 
 contains instruction in strategy, in naval tactics, in coast defence, 
 in the elements of war charts, in torpedo warfare, in the maritime 
 interests of this country, in the use of the ram, in the employment 
 of the marine corps for coast defence, in types of ships, in steam 
 engineering, in the armour and other protection of vessels, in the 
 supply of coal and other stores, in rations and hygiene on ship- 
 board, in ordnance, in electricity for war purposes, in naval history. 
 But all along the application of these studies to the particular 
 problem of the year will be borne in mind. There will be 
 reconnoissances in steam launches of the points and lines 
 mentioned in the problem ; there will be personal study of 
 localities ; there will be signalling and mental training by war 
 games ; there will be examinations of the resources of the ports 
 mentioned, and discussions of the enemy's bases and other features 
 of the problem." 
 
 Many points in this programme may fairly be open to 
 criticism ; but its essential and characteristic feature is the 
 subordination of theoretical studies to practical training for 
 war. The practical methods contemplated are certainly 
 inferior to those usually employed in our own manoeuvres, 
 but the combination of the practical and theoretical 
 elements is a feature sadly wanting in our own system of 
 naval training, and the inferiority of the practical methods 
 employed is the result not of design but of necessity. 
 " Our lack of a powerful home squadron," says the same 
 writer in a subsequent paragraph, " does not permit summer 
 manoeuvres on the scale annually practised by other nations, 
 or, indeed, for the present upon any scale at all ; but the 
 system of steam-launch work, with reconnoissances of every 
 spot indicated, make the problem far different from simple 
 desk work,'' 
 
 This is how the problem of naval training is approached 
 in one of the most enterprising and ambitious of modern 
 navies — theoretical training strictly subordinated to a 
 strategic and practical purpose, theoretical training com- 
 bined with such practical experience as is available, and 
 based on the assumption that the business of naval officers 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 25 1 
 
 is with the sea and its problems, not on the hypothesis 
 that all naval officers must acquire some smattering of 
 mathematics and science, apparently in the hope that a few 
 of them may become not Nelsons, but Newtons. 
 
 Now let me contrast the system pursued in France and 
 its results. The writer quoted above reproaches the 
 " children of Nelson " with their inferiority to the foreign 
 product of high scientific training, and declares that "the 
 British officer often compares most unfavourably with 
 foreign officers." In particular he affirms that " the French 
 navy is essentially progressive and therefore essentially 
 modern." Now, whether this means that the French naval 
 officer is better trained in the theory or better trained in 
 the practice of his profession, it ought certainly to imply 
 that, either by virtue of his superior theoretical training or 
 by virtue of his larger practical experience, or by a judi- 
 cious combination of both, he is better fitted for actual 
 service at sea. Whether this is so or not I cannot say, and 
 perhaps a single instance is no adequate criterion. But I 
 can cite a single instance in which, though the French 
 officers engaged may all have been Newtons, they failed in 
 their enterprise more egregiously and, I am satisfied, far 
 more completely than any one would believe it possible 
 for the stupidest and least educated of British sub- 
 lieutenants to fail in a like case. This happened in the 
 French Channel Manoeuvres of last year. Admiral Barrera, 
 in command of a sea-going fleet whose maximum speed 
 was nine knots, was required to force the passage of the 
 Straits of Dover, which was guarded by the torpedo-boats 
 and other light craft belonging to the Defense Mobile of 
 the adjacent French coast. The time of Barrera's advance 
 was known beforehand within certain narrow limits, and 
 might have been ascertained almost exactly by scouting 
 operations judiciously adapted to the situation. The night 
 selected was dark, but not foggy, and, though the fleet 
 advanced without lights, it ought not to have been difficult to 
 detect it in a channel barely twenty miles wide. It passed 
 at midnight entirely unmolested, and, having proceeded as 
 
252 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 far as the Varne without sighting a single enemy, it bore 
 up for Boulogne, capturing on its way a whole division of 
 torpedo-boats, — which, having proved entirely useless for 
 purposes of patrol and defence, now showed their inability 
 even to escape, — and surprising another division with its 
 attendant gunboat actually at anchor off Boulogne. Almost 
 the only other noteworthy incident of this remarkable 
 campaign was the futile attack of two torpedo-boats on 
 the Isly in broad daylight, which resulted in their speedy 
 destruction. Now torpedo-boat warfare is supposed to be 
 one of the peculiar specialities of the French navy, and the 
 French naval officers are the representatives of a service 
 " which is essentially progressive and therefore essentially 
 modern." After all, however, the proof of the pudding is in 
 the eating, and, if this is to be the result of requiring the 
 naval officer to know "much of chemistry, steam, law, 
 electricity, pneumatics, hydraulics, hydrostatics, dynamics, 
 metallurgy," to say nothing of naval literature, modern 
 languages, modern history, and modern politics, I am 
 satisfied that English common sense will still insist that 
 the children of Nelson should be trained in the school and 
 spirit of Nelson himself. 
 
 11." 
 
 To-morrow is the anniversary of Trafalgar. Eighty- 
 nine years ago, on the morning of October 21, 1805, Nelson 
 made to his fleet that immortal signal which has ever 
 since been the watchword of the British Navy and one of 
 the noblest traditions of the nation ; and before the sun 
 set Napoleon's hopes of subduing England had been finally 
 shattered, and the greatest seaman the world has ever 
 known had breathed his last. The lessons suggested by 
 this memorable anniversary are innumerable and inexhaust- 
 ible. Trafalgar was the crowning exploit of a Navy which 
 for centuries had claimed for England the "sovereignty 
 
 * Times, October 20, 1894.. 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 253 
 
 of the seas." It was the final overthrow of a naval com- 
 bination, directed against England by the man who had 
 made himself master of Europe, and, but for England, 
 would have been master of the world. From it, if we 
 read it aright, may be deduced those indefeasible and 
 eternal principles of naval policy and conduct which, amid 
 all the vicissitudes of circumstance, lie at the root of sea 
 power. A year ago, in a letter addressed to the Times, 
 a " Student of Naval Warfare " forcibly pointed the moral 
 of Trafalgar. The lesson he inculcated was twofold — 
 first, that Nelson, the greatest master of naval warfare, 
 was also a profound student of naval history, and, second, 
 that at Trafalgar the superior harbour-trained fleet was 
 defeated and destroyed by a fleet inferior in numbers and 
 armament, but superion in the nautical aptitudes engendered 
 by sustained experience of the sea. I propose to follow 
 his example, and to preach from the same text — the text 
 that nowadays the children of Nelson must acquire the 
 aptitudes which make for victory in the same school as 
 that in which Nelson and his heroes acquired them. 
 
 I have already had my say on this subject in the Times, 
 and I am not about to repeat the arguments I have formerly 
 advanced ; but it may not be amiss to expand and illustrate 
 them, and incidentally to make some reply to the only 
 serious criticism they have encountered in the same place. 
 Indeed, I hardly know whether I ought to regard the 
 criticism in question as serious. I do not know who " A 
 Late Captain of a Battleship " may be ; but I strongly 
 suspect that he is an esteemed friend of mine, who must 
 have his joke, and whose jokes I always appreciate, though, 
 when he is really serious, I seldom differ from him with- 
 out suspecting myself to be in the wrong. As I cannot 
 possibly agree with him in his views on " The Training of 
 Naval Officers,'' I prefer to think that he must have been 
 joking. We are asked to bear in mind "that the only 
 people who have any extra work at sea (exclusive of the 
 engine-room complement) are the captain, the navigating 
 officer, and the officers of watches." Well, I was speaking 
 
254 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 of the training of naval officers, not of the training of blue- 
 jackets, and therefore the critic really concedes the case. 
 There is a good deal to be said on the subject of the sea 
 training of blue-jackets, and some persons, whose opinion 
 "A Late Captain" would, I am sure, respect, are apt to 
 think that a blue-jacket on Whale Island or in naval 
 barracks is not quite so well employed as a blue-jacket in 
 a sea-going ship at sea. But, without pressing that point, 
 I would urge that, if the captain, the navigating officer, 
 the officers of watches, and the whole of the engine-room 
 complement are acquiring at sea experience and aptitudes 
 which are indispensable to their efficiency and cannot be 
 acquired except at sea, the case for sea training as against 
 harbour training is admitted even by " A Late Captain " 
 to be at least as strong as I contend. 
 
 So, again, " A Late Captain " concedes the point when 
 he says, in his humorous fashion, " Ships should un- 
 doubtedly spend some portion of their time at sea, to 
 inure the men to the motion of the ship and to train the 
 stokers." Why, this is exactly what Captain Mahan says 
 about Nelson and his fleets : — 
 
 " Continually cruising, not singly, but in squadrons more or less 
 numerous, the ships were ever on the drill-ground — nay, on the 
 battle-field — experiencing all the varying phases impressed upon 
 it by the changes of the ocean. Thus practised and hardened 
 into perfect machines, though inferior in numbers, they were con- 
 tinually superior in force and mobility to their opponents." 
 
 This is the kernel of the whole matter. "The sea itself," 
 as the Times has said, " is the one element of a seaman's 
 experience that cannot be reduced to book knowledge, and 
 must be assimilated on the quarter-deck." " Now, we do not 
 want sailors," says "A Late Captain," and this is true. The 
 special art of the sailor is as obsolete in modern warships 
 as the special art of the bowman. But we want seamen as 
 much as ever, and seamen can only be made at sea. By 
 seamen, I mean not only men inured to the motion of the 
 ship— though men not inured to the motion of the ship 
 would surely be very indifferent seamen at a pinch — but 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 255 
 
 men constantly, as Captain Mahan says, " on the drill 
 ground — nay, on the battle-field — experiencing all the 
 varying phases impressed upon it by the changes of the 
 ocean." When men traversed the sea by means of vessels 
 propelled by oars, they did not need to be sailors, but they 
 did need to be seamen. Now that men traverse the sea by 
 means of vessels propelled by steam, they no longer need 
 to be sailors, but they need to be seamen as much as ever. 
 " We want," says " A Late Captain," " mechanics, electri- 
 cians, and stoker-gunners." No doubt we do, but we want 
 them all to be seamen as well. Would "A Late Captain" 
 like to take his battleship into action manned by " mechanics, 
 electricians, and stoker-gunners " who were not seamen .' 
 I fancy not. 
 
 Surely, too, he must be merely joking when he writes : — 
 "One seaman, under the direction of the quartermaster, 
 and the officer of the watch, twiddles a steam wheel around 
 from right to left, or from left to right, and has a vague sort 
 of notion that one way is called ' starboard ' and the other 
 'port,' but usually puts it the wrong way unless closely 
 watched " ; or again, " In the vicinity of land two men 
 swing leads over their heads, and occasionally shout some- 
 thing unintelligible ; but they never get bottom, and no 
 one pays any attention to them." I am no seaman myself, 
 so perhaps I have no right to protest against pretty fooling 
 of this kind. But I suppose no one knows better than " A 
 Late Captain " that it is fooling, and nothing else. As 
 regards leadsmen and their use, I need only refer to the 
 narrative quoted below. I wonder whether " A Late 
 Captain " would care to take his battleship, say, from 
 Roche's Point to Haulbowline without leadsmen in the 
 chains — though I suspect he knows that particular anchor- 
 age as well as I know the place in which I live. As regards 
 the helmsman, I am tempted to narrate a little anecdote. 
 Some years ago I was watching the evolutions of a fleet 
 during the manoeuvres from the poop of the flagship. The 
 signal had been hoisted for the evolution known as the 
 " gridiron," which requires the ships in two parallel columns 
 
256 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 to turn towards each other, and each to pass through an 
 interval in the opposite column. The columns had already- 
 turned inwards, and were fast approaching each other when 
 the captain of a battleship, notorious for her erratic steering, 
 signalled to the Admiral, " My ship steers very wildly." 
 " Is that hole big enough for you to get through ? " was the 
 Admiral's query in reply. " I think so," answered the 
 captain, and, wildly as his ship steered, his own seaman- 
 ship and that of his helmsman took her through trium- 
 phantly. This little incident impressed me greatly, and 
 though I do not know who "A Late Captain" is, I know 
 who the captain in question was, and I know him to be a 
 thorough seaman as well as a man of infinite jest. 
 
 But the question is not merely one of argument. The 
 proof of the pudding is in the eating. Why is it that 
 English naval officers are constantly found capable of 
 doing things which the officers of other navies do not 
 even attempt — leaving an anchorage at midnight without 
 navigation lights and in the teeth of a storm, as Admiral 
 Hornby took his fleet out of Blacksod Bay during the 
 manoeuvres of 1885 ; maintaining course and station for 
 hours together in a fog, as Admiral Baird did in 1889, 
 when he brought his whole fleet round from St. David's 
 Head to St. Alban's Head without once being able to 
 make a single visible signal ; or entering a foreign harbour 
 without taking a local pilot, as British admirals and British 
 captains are constantly doing in all parts of the world ? 
 The answer is that, in spite of some ill-judged attempts 
 to make our modern naval officers mathematicians, mechan- 
 icians, electricians, and what not, and some mischievous 
 tendencies which make for the ascendency of harbour 
 training over sea training, the children of Nelson are still 
 worthy of their sires — still seamen in the sense of men 
 trained to the emergencies of the sea, apt to command, 
 prompt to obey, self-reliant, and full of resource. How 
 long they will retain these inestimable qualities if some 
 of their critics and counsellors have their way is a question 
 of vital moment to the nation. 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 257 
 
 I do not know whether such performances as I have 
 
 mentioned above can be paralleled in other navies — navies 
 
 whose officers are said to be much more scientifically 
 
 trained than ours — but I do know that they are no very 
 
 •exceptional performances in our Navy. I know, too, that 
 
 a few years ago it was stated in the French newspapers, 
 
 that if a fog came on during the manoeuvres of the French 
 
 fleets, a truce was proclaimed between the contending 
 
 squadrons until it lifted. I know that, when a portion of 
 
 the Toulon fleet was cruising in the Atlantic a year or 
 
 two ago, the Admiral in command obtained the services 
 
 •of local pilots to take it into Brest. I can also quote an 
 
 impartial witness to the contrast between the training of 
 
 ■our own naval officers and that of the officers of the 
 
 United States Navy, in an extract from a Boston 
 
 newspaper — a piece of testimony whose weight is not a 
 
 little enhanced by the fact that the extract in question was 
 
 sent by Admiral Luce, of the United States Navy, to 
 
 Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton (who kindly allows me to 
 
 use it), as expressing in substance his own views formed 
 
 after a visit to this country, during which the gallant 
 
 Admiral specially devoted himself to the study of our 
 
 methods of naval training : — 
 
 " Last year the words of Admiral Sir John Hopkins in favour of 
 educating officers at sea, and the example of the sturdy little 
 English reefers doing boat duty and in other responsible places, 
 while American cadets were studying logarithms, created a very 
 strong impression in favour of shortening the term at Annapolis 
 and lengthening the term at sea. . . . Everything pertaining to 
 this highly scientific education is purely experimental, for there 
 is nothing in the whole course that tests the question of whether 
 the cadet is adapted for a sea officer. Unless he knows how to 
 command men, he may be a second Laplace in his studies, but 
 he will be of no earthly account in the navy. Or he may be 
 a Nelson on board ship, but unless he has a knack for reciting 
 in the classroom, he cannot get a commission . . . The young 
 gentleman ... is apt to be cocky and to make the grizzled 
 lieutenants ill and weary with his theories of how things should be 
 done, which is always exactly opposed to the way in which they 
 have heretofore been done. The English middies are caught 
 young, and the first thing they learn is the last thing the American 
 
 S 
 
258 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 cadets learn— how to control men and to assume responsibility. 
 A fifteen-year-old midshipman in the British Navy has charge of 
 a boat, and he is responsible for that boat and every man in it, 
 under all circumstances, in all weathers, and at all times. The 
 American cadet by the time he gets a boat is a young collegian,, 
 with his head stuffed full of theories, very well advanced in his 
 studies, but he has not washed his face in salt water like the 
 British fellow of his age, who by that time is quite an old andl 
 experienced tar." 
 
 There are some inaccuracies in this trenchant contrast, 
 but it points a salutary moral, and may serve to show that 
 the children of Nelson who have " washed their faces in 
 salt water " are not found by impartial observers to con- 
 trast very unfavourably with their more scientific contem- 
 poraries trained in harbour and at college. It is the old 
 story of Trafalgar again, the victory of the seaman over 
 the bookman. " There is nothing," wrote Villeneuve before 
 quitting Toulon, " to alarm us in the sight of an English 
 fleet ; their 74-gun ships have not five hundred men on 
 board ; the seamen are harassed by a two years' cruise ; 
 they are not more brave than we are. . . . They arc 
 skilful at mancEuvring. In a month we shall be as much 
 so as they are." More brave than their adversaries 
 Nelson's seamen were not. But Villeneuve knew vi'ell 
 enough that it was not a month, nor many months, at sea 
 that would give his ships the skill of manoeuvre which 
 Nelson's had acquired by constant experience at sea. 
 Harassed, indeed, they were by a two years' cruise, but 
 while harassed they were hardened. As Captain Mahan^ 
 says in a noble passage : — 
 
 " Nelson was wearing away the last two years of his glorious 
 but suffering life, fighting the fierce north-westers of the Gulf of 
 Lyon, and questioning, questioning continually whether Napoleon's 
 object was Egypt again or Great Britain really. They were dull,, 
 weary, eventless months, those months of watching and waiting 
 of the big ships before the French arsenals. Purposeless they 
 surely seemed to many, but they saved England. The world has- 
 never seen a more impressive demonstration of the influence of 
 sea power upon its history. Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, 
 upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and 
 the dominion of the world." 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 259 
 
 These two years were typical of the training that makes the 
 seaman. Not all the mathematics, nor all the scientific 
 gunnery, nor all the book learning in the world can make 
 a man a seaman if he does not constantly " wash his face 
 in salt water." In war this means victory, as the world 
 learnt at Trafalgar. In peace it means exactly the same 
 thing, superiority of sea aptitude and superior capacity to 
 deal with all the emergencies of the sea as they arise. This 
 is the one constant factor in a seaman's training, and it is 
 practically independent of the particular weapons with 
 which at any given period the seaman has to fight. 
 
 Of course, in time of peace the naval ofificer cannot be 
 trained, as Nelson's officers were trained, in the actual 
 experience of warfare. But there is one mode of warfare, 
 the conflict with the sea and its conditions, which Nature 
 herself perpetually imposes on the seaman. How does the 
 British naval oflficer acquit himself in this conflict? I 
 have already cited one or two cases which may serve to 
 answer the question. By the courtesy of Sir Vesey 
 Hamilton, to whom I am indebted for the documents I am 
 about to quote, I am able to cite one or two more, and I 
 think I shall be able to show that the children of Nelson 
 are not unworthy of their sires. 
 
 Nelson says somewhere that the naval officer, unlike his 
 military brother, can form no fixed plans ; he must be 
 prepared for the chance when it occurs ; it may be to-day, a 
 v/eek or a year hence, or never. The thing is to be ready 
 for it when it does occur. Well, that is exactly the spirit 
 of the British naval officer of to-day, as the following story 
 will show. It relates to the opening of the Zambesi to 
 free navigation in 1890. The bare facts are recorded in 
 the " Annual Register " as follows : — 
 
 "A British naval force left Zanzibar on September 3 for the 
 Zambesi River, and, though opposed by the captain of a 
 Portuguese gunboat, who disputed the passage, the river was 
 entered by the Redbreast, of eight hundred tons, with several 
 other vessels, after some difficulty with the sandbars at the 
 mouth, towards the end of the month. In future the Zambesi 
 will be kept open, a free waterway for all nations, Portugal alone 
 protesting." 
 
26o THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 I have before me a private narrative written by an officer 
 who bore a leading part in this very delicate and difficult 
 business. It is too long, and perhaps too personal, to 
 quote in full; but I think the following extracts which, 
 without giving names, I am permitted by Sir Vesey 
 Hamilton to cite, will serve to show the nature of the 
 work undertaken and the brilliancy of its execution — 
 
 " We did not reach the Chinde mouth till too late on the 9th 
 to cross the bar. ... I went in at seven o'clock next morning 
 to examine the bar and put down a buoy or two, and never had 
 
 a worse surveying job in my life. . . . of the Humber came 
 
 at last, in his bigger boat, and between us we managed to get 
 some idea of what was before us and returned at noon with a 
 
 most unfavourable report, which must have made shake in 
 
 his shoes, for we'd only got 1 1 ft., and there was only one more 
 hour's flood ; however, with a two-foot rise in that hour which the 
 lead-line showed he most pluckily determined to risk it. . . . This 
 Chinde bar had been held up to us as our grave difficulty, as our 
 very certain danger, if we attempted it under any but the most 
 favourable circumstances, and here it was dead neaps and blowing 
 fresh ; if the Humber and Buccaneer had struck they must certainly 
 
 have been wrecked, so ordered us, drawing 13 ft. 2 ins. 
 
 to lead him, drawing 13 ft. 4 ins., and sent to bring on the 
 
 Buccaneer. . . . Off we started, just at the top of the flood ; as 
 we got into i8ft. we began signalling each cast; we were soon 
 in 15 ft. and then in 14 ft., which I wouldn't hoist for fear of 
 frightening the Humber ; it would have been worse for him to 
 turn back, than to ram her over, but immediately after it deepened 
 to 15 ft. again, and soon we were over, and it was a relief. . . . 
 By four p.m. we were at anchor ; it's all pretty easy now we've 
 done it, but I felt just like it must be before going into 
 action. . . . 
 
 " The first thing of course was to set up a tide-pole (I had one 
 prepared on the way down) ; but the creek I clumsily selected 
 had a bar considerably above the level of L. W. (low water) 
 springs, and we lost the first day's observations (the day of new 
 moon, too), and had to bring it out, and set it up on a very 
 shelving foreshore, so that at H. W. (high water) it was 
 dangerously far out, seeing how strong the tides run ; but we 
 got a sort of rafl: knocked up, laid in and out at the pole, and 
 by means of an endless rope hauled out and back to read off at 
 night It was endless anxiety to me, and we always kept a 
 lifeboat ready, and had to use her too. Bang I would go the 
 rifle, ' Away lifeboat 1 ' and each time an unfortunate was found 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 261 
 
 overboard holding on to the raft half drowned, lantern sunk, and 
 frightened to death ; and one night they dared not take the 
 tides because of the number of hippos round the tent. . . . 
 
 " Well, in course of time I arrived actually in the Zambesi, 
 worrying my poor chaps dreadfully, turning out at four a.m., and 
 leaving for a long day at five o'clock ; but it was well we stuck 
 to it, for I still wanted to continue the work as far up the 
 Zambesi as McChenga, and one day went off as usual, but found 
 a Portuguese gunboat at Sombo, who objected to my further 
 progress, and I had to give it up for good. It was rather 
 exasperating, for on the strength of what I had seen I had sent 
 a report to the admiral to say that it would be possible to take 
 this ship up, but I badly wanted to examine the last three miles 
 more thoroughly. ... It would have been very disappointing, 
 though at the same time a relief, if he had sent to me to say, 
 ' Don't attempt it.' Instead, however, down came the Pigeon 
 the day before the boats were to start, bringing me a private 
 letter from the Commander-in-Chief that would have made any 
 officer jump her over a stone wall, . . . and just at the very end 
 of his letter he adds, evidently feeling it was a considerable risk, 
 ' If you do not see your way to go up Chinde after all, give it 
 up. I do wish you to go, but I know it is narrow ' — he litde 
 knew, no more did I, how narrow ! ... I do assure you that I 
 felt a most confounded lot of responsibility on me. To complete 
 the bad aspect, it was dead neaps, and a most abnormal one ; for 
 two days past our range had been only 2 ft. to 3 ft., and the 
 whole rise above L.W. springs only 5 ft. ; however, it was no use 
 hanging back now. I had some capital leadsmen whom I had 
 taken frequently up the river to practise them, and it was arranged 
 that we should leave at half past six on the 18th. . . . This ship 
 steered beautifully, answering in a moment as if one was speaking 
 to her J and as I knew the river very well by now, it was only a 
 matter requiring extreme vigilance and careful attention, and we 
 reached Sombo before ten o'clock. 
 
 " Before we got there the Portuguese had opened for a moment, 
 and we saw that he was so swung that we could get by. Here 
 was apprehension No. i relieved, and we went past him, and 
 dropped an anchor from the stern on the up river side of him, 
 signalling Herald to anchor instantly, which was done, and so he 
 was between two fires and the game was up. He came on board 
 to see me immediately, and found my cabin full of filled hoppers 
 and a Nordenfelt bearing on his ship out of the cabin port. . . ." 
 
 I pass over the account of an interview with the Portu- 
 guese Governor, which really reads like a page from Mr. 
 Rudyard Kipling, who must have had some such incident 
 
262 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 in his mind when he wrote one of his " Many Inventions '' ; 
 but in such a case it is perhaps as well to let bygones be 
 bygones. The narrative continues : — 
 
 "... And then we weighed and proceeded, commencing the 
 really difficult part of the river. The water was desperately bad. 
 
 1 had never known it so bad ; but we managed all right till we 
 arrived at a certain bad reach I knew, and then I dared not go on 
 without an examination, so had to anchor by the stem and bow 
 in 23 ft on the port side and 7 ft. on the starboard. Got away in 
 steam pinnace, and found we could get 14 ft. by careful manage- 
 ment, and raced back, a valuable half hour at the very top of the 
 tide lost. Got under way, and managed it all safe. The next 
 reach is all right, but then comes another very bad — and though 
 we crossed in safety in 13+ ft. and 14 ft., we stuck fast a short 
 distance on, though only 30 ft. from the steep bank. Well, we 
 backed off easily enough in a few minutes and then laid her right 
 against the bank, and so got through another half mile, getting 
 14 ft. and 15 ft. in the port chains, and 11 ft. only in the starboard, 
 a regular gutter way. . . . Only one difficulty now remained — 
 viz. the bar at Chinde village, no marks when to turn, no saying 
 what was on it, for though I had long ago sent on Herald to bring 
 me information, he had not returned, and wasn't in sight, but 
 had rounded into the Zambesi. Sure enough, I piled her well up, 
 through not turning soon enough, as it turned out afterwards, 
 when I made a thorough examination in a boat; and there we 
 stuck with a falling tide running 13 ft. all along the port side, 5 ft. 
 under starboard chains, and 10 ft. under starboard counter. I 
 worked the men about the decks and did the usual things ; first 
 tried to force her over, but no ! it wouldn't do ; but at last backed 
 her off, and getting her stern against the bank, her bow canted, 
 happily the right way, and we shot her over 13 ft., drawing 13 ft. 
 
 2 ins., and had done it. I believe I was the happiest man in the 
 Navy at that moment, and the men were so pleased and officers 
 congratulated me, it was like winning a successful action. We 
 anchored for the night in 24 ft., but no room to swing, and in the 
 middle of the night, and again next forenoon, I had to shorten in 
 to let the tide take her stern past the bank, but it was calm that 
 evening and tide weak. . . . 
 
 " Bad weather had been brewing for the past five days, and at 
 last we had got it. Tide did not serve till two o'clock, and at ten 
 o'clock it came on half a gale and driving rain — a wretched berth 
 to lie in at very short stay, and the attempt to return down the 
 river seeming hopeless, I had got away surveying by seven o'clock, 
 but couldn't get more than two hours' work done, and so didn't 
 reach McChenga, though I got somewhere near ; returned at 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 263 
 
 half-past ten and went round into Chinde Bar, found the best 
 ■channel and laid a small buoy, and decided on a patch of reeds 
 to steer for, and came back to await events. It was unpromising 
 and I couldn't decide to make the venture, but at half-past one 
 went to the bar again, found 13 ft., and yet another hour's flood, 
 decided to risk it, dashed back, and got the anchor up, had a 
 desperate job to turn her sharp into the Chinde with a gale blow- 
 ing and flood setting us in, and once ran her straight into the 
 steep bank, the dolphin striker tickling about in the grass, but we 
 ■did turn her, pointed her head right, and crossed with 13^ ft. of 
 water and some hour more flood yet to make ; it was a capital 
 tide to-day, but very delicate steering, as she often had to be 
 brought round up to the strong wind ; the driving rain made it 
 hard to see accurately, but the leadsmen nobly did their duty, and 
 
 the way young , the navigator, steered her was beyond praise ; 
 
 and to cut a long story short, we ran her through in daylight 
 without once touching, and anchored soon after sunset near the 
 old Hiimber, happy as kings to have done it. I am now very 
 sure that the Chinde is navigable for a ship of this length and 
 draught at all times of the year, and pretty certainly in all years ; 
 for it is said never to have been known so low as this particular 
 one." 
 
 Now this plain unvarnished narrative, written in the 
 confidence of privacy and never intended either for publica- 
 tion or for official purposes of any kind, is not to be regarded 
 as illustrating, merely the skill and pluck of a particular 
 officer, or as recording any exceptional exploit. I cite it 
 as illustrating the normal manner in which the British naval 
 officer goes about the performance of any duty which 
 happens to fall in his way, and I contend that the aptitudes 
 it reveals are only to be engendered by the practical train- 
 ing of the seaman. Desk studies and book learning, and 
 the profound scieatific lore of Greenwich, the Excellent, 
 and the Vernon are all very well in their way. For certain 
 subsidiary purposes of naval warfare, and for a few officers 
 specially fitted by native aptitude for the pursuit of such 
 purposes they are, no doubt, indispensable. But in such 
 exploits as the opening of the Zambesi, they count for next 
 to nothing, and the qualities required, and displayed, are 
 such as no theoretical training can impart. For cnerg}-, 
 pluck, skill, and resource, the men who first established the 
 
264 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 navigation of the Zambesi may safely claim to be worthy 
 children of Nelson. They were not picked men in any 
 way. They were merely British naval officers and blue- 
 jackets, who got a better chance than some of their fellows 
 of showing what sort of stuff the service is made of, and I 
 confess I think we have no sort of reason to be dissatisfied 
 with the sample. 
 
 One more illustration of the same temper and its results 
 and I have done. I am again indebted to Sir Vesey 
 Hamilton for permission to use a private narrative of the 
 salvage of the Seignelay, a French man-of-war which went on 
 shore during a cruise, and was got off again by the efforts of 
 the Undaunted, when under the command of Lord Charles 
 Beresford. Of that distinguished officer's energy, capacity 
 and fertility of resource the country is well aware, and I 
 should hardly think it necessary to cite the narrative I am> 
 about to quote if he alone were concerned. The country 
 knows the quality of its captains and its "late captains." It 
 is just as well that it should learn a little more of the sort 
 of stuff out of which they are made. " I had the happiness 
 to command a band of brothers," said Nelson of the officers 
 who fought under him at the Nile. Not even the energy 
 and resource of Lord Charles Beresford would have got oft 
 the Seignelay so brilliantly, if he, too, like other captains, 
 had not had the happiness to command a body of officers, 
 and men who " had washed their faces in salt water," and 
 learnt their seamanship in the school and spirit of Nelson. 
 The narrative is taken from a private letter, written by an 
 officer of the Undaunted. As before, I suppress names 
 and omit some few passages, mainly for the sake of 
 brevity : — 
 
 " We got the telegram giving the news at one a.m. on Tuesday. 
 Set to at once unrigging our ballroom and pulling to pieces our 
 decorations, getting off gear we had landed, etc., and at daylight 
 were steaming full speed the two hundred and seventy miles to 
 this place, leaving telegrams to put off our three hundred guests. 
 It was a good sample of the vicissitudes of naval life, and I think 
 we all rather enjoyed it — at any rate, all set to with a will. 
 
 "At daylight this morning we found the French ship Seignelay,. 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 265 
 
 of one thousand nine hundred tons, driven high up on a sandy 
 beach, apparently very contented, and having taken no steps what- 
 ever in forty-eight hours to get themselves off. . . . The captain 
 could get no definite reply out of them, so now we have sent a 
 big working party on board, and are unloading the ship for them, 
 have laid out anchors astern of them, and generally done more 
 work in the day than they seem likely to have done in a week. . . . 
 
 " The ship parted her cable in a gale of wind, had no second 
 anchor ready, no look-out was being kept, and the ship was piled 
 up before the captain or officers knew anything about it. Fortu- 
 nately she drove on a light sandy beach, where she made a dock 
 for herself, and has suffered but little damage, but so embedded in 
 sand and shoal water running so far out that it will be difficult 
 to haul her off. 
 
 " May 5. — A week to be long remembered is over and so 
 happily. The French captain telegraphed that his ship was 
 hopelessly lost ; they sent a squadron of three ships to take the 
 men and stores back to France, and they arrived to find her 
 quietly at her anchors and almost undamaged. . . . The senior 
 French captain of the arriving squadron said, 'You English do 
 not know the word " impossible " !' 
 
 " . . . . The Seignelay first said all help was useless. . . . On 
 our arrival, after hearing the state of affairs, our skipper went 
 aboard with an anchor and cable in our launch, laid it out astern 
 and gave them the end, saying : — ' Of course you will want it, so 
 will haul it taut.' . . . Then he said, ' Of course you have only 
 been waiting for more men to lighten the ship, so I am sending 
 one hundred and thirty, with an officer to act as interpreter.' . . . 
 Our first lieutenant went as interpreter, and all our captain wanted 
 done was ' suggested ' by him to the French. He gave the orders 
 to the junior officers over our men, and I believe worked the French 
 crew also by his ' suggestions,' a fine old sailor, who was one of 
 their chief petty officers, giving what orders were necessary. . . . 
 He hardly left the deck for three days or nights, and did his work 
 splendidly. . . . 
 
 " The difficulty of the situation was that, owing to the great 
 extent of shoal water, we could not get within eight hundred and 
 fifty yards of her, though the Melitds light draught enabled her to 
 get within three hundred. The ship was embedded five and a half 
 feet in the sand, so had to be lightened that much before we 
 could hope to move her. This we spent all Wednesday afternoon 
 and night in doing. 
 
 " On Thursday morning the Melita, with a light draught Turkish 
 steamer, tried to pull her off, but failed, while the Melita was very 
 nearly wrecked herself; nothing but very smart seamanslwp in 
 making sail and casting off hawsers with cool judgment on the 
 
266 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 part of saved her from being dashed in a good sea upon a 
 
 jagged reef of rocks close to leeward. Her screw got fouled, and 
 the willing but awkward Turk towed her head round towards the 
 reef, and she only just managed to get sail on her and shave it 
 by fifty yards. She could not anchor or she would have swung 
 on top of it. We were looking on, powerless, from our deep 
 draught of water, though we hurried out hawsers, but it was one 
 of the nearest shaves I have seen, and with the large number of 
 men they had away in working parties, a thing to be very proud 
 of and thankful for. 
 
 "All Thursday we worked on at lightening her, getting out 
 three hundred tons of coal, all her shot, shell, small guns, provisions, 
 and cables on board our ship till every part of the ship was piled 
 up with them, and all our nicely painted boats reduced to ragged 
 cargo boats, besides being a good deal damaged, owing to the 
 exposed anchorage and seaway. 
 
 " \Ve got out our one strong and two light wire hawsers, and 
 with them the two ships tried to tow, but we parted the light 
 hawsers at once. Then the captain let me try a plan I had all 
 
 along been urging, but which he, , and the French called a 
 
 ' physical impossibility.' We hired native boats and large lighters, 
 got our strong chain cables into them, and laid out four hundred 
 and fifty yards of chain cable between the Melita and ourselves, 
 floated on these lighters. Thanks to the skill of our boatswain 
 and a picked party of men in the lighters, this was done most 
 successfully, though three lighters were sunk or destroyed in 
 doing it. 
 
 "That afternoon (Friday, the ist) — having got four hundred 
 and fifty tons out of the ship in forty-four hours — we got a fair 
 pull at her with all three ships, the little Turk tugging manfully 
 at his rotten hawser on one quarter and giving her a side pull 
 occasionally. \Ve gradually worked our mighty engines up to 
 full speed, the chain cable tautened out as I had never seen chain 
 do before, and off she came. 
 
 " We manned the rigging and gave her cheer on cheer, the 
 band playing the ' Marseillaise ' as the Melita towed her past our 
 stem, while the Frenchmen hugged and kissed our men on their 
 cheeks. ... It was a scene to be long remembered, the crowds 
 of spectators lining the beach and walls, and our own men ' spent 
 but victorious ' after their long forty-four hours of almost unceas- 
 ing work, hardly any one lying down for more than three or four 
 hours on either night. 
 
 " Once off, I must say the Frenchmen worked famously, and 
 by noon on Saturday we had replaced all their gear on board, 
 picked up their anchors and cables, etc., so that when their 
 squadron came in that evening they found nothing left to do. 
 
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS. 267 
 
 They were really grateful and showed much good feeling, coming 
 to call on us and being most friendly. . . . 
 
 " On Monday night, when we left, the whole squadron cheered 
 us manfully. I had charge of the work in our own ship, the 
 laying out hawsers, cables, and anchors. All our picked men 
 were sent to the Seignelay, and I worked those remaining almost 
 continuously, yet I never heard a grumble, nor had I to punish a 
 single man. Never in my life have I seen men work so hard and 
 so cheerily ; again and again it made me sing with thankfulness 
 to have such fellows under me. Our mids. worked famously; 
 they were watch and watch in the boats and on deck, the mere 
 lads of sixteen and a [half, only a year and a half out of the 
 Britannia, proving most self-reliant and capable. I was glad to 
 be able to tell them afterwards how well I thought they had 
 
 borne the strain put on them, and that also said he had 
 
 never seen boats better handled ; the lads were so pleased." 
 
 Note. — I have only to add to the foregoing, what con- 
 siderations of space alone prevented my saying at the time, 
 that nothing in the English officer's narrative of the salvage 
 of the Seignelay can have been written, or ought to be taken, 
 to imply the slightest reflection on the professional capacity 
 of the French captain and his officers. Until the Undaunted 
 appeared quite unexpectedly on the scene, there was no 
 prospect and indeed no possibility of getting the Seignelay 
 off. Hence, there was no reason whatever why steps 
 should have been taken to get her ofif before the 
 Undaunted arrived. When she did arrive the case was 
 changed, and as Sir Vesey Hamilton pointed out at the time, 
 '■ the quantity of weight removed from the Seignelay, 
 without which she would not have come off even with 
 the Undamiteds steam, and the rapid manner the stores. 
 were got on board and the Seignelay prepared for sea 
 after being floated, could not have been accomplished had 
 her crew not done their work with equal ardour as our 
 people did, which every sailor reading between the lines 
 understands. ... It must, moreover, be remembered that 
 the captain of the Seignelay was the only person responsible. 
 Is is not every one who would have risen to the then 
 improbable chance of the Undaunted s being able to drag 
 his ship off through so much sand ; but he did it, and 
 
268 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 saved her." I could not have made this comment myself 
 with the authority which belongs to Sir Vesey Hamilton, 
 and therefore I am very glad to be able to quote his 
 remarks on the subject. I need only append the con- 
 cluding sentence of a letter which I subsequently addressed 
 to the Times when I learnt from Sir Vesey Hamilton that 
 he thought some passages in the narrative quoted above 
 might suggest to the mind of a landsman reflections on the 
 captain and officers of the Seignelay which no sailor would 
 entertain : — " I should be sorry indeed if an international 
 episode which displays so happily the friendly relations of 
 two great services were to be turned into an occasion for 
 invidiously and quite unwarrantably exalting one at the 
 expense of the other." 
 
 J. R. T. 
 
( 269 ) 
 
 SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR.* 
 
 In one of Hans Andersen's charming tales, two ingenious 
 persons represent to the Emperor that they are the sole 
 possessors of the secret of weaving clothes of the most 
 "elaborate patterns," which have "the wonderful property 
 of remaining invisible to every one who was unfit for the 
 office he held, or who was extraordinarily simple in 
 character." The Emperor gives out a large order, and as 
 there is a delay in supply, he sends his "faithful old 
 minister" to report progress. "The poor old minister 
 looked and looked, but could not discover anything on the 
 looms." " Is it possible that I am a simpleton } " he 
 remarks to himself. " I have never thought so myself, and 
 at any rate, if I am so, no one must know it." He there- 
 fore writes an able memorandum, setting forth the extra- 
 ordinary qualities of the garments he could not see, and 
 soon the whole town is filled with rumours of their perfec- 
 tion. Ultimately, the Emperor is undressed, and the 
 experts go through the motions of clothing him in the new 
 garments, while the courtiers vie in praising their delicacy 
 of texture. And, as the procession passes through the 
 streets, all the people cry out, " ' Oh, how beautiful are our 
 Emperor's new clothes' ... in short, no one would allow 
 that he could not see these much admired clothes, because 
 in doing so he would have declared himself either a 
 simpleton, or unfit for his office." "'But the Emperor 
 
 • Royal Artillery Institution Papers, reprinted by permission of the 
 Committee. 
 
270 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 has nothing at all on,' said a little child . . . and what the 
 child said was whispered from one to another," till the 
 crowd echoed the cry. " The Emperor was vexed, for he 
 knew the people were right ; but, he thought, ' the pro- 
 cession must go on now.' " 
 
 There is a certain measure of analogy between the 
 submarine mines, on the provision of which many Powers 
 have largely embarked, and " the Emperor's clothes.'' Of 
 the real value of submarine mining defence, applied to 
 varying conditions, we know exceedingly little. We must 
 take it all on trust. These mysterious machines are 
 commonly assumed to be beyond the understanding of the 
 ordinary mind. To hint a doubt of their efficiency under 
 every conceivable condition is, perhaps, to proclaim one's self 
 "unfit for office," and at least "no one must know that." 
 
 So, for the most part, we agree to regard the submarine 
 mine as a thing above and beyond all criticism. Large 
 sums have been expended by many Powers, and the 
 Emperor's philosophy recommends itself in such circum- 
 stances — "the procession must go on now." 
 
 This may possibly have its advantages ; but the draw- 
 backs are sufficiently obvious, and every rule by which 
 modem science, military and civil, should be governed is 
 violated. A profound scepticism ought to be engendered 
 by the medium who tells you that you are not a sympathetic 
 subject, and therefore unable to partake in his manifesta- 
 tions. And it may well be that submarine mines will 
 eventually suffer from the want of daylight, or even criticism, 
 from the outside. 
 
 Two things at least are certain. In the first place, 
 the mine is merely one of the elements of the defence 
 of a channel or harbour. If it has any value at all, its 
 presence or absence must affect the general scheme of 
 which it forms part. That scheme, unless considered as 
 a whole, will necessarily be inharmonious, extravagant, and 
 unsatisfactory. 
 
 Secondly, there is no need whatever for expert knowledge 
 in discussing the position of the submarine mine in relation 
 
SUn.l/ARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 27 1 
 
 to defence — its tactics, if the term can with any propriety 
 be applied to a weapon which, once deposited in the 
 fighting line, remains there till it has expended itself or 
 become unserviceable. The special knowledge of a Small- 
 Arms Committee is not required for the elucidation of 
 Infantry tactics, and submarine mines cannot be permitted 
 to claim immunity from free discussion on the grounds of 
 their peculiar abstruseness. Such a claim would, in fact, 
 be a dangerous one to prefer, for if the arrangements of 
 submarine mining defence are beyond the powers of com- 
 prehension of the officer of ordinary scientific attainment, 
 their fitness for purposes of war may fairly be questioned. 
 
 Each nation pretends keen anxiety as to the secrecy of 
 its apparatus, and each knows all about its neighbours' 
 paraphernalia. The fiction of mystery must perhaps be 
 maintained in regard to a weapon for which moral effect is 
 extensively claimed. Above and beyond the purely tech- 
 nical aspects of the submarine mine, there lies a sufficiently 
 wide field for discussion, which is too generally neglected. 
 
 The questions which it is proposed to examine — which 
 ought on every ground to be fully and worthily examined 
 — are the fitness of submarine mine defence for varying 
 conditions, the validity of certain historical claims put 
 forward on its behalf, the position of this branch of defence 
 in relation to others, and the extent to which the system 
 is applicable to the special requirements of the British 
 Empire. 
 
 Such questions are naval in their very essence, and, 
 doubtless on this account, the submarine mine systems of 
 France, Germany, Italy, and Austria, are in the hands of 
 the respective navies of these Powers. In Great Britain, 
 Russia, and the United States,* on the other hand, the 
 organization is military. Whatever may be the advantages 
 or disadvantages of the two methods, it is at least incon- 
 testable that all the really important questions connected 
 
 * The United States have a system worked out, and a certain 
 number of trained men ; but up to the present time they have neither 
 created an organization nor provided the necessary stores for defence 
 on a large scale. 
 
272 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 with submarine mines require expert naval knowledge at 
 every stage of their solution, and that the fitness of this 
 means of defence for special conditions, its proper standard 
 as well as its limitations, can only be authoritatively laid 
 down by naval men. Electrical science has nothing what- 
 ever to do with the matter. 
 
 The Chatham text-book of 1873 — a confidential work 
 which was immediately re-published in the United States 
 — adopted a broadly comprehensive view of the realms of 
 the submarine miner. Submarine mining defence is stated 
 to be suitable for: — 
 
 a. First Class Fortresses such as ... Portsmouth 
 
 b. Mercantile Harbours , 
 
 Liverpool. 
 
 c. Undefended „ , 
 
 Belfast. 
 
 d. Small ,, , 
 
 Whitby. 
 
 e. Open towns „ , 
 
 Brighton. 
 
 / Open beaches „ , 
 
 Sandown. 
 
 And further, {g) for intrenching a fleet against a stronger 
 adversary. Moreover, {It) it is "especially adapted for the 
 use of Colonial ports.'' In short, universal utility appears 
 to be claimed for the system, since nothing is left except 
 the open sea. Although the experience since gained as to 
 the practical value of submarine mines is almost nil, more 
 recent writers, such as Commander Sleeman * and Lieut.- 
 Colonel Bucknill,t are more moderate in their claims. 
 
 Upon certain points the advocates of submarine mines 
 are quite clear. The teaching of the American and of the 
 Franco-German Wars constitutes — so they hold — proof 
 positive of the peculiar value of their system. Again, it 
 is cheap. Finally, the moral eff'ect is enormous. All these 
 things have been passed on from book to book and paper 
 to paper, till they have grown into a parrot cry. Yet the 
 first will not stand any examination whatever. The 
 second depends wholly upon what is understood by a mine 
 defence. The third is a matter of circumstance and 
 opinion. 
 
 * "Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare," 1880. 
 t " Submarine Mines and Torpedoes," 1889. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 273 
 
 The material results achieved in the war of 1861-5 by- 
 very rough and really cheap apparatus were so considerable, 
 that rash generalization, not unnaturally, followed. During 
 this war, twenty-one vessels appear to have been sunk by 
 submarine mines, and three others seriously injured. Even 
 when the long period involved, and the large number of 
 vessels employed is taken into full account, these results 
 are necessarily striking, and undoubtedly testify to the 
 practical efficiency of the submarine mine, in the peculiar 
 circumstances in which it was called upon to play part. 
 
 The Confederate States had practically no sea-going navj-, 
 no commerce in the ordinary sense of the word, no distant 
 possessions with which it was of vital importance to main- 
 tain communication. Provided only that blockade runners 
 could make their way into some few of their ports, self- 
 imposed obstructions of any kind and in any degree of 
 profusion need not be excluded. It is surely desirable to 
 remember at starting that, under no circumstances, could 
 the conditions under which the Confederate States fought, 
 apply to the British Empire. As to the question of the 
 fitness of submarine mines for our needs, the American 
 War can evidently teach us nothing. What may have been 
 an admirable policy for the Confederate States might be 
 fatal to Great Britain. 
 
 The great lesson of the American War — so we are told — 
 is that guns unaided by obstructions cannot stop ships, and, 
 as of all obstructions mines are held to interfere least with 
 navigation, it follows as a corollary that mines are necessary 
 for the defence of channels. In one form or another this 
 proposition is copied from book to book, reappearing with 
 wearisome punctuality whenever questions of defence are 
 under consideration. An axiom cannot, however, be created 
 by reiteration ; and science repudiates formulas unsupported 
 by reason. " It requires no argument to prove that four or 
 five miles of channel thus obstructed (by submarine mines) 
 will be no small obstacle to an advance, and if at the same 
 time it be swept by a heavy fire of modern artillery and 
 be covered by movable fish torpedoes . . . the city in rear 
 
 T 
 
274 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 will be safe from insult." * Most willingly granted ; but 
 this tremendous sentence throws no real light whatever 
 upon any question of defence. 
 
 The experience of the American War surely needs 
 analysis before rash generalizations are propounded and 
 offered to us as scientific truths. " The running past a 
 battery is a very easy thing when there is a straight channel 
 and sufficient depth of water," wrote Admiral Porter.t and 
 these few words appear to be one of the bases upon which a 
 vast structure has been built up. " A battery " is the term 
 used — not several batteries, or dispersed and concealed 
 guns, crossing their fire over a narrow channel, and yet 
 able to concentrate their energy under the direction of a 
 single will. Further, Admiral Porter demanded " a straight 
 channel and sufficient depth of water." More, however, is 
 implied. The obvious meaning is that ships which are to 
 run easily past a battery, are to have clear water beyond 
 them not under fire. Admiral Porter evidently had in 
 view the Mississippi or Mobile Bay, and his words have 
 no reference whatever to channels leading the ship only 
 into cramped waters commanded by guns — no reference, 
 therefore, to Plymouth, Harwich,Malta, Singapore, Mauritius, 
 St. Lucia, and many other harbours that could be named. 
 
 Again, such waters as the Thames or Medway are 
 clearly excluded, for the difficulties of navigation are con- 
 siderable, and large vessels which have found it an "easy 
 thing" to run past the immense defences near Gravesend 
 will be effectually stopped by the river bottom — greatest 
 of all obstructions — at Erith. Further, it is apparently 
 forgotten that both combatants in the American Civil War 
 built special ironclad navies for the river and coast work 
 which largely entered into their operations, and that the 
 armour of the vessels outmatched the available guns. A 
 hostile Power may, of course, build a fleet of monitors or 
 special vessels for the attack of our coast defences ; but this 
 could not be kept secret, and the flotilla when it leaves its 
 
 * Report of Committee of U.S. Board on Fortifications (1885). 
 t Report to Secretary of the Navy (ist February, 1865). 
 
PLATE I. 
 
 MOBILE 
 
 Cedar Point 
 
 Ft.POWELu'^ .Grants Pass 
 
 Heron /. • ^ 
 
 Bay of Mobile 
 
 i6H 
 
 JH 
 
 :3M 
 
 ib'A 
 
 '■J7 
 
 
 3lil 
 
 \i6'/. 
 6'A 
 
 
 uY. ..-■••^^ 
 
 
 ,.^^d^^^ 
 
 ^<^ 
 
 .•v<' . •• 
 
 *%, 
 
 12% 
 
 ^ 
 
 *4., 
 
 AJK' 
 
 VK" 
 
 Scale of Yards 
 
 lOOO !;po O lOOO 2000 •JOOO 
 
 W.B. Soundings inside 3 Fathom line are in feet 
 
 tVaUKT ijr BoutcUl so. 
 
 To face p. 275. 
 
SUBMARINE MIXES IN RELATION TO WAR. 275 
 
 harbours can be dealt with by the British Navy. The whole 
 question is, in fact, essentially naval, and can be studied 
 only in connection with charts and diagrams of ships. It 
 has nothing whatever to do with the Electrical Laboratory 
 or the testing room. 
 
 Three instances drawn from the American War deserve 
 mention, since it is important that their real significance 
 should be understood. 
 
 I. Mobile. — The entrance to the lower Bay of Mobile 
 was forced on August s, 1864, by Admiral Farragut with 
 four ironclads and fourteen steamers. This entrance was 
 threc-and-a-half miles broad between Fort Morgan and 
 Fort Gaines (Plate I.).* Of this distance about two-thirds 
 was obstructed by piles, as shown, the water being here so 
 shallow that "only vessels of very light draught" could 
 have passed it in any case. The obstruction was prolonged 
 by three lines of contact mines ; but between the mine 
 field and Fort Morgan a gap of five hundred yards had 
 been left for the use of the blockade runners. The 
 Tccumsek was sunk by a mine ; but the flagship Hartford, 
 which then took the lead, "steamed through between the 
 buoys where the torpedoes were supposed to have been 
 sunk." t The inference drawn from this operation by 
 Lieut. -Colonel von Scheliha is, that a "merely partial 
 obstruction " is " not sufficient to enable forts to keep out 
 a large fleet," and the experience of Mobile is assumed to 
 justify the employment of mines in any degree of profusion 
 and under all manner of circumstances. The inference, if 
 limited to the Bay of Mobile and strictly analogous con- 
 ditions, may be just ; but it is of some importance that 
 these conditions should not be forgotten. Fort Gaines was 
 too far away to give any support, and the whole artillery 
 defence fell upon Fort Morgan, an old hexagonal masonry 
 work, which the Confederates had not been able for want 
 -of labour to improve materially. The guns were all J 
 
 * Taken from " The Navy in the Civil War," by Commander A. T. 
 Mahan, U..S.N., 1883. 
 t Rear-Admiral Farragut's Report. 
 X Except some ditch flanking guns in casemates. 
 
276 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 mounted en barbette — in the old, not in the modern sense. 
 There was a towering octagonal brick keep, whose walls 
 were twenty feet from the gun rampart ! Altogether Fort 
 Morgan appears to have been as hopeless an artillerj' 
 position * as can well be imagined, and such little power 
 as it possessed was doubtless due to two extemporized 
 batteries which had been formed in the covered way. 
 Nevertheless, "not a single one of the guns in the Con- 
 federate batteries was silenced by the torrent of shrapnel 
 shell and grape poured into them as each Federal vessel 
 passed." f 
 
 The facts may be briefly summed. A strong fleet success- 
 fully passed a single obsolete fort placed on the end of an 
 isolated spit. Once past this obsolete fort, the fleet found 
 sufficient water — commanded by no shore gun — to carry 
 on a little ramming action. Even so, Admiral Farragut 
 did not attempt to engage the Fort again, and two 
 Confederate gunboats, "Morgan and Gaines, succeeded in 
 escaping under the protection of the guns of Fort Morgan." | 
 The operation appears to have been decidedly more difficult 
 than might have been supposed, and no moral can be 
 drawn which has the remotest bearing on the desirability 
 of submarine mine defence for such harbours as Singapore, 
 and such channels as the Thames, the Tyne, the Clyde, or 
 the Mersey. 
 
 2. New Orleans. — On April 24, 1862, the entrance to 
 the Mississippi below New Orleans was forced by Admiral 
 Farragut with a squadron, of which the largest vessel — the 
 Pensacola — registered 2158 tons, while seven vessels were 
 gunboats of 507 tons. The river was defended by two 
 forts— St. Philip and Jackson (Plate !!.).§ The breadth of 
 the Mississippi at this point was eight hundred yards. A 
 strong line of obstruction had been formed "early in the 
 
 • Bombarded by the fleet 'and by shore batteries on August 22, 
 Fort Morgan surrendered in a state of utter dilapidation the following 
 day. Contrast this with Fort Wagner, which stood a siege of 58 
 days, with successive bombardments from land and sea. 
 
 t Von Scheliha. 
 
 \ Rear-Admiral Farragut's Report. 
 
 § Taken from " The Navy in the Civil War." 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 277 
 
 winter," consisting of two 2j-inch iron cables suspended 
 from anchored logs ; but this gave way on Alarch 10, and 
 w£is repaired by a line of anchored schooners, each of 200 
 tons, tied together by two or three one-inch chains. " The 
 current and collisions with their own vessels had somewhat 
 disarranged the apparatus." * A breach was effected in 
 this obstruction on the nights of the 20th and 21st, through 
 which the squadron passed in two divisions line ahead.t 
 
 The above is held up as " a proof that artillery fire alone 
 will never again prevent a steam fleet from forcing a 
 passage, the channel of which has not been obstructed." % 
 Such obstructions as those created by the Confederates 
 being wholly inadmissible in the case of any frequented 
 channel, the necessity for submarine mines is assumed to 
 follow. 
 
 This, however, is not the whole of the story. The mouth 
 of the Mississippi had been blockaded for months. On 
 March 18, Admiral Porter arrived inside the bar with twenty 
 mortar schooners — each carrying a 13-inch mortar — and 
 six gunboats. A careful survey of the river was made, 
 and by April 18, the mortar boats were all carefully placed 
 in position behind "a thick forest of trees and matted 
 vines." § A steady bombardment was opened, by which 
 "the citadel and out-houses of Fort Jackson were set on 
 fire, " and the magazine was placed " in great danger ; so 
 that the enemy's fire ceased." || The bombardment was 
 continued for six days, with an average of between 1400 
 and 1500 shells per day, and the fire was maintained 
 during the passage of Farragut's squadron which took 
 place before daybreak on the 24th. Fort St. Philip 
 received only occasional shells, and was little injured ; but 
 of Fort Jackson, Admiral Porter reported—" Never in my 
 life did I witness such a scene of desolation and wreck." 
 
 Thus, in place of an easy rush of vessels past forts, the 
 
 • «' The Navy in the Civil War." 
 
 f The intention was to pass the defences in single line ahead, but 
 the port division being checked, diverged, and followed a line of its 
 
 own. ,, ,, , 
 
 X Von Scheliha. § Admiral Porter. |1 Mahan. 
 
278 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 operations were really of the nature of a protracted naval 
 siege. Not only had a long blockade been maintained, but 
 weeks of preparation and reconnaissance passed, followed 
 by a six days' bombardment, which, under the circumstances, 
 was probably as effective as if the mortars had been placed 
 in batteries on shore. The difficulties of navigation appear 
 to have been so small * that the squadron was able to 
 move in darkness. Again, the forts were of medieval 
 type, possessing only one rifled gun — 7-in. — each, more than 
 half the total armament being 24-prs. "The truth is that 
 the Confederacy was very badly off for cannon." t Finally, 
 it should never be forgotten that Farragut's object in 
 entering the Mississippi was to join hands with a Northern 
 Army. There is here no analogy whatever with the entry 
 of vessels through a difficult channel into cramped waters. 
 
 Imagine the mouth of the Thames completely blockaded 
 for months, and the reaches from Sheerness to Gravesend 
 in full possession of a large hostile fleet for more than five 
 weeks. Pendennis Castle — transferred from Falmouth to 
 Gravesend — and Tilbury Fort, armed with smooth-bores 
 and one 7-in. R.B.L. gun each, constitute the defences, 
 which are heavily bombarded by a mortar flotilla for a week. 
 Even then no argument in favour of inflicting mines on 
 the waterway of the Thames can be drawn from the ex- 
 perience of the Mississippi. The conditions are not by 
 any means parallel ; since our enemy, once past Pen- 
 dennis Castle and Tilbury Fort, is confronted with a narrow 
 and difficult tidal channel, which only his light ships can 
 use. Before Farragut rolled the mighty waters of the 
 Mississippi, navigable, even by night, for his whole fleet 
 for hundreds of miles, and bringing him into touch with 
 a Northern Army. Finally, if the above conditions are 
 ever fulfilled in the Thames, the British Empire will not 
 be saved by submarine mines. Some caution is surely 
 
 * There were ten fathoms of water at the point where the obstruction 
 was breached, and short of avoiding close proximity to the banks, 
 there appear to have been no difficulties of navigation whatever. 
 
 t Mahan. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 279 
 
 needed before making generalizations from unsuitable or 
 irrelevant data. 
 
 3. Vicksbiirg was several times passed by the Federal 
 squadron. Here also the operation consisted in moving 
 for a time under fire with a view to reach free water 
 beyond. Moreover, the Confederate artillery was weak 
 and indifferently served, while only one bank of the river 
 was held. 
 
 The general lessons of the American War are very 
 simple: — (i) Obstruction of any imaginable density is 
 permissible in the case of a Power possessing no commerce, 
 and whose fighting navy is confined to a river flotilla. 
 (2) Even unarmoured vessels can pass obsolete and badly 
 mounted guns, provided that there is no difficulty of 
 navigation, and that they have clear water ahead. 
 
 The Franco-German War provides another much vaunted 
 historical plea for unlimited submarine mining. Yet the 
 evidence, such as it is, points the other way, and in no case 
 would it be permissible to draw inferences intended to 
 guide the Imperial policy of Great Britain from this war. 
 A navy, hopelessly over-matched, unable to keep the seas, 
 scarcely permitted to show a ship out of harbour — these 
 were the conditions under which Germany fought. On 
 peril of national effacement. Great Britain must never 
 fight under such conditions, and to borrow a policy from 
 Prussia, in 1870, would be a confession of contemplated 
 naval impotence. Such impotence meant to Prussia a 
 mere pecuniary loss, to be presently recouped in the 
 ransom of France. To Great Britain it would mean national 
 ruin. 
 
 It is from the French side that we should naturally 
 expect to gather evidence in support of the alleged deterrent 
 effect of the mine. There is practically no such evidence. 
 Unpreparedness for war, unsuitability of vessels and diffi- 
 culties of navigation, are the full and sufficient reasons why 
 the French navy was unable to take action against the North 
 Sea and Baltic ports of Germany. " The northern fleet, 
 being still composed, as in the early days of the expedition 
 
2So THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 of ships of heavy draft of water, the approach to the 
 enemy's coast, studded with shoals, was for them impossible, 
 and Vice-Admiral de Gueydon, in spite of his energy, had 
 been obliged to content himself, as his predecessors, Vice- 
 Admirals Fourrichon and Bouet-Willaumez, had done, in 
 blockading Prussian ports." * "Before Kiel, without a dis- 
 embarking force, without floating batteries, Admiral Bouet- 
 Willaumez had nothing to expect from vigorous action." f 
 The Admiral, in fact, held a council of war, at which it was 
 decided, after much deliberation, that "without special 
 vessels, without a disembarking force, any attempted 
 attack, by the little effect which it must produce, would 
 be of a nature to destroy all the prestige which still 
 remains to the French squadron." t The same writer states 
 that on July 26th, the buoys and lights of the Jahde 
 were still in position eight days after the entry of Prince 
 Adalbert's squadron and no mines were down, while the 
 defences of Wilhelmshaven were incomplete. Whatever 
 may have been the chances of success against Kiel and 
 Wilhelmshaven, had a blow been delivered within a few 
 hours of the declaration of war by a specially prepared 
 squadron ready for instant action, there were certainly 
 none later on for such a fleet as the French employed — and 
 this whether there were mines or not. The council 
 summoned by Admiral Boiiet-Willaumez of August 12, 
 reviewed all the ports of the Prussian littoral, and 
 unanimously came to the conclusion that Danzig and 
 Colberg alone could be attacked, and that the effect 
 produced even here would be small. As for the commercial 
 ports Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and Stettin, which it 
 is commonly assumed were effectively defended by 
 submarine mines, and the destruction of which "seemed 
 so easy to the critics who, being on shore, occupied 
 themselves with the affairs of the squadron," the reason 
 
 * Article in " Moniteur Universel de Tours," November 24, 1870, 
 by R6ne de Pont Jest, translated by Vice-Admiral Colomb. 
 
 t " L' Admiral Bouet-Willaumez et I'expedition dans la Baltique," 
 Felix Julian, 1872. 
 
 I Ibid. 
 
SUBMARINE MIXES IN RELATION TO WAR. 281 
 
 of their immunity appears to have been simple. " It was 
 because these towns — these fantastic sailors did not know 
 it, and no doubt ignored it — are at the end of shallow 
 rivers, twelve or fifteen miles from the coast, where even 
 in peace time, and with the most skilled pilots, the 
 Prussian ironclads do not themselves enter." * The 
 charts of this coast-line speak for themselves, and fully 
 explain the difficulties which confronted the French 
 squadron. 
 
 Of the two ports selected as the only possible objectives 
 for the French fleet, Colberg had no mines, but was 
 nevertheless left severely alone. On the other hand, 
 "Admiral Bouet, being determined to examine Danzig 
 Roads closely, pushed in there in spite of the mine-field 
 which defended it, and had the daring to anchor there," 
 but was unable to effect anything on account of the unfit- 
 ness of his squadron, by which he was even prevented 
 from capturing a little Prussian gun-boat which attacked 
 the Surveillante on the night of August 30. 
 
 There is, in fact, no evidence whatever that mines played 
 any part in securing the ports of the North Sea and Baltic. 
 At any rate, the immunity of these ports is amply accounted 
 for on other grounds. 
 
 It would, however, be unjust to say that mines failed 
 to give evidence of their existence in this war. M. Ren6 
 de Pont Jest states that the German merchant vessels which 
 ran for the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, in attempting 
 "to get into the river or into the bays, ran upon the 
 submarine mines which had been submerged for our 
 benefit, and sank under the eyes of those for whom the 
 engineers of King William had reserved this sort of death." 
 This may be a picturesque exaggeration ; but it seems 
 certain that, owing to the blocking of the ports, a large 
 number of trading vessels were caught. " More than thirty 
 ships certainly had been captured or lost . . . and it 
 is not exaggerating to estimate the German losses by the 
 blockade since the end of July at five millions of francs a 
 
 * Rend de Tont Jest, November 28, 1870. 
 
282 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 day." * As might have been expected, the vessels appear 
 to have been uniformly caught in attempting to enter their 
 own ports by night. Finally, it is certain that several 
 Germans were killed in subsequently raising their mines. 
 On the whole, it seems clear that Prussia would, under the 
 circumstances, have saved herself loss, by omitting to lay 
 out her mine-fields. 
 
 Whatever opinions may be held as to the value of the 
 Prussian submarine mine defence in 1870, it will probably 
 be admitted that France might have been content to dis- 
 pense with the aid of this doubtful ally. Her ports, at 
 least, were in no danger whatever, and the spectacle of 
 the French spending three months in laying down mines 
 at Toulon, and apparently failing to complete the mine- 
 fields at Cherbourg, is not edifying. At a time of dire 
 national need, was no better work to be done than the 
 obstruction of French harbours in fear of an enemy who 
 could not even look at them ? f Will a single mine be 
 permitted to be laid down in the British Empire in the 
 event of war with Germany .-' 
 
 The lessons of the Franco-German War stand out in clear 
 relief, but none of them point in the direction of submarine 
 mines. Ports, like London and Glasgow, lying far up 
 narrow tidal channels, can only be approached at all tides 
 by comparatively small vessels of the cruiser type, which 
 could not live under the fire of field guns. Large vessels 
 will certainly not venture into cramped tidal channels where 
 their retreat would not be secure, and they would run every 
 chance of grounding, apart from the risk of being caught 
 in a trap by a force entering the river behind them. 
 Fortified ports can only be effectively attacked by large 
 special flotillas, such as those constructed in the American 
 Civil War, and, except in good weather, such a flotilla 
 would find many difficulties in northern waters. Further, 
 
 * De Pont Jest. Another French writer, F^lix Julian, estimates the 
 German loss during the war at three millions of francs per day. 
 
 t Meanwhile, a brig, a barque, and a steamer were picked up by a 
 German vessel off Point de Coubre, near the mouth of the Gironde. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 283 
 
 an attack, to have any real prospect of success, must be 
 supported by a land force. Finally, defended ports cannot 
 be seriously attacked at all, and no blockade can be 
 established except by a Power possessing a great naval 
 preponderance. 
 
 Another curious historic fallacy remains to be dealt with. 
 " In the war which was carried on for six years by the 
 Empire of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay, the latter 
 managed, by means of submarine mines, to keep at bay 
 for the whole period the Brazilian fleet of fifteen ironclads 
 and sixty other men-of-war." So states a distinguished 
 advocate of submarine mines, who, at the same time — and 
 quite as accurately — takes occasion to observe that " it is 
 well known that the French naval supremacy was paralyzed 
 during the Franco-German War by the existence, or re- 
 ported existence, of mines in the Elbe." * Few, probably, 
 have ever taken the trouble to wade through any account 
 of the confused scrambling which occurred between the 
 Allies and Paraguay, and the fearless statement above 
 quoted appears to have escaped criticism. As a matter of 
 fact, it is altogether incorrect. The Paraguayan mines are 
 credited with the destruction of one Brazilian vessel, the Rio 
 de Janeiro. "Les terribles torpilles . . . ont rempli une 
 seule fois leur ofiice," states one writer.f Another writer,^ 
 dealing with the matter from the submarine mine point of 
 view, describes the vessel, a river monitor drawing nine 
 feet of water, as "un magnifique cuirass^," and, in order 
 to aid the imagination, provides a striking picture of the 
 scene, utilizing a first-class battle-ship for the purpose ! 
 A third writer,§ however, who was practically Commanding 
 Engineer at the time to the Paraguayan army, and who 
 must apparently have heard of this triumph of his adopted 
 country, makes no mention of it whatever, although he 
 
 ♦ How the existence of mines at the mouth of a single river could 
 in any case " paralyze" a nation's navy does not appear. 
 
 t Thdodor Fix, capitaine d'etat major. Conference de Ministdre 
 de la Guerre. 
 
 X " Les torpilles." Lieut.-Colonel Hennebert, 1884. 
 
 § "The War in Paraguay." G. Thompson, C.E. (1869). 
 
284 THE XAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 alludes to the explosion of fifteen hundred pounds of 
 powder floated down among the Brazilian vessels, by 
 which no damage appears to have been eiTected. 
 
 The Brazilian fleet moved without any difficulty whenever 
 the Admiral was able to make up his mind. After leaving 
 Buenos Ayres, "it took just a year to reach the nearest 
 point of Paraguay," and the subsequent proceedings of 
 the squadron, when at length it succeeded in reaching the 
 enemy's waters, were characterized by similar deliberation. 
 The action of the navy began with the little aff"air of 
 Riachuelo, where the Brazilian vessels, during their en- 
 gagement with a few small armed river steamers of the 
 Paraguayans, were fired at by some field guns on the 
 bank. This seems to have inspired a wholesome dread of 
 shore guns, which proved persistent. On May 20, 1867, 
 eight months after the reported date of the destruction of 
 the Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Admiral reconnoitred 
 Curopayty, and finding a few empty demi-johns, he ex- 
 cused himself for doing nothing for three months — this, 
 possibly, is one of the bases of the kept-at-bay- for-the- 
 whole-period story. By August 15, however, he had 
 hardened his heart, and the flotilla passed the Paraguayan 
 battery. " The passage of Curopayty by the fleet had the 
 eflfect of making the Paraguayans see they could do nothing 
 against ironclads with their small artillery." * Having 
 accomplished so much, and proved that the submarine mine 
 scare was capable of alleviation, five ironclads anchored 
 off Humaitd, and bombarded the church intermittently from 
 August, 1867, to February, 1868, "displacing some bricks 
 and cutting one or two beams in half" t Three new monitors 
 having arrived on February 13, the fleet passed Humaitd 
 on the iSth without any difficulty. 
 
 In fact, so far from the Paraguayans being able "by 
 means of submarine mines to keep at bay for the whole 
 period the Brazilian fleet," that fleet was able to move about 
 whenever and wherever its Admirals chose, hindered only 
 by batteries on shore and by some rude extemporized gun 
 
 * "The War in Paraguay." t Ibid. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 285 
 
 flats. Mines played no part whatever in this war, and, 
 even had it been otherwise, Great Britain might as rationally 
 look to Switzerland for the inspiration of her naval policy, 
 as draw a lesson from the proceedings of the semi-civilized 
 inland State of Paraguay. As a primary qualification for 
 forming a sound opinion of the war value of submarine 
 mines, it is necessary to attain to a conception of the 
 British Empire. 
 
 In 1866, the Austrians employed mines for the defence 
 of Pola and Venice, yet the ancient fortifications of Lissa, 
 armed with smooth-bore guns and unaided by any mines, 
 repulsed a two-days' attack by fifteen Italian vessels, con- 
 taining "in their armament all the latest improvements 
 which the modern art of war had up to that date invented," * 
 and the naval action which followed sufficed to secure the 
 safety of every Austrian port. 
 
 On October 10, 1877, a Turkish gunboat, the Suna, 
 was sunk in the Suhna arm of the Danube. The Turks had 
 intrenched themselves behind a line of obstructions and 
 mines, outside of which the Russians laid a second line 
 of electro-mechanical mines, one of which was struck by 
 the Suna in moving up stream to engage the Opyt. This 
 was the only result obtained during the war, and the 
 immunity of the ports of both belligerents is amply 
 accounted for on grounds with which submarine mines 
 have nothing to do. 
 
 In the war of 1879-81 on the Pacific Coast of South 
 America, submarine mines played no part. " The Peruvians 
 probably did lay down a few torpedoes, but they were 
 placed close to the shore," f and in any case it is not easy 
 to see how mines could have materially affected the 
 operations, t 
 
 In 1884, the French squadron lay at anchor off Pagoda 
 Point inside the defences of the Min River for more than 
 
 * M. Buloz. " Revue des deux tnondes." July 20, 1866. 
 
 t Papers issued by the U.S. Intelligence Department. 
 
 X One vessel was sunk, however, and another much injured by 
 drifting boats prepared with explosives and incautiously taken along- 
 side by the Peruvians. 
 
286 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 a month making preparations for hostilities. The position 
 was twenty-five miles from the sea, and there were no 
 defences on shore except " two old stone forts and a field 
 battery."* Coming down the river after the bombardment 
 of September 23, Admiral Courbet seems to have feared 
 that mines had been laid behind him in the Kimpai Pass — 
 "from various sources I had reason to fear the presence 
 of torpedoes." Accordingly, on "the nights of the 28th 
 and 29th our boats dragged the channel, finding nothing." 
 "The new buoys seemed to be fishermen's, and the drag- 
 ging gave no cause to suspect torpedoes." The "moral 
 effect " of the supposed existence of submarine mines was, 
 therefore, limited in this case. Two nights of work were 
 entailed on some of the boats of the French squadron. 
 
 At Tamsui, Admiral Lespes reported that the river was 
 "obstructed by four large junks loaded with stones and 
 sunk. ... A line of sixteen ground mines is easily 
 observed." Admiral Lespes had only one gunboat in his 
 squadron, and it was physically impossible for him to enter 
 the river ; but the mines are, notwithstanding, credited 
 with his exclusion. After some days of reconnoitring, a 
 force of five hundred and forty men were landed, only to 
 be repulsed by the Chinese with a loss of more than 
 twenty-one per cent, of the strength engaged. 
 
 Even if every advantage claimed for submarine mines 
 exists, no war experience at present indicates their 
 universal suitability for the needs of Great Britain. It is 
 somewhat remarkable that, as a nation, we appear to have 
 been chary in adopting an arm which now threatens to be 
 regarded as of general application. Lord St. Vincent is 
 stated to have held that " Pitt was a fool for encouraging 
 a mode of warfare which, if successful, would wrest the 
 trident from those who then claimed to bear it." This 
 opinion probably survived to a later date, and the formation 
 of a "Floating Obstructions Committee," in 1863, appears 
 to have been the original bacillus from which an epidemic 
 has sprung. 
 
 * Papers issued by the U.S. Intelligence Department. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 287 
 
 Submarine mines may be divided into three cate- 
 gories — 
 
 (a) Mines which depend for their chances of suc- 
 cessful employment on accurate observation of two kinds — 
 first, when the mine itself is being laid out ; second, when 
 following the ship which it is proposed to destroy. 
 
 (3) Controlled electro-contact mines which depend for 
 their action on contact with a vessel, the firing being effected 
 through the medium of a circuit closer in the mine itself. 
 
 (c) Uncontrolled mines, mechanical, electro-mechanical, 
 or chemical, which are exploded when struck with adequate 
 force by friend or foe. 
 
 As to the relative merits of {a) and {b) the experts 
 seem to differ ; since Colonel Bucknill states " contact 
 mines are the general favourites ; " but " the preference 
 ... is not easily accounted for." * After remarking, 
 however, that "it is not prudent to rely upon observation 
 firing at greater distances than one sea mile, the smoke 
 of an engagement, or fog, or thick weather, having to be 
 reckoned with," he lays down an ideal defence for Cher- 
 bourg, in which some of the observation mines are thirteen 
 thousand yards from the observing station. 
 
 Putting aside all questions of higher policy for the 
 moment, the following conclusions appear to be inevitable. 
 Observation mines, lying on the bottom or anchored at 
 depths greater than a ship's draught, can be employed 
 without hindrance to traffic ; but their real efficacy in war 
 is somewhat problematic, which, doubtless, accounts for 
 their rejection by Germany and the United States. Under 
 exceptionally favourable circumstances, where there is no 
 great rise and fall of tide, where sufficient height exists 
 for the employment of a depression position-finder, and 
 where good weather can be secured for laying them, they 
 may prove effective by day. Such efficiency will, however, 
 ultimately depend on the nerve and coolness of a single 
 individual, who cannot be previously practised in his rdle, 
 and who would, at the critical moment, find himself 
 
 * " Submarine Mines and Torpedoes." 
 
288 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 saddled with a great and unaccustomed responsibility. 
 By night the value of observation mines becomes doubt- 
 ful. If electric lights are provided, observation firing is, 
 perhaps, practicable ; but if such lights are permitted to 
 rove they will most seriously interfere with those required 
 for artillery purposes. It appears, in fact, altogether 
 impossible to employ two sets of search lights in charge 
 of different arms with different objects. In thick weather 
 observation mines are useless. 
 
 Contact mines, so long as the system adopted is simple 
 and workable — not in short peace experiments, but 
 throughout long months of war — should be effective. 
 They admit of more rough-and-ready laying out than 
 observation mines, and are not so dependent upon good 
 weather in the first instance, though much more liable to 
 disturbance, due to bad weather, when laid. They may 
 be claimed as efficient by night or in a fog. On the 
 other hand, there is no experience to show whether they 
 could be employed in a channel where there is heavy 
 traffic, and, without this experience, it is impossible to 
 admit their general suitability to the needs of the British 
 Empire. If set to act automatically by night, or in thick 
 weather, they are equally dangerous to friend and foe. 
 Whether, when not rendered active, they would be fired 
 if cut through by a ship's screw blades, is not known. 
 
 Uncontrolled mines, in the case of almost every fortified 
 harbour of the Empire, are barred by the elementary 
 principles of national policy. The Germans, who make 
 simplicity and fitness for the rough ordeal of war their 
 sole ideal, have apparently adopted this class of mine 
 only, thus frankly abandoning the use of their commercial 
 ports during war. This policy may be wise * — for 
 Germany ; for Great Britain, it would be suicidal. 
 
 * The writer does not, however, admit the wisdom of this policy 
 for a moment, strongly holding that all the war experience of the past 
 clearly shows that the present defences of the German ports— mines 
 apart—are more than sufficient for security, and that those ports are 
 unassailable without the co-operation of a large force on shore, the 
 action of which would be unaffected by any number of mines. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 289 
 
 Summing up, therefore, observation mines, placed at 
 an adequate depth, are unobjectionable from the point of 
 view of navigation. In their case, the question is mainly 
 one of requirement, of efiSciency under a variety of con- 
 ditions, and of reasonable economy. Is the channel to be 
 defended one which such vessels as we must prepare to 
 resist would ever attempt to enter ; or, in other words, 
 are mines required at all .' What is the minimum defence 
 necessary to prevent such an attempt ? Do the local 
 conditions permit the probability of the successful opera- 
 tion of observation mines .' In the case of electro-contact 
 mines, a further question arises — for Great Britain — as to 
 whether they can be employed without entailing any 
 hindrance, delay or danger to navigation at a time when 
 the quick entry of vessels into port is essential — whether, 
 in fact, the " friendly channel " can be practically and 
 safely worked. The latter question can be answered only 
 after careful experiments, not yet carried out. All these 
 questions are naval in their very essence, and require, as 
 the prime qualification for discussion, a thorough grasp of 
 the principles of Imperial defence. Not till they have 
 been exhaustively answered do the functions of the expert 
 electrician begin. On the answers depends the only 
 practicable basis for submarine mines. 
 
 In proposing an elaborate defence for New York 
 Harbour, Colonel Bucknill bases his plea upon the ease 
 with which a hostile force could be landed on Long 
 Island. It does not appear to have occurred to him that 
 the United States could, without any difficulty, place 
 twenty thousand men on Long Island before any Power 
 in the world could land two thousand men there, and 
 that, but for the absurdity of the measure, they could 
 raise the number tenfold without excessive effort. Take 
 away the major premiss, and the whole elaborate structure, 
 with all its charming electrical possibilities, dissolves " like 
 the baseless fabric of a vision." 
 
 Whether the experts place complete trust in the efficacy 
 of the great systems they have elaborated cannot be 
 
 u 
 
290 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 stated ; but there are signs, in the remarkable multiplica- 
 tion of new demands, that their belief is not deeply 
 rooted. 
 
 Very rough extemporized appliances proved efficacious 
 in the American War — that is to say, in the hands of a 
 Power which possessed no sea-going navy. Submarine 
 mines have practically achieved nothing in any other war. 
 With the exception of the countermining drill occasionally 
 practised by the British Navy, no means of neutralizing 
 submarine mines has been devised which was not tried in 
 America ; * and this drill — for its practical application — 
 requires a special equipment and careful special prepara- 
 tion in sheltered waters, is obviously impossible under 
 fire,t and has never been adopted by any foreign navy. 
 Nevertheless, the submarine mines of the first naval 
 Power in the world, even when superimposed upon an 
 artillery defence capable of standing alone, are not con- 
 sidered to be efficiently guarded. You must, in fact, add 
 to your works and armaments in order to protect your 
 submarine mines, notwithstanding that countermining, 
 except when blank cartridge is employed, is out of the 
 question. 
 
 Here are a few of the requirements of the perfected 
 submarine mines of to-day. "The defence must be well 
 supplied with powerful electric lights." " Smokeless 
 powder should be used." Special additional works of 
 special design are required for the defence of the mine- 
 fields, perhaps even special guns firing special high 
 
 * The possibilities of the dynamite gun in this respect have yet to 
 be demonstrated. 
 
 t On this point it is happily possible to refer to experiment. A 42- 
 foot launch, equipped for countermining, was fired at by one 6-pr. 
 O.F. gun and one 4-barrel Nordenfelt for four-and-a-half minutes at 
 ranges of 1000 to 1500 yards, receiving altogether 65 hits, of which 
 the countermines received 13, while the cable was cut in 27 places. 
 In a second experiment of the same duration, 310 rounds were fired 
 from Martini-Henry rifles, at 500 yards, giving 93 hits, of which the 
 countermines received 21, and the cable was cut in nine places, and 
 injured in 28 places. In both cases the whole equipment was, therefore, 
 wrecked, and the countermines would, doubtless, have been exploded, 
 sending the launch to the bottom. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 291 
 
 explosive shell. If the mined waters lie at the most 
 moderate distance from the shore, "quick-firing guns 
 should be mounted on a number of small steamers." A 
 special naval force is, in fact, required in addition to 
 special works and armaments on shore, merely to guard 
 these guardians. All these things, however, appear to 
 avail nothing if the enemy should find out where the 
 mines are, for we are solemnly assured that "secrecy is 
 . . . essential."* 
 
 The great advance in electrical science since the 
 American War must apparently have merely rendered 
 submarine mines helpless to a degree which their rough, 
 simple, and cheap forerunners did not manifest. The 
 adjunct of defence which proved useful to the Confeder- 
 ates — under the peculiar conditions with which they had 
 to deal — is now a veritable octopus, with tentacles all 
 pervading. The best known instance of a fleet being 
 stopped by mines and obstructions occurred in 1863 at 
 Charleston, where none of the requirements, now viewed 
 as essential, ever existed ; but Charleston in 1776, un- 
 provided with either mines or obstructions, succeeded in 
 repulsing Sir Peter Parker's squadron. 
 
 If the existence of a mine-field were regarded as justify- 
 ing any diminution of the defences of a port, concessions 
 to its multifarious demands might perhaps be made ; but 
 the Text-book of 1873 is explicit on this point. "The 
 use of submarine mines does not in any way enable us to 
 dispense with guns and batteries ; these are as necessary, 
 if not more so, than ever." The same work, however, 
 points out that "a channel a hundred yards wide might 
 in this way — by submarine mines — be defended at a cost 
 not exceeding that incurred in the purchase of half a 
 dozen heavy rifled guns." To defend a channel a hundred 
 yards wide is not a great achievement at any time ; but 
 as the half-dozen, or other number of guns would have 
 to be provided in any case, the question of relative cost 
 does not arise. 
 
 * " Submarine Mines and Torpedoes," \ 
 
292 THE NAVY AND THE NATIOX. 
 
 Guns are required to keep an enemy's ships at a distance 
 and to prevent bombardments of dockyards, towns, and 
 shipping. Their number and power is thus determined 
 by considerations with which mines have nothing to do. 
 There is no comparison between a weapon which is always 
 ready for action as soon as men can be placed alongside 
 of it, and one which may — as at Toulon in 1 870 — require 
 three months of preparation, which demands, in most 
 cases, fair weather for its installation, and which in the 
 last resort depends for success on the fortunate absence 
 of "that little something which so often causes a failure 
 in this mode of warfare." * 
 
 It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain what the cost of 
 a mine-field really is. At Spezzia, for example, the stores, 
 boats, buildings, etc., might be appraised and balanced 
 against a certain number of guns ; but the capitalized cost 
 of the fifteen hundred trained men whom the Italians con- 
 sider necessary in order to be able to put their mines down 
 with sufficient despatch would have to be taken into account 
 in the calculation, f About sixty of the heaviest guns 
 necessary for coast defence could be worked with half this 
 number of men. We cannot compare cost without a 
 common denominator. If, for example, the total personnel 
 at any station were such that three weeks would be required 
 to lay the mine-field, no comparison can be instituted with 
 another arm ready for use on the first day. We may 
 perhaps compare the cost and scope of action of a gun with 
 that of a Brennan installation — at least when the latter 
 has steam up — but we cannot possibly compare a gun in 
 battery with any number of mines in store. Assuming 
 parity of readiness, however, there is one case in which a 
 common denominator may, perhaps, be found. If, at any 
 such harbour as Singapore, it was proposed to mount a 
 
 * " Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare." 
 
 t Here, however, arises one distinct advantage in employing sailors. 
 When once the mines are down a comparatively small number of men 
 ought to be able to keep them in order, and operate them in case of 
 need. The sailor, having laid his mine, is available to take his 
 natural place on board ship. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 293 
 
 few special guns commanding the inner waters, the cost 
 of these guns might be compared with that of the mine- 
 fields, whose place they would fill with equal efficiency 
 and without objection. In this case, the balance of 
 economical advantage would certainly not be on the side 
 of the mines unless an extremely modest standard of 
 requirement were adopted. 
 
 In deciding whether a mine defence is suitable in a 
 given case, the first considerations are the conditions 
 -which the defence, as a whole, is intended to fulfil, and 
 the nature of the operations practicable to an enemy. At 
 Harwich (Plate III.), for example, the sole conditions are 
 the denial of the harbour to an enemy, and its free use 
 without delay or hindrance by British vessels of all kinds. 
 There is nothing to bombard, since if bombardment becomes 
 a feature in future naval war, as certain French writers 
 would have us believe, such towns as Brighton, Hastings, 
 or Torquay, would obviously be selected in preference to 
 places like Harwich. Bombardment is, however, humani- 
 tarian considerations apart, scarcely a suitable policy, 
 except for a dominant naval power, as tenfold reprisals 
 would be taken — and justified. 
 
 All necessary conditions of defence at Harwich will, 
 therefore, be fulfilled by a strong occupation of Shotley 
 Point. Guns well posted here can easily deny the use of 
 the harbour to hostile vessels, and to engage such vessels 
 in these cramped waters is precisely what the artilleryman 
 would most desire.* The Shotley Point position is so 
 far (6400 yards) from deep water outside that its armament 
 could not possibly be injured by vessels able to manoeuvre 
 without constraint. The guns at Shotley Point can 
 effectually prevent a landing inside the harbour ; and, if 
 a land attack were undertaken, as all the experience of 
 
 • England owes much to Queen Elizabeth's reign ; but for modem 
 purposes, we could well have dispensed with Landguard Fort. It has 
 been pointed out by American writers that Fort Fisher would never 
 have been taken, if it had not been placed in the wrong position. 
 The case of Landguard Fort is somewhat similar, and its attempted 
 rehabilitation, at great expense, has not been successful. 
 
294 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 the American War shows to be necessary in deah'ng- 
 effectively with coast defences, mines would not affect the 
 success or failure which would determine the possession 
 of the harbour. 
 
 Port Louis, Mauritius (Plate IV.), is another case of the 
 same kind, except that the waters are even more cramped, 
 and a ship once inside is at the mercy of any gun that 
 bears upon her. Moreover, if there were any real danger 
 of a vessel running into such a trap, a single 6-in. gun 
 mounted on Signal Mount, at a height of 1060 feet, would 
 dominate the whole of the little harbour at a range of less 
 than 2500 yards, and render it untenable. The Grand and 
 Quarantine harbours at Malta, Port Castries (St. Lucia), 
 and Esquimau, are similar cases, and many others might 
 be mentioned. No vessel would ever attempt to enter 
 such ports if the inner waters were commanded by guns. 
 
 It may be laid down, therefore, as a general rule, that 
 mines are not required where it is necessary to deny 
 cramped waters, capable of being commanded by guns, to 
 an enemy. The guns will usually be the most economical 
 defence ; they will have a far wider sphere of action than 
 the mines ; they will give rise to no possible hindrance or 
 delay to the entrance of friendly vessels. If arranged 
 for high angle fire, they will, in many cases, be at the 
 same time available to aid the defence of the outer waters. 
 If, as can rarely be the case, there are no suitable positions 
 for guns bearing on the inner waters of a harbour, it may 
 be desirable to fall back upon mines. 
 
 In such cases as Plymouth and Singapore (Plate V.), 
 where the port to be defended has two entrances, the one 
 least suitable for traffic may, if it is so desired, be barred 
 by submarine mines without positive disadvantage ; but 
 as excellent artillery positions exist in both these cases, 
 nothing would better suit the purpose of the defence than 
 the entry of one or two vessels which may have succeeded 
 in running the gauntlet of the artillery in first line. If 
 Farragut, after passing Fort Morgan, had found himself 
 in such cramped waters as those of Plymouth Sound fully 
 
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 and Drake's Island, he would have been destroyed, and 
 Mobile would have been treated as an object lesson of 
 another kind. 
 
 Where an easy channel of approach leads into free waters, 
 the possession of which by an enemy's vessels would confer 
 a definite advantage upon them, the claims of submarine 
 mines are of a different kind. In such a case — rare in 
 the British Empire — it may be contended that vessels 
 will be able to run past shore guns, trusting to speed, bad 
 light, smoke, or the armour protection of which the modern 
 ship has generally but little. The first question here is 
 what nature of vessels could reasonably be expected to be 
 employed in the venture. Almost the whole of the cruiser 
 class is constitutionally incapable of facing moderate de- 
 fences on shore, since the crews are practically in the 
 open, with the drawbacks of a bursting screen in front of 
 them, and of offering a perfect target, which there could 
 be no excuse for missing at medium ranges. This fact 
 is. howc\ er, dimly realized at present, and the term " iron- 
 clad " is frequently applied in the loosest fashion to any 
 iron or steel vessel. 
 
 The distance of the probable attacking squadron from 
 its base would be another factor of importance, since it is 
 clear that, in view of the terrible damage which modern 
 shell can inflict, there will be little eagerness to wilfully 
 expose ships to the chance of being rendered unseaworthy 
 after two or three hits, when their nearest place of repair 
 may be thousands of miles distant across storm-swept seas. 
 It is not the wretched guns of the Confederates or the 
 Paraguayans which would have to be faced to-day. 
 
 While, therefore, it may well be doubted whether any 
 mines are required for the ports of Australasia, which, 
 if they possess effective artillery defence, will never be 
 attacked, such cases as Halifax, Kingston Harbour 
 (Jamaica\ Hong Kong, and the Firth of Forth may 
 .seem to come within the legitimate domain of the sub- 
 marine miner. 
 
296 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 What class of vessels is it necessary to be prepared 
 against at Halifax ? Can such vessels enter by night or 
 in weather so thick that the shore guns could not be used 
 against them ? Would a night attack offer any possible 
 attraction to an enemy where well placed electric lights 
 exist? Can ships enter at speed, if the ordinary buoys are 
 removed or changed in position ? These are purely naval 
 questions which can be dealt with only by naval experts 
 having local knowledge. When they have been authori- 
 tatively answered, a basis may be found on which to rest 
 submarine mine defence. 
 
 At Kingston, Jamaica, the single entrance channel is 
 only one hundred and eighty yards wide. A few observa- 
 tion mines here would amply suffice to deny the passage 
 and be open to no objection. 
 
 At Hong Kong the interior waters can be commanded 
 by guns in very advantageous positions ; but the ranges 
 are long, and an enemy's vessel, if recklessly handled, might 
 be able in a short time to inflict much damage among the 
 shipping probably crowded there in time of war. Mines, 
 by their moral effect, might succeed in minimizing the 
 chances of such an exploit The most necessary condition 
 at Hong Kong is, however, that Her Majesty's ships, and 
 all British vessels whatever, may be able to enter the port, 
 by day or night, with the least possible delay. If it cannot 
 be shown that this condition is fully compatible with the 
 employment of mines, the case for the latter ceases to exist. 
 Whatever may be the arrangements laid down in peace, 
 it is certain that in the event of war with a naval Power, 
 the naval Commander-in-Chief in China would not permit 
 any serious restrictions upon entry into his base. 
 
 The Firth of Forth offers conditions extremely un- 
 favourable to mines, unless the contact class is employed 
 on a large scale. But in this case, to be really effective 
 as a defence, they must be always ready for action in the 
 thick weather which frequently occurs on this part of the 
 coast. Who would accept the risk of such a state of things, 
 considering that for one cruiser of an enemy making for 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 297 
 
 Leith Roads, there will be hundreds of British vessels want- 
 ing to enter, and liable to be caught outside if compelled 
 to wait till the weather clears ? What system of patrol 
 would satisfactorily meet the difficulty? In any case, 
 mines cannot prevent shells being fired into Edinburgh from 
 the outside waters, although the only real result an enemy 
 would thus obtain would be a great impetus to the local 
 volunteers. To protect the inner waters, a few 6-in. guns 
 and two or three small groups of high angle fire guns 
 would amply suffice. Few so-called "ironclads," and no 
 cruisers, would face them. 
 
 A further case for consideration arises in the defence of 
 ports lying far up long channels of approach. Here, again, 
 -only naval opinions are of value. The main questions 
 are, would an enemy's vessel venture into these traps, and 
 what could she do when she got there ? The Thames 
 and Medway lie still under the ban of de Ruyter, and 
 the popular ideas as to their necessary defence may, to 
 a greater extent than is generally believed, be traced to 
 a Dutch origin. The naval conditions which completely 
 explain this disgraceful chapter of history are commonly 
 forgotten altogether, although Pepys has defined them in 
 a sentence — " in wisdom, courage, force, knowledge of our 
 own streams, and success, the Dutch have the best of us." 
 
 The last place selected by an enemy for his operations 
 would, however, be such channels as the Thames, the Med- 
 way, and the Clyde * — at least until the British Navy is 
 effaced, and in this case, an enemy's squadron would be 
 accompanied by a large force operating on shore, Unless 
 this force could be defeated in the field, the Thames defences 
 would quickly fall, and with the possession of the river 
 banks by an enemy all possibility of utilizing mines must 
 end. Financial considerations apart, there is, however, no 
 practical objection to the employment of mines in these 
 cases, provided that the traffic is not impeded. They will 
 
 • It is extremely unfortunate that, for reasons which cannot be 
 here investigated, the lessons of the naval manoeuvres of 1888 and 1889 
 should have been popularly read in an opposite sense. 
 
298 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 never be required, since the real danger to British interests 
 lies outside these channels, and can be met solely by naval' 
 means ; but, on the condition above laid down, they will be 
 unobjectionable, and, though not required for their" moral 
 effect ' upon an enemy, they may have a moral effect in 
 the sense of security possibly conveyed to uninstructed 
 persons at home. 
 
 The Mersey (Plate VI.) offers, perhaps, a special case, 
 but is specially unfavourable to mine defence. It is 
 obviously useless to employ mines to close the mouth of 
 the river at /i, for a vessel which has penetrated thus far 
 could, with her long range guns, inflict just as much 
 damage as if she went further up the river, and with less 
 risk of being caught. There is, in fact, no inducement to 
 proceed further. Moreover, guns on shore can easily 
 prevent her from remaining near A. On the other hand, 
 to deny the main channel higher up, say at B, might be 
 an advantage. Liverpool is, of all commercial ports in 
 the Empire, the one which it is most essential to keep open 
 in war, as well as the one most certain of naval protection. 
 The cases of the east and west coasts of England differ, 
 since it is far more easy to watch and guard the Irish 
 Channel effectively than the North Sea. The Atlantic 
 passage, even by slow steamers running well out of their 
 ordinary courses, will offer comparatively little risk. The 
 " Greyhounds " will be safe, till they reach home waters, 
 where naval protection must be afforded. It is inconceiv- 
 able that an enemy's cruisers would attempt to enter the 
 cramped and difficult waters at the mouth of the Mersey,* 
 when rich harvests await them outside, if they can maintain 
 themselves there. If they cannot so maintain themselves, 
 it would be suicidal to venture into such waters. The 
 defence of Liverpool is thus essentially a naval question. 
 In the Mersey, as in the Forth, and in most of the ports 
 of the Empire, it would be absolutely impossible to permit 
 
 * There are only fifteen feet of water on the bar at low tide, and 
 even a second-class cruiser of the Mersey type would be unable to 
 enter at all times. 
 
SUBMARINE MIXES IX RELATION TO IV. I R. 299 
 
 contact mines to be rendered active in foggy weather. 
 Here, as elsewhere, ground mines, fired by observation, 
 are open to no objection, if they can be satisfactorily 
 worked from a low coast line at some distance from the 
 channel ; but the most efifective defence of the docks and 
 shipping of Liverpool is that afforded by the natural 
 difficulties of the approaches supplementing the general 
 guardianship of the Irish Channel by the navy. 
 
 Besides their employment for closing channels of 
 approach, mines are advocated for denying the free use 
 of outside water, which an enemy might require for the 
 purpose of engaging coast defences. They would — it is 
 claimed — act much as obstacles intended to prevent the 
 free movement of an attacking force on land. Colonel 
 Bucknill thus proposes to employ observation mines in his 
 ideal defence of Cherbourg, and, although not required and 
 unlikely to prove effective, they would at least be harmless 
 so far as French interests are concerned. The strength of 
 the artillery of the defence is, however, generally based on 
 independent considerations, and could not be reduced on 
 account of the presence of the mines. In such a case as 
 Simon's Bay, for example, a moderate artillery defence will 
 amply suffice to deny the anchorage. If the enemy were 
 prepared to put men on shore, which would be the only 
 way of silencing the guns, any mine defence would stand or 
 fall with the failure or success of the landing force. Mines 
 under these circumstances must be wholly superfluous. In 
 any case, it seems evident that only observation mines 
 should be employed. Contact mines would be inadvisable, 
 and where rough weather prevails, impossible. Since it is 
 now clear that the only hope of successfully engaging coast 
 defences lies in anchoring ships in well chosen positions, 
 the restriction of the use of manoeuvring waters is of less 
 importance than was formerly supposed. 
 
 The general considerations which it is maintained should 
 rule the employment of submarine mines may now be 
 briefly summed — 
 
 I. The first requirement of the British Empire in war 
 
30O THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 is free and open ports which can be used with the minimum 
 of hindrance by day and night. In distant waters the 
 number of British vessels afloat will so enormously exceed 
 the greatest possible number of an enemy's cruisers that 
 the primary object to be attained is quick egress and 
 ingress. As a rule, therefore, the removal of lights, buoys 
 or beacons cannot be permitted. Great naval inferiority 
 alone would justify such a measure. 
 
 2. The knowledge that any restrictions existed on the 
 entry of ships would be invaluable to the commander of 
 an enemy's cruiser. To adopt a policy involving such 
 restriction is to play into his hands. This was well illus- 
 trated in the Franco-German war. So long as an enemy's 
 vessel can maintain a position outside a mined commercial 
 port, she may confidently expect to effect many captures. 
 Whether she can so maintain herself depends solely on the 
 strength and handling of the British Navy. 
 
 3. Naval attack upon ports possessing a moderate but 
 efficient defence will be extremely rare. The modern ship 
 is little fitted for the task, and naval commanders will 
 unquestionably shrink from risking vessels in operations 
 for which they are not constructed. This reluctance has 
 been a marked feature in the past, and will assert itself 
 with even greater force in the future. Defended ports at 
 a distance from an enemy's base are specially unlikely 
 to be attacked, and in home waters, naval supremacy is 
 a necessary condition of all operations except raids. 
 Against a raid, guns will generally be the most eff'ective 
 and economical defence. 
 
 4. If, however, a purely naval attack upon a defended 
 port is to be attempted, the most favourable chance is, 
 without doubt, at the very outset of war, as several French 
 writers have pointed out. In this case, the defence cannot in 
 many cases count upon any real aid from submarine mines.* 
 
 * " Qu'on ne se prdoccupe pas des torpilles fixes ! Elles ne sont pas 
 encore mouilldes, ou si elles le sont, leurs observateurs ne sont pas 
 prets, le personnel est insuffisant, mal exercd, trouble ! " (" Revue 
 Maritime et Coloniale," vol. xciii., 1887.) The picture is not unlikely 
 to prove true. 
 
SUBMARINE MINES IN RELATION TO WAR. 301 
 
 5. Attacks on defended ports, to be successful, need — as 
 all experience proves — the co-operation of a force on shore 
 whose action, as recently at Port Arthur, will generally 
 render mine defence nugatory. In the event of a com- 
 bined attack, mines could at best play a very subordinate 
 role. 
 
 6. No vessels that are likely to be met with in distant 
 waters are fitted to contend with properly mounted and 
 well-handled 6-in. Q. F. guns on shore. The small cruiser 
 classes could not fight field guns behind extemporized 
 earthworks. 
 
 7. It is inconceivable that ships will run the gauntlet 
 of modern guns in order to reach cramped waters com- 
 manded by fire. In the case of waters thus commanded, 
 therefore, submarine mines have no raison d'itre. They 
 are not required, and they may be open to grave objection. 
 Again, mines do not enable fire upon inner waters to be 
 dispensed with, and the provision of such fire is in some 
 cases essential. 
 
 8. The function of mines is that of an obstacle retaining 
 the enemy under fire by their moral effect, or acting as an 
 absolute block. The analogy of the obstacles employed 
 in land defence is, however, most misleading when pressed 
 too far. The object in a land attack is to close with the 
 defenders as quickly as possible. Provided that the ob- 
 stacles are not so dense as to prevent such sorties as the 
 defenders are strong enough to make, obstruction of 
 approaches may be regarded as a clear gain. Free breath- 
 ing power, however, is the first necessity of the ports of 
 the British Empire in war. 
 
 9. It follows that, to a weak naval Power whose com- 
 merce must be thrown over in time of war, mines are 
 admissible allies. This may have been the case of 
 Germany in 1870, although, as above pointed out, it is 
 probable that loss would have been spared by renouncing 
 submarine defence. To a Power independent of its com- 
 merce in war, and able, therefore, to block its ports, 
 submarine mines may also be an economical form of 
 
302 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 defence, enabling heavy guns to be dispensed with unless 
 bombardment has to be provided against. 
 
 10. Since to Great Britain free waterways are the first 
 requirement in war, it is necessary to prove that mine 
 defence — in the few cases to which it is suitable — can be 
 worked without hindrance to traffic. Otherwise this hin- 
 drance, which would be a daily or hourly evil, will be a 
 greater injury to the State than lies in the chance — in any 
 case remote — of the visit of an enemy's vessels. A crucial 
 experiment on the point cannot be made, because the 
 urgency would be greater in war than in peace. If, how- 
 ever, it were possible to lay down a complete defence in 
 the Mersey or Clyde at home, or at Singapore or Malta 
 abroad, and to work it according to the methods proposed 
 for service, a fair idea might be arrived at as to the practical 
 effect of mining British ports. To block a British port is, 
 in most cases, to play the enemy's game, and the success 
 of a mine-field by sinking a vessel in a narrow channel 
 might be far more injurious to British interests than its 
 failure. 
 
 11. Observation mines, except in an anchorage, are 
 unobjectionable, apart from their cost ; but, since the 
 defence of a port can only be dealt with as a whole, the 
 question of their relative value, as compared with their 
 equivalent in gun power, demands careful consideration. 
 In any case, the scope of action of observation mines is 
 necessarily restricted, since distance from the observing 
 station and thick weather renders them practically useless. 
 
 12. Contact mines, except in a channel of approach, are 
 open to little objection by day, so long as a distinction can 
 be drawn with unerring certainty between friend and foe ; 
 but must always be attended by risk to friendly vessels by 
 night, and are so dangerous in thick weather that they 
 could not be rendered active. To a Power which decides 
 to block its ports, warn off its own shipping, and permit 
 indiscriminate destruction in thick weather, they are 
 useful. 
 
 13. In weather so thick as to prevent the effective use 
 
SUBMARINE ML\ES I.V RELATION TO WAR. 303 
 
 •of guns on shore, most ports are safe from attempted entry 
 'by an enemy's ships. 
 
 14. By night, where electric h'ghts are provided, the risks 
 of attempting to enter many ports are so great as to be 
 sufficiently deterrent, without any recourse to mines. It 
 is excessively difficult, if not impossible, to con a ship if 
 the electric light can be kept upon her, and to enter on a 
 compass bearing is frequently impracticable. Search lights 
 should be permitted for artillery purposes only. Intoler- 
 able confusion would result from employing a double set. 
 There is no such objection to a fixed beam for the use of 
 submarine mines, but it serves to betray their position. 
 
 15. Countermining is altogether impracticable, except 
 •as one of the operations of a deliberate naval siege, which, 
 (however, requires a large and specially equipped force, a 
 long period of time, and naval supremacy. 
 
 16. The artillery defence, which would ordinarily be 
 provided for waters of approach, supplemented by rifles 
 .and machine guns, necessary as a protection against a 
 landing force, will generally suffice for the defence of 
 mine-fields. Guard boats would be the greatest possible 
 impediment to the free action of all fire from the shore, 
 and any wise commander would at once order his range 
 to be cleared. Unless manned by trained sailors, they 
 •would be totally unfit to meet on equal terms an enemy's 
 boats upon the water. 
 
 17. No mines should be allowed to be laid down except 
 in case of war with a great naval Power, and even then 
 all British ports need not be mined. 
 
 18. While cramped waters commanded by fire are never 
 likely to be entered by an enemy's ships, torpedo-boat 
 attacks must in some cases be provided against. Such 
 attacks — generally involving great risks to the boats — 
 would be undertaken only with a view of destroying 
 valuable ships or of blowing in dock caissons. Submarine 
 mines are perfectly powerless to avert this danger ; but 
 boat mines capable of being rapidly laid out and picked 
 up will probably be employed in combination with booms 
 
304 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 or other obstructions, and a portion of the channel of 
 approach will be illuminated by dispersed electric light 
 beams. Floating obstructions will necessarily be in charge 
 of the Navy. 
 
 It has been sought to raise discussion upon the various- 
 points connected with the war uses of submarine mines, 
 merely because such discussion is entirely wanting. All 
 the other elements of defence, all questions of tactics by 
 sea or land, have been subjected to searching inquiry 
 in endless books, papers, and lectures. Nothing but good 
 results from free discussion, by which alone can vagueness 
 of thought and hallucination be swept away. The same 
 method — the ordinary method of all science — must be 
 applied to submarine mines, in order that they may be- 
 enabled to take their proper place in the national armoury. 
 If an authoritative basis can be arrived at, they will fall at 
 once into their legitimate sphere. 
 
 Meanwhile one great principle may be safely laid down. 
 The suitability of submarine mine defence in any given 
 case, its nature and its extent, are matters involving naval 
 consideration alone, and no step affecting any of the- 
 waterways of the Empire should ever be taken except on 
 the responsibility of the Admiralty during peace time, or 
 that of the Naval Commanders-in-Chief on foreign stations- 
 during war. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
( 305 ) 
 
 CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED ? • 
 
 The evolution of the modern State from the primitive 
 family or the tribe is largely due to a natural craving for 
 personal and territorial security. Association for purposes 
 of defence must, from the earliest times, have been re- 
 cognized as a necessity, and by a process of successive 
 groupings small units became absorbed into large com- 
 munities, whose survival depended upon their powers of 
 resistance to aggression. Aptitude for war, race affinities 
 favouring the mutual confidence which organized action 
 demands, and geographical conditions were ruling factors 
 in the upward struggle. So long as territorial securit)- 
 was maintained, civil development could proceed, and 
 commerce might spring up and thrive, while war, if suc- 
 cessful, tended to foster the growth of national sentiment, 
 the most powerful of the forces by which a State is 
 consolidated. 
 
 The speed of events has been enormously quickened 
 in modern times, but the laws of evolution endure, and 
 the conditions which governed the rise and the decadence 
 of the Old World States remain unchanged. Now, as in 
 the days of ancient Greece, the State which is unprepared 
 to defend its integrity has no sure foundations. Within 
 the past two hundred years every country in Europe has 
 been invaded, and the map has undergone constant 
 changes. Only the frontiers of Spain, Portugal, and 
 Switzerland remain practically unaltered, though they have 
 
 • National Review, May, 1896. 
 
3o6 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 been crossed and recrossed by armies. Within the last 
 fifty years Russia, Denmark, Austria, France, and Turkey 
 have all been successfully invaded, while the German 
 Empire, the kingdoms of United Ital\-, Roumania, and 
 Servia, and the Principalities of Montenegro and Bulgaria 
 have sprung into existence. Peace in Europe has been 
 unbroken only since 1885, and in the restless rivalries, the 
 ambitions, the unhealed sores, even the domestic exigencies 
 of nations, lurk abundant potential causes of future wars.. 
 None can dream that a state of stable international 
 equilibrium has been attained ; few regard it as attainable. 
 Meanwhile great Powers such as France and Germany, 
 and small ones such as Belgium and Denmark, are alike 
 driven to contemplate the possibility of invasion, and to 
 undertake preparations for defence. Such preparations are, 
 next to the maintenance of internal order, the first duty 
 of a State ; but the measure of the danger, and the nature 
 and extent of the requisite means of defence, necessarily 
 vary with the national conditions, geographical, political, and 
 economic. To a great Power, self-contained, united, and 
 permeated with a strong spirit of patriotism, hostile invasion, 
 even though successful, can rarely prove absolutely dis- 
 astrous. The permanent annexation of an alien white race 
 imbued with fighting instincts is not usually an object 
 of desire to a modern conqueror. Great temporary suffer- 
 ing, increased burdens, and prosperity checked for a longer 
 or shorter time, may be the only results of invasion. 
 Prussia, crushed in 1806, was soon again a powerful State, 
 regenerated by disaster. France, brought to her knees in 
 1814 and again in 1871, is now stronger in every respect 
 than at any period since 18 12. 
 
 Loss of territory, and especially of external possessions, 
 does not necessarily involve loss of strength, and of all 
 Continental Powers to-day, only Spain,* Holland, and 
 possibly Portugal would suffer materially by being shorn 
 of their few colonies. The possessions of Germany which 
 
 * The possession of Cuba is, however, a doubtful advantage to 
 Spain. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 307 
 
 Germans refuse to inhabit, and the African adventures of 
 Italy, bring increase of national expenditure without 
 counterbalancing advantage. The colonies of France are 
 not necessary to her existence as a great Power, and 
 would, for the most part, be points of vulnerability if 
 she were overmatched at sea. 
 
 The conditions of Great Britain differ vitally from those 
 of all other Powers. Throughout the history of the world 
 no other great island State has ever yet arisen to become 
 the centre of an Empire. Japan alone offers striking points 
 of resemblance, but the analogy is incomplete, since the 
 island Power of the East is only now beginning to ex- 
 pand and to become dependent upon sea-borne commerce. 
 Carthage and Athens in ancient times, Spain and Holland 
 in the present era, owed their greatness wholly to maritime 
 achievement. All fell ; and Carthage, which, like Great 
 Britain, lived by external trade, was effaced. Spain, 
 almost insular by reason of a strong natural barrier, lost 
 her Empire by failure to maintain her supremacy at sea ; 
 while Holland, never oblivious of her naval needs, and 
 showing no decadence in the fighing power of her seamen, 
 sank irrevocably from the position of a great Power by 
 inability to defend her land frontier.* 
 
 Dependence on sea-borne trade for the incomes and food 
 supply of the mass of the population at home ; responsibility 
 for the security of more than fifty scattered Colonies, con- 
 taining upwards of twenty millions of fellow-subjects, whose 
 prosperity is mainly derived from commerce ; further re- 
 sponsibility for the maintenance of law and order among 
 two hundred and ninety millions of heterogeneous people 
 in India — such, in brief, are the conditions of the British 
 Empire, with its eleven million square miles of territory. 
 Of its population, more than fifty millions are of our own 
 race, distributed in the proportion of about thirty-nine 
 millions at home to eleven millions abroad. The mutual 
 
 • It is none the less true, as Admiral Colomb has stated, that 
 Holland, in two years (1654-56) of unsuccessful naval war with Great 
 Britain, was brought to terms without the landing of a soldier on her 
 shores. 
 
3o8 THE XAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 interdependence of Great and Greater Britain is now 
 absolute. Shorn of her Colonial dominions and hcr 
 commerce, Great Britain would, in the words of the late 
 Lord Carnarvon, be a mere "pauperized, discontented, 
 over-populated island in the North Sea." If a hostile 
 army succeeded in establishing a militaiy occupation of 
 England, the Empire would be disintegrated. France has 
 passed through both these ordeals,* and remains a Great 
 Power. For us there would be no resurrection. The 
 national security may, therefore, seem to require the fulfil- 
 ment of two independent conditions — naval supremacy, and 
 the maintenance of a home army able to oppose any force 
 that could possibly be landed on the shores of England. 
 These two conditions are, however, intimately correlated, 
 since the necessary standard of the military defence of an 
 island State is determined by the efficacy of the naval 
 weapon. On the one hand, it is obvious that such a measure 
 of naval strength is conceivable as would end all possible 
 risk of invasion. On the other hand, in the absence of 
 all naval defence, an island with such a coast-line as our 
 own can be rendered safe only by maintaining an army 
 able to oppose the whole military force which an enemy 
 could transport by sea. Leaving out of consideration all 
 questions of the Colonies and India, of commerce and 
 of food supply, and assuming Great Britain to be self- 
 supporting, these two propositions represent the extremes 
 of policy in regard to the defence of our island. Between 
 them lies a wide range of debateable ground, strewn with 
 the debris of many controversies, and supplying periodical 
 crops of scares, delusions, and luxuriant theories. 
 
 To the great Powers of Europe protection against 
 invasion is an affair of armies. Each can be defended 
 from the aggression of its neighbours by military force 
 alone, and no naval strength, however enormous, will save 
 the State whose army fails to repel invasion. Other 
 Powers being neutral, however, France becomes an island 
 in regard to Russia or Austria, and could invade or be 
 " Three military occupations in this century. 
 
CAN ENGLAXD BE INVADED? 309 
 
 invaded by neither except under conditions dictated on the 
 sea. For the naval factor would then become paramount, 
 and while naval superiority will not guarantee successful 
 invasion, naval inferiority will either render the attempt 
 impossible or lead to swift disaster. In all history, no law 
 stands out more clearly. The sea has never been and 
 never will be a barrier against invasion ; but special limita- 
 tions attach to sea-borne expeditions, and there is no 
 instance of an united people being conquered by military 
 forces landed on their shores,* until all effective naval 
 resistance had ceased. 
 
 The dominating influence of the naval factor is strikingly 
 shown by the disastrous failure of the expedition of Xerxes 
 in 480 B.C. The States of Greece were, as usual, disunited ; 
 counsels of surrender were plentiful, and Greek galleys were 
 ranged with the Persian fleet. The oracle of Delphi, ever 
 ambiguous, announced that a " wooden wall " would shelter 
 the Athenians, and thus nearly 2400 years ago the com- 
 parative advantages of pallisades — fortifications — and ships 
 came to be eagerly discussed. Like Raleigh, St. Vincent 
 or Nelson, Themistocles pleaded the efficacy of naval 
 defence, and Herodotus fifty years later applauded his 
 action. If nothing had been attempted at sea, writes the 
 Father of History, 
 
 " what then would have followed may be readily imagined. The 
 fortified lines proposed by the Peloponnesians across the Corinthian 
 isthmus would have been useless ; for the Persian, having it in 
 his choice to make his attack by sea, would have subdued the 
 several States one by one ... so that all Greece must inevitably 
 have fallen under the Persian yoke." 
 
 The military defence of Greece broke down in spite 
 of the devoted gallantry of Leonidas and his Spartans, 
 and the advancing host of Xerxes occupied Athens, while 
 his fleet, after fighting a drawn action, closed in upon 
 Salamis. Again there was wavering on board the con- 
 federate squadron, and again Themistocles prevailed. The 
 
 • Carthage forms no exception, since the Numidians were always 
 \\ danger at home, and Masinissa played a great part in her downfall. 
 
310 THE iXAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 sea-fight off Artemisium had not redounded to the credit 
 of the superior Persian fleet, which had subsequenth- 
 suffered loss during a storm. Artemisia, the warrior queen 
 of Caria, with true insight, represented to Xerxes that 
 more than naval issues were at stake, and that defeat 
 at sea implied ruin to his land forces. The day after the 
 battle of Salamis the retreat of the army began, and later 
 the unpursued remains of the Persian fleet retransported 
 Xerxes with sixty thousand men across the Hellespont. 
 Naval inactivity ensued, but the following year the Greek 
 fleet crossed the ^gean, and found the enemy at Mycal6, 
 opposite the island of Samos. The Persian ships, having 
 been drawn on shore and surrounded by fortifications, were 
 destroyed by a successful land attack, on the very day that 
 the troops left behind in Europe were defeated at Platzea. 
 
 In 415 B.C. Athens undertook a great venture across the 
 sea — the invasion of Sicily — and became in the following 
 year involved in the siege of Syracuse. Nicias, the 
 Athenian commander, in a remarkable letter quoted by 
 Thucydides, showed that he grasped the fact that the fate 
 of the enterprise must be decided on the sea. The fleet 
 having been defeated in a general action in the great 
 harbour, the expedition was doomed, and forty thousand 
 men were either killed or taken prisoners. Having regard 
 to the resources of Athens, no modern Power has under- 
 taken an over-sea enterprise comparable in magnitude to 
 this, and it is to be remembered that at the very time when 
 reinforcements were being despatched to Sicily a hostile 
 Lacedemonian army was camped within fifteen miles of 
 the Piraeus. The power of Athens never fully recovered 
 from this disaster. In 405 B.C. the Athenian fleet under 
 Conon at .^gospotami, caught unprepared for action, and 
 \\'ith most of the crews on shore, was almost entirely 
 captured by Lysander. The loss proved irreparable, and 
 in 404 B.C. the Imperial city surrendered to a blockade by 
 sea and land. 
 
 This period of less than eighty years is rich in great 
 object lessons. Successful invasion, on a vast scale, was 
 
CAN ENGLAXD BE I.WADEDI 311 
 
 arrested by a single naval victory, which did not by any 
 means involve complete disaster to the defeated fleet. A 
 squadron which had placed itself behind fortifications was 
 destroyed by a land attack. An immense expedition was 
 ruined by a naval defeat. Finally, the capture of a fleet, 
 due to culpable carelessness, involved the downfall of a 
 maritime Empire. It is not by chance that these lessons 
 repeat themselves all through the pages of history. 
 
 The contest between Rome and Carthage involved three 
 great wars, spread over 117 years.* Captain Mahan has 
 shown how completely the course of the immense and 
 varied operations, as well as the final issue, was dominated 
 by sea power. 
 
 In the first Punic war, two great naval victories enabled 
 the Romans to send an expeditionary force of twenty 
 thousand men across the Mediterranean to be disastrously 
 defeated outside the walls of Carthage. A third naval 
 victory was neutralized by the subsequent total loss, in a 
 storm, of the victorious fleet, a catastrophe which seems to 
 have been due entirely to the inexperience of the Roman 
 commanders. In three months, a new fleet of two hundred 
 sail was ready for sea, and the consuls for 254 B.C. 
 succeeded in capturing Palermo ; but again the fleet was 
 almost entirely wrecked on the return voyage to the 
 Tiber. In 249 B.C. a third fleet was built, and an expedi- 
 tionary force proceeded to attack Lilybceum, the strongest 
 Carthaginian fortress in Sicily. The Carthaginian "fleet 
 in being" lay near at hand, and succeeded in inflicting a 
 crushing defeat upon the Romans, who saved only thirty 
 out of two hundred and twenty ships, while a convoy with 
 provisions for the troops in Sicily was wrecked at sea. 
 A fourth fleet was built, and the Carthaginians, who had 
 neglected their navy, were totally defeated. Lilybceum 
 could not now be saved, and the Carthaginians, whose 
 trade was nearly ruined, made peace, evacuating Sicily 
 and paying a large indemnity. 
 
 In the second Punic war, the deposed mistress of the sea 
 ' 363 i;.c. to 146 B.C. 
 
312 THE NAVY A.XD THE A'AT/OX. 
 
 undertook- the huge task of invading Italy from Spain. 
 In !\Iay, 218 B.C., Hannibal began his great march, and, 
 after the victories of Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae, went 
 into winter quarters at Capua at the end of 216 B.C. 
 Military forces employed in Italy had so far utterly failed 
 to stem the invasion ; but " the tremendous weapon " of 
 sea power was in the hands of the Romans. Hannibal's 
 hope of raising a great insurrection in the Peninsula was 
 not realized, and a Roman squadron in the Adriatic effect- 
 ually shut off all aid from Macedonia. Utilizing sea- 
 transport, the Romans were able to operate in Spain, to 
 divert troops intended for Italy, and to delay the march 
 of Hasdrubal. Syracuse, which had espoused the Cartha- 
 ginian cause after Canns, was besieged and taken by 
 Marcellus in 212 B.C., the Carthaginian fleet sent to relieve 
 it declining an action. In 207 B.C. the Carthaginian cause 
 in Spain was lost, and in 204 B.C. Scipio sailed from Lily- 
 boeum with a great combined force and landed in Africa. 
 The pressure thus brought to bear upon the centre of the 
 Carthaginian power determined the withdrawal of Hannibal 
 from Italy in 203 B.C., and the battle of Zama ended the 
 war. Even after this second defeat the trade of Carthage 
 revived ; but the sea power of Rome was no longer threa- 
 tened, and the third Punic war seems to have been inspired 
 solely by the desire to crush a commercial rival. In 150 
 B.C. the Numidians under Masinissa had already defeated 
 the Carthaginians when the Roman Senate intervened at 
 Cato's instigation. Again a Roman army crossed from 
 Sicily to Africa, and in 146 B.C., after a long siege, 
 Carthage fell. 
 
 The first Punic war revealed to the Romans the secret 
 of success, and throughout the long struggle they clung 
 persistently to the employment of naval force. Their 
 control of the sea, as Captain Mahan points out, " did not 
 exclude maritime raids, large or small. . . but it did forbid 
 the sustained communications of which Hannibal was in 
 deadly need." The Carthaginians in Southern Italy were 
 reinforced by Hamilcar's fleet in 215 B.C., but it seems 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED1 313 
 
 clear that Hannibal's sea-communications were too pre- 
 carious to be relied upon, and the fact that Hamilcar would 
 not face the Roman squadron blockading Syracuse bears 
 out this view. In spite, therefore, of the enormous 
 difficulty, it was sought to succour Hannibal overland. The 
 entire project of the invasion of Italy from Spain must 
 have been due, as Captain Mahan was the first to discover, 
 to the sense of naval inferiority brought home to Carthage 
 in the first Punic war. Even when the wonderful enterprise 
 was carried through, Rome, utilizing her sea power, could, 
 and did, strike straight at Hannibal's base, and, although 
 the fortunes of the war in Spain were chequered and the 
 details remain obscure, it appears certain that off the coasts 
 of Spain, as off those of Sicily and the Adriatic, the 
 Roman navy was supreme. By neglect of her fleet, by 
 trusting overmuch to her miUtary forces, or from causes 
 which we cannot know, Carthage failed to make any 
 effective use of naval force during the second Punic war, 
 and this to a maritime power, then as now, must involve 
 certain disaster. 
 
 In the first Punic war naval supremacy hung for a time 
 in the balance, passing ultimately to the Romans. There 
 were great sea-fights, and at Ecnomus the combatants are 
 stated to have numbered three hundred thousand.* Ex- 
 peditionary forces were employed on both sides : invasions 
 and evasions occurred. 
 
 In the second Punic war, naval supremacy was asserted 
 by the Romans from the first, and the over-sea ventures 
 of Carthage were few and ineffective. In the third, 
 Carthage was limited to the defence of her home territory. 
 One important condition of the contest must be noticed. 
 Carthage was not an island State, and had no natural 
 frontiers. On her flank lay the Numidians, powerful 
 enemies always ready to become Roman allies. Nor was 
 
 • We are far too prone to think lightly of the naval achievements of 
 the ancients. The numbers of craft and of men who took part in the 
 old sea-fights were often immensely greater than in modern days, and 
 such a matter as the sea-transport of a hundred and forty elephants 
 would be no child's play to-day. 
 
314 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 Rome mistress of an united Italy, or even a nation in 
 the modern sense. Hannibal counted upon the disaffection 
 of the people, and, although the Latin Colonies preserved 
 their allegiance, the Apulians, Samnites, Bruttians, and 
 many Greek cities of the South, hailed him as a 
 deliverer. 
 
 In spite of all differences of political conditions, in spite 
 of the apparently vital changes wrought by the introduc- 
 tion of the line-of-battle ship and the modern steamer, it 
 is impossible to study these pas.sages of Greek and Roman 
 history without admitting the existence of eternal laws 
 governing over-sea operations. The struggle of Rome and 
 Carthage for Sicily forcibly recalls, even in details, the 
 contest of France and England for the West Indies. 
 Gibraltar, a fortress impregnable like Syracuse, must have 
 fallen if Rodney's fleet, like that of Hamilcar, had failed 
 in its mission of relief. The Athenian invasion of Sicily 
 is paralleled by Napoleon's descent upon Egypt, and the 
 decisive action in the harbour of Syracuse presaged that 
 in the Bay of Aboukir. The squadron of Tigranes, behind 
 its fortifications at Mycalc, courted and incurred the same 
 fate as that of Admiral Ting at Wei-hai-Wei, and for the 
 same reason. The Roman attack on Lilyboeum in 249 
 B.C. suggests that on Lissa in 1866. A lesson drawn from 
 the Roman policy in the second Punic War might have 
 changed the whole course of the Crimean campaign. In 
 1877, naval weakness imposed upon Russia a long land 
 march and the passage of a great river and mountain 
 chain, just as similar weakness determined Hannibal's line 
 of operations across the Rhine and the Alps. Turkey, 
 unmindful of the plain teaching of 2200 years of history, 
 has allowed her navy to decay. The one advantage she 
 possessed in 1827 and in 1877 is now lost, and her Zama 
 may, like that of Carthage, be fought near to the heart of 
 her Empire. The Delphic Oracle, in 200 B.C., if its pre- 
 siding deity had followed the fortunes of Athens and 
 Rome, might, with much certitude, have thus predicted the 
 destinies of England — 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 315 
 
 In tribal days she will be frequently invaded and colonized 
 by adventurous spirits, drawn from sea-faring peoples across the 
 neighbouring seas. Rome, by reason of her great sea power, 
 will subjugate the islanders. When Rome shall decay they will 
 become independent, and from that day their defence against 
 over-sea invasion must rest with their Navy. If ships and 
 seaman are wanting, raids and invasions will occur. Should the 
 island people become united, unlike the fickle Greeks, so that a 
 stout-hearted race springs up within their water walls, then they 
 will begin to exercise sway over and across far distant seas, kept 
 secure at home by their fleets, so that invasion can no longer be 
 even threatened unless civil dissension should arise. In the known 
 world there is no other territory so fortunately situated. If its 
 people learn to trust the gifts of the sea, they will win and hold 
 an Empire mightier far than that of Athens or of Rome. 
 
 So, in resounding Greek verse, might the Priestess have 
 spoken. 
 
 In a most interesting article,* Admiral Sir Vesey 
 Hamilton has reviewed the invasions of England attempted 
 or contemplated since the days of the Saxon kings. 
 Between the menaces of Charlemagne and the elaborate 
 projects of Napoleon lie more than icxx) years, during 
 which a number of petty and mutually jealous kingdoms 
 grew into a great State. Meanwhile the galley grew into 
 the line-of-battle ship, and the gun became the weapon 
 by which naval actions were decided. Widely though the 
 political and material conditions of the two periods differed, 
 the same law prevailed. Towards the end of the eighth 
 century, Ofifa, King of Mercia, began to " turn his thoughts 
 on the proper means of securing his dominions from foreign 
 attempts, which he soon saw could no other way be done 
 than by keeping up a naval force. He therefore applied 
 himself to the raising of a considerable fleet." t Abandon- 
 ing all idea of invasion, Charlemagne shrewdly sought a 
 Mercian alliance, and Ofifa, " after a glorious reign of thirty- 
 nine years, bequeathed to England this useful lesson, 
 that he who will be secure on land must be supreme at 
 sea." X "I trust and am confident," wrote Nelson, in 1801, 
 
 • The Nineteenth Century, March, 1896. 
 t " Lives of the Admirals," Campbell, i779- 
 % Saxon Chronicles quoted by Campbell. 
 
3i6 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 "that if our sea-faring men do their duty, either the 
 enemy will give over the measure (invasion) or if they 
 persist in it that not one Frenchman will be allowed to 
 set his foot on British soil." Behind Nelson lay long 
 years in which the British Navy had securely guarded 
 England. Offa, the mere chief of a Saxon group, gave 
 evidence of instinctive perception. That the Britain of 
 the first century should fall under the sway of the great 
 sea Power which had conquered Gaul was inevitable, and 
 the first striking indication of the dominant influence 
 which a mobile navy must exert over her destiny occurred 
 two centuries later. In 287, Carausius," the commander 
 of the Roman fleet at Boulogne, conceived and executed 
 the plan of becoming the master of Britain. Having gained 
 over the fleet, he crossed the Channel, and persuading "a 
 great part of the Roman army, and the Britons in general 
 to embrace his party," proclaimed himself Emperor ; 
 
 " His fleets rode triumphant in the Channel, commanded the 
 mouths of the Seine and the Rhine, ravaged the coats of the ocean, 
 and diffused beyond the columns of Hercules the terror of his 
 name. . . . Under his command, Britain, destined in a future age 
 to obtain the Empire of the Sea, aheady assumed its natural and 
 respectable station of a Maritime Power." f 
 
 After ruling England for seven years, Carausius was 
 murdered by Allectus. Meanwhile Constantius was making 
 immense eff"orts to build a navy, and after capturing a 
 portion of the British fleet at Boulogne by a land attack, 
 put to sea, and, evading in a fog the main squadron of 
 Allectus off the Isle of Wight, landed safely on the shores 
 of Kent, where he burned his ships. The invading force, 
 thus cut off, succeeded only because Constantius found 
 everywhere "obedient subjects. Their acclamations were 
 loud and unanimous," and they seem to have " rejoiced in 
 a revolution which, after seven years, restored Britain to 
 the body of the Roman Empire." % Under such happy 
 
 ' Carausius is generally said to have been a Menapian, but " certain 
 Scottish authors claim him for their countryman, and with great 
 appearance of truth." — Campbell. 
 
 t Gibbon. % Ibid. 
 
CAX ENGLAND BE INVADED? 317 
 
 ■conditions only are over-sea invasions, carried out by 
 evading an undefeated fleet, rendered successful. In the 
 •existence of some such conditions, Philip II., Louis XIV., 
 Louis XV., and Napoleon belie\ed. On the other hand, 
 the revolution efifected by Carausius curiously resembles 
 that accomplished by William III. 
 
 From the days of Offa to our own the fleet has been 
 the gauge of the security of England. Only when it has 
 been neglected or trust has been reposed in other means 
 of defence has territorial aggression occurred. Neglect of 
 the Navy and resort to fortification after the death of Offa 
 brought over successive inroads of Danes till " the country 
 was destroyed, all the cities and great towns demolished, 
 and the people worn out with continual fatigue, having 
 been sometimes compelled to fight nine or ten battles in 
 a year." * The Navy was restored by Alfred, and again 
 the country found rest. Eight hundred years after the 
 reign of Offa the great Navy of Cromwell kept England 
 secure, brought Holland to terms, and carried the flag into 
 the Mediterranean ; while, in 1667, Charles II. laid up his 
 ships, and immediately the coasts were harried, and the 
 Dutch sailed up the Thames and Medway. Civil dis- 
 sension permitted the Norman conquest ; t an invitation 
 from John's revolted barons brought a French army to 
 England in 1216; but, as Sir Vesey Hamilton states, "all 
 modem history does not afford a single instance of a 
 successful invasion of this country, because our Navy has 
 always stood directly in the path of the would-be invader." 
 As in the wars of Greece and Rome, however, raids have 
 occurred — never serious except when the Navy had been 
 palpably neglected, as at the close of the reigns of Edward 
 III. and of Charles II. Such raids have varied from the 
 systematic harassing of our coasts by John de Vienne,J 
 
 • Campbell. 
 
 t Harold had attained no hold upon England, and William was a 
 rival claimant to his crown. The former staked all upon his army, 
 and lost. If his navy, which had just won a great victory over the 
 King of Norway, had been brought into the Channel, and if there 
 had been an united people at his back, he must have triumphed. 
 
 I At a time when we were in occupation of a large part of France. 
 
3i8 THE NAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 to the petty escapade of Napper Tand)-. They have never 
 contemplated the landing of considerable bodies of men,, 
 except when Louis XIV. endeavoured to aid James II. in 
 Ireland, or when the Directory sought to raise rebellion in 
 that country with results rendered disastrous by the British. 
 Navy. When, as in 1690, the fleet had been allowed to 
 fall below a safe standard, the burning of Teignmouth 
 and the capture of a few trading craft in Brixham harbour 
 were the achievements of De Tourville, notwithstanding 
 that a deposed English king, advised by the greatest of 
 English generals, had drawn up an elaborate plan of 
 French invasion.* When, as in 1757 and 1779, the British 
 Navy was temporarily overtasked, the utmost achievement 
 in home waters was restricted to an unsuccessful attempt 
 on Jersey, and the parade of an allied French and Spanish 
 fleet in sight of Plymouth. 
 
 Moreover, the British Navy has shown astounding re- 
 cuperative power directly national effort was redirected to 
 the sea. Undaunted by the defeat of Beachy Head in 
 June, 1690, the fleet won the great victory of La Hogue 
 in May, 1692, and in 1694, 1695, and 1696 the weight of 
 the British Navy bore heavily on the coasts of France. 
 Beginning with clear signs of naval insufficiency, the Seven 
 Years' War ended in the conquest of Canada and the 
 establishment of British power in India — each a gift of 
 the sea — while in 1759 preparations for a French invasion 
 were met by Rodney's destructive bombardment of Havre 
 and Hawke's great victory in Quiberon Bay. Overtasked t 
 in the war of American Independence — a war begun in a 
 bad cause — the Navy suffered no real reverse. The menace 
 of an inferior fleet in the Channel sufficed to avert a 
 threatened invasion, while Rodney defeated the Spaniards 
 off" Cape St. Vincent in 1780, and shattered the fleet of 
 
 * To be carried out by " fourteen battalions of English and Irish 
 troops, and nine thousand French." — Lord Wolseley's " Life of 
 Marlborough." 
 
 f In 1782 Great Britain was at war with France, Spain, Holland, 
 the revolted colonies of North America, the Marathas, Hyderabad 
 and Hyder Ali of Mysore, and menaced by the "Armed Neutrahty 
 of the North" — Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 319 
 
 De Grasse off Guadaloupe in 1782. In 1793 began the 
 heroic period of the British Navy, which culminated at 
 Trafalgar. 
 
 During eight hundred years in which the Navy has stood 
 between Great Britain and over-sea invasion, and has 
 rigidly restricted the raids upon her coast-line, her fleets 
 have as a rule maintained themselves on the coasts of 
 her enemies, while British raids on a large scale have 
 been frequent, and military operations have been carried 
 on in every portion of the world. Until 1374 England 
 held a considerable portion of France, and the last foothold 
 across the Channel was not abandoned until 1558. Even 
 in 1758, a year of relative naval weakness, expeditionary 
 forces effectually raided St. Malo, and destroyed the docks, 
 fortifications, and shipping at Cherbourg. During a period 
 of only 130 years a single British regiment — the 50th 
 Queen's Own — selected at random, has fought in Canada, 
 Germany, Corsica, Egypt, Denmark, Spain, France, 
 Holland, India, Russia, and New Zealand. Such a record 
 shows clearly from what quarter over-sea invasions have 
 proceeded. While the Navy of England has guarded the 
 coast-line, the army has been uniformly employed in 
 offensive operations — its proper rdle. Escaping the dis- 
 abilities under which the Continental States of Athens, 
 Carthage, and Rome laboured, the sea power of the Island 
 Kingdom has had full scope. The British Empire is the 
 splendid result. 
 
 Parity of conditions is to be found only in the case of 
 Japan, and the historical resemblance is striking. The 
 early records are vague, but it seems certain that Japan 
 has not been successfully invaded for fully 1600 years, 
 and her military operations have been carried on mainly 
 in Korea, where, from the third century onwards, the 
 Japanese have frequently fought. Even when worsted in 
 the great war of 1592-1598, they still retained Fusan — 
 their Calais — and claimed rights of sovereignty for three 
 hundred years. Their navy, securing their own shores, has 
 persistently ravaged the coasts of China. 
 
320 THE XAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 " From the reign of Hung-wa to the end of that of Shih-tsung 
 (a.d. 1370-1567) the sea-board provinces of China were devastated 
 by Japanese adventurers, who not only raided the coast, but oflen 
 established themselves ashore in strong positions, from which 
 they used to sally forth to plunder, destroy, and burn. But they 
 never lost their hoW on the sea, and kept their ships either to 
 retreat to Japan when their situation became hopeless, or to remove 
 to some other portion of the coast." * 
 
 The Mongols, who penetrated into Central Europe, were 
 utterly unable to conquer Japan, and the huge expedition 
 of Kubla Khan in the thirteenth century suffered disaster 
 as complete as that of Philip II. After many civil wars, 
 wliich for a time checked the external power of the 
 islanders, a feudal system resembling our own tardily dis- 
 appeared, and at last an united nation — like Great Britain 
 in 1803 1 — confronted an ancient foe. Junks had given 
 place to armour-clads and fast cruisers ; every technical 
 condition had been revolutionized ; but the naval superiority 
 which Japan had asserted at intervals during many centuries 
 remained, and the eight months' war was a series of brilliant 
 triumphs by sea and land.J The course and the issues of 
 the operations were ruled by sea power, and the old laws 
 received fresh illustration. Strategically the navy, at least 
 till the battle of the Yalu, was the defensive force ; the 
 army, from first to last, was the offensive weapon. The 
 invasion of China from a base in Korea recalls that of 
 France starting from Lisbon, and the elaborately fortified 
 harbours of Port Arthur, and Wei-hai-Wei succumbed to 
 a land attack supported by the navy precisely as Syracuse 
 in 212 B.C. fell to Marcellus. 
 
 That naval force is the natural and proper defence of 
 a maritime State against over-sea invasion is the in- 
 disputable teaching of history. The unbroken consistency 
 of the records of hundreds, of years cannot possibly be the 
 result of accident. No theories incubated in times of peace, 
 
 * " The China-Japan War." Vladimir. 
 
 t For the first time. 
 
 \ The significance of the Japanese victory is best realized by com- 
 paring the operations with those carried on by the Western "Powers 
 .against China. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED f 321 
 
 no speculations as to what might have happened if events 
 had shaped themselves differently, can shake a law thus 
 irrefragably established. There is only one explanation 
 of the fact, that of the many projected invasions of England 
 none has succeeded for eight hundred years, notwithstand- 
 ing that naval superiority has not existed at all periods, 
 and that the military forces at home have often been utterly 
 inadequate to resist the strength which could be brought 
 against them, if the sea had not intervened. All the great 
 operations of war are ruled by the measure of the risk 
 involved, and until the defending navy has been crushed, 
 the risk of exposing large numbers of transports to attack 
 is too great to be easily accepted. Moreover, secure com- 
 munications are vital to successful invasion, and, as Lord 
 Wolseley has pointed out, " a modem army is such a very 
 complicated organism, that any interruption in the line 
 of communications tends to break up and destroy its very 
 life." * This consideration, potent in ancient times, is now 
 paramount. It can be modified only if effective allies are 
 forthcoming in the country to be invaded. Unless this 
 condition is fulfilled, invasion will not be attempted until an 
 absolute control of the sea has been established. 
 
 Throughout our history there have been periods at which 
 this great law has been recognized, and has formed the 
 basis — actual if unavowed — of the national policy. At 
 other periods, the law has been disregarded, with results 
 always painfully apparent on the outbreak of war. No 
 doubts or misgivings clouded the minds of the great sailors 
 of Elizabeth when a great invasion was impending which 
 the military resources of the kingdom were hopelessly 
 inadequate to resist. The Navy, to be employed on the 
 enemy's coasts and not in home waters, was then regarded 
 as the true safe-guard. 
 
 " The opinion of Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobisei 
 and others that be men of greatest judgment (and) experience is 
 that (the) surest way to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their 
 
 • Fortnightly Revieie, January, 1886. 
 
322 THE KAVY AXD THE NATION. 
 
 own (coast) or in any harbour of their own and there to defeat 
 them." * 
 
 " The seas are broad ; but if we had been (on) their coast they 
 durst not have left us on their backs." f 
 
 " My opinion is altogether that we shall fight them much better 
 cheap upon their own coast than here." % 
 
 " But making the question general," wrote Raleigh, " whether 
 England without the help of her fleet be able to deter an enemy 
 from landing, I hold that it is unable so to do ; and I therefore 
 think it most dangerous to make the adventure. . . . But I say 
 that an army to be transported over-sea, and to be landed again 
 in an enemy's country and the place left to the choice of the invader, 
 cannot be resisted on the coast of France or any other country, 
 except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army. . . . 
 To entertain them that shall assail us with their own beef in their 
 bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons I take it to be 
 the wisest way; to which his Majesty, after God, will employ his 
 good ships on the sea, and not trust in any entrenchment on 
 shore." 
 
 If the measures urged by Howard and all his captains 
 had been adoptee', the Armada would never have reached 
 the Channel. There was, however, wavering among the 
 Queen's advisers ; the idea of holding the fleet close to the 
 coast-line and supporting it by a " second line " of troops 
 and fortifications on shore found favour ; a great object 
 lesson was lost, and after many years it came to be 
 believed that England was saved mainly by act of God.§ 
 
 Again, at the beginning of this century, naval opinion 
 was unanimous, and though great preparations were made 
 on shore in order, as St. Vincent stated, "to satisfy the 
 fears of the old women of both sexes," these fears were 
 happily not permitted to hamper naval action. Whether 
 Napoleon really hoped to carry out his invasion can never 
 be known. There exists, as Sir Vesey Hamilton has 
 pointed out, a mass of evidence tending to prove that his 
 
 * Howard to Walsyngham, 14th June, 1558. Defeat of the Spanish 
 Armada. Navy Records Society. 
 
 t Howard to Walsyngham, 15th June, 1558. 
 
 j Memorandum by Drake. 
 
 § The fact that the Armada was hopelessly shattered before en- 
 countering any stress of weather has required recent demonstration, 
 and is not yet universally recognized. See above, " The Armada," 
 p. 152. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 323 
 
 only objects were to collect a great army for ulterior 
 purposes, and by placing it on the shores of the Channel 
 to create panic in England. It may safely be assumed, 
 however, that if the British Navy could have been crushed 
 he would have turned his elaborate preparations to account. 
 In the then relative state of the two navies there was not 
 the smallest hope of this condition being fulfilled, and a 
 single fleet action would certainly not have provided secure 
 communications for the invader. Thus, as often before, 
 menace sufficed to prevent the sailing of a single transport 
 without any necessity for fighting a great naval action, 
 and two months before Trafalgar, Napoleon began his 
 march to the Rhine. 
 
 The splendid naval achievements during the first war of 
 the French Revolution, the vigorous naval offensive assumed 
 on the outbreak of the second, the long list of ships captured 
 on the enemy's coast, the great system of fortifications which 
 Napoleon considered necessary for his security at Boulogne 
 — all these circumstances combine to show on which side 
 of the Channel danger lay. Yet within a few years all 
 were forgotten, and amazing fictions found place in popular 
 history. Nelson had been successfully " decoyed away " by 
 Villeneuve to the West Indies, leaving England defence- 
 less save for her army and her fortifications. Only a series 
 of happy chances, unlikely to recur, enabled the fleet to 
 return just in time to win Trafalgar, a lucky accident by 
 which the nation was narrowly saved. Such were, and 
 still to a great extent remain, the beliefs by which policy 
 is swayed. An interesting lecture has recently been 
 delivered on " Fog in War " ; perhaps some student of 
 history may be found to treat of " Fog in Peace." If it 
 should come to be generally realized that Nelson merely 
 adhered to the rules of naval war and anticipated orders 
 sent to him by the Admiralty, that the only accident was 
 the narrow escape of Villeneuve from destruction in the 
 West Indies, that a considerable naval force, exclusive of 
 the blockading squadrons, remained in the Channel,* and 
 
 • " We could, at that period, have concentrated sixty sail of the line, 
 
3n THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 that Trafalgar, however momentous, had no more influence 
 on the collapse of the invasion project than Lepanto, then 
 the national policy may emerge from the fog-bank of 
 illusions, theories, and misconceptions by which it has been 
 obscured. Failing absolutely in his naval projects, as 
 under the conditions was inevitable, Napoleon, never- 
 theless, succeeded in a way which he can scarcely have 
 foreseen. His words, " II ne faut etre maitre de la mer 
 que six heures pour que I'Angleterre cesse d'exister" — 
 words merely strung together on the principle which 
 inspired his accustomed proclamations, and without the 
 smallest basis of truth — have entailed upon Great Britain 
 the misapplication of many millions sterling, the darkening 
 of counsel, and national weakness not yet wholly remedied. 
 There have been two grave inquiries into the question 
 of territorial defence. In 1785, within six years of a time 
 when a superior hostile fleet sailed the Channel, a 
 Royal Commission reported upon a project of fortifications 
 for Plymouth and Portsmouth. The members appear to 
 have been unanimous only in affirming that " exertions 
 for the support of the Navy" were "the first object for 
 the safety and prosperity of the kingdom." With this 
 unexceptionable proposition, their agreement seems to 
 have ended. Certain data were drawn up as to the strength 
 of an invading force, to which Captain Macbride objected 
 as excessive. Rear-Admiral Graves "would not have it 
 implied that I think any new system of additional land 
 fortifications for the security of Plymouth necessary." 
 Lieut.-General Burgoyne, Earl Percy, Vice-Admiral Mill- 
 banke, Rear-Admiral Graves, and Captain Sir J. Jervis, 
 signed the following significant protest : — 
 
 " Our proceedings have been founded upon the supposition of 
 the whole fleet being absent as mentioned in the second datum, 
 and therefore that the enemy can bring over an army, with an 
 
 and as many, or more, frigates, in the Straits of Dover, or their vicinity, 
 at short notice." — Sir Vesey Hamilton. Of the result of a fleet action 
 between this force and the eighty French and Spanish battleships, 
 which Napoleon proved quite unable to collect, there can be no 
 possible doubt. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 32; 
 
 artillery proportionate to an attack on Portsmouth or Plymouth, 
 having (a certain time) to act in, uninterrupted by the British fleet, 
 as mentioned in the third datum. The bare possibility of such an 
 event we do not pretend to deny ; but how far it is improbable 
 that the whole British fleet may be sent on any service requiring 
 so long an absence, at a time when the enemy is prepared to invade 
 this country with (force stated) we humbly leave to your Majesty's 
 superior wisdom, and, therefore, whether it is necessary in con- 
 sequence of such a supposition to erect works of so expensive a 
 nature as those proposed, and which require such large garrisons 
 to defend them." 
 
 The estimate for the proposed fortifications, amounting 
 to .^760,097, was submitted to the House of Commons on 
 February 27, 1786, in the form of a resolution, declaring 
 the plan to be "an essential object for the safety of the 
 State, intimately connected with the naval defence of 
 the kingdom, and necessary for enabling the fleet to act 
 with full vigour." After a remarkable debate* the resolu- 
 tion, supported by Pitt with all the force at his command, 
 was lost by the casting vote of the Speaker. The opposi- 
 tion was led by Sheridan, who, in a speech which was 
 "the subject of much admiration," t contended that "the 
 opinion of the land officers was founded upon hypothetical 
 and conditional suggestions." Nine years later the nation 
 was involved in a war with three great naval Powers ; 
 but, in the eleven years of storm and stress which followed, 
 it is sufficiently clear that the need of Pitt's fortifications 
 was never manifested.! 
 
 Forty-five years of immunity from naval war materially 
 modified the views of the nation as to its defensive require- 
 ments. For experience gained in the tremendous ordeal 
 of the War of American Independence, following close on 
 
 • The extraordinary difference between the tone of this debate and 
 that of the military discussions in the House of Commons in the 
 present day was due to the fact that the nation in 1786 knew what 
 war implied. 
 
 t Annual Register, 17S6. 
 
 X A little later Fox expressed the then feeling of the nation, when 
 arguing that the armed forces of the Crown required consideration, 
 .ind "especially the navy, on which the country depends so much 
 more to prevent invasion than on the army." 
 
326 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 the Seven Years' War, were now substituted "hypo- 
 thetical and conditional suggestions," and a unanimous 
 Royal Commission recommended an expenditure of eleven 
 millions sterling* on mere fixed defences. The Commis- 
 sioners even pointed out that : — 
 
 " Should any such catastrophe (defeat or dispersion by storm) 
 occur, or should the fleet, from whatever cause, be unable to keej) 
 the command of the Channel, it appears to your Commissioners 
 that the insular position of the kingdom, so far from being an 
 advantage for defensive purposes, might prove a disadvantage, 
 inasmuch as it would enable any superior naval Power or Powers 
 to concentrate a larger body of troops on any part of our coasts, 
 and more rapidly and secretly than could be done against any 
 neighbouring country having only a land frontier ; and an army so 
 placed could maintain its base, and be reinforced and supplied 
 with more facility than if dependent on land communications." 
 
 No strong protest was forthcoming, for the nation had 
 forgotten what a naval war implied. Either naval history 
 had been relegated to Saturn, or the uninterrupted com- 
 munications of the Allies in the Crimean Campaign had 
 blinded the national imagination. Between the years 
 1S60-61 and 1889-90, more than seventeen and a half 
 millions sterling were spent upon fortifications and im- 
 mobile guns,t but the actual total expenditure for the 
 Empire, due to the new departure of 1859, has been far 
 greater. The mere money is of no account ; but the 
 change of policy entailed the loss of the ancient faiths. 
 New theories — that naval force is untrustworthy in action, 
 that the British Navy will inevitably be "decoyed away" 
 when needed, or dispersed or wrecked by tempests if 
 available, and that the protection of an island State against 
 invasion is a matter of armies and especially of fortifications 
 — obtained general credence. It naturally followed that 
 the Navy was neglected to a dangerous extent. In 1786, 
 after a great war against a powerful combination of naval 
 
 * Lord Palmerston thus obtained about fourteen times the amount 
 refused to Pitt. 
 
 t Parliamentary Return. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 327 
 
 Powers, the naval estimates exceeded those of the army. 
 In accordance with the modern theory, the Navy estimates 
 in recent years dropped far below those of the army, and 
 equality was only reached in 1895-96. There have been 
 other strange manifestation of the new spirit. So com- 
 pletely has history been forgotten that the tardy rehabili- 
 tation of the decayed naval strength of the Empire has 
 involved a superfluous and irrelevant plea for the 
 necessity for an army.* The British army has fought in 
 every land, from China to South America, from the 
 Himalayas to South Africa and New Zealand. It has 
 a long and brilliant record of operations all carried on 
 beyond the naval frontier. It has conquered for us an 
 Empire greater than that of Rome. It has been almost 
 continuously employed on active service throughout this 
 century. The only ser\'ice it has not been called upon 
 to render is the defence of England against over-sea 
 invasion. But whether the army fought in Canada, 
 Germany, Egypt, Spain, the Crimea, or India, behind it 
 stood the real defensive force of the nation. A sufficient 
 Navy was the necessary condition for its activity in the 
 past, and an inadequate Navy would paralyze its action 
 in any future great war. It is futile to pretend to 
 discern in the recent determination to rehabilitate the 
 fleet the slightest tendency to ignore the need of an 
 army. 
 
 The sea is no impassable barrier ; but in war it is 
 reasonable probabilities, not possibilities, which must be 
 taken into consideration. To an invading force, whether 
 operating by land or over-sea, secure communications are 
 vital. The protection of these delicate and sensitive threads 
 is, on land, favoured by many circumstances. Geographical 
 conditions may render the communications of an advancing 
 army unassailable, or the broad front presented by that 
 
 * A recent writer in the Times has unconsciously revealed the 
 hopeless fallacy on which the modern theory of defence is based. 
 By likening the sea to a "mountain chain," from the defiles of which 
 invading armies issue, the climax of misconception seems to have 
 been reached. 
 
328 THE NAVY AND THE NATION. 
 
 army may effectually prevent operations in its rear. At 
 sea there is only one means of obtaining such protection. 
 The navy of the invader must either be able to count on 
 certain victorj', if attacked, or must have previously reduced 
 the navy of the defenders to impotence. The first condi- 
 tion was fulfilled in the Franco-German war, the second 
 after Trafalgar. The superiority required in the first case 
 must be overwhelming.* Moreover, the coast-line of an 
 invader is a veritable mountain chain, from which he can 
 issue only at few and known points ; and he can so issue 
 only if he has primarily made visible preparations — the 
 collection of transports — at these points. Neglect of the 
 study of naval history has induced difficulties of imagina- 
 tion in relation to operations at sea. To explain the latter 
 it is generally necessary to seek for military parallels, and 
 acting on this principle the problem of over-sea invasion 
 may be thus defined : — 
 
 Between two mountain frontiers lies a plain, traversable 
 with perfect ease at all times, and in all directions, by 
 small or large bodies of light cavalry. While crossing it, 
 however, all other arms cease to be fighting bodies. The 
 frontier of the invader can be passed only at few and 
 known defiles. The whole transport of the invading army 
 — ^which cannot pass over the mountains — must be collected 
 at the outlets of these defiles, incurring risk from the 
 ubiquitous light cavalry during the process. The de- 
 fenders' frontier, on the other hand, possesses points of 
 ingress relatively large in number, but nevertheless limited. 
 The light cavalry, which cannot cross either frontier, is 
 perfectly self-supplied, carrying with it all that is needed, 
 moving at very high speed, capable of being restrained 
 only when caught and defeated by a force of similar 
 nature, flexible to the last degree, and organized in units 
 
 * Naval raids are, as has been noticed, always difficult to control ; 
 and such raids, even in small force, are necessarily dangerous to great 
 fleets of crowded transports. We shall shortly possess a flotilla of 
 ninety " destroyers," the greater part of which will always be available 
 in the Channel. How a fleet of transports is to be protected against 
 such a force cannot be stated. 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 329 
 
 able, without preparation, to act singly or in any com- 
 bination, and to disperse or reassemble at will. 
 
 Such being the elements of the problem of over-sea 
 invasion, the invading general will surely decline to move 
 his transports into the plain till it has been definitely cleared 
 of hostile cavalry ; while his opponent, recognizing that the 
 frontier is distinctly unfavourable for defence, will decide 
 to wage offensive operations in the plain where the invading 
 army is powerless, and will make his preparations with this 
 object. Remembering, however, that an enterprising enemy 
 may attempt to raid his frontier, he will provide light 
 defences for the bases from which his cavalry acts, and he 
 will hold a well-organized mobile force in readiness to 
 oppose forays at other points. 
 
 Such would be the logical policy in regard to the defence 
 of a Great Britain self-supporting and standing apart from 
 her Empire. But the only conditions which could render 
 invasion practicable, would at the same time imply that 
 the vital communications of the Empire were in the hands 
 of an enemy, that India and every colony lay open to 
 attack in any force, that trade was paralyzed, and that the 
 means of existence of the home population were destroyed. 
 In a multiple sense, therefore, naval defence is now vital. 
 
 The answer to the question. Can England be Invaded ? 
 is deeply graven on the pages of history. Nearly five 
 hundred years ago, the only means of security were pointed 
 out in a poem, in ten cantos, bearing the title, " De Politia 
 Conservativa Maris," * and ending with the following re- 
 markable lines — 
 
 " Keep then the Sea about in special, 
 ^Vhich of England is the Town-wall. 
 As though England were likened to a city, 
 And the Wall environ were the Sea. 
 Keep then the Sea that is the Wall of England, 
 And then is England kept by God's hand : 
 That for anything that is without, 
 England were at ease withouten doubt.'' 
 
 • Written about 1422. Entick, 1757. 
 
330 THE NAVY AXD THE XATIOX. 
 
 It is impossible to improve upon the simple words of 
 this old writer, who clearly saw where lay the safety of 
 England. He lays down the principles of a national policy 
 which have at times been obscured, only to be reaffirmed 
 by the experience of war. 
 
 The national instincts and the aptitudes inherited from 
 the pick of the seafaring adventurers of Western Europe 
 are not extinct. Geographical advantages remain, and 
 have been enhanced by naval progress. Our internal 
 resources have greatly increased in proportion to those of 
 our rivals. With a far inferior population, generally dis- 
 united. Great Britain won her supremacy on the sea and 
 frustrated every projected invasion. The population of 
 these islands now equals that of France, and a national 
 cohesion, unknown in the period of great wars, has been 
 happily attained. In 1800 there was not a single self- 
 governing colony ; there are now eleven centres of British 
 power scattered over the world. In the Empire of to-day 
 there are potentialities undreamed of in the past. Far 
 stronger at home than when it faced the fiery ordeal of 
 the War of American Independence, the nation has now 
 external resources which are as yet unrealized. Which of 
 all the great Powers owns free colonies able and willing 
 to provide active aid in any national emergency ? On the 
 other hand, while at the beginning of the century there 
 was only one land frontier to guard, there is now a second, 
 happily the strongest in the world. Both are, however, 
 indefensible under the conditions which alone render 
 possible the invasion of England. Thus the protection 
 of the sea communications of the Empire has become 
 a paramount object, involving defence against territorial 
 aggression, and securing to the army the possibility of 
 offensive operations. Raids, possible now as always, must 
 in the case of all positions necessary to the action of 
 the Navy, be met by moderate defences supported by 
 mobile garrisons. 
 
 If the nation is true to its own splendid history, if the 
 precepts of the Lancastrian poet above quoted, of Howard, 
 
CAN ENGLAND BE INVADED? 331 
 
 Drake, Raleigh, St. Vincent, and Nelson, are permitted to 
 inspire the national policy, and if illusions bred in times of 
 peace are flung aside, the essential naval conditions can 
 be fulfilled. Then, as in the past, will England be secured 
 against invasion. 
 
 G. S. C. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abercrombie, General, 17 
 
 Aberdeen, 81 
 
 Aboukir, Bay of, 314 
 
 Accini, Vice- Admiral, in command of 
 the defending squadron, 202 ; opera- 
 tions against the Duke of Genoa, 
 203-214 
 
 Acha:ans, 14 
 
 Actium, Battle of, 120, 190 
 
 Acton, Lord, 195 note 
 
 Adalbert, Prince, 280 
 
 Aden, 223, 236 
 
 yEgean, 310 
 
 ^gina, 12 
 
 ^gospotami, 310 
 
 /Eolians, 14 
 
 Affondatore, 202, 205, 209, 210 
 
 Afghanistan, 36, 50, 219 
 
 Africa, North, 232, 235 
 
 Africa, South, prosperity dependent 
 on sea-borne commerce, 25 ; em- 
 ployment of local forces, 35 ; trade 
 with the United Kingdom, 103 
 
 Agamemnon, H.M.S., 215 
 
 Agincourl, 208 
 
 Alabama, 25 ; speed of the, 107 note ; 
 depredations of, 108 
 
 Alliaii's Head, St., 256 
 
 Alderney, 85, 86 
 
 Algeria, occupation of, 235 
 
 AUectus, murders Carausius, 127, 
 316 ; death of, 128 
 
 AUeghanies, 16 
 
 Alliances, Continental, 215 
 
 America, summer programme of the 
 Naval War College, 249 
 
 America, North, Colonies of, 16 ; 
 outbreak of hostilities with England, 
 17, 19; defence of the long land 
 frontier of, 36 
 
 American Civil War, 107 ; lesson of 
 the, 109; results of submarine 
 
 mining, 273 ; Mobile Bay, 275 ; 
 New Orleans, 276-279 ; Vicksburg, 
 279 
 
 American Independence, War of, 
 218, 318, 325 
 
 Amherst, 17 
 
 Amiens, Peace of, 21 
 
 Andersen, Hans, 269 
 
 Andria Doria, 202 
 
 "Annual Register," extracts from, 
 259, 32s note 
 
 Anson, 81 
 
 Anticosti, 220 
 
 Aquila, 202, 204, 209 
 
 Areco, d", 163 
 
 Aretusa, 202, 207, 209 
 
 Argentaro, Monte, 204 
 
 Argentine, table of returns for 1895... 
 96 
 
 Aristides, 13, 15 
 
 Armada, 2, 5, 57, 126, 127, 130, 152, 
 153, 322; history of the, 156-187 
 
 "Arme* Neutrality" of 1780.. .18 
 216, 318 note 
 
 Arnold, Dr., 190 
 
 Artaxerxes, 15 
 
 Artemisium, 310 
 
 Asclepiodotus, Prefect, 128, 129 
 
 Asia, Central, 36 
 
 Asia Minor, 223 
 
 Athens, position of, 12 ; fall of, 39, 
 307 ; occupied by Xerxes, 309 ; 
 invasion of Sicily, 310 
 
 Attica, 13 
 
 Aube, Admiral, 116, 235 
 
 Augsburg, League of, 217 
 
 Austerlitz, 191, 192, 194, 217 
 
 Australasia, prosperity dependent on 
 sea-borne commerce, 25 ; import- 
 ance of the British command of the 
 sea to, 26 ; question of contribu- 
 tion, 27 ; employment of local 
 forces, 35 ; trade with the United 
 Kingdom, 102, 103 ; ports, 295 ; 
 
334 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Colonies, reduction of military ex- 
 penditure in, 39 twU ; danger 
 through ignorance, 41 ; views of, 
 42 ; prosperity dependent on Eng- 
 land, 44 ; peace strength of, 46 ; 
 military advantages, 47, 48 ; dis- 
 advantages of independence, 50 
 
 Australia, East, development of, 2 1 
 
 Austria, 126, 191, 192, 215, 217, 218, 
 306 ; relative importance compared 
 with England, 3 ; military power, 
 4 ; submarine mine system, 271 
 
 Austria-Hungary, table of returns for 
 1895. ..96 
 
 Avvoltoio, 202, 209 
 
 Azores, 84, 90 
 
 13 
 
 Babel-el-Mandeb, Straits of, 221, 
 
 228, 232 note, i-ifi, 237 
 Bacon, on the advantage of sea power, 
 
 120, 190, 227; his essay "Of 
 
 Prophecies," 152 
 Baird, Admiral, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 
 
 76, 77, 79. 80, 81, 82, 90, 256 
 Bakewell, Dr., 42, 43, 47, 49, 50 
 Baltic, Battle of the, 216 
 Baltic Sea, 56, 279, 281 
 Bantry Bay, 68 ; blockade of, 73-76 
 Barcelona, 230 
 Barham, Lord, 173 
 Barrera, Admiral, 251 
 Barrow, Sir John, 119 note 
 Bastia, 32 
 
 Batavian Republic, 21 
 Bayona, Isles of, 174, 175 • 
 Beachy Head, Battle of, 71, 72, 79, 
 
 127. 130. 136. 143. '44, 318 
 
 Belfast, 69, 70, 272 
 
 Belgium, iii, 306 
 
 Berehaven, 68, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84, 
 208 
 
 Beresford, Lord Charles, on the pro- 
 posal for "national insurance," 
 105, 106 ; on the difficulties of 
 transfer shipping, no; in command 
 of the Undaunted, 264 
 
 Bertelli, Admiral, 212 
 
 Biscay, Bay of, 160, 170 
 
 Biserta, 224 
 
 Black Sea, 56 
 
 Blacksod Bay, 68, 6g, 256 
 
 Blake, 230 
 
 Blitzenstein, Graf von, 219 
 
 Bombay, 237 
 
 Boscawen, 51 
 
 Boston newspaper, extract from, 237 
 
 Boiiet-Willaumez, Vice-Admiral, 2S0 
 
 Boulogne, 127, 128, 192, 252, 316 
 
 Bowles, Mr. Gibson, on the abroga- 
 tion of the Declaration of Paris, 
 106 ; transfer of ships to a neutral 
 flag, 108, 1 10 ; on the liabilities of 
 SirG. Tryon's proposal, 113 
 
 Boyne, Battle of the, 72 
 
 Braddock, 16, 17 
 
 Brazil, table of returns for 1895.. .96 ; 
 result of submarine mines in tlu- 
 war with Paraguay, 2S3 
 
 Bremen, 280 
 
 Brest, 126, 132, 146, 161, 191, 196,. 
 257 
 
 Brighton, 272, 293 
 
 Brisbane Courier, extract from, 27 
 
 Britain, Great. See England 
 
 British Empire. See England 
 
 Brixham Harbour, 318 
 
 Brown, Mr. Horatio F., 162 
 
 Bruges, 163 
 
 Buccaneer, 260 
 
 Bucknill, Lieut.-Col., " Submarine- 
 Mines and Torpedoes," 272, 287, 
 299 ; on landing a force on Long 
 Island, 289 
 
 Buenos Ayres, 284 
 
 Bulgaria, 306 
 
 Buloz, M., 28s note 
 
 Burgoyne, Lieut. -Gen., 324 
 
 Burke, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22 
 
 Burnham, 180 
 
 Byng, 216,230 
 
 Cadiz, 2, 126, 136, 191, ig6 
 
 Calais, I, 163, 178, 179, 181, 182,. 
 
 183 
 
 Calder, 191, 195 
 
 Calvi, 32 
 
 Campanella, 202 
 
 Campbell, " Lives of the Admirals,'' 
 315 note, 316 note, 317 note 
 
 Canada, defence of, 9 ; contest for, 
 16 ; population and trade, 21 ;. 
 prosperity 'dependent on sea-borne 
 commerce, 25 ; employment of 
 local forces, 35 ; trade with the 
 United Kingdom, 102, 103 ; con- 
 quest of, 318, 319 
 
 Canadian Pacific Railway, 220 
 
 Canute, 312 
 
 Cape Times, extract from, 27 
 
 " Captain, a late, of a Battleship,'' 
 his views on the training of naval 
 officers, 253 
 
IXDEX. 
 
 335 
 
 Capua, 312 
 
 Carausius, his invasion of England, 
 
 127-129, 316 
 Carnarvon, Lord, 308 
 Camatic, 17, 318 note 
 Carolina, North and South, 16 
 Carthage, sea-borne trade of, 15 ; 
 
 fall of, 59, 117, 307, 309 note, 312 ; 
 
 result of the wars with Rome, 311- 
 
 3'4 
 
 Caspian, the, 9, 36 
 
 Castelfidardo, 202, 207, 209, 210 
 
 Catalonia, 230 
 
 Cato, 312 
 
 Chamberlain, Mr., 39 
 
 Channel, contention of navies for 
 mastery of, i 
 
 Charlemagne, 315 
 
 Charles iF., 317 
 
 Charleston, 291 
 
 Chateau-Renaud, 132, 136 
 
 Chatham, 139; text-book of 1873... 
 272, 291 
 
 Cherbourg, 282, 299, 319 
 
 Chili, table of returns for 1895. ..96 
 
 China, employment of local forces, 
 35 ; table of returns for 1895. ..96 ; 
 destruction of the fleet, 159 ; in- 
 vasion of, by Japan, 319, 320 
 
 Chinde, the, 260, 262 
 
 Chitral, 36 
 
 Cicero, 120 
 
 Civita Vecchia, 204, 205, 212 
 
 Clear, Cape, 175 
 
 Clowes, Mr. Laird, his proposal of 
 abandoning the Mediterranean, 
 228-242 ; measures to be under- 
 taken, 237 ; results of his scheme, 
 240 
 
 Clyde, the, 276, 297 
 
 Colberg, 280, 281 
 
 Collingwood, 51 
 
 Colomb, Admiral, 75, 192 ; on 
 "Naval Warfare," 53; the com- 
 mand of the sea, 56 ; on Torring- 
 ton's strategy, 71, 173; the "Dif- 
 ferentiation of Naval Force," 89 ; 
 the " Naval Annual," 94 ; his com- 
 ment on Nottingham's despatch, 
 140, 144 ; on the Armada, 177 ; 
 Holland, 307 note 
 
 Colonies, position of the, 19 ; com- 
 nRTcc, 19; dcvclc)|imLiit, 21; in- 
 tegral parts of the Empire, 24 ; 
 expenditure on coast fortifications, 
 31 J armed strength, 34 
 "Colonist" and " Globe-lrotter," 
 dialogue between, 42, 45 
 
 Colony, Cape, trade with the United 
 Kingdom, 102 
 
 Commons, House of, debate on the 
 proposed fortifications in 1786. ..325 
 
 Compton Bay, 137 
 
 Conflans, fate of, 29 
 
 Conon, capture of the fleet of, 14, 310 
 
 Constantinople, 10, 250 
 
 Constantius, his invasion of England, 
 127-129, 316 
 
 Copenhagen, Battle of, 194, 216 
 
 Corcyra, 13 
 
 Corea, invasion of, 158, 159, 319, 320 
 
 Corinth, 13 
 
 Cork, 134, 135 
 
 Cornwallis, 51, 126, 191 
 
 Corsi, Rear-Admiral, 202 
 
 Corsica, 213, 319 
 
 Corunna, 170 
 
 Coubre, Point de, 2S2 note 
 
 Courbet, Admiral, 286 
 
 Creasy, .Sir Edward, 13, 190 ; ex- 
 tract from his " Fifteen Decisive 
 Battles," 130 note 
 
 Crete, 221 
 
 Crimean War, 56, 64, 66, 314 
 
 Cristo, Monte, 211 
 
 Cromwell, 230 ; the Navy of, 317 
 
 Cronstadt, 7, 56 
 
 Cuba, 306 note 
 
 Culme-Seymour, Sir M., 83, 84, 90 
 
 Curopayty, 284 
 
 Cyprus, Island of, 10, 14, 223, 22S, 
 230 
 
 D 
 
 Dandolo, 202, 205, 209, 210 
 
 Danube, 285 
 
 Danzig, 280, 281 
 
 D'Arcy- Irvine, Admiral, 79, 81 
 
 Dardanelles, 56 
 
 David's Head, St., 256 
 
 De Grasse, 193. 3 '9 
 
 De Guichen, 193 
 
 "De Politia Conservativa Maris,'' 
 
 extract from, 329 
 De Witt, 137 
 Dead Sea, 179 
 Deakin, Mr., 24 
 Delaval, 142 
 
 Delos, Confederacy of, 13, 14 
 Delphi, oracle of, 12, 309, 314 
 Denmark, 18, 97, ni, 306, 319; 
 
 alliances of, 216, 218 
 Devonport, 79 
 
336 
 
 I\DEX. 
 
 Dixon, Hepworth, " Life of Blake," 
 230 note 
 
 Does, Van der, 162 
 
 Doria, 209, 210 
 
 Dorian, 14 
 
 Dover, Straits of, 161, 177, 179, 251 
 
 Dowell, Sir W., 9 note 
 
 Downs, the, 77, 79, 137 
 
 Drake, Sir F., 2, 160, 163, 165, 168, 
 174. 175. 178, 179. 180, 182, 184, 
 321 ; his ad^e to the Council, 171, 
 234 ; to Elizabeth, 1 72, 1 76 
 
 Drake's Island, 295 
 
 Duckworth, Admiral, 217 
 
 Duilio, 202, 207, 209, 210 
 
 Dumeirah, 221 
 
 Duncan, 51 
 
 Dunkirk, 162, 163, 177, 180, 181 
 
 Duro, Captain, his story of the 
 Armada, 153, 164 
 
 Dutch fleet, position of the, iSi 
 
 Ecnomus, 313 
 
 J'^dinburgh Kcincw^ 1 10 
 
 Edward III., 317 
 
 Egypt, I9> 33. '-7, '59, 228, 240, 
 314, 319 ; occupation of, 10, 233 ; 
 described by a German strategist, 
 221 
 
 Elba, 209 
 
 Elbe, 220, 281, 283 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen, 183, 187; faith of 
 her seamen in naval supremacy, 2, 
 4 ; relaxes her preparations against 
 the Armada, 167 ; parsimony, 168 ; 
 reluctance to acknowledge the im- 
 minence of the peril, 169 ; belief 
 in the possibility of peace, 173 
 
 Elswick works, 81 
 
 Engineers, increase in the number 
 of, 66 
 
 England, early naval history of, i ; 
 population, 3, 23, 307 ; develop- 
 ment, 3, 15 ; naval supremacy, 4, 
 22, 53 ; monopoly of coal, 6 ; neg- 
 lect of the Navy, 6, 58, 326 ; policy 
 of passive defence, 7 ; Naval De- 
 fence Act of 1889.. .8 ; principles 
 of Imperial defence, 9 ; national 
 policy, 9 ; outbreak of hostilities 
 with the North American Colonies, 
 17, 19; the "Armed Neutrality of 
 the North," 18; position of the 
 Colonies to, 19, 24 ; trade, 20 ; 
 extent of territory and revenue, 23 ; 
 
 objects of national defence, 24 ; 
 failure of commerce-destroying, 25 ; 
 primary duty of the Navy, 26 ; 
 importance to Australasia, 27 ; 
 question of Colonial contribution, 
 27 ; standard of navaJ strength, 28 ; 
 coast fortifications, 30, 31 ; expen- 
 diture on, 31 ; advantages of a 
 military force, 32 ; primary duties, 
 33 ; armed strength of the Colonies, 
 34 ; plan of Imperial defence, 37- 
 39 ; danger through ignorance, 41 ; 
 relations with her Colonies, 42 ; 
 importance of the Navy, 51 ; 
 abandons the sovereignty of the 
 seas, S3, 1 19 ; result of the loss of 
 the command of the sea, 54, 55 ; 
 efficacy of sea power in the Crimean 
 war, 56 ; in the history of the 
 British Empire, 57 ; strategy and 
 tactics, 59 ; institution of naval 
 manoeuvres, 60 ; active and passive 
 defence, 64 ; relative strength of 
 the military forces, 65 ; increase in 
 the number of engineers, 66 ; 
 manoeuvres of 1885... 68 ; of 1886... 
 69 ; of 1887. ..69-73 ; of 1888.. .73- 
 78 ; of 1889.. .78-82 ; of 1890, ..S3 ; 
 torpedo-boat operations of 1890... 
 85; of i89i...86;of 1893... 118; 
 advantage of superiority of force, 
 90 ; dependence on maritime com- 
 merce, 93-9S ; table of returns for 
 1895. ..96 ; value of the sea-borne 
 commerce, 97-100 ; cost of insur- 
 ance, 100 ; error in the returns, 
 101-103; question of "national 
 insurance," 105 ; sea power or 
 command of the sea, the indis- 
 pensable condition of her existence, 
 120, 122, 148, 189 ; meaning of 
 the terms, 121 ; strategic freedom 
 of transit, 122, 149 ; need for 
 securing, 125 ; recovery of Britain 
 for the Roman Empire, 127-129 ; 
 Battle of Beachy Head, 130-148 ; 
 value of a "fleet in being," 147, 
 158 ; history of the Armada, 156- 
 187 ; alliances, 216 ; views of the 
 German strategist, 220-227 ! Pro- 
 posal of abandoning the IMediter- 
 ranean, 228-242 ; record of fighting 
 there, 230 ; annual total of trade, 
 332 ; training and supply of naval 
 officers, 243 ; submarine mine 
 system, 271 ; rules for the employ- 
 ment of, 299-304; conditions of, 
 307 ; measures for national security, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 337 
 
 308 ; attempted invasions of, 315, 
 321 ; result of neglect of the Navy, 
 317; recuperative power, 318 ; 
 victories, 318 ; military operations, 
 319 ; the Navy, the true safeguard, 
 321-323; proposed fortifications in 
 1 785... 324 ; estimated cost, 325 ; 
 expenditure from 1860-90... 326 ; 
 brilliant record of the army, 327 ; 
 definition of the problem of over- 
 sea invasion^ 328 
 
 Entick, 131, 134, 144, 145 
 
 Erith, 274 
 
 Esquimau, 294 
 
 Essex, 139 
 
 Estimates, Navy, 327 ; for 1894-95... 
 243 ; for 1893-94.. .24S ; for 1896... 
 104 
 
 Euridice, 202, 209 
 
 Europe, North of, insurance rates, 
 108 
 
 Evertsen, 130, 137 
 
 Kalco, 202 
 
 Falmouth, 80, 86, 278 
 
 Farnese, Alexander, 177, 1 80 
 
 Farragut, Admiral, 172, 275, 276, 
 278, 294 
 
 Fenner, Mr. Thomas, 175 
 
 Ferrol, 195, 196 
 
 Fieramosea, 202, 207, 209, 210 
 
 I'Kher, Fort, 293 note 
 
 Fitzroy, Admiral, 70, 72, 73, 76, 90, 
 124, 126 
 
 Fix, Th^odor, 283 note 
 
 Flanders, 126, 157, 161, 165, 218 
 
 " Floating Obstructions Committee," 
 formation of a, 286 
 
 Flushing, 162 
 
 " Fog in War," lecture on, 323 
 
 Foochow, 32 note 
 
 Forth Bridge, 81 
 
 Forth, Firth of, 295, 296 
 
 portnighlly Revie-,i\ 321 
 
 Forwodd, Sir A., no 
 
 Fourrichon, Vice-Admiral, 280 
 
 I''. .\, 325 note 
 
 France, 5(1, ig,iig note, 149, 151, 1 75. 
 213, 21S, 219, 220, 223, 227, 240, 
 319; relative importance compared 
 with England, 3 ; military power, 
 4 ; ship-building, 7 ; sea-borne 
 trade, 15 ; want of colonizing 
 power, 16 ; hostilities with the 
 United States in 1798.. .19 ; returns 
 
 of traffic, 21 ; torpedo-boats, 87 ; 
 table of returns for 1895... 96; value 
 of the sea-borne commerce, 100 ; 
 naval expenditure, 104 ; command 
 of the sea in 1870-71. ..i57;problem 
 of a war with Italy, 201 ; result of 
 the coalitions against, 216 ; occupa- 
 tion of Algeria, 235 ; system of 
 naval training, 251, 257 ; the 
 Channel manoeuvres, 251 ; sub- 
 marine mine system, 271 ; result 
 of invasion, 306, 308 ; colonies of, 
 
 307 
 
 Franco-German War, results of sub- 
 marine mining, 279-283 
 
 Fremantle, Admiral, 70, 72, 90 
 
 Friedland, 217 
 
 Frobiser, Mr., 172, 174, 175, 234, 
 321 
 
 Froude, his account of the Armada, 
 >53. '54, I55i »6i, 167, 168, 178, 
 180, 181 
 
 Fusan, 319 
 
 Gaeta, 205, 206, 210, 212, 213 
 
 Gaines, Fort, 275 
 
 Ganteaume, 126, 191 
 
 Garbett, Commander, 202 
 
 Genoa, 203, 204, 213 
 
 Genoa, Duke pf, in command of the 
 
 attacking squadron, 202 ; operations 
 
 against Accini, 203-214 
 George's Channel, St., 72, 73, 76, 86, 
 
 131 
 
 Georgia, 16 
 
 Germany, 319; its dependence on 
 military force, 3, 189; military 
 power, 4 ; want of colonizing power, 
 16 ; returns of traflic, 21 ; table of 
 returns for 1895. ..96; trade, 109; 
 military literature, 219 ; views of 
 the strategist, 219-227 ; naval 
 manoeuCTes of 1893. ..249; sub- 
 marine mine system, 271; rejection 
 of obsei-vation mines, 287 ; adoption 
 of uncontrolled, 288 ; possessions, 
 306 
 
 Gibbon, extract from, 127 
 
 Gibraltar, Straits of, 96 note, 97, 163, 
 221, 228, 236, 314 ; annual total of 
 British trade passing the, 232: 
 to "seal" the, 236; improvement 
 of, 237 
 
 Giglio, 204 
 
 Gironde, 282 note 
 
 Z 
 
338 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Gladstone, Mr., 22, 195 ttotc 
 
 Glasgow, 70, 282 
 
 "Globe-trotter" and "Colonist," 
 
 dialogue between, 42, 45 
 Goita, 202 
 
 Gonzales, Rear-Admiral, 202 
 Good Hope, Cape of, 240 ; popula- 
 tion and trade, 21 
 Gravelines, 162, 180 ; Battle of, 162, 
 
 181, 182, 184 
 Graves, Rear-Admiral, 324 
 Gravesend, 274, 278 
 Greece, 59 ; failure of the Persian 
 
 invasion, 12, 309 ; colonies of, 14 ; 
 
 sea-borne trade, 15 
 Greenock, 69 
 Greenwich Royal Naval College, 
 
 number of officers at, 244 ; course 
 
 of instruction in, 248 
 Gritti, Giovanni, 162, 163, 166 
 Groyne, 175 
 Guadaloupe, 319 
 
 "Guerres Navales de Demain," 199 
 Gueydon, Vice-Admiral de, 280 
 Gulf, insurance rates, 108 
 Gunfleet, 138, 139, 140, 141 
 
 H 
 
 Haines, Mr., 106, 113, n6 ; on the 
 
 danger of commerce, in war, 115 
 Halifax, 295, 296 
 Halong Harbour, 220 
 Hamburg, 280 
 Hamilcar, 312, 314 
 Hamilton, Lord George, on the 
 
 number of officers, 245 
 Hamilton, Sir Vesey, 9 noU, 257, 
 
 259, 260, 264, 267, 322, 324 noie; 
 
 on the invasions of England, 315, 
 
 317 
 Hamoaze, 136 
 Hannay, Mr. David, 154 
 Hannibal, 190, 312, 314 
 Haro Strait, 220 
 Harold, King, 130 noU, 317 noie 
 Hartford, 275 
 Harwich, 274, 293 
 Hasdrubal, 312 
 Hastings, 293 
 Havre, 318 
 Hawke, Lord, 51, 193, 230, 318; 
 
 his " Memoirs," 134 note 
 Hawkyns, 16S, 172, 174, 175, 234, 
 
 321 
 Hecla, 80 
 
 Helen's, St., 137 
 
 Heligoland, 220 
 
 Hellespont, 12, 14, 310 
 
 Hennebert, Lieut. -Col., " Les Tor- 
 
 ' pilles, " 283 note 
 
 Henry VIL, 2 
 
 Herald, 261, 262 
 
 Herbert, Thomas, 133, 134, 141 
 
 Herodotus, 12, 309 
 
 Hewett, Admiral, 70, 71, 90 
 
 Hohenlinden campaign of 1800...21& 
 
 Holland, 59, iii, 117, 160, 161, 162, 
 218, 317, 319 ; relative importance 
 compared with England, 3 ; sea- 
 borne trade, 15; alliances, 216; 
 colonies, 306 ; inability to defend 
 her land frontier, 307 
 
 Hong Kong, 25, 295, 296 ; trade of, 
 96 note, 97 
 
 Hopkin,s, Admiral Sir John, 257 
 
 Hornby, Sir Geoffrey, in command 
 of the naval manoeuvres of 1885... 
 6^, 69, 256 
 
 Howard, Lord, 2, 160, 171, 176, 177, 
 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 187; 
 on the preparations for the Armada, 
 168; his advice to the Council, 
 172, 173 ; letters to Walsynham, 
 174-176, 234, 322 note ; his ac- 
 count of Gravelines, 184, 185 
 
 Howe, SI, 193 
 
 Howe, Earl, extract from the Life 
 of, 119 note 
 
 Humaita, 284 
 
 Humber, 260, 263 
 
 Humphrey, Sir Gilbert, 3 
 
 Hyder Ali, 17, 318 note 
 
 Imperial Defence, principles of, 9 ; 
 plan for, 37 
 
 India, 38 note, 58, 64 note, 149, 319 ; 
 defence of, 9 ; valuable assistance 
 to England, 19 ; sensitiveness to 
 trade fluctuations, 25 ; expenditure 
 on defences of ports, 31 ; troops, 
 35 ; increase in the efficiency of 
 the army, 36 ; table of returns for 
 1895. ..96, loi ; value of the sea- 
 borne trade in 1892-93.. .102 ; in- 
 surance rates, 108; establishment 
 of British power in, 318 
 
 Indo-China, 220 
 
 Indus, 36 
 
 Inflexible, 80, 81 
 
INDEX. 
 
 339 
 
 lonians, 14 
 
 Ireland, 18, 73, 78, 118, 131, 140, 
 •74. 17s ; strength of, prior to 
 1707...3 
 
 IritU, 202, 209 
 
 Irish Channel, 124, 126, 132, 29S 
 
 Iron Duke, 208 
 
 Iskendenin, Gulf of, 223 
 
 Isly, 252 
 
 Italia, 202, 209, 210 
 
 "Italia Militare e Marina, 1'," 199 
 
 Ilaly, III, 216, 219, 306, 312; table 
 of returns for 1895. ..96 ; naval 
 manoeuvres of 1893... 199 ; condi- 
 tions of a war of coasts, 200 ; 
 problem of a war with France, 
 201 ; operations between the Duke 
 of Genoa and Vice- Admiral Accini, 
 202-214 ; first phase, 203-206 ; 
 second phase, 206-209 > third 
 phase, 209-212 ; submarine mine 
 system, 271 ; colonies of, 307 
 
 Ito, Admiral, 159 
 
 J 
 
 Jackson, Fort, 276, 277 
 
 Jamaica, 3 
 
 James I., 2 
 
 James II., 13, 131, 318 
 
 James, 29 note 
 
 Japan, 50 ; table of returns for 1895... 
 96 ; invasion of Core a, 159 ; ex- 
 pansion of, 307 ; military opera- 
 tions, 319 ; naval force, 320 
 
 Jean, S., 163 
 
 Jena, 217 
 
 Jersey, attempt on, 318 
 
 Jcrvis, 51 
 
 Jervis, Sir John, 94, 95, 324 
 
 Julien, Felix, 280 note, 282 twtc 
 
 Justin, Count, 177, 179, 180, iSl, 
 182 
 
 K 
 
 Kazan, 225 
 
 Kent, 128 
 
 Kiel, 280 
 
 Killigrew, Admiral, 72, 136, 138, 
 
 140, 141, 142, 146, 148, 181 
 Kimpai Pass, 286 
 Kingston Harbour, 295, 296 
 Kipling, Mr. Rudyard, 261 
 Kliber, 222 
 Kubla Khan, expedition of, 320 
 
 La Hogue, victory of, 318 
 
 Lamlash, 73, 79- 
 
 Landguard Fort, 293 note 
 
 Laugbton, Prof., on the defeat of the 
 Armada, 156, 157, 161, 162, 164, 
 165, 167, 168, 170, 177, i86 
 
 Le Pere, Citizen, 222 
 
 Leith, 81, 297 
 
 Leonidas, 309 
 
 Lepanto, Battle of, 120, 156, 190, 
 
 324 
 Lepanto, 202, 209, 210 
 Lespes, Admiral, 286 
 Libyan desert, 223 
 Lilyboeum, 311, 312, 314 
 Linaro, Cape, 212 
 Lippomano, 165, 178 
 Lisbon, 94, 163, 165, 170 
 Lissa, 127, 201, 285, 314 
 Liverpool, 70, 76, 77, 82, no note, 
 
 Z-J2, 298 
 London, 38, 55, 145, 282 ; conferemx- 
 
 of 1887.. .39 
 Long, Admiral, 86, 87 
 Long Island, 289 
 Lord Warden, 208 
 Loudon, Lord, 17 
 
 Louis XIV., 132, 146, 217, 317, 31S 
 Louisburg, 17 
 " Loyalty of the Colonies,'' article on 
 
 the, 42 
 Lubeck, 2S0 
 Luce, Admiral, 257 
 Luce Bay, 76 
 Lucia, St., 274 
 Lyons, Gulf of, 232 
 Lysander, 14, 310 
 
 M 
 
 XIacaulay, Lord, 134, 140, 144, 145 ; 
 on the Battle of fieachy Head, 130 ; 
 his opinion of Torrington, 132 
 
 Macbride, Captain, 324 
 
 Macedonia, 312 
 
 Madagascar, 241 
 
 Maddalena, 203, 211 
 
 Mahan, Captain, 18, 19 rule, 20, 94, 
 127, 140, 234, 23s, 249, 254, 258; 
 on the guerre de course, 1 16, 1 50 ; 
 his " Influence of Sea power upon 
 History," 15S, 188; on the 
 Armada, 161 ; his philosophical 
 method, 192 ; his work on the wars 
 of the Revolution and the Empire, 
 
340 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 193) 217; on Napoleon's project 
 for invading England, 195, 197 ; 
 style of his wTiting, 198; "The 
 Navy in the Civil \\'ar," 275 note, 
 276 note, 277 note; on the contest 
 between Rome and Carthage, 311, 
 321 
 Malaga, 230 
 Malo, St., 319 
 Malta, 96 note, 97, 22S, 237, 241, 274 ; 
 
 harbours at, 294 
 Man, Colonel, 34 
 Minn, 234 
 
 Mancjiuvres, naval, institution of, 
 60; strategical, 62 ; of 1885. ..68; 
 of 1886.. .69; of 1887.. .69-73; of 
 1888...73-78 ; of 1889...78-82; of 
 1890.. .83-86; of 1891...86; of 
 1893, 118, 123 
 Manrique, Don Georgio, 1 63 
 Marathon, victoi-y of, 12 
 Marcellus, 312 
 Mardonius, 12 
 "Maritime Confederacy" of 1801... 
 
 216 
 Marlborough, 218 
 Marmora, Sea of, 217 
 Marra, Rear-Admiral, 202 
 Mary, Queen, 131, 139; her order 
 
 to Torringtou, 140 
 Masinissa, 309 note, 312 
 Mauritius, 19, 33, 34, 113, 274, 294 
 McChenga, 261, 262 
 Mediterranean, S9>9S> 200, 221, 225, 
 240 ; contention of rival navies 
 for mastery of, i ; insurance rates, 
 108 ; proposal for the abandon- 
 ment of, 228 ; total of British com- 
 merce, 232 ; peace strength of the 
 fleet, 238 
 Medway, 140, 274, 297 
 Mehemet Ali, 217 
 Melbourne, 35 
 Mclita, 265, 266 
 Mersey, the, 276, 298 
 Mersey, 76 
 Messina, 230 
 Metteruich, 192 
 Milford Haven, 69, 73, 79, 86 
 Millbanke, Vice-Admiral, 324 
 Min River, 285 
 Minerva, 202, 207, 209 
 Minotaur, 208 
 Mississippi, 276, 277 
 Mobile Bay, 275 
 
 Montechant, Commander H., 199 
 Montenegro, 306 
 Montreal, 17 
 
 Monzambano, 202, 209, 210 
 
 Moor, de, 162 
 
 Morgan, Fort, 275, 276, 294 
 
 Morocco, 22S, 237, 23S, 241 
 
 Moscow, 194, 225 
 
 Motley, his history of the Armada, 
 
 153, 154, 161, 180 
 Mycale, 310, 314 
 
 N 
 
 Naples, 205, 207, 212 ; Bay of, 205, 
 210, 212 ; Gulf of, 202 
 
 Napoleon, 57, 58, 1 19 note, 159, 161, 
 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 217, 222, 
 252, 258, 314; his ."continental 
 system," 25 ; lack of judgment, 
 29 ; scheme for the invasion of 
 England, 125, 195, 322; naval 
 achievements, 323. 
 
 Nassau, 162 
 
 Natal, trade with the United King- 
 dom, 102 
 
 National Review, 305 
 
 Naval AiDinal, 199 
 
 Naval Defence Act of 1889... 8 
 
 Naval Exhibition of 1 89 1, motto 
 
 of, 51 
 
 " Naval History, A Student of," 246, 
 
 247. 253 
 Navy Records Society, 155, 156, 
 
 322 note 
 Nelson, 3, 20, 51, 60, 89, 159, 187, 
 
 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 231, 
 
 234, 252, 258, 315 ; his pursuit of 
 
 Villeneuve, 47, 54, 125, 191, 323 ; 
 
 on the futility of continental 
 
 alliances, 215; his letter to Mrs. 
 
 Nelson, 235 note; admonition to 
 
 " the children of," 246 
 Netherlands, table of returns fur 
 
 1 895... 96 
 New Caledonia, 50 
 New Guinea, 41, 50 
 New Hebrides, 50 
 New Orleans, 276 
 New South Wales, 21; patriotic 
 
 action in 1885... 34 
 New York Harbour, defence for, 289 ; 
 
 Sun, extract from an article in, 249 
 New Zealand, 319; population ami 
 
 trade of, 21 ; annual export trade 
 
 of, 43, 44 note ; harbours, 48 
 Newfoundland, 35 note, 37 note, 41, 
 
 220 ; importance of, 19 
 Newport, 162 
 Nibbio, 209 
 
INDEX. 
 
 341 
 
 Nicias, the Athenian Commander, 
 
 310 
 Nieuport, 163, 177, 181 
 Nile, 221, 240; Battle of the, 159, 
 
 194. 231 
 Nineteenth Century, 228, 315 note 
 North Channel, 69 
 North Foreland, 178 
 North Sea, 71, 79, 279, 281, 298; 
 
 contention of navies for mastery 
 
 of, I 
 North- West Passage, 3 
 Norway, 97 
 Nottingham, Lord, 131, 135, 137, 
 
 138, 144, 145 ; his despatch to 
 
 Torringtori, 139 
 Nova Scotia, 17 
 
 O 
 
 Obolc, 221, 239 
 
 Offa, King of Mercia, 315, 317 
 
 Officers, the training and supply of 
 naval, 243 ; number of lieutenants, 
 244-246 ; system of training, 246 ; 
 course of instruction, at the Green- 
 wich Royal Naval College, 248 ; 
 sea, against harbour training, 253 ; 
 qualities, 256 ; compared with other 
 navies, 257 ; the spirit of, 259, 264 
 
 Offyt, 28s 
 
 Oquendo, Miguel de, 178 
 
 Oregon, 69 
 
 Overstone, Lord, 55 
 
 Pacific coast, war of 1879-81. ,.285 
 
 Pagano, 202 
 
 Pagoda Point, 285 
 
 Palermo, 311 
 
 Palestine, 230 
 
 Palmer, 18 1 
 
 Falmerston, Lord, 326 note 
 
 Paraguay, result of submarine mines 
 
 in the war with Brazil, 283 
 Paris, 218; Declaration of, 106, 107, 
 
 no. III, 112, 115 
 Parker, Sir Peter, 291 
 Parma, Duke of, 157, 160, 161, 163, 
 
 164, 165, 169, 171, 178, 179, 180, 
 
 181, 182, 184 
 Parsons, Father, 157 
 Passaro, Cape, 216 
 Paul, £mperor, 216 
 Pausanias, 15 
 Pe-che-li, Gulf of, 159 
 
 Pekin, 159 
 
 Pellew, Sir E., 113 
 
 Peloponnesian War, 13 
 
 Pembroke, Earl of, 133 
 
 Pendennis Castle, 278 
 
 Peninsula, 18, 183, 189, 194 
 
 Peninsular campaigns, 66, 67 
 
 Penjdeh incident, 68 
 
 Pennsylvania, 16 
 
 Pensacola, 276 
 
 Percy, Earl, 324 
 
 Pericles, 13, 186 
 
 Perim, 221, 236, 237, 239 
 
 Persano, 127, 201 
 
 Peterhead, 8 1 
 
 Philip IL of Spain, 173, 177, 187; 
 
 his military prestige, 156 ; resolves 
 
 upon the invasion of England, 157 ; 
 
 appoints Santa Cruz, 164 ; Sidonia, 
 
 166; instructions, 178 
 Philip, Fort St., 276, 277 
 Piombino Channel, 209 
 Pitt, 17, 57, 189, 191, 192, 194, 19s 
 
 note, 286, 325 
 Plata;a, 12, 15, 310 
 Plymouth, 78, 83, 84, 86, 136, 139, 
 
 140, 171, 177, 178, 239, 274, 294, 
 
 318 ; proposed fortifications for, 
 
 324 
 Pola, 285 
 Poland, 216 
 Polyphemus, 68, 209 
 Pope, the, 162, 163, 165, 166, 169 
 Port Arthur, 32, 159, 212, 320 
 Port Castries, 294 
 Port Louis, 294 
 Porter, Admiral, 277 ; extract from 
 
 his " Report to Secretary of the 
 
 Navy," 274 
 Portland, 79, 85 
 Porto Ferrajo, 203 
 Porto San Stefano, 203 
 Portsmouth, 139, 272 ; expenditure 
 
 on defence works at, 64 ; proposed 
 
 fortiBcations, 324 
 Portugal, table of returns for 1895... 
 
 96 ; frontiers of, 305 ; colonies, 306 
 Prussia, 215, 217, 218, 279, 282; 
 
 alliances of, 216 ; result of invasion, 
 
 306 
 Fuliga, Rear-Admiral, 202 
 Putney, 194 
 Pyramids, the, 221 
 
 Quadruple Alliance of 1718...216 
 
342 
 
 LXDEX. 
 
 Quarterly Revicii; 51, 118, 152 notes 
 Quebec, 17 
 Queensland, 15, 21 
 Queenstown, 78, 80, 81 
 Quiberon Bay, 318 
 
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, i, 3, 20, 33, 
 121, 125, 322 
 
 Re Umberto, 202, 207, 209, 212 
 
 Recalde, Martinez de, 178 
 
 Red Sea, 221, 223, 236, 240 
 
 Redbreast^ 259 
 
 R^ne de Pont Jest, 280, 281 notes 
 
 " Revue Maritime et Coloniale," ex- 
 tract from, 300 note 
 
 Riachnelo, 284 
 
 Richard I., 230 
 
 Richards, Sir F., 9 note 
 
 Rio dejatuiro, 283, 284 
 
 Robinson, Sir John, 24 
 
 Rochefort, 161, 195 
 
 Rodney, 60, 193, 314, 318 
 
 Rome, 59, 117, 190 ; sea-borne trade 
 of, 15 ; result of the war with 
 Carthage, 3 1 1-3 14 
 
 Rooke, Sir George, 230 
 
 Rosebery, Lord, 195 iiote 
 
 Rosendae], 162 
 
 Rosily, 191 
 
 Roumania, 306 
 
 Rowley, Admiral, 73, 74, 76 
 
 Ruggiero di Lauria, 202, 209, 210 
 
 Russell, 131 
 
 Russia, 68, 149, 151, 218, 219, 225, 
 227, 306, 314, 319 ; advance of, 9 ; 
 question of the invasion of India, 
 36 ; loss of sea power in the Crimean 
 War, 56; tableof returns fori895... 
 96; cost of maritime insurance, 100; 
 naval expenditure, 104 ; " volunteer 
 fleet," 115; alliances, 216, 217; 
 submarine mine system, 27 1 
 
 Saigon Harbour, 220 
 
 Salamis, 12, 59, 309, 310 
 
 Samoa, 50 
 
 Samos, Island of, 3 10 
 
 San Domingo, 163 
 
 Sandown, 272 
 
 Santa Cruz, Marquis of, in command 
 of the Armada, 164 ; estimated 
 cost, 164 ; death, 165 ; character, 
 166 
 
 Sardinia, 202, 203, 205 
 
 Scheldt, 180, 182 
 
 Scheliha, Lieut.-Col. von, 275, 276 
 
 note, 277 note 
 Schinkenbaum, Baron von, 219 
 Scilly, 85, 86, 176 
 Scipio, 312 
 Scotland, 81, 140, 141, i74. ^TS. 
 
 185 ; strength of, prior to 1707... 3 
 Scribner's Magazine, III note 
 Sebastopol, 7, 10, 56, 57 
 Seeley, Prof., 109 note 
 Seignelay, narrative of the salvage of 
 
 the, 264-267 
 Seine, 128 
 
 Selden, his "Mare Clausum," 119 
 Semmes, Admiral Raphael, extracts 
 
 from " Memoirs of Service Afloat," 
 
 107, 108 notes 
 Semmes, Captain, 108, 115 
 Servia, 306 
 Seven Years' War, 16, 17 note, 318, 
 
 326 
 Seymour, Lord Henry, 171, 177, 179, 
 
 181, 182, 184 
 Sheerness, 278 
 Sheridan, 325 
 Shotley Point, 293 
 Shovel, Sir Cloudesley, 72, 131, 136, 
 
 140, 141, 142, 146, 148 
 Sicily, 14; the invasion of, 310 
 Sidonia.Duke Medina, 160, 162, 163, 
 
 170; in command of the Armada, 
 
 166, 167 ; wish to abandon the 
 
 enterprise, 170 ; his strategy, 177 ; 
 
 instructions from Philip II., 178 ; 
 
 anchors off' Calais, 179 ; appeals to 
 
 Parma for help, 179, 181, 182 ; 
 
 discomfiture, 183, 185 
 Signal Mount, 294 
 Simon's Bay, 299 
 Singapore, 25, 274, 276, 292, 294 
 Sixtus v., 163 
 Siyan, promontory of, 221, 229, 236, 
 
 237 
 Sleeman, Commander, " Torpedoes 
 
 and Torpedo Warfare," 272 
 Sleeve, the, 176 
 Sluys, 162 
 Smith, Adam, 198 
 Socotra, 223 
 
 Soley, Mr. J. Russel, ill 
 Sombo, 261 
 Soudan, 223 
 Southey, his " Life of Lord Howard 
 
 of Effingham," 154 
 Spain, 59, 72, 117, 119 note, 165, 
 
 171, 17s. 176, 190. 216. 217. 218, 
 
nXDEX. 
 
 343 
 
 230, 312, 319 ; relative importance 
 compared with England, 3 ; sea- 
 borne trade, 15; table of returns 
 for 1895.,. 96; the dominant power 
 in the sixteenth century, 156 ; 
 frontiers of, 305 ; colonies, 306 ; 
 failure to maintain her supremacy 
 at sea, 307 
 
 Sparta, 15, 59 
 
 Sparviero, 202, 209 
 
 Spezzia, 203, 209, 292 
 
 Spithead, 69 
 
 Staddon Heights, 295 
 
 "Statesman's Year Book'' for 1891, 
 table from the, 65 
 
 Stettin, 280 
 
 Stromboli, 202, 207, 209 
 
 Suakim, 26 note 
 
 Suba Islands, 221 
 
 Submarine mines in relation to war, 
 269 ; value of the system, 272 ; in 
 the American War, 273-279 ; the 
 Franco-German War, 279-283 ; 
 war between Brazil and Paraguay, 
 283-285 ; in other wars, 285 ; ob- 
 servation, 287 ; contact, 288 ; un- 
 controlled, 288 ; countermining 
 drill, 290 ; requirements, 290 ; cost 
 of defending a channel, 291 ; cost 
 of a mine-field, 292 ; use of guns, 
 293 ; employment of mines, 295- 
 299 ; general considerations ruling 
 the employment, 299-3041 
 
 Suez Canal, 20, 22, 233, 236, 240 
 
 SuflFren, 193 
 
 Sultan, 108 
 
 Suna, a Turkish gunboat, 28$ 
 
 SurvtUlantf, 281 
 
 Sweden, 18, 97, 11 1 ; alliances of, 
 216, 2t8 
 
 Swilly, Lough, 69, 73, 75, 76, 81 
 
 Switzerland, frontiers of, 305 
 
 Syracuse, 13, 15, 59 ; siege of, 310, 
 312 
 
 Syria, 223 
 
 Tamsui, 286 
 
 Tangier, 228, 236, 237, 241 
 Tasmania, 35 
 
 Tatnall, Admiral Josiah, 43 
 Tecumseh, 275 
 
 Teignmouth, descent on, 145, 318 
 Tevere, 202 
 
 Thames, 70, 71, 77. 79. '4°. US. 
 IS7, 274, 276, 278, 297 
 
 Themistocles, 12, 13, 15, 120, 309 
 
 Thermopylae, 12 
 
 Thompson, G., "The War in Para- 
 guay," 283, 284 notes 
 
 Thucydides, 13, l86, 189, 310 
 
 Tiber, 311 
 
 Tigranes, 314 
 
 Tilbury Fort, 278 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 216, 217 
 
 Times, The, 92, i88, 243, 252 
 
 Ting, Admiral, 159, 314 
 
 Tonquin, 220 
 
 Torbay, 132, 145 
 
 Torpedo-boat, operations of, 1890... 
 85 ; ofi89i...86; of i893...:i8 
 
 Torquay, 293 
 
 Torres Vedras, 218 
 
 Torrington, Earl of, 71, 72, 90; his 
 sense of duty, 131 ; surrenders his 
 post at the Admiralty, 132 ; en- 
 trusted with the chief command at 
 sea, 133 ; his defence, 135 ; insuf- 
 ficiency of his force, 136 ; defensive 
 strategy, 137 ; despatch to Notting- 
 ham, 138 ; his orders to fight, 139- 
 142; on the value of a "fleet in 
 being," 146 
 
 Toulon, 132, 161, 282, 292; the base 
 of the French fleet, 235 
 
 Tourville, de, 72, 130, 132, 13S, 136, 
 137, 141, 14s, 146, 148, 318 
 
 Trafalgar, 187, 190, 191, 194, 196, 
 '97. 3'9. 323 ; battle of, 18, 22, 
 66, 119 note, 126; anniversary of, 
 252 
 
 Trapani Islands, 202 
 
 Trasimene, 312 
 
 Trebia, 312 
 
 Trinacria, 212 
 
 Trinidad, 34 
 
 Triple Alliance of 1717...216, 218, 
 219,227, 231 
 
 Tripoli, 223, 228 
 
 Troezen, 12 
 
 Tryon, Sir George, 73, 74, 7$, 76, 77, 
 78, 79, 80, 81. 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 
 90 ; his proposal for " national 
 insurance," 105, 106, 113, 114, 
 
 "7 
 Tunis, annexation of, 235 
 Turk, 266 
 Turkey, 217, 306 ; decline of the 
 
 navy, 314 
 Tuscan Islands, 204 
 Tuscany, 203 
 Tyne, the, 81, 276 
 Tynemouth, 81 
 Tyrrhenian Sea, 203 
 
344 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 U 
 
 Ulm, 194 
 
 Ulster, 16 
 
 Undaunted, 264 
 
 United Kingdom. See England 
 
 United Service Magazine, 41, 105, 
 215 notes 
 
 United States, 19, 43, 44, 49, in, 
 '92> 193 ; table of returns for 1895 
 ...96 ; carrying trade of the, 108 ; 
 annihilated, 109 ; system of naval 
 training, 257 ; submarine mine 
 system, 271 ; rejection of observa- 
 tion mines, 287 
 
 Urania, 202, 209 
 
 Ushant, 80, 176 
 
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 216 
 
 Vado, 203 
 
 Valdez, Pedro de, 178 
 
 Vancouver, 220 
 
 Vame, 252 
 
 Venice, 230, 285 
 
 Ventimiglia, 202 
 
 Versailles, Treaty of, 17 
 
 Vesuvio, 202, 209, 210 
 
 Vicksburg, 279 
 
 Victoria, 21, 48 
 
 Vienna, 194, 224 
 
 Vienne, John de, 317 
 
 Villeneuve, 47, 54, 125, 126, 173, 
 
 191. 19s. 196, 258, 323 
 Vincent, Cape St., Battle of, 95, 194, 
 
 235. 318 
 Vincent, Lord St., 173, 234, 286, 309, 
 
 322 
 Virginia, 3, 16 
 Vistula, 58, 191 
 Vladimir, " The China-Japan War," 
 
 320 note 
 Volturno, 212 
 
 W 
 
 Wagner, Fort, 276 note 
 Wagram, 217 
 Walcheren, 162 
 
 Walsynham, letters on the Armada, 
 
 160, 174, 180, 234 
 Warmond, 162 
 Warren, Commodore, 17 
 Washington, 44 
 Waterloo, 194 
 
 Wei-hai-wei, 32, 159, 212, 314, 320 
 Welles, Mr., 108 
 Wellington, 67, 189, 2l8 
 Weser, 2S1 
 West Indies, 19, 47, 125, 323 ; trade, 
 
 20; emplojranent of local forces, 
 
 35 ; insurance rate, 108 ; contest 
 
 for, 314 
 Whale Island, 254 
 
 '• Whitaker's Almanack," 98, loi, 102 
 Whitby, 272 
 
 Whyte, Rear-Admiral, 68, 69 
 Wight, Isle of, 128, 137, 143, 17s, 
 
 178, 316 
 Wilhelmshaven, 280 
 WilHam I., 129, 130 
 William III., 2, 72, 131, 217, 317 
 Wilmot, Captain Eardly, on " The 
 
 Development of Navies during the 
 
 last Half Century," 89 
 Wolfe, 17 
 Wolseley, Lord, 29, 321 ; " Life of 
 
 Marlborough," 318 note 
 Wynter, Captain, 160, l6l, 181 ; his 
 
 device, 183 ; account of Grave- 
 lines, 184 
 
 Xerxes, invasion of, 12, 309 
 
 Yalu, Battle of, 5, 158, 159, 320 
 Yellow Sea, 240 
 
 Z , Commandant, 199 
 
 Zafrin Islands, 224 
 
 Zama, Battle of, 312 
 
 Zambesi, opening of the, 259, 260- 
 
 263 
 Zealand, 160, 161, 162 
 
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 Can England be Invaded? 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. 
 
 OR THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH SHIPS, PORTS, AND 
 
 COMMERCE. 
 
 A Selection from the Letpers and Speeches of 
 
 HENRY HOWARD MOLVNEU.X, 
 
 FOURTH EARL OF CARNARVON. 
 
 Edited by 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Sir GEO. SYDENHAM CLARKE, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S. 
 
 British Possessions Abroad. 
 Colonial I'ossesmons and Garrisons. 
 Australian Naval Force. 
 
 The AllANDONMENT OF PORT 
 
 Hamilton. 
 The Defence of our Coaling 
 
 Stations. 
 The Defence of Ho.me Commercial 
 
 Ports. 
 Defence of our Commercial Ports 
 
 and Coaling Stations. 
 
 Imperial Relations. 
 
 Comdination for Defence. 
 
 Views on Australian Defence. 
 
 The Condition of our Coaling 
 Stations. 
 
 Thr Koval Commission of 1888 on 
 Naval and Military Depart- 
 ments. 
 
 Colonial Defence. 
 
 The Relations between Local For- 
 tifications and a Moving Navy. 
 
 With Map. Croivit %vo. 
 
4 Mr. Murray's List of Forthcoming Works. 
 
 A NEW POEM BY AX AXOXYMOUS WRITER. 
 
 THE WATCH SONG OF HEABANE 
 THE WITNESS. 
 
 A POEM. 
 
 BASED ON THE TRADITIONS OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE 
 
 ^VORLD AS DISPLAYED IN BOTH TESTAMENTS. 
 
 By which it would appear that certain Watchmen or Witnesses have borne testimony in 
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 Royal %vo. los. (sd. \.J"^> out. 
 
 SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CRITICISM OF 
 THE TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 
 
 By Professor GEORGE SALMON, D.D., 
 
 Provost of Trinity College, Dublin. 
 
 Recent History of New Testament 
 
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 Westcott and Hort's Nomencla 
 
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 Conclusion. 
 
 NEW WORKS BY EDWARD WHYMPER. 
 
 CHAMIONIX AND THE RANGE OF 
 MONT BLANC. 
 
 By EDWARD WHYMPER, 
 
 Author of " Scrambles amongst the Alps," " Travels amongst the Great Andes," &c. 
 
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 ZERMATT AND THE MATTERHORN. 
 
 With 70 Illustrations and Maps. 3^. net. [Nearly ready. 
 
Mr. Murray's List of Forihcoming Works. 5 
 
 HERODOTUS. 
 
 THE TEXT OF CANON RAWLINSON'S TRANSLATION. 
 
 WJTH THE NOTES ABRIDGED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 
 By A. J. GRANT, M.A., 
 
 of King's Coll., Cambridge ; Profe-ssor of Historj-, "S'orkshire Coll., Leeds. 
 Author of " Greece in the Age of Pericles." 
 
 With Map and Plans. 2 Vols, crown %vo. 
 
 (Uniform with Grote's Greece.) 
 
 This, which is recognized as the best translation of the " Father of History," has hitherto 
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 make the work more generally aoctssible. 
 
 ♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦ 
 
 PHILIP AND ALEXANDER OF MACEDON. 
 
 TWO ES.SAYS IN BIOGRAPHY. 
 By DAVID G. HOGARTH, 
 
 F«llow of Magdalen College, Oxford ; Author of '* A Wandering Scholan-," &c. 
 With Map and Illustrations. Svo. 
 
 THE DAWN OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY. 
 
 A HISTORY OF TRAVEL .A.ND GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCE FROM THE 
 CONVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO 900 A.D., WITH AN 
 ACCOUNT OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND WRITINGS OF THE 
 EARLY CHRISTIAN, ARAB AND CHINESE STUDENTS AND 
 EXPLORERS, 
 
 By RAYMOND C. BEAZLEY, 
 
 Fellow cf Merton College, Oxford. 
 
 Wi'M reproductions of the principal Maps of the time. Demy ivo. 
 
 This volume attempts to give an account of all the more import^t geographical movements 
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 subsequent volumes it is intended to continue the same design through the Crusading period 
 and the later Middle Ages. 
 
 A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF 
 GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES. 
 
 Uniform with Smith's Classical Dictionary. 
 Condensed and Edited by F. W. CORNISH, M.A., 
 
 Vice-Provost of Eton College. 
 In One Volume. tVith many Illustrations. Royal Svo, 
 
Mr. Murray's List of FortJiconmig Works. 
 
 THE STORY OF THE PERSIAN WARS 
 
 AS TOLD BY HERODOTUS. 
 
 In English. 
 
 SELECTED, ARRANGED, AND EDITED, SO AS TO FORM A 
 HISTORY READING BOOK FOR SCHOOLS. 
 
 By the Rev. C. C. TANCOCK, 
 
 (Sometime He.id Master of Rossall School). 
 With Map and Plans. Crown 8t'0. 
 
 
 WOMEN OF 
 COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY TIMES. 
 
 Under this general title Mr. Murray (in conjunction with Messrs. Charles Scribner's 
 Sons, of New York) has in preparation a series of volumes, the aim of which is not only 
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 MARGARET WINTHROP (Wife of Governor John Winthrop, of 
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 By Alice Morse Earle, Author of " Customs and Fashions in Old New 
 
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 The daughter of Sir John Tyndal, a man of character and influence in Essex County, 
 
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 DOROTHY PAYNE MADISON (wife of James Madison). 
 
 By Maud Wilder Goodwin, Author of "The Colonial Cavalier," and "The 
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 ELIZA PINCKNEY (Wife of Chief Justice Pinckney). 
 
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 [Already published. 
 
 MARTHA WASHINGTON (Wife of George Washington). 
 
 By A.NNE Hollingsworth Wharton, Author of "Through Colonial Door- 
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 MERCY OTIS WARREN (sister of James Otis). 
 
 By Alice Brown, Author of "Agnes Surriage " in "Three Heroines of New 
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 OTHER VOLUMES TO BE ANNOUNCED. 
 
Mr. Mun-ays List of Forthcoming IForks, 
 
 THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PENGELLY, OF 
 TORQUAY, F.R.S., GEOLOGIST. 
 
 WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 By his Daughter HESTER PENGELLY. 
 
 AND A SUMMARY OF HIS SCIENTIFIC WORKS, 
 
 By Professor BONNEY, P.R.S., F.G.S., etc. 
 
 (Vith Illuslralions. Demy Zvo. 
 
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 FOR CYCLISTS, PEDESTRIAXS, NORSEMEN, ETC. 
 
 From LONDON through CHICHESTER, PORTSMOUTH, SOUTHAMPTON 
 
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 Illuslraled by a Road Alias at the end of the book. Feat. 8wc. 
 
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 A New Work. 
 
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 A New and thoroughly Revised Eiution. 
 
 With .Mafs and Plans. 
 
8 Mr. Mtinay's List of Forthcoming Works. 
 
 EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGE. 
 
 By OLIVER d. THATCHER, Ph.D., 
 
 AND 
 
 FERDINAND SCHWILL, Ph.D. 
 
 Europe, its Peoples and the Chris- i Thk Struggle between the Papacy 
 
 TiAN Church. I and the Empire. 
 
 The Migration of the Nations. Monasticism. 
 
 The History of the New Christian 
 
 German States. 
 The Reaction of i'he Empire against 
 
 THE Germans. 
 The Franks. 
 
 The Disme.miierment of the Empire. 
 Political History of France. 
 Germany and its Relation to Italy. 
 England and the Norsemen. 
 The Normans in Italy. 
 Feudalism. 
 The Growth of the Papacy. 
 
 Mohammed, Mohammedanism, and 
 
 the Crusaders. 
 The DtVELOPMENi- of the Cities, 
 
 more especially in France. 
 Italy. 
 France {1108— 1494), England (1070— 
 
 1485). 
 The lesser Countries of Europe to 
 Germany {1254— 1493). [1500. 
 
 The I'apacy (1250 — 1450). 
 The Civilization of the Middle Age. 
 The Italian Renaissance. 
 
 With Maps and Charts, Cri'un S?<>. 
 
 UNIVERSITY EXTENSION MANUALS. 
 
 Edited by Professor Knight, of St. Andrews. 
 THE FOLLOWING ARE IN PROGRESS:— 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 By John Cox, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Professor of Experimental 
 Physics, McGill College, Montreal. 
 
 THE ENGLISH POETS, FROM BLAKE TO TENNYSON. 
 
 By Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, Trinity College, Dublin. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY. 
 
 By Arthur Berry, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, Secretary to the 
 Cambridge University Extension Syndicate. 
 
 A HISTORY OF EDUCATION. 
 
 By James Donaldson, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
 St. Andrews. 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 By Professor Knight, the Editor of the Series. 
 
Albemarle Street, 
 
 January, 1897 
 
 MR. MURRAY'S 
 
 LIST OF 
 
 NEW AND RECENT WORKS. 
 
 Lord Bowen. 
 
 A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS UNPUBLISHED POEMS. 
 By Sir HENRY STEWART CUNNINGHAM, K.C.I.E. 
 
 U'ilh Portrait. Fcap. ^lo. los. dd. 
 
 This Memoir has already been printed and circulated privately among a few ot Lord 
 Bowen's personal friends, and at the request of many of them it is now published in a slightly 
 enlarged form. 
 
 ♦♦ 
 
 The Sermon on the Mount. 
 
 .\ PRACTICAL EXPLANATION. 
 By the Bev. CHARLES GORE, 
 
 Gallon of Westminster. 
 Crown %vo. y, 6d. 
 
 Contents. The Sermon — The Beatitudes in General — The Beatitudes in Detail — The 
 
 Deepening of the Law — The Christian Motive — The Lord's Prayer— 
 Unworldliness —Christian Characteristics — Concluding Warnings. 
 
 The Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford, 
 
 UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, 1860-71. 
 Edited by GEORGE EDEN MARINDIN. 
 
 IVith Portraits. Szo. 16s. 
 
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 and l&cC—AcjJcmy. 
 
lo Ml'. Murray s List of Ncio and Recent Works. 
 
 Eileen's Journey. 
 
 A FAIRY TALE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUNG READERS. 
 By ERNEST ARTHUR JELF. 
 
 With Illustrations. %-oo. lOs. 6d. 
 
 This book is an attempt to gather together some of the most beautiful stories which 
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 The Work of the Church in London. 
 
 I. LONDON OVER THE BORDER. By the Lord Bishop of St. Albans. 
 II. SOUTH LONDON. By the liisHOP ok Southwark. 
 IIL WEST LONDON. By the Bishop of Marlborough. 
 IV. EAST LONDON. By the Bishop of Stepney. 
 
 With an Introduction by 
 His Grace the ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURT. 
 
 Crmvn Svo. 31. 6(1. 
 
 Running the Blockade, 
 
 A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF ADVENTURES, RISKS AND 
 ESCAPES DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. 
 
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 Second Edition. 
 
 fVttk Introdtution by Julian Corbett, Illustrations, and Maps. Crown ?n)o. •js. bd. 
 
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 "Mr. Taylor's excellently written book is the best account yet published of blockade- 
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J^Ir. Murray's List of Nciv and Recent Works. 1 1 
 
 Our Seven Homes. 
 
 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL REMINISCENCES OF THE LATE 
 MRS. RUNDLE CHARLES, 
 
 Author of the "Schonberg Cotta Family." 
 
 With Portraits. Crovm %vo, Js. 6d. 
 
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 A Memoir of 
 The late Sir John Drummond Hay, 
 
 P.C, K.C.B., G.C.M.G. 
 
 SOMETIMtf MINISTER .\T THE COURT OF MOROCCO. 
 
 BASED ON I//S JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 With a Preface by General Sir FRANCIS DE WINTON, K.C.M.G. 
 
 With Portrait and Illustrations. %vo. i6j. 
 
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 The Japanese Alps. 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF CLIMBING AND EXPLORATION IN THE 
 
 UNFAMILIAR MOUNTAIN REGIONS OF 
 
 CENTRAL JAPAN. 
 
 By the Kev. WALTER WESTON, M.A., F.S.A. 
 
 Member of the Alpine Club ; late British Chaplain, Kobe, Japan. 
 With .Map and Illustrations. .Mcdinni Svo. 2ls. 
 
 " The best book of travel I have seen for many a long day is Mr. Weston's account of his 
 mountaineering excursions. "—/'<i// .1/.;// Gazette. 
 
 " A book quite out of the ordinary run. ' — Queen. 
 
 " Recommends itself to the general reader as a pleasant and lively description of a region 
 which has hitherto been untrodden ground." — Athenaum. 
 
12 Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent Works. 
 
 The Life, of Brian 
 
 Hodgson. 
 
 By Sir WILLIAM W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I. 
 
 With Portraits and lilustrations. Svo. ■ 14s. 
 
 " In this life of a great Indian civilian and scliolar, Sir William. Wilson Hunter has pro- 
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 his lifetime as he ought to.ha\e been. .„. .^.. ,. Wc rise from.th,e perusal with the feeling that 
 we have made the acquaintance of a noble and sympathetic nature." — Times. 
 
 ' ' A deeply interesting history of a noble life. " — Diii/y Xnvs. 1 
 
 A'EIV A AD CHEAP EDITIONS OF TWO POPULAR WORKS 
 BY H. C. BARK LEV, 
 
 Author of " Between the Danube and the Black Sea." 
 
 My Boyhood. 
 
 A STORY BOOK FOR BOYS. 
 With Illustrations Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 Studies ill tJie Art of 
 Ratcatching. •. 
 
 Croivn %vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 \ 
 
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 Wholesome, fresh, and amusing, it well deserves the long life deserved popularity has 
 assured it.' — Land and Water. 
 
 I 
 
 Life and Letters of Samuel Butler, d.d. 
 
 (Headmaster of Shre-wsbury School, 1798 — 1836, and 
 afterwards bishop of lichfield.) 
 
 IN SO FAR AS THEY ILLUSTRATE THE SCHOLASTIC, RELIGIOUS 
 AND SOCIAL LIFE OF ENGLAND, 1798—1840. 
 
 By his Grandson, SAMUEL BUTLER, 
 
 Author of "Erewhon," "Life and Habit," "Alps and Sanctuaries," "The Trapanese Origin 
 of the 'Odyssey,'" etc. 
 
 With Portraits. 2 Vols. Svo. 24s. 
 
 " It is a work on which much loving care has been bestowed by the accomplished writer, 
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 when difficult problems present themselves for solution. That head master will be wise who, 
 finding himself under the necessity of dealing without delay and without injustice with critical 
 situations in the life of a school, turns to Butler's diary or to his correspondence for advice as 
 to his conduct." — National Observer. 
 
Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 13 
 
 Common Thoughts on Serious Subjects. 
 
 ADDRESSES TO THE ELDER STUDENTS OF THE 
 RAJKUMAR COLLEGE, KATHLAWAR. 
 
 By the late CHESTER MACNAGHTEN, M.A. 
 Edited, with an Introductory Memoir, by ROBERT WHITELAW, 
 
 Master at Rugby School. 
 With Portrait and Illustratiom. Crmvn %vo. <)s. 
 
 "They well deserve to be widely known. They are really admirable in their simplicity, 
 straightforwardness, and impressiveness." — Manchester Guardi.jn. 
 
 "The volume of addresses before us discloses the spirit in which Macnaghten worked, and 
 how his influence was gained." — Times. 
 
 Dean Hook's Church Dictionary. 
 
 A Popular and Cheaper Edition, ivo. 12s. 
 
 Sophocles. 
 
 THE SEVEN PLAYS IN ENGLISH VERSE. 
 By the Rev. LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D., 
 
 Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrew'.-*, and Hon. Fellow of Dalliol College, 
 
 Oxford. 
 
 A/'ew £dition, revised. Crmvn 8i'0. \os. 6d. 
 
 " His book may be read with ease and pleasure. His blank verse appears to be based'on 
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 in the choruses, is, to our mind, the chief and pre-eminent merit of Professor Campbell's 
 translation." — Saturday Review. 
 
 Handbook for Egypt. 
 
 ALEXANDRIA, CAIRO, THEBES, THE SUEZ CANAL, THE 
 
 PYRAMIDS, SINAI, THE FYOOM, THE COURSE OF 
 
 THE NILE FROM DONGOLA, &c. &C. 
 
 A NEW .AND ENTIRELY REVISED EDITION. 
 
 Edited by Miss BRODRICK and Professor SAYCE ; 
 
 With the assistaiice of distinguished Egyptologists and Officials. 
 
 With many NcM Maps and Plans. Crown 8ru. 15^. 
 
14 Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 
 
 Cairo Fifty Years Ago. 
 
 By the late EDWARD W. LANE, 
 
 Author of " The Modern Egyptians." 
 
 Edited by STANLEY LANE-POOLE. 
 
 Crown Svo. 6s. 
 
 " As a vivid, minute picture of Cairo before the age of steam and telegraphs, the book has 
 distinct claims. " — Speaier. 
 
 " The work is one wliich shouhi be in the hands of all who visit the beautiful city, of whose 
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 Lyell's Students' Elements of Geology. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, THOROUGHLY REVISED AND IN GREAT 
 
 P.VRT REWRITTEN BY 
 
 Professor J. W. JUDD, C.B., E.B.S., 
 
 Of the Royal School of ^Iihes. 
 
 IVilh upwards of 600 Illustratuns . CrcrwH Zvo. gj, 
 
 "It was a bappy thought to entrust the preparation of so important a manual to one of the 
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 science. " — Standard. 
 
 The Great Rift Valley : 
 
 A JOURNEY TO BARIXGO AND MOUNT KENYA. 
 
 WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE GEOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, 
 NATIVE RACES, FAUNA AND FLORA OF THE REGION. 
 
 AND 
 
 A SKETCH OF THE NATIONAL MIGRATIONS IN BRITISH EAST 
 AFRICA, AND REMARKS ON ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS. 
 
 By J. W. GREGORY, 
 
 Of the Natural History Museum, South Kensington. 
 With Maps and Illustrations. %vo, 21s. 
 
 " Dr. Gregory's fascinating book is the most comprehensive and important, as well as the 
 newest, work yet written on British East Africa. " — Daily News. 
 
 ' ' Dr. Gregory's book is so suggestive, so many-sided, and so interesting, that in the space 
 which can be spared we can only give a summary indication of its nature. . . . Dr. 
 
 Gregory is as skilled with his pen as with his geologist's hammer. .... He has added 
 vastly to our knowledge of this most interesting region." — Times. 
 
 ' ' We warmly recommend his book to the attention of all who appreciate a record of travel 
 as remarkable for its unassuming simplicity as for its wealth of incident and adventure." — 
 Land and Water. 
 
Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent Works. i 5 
 
 The Life of Sir John FrankHn, 
 
 K.C.H., K.R.G., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. 
 
 BASEl ON PRIVATE AND HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS. 
 
 By H. D. TRAILL. 
 
 With Maps and Portraits. %i>o. \(ss. 
 
 " A wothy memorial of the intrepid explorer who did more than any man to stimulate 
 interest in he frozen North and to develop the geography of the Arctic regions, eventually 
 sacrificing lis life to his unconquerable ambition to discover the North-West passage." — 
 Morning hst. 
 
 The Heart of a Continent. 
 
 A NARRATIVE OK TRAVELS IN MANCHURIA— THE DESERT 
 
 0' GOBI— TURKESTAN— THE HIJMALAYAS— THE 
 
 HINDU KUSH— THE PAMIRS, CHITRAL, ETC. 
 
 From 1884 to 1894. 
 ]y. Captain FRANK YOTTNGHUSBAND, C.I.E., 
 
 lodian Staff Corps, Goki Medallist, Royal Geographical Society. 
 
 Third Edition. 
 
 With Maps, Illustrations, is'c. %vo. 21s. 
 
 "A delighUl book, remarkable even amongst the many volumes of Asiatic travel which 
 have lately bee published. " — Daify Telegraph. 
 
 " We can nly send our readers to a book, whicli seems to us to be the most fascinating 
 of all recent bcks of travel. ' ' — Spectator. 
 
 A Wandering Scholar. 
 
 By DAVID G. HOGARTH, 
 
 Feilow of Magdalen College, Oxford. 
 
 Second Edition. 
 With Map and Illustrations. Crown %vo. Ts. dd. 
 
 "The little b)k is one of the liveliest, brightest, and most informing accounts of travel 
 in the near East ai we have s.-en for many a day ; and though one hesitates to compare a 
 new book with tl immortal ' Eothen.' it is only true to say that .Mr. Hogarth's pages h.-ive 
 something of theim-; air of fresh, first-hand experience, and something of the same vivid- 
 ness of literary ste." — Tintts. 
 
 "The spell (the East pervades this little book— written by a ripe and many-sided 
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 Daily Aacs. 
 
1 6 M}'. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 
 
 TWO NEW UNIVERSITY EXTENSION MANUALS 
 
 Elements of 
 
 Philosophy. 
 
 By G. C. ROBERTSON, 
 
 Late Grote Professor, University College, LondoD. 
 
 Elements of 
 
 Psychology. 
 
 By G. C. ROBERTSaV, 
 
 Late Grote Professor, University Colleg;, London. 
 
 Editf.1i from Xotes of Lecturks delivered at the CoLLixE 1870-1892. 
 By (Mrs.) C. A. FOLEY RHYS DAVIDS, M.A. 
 
 2 Vols. Crown Svo. y. 6ii. i-adi. 
 
 *^^* The above are bounti either as Library Books, or as volumes of th<L'niversity 
 Extension Series, eiJited by Professor Knight of Si. ,\ndrew's University. 
 
 NEW EDITION OF KIRKES' HANDBOOK OF 
 PHYSIOLOGY. 
 
 Handbook of Physiology 
 
 By W. D. HALLIBURTON, m.D., F.R.S., I 
 
 Professor of Physiology, King's College, London. I 
 
 I 
 
 Fourteenth Edition, thoroughly Revised. I 
 
 With upwards of Six Hundred IllustrcUions. Including some Coloun Plates, 
 Large Crown 8w. 14.?. 1 
 
 " The book, as now presented to the student, may be regarded as a thoiiJghly reliable 
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 " Dr. Halliburton has re-edited the work with great care and judgment, Id being now 
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 books." — Medical Times. 
 
 Lady Eastlake. 
 
 JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF LADY ESTLAKE. 
 Edited by her Nephew, CHARLES EASTLAKE SiTH. 
 
 With Facsimiles of her Drawings and a Portrait. 2 Vols. Crown p. 2,\s. 
 
 I ... 
 
 " To read her letters and journals is to live with a keen observer anja strong apd 
 sensible mind, in the best society, hterary and artistic, in London and Etjburgh, duri^, 
 upwards of .fifty years of the present century. The book will be widely readnd thoroughly 
 enjoyed, not only by Lady Eastlake's friends, but also by all who take atiSnterest in the 
 literary, artistic, and social life of the period with which it is concerned." — Surday Review. 
 
Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent IVorks. 1 7 
 
 THE DUKE OF ARGYLL'S LATEST WORK. 
 
 Our Responsibilities for Turkey. 
 
 FACTS AND MEMORIES OF FORTY YEARS. 
 
 By the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.G., K.T. 
 
 Crown Sva. ^s. &/. 
 
 " This is a book which it does one good to read. . . . Within the compass of i66 
 pages the Duke gives a panoramic view of the Turkish question from the Crimean War down 
 to this year, so comprehensive, yet so clear, that the unprejudiced reader is forced by the 
 logic of facts, rather than by appeals to his emotions, to adopt the Duke's conclusion as 
 inevitable." — Daily Chronicle. 
 
 OTHER WORKS BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL. 
 
 The Philosophy of 
 Belief; 
 
 OR, LAW IN CHRISTIAN 
 
 THEOLOGY. 
 
 %vo. i6j. 
 
 " It is refreshing to read a book inspired by 
 a faith so vigorous and earnest. We have 
 allogtiher failed to do justice to the wealth 
 and v.iriely of ideas in this rumarkable book. 
 But some of the salient qualities of mindwhich 
 it reveals must strike every reader— the fervent 
 yet reasonable faith, the solidity and consist- 
 ency of thought, the manly confidence in the 
 faculties which God has given us, the no less 
 manly reverence and humility. . . . The 
 debt of the Church to such a book is great, 
 and is twofold. For true Christian apology 
 it is no mere affair of outpost and frontier 
 defence, it plays the part which Plato ascribes 
 to War in the development of the State ; it 
 exerts a bracing and purifying influence upon 
 the faith which it maintains."— G«arrf»o«. 
 
 The Reign of Law. 
 
 Nineteenth Edition. 
 Croiun %vi). ^>. 
 
 ".^ masterly book. Strong, sound, 
 m.iture. able thought from its first page to 
 its lasu"— iyw/a/tfr. 
 
 The Unseen 
 Foundations of Society ; 
 
 An Examination op the Fallacies 
 AND Failures of Economic Science 
 DUE to Neglected Elements. 
 
 %vo. \%s. 
 
 " Every page is marked by some novelty of 
 treatment of old theories, and is the outcome 
 of fresh individual observation. . . , To 
 many it will seem that the most valuable ele- 
 ments in the ' Unseen Foundations * are the 
 skill, insight, and force with which moral laws, 
 not to be voted down or suspended by popular 
 acclamation, are detected underlying the 
 infinite variety of economical facts." — Times. 
 
 The Unity of Nature. 
 
 Third Edition. 
 
 &V0. 12S. 
 
 Irish Nationalism. 
 
 AN APPEAL TO HISTORY. 
 Crown 8io. 3/. 6d. 
 
 The Burdens of Belief, 
 
 AND OTHER POEMS. 
 Crown %vo. 6s. 
 
1 8 Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent Works. 
 
 The Bible In Spain. 
 
 OR THE JOURNEYS AND IMPRISONMENTS OF AN 
 
 ENGLISHMAN IN AN ATTEMPT TO CIRCULATE 
 
 THE SCRIPTURES IN THE PENINSULA. 
 
 By GEORGE BORROW. 
 
 A New Edition, carefully Revised, with Notes and a Glossary. 
 By the late TTLICK RALPH BURKE, 
 
 Author of "A History of Spain." 
 With Etchings by Vi. 'S\,\}iV.Si'E and a Map. 2 Vols. CrovjnZvo. 12,1, 
 
 " Nothing better than the type, or than Mr. Uliclc Burke's brief notes and glossary, could 
 be desired by the most enthusiastic Borrovian." — Times. 
 
 "The ' Bible in Spain ' has never been more adequately presented than in this instance." 
 —Globe. 
 
 SIR DANIEL LYSONS, G.C.B. 
 
 Early Reminiscences. 
 
 With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. gs. 
 
 " Like its predecessor, this excellent liitlc 
 book is written with a soldieriy modesty and 
 a vivacious humour that greatly enhance its 
 attraction." — World. 
 
 ' ' There is not a dull page in this agreeable 
 little book."— c;/oi<!. 
 
 " Brightly written and easily lead."— Pall 
 Mall Gazette. 
 
 The Crimean War, from 
 First to Last. 
 
 With Illustrations from the Author's own 
 Drawings and Plans. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 12s. 
 
 "Sir Daniel Lysons, who was the first 
 soldier of the British force to set foot on 
 Crimean soil, and one of the last to leave it, 
 h.is ' done' the Crimean war 'from first to 
 last ' in a little book of less than three hundred 
 pages, as interesting as it is modest."— 
 Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 Some Principles of Religious Education. 
 
 FOUR ADDRESSES DELIVERED IN WORCESTER 
 CATHEDRAL. 
 
 By the Bev. WILLIAM H. CARNEGIE, 
 
 Rector of Great Witley. 
 
 Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 "A clear and ably-stated account of the reasons urged by churchmen why religious 
 instruction uught to form part of the authorised school system."— Scotst/mn. 
 
Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent Works. 19 
 
 The Transvaal Trouble. 
 
 HOW IT AROSE. 
 
 BEING AN EXTRACT FROM THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE LATE 
 SIR BARTLE FRERE. 
 
 By JOHN MARTINEATJ. 
 
 Crown %vo. 2s. 
 
 "We desire to call attention to this small volume of 263 pages, which is extracted and 
 reprinted from Mr. John Martineau's ' Life of Sir Bartle Frere.' Things move so rapidly 
 nowadays, and are so soon forgotten, that very many people who are at this moment keenly 
 interested in the Transvaal and its affairs have no recollection of such matters as the Zulu 
 War and the important series of events which preceded and followed it. In those a leading 
 part was played by Sir Bartle Frere, who was Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner 
 from October, 1876, till September, 1880. " — Times. 
 
 With an Ambulance. 
 
 A NARRATIVE OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCES DURING THE 
 
 FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870— 1871. 
 
 By CHARLES E. RYAN, F.R.C.S.I., M.R.O.P.I. 
 
 Knight of the Order of Louis II. of Bavaria. 
 
 pyit/t Portrait. Cro-wn &vo. gs. 
 
 " Dr. Ryan, who voluntarily joined an ambulance at Paris, went through the whole of 
 the Sedan horrors as a member of the Anglo-American Ambulance. He was a medical 
 student, fresh from Dublin, and he was in the thick of battles, murder, and sudden death 
 before lie had worn bis uniform for many days. The picture which he unfolds is fascinating 
 in the extreme, and no detail is left out to give a complete insight into the truth about war." 
 — Westminster Gazette, 
 
 ♦♦ 
 
 Methods of Social Reform. 
 
 OR THE TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF DEALING WITH 
 
 THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE POOR. 
 
 By THOMAS MACKAY,| 
 
 Author of "The English Poor ; " Editor of " A Plea for Liberty," &c 
 
 Crown ivo. ys. 6a'. 
 
 CONTENTS.— VooK Law Refor.m. — Poor Law an Obstacle to Thrift.— 
 Inikrkst of Working Classes.— Old Age Pensio.ns.— People's Banks. 
 — Free v. Collective Bargaining, &c. 
 
 " Mr. Mackay handles the subject with great .-ibility. . . He writes moderately and 
 sensibly, and shows a thorough grasp of the iubjccL"— Scotsman. 
 
20 Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent lVo?-ks. 
 
 The New Forest. 
 
 By KOSE C. DE CBESPIGNY 
 
 AND 
 
 HORACE G. HUTCHINSON, 
 
 Author of *' Golf" in the Gadmtnton Series. 
 
 The Forester.— The Law of the Forest. — Gypsies. — Folk-Lore. — Local 
 Names, &c. — The Barrows and Old Potteries. — Domestic Creatures 
 AND some Others. — Deer Hunting and Fox Hunting. — The Beauties 
 OF Flora. — Charcoal-Burners and Queer Characters. — Shooting. — 
 Knotty Points. — Deer-Poaching and Smuggling. — Birds in the Forest. 
 — Insect Life.— Geological Formation. 
 
 With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. yj. 6cl. 
 
 ' • A charmingly illustrated book The place is enchanted ground. Every one of 
 
 us knows something about it ; very few among us know so much about it as we should be 
 glad to know. And the authors of this book tell us everything in the brightest and most 
 attractive way." — Daily jXcws. 
 
 Reminiscences of Thirty-five Years 
 of my Life. 
 
 By the late Sir JOSEPH A. CROWE, K.C.M.G., C.B., 
 
 Author of '*The Early Flemish Painters," " Painting in North Italy," etc. etc. 
 
 Including the Founding and Early Days of the Daily Neivs. Kxtkhiences 
 AS War Correspondent during the Campaign on the Danube in 
 1854; THE Crimean War; Bombay during the Mutiny; the Franco- 
 Austrian War in 1859, &c., &c. 
 
 With Plans. 8vo. l6s. 
 
 "All these and many more and better stories, adventures, important happenings, are 
 (;raphically described in this most delightful book." — Daily Chronicle. 
 
 " Sir Joseph Crowe's reminiscences are of entrancing interest." — St. James's Gazette. 
 
 Lights and Shades of Indian Hill Life 
 
 IN THE AFGHAN AND HINDU HIGHLANDS. 
 
 A CONTRAST. 
 By F, St. J. GORE, B.A., Magdalen College, Oxford. 
 
 With 72 Full-page Illustrations from Photographs taken by the Author, Illustrations 
 in the Text, and Maps. Medium %vo. t,\s. td. 
 "Mr. Gore possesses in a high degree the art of descriptive writing ... we accompany 
 the traveller, see his sights, share his feelings, and are satisfied. To this result, however, it 
 must be admitted that something beyond the mere text contributes. It is adorned with a 
 great number of photographs, which are simply wonderful for their perspicuity and perfection 
 of execution. " — Guardian. 
 
Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 21 
 
 THE LIVES OF FOUR BISHOPS. 
 
 Reginald Heber. 
 
 Harvey Goodwin. 
 
 LATE BISHOP OF CARLISLE. 
 
 A BIOGRAPHY. 
 
 By H. D. RAWNSLEY, 
 
 Hon. Canon of Carlisle. 
 With Portraits, &^c. 8vo. i6.r. 
 
 Edward Harold Browne, 
 
 D.D. 
 
 Lord Bishop of Ely and subse- 
 quently OF Winchester and 
 Prelate of the Order of the 
 Garter. 
 
 A MEMOIR. 
 
 By the Very Rev. 
 GEO. WM. KITCHIN, D.D., 
 
 Dean of Durham. 
 With Portraits. 8vo. iSs. 
 
 POET & CHIEF MISSIONARY TO 
 THE EAST, 1783-1826. 
 
 With Letters and Verses not 
 hitherto Pudlished. 
 
 By Dr. GEORGE SMITH, 
 
 C.I.E., F.R.G.S. 
 
 .\uthor of the " Life of William Carey," 
 
 " Henry Martin, ' &c. 
 
 With Portrait, Maps, and Illustrations. 
 Large Crmvn 8vo. los. 6d. 
 
 Thomas Valpy French. 
 
 SCHOLAR AND .MISSIONARY. 
 
 FIRST BISHOP OF LAHORE. 
 
 1825- 1891. 
 
 By the Rev. HERBERT BIRKS, 
 
 M.A. 
 
 Portrait, Illustrations, and Maps. 
 2 Vols. %vo. 30J. 
 Vol. I. — The Missionary Scholar. 
 Vol. II.— The Missionary Bishop. 
 
 WORKS by the RE V. CANON CHARLES GORE. 
 
 Dissertations on Subjects connected 
 with the Incarnation. 
 
 By the Rev. CHARIiES GORE, 
 
 Canon of Westminster. 
 
 8ot. Ts. bd. 
 
 CONTENTS.— Thk Virgin Birth of Our Lord.— The Consciousness of 
 Our Lord in His Mortal Life.— Transubstantiation v. Nihilianism. 
 
 ETC., ETC. 
 
 The Mission of the 
 Church. 
 
 Four Lectures delivered in the 
 
 Cathedral of St. Asaph. 
 
 Crown ive. 2s. 6d. 
 
 The Incarnation of the 
 Son of God. 
 
 The Bampton Lectures 
 FOR 1S91. 
 
 Seventh Thousand, ivo. ys, 6d. 
 
2 2 Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 
 
 Progressive Revelation. 
 
 OR THROUGH NATURE TO GOD. 
 By Miss E. M. CAILLAKD, 
 
 Author of " Electricity : the Science of the Nineteenth Century," "The Invisible Powers of 
 
 Nature," &c. 
 
 Crown %vo. 6s. 
 
 " It would be impossible to do justice lo the whole argument of this remarkable work, 
 except at a length which our space forbids ; nor could any abstract of that argument convey 
 an adequate impression of the close reasoning, the true spiritual intuition, thepbilosophic grasp 
 of principles, the stnkmg and original ideas, which impart a unique force and interest to every 
 chapter. We have perused no recent work, in its department of literature, so freshly thought- 
 ful and attractively suggestive."— A'a/iuna/ Observer. 
 
 A Vagabond in Spain. 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF A JOURNEY ON FOOT, 
 
 Chiefly with the purpose of Studying the Habits and Customs 
 AND the Agriculture of the People. 
 
 By C. B. LXJFFMANN. 
 
 StcoND Edition. Crown 8w. 6s. 
 
 ' ' Enamoured of a vagrant life, and desirous of getting a practical knowledge of the condi- 
 tion of agriculture in Spain, and of learning to underst.ind the life and social conditions of the 
 common people, Mr. C. Bogue Luffmann shouldered his wallet at Biarritz, and walked as a 
 tramp for one thousand five hundred miles across Spain, from the Pyrenees to the Mediterra- 
 nean The present volume is the record of his experiences and adventures, and it is 
 
 full of interest from the first page to the last." — Times. 
 
 " One of the freshest, brightest, and most original volumes of travels it has been our 
 pleasant task to read for many days." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 The Evil Eye. 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THIS ANCIENT AND WIDESPREAD 
 
 SUPERSTITION. 
 By FKEDEBICK THOMAS EL WORTHY. 
 
 With many Illustrations. ?,vo. 2ts. 
 
 " A book teeming with curious and valuable information As Mr. Elworthy justly 
 
 observes, the origin of the beUef in the evil eye is lost in the obscurity of prehistoric ages, and 
 it must be set down as one of the hereditary and instinctive convictions of mankind. His 
 admirable work on the subject, the interest of which is enhanced by nearly 200 excellent engra- 
 vings, should figure in every public and private library in the three kingdoms."— Daily 
 Telegraph. 
 
 " Mr. Elworthy, well known as a master of the dialects and folklore of Somersetshire, has 
 amassed a quantity of notes, commentaries and quaint literature, dealing with witchcraft, 
 fascination and the charms used as a protection against the evil eye throughout Europe." — 
 Atherusum. 
 
Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 23 
 
 Life & Letters of the late 
 Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan, K.C.B. 
 
 INCLUDING PERSONAL NARRATIVES OF ACTIVE SERVICE DURING 
 
 THE PARANA CAMPAIGN IN 1846, AND WITH THE BALTIC 
 
 FLEET DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR IN 1854—5. 
 
 ETC. ETC. 
 
 By his Son, H. N. SULIVAN. 
 
 WITH 
 
 Personal Beminiscences by Admiral Sir G. H. BICHAUDS. 
 
 With Map, Flans, and Illustrations. %vo. its. 
 
 " The late Sir B. J. Sulivan was one oC the finest seamen whom the old wooden navy pro- 
 duced." — Daily News. 
 
 The ' Life of Sir B. J. Sulivan ' is an excellent example of naval biography. It sketches 
 for us a singularly amiabls, upri);ht personality ; an officer who was an ornament to his ser- 
 vice : and a career which abounds in striking incidents." — Yorkshire Doily Post. 
 
 DEAN STANLEY. 
 
 The Life and Correspondence of 
 Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, 
 
 LATE DEAN OF WESTMINSTER. 
 
 By ROWLAND E. PROTHEBO, M.A., 
 
 Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. 
 
 With the Co-operation and Sakction of the 
 Very Rev. G. G. BRADLEY, 
 
 DEAN OF WESTMINSTER. 
 Third Edition. With Portraits and Illustrations. 2 Vols. %vo. 32J. 
 
 Letters and Verses of 
 Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., 
 
 LATE DEAN OF WESTMINSTER. 
 Edited by ROWLAND E. PBOTHERO, 
 
 Author of the " Life and Letters of Dean Stanley." 
 
 %10. i6j. 
 
 "The ' Letters ' are edited with fine skill and judgment. The editor's introductory notes 
 and the annotations are exactly what they ought to Ije — terse, informative, and, where needs 
 be, scholarly and elucidative of the context. ' — St. James's Gazette. 
 
24 Air. Murray's List of Neiv and Recent Works. 
 
 Day-Dreams. 
 
 BEING THOUGHTS FROM THE NOTE-BOOK OF A CRIPPLE. 
 By Major GAMBIEB-PARBY, 
 
 Author of " ReyncU Taylor ; a Biography," &c. &c. 
 Crown %vo. Ts. 6d. 
 
 "The book has an interesting character of its own as a revelation of the writer's own indi- 
 viduality ; and the bright, courageous and hopeful spirit in which he grapples with problems 
 that too often set the writers of books complaining, makes the volume stimulating and enjoy- 
 able to read." — Scotsman, 
 
 " Major Gambier-Parry's themes are well-worn, as the titles 'Work,' ' Truth,' &c., suffi- 
 ciently indicate ; but he seldom fails out of the storehouse of his reading or observation, to 
 bring forth treasures new and old." — Athenteum. 
 
 GABRIEL SETOUN'S WORKS. 
 
 Sunshine and Haar. 
 
 Some further Glimpses into Life at 
 Barncraig. 
 
 Crown ivo. 6s. 
 
 ' ' A second book from the author of ' Barn- 
 craig' should convince those left un persuaded 
 by the earlier volume — if any such there be — 
 that a new writer has come among us with 
 a notable gift of sympathy and insight into 
 the hearts and lives of homely people." — 
 Scotsman^ 
 
 Barncraig. 
 
 Episodes in the Life of a Scottish 
 Village. 
 
 Crown Zvo. 5i. 
 
 " It is with real pleasure that we welcome 
 a new writer in the person of Gabriel Setoun. 
 It is very rarely that a first book is of such 
 excellence. It not only contains promise, but 
 fulfilment." — Queen, 
 
 The Life and Correspondence of 
 Sir Bartle Frere, Bart, G.C.B., F.R.S., &c, 
 
 DERIVED FROM HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS. 
 By JOHN MARTINEATJ. 
 
 Second Edition. Portraits and Illustrations. 2 Vols. 8vo. 32s. 
 
 ' ' Few members of the. British public service, which has given England many of her 
 greatest names in peace and war, have been connected with a larger variety of affairs than 
 Sir Bartle Frere, and' his association with them will be matter of history as long as this 
 Empire lasts or affords a- theme for comment and admiration." — Times. 
 
 "Through prosperity and adversity the charm of his personal character remained 
 unbroken, and to this he owed much of the respect and affection with which he was regarded 
 by those who had the advantage of his acquaintance." — Athen(Bum. 
 
 "A fine life and a worthy biography is the verdict the critic will gladly record." — Si. 
 James's Gazette. , ". 
 
Mr. Murray's List of New and Recent Works. 25 
 
 Dr. Dollinger's Addresses on Historical 
 and Literary Subjects. 
 
 TRANSLATED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISH OF 
 THE LATE AUTHOR, 
 
 By DIABOABET WABBE. 
 
 A New Series. Svo. 14s. 
 
 CONTENTS. — Universities, Past and Present ; Founders of Religions ; 
 The Empire of Charles the Great and his Successors; Anagni ; 
 The Destruction of the Order of Knights Templars ; The History 
 OF Religious Freedom ; Various Estimates of the French Revolu- 
 tion ; The Literature of the United States of America, 
 
 BENJAMIN JOWETT. 
 
 College Sermons. 
 
 FOR THE MOST PART PREACHED IN THE CHAPEL OF 
 BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
 
 SOME SHORT ADDRESSES TO COMMUNICANTS. 
 By the late BENJAMIN JOWETT, M.A., 
 
 Master of Balliol College. 
 
 . . Crown &V0. Js. (>d. 
 
 "All Balliol men of many University generations, and not a few of their contemporaries of 
 other colleges, will treasure these ' College Sermons ' of the Master as representing and 
 recalling some of the most inspiring memories of their lives. Few men could go so straight 
 to the understandings and hearts of his youthful hearers as Dr. Jowett could in his own 
 college chapel. "^ — Tima. "^" 
 
 The Epistles of St. Paul to the 
 Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans. 
 
 WITH NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 Including an Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture, originally 
 Published in "Essays and Reviews." 
 
 By the late B. JOWETT, M.A., Master of Balliol College. 
 Edited by LEWIS CAMPBELI., M.A., LL.D., 
 
 Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews. 
 
 2 Vols. Crown %vo. Ts. td. net, each volume. 
 
26 Mr. Murray's List of Nciv aiid Recent Works. 
 
 The Journal of a Spy in Paris. 
 
 FROM JANUARY TO JULY, 1794. 
 
 By BAOUL HESDIN. 
 
 Fcap. ?>vo. 5f. 
 
 "The writer draws a very vivid picture of the social condition of Paris under the Terror." 
 — Times, 
 
 " It is extremely interesting, and yet not laden with information . . . but he states facts 
 now and then, and here and there throws brief, passing glances at death-tumbrils and the 
 like, which make a vivid impression," — Siatsman. 
 
 Italian Painters. 
 
 CRITICAL STUDIES OF THEIR WORKS. 
 
 By GIOVANNI MOBELLI (Ivan Lermolieff). 
 
 Translated from the German 
 By CONSTANCE JOCELYN FFOULKES. 
 
 2. — The Galleries of Munich 
 and Dresden. 
 
 I. — The Borghese and Doria 
 Pamfili Galleries in Rome. 
 
 With an Introductory Notice by 
 
 Sir A. Henry Layard, G.CB. 
 
 With Illustrations. %vo. 15J. 
 
 With Illustrations. %vo. \t,s. 
 
 Shakspere and his Predecessors in the 
 English Drama. 
 
 By F. S. BOAS, 
 
 Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 Crown %vo. 6s. Library Edition, on larger paper, -js. 6d. 
 
 ^* This work is bound either as a Library Book, or as one of the Series of University 
 Extension Manuals edited by Professor Knight, of St. Andrews University. 
 
 "It is impossible to part with this work without sword of cordial congratulation to the 
 author on the vigour of his style, the originality of some of his views and theories and the 
 painstaking appreciation he has brought to bear on his subject."— A^ora«Hf /"oj^ 
 
j\lr. iMurrays List of N^eiv and Recent W^orks. 27 
 
 Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman : 
 
 HIS LIFE AND WORK ON OUR INDIAN FRONTIER. 
 
 A MEMOIR, 
 With Selections from his Correspondence and Official Writings. 
 
 By THOMAS HENRY THORNTON, C.S.I. , D.C.r,., 
 
 Formerly Secretary to the Punjab Government, & sometime Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. 
 
 With Map, Portrait, and Illustration!. &vt. lUs. 
 
 "We have read every word of it attentively, and we can unhesitatingly accord it the 
 
 highest praise Few records of Imperial service are so entertaining, and every page 
 
 is charged with instruction The reader rises from its perusal, loving Sandeman 
 
 himself, deeply grateful to him for his lifelong services, proud to be his countryman." — Daily 
 Chronicle. 
 
 THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE. 
 
 The Psalter : According 
 
 to the 
 
 Prayer Book Version. 
 
 With a Concordance and other 
 Matter 
 
 compiled by 
 The Rt. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. 
 
 Fifth Thousand. 
 
 Imperial 32mo, morocco, t,s., roan, y. 6d. 
 New Popular Edition, is. net. 
 
 The Odes of Horace 
 
 and the 
 
 Carmen Saeculare. 
 
 translated into ENGLISH VERSE 
 
 BY 
 
 The Rt. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. 
 
 Large Crown %vo, 6s. 
 
 Also New and Popular Edition, Fcap. %vo, 
 
 is. td. 
 
 *,* A few Copies, printed on best hand- 
 made paper, rubricated, at 2ls. each net, 
 are still to be had. 
 
 The English Flower Garden. 
 
 AN ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ALL THE PLANTS USED, 
 
 AND DIRECTIONS FOR THEIR CULTURE AND 
 
 ARRANGEMENT. 
 
 By W. ROBINSON, F.L.S. 
 
 New and Revised Edition. 
 W'll/'i Numerous Illustrations. Medium &vo. l$s. 
 
28 Mr. JMurray's List of AW' and Recent Works. 
 
 Sir Henry Layard's Early Adventures in 
 Persia, Babylonia, &c. 
 
 INCLUDING A RESIDENCE AMONG THE WILD TRIBES 
 
 OF THE ZAGROS MOUNTAINS BEFORE THE 
 
 DISCOVERY OF NINEN'EH. 
 
 Condensed from his larger Work, and Revised by the Author. 
 
 With an Introductory Notice of the Author by LORD ABEBDAR.E. 
 
 With Portrait. Crown %vo. "Js. tii. 
 
 " It is indeed a charmingly told story of genuine adventure. It is the simple unpretentious 
 story of the wanderings of his youth in one of the most interesting regions of the world." — 
 Tiinti. 
 
 The Rise and Expansion of the 
 British Dominion in India. 
 
 FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 
 TO THE MUTINY. 
 
 By Sir ALFRED LYALL, G.C.B. 
 
 A New Library Edition, with Considerable Additions. 
 IViiA Coloured Maps. 8vo. 1 2s. net. 
 
 The favourable reception given to this work on its first publication as a Volume of the 
 University Extension Series, edited by Prof. Knight, has induced the author to expand it 
 and to bring out a larger edition continued to the time of the Mutiny. 
 
 ' ' A cordial welcome is due to its appearance as an independent work. ' '— Times. 
 
 Jenny Lind the Artist. 
 
 A NEW AND ABRIDGED EDITION OF THE MEMOIR OF 
 
 MADAME JENNY LIND-GOLDSCHMIDT. 
 1820 — 1851. 
 
 FROM MSB. AND DOCUMENTS COLLECTED BY 
 MR. GOLDSCHMIDT. 
 
 By H. SCOTT HOIiliAND, and W. S. KOCKSTBO, 
 
 CanOD of St. Paul's Cathedral ; Author of " The Life of Mendelssohn." 
 
 With Portraits. Crown Svo. gs. 
 
Mr. Murray s List of New and Recent Works. 29 
 
 HELEN, LADY DUFFERIN. 
 
 Songs, Poems and Verses. 
 
 By HELEN, LADY DTJFFEBIN. 
 
 (COUNTESS OF OUTOBI).) 
 
 Edited, with a Memoir, and some Account of the Sheridan Family, 
 
 by her Son 
 
 The MARaUESS OF DTJFFEBIN AND AVA. 
 Fourth Edition. With Portrait. Crown ivo. izs. 
 
 A SELECTION OF 
 
 The Songs of Lady Dufferln. 
 
 (Countess of GIFFOKD.) 
 
 SET TO MUSIC EV HERSELF, AND OTHERS. 
 
 A Companion Volume to * Songs, Poems and Verses.' 
 
 Words and Music. Crown St'O. 91. 
 
 TWO GREAT NATURALISTS. 
 
 The Life of The Life and Corre- 
 
 Richard Owen. i spondence of William 
 
 Based on his Correspondence, his Buckland, D.D., F.R.S., 
 
 Diaries, and those of his Wife. I 
 
 By his Grandson, The Be v. 
 
 Sometime Dean of Westminster. 
 
 RICHABD OWEN. By his Daughter, Mrs. GOBDON. 
 
 Second Edition. 
 
 IVUh Portraits and Illustrations. 
 
 With Portraits and Illustrations. 
 
 2 Vols. Crown &vo. 241. I Crown %vo. 12s. 
 
 "A book of moderate compass and re- 
 markable interest. In these pages a very 
 human figure stands out. bold in iu outline, 
 but revealing many an intimate detail.' 
 
 "The Dean well deserves the tribute paid 
 him in this volume, which is of modest pro- 
 portions, and in no way exaggerates its sub- 
 
 Saturday Rrvitw. ject's claim to remembrance." — Ghie. 
 
30 Mr. Murray s List oj New and Raoit Works. 
 NEW AND REVISED EDITION OF 
 
 Fergusson's History of Architecture 
 in all Countries. 
 
 In Four Volumes, medium 8vo, with upwards of 1,700 Illustrations. 
 
 Vols. I. & ll.-ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE. 
 
 Edited by B. PHENE SPIERS, F.S.A. 
 
 With I, ooo J lluslrations. 2 Vols. £2 3^- 
 
 Vol. iii.-INDIAN AND EASTERN ARCHITECTURE. 31^- 6</. 
 Vol. iv.-MODERN STYLES OF ARCHITECTURE. 3". 6-/. 
 
 A Manual of Naval Architecture. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF OFFICERS OF THE NAVY, THE 
 
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