Russia AdXiNST India % m^ A.R.COLQUHOUN 1> BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF 189X AUkJ^dS ^/J/i.^...d.S.. S474 Cornell University Library D 378.C72 Russia against lnfTRAL ASIA The present chapter will be devoted to a brief investigation of the causes which have led to the present domination of Eussia in Central Asia, and to a slight outline of her progress, territorial and influential, in that part of the world ; to- gether with a consideration of her present limits and of probable future developments in her line of action, as those developments are likely to affect, directly or indirectly, Britain's Eastern Empire. Russia's policy of expansion is of no recent growth. It has now been in progress for some centuries, and was in the first instance imposed upon her by forces of nature irresistible in their strength. To see what these forces really were, and to a certain extent still are, it is necessary to look into the natural characteristics of the 183 i84 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA country, the early history of the nation, and the condition of its inhabitants. In the north, the land of the Slav consists of vast expanses of gloomy forest, alternating with icebound morasses and frozen lakes. These give place, in Central Eussia, to the " black land ; " vast plains on which corn is cultivated in large quantities ; while in the south are the steppes, the more western of which are to a certain extent under cultivation, while those further east are nothing but dreary wastes, through which formerly roamed bands of nomads, plun- dering and murdering any hapless intruder who came in their path. The whole country is practically destitute of roads, and locomotion and communication gene- rally are therefore carried on chiefly by means of the rivers ; sledges being employed during the long winter, whilst boats are used during the brief time of thaw, when for a few months the surrounding country is in a state of liquid mud. Russia's seas are of little practical use to her ; for two of them, the Baltic and the White Seas, are icebound for six months of the year, whilst the Caspian is in reality merely a huge lake, and the Black Sea rendered of little value RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 185 to the White Tsar owing to the fact that its approaches are commanded by foreign Powers. With regard to climate, the long and rigorous winter and the short, hot summer give rise to drought and famine, which, indeed, are probably never absent from the land. With such a country and such a climate, it is little wonder that the people are apathetic and inert. Devoted to a superstitious idolatry, although nominally Christian, the average mujih, or Slav peasant, who may be taken as a type of the true Russian, averse to all labour, un- willingly gives his time to the tilling of the ground or to the care of the herds and flocks, indifferent to all higher considerations, and seek- ing solace in vodka. In Eussia, to-day, the chief idea contained in the system of government is to obtain revenue from the masses, whilst at the same time keeping them as ignorant as possible. This policy differs radically from the British plan of rule in India, which at least attempts to establish a just and free system of govern- ment, and by education to fit the natives for the Imperial citizenship which officially was granted to them in 1858. The Slav peasants, known as Great Russians, compose the most 1 86 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA important part of the population, both, as re- gards numbers and the influence they exercise over the non-Slav races. From early times they have been of an inherently migratory nature, feeling no love for their homes, and always ready to seek fresh fields, if by so doing they could hope to better their lot, and escape, perhaps, from the monotony of their lives and their chronic state of poverty and serfdom. South and east they endeavoured to migrate, merely to fall into the hands of the marauding nomads. Then they pushed their way north- wards, there to find only a frozen, barren country. Military settlements continually fol- lowed in the wake of the peasant migrations, and thus were formed the Cossack colonies on the Volga, the Don, and the Dnieper. Exten- sion to the west was attempted, but here Sweden and Poland for a time barred the way, until, indeed, Peter the Great introduced Western ideas and methods, and organizing a peasant army, secured to his country immunity from the domination of those Powers. Towards the middle of the thirteenth century, the great movement of migration and expansion was checked by an incursion into Russian territory RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 187 of Tartars, known as the " Golden Horde," from the northern districts of China, who, having carried devastation throughout Northern China itself, and thence through Turkistan and Bok- hara, eventually made a descent upon Southern Russia, and subsequently carried their incursions to the very heart of the empire. For two hun- dred years they held dominion over the country, and, in order that the collection of taxes might be facilitated, did their best to put an end to the peasant migration and colonization. Even under the rule of Ivan III., who delivered Russia from the Tartar domination, the lot of the peasants was but little improved, and, with the despotism established by that monarch's grandson, Ivan the Terrible, in the middle of the sixteenth century, they lapsed into an even more abject state of slavery, their condition becoming worse and worse as time went on. Even under Peter the Great they were not much better off, and it is matter of history that, under the Empress Catherine II. (1762-96), absolute powers over the serfs were conferred upon the landlords, who were permitted to sell or give away any or all peasants over whom they held sway. The Empress herself, it is said, gave 188 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA away many thousands to her own personal favourites. It was not till 1855, when Alex- ander II. came to the throne, that any serious attempt to improve their condition was made. That monarch, with intent to introduce some reform, set about the abolition of serfdom, to which end freedom was immediately granted to Crown serfs, whilst, as far as possible, those belonging to private landlords were allowed to recover their traditional acres on condition of paying dues to the late proprietor and taxes to the Crown. Theoretically the measure was entirely beneficent, but practically its effect has not been so satisfactory as was expected. The reform was, for one thing, too precipitately introduced, and the peasantry, after their long years of servitude, were not fitted to take ad- vantage of it. Not only have they had to work equally hard, but they have been compelled to borrow money in order to pay the legal dues demanded, with the result that they are now as much serfs to their creditors as formerly they were to the landlords. Under these conditions their desire for migration, called " colonization " by the Kussians, still lives ; the wretched mujik has, in fact, no inducement to stay in his RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 189 icebound, unproductive native country, and his readiness to leave it is evidenced by tbe eager- ness witb which he seized upon the opportunity offered him of migrating to Siberia, to which land of promise many thousands annually emi- grate. The recent acquisition of Manchuria opens a veritable paradise for these down- trodden people, and there can be little doubt that, with the help of the new railway, immense numbers wiU in a short time make their way to this fertile and beautiful country, the " Garden of Kussia." The Kussian Government, actuated by the same desire for expansion, for political purposes, have ever sought an enlargement of boundary. Ivan III. having to all intents and purposes overcome the Tartars, thus practically liberating his country from their yoke, it was left for his grandson, Ivan the Terrible, to carry on the war against them. He did not, however, rest on such laurels as this campaign brought him, but waged war also on Swedes and Poles. Later, that is to say, at the end of the seven- teenth and the commencement of the eighteenth century, Peter the Great, aided by his mujik army, finally crushed Sweden and other enemies igo RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA of his country, and proceeded to considerably enlarge his domain. His dictum was that Eussia, at all hazards, must obtain access to the open sea ; and finding her advantages in this direction limited to the Arctic Ocean, his great ambition was to open to her the Baltic and the Black Sea. Having effected his object so far as the Baltic was concerned, he then turned his attention to the Black Sea ; but his expedition in this connection against the Turks not only ended in failure itself, but led to the loss of his previously acquired territories in a similar direction. It was not, indeed, till more than fifty years later, in the reign of Catherine II., that the Black Sea came under Eussian control ; and even now the benefit to her in this respect is greatly minimized owing to the command exercised over the straits by the Turks, supported by certain European Powers. In 1800 the Eussian Tsar, Paul I., carried away by Napoleon's brilliant successes, conceived the grand idea of co-operating with him in attempting the expulsion of the British from India ; and the gravitation of Eussia and Britain towards each other in their Central Asian spheres may be said to date from this time. The scheme. RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 191 of course, was soon abandoned ; but not without an attempt being made to carry it into effect. A body of Cossacks actually crossed the Volga, and the proposed invasion of India might have been seriously attempted had not difficulties of transport and commissariat checked the advance between the Caspian and the Indian frontier. These difficulties might possibly have been overcome in time ; but the campaign was pre- maturely cut short by news of the assassination of the Tsar, and was never afterwards renewed. It was this scheme which first gave rise to the distrust of Eussia which has never since ceased to influence the British nation, and which has caused the expenditure of millions of money, largely extracted from the natives, in the en- deavour to secure the approaches, by way of Persia and Afghanistan, to the Anglo-Indian Empire. By the time of Paul I.'s assassination, the Russian peasants, owing to the various Western campaigns in which they had taken part, had begun to recognize the fact that their condition at home was not what they had a right to demand, and, actuated by the example of the other and freer peoples with whom they had come 192 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA in contact, they began to turn their attention towards revolutionary movements. The new- Tsar, Alexander I., who had >egun his reign with attempts at improvement amongst his subjects, later became fearful of revolution ; and to prevent this, introduced repressive measures, which were still more stringently enforced in the time of his successor, Nicholas I. In this reign national risings took place in Poland and Hungary, but were put down with a ruthless hand. A war, for the purpose of championing Greece, was commenced with Turkey, and en- couraged by success, the Tsar endeavoured to seize certain territories on the Danube. England and France, however, who had formerly been his allies, refused to countenance these aggres- sions, and took up arms against him, compelling his withdrawal. That he was unwise to provoke the hostility of his former allies he doubtless realized when the Crimean War took place. A further campaign against Turkey was un- dertaken in 1876-78, ostensibly with the object of rescuing the Bulgarians and Eoumelians from Turkish oppression. The real object, however, was to obtain possession of the two provinces, and to effect an occupation of Constantinople, RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 193 whicli Eussia has always coveted. The other Powers interfered, and Russia's scheme was frustrated for the time being. Finding it impossible to further extend her empire in Europe, unless, as has been said, at the cost of many lives and vast expenditure, Russia turned her attention to Asia, in which continent she could foresee grand opportunities for empire-building. Yes ! Asia was open to her ! There, with the exception of England, she would find no Power prepared to oppose her schemes, no country with strength sufficient for its own defence. And Russia is gradually ex- tending her empire in Asia. Siberia, previously acquired, she has developed and colonized, as we have seen ; Manchuria has quietly passed into her hands ; Caucasia is receiving Russian immi- grants ; Turkistan is in her possession ; and Afghanistan and Persia are now about to enter upon a course of exploitation. Finally, she means to force her way to the sea, to a seaport on the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, where she can create another Vladivostock. With forethought, energy, and fertility of resource, Russia is leading the way, and showing the world how to conquer by railways. She alone has recognized how much 194 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA more valuable are communications than mere army corps ; how necessary in the conduct of a nation's affairs is a fixed plan. Eussian railways, made by Russians for Russia, now run right across Asia, under Russian guard, from Moscow to the China Sea, and from Batum through Trans-Caspia to the "Western gates of the Chinese Empire, and to the Herat province (not the town) — the key of Afghanistan, which is the outwork of India. Both in the region of the Far East and of Central Asia, the Russian railways are also gradually to be carried further south — through China to the Yangtze valley, and through Persia to the Indian Ocean. At the same time she is pushing her feeder lines southwards also into Europe's sphere of influence to gain a commanding influence in Turkey and Persia. New lines will join her present Trans-Caspian system with the Trans-Siberian railway, and with the European-Russian system, and thus provide alternative routes to the present inconvenient trans-shipment across the Caspian. Is there no danger to all Europe and to the United States in this constant extension of dominion and growing control of the world's highways ? RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 195 Is it to be supposed that this continual absorp- tion of Central Asian provinces is solely for purposes of commerce and colonization ? Russia has already many thousand miles of country destitute of population, Siberia alone being spacious enough to meet her requirements in this respect for centuries to come. The inference is that, whatever may have been the moving power in the past, she is now influenced by political motives. And, indeed, she herself attempts no concealment as to her true aim. India to Russians is still the land of fabulous wealth. Her method of effecting her object, however, has undergone a change. The old idea of a direct military invasion of India has been, for the time at least, abandoned, and in its stead the plan has been adopted of commanding Central Asia, Persia, and Afghanistan, by means of railways, and of reaching India's north- eastern frontier by way of China. Probably only in the event of England showing a determination to offer opposition, at any sacrifice, would any immediate military demonstration be made towards the Indian frontier — "the vulnerable heel." The time is not yet ripe. It is frequently pointed out that Skobeleff, 196 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA who talked of hurling "masses of Asiatic cavalry" into India, is said later to have re- canted his earlier views, and to have ridiculed the idea of a Russian invasion of India, pointing out the insuperable difficulties of transport for the 150,000 men required, and asserting that the Russians would have to fight the Afghans en route. Skobeleff found it prudent to adopt this line. But Afghanistan, with orderly govern- ment, could in time raise considerable supplies, and the Afghans would side with the Russians, if they appeared the stronger. It may also be noted that the "masses of Asiatic cavalry," which have been so much ridiculed by certain British authorities, were not those already at the disposal of Russia, but those to be organized in Afghanistan and Persia and the borderlands generally. Therefore it is Russia's policy to develop the resources of Afghanistan, and as with this country, so with others in Central Asia. Where she can develop cultivation, she will provide storehouses for the time when she wishes to introduce an invading army. Where she can develop her railway systems, she will have the means of transport ready to her hand. She aims at re-creating the fertility of the RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 197 Central Asian steppes, and thus forming fresh bases for further advance. This difficulty of providing food for her armies has always been one of her hindrances, and she has hoped to find in some point abroad a territory where her troops could be fed, the necessity naturally growing as her advance proceeded. At first Tashkent was looked upon as a possible granary, then Bokhara, then Khojent, and the country between the Jaxartes and Oxus, known as the Garden of Central Asia. But now, at last, in the Herat province and Khorasan, granaries can be created of great value. Any thought of a rising against her in Central Asia is out of the question. The Turkomans, Kirghiz, and other tribes, have been hopelessly crushed. They have nothing to hope from rebellion, no hope of support from England ; whereas in India the case may one day be quite the other way. The British have some reason to fear an outbreak of close on three hundred millions of natives of India ; the Russians none from the eight or ten millions in Central Asia. In the event of risings of individual tribes, Russia would no doubt find herself quite able to deal with them, as she did with the Akhal igS RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA Tekk6s, and as she has done in innumerable other instances. Her method of dealing with tribes, whom it is her object to subdue, presents a great contrast to that adopted by the British, The latter make a display of force, which has but little effect on the warlike natives, with the result that, so soon as the troops are withdrawn, dis- turbances again arise. Kussia pursues quite a different plan. When she sends out a punitive expedition, no mercy is shown, even women and children being sacrificed in order to further her aim of a complete subjection. Consequently a single lesson of this nature amply suffices for the tribe concerned. The manner in which Caucasia and Central Asia have been subdued by the Cossacks is but an example of what, no doubt, Eussia would be able to effect in any other portion of the territory she acquires in Asia. Sooner or later, however, Eussia must make her final blow. She may await the completion of her railways, the development of her territories, and a closer approach to British frontiers, before bringing matters to a climax; or, on the other hand, she may find favourable opportunity (such, for instance, as that provided RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA i^ by England's present pre-occupation in South Africa), may be forced by circumstances — " in- exorable circumstances," the Russians term it — to hurry matters. Even as Constantinople was and is her aim in Europe, so in Asia is India the prize she covets. Peter the Great is reported to have said in his will (although the version con- taining the words is disputed), " Approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. He who establishes himself in those two places will be the true sovereign of the world." And, whether the words are authentic or not, Eussia has relentlessly pursued the scheme they indicate, using all means coming to hand in furtherance of it — extension of territory ; subjugation of opposing tribes ; treaties for favourable frontiers (e.g. after the Panjdeh incident) ; alliances ; making and, when convenient, breaking of promises ; construction of railway lines ; acquisi- tion of ports ; — anything, in fact, likely to assist her. In the words of Sir Henry Eawlinson : " Any one who traces the movements of Eussia towards India on the map of Asia, cannot fail to be struck with the resemblance which these movements bear to the operations of an army opening parallels against a beleaguered fortress." 200 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA And at the present moment the only remaining obstacle to be overcome is that supplied by the strip of mountainous territory in Afghan- istan, or, if she elect to make her attack by way of Persia, the easily traversed plains of Beluchistan. A further occupation of Afghan- istan, therefore, can only be looked upon either as a direct provocation of hostilities, or as providing her with a better position for future attack ; for under no other hypothesis can such a move be explained. If commercial develop- ment merely were the object, there is plenty of room on the Asiatic continent for such develop- ment, without encroaching on India's defences. But even if purely commercial aims were in question, although Eussia might be within her rights, Britain would be perfectly at liberty to combat her policy, so far as possible ; for, although the latter early obtained a practical monopoly of the best markets of the world, she has thrown those markets open, welcoming all competitors, while Eussia aims at exclusion, and replies to Free Trade by Protection, each step of her progress meaning loss to Britain. But com- mercial considerations are not at the root of the matter ; and when Eussia by further aggression RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 201 or other unmistakable challenge has once thrown aside all further concealment of her designs, there remains but one course for Britain to pursue, and that is to attack her, not only in Asia, but all over the world, on sea or on land ; and to do this while she is engaged in moving her troops over the space intervening between European Eussia and India. Eussia has her own theories as to future pos- sibilities. Doubtless her ideas on the subject have altered little since the time when SkobeleflF, in his scheme of invasion in 1878 already referred to, said — " Should our enterprise not result in complete success — that is, if a rebellion should not break out in India — and if we should faU. to cross the frontier, we should nevertheless compel the British to keep the whole of their Indian army in Hindustan, and make it impossible for them to utOize any portion of it in Europe. They would, in fact, be compelled to transfer some of their troops from Europe to India. We could, hi short, to a great extent, paralyze the land forces of England, either in a European war, or in the choice of a new hne of operations from the Persian Gulf through Tabris to Tiflis ia conjunction with the Turkish and Persian armies." CHAPTER IX THE DEFENCE OF INDIA " For I hold it to be an essential principle that under no conceivable circumstance would it be compatible, either with the good faith of the contracting Powers or the safety of the Empire, that the agreement come to by us with Eussia, on behalf of the Amir, ia regard to the northern boundary of Afghanistan, should ever be modified or ignored. Any further approach of a great foreign military Power towards the confines of India would entail upon the latter country such an intolerable amount of expense in the shape of additional fortifications and other measures of defence as would become absolutely intolerable, and would be less prefer- able than any other alternative, however serious." — The Marquis of Duffekin and Ava, ex- Viceroy of India, at the Ghdldhall, May 29th, 1889. " The more powerful Eussia becomes in Central Asia, the weaker does England become in India, and, con- sequently, the more amenable in Europe." — A. Sobolev, These words of Lord Dufferin and General Sobolev accurately place before us the present situation of Britain in India, whilst clearly 202 MAP ILLUSTRATING POSSIBLE LINES & BASES OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIA & N.W. INDIA. TIFLI3 "^^ 30 London dr J7e^- Jork . Jlarpe^ Ar brothers . 46 ^AlhemaHe, St . W . Reference . Couniry iuyoxzrable^ to nell^ offlcere-ci vrregular troops dr a- wttr of rrunor opercdioTiS EZ S/ixhyyjys operv Main liTtes of comrwuriLcaiijOTv Tiouj-ixlcLriAis^—- CourUry foA-otunbU to regular- tt^oops and gener^aZ' engagemerUs.^ RailMXiys proposed, ,._ Scale of Miles . O 50 lOO 200 1 ' — t u -^ FS^eUer.I.R.Gr.S.6J^ 300 THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 203 indicating her only possible course of action if the integrity of her Indian Empire (and with it the interests of her Eastern colonies) is to be maintained. India may in fact be regarded as the centre or pivot of Britain's Empire in the East ; and for this reason alone, setting aside all other considerations, must be defended against foreign aggression. It is not only British supremacy in that country itself which is at stake ; the uninterrupted intercourse with her Eastern colonies, and consequently the well-being of the colonies them- selves, would at once be threatened, should foreign invasion take place. Those who either ignore unpalatable truths, or advocate the policy of submitting to what they regard as the inevitable, and who adopt a line of conduct which must lead to Britain's gradual efFacement in Asia, in preference to opposing Eussia's onward march, are certainly not the men who have built up the British Empire, and they are not the men who will help to preserve it. There is no valid reason for Britain yielding her pride of place. It is true that her strength, as represented in her colonies, spread over the globe, is in great part beyond the immediate control of the mother-country ; 204 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA while Russia, on the other hand, has complete command of her ever-increasing population and resources, and thus is able to concentrate her forces, whenever it pleases her, on the Indian frontiers. But Great Britain is no isolated Power. Her interests are the interests of count- less thousands throughout the world ; her wars — as evidenced in the case of South Africa — are not by and for herself alone ; they are of Imperial importance, and she can depend on loyal support from all her colonies. It is generally assuhied in Britain and the United States that Eussia, strong for defence — on account of its immense area, the homogeneous character of its people and their stolid patriotism — is peculiarly weak for purposes of offence. The vast distances, the incomplete communica- tions, the barrenness of the country, the extremes of heat and cold, the inefficiency of commissariat and transport, the corruption and incompetence of the commanders and officers, are all adduced to prove the impossibility of an advance through Afghanistan or Beluchistan. But, as we have already said, the communications are being per- fected, supplies can be grown, the Eussian soldier can support any extreme of climate, and THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 205 finally, life is cheap in Russia. " We have the men, you have th,e money," is the Eussian cry. It may be taken for granted, of course, that if Eussia were now from her present base to attempt a direct invasion of India across the whole extent of Afghanistan it would fail. But does any one in his senses suppose Eussia is going to embark on such a foolhardy enterprise, when, with the experience of her continued success, she can, without sacrificing the life of a single Cossack, without any great expenditure, do now as she has done before, creep on bit hy hit, so as to avoid arousing the susceptibilities of the British public ? The Eussians have made a close study of the British character, under the influence of a democratic Parliamentary Govern- ment. The apathy and indifference to every- thing except the safety of the present second, embodied in the sayings, " A long way off," and " It will last our time," are powerful allies of Eussia, and well she knows it. She is more likely to embark on a war with Japan for Corea, or with Turkey, when opportunity offers, for the possession of Constantinople — a war which would find high favour in Eussia as holy — and to gradually continue the absorption of Persia, 2o6 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA Afghanistan, Beluchistan, and China. She can gain what she wants by gentle sapping and mining, and the next steps are probably the per- fection of her communications southward to the open sea, the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, leaving, perhaps, the official occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkistan till some later date. Such a step has always been considered in Britain as impossible, except on the hypothesis that it would at once involve Russia in war with England. Exactly such a situation has arisen. Are we prepared to meet it ? While the ability of Eussia to disquieten India and to drain the finances on military expenditure has greatly increased, the British public has been fed more and more on Eussian " assurances " — with what degree of success events in the Far East can tell — and has seem- ingly embarked on the attempt to create an African Empire, an Empire which is to stretch from the Cape to Cairo ; an adventure which, as emphasized elsewhere,* means gradual eflfacement of Britain in Asia. Meanwhile, certain steps have been taken. The frontier defences of India have been made stronger, though not impregnable, * " China in Transformation," THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 207 at Quetta and Eawalpindi ; Britisli railways run to New Chaman, within sixty miles of Kandahar, which is connected with Kurrachi and the whole course of the Indus. The masterful Amir, too, is friendly, and the wild, fanatical tribes are held down by an iron hand. But the Amir may die any day, and what then ? Then will come still one more opportunity for Russia to further shake the British position in India, by acquiring a commanding position in Afghanistan and Beluchistan, and smoothing the way for the final stage — the preparation of the Indian populations for the advent of their northern " Liberator," the Mistress of Asia. It is often said that the Russian troops in Central Asia are generally not equal to the British, or even the best Indian troops serving in India. The Central Asian officers are notori- ously not the fine fieur of the service. The isolated life, the inhospitable character of the country, the feeling of exile, are too much for the ordinary Russian, a man of little culture and few resources. With the advent of the railway, however, the morale of the troops — the officers especially — will be raised. The 2o8 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA corruption, tlie want of business ability and precision, the carelessness of Kussian military officials, are always invoked by those who deride the possibility of any hostile movement on India. But, as has been said before, one thing the Eussians possess, plenty of men imbued with an ardent, if somewhat loutish, patriotism, and officers in profusion, who have no qualms about sacrificing their men wholesale. Another advan- tage Russia has over Britain in the quarter of the world under discussion — throughout Central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere in Asia — a superior and rising prestige. Com- pared with British methods, — the punitive expe- ditions, the bourgeois state maintained by her officials, the feeble diplomacy and futile talking of the Government, — Russia's methods of warfare,* — 'her showy Asiatic magnificence, her iron hand under the velvet glove, — impress the Asiatic, and her reputation in Central Asia is correspondingly great, probably in excess of her real strength. With the increase of the visible signs of power * At tlie capture of Geok Tdp^ by Skobelefif there was an indis- criminate slaughter of 8000 Turkomans — ^men, women, and children. Such wholesale slaughter, which broke the spirit of the whole of Central Asia, is claimed by the Russians as not only cheaper, quicker, and more effective, but in the end more humane. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 209 — her strategic railways and garrisons — must inevitably come a further rise in prestige. The greater portion of the Eussian army is quartered in her European possessions, espe- cially in Russian Poland : in the Caucasus, she has a force of over 100,000 men on a peace footing ; her strength in Central Asia and Siberia, till lately small, has been considerably increased, and with the aid of the railways can be augmented rapidly whenever wished. For service in the Amur province and Manchuria, troops are sent round by sea as well as over- land by the Trans-Siberian railway. Until lately, before it was largely increased, the Central Asian force had work enough to do in Turkistan and Northern Persia, on the Trans- Caspian line, and in keeping open communi- cations. How far it has been strengthened is not yet known, but there can be no doubt that large bodies of men are being moved to the Afghan frontier, the efficiency of the Trans- Caspian railway having recently been tested by an " experimental " despatch of a body of troops from the Caucasus to the frontier post of Kushk, near Herat. As regards the railway, in case of any serious p 210 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA move into Afghanistan, the single line will be improved by the provision of a large number of sidings, or by doubling the line. Khorasan, the northern province of Persia, would be annexed and strongly garrisoned — an easy matter. As has been already said, there is no chance of the Turkomans or other tribes rising, and this fond delusion, still cherished by some, had better be abandoned at once. It is a favourite form of argument with English politicians to demonstrate the antecedent improbability of Kussia embarking on an " in- vasion of India." They find consolation in the thought that millions would have to be spent on her Central Asian communications with Europe and Siberia, and that the lines would be financially unproductive. Granted; yet these millions are being spent, and why? Not for any wild adventure, such as a direct and brutal attack on India would be at present, but to strengthen her offensive power against that coun- try through Afghanistan — the fulcrum of the lever which will open the way for her first to the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, and eventu- ally to the Mediterranean. The whole aim of Eussia's advance into Central Asia has been THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 211 with this object, to be able to " squeeze " Britain in India through Afghanistan ; and now she is in a fair way to taking yet another step in this direction — a further occupation of Afghan territory, and a move southwards by railway towards the Persian Gulf. The acquisition of Port Arthur has whetted her appetite for strategic positions on the open sea, and she now aspires to one on the Indian Ocean. Having succeeded in this policy in the past, is she likely now to desist, when at last she is in a position to exert a more powerful pressure than ever on India ; when she will be still more strongly established as years go by ? No, not unless Britain takes up the question of the defence of India in the only way in which it can be effectively done, by putting herself in a condition of complete counter-preparation ; and this cannot be accomplished merely by adhering to the present expensive defences, and so await- ing " the inevitable " within our frontiers, but by adopting a bold and comprehensive policy. What that policy should be will be outlined later on. The opinion is held by many that a passive defence within the Indian frontiers is all that 212 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA is necessary to preserve the Empire, it being argued in support of this opinion that the cost is less, transport difficulties are practically nil, and that Britain, on her own territory, would have a great advantage over an enemy many hundreds of miles from their base of action. It may be conceded that the immediate expen- diture would be less, but the eventual cost to Britain of such an inadequate defence would probably be very large — what, indeed, might not be its price ! With regard to the third argument, Russia has already, by means of her railway lines, overcome many of the difficulties as to transport and communications. One of the greatest objections to the scheme of passive defence is that it presents so long a frontier line to the enemy on which to operate, whilst at the same time involving grave dangers in the event of a reverse. History has before now illustrated the fact that such a frontier line, even when elaborately defended, is by no means impregnable. Another proposal is to depend on the Sulei- man range as a barrier, carrying on a passive defence behind these mountains by means of entrenched positions at Pishin, Quetta, and THE DEFENCE; OF INDIA 213 other points. But, used merely passively, these advanced positions are of practically little value. If Eussia were allowed to bring her troops as far as the neighbourhood of these posts, she could, whenever it suited her, compel evacuation, for she could outflank the garrisons, and thus cut off communication with the British base in India. Clearly then, Quetta, Pishin and neighbouring positions are only of value if used as a base for pushing forward active measures of offence. Perhaps the greatest danger consequent on passive defence, either within the Indian frontiers or behind the Suleiman range, is that Russia is left free to push her way to- wards the Persian Grulf, and, as pointed out,* her domination in these regions is far from being desirable. It would mean the control and, later, the ownership by Eussia of Belu- chistan, — some day, as the Eussians hope, of Afghanistan ! In any case, to allow Eussia to become the neighbour of India, whether through Afghanistan or Beluchistan, with only the Indus as dividing line, cannot but be considered a suicidal policy. Eivers, as is well known, do * Chapter VII, 214 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA not constitute a sure defence. A further argu- ment is that, should Britain decide to rely on the Indus as the line of defence, the garrison of India, vastly increased though it might be, could not conceivably be made equal to the task of opposing on such an extended line an army numbering perhaps 500,000 men ; * and, when in Russian possession, the resources of Afghan- istan in men and food supplies would enable such an army to be created and maintained. In the writer's opinion, the true defence of the British Indian Empire is to preserve Afghanistan and Beluchistan as real barriers, which can only be done by developing and extending communi- cations to Kabul, Kandahar, and Seistan. There is no alternative. The policy of passive resist- ance should be at once abandoned in favour of an active scheme, which would embrace the domination of Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, * " The greatest want, in my opinion — and, I know, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief — ^is an increase to the number of British ofBoers in the Indian army. We have endeavoured to meet this by establishing a reserve of officers, but the attempt has been a failure. . . . Yet upon the outbreak of war we ought to increase the number of European officers with every unit of the Native army, and we should require some hundreds of officers for transport duties and various staff appointments in the field. Where to lay hands upon these officers is a problem that has not been solved " (Sir H. Brackenbury, late Military Member Viceroy's Council). THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 215 the establishment of outposts in the Hindu Kush, and the power to advance still further towards Seistan and Herat, should circumstances require. This view of the situation is supported by that of the strategist Hamley, who, so long ago as 1884, was of opinion that the defence of India would be best ensured by " a strong British Government at Kandahar, wielding an army whose advanced posts should be at Kabul and Herat, based on Karachi, with railway com- munication at least thence to Kandahar." The Indus plains must be defended, but actively defended, in Afghanistan. It is no longer enough to merely block the mouths of the passes. The present mode of defence, effective where only untrained Afghans were concerned, would be of no avail against large numbers of trained troops, valuable as these passes are as natural barriers against invasion. A more active policy must be pursued too, if we are to take full advantage of these natural features of Afghanistan — the inaccessible moun- tains and difl&cult roads. Too much reliance must not be placed on irregular Afghan troops, who, disunited themselves, might at any time be persuaded by threats or promises to enlist 2i6 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA under the Russian banner. The expenditure involved must be undertaken by Britaiu herself, for the force necessary to cope with the situation in case of war would mean the financial ruin of India. Indeed, that country is unable to defray the cost of the present inadequate defence of frontiers which is growing every year. We may have to create a Central Asian province, paid for mainly by British revenues. Finance ministers are at their wits' ends even now to meet the ever-increasing demands, and there is danger to India from financial disorganization, as well as from Russian policy. The question is one to tax the powers of the British nation. But the difficulty has to be faced. The question of Afghanistan's internal power for defence against Russia is of vital importance as affecting the safety of India. The necessity for providing for the adequate defence of the Indus plains is apparent, and for this purpose it is necessary, having regard to the proximity of the Afghan hills (which might otherwise at any time be in the occupation of the enemy), to see beyond these hills, for without such sight one cannot act decisively but must grope blindly in the dark ; to hold the mouths of the passes ; to THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 217 create defeLsive posts and positions (main valleys) within the hills, barring the passages through them ; and, finally, to hold defensive positions in the plains to their rear, and so prevent all egress from them, Afghanistan, as we have said, is a mountainous and therefore highly inaccessible country. Its advantages for defence, after the experience of South Africa, are obvious. Just as the mobile Boers, sheltered by their rocks and hills, with an intimate knowledge of the ground, are able to almost defy attack, so a body of even irregular troops, under British ofiicers, would be able to hold the Afghan country for an indefinite period against an invader ; whilst, if' sufficiently trained, and especially if stiffened by regular troops, such as those of the Anglo-Indian army, the defending force could no doubt be rendered capable of even meeting the enemy in the open, if circumstances so required. At the present time the native Afghan troops are not only unreliable, for reasons already given, but suffer from the disadvantages of immobility and of being badly officered. Against trained European troops they would, as at present con- stituted, be practically helpless. 2i8 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA Taking into consideration the number of men which the provinces of Afghanistan could support, it may be concluded that the country as a whole could provide for an army of close on 200,000. A popular leader, with ample means at com- mand, would probably find little difficulty in enlisting from amongst the diflfM^ent native tribes such a force of men, of fair, if not first- rate, fighting efficiency. Under efficient govern- ment, too, cultivation of the soil would increase rapidly. Even allowing for a much slower increase in agricultural production than has taken place of late years in the Indian frontier provinces, Afghanistan could probably, in five years' time, furnish sufficient food to provide for 250,000 foreign troops ; and there is little doubt, having regard to the latest information, that, within ten years' occupation of certain districts and the completion of the necessary communica- tions, an army of over 500,000, foreign and native, could be concentrated in the country. Is such an advantage to pass into the h^nds of Russia, while England looks on and submits to " the inevitable " ? If Britain continues to main- tain her position of passive defence, refusing to safeguard her Empire by herself pushing forward THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 219 a barrier against aggression, she will eventually find that further passive defence, or indeed any defence at all, is impossible. To allow the fighting strength of Afghanistan to faU into the hands of Russia would be a two- fold mistake, for it would not only deprive Britain of valuable allies, but would add just so much strength to Russian power for mis- chief. It is said that the Afghans would be opposed to a British advance. Much, however, can be accomplished by a skilful diplomacy Probably a few easily suppressed risings would be the only result, whilst the majority would soon become contented and happy under a beneficent rule. Had Afghanistan been under British rule since 1842, it would long ere this have been in as orderly a condition as are Britain's Indian provinces ; and, indeed, there is reason to believe that an improved system of taxation, which would be possible under a settled government, would in a single generation com- pletely alter the condition of the country and people. Should Russia, on the other hand, obtain the ascendency, she would then find the absorption of Persia and Beluchistan an easy matter, and the further strengthening of her 220 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA maritime bases and navy in Asia would then confer on her almost limitless power in the East. One of the most natural directions for Russia's advance is undoubtedly that from Balkh to Kabul, this being the most direct road to the capital. In conjunction with this route, however, there is another and more practicable line, passing through productive country, and presenting few physical obstacles — that from Herat by way of Farah to Kandahar, and this is certain to be the route taken by the Russians. The mountainous northern zone is not so im- probable a line of attack on India as has commonly been supposed, being accessible on the enemy's side at several points. On the British side a railway line connects Peshawar, the northern terminus, with Karachi, as well as with Calcutta. It is necessary not only to defend the passes here, but to develop communi- cations beyond, an end best achieved by means of a railway to Kabul. The central zone — Ghazni, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan — is another possible route for an attacking force, and it has to be borne in mind that surprises by means of hill roads are easy of accomplishment. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 221 The question is, how far shall Russia be allowed to advance before England not merely raises her voice in protest, but places an insurmountable obstacle in her path ? The Hindu Kush and the chief provinces, at least, should not be allowed to fall into the Tsar's hands. To give up any one of the provinces of Afghanistan to Eussia is to weaken the defence of the entire country, and this applies especially to Herat, Kabul, or Kandahar. Any one of these places yielded to the enemy, provides that enemy with an opportunity for further strengthening them- selves ; while, on the other hand, if occupied first by the defenders, those defenders will hold an inestimable advantage. The province of Herat offers incalculable facilities to an invader having designs on India. The province, as we have already said, as the key to Afghanistan has been called, not inaccurately, "the key to India." The appellation is easy to understand. To recapitu- late its advantages : it is fertile, and capable of supporting a large army ; it dominates the roads leading to Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and other important towns, thus indirectly commanding the passes to India ; and its natural features 222 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA make it at once a barrier or a menace, accord- ing to the possessor. Eawlinson considered it of such importance that he expressed his willingness to give up all Afghanistan rather than allow Herat to be controlled by the Kussians. In his pithy phrase, Herat and Kandahar were the Malakoff and Mamelon of India. The pivot of the whole Eastern question, in Eawlinson's view, was that Britain cannot afford to expose Herat to the risk of being taken by a Kussian coup de main. " Russia in possession of Herat," he said, " would have a grip on the throat of India." The main length of frontier to be defended between Faizabad and Herat, and that from Peshawar to Peshin are about the same — 600 miles. There is a vital diflference, how- ever, in the two cases. In the former the real fighting front extends from the neighbourhood of Kabul to that of Kandahar, a distance of not more than 350 miles, the greater part covered by hills, whose main passes alone it is necessary to hold ; in the latter, the whole extent of 600 miles of frontier line must be held, because of its comparative vulnerability. The essential difference between the defence of the two lines is at once apparent. In the one THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 223 case, conducted from the proper side of the passes, the configuration of the deep intricate hills allows the difficult roads penetrating them, closed by snow for three months in the year, to be economically defended by field armies well-placed in secure positions so as to block the outlets ; their mouths under observation, the passes themselves can be blocked and held at favourable points. In the other it is conducted from the wrong side of the passes. Here the fronting barrier of hills is passable at many points, which can be blocked only by a most costly expenditure of force ; and facing the narrow ragged screen of hills there are elevated plateaux and valleys favourable to the move- ments and concentration of troops, after due preparation of roads and dep6ts.* Preparation for possible war should no longer be neglected by Britain. Fortified posts should be established in the Afghan territory, and dep6ts and magazines placed in such positions as are dictated by the geographical conditions of the country, having regard especially to the question of cultivation of the soil, a consideration affect- ing the future support of an army. Suitable * Colonel Mark S. Bell, B.U.8. Jownal, 1885. 224 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA positions for such dep6ts are to be found at the great centres of commercial activity— Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Farah, Balkh, Herat, and other places.* It is essential that these points, neces- sary to the organization of field armies, their administration, and maintenance, be held by troops, though not necessarily by fortifications. An ofiensive-defensive plan of campaign, above all, requires for its efficient prosecution rail- ways: from Peshawar to Kabul; from the Indus-Bolan line, via Nushki and south of the Helmand, through Baluch territory to Seistan, with lines to Kandahar, Farah, and Kabul ; a direct military line from Chaman to Kandahar ; and, eventually, a southern extension from Seistan to the Persian Gulf. Seistan, the watch- tower of Beluchistan and Khorasan, at the bend of the Helmand, is the one large oasis between Khorasan and the Gulf, the others to the south being of less importance. The cost of construction of such lines would inevitably be heavy, but the expenditure is necessary, for it would secure the protection and increased prosperity of the Indian Empire. The * On the map the bases of possible operations are shown, and the main lines of communications by double lines. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 225 value of commercial-strategic railways does not seem to be understood in England as elsewhere — for instance, in Germany and Russia ; and Britain will perhaps too late find out her mistake if, from motives of economy, she continues to favour merely commercial lines. The Trans-Siberian railway is an instance of the value of a line not only commercial but strategic in its objects. Railways, rather than mere armies, will decide the fate of India, and ultimately of Asia, The Russians never ask, " Will it pay ? " They know it will eventually pay them. When Russia is extending her lines from the Caspian to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and through China to the Yangtze valley, Britain cannot afibrd to sit still looking always for immediate results. She should reply by a direct overland line from Quetta to Seistan, and thence, vid Kerman, to Ispahan, Mosul and onward, with branches. In time of war these railways would be absolutely necessary for the transport of such an organization as a modern army, and the incalculable importance of constructing such lines while there is yet time should cause all objections to be put aside. Not only Britain, but Europe and the United Q 226 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA States, have a vital interest in barring further Russian progress in Central Asia. The danger of Eussian ascendency, and consequently of the decline of British power in the East, is not yet realized. As was foreseen many years ago, the growth of Russia in the East threatens, though indirectly, the whole of Europe ; for once firmly established in Asia Minor, Constantinople would be in imminent danger, the commerce of the Mediterranean would eventually fall into her hands, and she would command, not merely the Indo-European overland highway, but the canal through the Isthmus of Suez. All the more dangerous, too, as Russian ascendency in China is daily increasing, and at an alarming pace. Hitherto it has been left to Britain alone to oppose Russia in the East, in doing which she has also been serving the interests of others. It would be wise for the European nations and the United States, whose interests are involved, not to oppose, but to join Britain in safeguarding those interests, and especially in defending that great overland highway of the nations between East and West, the maintenance of which, as an open trade route, is of such vast importance to European and American trade. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 227 In order to defend her Asiatic interests, Europe can no longer depend exclusively on the Suez Canal line of communication. She needs also a more fully developed overland route — a railway line through Mesopotamia ; and this not only for political but for commercial purposes. Such a railway would pass through fertile country, possessing a favourable climate, and populated in great part by agriculturists. By developing this region, Europe would be merely advancing her commercial interests, and for this purpose, almost as much as for political reasons, it is neces- sary to combat Eussian policy. Between the Mediterranean and the Indian frontier lawless- ness and oppression at present prevail, and the introduction of a more civilized control is a necessity of the age, and would be welcomed by the world at large. The cost of constructing such a line, roughly estimated, would be about forty millions sterling. Not merely Russia and Britain but Germany also is now involved in Asia, by reason of her economic interests and railway enterprises in Asiatic Turkey and the Far East. Germany, the neighbour of Eussia in Europe, — Germany, always ready for a deal. Shortly Britain in 228 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA India will be bordered on the east by Russia and France, and on the west by Eussia and Germany. Under such circumstances, she can no longer avoid the burdens imposed on great land-powers, and must become a strong military State, especially as Eussia, Germany, and France are now enormously increasing their naval strength. The legitimate expansion of Russia does not now lie southwards. As trade outlets she has the Black Sea in Europe and the China Sea and Pacific in the Far East. It is not, cannot be, for any commercial purpose that she seeks to reach the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, but to create a powerful naval base and arsenal halfway to the Far East, with a great Hinterland behind, opened by Russian railways, as she has done at Port Arthur. Forty years ago the Austrian War Minister predicted that Russia would try to reach the open sea by operating through Asia, as she has done. " She wiU not reach the shores of the Persian Gulf in one stride," said this far-seeing statesman, " or by means of one great war ; but, taking advantage of continental complications, when the attention and energy of European States are engaged in contest more nearly concerning THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 229 them, she will endeavour to reach the Persian Gulf step by step — by annexing separate districts of Armenia, by operating against Khiva and Bokhara, and by seizing Persian provinces. . . . The growth of Eussia in the East," he continued, "threatens, though indirectly, the whole of Europe, as well as the States named above ; for if she were firmly established in Asia Minor, the real apple of discord, Constantinople, would be in imminent danger, all the commerce of the Mediterranean would fall into her hands, and she would command the canal through the Isthmus of Suez. . . . Whatever the com- mercial value of the canal to Central Europe, there is no doubt that it is secondary iu importance to the Euphrates valley, which affords the only means of stemming Eussian advances in Central Asia, and which directly covers the Suez Canal." Certainly events in Central Asia and the Far East serve to show the wisdom of the conclusion arrived at so many years ago by this eminent statesman. The expansion of the Northern Colossus — more Oriental than European, whose heart of Empire lies in Central Asia — into China and towards the natural zone of influence of Europe ; her determination to control commerce, religion, and communications, are grave dangers for all other nations, and more especially the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Unchecked, they would lead to the subjugation of Europe by Asia, The 230 RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA danger is clear to any one who will take up the map. Russia already becoming a paramount power in Northern China; Russia with a port on the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean treated as a right beyond question; Russia connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf by railways, from Askabad southwards, and from Tiflis by Kars and the Turko-Persian frontier, thus making herself independent of the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, and cutting into the direct Indo-European line of overland communication. A conflict between East and West for the dominion of the old world is imminent. Slav and Saxon must contend for supremacy, even for equality, and upon the skill and determina- tion of the two opponents hangs the future of Asia, and not only of Asia but of Europe. APPENDIX In 1864 the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortschakoff, issued his famous circular note, directed against the suspicions entertained in Britain regarding the Eussian advance in Central Asia, and justifying the Eussian forward move- ment. (CrRCULAIRE.) " St. Petersbourg, le 21 Novembre, 1864. "Les journaux Eusses ont rendu compte des demieres operations miHtaires exteutees par un d^tachement de nos troupes dans les regions *de I'Asie Centrale avec un succes remarquable et des resultats importants. " II ^tait a prevoir que ces ^venements exciteraient d'autant plus I'attention du public etranger qu'ils se passent dans des contrees a peine connues. "Notre auguste Maitre m'a ordonne de vous exposer succinctement, mais avec clart6 et precision, la position qui nous est faite dans I'Asie Centrale, les inter^ts qui servent de mobile a notre action dans ces contrees, et le but final que nous y poursuivons. " La position de la Eussie dans rA.sie Centrale est celle de tons les Etats civilises qui se trouvent en contact avec 231 232 APPENDIX des peuplades k demi-sauvages, errantes, sans organisation sociale fixe. " II arrive toujoursen pareil cas que I'intdrgt de la sdcurit6 des fronti^res et celui des relations de commerce exigent que I'Etat plus civilis6 exerce un certain ascendant sur des voisins que leurs moeurs nomades et turbulentes rendent fort incommodes. " On a d'abord des incursions et des pillages a reprimer. Pour y mettre un terme on est forc6 de r^duire k une soumission plus on moins directe les peuplades limitrophes. " Une fois ce resultat atteint celles-ci prennent des habi- tudes plus tranquilles, mais elles se trouvent k leur tour exposdes aux aggressions des tribus plus 61oign6es. " L'Etat est oblig6 de les defendre centre ces depredations et de cMtier ceux qui les commettent. De Ik la ndcessitd dMxpdditions lointaines, cotiteuses, pdriodiques, centre un ennemi que son organisation sociale rend insaisissable. Si Ton se borne k cMtier les pillards et qu'on se retire, la le§on s'efface bient6t ; la retraite est mise sur le compte de la faiblesse ; les peuples Asiatiques en particulier ne respectent que la force visible et palpable ; la force morale de la raison et des interSts de la civilisation n'a point encore de prise sur eux. La tS,clie est done toujours a recommencer. " Pour couper a ces d6sordi-es permanents ou dtablir quel- ques points fortifies panni les populations ennemies, on exerce sur elles un ascendant qui pen k peu les reduits a une soumission plus ou moins forc^. "Mais au del^ de cette seconde ligne d'autres peuplades plus 61oign6es encore viennent bient6t provoquer les mSmes dangers et les m@mes repressions. " L'Etat se trouve done dans I'altemative ou d'abandonner APPENDIX 233 ce travail incessant et de livrer ses frontieres k des d^sordres perpetuels qui y rendent toute prospMt^, toute security, toute civilisation impossible, ou bien d'avancer de plus en plus dans la profondeur de contrdes sauvages ou k chaque pas qu'U accomplit les distances accroissent les difficult^s et les charges auxquelles il s'expose. " Tel a ete le sort de tons les pays qui out ete places dans les m^mes conditions. Les Etats-Unis en Amerique, la France en Algerie, la Hollande dans ses Colonies, I'Angle- terre aux Indes ; tons ont etc in^vitablement entraines a suivre cette marche progressive ou Tambition a moins de part que I'imperieuse n^cessit^ et ou la plus grande difficulte consiste k savoir s'arrSter. " C'est aussi la raison qui a conduit le Gouvemement Imperial k s'etablir d'abord d'un c6t6 sur la Syr-Daria, de I'autre sm- le Lac Issik-Kul, et a consolider ces deux lignes par des forts avances qui peu a pen ont pen^trd au cceur de ces regions lointaines sans cependant parvenir k etablir au dela la tranquillite indispensable a la security de nos frontieres. " La cause de cette instabOite reside d'abord dans le fait qu'entre les points extremes de cette double ligne il y a un immense espace inoccup6, ou les invasions des tribus pillardes continuent a paralyser toute colonisation et toute commerce par caravanes ; ensuite dans les fluctuations per- petuelles de la situation politique de ces contr6es, ou le Turkestan et le Khokand tant6t r^unis, tant6t separ^s, toujours en guerre, soit entre eux, soit avec le Bokhara, n'offraient aucune possibility de relations fixes ni de trans- actions r^gulieres quelconques. " Le Gouvemement Imperial s'est done vu plac6, malgr6 234 APPENDIX lui, dans I'alternative que nous avons indiqtt^, c'est-a-dire, ou de laisser se perpetuer un 6tat de desordre permanent qui paralyse toute s6curit6 et tout progres, ou de se con- damner a des expeditions couteuses et lointaines sans aucun resultat pratique et qu'il faut toujours recommencer, ou enfin d'entrer dans la voie inddfinie de conqu§tes et d'an- nexions qui a conduit I'Angleterre a TEmpire des Indes, en chercliant a soumettre I'un apres I'autre, par la force des armes, les petits Etats independants dont les moeurs piUardes et turbulentes et les perp6tuelles revoltes ne laissent a leurs voisins ni trgve ni repos. "Ni Fun ni I'autre de ces alternatives ne repondait an but que s'est tracd la politique de notre auguste Maitre, et qui est non d'etrendre hors de toute proportion raisonnable les contrdes soumises k son sceptre, mais d'y asseoir sa domi- nation sur des bases solides, d'en garantir la s6curit6 et d'y d^velopper rorganisation sociale, le commerce, le bien4tre et la civilisation. " Notre t^che dtait done de rechercber un systeme propre k atteindre ce triple but. " A cet effet les principes suivants ont et6 pos^s : — "1. II a 6t6 jug6 indispensable que les deux lignes forti- fiees de nos f rontife-es, I'une partant de la Chine jusqu'au Lac Issili-Kul, I'autre partant de la Mer d'Aral le long de la Syr-Daria, fussent r^unies par des points fortifito de maniere a ce que tons nos postes fussent a mgme de se soutenir mutuellement et ne laissassent aucun intervalle par oil pussent s'effectuer impunement les invasions et les depre- dations des tribus nomades. " 2. II etait essentiel que la ligne ainsi compl6tee de nos forts avanc6s fut situ6e dans une contr^e assez fertile, non APPENDIX 235 seulement pour assurer leur approvisionnement, mais aussi pour faciliter la colonisation regulifere qui seule peut preparer au pays occupe un avenir de stabilite et de prosperite, en gagnant k la vie civilisee les peuplades avoisinantes. "Enfin, 3. 11 6tait urgent de fixer cette ligne d'une maniere definitive afin d'echapper aux entrainements dan- gereux et presque inevitables qui de repression en reprdsailles pouvait aboutir a une extension illimitee. " Dans ce but U faUait poser les bases d'un systeme fond^ non seulement sur la raison qui peut gtre elastique, mais sur les conditions gfegrapliiques et politiques qui sont fixes et permanentes. " Ce systeme nous etait indique par un fait trfes simple, resultant d'une longue experience, c'est-a-dire, que les tribus nomades, qu'on ne peut saisir ni cMtier, ni contenir efficace- ment, sont pour nous le voisinage le plus incommode, et que par centre les populations agricoles et commergantes, fixees au sol et dotees d'un organisme sociale plus developpd, nous offrent la chance d'un voisinage tolerable et de relations perfectibles. " La ligne de nos frontieres devait done englober les premieres, elle devait s'arrfiter a la limite des secondes. " Ces trois principes donnent I'expUcation claire, naturelle et logique des demieres operations militaires accomplies dans I'Asie Centrale. " En effet, la ligne piimitive de nos frontieres le long de la Syr-Daria jusqu'au Fort Perovski d'un cote, et de I'autre jusqu'au Lac Issik-Kul, avait I'inconvenient d'etre presque a la limite du desert. Elle etait interrompue sur un immense espace entre les deux points extremes, elles n'offrait pas assez de ressources a nos troupes et laissait en dehors des 236 APPENDIX tribus sans coMsion avec lesquelles nuUe stability n'etait possible. " Malgr6 notre repugnance a donner a nos fronti^res une plus grande ^tendue, ces motifs avaient neanmoins 6t& assez puissants pour determiner le Gouvemement Imperial a etablir cette ligne entre le Lac Issik-Kul et la Syr-Daria, en forti- fiant la ville de Chemkent rdcemment occup^e par nous. "En adoptant cette ligne nous obtenons un double r6- sultat. D'un c6te la contr^e qu'elle embrasse est fertile, bois6e, arrosee par de nombreux cours d'eau ; elle est habitue en partie par des tribus Kirghiz qui ont dej^ reconnu notre domination ; elle offre done des Elements f avorables k la colonisation et k I'approvisionnement de nos gamisons. De I'autre elle nous donne pour voisins immddiats les populations agricoles et commergantes du Khokand. " Nous nous trouvons en face d'un milieu social plus soHde, plus compact, moins mobile, mieux organist ; et cette con- sideration marque avec une precision g6ographique la limite ou I'inter^t et la raison nous prescrivent d'arriver et nous commandent de nous arrSter, parce que d'une part toute extension ultdrieure de notre domination rencontrant desor- mais non plus des milieux inconstants, comme les tribus nomades, mais des Etats plus rdguliferement constituds, exigerait des efforts considerables et nous entrainerait d'an- nexion en annexion dans des complications incalculables — et que d'autre part ayant desormais pour voisins de pareils Etats malgre leur civilisation arrierde et I'instabilite de leur condition politique, nous pouvons neanmoins esperer que des relations reguli^res pourront un jour se substituer pour I'avantage commun aux desordres permanents qui ont para- lyse jusqu'ici I'essor de ces contrees. APPENDIX 237 " Tels soat, Monsieur, les interets qui servent de mobile a la politique de notre august Mattre dans I'Asie Centrale ; tel est le but final que les ordres se Sa Majeste Imperiale ont trac6 a Taction de son Cabinet. " Vous ^tes invite a puiser dans ces considerations le sens des explications que vous fournirez au Gouvernement aupres duquel vous 6tes accredite, si vous etes interpelle ou si vous voyez s'accrediter des suppositions erronees quant a notre action dans ces contrees lointaines. " Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur I'int^rSt evident que la Russie a ne pas agrandir son territoire et surtout a ne pas se creer aux extremites des complications qui ne peuvent que retarder et paralyse son developpement interieur. " Le programme que je viens de tracer rentre dans cet ordre didees. " Bien souvent durant ces demieres annees on s'est plu a assigner pour mission a la Eussie de civiliser les contreSs qui I'avoisinent sur le continent Asiatique. " Les progres de la civilisation n'ont pas d'agent plus efficace que les relations commerciales. Celles-ci pour se developper exigent partout I'ordre et la stabilite, mais en Asie elles r^clament une transformation profonde dans les mceurs. H faut avant tout faire comprendre aux peuples Asiatiques qu'U y a plus d'avantage pour eux a favoriser et assurer le commerce des caravanes qu'a les piller. " Ces notions elementaires ne peuvent penetrer dans la con- science publique que 1^ ou il y a un public, c'est^-dire un organ- isme social et un Gouvernement qui le dirige et le repr^sente. " Nous accomplissons la premiere partie de cette t^che en portant notre frontiere k la limite ou se rencontrent ces conditions indispensables. 238 APPENDIX " Nous accomplissons la seconde en nous afctachant desor- mais a. prouver aux Etats voisins par un systeme de fermete quant a la repression de leurs mef aits, mais en m^me temps de moderation et de justice dans I'emploi de la force et de respect pour leur ind^pendance, que la Eussie n'est pas leur ennemi, qu'elle ne nourrit a leur egard aucune vue de con- qufite, et que des relations paciiiques et' commerciales avec elle Bont plus profitables que le desordre, le pillage, les re- pr^sailles et la guerre en permanence. " En se consacrant a cette t&che, le Cabinet Imperial s'inspire des int6r6ts de la Eussie. II croit servir en mime temps les int^rSts de la civilisation et de I'humanite. II a droit de compter sur une appreciation equitable et loyale de a marche qu'il poursuit et des prinoipes qui le guident. " (Signe) " GrOKTSCHAKOFF." The Will of Peter the Geeat, As given in " Des Progres de la Puissance Eusse," by M. Lesur ; published in Paris in 1812. I. Neglect nothing which can introduce European manners and customs into Eussia, and with this object gain the co-operation of the various Courts, and especially the learned men of Europe, by means of interesting speculations, by philanthropic and philosophical principles, or by any other suitable means. II. Maintain the State in a condition of perpetual war, in order that the troops may be inured to warfare, and so APPENDIX 239 that the whole nation may always be kept in training and ready to march at the first signal. III. Extend our dominions by every means on the north along the Baltic, as well as towards the south along the shores of the Black Sea ; and for this purpose : — IV. Excite the jealousy of England, Denmark, and Brandenburg against the Swedes, by means of which these Powers will disregard any encroachments we may make on that State, and which we wiU end by subjugating. V. Interest the House of Austria in the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and under this pretext maintain a permanent army and establish dockyards on the shores of the Black Sea, and thus, by ever moving forward, we will eventually reach Constantinople. VI. Keep up a state of anarchy in Poland, influence the national assembhes, and above all regulate the election of its kings ; spUt it up on every occasion that presents itself, and finally subjugate it. VII. Enter into a close alHance with England, and main- tain direct relations with her by means of a good commercial treaty ; allow her even to exercise a certain monopoly in the interior of the State, so that a good understanding may be by degrees established between the Enghsh merchants and sailors and ours, who on their part are in favour of every- thing which tends to perfect and strengthen the Russian navy, by aid of which it is necessary to at once strive for mastery over the Baltic and in the Black Sea — ^the keystone on which the speedy success of the scheme depends. VIII. Bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world, and that he who can exclusively command it is dictator of Europe. No occasion should 240 APPENDIX therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its decay, to advance on the Persian Gulf, and then to endea- vour to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria. IX. Always interfere, either by force of arms or by intrigue, in the quarrels of the European Powers, and especi- ally in those of Germany ; and with this object : — X. Seek after and maintain an alliance with Austria, encourage her in her favourite idea of national predominance, profit by the slightest ascendency gained over her to entangle her in disastrous wai's, so that she may be gradually weakened ; even help her sometimes ; but incessantly stir up against her the enmity of the whole of Europe, but particularly of Germany, by rousing the jealousy and distrust of the German princes. XI. Always select wives for Eussian princes from among the German princesses, so that by thus multiplying alliances based on close relationship and mutual interest, we will increase our influence over that Empire. XII. Make use of the power of the Church over the dis- united and schismatioal Greeks who are scattered over Hungary, Turkey, and the southern parts of Poland, gain them over by every possible means, pose as their protectors, and establish a claim to religious supremacy over them. Under this pretext, and with their help, Turkey will be conquered, and Poland, unable any longer to stand alone, either by its own strength or by means of political connections, will voluntarily place itself in subjection to us. XIII. From that time every moment will be precious to us. All our batteries must be secretly prepared to strike APPENDIX 241 the great blow, and so that they can strike with such order, precision, and rapidity as to give Europe no time for preparation. The first step will be to propose very secretly, and with the greatest circumspection, first to the Court of Versailles and then to that of Vienna, to divide with one of them the Empire of the World ; and by mentioning that Russia is virtually ruler of the Eastern World, and has nothing to gain but the title, this proposal will probably not arouse their suspicion. It is undoubted that this project cannot fail to please them, and war will be kindled between them which will soon become general, both on account of the connections and widespread relationships between these two rival courts and natural enemies, and because of the interests which will compel the other Powers of Europe to take part in the struggle. XIV. In the midst of this general discord, Russia will be asked for help, first by one and then by another of the belligerent powers ; and having hesitated long enough to give them time to exhaust themselves, and to enable her to assemble her own armies, she will at last appear to decide in favour of the House of Austria, and while she pushes her irregular troops forward to the Rhine, she will at once follow them up with the hordes of Asia ; and as they 'advance into Germany, two large fleets filled with a portion of the same hordes must set sail, one from the Sea of Azoff and the other from the port of Archangel, under convoy of war vessels from the Black Sea and Baltic. They will suddenly appear in the Mediterranean and Northern Ocean, and inundate Italy, Spain, and France with these fierce and rapacious nomads, who will plunder a portion of the in- habitants, carry off others into slavery to re-people the deserts R 242 APPENDIX of Siberia, and render the remainder incapable of escaping from our yoke. All these distractions will afford such great opportunities to the regular troops, that they will be able to act with a degree of energy and precision which will ensure the subjugation of the rest of Europe. ©EH^M^jl U ASIIA INDEX Afghan Boundary Conunission, the, 46 Afghanistan, British disasters in, 1841-42, 14 ; a huffer between India and Bussia, 150 ; the Af- ghan wars, 151 ; two schools of British policy, 152 ; nature of country, 164 ; food supply, 165 ; origin of people, 168; religion, 169 ; relative positions of Eussia and England, 170; impossibility of the country remaining neutral, 172 ; a " scientific "frontier, 173; with Beluchistan the only real barrier for defence of India, 214 ; country admirably adapted for defence, 217 ; plentiful fighting material available, 218 Akhal Tekk^s, expedition against the, 40 Ak-Mechet, fortress of Khokand, capture of, 19 Alexander I., scheme for invasion of India, 10 Ashurada, Bnssia takes possession ^of, 16 Assurances of Bussia in 1869 and 1873, 37 ; in 1878, 38 ; in 1881, 43 Bazaabs, Central Asia, 83 Bell, Colonel Mark S., on food supply in Afghanistan, 165 ; on lines of defence for India, 223 Beluchistan, facilities for travers- ing, 177 ; with Afghanistan, the real barrier for defence of India, 214 Black Sea, nature of Bussian con- trol of, 190 Bokhara, subjugation of, 21 Brackenbury, Sir H., on want of British officers in Indian army, 214 British Muscovy Company, the, 6 British policy regarding Bussian advance, 150 Bureaucracy in India, 128 Cavagnaei, Sir Louis, murder of, 42 Central Asia: climate, 55; minerals, 57 ; races, 58 ; religions, 75 ; towns, 81 ; modes of travel. 111 ; ancient civilization, 117 Chimkent, seizure of, 20 Chinese travellers in Central Asia, 120 Communications, importance of, recognized by Bussia, 194, 225 « Comwallis Settlement," the, 137 Cossacks : expedition to Ehiva, 4 ; description of, 70 ; mode of fighting of, 73 Crimea, annexation of the, 8 Cnrzon, Lord, on concession of port on Persian Gulf to Bussia, 176 DoLQOEorKOPP, Prince, on policy of Bussia in Central Asia, 38 Dufferin, Marquis of, on defence of India, 149, 202 243 244 INDEX Duhamel, his scheme for invasion of India, 18 Dnrand, Sir Henry, on " fictitious importance" of Herat, 167 Elliott, Sir Charles, on Indian poverty, 138 Europe, danger to, of Bussian as- cendency in the East, 226 Gebmant, interests of, in Asia, 227 Gladstone, action of, in Afghan- istan, 42 Golden Horde, the, 1, 187 Gortschakoff, Prince, circular note by, on Bussian forward move- naent, App. 231 Griffin, Sir Lepel, on difference in fighting quality of various races in India, 131 Grodckoff's ride to Herat, 39 Heeat, Grodckoff's ride to, 39 ; its seizure by Bussia easy, 51 ; probable early occupation of, by Bussia, 163 ; importance of com- munications with, 165 ; already at Bussia's mercy, 171 ; the "key of India," 221 Hindu money-lenders in Central Asia, 87 ; in the Punjaub, 133 Hordes, the three, 31 Horse-breeding in Central Asia, 108 Ignatiefp, mission to Khiva and Bokhara, 18 India, British rule in, nature of, 126 ; tendency towards bureau- cracy, 128 ; different races, 130 ; unsuitability of complex admin- istration for Orientals, 132 ; in- crease of discontent, 133 ; Hindu money-lenders in Punjaub, 133 ; impoverishment of peasantry, 184 ; necessity for reform, 135 ; taxation contrasted with that in Bussian dominions, 136 ; charac- ter of assurances of loyalty by native princes, 136; dangers from over-taxation, 138 ; educa- tion, 189; frontier administra- tion, 141 ; turbulence of trans- frontier tribes, 146 India, importance of, 203 , invasion of, project of Napo- leon I, and Emperor Paul I., 9, 190 ; of Napoleon I. and Em- peror Alexander I., 10; of General Duhamel, 18 ; Bussia's methods for, 195 ; probable route of, 220 , the defence of, different pro- posals for, 211; true defence is to preserve Afghanistan and Beluchistan as barriers, 214; present policy ineffective, 215; what must be done, 223 ; strate- gic railways ', wanted, 224 ; a European question, 226 Indo-Bussian question, date of beginning of, 150 i JoNBB, Sir Harford, the first British statesman to recognize Bussian danger, 10 Kabul, British retreat from, 15 ; foundries and factories at, 169 Kahnuks, the, 66 Kbanikoff mission, 19 Khiva, Cossack expedition to, 4 ; the Khanate of, 12 ; the door to Central Asia, 25; capitulation of, 29 Kirghiz, the, Peter the Great's definition of, 17; antiquity of, 31; subjection to Bussia, 83; tribes, 60; description of, 61; method of reckoning time, 122 Kok-tash, the, 97 Krasnovodsk, occupation of, 24 Kuldja, annexation of, 23 ; evacua- tion of, 24 INDEX 245 Lackencb, Sir John, on Afghan- istan, 157 ; on Russian advance, 158 Lazareff, General, expedition against the Akhal Tekkes, 40 ; ite defeat, 41 ■ Lomakin's expedition against the Akhal-Tekkes, 40 ; its defeat at Dengha Tepe', 42 Mabkasoff, expedition to Khiva, 26; campaign against the Tekke's, 27 Merv, occupation of, 43 ; value of, for communications, 44 Merv-Kushk railway, the, 49 Mesopotamia, necessity for railway through, 227 Muscovite power, rise of, 2 Napoleon I., schemes for invasion of India, 9 ; despatch of envoys to Teheran, 178 Okenbtjrg, 99 Pandjbh incident, events con- nected with, 47 Paul I., scheme for invasion of India, 9, 190 Perovski, expedition of, 12 Persia: Eussian plans regarding, 176; the easiest overland route to liidia, 177; intercourse with Britain, 177 ; increase of Russian Influence, 179; importance of Persian Gulf to England, 180 ; Russia's policy, 182; necessity for British activity, 182 Persian Gulf, Russian desire for railway to, 48, 176, 211, 228; British treaty rights in, 178; control of, indispensable to England, 180 Peter the Great, the Will of, 8 ; text of, 238 (Appendix) ; his desire to gain access to the open sea, 190 Present-giving in Central Asia, 114 Qtjbtta, railways to, 174 Railways: Merv-Kushk, 49; Quet- ta, 174 ; Russian lines in Persia, 181 ; Russia's conquests by, 193 ; strategic, necessary for defence of India, 224 ; necessity for line through Mesopotamia, 227 Eawlinson, Sir Henry, on danger of Russian occupation of Herat, 152; on nature of Eussian ad- vance, 199; on importance of Herat, 222 Ridgway, Sir George, on Herat Valley, 166 Russia: methods of dealing with Asiatics, 5, 198, 208 ; policy in Central Asia, 32, 38, 182 ; man- ner of encroachment upon India, 205; rising prestige in Asia, 208 in Central Asia: policy of expansion, 183; migratory na- ture of Slav race, 186 ; desire to gain access to open sea, 190; Russia's awakening, 192 ; at- tempts at extension of empire in Europe, 192; expansion of empire in Asia, 193 ; conquests by railway, 193; motives for absorption of Central Asian pro- vinces, 194; rebellion impos- sible, 197 ; Russian methods of dealing with natives, 198 Russian advance towards India, two schools of British policy regarding, 152; diflScnlties ex- aggerated, 167; what England has done, 173 Russo-Turkish Campaign, the, 34 192 246 INDEX Samarkand, siege of, 21 ; his- torical importance of, 94 San Stefano, events leading up to treaty of, 34 Serfdom, abolition of, 188 Shore Ali, position of, after Berlin Congress, 36 Siberia : iirst advance of Russians, 2 ; Yermak's expedition, 3; area sufficient to meet wants of Bussia's population for centuries, 195 Skobeleff, expedition to Khiva, 25 ; on Central Asian Eailway, 50 ; on invasion of India, 35, 195, 201 Slav race, migratory nature of, 186 Sobolev, General, on the destiny of Herat, 171; on balance of povrer in Asia, 202 Steppe Commission, the, 22 Steppe forts, method of construc- tion of, 74 StolietofE's mission to Kabul, 36 Tadjiks, the, 59 Tashkent, surrender of, 20; typical tovfn of the new regime, 81 Teheran, Convention of, 43 Tekkes, campaign against the, 27 ; final subjection, 29 Thorburn, S. S., on litigation in India, 132 ; on English system of education in India, 140 Trans-Caucasus, various races in- habiting the, 69 Trans-Siberian Eailway, strategic value of, 225 Travel, modes of, in Central Asia, 111 Turkestan, formation of, 22 Tnrkistan, Mosque of, 98 Turkomanchi, Treaty of, 15 Uzbeks, the, 59 Wyllie, Mr., on the " phantom of a Russian invasion," 152 Yakoob Khan, deposition of, 42 Yermak's expedition, 3 THE END LOHDOK : PHINTBD BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIUITED, STAFFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS. HARPER & BROTHERS' NEW BOOKS. SOUTH AFRICAN PROGRAMME. By ARCHIBALD E. CoLQUHOUN. [/« the press. An attempt to forecast the reconstruction of South Africa which will be rendered necessary when the English conquer the two Repuhlics. A New Cheap Bdition of WHITE MAN'S AFRICA. By PouLTNET BiGELOW. With a Special New Intro- duction by the Author. Crown 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d. 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