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 The choice before us / 
 
 3 1924 007 365 004 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924007365004 
 
THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
THE 
 CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 BY 
 
 G. LOWES PICKINSON 
 
 Author of 
 
 "Letters from a Chinese Official," 
 
 "After the War," etc. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 
 
 1917 
 
COPYHIOHT, 191T 
 
 By DODD, mead AND COMPANY, Inc. 
 
PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION 
 
 This book was written before the United States joined in 
 the war. That act of theirs makes certain the victory of 
 the cause for which the allied nations stand against the 
 governments of the Central Powers. But it is not merely 
 nor mainly the armed forces of America which will secure 
 that victory; it is the purpose and ideal of the American peo- 
 ple. That purpose and ideal were set forth by President 
 Wilson, while he was yet a neutral, in a series of speeches 
 which will count among the most important state papers 
 in history. In them he announced a revolution in interna- 
 tional policy; and it is for the achievement of that revolu- 
 tion that he and his nation now stand in arms. President 
 Wilson announced the end of international war and the"^ 
 beginning of international co-operation. Nothing less than 
 that is implied in what he has said and what he has done. 
 For that America is fighting, not with arms only but with 
 diplomacy. And never before in the history of the world 
 has a nation taken up arms with a motive so disinterested 
 and for a cause so great. 
 
 Precisely because that is so, the book which I here lay 
 before Americans may hope to find sympathetic and appre- 
 ciative readers. For its purpose is, first, to expose the ruin 
 that lies before the world unless this war shall indeed end 
 war. Next, to discuss some of the problems of that 
 "League of Nations " the creation of which, with the 
 United States as a principal member, is the only way to 
 a lasting peace. The shallow objection that a nation at 
 war must not think about the object of the war, but only 
 about the waging of it, will be far from a nation that is at 
 war only to establish peace. Nor is thought about the 
 
vi PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION 
 
 object of the war superfluous. For, as I here show, war 
 depends upon prejudices and assumptions which are rooted 
 deep in the minds of all men and women. It is not enough 
 to wish to end war. We must root up the errors that foster 
 it. And that requires a process of intellectual conversion 
 which, if it is to be achieved in time, must be achieved even 
 while the war is waging. It is with no fear that this book 
 may weaken the determination of the reader that I lay it 
 before him. It is in the hope that it may at once strengthen 
 and enlighten him. For though the war may be won merely 
 by arms, the peace cannot. The peace can only be won 
 by thought and will. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 It is so difficult in war-time, for any one who does not deal 
 with immediate exigencies, to gain a fair hearing, that I 
 think it necessary to say in a preface some things which 
 otherwise I might safely have left to the reader's own per- 
 ception. I am not, in this book, discussing the origin or 
 justification of the present war, nor the participation in it of 
 this country. As a matter of fact, I agree with the general 
 view that, after the invasion of Belgium, it would have been 
 neither right nor wise for us to abstain. But the arguments 
 of this book should be equally cogent to readers who take 
 the most different views on these matters. For, whatever 
 may be thought of the immediate origin of the war, it can- 
 not be dissociated from all the deeper causes which have 
 led to wars in the past and may lead to them in the future ; 
 and it is these with which I deal. I argue that war proceeds 
 from wrong ideas and wrong policies; that in these ideas 
 and policies all nations have been implicated ; and that this 
 war will have been fought in vain unless it leads to a change 
 of attitude in all governments and all peoples. This change, 
 I agree, is most required in Germany, and may be most 
 difficult to effect there. But there are, in all countries, tra- 
 ditions, interests, prejudices and illusions making for war, 
 and it is these that I endeavour to expose. 
 
 In the first part of the book I set forth the system of 
 ideas and facts which I call Militarism. I have given no 
 definition of that term because it signifies something too 
 complex for definition. But I will so far summarize my 
 meaning as to say that Militarism is at once a state of mind '. 
 and a military and political system. On the one hand, it is 
 a belief that war is both inevitable and wholesome — the 
 
 vii 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 notion that it is wholesome fostering the notion that it is 
 inevitable, and vice versa. On the other hand, it is a sys- 
 tem whereby every citizen is compelled to military service, 
 whereby a large and powerful class of military officers influ- 
 ences or dominates policy, and whereby education is directed 
 by the State to a glorification of war. So conceived, it is 
 clear, that Militarism is more perfectly developed in Ger- 
 many than anywhere else. But in other countries, too, it is 
 both partially a fact and potentially a danger. And I argue 
 that nothing but a complete and radical reform in interna- 
 tional relations can prevent the danger from becoming a 
 reality. 
 
 For Militarism does not arise without cause. Its main 
 cause is the menace of war. And that menace grows con- 
 tinually more terrible as preparation for war, in all States, 
 becomes more effective. Nations do not choose Militarism. 
 It is forced upon them. And if, when this war is over, 
 the conditions that led up to it are to be perpetuated. Mili- 
 tarism is likely not only to be maintained and exasperated 
 on the Continent, but to be introduced into the United King- 
 dom, the United States, and China. In Japan it already 
 prevails. The fact that men have died by millions to de- 
 stroy it will have no effect on this result, unless, in all coun- 
 tries, those who have leisure and knowledge deliberately 
 plan and work for a durable peace. It is as a contribution 
 to such work that the second part of this book was written. 
 But the second part is intimately connected with the first, 
 and should not be considered apart from it. 
 
 It will not, I hope, be inferred that, because I condemn 
 war uncompromisingly, I therefore condemn those who 
 take part in it. Nothing can be further from my thought. 
 Too many of my own friends have fought and died, or are 
 yet to die, in this war. I do not praise them, for I have 
 no right to praise what is above praise. I have wished to 
 do better than praise. I have wished to contribute to a 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 future in which such sacrifices as theirs shall never again 
 be required. I have wished to destroy the errors which 
 perpetuate war. And if I have succeeded, in any smallest 
 measure, in that, I shall have helped the young men I have 
 loved and admired to the purpose for which they have 
 fought and died. 
 
 I have profited throughout by the sympathy and criticism 
 of my friend Miss F. M. Stawell. I do not claim to asso- 
 ciate her, more than she would choose to be associated, with 
 the result. But I know that, whatever be the defects of the 
 book, in matter or manner, they would have been far greater 
 but for her judgment and tact. 
 
 POSTSCRIPT 
 
 The two greatest events of the war, the Russian revolu- 
 tion and the declaration of war by the United States, 
 occurred after this book was in type. Both enhance, be- 
 yond all reckoning, the good prospects of civilization. The 
 party at present in power in Russia appears to be opposed 
 to schemes of imperialistic aggrandizement. and inclined to 
 international solutions. And the United States, which have 
 entered the war with no other purpose than to secure the 
 rule of right, will now have an undisputed place at the con- 
 ference which is to settle the future. The outlook for a 
 new international organization, based upon a new will for 
 creative peace, has never been so bright. All that remains 
 to make a certainty of hope is a change of government in 
 Germany. That change seems now to be probable, if not 
 during, then immediately after the war. And if, and when, 
 it takes place, there can be no further scruples about includ- 
 ing the German people in the League of Nations. The best 
 of all guarantees for the future, the good will of the peoples, 
 seems now to be almost assured. May their leaders know 
 how to elicit and interpret that will in all countries ! 
 
 April 6, 1917. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART t 
 MILITARISM 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Future of Militarism 3 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Methods of Warfare (p. 23) ; Conscription breeding Perse- 
 cution (5. 27); Military Training and its Effects (p. 27); 
 Christianity and the War (p. 31) ; Preconceptions 01 Mili- 
 tarism (p. 33) ; Militarism and Morals (p. 35) ; Militarism 
 and Education (p. 35) ; President Wilson and War (p. :g) 
 
 CHAPt(eR II 
 
 The Reality of the Menace 39 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Attitude of Soldiers to War (p. 45) ; Attitude of Non-com- 
 batants to War (p. 46) 
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 
 The Militarist and the Pacifist Ideals 49 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 The Realities of War (p. 66) ; The Religion of War (p. 
 71) ; Emerson on Liberty (p. 78) 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The State as a Super-personality 80 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 The TheorV of Inevitable Expansion 89 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Armamefats as a Cause of War (p. 102) ; Imperialism (p. 
 104) 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Growth of Population as a Cause of War . . . .106 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Over-population as a Cause of War (p. 116) ; Immigration 
 from Eastern Countries to America (p. 119) 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 Economic Competition AS a Cause OF War 120 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Economic Competition and War (p. 137) ; Dumping (p. 
 141); Trade and Political Frontiers (p. 142); The British 
 Empire and Commercial Monopoly (p. 142) ; Socialist Poli- 
 cies and Commercial Monopoly (p. 146) 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Other Causes of War 148 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 National Honour (p. 154) 
 
 PART II 
 
 INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 Internationalism 160 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 A League of Nations 166 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 The American Treaties (p. 179) ; The Court of Interna- 
 tional Justice (p. 180) ; The Council of Conciliation (p. 183) 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The Question of a Sanction to the Treaty 187 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 An International Force (p. 200) ; The Economic Boycott 
 (p. 201) ; British Naval Supremacy (p. 202); Reduction of 
 Armaments (p. 202) ; Armament Firms (p. 203) ; An Inter- 
 national Executive (p. 204) ; Limitation of Armaments (p. 
 20s) 
 
CONTENTS xiii 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 PAGE 
 
 International Regulation and Administration .... 208 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 The League and Outside States (p. 222) ; Treaty of Al- 
 geciras (p. 222) ; Treaties (p. 223) 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 Democratic Control of Foreign Policy 227 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 Democratic Control (p. 248) ; How Wars are Brought 
 About (p. 248) 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 The League and the Settlement 255 
 
 Notes and Illustrations — 
 The United States and the League of Nations (p. 263) ; 
 The German Chancellor and the German Press on a League 
 of Nations (p. 264) ; International Routes (p. 266) ; The 
 Soldiers' Aim in the War (p. 267) 
 
PART I 
 MILITARISM 
 
It is quite true that in the past, many, probably the majority, 
 of wars have been unjustifiable, and that, had the world been 
 governed with greater wisdom, they might have been avoided. 
 
 Lord Cromer. 
 
 . Many wars have been unjust, most have been unnecessary. 
 
 Lord Bryce. 
 
 There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between States. 
 
 T. H. Green. 
 
THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 
 
 The political relations of the European States have con- 
 sisted for centuries past of war and preparation for war. 
 In the present war, this practice has culminated in a 
 catastrophe which, it might seem, must lead to a reaction. 
 Perhaps it may. But it certainly will not do so, unless 
 it be by a deliberate and conscious change in the ideas 
 and the wills of men. Meantime people already talk 
 of the " next war." It is therefore important to make 
 some forecast of what kind of a war that is likely to be, 
 and, more generally, what kind of a future the continua- 
 tion and extension of militarism would prepare for man- 
 kind. 
 
 A Russian general, Skugarewski, has recently attempted 
 a forecast of the next war,^ which he anticipates in ten 
 or twenty years, if Germany is not " conclusively con- 
 quered." He starts by remarking that every war he can 
 remember, beginning from the Crimean War, was an 
 "unprecedented" war; and his moral is that "humanity 
 must at last learn how to prepare for war." " In the 
 future struggle of nations all men capable of bearing arms 
 will be taken into the ranks of the nations' armies, and 
 for them everything will be ready in peace-time." This 
 will mean that Russia will T^ve an army of forty millions 
 and Germany of twenty millions. For an army of forty 
 
 1 See the Russian Supplement to The Times of July 29, 1916, which 
 reproduces the general's contribution to the Russkoe Slovo. 
 
4 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 million men three hundred thousand officers will be re- 
 quired. To secure them " it will be necessary to introduce 
 conscription for officers : all young men who have received 
 not even complete middle-school education will be obliged 
 to serve as officers." Further, it will be necessary to re- 
 place, so far as possible, by women the men who under 
 existing arrangements are kept in the rear by non-combat- 
 ant duties. Perhaps therefore " it will be necessary to 
 introduce conscription for girls and childless widows, so 
 that more men can be sent to the front." As to armaments, 
 " there will be required for such an army one hundred thou- 
 sand guns, a million maxims, tens of thousands of motor- 
 cars, armoured, freight, and light cars. By the beginning 
 of the war at least fifty million gun-projectiles must be 
 prepared, and five thousand million rifle cartridges. Be- 
 sides machine-gun detachments, each company of a regi- 
 ment will have its portable machine guns on light stands." 
 Aviation, of course, " will receive special development." 
 " It is clear that in ten to twenty years every State will 
 reckon the numbers of its dirigibles in thousands and the 
 number of its aeroplanes in tens, if not hundreds of thou- 
 sands. The dropping of shells from above on to large 
 stretches of country will be extensively practised. And if 
 the laws of war permit the application of inflammable ma- 
 terials and substances for the development of poisonous 
 gases, then the raids of aerial flotillas will instantly convert 
 large districts of several square versts ^ into complete deserts 
 where every vestige of animal and vegetable life will be 
 slain and where large units of armies will be annihilated to 
 a single man." The range of guns will be enormously in- 
 creased and " perhaps Dover will be shelled from Calais." 
 The general proceeds to estimate the cost of such a war 
 
 1 Such as London or Berlin. — Author. 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 6 
 
 at twenty millions a day. The peace establishment of 
 Russia will cost a hundred millions a year. 
 
 " Besides the existing material conscriptions, it may per- 
 haps be necessary to introduce conscription for grain, meat, 
 and fodder. All industrial establishments — mills, fac- 
 tories, workshops, even handicraftsmen — on declaration of 
 war will have to work for the army in accordance with a 
 special plan of mobilization." In short, " expedients for 
 the extermination of humanity will be of such a nature that 
 everything of which we hear nowadays will pale in compari- 
 son. The number of killed will be reckoned by millions, of 
 wounded by tens of millions." 
 
 This is not a romance by Mr. Wells. It is a very sober 
 description, certainly not overdrawn, of what is likely to 
 occur in that " next war " to which so many people are 
 already looking forward.^ Let us carry the description a 
 little further. 
 
 And, first, as to methods of war. It is as probable as 
 anything can be that these will be of a kind which will 
 make the worst that has been done in this war seem by 
 comparison like humanity and kindness. Not only will 
 every weapon that has been used in this war be employed 
 in the next, except those that have been rendered obsolete 
 by the invention of worse ones, but science will have dis- 
 covered new and far more destructive means of murder. 
 We have long applied chemistry to war; but we have not 
 begun to apply bacteriology. In the future, the deliberate 
 spread of lethal diseases among the enemy is likely to be a 
 
 i"I believe it to be a fact that there are some people going about 
 even now saying, and trying to induce other people to believe, that 
 we should never have another war. All I can say is that in my 
 humble opinion the people who say it either wittingly or unwittingly 
 are nothing more or less than traitors to their country " (Lord Lilford, 
 at Thrapston. Quoted in Labour Leader, August 12, 1915). 
 
6 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 principal and recognized method of destruction. Further, 
 the war will be waged, without any restriction, on non-com- 
 batants. Already a German professor ^ has written a book 
 to show that this is permitted by the " new " law of nations, 
 created by the experiences of this war. And, of course, the 
 logic of war is in favour of it. For a munition-worker, or 
 a producer of any kind, is just as much helping the enemy 
 to win the war as a soldier at the front. 
 
 We must therefore expect that in any future war any 
 and every weapon of extermination will be used freely 
 against non-combatants as well as combatants. Rules of 
 war may be drawn up to prevent this. But the issues of a 
 modern war are so tremendous, that such rules are likely 
 to break at the first tension put upon them. One combat- 
 ant succumbs to one temptation, another to another. Each 
 breach of the law by one is followed by breaches by the 
 others, under guise of reprisals. Neither religion, morals, 
 nor humanity have availed to arrest this process in the 
 present war. Why should we suppose they will be more 
 potent in the future? 
 
 But destruction by war does not end with the lives of the 
 immediate sufferers. Every man of sound stock who is 
 killed childless extinguishes with himself whole generations. 
 But it is the sound that are killed in war, and the unsound 
 preserved, for it is the sound that are selected to go to the 
 front. Further, among those that survive, men and women, 
 the conditions of war tend to disseminate over wider and 
 wider areas venereal and other diseases, and this again 
 reacts upon the stock. So that, whoever wins or loses the 
 war, winners and losers alike have impaired irremediably 
 the strength of their nation. War may preserve liberty for 
 
 '■Dr. Paul Eltzbacher, formerly rector of the Hochschule at Berlin, 
 in his book Totes und Lebendiges Volkerrecht. Miinchen and Leipzig: 
 Duncker u. Humblot. See Blatter fur Zwischenstaatliche Organisation, 
 July 1916, p. 216. 
 
ITHE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 7 
 
 posterity, but it is a posterity weakened and enfeebled that 
 will enjoy it. 
 
 War, then, means not merely the destruction of the best 
 among the living, but an irreparable impoverishment of the 
 race; and that on a scale proportional to the scale of the 
 war. But the scale of modem wars is world-wide. So, 
 therefore, is the impoverishment. War is a way of racial 
 suicide. Soldiers and statesmen do not think of such re- 
 mote effects ; but they do not cease to happen because they 
 are not thought of. And in comparison with them victory 
 or defeat, and the other results of war, are negligible in the 
 balance. 
 
 Let us turn now from the biological to the social effects of 
 war. War implies preparation for war. And if the inter- 
 national anarchy is to continue, so that States are compelled 
 to arm against one another, each driving on each to ever 
 more tremendous efforts, there can be no pause in the pro- 
 cess and no limit to it. We have no right to dismiss as 
 improbable, still less as impossible, any extremity that lies 
 in the logic of the movement. Let us therefore without 
 shrinking develop that logic to the full. 
 
 First, universal service will be introduced as a permanent 
 institution into the countries that have hitherto escaped it; 
 and it is probable that it will be organized on the complete 
 Prussian model. There are, I am aware, some who look 
 forward to what they call a " popular " army, such as is 
 maintained in Switzerland and was proposed for France 
 by Jaures. Their idea is, first, that an army may be or- 
 ganized for defence only, and not for offence. Secondly, 
 that it may be so organized that it cannot become the 
 instrument of a military caste. A full discussion of these 
 points is not possible here ; but there are one or two obvious 
 considerations which must be borne in mind. In the first 
 place, there is not, and cannot be, any clear and universally 
 
8 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 accepted distinction between offence and defence, until there 
 is an international agreement as to what shall constitute 
 offence. Every nation in every war that I have ever heard 
 of has claimed to be on the defensive. The mere act of 
 declaring war, or of taking the first step in war, cannot be 
 accepted as proof of aggression, for it may be merely a 
 reasonable precaution of defence. It may be urged that the 
 act of invasion should be the test of offence, and that an 
 army of defence must never cross the frontier. But would 
 any military authority accept that view? And, in partic- 
 ular, is it applicable to this country, where in any future 
 war the transport of an army to the Continent will be the 
 first necessity, if any of our continental allies are also in- 
 volved? The Territorials were enlisted for home defence; 
 and we see what has come of that, under the first pressure 
 of war. The distinction, then, between an army for offence 
 and an army for defence is unreal and must remain unreal, 
 unless and until we have a system of international agree- 
 ments and guarantees which would transform the whole 
 situation out of which wars arise. 
 
 Secondly, whatever organization be adopted for an army, 
 however short the period to be spent in barracks, however 
 democratic the method of recruiting and promotion, it does 
 not seem possible that a force on the modern scale of num- 
 bers and efficiency could be maintained without the aid of a 
 very large class of professional officers, and without giving 
 to these a large measure of social prestige and political in- 
 fluence. The British tradition, whereby the officer rarely 
 appears in uniform, and is not felt in time of peace as an 
 element in society or in politics, must disappear, it would 
 seem, with the permanent adoption of universal service. 
 The more numerous, highly-trained, and intelligent the offi- 
 cer caste, the more influential they will become. And as 
 they will be trained exclusively for war, and will regard 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 9 
 
 war both as their own sole business and as the sole business 
 of the nation, they are not likely to abstain from bringing 
 their influence to bear upon foreign policy. But such politi- 
 cal influence of an officer caste is precisely one of the most 
 important elements in militarism. And the moment officers 
 begin to wear their uniforms in time of peace will be the 
 moment when militarism starts to run its course in England. 
 
 In any case, whatever form of military organization be 
 adopted, we shall have everywhere universal service; and 
 that, as General Skugarewski foresees, on a scale hitherto 
 unknown in history. Every man between the ages, let us 
 say, of 17 and 50 will be liable to military service. Boys 
 tmder 17 will have compulsory "preliminary training" as 
 boy scouts, in officers' training corps, and the like. Women 
 and girls will be enrolled for the various non-combatant 
 services — unless indeed, which is quite possible, it be de- 
 cided to raise combatant corps of amazons. In any case, 
 the question of the fitness of people for military service, 
 in character or temperament or conviction, will not enter 
 into consideration. In the past, in pagan societies — an- 
 cient India, for example, or Japan — men were selected as 
 soldiers by their own choice or by hereditary aptitude. In 
 the twentieth century of Him who came to bring peace 
 among mankind, we do not hesitate to compel all men into 
 the army without reference to their aptitude or choice, and 
 in defiance of their moral, religious, or political scruples. 
 Thus, as conscription extends, so does the necessity of per- 
 secution. And if international war is to continue, persecu- 
 tion will be established as an institution in all countries. 
 
 Having forced the men (and the women it may be) into 
 the army, the next thing will be to train them. What the 
 object of military training is was once summed up as fol- 
 lows by a military officer. " The one object," he said, 
 " of a military system is to overcome a man's natural re- 
 
10 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 luctance to kill and to be killed. To accomplish this we 
 have three devices. The first is to make the soldier more 
 afraid of his own officers than he is of the enemy. The 
 second is to convert him into an automaton by perpetual 
 drill, so that he obeys instinctively every order given without 
 any intervention of his own choice or will. The third de- 
 vice is a just cause." This last device is rather the business 
 of the politicians than the soldiers, and it is one they vevy 
 well understand. As to the others, there seems to be some 
 question, in modern warfare as to the extent to which it is 
 necessary to destroy the soldier's individuality. But it can 
 hardly be doubtful that the more it is possible to overcome 
 beforehand, not only his reluctance to kill and to be killed, 
 but his squeamishness as to methods of killing, the better 
 soldier he will be. And we may expfect developments in this 
 direction which would surprise and shock our present sus-. 
 ceptibilities, formed, as they have been, in and for peace. 
 
 But to make a nation efficient for war it will not be 
 enough to conscript the whole population, to train them in 
 the use of any and every weapon, and to counteract their 
 humane instincts. Much more important will be the re- 
 ligious and moral training. The soul as well as the body 
 of a good soldier must be militarized ; and for this purpose 
 a new direction must be given to the State religion. Ex- 
 actly how revolutionary the change must be it is not easy to 
 say. The attitude of the clergy in the present war has 
 shown that the apparent teaching of the Gospels need not 
 interfere with an enthusiastic support of war by ministers 
 of a Christian Church; and that, in the view of many, the 
 dispensation of Jesus left standing in full authority that of 
 the God of the Jews. The Sermon on the Mount, we have 
 been told in effect, was merely a string of amiable meta- 
 phors. The real Jesus Whom we are to treat as our Master 
 was the one Who used the scourge of small cords in the 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 11 
 
 Temple, not the one who bade us turn the other cheek. 
 When He said, " Greater love hath no man than this, that 
 he give his life for his friend," what He meant was that we 
 are to kill our enemies. And when He said, " Render unto 
 Csesar the things that are Caesar's," He already by anticipa- 
 tion condemned those who, in the future, in His name, might 
 refuse military service. This adaptability of Christianity, 
 as professed by the Churches, suggests that its forms might 
 still be preserved even in an era of universal militarisrtk 
 Nor need we be troubled by the fact that Christianity is a 
 universal religion, and that all Christians are supposed to 
 worship the same God. For we have seen also, in this war, 
 that each nation can claim, with the full support of its 
 Church, that its national god is really the universal god ; so 
 that Christian nations may not only fight against one an- 
 other with a good conscience, but each may be sure, in so 
 doing, that it is fighting for the true God, Who is being 
 denied by its enemies. 
 
 There seems, then, on the whole, good reason to think 
 that the forms of Christianity may still continue to direct 
 the militaristic societies of the future. At the same time 
 we must make no mistake about the reality. The real re- 
 ligion of the future, if war is to continue, will be the 
 religion of the God-State ; for the essential requirement will 
 be an unquestioning submission to the will of the State. It 
 is this that has given such moral strength to the Germans 
 in the present war; and the fact will be noted and its lesson 
 applied by other nations. 
 
 The essence of this religion, stated without compromise 
 or qualification, is as follows: The State is the purpose 
 and end for which individuals come into existence. It is a 
 god; and, like other gods, it is mysterious. Its nature is 
 unknowable and undefinable. This does not prevent the 
 existence of whole libraries of "Statology" about It or 
 
12 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Him. But these volumes do not really serve, and are not 
 intended to serve, to dispel the darkness. The State is 
 something supernatural. It is not the sum of its members. 
 It is not their trend, their purpose, or their impulse. It 
 works through governmental agents, who may be called its 
 priests. But it is not they. It works upon the people, but 
 it is not they. Neither their happiness nor their well-being, 
 nor even the well-being of the Government, is its purpose. 
 Its purpose is Its own Being and Power. It has, in fact, 
 only one point of contact with its worshippers : it demands 
 their sacrifice to itself. A sacrifice complete, unreserved, 
 unquestioning; a sacrifice not only of their lives (that is 
 little) but of their most profound instincts, their most pas- 
 sionate feelings, their deepest convictions. They must have 
 no conscience but its, no belief but its, no cause but its. 
 They must be its slaves, not body only, but mind and soul. 
 They are nothing ; It is all. 
 
 I am aware that this expression of the militarist theory 
 of the State will be repudiated, even by Germans. Of 
 course they do not so express it. But they imply all that 
 has been here expressed, though no doubt they may be un- 
 aware of the implications. Not only so, but much that is 
 said and thought in other countries, not excluding England, 
 really involves the same presuppositions. I shall have occa- 
 sion later to return to this point, when I consider the theory 
 of foreign policy. At present, what interests me is the 
 connexion of the theory with war. The unquestioning and 
 uncritical sacrifice demanded in the name of the State is 
 for the purpose of extending its power by war. The State 
 is a god of war, as once the God of the Jews was. And 
 that is why the religion of the State will more and more 
 drive out every other, if the process of militarizing the 
 world continues. Other countries, in this respect, will fol- 
 low the lead of Germany. And the philosophy we have 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 13 
 
 been repudiating as devilish because Germany was our 
 enemy, we shall end by adopting ourselves in order to be 
 the better prepared to fight her. We may expect that, in a 
 militarist future, this doctrine of the God-State, in essence 
 if not in set terms, will be taught in every school, college, 
 university, and pulpit. Thus, both before and after the 
 period of actual military training, the citizen will be pre- 
 pared and confirmed for his main business in life by every 
 form of spiritual exhortation. Education will mean train- 
 ing for war. The effort to teach men to think and judge 
 for themselves will be eliminated. For nothing could be 
 more directly opposed than this to the cult of the State and 
 of war. That cult requires what is rather a discipline than 
 an education. The student must be taught dogmatically 
 what the purposes of life are; not permitted, still less en- 
 couraged, to examine the question for himself. He must 
 be taught from infancy up, that he came into the world to 
 sacrifice himself in war ; that the reason of this is a mystery ; 
 and that into that mystery it is blasphemy and pride for the 
 human reason to pry. 
 
 We have spoken so far of that part of education (the 
 most important part) which is concerned with the purposes 
 of life and which (as we shall doubtless be told) in all 
 well-organized States has always rested on revelation. 
 Upon this depends all the rest. The teaching of morals 
 must of course conform to that of religion; and the religion 
 of the God-State will require a different code to that which 
 has hitherto been professed by Christians. The old profes- 
 sion must now be brought into accord with the new practice 
 required by the age of war. Pity, gentleness, charity, must 
 not merely not be practised, they must be branded as crimes 
 against the social order; the practical lessons in brutality 
 which will form the main part of military training must 
 be reinforced by preaching, teaching, and example at every 
 
U THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 stage of life; and for the cult of humanity which has in- 
 creasingly prevailed in democratic societies we must substi- 
 tute the Nietzschean formula " Be hard." 
 
 The new religion and the new ethics will be accompanied 
 by a new development of scientific teaching. For science 
 will be more necessary than ever in the strenuous competi- 
 tion that lies before us. It will be necessary for industry. 
 On that I need not dwell. But above all it will be neces- 
 sary for war. The nation, we shall be told, that is most 
 successful in inventing new methods of destruction will be 
 the nation that will " survive " ; and we shall be urged no 
 longer to hamper our efforts by the scruples and limitations 
 of a romantic tradition and a system of pseudo-law. What 
 this may imply in the actual invention of lethal weapons it 
 would be idle to try to forecast. But to one thing we must 
 make up our minds. Whenever there emerges, in any gen- 
 erous young soul, the passion for truth and the genius for 
 discovery,- he will be seized upon by society and urged, nay 
 compelled, to devote his idealism not to the perfecting but to 
 the destruction of human life. The perversion of the in- 
 tellect will follow from the perversion of the soul. And 
 reason, distorted from its trend to comprehend truth and 
 serve mankind, will become more devilish than ever mere 
 bestiality could be, and make of man something as infinitely 
 lower than the brutes as he had it in him to be infinitely 
 higher. Germany boasts that she has introduced into the 
 world the new gospel of " organization." Perhaps she has. 
 But if war is to continue, and to govern all the effort of men, 
 the gospel of organization is the gospel of Satanism* 
 
 The development of religion and education which I have 
 thus sketched is likely to be accompanied by a transforma- 
 tion of political institutions. Democracy is a bad medium 
 for war. For democracy, in the first place, is hard to 
 discipline. That goes without saying. And for that rea- 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 15 
 
 son alone lovers of discipline look upon it with mistrust. 
 
 In the second plarPjjWiTnprarY is fi.vprsp frnm^ gnrl pprj^ppa 
 
 incap able^ff t>ff licips 1otV'"S ^'^^ ihotirl Its essence is 
 responsiveness to the movements of public opinion; and 
 public opinion, in a free democracy, is always in movement. 
 But war, and the policies war subserves, require long views. 
 It is not without reason that, even in democratic countries, 
 foreign policy, and the military and naval policy which is 
 its handmaid, has been withdrawn as far as possible from 
 popular control. But that withdrawal has not been suffi- 
 cient. The democracies have not been able to prepare with 
 the deliberation and thoroughness of the autocracies. This 
 is true both of England and of France. As to England, it 
 would be superfluous to repeat here the condemnation that 
 has been dealt out to our government, both from militarists 
 and from pacifists. As to France, we have the interesting 
 record of M. Sembat's book : " Faites un roi. Sinon faites 
 la paix." M. Sembat is (or was) a democrat and a social- 
 ist. But he deliberately affirmed, before the war, and it is 
 hardly likely that he has changed his view since, that a Re- 
 public was incompetent to prepare adequately for war against 
 an autocracy, and that either France must make up her quar- 
 rel with Germany, or she must convert herself into a mon- 
 archy» By dint of an unexampled coalition of forces, the 
 inadequacy of preparation in the two democracies has been 
 counterbalanced by the greater resources. But how near a 
 thing it has been ! How immense has been and is the techni- 
 cal superiority of the autocracy ! The " militarism " we con- 
 demn in Germany is a condiiton of efficiency for war. 
 And if war is to continue, other nations must adopt it, 
 in its political as well as its other manifestations. The 
 franker organs of our militarists at home, like the Morning 
 Post, have recognized that from the beginning of the war. 
 And even before the waTThe same view was set forth in 
 
16 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 militarist publications with a candour and a force which 
 opponents of militarism should be the first to recognize. 
 
 I may refer, in this connexion, to a remarkable book by 
 Captain Ross, entitled Representative Government and 
 War, published in 1903, and based in part upon the experi- 
 ence acquired in the Boer War. This book, had it had the 
 good fortune to become known in Germany, would doubtless 
 have aroused as much attention there as the book of Gen- 
 eral Bernhardi did in England. Its philosophy is the same, 
 its frankness is as complete, its brutality as uncompromis- 
 ing. It justifies beforehand, in principle if not in set terms, 
 everything the Germans have done ; their declaration of war, 
 their invasion of Belgium, their methods of conducting war. 
 It is not, however, on that aspect of the matter that I desire 
 now to dwell. It is the political views of the author to 
 which I would call attention. The form of government 
 which he admires is that of Germany ; and he desires, by a 
 coup detat or otherwise, to convert the government of Eng- 
 land into that form. He points out that the preparation 
 for war is not only military but political ; that the publicity, 
 or comparative publicity, of parliamentary government not 
 only makes more difficult the appropriation of enormous 
 funds to armaments and secret service, but also hampers 
 that preparation for war by diplomacy which is essential if 
 war is to be made at the right moment against the right 
 enemy. For the only business of diplomacy is to make war ; 
 not defensive, but aggressive war. The gallant captain 
 perceives that such objects cannot be avowed by govern- 
 ments and would hardly be tolerated by peoples. His rem- 
 edy for this disastrous state of things is to remove from 
 even the shadow of popular control not only the administra- 
 tion of the armed forces and the conduct of war, but the 
 whole of foreign policy. He would make the King com- 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 17 
 
 mander-in-chief, and allow him to govern through three 
 military chiefs, who should direct not only the forces but 
 the diplomacy of the country. He sees no hope of achiev- 
 ing this purpose (short of a coup detat) until the country 
 has accepted conscription. For only a conscript people will 
 tolerate military rule. Thus he definitely desires universal 
 service, not only for military but also, and mainly, for politi- 
 cal purposes ; he desires it as a means to destroy free govern- 
 ment and put the country under the heel of a military dic- 
 tatorship. For his grudging admission — " it is too much 
 to expect of the British race that it shall make matters of 
 internal administration in any way subject to the will of an 
 autocrat, and it is unnecessary " — still leaves the people 
 without any say in what is most important to their welfare, 
 crushed under an ever increasing burden of armaments, and 
 subject, at least once in a generation, to wars becoming ever 
 more destructive not only of life but of humanity itself. 
 
 Some readers may be inclined to set aside a book of this 
 kind as the raving of a madman. But to do so would be to 
 do injustice to the author and to his position. Granted 
 certain assumptions — the struggle for existence between 
 States, the consequent necessity of war, the subordination 
 of home to foreign policy, the conception that the main aim 
 of the latter is to prepare aggressive war — granted, in fact, 
 the philosophy of militarism, and all the contentions of the 
 author follow. And unless we root militarism out of our 
 minds and souls (its real dwelling-place) and in conse- 
 quence out of our institutions, national and international, 
 we have no defence against that logic and therefore none 
 against the policies it engenders. Let the international an- 
 archy and international war continue, and there is an end 
 of political liberty. What those who hate this prospect 
 have most to fear is that they should be dupes of their own 
 
18 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 optimism. The connexion between war and autocracy is 
 essential. We see it immediately when we are actually at 
 war. Thus, during the last two years we have abandoned 
 to the Executive liberty of person and of speech. We have 
 sat still and watched while a Government department abol- 
 -ished the Habeas Corpus Act. We have reintroduced re- 
 ligious persecution, and condemned young men to death and 
 sent them to penal servitude for obeying their consciences; 
 and we have permitted the military authorities to take 
 charge not only of the policing of the country, but of the 
 expression and formation of opinion. Democrats no doubt 
 flatter themselves that they will recover their liberties and 
 their constitution after the war. But whether they will or 
 no depends on whether or no the international anarchy 
 is to continue. If it is, the nation will be cajoled and bul- 
 lied to sacrifice its political liberty to the need of national 
 defence. By that kind of imperceptible process by which 
 our constitution develops, the military authority will thrust 
 aside the civilian; and we shall find ourselves living under 
 a Prussian system, without having ever taken a clear de- 
 cision in the matter or at any moment definitely surrendered 
 our liberties and rights. Meantime the discipline and train- 
 ing which I have described will be operating on the younger 
 generation. So that it will not be long before they have 
 lost even the remembrance of liberty, and become as proud 
 of their passive abnegation before an officer caste as any 
 German can be. Political liberty has been the capital 
 achievement of the British race. But it, above all things, is 
 threatened by the rising flood of militarism. And while it 
 thinks it stands, it may well take heed lest it falls. 
 
 The militarism of which I have thus outlined the possible 
 development is primarily a European phenomenon. The 
 Far East (with the very notable exception of Japan) and 
 the Far West are as yet hardly touched by it. For that 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 19 
 
 reason, those parts of the world are the hope of the world. 
 But then, their development is strictly conditioned by that 
 of Europe. For the world is now one, for evil as well as 
 for good. Every contagion spreads, and every cause pro- 
 duces effects round the whole girdle of the globe. Turning 
 first to the United States of America, we find that that 
 great country — the greatest potential force, material, 
 moral, and spiritual, in the world — has realized, with a 
 shock of dismay, that it is no longer isolated from the 
 European madness. It is part of the system, or rather the 
 anarchy, of States. Americans can no longer disconnect 
 themselves from the chain of international policy. Their 
 future is bound up with the future of Europe. Either they 
 must arm for self-defence, and by so doing join and exas- 
 perate the international anarchy ; or they must combine with 
 the European Powers to end it. That is what President 
 Wilson has realized, and wlaat he has been saying to a 
 sceptical and uncomprehending Europe. This question of 
 the American attitude is the crucial one for civilization as a 
 whole, and for that of Europe in particular. For once let 
 the United States arm on the European scale, once let the 
 Far East do the same, and where will Europe be? If the 
 West and the East do not combine with Europe to stay this 
 madness they will be driven to participate in it, to the ruin 
 of Europe as well as of themselves. To reject the over- 
 tures of President Wilson at this crisis is to reject what is 
 perhaps the last hope of civilization. Let me, then, cite 
 his words, for they are too little known in this country : — 
 
 We are not mere disconnected lookers on. The longer the war 
 lasts, the more deeply do we become concerned. . . . When it 
 comes to an end we shall be as much concerned as the nations at 
 war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence that will give 
 promise of days from which anxiety and uncertainty shall be lifted 
 and bring some assurance that peace and war shall hereafter be 
 
20 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 reckoned as part of the common interest of mankind. We are 
 participants, whether we would or not, in the Hfe of the world. 
 The interests of all the nations are our own also. We are partners 
 with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as 
 well as the affair of the nations of Asia and Europe. 
 
 The repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the 
 great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their 
 thought has come to this — that the principle of public right must 
 henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of par- 
 ticular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way- 
 band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any 
 sort of selfish aggression ; that henceforth Alliance must not be set 
 up against Alliance, Understanding against Understanding, but 
 that there must be a common agreement for a common object, 
 and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable 
 rights of peoples and of mankind. . . . This is undoubtedly the 
 thought of America, this is what we ourselves will say when there 
 comes the proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations 
 with one another arbitrary force must be rejected, and we must 
 move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought 
 of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes 
 the chief part of the passionate conviction of America. We 
 believe these fundamental things : — 
 
 Firstly: That every people has the right to choose the 
 sovereignty under which they shall live. 
 Like other nations, we have ourselves, no doubt, once and again 
 offended against that principle when for a little while controlled 
 by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honourable 
 enough to admit, but it has become more and more our rule of life 
 and action. 
 
 Secondly: That the small States of the world have the 
 right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for 
 their territorial integrity that the great and powerful nations 
 expect and insist upon. 
 
 Thirdly: That the world has the right to be free from 
 
 every disturbance to its peace that has its origin in aggression 
 
 and the disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. 
 
 So sincerely do we believe in these things, that I am sure I speak 
 
 the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the 
 
 United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 21 
 
 association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and 
 to make them secure against violation.^ 
 
 So speaks America to Europe. How will Europe re- 
 spond ? Accept, and America comes in to save civilization. 
 Refuse, and she arms, whether she will or no, to destroy it. 
 
 And now look East. It is the same alternative. China, 
 next to, perhaps even beyond, the United States, is a 
 storehouse of potential energy with which all Europe would 
 contend in vain once it were developed. But Europe is 
 compelling its development; compelling it not only in the 
 economic but in the military sense. For centuries China 
 has preached and acted on the gospel of peace. Europe, 
 taking advantage of her weakness, mocks at the philosophy 
 which has led to it. Europe is as anxious to instruct her in 
 war as to instruct her in industry. Well, in both, Europe is 
 prevailing. Listen to the words of a Chinese Confucian, 
 and see what thoughts European policies have forced upon 
 these men who once believed in reason : — 
 
 The contact of China with Europe in the last two decades has 
 revived the martial spirit of the people, which died out in the 
 middle of the Manchu reign. The rise of Japan as a military 
 Power has set them an admirable and practical example. This 
 European conflict has again brought home to them the absolute 
 necessity of an adequate efficient army and navy for the security 
 of their national independence and existence. To the intelligent 
 Chinese of the present generation no person appears to deserve 
 a more appropriate worship than the Krupp engineer who pro- 
 duces a 75-cm. gun, and no nation can give a better lead than 
 the one that raises a voluntary army of three millions in a short 
 period of six months. To cite an instance, I might be permitted 
 to give an extract of a letter I received from a Chinese schoolboy 
 
 1 Since this speech was made the President has reaffirmed the posi- 
 tion then taken up, most notably in his speech to the Senate of January 
 22, 1917, and again in the speech in which he announced the entry of 
 the United States into the war. 
 
22 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 who was expecting to go to America. The letter says : " Having 
 finished my secondary education, I am not entering any uni- 
 versity in China. I solemnly hope that in the future I shall be 
 a Hindenburg or a Petain. Germany and France being now at 
 war, I am going to be trained as a soldier in the land of 
 Generals Jackson and Lee." 
 
 To fight is the nature of man! To urge man to fight is the 
 nature of woman! To this the Chinese are no exception. Cour- 
 age, patience, and endurance, which form their physical and 
 moral character, are the basis of the good soldier. Lord Wolseley, 
 speaking with his personal experience of the China War, says that 
 the Chinese soldier is a mighty and worthy foe. Lord Curzon, 
 criticizing the Sino-Japanese War, admits that, man for man, the 
 Chinese are superior to their opponents. It only needs training to 
 utilize these soldierly qualities and to create a gallant army and a 
 mighty navy for the defence of the country and for its war of 
 liberation. 
 
 In the last five years Bill after Bill has been considered by 
 the Government for universal conscription; proposal after pro- 
 posal has been submitted to President Yuan Shih-Kai for the 
 extension of arsenals and the establishment of shipbuilding yards. 
 The War Office is busily engaged in training army officars and 
 the Admiralty in training naval cadets. Flying schools have been 
 opened, flying corps have been formed; cavalry, artillery, infantry, 
 commissariat. Boy Scouts, Red Cross nurses, and even Woman 
 Volunteer Corps — all have come into being, and all will grow 
 to full strength in time. It is certain that once the foundation 
 has been laid, the structure will be firm; and that once the seeds 
 have been sown the fruits will be wholesome. It may take 
 them fifty years or more before they can be tested in the field, 
 but the day will come when their sinews of war have been 
 provided through the opening up of their resources, when their 
 strategic railways have been extensively built, and when their 
 national education has been speeded up — the day will come when 
 China, possessing one-fourth of the world's population, and oc- 
 cupying an area twenty times as great as Great Britain, will 
 adequately defend her vast Empire and claim the voice and 
 place to which she is entitled in the family of nations.*^ 
 
 1 Clare Market Review, " The Action and Reaction of the War in 
 China," by S. G. Cheng. 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 23 
 
 We see, then, that the prospect I have been opening 
 out extends far beyond Europe. There is no part or 
 corner of the world which is not threatened. Mihtarism 
 spreads Hke an epidemic. And either we must cut it off, 
 root and branch, here in Europe, or we must look forward 
 to its extension East and West, to return thence against 
 ourselves and consummate by destruction from without our 
 own internecine strife. Europe is not only committing 
 harikari; she is at the same time arming the hand that is to 
 strike off her head, after she has made the fatal cut.^ 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Page 5. — Methods of Warfare. 
 
 I. Submarining. 
 
 The fact that the British in this war have not found it necessary 
 to imitate German methods of warfare at sea cannot prudently be 
 taken as prophetic of the conduct of such warfare in the future. 
 Holding the command of the seas, we have been able to carry on 
 our blockade without too violent a breach with the traditional sea- 
 law. But the submarine has none the less altered the whole 
 position. And already before this war a distinguished British 
 authority both foresaw and justified the policy which the Germans 
 have adopted. Writing in The Times a fortnight before the war 
 broke out, Sir Percy Scott said that a declaration of blockade 
 accompanied by the threat to sink by submarines and mines ships 
 attempting to break the blockade " would in my opinion be per- 
 fectly in order; and once it had been made, if any British or 
 neutral ships disregarded it and attempted to run the blockade they 
 would not be held to be engaged in peaceable occupations arid avo- 
 cations, and if they were sunk in the attempt it would not be 
 
 ^ Since this chapter was written a book has been published by a 
 M. Alphonse Seche entitled Les Guerres d'Enfer (Deuxieme Edition. 
 E. Sansot, Paris, 1915), which develops at length the positions of this 
 chapter. It is to be noted that, by a fatalism too common among 
 French intellectuals, the author regards the whole process as "in- 
 evitable." This war is only the prelude to centuries of wars on a scale 
 find of an intensity of destructiveness of which this is only the foretaste. 
 
24. THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 describable as a relapse into savagery or piracy in the blackest 
 form" (The Times, July i6, 1914). 
 
 2. Air Raids. 
 
 After long hesitation the British have now (1917) sanctioned 
 reprisals in kind for the German air raids. The French succumbed 
 earlier to the temptation, as the following official German account 
 of the Karlsruhe raid may illustrate: — 
 
 " It was obviously no mere coincidence that the French chose 
 Corpus Christi Day for their raid. They knew that on this great 
 Catholic festival, under the bright sunshine, crowds of people, 
 athirst for light and air, would be sure to stream through the streets 
 and squares. That it was people's lives they aimed at is proved 
 by the sort of bombs they threw. Incendiary bombs were only used 
 in a small number. Nearly all the bombs were small, but filled 
 with very strong explosives. They thus broke into very small 
 splinters and destroyed the maximum of human lives, their effect 
 being increased by poisonous gases. Their preparations and in- 
 tentions had only too great a success. On the Karlsruhe Festplatz, 
 where Hagenbeck's zoo had erected tents, there moved a joyous 
 crowd. Happy children's laughter mingled with the sounds of 
 music. . . . Before there was time to bring the people into safety 
 the first shots fell. . . . The enemy's worst destruction was . . . 
 achieved around the Festplatz amongst the innocent children, who 
 a few minutes before had been so happy. When the French airmen 
 disappeared a quarter of an hour later they could boast of having 
 killed 117 people .... of whom 82 were children, . . . and 
 wounded 140 people ... of whom 72 were children. . . ." 
 
 On this the New York Evening Post comments (June 27, 1915) : 
 " Such is the latest record of legitimate warfare under the recog- 
 nized form of ' reprisals.' Does the human conscience find any 
 justification for such savagery in the fact that Karlsruhe has only 
 been punished for what the Germans have done in France and 
 England? Even in colonial warfare, against tribes who tortured 
 their prisoners and maimed the dead, the nations of Europe have 
 not resorted to reprisals on women and children. ... It is an out- 
 break of primitive brutality which fitly marks the status of Euro- 
 pean ' civilization ' after two years of war." 
 
 It must be remembered that even the existing international law 
 sanctions the bombardment from the air of " defended " places, and 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 25 
 
 that every great capital is in this sense " defended." Thus London, 
 in the German view, is a " fortress." So, of course, is Antwerp ; 
 and in reference to the first Zeppelin raid on that city The 
 Times wrote: — 
 
 " It marks the beginning of a new epoch in the conflicts of man- 
 kind. . . . Much indignation was expended yesterday, much of it 
 was misdirected. Antwerp is a formidable fortress, protecting a 
 strong army, and its bombardment is permissible. Bombs dropped 
 from aircraft are not more destructive than great shells fired from 
 siege howitzers. In all bombardments of defended places the civil 
 population is not exempt, and even the British Official Manual de- 
 clares that in operations against such places ' the town and forts 
 form an indivisible whole.' . . . How is the commander of a hostile 
 airship to give notice of bombardment?" {The Times, August 27, 
 
 ■ 1914). 
 
 We are not, therefore, surprised to read in the Press of Sep- 
 tember 29, 1916, the following notice (German Wireless): — 
 
 " During a British bombing attack on Brussels 15 houses were 
 destroyed and 13 Belgians killed, while 28 were wounded." 
 
 On April 6, 1916, we find the Daily News complacently remarking 
 of a British aeroplane raid upon the airship shed of Hoboken 
 (Antwerp), which killed 42 German working men and wounded 62 
 others, that this particular raid " is far and away the most effective 
 air bombardment during the war." 
 
 3. Starvation of the Civilian Population. 
 
 The object of the British blockade of Germany and of the 
 German blockade of England is, of course, to reduce by famine the 
 civilian population; and no one will contend that either party 
 would relax their measures because they found that they were 
 succeeding and that little children were actually dying by hundreds 
 and thousands. Each would say that the enemy ought to give in, 
 and that if they did not the consequences were on their own head. ' 
 Thus, in a leading article of one of the principal " Liberal " news- 
 papers I read : " We shall be sustained, no doubt, by the belief, 
 which all available information endorses as valid, that Germany and 
 Austria have not merely less than they want, but less, far less, than 
 they need." 
 
 In Poland, it would seem, the death by starvation or disease of 
 women, children, and old people is already an accomplished fact. 
 In an appeal for funds for Polish relief signed by Paderewski and 
 
26 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Ex-President Taft, the following description of conditions in Poland 
 is given: — 
 
 " The latest reports from Poland have been of such a nature that 
 unless we obtain more assistance from you the whole Polish nation 
 will be wiped out of existence. Over 20,500 villages have been 
 levelled to the ground. More than 200 towns have completely 
 disappeared. Sixteen hundred churches are in ruins. Loss in 
 property destroyed over 2 billions (500 million pounds). More 
 than 100,000 young girls of Poland have had their lives shattered 
 by the greatest tragedy that can come to a woman. Victims of the 
 conquering and the retiring armies that have incessantly swept over 
 Poland since the beginning of the war, these unfortunate young 
 mothers, whose babies have died for want of food, clothing, and 
 shelter, find themselves outcasts — helpless, alone, having known of 
 maternity nothing but the sorrows. Fourteen million^ Poles, in- 
 cluding all the children under seven years of age, have actually been 
 wiped out of existence. A prominent American, who has just 
 returned from Poland, where he had been investigating conditions 
 on behalf of a well-known American war relief organization, reports 
 as follows : ' Having had occasion to travel on the main road from 
 Warsaw to Pinsk, about 150 miles long, I noticed that the ground 
 was simply littered with civilian garments and cradles. Four 
 hundred thousand human beings must have dropped dead along that 
 road. The retreating army had burned their homes and compelled 
 them to evacuate the land. There had been no time to bury those 
 who fell. The birds of prey, as well as the wild animals, had 
 cleaned the bones, and the invader, after gathering these bones and 
 grinding them, had used them for fertilizing the fields in his own 
 home land.' And now winter is coming again with all its horrors. 
 It will bring untold misery to the homeless, shelterless, foodless 
 Polish sufferers. Thousands more must die. They are doomed. 
 Help cannot reach them in time. However, out of a population of 
 34,000,000 (?) Poles still quite a number remain whom you can help 
 us to save, for food can still be obtained in Poland, but only at 
 extremely high prices" (from the New York Tribune, November 
 1916). 
 
 Those who still speak of the ennobling and regenerating effects of 
 war are invited to contemplate these facts. 
 
 ^Sic. (?) 4,000,000 or 1,400,000 (?). The figure clearly is wrongly 
 reproduced. 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 27 
 
 Page 7 — Conscription breeding Persecution. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to illustrate this point by the case of the 
 "conscientious objectors." The objection of these men, who num- 
 ber in England many thousands, is either religious or political, 
 and in both cases conscientious. Yet the effort of the Govern- 
 ment to give them security against being forced into the army has 
 been defeated by the Tribunals with the full support of public 
 opinion. Hundreds of men, as I write, are undergoing sentences 
 of imprisonment for obeying their conscience, and few voices 
 are raised in their behalf, though those few are pertinacious and 
 courageous. It is clear that the English public does not disap- 
 prove this kind of persecution. It is also clear, to any one who 
 knows the English, that there will always be, in every generation, 
 people who will face persecution on this issue. Resistance will 
 breed resistance. The public will become more exasperated as 
 the victims become more obstinate. And it may not be long, if 
 conscription is continued after the war, before these men will be 
 shot, with the full approval of the Press, the Universities, and the 
 Churches. 
 
 Page 8. — Military Training and Its Effects. 
 
 This is a large subject, on which I profess no expert knowledge. 
 If the reader wants confirmation of the statements in the text, I 
 advise him to make inquiry among officers and soldiers who have 
 been through the war and are willing to tell the truth. I mention 
 only what has come before my own notice. Thus, for example, in 
 the training for bayonet charges the men are taught to kick the 
 enemy in the genital organs at the same time that they make their 
 thrust. They are trained to charge at sacks or dummy men on 
 which the vital parts are marked. I have heard of men fainting 
 with physical horror under this discipline. More commonly, I am 
 told, it has no ^effect at all on their imagination. But if the training 
 does not actively promote brutality, it must at least passively hinder 
 the motions of humanity. Suggest to men, by a matter-of-fact 
 teaching, that any course you like to think of is normal and ap- 
 proved, and you will get them to adopt it. For they will not either 
 think or imagine for themselves. If these good-natured boys in all 
 the armies saw or conceived the remote consequences of every 
 bomb they throw in the spirit of cricket, or every gun they fire in the 
 spirit of sport, is it to be supposed that they could do what they do ? 
 
28 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 It is essential both to war and to preparation for war that men 
 should not be allowed, or allow themselves, to realize what they 
 are doing. 
 
 That training for war, whether or no it actually encourages 
 brutality, gives opportunity for it is clear from the well attested 
 records of outrages by non-commissioned officers in conscript 
 armies abroad. To convince the reader that those possibilities 
 lie quite near to us at home, I will ask him to consider the 
 following case of the treatment of a recalcitrant conscientious 
 objector, not by Germans but by Englishmen. 
 
 " G. B. appeared before the Local Tribunal on July loth to 
 
 claim exemption as a conscientious objector on moral grounds. 
 Immediately he had made his statement, the military representative 
 read a case from a circular sent out for the guidance of tribunals, in 
 which an applicant had been turned down on the ground that the 
 objection was a political one, and not moral, and .the military repre- 
 sentative held that B.'s case was analogous. B. contended that his 
 objection was not analogous, and that his objection, based on his 
 conception of war as murder, was moral. The tribunal upheld the 
 contention of the military representative, and he was turned down. 
 
 The appeal was heard at on August 8th, and before B. had 
 
 finished his case or called his witnesses the chairman announced 
 that the tribunal were unanimously of opinion that his case was 
 analogous, and the appeal would be dismissed. B. tried to elicit 
 from the chairman whether in his opinion a moral objection apart 
 from religious belief could be sustained. No answer was given to 
 this question. Feeling that this point was of the most vital im- 
 portance to objectors on moral grounds, B. asked for leave to go 
 before the Central Tribunal, but this was refused. He was left, 
 therefore, without remedy. 
 
 " On the morning of August 29th he reported, in answer to a 
 
 notice, at the Town Hall, and was sent the same day to . 
 
 From the start he refused to be medically examined, to sign papers, 
 or to obey military orders. On the attempt forcibly to dress him 
 in khaki he consented to dress himself, but refused to wear puttees. 
 He was handcuffed while the puttees were put on, but he pulled 
 them off when the handcuffs were removed. He was placed in the 
 guardroom, and spent Tuesday night there. 
 
 " On Wednesday he was allocated to the 3rd and sent back 
 
 to . The escort tied his kit-bag round his neck, nearly choking 
 
 him, but a soldier from the camp, seeing his condition, cut the 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 29 
 
 string, and placed the kit-bag in a cart from the camp. On arrival 
 here the military policeman threw the kit-bag at him, striking him 
 on the forehead and making it bleed. 
 
 "Thursday morning saw the attempt in earnest to tame the 
 conscientious objector. For an hour and a half before breakfast 
 several men told off for the purpose tried to force him to obey 
 orders, and on his refusal he was pummelled until he was bruised 
 from head to foot. In this state he was dragged out to parade after 
 breakfast, and dragged by main force round the field. When he 
 refused to march or mark time his ankles were kicked until they 
 were swollen and a source of torture, fresh relays of men keeping 
 up the fusillade of blows and kicks and arm and wrist twisting. It 
 should be remembered that B. had taken no food after Wednesday 
 noon, and this was Thursday morning. His physical condition 
 with hunger plus brutality can be dimly imagined. The major was 
 riding about the field on horseback, and sent for B. to interrogate 
 him as to the reason of his attitude. B. pointed out that he had 
 already stated his attitude, and under proper conditions he would 
 be willing to restate it. He was then handed over to the Gym 
 squad for a further course of ' discipline.' 
 
 "The exhibition of the next hour took place in a public park 
 before a large number of men and women and children. At ii a.m. 
 the wife and sister of B. arrived in the park and were eyewitnesses. 
 He was first taken to the water- jump. The men take a run, vault 
 over a rail, and then leap over the pool of water. B. resisted. He 
 was dragged to the rail, roughly bundled over, and as he refused 
 to leap he was pushed time after time into the water. No time 
 was allowed him to recover his breath. As he scrambled out of the 
 water he was seized and harried round the field by fresh men as fast 
 as they could force him, only to be brought back with the object of 
 making him leap. After he had been doused about a dozen times 
 the attempt was abandoned, and he was taken to a palisade 7 feet 
 high. Men clamber up one side and drop down the other. Five 
 men seized B. and threw him bodily towards the top, but being a 
 fairly big man, instead of landing him clear they caught him on the 
 top, and as he fell over on the other side they caught him. This 
 was not ' efficient ' enough for the officer. He was dragged back, 
 hurled bodily over the top, and as the men ran to catch him this 
 officer shouted, ' Stand clear ! ' and he was allowed to fall on the 
 ground like a log. This was repeated a third time, and he was 
 hurried to a frame platform reached by an inclined plank. In a 
 
30 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 state of physical exhaustion B. was seized on every side and forced 
 at full length up the sloping plank. At the top he was turned head 
 over heels time after time, and finally dumped on the ground 
 helpless and bleeding. . . ."^■ 
 
 This treatment was accorded by English soldiers to an English- 
 man under the supervision and direction of an English officer, 
 presumably a gentleman. It would, I believe, be repugnant to the 
 natural feeling of most Englishmen thus to treat a defenceless man. 
 But military discipline makes it possible, even though it be illegal. 
 For no natural kindness or sense of fair play can preserve the sol- 
 dier from obeying such orders once they are given. 
 
 To complete the story I will cite the following authentic letter 
 from a corporal who had been compelled to do the bullying (not in 
 the case quoted above, but in another) : — 
 
 " Excuse me writing this, but I cannot help it, because of such 
 
 an act of injustice nobody ever heard. When I was at as 
 
 corporal, I was stripped of my stripes because of obeying orders. 
 Anyway, you know what I did. I did the dirty work, after which 
 I was stripped of stripes so as somebody else could get the credit 
 of doing it, although there was no credit in the human eye for what 
 I did; there was no credit for the men having signed articles after 
 the force was used against them. . . . The sooner I am dead the 
 better. I recognize, now it is too late, that I was to do this thing 
 and make a brute of myself by so doing. ... I will either get my 
 discharge from the Service, for which I am totally unfit, or take my 
 own life." 
 
 At present, conscription being new to us, public opinion is 
 against such treatment and the higher military command dis- 
 courages it. It is in a comparatively few cases that these scenes 
 have occurred. But if conscription becomes a permanent institu- 
 tion in England, how long will it be before such occurrences are 
 regarded as a matter of course ? It must be remembered that there 
 is a powerful strain of the bully in many Englishmen. I may illus- 
 trate by the following episode, to which attention was called by a 
 letter in the Daily News of November 4, 1916: — 
 
 " Sir, — In a corner of your issue to-day I find an item of news 
 which ought surely to be rescued from obscurity : 
 
 1 See Manchester Guardian of September 20, 1916. Since this date 
 other cases of brutality have occurred amounting even to torture. 
 Several conscientious objectors have committed suicide. 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 31 
 
 " ' At an inquest at Surbiton on Private R. G. Eley, of the Royal 
 Fusiliers, who was knocked down by a train near New Maiden, the 
 father said his son complained of being bullied by sergeants and 
 could not face going back after his leave. 
 
 " ' The Coroner : Well, I can tell you I served in the ranks as a 
 young fellow, and I know a lot about that bullying. It is the way 
 to smarten a soldier up. 
 
 " ' An open verdict was returned.' 
 
 " Will the authorities allow to pass unrebuked an utterance which 
 cannot but gravely impair our military efficiency by bringing the 
 army into disrepute and odium. I know nothing of ' crowner's 
 quest law,' but was it not the official's plain duty to call for evi- 
 dence as to the treatment to which the young man had been sub- 
 jected?" 
 
 The connexion between military training and the militaristic 
 ideal is well stated by one of the German writers who is opposed to 
 the latter : — 
 
 " Sometimes when I watch boys enthusiastically drilling, I cannot 
 escape from the impression that this one-sided physical training 
 must have a bad effect on the nobler development of spirit and 
 heart. As a natural consequence, the young people must come to 
 the conclusion that there is nothing nobler and more ideal on earth 
 than to carry rifles, march in line, and enthuse in the trenches. In 
 my judgment, the vision of a higher goal and a religious ideal 
 must perish utterly among men brought up in this one-sided cult of 
 nationalism" {Vorw'drts, December 3, 1915). 
 
 Page 10. — Christianity and the War. 
 
 According to Mr. Outhwaite, speaking in the House of Com- 
 mons: 
 
 " The Venerable Archdeacon Wilberforce, who read the prayers 
 in the House, preaching in St. Margaret's Church at the beginning 
 of the war, "said : ' To kill Germans is a divine service in the full- 
 est acceptation of the term.' ... A leadihg minister in his division 
 had said that if Christ came to the world to-day he would expect 
 to see Him using a bayonet. (See Hansard of January 20, 1916.) 
 
 Extract from a letter from a conscientious objector (1916) : — 
 
 "We had the priest in just before dinner and he told us the 
 tale. Of course he was in uniform. He said the Catholic Church 
 upheld this war, and that we as Catholics were bound to fight 
 imder pain of sin. He said we were not Catholics, as no Catholic 
 
32 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 could have a conscientious objection to warfare, and that he could 
 not give us absolution if we went to confession." 
 
 With regard to the possibility of the fusion of Christianity, as 
 professed by the Churches, with the religion of the God-State, the 
 following passage is worth citing from a translation of an article 
 by Professor Ernst Troeltsch which appeared in the New York 
 Sun. The professor is dealing with the ideas fermenting in Ger- 
 many in war-time, and he speaks of " the German Imperialists, 
 to whom belong the majority of the German historians, a large 
 number of national economists, the industrial magnates and many 
 officers. They saw all their previous teaching confirmed, and 
 celebrated the great moment of the final breaking-through of the 
 Germans to be the world-race. Races and States must grow or go 
 under. The goal of every great and noble people, to become a 
 world-Power, seemed to have approached very near. ... To be 
 sure, in this teaching there plays no religious tone ; Christianity is 
 not denied, but is warned against every humanitarian and senti- 
 mental understanding." 
 
 The last sentence gives the key to a position which the Churches 
 of all countries may feel it easy and perhaps imperative to adopt. 
 
 It is perhaps worth while to append the following example of 
 militant Christianity from the Morning Post, January 2, 1915 : — 
 
 " The war opens out a vast field of usefulness for the Christian 
 Church; as it reminds people of death, so it reminds them of 
 faith; as it destroys their wealth, so it suggests to them spiritual 
 consolations; as it teaches them the folly of sloth and self-indul- 
 gence, so it instructs them in the deeper purposes and meanings of 
 life. Therefore war and faith go commonly hand in hand; and 
 war teaches mankind what child-birth teaches women. The spir- 
 itual field is ploughed and harrowed by such terrible events, and 
 the seed which the Church sows should fall upon prepared ground. 
 And if the Church uses the opportunity well, and scorns all com- 
 fortable doctrine, not confusing safety with virtue or war with 
 evil, it should reap a great spiritual harvest." 
 
 As a pendant to this, I cite the following letter from a German 
 evangelical divine : — 
 
 "The peaceable settlement of future international disputes by 
 way of conciliation or juridical decision is a dream which can 
 never be realized. Think of the Hague Palace with its portraits 
 of the Czar and of Edward. As a clergyman you should know that 
 so long as men live on earth, sin reigns, and so long as that is 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 33 
 
 the case, the Government must wield the sword lent it by God " 
 {Blatter fur ZwischenstaatUche Organisation, October, 1916, p. 
 302). 
 
 And this : — 
 
 "The whimpering and howling over the misery and havoc of 
 the war I can no longer endure. The war is not Germany's mis- 
 fortune, it is Germany's good fortune. Thank God that the war 
 has come! I say it even now in the third year of the war. And 
 thank God that we have no peace yet ; I say it still, and spite of all 
 the victims. . . . Therefore I say it again and again. Thank God 
 that we have the war ! It alone can save our people, if they be yet 
 capable of salvation. It is the great operator's knife with which the 
 great Physician of the nations cuts out the most terrible of cancers. 
 Thank God that we have yet no peace ! The wounds would close 
 too quickly and the evil become worse than ever" (Herr Pastor 
 Philips, President of the Christian Socialist Party. Cited in Die 
 Welt am Montag, October 9, 1916. As the editor remarks, it is 
 a pity tbat this gentleman — and many others one could think of — 
 should not pass twenty-four hours on the Somme). 
 
 In quoting these passages I do not intend to imply that there 
 is no other attitude to war than this to be found among the clergy. 
 I note, for instance, with satisfaction, that a body of Congregational 
 ministers have issued a letter in which they state that " any com- 
 promise between Christianity and militarism involves ultimately 
 betrayal of Christ," and that the principles of Christianity and war 
 cannot be reconciled. 
 
 Page 12. — Preconceptions of Mii-itaeism. 
 
 As an example of the way people imply in their thought a 
 doctrine they nevertheless deny in words, I may refer to an 
 article which appeared in the Deutsche Tagesseitung dealing with 
 the contrast between German and American political ideas. The 
 author cites an American writer as taking the view (which of 
 course is the one generally taken outside Germany) that the Ger- 
 man philosophy of the State rests on two preconceptions: one, 
 that Might is Right; the other that the individual exists for the 
 State, not vice versa. Repudiating this interpretation of the Ger- 
 man view, he says, as to the first point : — 
 
 " The rule ' might is right,' at any rate in the sense that every 
 Power ought to be allowed to stretch and contract Right according 
 to its good pleasure, has never been defended by any reputable 
 
34 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 German. Only the enthusiastic perversion that Might ought to 
 be nothing but a servant of Right has been rejected, and rightly, 
 as an ideological soap-bubble." 
 
 The latter part of this passage, of course, admits the whole case 
 the writer supposes himself to be refuting. 
 
 On the second point he has nothing to say, except that the 
 individual, according to German philosophers, ought to submit 
 himself to the moral law. The charge made against the German 
 view is that it supposes the State to be the ultimate judge of the 
 moral law. And the author does not seem even to perceive this 
 point, so deeply engrained in him is the belief that the State is 
 in fact the judge. (See Deutsche Tageszeitung, August ii, ipiS-) 
 
 Here is another example of the sophistries of the " Might is 
 Right " theory. Dr. Zacher, a " Geheimer Regierungsrath," writes 
 to the Muncher-Augshurger Zeitung of September 14, 1916: — 
 
 " Seldom has so much confusion been produced by a misunder- 
 stood foreign word as has been created by the word ' annexa- 
 tions ' in the conflict of opinion about the aims of the war. Accord- 
 ing to common usage the word to ' annex ' carries with it the 
 connotation of seizure contrary to Right, while the meaning of 
 the word really is ' to bind one thing with another,' in the sense of 
 'joining on.' In the case of territory occupied and held in war, 
 there can be no question of wrongful seizure. In such a case one 
 speaks logically of the ' Right ' of the conqueror, who creates a new 
 ' Right ' adapted to the new relations of Might.'' 
 
 This citation is given in the Blatter fiir Zwischenstaatliche Or- 
 ganisation for September, 1916 (p. 306). And the editor appro- 
 priately comments: "This new 'Right,' with the creation of 
 which German professors are now trying to throw dust in the 
 eyes of the German people, is unfortunately the ancient right of 
 savagery, whereby the order of social relations was measured by 
 nothing but brute force. To reintroduce this old 'Right' into 
 the modern world is to annihilate our civilization and to reduce 
 ourselves to cannibals." 
 
 The views and sophistries here illustrated are not peculiar to 
 Germany. They are those of the militarists of all countries. And 
 they follow from accepting the position that the State, not the 
 individual conscience, is the ultimate depository of moral truth 
 and that the power of the State is the highest aim of life. 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 36 
 
 Page 13. — Militarism and Morals. 
 
 It is well known that German writers, with that sense of logical 
 consequence which makes them the enfants terribles of the world, 
 have stated definitely that what the Teutonic race most needs is 
 a new religion freed from the humanitarianism and universalism 
 of professed Christianity. If English militarists were as clear- 
 sighted or as frank, they would adopt the same position. Captain 
 Ross, in his book Representative Government and War, to which I 
 refer in the text, is as contemptuous of morality or honesty or 
 honour as any German could be. He regards the liberation of 
 the slaves in South Africa as simply bad strategy. "What mat- 
 tered it that black men were slaves? . . . What mattered it even 
 that that country were denuded of these black men, provided that 
 white men grew up in love and reverence for the Mother Country ? " 
 The support by the British Government of the interests of the 
 natives against those of white settlers was an " indelible disgrace 
 to the British nation." And this, observe, is all quite in the logic 
 of the worship of the God-State. For in the captain's view those 
 procedures of the British Government (based upon Christian prin- 
 ciple) were inimical to the interests of the Empire. " Justice ! — 
 injustice ! " he cries elsewhere. " What are such things when the 
 national existence is at stake ? " And again : " Morality — im- 
 morality ! What are such things to great nations when their fate 
 is at stake ? " 
 
 The reader should seriously consider that the sentiments here 
 frankly stated are practically endorsed, in sheer muddleheadedness, 
 by many people who are shocked by the statement of them. 
 
 Page 13. — Militarism and Education. 
 
 A correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, writing of the 
 new educational movement in Germany, says: — 
 
 " As with us, the experiences of the war are making the Germans 
 overhaul the principles and practices of their educational system 
 and forecast the best developments for the future. As with us, 
 unfortunately, the German writers on education all of them pre- 
 suppose that there will be war in the future, and education must 
 prepare for it. They take war for granted, and instead of shaping 
 education in such a way as to make war impossible, their sole 
 idea is, by means of education, to produce the best possible men 
 for fighting purposes. 
 
S6 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 " Speaking generally, educational writers are sublimely satisfied 
 with the way in which the aims and methods of their education 
 have approved themselves again in this war as they did in the 
 war of 1870-1. Writing at the end of the first year of war, when 
 German arms were in the ascendant, they claim that the German 
 soldier has proved himself superior to the Russian and the Italian 
 on two grounds: first, because the national system of education 
 has imbued the youth of Germany with a stronger sense of disci- 
 pline; and, secondly, because an educated population lends itself 
 more readily to organization and concerted efifort on the largest 
 scale. Special stress is laid on discipline and subordination of self. 
 These results are accredited to the elementary school, but the part 
 which the universities and the secondary schools have played 
 comes in also for special commendation, and the ' volunteers ' (i.e. 
 the privileged soldiers of one year's service) are contrasted with 
 'the educated shirkers of France.' The writer quotes a Turkish 
 newspaper and the King of Bavaria in confirmation of his views. 
 The Ministry of Education has not been slow to avail itself of the 
 tide of patriotic feeling. A new syllabus for the teaching of his- 
 tory has been promulgated which came into force last Easter — 
 Easter marks the close of the educational year throughout Ger- 
 many. The new syllabus is avowedly experimental, and headmas- 
 ters are to report on its success in 1918. Briefly, the aim is to 
 concentrate study upon the last half-century, and more especially 
 upon the achievement of national unity under Prussia and the 
 rise of united Germany to the position of a great world-Power. 
 HohenzoUern Day opened the flood-gates of panegyric. The 
 reigning dynasty was extolled as having given to Prussia the 
 schools which had made it mighty in the world of learning and of 
 military power. The reigning Emperor was extolled as the direct 
 inspirer of all educational reforms which followed as the result 
 of the great Conference of 1890. The qualities which have made 
 Prussia are analysed, and emphasis is laid upon the sense of social 
 obligation and the habitude of obedience. The authority of the 
 State must increase, the individualism which was threatening the 
 country must be repressed. The State must be more and more; 
 the individual must be less and less. The teaching of Socialism is 
 held up as having been in reality individualistic in its tendency, 
 because it disposes the individual 'to make greater claims upon 
 life for personal pleasure and self-indulgence.' Extremists are not 
 wanting. Some writers would exclude all teaching of English 
 
THE FUTURE OF MILITARISM 37 
 
 and French from the schools, and admit Russian and Spanish only 
 because of their commercial importance. In view of the all-trans- 
 cending greatness of German education, all disposition to study 
 foreign systems, Swedish, English, or American, is sternly repri- 
 manded." 
 
 In the same spirit, one understands, German is being dropped 
 in English schools. 
 
 The following passage is taken from an article by Professor 
 Wilhelm von Blume in the Europaische Staats- und Wirthschaft 
 Zeitung, p. 951 : — 
 
 " Internal policy must be determined by external policy in a State 
 whose existence is perpetually threatened. It is from this point 
 of view that the Constitution, the Law, and the Administration 
 must be treated. We must fashion the State with a view to war 
 in order to preserve peace, and save our skin, if we can do it in no 
 other way. We must — I do not shrink from saying it — cultivate 
 our militarism even more consciously than before. 
 
 "War is an act of the whole nation, not only of the army., 
 Therefore the whole nation must be made ready for war, its 
 intellectual (geistige) force, its moral force, its economic force. 
 War is above all an act of the ' common man,' however important 
 may be the services of leaders. It follows that every individual 
 must be educated for the State and trained for service in the State. 
 War is a product of technique. We must therefore develop the 
 technical production of our people to the greatest possible per- 
 fection. There remains for us therefore no other way than this: 
 we must ' statify ' (verstaatUchen) the life of the nation in a much 
 higher degree than before." 
 
 A member of the German Reichstag, Miiller-Meiningen, has pro- 
 posed compulsory physical training for all boys from the age of six 
 to sixteen, and military training from sixteen upwards. It has 
 then been further proposed that this training be entrusted to mil- 
 itary officers, and even to any non-commissioned officer. A Dr. 
 Adolf Matthias, after saying that "There must be made of our 
 youth a giant in military force before which, even in peace-time, 
 ■ our foes will shrink in terror," adds : " The State orders and regu- 
 lates not only the acts but the thoughts of its citizens." This latter 
 sentence gives the full logic of the God-State. 
 
 It should, however, be added that, as a counter to these senti- 
 ments, there is a movement among German students for greater 
 freedom from State dictation and leave to shape their own ideals. 
 
88 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Which of these tendencies will triumph depends upon the way 
 Europe is shaped after the war; and that depends upon the kind 
 of peace that is made.*- 
 
 Similar ideas are found in France. Thus: "Three members 
 of the French Chamber have tabled the proposal that after the 
 war all French boys shall be subject to a Spartan military training 
 from the age of twelve onwards." 
 
 The English are likely at first to go slowly in this matter. They 
 will begin by teaching "patriotism" in the schools; that is, a 
 falsification of history (which is what State-instructed patriotism 
 is bound to mean) and a hatred and mistrust of all other nations 
 except those which at the moment are allied with them. The 
 teaching of " religion " will be fused with this, and the pupil will 
 get a general idea that the mission of Jesus Christ is fulfilled, and 
 can only be fulfilled, in the British Empire. The movement will 
 ascend from the elementary to the secondary schools, and from 
 these to the universities. All the time, of course, the official re- 
 ligion will continue to preach an academic preference for peace — 
 in short, the pulpit variety of the song, " We don't want to fight, 
 but, by jingo, if we do," and we shall point with horror to the 
 wicked " foreigners " who positively glorify war. 
 
 ^The above remarks are based on an article in the Friedenswarte of 
 August-September 1916, " Richtlinien innerhalb der deutschen Studen- 
 tenschaft," by Dr. Cornelius Bergmann. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 THE REALITY OF THE MENACE 
 
 I HARDLY know how my attempt to set forth the meaning 
 and the prospects of mihtarism may have affected the 
 reader. But there are two possible effects on which I wish 
 to say something before proceeding with my argument. 
 First, some readers may agree that the developments I 
 indicate are probable, but may feel nothing but satisfaction 
 in the prospect. In other words, they may regard as an 
 ideal what I regard as the contrary. I endeavour, in the 
 next chapter, to do what justice I can to that attitude. 
 More important, however, and from my point of view 
 more dangerous, is a different reaction of the reader. He 
 may say that I take it all too tragically; that there may 
 be tendencies in the direction I indicate, but that they 
 will be countered by other tendencies; that we shall be 
 able, in the future as in the past, to continue war, and yet 
 to continue with it civilization, and even Christian civiliza- 
 tion. I may have overrated the danger. But it is much 
 more likely, especially by Englishmen, to be underrated 
 than to be overrated. Our unwillingness or inability to 
 think things through, to look to remoter consequences, 
 to make clear to ourselves the ultimate meaning and im- 
 plications of our policies, make us peculiarly liable to arrive 
 without knowing or intending it, at situations from which 
 we should have shuddered back had we clearly antici- 
 pated them. 
 
 I desire therefore, even at some risk of repetition, to 
 remind the reader why it is that I think the danger immi- 
 nent and real. 
 
 39 
 
40 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Militarism, in the first place, does not happen in any 
 nation because people want or choose it. It happens 
 because it is a consequence of a situation. That situation 
 is what I have called elsewhere the European anarchy. 
 Its essence is that nations have conflicting aims and pur- 
 poses, just as individuals; but that they have no system 
 of law and government peaceably to adjust their disputes. 
 They therefore arm, in order to be able to get what they 
 want by force, or to protect themselves against attempts by 
 others to do the same. But arming means counter-arming. 
 IiTproportion as armaments become formidable, the fear 
 of them increases, and that fear becomes, more and more, 
 the dominant motive of national life. More and more of 
 the wealth, the intelligence, the physical and moral force of 
 nations, is directed to the aim of being safe and being 
 strong. And this involves not only the continuous increase 
 of armaments, not only the constant invention of new and 
 more lethal methods of destruction, but a transformation 
 of the institutions and ultimately of the very minds and 
 souls of men. We all see this, or think we do, in the case 
 of Germany. But Germany is only the leading case. And 
 the same cause, working in other countries, must end by 
 producing the same effects. All that I have said above 
 about the training for war, both on the physical and the 
 intellectual and the moral side, if sometimes it has been 
 expressed in terms which the reader may have felt to be 
 extravagant, is nevertheless in the logic of the movement, 
 and already, at least partly, in the facts, as my illustrations 
 show. On what, short of a revolution in international 
 policy, does the reader rely, to prevent the development 
 of the full effects? 
 
 He will perhaps be inclined to say that he relies on 
 "human nature." But human nature is like an organ. 
 It has many stops and many notes, and it depends on the 
 
THE REALITY OF THE MENACE 41 
 
 organist which of these are to sound. In international 
 affairs the master-organist is the situation; and I insist 
 that the situation plays the militarist tune. Does the 
 reader recall what he thought war was like before this war 
 began, and can he measure the gulf between that imagina- 
 tion and' the facts? Human nature did not prevent the 
 Germans, nor yet the French, from dropping bombs on 
 an innocent civilian population. Human nature did not 
 prevent the submarining of passenger ships. Human 
 nature did not prevent the use of poison gases. What 
 atrocity is human nature likely to prevent, when human 
 , nature is at grips with death ? And observe, it is one plain 
 fact about human nature that it soon becomes unable even 
 to attend to the horrors it is perpetrating and suffering. 
 I have talked, as every one has, to men from the front. I 
 know that any generalization about their attitude would 
 be false. But what has struck me personally, more than 
 anything else, is their indifference. They have witnessed 
 and participated in things which, before, they would have 
 shrunk from with horror. But now ? " You get used to 
 it." " You are too tired to think of anything." " You just 
 see red." The check of humanity operates not at all, or 
 operates very fitfully, on the men at the front, however 
 humane they may naturally be. And still less does it 
 operate on those at home who are responsible for continu- 
 ing the war. Nothing has been more remarkable, in the 
 course of this war, than the readiness with which some men 
 sacrifice other men. And this, I believe, arises mainly from 
 a defect of imagination; which, however, we must reckon 
 as essential in the make-up of ordinary men. What they 
 do not take part in — nay, even what they do take part in — 
 they do not realize. They go through it, and come out 
 of it, as if they had been in a dream. And for that reason 
 I believe that we have no kind of guarantee that any 
 
42 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 reaction from the horror of war will ever prevent men 
 from prosecuting it to the end, and developing and apply- 
 ing in it the last extremes of cruelty. 
 
 And this same lack of imagination will enable men to 
 prepare to the utmost for such war. They will do all they 
 can (EngUshmen at least will) to take their preparations as 
 a "picnic." They will turn their eyes away from the 
 reality for which they are preparing. And not even the 
 most realistic preparations, such as have already been in- 
 troduced and must become more and more essential to 
 efficiency, will arouse any such revulsion as will make it 
 impossible to prosecute them. Men will submit to have 
 their humanity destroyed for the sake of their country, and 
 they will not even know that it is being destroyed. Nor, 
 while they pursue the policies that lead up to war, will they, 
 in the future, any more than in the past, keep fresh before 
 them a vivid picture of what war is. I suppose it might 
 be true that immediately after a war in which the mass 
 of ordinary citizens have participated, the word " war " 
 might reverberate with such sinister import that statesmen 
 would hardly dare to whisper it. But that effect quickly 
 -wears off. War becomes a word again. It becomes again 
 the counter behind policies. And no effort of men of im- 
 agination — of a Tolstoy here or there — avails to open the 
 eyes either of statesmen or of peoples. 
 
 And, mark, it is not that man is an animal loving murder, 
 a merely vicious sadistic beast. No. But all the natural 
 instincts of kindliness, all the casual reactions of individuals 
 to humane appeals, do not save them from acting in accord- 
 ance with the conditions and policies States have imposed 
 upon them. It is not enough to have decent instincts. 
 Still less is it enough to profess a religion of which the 
 ostensible basis is charity. Instincts and ideals have to 
 be directed by intelligence to a course of action which 
 
THE REALITY OF THE MENACE 43 
 
 will give them the opportunity to unfold themselves 
 beneficially. And short of that, no good will, no good 
 nature, no profession, not necessarily insincere, of justice 
 and kindness, will prevent men from preparing system- 
 atically, from producing by their preparation, and from 
 pursuing by all and every means to the bitter end, the 
 satanic thing that modem war is. Human nature will 
 not save us. Nothing will save us but the harnessing of 
 human reason to human charity. 
 
 It will not do, then, to expect that some mere revulsion 
 of humane instincts will deliver mankind from the prospect 
 before them. There will have to be something much more 
 definite and deliberate than that. And the most obvious 
 thing to suggest is economic exhaustion. Thus, I have 
 heard it argued that General Skugarewski's forecast, cited 
 above, is fantastic, because it omits to consider the financial 
 impracticability of such a development. It is indeed im- 
 possible to foresee the economic future with any clearness. 
 There are possibilities of social revolt, of universal an- 
 archy, of wide-reaching transformations of the whole in- 
 dustrial structure, including the ownership and distribution 
 of wealth. But that mere lack of funds will prevent war, 
 I have myself no sort of confidence. All the forecasts 
 of experts have been refuted by the experience of the 
 present war. And we find, to our astonishment (1916), 
 that we can feed our population better than it has ever 
 been fed in peace-times while we are withdrawing from 
 productive labour millions of workers. True, in part we 
 are living on capital. But for a year or two, that, it is 
 thought, need not dismay us. True, we have raised loans 
 which will involve after the war an annual expenditure 
 of hundreds of millions in interest and sinking fund. But 
 that will be mainly a transfer of wealth from the' poor 
 to the rich, and the rich, at any rate, are not likely to 
 
44 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 complain. If society wants expenditure on war it will 
 always manage to provide it. And it will be ready, in 
 order to provide it, to degrade the standard of living of 
 the mass of the people to the minimum of bare neces- 
 sity. For the war gospel, expressed without reserve, is 
 tjiis : " It does not matter how you live, so long as 
 you are always ready to kill and be killed." Will the 
 people revolt against this impoverishment for the sake of 
 war? Possibly. But if so, only because they have under- 
 stood the causes of war, seen that it is avoidable, and 
 determined to take joint international action to avoid it. 
 In other words, only if the people get exactly the kind 
 of education which militarists will be most determined 
 they shall not have. But in that case it will not be 
 economic exhaustion that will have put an end to war. 
 It will be enlightenment. So long as the people covet and 
 hate and fear, without even knowing that they are doing 
 it, so long they will stand for war at whatever cost. That, 
 I fear, is the last word. 
 
 " Will there not then be a moral and religious revulsion ? " 
 There may be. That there should be is essential, if civili- 
 zation is to be saved. And perhaps it will have to be of 
 a quite simple, uncompromising kind — a mere declaration 
 to society and the State, by the conscience of individuals : 
 " We do not stand for this. Say what you like, do what 
 you like, we refuse ! Carry on your war and your prep- 
 arations for war if you can, without us, and over our 
 bodies. We will take no part in them." There are some 
 thousands of men taking this stand in England, even in 
 the midst of a great war. Their numbers may increase in 
 all countries after the war; and their resistance may make 
 it possible and necessary for nations and Governments to 
 attend to the voice of reason. Yet, after all, even so, their 
 sacrifice would only be, as it were, a gesture to compel 
 
THE REALITY OF THE MENACE 45 
 
 men to attend. The attention, the comprehension, and 
 then the will to a new direction of policy, is what we 
 must have, if war is to be ended. Most men now do not 
 " want " war. But most are convinced that it must be, and 
 that they must prepare for it. To convince them of the 
 contrary, it is not enough to demonstrate the satanic char- 
 acter of the war they are preparing. They will discount 
 all that, will look away from it, just because they will 
 believe it cannot be avoided and therefore ought not to be 
 dwelt upon. The mere refusal to take part in war and prep- 
 aration for war they will regard as a form of fanaticism. 
 And they will be ready, under the influence of their fear, 
 and of what they hold to be their patriotism, to suppress 
 the fanaticism by every means at their command; just as 
 the Romans managed, first by persecution and later by 
 absorption, to destroy the menace of early Christianity to 
 the pagan State. 
 
 I conclude that we must not rely on " human nature," 
 nor on economic forces, nor yet on the resistance of rebels 
 against war, to save us from the prospect opening before 
 us. We must rely on enlightenment as to cause and effect. 
 We need the conviction that war is not necessary, and the 
 adoption of a policy that will make it tmnecessary. I shall 
 proceed later to elaborate these two points. But first I must 
 take up a question even more fundamental. I must deal 
 with the case of those who think militarism not only 
 necessary, but desirable. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 41. — Attitude of Soldiers to War. 
 
 The following estimate of the effect of war on the British soldier 
 is taken from a letter from an officer at the front, published in the 
 Open Forum: — 
 
 " On balance he has been slightly brutalized by his experience in 
 
46 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 this war, yet on the whole I believe he has been changed very little 
 by it ; at any rate, when he gets back to billets he has forgotten all 
 about it and is just what he was." 
 
 The letter is quoted at length below, p. 75, where the reader 
 will see that the author attributes very good qualities to the 
 British soldier. But these, as he says, were not created by war. 
 And the actual effect of war he estimates as above. 
 
 In the same connexion I may remind the reader that the main 
 effect produced on the minds of war-correspondents and (if they 
 are to be trusted) on the soldiers at the front by the " tanks " at 
 their first appearance was one of amusement. These are appar- 
 ently among the most destructive engines of war that have yet 
 been invented. But they make the English laugh — only that ! 
 One is reminded, as the Nation pointed out in an article on the 
 subject, of the famous passage in Gulliver's Travels where Gulliver 
 describes to the Houynhnms the ways of men in war. " The 
 man who invented the tanks," writes a correspondent, "deserves 
 much of the army, if for no more than that he has made it laugh 
 as it has fought." Gulliver assured the incredulous horse that he 
 had seen his own dear countrymen blow up a hundred enemies 
 at once in a siege, and as many in a ship, and beheld the dead 
 bodies come down in pieces from the clouds " to the great diversion 
 of the spectators " (Nation, September 25, 1916) . 
 
 We have advanced since the days of Swift in the scale and 
 ingenuity of our methods of destruction, but the "nature of the 
 beast" remains essentially the same. 
 
 Page 41. — Attitude or Non-combatants to War. 
 
 Here is an interesting impression by an Italian journalist of the 
 state of feeling in Russia in the summer of 1916. It will serve 
 to illustrate my meaning, though of course I recognize that it is 
 only an impression, and that different people attending to different 
 things will get different impressions about anything so complex 
 as the attitude of a whole nation. Still, no doubt, among other 
 things that were true, this was true. And a similar impression 
 might be derived by any foreigner from the condition in war-time 
 of the prosperous industrial districts of England: — 
 
 "Well, what do they think of the war at Petrograd? At 
 the front, now that the frosts are nearly over, they expect great 
 doings. Here, however, it would seem that they do not think about 
 
THE REALITY OF THE MENACE 47 
 
 the war at all. They say very little about it. The war ? ' It has 
 been going on such a long time ! ' and meanwhile here is the 
 spring. . . . 
 
 " Russia has now got accustomed to the war. They take no 
 more interest in it, and are no longer frightened by it; the war 
 is no longer a novelty. ' We shall have it for some years yet,' they 
 say, and settle down to it. 
 
 " The country has become tranquil and indifferent, and has 
 recovered its equilibrium. It has the temper now for resisting to 
 eternity — passively. Last autumn Petrograd was in fear of the 
 Germans arriving, when they were still 500 versts away, after five 
 months of fighting that had exhausted them; now, after seven 
 months of rest and reconstruction, they speak no more of them. 
 ' They will not come.' There will be no besieged cities, no star- 
 vation. So there is no need for economy. Such is young Russia, 
 which proceeds by instinct, which knows no stopping places, which 
 fronts the riddle with unknowing joyful serenity. 
 
 " Severe-minded people at Moscow started a crusade against 
 extravagance. Russian women in the towns love elegance at 
 any cost. The Puritans thought that war economy for the 
 war loans was a duty. They had no following. A paper which 
 made inquiries found that at Moscow itself the fashionable shops 
 had made miraculous profits; they had done better in one year of 
 war than in five or six seasons of peace. Everywhere there is a 
 frenzy of enjoyment. 
 
 " Such is the transformation of urban Russia in the war. It 
 reverts to what it was before, only with more money to spend. 
 After passing through internal and external crises, fears and 
 threatenings, spiritual and political oscillations, it has slowly 
 settled itself comfortably again to its peace habits of enjoying 
 life, of making the most of the passing movement, of trusting in 
 the future with a vague instinct of powerful vitality, only at times 
 bursting out into criticism, even of the war, from that spirit of 
 contradiction and over-intellectuality which is the mental delight 
 of many Russians. There is in the Russian temperament, as in 
 the system of Russian social life, a certain elasticity of nature, 
 primitive but tenacious of existence, like that of protoplasm; it 
 3rields under the pressure of the finger and rises again intact as 
 soon as the pressure is removed. It derives this immutability from 
 the country itself, which has resources without end, and can stake 
 on the war hundreds of thousands of men, or square miles of 
 
48 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 territory, without feeling exhausted or even threatened. It derives 
 it, too, from the boundless immensity of the country, for which 
 national solidarity or patriotism can only exist as yet in an exten- 
 sive sense, as there exists an extensive, not intensive, culture of its 
 scarcely populated soil, so much greater than its needs. And this 
 tranquil indifference, which in the case of the cities is associated 
 with the pursuit of pleasure, even now in war-time, on the anxious 
 eve of the final decision, arises, too, from another calm and mighty 
 force — the humble simplicity of Russian country life. It was the 
 country which gave the Empire its riches in time of peace, which 
 preserved its equilibrium and stability in the shock of the violent 
 agitations for reform among the town-dwellers. Now it furnishes 
 the towns with bread, meat, and men for the trenches. ' This 
 silent great wheel of Russia goes on turning slowly, and never 
 stops ' " (La Stampa, June i, 1916. Letter from Virginio Gayda, 
 Petrograd, dated May). 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE MILITARIST AND THE PACIFIST IDEALS 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have set forth the results that 
 must reasonably be expected to follow from a continuation 
 of the existing international anarchy. I have w^ritten in 
 the hope that the reader will think those results intoler- 
 able and will consequently be ready to urge or support 
 a radical movement in the opposite direction. But I am 
 aware that some who may read this book, and many who 
 will not read it, will be affected differently by the prospect 
 before us. They will not be repelled by it. They may tol- 
 erate it. They may even welcome it. And as it is essential 
 that those who intend to fight for peace should understand 
 what it is they have to oppose, I shall now proceed to ex- 
 amine the ideal impulses which make for war and contrast 
 them with -those which make for peace. 
 
 And first I must point out, what lovers of peace, are ap t 
 to forget, t hat there is such a thing as the love of wa r, 
 either for its elf_o r for its sup posed effect s on characte r 
 and lif e^ and that that is one element making for the 
 perpetuation of war. Few people frankly admit this. Yet 
 the admission may be found, and not only among 
 Germans. And it is much more often felt than it is 
 expressed. Here, for example, is an utterance to which 
 it is worth while to attend : — 
 
 I do not myself understand our theoretical craze for no-war, 
 which would mean a constipated civilization; ... all great cre- 
 ative movements have flourished in or sprung from warlike con- 
 ditions. The idea that as a result of this war Europe is going to 
 develop into an abode of Arcady, where men no longer fight or 
 
 49 
 
50 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 learn to fight or want to fight, while lawyers and politicians rule 
 over us with unctuous infallibility, and there is no longer need 
 for a stout heart and a dripping sword — this is one of the drollest 
 views ever kibbled for the democratic table. . . . The spirit of 
 fighting is so directly associated with the sex instinct. Atrophy of 
 the one inevitably brings about atrophy of the other. ... To talk 
 of the abolition of war is to conceive of life without strife, which 
 is its inherent reason and beauty. 
 
 We who believe in peace as a necessary condition of 
 Good are apt to meet utterances like this with silence, or 
 indignation, or wordy argument. But in doing so we miss 
 our antagonist's point and so underestimate the forces 
 we have to oppose. Tlie words_sitg d are a foolish and 
 trivial expres sion of a genuine feelin g — the feeling that 
 life w ithout war would be a dull and dra ^. affair. The 
 feeling is superficial. It ^is d ue t o inexperien ce__both 
 of life and o f war. But it mffiiences a great many 
 people; more people than we choose to admit. And it 
 will continue to do so, and to do so the more in propor- 
 tion as the memory of what war really is sinks once again 
 into the background. Let us try to realize, then, what was 
 in the mind of this writer,^ however crudely he may have 
 expressed it. 
 
 At bottom, what appeal to him are certain states of 
 feeling. He likes to imagine himself, and to imagine 
 other men, engaged in a struggle of body and wits so 
 intense that all energies are absorbed in it. It is this 
 release of energy from the checks of reason, of conscience, 
 and of self-interested calculation that appeals to him; the 
 functioning as a unity, free from the paralysis of doubt or 
 the boredom of hal f -interests ; the activity (as he imagines) 
 of all the faculties at their keenest under the stress of 
 imminent and continuous risk. This kind of experience 
 
 1 1 do not think it necessary to cite his name, for I have no interest 
 in personalities. He is just one of a school. 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS SI 
 
 can no doubt be partly obtained in various forms of 
 sport. And, in fact, the men we are considering do often 
 spend the greater part of their peace-Hfe in sport. The 
 connexion between war and sport is very close, at any 
 rate among Englishmen. But sport lacks some of the 
 most important elements of war. It lacks first the sense 
 of " consecration," which lays the conscience to sleep. It 
 lacks, secondly, the enormous enhancement which is given 
 to all emotion by its being shared by great numbers of 
 men. Few people can resist the contagion of a march 
 past, even in a cinematograph. And in one aspect war 
 is (or rather is thought to be, by those at a distance) a 
 continuous march in time, if not physically yet spiritually. 
 This sense of unquestioning comradeship, in acts reduced 
 as nearly as possible to instinctive reactions, seems to be 
 what at bottom attracts men to war. And I suppose that 
 the most "pacifist" of us are not without comprehension 
 of that. 
 
 Now it is true that all this makes an appeal not only 
 to what is bad, but also to something that is good in 
 human nature. But the appeal is that of an illusion about 
 war, not of the reality. Real war is something very dif- 
 ferent, as all who have experienced it would be the first 
 to admit. Literature has invented a fiction which still 
 inspires boys and old men and romanticists. Vague 
 remembrances of Marathon and Thermopylae blend with 
 mediaeval tales of chivalry. Pictures of hand-to-hand 
 conflict according to the rules, of chivalrous reconcilia- 
 tions, of mutual honour and respect, move confusedly 
 before the imagination. The sentiment and the ethic 
 of a method of war as extinct as the Stone Age are 
 applied to what has long ago become a matter of cold- 
 blooded calculation and organized butchery by machines. 
 For modern war is summed up in such phrases as these, 
 
52 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 inadequate though they be to represent its monstrous 
 horror. The men who go out to it and go through with 
 it have indeed a courage not the less admirable because, 
 as is now clear, almost every one possesses it. But ad- 
 mirable, too, is the courage of the worshipper who flings 
 himself under the car of Juggernaut. And the nobler 
 the victim the more the pity. 
 
 Editors and bishops who take a kind of holiday jaunt 
 along the front, personally conducted and carefully shielded 
 from the real facts, may come back talking cheerfully of 
 war. That is what they went for. It is only those who 
 have lived weeks and months in the trenches, those who 
 have taken part in a bayonet charge, those who have 
 struggled like brutes with feet and hands and knives and 
 clubs, who have trampled on the faces and mangled limbs 
 of wounded men, and staggered away at last hardly know- 
 ing what they have been doing; those who have lain hour 
 after hour between the lines at night, tortured themselves 
 and listening to the screams of the tortured; those who 
 have hung in agony on barbed wire till a spout of liquid 
 fire released them: these men, with their bowels dropping 
 out, with their lungs shot through, with their faces torn 
 away, with their limbs blown into space, are the men who 
 know what war is. Is this an ideal? The question an- 
 swers itself. Yet so long as words take the place of things 
 in men's thinking and feeling, so long as second-hand 
 emotions, and remembrances of remembrances of books, 
 are substituted for experience, so long will it be possible 
 to write such words as I have quoted above, and so long 
 will such words have a certain weight. It is only possible 
 to idealize war because those who idealize it are dealing 
 with a word, not with the thing. 
 
 My first reply then, to the idealizers of war is that 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 53 
 
 modem war does not really contain the things they hold 
 to be good, or contains them only as one element in such 
 a mass of others as makes them cease to count in the 
 balance. I do not believe this statement can be seriously 
 questioned. But those who have been through the war, 
 and they only, can judge. And to their judgment I appeal. 
 Let us turn now to the ideal of peace. On what prefer- 
 ences does this rest? The advocates of war are apt to 
 pretend that it rests on a mere love of security. But this 
 is to take a view of pacifism as ungenerous and as false 
 as that which supposes the love of war to arise from a 
 sadistic lust for murder. Pacifists who have a positive and 
 passionate attitude to life (and they are the only ones we 
 need consider) have also at bottom a love for certain feel- 
 ings and activities. What they like and desire is free 
 friendship, where men co-operate or compete as independ- 
 ent individuals, not' as passive creatures of a mass move- 
 ment. The activity they prize is that of reasonable will, 
 not that of irrational instinct. And they find their con- 
 ception of the highest lift in voluntary creation, in political 
 and social work, in science, in speculation, and in art. To 
 be swept away on a torrent of corporate passion is to them 
 not an ideal at all. On the contrary, it is the negation of 
 all they value. They are neither more egotistic nor more 
 materialistic than the others. But all their social activity 
 they desire to be constantly accompanied by a full sense of 
 personal choice. Further, while the " war-men " overlook 
 the act of killing as trifling and negligible, in view of 
 the tremendous flood of vigorous life which they imagine 
 to accompany it, to the " peace-men " that act, like all 
 violence and coercion, destroys the value of any life they 
 could prize. That the others among whom they labour 
 should be also labouring, equally, freely, and in the same 
 
64 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 spirit as themselves, is what they want; and that in these 
 concurrent or competitive labours there should be the least 
 possible antagonism. 
 
 Now, it is true that such " peace " as we have actually 
 achieved is almost as remote from the ideal of the pacifist 
 as real war is from that of the war-man. The pacifist, 
 therefore, needs and intends to transform peace as well as to 
 abolish war. But does any war-man mean, or intend, or 
 think it in any way possible, to transform war from its pres- 
 ent form of mass-murder? I have never heard of any one 
 who thought that either possible or desirable. Whereas 
 the pacifist's vision of a society of passionate and creative 
 lovers is in the heart of every man and woman who has 
 a peace-ideal at all. That is the pacifist's strength as 
 against his antagonist. War as an ideal lies behind. Peace 
 as an ideal lies in front. The one can spur to action, the 
 other only to regret, or to sentimental or dishonest fancies. 
 The organized butchery that war is, and henceforth in- 
 creasingly must be, can inspire no man who has seen and 
 known and felt what it is. The harmony of contrasted 
 effort that peace might be may fail to inspire because it 
 may be thought chimerical. But it needs must inspire 
 every one who has the faith to believe it possible. 
 
 At this point, very likely, I shall be met by a protest from 
 the war-man. He will say : " You misrepresent me when 
 you suppose me blind to the horror of modern war, when 
 you suppose that my respect for it is based on illusions 
 about its nature. I admit all that you say. The reason 
 that I stand for war is, not that I admire the activity of 
 killing and being killed in the modern way, but that I 
 admire the power to face and endure that. War to my 
 mind is tragic; not a picnic, or sport (as the superficial 
 Englishman is apt to think), but an assertion of that ele- 
 ment in life which gives it all its nobility. War can only 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 65 
 
 be faced if it is faced in the spirit of religion. And there 
 is a religion of war." 
 
 What is this religion? I will quote in illustration the 
 following passage : — 
 
 In war and in the right of war man has a possession which he 
 values above religion, above industry, and above social comfort; 
 in war man values the power which it affords to life of rising above 
 life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the 
 ideal.'- 
 
 Let us consider this. We have, first, the belief on which 
 I have already dwelt, that the tensest, most " worth while " 
 moments of life can only be had in war. But here that 
 belief has associated itself with a reflective, philosophic, 
 and religious temperament. The author has realized the 
 tragedy involved in his standard of values. He has realized 
 that the feelings he desires can only be attained at the 
 cost of infinite suffering and infinite evil. That has not 
 led him (as it might have led simpler and less intellectual 
 men) to revise his feelings of what is valuable. It has led 
 him to construct a mysticism. Unwilling to say simply: 
 " We live in an intolerable and futile world, a world indif- 
 ferent to all our ideals and all our hopes, a world not only 
 of tragedy, but of tragedy unredeemed and unredeemable," 
 he affirms that, in some incomprehensible way, some pur- 
 pose must be served by all this suffering, without which men 
 like him could not have the feelings and activities they 
 desire. He assumes that some " ideal " end is being 
 achieved though we cannot see what it is (for he is not 
 shallow enough, if I understand his spirit, to suggest that 
 any of the objects that may be attained by war constitute 
 its justification). His religion is thus one form of the 
 religion of suffering — the pagan, not the Christian form ; 
 
 1 Cramb. Cited by Bruce Glasier, Milit^risnif p. 19. 
 
56 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 a form which is perhaps best set forth by Nietzsche in the 
 words " Be hard." Accept suffering, injustice, cruelty, 
 all uttermost evil and conflict, for the sake of being hard; 
 and believe that somehow there is some sense in it all, 
 though it does not appear how. 
 
 When a war-man is both philosophic and intelligent, that 
 is the kind of religion he is driven to. But 'if in such 
 matters he is a simple, unreflective soul, he will adopt an 
 easier course, and dispose of the question by assuming 
 another world where we shall all be happy and harmonious ; 
 a world in which, if he reflected, he would see that he per- 
 sonally would be very miserable, since he would not be 
 able to fight. Thus, for instance, Bismarck said that if he 
 had not been a Christian he would have been a republican. 
 By which I suppose him to mean that if he had not believed 
 that there was another world, where somehow everything 
 is made right, he would have abstained from making hell 
 of this one. 
 
 Turning now to the pacifist, he too may have his 
 religion. And his religion, too, may include a belief in 
 some " other world " of harmony. But in that harmony 
 he really would find satisfaction, for it is really his ideal. 
 The bottom of his belief is that the impulse in him to 
 love and to create is the divine impulse; that that is the 
 core and the meaning of the world. And whatever he 
 may believe or not believe about a world beyond, that 
 spirit working in this one is the spring of his religion. 
 That is why Christians and Atheists may, and often do, 
 have the same religion. For the essential thing is the 
 common spirit, not the theology. 
 
 On the other hand, between the " War-Christian " 
 and the " Peace-Christian " there is a profound gulf ; 
 just as there is between the "War-Atheist" and the 
 "Peace-Atheist." The theological distinctions are not 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 57 
 
 the important ones in this matter of religion. If they 
 were, we should not see, as we do at this moment, one 
 set of Christians persecuting another, while the persecuted 
 are sustained and defended by atheistsi. The one im- 
 portant difference between men is the difference in what 
 they hold valuable, and in the degree of passion and con- 
 viction with which they adhere to and pursue that. The 
 rest is embroidery. To the man who has the religion of 
 peace, the supreme value is love. To the man who has the 
 religion of war, the supreme value is strife. There can be 
 no reconciliation between these attitudes. Men have simply 
 to discover which it is they stand for. And it is these ulti- 
 mate antagonisms that constitute the tragedy of life. 
 
 These ultimate ideals may seem somewhat remote to the 
 reader. Let me then show him, by an illustration, how 
 they affect very important decisions. As I write, the main 
 road from Warsaw into Russia is lined with bones. At 
 intervals all along are baskets, full of the dust of bones. 
 The dust in the baskets is that of little children, whom 
 their mothers were carrying in the enforced flight of the 
 whole civilian population. The rest is that of the mothers 
 and the fathers and the elder children. To both war- 
 man and peace-man we may assume this is a tragic spectacle. 
 The difference is that the peace-man says : " See ! War is 
 the crown and consummation of Evil. Down with war ! " 
 The war-man says : " No ! War is tragic, but it is great. 
 Long live war ! " I know not. what difference more pro- 
 found could divide men. I know not in what sharper 
 intensity ideas of Good and Evil could confront one an- 
 other. I have merely tried to formulate in general terms 
 the spiritual antagonism that issues in these opposite ver- 
 dicts.^ 
 
 ^The reader, I hope, will understand that the position he in fact 
 may hold — namely, that war is evil, but may be a necessary evil, to 
 
68 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Now, these opposite religions naturally connect with 
 opposite political and social ideals. And these too it will 
 be worth while to try to describe. 
 
 I will start with the familiar antithesis between "lib- 
 erty" and "authority." The ideal of peace, I believe, 
 goes along with that of liberty, and the ideal of war with 
 that of authority. This, of course, is quite compatible 
 with the patent fact that men have often waged wars for 
 liberty. Have they not also waged wars for peace? My 
 point is that liberty, in the sense in which I am here con- 
 ceiving it, requires peace for its fulfilment; while authority, 
 if it does not require war, requires a kind of organization 
 best favoured by the preparation for war. 
 
 Advocates of liberty take a friendly and hopeful view 
 of human nature. They conceive it as continually push- 
 ing and straining — in all men, not only in some — towards 
 a full and noble life, much as trees may be thought to 
 aim at a perfect and symmetrical growth, and only to 
 fail to attain it by overcrowding or by inclemencies and 
 accidents of climate or position. Nothing has to be put 
 into the tree. Everything is there, if it had its chance. 
 So with Man. It all lies there in him. But natural and 
 social obstacles continually hinder its realization. Thus 
 to the advocate of liberty, the important thing is the 
 preparation of the ground. That is why liberty is some- 
 times accused of being an empty or negative ideal. What 
 is to come out, the libertarian trusts and feels, it would 
 be presumptuous to define. It is a something "ever on 
 
 avoid a greater one, as in the case of a "war for righteousness "— is 
 one I am not here dealing with. The man who takes that view has 
 apparently the ideal of peace, not of war. He wages war for the sake 
 of peace. It is clear that there need be no war for Right unless some 
 one had first made war for Wrong. In my judgment all wars come 
 from errors somewhere about Good and Evil. But I discuss all this 
 in later Qhapters, 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 69 
 
 before." But some suggestions of it, to confirm his faith, 
 he finds in every great manifestation of the human spirit. 
 Thus his main aim is always to remove obstacles. The 
 positive content life, set free, will reveal. 
 
 And that is why I say that there is a deep connexion be- 
 tween liberty, so conceived, and peace. For the unfolding 
 process is to proceed from an inner need. All coercion 
 is opposed to it; and the profoundest objection of the 
 pacifist to war is that war means coercion. In peace he 
 does not honour a mere absence of contention. He desires 
 no flat and tedious unison of identities; but rather that 
 contest of free spirit in which each stimulates the other 
 by the very difference of his aim, and in which a man 
 would no more kill his opponent than his ally, for his 
 opponent is his benefactor. The object of war is to 
 eliminate the foe, the object of peace is to grow strong 
 by him. And this all the great men of peace know — the 
 rivals in science, in art, in moral passion, in individual 
 and social ideals. " Freedom for you," they say, " that I 
 may be free; and freedom for me, that you may be." 
 And all freedoms, they believe, can dwell together and 
 multiply in the same world, the same country, the same 
 parish. The word of war is " I or You." The word of 
 peace is " You and I." War and coercion ; but peace 
 and liberty. 
 
 It will be replied, "But wars are fought for liberty." 
 They are. But a lover of liberty will never wage them 
 save to remove a coercion by a coercion. And war he 
 will always hold to be a desperate remedy, likely to destroy 
 the very thing it is waged to secure, as we see but too 
 clearly at this moment in England, and are likely to see 
 and feel for years to come. It is only in a true peace — 
 one in which coercion (social and economic as well as 
 political) should have disappeared — that the soul could 
 
60 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 tmfold to perfection. Thus peace, though it is not the 
 ideal, is the condition of it. It can be misrepresented as 
 a negative state. But it is not that. It is the condition 
 of all that is positive. For it is the space that gives room 
 to the soul to grow. 
 
 To this ideal of " liberty " is opposed that of what I 
 have called " authority." The difference is radical. The 
 " authoritarian " does not believe in " human nature." 
 He believes in select individuals. The confusion, violence, 
 anarchy which to the libertarian are the result of ignorance 
 and oppression, to him are the spontaneous and inevi- 
 table products of the human soul. Man is a quarrelsome, 
 ignoble, incapable brute. So he always has been, and so 
 he always will be. There is no hope for him, save to be 
 drilled into order. And, fortunately, there do appear on 
 the earth select men, capable of doing this. That these 
 men should govern the others, not by their choice, but 
 in their despite, is the proper, the " divine " arrangement. 
 All else is anarchy. This view, of course, is aristo- 
 cratic, but it is not necessarily oligarchic. The arrange- 
 ment aimed at may be aimed at for the sake not of the 
 rulers, but of the ruled. And, in fact, it is commonly so 
 represented by those who adopt this attitude. The 
 " Many " will be as good as they can be, and as happy 
 as they can be, under such rule. Happier, indeed, than 
 the " Few " who are the rulers. For these have reluctantly 
 assumed a duty, not for their pleasure or profit, but for 
 the Good of the whole. Once more the tragic element 
 emerges, as in the religion of war. The great man may 
 be noble, but cannot be happy. The masses may be happy, 
 because they cannot be noble. 
 
 Now this attitude does not imply necessarily a love of 
 war. But it does imply a love of military discipline, 
 because military discipline is the most rigorous and un- 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 61 
 
 compromising; and the danger of war is an element 
 without which it cannot flourish. It was not really with 
 reluctance that Plato put his Republic on a military- 
 basis, though he plays a little, at first, with the idea of 
 peace. He required an army for his type of discipline, 
 and the discipline was the purpose of the community. 
 Like all men with this kind of idealistic bent, he stood 
 outside his creation, and contemplated what appeared to 
 him to be its aesthetic beauty. He knew well that there 
 would be little happiness within it. Authoritarians may 
 deprecate war, because war has a side which is anarchy. 
 But they must welcome military organization, because it 
 is the type of order. And they would be as reluctant to 
 inhabit a world without war as the libertarian is to inhabit 
 one with it. 
 
 It will readily be seen that to these opposed political 
 ideals correspond opposed interpretations of history. The 
 libertarian thinks of history in terms of progress. He 
 sees in it a continuous removal of hindrances to free life. 
 At the beginning he sees man caught in a fate inherited 
 from his animal ancestors. He sees him emerging in 
 small groups, opposed to other groups by conflicting 
 interests, by lack of comprehension, by contacts that are 
 all of strife and war. He sees the process of history as 
 a constant enlargement of the area of co-operation. And 
 when he looks at the contemporary world, the antagonism 
 of national groups appears to him as an atavism, sur- 
 viving into a condition in which universal co-operation 
 already largely prevails in spite of political anarchy. To 
 remove that anarchy he believes to be as possible as it 
 is desirable. And its removal he sees as another great 
 step forward in the progressive transformation of human 
 life from the form of coercion to that of co-operation. 
 
 The authoritarian reads history differently. He empha- 
 
62 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 sizes the coercion throughout; and he believes that this 
 changes its form rather than its essence. History to him 
 is oscillation, not progress. It is the oscillation of a 
 pendulum about that point of rest which is the perfect 
 static order that the " philosopher " or the " hero " or the 
 " dictator " would impose. 
 
 In setting out this opposition between libertarian and 
 authoritarian, I am of course simplifying the real attitudes 
 of men and omitting those intermediary and compromising 
 positions which in fact most of us adopt. But I wish to 
 bring the reader back to what I believe to be ultimate 
 antagonisms of temperament and outlook, explaining much 
 of the antagonism of practice revealed confusedly in our 
 contemporary life. He will see, I think, what I am aiming 
 at if he will consider, on the one hand, the life-work of 
 Voltaire, Shelley, Mazzini, Walt Whitman, Jaures; and 
 on the other that of de Maistre, Carlyle, Treitschke, 
 Bismarck, Pobidonostseff. Somewhere deep at the roots 
 of modern life, with more or less sharpness of definition, 
 these ultimate principles are contending. And the differ- 
 ence of orientation given by the difference of the soul 
 affects not only the action of men, but their whole inter- 
 pretation of the facts of history and society. 
 
 Well, the one side is drawn to peace, the other to war, 
 or at least to organization for war. And the pacifist has 
 to fight not only (what are his easier antagonists) routine, 
 stupidity, greed, lack of vision. He has to fight an op- 
 posite ideal, claiming its own nobility. 
 
 Now, in this contest, it is the contrary of the truth 
 that the pacifist takes the negative and his opponent the 
 positive side. A pacifism which is merely an objection 
 to strife has no force in it. And a cult of war which is 
 strenuous and determined, and has faith in itself, is strong. 
 But the pacifism I am defending has bew and is a positive 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 63 
 
 impulse. It is one with that whole movement of social 
 transformation which is vaguely called democracy and 
 which is essentially pacific, even when it believes that it 
 is only by violence that it can attain its ends. It has a 
 conception of the meaning of history and of life as in- 
 spiring as that of its opponents is depressing. It sees the 
 centuries marching with it to its goal and it sees that goal 
 as a free and delighted life. 
 
 Compare — that I may make it clearer by an example — 
 the picture of the world presented by Carlyle with that 
 held up by the long and noble line of French idealists, from 
 Turgot, and earlier still, all the way to Jaures. To Carlyle 
 history represents little but nemesis. It is one long, dreary 
 tale of crime and retribution. A jealous god lies for ever 
 in wait to punish men who stray for ever from his way. 
 That way they are unable to find or to keep. Therefore 
 he sends them from time to time a " hero " to beat them 
 into submission. And the way of the hero is sword and 
 fire. Odin in Scandinavia, the T-eutonic Knights on the 
 eastern marches, Cromwell in Ireland, Frederick in Silesia, 
 these are the figures he is forced to admire. For the 
 mass of men, sheer contempt. For Jesus, or for Socrates, 
 little better. All victory interpreted as Right. All defeat 
 interpreted as Wrong. Everywhere sin and punishment, 
 punishment and sin. All this is but too congenial to the 
 British and German soul. But how other is -the vision 
 of the French! As far back as the sixteenth century it 
 was at Frenchman, Bodin, who half saw human life 
 as progress. It was Frenchmen — Turgot, Condorcet. 
 Rousseau — who mixed that fiery wine that set streaming 
 over the world the divinest madness it has ever known. 
 It was Frenchmen who, awakening sobered, saw the social 
 behind the political revolution, and laid down the great 
 lines of a socialism that was truly an ideal, a socialism 
 
64 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 for all, a socialism where science should co-operate not 
 only with industry but with art, and all of these with 
 love. That, throughout, has been the French note, as 
 distinguished from the German. And the last testimony 
 of Jaures vibrates with a synthetic passion whereby it 
 stands out, beside Marx's monument to class-war, as the 
 soul of a man beside the corpse of a mammoth. Against 
 this passion of faith, fusing all history and life in its cruci- 
 ble, what can avail the unfaith of authoritarians? Their 
 victory is never anything but that of guns and bayonets. 
 And against these ever will arise resilient the soul of man. 
 In all the philosophy of war there is nothing that could ap- 
 peal to youth ; and youth has the mastery of the world. No ! 
 Pacifism is not an obstruction, a refusal. It is the fire at 
 the heart of the world. 
 
 And that fire English pacifists would do well to seek 
 in France. We English see and feel too exclusively from 
 the moral point of view, and our notion of morals is too 
 narrow. The obstinacy of simple conviction that, as I 
 write, is defying all the powers of society to force a few 
 poor men to fight when their conscience forbids, is indeed 
 a great English quality. Again and again it has saved for 
 us our liberties and our soul. But it is private, personal, 
 uninformed, unimaginative, better to resist than to create. 
 It has not been married to intellect. It has not been sown 
 as a seed in the matrix of the world, to grow up as the tree 
 of science and art. The stream of total idealism flows full 
 and strong, where it has always flowed, in France. And it 
 is thence that we may best draw the inspiration that will 
 make of pacifism not a mere protest against militarism but 
 a taking of the field to establish that true peace which is 
 the rivalry 6f generous souls. The cause of war is the cause 
 of the established order, of capitalists against wage-workers, 
 of social discord and antagonism, of tyranny, of hypocrisy, 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 65 
 
 of stupidity, of cant. The cause of peace is the cause of 
 justice, charity, and love, of immense corporate efforts to 
 control nature by science and art, of an individualism the 
 tenser and fuller in its personal life that it is participating 
 consciously in a collective work. For it is only the col- 
 lectivism of war that destroys the individual. The collecti- 
 vism of peace might fulfil him. 
 
 What kind of a man, then, does the pacifist look forward 
 to ? A tame man, as war-men pretend ? No. But neither 
 the war-man's fierce man, nor yet the noble, nor the king, 
 nor the " philosophic ruler," nor any of those types that 
 presuppose a passive sulaject class, a " twenty millions mostly 
 fools," an orgy of destruction in the midst of which the 
 " hero " shall shine supreme, or an ordered State over 
 which he shall brood like Providence. Not these. But 
 active centres everywhere of passionate life, freely com- 
 bining for their joint ends. One poet only has had a con- 
 crete vision of the pacifist's ideal. From him I take the 
 prophecy of it : — 
 
 I dream'd in a dream I saw a city invincible to the attacks of the 
 
 whole of the rest of the earth. 
 I dream'd that was the new city of friends. 
 Nothing was greater there than the quality of robust love, it led the 
 
 rest. 
 It was seen every hour, in the actions of the men of that city. 
 And in all their looks and words. 
 
 What that city breeds is not soldiers. It is — 
 
 The noble character of mechanics and farmers, especially the young 
 
 men, 
 Their manners, speech, dress, friendships, the gait they have of 
 
 persons who never knew how it felt to stand in the presence 
 
 of superiors, 
 The freshness and candour of their physiognomy, the copiousness 
 
 and decision of their phrenology. 
 
66 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 The picturesque looseness of their carriage, their fierceness when 
 
 wronged, 
 The fluency of their speech, their delight in music, their curiosity, 
 
 their good temper and open-handedness, the whole composite 
 
 make. 
 The prevailing ardour and enterprise, the large amativeness. 
 The perfect equality of the female with the male, the fluid move- 
 ment of the population. 
 The superior marine, free commerce, fisheries, whaling, gold 
 
 digging. 
 Wharf-hemmed cities, railroad and steamboat lines intersecting at 
 
 all points. 
 Factories, mercantile life, labour-saving machinery, the North-east, 
 
 North-west, South-west, 
 Manhattan fireman, the Yankee swap. Southern plantation life. 
 
 This is the liberty, these the contests, these the heroes of 
 peace. And if we could achieve such a peace, should we be 
 driven to make an ideal of war ? 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 52. — The Realities of War. 
 
 To illustrate the very inadequate words in the text would be to 
 cite everything real and genuine that has been allowed to come 
 through to the public, supplemented by all one has heard privately. 
 The following are merely a reminder from material I happen to 
 have beside me. Here, for instance, is a more or less real account 
 of a bayonet charge (from the Manchester Guardian of July 25, 
 1916): — 
 
 " The trench was in a beastly state. It was like porridge with 
 syrup over it, and we were all absolutely plastered — hair and mous- 
 taches and everything. The Boche was crumping us all the time. 
 We had to be mighty careful about matches, the Boche being no 
 more than a hundred yards off. Our adjutant came along about 
 three, checking up watches and giving us divisional time. Mine 
 was all right; never stopped once from the day I bought it till 
 that left wrist of mine was hit — see ! It registers my first hit — 
 3.26. 
 
 " Just before three I got my position — right in the middle of my 
 company. We were going over at 3.25, you know. The trench 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 67 
 
 was deep there, with a lot of mud and water, but there was no set 
 parapet left: just a gradual slope of muck, as though cartloads of it 
 had been dropped from the sky by giants — spilt porridge. I 
 wanted to b,e first out if I could — good effect on the men, you 
 know — but I couldn't trust myself in all that muck, so I'd col- 
 lared a rum-case from 's dug-out and was nursing the bloom- 
 ing thing so that when the time came I could plant it in the mud 
 and get a bit of a spring from that. I was in a devil of a stew 
 lest some of my chaps should get over too soon. They kept 
 wriggling up and forward in the mud. They were frightfully 
 keen to get moving. 
 
 " I thought I could just make out our artillery lift, about a min- 
 ute and a half before the twenty-five, but I wouldn't swear to it. 
 On the stroke of the twenty-five, I got a good jump from my rum- 
 box, and fell head-first into a little pool — whizz-bang hole, I sup- 
 pose; something small. It loosened two of my front teeth pretty 
 much. I'd my whistle in my teeth, you see. But I blew like blazes 
 directly I got my head up. Never made a sound. Whistle full of 
 mud. But it didn't matter a bit. They all saw me take my dive, 
 and a lot were in front of me when I got going. But I overhauled 
 'em and got in front. 
 
 " I believe we must have got nearly fifty yards without a casualty. 
 But it's hard to say. It wasn't night, you know ; just a glimmering 
 kind of a greyness. Not easy to spot casualties. The row, of 
 course, was deafening; and we were running like lamplighters. 
 
 " You think you're going strong, and — Woosh ! You've got 
 your face deep in porridge. Fallen in a shell-hole. You trip 
 over some blame thing, and you turn a complete somersault; and 
 you're on again, wondering where your second wind is. Lord, you 
 haven't a notion whether you're hit or not. I felt that smack on 
 my left wrist, along with a dozen other smacks of one sort and an- 
 other, but I didn't know it was a wound for an hour or more. All 
 you thought about was trying to keep your rifle muzzle up, and I 
 guess the fellows behind must've thought a bit about not stickin' us 
 
 with their bayonets more'n they could help. I was shouting ' ' 
 
 the local name of the regiment, you know. The boys like it. But 
 my sergeant, who was close to me, was just yelling, ' Down 'em, 
 boys ! ' and ' Stick 'em ! Stick 'em ! ' for all he was worth. 
 
 " There was no real parapet left in that Boche front line. Their 
 trench was just a sort of gash; a ragged crack in the porridge. 
 Where I was, there was quite a bit of their wire left; but, do you 
 
68 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 know, one didn't feel it a bit. You can judge a bit from my rags 
 what it was like. We went at it like fellows in a race charge the 
 tape ; and it didn't hurt us any more. Only thing that worried us 
 was the porridge, and the holes. Your feet sinking down make you 
 think you're crawling: making no headway. I wish I could have 
 seen a bit better. It was all a muddy blur to me. 
 
 " But I made out a line of faces in the Boche ditch ; and I know 
 I gave a devil of a yell, as we jumped for those faces. Lost my 
 rifle there. 'Fraid I didn't stick my man, really, because my bay- 
 onet struck solid earth. I just smashed my fellow. We went 
 down into the muck together, and another chap trod on my neck 
 for a moment. Makes you think quick, I tell you. I pulled that 
 chap down on top of my other Boche, and just took one good look 
 to make sure he was a Boche, and then I gave him two rounds 
 from my revolver, with the barrel in his face. I think I killed the 
 under one too; but can't be sure. 
 
 " Next thing I knew we were scrambling on to the second line. 
 It was in the wire of the second line that I got my knock-out ; this 
 shoulder, and some splinters in my head. Yes; bomb. I was out 
 of business then, but as the light grew I could see my chaps having 
 the time of their lives inside that second line. One of 'em hauled 
 me in after a bit, and I got a drink of beer in a big Boche dugout, 
 down two separate flights of steps. That beer was good, though it 
 was German." 
 
 Here is a little case of reprisals — Russian, as it happens: — 
 
 " According to an official report, on August 29, 1914, in the com- 
 mune of Liweze, circle Sokal, youths and men, on the plea that the 
 inhabitants of Liweze had fired on the Russians, were rounded up 
 and shut into a house. A Russian patrol of eight came to the 
 house. The commanding officer, Faehnrich, gave the order, ' These 
 dogs are to be shot.' The patrols shot through the window and the 
 door on the prisoners and then massacred them with sword and 
 bayonet. These victims of Russian bestiality, eighteen in number, 
 were aged from fourteen to seventy years." 
 
 The reader, I hope, will not be led away from the point by 
 irrelevant discussions as to the relative brutality of different na- 
 tions. War necessitates these kinds of brutalities, whatever nation 
 is waging it. And the fact that the Germans have committed them 
 with more deliberation than others, ought not to blind us to the 
 much more important fact that they belong to the nature of war. 
 No soldiers are under any illusions on the subject. 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 69 
 
 I give now an extract from a German soldier's diary: — 
 
 " We have been parched with thirst and lie in cold earth-holes at 
 nights. The whole battlefield was full of dead, and there was great 
 heat during the day. We are indeed no longer men, only as it were 
 half-living creatures. 
 
 " There lie in the Delville Wood, which we and the English have 
 occupied, thousands of dead. And the number of flies and the 
 smell ! . . . These days I shall never in my life forget — what we 
 had to endure there. One would hardly think it possible what men 
 can endure" {Manchester Guardian, August 29, 1916). 
 
 Finally, I give two hospital scenes: — 
 
 "Among the German wounded in one of the hospitals it was 
 observed that one man seemed to be in great trouble over some- 
 thing. His wound was making excellent progress, and there 
 seemed nothing to hinder a complete recovery. Finally, he con- 
 fessed what was preying on his mind. He was guilty, he said, of 
 tying three wounded Frenchmen together and throwing them into 
 a river. And now, night and day, he could hear nothing but their 
 cry, ' Fitie ! Pitie ! ' which would haunt him for the rest of his 
 miserable and, as he hoped, brief existence. 
 
 " The same informant tells me that there are many cases of 
 Germans in the French hospitals similarly affected, some of them 
 having lost their reason as a result of scenes they have witnessed 
 and in which, it may be presumed, they took an active part" 
 (Central News). 
 
 Again : — 
 
 " It is my last day here, and I return to one of the German 
 wards. There are six beds here — at the foot of each a card with 
 the name, the regiment, and the doctor's diagnosis of each case ; at 
 its head are scrawled upon a slate the letters ' Cath.' or ' Pr.,' to 
 indicate the faith of each poor wreck of humanity. To look round 
 upon them — a school-teacher from Saxony, a peasant from Prussia, 
 a clerk, a shop-assistant — is to realize the infatuated cruelty of 
 conscription in its blind, unintelligent, inexorable compulsion of 
 men, snatched from the farm, the loom, the class-room, the count- 
 ing-house, to fight for a cause they do not comprehend, in a place of 
 which they have never heard, against an enemy with whom they 
 have no enmity. Pathetic is their eagerness to speak their mother- 
 tongue, and at the first words of German which I utter one of them 
 in a corner of the ward rises in his bed and turns on me a look of 
 unutterable wistfulness. But, hush ! My eyes are drawn irresisti- 
 
TO THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 bly towards another bed. On this bed lies a lad with blue eyes and 
 a soft yellow down upon his unshaved chin; his face is white as 
 chalk with a kind of misty pallor, glistening with cold sweat. One 
 bare arm is extended with the finger pointing upwards to the ceil- 
 ing, the other is curved as if he were holding some one in a long 
 embrace. The fingers are plucking, plucking, as though at an in- 
 visible rope which is for ever escaping his grasp. His teeth are 
 clenched — it is a case of tetanus — but through them there es- 
 capes a mournful and imperative cry that never ceases — ' Emma ! 
 Emma ! Emma ! ' The nurse, a brave little Englishwoman, whose 
 ministries never tire, whispers to me that it is the name of his 
 fiancee — he has never ceased to extend his arms and to call upon 
 her name. Poor boy! perhaps even now in this thy hour of per- 
 plexity and anguish thy Emma, in some little village far, far be- 
 yond the Rhine, is upon her knees praying for the lover who will 
 never return. The cry grows fainter and more faint, the yearning 
 arms relax, all heads turn upon their pillows to look with mute 
 fixity at their dying comrade. There is a rush of doctor and 
 nurses around the bed. The room is flooded with the soft radiance 
 of September sunshine, yet never has a room seemed to me so 
 dark. I turn away and stumble out into the court-yard, and as I 
 pass through its portals I see the hearse " ( from the Westminster 
 Gazette). 
 
 Does the reader need more? I offer him this from a surgeon's 
 notes : — 
 
 But, oh Lord, what other sights I have seen to-day! It's 
 
 horrible — horrible — horrible ! I am often afraid that the 
 
 tragedies I see will haunt me all my life ; that my dreams will 
 
 be blood-red, and that armies of wrecked men will parade 
 
 before me as I sleep. I thought I was hardened. I'm as 
 
 sensitive as a little convent-girl of seventeen. . . . 
 
 The next passage speaks of a scene in the retreat: — 
 
 Hundreds of other wounded continued to come to us. Several 
 
 times there were as many as thirty or even forty Red Cross 
 
 carts standing in a line waiting to be emptied. Tragedy — 
 
 horrible tragedy all the time. Limbless men with deathlike 
 
 faces, fearfully gashed bodies and heads. The straw on 
 
 which the men lay was sodden with blood. The atmosphere 
 
 was foul; it stank of blood, and sweat, and human bodies. 
 
 The open-air spaces occupied by the wounded were stuffy 
 
 like crowded rooms. 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 71 
 
 Then, for the civilians at the same place : — 
 
 And the refugees. . . . Hundreds of them — old and young 
 and middle-aged. An old, old man, trembling as he sat on a 
 heap of luggage. An old lady, black silk dress and lacy cap of 
 another age, in an invalid's chair. Young mothers nursing 
 their babies, with fear in their eyes. One of our generals found 
 a dead woman by the wayside this afternoon. She had 
 tramped for days from somewhere many miles away. Weak 
 and ill, she had lain down by the roadside and died. " C'est 
 la guerre ! " says one officer. " C'est la guerre ! " says an- 
 other, dismissing the tragedy with a careless shrug and raised 
 eyebrows. " C'est la guerre ! " says every one. I am sick of 
 the phrase. 
 " Yes," the reviewer comments, " this is war ; and those who have 
 never known war in their own lands should read this book and 
 discover what a foul business it always must be" (from On the 
 Russian Front, by K. Scotland Liddell. Review in the Nation of 
 October 28, 1916.) 
 
 Having read these pale reflexes of some infinitesimal part of 
 what has been going on .continuously among millions of men for 
 more than two years, will the reader turn back and read again the 
 passage quoted on p. 49 in the text, and see what he thinks of it? 
 
 Page 55. — The Religion of War. 
 
 It is almost impossible, for one to whom the " war-ideal " seems 
 as monstrous as it does to me, to write of it with any measure of 
 restraint or justice. But if I try to fix "objectively" its weak 
 spot, I find it to reside in the constant pretence of pursuing some 
 kind of " spiritual " end, and yet never even attempting to define 
 that end in any terms but those of destruction, conquest, and ex- 
 termination. " What are the ideal qualities ? " " Those that en- 
 able one to exterminate without fear or revulsion of feeling." " To 
 what . end do these qualities serve ? " " To the end of waging 
 war." There seems no emerging from this circle. Germans talk 
 much of what Germany is going to give the world when it has 
 finally subdued it, after centuries of bloody warfare. But what can 
 it give, on its own showing, except war? For only war, in this 
 view, is noble ! Directly you try to define something good that 
 would not be war, you are back on one of the peace ideals — art, or 
 love, or knowledge, or harmonious organization. This immense 
 piece of stupidity that lies behind all the German highfalutin is 
 
72 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 characteristic of their modern way of thinking. They never ques- 
 tion their premises, nor even conceive them to be questionable. 
 
 As an example of the confusion of this German Romanticism, 
 I may cite the following passage from a certain Richard Fugmajin 
 in a pamphlet entitled Segen des Sieges. Before the war there 
 was: — 
 
 " Division everywhere and petty everyday interests. Truth and 
 faith had vanished. The pledged word no longer held. Treaties 
 were concluded only to be broken. Business life assumed a form 
 very like universal fraud. In town and country a terrible way of 
 life began to spread. No prophet, no preacher of morals, no 
 apostle of nature, no seer, could arrest the stream of degeneracy 
 and corruption." 
 
 The war broke out, and, says Fugmann, hey presto ! everything 
 was changed. Everything became noble and beautiful. Yet what 
 was this war? It began with the invasion of Belgium, in defiance 
 of a solemn treaty; it continued with the Belgian atrocities; it bids 
 fair, before it ends, to have converted the whole of Europe into a 
 horde of homicidal lunatics. And this gentleman is quite unaware 
 of it ! He is thinking all the time of some idea of war in his head. 
 " No matter ! " he may say, " the war is going to achieve great re- 
 sults." What are they? Why, the Great Germany! And what 
 does that mean? Why, that the " Edel-Deutscher " (that is the 
 brand to which the author belongs) " will form the world accord- 
 ing to his sense and will." On what kind of model ? Here is the 
 reply to that very natural question : " Hard Edel-Deutsche, with 
 natural inner greatness and goodness. May we have a severe gov- 
 ernment that selects the fittest. The supremacy of the military over 
 the civil authority would be profitable to us for many years, and 
 further our unity." That is all. In other words, the war has to 
 serve the great purpose of maintaining militarism and preparing for 
 other wars. (See a notice of this book in Vorwdrts, September 24, 
 
 1915-) 
 
 Here is another illustration of the same point of view from 
 Sombart's Handler und Helden: — 
 
 " It does not hurt us at all if all the others fail to understand 
 us. We do not need them. It does not hurt us if they remain 
 for ever our enemies. For the threatening of the Fatherland by 
 foreign foes belongs essentially to the Ideal picture which we make 
 of the German nation of the future, to which, among many other 
 blessings, Heaven has granted this one, that it lives in the midst 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 73 
 
 of a world of foes. . . . We not only expect future wars, we hope 
 for them. For in opposition to the melancholy treatise on ' Per- 
 petual Peace' of the dried-up particularist Kant, we see in war 
 itself ' a holy thing, the holiest on earth.' We, as heroes, have 
 sheer warrior virtues, which attain their full development only in 
 war and by war. That is why we praise war as ' the greatest 
 moral power of which providence makes use to preserve men upon 
 earth from rottenness. ' " 
 
 (The above is a summary of Sombart's views, taken from the 
 Welt am Montag, July lo, 1916. I have not yet seen the book.) 
 
 It would be a mistake to suppose that this view of war as the 
 purpose of life, the great regenerator, is confined to Germans. 
 Among Englishmen and Englishwomen of the upper classes no one 
 is more popular than the late Lord Roberts. And his views on 
 war appear to be substantially the same as the foregoing. I take 
 the following summary from Common Sense of December 2, 
 1916: — 
 
 "War is as inevitable as death. It is salutary, necessary, and is the 
 only national tonic that can be prescribed. — ^Lord Roberts. 
 
 " This is the philosophy of militarism, in the light of which all 
 the ideals for which this country entered the war, for which our 
 young men have died and are dying, must be revised. War is 
 inevitable: it will always recur. War to end war is an absurdity. 
 War will never end. It is not desirable that it should do. To 
 desire it is, indeed, a sign of that ' degeneracy ' that follows ' over- 
 civilization.' This degeneracy, which ' sets in like a blight,' finding 
 its expression in ' pacifism and the desire for pacifism,' and hu- 
 manitarianism generally, ' spreads to the younger generation, and a 
 diseased country is very quickly brought to the condition when it 
 must either die or be operated upon. It is the inevitable law, both 
 of nature and nations. Then comes war — the final test.' 
 
 " The final test — and the only tonic : the iron that can cure its 
 anaemia. 
 
 " The sentences quoted, in which is expressed the quintessence 
 of militarism, are not taken from Bernhardi, Treitschke, or any 
 Prussian. They occur in an essay by the late Lord Roberts, read 
 the other day before a New York Club, and reported in the New 
 York Tribune. Lord Roberts is a hero to millions of his country- 
 men; and this makes it the more instructive to have his thoughts 
 expressed thus fully and forcibly. Germany made the war. Then 
 
74 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Germany has saved the world. If militarism is a good thing, and 
 a means to health, Germany was nearer health before the war than 
 any other nation. This is what militarists think, though not all of 
 them have the logic to see it or the honesty to say it. 
 
 " ' I have the temerity to assert that Germany is the Allies' best 
 friend. This is true because Germany has supplied the tonic which 
 England and France and Russia urgently needed. By making war, 
 Germany has forced these countries out of degeneracy and has 
 obliged them to set their houses in order.' Germany, he goes on, 
 is ' rescuing her opponents from suicide.' We did not realize it, 
 but before the war we were all (with the apparent exception of 
 militarist Germany) in a most parlous state of over-civilization, 
 and ' history ' shows that at the moment when countries arrive at 
 over-civilization something must happen, and that something is war. 
 ' History ' also shows, however, that even war brings only tem- 
 porary salvation; the process is an endless one, a veritable task of 
 Sisyphus. We are saved, but only for a time. Peace and its 
 canker must return. And so history repeats itself. War will come 
 again ' with the swing of the pendulum.' Thus, though war is a 
 good thing, because it calls out splendid qualities, it is not per- 
 manent in its salutary effects; nations sink back again inevitably 
 into that terrible condition from which war is needed to save them." 
 
 This romantic view of war deprives its only real force from the 
 fact that, among all the complex happenings of war, there occur 
 cases of individual heroism and beauty of character. It is true. 
 But is there one of those noble men who would choose war, if 
 he thought it could honourably be avoided, in order that such 
 opportunity should be presented? I do not for a moment believe 
 it. The state of mind of such men is probably well expressed by 
 the following extract from a war-letter of a German student : — 
 
 ". . . For there were hours of late which will weigh heavy on 
 the memory like a stoppage of the heart, like black waves which 
 are not to be got rid of with any amount of denying. Childhood 
 and youth are passed for good and all. The time of overshadow- 
 ing has begun. 
 
 ". . . The elasticity of life is incomprehensible; I should never 
 have thought that one could survive such things. If I come safe 
 out of this time of trial, everything must be begun over again. 
 
 "I see death and cry to life. I had achieved little in my life, 
 which had been filled with study. To God I have commended 
 my soul, I have sealed it up firmly and surely in Him. I am free 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 75 
 
 to dare all. My eternity belongs to God, my life to the Father- 
 land, but to me remains joy and strength" (international Review, 
 May 31, 1916). 
 
 This is fine; but it is no glorification of war. And in all the 
 mass of soldiers, how many such men are there? And for those 
 men, how many such moments? Why, next minute, it would be 
 the duty of that man to be struggling like a wild beast in the 
 trenches, with feet, hands, and knives, his whole spiritual and moral 
 and intellectual life arrested and buried beneath the flood of sheer 
 animal rage that alone can carry a man through such work. We 
 are apt to scoff at the Germans for being drugged with ether. 
 That they require to be so drugged, if they do, is to their credit. 
 The man who could so act undrugged must be something less 
 than human. 
 
 Sober observers who have been at the front are under no illusions 
 as to the ennobling effects of war. I quote the following letter 
 published in the Open Forum: — ■ 
 
 " Dear , 
 
 " I have been meaning to write to you for many days, but 
 haven't found time. I am at last a comfortable distance behind 
 the firing-line in fairly good billets. We expect to stay here till 
 December nth. The rest and peace are welcome, though rest is 
 hardly a good word for it, as they work us pretty hard morning and 
 afternoon with route marches, drill, and military exercises of va- 
 rious kinds. 
 
 "You asked me to enlarge on some remarks I made when I 
 was back the other day, on the futility of war. I will try and put 
 down what I meant. 
 
 " When I said ' futility,' I was hardly using the word at the 
 moment in its most practical sense. What was in my mind was 
 the huge unnecessary waste of life, of the lives of happy, healthy 
 men, with consequent misery to those who loved them, for no gain 
 of any sort to humanity. I have seen six months now of continuous 
 trench warfare and latterly of heavy fighting. It has not upset my 
 nerves or my health; it has chiefly disgusted me, apart from its 
 interest as a game of skill. What I have felt chiefly about the war 
 is its vileness and out-of-dateness. It has seemed to me so ludi- 
 crously out of place in these civilized days that at the worst 
 moments the incongruity has almost made me laugh. More and 
 more I have felt it to be a child's game played by those who had 
 
76 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 pretended to be grown up. I can understand the justification of 
 murder where there is some strong personal motive more easily 
 than I can understand the justification of war. War is simply 
 wholesale underhand murder — it is essentially, and on principle, 
 underhand — continuing until the misery caused on one side is so 
 much in excess of the misery caused on the other that an alteration 
 in certain national boundaries is agreed to and there ensues the 
 misery of a peace following extreme exhaustion. 
 
 " The above is commonplace and obvious and deals rather with 
 the moral aspect of war than its futility. But I stick to futility. 
 War I think morally futile, because I do not believe at all in the 
 romantic view of it, i.e. in the good qualities which it is supposed 
 to breed. It is true that it tests men, like plague, shipwreck, 
 famine, or any other adversity, but in doing so it does not make 
 the good qualities that come to light, it merely makes them ap- 
 parent. No man in his senses would advocate the occasional 
 sinking of a liner, or the inoculation of a disease, in order to pro- 
 mote heroism and self-sacrifice, yet justification of war on such 
 ground is equally indefensible. 
 
 " With regard to the feelings of the men out here in moments 
 of crisis, I should say that they were much simpler than the story- 
 writers would have you believe. The average Tommy is very 
 simple, because he's so unthoughtful and wanting in imagination 
 and all capacity for self-analysis. I am convinced that in the actual 
 moment of assault — it is more like a 'jog-trot' than the 'fiery 
 rush ' of fiction — the average Tommy is conscious chiefly of a 
 sense of discomfort and a vague feeling that somehow or other and 
 for some reason or other it's got to be done. This unreasoning in- 
 stinct of a thing having to be done is his strength, and what makes 
 him as good a fighting machine as any in Europe. Half an hour 
 after the show I suspect that little or no impression is left on his 
 mind by what he has been through, and from then onwards he tells 
 increasingly tall stories about it. . . . 
 
 " I never cease to wonder at the Tommy. He's so elementary 
 and stupid in many ways and yet such a good fellow. Ordinarily 
 he never stops 'grousing' and grumbling. His food is his chief 
 concern, and he never stops grumbling about it, usually quite un- 
 reasonably ; if the resources of the Savoy and its chef were placed 
 daily at his disposal, I don't think he would grumble any less. 
 But apart from that he can always find trifles to grouse about, 
 especially if he can discover, or imagines, that some one else has 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 77 
 
 been more favoured than he in some respect. He uses vile lan- 
 guage, quite ridiculously and unmeaningly, and by force of exam- 
 ple gets more and more into this habit. He is very sentimental, 
 but doesn't know it, wouldn't admit it, and covers it up under a 
 mask of coarse jocularity. On balance he has been slightly bru- 
 talized by his experience in this war, yet on the whole I believe he 
 has been changed very little by it; at any rate when he gets back 
 to billets he has forgotten all about it and is just what he was. 
 Normally he is either in a state of being aggrieved and dissatis- 
 fied or is rowdily cheerful. His mania at all times for kicking 
 about a football is quite astonishing. So far I haven't said much 
 in his favour, but there is a great deal to be said. When suffering 
 and endurance are really necessary, he suffers and endures with- 
 out a murmur. Also he has an instinct for saving life, and his 
 gallantry and kindness in succouring wounded comrades are beyond 
 reproach. As for stretcher-bearers, I hardly like to talk about 
 them for fear of being extravagant. Early on in training men are 
 selected pretty much at random for stretcher-bearers and are taught 
 First Aid, etc. When they get to work out here, a mantle of 
 heroism seems to descend upon them. Really my company 
 stretcher-bearers seem to me one and all to be Heroes with a very 
 large H. Their bravery, their self-denial, and their devotion to 
 duty have been simply beyond words — and almost all Company 
 Commanders will tell you the same. This has been a digression. 
 I must get back to ' futility ' and polish it off. 
 
 "With regard to the wicked and ugly waste caused by war, I 
 suppose nobody can quite realize it who has not seen, as I have, 
 hundreds and hundreds of corpses — our best stuff most of them, 
 our bravest and healthiest youth — lying unburied where they fell, 
 putrid and blackening. It's a filthy sight. I have hated seeing it, 
 and it has made me more than ever furious at the folly of war. 
 Well, where is the gain for which all that ugly slaughter, with the 
 misery it has made, is the price? There should be a big gain to 
 justify it. As far as this war is concerned, I think myself that in 
 the circumstances that had arisen it was unavoidable. But those 
 circumstances should never have arisen. I hope and pray that the 
 world may wake up from its madness, as from a bad dream, and 
 that this may be the last war, but I haven't much faith in any such 
 happy prospect. Those who have fought and survived will come 
 home slightly brutalized, but otherwise just as they were, and they 
 and people in general will soon forget the waste and black murder 
 
78 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 aspect of this foul thing, whereas the newspapers and literary 
 glorification which always accompanies a war will have sounded 
 a note which will go on ringing for generations. My only real 
 hope lies in the probability that a war twenty years hence will be 
 entirely a matter of flying machines and poisons. It's almost 
 certain that methods will be discovered of destroying life by 
 chemical gases or otherwise over vast areas at a time, and then 
 if politicians disagree either one nation will swiftly exterminate 
 another or civilization will give up this insane method of settling 
 disputes. As for this war, I suppose nobody out of Bedlam dreams 
 that there can be any gain to anybody from it. On the contrary, 
 it must result for all in great loss and years of suffering. At best 
 an even greater possible peril to humanity may have been removed. 
 But that only if a pernicious mental disease has not been spread 
 from Germany to other countries ! Are you quite sure that we 
 have not begun to catch it? I am not. I can see that in some 
 ways we are more Hun-ish than we were. Well, , . . I've written 
 you a fearful long screed, and it's late and I must go to bed. I 
 am having a pretty good time here. I am billeted in a farmhouse 
 and the country round is rather jolly. I forgot to say that shooting 
 Germans at a reasonable distance feels exactly like shooting pheas- 
 ants. Also that Tommy Atkins and Fritz have no personal dis- 
 like of each other. They would cross to each other's lines and 
 fraternize to-morrow if it were possible. It happened last Christ- 
 mas and during January, and will happen again unless the authori- 
 ties, as is possible, make strenuous efforts to keep the game of hate 
 going. 
 
 " Ever yours, ." 
 
 Page 59. — Emerson on Liberty. 
 
 The following passage from Emerson may serve to illustrate the 
 idea that underlies all belief in liberty : — 
 
 " There is in every man a determination of character to a peculiar 
 end, counteracted often by unfavourable fortune, but more apparent 
 the more he is left at liberty. This is called his genius, or his 
 nature, or his turn of mind. The object of education should be 
 to remove all obstructions and let this natural force have free play 
 and exhibit its peculiar product " (Emerson, Journal, vol. 3, p. 416). 
 
 It will be apparent that this view of education belongs to the 
 ideal of liberty. The opposite view, attached to the ideal of au- 
 
MILITARIST AND PACIFIST IDEALS 79 
 
 thority, would make education a training in definite dogmas to 
 counteract the nature of the individual, as it was in the Jesuit sys- 
 tem and will be in the miUtarist system, if ever it can get itself 
 established, as shown in the first chapter of this book. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY 
 
 I HAVE made an attempt in the last chapter to set forth 
 the ideal impulses that underlie, respectively, war and peace. 
 I have done so because I believe them to be the most funda- 
 mental. It remains true, whatever men may say or think, 
 that ideals are the greatest force in the world. What makes 
 people sceptical about this is the fact that men commonly 
 profess ideals which they do not believe, and act on others 
 which they do not profess. This is peculiarly true of the 
 English, who hate formulating their ideals, even to them- 
 selves. 
 
 Still, it is ideals — the ones men really have — that move 
 the world. For those who live by ideals are the active cen- 
 tres in a waste of habit and routine. That is why the world 
 has always been governed, and always will be, by minorities. 
 
 On the other hand, it is true that no ideal impulse can do 
 work by itself. It may sing by itself, as Shelley sang, and 
 all the Utopians, and lovely and inspiring the song may be. 
 But if it is to do work it must be harnessed to coarser 
 elements. Ambitions, lusts, interests, with these it must 
 make contact ; and, making the contact, must lose its purity. 
 Therein is the tragedy of life, both for the individual soul 
 and for historic movements. It is as though some spiritual 
 • energy were always pressing in from an outer region to 
 penetrate the crass world of matter, and in the process of 
 penetration were for ever parting with its own nature and 
 becoming assimilated to the stuff it endeavours to control. 
 Into the heart of youth it enters freely. But soon the com- 
 
 80 
 
THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY 81 
 
 munication with the source is cut ofiE and the imprisoned 
 element struggles with alien substances till it becomes fused 
 with them and they with it. That is why, when an ideal is 
 set forth barely, as I have tried to do it, there comes quickly 
 a reaction of feeling. " Where," men say, " in the real 
 world, is this ideal? What force has it? What embodi- 
 ment ? " It is those, then, who can show it not pure but in 
 the amalgam, not as an isolated impulse but as part of the 
 tangle of life, that will have credit. And it is this that is 
 the capital achievement of the French intellect. Germans 
 in the past could develop an ideal that was all pure thought. 
 The nemesis has been that, returning to reality, they dis- 
 cover no ideal at all except that of force. The French 
 have shown the ideal in its actual travail to shape the real. 
 The English, clinging to reality, have been apt to deny 
 ideals. 
 
 An Englishman, then, at the point I have reached, will 
 probably turn to me and say, " You have talked about ideals 
 of war and peace; but all that is words. Of course we 
 should all like to avoid war if we could. But it is not a 
 question of our will and our desires. War is in the nature 
 of things. It is inevitable." Is it? To that question I 
 will now address myself. 
 
 In a pamphlet published at the beginning of the war, I 
 wrote as follows : — 
 
 War is made — this war has been made — not by any necessity of 
 nature, any law beyond human control, any fate to which men must 
 passively bow ; it is made because certain men who have immediate 
 power over other men are possessed by a certain theory. Some- 
 times they are fully conscious of this theory. More often, perhaps, 
 it works in them unconsciously. But it is there, the dominating 
 influence in international politics. I shall call it the governmental 
 theory, because it is among governing persons — emperors, kings, 
 ministers, and their diplomatic and military advisers — that its 
 
82 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 influence is most conspicuous and most disastrous. But it is sup- 
 ported also by historians, journalists, and publicists, and it is 
 only too readily adopted by the ordinary man, when he turns from 
 the real things he knows and habitually handles to consider the 
 unknown field of foreign affairs. Very briefly, and, therefore, 
 crudely expressed, the theory is this : " The world is divided, 
 poUtically, into States. These States are a kind of abstract Beings, 
 distinct from the men, women, and children who inhabit them. 
 They are in perpetual and inevitable antagonism to one another; 
 and though they may group themselves in alliances, that can be 
 only for temporary purposes to meet some other alliance or single 
 Power. For States are bound by a moral or physical obligation to 
 expand indefinitely each at the cost of the others. They are natural 
 enemies, they always have been so, and they always will be; and 
 force is the only arbiter between them. That being so. War is an 
 eternal necessity. As a necessity, it should be accepted, if not 
 welcomed, by all sound-thinking and right-feeling men. Pacifists 
 are men at once weak and dangerous. They deny a fact as 
 fundamental as any of the facts of the natural world. And their 
 influence, if they have any, can only be disastrous to their State in 
 its ceaseless and inevitable contest with other States." 
 
 Reviewers have denied that this theory is held by anybody. 
 They cannot be well acquainted with the political literature 
 of Germany or they would know that there it has often been 
 given explicit expression. Some account of the matter will 
 be found in an essay by Mr. Gooch,^ who thus sums up the 
 views of Treitschke: — 
 
 The State stands high above the individuals who compose it, 
 and it exists in order to realize ideals far above human happiness. 
 This it can only do if it is strong. It is no part of its duty to 
 inquire whether its actions are approved qr disapproved by .its 
 subjects. It is the guardian of the national tradition and a trustee 
 for the interest of unborn generations. ... In like manner the 
 State owes no allegiance to any external authority. International 
 law is a mere phrase, and no tribunal can arbitrate between sover- 
 
 ^The (ferman Theory of the State, by G. C. P. Gooch. Reprinted 
 from the Contemporary Review of June 1915. 
 
THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY 83 
 
 eign States. Treaties are a voluntary self-limitation, and no State 
 can hamper its freedom of action by obligations to another. It 
 must be ever ready for war, which, when undertaken for honour or 
 for some supreme national interest, is wholesome and elevating. 
 For war is not a necessary evil, but an instrument of statesman- 
 ship and a school of patriotism. Only in war for the fatherland 
 does a nation become truly and spiritually united. ... It is ideal- 
 ism that demands a war and materialism which rejects it. . . . The 
 State is Power. All its institutions and practices must be directed 
 towards this goal. The youth of the country must be trained to 
 arms and courage must be fostered by duelling. 
 
 The author ends his survey of the recent trend of German 
 thought with the words : " The idolatry of the State has 
 reached its logical issue in the elevation of force to the 
 sovereign principle in national life and in international 
 relations." 
 
 It is not, however, when it is formulated that the theory 
 is most pernicious. It is when it is held unconsciously. 
 For then, though it governs all a man's thinking, its 
 essential absurdity never appears to him. The most radical 
 changes in the orientation of the human spirit are 
 effected by setting forth in clear language the concealed 
 presuppositions of current thought. For the best way 
 to convert a man is to show him that his reasoning rests 
 on premises which he is bound to deny as soon as they 
 are exposed. It is encouraging to me, therefore, to 
 find that critics consider the doctrine outlined above to 
 be absurd. I agree with them. But that does not alter 
 the fact that the doctrine is implied in most speaking and 
 writing on international politics, and, as I venture to guess, 
 in that of the critics themselves. I have read, since I wrote 
 that passage, many books, pamphlets, newspaper articles, 
 and speeches in many languages, and the result has been 
 to confirm my belief that the view there set forth really is 
 the one prevalent among those who profess to speak with 
 
84> THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 authority on international relations. The literature is so 
 vast that this statement cannot be proved by citations nor 
 disproved by counter-citations. But I would a'sk the reader 
 to test it for himself. Let him substitute, in anything he 
 may read on this subject, for the names of States — Eng- 
 land, Germany, France — rthe names of the corresponding 
 peoples — the English, the Germans, the French. Let him 
 then endeavour to form some concrete image of all the va- 
 rieties of classes and individuals, professions, occupations, 
 interests, which those names aim at designating. Let him 
 next ask himself precisely who, of all these, is being bene- 
 fited or injured by the policy that is being discussed ; and he 
 will, I think, quickly come to the conclusion that his authors 
 are not thinking of men and women at all. They are 
 thinking of words, like power, or prestige, or empire. Their 
 whole game is a game with counters ; or would be, were it 
 not that the moves with the counters effect real changes, 
 though changes unforeseen and unintended, in the lives and 
 fortunes of real people. 
 
 This dwelling among abstractions is one principal char- 
 acteristic of the doctrine we are criticizing. The other is a 
 kind of mystic fatalism. It is supposed not only that his- 
 tory is governed by " laws " (as it may be, but if so we 
 have made little progress in discovering them), but that 
 these laws operate from outside upon men who are passive 
 instruments under their power. This is the same error 
 which seps, in the " laws " of nature, commands, instead of 
 descriptions of behaviour. But the error becomes per- 
 nicious when it is applied to human society, because it tends 
 to paralyse beforehand the operations of reason and the 
 motions of humanity by an assumption of ineluctable fate. 
 " So it has been, so it is, so it will be " — though it be in 
 plain and admitted opposition both to the interests and the 
 
THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY 85 
 
 desires of men. There are publicists and historians who 
 enjoy the spectacle of the suffering of mankind, and feel a 
 kind of aesthetic indignation against those who insist on 
 pointing out that what they are contemplating is not a' 
 tragedy of fate, but a muddle of incompetence, ignorance, 
 and bad will. It is only when we look back on the irrevoca- 
 ble past that this pathos of " necessity " is either possible 
 or tolerable. The present and the future is the domain of 
 foresight and of will. 
 
 The reason why people find it difficult to believe that 
 those who control international politics conceive the State 
 in this abstract way, is that, in domestic affairs, modern 
 States really do, to some extent, pursue the real interests 
 of the citizens, and are thus, partially at least, what they 
 should be, instruments of society. That is why most people 
 are usually more interested in domestic than in foreign 
 politics ; for in domestic politics they attempt to get things 
 done which will subserve the real well-being of themselves 
 and their descendants. It is true, of course, that even here 
 there is no identity between the State and society, even in 
 countries supposed to be democratic. For, in fact, govern- 
 ment is everywhere to a great extent controlled by powerful 
 minorities, with an interest distinct from that of the mass of 
 the people ; and this fact gives a key to the internal politics 
 of all contemporary States. But the theory, at least, is 
 accepted that society controls government and directs it 
 in its own interest. So that the State may be plausibly re- 
 garded as an aspect of society and as concerned with real 
 things and people. What has been above said, therefore, 
 is not intended to apply, and would apply only within nar- 
 rower limits, to the State as controlling and directing in- 
 ternal policy. In foreign policy, on the other hand, I main- 
 tain it to be true that the " State " both is conceived and 
 
86 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 behaves in abstraction from the concrete interests of the 
 people.^ 
 
 It may perhaps be objected that this cannot be true because 
 men would never be moved by abstractions. It would be 
 as true to say that they are never moved by anything else. 
 For they are moved by their passions, and their passions 
 respond to words rather than things. The more remote the 
 issue from daily experience, the more violent the appeal to 
 passion. And nothing is so remote from ordinary men as 
 the issues of foreign policy. When these come up, men 
 have nothing to fall back on except their primitive sense 
 that they all belong with one another and don't belong with 
 a remote, unknown being called the " foreigner " ; a sense 
 to which there attaches a passion derived, according to 
 sociologists, from instincts of the animal herd or pack. 
 Arouse this, and it is strong in proportion to its emptiness 
 of concrete knowledge and experience. And it may be 
 aroused by any of the words or phrases which have become 
 associated with it — " Holy Russia," " Deutschland iiber 
 alles," " Britons never, never, never will be slaves." These 
 kinds of cries have only to be raised and any issue you like 
 may be made one of national pride or honour or interest. 
 You have only to suggest that it is such, and at least nine- 
 tenths of the population will believe you. They like feel- 
 ing strongly in that way, and they resent the attempt to show 
 them, by a consideration of the facts, that the feeling in the 
 given case is absurd. It is thus that every attempt at inter- 
 national agreement, even the most obviously necessary and 
 convenient, may be, and often is, opposed as a kind of 
 treachery to the nation-pack. For example, when first an 
 international postal convention was suggested. " National- 
 ists of all countries saw in the proposal a menace to national 
 
 ^ What qualification is necessary for this statement will be found set 
 forth below. It conies mainly under the heading " defence." 
 
THE STATE AS A SUPER-PERSONALITY 87 
 
 sentiment and national glory." ^ When an international 
 agreement for wireless telegraphy was proposed, " the usual 
 parochial cry of national interests was raised." ^ In such 
 cases what raises the passion is not real feasons or real 
 angers, even though these be alleged. It is the abstract 
 notion, almost the word, " the foreigner." Unless we real- 
 ize the power of abstract conceptions and words to raise 
 passion, we have not the key to the problem of international 
 relations. For it is by rousing passion through words that 
 small groups of men, knowing their own mind, maintain 
 nations in a state of armed peace and precipitate them pe- ■^' 
 riodically into war. 
 
 We have to take along with us, then, in all our inquiry, 
 this fundamental fact, that the actions of men are controlled 
 more by passion than by reason ; that passion is aroused by 
 abstract notions and words ; and that it thus becomes possible 
 for men to sacrifice everything they have to causes which 
 have no bearing on their real interests, whether material, 
 moral, or spiritual. It is on these abstractions that most 
 of the reasoning of international politics rests. And it is 
 because of them that the reasoning, though so bad, passes 
 muster ; that the facts alleged in its support, though so false, 
 are accepted; and that criticism and analysis beat in vain 
 against structures of sophism as flimsy as any that have 
 ever served to confine the spirit of man in the torture-house 
 of his own misconceptions. Some of these chains of false 
 ideas we shall now proceed to examine, remembering al- 
 ways that they derive their apparent cogency from the ele- 
 ment of passion that bears them up, and on which they 
 float like seaweed. 
 
 In my criticism I shall subject them to one simple test, 
 the same to which the Benthamites subjected domestic in- 
 
 1- Woolf, International Government, p. 120. 
 « Ibid., p. 134. 
 
88 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 stitutions, namely, their actual bearing upon human well- 
 being. The importance of the service performed by this 
 school to the theory and practice of politics has been ob- 
 scured by more or less irrelevant discussions about hedonism. 
 It is, in my judgment, quite true that pleasure is not the end 
 of life. But any Government would have earned the grati- 
 tude of mankind if it could do even so much as to promote 
 pleasure and diminish pain. And if we could get so far as 
 to prevent Governments, in their handling of international 
 relations, from accumulating on mankind evils inconceivable 
 in their magnitude and unredeemed by any compensating 
 good, we should have made an enormous step in human 
 progress. 
 
 This general idea then, the subordination of international 
 politics to the well-being of real men and women, will govern 
 everything I have to say. I will now proceed to examine 
 critically the causes why international war occurs, and the 
 reasons alleged to show that it must occur. 
 
CHAPTER V • 
 THE THEORY OP INEVITABLE EXPANSldN 
 
 In a book by a Swedish writer^ I find the following 
 passage : — 
 
 From this point of view, it is clear that wars, in the true sense, 
 are a matter of States, not of individual men. . . . Historical events 
 are influenced by free will, but taken by large and by long do not 
 contradict the equal law of necessity. Wars appear as unheard-of 
 revolutions, not to say as simply incomprehensible, so long as one 
 applies to them the measure of the individual man ; but the suffer- 
 ing of war must not be measured by the unrest of our hearts, but by 
 the suffering of the State, for it is the need of the State that pro- 
 vokes them, not that of individual men. To such great events a 
 merely anthropomorphic perspective is inadequate; the historian 
 must elevate himself to a " planetary " point of view. But that 
 demands of the historian the capacity to grasp the State as an 
 independent super-individual personality, different in kind from the 
 individual, even though it be essentially akin to him. Only he who 
 can in this way set himself free from the prejudice and narrowness 
 of the individual is in a position to form a scientific conception of 
 war as an instrument of development. 
 
 This is a typical passage in illustration of the doctrine I 
 am combating. Here is the flat assertion that the State is a 
 personality " different in kind " from the individuals it con- 
 trols. Here is the implication that its well-being has nothing 
 to do with the well-being of real men and women ; that their 
 sufferings are irrelevant, and, of course, also their joys, 
 their goodness, their badness, their intellectual, moral, or 
 spiritual growth. The purposes of the State, we are told, 
 are " super-individual." And when we ask what these pur- 
 
 1 Dr. Rudolf Kjellen, Die poUtischen Prohleme des Weltkriegs. 
 
 89 
 
90 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 poses are, we are informed (in what follows) that they 
 are " Sufficient extension," " Freedom of movement," and 
 " The possibility of powerful union." To the defect of the 
 various States in one or other of these respects the origin 
 of the present war is traced. 
 
 I proceed to ask why the " State " requires any of these 
 things; and if "It" does require them, why we, men and 
 women, are to incur this frightful suffering in order to secure 
 them for " It." And it becomes clear, on further reading 
 (as far as anything becomes clear), that the State requires 
 them in order that it may be great and strong. Well, how 
 does this strength of the State react on the goodness or bad- 
 ness of its citizens, present or prospective? No answer, of 
 course! For the question has never been asked. The 
 premises adopted exclude the question. Let us, however, 
 who are dealing with realities, that is, with men and women, 
 insist upon asking : Why must the State be strong? 
 
 The first answer given is likely to be, " In order to de- 
 fend itself from attack." So that, so far, we get the result 
 that this war was inevitable in order that every State might 
 become stronger for defence in some future war. This 
 seems odd, at first sight. Let us, howler, pursue it. And 
 first let us take the simple and plausible view that every 
 State felt that it was threatened by a stronger State, and de- 
 sired at once to meet that danger in the present and to 
 guard against it in the future by strategic advantages which 
 it hoped to gain as a result of the war : Russia wanting, for 
 that reason, Constantinople, Italy the control of the Adriatic, 
 Germany a port on the North Sea or the Channel, Great 
 Britain a control over the land route to India, and so on. 
 Admit it, if you like, and admit, what I do not dispute, that 
 it is the real interest of citizens, and not merely of the super- 
 individual State, that they should not be attacked, and suc- 
 cessfully attacked, by another State, since that would involve 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 91 
 
 them not only in all the losses of war, but in what they may 
 judge to be worse, the loss of independence. But, then, 
 why had any of these States to fear attack and therefore to 
 develop strength? 
 
 The first answer is this: They all had to fear attack 
 because they were all armed against it. This may seem to 
 some readers a paradox, but on reflexion it will be seen to 
 be self-evident. A principal cause of war is mutual fear and 
 suspicion; and the fear and suspicion is due to the arma- 
 ments. Increase of armaments for defence in any State is 
 interpreted by the rest as increase for offence. None be- 
 lieves the statements or pledges of another ; and the prepara- 
 tion against war comes to be itself nothing but a veiled 
 form of war. It may well seem surprising that, in the 
 face of this plain fact, the maxim is still current, among 
 men supposing themselves to be realistic and practical, that 
 the only way to keep the peace is to prepare for war. But 
 in fact the source of the error is clear. These men look at 
 the question exclusively from the point of view of their own 
 nation. " We," they say in effect, " should never make a 
 war, at any rate if we could get our way without it. We are 
 a just people, and everything we want to get is just. If, 
 therefore, we were so strong that nobody would dare to 
 attack us, there would never be war. And as, in that case, 
 we should always get our way, there would never be injus- 
 tice. Moral: pile up armaments till you are demonstrably 
 stronger than anybody else." " The present war," says this 
 school, " would not have occurred if Great Britain had had 
 a conscript army on the continental scale." This looks 
 sound enough. But meantime people in every other coun- 
 try are reasoning in precisely the same way. So that the 
 doctrine, looked at all round, amounts to this : " The only 
 way to keep the peace is for every State at the same time 
 to be stronger than every other." The maxim thus becomes 
 
92 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 a flat absurdity as soon as every nation adopts it. But 
 every nation does adopt it; with the result that you get 
 an endless competition in armaments, an increasing strain, 
 mental, moral, and physical, and finally, and in consequence 
 of that strain, a breakdown into war. This is the plain 
 truth of the matter. And the history of the past forty years, 
 culminating in the war, is a sufficient illustration of it. 
 Those who argue that the war would have been avoided if 
 we had built up a conscript army, forget that the threat 
 involved in such a policy would more likely have precipi- 
 tated the war at an earlier date. Competing armaments 
 must necessarily tend to produce war, unless and until some 
 Power or alliance of Powers should establish a superiority 
 so evident and insuperable that the attempt to cope with it 
 should be abandoned as hopeless. But no such alliance of 
 Powers would be likely to remain united for long. And no 
 single Power could ever attain a position of undisputed su- 
 premacy. And if any Power or alliance of Powers should 
 succeed in doing so, there would have been established pre- 
 cisely that hegemony over Europe which it has been the 
 object of British policy for centuries to prevent. Every 
 great Power tends to suppose that a peace established by its 
 own supremacy would be the proper solution; for every 
 Power supposes itself to be just, competent, and the repre- 
 sentative of the highest form of civilization. We are like 
 the rest in that respect. Only we do not happen to want the 
 hegemony of Europe, since our Empire is beyond the seas. 
 We content ourselves, therefore, with preventing any other 
 Power from getting it, and for that reason among others it 
 is not likely that any Power ever will get it. That being so, 
 one clear conclusion emerges. The way to peace, if any one 
 really wants it, is not by piling up competing armaments, 
 but either by putting them down by agreement or by putting 
 •them all jointly at the service of peace and law. That way, 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 93 
 
 or no way! I do not believe any intelligent man with a 
 competent knowledge of the facts could dispute that. And 
 I revert to the statement with which I began this argument : 
 the first and most obvious cause of war is the fact that 
 States are armed, and armed against one another. 
 
 It is usual, however, for governments and nations to 
 maintain that their own armaments are only for defence, 
 whereas those of other nations are for aggression. And this 
 is not necessarily hypocrisy, though of course it may be. 
 For all States may really believe that they are on the defen- 
 sive. But also, and at the same time, there is a common be- 
 lief among statesmen and publicists that, in fact, some States, 
 even perhaps all States, not only are, btit must be, aggres- 
 sive; and that for that reason, quite apart from the fears 
 and misunderstandings fostered by the international an- 
 archy, there must always be war. The necessity for war, 
 in this view, is derived from the need States have to expand. 
 And this need again seems to be regarded as in some sense 
 " natural," like that for the expansion of water into steam 
 at a certain temperature. On this idea a whole system of 
 international politics is based. Imperialism is regarded as 
 an " inevitable " phase in the history of nations. No sooner 
 have they achieved independence than they must set out on a 
 career of conquest. As an Italian writer (shade of Maz- 
 zini!) has put it, " Nationalism is only a step on the way to 
 Empire." Nations, it seems to be thought, have no choice 
 in the matter. Expansion is a fate, though a joyous and 
 noble one. And those who oppose it are dreamers, senti- 
 mentalists, and whatever else is included in the ritual of 
 abuse which these gentlemen affect. This view of the rela- 
 tion of States appears to be so widely held that it will be 
 worth while to examine it somewhat carefully. 
 
 We may notice, in the first place, that what lies behind 
 the theory is passion, even when it pretends to rest on 
 
94 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 science; and the passion centres about the " State," ab- 
 stractly conceived. The " State," it is thought, is a Being, 
 that must grow like other beings. And with that Being 
 the theorist identifies his own ego. He imagines himself 
 growing with it, and in this vicarious expansion of his per- 
 sonality finds compensation for its actual limitations. It is 
 this passion for expansion that gives plausibility and weight 
 to arguments that, seen in a dry light, would appear at once 
 in all their insufficiency. 
 
 The passion implies the judgment : " It is a good thing 
 for States to expand." And I meet this statement at once 
 with the question. Why? What particular people, when 
 and where, are going to be benefited by the expansion, and 
 in what way? What particular people are going to be, I 
 will not say happier (since this school is apt to profess a 
 contempt for happiness, at any rate for other people's), but 
 better or nobler ? Suppose that Russia takes Constantinople. 
 How will that affect the Russian peasants? Will they be 
 materially or morally or mentally or spiritually superior to 
 what they are now ? Is the ordinary British citizen a better 
 man, because he is the citizen of an Empire, than his fore- 
 fathers were in the reign of Elizabeth? Was the individual 
 Roman citizen under Diocletian a better man than the con- 
 temporaries of Camillus? Is the individual Swiss on the 
 average a worse man than the individual Briton ? The an- 
 swers to these questions would certainly be complicated and 
 controversial. But at any rate the answer " Yes " is not 
 self-evident. On the other hand, the " expansion " policy 
 implies an unending series of wars, each more terrible and 
 destructive than the last, not only to the material but to the 
 moral and spiritual life of men. Against this certain evil 
 what certain good is to be set? I venture to say, none 
 whatever. There are some problematical goods, in so far 
 as it may be alleged that the civilization of one nation is 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 95 
 
 " higher " than that of another. I shall consider that di- 
 rectly. Meantime, my point is that the questions I am ask- 
 ing are the only relevant questions, and that the expansion- 
 ists never ask them, or never ask them seriously. The truth 
 is, that all that is in the mind of the ordinary literary or 
 poetical or journalistic politician ^ is the pleasurable excite- 
 ment that he feels at the idea that he belongs to something 
 big and growing. It does not occur to him even to inquire 
 how the policy he advocates affects the real life of the mass 
 of men. He even feels that question to be a kind of insult- 
 ing irrelevance. And, probably, if you could get a frank 
 confession from him, it would run something like this: 
 " We people, a few poets, a few journalists, a few aristo- 
 crats, a few soldiers, and others whom we can bully, cheat, 
 or flatter to be our jackals in the hunt — we are the only 
 people that really matter. If others do not share our ambi- 
 tion, so much the worse for them ! Fortunately our posi- 
 tion, our talents, our wealth give us power to put our poli- 
 cies into effect. We shall do so, regardless of pettifogging 
 considerations about consequences. If you press the idle 
 question as to what we think will be gained, we reply that 
 we now, and people like us in the future, have, and will 
 have, certain emotions which we cherish, and which we can 
 only satisfy by a policy of expansion and war : and to satisfy 
 these we are prepared to sacrifice anybody and anything else. 
 This we call idealism. To challenge it is to confess yourself 
 a materialist. And there, if you please, let us leave this dis- 
 cussion, which is offensive to a gentleman and a man of 
 honour." 
 
 It is not likely that any one except a modern misinterpreter 
 of Nietzsche — as ignorant of politics as he is of life — 
 
 ^The reader will understand that I am dealing here with the 
 "romanticism" of expansion. The alleged "real" reasons are dis- 
 cussed later. 
 
96 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 would express himself in such words as the above. But the 
 spirit of them is easily to be detected underlying the lucubra- 
 tions of expansionists, whether in England, Germany, Rus- 
 sia, France, or Italy; and it is the influence of that spirit that 
 gives apparent cogency to their arguments. Englishmen, I 
 gladly concede, are less liable to such emotions, and less 
 aware of them when they have them, than more imagina- 
 tive and romantic peoples. But we are considering the gen- 
 eral motives of the policy of expansion. And I say, with 
 some confidence, that, among the few who stir the many 
 to action, this kind of feeling is a real, if unavowed motive. 
 But, equally clearly, it is the motive of a minority ; and one 
 which, if it were frankly expounded, as I have expounded it, 
 would be dismissed with ridicule and contempt by the mass 
 of every nation. It certainly does not constitute an irre- 
 sistible popular obsession, against which reason and hu- 
 manity must always struggle in vain. Policies of expansion 
 do not originate among the masses, they originate among the 
 few. And those few are inspired by the romantic passion 
 I have characterized. 
 
 This passion they sometimes support by the theory that 
 the civilization of their State is so superior to that of all . 
 others that it is a duty to mankind to impose it by force 
 on the world. This view has been expressed with unusual 
 frankness by recent German writers. But it must not be 
 supposed that it is peculiar to Germans. It may be found 
 underlying the Imperialism of all nations. The English 
 Chamberlain was as much a believer in it as the German 
 Chamberlain. And it is a Scot who writes : " If I were 
 asked how one could describe in a sentence the general 
 aim of British Imperialism during the last two centuries 
 and a half, I should have to answer : * To give to all who 
 come within its sway the power to look at the things of 
 man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 97 
 
 of an Englishman.' " ^ Panslavism is as sure that the salva- 
 tion of the world depends on its domination by Russia as 
 Pan-Germanism is that it depends on its domination by 
 Germany. And it is in the following passage by a great 
 Russian writer that I seem to find expressed better than 
 anywhere else the real spirit of all these movements : — 
 
 Is it not thus, like the bold troika which cannot be overtaken, 
 that thou art dashing along, O Russia, my country? The roads 
 smoke beneath thee, the bridges thunder ; all is left, all will be left 
 behind thee. The spectator stops short, astounded as at a marvel 
 of God. Is this the lightning which has descended from heaven? 
 he asks. What does this awe-inspiring movement betoken? And 
 what uncanny power is possessed by these horses, so strange to the 
 world? Ah, horses, horses, Russian horses! What horses you 
 are ! Doth the whirlwind sit upon your manes ? Doth your sen- 
 sitive ear prick with every tingle in your veins ? But lo ! you 
 have heard a familiar song from on high; simultaneously in 
 friendly wise you have bent your brazen breasts to the task; and 
 hardly letting your hoofs touch the earth, you advance in one 
 tightly stretched line flying through the air. Yes, on the troika 
 fiies, inspired by God! O Russia, whither art thou dashing? Re- 
 ply ! But she replies not ; the horses' bells break into a wondrous 
 sound ; the shattered air becomes a tempest, and the thunder growls ; 
 Russia flies past everything else on earth ; other peoples, kingdoms, 
 and empires gaze askance as they stand aside to make way for her.^ 
 
 1 cite this passage for the reason that it gives, more purely 
 than anything else I have come across, the " idealistic " 
 side of this passion to spread one's Kultur. The passion, 
 it is clear, is simple, naive, and instinctive. The man wants 
 to see his country "first." First in what, and for what? 
 Ah, that question he has not asked! Being a poet, and 
 not a philosopher, he gives the whole case away by admit- 
 ting, almost boasting, that he has not the least idea where 
 
 i-Cramb, Germany and England, p. 125. For further English cita- 
 tions, see J. M. Robertson, The Germans, chap. i. 
 
 2 Gogol, Dead Souls. I am not responsible for the translation. 
 
98 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Russia is going. The point is, that she should go fast, 
 and that all other nations should have to stand out of 
 her way. Well, that is, at bottom, the main inspiration of 
 patriotic Imperialism. Afterwards, when it seems neces- 
 sary to give arguments, people begin looking for something 
 plausible to say about the ways in which their nation is 
 superior. But they feel it to be superior long before they 
 have inquired whether it is really so. They feel it to be 
 so, because they belong to it, and what they belong to 
 must be superior. The foreigner, not being under this 
 illusion about any nation except his own, sees through 
 and exposes these pretensions of others. But he advances 
 similar claims about his own people. It is, indeed, true 
 that different nations have different merits, and that, in 
 this or that respect, one is superior to another. But, on 
 the whole and altogether, this idea of superiority is an 
 illusion of egotism. Nations can no more appraise them- 
 selves justly than individuals can: less, indeed; for men 
 give free vent to their collective vanity, and even regard it 
 as a virtue, while they are aware of the danger and absurd- 
 ity of personal conceit. We can all see this truth, when 
 we listen to the self -applause of other nations. The whole 
 civilized world is laughing at the way the Germans talk 
 of themselves. And justly. But one may well doubt 
 whether even the much soberer and finer plea for Anglo- 
 Saxon civilization put forward by the writers of the Round 
 Table would be read without a smile by foreigners. The 
 plain truth is that a comparison between nations that have 
 attained to stable government is so complicated, and so 
 subject to the idiosyncrasies and preferences of the person 
 judging, that no conclusions from it could ever be anything 
 more than interesting. As far, indeed, as the Western 
 nations are concerned, their achievements resemble one 
 another far more than they differ. These nations are con- 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 99 
 
 stantly interacting and borrowing from one another. And 
 the notion that any one of them is even so different from the 
 others (to say nothing of superiority) that the conquest of 
 the rest by it, were that even conceivable, would seriously 
 affect the whole nature of European civilization, is really 
 preposterous. What we have is simply Western civiliza- 
 tion ; and we shall continue to have it, unless we destroy it 
 by internecine strife. Its character does not depend on 
 whether any, or which, of its component nations exercises 
 any temporary hegemony. 
 
 When we turn to the East, it is different. The civiliza- 
 tion of India, or of China, or of Egypt, is radically different 
 from that of the West. But he would be a rash man who 
 would say simply that one is "higher" than the other. 
 The spectacle of Europe at this moment is not calculated 
 to impress a Confucian, or a Buddhist, or a Brahman, or a 
 Mahommedan, with the superiority of the West. The life 
 of Manchester or Sheffield is not demonstrably nobler than 
 that of Benares. And the German or French peasant is 
 not obviously a finer creature than the peasant of China or 
 Japan. These questions of comparative merit are indeed 
 not uninteresting to discuss. But it is clear beforehand that 
 no certainly true conclusions can be arrived at. And for 
 nations, as for individuals, the only sound rule for practice 
 is to give to each one the best possible chance to develop 
 freely, subj^t to the equal freedom of others. This rule 
 would be easier and simpler to apply to nations than to 
 individuals, though it is subject to limitations which I shall 
 notice presently. The opposite policy, of imposing one's 
 civilization by force on the rest, is as false in ideal as it is 
 chimerical in practice. Germany could not, if she would, 
 impose " her " civilization on the rest of the Western world. 
 Why, Rome even could not impose hers on Greece ; rather 
 the contrary happened. Nor have the English imposed 
 
100 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 theirs on India. They have made only a confusion of both. 
 And a serious observer will draw from that case many grave 
 doubts as to the advantages of the conquest and government 
 of one people by another, even when all has been said that 
 can be said (and it is much) on behalf of the order arid 
 material development that has resulted from the conquest. 
 
 The true way for one civilization to " conquer " another 
 is for it to be so obviously superior in this or that point that 
 others desire to imitate it. The Germans have had suc- 
 cesses enough of this kind, and they would have had more 
 if they had abstained from war. The more they try to 
 bully other people, the less will these recognize even the real 
 merits that they have. It is these simple facts about human 
 nature that they are so curiously unable to appreciate. If 
 they really have a gospel of " organization " to preach (to 
 me it seems the poorest gospel ever put forward), they 
 may be sure that it will have its success, without their 
 attempting to impose it by armies. It will have all the 
 success it deserves. And it ought not to want to have any 
 more. And so with the English. What is our real success 
 in the world ? Not, I venture to think, our " Empire," but 
 our practice of self-government, which has made way over 
 the greater part of the civilized world, not by conquest but 
 by its intrinsic merits. What is the real triumph of France ? 
 Not Morocco, nor Tunis, still less the transitory and dis^ 
 astrous conquests of Louis XIV or of Napoleon, but the 
 prestige, and the deserved prestige, of French culture. All 
 good things propagate themselves by imitation; and, so far 
 as I know, one good thing only can be propagated by force, 
 and that is order. 
 
 And this brings me to the one clear exception to all 
 I have been saying. When a people cannot establish a 
 stable political system; when it lives by raiding its neigh- 
 bours ; when its internal confusions spread beyond its bor- 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 101 
 
 jders to better organized communities; when it occupies 
 territory rich in valuable materials which it cannot utilize 
 itself, and will not let others utilize; then it cannot claim 
 the right to free and independent development. In these 
 cases I do not deny a " right of conquest." But having 
 said this, I must add that the way in which conquests have 
 in fact been achieved, the motives, and many of the results, 
 constitute an indelible stain upon the record of the white 
 race. Never has any nation intervened in any country 
 genuinely and solely in the joint interest of the native 
 inhabitants and of civilization as a whole. Motives of 
 egoistic exploitation and acts of hideous oppression and 
 cruelty have been almost everywhere the origin and result 
 of intervention; and only by degrees, after the event, has 
 some decent standard of administration, some concern for 
 the well-being of the native population, grown up. Even in 
 our own day we have seen the horrors of the Congo and of 
 Putumayo.^ And much as the English have learned by 
 their own ill-record of the past, much as they may justly 
 claim to have advanced in their ideals and their achievement, 
 we have yet lived to see, in the midst of the war for free- 
 dom, a British Colonial Secretary return to the worst 
 traditions of mercantilism, and initiate a policy by which 
 millions of natives are made to suffer in order to put money 
 into the pockets of British merchants.^ 
 
 Nevertheless, bad as is the record of the European na- 
 tions, it is impossible to maintain that Africa or America 
 should have been left unsubdued and undeveloped. More 
 questionably, the same may perhaps be said of some Eastern 
 countries. So far as this is true, we may justify " expan- 
 sion " for the sake of spreading civilization. But we can- 
 
 1 And, observe, the system of the French Congo was as bad as that 
 of the Belgian. And British companies were responsible in the last 
 resort for, the atrocities of Putumayo. 
 
 2 See Notes and Illustrations to Chapter VII, p. 142, 
 
103 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 not, for that reason, justify one civilized nation for making 
 war upon another in order to seize its dependencies. It is 
 indeed intelligible that a nation like Germany, arriving late 
 in the field, should feel an ambition to try its hand at " civ- 
 ilizing," and a regret that the principal regions available 
 for that purpose should have been already occupied by 
 others. But to threaten or make international war, in order 
 to seize from others that field of enterprise, is justifiable by 
 no conceivable standard of international ethics. What have 
 the nations of Europe to do, destroying one another in 
 internecine conflict, in order that one rather than another 
 may undertake the thankless and difficult task of develop- 
 ing dependencies inhabited by men of alien race, and risk in 
 the process (as history shows that nations do risk) its own 
 finer achievement at home? Any nation, one might think, 
 would be thankful to be spared that dangerous duty (dan- 
 gerous to a nation's soul), though a nation upon whom 
 history has forced it has no right nor power to shirk it. 
 But to go to seek it, in these days, by machine guns and 
 mass-murder! Ask the people frankly what they think of 
 that! Never was ideology so false as that which would 
 plunge the world in war in order that one rather than 
 another of the nations of Europe — all so inadequate to 
 the task — should try its hand at solving this riddle of the 
 Sphinx, 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 91. — ^ Armaments as a Cause of War. 
 
 The view taken in the text about the effect of armaments is so 
 self-evident that I can hardly imagine an intelligent man honestly 
 disputing it. The contrary view, however, will always be main- 
 tained by those who, because they want war, want also preparations 
 for war. Thus the Morning Post writes (January 2, 1915) : — 
 
 " It is necessary for all patriots who do not believe in these 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 103 
 
 material millenniums ^ to maintain unceasing vigilance and to 
 preach constantly the truth that naval and military precautions are 
 the only means yet devised to prevent war. . . . 
 
 " If this country had not been deluded and tempted into inade- 
 quate preparation and fancied security there might possibly have 
 been no war at this time. We are paying now the heavy price 
 which pacifists laid on the future. We shall have to pay a vast 
 sum in lives and money which might have been saved in prepa- 
 ration." 
 
 The exact point of my disagreement with the Morning Post is 
 that I hold that, while an international force might prevent war, 
 a rivalry of national forces must produce it. But the truth is, as 
 the rest of the article suggests (see above, p. 32), that the Morning 
 Post, like the German romanticists of war whom I have already 
 discussed, believes that war is itself the goal and ideal of nations, 
 and that without it they must degenerate. I respect the honesty 
 with which this newspaper has asserted its position. If we know 
 who our opponents are, and what they really think, we can the 
 better and the more honourably fight them. 
 
 As an extreme example of what I can only call the insanity of 
 the militarist doctrine of arming to keep the peace, I cite the 
 following from Humanite: — 
 
 " Let us away with these empty, senseless words, and organize 
 our Army so that France can put nine million combatants in the 
 field. She will be able to do that in forty years hence if, from 
 to-day, the means are granted that I enumerated. Then France 
 will be able to defy all attack, even that of all Europe combined " 
 (cited from Humanite in the Labour Leader of October 26, 1916). 
 
 When France has nine million combatants in the field, how many 
 will Russia have, or Germany? Nine million is about the whole 
 adult male population of France. There could not be a better 
 reductio ad ahsurdum of the fallacy of arming to keep the peace, so 
 long as the international anarchy continues. 
 
 An armament manufacturer may fairly be supposed to have 
 motives, other than a disinterested love of war, for supporting 
 the popular fallacy. And one is not surprised to find Mr. Hudson 
 Maxim reported as saying to the American public : — 
 
 lA "material" millennium seems to be one in which people do not 
 use every kind of material weapon to destroy material bodies and 
 things. A spiritual millennium, presumably, is one in which they do. 
 
104 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 " The fighting among other nations has done much towards pre- 
 paring us for war, and therefore much towards insuring inter- 
 national peace for us." He adds that, " If war is ever to be con- 
 quered, industry will be its conqueror." ^ 
 
 Perhaps. But hardly the armaments industry. 
 
 The fallacy. Si vis pacem para helium, has been exposed with 
 exceptional vigour by " Roland " in The Future of Militarism 
 (Fisher Unwin, 1916). The exposure would be final, if men could 
 be moved by argument and reason. But it appears to be the boast 
 of Mr. Oliver, against whose Ordeal by Battle " Roland's " book is 
 directed, that neither he himself nor any other great man is so 
 moved. I show some disinterestedness in recommending this book 
 to the reader, for the author includes me in his denunciations. I 
 only hope that Mr. Oliver does not feel as unscathed as I do! 
 
 Page 98. — Imperialism. 
 
 Italian Imperialists are as violent and aggressive as any German ; 
 and even when engaged in war for the " rights of small nations " 
 they do not moderate their claims. In an article in the Manchester 
 Guardian of October 10, 1916, we read as follows: — 
 
 " One of the most interesting political developments of recent 
 years is the rapid ripening of Italian Imperialism. Crispi had the 
 mentality and the ambitions of the Imperialist, but the disaster in 
 Abyssinia drove Italy back to home problems. In the months pre- 
 ceding the Balkan Wars a little group of Imperialists began to 
 make a renewed impression upon Italy. The Tripoli campaign was 
 not their work alone, but it definitely launched Italy on the path of 
 expansion and automatically extended the influence of the Im- 
 perialists, a few of whom won their way into Parliament. The 
 Imperialists fought hard to bring Italy into the war on the side 
 of the Allies, and for that we have reason to be grateful to them. 
 They have ever since been engaged in imparting to the Italian 
 people a sufficiently extensive vision of its Imperial future. The 
 quality of Italian Imperialism does not differ materially from that 
 of other brands, although it has a pronounced aroma of futurism. 
 The interesting thing about it is its program, or rather, the claims 
 it puts forward for Italy in the resettlement of the world. In 
 the region of Epirus and in the matter of the islands of the 
 Archipelago it has no tenderness for Greece. In Dalmatia it is 
 
 1 See New York Times Magazine, July 11, 1915. 
 
THEORY OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION 105 
 
 suspicious of and hostile to the claims of the southern Slavs. It 
 is worth noting that Signor Bissolati, the distinguished Italian 
 Minister, has recently protested against pretensions and a temper 
 which render difficult or even impossible a good understanding 
 with Serbia. But the Italian Nationalist looks far beyond the 
 Adriatic and the ^gean. The Idea Nazionale demands the whole 
 coast of Asia Minor from Messina, near the Cilician Gates, round 
 to the north of Smyrna, with the interior as far as the water-shed 
 of Anatolia; the southern coast of the Dardanelles, and the Sea 
 of Marmora as far as a point opposite Constantinople ; the Yemen ; 
 a free hand in Abyssinia ; and a rectification of frontiers in Tripoli 
 and Somaliland. The Italian Imperialist, it will be seen, takes 
 a comprehensive survey, and is not deterred by the prospect of 
 conflict with other Powers. There is no reason to suppose that 
 he has succeeded in endowing the Italian Government with so 
 ambitious a program, but a skilful and persistent agitation can 
 usually count on some success with the man in the street." 
 
 In further illustration, see the quotations from the Idea Nazionale 
 in the Cambridge Magazine for October 28, 1916. 
 
 Lord Northcliff e is quoted in the New York Times as saying : — 
 
 " England and Germany know that there is something more 
 than a continental land war at issue, great as that is, and that 
 there is a racial mastery at stake — the Saxon or the Teuton — 
 which civilization will go forward in the future or which back- 
 ward? Both of them cannot go forward together as in the past." 
 
 Compare with this the Daily Mail at the Fashoda crisis, urging 
 England to " roll France in blood and mud." 
 
 There is only one stable idea in Lord Northclifife's political 
 philosophy: the superiority of the English to everybody else. The 
 other nations take rank, from time to time, as they are our allies 
 or our enemies. On this whole subject it is worth while to cite 
 the following from Jaures: "The fatherland, in absorbing or 
 rather exalting individual egotisms into a great collective egotism, 
 too often covers with a semblance of generosity the most brutal 
 cupidities. Men may have the illusion that they are serving jus- 
 tice when they are sacrificing themselves for the interests, even 
 the unjust interests, of a Force in which they are included, but 
 which is infinitely stronger than they. Hence blind zeal and 
 brutal maxims. Hence the adhesion given, even by superior 
 minds, to the detestable formula : ' My country right or wrong.' " 
 — Jaures, L'Armee nouvelle, p. 452. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GROWTH OF POPULATION AS A 
 CAUSE OF WAR 
 
 The motives for expansion which I have dealt with so 
 far may be called ideological. They consist of ideas in 
 people's minds, suggested and reinforced by the passions of 
 collective egotism. If, and so far as, they have affected 
 policy, they have done so through no pressure of fact and 
 need, but only through their infectious appeal to an undis- 
 ciplined imagination. But it will now be urged that the 
 " real " motives of policy are not of this kind; that it is 
 ineluctable facts that impel statesmen and nations ; and that 
 " expansion " is a natural''necessity rather than a human 
 ambition. Well, let us examine this. 
 
 I will first refer briefly to an argument which weighs 
 much with soldiers and statesmen. Owing to the danger 
 of war in the present condition of international anarchy, 
 defence becomes an absorbing preoccupation. But one 
 aspect of defence is strategic frontiers; and to secure these 
 nations will use and even make wars. Thus, for example, 
 sentiment apart, one reason why Russian statesmen desire 
 to occupy Constantinople is that they may be able in time 
 of war to send a fleet into the Mediterranean. It is with 
 a view to the contingency of war that Italy desires to domi- 
 nate the Adriatic. It was, in part at least, for military 
 purposes that Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine. But no 
 such annexations can be made without war, and they usually 
 prepare the way for another war. So that, actually, men 
 provoke war in order to guard against the risks of war. 
 The absurdity of this needs only to be pointed out to be 
 
 106 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 107 
 
 self-evident. But it will continue so long as the inter- 
 national anarchy continues. For that anarchy engenders 
 fear of attack, and fear of attack provokes attack. It is 
 that fear that will be a principal obstacle when we set 
 to work to reorganize international relations. Mean- 
 time, there is no " natural " necessity about all this : it is 
 a result of a state of things which we could cure if we 
 liked. 
 
 But, says the objector, there is, nevertheless, a natural 
 necessity behind war. Well, what is this necessity ? 
 
 One answer is, the increasing pressure upon subsistence, 
 due to increasing population. Here we really do seem at 
 last to have a cause for war which may be called " real." 
 Let us examine it. 
 
 Given that a nation or a State is confined to a given 
 territory, and that its numbers increase in every genera- 
 tion, the time must come, it would seem, when the terri- 
 tory will not suffice to maintain the people, and some of 
 them must emigrate or starve. But unless there is un- 
 occupied territory of the right kind available they will have 
 to invade that occupied by other people. And if these 
 people in turn already require what they occupy for their 
 own sustenance, they will resist this invasion by force. 
 In other words, there will be war. Put in its simplest 
 terms, this is the case for the necessity of expansion by 
 war. 
 
 Now, I do not deny that we have here a case for war 
 of a quite different kind from that which we have 
 hitherto been examining. For we have come down to 
 a fundamental instinct for life, which affirms itself at all 
 costs, defiant of all arguments, and indifferent to all con- 
 sequences. The disturbances and conflicts that filled long 
 ages of history were due to shortage of food and conse- 
 quent migrations. Men will fight rather than starve, and 
 
4 
 
 108 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 they will see others starve before they starve themselves. 
 Agreed. 
 
 But now, in the modern world, does that case occur, 
 and need it occur? That it does occur, or need, on the 
 continents of Europe, America, or Australia will not, I 
 believe, be afiSrmed by any instructed man. Two facts 
 are always operating to prevent it. One is the develop- 
 ment of industrial technique, both of machinery and of 
 organization, by which it has become possible to support, 
 on a given area, an increasing population in increasing 
 comfort. This development has, no doubt, been seriously 
 hampered and limited in its beneficent effects by war and 
 preparation for war. For armed conflicts in our own 
 time, so far from being a way of getting subsistence, are 
 a way of destroying it on an enormous scale. But even 
 so, the outstanding fact of the last century is increas- 
 ing population within a given area accompanied by in- 
 creasing wealth. It is only our imperfect system of 
 distribution which masks this fact — a system which every 
 international war makes it more difficult to improve. The 
 case of Germany affords a very interesting example of 
 this general truth. Some years ago there was a consider- 
 able emigration from that country to the United States, 
 and German Imperialists were crying that Germany must 
 have colonies wherein to settle her " surplus population." 
 Since then, by the developrdent of industry, emigration 
 has been more than balanced by immigration. That par- 
 ticular case for a war policy has thus disappeared, and the 
 advocates of war have had to fall back upon a different 
 kind of argiunent. 
 
 It may, however, be reasonably replied that this process 
 cannot continue indefinitely; that the conditions that have 
 prevented population from outstripping subsistence are 
 transitory, and in fact are rapidly passing away; and that 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 109 
 
 with the filling up of America, Australia, and New Zealand, 
 and the progressive exhaustion of the soil and of its raw 
 materials throughout the world, it is a question of time, 
 and perhaps but a short time, before men will once more 
 be driven to fight one another for subsistence. That the 
 fat years we have been enjoying for a century may pass, 
 will not, I suppose, be denied. All the more is the pity 
 that we waste their resources in war instead of husbanding 
 them for the lean years. But to suppose that we must 
 therefore revert to a primitive struggle for existence is to 
 ignore another great factor. One of the most striking 
 and important facts of the modern era is the deliberate 
 control of the birth-rate. The population of France has 
 long been stationary for that reason. The increase in all 
 countries called civilized is becoming less and less in pro- 
 portion as they become civilized. So that it would seem 
 that if in future we cannot adapt subsistence to popula- 
 tion we ought to be able to adapt population to subsist- 
 ence. This is a point of the utmost importance, and 
 deserves careful and frank consideration not only by ex- 
 perts but by every ordinary citizen, and especially by 
 the clergy and others whose business it is to instruct the 
 public. 
 
 The population question is, in fact, by way of settling 
 itself, if only it is allowed to do so. But this process, so 
 necessary if we are ever to have a civilization in which a 
 life, worth living shall be possible for the mass of men and 
 women and children, is constantly threatened and attacked 
 by what passes in the newspapers for public opinion and 
 in the pulpits for religion. I cannot here attend to all the 
 arguments advanced against the limitation of the birth-rate. 
 I am concerned with the question only in so far as it bears 
 upon international war. And in this connexion, very 
 briefly, the circle of argument is this : — 
 
110 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Militarist: Since our population is expanding, we must expand 
 our territory, and that we can only do by war. 
 
 Pacifist: But look at the facts. The rate of increase of our 
 population is steadily diminishing, and so is that of all other 
 civilized countries. We may look forward, therefore, with 
 some confidence to a condition of stationary population in 
 all Western States, and consequently to a really progressive 
 society, delivered once for all from the two great scourges of 
 mankind — poverty and war. 
 
 Militarist: What! The population tending to become station- 
 ary? We must stop that! 
 
 Pacifist: My dear sir, why? 
 
 Militarist : Why ? Because otherwise we shall be short of fight- 
 ing-men. 
 
 Pacifist : But I was arguing that there was no necessity for war. 
 
 Militarist : No necessity ? What tomfoolery ! 
 
 Pacifist : But where is the necessity ? 
 
 Militarist: The pressure of population. 
 
 This brief imaginary dialogue sums up volumes of con- 
 troversy. If the reader will keep his attention fixed on the 
 point in future, when he comes across these discussions, he 
 will find that much of the apparent cogency of the argu- 
 ment for war depends upon the same people holding at the 
 same time both the view that there must be war because 
 the population increases and the view that the population 
 must increase in order that there may be soldiers for war. 
 It would be tedious to dwell further on this absurdity, 
 although the mere exposure of it will do little to prevent 
 its continued currency. But there remain some arguments 
 in connexion with this question of population which re- 
 quire more serious attention. 
 
 Just as, within the limits of a single State, it is the fact 
 that the diminution of the birth-rate is greatest among the 
 well-to-do and least among the very poor, so with nations 
 it is among those whose civilization is materially the most 
 prosperous that the population tends to become stationary, 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 111 
 
 and among those that in this respect are more primitive that 
 it tends to increase up to the limit of subsistence. We thus 
 get the fear that the pressure of population in a " back- 
 ward " nation may drive them to make war on a more 
 " advanced " one, and that the very fact of the greater popu- 
 lation of the former may give it the victory. It appears 
 that Germans are constantly haunted by this spectre in re- 
 gard to Russia. 
 
 But there seems to be no valid ground for the fear. 
 For, however great may be the increase of the Russian 
 population, in any period to which it is reasonable to look 
 forward, it will not outstrip the possibilities of support on 
 that enormous, rich, and undeveloped territory. If Russia 
 is now an aggressive Power,^ it is not through pressure of 
 population, but through that obsession of power and size 
 with which I have already dealt. If, on the other hand, 
 we look forward to a time at which, if the present rate 
 of increase were to continue, Russia would really be over- 
 populated, we must remember that by then, it is reasonable 
 to suppose, the same checks will have begun to operate 
 there that are now operative in the Western nations. The 
 view, then, that the proportionally greater increase of the 
 Russian population constitutes in itself a menace to other 
 countries seems to be unfounded. The real menace of 
 Russia, like that of Germany, lies in the ambitions and 
 illusions of its governing class. 
 
 But, further, even granting that any nation may, in 
 certain cases and for certain periods of time, really be in 
 danger of over-population, why should that lead to war? 
 What is to prevent the " surplus " population from emi- 
 grating elsewhere, so long, at least, as there is not general 
 over-population over the whole world — a contingency 
 which, for the reasons given above, we need not contem- 
 
 i-This was written before the Russian revolution. 
 
lia THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 plate, unless we deliberately provoke it by our unwisdom. 
 
 Two answers are given to this question. One is the ob- 
 jection some nations feel to " losing " their population by 
 emigration. Here, it must be remarked at the outset, we 
 have left the region of " natural " necessity and have come 
 back to ideas in people's heads. Ideas, too, which are so 
 modern that it is difficult to accord them any valufe but a 
 transitory one of fashion. For years and decades after the 
 British Colonies in America threw off British allegiance, 
 British and German subjects emigrated thither, to the great 
 advantage and satisfaction alike of the emigrants, of the 
 country to which they went, and of the country they left. 
 Only in comparatively recent years has it become the fashion 
 to stigmatize as undesirable and unpatriotic this natural 
 and wholesome process. Why is it now questioned and 
 attacked ? 
 
 One reason is that governments object to losing poten- 
 tial soldiers. And here we get another instance of the 
 circular argumentation of militarists* — 
 
 Militarist : We must have war in order to seize territory so that 
 our emigrants may remain under our own flag. 
 
 Pacifist : But why should they remain under your own flag ? 
 
 Militarist : Because we require them for soldiers. 
 
 Pacifist: But why do you require them for soldiers? 
 
 Militarist: Because of the war we intend to make to seize the 
 territory. 
 
 Pacifist: But you said that the reason for seizing the territory 
 was that there was going to be a war. And now you say 
 
 Militarist : Oh stop this logic-chopping and think in continents ! 
 
 Apart from this mere confusion, however, it is urged that 
 it is the duty of every State and every citizen to perpetuate 
 and expand the national type of civilization. So that Ger- 
 mans, for instance, goipg to' America and becoming trans- 
 formed by American habits and institutions, are thought 
 to become, though it be involtintarily, traitors to their own 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION IIS 
 
 national tradition. I have already dealt with this form 
 of militant nationalism, and I will not repeat what has been 
 said above. 
 
 But there is another point to be taken here. We have 
 dealt with the quite recent and, let us hope, transitory 
 objections offered by governments and "public opinion" 
 to the emigration of their citizens to lands under a foreign 
 flag. We have now to notice the objection on the part 
 of these countries to receiving immigrants. These are 
 much more formidable. They are, in the first place, 
 economic. The population of a new and rich country with 
 a high standard of life will, or may, object to being 
 " flooded " by immigrants who will undersell their labour 
 at wages which, to the older settlers, do not constitute a 
 decent living-wage. Whether, or at what point, this natural 
 resistance will go so far as seriously to restrict immigration, 
 will depend on the special circumstances. In the United 
 States, up till now, the arrival of new drafts of pauper 
 labour has been accompanied by a moving of the earlier 
 settlers up and out into other more highly paid occupa- 
 tions. But this cannot go on indefinitely; and there are 
 signs that the traditional hospitality of the United States 
 to immigrants from Europe may be very seriously restricted 
 in the near future. It is, however, difficult to imagine such 
 restrictions being made a cause of war between the white 
 nations, unless an unrestricted fertility, encouraged by re- 
 ligion, law, and public opinion, should take the place of the 
 present adaptation of population to subsistence, and at the 
 same time unjust social institutions, bad education, and 
 false traditions should continue to hamper the develop- 
 ment of industry and agriculture. All this, conceivably, 
 may happen, and may produce a real local over-population, 
 which again may lead to desperate efforts to get access 
 by war to the wealth of more favoured and more intelligent 
 
114 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 communities. Nations so situated would no doubt be likely 
 to lose any war in which they might engage. But they 
 might be driven to attempt the enterprise. They would be 
 so driven, however, not by any necessity of nature or any 
 fundamental condition of human life, but by a policy, at 
 once stupid and base, of which their waste of wealth on 
 armaments would be an important and essential part. If 
 they have war for that cause, that will be their own fault 
 and choice. It will be due, once more, to wrong ideas and 
 ideals, and not to " natural " necessity. 
 
 But, besides the economic objection to receiving immi- 
 grants, there is another still more serious. There is the bar 
 of colour. We are back here once more upon something 
 like a " natural " fact. If people are too much and too 
 obviously different from one another they find it hard to 
 live on equal terms in the same community. And in the 
 case of immigration from the East into America or Austral- 
 asia or South Africa, the economic motive is reinforced by 
 an objection, in many people perhaps instinctive, to men 
 of a different colour. What proportional part is really 
 played in this antagonism by the economic and by the 
 colour motive respectively, we need not here attempt to 
 estimate. The result, at any rate, is a solid block-feeling 
 of resistance, which may have good biologic justification, 
 and in any case may be an insuperable obstacle to immi- 
 gration from the East to the West. Now, if the populations 
 of India, China, and Japan are already pressing, or will 
 press in the future, upon subsistence within their own bound- 
 aries, and if they are forbidden all access to rich and 
 under-populated countries, we shall have really one of those 
 cases for war which look like natural necessity. It must be 
 observed, however, that this problem is not insoluble, though 
 it is very difficult. The intercourse between East and West 
 takes already, and will progressively take, the form of the 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 116 
 
 exploitation of the natural resources of the East by West- 
 ern capital, enterprise, and skill. In proportion as this is 
 done — and it is, of course, already being done on an enor- 
 mous scale — those countries will be able to support a larger 
 population. They will become more prosperous; and it is 
 only reasonable to suppose that prosperity will induce 
 among them, what it has induced in Europe and America, 
 a decline in the birth-rate and a tendency towards a sta- 
 tionary population. This result no doubt will be delayed 
 in the East by religious and social custom, in particular 
 by that institution of ancestor-worship which makes it a 
 moral duty to have as many sons as possible. But these 
 religious and social customs are undergoing decline through 
 contact with the West and need not be expected to ofifer 
 a long resistance to the tendencies that show themselves 
 wherever industrialism has spread. 
 
 We need not therefore look forward to an inevitable 
 conflict between East and West in some nearer or remoter 
 future, even if we accept as final and irreducible the present 
 attitude of the Western nations, whereby they claim to 
 monopolize to themselves and their descendants the whole 
 of the comparatively vinder-peopled Western world, and to 
 confine the Orientals, however overcrowded they may be, 
 to regions in which they do at times actually perish from 
 insufficient nourishment. This inequity should correct it- 
 self as a result of Western enterprise in the East. And 
 meantime, it should be possible by temporary transactions 
 to meet the existing emergency. To pass from the con- 
 sideration of this real and difficult but quite specific prob- 
 lem to grandiose imaginations of inevitable armed conflicts 
 for existence between East and West, is merely to indulge a 
 hectic and untutored imagination under the pretence of 
 realistic reasoning. But all militarists are romanticists, 
 even when they are professors. Their imagination revels 
 
116 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 in the idea of war. And they are predetermined, in all 
 their inquiries, to come out with a demonstration that war 
 is inevitable, and an exhortation to regard it as therefore 
 admirable. 
 
 Finally, and as the conclusion of this whole matter, if 
 the supply of food to the world is really going to be a 
 difficult problem, the most hopeful way to solve it is for 
 all nations to co-operate in the effort, and, as a first step, 
 to cease diverting from production to destruction a great 
 part of their, capital, labour, and intelligence. This really 
 is the last word, brief though it be. And I do not see 
 that it needs further elaboration. Internationalism lies as 
 inevitably on this line of 'approach as it does on every other. 
 Internationalism is common sense. War is insanity. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 107. — Over-population as a Cause of War. 
 
 The ordinary journalistic way of regarding increase of popula- 
 tion as a necessary cause of war is well illustrated by the following 
 passage from the National Review: — 
 
 " Germany must expand. Every year an extra million babies 
 are crying out for more room, and as the expansion of Germany 
 by peaceful means seems impossible, Germany can only provide 
 for those babies at the cost of potential foes, and France is one of 
 them." (Cited in War and Peace, December 1916, p. 41.) 
 
 The argument that we must increase our population, explicitly 
 with a view to the next war, has naturally been made prominent 
 during the war. Thus, for example, Mr. Herbert Samuel is re- 
 ported as saying : — 
 
 " Now, the war has made us realize that it is the mass of a 
 people that tells, and that the security of our own civilization 
 depends not only on the quality and efficiency, but on the quantity 
 of our people. 
 
 " It is the rapid growth of her population, which has increased 
 during ten years by 8j4 against our 3J4 millions — that has given 
 Germany, her aggressive power; and if we would hold our own 
 when this war is over and compensate for the war waste that has 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 117 
 
 taken place, we must take measures to increase and multiply our 
 own peoplei" (Cited in the Malthusian of February 15, 1916, 
 from a speech at the Guildhall.) 
 
 This dismal perspective of an. infinite series of wars might seem 
 rather to be a reason why no children at all should be produced 
 and the human race should put an end to its tragic existence. But 
 of course it is possible to hold that population may continue to 
 increase without becoming in itself a cause of wars owing to an 
 actual struggle for food. Thus Sir J. Crichton-Browne, while 
 advocating an increase of population, says : — 
 
 " The bugbear of the exhaustion of our accessible coal-fields 
 need not frighten us. Science will yet open up to us new sources 
 of available energy. The food problem need cause no alarm, for 
 Canada is increasing her wheat production greatly in excess of 
 our consumption. The country is not overcrowded as a whole, 
 although congested in certain areas, and with suitable redistribu- 
 tion will carry many more human beings than it now does." 
 
 This may be true. But on the other hand. Dr. Pierson, the 
 famous Dutch economist, writes : " No improvement in the eco- 
 nomic situation can be hoped for if the number of births be not 
 considerably diminished." 
 
 Professor Taussig, the American economist, writes: — 
 
 " It is clear that restraint on the increase of numbers is one 
 essential of improvement. Stated in this way, the Malthusian 
 position is impregnable." 
 
 Dr. Warren Thompson, of the University of Michigan, says: — 
 
 " The conditions which made possible the unprecedented expan- 
 sion of the European peoples in the last fifty years are passing 
 away." ^ 
 
 I pronounce no opinion on the question of fact, for I am not 
 competent to pronounce one. Nothing, I should suppose, can be 
 more difficult than to form a true estimate of the amount of popu- 
 lation the world may be able to support in reasonable comfort at 
 some future time ; for many of the factors, and especially the factor 
 of technical invention and organization, must be incalculable. 
 Granting, however, that we did really have to contemplate in some 
 future an actual insufficiency of food on the earth for all the people 
 
 I I take these quotations from the able article on the subject in the 
 Cambridge Magazine, June 3, 1916. The article has been reprinted, 
 with the title Fecundity versus Civilisation, by Adelyne More (George 
 Allen & Unwin Ltd.). 
 
118 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 on it, then, though that situation might lead to war, war would not 
 assist it ; unless war meant, as it has meant in the past, the actual 
 extermination of the whole of one nation by another. This is an 
 unlikely contingency, except in the case of mere savages, attacked 
 by men equipped with all the resources of modern science. If 
 Germany (say) and Russia fought one another for food (or the 
 basis of food, raw materials and land), both nations would lose a 
 great part of their population. There might be (it does not follow 
 that there would be) a slight temporary let-up in the pressure of 
 population on food. But unless the increase of population were 
 otherwise checked in both nations, the pressure would quickly 
 begin again. The last reply to this will be : " The Germans then 
 (supposing them to be victors) must systematically exterminate the 
 Russians." A la bonne heure! We see whither this logic is 
 leading us. And I ask, in all seriousness, if that extreme con- 
 tingency should really threaten mankind, would it not be better 
 that all nations alike should gradually die off, by a voluntary 
 limitation of population, as it became more and more impossible 
 for them to maintain themselves on the earth ? In other words, the 
 position of the extreme pessimists as to the exhaustion of the food 
 supplies of the earth leads, in all reason and humanity, not to a 
 series of wars which would have to be literally wars of extermina- 
 tion, if they were to be effective for their purpose, but to an 
 extreme application of the practice of voluntary restraints on pop- 
 ulation. I write this to finish the argument, not because I have 
 yet found any reason to believe that this extreme form of pessi- 
 mism is justified. 
 
 I cannot forbear to note, in this connexion, because it is so 
 characteristic of the militarist bias when it enters into a German 
 professor, that in an interesting and intelligent article a certain 
 professor, Dr. Branca, after discussing elaborately the possibilities 
 of increasing food supplies, and concluding that the principal hope 
 lies in chemistry, and that an artificial synthesis of food-stuffs 
 might indefinitely postpone any real shortage, even with a popula- 
 tion continually increasing, adds (lest any one should derive from 
 this some hope that wars may cease) that there are other forms of 
 hunger than hunger for food, namely, " Land-hunger, Power- 
 hunger, Gold-hunger"! He then refers to wars caused by these 
 foolish and superfluous desires as " struggles for existence," infers 
 that they are " inevitable," and concludes that any German who 
 doesn't want to annex territory is guilty of a " crime against the 
 
THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 119 
 
 German people." With such bad-natured stupidity is "science" 
 compatible! (See Europaische Stoats- und Wirthschaft-Zeitung, 
 August 25, 1916.) 
 
 The question of the control of population in connexion with 
 civilization and war is treated by Mr. Havelock Ellis in an article 
 published in the Nation of September 25, 1915. He concludes that 
 " the arrest of the falling birth-rate, it cannot be too often repeated, 
 would be the arrest of all civilization and all humanity." ^ 
 
 Page 112. — Immigration from Eastern Countries 
 TO America. 
 
 As a practical policy for regulating immigration from Eastern 
 countries to the United States, Professor Gulick suggests that the 
 immigration in any given year be limited to one-iifth of the number 
 of natives of the country in question already naturalized as Ameri- 
 can citizens. This, he thinks, would ensure that the new-comers 
 will be duly assimilated to American manners and institutions by 
 their countrymen, already themselves assimilated. (See "Two 
 Addresses " on a new Immigration PoUcy and the American- 
 Japanese Prohlemr, by Professor Sidney L. Gulick, pp. 27 and 34.) 
 Professor Gulick, the reader should remember, has resided many 
 years in Japan, and is a deservedly respected authority on that 
 country. 
 
 iThe article is reprinted in Essays in War Time (Constable). 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 ECONOMIC COMPETITION AS A CAUSE 
 OF WAR 
 
 I HAVE argued, in the preceding chapter, that a sober exam- 
 ination of the plain facts gives little support to the idea 
 that in the modern world pressure of population on sub- 
 sistence need drive men to war. If we consider, in the 
 first place, the great industrially developed nations that are 
 now at war, there can be no question about this. They 
 do not suffer from over-population; and, if they did, their 
 remedy would be to improve their social institutions and 
 their industrial technique, or to adjust their population to 
 their resources. Science, not war, is the only way to deal 
 with the problem, in the present or the future. But while 
 war cannot solve it, it can and does make the solution 
 more difficult. For war destroys both capital and labour 
 on an enormous scale; and preparation for war diverts 
 them continually to the creation of means to destroy them- 
 selves. If nations really directed their policy with a view 
 to subsistence, they would scrap all their armaments. From 
 an economic point of view, there is nothing to be said for 
 war, and everything to be said against it. 
 
 On the other hand, it may be urged with truth that it 
 is important, with a view to subsistence, to develop all the 
 resources of the earth; and it may be assumed that this 
 can only be done if the industrially developed nat i ons ma ke 
 Tj^r on the industrially undeveloped, in order to exploit 
 the resources the latter control. That is certainly the w^y 
 the thing has been done in the past, and it would be idle 
 
 120 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 121 
 
 now to discuss whether it might not have been done other- 
 wise; whether, for example, men of the Livingstone type 
 might not have civilized Africa without force; and whether 
 war was the best and only possible way of opening China 
 to Western influence. But, in any case, that necessity for 
 war is already past. Every part of the world is under the 
 influence or dominion of some Western or Westernized 
 Power; and if the civilized Powers did not quarrel among 
 themselves as to which of them should wield that influence, 
 war need no longer arise over the issue between " civilized " 
 and " uncivilized " peoples. 
 
 " But that is precisely what the Powers do quarrel about." 
 They do. But why do they? Because their ideas and 
 their policies are mistaken, not because any natural neces- 
 sity drives them. So I shall argue in this chapter. 
 
 The economic development of nations is often held, by 
 those who regard war to be " inevitable," both to be itself 
 a kind of war and necessarily to lead up to real war. This 
 is one aspect of the " expansion " theory. There is no 
 room, it is thought, for everybody to take part in the pro- 
 duction and exchange of wealth. The nations, therefore, in 
 this competition impinge and press upon one another; and 
 then they must fight — for space, as it were, and air. Let 
 us examine carefully this rather curious notion. 
 
 First, trade between nations is regarded as being itself 
 a kind of war between them. This, on the fact of it, is a 
 very odd idea. So far, indeed, as trade is competition, 
 it may by a metaphor be called war, just as, if any one 
 likes, he may say there is " war " between two football 
 teams. But the war, in the case we are considering, is 
 not between the two countries engaged. It is a struggle 
 of foreign producers against home producers, to the benefit 
 of home purchasers. The point, though it is simple and 
 obvious, is so commonly misunderstood that it is worth 
 
122 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 while to labour it a little. "Germany," we say, trades 
 with " England " and " England " with " Germany." But 
 what really happens is much more complicated. First, 
 some German producers compete in British markets with 
 some British producers, and some British producers com- 
 pete in German markets with some German producers. 
 And these rival producers in both countries may be said 
 (if you like) to be at war, and to be injuring one another. 
 On the other hand, it is by selling to British purchasers 
 that the German producers injure (if they do injure) the 
 British producers, and it is by selling to German purchasers 
 that the British producers injure (if they do injure) the 
 German producers. In either case, the purchasers, British 
 or German, are benefited. The German importers cannot 
 injure British producers except by the process of benefiting 
 British purchasers. There is simply no other way of doing 
 it. And vice versa. Thus, to cut off this trade would be, 
 it is true, to prevent the German importers from injuring 
 the British producers. But also it would prevent them 
 from benefiting the British purchasers. If, then, a tariff 
 is a " war " measure, it is one which injures ourselves as 
 well as the supposed enemy. 
 
 Further, these British purchasers who benefit by the Ger- 
 man imports are themselves very commonly producers. In 
 that case the German imports are the raw material for 
 British industry. Thus, in injuring one class of British 
 producers, the German importers are benefiting another 
 class. So that to cut of? that trade is to sacrifice the inter- 
 ests of one set of British producers to those of another. 
 We cannot wage war against German trade without waging 
 it also against British trade. 
 
 Secondly, the German producer cannot sell in England 
 without buying from England, directly or circuitously. 
 And in thus buying he is benefiting British sellers, and, 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 128 
 
 if the sellers are manufacturers, is benefiting British manu- 
 factures. It is thus impossible for the German importer 
 to injure one class of British producers without benefiting 
 another ; and equally impossible for .the British to cut off 
 German imports without injuring one class of British pro- 
 ducers while benefiting another. 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that to conceive foreign trade as 
 a war between the countries engaging in it is to miscon- 
 ceive it altogether. It is a contest between some members 
 of the various countries concerned, resulting in the benefit 
 of other members of those countries. And to import into 
 the controversy about tariffs this prejudice that an importer 
 is an " enemy " implies either confusion or dishonesty. 
 The issue is between the rival interests of producers and 
 purchasers in the home country; and on that ground alone 
 it ought to be considered and decided, so long as we con- 
 fine ourselves to the national point of view. When it is so 
 considered I believe myself that the argument for free trade 
 is unassailable. Biit that controversy I leave to the econo- 
 mists. 
 
 In general, perhaps, the candid reader will agree with 
 this statement. But he may put in certain demurrers. 
 Thus he may urge that, though international trade is not 
 even by metaphor " war " between the nations taking part 
 in it, it is nevertheless a " kind of war " between sets of 
 traders in the different nations, and that in this war things 
 are done which are " unfair " and injurious and ought to be 
 stopped. Thus, for example, nations are apt to complain 
 that other nations " dump " goods upon them and to ask 
 for special protection against this practice. Now, there is 
 a case here for investigation and possibly for regulation. 
 The investigation is required, first to get a clear notion as 
 to what is meant by "dumping" — whether it is merely, 
 selling abroad at a lower price than you sell at home, or 
 
124 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 selling below cost price, or doing either of these things with 
 a view to " capturing " the market and then putting up the 
 prices — which would seem to involve a difficult inquiry 
 into motives and intentions. Secondly, the investigation 
 would have to ascertain whether the trade of the nation did 
 or did not stand, on the whole, to lose by such dumping. 
 If it should be proved that it did, there would be a pre- 
 liminary case made out for regulation. But such regula- 
 tion, as I shall argue later,^ should be international in char- 
 acter, so that those practices and those only may be pro- 
 hibited which all nations agree to be pernicious, and the 
 existence of such practices may not be made an excuse for 
 tariff wars, as disastrous to the prosperity of the individual 
 nations as to the comity and peace of the world. 
 
 Again, it is arguable that an " invasion " of cheap goods 
 injures labour by compelling employers at home to reduce 
 their prices and therefore their wages. I cannot discuss 
 here the complicated question as to the total gain and loss 
 involved to particular classes and to a whole community 
 by the entry of cheap goods from abroad. But clearly this 
 is not a case of the interest of one nation being opposed 
 to that of another. It is a question of a conflict of interests 
 between classes and sections of the one nation, between 
 producers and consumers, or between one set of producers 
 and another. There might conceivably, in a given case, be 
 arguments for a tariff which on balance would be sound. 
 But it would be quite erroneous to regard such a tariff as 
 a measure of " defence " directed against a " foreigner " 
 who wants to do the nation an injury by trading with it. 
 It is only by benefiting somebody in the nation that the 
 foreigner can injure anybody else. And his motive is no 
 more to injure than it is to benefit his customers. His 
 motive is to benefit himself. 
 
 iSee Chapter XII. 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 125 
 
 I have spoken hitherto of direct trade between two coun- 
 tries. I now turn to the competition of two countries for 
 the markets of a third. This is a different case. The pur- 
 chasers in the country where the importers are competing 
 will presumably benefit by the competition. But the com- 
 petitors may injure one another if they are trading in the 
 same goods. There is therefore, in this case, some sense 
 in saying that the two countries concerned are carrying on a 
 " trade war." If, for instance, Germans and British com- 
 pete in China, and Germans get the best of it, no other Brit- 
 ish need be benefited, and the defeated British are injured. 
 The situation, however, need not be, and commonly is not, 
 as simple as that. For instance, in China German distrib- 
 utors have been ousting British. But what they distributed 
 were British goods; and they captured that trade because 
 they were more intelligent, more hard-working, and more 
 enterprising than British distributors. British distributors 
 were injured, but British manufacturers were benefited by 
 this result. And, of course, wherever there is division of 
 labour between the traders of different countries in the mar- 
 kets of a third, these traders may be presumed to be bene- 
 fiting one another as well as the people of the country in 
 which they operate. If, for example, Germans make rail- 
 vvays" in Shantung and British traders use them, the British 
 are benefited no less than the Chinese by this German enter- 
 prise. This, at least, would always be true under that 
 regime of the " open door " which Free Traders advocate. 
 Under free trade conditions there is thus no general pre- 
 sumption that competition between the traders of different 
 nations, even in the markets of a third, implies a " war " be- 
 tween them, in which the one must succumb and the other 
 survive. The very victory of the traders of one country in 
 one branch of activity may mean a victory for traders or 
 manufacturers of the other country in another branch. So 
 
126 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 that we must not presume that, for example, the exclusion 
 of German competition in the East or in our African Do- 
 minions would necessarily benefit British trade. 
 
 The general truth of what has here been urged will 
 hardly be disputed. But I shall be met with a new objec- 
 tion. There is, I shall be told, one nation, Germany, which 
 is not influenced solely by trade motives, but adopts a na- 
 tional policy whereby trade is used as an instrument of 
 political "domination." It is not easy to deal with this 
 charge, because the facts adduced in its support are so few 
 and so questionable. Pamphleteers and journalists often 
 speak as though the mere fact of commercial penetration, of 
 lending money, of opening markets, and the like, though 
 innocent and right when done by other nations became an 
 act of war when done by Germany. Thus I have seen it 
 argued that the control by a German company of the light- 
 ing or the tramways of foreign cities constitutes a " domina- 
 tion." Yet it is never argued in England that the British 
 Continental Gas Company " dominates " the German cities 
 where it operates. It is not, however, necessary to my pur- 
 pose to pursue this argument, because, if it be true that Ger- 
 many, or any other country, perverts trade to political pur- 
 poses, then we have a procedure not due to the nature of 
 trade but simply to the desire to dominate. In other words, 
 we have left the contention with which I am at present 
 dealing, that war follows inevitably from the nature of 
 commercial competition, and we are back upon that desire 
 to dominate which I have already discussed. The trade 
 war, in the case supposed, is an episode in a war decided 
 upon for other reasons. The war is not the consequence 
 of the trade; the methods of trade are a consequence of the 
 war. 
 
 In this connexion I may deal briefly with another point. 
 It is often urged that international trade, either in general 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 127 
 
 or in some particulars, makes a nation " dependent " on 
 others and so weakens it in case of war. Pushed to its 
 furthest point, this argument would lead every nation to 
 be completely self-supporting and to do no foreign trade 
 at all, in order to be always prepared for war. The sheer 
 impossibility of this for great commercial and manufac- 
 turing nations in the modern world rules it out of practical 
 politics. But, of course, the prospect of war may reason- 
 ably suggest special measures to ensure " independence " 
 in certain matters essential for war. But here, once more, 
 the war is not produced or led up to by the trade. The trade 
 is restricted because the war is supposed to be imminent on 
 other grounds. 
 
 Look at it how we may, it seems clear that the com- 
 petition of international trade, when pursued only for the 
 sake of trade, is not a competition between nations to in- 
 jure one another; that it implies mutual benefit, or it could 
 not exist ; and that, in fact, by the web of reciprocal interest 
 and acquaintanceship which it spins all over the world and 
 across the frontiers of all States, it is, if honourably pur- 
 sued, a potent influence making for peace. It was thus, of 
 course, that the early Free Traders saw it. Cobden was a 
 hard-headed man, but he had his vision ; and this is the far 
 future to which he looked forward : — 
 
 I have been accused of looking too much to material interests. 
 Nevertheless, I can say that I have taken as large and great a view 
 of the effects of this mighty principle as ever did any man who 
 dreamt over it in his study. I believe that the physical gain will 
 be the smallest gain to humanity from the success of this principle. 
 I look further ; I see in the free trade principle that which shall act 
 on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe — 
 drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and 
 creed, and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. 
 I have looked even farther. I have speculated, and probably 
 dreamt, in the dim future — ay, a thousand years hence — I have 
 
128 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 speculated on what the effect of the triumph of this principle may 
 be. I believe that the effect will be to change the face of the 
 world, so as to introduce a system of government entirely distinct 
 from that which now prevails. I believe that the desire and motive 
 for large and mighty- empires, for gigantic armies and great navies 
 — for those materials which are used for the destruction of life 
 and the desolation of the rewards of labour — will die away. I 
 believe that such things will cease to be necessary, or to be used, 
 when man becomes of one family, and freely exchanges' the fruits 
 of his labour with his brother-man. I believe that, if we could 
 be allowed to reappear on this sublunary scene, we should see, 
 at a far distant period, the governing system of this world revert 
 to something like the municipal system; and I believe that the 
 speculative philosopher of a thousand years hence will date the 
 greatest revolution in the world's history from the triumph of the 
 principle which we have met here to advocate.^ 
 
 In the midst of the greatest war of history, this passage 
 falls on the ear with a sense of poignant irony. It marks 
 how far the world has receded from the vision and the 
 ■ideals of that great man, upon whom men now affect to look 
 down with contempt. But what, in fact, has prevented any 
 approximation to this generous forecast ? Certainly not the 
 failure of Cobden's policy, for that has never been uni- 
 versally tried. But neither can we say that wars continue 
 merely because free trade has not been tried. It would be 
 truer to say that free trade has not been tried because of the 
 national egotism and mistrust that provoke war. But then, 
 again, protective trade policies based on national egotism 
 become themselves contributory to the international friction. 
 It is not trade, it is restriction of trade, that helps to provoke 
 war; not necessity, but human policies running counter to 
 what, in this matter, is the nature of things. For to deal 
 with one another, to exchange goods, to have joint access 
 to natural resources, that is a common interest of all na- 
 
 1 Speech of January 15, 1846. See Hirst, Free Trade and the Man- 
 chester School, p. 229. 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 129 
 
 tions. Exchange takes place,- in fact, even across tariff 
 barriers; and if it did not, if it were possible for States to 
 fence themselves off from one another by impassable com- 
 mercial frontiers, the consequent injury might furnish a 
 real cause for attempting by force, that is by war, to break 
 through the restrictions. It is not true that trade is a cause 
 of war between nations. The cause of war is the determina- 
 tion to interfere with trade ; and that cause becomes power- 
 ful in proportion as the interference becomes violent and 
 effective. 
 
 This will become clear if we take particular examples. 
 What is the cause of that friction between Serbia and Aus- 
 tria-Hungary which immediately led up to the present war? 
 Primarily, no doubt, the ambition of the Serbs and Croats 
 included in the Dual Monarchy to become citizens of an 
 independent Serbia, and the ambition of the latter to annex 
 them. But, besides that, there was an economic cause. 
 Serbia has no port, and is largely dependent for her export 
 trade on the markets of Austria-Hungary. This fact has 
 been used by the Dual Monarchy as a means of putting po- 
 litical pressure on Serbia by closing the frontiers to her 
 trade. This constitutes a real injury, both to the material 
 interests and the self-respect of Serbia. It has given her 
 a valid reason for desiring to seize a port on the Adriatic, 
 and that desire was largely the cause of the second Balkan 
 war and of the continued friction which led up to this war. 
 Here is one case where not trade but restriction of trade 
 has been the cause of war. Other examp les will occur to 
 the reader. For instance, the desire of R ussia to own Con- 
 stantinople and to control the waterway into the Black Sea 
 is partly due to the fact that the Power controlling the 
 Straits can close the Straits to Russian trade, and, in time of 
 war, has in fact done so more than once. Of course, the 
 occupation of the Straits by Russia would leave the same 
 
130 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 danger hanging over Turkey, Bulgaria, and Roumania. 
 But, once more, the cause of the friction is not the nature 
 of trade, but the running counter to it by poHcy. Again, if 
 the Italians occupy Trieste, and if no guarantees are given 
 of a free route for the trade of the German hinterland, a 
 friction will be set up between Italy and the Central Powers 
 which may well lead to another war. 
 
 Yet one more example, and one of immediate urgency. 
 Germans are much preoccupied with the idea of an eco- 
 nomic union of Central Europe. Such a union, if it meant 
 the better development, by joint organization, of the eco- 
 nomic resources of all the Central European States, with 
 the consent and approval of them all, accompanied by a 
 greater extension of free trade, would be a benefit to all 
 the world. What converts this idea into a menace instead ? 
 Simply the absurd notion that, to accomplish this economic 
 advance, other countries must, in some way, be annexed, 
 or semi-annexed, to German political sovereignty. Thus 
 Naumann writes : " A real Mid-Europe needs agrarian 
 territories on its boundaries and must make the accession to 
 them easy and desirable. It needs, if possible, an extension 
 of its northern and southern sea-coasts, it needs its share 
 in oversea colonial possessions." ^ Why? All it really 
 " needs " is free transit for trade across frontiers, and free 
 organization between nationals of different political alle- 
 giance. All of which is to be had without annexations 
 and the continual wars, with accompanying economic loss, 
 which annexations involve. As it is, in peace-time, in spite 
 of hostile tariffs, German trade leaps all frontiers and crosses 
 all oceans. Throughout, Naumann appears to be thinking 
 of war conditions. And then, in order to meet these con- 
 ditions, he advocates measures and policies which are bound 
 to produce and perpetuate them. This is the typical logic 
 
 ^ Central Europe, p. 198. 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 131 
 
 of militarism. On the other hand, of course, the policy 
 suggested by the Allied Governments — the policy of the 
 Paris resolutions — plays directly into the hands of these 
 German annexationists. For if the Allied States intend to 
 cut Central Europe off from commercial intercourse with 
 the rest of the world, then, and then only, it becomes a 
 matter of life and death for the German States to make 
 themselves self-supporting by annexing territory, in order 
 to have access to necessary products and markets. 
 
 These are European examples. But the fact, or threat, 
 of interference with oversea trade is an even more potent 
 cause of international friction. Great Britain controls more 
 than one-fifth of the surface of the globe, including huge 
 areas which have immense economic importance, not only as 
 actual or potential markets, but as sources of raw materials. 
 The closing of these to other nations, wholly or partially, 
 would be an immediate menace to the peace of the world. 
 When Mr. Bonar Law, the other day, announced a new 
 policy, or rather a return to an old one, which we hoped 
 was finally abandoned; when Mr. Mackinder claimed that 
 our African dependencies ought to be treated " as an asset 
 of the Empire," and interpreted that phrase as meaning 
 that British citizens were to monopolize " a considerable 
 proportion of the advantages that come from these regions," 
 these gentlemen were as certainly engineering a combina- 
 tion of all other States against the British Empire and 
 opening an era of world-wars, as if they had put their signa- 
 ture to a document framed with that object. But it would 
 be a false policy, not the nature of trade, nor even of Em- 
 pire, that would set in motion that train of causes. From a 
 political point of view, the British Empire has been able to 
 maintain its existence without arousing a combination 
 against it, because it has been a free trade Empire, or at 
 least one without differentiation against foreigners, during 
 
132 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 the period of intense competition that dates from the middle 
 of the nineteenth century. The partial reversal of that 
 policy by the self-governing dominions, and the new pros- 
 pects opened up by Mr. Bonar Law and his friends, are full 
 of ill-omen for the future of the Empire and of the world. 
 But if, in consequence, the British Empire goes under, to- 
 gether with Western civilization, we shall not be able to lay 
 the blame on " economic necessity." Our own short-sighted 
 cupidity will be the culprit. Interfere with the flow of 
 trade and you create a friction which may lead to war. 
 Leave it free, and you release the forces making for peace. 
 That is the really fundamental fact, against which sophisms, 
 ambitions, cupidities, short-sighted patriotisms beat in 
 vain. 
 
 I have spoken, so far, of the course of trade and of the 
 closing of markets and trade-routes by policy. But there 
 are forms of competition other than competition to buy and 
 sell goods. There is competition of capital to exploit land 
 and minerals and raw materials of every kind; and, in course 
 of this, to place loans and obtain concessions. In this com- 
 petition the capitalists and investors of different countries 
 compete with one another. But this is not the same thing 
 as a competition between the nations concerned. The im- 
 mediate beneficiaries of a concession are the financiers and 
 shareholders concerned. Whether also the whole nation 
 to which these persons belong benefits is far more ques- 
 tionable. It is certain that it does not benefit in the same 
 proportion. For the total effects of the enterprise upon the 
 whole world of business and labour depend upon a long 
 chain of circumstances in which the nationality of the 
 original investors is but one and not the most important 
 link. If, for instance, a railway is made in Mexico or 
 China, and new resources tapped, every nation will benefit 
 in proportion to its enterprise and capacity, so long as 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 133 
 
 the open door is maintained and free access permitted to 
 traders of all nationalities. The concession for the rail- 
 way may even carry with it a condition that all materials 
 and rolling stock be supplied by contractors of the same 
 nationality as the concessionaires, and yet other nations 
 may have nothing to complain of. Their railway contrac- 
 tors and workers will be employed on some other railway, 
 not on that one, that is all. It is not as though, really, in a 
 world as incompletely developed as this, there were just so 
 many opportunities of using capital and labour and no more. 
 The opportunities are indefinite. The British or French 
 labourers, or the British or French population as a whole, 
 would have nothing to complain of if capital stayed at home 
 and developed the home country instead of embarking on 
 venturesome speculations abroad. Probably, on the whole, 
 the best results for the whole world, and for every country 
 in the world, are attained by letting capital go where it sees 
 the highest return, though there is much to be said, which 
 cannot be said here, as to the way in which capital exploits 
 defenceless labour among primitive peoples. But the broad 
 fact is true, that the competition of the capital of different 
 nations is not the same as competition between those na- 
 tions, since it does not affect, or affects but slightly, the total 
 national interest. It should not therefore affect the policy 
 nor the political relations of States. But in fact it does. 
 And it does so because governments conceive it to be their 
 duty to back the enterprises of their own capitalistic groups 
 by diplomacy, which means ultimately by the threat of 
 force. The consequence is, that concessions, loans, and the 
 like become questions of international policy and give rise 
 to the kind of friction that leads to war. In illustration of 
 this fact I have only to mention the names Morocco, China, 
 Persia. Every one knows that the effort of this or that 
 nation to get some monopoly of the resources and markets of 
 
IS* THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 such areas constitutes a great part of the international ten- 
 sion. But, once more, why? Because poHcy interferes 
 with the natural economic mechanism. If governments did 
 not back the often predatory ventures of their nationals, if 
 they allowed success to go to the more enterprising, the 
 more intelligent, and the more industrious, without respect 
 to their nationality, and if they never attempted to use com- 
 mercial and financial penetration as a lever to acquire politi- 
 cal influence, these complications would not arise. 
 
 But is there then no justification for this behaviour of 
 governments ? There is some. The 'economic penetration 
 of countries which have weak or corrupt governments 
 would either not be accomplished in the absence of some 
 guarantee that order would be kept and contracts observed ; 
 or it would be attempted by mere adventurers, with disas- 
 trous results to the native population, necessitating after all 
 in the end political interference by the civilized State. Cer- 
 tain experiences of the British in this respect are informing.^ 
 
 It may be urged, therefore, that some support and control 
 by governments of their financial and trading adventurers 
 is essential to the economic development of the world. 
 But then, why should that support lead to international 
 complication, and to war, or the threat of war? Only be- 
 cause governments think of such situations as an oppor- 
 tunity of backing their own nationals instead of jointly hold- 
 ing the ring, and seeing that there is fair play and no favour 
 all round, both to the competing groups of traders and finan- 
 ciers, and also (which is certainly not less important) to the 
 native inhabitants. The solution of this difficult problem 
 would seem to be international instead of national control. 
 I shall return to this point later. ^ Meantime (to reaffirm 
 
 iThe reader may be referred to the account of the penetration of 
 Fiji by British adventurers given in The Project of a Commonwealth, 
 Part I, p. 223 (Macmillan, 1915). 
 
 2 See Chapter XII. 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 135 
 
 my present contention) not here any more than in the other 
 cases that I have touched upon is it true that war arises from 
 the necessities of economic competition. It arises from bad 
 policies, from interference in the natural course of business 
 and trade, in the supposed interest of this or that nation, 
 but really in the interest of this or that group of capitalists 
 or merchants. It is these interferences by governments that 
 lead to wars. It is not the real exigencies of national in- 
 terest. 
 
 But at this point I must sound a note of warning, directed 
 especially to the democracies of the New World, or to those 
 which are struggling to establish themselves in the Old. In 
 Europe hitherto, and in the United States, the commercial 
 policy of governments has been influenced or controlled by 
 powerful groups of rich men, and the mass of the nation 
 may be said to have been guiltless of its errors. But it 
 would be foolish to suppose that therefore that mass is 
 more enlightened or more unselfish than the few. And very 
 likely, in the near future, a policy will be suggested to the 
 people whereby it may appear that they can profit by iniquity 
 and that wars may be made to " pay." Let us take the case 
 of the British Empire. If we chose to introduce the policy 
 of monopoly now foreshadowed by a section of the Gov- 
 ernment, the House of Commons, and the Press ; if we chose 
 to say of the natural products of a quarter of the globe, 
 " Since we took them by force we therefore own them, and 
 the rest of the world shall have none, or shall have our leav- 
 ings," we could, perhaps, make ourselves for the time being 
 richer; and if we socialized the advantage, if we bribed our 
 people by ofifering them their share of the loot in improved 
 conditions of living, we could perhaps get their assent. 
 Under the present regime, where the profits of financial 
 and commercial enterprise go to those who own capital, it 
 is true to say that it is not the nation but groups within the 
 
136 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 nation that profit by aggressive commercial policies. But 
 socialize your wealth, as it is partially socialized in Aus- 
 tralia, and the temptation to which minorities succumb be- 
 comes a temptation to a whole people. The appeal from 
 the self-interest of the few to that of the many fails, and a 
 nation becomes an organized pack to hunt food by starving 
 and killing other packs. It is this future which is opened 
 out by some of the tendencies of the present day. The 
 predatory Central Europe of Naumann is to be just and 
 generous within its own boundaries : all are to share the sup- 
 posed economic advantages of the new regime. Similarly, 
 the predatory British Empire desired by some of our tariff 
 reformers may offer a greater justice in the distribution 
 of the spoils to its own citizens. A progressive harmony of 
 interests within the frontiers of a nation is compatible with 
 a progressive hostility to all outside them. The policy of 
 nations may become frankly a policy of robbery, and then 
 much that has been said in this chapter would cease to be 
 true. If, for instance, after making war a nation were to 
 proceed to steal the private property of the citizens of terri- 
 tory annexed, as it would seem some Germans desire to 
 steal the coal and iron of Belgium and France, if this prop- 
 erty were then to be made national and its revenue devoted 
 to the common interest, then indeed it might be arguable 
 that war could " pay " in the pecuniary sense. And for 
 such wars popular assent might be secured. The penalty, 
 of course, would be paid. It would be paid in full, in all 
 the ways on which I have dwelt in my first chapter. But 
 if men be willing to sell their lives and their souls in the pur- 
 suit of wealth by theft, I do not know that it can be shown 
 that their enterprise is necessarily fantastic. Perhaps some 
 nation might come to " own " the world, and live upon its 
 tribute. But I think better of the heart and the mind of 
 men. For, consider! As I write, there are dying on the 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 137 
 
 battlefields of the world hundreds and thousands of innocent 
 youths, in anguish such that, if the reader could witness it, 
 he would think his whole fortune lightly spent to bring it to 
 an end. The only thought that enables men and women 
 with the ordinary feelings of humanity to endure this fact 
 is their belief that the sacrifice is redeemed by some ideal 
 purpose. What if they should learn that nothing lay behind 
 all this but the competition of rich men to be a little richer 
 or of poor men to be a little less poor? Yet it is just this 
 that those men have in mind who believe that nations ought 
 to make war for economic gain. The whole conception of 
 international relations now current in the world is influenced 
 by this idea that war can be made to pay. Professors, 
 publicists, journalists in all countries put it forward with- 
 out reprobation as a scientific truth. Well, if it were true? 
 What decent man or woman would say anything else than : 
 " Let us remain poor, then, to avoid war " ? Nothing could 
 justify war but an ideal purpose. And the extension of 
 trade and the increase of wealth, whatever it be, is not that.^ 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Page 121. — Economic Competition and War. 
 
 I have already referred (p. 106) to the way in which the desire 
 to be secure in a future war prompts policies which themselves 
 produce war. Here is another case. At this moment (1916) one 
 of the great objectives of the present war is the ownership of 
 Alsace-Lorraine. The one thing about which both France and 
 Germany seem to be clear is that the people of those provinces are 
 not to be consulted in the matter. And why? Very largely, as 
 becomes increasingly clear, because of the deposits of iron in this 
 district, and their importance for the manufacture of armaments 
 for the " next yvar," or for increasing the wealth (as is supposed) 
 of the countries concerned, the wealth being regarded as an asset 
 
 1 On this whole subject I would refer the reader to the chapter on 
 "The Economics of Peace" in Mr. Brailsford's book A League of 
 Nations. 
 
138 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 for war. In other words, the expectation of another war, and the 
 determination to be prepared for it, is both, prolonging this one and 
 preparing the way for the next. So fatal is the circle in which the 
 nations have become involved by the international anarchy they 
 have accepted. I quote, in illustration of this point, the following 
 from the Cambridge Magazine of September 23, 1916 : — 
 
 " L'Echo de Paris suggests that the only effective way to cripple 
 Germany, after the war, is to deprive her of her superiority in coal 
 and iron ore. This can be even more' effectively done by the 
 annexation to France of Lorraine, which at present furnishes most 
 of Germany's mineral wealth, than by the erection of tariff walls. 
 
 " ' All industries depend more or less on metallurgy. ... A Ger- 
 man writer has said : " The brave representatives of all the indus- 
 tries of Germany threw themselves through the breach opened by 
 Krupp, and step by step, along with them, the commerce of Ger- 
 many has spread over every land." 
 
 " ' To strike at Germany through her metallurgy is really the 
 surest way to strike her death-blow, and this should be the inevi- 
 table result of the victory of the Allies, and especially of France. 
 . . . The taking of Lorraine, alone, is what has permitted the de- 
 velopment of German metallurgy, securing her industrial, military, 
 and political domination. By losing Lorraine Germany would lose 
 this iron ore, which she has not and could not obtain elsewhere, 
 and which she will no longer obtain except at such a price as we 
 French will be able to control. Controlling this, one of the prin- 
 cipal elements in the price of the German products, we could 
 effectively shatter her attempts at international competition, her 
 extravagances of dumping. 
 
 " ' This will be the decisive blow. We French could strike it 
 alone, but that would not be enough, and the Allies would do well 
 to reflect upon it. . . . Let England especially remember that it 
 was because she allowed Prussia in 1815 to annex the coalfields of 
 the Sarre, and in 1871 the mines of Lorraine, that England's policy 
 laid the foundations of the metallurgical wealth of Germany, and 
 created a master for others and for herself.' 
 
 " Critica Sociale, August i6th-3ist: — 
 
 " In an article on ' The War with Iron for Iron,' Schiavi writes 
 on the true objective of the Verdun offensive. The rich Lorraine 
 iron basin extends over German, French, Belgian, and Luxenlburg 
 territory. Though Germany extracts 21,000,000 tons with her 
 300,000 miners from Lorraine, she still has to import 12,000,000 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 139 
 
 tons of iron ore. Her production of pig-iron is nearly double that 
 of England, and second only to that of the United States. Whereas 
 in 1907 Germany exported 600,000 tons of ore to France, in 1913 
 she iihported 3,000,000 tons from France. More light is thus 
 thrown on the sinister hidden struggle for the raw products which 
 are the life-blood of a modern industrial State. Will peaceful 
 international agreements ever replace the grim struggle of eco- 
 nomic war? Schiavi despairs of such a solution in the present 
 state of society. 
 
 "Evening Mail, August 7th: — 
 
 " An article on ' Fighting for Steel Markets ' says : ' In the 
 London Outlook of July 8th is an illuminating article on " Lorraine 
 and German Metallurgy." It is a call to England to see that 
 France gets back Lorraine, because this would destroy the German 
 steel industry and leave Great Britain a free hand in the export 
 field. It is shown that Germany before 1871, when Lorraine was 
 acquired, was rich in coal but poor in iron ore. Take away her 
 iron ore, and her iron industry is gone. 
 
 " ' Figures are cited to show what England has lost and what 
 she must regain. 
 
 " ' Great Britain is called upon to remove the Germans from 
 Lorraine and regain the steel trade of Europe. 
 
 " ' It is a striking illustration of the solid basis of fact that must 
 be behind Great Britain's championing the cause of smaller nations. 
 The history of Ireland, the Boer Republic, Egypt, and Persia must 
 make it clear that small nations per se are not indiscriminately 
 championed. The designs ,upon German metallurgy are a specific 
 instance of that principle which the London Times of March 8, 
 191 5, proclaimed in such classic form: "In this war England is 
 fighting for exactly the same kind of reasons for which she fought 
 Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. She is not fighting for 
 Belgium or for Servia, for France or for Russia. They fill a great 
 place in her mind and her heart, but they come second. The first 
 place belongs, and rightly belongs, to herself." ' 
 
 " Zukunft, July: — 
 
 " Harden gives prominence to, and endorses the French view of 
 the importance both to France and Germany of the iron mines 
 between Metz and Verdun. The documents in which the Six Indus- 
 trial Unions set out their demands have now been translated and 
 published in the French papers, and France can realize that Ger- 
 
14.0 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 many, if victorious, will take away from her the iron district of 
 Briey. The first note of alarm was sounded by Berenger, the Sec- 
 retary of the Senatorial Defence Committee: — 
 
 " ' Every one of us,' he said, ' soldier or civilian, recognizes that 
 iron is king of this war. . . . That is why Germany has flung 
 herself on the district of Briey, which produces 90 per cent, of our 
 ore, and why she has done everything in her power to keep it. 
 That is the real object of the attacks on Verdun, and of the mad 
 submarine warfare which aimed ... at preventing us from obtain- 
 ing iron from England or America. The mining district of Briey 
 forms the battleground where France and Germany are fighting for 
 the control of iron. This basin lies between Metz and Verdun like 
 a giant key between two mighty fortresses. . . . Can we under- 
 stand at last that Germany's desire to take Verdun must be as 
 strong as our own to regain Metz ? Before the war Germany used 
 28 million tons of iron ore in the year: 21 of these came from the 
 part of Briey that was annexed in 1871. France used 22 million: 
 15 of these came from the part that remained French. This 
 district was lost at the invasion. England and America had to 
 make good the deficiency. Germany seized the French and Luxem- 
 burg districts, set almost all the furnaces to work, and therefore 
 could add to her own 28 million tons 15 from France and 6 from 
 Luxemburg: a total for herself and her allies of 49 million tons. 
 . . . The six German Unions have told the Chancellor that it would 
 have been impossible to carry on the war if the production of iron 
 and steel had not doubled since August 1914: and seeing that 60 to 
 80 per cent, of this depends on the ore from Briey, the war could 
 scarcely be won now without the undisputed possession of the entire 
 district. This explains the obstinate attacks against Verdun. . . . 
 If it falls, the German can believe in an indefinite prolongation of 
 the war, for Briey holds in her lap 3,000 millions tons of iron ore. 
 But if we keep Verdun and win back Metz, Germany loses nine- 
 tenths of the raw material for her steel.' " 
 
 I do not here discuss the economic soundness or unsoundness 
 of the extracts I have quoted. I quote them as illustrating the 
 kind of considerations that determine the policy of States. As a 
 matter of fact, unless the country owning these deposits forbade the 
 export of them, the iron would go to the best buyer, foreign or 
 home; and Germany (or France) would get as much as she chose 
 to pay for. And this is as it should be, were the world bent on 
 developing production instead of devising destruction. Of course, 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 141 
 
 if the deposits were simply stolen by the conquering nation from the 
 present owners, and their revenue socialized for the benefit of all its 
 citizens, that nation might be said to benefit economically. I dis- 
 cuss that possibility in the text. Hitherto nations have not thought 
 it wise or just to adopt such policies. 
 
 Page 124. — Dumping. 
 
 On this question of German dumping, the most fantastic illusions 
 have gained currency during the war. Thus, for example, Mr. 
 Hughes is reported to have said : " If we do not act, and at once, 
 peace will overwhelm us more surely than war; the Germans will 
 dump their sugar and their goods generally into our markets, our 
 streets will be thronged with unemployed men, and industrial chaos 
 will reign in the land" (The Times, May 11, 1916). In the only 
 sense in which it would seem that dumping can reasonably be com- 
 plained of — the case of deliberately underselling competitors in 
 foreign countries at a loss, in order to capture the whole trade, 
 and then put up the price — I have not yet found an example 
 established by evidence. Further, there seems to be no evidence, 
 as there is no probability, for the contention put forward at the 
 Paris Conference that Germany is preparing to " dump " cheap 
 goods on all the allied countries as soon as the war is over. I cite 
 the following from the Sunday Times of November 12, 1916: — 
 
 " An American business man who has for years been managing a 
 branch establishment in Berlin was recently interviewed on his 
 arrival in Rotterdam from the German capital. He characterized 
 the German ' dumping ' scare as absurd. ' Not only will there be no 
 dumping,' he said, ' but German industry will be terribly handi- 
 capped for years because of the shortage of raw materials. 
 
 " ' Even the steel and iron manufacturers,' he continued, ' though 
 they have greatly enlarged their plants and are doing an incredible 
 amount of war work, cannot undertake immediate exports when 
 peace comes, because they must first import hundreds of thousands 
 of tons of copper, zinc, and materials which Germany can get now 
 with the greatest difficulty, if at all, as they are reserved for mili- 
 tary work. 
 
 " ' There is no raw cotton in Germany excepting the reserve used 
 in- manufacturing high explosives, and very little wool, and cotton 
 and wool must be imported in great quantities before the textile 
 mills can resume operations. 
 
142 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 " ' So far from Germany outstripping her rivals in foreign mar- 
 kets, her manufacturers are lying awake at night worrying because 
 they think British and French industry, released from war work, 
 will grab the old German markets before raw material can be im- 
 ported to the Fatherland, turned into finished products, and ex- 
 ported.' " 
 
 It may be worth while to add that " dumping," in the sense in 
 which it rouses British indignation when supposed to be done by 
 Germans, was originally a British invention. " As early as the first 
 decade of the nineteenth century, English industries were employing 
 the expedient of selling in foreign markets large quantities of their 
 manufactured products at prices below the cost of production to 
 themselves, in order to nip in the bud a similar industry developing 
 in the country of import." ^ 
 
 Page 130. — Trade and Political Frontiers. 
 
 The international organization of business does, of course, easily 
 overleap political frontiers. Witness such world-wide combina- 
 tions as the Oil Trust and the Tobacco Trust. 
 
 Page 135. — The British Empire and Commercial Monopoly. 
 
 See Hansard, vol. 85, No. 81, Debate of August 3, 1916, on the 
 Colonial Vote. The point in discussion was the imposition of an 
 export tax on palm kernels from West Africa. These kernels are 
 used for margarine and oil-cake; and the avowed object of the tax 
 was to confine the supply to the British Empire, a rebate of the 
 export duty being allowed if the kernels were crushed within the 
 Empire. It was explained that if the tax was not sufficient to se- 
 cure the monopoly to the Empire it would be increased. In his 
 speech defending the tax, Mr. Mackinder said : " These regions 
 ought to be treated as an asset of the Empire," and explained him- 
 self to mean that " we are entitled to a considerable proportion of 
 the advantages that come from these regions." Major Hunt put 
 the matter even more simply when he said : " The land belongs to 
 the Empire, does it not ? And the people who live on it grow nuts, 
 do they not? If a man or a nation owns the land and has to look 
 after the people who live on it, and protect them from Germans 
 or other barbarians, it is perfectly right that that man or nation 
 should have the first or a better chance of buying the nuts off that 
 
 iQrunzel, Economic Protection, p. 148. 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 143 
 
 land than anybody else." As to the natives, Mr. Molteno stated in 
 the course of the debate that the effect of the new policy had been a 
 fall of the price received by the West African natives, while there 
 had been a rise to the Liverpool merchant of 67 per cent, between 
 June and July, the proposed tax being made known on June loth. 
 It is clear that the policy applicable to palm kernels from West 
 Africa is applicable to every product of which the British Empire 
 has a monopoly or a considerable preponderance of the supply. 
 The effect of such a policy on the political future of the Empire, 
 on our relations with other Powers, and on the reputation of 
 our country for fairness and justice may be imagined. And there 
 is another point, put thus by Mr. Molteno : " I contend that this 
 dispatch is a reversal of the policy that has been consistently 
 pursued towards our Crown colonies and all our colonies ever since 
 the loss of the American colonies. That policy was never to tax 
 the colonies without employing the taxes for their own good. . . . 
 We are constantly told that the rights of small nationalities have 
 been put on an indefeasible foundation as a result of this war. 
 Here are small nationalities, though great in numbers, for the 
 people affected by this will total some twenty millions .of human 
 beings, many in a high state of native civilization, which are com- 
 pletely in our hands. With what conscience can we invade their 
 rights and stand out as the defenders of the rights of small 
 nations ? " 
 
 The question came up again in the debate of November 8, 1916 
 (Hansard, vol. 87, No. 106, p. 247 seq.), when it was proposed that 
 only British-born subjects and British firms should be allowed to 
 compete for the purchase of enemy properties to be sold in the 
 Crown colonies and protectorates. As applied to Nigeria, that, of 
 course, would confirm the monopoly of the ring of British firms, 
 who, as Mr. Steel Maitland was able to show, had depressed the 
 price to the natives from £14 to £9 or £10 and raised it to the 
 British purchaser, the rise in freights accounting for no more than 
 a fraction of this rise. It is creditable to Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. 
 Steel Maitland that they resisted, in the interest of the natives, of 
 our allies and of neutrals, a proposition which seems to be a not 
 unnatural corollary of the policy they had sanctioned previously. 
 They were unwilling to affirm to the full the monstrous principle 
 that the products and trade of the British Empire, nearly one- fourth 
 of the surface of the globe, shall be preserved as a monopoly for 
 British subjects. But that principle plainly underlay much of the 
 
144 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 argument in favour of the proposal, which indeed can hardly be 
 intelligibly defended on any other ground. And it was plainly 
 affirmed that such a monopoly was to be regarded as war-booty and 
 as one of the objects of the war. I append a few illustrations. 
 
 Sir Alfred Mond: I should have thought it was the British 
 Empire first, the British trader second, and all other considerations 
 afterwards. 
 
 Mr. Molteno : And the native nowhere ! 
 
 Sir a. Mond : No, not nowhere, but in his right place ! 
 
 Mr. R. McNeil described the policy of the Government as 
 " Asking aliens to come in and enjoy the fruits of our victory." 
 
 Sir E. Carson ended with the following peroration: — 
 
 " I do beg and pray of the Government — and if the Government 
 do not listen to it, I beg and pray of this House — in the circum- 
 stances in which this country is situated at the present moment, not 
 to send out a message to our suffering fellow-subjects — ay, and to 
 our soldiers in the trenches — that the war is being waged, not for 
 the British Empire, but equally for neutrals." 
 
 It is thus that the war for " liberty " and the " rights of small 
 nations" is interpreted by powerful and representative English- 
 men. It is thus that they give colour to the German view that 
 it is a war to destroy by force the trade of rivals whom our 
 merchants and manufacturers cannot meet by fair competition. 
 On the whole, the Manchester Guardian seems fully justified in 
 commenting : " Mr. Bonar Law has revived in all its worst fea- 
 tures the old colonial system which cost us America and which now, 
 applied at the expense of the most defenceless populace in the 
 King's dominions, bids fair to lose us our honour" (November 4, 
 1916). 
 
 How the export duty will profit British companies is indicated by 
 the following note from Common Sense: — 
 
 " Sharebrokers are advertising their clients to purchase the 
 shares of the British Oil and Cake Company, Ltd., on the ground 
 that recent legislation has put a duty of £2 per ton on palm ker- 
 nels exported from West Africa to countries outside the British 
 Empire ; and this it is said, no doubt truly, will cause great benefit 
 to accrue to this already very prosperous company. It is not a 
 poor, struggling concern which is to reap the benefit of this new 
 monopoly, but a company which has raised its profits from £111,000 
 in 1914 to £243,000 in 1915, and its dividend from 5 to 15 per cent." 
 
 Special importance is given to the subject-matter of this chapter 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 145- 
 
 by the resolutions of the Paris Conference, whereby the AlHes 
 propose an economic " war after the war " against the Powers of 
 Central Europe. The resolutions appear to embody all the eco- 
 nomic and political fallacies which I have endeavoured to expose 
 in the text. I have dealt with the question specially in a separate 
 pamphlet,^ where I have illustrated among other things the effect 
 of the resolutions in stiffening our enemies to fight to the end. 
 
 The following passage from a lecture given by Professor Bren- 
 tano is worth quoting, as showing that, even in a country as pro- 
 tectionist as Germany, there are thinkers who see clearly the con- 
 nexion between war and protectionist policies : — 
 
 " ' There is only one way to reach a durable peace : namely, to 
 renounce in future all commercial hostilities and all the means that 
 minister to them. . . . History shows that the effort of any eco- 
 nomic system to be self-sufficient has always led to war.' . . . The 
 lecturer criticized the folly of the arguments which the advocates of 
 protective tariffs in both camps bring forward in favour of the ex- 
 clusion of the enemy from the world markets even after the re-es- 
 tablishment of peace. If this tendency should get the upper hand 
 among the nations engaged in the conflict, it will lead to new wars. 
 There is an immanent logic of facts in politics as elsewhere. . . . 
 The assumption of mercantilism that in trade the gain of one is 
 only possible at the cost of the loss of the other, and that the ob- 
 ject of trading is to derive from it one-sided advantage, is opposed 
 by the view that trade flourishes best when both parties gain. 
 On that view rests free trade. And just as the organized system 
 of commercial hostility ended in war, so free trade assumes peace 
 and leads to it. It has always been so and must be so in the future, 
 for it lies in the nature of things. 
 
 " Finally the lecturer dwelt upon what would be involved for 
 Europe in another war. After describing the sacrifices in men and 
 goods which the present war has laid upon Europe, he concluded 
 with the remark that a recurrence of war would mean the destruc- 
 tion of Europe as the leader of civilization in the world. ' If the 
 European peoples that are now involved in all the horrors of the 
 world war, instead of aiming at the quickest possible recovery from 
 the losses inflicted on them by ordering international trade on the 
 basis of a peaceable division of labour, consult (as at an economic 
 
 1 Economic War after the War, published by the Union of Demo- 
 cratic Control {Z7 Norfolk Street, Strand). 
 
146 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 conference which has just been held in Paris) how after the re- 
 establishment of peace the world war may be liquidated by a trade 
 war which must one day produce a new war with all the dangers 
 indicated — if they do this, then for such conduct there is only one 
 word, and that one word madness.'" (See Zuricher Zeitung, 
 June IS, 1916.) 
 
 It is well known that the German Social Democrats have always 
 been Free Traders and apparently still are. A very sound article, 
 from this point of view, dealing both with the Mittel-Europa 
 project and with the resolutions of the Paris Conference appeared 
 in Vorwarts for June 26, 1916. 
 
 A deputy of the Reichstag, Herr Gustav Hoch, in an article 
 opposing all schemes of annexation, said : " The future struggle 
 for markets must no longer be allowed to be conducted by any other 
 than peaceful methods — by methods of commercial competition " 
 {Neue Zeit, January 29, 1916) . 
 
 Page 136. — Socialistic Policies and Commercial Monopoly. 
 
 The point suggested in the text is unfortunately not a mere 
 imagining, unbased on real tendencies. I may cite in illustration 
 an article from the New York Journal, giving an interview with 
 Dr. Ludvig Quessel, a leading German Socialist. Dr. Quessel is 
 reported to have said that "The shutting off of foreign supplies 
 of cotton, wool, rubber, oil, fibrous material, and food-stuffs has 
 awakened among the working people a conception of the value of 
 world politics for colonies. It is plain that this conception must 
 continue after the war." After a long account of the monopolistic 
 colonial policy of the Entente Powers (an account which, so far as 
 England is concerned, is unfounded and unjust) ,. he concludes that 
 the "whole of Central Europe, from the simplest worker to the 
 multimillionaire, is made to pay tribute to the Entente," and that 
 the object of the Entente is entering on the war " the desire 
 to make their colonial monopoly more complete. By appropriating 
 Germany's colonies and partitioning Turkey, the exploitation of 
 colonially disinherited Central Europe was to be reduced as it 
 were to a system.'' 
 
 That this policy was the object of the Entente in going to war 
 is a fantastic illusion. But it is more than unfortunate that the 
 partitioning of Turkey and the seizure of German colonies is now 
 their policy, and that prominent politicians and business men in 
 
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND WAR 147 
 
 the Entente countries have avowed precisely this ideal of a colonial 
 monopoly directed against Germany. The result, of course, can 
 only be to convert the great Socialist masses of Germany, hitherto 
 Free Traders, to the idea of an aggressive policy to seize colonies 
 by force as a necessary basis of economic life. Such policies in all 
 countries might be made popular by associating the working class 
 with the alleged advantages. We may thus have a series of world 
 wars, accompanied by the militarization of all countries, simply 
 because a false conception of public advantage has been fostered 
 by individuals who see in it private advantage, has then been ex- 
 ploited by those who desire war to continue, and has been accepted 
 in shortsighted ignorance by masses too little educated to be able 
 to think the matter through for themselves. Mr. Hughes of Aus- 
 tralia and Mr. Hodge of England are typical examples of the kind 
 of men who are taken in by these illusions. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 OTHER CAUSES OF WAR 
 
 I HAVE now dealt with those causes of war which are some- 
 times regarded as the result of a natural necessity, against 
 which human ideals and policy must beat in vain; and I have 
 tried to show that they are nothing of the kind; that, in fact, 
 mistaken ideas, wrong policy, and false ambitions here mas- 
 querade as Fate. 
 
 But there remain some other causes of war on which 
 it will be necessary to touch briefly. 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have been dealing with na- 
 tional interests in a simple material form. For it is material 
 interests, misunderstood, that furnish the principal causes 
 of war; and when it suits the militarists, they will frankly 
 admit it. Thus, I find in Naumann's Central Europe the 
 following illuminating passage : — 
 
 War is only unavoidable because there is no recognized measure 
 for evaluating the claims that are put forward. If, for example, 
 Japan, Russia, England, America, and other States dispute over the 
 extent of their influence in China, there is no recognized procedure 
 of apportionment according to which their mortgages in China can 
 be measured. The actual discovery of such a procedure would be 
 pacifism. . . . Under these circumstances, what remains but to put 
 it to the test of blood how highly each one who makes a claim is 
 in a position to value it?^ 
 
 This passage, if it means anything, can only mean that 
 every State has a right to all it can take by force; and that 
 if forces could be accurately measured without war, war 
 
 '^ Central Europe, p. 200, English translation. 
 148 
 
OTHER CAUSES OF WAR 149 
 
 could be dispensed withi. For the distribution of other 
 people's property could then be made by a Court, accord- 
 ing to this German principle of justice. As it is, wars 
 must be fought to ascertain where the preponderance of 
 this force, which is also Right, may lie. And the assump- 
 tion, of course, throughout is, that it is for their material 
 interests that this stealing is necessary to States. When- 
 ever the pacifist puts forward some other purpose than 
 power and wealth as a motive for State policy, he is swept 
 from the stage by the indignant militarist, who says, like 
 Admiral Mahan: — 
 
 It is vain to expect nations to act consistently from any motive 
 other than that of interest . . . and the predatory instinct that he 
 should take who can.^ 
 
 But, on the other hand, so soon as the pacifist himself 
 begins to talk of interest, and urges, with Mr. Norman 
 Angell, that the interest of States is not in fact furthered 
 by war, the militarist turns round in a fury and says that 
 no one but a materialistic pacifist would suppose that States 
 ever go to war for anything so low as their interest! 
 Thus we find the very same Admiral Mahan writing in 
 another place : — 
 
 •To regard the world as governed by self-interest is to live in a 
 non-existent world, a world possessed by an idea much less worthy 
 than those which mankind, to do it bare justice, persistently 
 entertains.^ 
 
 The solution of these contradictions I must leave to the 
 militarists. Meantime, as a sober pacifist I must recognize 
 that nations do sometimes go to war for other reasons than a 
 miscomprehension of interests. They go to war, for in- 
 
 1 Cited by Norman Angell in Foundations of International Policy, 
 
 p. lO. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 36. 
 
150 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 stance, about their " honour." What is this " honour " ? 
 No term is more indefinite and none is more abused. But 
 some immediate reaction of the corporate personality of 
 a nation either to a supposed insult or to an admitted 
 obligation. To take first the question of an insult. Never, 
 I suppose, has that been the sole cause of war. But it 
 has often been the match to fire the train. Thus, for ex- 
 ample, " Jenkins's ear " was an immediate occasion of the 
 Anglo-Spanish War of 1739. But trade rivalry and the 
 Balance of Power were the real causes. Again, the 
 Franco-German War was precipitated by the insult falsely 
 alleged to have been offered by the King of Prussia to the 
 French envoy. But there were other and deeper causes. 
 In fact, those who are determined on war are apt to bring 
 it to birth by causing it to appear, falsely or truly, that 
 the nation has been insulted. They are aware that the 
 notion of an insult works upon a people as it works upon 
 an individual, suppresses all calculation of consequences, 
 and arouses a blind passion for revenge. A common 
 provocative of such passion is the pretence, or the fact 
 that some member of the nation has been wantonly in- 
 jured. Immediately all the hot-heads feel that they them- 
 selves have suffered vicariously in the person of the in- 
 jured. Their pride, rather than their humanity, is out- 
 raged, and they cry for the humiliation of the offender or 
 for war. 
 
 Now, in such cases, no sober judgment would maintain 
 that the insult must be wiped out in blood. We do not 
 think so even in the case of insult to an individual, since 
 we have discredited the duel. But an individual at least 
 is risking only his own life. A statesman is risking the 
 present and future of a community and the lives of many 
 who are quite indifferent to the alleged affront. Wherever 
 reflexion might see in such cases a justification for war, 
 
OTHER CAUSES OF WAR 161 
 
 it would be because of some calculation that the outrage 
 will be followed by substantial aggression unless reparation 
 is exacted. Broadly, no nation ought ever to go to war 
 merely because of an affront. And it is exactly in such 
 cases that delay is all important, to allow passions to cool. 
 The reference of the case of the Dogger Bank outrage to a 
 commission of inquiry at The Hague is a model of how 
 such issues should be handled. Who now regrets that we 
 did not then go to war With Russia? Yet a weaker or 
 more passionate Government might have gone to war, 
 and " public opinion " (that is, the Press) at the first 
 moment would have approved it. In every such case where 
 a supposed insult is the essence of the trouble, inquiry 
 and delay is the remedy that will prevent a precipitate 
 war. 
 
 It is different when the point of "honour" is a point 
 of legal or moral obligation. Nations are under an obliga- 
 tion, for instance, to keep their pledged word, though 
 it is one they do not in fact commonly recognize and 
 one which the same people who would go to war about an 
 " insult " are apt to treat with cynical contempt. For those 
 who are most sensitive to insult are not necessarily those 
 most scrupulous of obligation. Since then nations ought 
 to keep their word, they should be the more careful how 
 they pledge it, and they should not allow it to be pledged 
 behind their back, nor ambiguously, nor for improper 
 purposes. There arise here questions about the making 
 and sanction of treaties, and the democratic control of 
 policy, which we shall have to discuss presently. Mean- 
 time, let us admit that it may sometimes be right and 
 necessary to make war in support of a pledged word; and 
 that in that sense " honour " may be a good cause of 
 war. 
 
 The other kinds of cases out of which war may arise 
 
152 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 are concerned with what are called " vital interests." And 
 it should be observed, to begin with, that no treaties should 
 be entered upon which it is not a matter of " vital interest," 
 as well as of honour, to maintain. Statesmen, in fact, do 
 not maintain treaties by war, unless they hold that vital 
 interest is concerned, and are often ready to break them 
 when vital interest seems to sanction it. An antagonism 
 between these two kinds of obligation, " honour " and 
 " interest," is very unfortunate, and leads to much hy- 
 pocrisy and much insincere vituperation. The moral 
 is. Be very careful what kind of treaties you enter upon, 
 and give scope for periodical revision as circumstances 
 change. 
 
 Among vital interests, the first is " national independ- 
 ence"; by which I mean independence of the will of 
 another imposed by force, not independence of obligations 
 voluntarily undertaken. Every treaty limits independence 
 by obligations deliberately assumed. But such limitation 
 is a guarantee, not an infringement, of vital interest. Any 
 amount of international agreement, if it be voluntary, is 
 thus compatible with national independence. But no jot 
 or tittle of armed coercion contrary to Right is compatible 
 with it. On the other hand, a nation deliberately recal- 
 citrant to international law and comity may forfeit its right 
 to independence, just as an individual citizen may within 
 the State. Force to back recognized law may become 
 legitimate even against the right of independence. Force 
 without that sanction of law is illegitimate, except to 
 counter illegitimate force applied by another. The general 
 recognition, in theory and practice, of this right of inde- 
 pendence, so limited, is essential to an international order. 
 And there can be no international order, and no salvation 
 from war and ruin, while any powerful State regards 
 force, in and by itself, as either being or creating a 
 
OTHER CAUSES OF WAR 153 
 
 Right. If this war is about anything ideal, it is about that 
 issue. 
 
 Closely connected with this question of independence 
 is that of oppressed nationalities. For oppression here 
 means the denial by one group to another of some kind 
 of independence. No questions are so difficult of solution 
 as these, and it may be admitted that war may be a neces- 
 sary step towards the solution of them. On the other hand, 
 war is a very precarious remedy, precarious in its imme- 
 diate issue and in its remoter effects. Many rebellions have 
 been worse than vain, and many that have been successful 
 have only converted the whilom victims into oppressors. 
 Nothing is more disconcerting to lovers of liberty than the 
 new Imperialism of Italy, or the campaigns of the various 
 Balkan States to oppress one another as soon as they had 
 jointly delivered themselves from the yoke of the Turk. 
 " They that take the sword shall perish by the sword " — 
 perish, it would seem, spiritually as well as physically. 
 There is a better way, the way of justice and agreement, 
 the way which, after centuries of bitter experience, the 
 British have at last beenj±tegiipting-in Ireland. Their diffi- 
 culties are typical of those which arise in every such case. \ 
 But that way is the right way. And the more Europe can 
 be induced to follow it, the more carefully and deliberately 
 she can frame machinery for that purpose, the more she 
 can avoid perilous and drastic operations with the knife, the 
 better the chance not only for civilization as a whole, but 
 for the solution of the very problems which war must 
 otherwise be called in to settle. 
 
 There remain economic issues, and of these I have al- 
 ready spoken at length. What resulted from our discus- 
 sion was the need for international agreements to regu- 
 late commercial and financial competition. We shall return 
 to this point presently. 
 
154 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Finally, all these issues lead up to war, not so much 
 because they are otherwise insoluble, as because they are 
 handled in an anarchic world. It is the absence of ade- 
 quate machinery to deal with disputes, rather than the 
 insoluble nature of the disputes, that leads to international 
 war. To suggest what steps may be immediately prac- 
 ticable in the constructing of such machinery and what 
 kind of agreements would be best calculated to deal with 
 the issues as they arise is the purpose of the concluding 
 portion of this book. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 151.. — National Honour. 
 
 The view of " honour " and its obligations which I am challeng- 
 ing is expressed by Treitschke in the following passage : — 
 
 " A State must have a very highly developed sense of honour, if 
 it is not to be disloyal to its own nature. The State is not a violet 
 blooming in the shade. Its power must stand forth proud and 
 refulgent, and it must not allow this power to be disputed even in 
 matters of forms and symbols. If the flag of the State is insulted, 
 it is the duty of the State to demand satisfaction, and if satisfaction 
 is not forthcoming, to declare war, however trivial the occasion 
 may appear; for the State must strain every nerve to preserve for 
 itself that respect which it enjoys in the State system." ^ 
 
 This passage expresses admirably the real immediate feeling of 
 almost everybody, and it is necessary that this feeling shall be 
 counteracted by reflexion if the most trivial causes are not to 
 lead to world wars. The "honour" of nations no more requires 
 war to safeguard it than the honour of individuals requires the duel. 
 In all such matters the question should be put in cold blood, " Do 
 you think, because somebody has been rude to your representative 
 or your flag, that millions of men ought to die in the prime of life 
 and the whole level of civilization sink to the depths into which 
 every modern war must inevitably plunge it?" 
 
 ^The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, by H. W. C. 
 Davies, p. 177. 
 
OTHER CAUSES OF WAR 165 
 
 I append other examples of the use of the word " honour." 
 
 1. In a speech delivered in the Reichstag in the debate of 
 October ii and 12, 1916, Naumann, the author of MitteUBuropa, 
 is reported to have said that the murder of Serajevo was " in the 
 strictest sense of the word a question of honour, and therefore 
 Austria-Hungary could not leave it to other Powers to say whether 
 and how far she should receive satisfaction for it." Clearly, the 
 question of the murder of Serajevo was one of justice. A crime 
 had been committed, and the first step was to investigate judicially 
 the question of guilt. It was the typical case for an international 
 court. If by the judicial investigation it should have been made 
 clear that the murder had been instigated or connived at by the 
 Serbian Government, an international question would have arisen. 
 But not till then. The refusal of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment to refer the case to an international commission of inquiry- 
 was itself an international crime, and no plea of " honour " can 
 palliate it. 
 
 2. "He (Usedom) began by assuring me that as early as 1865 
 efforts had been made from Florence to induce the Austrians to 
 sell Venice. The envoy, a certain Landau, had, according to him, 
 met with much sympathy at Vienna — in fact, even Count Mens- 
 dorff had shown himself not ill-disposed; yet the affair had mis- 
 carried owing to the opposition of the Emperor and the military 
 party, who held it incompatible with military honour to surrender 
 Venice without fighting." 
 
 Here is a case where a transference of territory which is now 
 generally recognized to be right and proper was refused by way of 
 agreement and had to be carried out at the cost of much blood- 
 shed, because certain individuals had a mistaken idea of " honour." 
 But it is perhaps true that in any State that notion of honour could 
 and would be imposed on the nation by its Press, and any Govern- 
 ment that might attempt the humane and reasonable course would 
 be discredited. So great is the empire of words. (See Memoirs 
 of Prince Hohenlohe, English translation, Heinemann, 1906, vol. i. 
 p. 316.) 
 
 3. In his Guildhall speech of 1911, Mr. Lloyd George maintained 
 that the compensation proposed to be given to Germany by France 
 in Morocco would seriously affect British interests. He then, by a 
 conjuror's trick, identified national interest with national honour: 
 " If a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only 
 be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position 
 
156 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allow- 
 ing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected 
 as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say 
 emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intol- 
 erable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour 
 is no party question." 
 
 The issue here, according to Mr. George's own statement, was 
 one of interest and prestige. But in order to prevent that question 
 from being examined coolly on its merits, in order to avoid show- 
 ing clearly by facts and documents exactly what British interests 
 were involved, and on what evidence (points on which we wait 
 for illumination), he brings in the words " humiliation " and " hon- 
 our," knowing well that they work on a nation like a red rag on a 
 bull, silence all discussion and criticism, and hand over the 
 nation a passive instrument into the hands of any Government, 
 quite apart from the wisdom or justice of that Government's policy. 
 
PART II 
 INTERNATIONALISM 
 
When it is a question of war, all means should first be tried in 
 the way of award, and only in the last resort should the way of 
 battle be tried. — Dante. 
 
 Mere agreements will not make peace. It will be absolutely 
 necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the perma- 
 nency of the settlement, so much greater than the force of any 
 nations now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, 
 that no nation or probable combination of nations could face or 
 withstand it. 
 
 President Wilson. 
 Speech to the Senate, January 22, 1917. 
 
 In a general way they desire to declare . . . their whole-hearted 
 agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations which 
 shall assure peace and justice throughout the world. They recog- 
 nize all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and 
 civilization from the institution of international arrangements 
 designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed 
 las to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an 
 illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of 
 aggression. 
 
 From the Reply of the Allied Governments to 
 President Wilson's Note, January 11, 1917. 
 
NOTE 
 
 In this Part I refer to the following schemes of international 
 organization, which will shortly be published in a separate volume 
 by Messrs. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., under the title " The 
 Framework of a Lasting Peace." 
 
 1. A scheme contained in International Government, by L. S. 
 Woolf. Published for the Fabian Society by George Allen & 
 Unwin Ltd., 1916. Referred to as the Fabian scheme. 
 
 2. Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars. By Lord 
 Bryce and others. Referred to as the scheme of the British group. 
 This scheme is separately published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
 Price one shilling net. 
 
 3. A scheme drawn up by a Dutch Committee and published 
 in the first volume of the Recueil des Rapports de I' Organisation 
 Centrale pour une Paix durable, referred to as the Dutch scheme. 
 
 4. The program of the American " League to Enforce Peace,'' 
 Secretary, W. H. Short, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York. 
 
 5. The program of the British " League of Nations Society," 
 offices at I Central Buildings, Tothill Street, Westminster. 
 
 I refer also to the Recueil des Rapports sur les differenfs Points 
 du Programme minimum published by the Organisation Centrale 
 pour une Paix durable (Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1916). A 
 translation of some of these reports will shortly be published by 
 George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
 
 Since this book was written there has appeared Mr. Brailsford's 
 admirable book A League of Nations (Headley Bros.), to which I 
 would refer the reader for a further discussion of some of the 
 points here treated, and especially for the relation of the project of 
 a League of Nations to all the other problems of the peace settle- 
 ment. 
 
 The periodical War and Peace, now issued monthly as a supple- 
 ment to the Nation, is devoting itself exclusively to the problems 
 of a League of Nations. 
 
 159 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 Let me now remind the reader where we stand. We 
 have seen what is likely, nay, certain to happen, if war 
 and preparation for war continues. It is a prospect which, 
 I believe, few who can realize it will face without dismay. 
 We have seen further that, contrary to our usual way 
 of thinking, war is not " inevitable," but proceeds from 
 definite and removable causes. In other words, salvation 
 is in our own hands. But to realize that fact, and to 
 act accordingly, is no easy matter. So hard a process of 
 intellectual and imaginative conversion is necessary, so 
 long may it take for the simple truths set forth in the 
 preceding pages actually to take hold of and govern the 
 hearts and minds of men. Yet the terrible experience of 
 this war should have broken up the soil of habit and pre- 
 pared it for the reception of new seeds. I must assume 
 that that process has taken place in my readers. If not, 
 they will hardly feel the force of all that follows. " War 
 leads to hell." " War is not inevitable." The acceptance 
 of those two propositions is the condition of the acceptance 
 of proposals for reconstruction. And a reader who should 
 turn to this part of my book without seriously considering 
 the first part will not be in a position to appreciate the 
 urgency of my contention. 
 
 Let me suppose, however, a reader who is so convinced. 
 What will be the first suggestion to occur to him? Not 
 unnaturally he might say, " There is one and only one way 
 out. Scrap your armaments, for these, we have seen, are a 
 
 160 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 161 
 
 principal cause of war, and settle your disputes henceforth 
 by process of law or arbitration." This measure would, I 
 believe, be the most effective that could be adopted. And 
 nothing at bottom prevents its adoption but moral and 
 intellectual inertia in all nations. For, as we have seen, 
 the main cause that embitters the relations of States is fear. 
 Each lives under the dread of what another may be plot- 
 ting against it ; and that other is so plotting only because 
 it fears the first. Read in detail any account of the policy 
 leading up to any war, and the truth of this will become 
 evident. The war is rarely, if ever, produced by the ques- 
 tions at issue. It is produced by the mutual suspicion and 
 fear in which the negotiations are enveloped. The issues 
 may be difficult, irritating, incapable even of a solution 
 satisfactory to both parties. But they would, in almost 
 every case, be adjusted nevertheless if it were not that the 
 parties are armed. True, a nation might conceivably arm 
 in order to enforce a claim. But weapons drive men to 
 conflict much more often than quarrels would drive them 
 to weapons. 
 
 And while armaments are thus a principal cause of war, 
 they are also a principal obstacle to international organiza- 
 tion. The formation and operation of a League of Nations 
 would be comparatively simple if it were not for the prob- 
 lem of security. But there is only a problem of security 
 because nations are armed. The great obstacle to a League 
 is the fear of the imscrupulous member. But if the un- 
 scrupulous member were not armed, he would no longer 
 be a source of fear. He could be coerced, if necessary, 
 then, by other means than force — by a boycott, for ex- 
 ample. And if he set to work to build up armaments, he 
 could be countered at once by precautionary action by the 
 loyal members. Armaments, one might almost «6ay, pro- 
 duce the unscrupulous action, since they alone give the hope 
 
163 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 that it may be successful. A State armed is formidable, 
 whatever be its intentions. A State unarmed is not formid- 
 able, whatever be its intentions. Abolish armaments and 
 you abolish fear; abolish fear and you abolish suspicion; 
 abolish suspicion and you abolish secrecy; abolish secrecy 
 and you have popular control ; grant popular control and the 
 people's will to peace becomes effective. 
 
 Common sense, then, shows that the complete abolition 
 of armaments ^ is the simplest and surest road to perma- 
 nent peace. It would also be technically the easiest ; easier, 
 for instance, than an all-round reduction, which bristles 
 with notorious difficulties. What stands in the way are the 
 habitual passions and preconceptions of men. 
 
 We English, for example, should hardly know ourselves 
 without the " biggest navy in the world," and we have not 
 yet realized that, if navies are to continue, that privilege is 
 not likely to be ours much longer. Similarly, the Germans 
 would not know themselves without " the biggest army in 
 the world." But the fact remains that our navy is only 
 needed because other Powers have navies, and that the 
 German army is only needed because other Powers have 
 armies. And this fact would carry conviction, if it could 
 be allowed to influence men in cold blood. But it will 
 not be. The flag will be waved in every nation. The 
 instinctive passions will be tapped. And the counter- 
 passions of reason, the passions for humanity and for 
 co-operation in peace, will be merged in the flood. Per- 
 ceiving this, some hold that we must not rely on reason at 
 all, but on a great religious revival. But nothing would be 
 more precarious in its effects than such a revival, if unen- 
 lightened and undirected by political reasoning and political 
 facts. 
 
 1 It is hardly necessary, I suppose, to dwell upon the obvious qualifi- 
 cations, such as the necessity of keeping troops upon frontiers threat- 
 ened by armed and uncivilized tribes. 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 163 
 
 Miracles and miraculous leaders may be possible. But 
 we cannot count on them. Neither can we trust them, 
 even if they should occur, to give us permanent salvation. 
 For moods pass, passions revive, errors recur. Only the 
 slow, gradual, uphill work of learning from experience, 
 formulating its lessons, and embodying them in institutions, 
 accomplishes permanent transformations. We have there- 
 fore to carry on, alongside of that moral revolt without 
 which we shall do nothing, a hard and ungrateful process 
 of thinking and inventing, if we are to make a real step 
 forward. To that process I wish, to contribute something 
 in what follows. I cannot make what I have to say enter- 
 taining, nor yet edifying. I cannot make it correspond to, 
 nor give relief to, the feelings of the reader. I can only 
 address myself to his reason and his practical sense. But 
 that too must be done. A connexion must be made between 
 the mood of aspiration and revolt and that complex of 
 facts and traditions out of which the war has come, and 
 within which the construction of the future must go on, at 
 the hands of men working on the ordinary level of human 
 activity and in the hard dry light of day. Having seen and 
 shuddered at the abyss that lies before us, we have next to 
 devise calmly and in cold blood the means we must and can 
 employ if we are to escape it. 
 
 First, then, let me remind the reader that it is only in the 
 political relations of States that sheer anarchy continues. 
 Everywhere else the actual needs of modem society have 
 long been pressing for embodiment in international organi- 
 zation, and, in fact, there exists a whole network of such 
 arrangements, little known to the public, not in themselves 
 very interesting to most people, but important as showing 
 that it is the internationalists, not the nationalists, that are 
 working on the lines of the true interests and needs of 
 modem men. Some account of these arrangements and 
 
164. THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 agreements will be found in Mr. Woolf's admirable book 
 International Government.^ He shows there in detail how 
 the closer communication effected by modern means of 
 transport has produced a number of new needs and prob- 
 lems, and how these have necessitated a machinery to deal 
 with them — a machinery- which had to be international. 
 Not only do the new means of communication require 
 internjitional regulation — the post, the cables, radioteleg- 
 raphy, and the like; but the fact of communication both 
 raises new problems and provides the possibility of solving 
 them. Thus, for example, when travelling becomes general, 
 the spread of infectious disease is facilitated, and measures 
 have to be devised to check it. As international trade 
 becomes more intricate and more extensive, States find 
 themselves more and more unable to solve domestic prob- 
 lems without the co-operation of other States; the use of 
 white phosphorus for matches, for example, cannot be 
 stopped, nor bounties on sugar abandoned, unless a number 
 of States agree to common action. The translation of 
 books into many languages leads to the need of an inter- 
 national law of copyright. The inconvenience of different 
 systems of currency and weights and measures has led to 
 the Metric Union and the Latin Monetary Union. These 
 are examples among many others of international action by 
 Governments, going so far, in some cases, as an international 
 legislative body and administrative council for the subject- 
 matter concerned. In addition, there are over four hundred 
 private international associations that have grown up in 
 response to international needs. Indeed, in peace-time, the 
 political relations of States may reasonably and naturally 
 seem to an observer to be a mere atavistic survival from an 
 age of isolation into an age of communication. Essentially, 
 
 1 L. Woolf, International Government, published for the Fabian So- 
 ciety by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916. 
 
INTERNATIONALISM 165 
 
 I believe, that is what they are. But war and the passions 
 of war show that the atavism is very powerful. Moreover, 
 national sentiment, though it has not been able to prevent, 
 has constantly hindered and delayed international organi- 
 zation, even in matters where it might have been thought 
 political passion would not be easily stirred. We cannot, 
 therefore, expect a sudden transformation of interstate 
 relations after the war. On the other hand, we may be 
 sure that, in advocating such transformation, we are on the 
 true line of development. The question of what exactly to 
 propose and how long the first steps may be is rather one 
 of sagacity than of principle. The international spirit is 
 already at work, not only in men's niinds but in conditions 
 and events. But it is at work against obstacles in feeling, 
 tradition, and passion which have to be very seriously 
 reckoned with. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 In examining the various proposals that have been put 
 forward with a view to international organization, it will 
 be convenient to start with the most radical, the idea of 
 a World-State. We may concede to this idea, what its 
 advocates claim for it, that, of political schemes, it is the 
 only one logically complete. And for that reason it is 
 sometimes employed by opponents of internationalism to 
 discredit less drastic and less Utopian proposals. " If you 
 want to stop war," it is urged, " you must have a World- 
 State. You don't think that possible? Well, then, drop 
 the whole idea of peace." But, in fact, even the World- 
 State, supposing it to be established, could not make war 
 impossible; for nothing can. Civil war might occur in 
 such a State, as it occurred, after the federal union, in the 
 United States. Still, the State is the closest and most com- 
 pact form of political association. And since it implies, 
 within its territory, that force shall be used only to back 
 law, and that there shall be only one force, that of the 
 government, the inclusion of the whole world in a single 
 State would solve completely, so far as form is concerned, 
 that problem of competing policies backed by competing 
 armaments which is the problem of war. 
 
 But to say that does not take us very far. A State 
 can only come into being when certain conditions are 
 fulfilled. A self-governing State requires a considerable 
 measure of agreement in feeling, tradition, ideas, and 
 way of life among its members. This seems to be true 
 even of a federal organization, though no doubt that device 
 
 166 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 167 
 
 enables more diverse peoples to cohere in a free community 
 than could be well comprised in a unitary State. On the 
 other hand, peoples united by no natural or moral tie can 
 be and have been held together in a single State, when the 
 bond has been not free agreement but Empire. But such 
 a bond is usually transitory, often tyrannic, and always 
 based on force. The British Empire comprises a greater 
 number of diverse peoples than perhaps have ever been 
 held together under a single rule; and to keep the peace 
 over so large an area is a notable service to civilization. 
 But the British Empire is not a free Empire, beyond the 
 limits of those self-governing Dominions which comprise 
 but a small minority of its total population. Now, the 
 essential problem of world peace is to bring together na- 
 tions which are indeed on substantially the same level of 
 civilization, and' so far might be capable of being members 
 of the same State, but in which history and tradition have 
 fostered an extravagant sense of political independence. 
 This sense, no doubt, is itself largely a product of war; 
 and, as we have seen, during peace it is always being under- 
 mined by international communication. But it will have 
 been reinforced, as between the rival groups, by the present 
 war ; and though, on each side, the allies have been brought 
 for the time being into friendly relations, that conjunc- 
 tion is likely to count for little as against the factors making 
 for independence. It is hardly necessary to labour this 
 point. The advocates of a World-State have only to con- 
 centrate themselves on Europe, and imagine themselves 
 standing up before any audience of ordinary Englishmen 
 to recommend that the British Empire and Germany, or 
 even France, shall form one State, to feel the full force of 
 it. A European State, and a fortiori a World-State, even 
 in a form of the loosest federation that could be called a 
 State, is not at present a serious political conception. 
 
168 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 But we are not therefore driven back at once upon inter- 
 national anarchy. The problem is to find the greatest 
 measure of organization which the state of feeling and 
 intelligence that will exist after the war will tolerate. I 
 think it clear that they will not tolerate a World-State nor 
 yet a European State. What less than this might they 
 tolerate ? 
 
 If States are to remain independent, not united even 
 by a loose federal Constitution, all organized relations be- 
 tween them must be based upon treaty. Every kind of 
 plan that does not fuse them into a single State implies 
 this condition. We are met, therefore, at the outset, with 
 the new scepticism about treaties. What is the use of 
 " scraps of paper " ? the critic contemptuously asks, and 
 dismisses the whole subject as Utopian nonsense. Now, 
 it must be evident that it is not only "pacifist" schemes 
 that are open to this attack. Not a single one of the 
 objects which the Allies have put before them in this war 
 can be achieved by any other means than treaties. Is 
 the independence of small States to be guaranteed ? How ? 
 By treaty! Are new frontiers to be laid down? How? 
 By treaty ! It is impossible to profess a general scepticism 
 about the observation of treaties without reducing to an 
 absurdity the whole program for which we profess to be 
 fighting. Treaties, it is true, may include provisions insti- 
 tuting a sanction against those who break them, and this 
 question of sanctions we shall presently discuss. But the 
 application of an agreed sanction depends itself on the 
 States concerned being willing to fulfil their agreement to 
 apply it. There is no escape from this circle. Grant the 
 continued existence of independent States, and they can 
 only organize by treaty. And the fulfilment of the treaty 
 must depend, in the last resort, on their sense of honour or 
 of interest, or of both. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 169 
 
 Blit a treaty that is to guarantee justice and peace must 
 be of a new kind. Its object is not to strengthen some 
 States against others, but to substitute in some way and 
 in some measure (presently to be discussed) peaceable 
 settlement for war. And the first point to be made is, that 
 it belongs to the nature of such a treaty that it should 
 be open to all civilized nations desiring to come in. For 
 to exclude any nation is to announce that between, it and 
 the contracting nations war, not peaceable settlement, is to 
 be the rule. On the other hand, a nation refusing to come 
 in would offer a presumption that it intends to continue the 
 way of war. It would announce itself a potential enemy of 
 the others, against which they must continue to guard 
 themselves. And should any State or States announce such 
 a policy, the treaty would in effect constitute a defensive 
 alliance against such State or States. 
 
 The application of this remark to a situation that may 
 arise after the war is obvious. If Great Britain and her 
 Allies, while entering into the proposed agreement among 
 themselves, should deliberately exclude the Central Powers, 
 they would be perpetuating the armed peace that preceded 
 the war and preparing the way for a new war; for the 
 Central Powers could only regard such an arrangement 
 as directed offensively against themselves, and would of 
 course act accordingly. On the other hand, should the 
 Central Powers be invited to come in, and refuse, suspicion 
 would legitimately rest upon them, and they must be held 
 responsible for perpetuating the European anarchy. On 
 the action that the Allies and the German Powers respec- \ 
 tively may take on this matter may depend the future of / 
 civilization. A point of such immense importance clearly 
 ought not to be decided under the influence of war passion, 
 but in the dry light of reason. If it be believed, as it is 
 believed not unnaturally by the present enemies of Germany, 
 
iro THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 that the German will is incurably set upon war for the 
 sake of conquest, the best way of testing that belief is to 
 invite Germany to join a League of which it is the object 
 to rule out such policies. If it be replied that they would 
 only come in in order to wreck the scheme, it must be 
 shown in detail how they can do this. On the face of it, 
 it would be easier to watch their proceedings and to keep 
 track of their armaments if they were inside than if they 
 were outside. And if the fear is that they would detach 
 members of the League, why should they be able to do that 
 more easily from within than from without? A Germany 
 determined to fight rather than await or abide by the de- 
 cisions of an international Court or Council would be a 
 Germany opposed to the purposes of the league. But 
 equally, whether she were outside or inside. And in either 
 case the only way of meeting her hostile action would be 
 by the joint action of the Powers faithful to the alliance. 
 If Germany were excluded by the Allies, the Allies would lie 
 open to suspicion. If she excluded herself, she would lie 
 open to suspicion. If she were invited to come in, and came 
 in, there would be the same guarantee against her as there 
 would be if she remained outside. For to provide such a 
 guarantee against a Power making aggressive war is pre- 
 cisely the primary object of the League. 
 
 The inclusion, then, of all the most powerful States seems 
 to be the most favourable, if not an essential, condition 
 of success. Otherwise we might get merely two opposed 
 groups, as before the war, and so move again to the same 
 catastrophe. If the Great Powers came in, no doubt the 
 smaller States would be willing to join. And the practical 
 question woiild then be, not who should be admitted, but 
 who, if any, should be excluded. The only tests to apply 
 here would be that of capacity for deliberative action and 
 that of public honesty. The representatives of no State 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 171 
 
 must be purchasable. What States might be legitimately 
 excluded by such tests as these it will be a difficult and 
 invidious task to determine. It is superfluous and would, 
 indeed, be pedantic to attempt it here. But it must be 
 remarked that a League from which all small States, as 
 such, should be excluded would be viewed by those States 
 with great suspicion. For it might well look like a League 
 for disposing unjustly of their interests. On the other 
 hand, it is certain that in any League that might be formed 
 the great States would predominate. The small States 
 would have perforce to be content with the right to repre- 
 sent their views fairly and effectively. 
 
 Assuming the formation of a League of States for the 
 general purpose of guaranteeing international order, how 
 are the objects of such a League to be defined? For they 
 must be defined, and strictly: since we are contemplating 
 an alliance not for any and every purpose the States may 
 conceive to conduce to their interests, but for the guarantee 
 of Right according to some clear rule. For this purpose 
 the pursuit of " righteousness," as suggested by Mr. Roose- 
 velt, is far too vague a formula. The " righteousness " of 
 States is too often that of the wolf to the lamb; and a 
 League with such a roving commission would be a public 
 menace to any State not of it, and constantly at dispute 
 within itself as to what is righteous and what not. Let 
 us proceed, then, to examine the possible functions of such 
 a League, starting with the essential minimum. 
 
 This minimum would seem to be the keeping of the 
 peace. That is the primary function of all government 
 and the one earliest established. If there were a single 
 World-State and a single police force, the peace would, 
 of course, be kept by its government so long as the State 
 subsisted. In a world of independent States the keeping of 
 the peace can only be based on treaty. And such a treaty 
 
172 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 may be more or less drastic. The very least obligation 
 it could impose, if the purpose were to be at all attained, 
 would be an obligation to refer disputes to peaceable settle- 
 ment in the first instance, leaving open an ultimate resort 
 to force. Such an arrangement as this may be called the 
 " minimum." For it is the very smallest measure of inter- 
 national organization that could achieve anything. It has 
 already been adopted in a series of treaties drawn up be- 
 tween the United States and other countries. These treaties 
 are bilateral, that is, each is contracted between the United 
 States and one other State. And the essence of them is 
 that all disputes between the contracting parties which 
 diplomacy has been unable to settle should be referred to 
 a permanent Commission for inquiry and report, the parties 
 to abstain meantime from all military action.^ Our pro- 
 posal, so far, would be a generalization of such an agree- 
 ment, all the States jointly binding themselves in that 
 sense. 
 
 Such an agreement, it will be observed, leaves it open 
 to the contracting States to have recourse to hostilities after 
 the Commission has made its report, in the case that either 
 or both of them cannot accept the recommendations that 
 may be olifered nor come to an understanding on the basis 
 of the facts ascertained. 
 
 For the moment I purposely leave aside the question 
 whether any sanction, or what, can be put behind such 
 an agreement. Let us suppose that, either because of a 
 sanction or in the absence of one, the agreement is observed, 
 and the dispute referred for peaceable settlement. What 
 about the interval during which the Commission of inquiry 
 is examining the issue? — an interval which may extend, 
 say, to a year. The case may clearly arise in which a State 
 contemplates making war at the end of the period, in the 
 
 ^ See Notes to this chapter. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 173 
 
 belief that no satisfactory modus vivendi can or will be 
 devised. Such a State might at once begin preparing for 
 war, and by doing so cause its opponents to do the same. A 
 very dangerous situation would at once be created, and one 
 which might precipitate war even before the period of delay 
 is exhausted. It seems evident, therefore, that the agree- 
 ment should contain a clause prohibiting not only war but 
 " preparation for war " during the period prescribed. That 
 " preparation for war " is a term needing much difficult defi- 
 nition is obvious. Increase of armaments beyond what 
 existed, or were in preparation, before the crisis arose, must 
 of course be regarded as a breach of the treaty. And the 
 proof of this breach would be facilitated if there existed an 
 international agreement defining the extent of armaments to 
 be maintained by the respective States. Further, "mobi- 
 lization" must be defined and must be prohibited during 
 the prescribed period of delay. A further point arises in 
 connexion with the interval during which the Court is 
 hearing the case or the Council considering it. There must 
 not be, during this interval, a continuance of the act that 
 is the cause of the dispute. This means that the Court 
 or the Council, or both, must have the power of injunction. 
 And if a sanction is to be applied (a point to be discussed 
 presently), there must be a sanction against breach of the 
 injunction. 
 
 The case, then, we will assume, has been heard and the 
 decision given, or the recommendation made, by the inter- 
 national authority. It is then, according to the " mini- 
 mum " plan I am examining, open to the States concerned 
 either to accept the solution thus offered, in which case the 
 matter is ended; or to agree by diplomatic procedure on 
 some modification of what the international authority has 
 proposed or decided; or, failing either of these, to seek a 
 way out by war. But this last step, though it might be 
 
174 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 taken without breach of treaty or formal penalty, would 
 surely be taken with reluctance and hesitation. For a State 
 making war in defiance of the decision of an international 
 authority would have put itself very wrong with public 
 opinion. It would be unlikely to find allies. It should, in- 
 deed, be a provision of the general treaty that obligations 
 incurred under any special treaties of alliance that may 
 continue to exist should cease in a case where public law 
 is being defied.^ And though the other Powers would not 
 be bound to intervene by force, they would be not unlikely 
 to do so. We may say then, on the whole, that recourse 
 to war in defiance of the international authority, though 
 permissible, would be very hazardous and not lightly 
 attempted. 
 
 But it may be suggested, at this point, why not go 
 further? Why should not the treaty include an obligation 
 to abide by the international decision ? 
 
 In dealing with this question we must advert to an 
 important distinction. There are two kinds of interna- 
 tional disputes. One comprises those that are sometimes 
 called " justiciable." They have been defined thus : — 
 
 " Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to 
 any question of international law, as to the existence of any 
 fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any 
 international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of 
 the reparation to be made for any such breach." ^ 
 
 Such cases are capable of reference to a purely judicial 
 tribunal and of solution by judicial principles; and there is 
 force in the view that every State ought to bind itself to give 
 effect to the decisions of such a tribunal, just as every suitor 
 
 lAs in the scheme of the British group; see clause i8. 
 
 2 This is the definition of the British group. A more elaborate 
 definition will be found in the Fabian scheme. The decision as to 
 whether a case is justiciable or no might be left to the Court, or to 
 whatever other body the contracting States might agree upon. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 175 
 
 is bound to submit to the decisions of his national courts. 
 The English " League of Nations Society " takes that view 
 and embodies it in its program. So do the proposals of 
 the British group. The question is really how far States 
 and peoples will be ready to go. It may perhaps be appre- 
 hended that they will be unwilling to bind themselves before- 
 hand to anything the consequences of which they cannot 
 more or less foresee. They will ask whether the court 
 might not condemn them to some course of action they 
 would regard as detrimental to their " vital interests." 
 This, it is true, is not a very admirable attitude. If, for 
 instance, the question were one of the interpretation of a 
 treaty, say a boundary treaty, a State refusing to accept the 
 decision of a competent court because it would thereby be 
 excluded from the ownership of valuable mineral deposits 
 would be morally in a very discreditable position. Unfor- 
 tunately, States have been in the habit of accepting such 
 discreditable positions and brazening it out. That they 
 should cease to do so is essential to the maintenance of peace 
 and order. But perhaps they will not do so beforehand by 
 a general act of renunciation. Americans, for instance, put 
 the case, that the decision of a court might and probably 
 would ratify a sale to another European Power of one 
 of the Danish West Indian Islands, and that such a sale 
 would be contrary to the " vital interests " embodied in the 
 Monroe doctrine. It is difficult to foresee all possible cases 
 of the kind ; and the more difficult because treaties are apt 
 to be vague in their terms — purposely, one is sometimes 
 tempted to think — and because the principles of inter- 
 national law are also vague and there is little case-law to 
 give it certainty and coherence. There may therefore be 
 more reason than at first sight appears in the hesitation of 
 a State to bind itself beforehand to accept the decision of a 
 tribunal in justiciable cases. It is true that, up to the pres- 
 
176 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 ent, no State has refused to accept the award of a Tribunal 
 of arbitration. But then most States have abstained from 
 binding themselves to arbitrate any and every justiciable 
 issue. ^ And that is what the treaty we are contemplating 
 would bind them to do. On the other hand, it may be 
 urged with force that if the decision of a Court should sup- 
 port a State in some action which the other party held to be 
 contrary to its vital interests, the issue would pass into the 
 other class of " non- justiciable " disputes and be dealt with 
 by the method now to be referred to. There would thus 
 still be a procedure of relief for the party aggrieved, even 
 if it lost its case in the Court. 
 
 It is this other class of non- justiciable cases that causes 
 most of the trouble ; cases, that is, of sheer conflict of inter- 
 est where no legal issue is involved. These are not capable 
 of judicial decision, for they do not turn on points of law. 
 They are purely political, and hitherto have been capable of 
 no solution except that of diplomacy or of arms. Two 
 points arise here. To what body should they be submitted? 
 And should the States bind themselves to accept the de- 
 cisions of that body ? 
 
 As to the first point, the most conservative suggestion 
 put forward is that of Dr. Lawrence,^ that the Concert 
 of the Powers (we must not say of Europe, for we hope 
 non-European States may be included) should be the Body 
 to which such disputes should be referred. This is prob- 
 ably the course diplomatists and statesmen would suggest. 
 It leaves the power in their hands and involves the least 
 possible change in the existing order. But it is open to 
 certain obvious objections. The Concert, hitherto, has been 
 a body of statesmen assembled to measure the existing 
 
 ^ They have commonly (though not always) excluded cases touching 
 their independence, honour, or vital interests. 
 2 See the Rapports de V Organisation Centrale. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 177 
 
 forces, to balance national egotisms, and to see whether, 
 this time, war is worth while or not, or whether it can be 
 postponed by some kind of temporary compromise. It is 
 a body meeting in secret. It does not publish reports of 
 its proceedings. At most, it records its decisions in proto- 
 cols and treaties. It is thus removed from all possibility of 
 popular control and from quick response to currents of 
 opinion that may be running strong in the nations. The 
 Concert no doubt has done good service on occasions. It 
 has marked a step towards international organization. But 
 we ought to be able to go a good step farther. 
 
 A more radical suggestion has been put forward by the 
 British group, and is implied in the phrase " Council of 
 Conciliation " employed by the American " League to En- 
 force Peace " and the English " League of Nations 
 Society." The proposal is that the nations who are parties 
 to the treaty should appoint a Council to investigate, and 
 make reports and recommendations on, any " non- jus- 
 ticiable" dispute which diplomacy has not been able to 
 settle. Since this Council is not to have any executive 
 powers, and its recommendations are not to be binding on 
 the governments, it should be made as independent of these 
 as possible. Thus, the appointments should be for fixed 
 periods of time, and should be subject to a veto by the 
 legislature. Nor should they be made simply from the 
 diplomatic class, but should include representatives of the 
 great social forces and interests. In particular, labour 
 should be represented. Such a Council, composed of mem- 
 bers not acting under the instructions of their govern- 
 ments, and not appointed to represent a particular view on 
 the issue in question, should be able to develop, by con- 
 tact, the " international mind," and to offer suggestions 
 prompted by a genuine desire to further the united interests 
 of civilization, instead of voicing merely a compromise be- 
 
1T8 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 tween conflicting national ambitions. The procedure of 
 such a body would have, of course, to be worked out in 
 detail ; and there would have to be a rule as to the number 
 of members to be assigned to each State, whether it should 
 be the same for each, or whether account should be taken 
 of relative size and power. It should be observed, however, 
 that this latter question has not the same importance for 
 an advisory body that it would have for an executive. 
 
 The Council should have power to call upon the parties to 
 appear before it, and to give decision in default if any party 
 refused to appear. If it could settle the issue by private 
 conferences, well and good. But if this failed, then the 
 essential point is, that it should publish its report on the 
 whole issue, and its recommendations, with a reasoned de- 
 fence of them, and thus appeal to the public opinion of 
 the world to support a peaceful settlement, worked out by 
 an impartial body, rather than to have recourse to the 
 hazardous arbitrament of war. In many cases it may 
 reasonably be hoped the appeal would be successful. If 
 it were not, then all the proposals to which we have re- 
 ferred leave open resort to war ; ^ they do not, that is to 
 say, put the contracting States under treaty obligations to 
 oppose with their joint forces a State making war in de- 
 fiance of the recommendations of the Council. The pro- 
 posals of the British group provide that, in this case, the 
 States shall meet in concert and consider whether they shall 
 take action and what the action shall be. 
 
 But now, it may be asked, why not bind the States before- 
 hand to accept the recommendations of the Council? The 
 question can only be met by another. Would the nations 
 agree so to bind themselves? The cases to be referred to 
 the Council will include all those which are most apt to 
 
 1 At any rate, in most cases. For details, see the schemes, and also 
 Notes to this chapter. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 179 
 
 cause wars — those, that is, where " vital interests " or 
 " honour " are involved. Will the nations consent before- 
 hand to accept in such matters the decision of an inter- 
 national body? Perhaps the time is coming When they 
 will. But the proposals we are considering assume that 
 the time is not yet. 
 
 The proposal, then, at which we have arrived so far is 
 as follows : an international agreement to which all civilized 
 States shall be admitted, to refer to peaceable settlement 
 all disputes that they have failed to settle by diplomacy; 
 the reference to be either, if the disputes are " justiciable," 
 to an international Tribunal, or, if they are non-justiciable, 
 to a Council of Conciliation. We have noted further that 
 it may be held with some reason that the contracting States 
 should bind themselves also to give effect to the judgment 
 of the Tribunal; but that it does not seem reasonable to 
 ask them, at' the present stage, to bind themselves to give 
 effect to the recommendations of the Council. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 172. — The American Treaties. 
 
 The following are the essential clauses of the Anglo-American 
 Treaty of September 15, 1914: — 
 
 " The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between 
 them, of every nature whatsoever, other than disputes the settle- 
 ment of which is provided for and, in fact, achieved under existing 
 agreements between the High Contracting Parties, shall, when 
 diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for 
 investigation and report to a Permanent International Commission 
 to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding 
 article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities 
 during such investigation and before the report is published. 
 
 " The International Commission shall be composed of five mem- 
 bers, to be appointed as follows : — 
 
 " One member shall be chosen from each country by the 
 Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Gov- 
 
180 THE CHOICE BEFOKE US 
 
 ernment from some third country; the fifth member shall be 
 chosen by common agreement between the two Governments, it 
 being understood that he shall not be a citizen of either country." 
 The other treaties (there are now twenty-nine) follow the same 
 general lines. 
 
 Page 174. — The Court of International Justice. 
 
 The present Hague Tribunal ("Permanent Court of Arbitra- 
 tion ") is not really a permanent Court. The arrangement is that 
 each of the States that have acceded to the Convention nominates 
 four judges who must be " of known competency in questions of 
 international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to 
 accept the duties of arbitrators." The appointment is for six years. 
 When a dispute arises, the parties appoint the judges from this 
 panel. Failing some other arrangement made between the parties, 
 the procedure laid down is that each party nominates two judges 
 to form the tribunal, and these appoint an umpire. If the judges 
 cannot agree upon the umpire, the choice is handed over to a third 
 Power, agreed upon by the States that are parties to the dispute. 
 Or, if they cannot agree upon such a Power, each selects one 
 Power, and these two Powers make the appointment. There is 
 also an alternative arrangement for " summary procedure." 
 
 An arrangement of this kind shows that, as things are. States 
 have regarded their own nominees as likely to favour their own 
 side and the nominees of the other party as likely to favour its 
 side. In other words, impartiality is hardly expected, and perhaps 
 is not commonly desired. The effect is, that the decision will often 
 rest with the umpire. So that really the tendency of the arrange- 
 ment is to leave the dispute to be decided by one man, without 
 appeal. As an American writer puts it, " The result is almost 
 inevitable that, in a close case, each nation has an equal number of 
 advocates and there is but one real judge in the court, the umpire, 
 who has been selected by the other judges." He comments, " It 
 would be unsatisfactory for private individuals to submit trifling 
 disputes of their own to the decision of one man, especially if they 
 did not know in advance who he would be, and with the under- 
 standing that there would be no appeal ; it is very doubtful whether 
 many individuals would agree to submit all their disputes to such 
 a person." 1 
 
 It may be remarked on this that, in fact, important disputes 
 
 ^ T. R. White in the Recueil des Rapports de V Organisation Centrale 
 pour une Paix durable, tom. i. p. 311. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 181 
 
 between capital and labour are submitted to such a tribunal. Still 
 the procedure is plainly unsatisfactory. And the nature of the 
 court may be one of the reasons that have deterred nations from 
 submitting important disputes to arbitration. 
 
 Clearly, however, the main reason is that most important dis- 
 putes are not " justiciable " ; and that nations are naturally unwill- 
 ing to accept beforehand a decision given by people whose impar- 
 tiality they do not trust on matters which they consider to be of 
 vital importance to them, and as to which there are no recognized 
 principles of law that are applicable. The transference of all such 
 cases to a different body, with a different procedure (the proposed 
 " Council of Conciliation ") would open the way to improving the 
 constitution of the court, which would then become truly a court of 
 justice administering law. The improvement in question would 
 naturally aim at a permanent court of impartial judges. The insti- 
 tution of such a court was, in fact, part of the labours of the 
 Hague Conference of 1907. The immediate difficulty was the 
 method of appointing the judges. In the case of national judges, 
 there is a national Executive to whom that function can be, and 
 usually is, entrusted. But there is no international Executive. It 
 is interesting to note that the same problem arose when the Consti- 
 tution of the United States was being discussed. It was proposed 
 in the Convention that the judges who were to decide disputes 
 between the States of the proposed Union should be appointed by 
 the States. But this idea was abandoned and the appointment 
 entrusted to the President. In our case, however, there is no 
 President, and the Hague Conference could only fall back on 
 appointment by the States. But then there were forty-four States, 
 and a court of forty-four was too big. Finally, a very elaborate 
 scheme was devised, whereby a court of fifteen permanent judges 
 would be set up, of whom each of the Great Powers would always 
 appoint one, while the other States would divide the rest among 
 them according to an elaborate system of rotation. This scheme, 
 however, failed to secure the assent of the smaller States, and 
 remains a project. Various other attempts have been made to 
 solve the problem. An account of some of them will be found in 
 the Proceedings of the American Society for the Judicial Settle- 
 ment of International Disputes (1912).'- Among recent sugges- 
 tions the following may be referred to : — 
 
 1 Washington, D. C. 
 
182 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 The Fabian scheme proposes that each State that is a party to 
 the treaty shall nominate one candidate; that the International 
 Council which they propose shall be created shall select from these 
 the fifteen judges, who shall comprise the eight candidates selected 
 by the Great Powers, the remaining seven being balloted for from 
 among the remaining candidates.^ 
 
 The Dutch scheme ^ would retain the existing " panel " system, 
 whereby the tribunal for any particular issue is selected from among 
 judges previously appointed by the States. But in this project, 
 instead of the judges for a given issue being nominated for the 
 occasion by the parties concerned, the court would be made up of 
 the two judges originally nominated (for a fixed period of years) by 
 the States that are parties in the case, or, in case they be more than 
 two, by the two senior of such nominees, and of a President agreed 
 upon by the States that are parties, or, failing their agreement, 
 nominated by the Presidential Bureau of the full court. 
 
 Mr. T. R. White ' suggests that each nation shall nominate one 
 judge and one deputy judge; that the Hague Conference shall 
 confirm or reject the nominations; that if the number of candidates 
 confirmed shall exceed seventeen, the Conference shall by ballot 
 elect an " appellate division " of the court, consisting of not less 
 than nine or more than fifteen judges; and that this division, 
 besides its appellate jurisdiction, shall also have original juris- 
 diction of disputes between sovereign States. The appellate di- 
 vision shall divide the remaining judges into divisions of not less 
 than five judges, who shall have jurisdiction in all suits by a 
 citizen of one nation against another nation, and of such dis- 
 putes between sovereign Powers as may be submitted to them by 
 treaty. 
 
 Once the functions of the Court were explicitly limited to 
 " justiciable " cases, it seems probable that the difficulties of appoint- 
 ing the judges would be solved in some way or other. 
 
 But there is a further point of difficulty. 
 
 By the treaty proposed. States would agree to submit to the 
 Court all " justiciable " cases, without excepting cases dealing with 
 " independence, honour, and vital interests." The questions, there- 
 
 1 See clause 12 of the scheme. 
 
 ^Recueil des Rapports de I' Organisation Centrale pour une Paix 
 durable, torn. i. p. 241. 
 3 Ibid. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 183 
 
 fore, of what cases are to be held "justiciable" becomes one of 
 the first importance. 
 
 It may be presumed that the treaty would contain a general 
 definition of "justiciable" cases.^ But it might often be matter 
 of doubt and dispute whether any particular case fell under the 
 definition. And the matter would be the more important if States 
 had bound themselves to abide by the judgment of the Court. 
 States may therefore be expected to consider this point with some 
 anxiety. The scheme of the British group, and also the Fabian 
 scheme, would leave the question whether the case be " justiciable " 
 or no to the Court ; which seems to be reasonable, since the question 
 is a judicial one. On the other hand, it is objected that this would 
 give too much power to the Court, which would tend to draw all 
 cases into its jurisdiction. This objection has been taken, for ex- 
 ample, by Mr. Elihu Root. To meet the not unreasonable suscepti- 
 bilities of States, in the early stages of a new arrangement, various 
 devices have been suggested. Thus, the Fabian scheme suggests 
 that an appeal might lie to the International Council in the case of 
 a dispute adjudged by the Court to be justiciable, whereby either 
 party might ask that a treaty under which the case falls shall be 
 abrogated, or the law modified or further defined (see clauses i6a, 
 i6&). By the Dutch scheme the States are permitted the alter- 
 native of bringing their dispute before the Council of Conciliation, 
 except in certain defined cases. (See section 3 of the Expose des 
 motifs of this scheme.) 
 
 Page 177. — The Council of Conciliation. 
 
 There is a pretty general agreement, among those who have put 
 forward proposals for international organization, that a Council 
 should be created whose function should be to inquire into and 
 make recommendations upon " non-justiciable " disputes. Natu- 
 rally many points of difficulty arise as to the appointment of the 
 members of such a Council, their relation to their governments, 
 and the organization of the procedure. One or two of the more 
 important points may be touched upon here. 
 
 I. In the first place, if (as proposed in the text) the Council 
 is only to inquire and recommend, and neither has itself executive 
 power nor can engage governments to use their executive power, 
 
 iSee the draft of the British group, clause 4; the Fabian scheme, 
 clause 14; the Dutch scheme, art. 16, 
 
184. THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 or to act on its recommendations, its members need not be and, 
 in my judgment, should not be mere agents of their governments, 
 acting under instructions. The Council should be a permanent 
 body; that is, its members should be appointed for a fixed period 
 of years, not ad hoc for a particular issue, as to which they may 
 be supposed to take a particular view agreeable to their government ; 
 and they should deliberate freely and decide freely. Only so could 
 the Council be expected to acquire an international mind and to 
 arrive at conclusions which should not be a mere temporary com- 
 promise between competing national ambitions and claims, but 
 should rest on a principle of equity and a desire to find a permanent 
 solution favourable to the general interests of civilization. 
 
 2. As to the method of appointment, the States who were parties 
 to the agreement would appoint each so many members. And 
 it must be left to each State to decide how it will appoint. In 
 autocratic States, the appointment would naturally be by the gov- 
 ernments. Democratic States might try other and more popular 
 methods. At the very least, they might give a veto to their repre- 
 sentative organ upon the nomination by governments, with a view 
 to securing the appointment of people likely to be in sympathy 
 with popular aspirations. A Council recruited from among diplo- 
 mats of the old school and tradition could hardly be expected to 
 operate in the spirit of a new internationalism. If a State had the 
 right to appoint several members, as would probably be desirable, 
 it could select, as well as an international statesman, representatives 
 of those great interests that are commonly ignored in international 
 afifairs, especially a representative of Labour. It should be recog- 
 nized that international questions do not constitute the subject of 
 a " science," to be handled onjy by experts in that science ; but are 
 to a great extent questions of common sense and decent feeling. 
 On the other hand, experience in dealing with men and a competent 
 knowledge of international history and relations would be requisite. 
 
 3. Ought each nation to have equality of representation? Or 
 should representation be proportional to actual power? This 
 question would be one of the first importance, if we were con- 
 stituting an international Legislature with authority to bind the 
 States. It is of subordinate importance for an advisory body, 
 which can neither take action itself nor impose it on governments, 
 and the members of which ought not to vote, as a mere matter 
 of course, in the interest of their own State. Probably, for such 
 a Council, equality of votes might be accepted; or some rather 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 185 
 
 simple compromise might be adopted, such as that which would 
 give three members to each of the Great Powers and one to each 
 of the others. (See the Dutch scheme, art. 109.) An attempt to 
 find out a satisfactory basis of apportionment, taking account of 
 all the positive factors in which States differ in importance — e.g. 
 wealth, population, and military or naval power — would meet 
 with difficulties which might be insuperable at an early stage in 
 international organization. The problem, however, was tackled by 
 the Hague Conference, and with success, in drafting a constitution 
 for the International Prize Court, and also in planning a Court 
 of International Justice, though in the latter case the scheme de- 
 vised failed to secure general agreement. All these difficulties will 
 be superable as soon as people want to solve them. But probably, 
 in the constitution of the Council of Conciliation, this one could be 
 evaded, for the reasons given. An interesting attempt to solve 
 the problem, and a full discussion of it, will be found in the Fabian 
 scheme (see note to art. 7 thereof). 
 
 4. If, as would probably be advisable, each State, or some of 
 the States, appointed several members, we have to contemplate a 
 Council of, say, a hundred members. Such a large body would have 
 to work mainly through committees. The Dutch scheme works 
 out a possible procedure as follows: When a dispute arises be- 
 tween States, and is referred to the Council, it will go before a 
 committee composed of the two members already appointed as 
 permanent members of the Council by each of the States that 
 are parties to the dispute or (if each has more than two members) 
 by the two senior members so appointed. So far, the committee is 
 formed automatically. The President is to be appointed by agree- 
 ment between the States concerned, or, in case they fail to agree 
 within a month, by the Presidential Bureau of the Council. The 
 committee will come to its decisions by majority vote, but the 
 majority must contain at least one representative of each of the 
 States concerned. A decision thus arrived at is binding on the 
 parties. If the committee fails to arrive in this way at an agree- 
 ment, the matter will be referred back to the whole Council. The 
 Council will then adopt a recommendation, which, however, will 
 not be binding on the States. 
 
 This ingenious project, then, makes it possible for the Council 
 (through the committee) to give an obligatory decision, but only 
 if at least one of the representatives of each of the States at issue 
 
186 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 concur.- Otherwise, the whole Council can proceed (presumably 
 on the report of a committee) to make a non-binding recommenda- 
 tion. 
 
 It may be noted here that there are two distinct functions which 
 may be attributed to the Council : ( i ) to mediate and effect a com- 
 promise between disputants; (2) to make a full inquiry and offer a 
 scheme of radical settlement on some principle which may later be 
 used in dealing with analogous cases ; as, for example, in a question 
 of the " Open Door," or of the rights of nationalities. Which of 
 these procedures may be required will depend, of course, on the 
 particular case. But it has been suggested that they could not be 
 appropriately entrusted to the same Body. I am not convinced by 
 this argument, which will be found ably set forth in War and 
 Peace for March 1917. This number contains an examination of 
 the various problems involved in the machinery of a League of 
 Nations under the title " The Framework of Peace." 
 
 I have adverted to these points to show that those who have 
 concerned themselves with this idea have not shirked the labour 
 of working out details. At the same time, it must be recognized 
 that it may be pedantic to do much in this direction, before we 
 have any guarantee that the general idea will secure acceptance. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE QUESTION OF A SANCTION TO THE 
 TREATY 
 
 I PASS on to the question which no doubt has long been in 
 the reader's mind. Will this treaty be a mere " scrap of 
 paper " ? Or can we, and should we, put a sanction behind 
 it? 
 
 This question is closely connected with another. Will 
 the nations after the war continue to arm? It will seem 
 to many readers rather naive even to ask such a question. 
 But there are some who believe that, if civilization is to be 
 saved, the nations must disarm, and that economic exhaus- 
 tion, if nothing else, will compel them to do so. Thus we 
 read in an article in the Nineteenth Century: " That some- 
 thing in the nature of a general disarmament should take 
 place after the war is not merely desirable : it is absolutely 
 necessary, in order to permit of the financial recupera- 
 tion of the world." ^ 
 
 Who wrote that sentence? " A pacifist, of course." Not 
 at all! None other than Lord Cromer! Let those mili- 
 tarists who desire to pour contelmpt on the idea seek out 
 the proconsul, not the pacifist! If there were in Europe 
 statesmen of genius who understood and cared about what 
 is important for mankind ; if there were among the peoples 
 a profound revulsion from war, accompanied by a compre- 
 hension of its causes ; then a general all-round disarmament 
 would appear to be an obvious piece of common sense. 
 Not that disarmament would be an infallible safeguard 
 
 '^Nineteenth Century, July 1916, p. 31. 
 187 
 
188 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 against war; for there might still arise between nations dis- 
 putes which they could not, or would not, adjust peace- 
 ably, and they might then begin once more to create and 
 equip armies — as happened, for example, in the case of the 
 American Civil War. Still, as we have sufficiently shown, 
 the existence of armaments is a principal cause of war; 
 just as in civil life there would be more quarrels, as well as 
 more deadly ones, if every one carried a sword or a pistol. 
 The project of disarmament is not absurd. On the con- 
 trary, it is the most simple, direct, and natural means to 
 that prevention of war which so many people profess to 
 have in view. Nor is it necessarily impracticable. Given a 
 lead by an imaginative statesman, and organized support by 
 the Press, the Churches, and the moral and intellectual 
 forces of all countries, and the thing would be done. It 
 is therefore worth while to consider more closely what is 
 meant by disarmament. 
 
 Is it meant that no public force at all would be main- 
 tained ? Not necessarily, and not probably. A police force 
 is, after all, an armed force ; and police forces are approved 
 by all except those who think, with Tolstoi, that no force of 
 any kind should ever be used. Further, on the frontiers 
 of ordered States, a force analogous to a police force would 
 be required as a protection against uncivilized tribes living 
 in a state of chronic war. This would be the case, for 
 example, on the fr6ntiers of Egypt, or Algeria, or India. 
 What disarmament means is the scrapping of the enormous 
 and constantly increasing forces which civilized nations 
 maintain with a view to war against one another. 
 
 But next, in the event of disarmament, so interpreted, 
 would it be necessary, or possible, to create a common 
 force, supplied and controlled by all the nations jointly, 
 to overawe any one of their number who might commit 
 an offence against public international law and treaties? 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 189 
 
 For we must not, of course, assume that, because there are 
 no armies, there will be no offences. Such an international 
 force would be the equivalent of the national police force, 
 and its object would be solely to maintain public law. It 
 must, however, be admitted that the creation and organi- 
 zation of such a force would be very difficult, because we 
 are not dealing with a World-State, but with a number of 
 independent States endeavouring to organize their mutual 
 relations. And perhaps an international force would be 
 too difficult to organize until these States have acquired 
 the habit of acting together politically. I leave the matter 
 there, because the question of an international force, entirely 
 under international control, and not at all under national, 
 will not come over the horizon of serious discussion unless 
 and until the nations have agreed to scrap their national 
 armaments. And I do not wish to put too great a strain 
 upon the reader's imagination. 
 
 I will now proceed to what appears to me the more 
 likely alternative. The nations, we will suppose, will not 
 disarm, though they may and should reduce their arma- 
 ments by agreement. I return to that point later. The 
 nations remain armed. Then comes the question, ought 
 they to agree to support by their national armaments the 
 treaty which we are advocating? 
 
 On this point there is difference of opinion. The Amer- 
 ican "League to Enforce Peace," which has on this point 
 the support of the Allied Governments as well as that of 
 President Wilson,^ proposes that the States entering into 
 the treaty should use their national forces jointly against 
 any member of the League that should have recourse to 
 arms before referring the dispute to the machinery of arbi- 
 tration and conciliation. The clause in the American pro- 
 gram is very drastic : — 
 
 1 See the quotations at the beginning of this Part. 
 
190 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their eco- 
 nomic and military forces against any one of their number that 
 goes to war or commits acts of hostiUty against another of the 
 signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as pro- 
 vided in the foregoing. 
 
 The " League of Nations Society " would further bind the 
 signatories to use force against a State, not a member of 
 the League, that should attack a member without first re- 
 ferring the dispute to arbitration or conciliation. The pro- 
 ject of the British group adopts the same position. 
 
 The arguments in favour of this course are fairly obvious. 
 The first objection apt to be taken to such a treaty as we 
 are proposing is that it would not be observed. Well, here 
 is the sanction : " Observe the treaty, or face the world 
 in arms." Those who believe, as many people seem to do, 
 that Germany would not have made war in 19 14 if she had 
 been sure that England would come in, must believe with 
 even more conviction that she would not have made it had 
 all other States been under treaty obligation to fight her if 
 she did. As political reasoning goes (of all reasoning the 
 most hazardous) , this conclusion seems beyond dispute. Of 
 course, it may always be urged by the sceptical that a State 
 desiring to make aggressive war might intrigue with mem- 
 bers of the League, making sure beforehand that some, 
 perhaps the chief of them, would, in fact, not fulfil their 
 treaty obligations, and might then risk war with comparative 
 security. And, no doubt, this is possible. It would mean 
 that the treaty had broken down. But is that a reason for 
 not entering into the treaty? If it be, then the same reason 
 holds against any and every treaty, including, for instance, 
 such as may be entered into after the war to guarantee 
 the security of small States. If our treaty broke down, we 
 should be back in the international anarchy. But the pos- 
 sibility of failure can be no reason for not making the 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 191 
 
 attempt. I suggest, then, that a treaty with this sanction 
 behind it has at least a very good chance of being observed. 
 
 On the other hand, strong objections are taken to the 
 imposition of a sanction. They are taken, in the first place, 
 by those who think that all and every use of force is wrong. 
 I do not here argue against that view, which perhaps lies 
 beyond argument. I take, myself, the common view, that 
 the employment of force is legitimate when the force is 
 used against a law-breaker. 
 
 "But there are also objections of a less radical kind. They 
 will be found ably set forth in a pamphlet by Mr. Ponsonby 
 entitled The Basis of International Authority} He argues 
 first that the obligation to support the treaty by arma- 
 ments would furnish a motive to States for continuing 
 armed. This is true. And if armaments can be abolished, 
 I certainly should not argue for their maintenance merely 
 in order to provide a sanction for our treaty. For the 
 sanction, if required, might be provided, in that case, by 
 an international force. On the other hand, if national 
 armaments are to be maintained (which is my present as- 
 sumption, and also Mr. Ponsonby's), then national arma- 
 ments constitute a clear temptation to a State to attack 
 another State, in defiance of the agreement; and it seems 
 necessary to provide against this contingency. Secondly, 
 Mr. Ponsonby thinks that States will be less ready to enter 
 into the agreement if it involves the eventual use of force. 
 But the Allied Governments, as well as President Wilson, 
 have now given their support to the scheme that proposes 
 the sanction,^ so that this objection falls. 
 
 Thirdly, Mr. Ponsonby argues that " a serious and dan- 
 gerous dispute between nations will now become a world 
 
 1 Published by the League of Peace and Freedom, i8o St. Stephen's 
 House, Westminster. 
 *See the quotations at the beginning of this Part. 
 
192 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 war, not possibly, but certainly." But this is hardly ac- 
 curate. A world war could only arise, as a result of the 
 treaty, if one State made war on another in breach of- the 
 agreement. And, as I have already argued, this contingency 
 is not likely to occur, unless the agreement has already been 
 undermined in preparation for a world war. Small quar- 
 rels between small States would certainly be obviated by the 
 mere threat of armed intervention by the Great Powers; 
 and a single Great Power, acting alone, or even a combina- 
 tion of two such, would hardly take the risk of facing the 
 rest in arms. A combination of forces to defy the League 
 equal to those ready to maintain it would no doubt take the 
 risk; but that would imply a state of things pregnant in 
 any case with world war, quite apart from this question of 
 obligation to intervene in support of the treaty. Mr. Pon- 
 sonby's further point, that the small States would be under 
 the tutelage of the great, is no doubt true ; but they are and 
 must be so in any case. Finally, his statement that to put 
 force behind the treaty is to fall back into the fallacy Si vis 
 pacem para bellwm seems to be very questionable. Com- 
 peting national armaments do provoke war. But an agree- 
 ment to use those armaments to enforce resort to peaceable 
 settlement might prevent it. While national armaments 
 subsist, the danger of war subsists. But the danger, I sub- 
 mit, will be diminished, not enhanced, by the arrangement 
 suggested. 
 
 Further, force, when used by the League to support 
 the agreement, will have changed its nature. It will have 
 become, by definition, force to suppress aggression. And 
 the aggressor, for the first time in history, will be clearly 
 defined as a State making war without first having recourse 
 to the international machinery for peaceable settlement. 
 This is a perfectly clear definition.^ And no State making 
 
 lA pamphlet entitled The Community of Nations, published by the 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 193 
 
 war of that kind covdd pretend, even to its own subjects, 
 that it was on its defence against aggression. In other 
 words, from such a State is taken the plea whereby govern- 
 ments always claim the support of their people, that they 
 are waging a " war of defence." Any government would 
 be loath to make war under such circumstances.. But if it 
 did, then the forces used against it would be used, beyond 
 dispute, in the cause of right and law. They would have, 
 therefore, a moral justification which is unique. They 
 could claim to be " righteous " by a quite definite test. 
 When that happens, the nature of force is transformed. 
 It is regrettable to have to employ it. But is it not better 
 to do so than still to have force, but to have it employed 
 only for the purposes of national aggrandizement? Mr. 
 Ponsonby's proposal seems either to leave it open to any 
 nation to make an aggressive attack upon another; or else 
 to rely on the other nations coming in, although they have 
 no agreement to do so. But would not the agreement 
 make the contingency calling for intervention much less 
 likely to arise? 
 
 We have been considering, hitherto, the case where one 
 or more members of the League make or threaten an 
 armed attack on another member, in breach of the agree- 
 ment to refer the dispute to peaceable settlement. Such 
 acts of force can only be met by force; and the sanction, 
 if there is to be one, must therefore be the sanction of 
 arms. But now, should a sanction also be put behind the 
 decisions of the International Court of Justice ? This point 
 I leave doubtful. But if it be decided to constitute a sanc- 
 tion, then perhaps the sanction need not be that of armed 
 force. It would be possible to apply an economic boycott. 
 Such a boycott might involve some, or all, of a whole series 
 
 St. Clement's Press, argues to the contrary. But I do not find the 
 argument cogent. 
 
194 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 of measures : ^ an embargo on the trade of the ofifender, 
 a refusal of loans, an interruption of postal, telegraphic, 
 telephonic and wireless communications, a prohibition of all 
 payments to the recalcitrant State, and of all passenger 
 traffic to or from the same; in short, the whole set of meas- 
 ures which are applied, when possible, in war, except the 
 use of armed force. There can be no doubt that such a 
 weapon, systematically applied by all States against one, 
 would be very powerful, and that the mere threat of it would 
 often bring the offender to reason. It is to be hoped, per- 
 haps expected, that this form of coercion, in lieu of armed 
 force, will be effectively developed in the future. But there 
 are obvious difficulties connected with it, of which the prin- 
 cipal is, that all the States inflicting the penalty must suffer 
 themselves by it. This, it is true, is the case to a greater 
 degree in actual war. But then war, unfortunately, carries 
 with it a condition of emotional excitement which would 
 hardly be aroused by a boycott, and governments attempting 
 to impose the latter would probably be met by strong opposi- 
 tion from all the parties that would suffer economically. 
 Further, although there are some States — notably the 
 United Kingdom — that could be quickly reduced by such 
 measures, there are others, like Russia and the Powers 
 of Central Europe, that are far less vulnerable. Such 
 States, moreover, would probably strike out with armed 
 force against their nearest neighbours; so that, in the case 
 of a strong and determined State, economic pressure would 
 be likely to lead on to armed force. 
 
 These difficulties must be recognized, but they are not 
 conclusive against the policy suggested. And it will pro- 
 bably be agreed that, if a sanction is to be put behind the 
 decisions of the Court, it should be, in the first place, eco- 
 nomic. If, later, the recalcitrant State should meet the 
 
 1 See the Fabian scheme, § 17. 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 195 
 
 boycott by force, the other States must meet force by force. 
 
 The economic sanction could also be the one applied to 
 a breach of an injunction by the Court, or to a refusal to 
 submit a dispute to the Court or the Council. 
 
 A sanction behind the recommendations of the Council 
 of Conciliation has not been suggested in most of the 
 schemes put forward. If such a sanction were contem- 
 plated, it would presumably be, in the first place, economic. 
 
 I turn now to a very difficult and controversial question. 
 We have contemplated as the most likely, though not the 
 most desirable contingency, the continuation of national 
 armaments. We have contemplated also — I might almost 
 say therefore — the contingency of war, if not in breach of 
 the treaty, yet on the failure of pacific settlement. The 
 possibility of war thus remaining, the motive for the rivalry 
 in armaments will remain. Must we not then expect a re- 
 currence of the vicious circle, preparation for war engender- 
 ing war? 
 
 I have no desire to minimize this difficulty. And, for 
 that reason, it seems to me almost essential,^ if the League 
 is to have a reasonable chance of fulfilling its purpose, 
 that the treaty should comprise a clause limiting arma- 
 ments. 
 
 I am well aware of the difficulties in the way. The 
 most obvious is that of proportion. It would be easy to 
 limit or reduce armaments, once the relative military and 
 naval strength of the different Powers had been agreed 
 upon. But if every Power intends to become relatively 
 stronger than it is at the moment, of course all attempts at 
 agreement fail. Thus, the Germans, before the war, refused 
 to limit their naval armaments on the basis of the then 
 measure of British preponderance. And similarly, Russia 
 
 1 See the letter by Sir Edward Fry quoted in the Notes to this 
 chapter. 
 
196 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 no doubt would have refused to accept the then proportion 
 of either her mihtary or naval armaments to those of 
 Germany. Will this difficulty continue to be insuperable? 
 If it does, then it will be because the " will to war " is 
 still so strong and " the will to peace " so weak among 
 the nations, even after this war, that any treaty arrangement 
 of the kind we are contemplating will be impossible. That 
 may be. I am not arguing that there must inevitably be 
 a movement towards peace. I am arguing only that, if 
 there is not, we are faced with the prospect indicated in 
 the first chapter. But if the conditions are such that the 
 treaty is possible, then an agreement about armaments 
 should also be possible. 
 
 Some pressure in that direction will be exercised by the 
 financial situation. I have already quoted ^ Lord Cromer's 
 remark — 
 
 That something in the nature of a general disarmament should 
 take place after the war is not merely desirable; it is absolutely 
 necessary in order to permit of the financial recuperation of the 
 world. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, the war has shown in some, if 
 not all. States unexpected financial strength. And so far 
 as the money is concerned, nations are quite capable of 
 starving every other side of life — education, sanitation, 
 housing, public health, everything that contributes to life, 
 physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, in order to main- 
 tain their armaments. We must rely rather on a change 
 of outlook than on financial pressure. We must rely on a 
 new " will to peace." Granting that, the difficulty that was 
 insuperable in 1899 (largely because nobody really wanted 
 to overcome it) would prove superable now. A proportion 
 would be worked out on the basis of all the relevant factors 
 
 ip. 187. 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 197 
 
 — population, geographical position, trade, and the like — 
 and on that basis a low maximum limit would be fixed for 
 both military and naval armaments. This agreement about 
 armaments would be part of the general treaty, and an 
 infringement of it by any Power would constitute a case 
 for joint action by the League. The agreement would be 
 for a term of years, and, on renewal, would be adjusted 
 to any change in the relevant factors on which it was 
 originally based. After the discussion at the Hague Con- 
 ference of 1899, it will probably be found that the best 
 way to establish the minimum will be to limit the amount 
 to be expended on armaments, military and naval, by each 
 State, leaving the States free to spend the money in detail 
 as they think fit. Of course, this would give a greater 
 relative strength to those who made the best use of their 
 funds. But that is inevitable. No agreement can neutral- 
 ize superior ability. 
 
 It should be noticed that the formation of the League 
 would itself facilitate the agreement about armaments. For, 
 since the contracting States are to contemplate the possi- 
 bility of joint action, they must know what resources each 
 and all have to rely upon. In other words, the arming 
 must be open and aboveboard. Further, the States being 
 guaranteed against sudden aggressive attack, a main motive 
 for continually increasing armaments will be removed. 
 States will come to think of their armaments more and 
 more as a joint police force, less and less as weapons 
 of national aggression, or even national defence. Further, 
 once the competition were arrested — as it would be by an 
 agreement — armaments would serve far less than they have 
 in the past as a provocative of war. We should have turned 
 the corner of our principal difficulty. And here I must 
 return once more to a point made earlier. This happy 
 effect of an agreement to limit armaments could only be 
 
198 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 realized if all the great States were members of the proposed 
 League. Otherwise the League would become a League 
 against the States left out; it, as a whole, would continue 
 to arm competitively against them as a whole; and we 
 should be back in the old vicious circle. 
 
 The reader will not expect me to go further into the 
 highly technical questions involved in an all-round reduc- 
 tion of armaments. These will be solved, if there is a will 
 to solve them, and they can only be solved by experts. I 
 am concerned here only with those moral and political con- 
 siderations to which all technical questions should be sub- 
 ordinate. But there is one point I may be expected to deal 
 with. What about British security at sea? 
 
 I will answer that question briefly, but, I hope, in a way 
 satisfactory to the reader. Any proportion that may be 
 fixed by agreement for reduction of armaments, taking 
 account of all the relevant factors, would leave the British 
 navy preponderant. And I agree that we could not as 
 yet accept any other arrangement. Unless and until it is 
 possible to substitute an international for national forces, 
 that cardinal principle of British policy cannot be aban- 
 doned. So long as the chance of war must be reckoned 
 with, or until there is an international navy, the naval 
 preponderance of this country is essential to us. And I 
 believe that all States, in coming to an agreement about 
 armaments, would recognize that. Similarly, in determining 
 the proportion of German military armaments, her position 
 in Central Europe, with three fronts to defend, must be 
 taken into account. Everything possible must be done, in 
 constructing an agreement about armaments, to avoid laying 
 any one Power at the mercy of another in the event of 
 war. That is the condition of any agreement being reached. 
 
 There is one further point which, though it is mainly 
 technical, has an important political aspect. It is often 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 199 
 
 urged, with force, that one of the causes making for war 
 has been the pressure of the armament firms. The se- 
 crecy in which this matter is involved makes it difficult to 
 deal with. But there are certain notorious facts which de- 
 serve very serious attention. In the first place, the arma- 
 ment firms of all nations are closely knit up into interna- 
 tional trusts, so that the shareholders of each nation profit 
 by the armaments that are being supplied to their enemies. 
 There is something, to say the least, repulsive about this. 
 
 In the second place, the pecuniary interests embodied in 
 the armament firms are created and maintained by war and 
 rumours of war. There is a huge vested interest against 
 peace. To what extent the armament firms actually pro- 
 mote panics and alarms in order to stimulate orders for 
 guns and battleships is a matter on which we are too little 
 informed. But at least one clear case has been revealed,^ 
 and it is but reasonable to suspect others. 
 
 Similarly, the relations between the military and naval 
 departments of governments and the agents of armament 
 firms give rise to much legitimate suspicion. When officials 
 of the Admiralty or the War Office accept high salaries to 
 transfer their services to armament firms (as is the case in 
 this country), it is not unreasonable to suspect that the 
 latter expect to profit by the connexion of their new em- 
 ployes with members of the Government and of the perma- 
 nent official staffs. And in one case at least (that of the 
 scandals in Japan) we have full proof of the bribery of 
 military and naval officers by the representatives of arma- 
 ment firms.^ This whole unsavoury business, wherein hun- 
 dreds and thousands of men and women, some holding 
 high political, military, and naval positions, have a direct 
 pocket interest in that very competition of armaments which 
 is a main root of war, deserves, and should receive after the 
 
 1 See Notes to this chapter. 
 
200 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 war, the fullest publicity. And it may well prove that there 
 are strong political grounds for nationalizing the produc- 
 tion of armaments, and that these grounds outweigh the 
 grounds of technical efficiency which may be advanced in 
 favour of the other plan. I attempt no pronouncement 
 on this subject. But I was unwilling to pass over in silence 
 a matter of such importance. 
 
 Lastly, an agreement to take, in certain contingencies, 
 joint military and naval action will involve, I presume, 
 some kind of international general staflf, and may involve 
 some international body with power to summon the states 
 of the League to make war or to take such measures of 
 commercial boycott as may be suitable to the occasion, 
 I make no attempt to work out these institutions. They 
 will follow from the logic of the arrangement. I will con- 
 tent myself with quoting from Sir Frederick Pollock : — 
 
 All the machinery required to put the power of the League in 
 motion would be an executive council small enough for prompt 
 action and an international general stafif to summon the Powers to 
 give aid as the sheriff summoned the power of the county before 
 there was a standing police, and to direct any necessary operation, 
 whether in the nature of military expedition, blockade, embargo, 
 or otherwise.^ 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Page 189. — An International Force. 
 
 The most obvious diiEculty in the way of an international force 
 is that the contingents supplied by the various nations can hardly be 
 supposed to be willing to serve against their own country; and, in 
 case of coercive action being required, some contingent or other 
 might be called upon to do so. Lord Cromer dwells upon this 
 point in the article referred to in the text (^Nineteenth Century, 
 July 1916, p. 33). But since, in the event of an international force 
 being constituted, national forces would have been reduced to quite 
 
 ^Manchester Guardian, August 1916. 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 201 
 
 negligible proportions, it should be possible for the international 
 force to act effectively without employing the contingent from the 
 offending country, and there might be a provision in the treaty 
 to that effect. Other questions, such as the amount of the con- 
 tingent to be supplied by various nations, the constitution of the 
 general staff, the training and discipline, would present difficulties, 
 but none that would be insuperable, granted a general will to carry 
 out the plan. On the other hand, every difficulty would be insu- 
 perable so long as the present exaggerated sense of national im- 
 portance, and inadequate sense of international obligation, con- 
 tinue to characterize all the great nations. The purely political 
 problems would become capable of solution in proportion as the 
 prehminary moral and intellectual conversion took place. 
 
 Page 193. — The Economic Boycott. 
 
 An interesting paper on the use of the economic sanction will be 
 found in the Recueil des Rapports de V Organisation Centrale pour 
 une Paix durable, tom. ii. An account is there given of the success- 
 ful boycott applied spontaneously by peoples (not Governments) : 
 (i) by the Chinese against America in 1905, as reprisals against the 
 treatment of Chinese immigrants into the United States; (2) by the 
 Chinese against the Japanese in 1908, as reprisals for the high- 
 handed action of Japan in connexion with the arrest by the Chinese 
 authorities of a Japanese ship which was carrying arms (as the 
 Chinese alleged) to Chinese revolutionaries; (3) by the Turks 
 against the Austrians in 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina. The result of this boycott was that Austria-Hun- 
 gary paid fifty-four million francs as indemnity for her seizure 
 of the provinces. Even a boycott by a single nation is thus effec- 
 tive. It is to be noticed, however, that in all these cases the boy- 
 cott was spontaneously imposed by the people of Oriental States. 
 Such action is much less likely, I conceive, in the case of Western 
 States. Thus the Paris resolutions, and all the talk of excluding 
 German trade by tariffs, imply that trade will in fact be resumed 
 with Germany after the war (in spite of the moral excommunica- 
 tion with which she is threatened) unless Governmental'measures 
 are taken to prevent it. 
 
 The Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace have 
 interpreted their third article as follows : — 
 
 " The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith their economic 
 
THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any 
 question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or Council 
 of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by 
 the joint use of their military forces against that nation, if it 
 actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory with- 
 out first submitting or offering to submit its grievance to the Court 
 or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion." 
 
 Page 198. — British Naval Supremacy. 
 
 I have purposely omitted a discussion of the whole question of 
 the " freedom of the seas." I have treated the subject briefly in 
 War and Peace (December 1915), and have there called attention 
 to the position taken up by Lord Grey, both in the Hague Con- 
 ference of 1907 and in his letter to the Press of August 1915, that 
 British concessions on this point would be conditional on counter- 
 concessions from the great military Powers as to reduction of 
 armaments and organization for peace. The question is bound to 
 assume great importance in the immediate future, and to handle it 
 fully would require a separate treatise. It is ably discussed by 
 Mr. Brailsford in A League of Nations. See also War and Peace 
 for April 1917. 
 
 Page 198. — Reduction of Armaments.^ 
 
 In connexion with the possibility of an agreed reduction, it is 
 interesting to note that the Act passed in the United States for an 
 increase of the Navy (1916) contains a clause authorizing the 
 President, on the conclusion of the war, to invite the Powers to 
 confer upon the question of general disarmament and providing 
 that, If the Conference makes real progress towards the limiting of 
 armies and navies, the President shall cancel the naval program 
 in so far as it proves itself to be inconsistent with the decisions 
 arrived at by the Conference. 
 
 The clause is as follows: — 
 
 " Upon the conclusion of the war in Europe, or as soon as it 
 may be done, the President of the United States is authorized to 
 invite all the great Governments of the world to send representa- 
 tives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of sug- 
 gesting an organization, a court of arbitration or other body, to 
 which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for 
 
 1 See also below, p. 205, 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 203 
 
 adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question 
 of disarmament and submit their recommendations to their respec- 
 tive Governments for approval. The President is hereby authorized 
 to appoint nine citizens of the United States, who, in his judgment, 
 shall be qualified for such duty, to be representatives of the United 
 States in such a conference. . . . The President is authorized to fix 
 the compensation of the Commissioners. ... A sum of $200,000 
 is appropriated to carry into effect this provision. . . . 
 
 " If at any time before the appropriations authorized by this Act 
 shall have been contracted for there shall have been established, 
 with the co-operation of the United States of America, an interna- 
 tional tribunal or tribunals, competent to secure peaceful determina- 
 tion of all international disputes, and which shall render unneces- 
 sary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that 
 case such naval expenStures as may be inconsistent with the en- 
 gagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals 
 may be suspended when so ordered by the President of the United 
 States." 
 
 Page 199. — Armament Firms. 
 
 Some of the facts as to the interlocking of armament firms will be 
 found in The War Traders, by G. H. Perris, and in a pamphlet 
 by Mr. J. T. Newbold, The War Trust Exposed, published by the 
 National Labour Press. See also the Recueil des Rapports de 
 V Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, torn. ii. p. 315. 
 The case referred to in the text is the following : The Directors of 
 the Deutsche Waffen und Munitions Fabrik addressed to their 
 agent in Paris the following letter : — 
 
 " I have just telegraphed to you, ' Pray wait at Paris for our let- 
 ter of today.' The reason of this telegram is, that we want you to 
 have inserted in one of the most widely read newspapers in Paris, 
 if possible the Figaro, an article to the following effect : ' The 
 French War Office has decided to accelerate considerably the con- 
 struction of the mitrailleuses destined for the Army and to order 
 twice as many as it had originally intended.' Please do your best 
 to get such an article accepted." 
 
 See Delaisi, " Le Patriotisme des plaques blindees," in La Paix 
 par le Droit, 1913, p. 370. The case is cited in the second volume 
 of the Recueil des Rapports. 
 
 The other case to which I refer is the bribery of Japanese naval 
 and military officers by the representatives of the German firm of 
 
204 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Messrs. Siemens-Schiickert and also by those of Messrs. Vickers 
 and other British armament firms. The facts were brought out 
 in a public trial and reported fully in the Japan Weekly Chronicle 
 of June and July 1914. I have read through these reports, and can 
 therefore speak with some confidence of this particular case. The 
 judgments given in the trial are too long to cite here. But briefly 
 it was proved to the satisfaction of the court that a Japanese naval 
 admiral had received bribes from the British firms of Vickers, 
 Arrol, and Weir, and that the directors and the technical adviser 
 of a Japanese firm acting as agents of Vickers in Japan had bribed 
 naval officers and forged the cheques with which they paid the 
 bribes. It is further interesting that every effort was made by the 
 German Consulate and by the British Embassy in Tokio to prevent 
 the facts from coming to light. 
 
 Armament firms, under the circumstances, can hardly be expected 
 to be very patriotic. At an address given to the British Association 
 in 1916, the President of the Engineering Section is reported to have 
 said (referring to the need that combinations of employers should 
 take a " wide " view of their responsibilities) : — 
 
 "If the armament ring in this country had taken such a view 
 when it was found what an enormous supply of munitions was 
 required, it is doubtful if there would have been such a shortage as 
 there has been. Hundreds of 'firms were willing and anxious to 
 help in the production of munitions, but when they offered their 
 services they were met in many cases with a blank refusal, and in 
 all cases with little encouragement. And when, under pressure 
 from the Government, the ring accepted outside help, in many 
 cases the conditions imposed on the sub-contractors were unfair 
 in the extreme, the whole idea of the ring apparently being to 
 make all the profit they could out of the troubles of the Empire. 
 It had been just as difficult to persuade the armament ring to give 
 up what they thought was their monopoly, and to bring in outside 
 works to help in the production of munitions, as it had been to 
 persuade the trade unions to forgo trade customs and to enable 
 outside sources of labour to be employed, such as women and other 
 unskilled labour. But both have had to do it." 
 
 Page 200. — An International Executive. 
 
 In the Recueil des Rapports de V Organisation Centrale pour une 
 Paix durable, torn, ii., will be found a project for an internation^J 
 executive by Dr. Odon Makai, of Hungary. 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 205 
 
 He proposes that the " Conseil administratif permanent " consti- 
 tuted at The Hague in 1907, and composed of the diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives of the Powers there, should be entitled the " Permanent 
 International Administrative and Executive Council." For this 
 purpose, there should be added to it a military, naval, and financial 
 delegate from each State ; the military delegates to form the Mili- 
 tary Committee, the naval delegates the Naval Committee, and the 
 financial delegates the Financial Committee. Each State would 
 contribute in case of need a part of its naval or military forces, or • 
 both, to be fixed beforehand by these committees. 
 
 It would be the function of the Council, when the occasion 
 should arise under the treaty, to order the mobilization of the con- 
 tingents thus set apart, and the operations would be directed by 
 the military and naval committees. In this project force is to be 
 used, if necessary, to compel a State to appear before the Court or 
 Council. 
 
 The idea of a Permanent Executive Council is supported also, in 
 the same volume, by the Belgian, M. Paul Otlet. See also his 
 book, Les Problemes internationaux et la Guerre (Paris, Ronnen et 
 Cie.). 
 
 Limitation of Armaments. 
 
 In connexion with the argument of this chapter, I append a 
 letter by Sir Edward Fry, the British representative at The Hague 
 in 1907. Writing in the Nation of November 1915, he said: — 
 
 " Some of those who have written on the settlement of Europe 
 after the war have passed in silence over the subject of the limita- 
 tion of armaments; others have proposed that the subject should 
 be left for discussion by the nations at a later date. But to me 
 it seems that this limitation should be dealt with in the first 
 instance as a matter of primary importance, and that it is in fact 
 the very corner-stone of any peace other than an armed one. If 
 the nations should be left at large on this point, some one or other 
 of them would begin at once to increase his armaments, and a 
 single nation would set the pace for the whole world. How diffi- 
 cult — or impossible — it would be to stop the race if once begun, 
 we know from cruel past experience. 
 
 " The subject is beset with difficulties, and that is perhaps in part 
 the reason why it has received less attention than it deserves. For 
 the purpose of the present discussion, I will venture to suggest 
 
206 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 a scheme for the limitation of armaments and the maintenance 
 of peace establishments throughout Europe. 
 
 " It is almost needless to observe that recent events have shown 
 that treaties by themselves cannot be relied upon as affording 
 real security, and that we must seek for some more valid guar- 
 antee. 
 
 " Almost every one who looks forward to a secure peace in future 
 regards some form of federation as an essential part of the scheme, 
 and the American statesmen and thinkers who have interested 
 themselves in the probable future of Europe have pointed with 
 great force to their own history, as furnishing a precedent which 
 may give some light to the formation of a federation of all the 
 great States of Europe, if not of the world. The institution 
 therefore of some federal council is the first plank in any plat- 
 form. 
 
 " Next, I suggest that the Congress which settles the terms of 
 peace of Europe should determine the maximum of naval and 
 military forces which each of the Powers, whether conquering or 
 conquered or neutral, is to be allowed to maintain; that it should 
 constitute a body of International Commissioners, charged with the 
 duty of keeping watch and ward that the limitation be never ex- 
 ceeded, for which purpose they must be armed with powers of 
 inspection and investigation of the most plenary kind; that in 
 the case of transgression of the limits there should be a power to 
 call upon the federated nations to enforce the observance of the 
 arrangement. 
 
 " There is no doubt that this appointment of an international 
 commission will have to be supported by other provisions of the 
 peace settlement, such as the suppression of some of the docks and 
 fortresses now in existence, the extinction of private firms for man- 
 ufacturing munitions of war in all countries, and the institution of 
 an effective system of international arbitration. Powers should 
 also be given either to the Federal Council or to the International 
 Commission to determine what materials and methods of war are 
 permissible. 
 
 " If a plan of the kind indicated above were to be adopted, no 
 indignity would be placed upon the conquered nations. They 
 would only be called upon to bear the same limitations of their 
 sovereign rights as their most successful neighbours, a fact which, 
 it may well be hoped, would tend to produce a spirit of acqui- 
 
THE SANCTION TO THE TREATY 207 
 
 escence in those nations, and check the desire for future retalia- 
 tion. Furthermore, this scheme would operate to prevent the 
 recrudescence of the military system, not only in Germany, but 
 in all the nations of Europe. 
 
 " I venture to think that this plan is conceived in that spirit of 
 equity and fairness towards our friends and foes alike, which, if 
 followed, will furnish a securer basis for peace than any humilia- 
 tion of one nation and exaltation of another — a basis without 
 which no peace could be expected to be lasting. 
 
 " One of the chief difficulties to be encountered would be the 
 determination of the maximum limit of armaments. I conceive 
 that it should be made after a careful consideration of the extent 
 and geographical position of each country, of its population, its 
 commerce, and all the circumstances which could possibly affect 
 the case. It should aim at allowing every nation a sufficient force 
 for the performance of all its police duties, and should leave it 
 capable of defending itself against the limited forces of its neigh- 
 bours, but not sufficiently armed to encourage or even permit ag- 
 gression. 
 
 " I again confess to the difficulties inherent in my scheme ; but 
 if the proposition be once conceded, that without limitation of 
 armaments no satisfactory peace can be obtained, some machinery 
 must be found to give effect to that object more powerful than 
 treaties; and I earnestly invite the attention of thoughtful lovers 
 of peace to the solution of this important question, 
 
 " Si quid novisti rectius istis, 
 Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum.'' 
 
 With regard to this question of reduction of armaments, the 
 following references may be useful: — 
 
 Interparliamentary Union: Publication No. S, "La Limitation 
 conventionelle des Armements " ; No. 3, " Armements navals " and 
 "Limitation des Armements," ed. Hans Wehberg. 
 
 De Martens: " La Question de Desarmement," in Revue de 
 Droit international et de Legislation comparee, vol. 26, p. 573. 
 
 Desjardins: " Le Desarmement," in Revue de Deux Mondes, 
 1898, p. 670. 
 
 Pedosa: La Conference de La Haye, chap. 4. 
 
 There is also a paper on the subject in the second volume of the 
 Rapports de V Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable. 
 
CHAPTER Xn 
 
 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION AND 
 ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Our proposed League, so far, has for its function to secure 
 the reference of disputes to peaceable settlement and (more 
 doubtfully) to enforce the judgment of a court in the case 
 of " justiciable " issues. It would be necessary, further, 
 that the States should convenant to offer mutual aid against 
 an attack by an outside Power not a member of the League, 
 if that Power should refuse resort to the machinery for 
 peaceable settlement. In that case, the machinery mu^t be 
 available for States other than members of the League, and 
 provision must be made for that contingency in the consti- 
 tution of the Court and of the Council. 
 
 Should the League have any functions other than the 
 above? First, it should be noticed that we have not given 
 it the fight to intervene in the internal affairs of States. 
 It is not therefore open to the objection that it will be a 
 revival of the Holy Alliance and will break down as that 
 broke down. The Holy Alliance proposed to keep order 
 not only between, but within nations; and so became, in 
 effect, an association for putting down popular insurrections. 
 Our League must avoid that pitfall. 
 
 But here there is a difficulty. One of the most dangerous 
 sources of international friction arises from what is pri- 
 marily a matter of internal policy — the treatment of a 
 subject nationality. Such friction will arise when there is 
 an independent State passionately affected by the oppres- 
 sion within another State of people akin to itself. This is 
 
 208 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 209 
 
 the situation in the case of the Southern Slavs ; and it was 
 that situation that led immediately to the present war. Now 
 it has been suggested that international guarantees might 
 be given, securing to alien nationalities within a State cer- 
 tain minimum rights. But should that involve a duty on 
 the part of outside States to interfere in precisely that 
 point of internal administration about which States are most 
 sensitive? Suppose, for example, that the administration 
 of Ireland were put under such an international guaran- 
 tee ? How would Englishmen, and probably Irishmen, feel ? 
 I do not ask how they ought to feel, but how they would. 
 Well, Austrians and Hungarians would feel in the 
 same way about their Slavs, and Russians about their 
 Finns. Is the proposal practical policy? I gravely 
 doubt it. 
 
 We must, however, fear that questions of nationality are 
 likely again to trouble the peace of Europe, unless the 
 statesmen of Europe, sitting round a table after this war, 
 have the power anxttjhe foresight to provide for these vexed 
 questions such a settlement as only good will and sound 
 principle can achieve. Suppose that, in the future, a dispute 
 should arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia similar 
 to that which led to this war; it would then be imperative 
 for the Council of Conciliation to give advice which might 
 include recommendations of a far-reaching kind as to the 
 way in which Austria-Hungary should treat its Slav popu- 
 lation. Were these recommendations equivalent to com- 
 mands, and were the Powers bound to enforce them, war 
 might follow to impose upon the Dual Monarchy a change 
 in its system of government. That might well seem a very 
 dangerous precedent. But, under the arrangement we have 
 thought most practicable, this intervention by force is not 
 obligatory, and the action of the Council is advisory, not 
 imperative. Now, advice may be taken when threats will 
 
210 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 be disregarded. And that, perhaps, is the most that can 
 be said on this thorny subject. The main condition of a 
 settlement of the nationality question is a change of feel- 
 ing issuing in a change of policy. That is likely to be a 
 slow and difficult process, as we see to our cost in the 
 case of Ireland. And the attempt to get a heroic solution 
 by war holds out little enough prospect of success. For, 
 cut about territory as you may, you cannot eliminate 
 national minorities. 
 
 One other objection with which it is necessary to deal is 
 not unconnected with this. People are afraid, if war is 
 ruled out, that an essentially unsatisfactory arrangement of 
 the world might be stereotyped. On this point Imperialist 
 jingoes and champions of liberty meet. " What ! " says the 
 Russian, or German, or British jingo, " no more territory 
 for us ! The strong to be kept for ever out of the inherit- 
 ance of the weak ! " " What ! " says the champion of 
 subject nationalities, " so many Slavs to remain under 
 Austria, so many Poles under Prussia or Russia, so many 
 Irish under England ! No ! Rather war ! " Well, in fact, 
 the scheme we have put forward does permit war, if every- 
 thing else has failed. Only — and this is the important 
 point — it makes it obligatory first to attempt the required 
 readjustments by agreement. If, indeed, imperialistic ambi- 
 tion and the lust for power continue to animate nations, 
 then an agreement will not be reached, and war will result. 
 If, again, the determination to dominate and oppress a 
 subject nationality continues, war will result, and so will 
 all the consequences of war which we have drawn out. 
 But what our proposed agreement does is to offer every 
 opportunity to avoid war by reason, humanity, and com- 
 mon sense. If that fails, it fails; and with it fails civiliza- 
 tion. But our treaty does not stereotype iniquity. On the 
 contrary, it offers an opportunity to remedy it by justice in 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 211 
 
 peace, and, failing that, admits, in the last resort, the 
 alternative of war. 
 
 The members of the League, then, will not be bound to 
 interfere by force in the internal affairs of any State, nor to 
 stereotype a bad order. These are restrictions of function. 
 Should there be any extension thereof in other directions ? 
 
 No doubt there should. The prevention of war, im- 
 portant though it be, is a negative act. And for the very 
 purpose of prevention some kind of positive activity will be 
 essential. The States must more and more develop machin- 
 ery of joint action in matters that concern them all. They 
 must learn to legislate and administer in common. For 
 that purpose they will naturally take as a starting-point 
 such legislative and administrative machinery as already 
 exists. 
 
 Taking first the question of legislation, we have the 
 precedent of the Hague Conferences. As the reader will 
 remember, two of these have been held, the first in 1899, 
 representing twenty-six States, the second in 1907, repre- 
 senting forty-four.^ 
 
 In thinking of the future development of international 
 law it is natural to start with this body (the Hague Con- 
 ference), and to urge that its meetings should be regular 
 and periodical, instead of dependent on a special summons 
 of the Powers; and that there should be created a perma- 
 nent Commission to prepare the agenda for the successive 
 meetings, collect information and reports, and perform any 
 other appropriate functions that may be assigned to it. 
 Most continental and American internationalists appear to 
 look forward to such a development as this. And very 
 likely they may be right. At the same time there are certain 
 
 iln 1907 all States were represented except Costa Rica, Honduras, 
 Morocco, Liberia, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Thibet, Nepaul (not all 
 of which are full "sovereign"), and the little States of Lichtenstein, 
 Monaco, and Andorra, which have populations of less than 20,000. 
 
212 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 difficulties in the constitution of the Hague Conferences 
 which may possibly militate against their developing into 
 the organ of international legislation. The first difficulty is 
 the number and diversity of the States included ; the second 
 is the rule that no decision is binding unless it is unani- 
 mously agreed to; the third is the legal tradition of the 
 " equality " of States, interpreted as meaning equality of 
 voting power. It is evident that these conditions, if they 
 persist, may make it impossible for the Hague Conferences 
 to develop into an effective legislature. The condition 
 of unanimity will render progress too slow and difficult. 
 It recalls the Polish liherum veto. But, on the other hand, 
 if the voices of all States are to be equal, no great State 
 will consent to be bound by a majority vote. For ex- 
 ample (to take an extreme case), it is inconceivable that 
 the eight " Great " Powers, acting together, would consent 
 to be overruled by any combination of small States. On 
 the other hand, small States are equally reluctant to be out- 
 voted by great ones. It will be remembered that the project 
 of an International Court of Justice was defeated in 1907 
 because no agreement could be reached as to the proportion 
 in which the different States should be represented in it. 
 
 A very interesting attempt to meet this difficulty and 
 mediate between the theory of the equality of States before 
 the law and the fact of their inequality in power will be 
 found in the scheme of the Fabian Society.^ The scheme 
 is necessarily complicated, but it is well worth study by 
 those who are interested in this very important question. 
 It may be noted, in passing, that by this plan the Council 
 of Conciliation which we have proposed would be a 
 standing committee of the " Supernational Legislature." 
 
 It is possible, then, and it is, I think, generally desired by 
 internationalists, that the Hague Conferences may develop 
 
 1 Clause 7 and note thereto. 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 213 
 
 into a permanent international or " supernational " Legis- 
 lature. But this process may be arrested by the difficulties 
 to which I have referred. On the other hand, a Legisla- 
 ture might arise in a different way out of the League of 
 Nations which we have discussed above. Very likely 
 such a League might not, at the beginning, include all 
 States. It is, indeed, essential, in my judgment, that it 
 should be open to all the Great Powers, or it will be only 
 an alliance confronted by a counter-alliance. But these 
 'Powers might judge that the purpose of keeping the peace 
 could be more easily fulfilled if they did not associate with 
 themselves all the smaller States, whose adhesion would 
 necessarily complicate the working of the League. It was 
 that consideration, in part, that led the British group to 
 suggest that the original members of the League should be 
 the eight Great Powers and the other States of Europe, thus 
 excluding the South American Republics. There is, of 
 course, something arbitrary about all such exclusions, and 
 they are not easy to defend on principle. But as it is pretty 
 certain that other considerations than the principle of the 
 legal equality of States will determine what is actually done, 
 we may contemplate the probability of a limited League. 
 In that case, it might be very desirable that the members of 
 the League should make for themselves rules of inter- 
 national law. And this is definitely contemplated in the 
 program of the League to Enforce Peace. Such a group 
 of States might accept a procedure which would not be 
 accepted at The Hague, and adopt rules which it would 
 be impossible to adopt there, while the existing procedure 
 is in force. The rules adopted by the League could, how- 
 ever, be submitted to The Hague, and would then have a 
 prestige that might lead to their acceptance. There would, 
 in fact, in that case, be two legislative Bodies, one repre- 
 senting the narrower group, the other representing all 
 
214 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 States. But there need be no great inconvenience in this, 
 and there might be advantages.^ 
 
 Given a legislative body, what kind of rules should it 
 make? On this point some general remarks may be made. 
 
 In the first place, the main business of an international 
 Legislature should not be (as was unfortunately the case 
 at the Hague Conferences) the formulation of the law of 
 war. It is for a very different purpose that an international 
 Legislature is required. Its business would be to lay down 
 rules for the peaceful intercourse of nations, in order to 
 prevent the growth of the friction which leads to war. 
 It would take us too far to specify here even the headings 
 under which such legislation would fall. But one subject 
 of obvious importance may be referred to. 
 
 We have seen that, under certain conditions, economic 
 competition is a cause of the friction leading to war. 
 These conditions result, not from the nature of trade, but 
 from the attempt, backed by governmental policy, to 
 secure for this or that nation differential advantages or a 
 complete monopoly. This cause of friction should be 
 removed by international agreement. The nations should 
 recognize the broad and obvious truth that trade benefits 
 all the parties concerned ; should remove, as far as possible, 
 and as quickly as possible, the artificial hindrances intro- 
 duced by false conceptions of national interest; should 
 provide, so far as that can be done by regulation, against 
 trading methods generally recognized as " unfair " ; and 
 should do all this by international arrangements which 
 should be absolutely impartial as between different na- 
 tions. 
 
 1 Professor Schiicking has argued strongly against the substitution 
 of the representatives of a limited number of States for the Hague 
 Conferences as a legislative organ. (See Recueil des Rapports de 
 I'Organisation Centrale pour une Paix durable, torn, i.) 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 215 
 
 The complete application of this policy would be general 
 free trade, with guarantees against unfair competition. 
 The arguments for free trade, economic and political, 
 have never been answered, for they are unanswerable. 
 The strength of the case for protection resides in no con- 
 sideration of public interest, but in the mutual support of 
 a number of interests standing to gain by inflicting loss 
 on the rest of the community. It is by a direct appeal 
 to what looks like the immediate interest of various sections 
 of the community, while ignoring the remoter results 
 whereby the injury will come in, that protectionists make 
 and maintain their converts. They rely, in fact, upon the 
 incapacity and reluctance of men to follow out a train 
 of reasoning. And their confidence is justified by results. 
 So long as this combination of cynical self-interest with 
 ignorance and thoughtlessness continues, we cannot hope 
 that the truth will prevail. At any rate, the general intro- 
 duction of free trade after the war seems to lie outside 
 all reasonable expectation. But some steps might be taken, 
 and must be taken, if the nations really intend a settlement 
 which shall be durable. Of these, the principal should be 
 the abolition of preferential trading. Whatever tariffs are 
 maintained should be applied equally to all. No restrictions 
 should be imposed upon the movement into any country of 
 foreign capital and foreign traders. And any restrictions 
 imposed upon the immigration of foreign labour should 
 be based solely on such considerations as the standard of 
 living or the unassimilability (if such there be) of the 
 would-be immigrants. In no case should the laws be 
 framed in the form of special discrimination against the 
 citizens of any country. 
 
 The principle underlying these suggestions may be 
 summed up as the principle of the " open door." And that 
 principle should further be applied by all countries in 
 
216 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 those dependencies of which they control the economic 
 policy.^ 
 
 Not only access for goods, but opportunities for obtain- 
 ing contracts and concessions, for making loans, and the 
 like, should be equal for all countries, without preference 
 for the Mother Country. And any restrictions it may be 
 necessary to introduce, as, for example, to protect the inter- 
 ests of native races, or in the way of tariffs for revenue, 
 should be applied equally to all nations. In other words, 
 the whole conception that a colony or a dependency exists 
 to benefit the material interests of the people who " own " 
 it should be definitely abandoned as unworthy of civilized 
 nations. The nation that administers such territory does 
 so as the trustee for civilization. Only on that ground 
 has the government of " backward " by " advanced " peo- 
 ples any justification. The recognition of equal rights to 
 citizens of all nations, subject only to the well-being of 
 native races, is a principle which is capable of immediate 
 application, if there be really any will to peace in the 
 world. It is a cardinal point in any genuine policy of 
 peace. 
 
 To this " open door " policy all States should be parties, 
 including those that are as yet industrially undeveloped, 
 like China or Turkey or Persia. Only it should be open 
 to these latter to adopt what measures they think fit to 
 protect themselves against forms of exploitation which are 
 predatory and unjust or incompatible with the principles of 
 their social order. But whatever restrictions they introduce 
 should apply equally to all nations. And, similarly, the 
 nations competing to develop the resources of the country in 
 question should make international agreements as to the 
 
 J-This excludes the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, 
 which should, however, themselves apply the principle in their own 
 territories. 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 217 
 
 conditions they will jointly observe with regard to loans, 
 concessions, methods of trade, and the like. Such agree- 
 ments have, in fact, been made with regard to certain 
 regions ; for example, the treaties guaranteeing the " open 
 door " in China and the treaty of Algeciras. 
 
 Another point of fundamental importance is that of free 
 routes for trade across the territory of independent States. 
 One of the principal causes of the economic friction that 
 lies behind war is the fear of countries that have no ports, 
 or none convenient, lest a neighbouring country, through 
 which their export and import trade has to pass, should 
 hamper and interrupt the transit. It is this fear that makes 
 States covet the ownership of ports and of the territory 
 giving access to them; that makes Germany, for instance, 
 uneasy because she does not possess the mouths of the 
 Rhine; Serbia, because she has no port on the Adriatic; 
 Russia, because she does not own Constantinople. These 
 fears may often be exaggerated or feigned, for the free 
 movement of trade is commonly ensured by mutual self- 
 interest. Thus, for example, the Dutch do not put any 
 hindrance in the way of German trade passing by the 
 Rhine, and have no motive to do so. Still, if a tariff war 
 occurs, countries in this position of dependence on a route 
 through another country may suffer injury from that coun- 
 try ; and, in any case, they dislike the feeling of dependence. 
 The only way of solving this problem, consistent with that 
 guarantee to all States of territorial integrity which is 
 essential to peace, is an international guarantee of free 
 routes across the territories and free use of the ports in 
 question. There is no insuperable difficulty about this, if 
 people want peace, not war. It is to the mutual advantage 
 of everybody concerned; and it would take away the only 
 reason that could even seem legitimate for appropriating 
 other people's territory. 
 
218 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Lastly, there is the question of " unfair " trading. What 
 is wanted here is, first, a definition agreed to by all the 
 parties concerned; then common measures for dealing with 
 the matter. Is dumping " unfair " ? And always ? And 
 for every one? Or sometimes? And, if so, when? If 
 "unfair," is every one ready to abandon it? These are 
 the sort of questions to be raised and answered in an Inter- 
 national Congress. 
 
 Again, is it " unfair " to " penetrate " a country with 
 your trade? To "capture key industries" and the like? 
 Or is it in some way dangerous to any independence which 
 a nation ought to cherish? It is international discussion 
 of that point that is wanted ; and discussion with a view to 
 and on the hypothesis of peace, not with a view to and on 
 the hypothesis of war. I have little doubt that a discus- 
 sion in this spirit would show, it to be true that if the 
 nationals of one country " capture " an industry in another 
 it is because they are more efficient; and that the proper 
 way to meet the competition is to imitate the methods of 
 the invader, unless those methods are " unfair," and recog- 
 nized so to be by international agreement. Nothing can 
 evade the broad truth that every kind of discrimination 
 is a protection of the incompetent against the competent, 
 with the result that the motive to become competent is 
 taken away. 
 
 Another point may be touched on here. Treaties are 
 part of international law, and their observance is a car- 
 dinal condition of any international order. All nations 
 admit this in theory, but none have been over-scrupulous 
 in practice. There is, however, some excuse for their 
 negligence or criminality. Treaties are apt to be drawn up 
 in terms so vague that it is easy to dispute what may have 
 been held originally to be their plain meaning. I need only 
 call in evidence the ambiguities which attach to the treaties 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 219 
 
 guaranteeing Belgium and Luxemburg, and especially the 
 fact that the latter treaty, almost before the ink was dry 
 on it, was expounded by a British Minister in a sense quite 
 other than that which had been attached to it by Bismarck.^ 
 It is therefore not superfluous to lay it down that the parties 
 to treaties should all mean the same thing, should know 
 what they mean, and should say it. 
 
 Further — and this point is even more important — no 
 treaties in a changing world can be permanently satis- 
 factory. For instance, by the Treaty of Paris the Powers, 
 including Great Britain, formally guaranteed the integrity 
 of the Turkish Empire. By that treaty we were bound 
 to resist the liberation of Bulgaria and of Roumania. 
 What would the British nation have thought if we had 
 gone to war for that purpose? The reservation, rebus sic 
 stantibus, though it is a cloak for every kind of Machiavel- 
 lianism, is also a recognition of the nature of things. The 
 moral is, not that it should be open to any one party to 
 declare a treaty a " scrap of paper " ; but that either all 
 treaties be limited in time, or that there should be a formal 
 provision in them that any one of the parties concerned 
 may bring them up for denunciation or revision before an 
 international authority, and get a decision as to whether 
 circumstances have so changed that the maintenance of 
 the treaty in its original form is unjust or prejudicial to 
 nized which are inscribed in it.^ 
 
 It should also be laid down that no secret treaty is binding 
 on either party or will obtain recognition before any inter- 
 national authority. With this object there should be opened 
 an international register of treaties and those only be recog- 
 nized which are inscribed in it.^ 
 
 1 See England's Guarantee to Belgium amd Luxemburg, by C. P. 
 Sanger and H. T. J. Norton (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1915). 
 
 2 Cf. clause 160 of the Fabian scheme. 
 8Cf. clause 15 of the Fabian scheme. 
 
THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 This is a matter which concerns the domestic policy of 
 every country. It should be made, wherever possible, part 
 of the State constitution that no secret treaties are binding. 
 We should then be delivered from such public scandals as 
 the secret treaties, in which this country participated, look- 
 ing to the partition of Morocco, or the fact that nobody 
 knows precisely the complete terms of the treaties that 
 constituted the Triple Alliance or of the Franco-Russian 
 agreement; on which treaties in 1914 the peace of Europe 
 hinged. 
 
 But what, I shall be asked, are international rules with- 
 out an international sanction? I think there should be 
 a sanction, and I think the proper sanction is economic. If 
 the members of the League guaranteed to one another 
 the " Open Door," and the other advantages which have 
 been suggested above, then breaches of such agreements 
 would be appropriately punished by withdrawal of the privi- 
 leges. States would thus have a strong motive, of matter 
 of fact interest, both to enter the League and to observe 
 its regulations; and the guarantee would be as effective 
 as that of armed force, and otherwise far more satisfac- 
 tory.^ 
 
 International legislation will require to be supplemented 
 by international administration. The latter does, in fact, 
 already exist, to an extent not generally appreciated. Thus, 
 for instance, there is the International Bureau of the 
 Universal Postal Union, which " collects, publishes, and 
 distributes information, circulates proposals, and notifies 
 alterations adopted, publishes a journal in three languages, 
 acts as a clearing house for the settlement of accounts, 
 arranges for the manufacture and supply of reply coupons, 
 and gives an opinion upon questions in dispute at the 
 
 1 This point is elaborated by Mr. Brailsf ord in A League of Nations, 
 chap. ix. 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 221 
 
 request of the parties concerned." ^ There is a similar 
 bureau for the International Telegraphic Union. There is 
 an Administrative Bureau for international transport by 
 railway, which has, among other functions, that of arbi- 
 trating in disputes between railways, and makes detailed 
 regulations as to packing, transport, recovery and payment 
 of charges and settlement of accounts between railways. 
 There is an International Commission to deal with the 
 navigation of the Danube. There are International Sani- 
 tary Commissions at Constantinople, Alexandria, Teheran, 
 and Tangier. There is a permanent Sugar Commission to 
 deal with bounty- fed sugar, whereby " the power of the 
 State over its own tariff and its right to export its own 
 produce is subjected to international government." 
 
 Thus, the principle of creating international administra- 
 tion for certain special matters is well established in practice. 
 It requires extension into the kind of matter about which 
 there is risk of war gathering. The most obvious case is 
 that of undeveloped countries under weak governments 
 where the Powers are competing for concessions and 
 influence. I have already suggested the necessity of inter- 
 national rules to regulate this kind of situation, and have 
 shown that in fact such rules have been embodied in special 
 treaties, for instance that of Algeciras.^ What is required 
 further is the creation of Administrative Commissions to 
 watch over the execution of these treaties. The important 
 point in connextion with such Commissions would be that 
 every complaint concerning a breach of the principles of the 
 treaty governing the case, or of regulations framed under it 
 by the Commission, should go before the Commission, not 
 before the governments, and that the governments should 
 
 1 See Woolf, International Government, p. 122. The facts of this 
 section are taken from that book. 
 
 2 See notes to this chapter. 
 
222 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 bind themselves not to entertain such complaints. This 
 should put an end to that intriguing of concession-hunters 
 and financiers and traders with their governments which 
 has in fact brought to nought the treaties guaranteeing the 
 open door in China. 
 
 It is impossible to forecast what further developments 
 of international administration may become possible and 
 desirable. But it seems clear that legislation and adminis- 
 tration will go hand in hand, and that events will constantly 
 be giving occasion for some new application of internation- 
 alism, once the initial inertia has been overcome. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Page 208. — ^The League and Outside States. 
 
 With regard to the relation of the League to outside States, the 
 attitude of the United States is likely to be different from that of 
 the European States. A League of European States is conceiv- 
 able, which, though formed on the basis discussed in the text, 
 should leave outside one or more of the great European States. 
 Such a League would have to be ready for joint defence against 
 the States left out. It would be, in effect, a defensive alliance. 
 But it is pretty certain that the United States would not join such 
 a League, for they would not desire to be involved in a war which 
 might be nothing but one of the old wars for power. If any of the 
 Great Powers were left out, the United States, we may be pretty 
 sure would not come in, except under a limited obligation which 
 did not involve the possibility of war against the States that were 
 not members of the League. On the other hand, if all the Great 
 Powers were included, the United States might accept the un- 
 limited obligation of defence against outside attack. But in that 
 case the obligation would be superfluous. 
 
 Page 217. — Treaty of Algeciras. 
 
 The treaty of Algeciras provides for the application of the 
 " principle of economic liberty without inequality,'' and in par- 
 ticular that if recourse shall be had by the Shereefian Government 
 to foreign capital or industries for the working of public services 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 223 
 
 or the execution of public works, the concessions for such purposes 
 shall be " subject to the principle of public awards on tenders 
 without respect of nationality." — See Chapter VI of the treaty. 
 
 By the treaty the diplomatic representatives of the Powers were 
 entrusted with the task of superintending the working of the 
 articles which stipulated that tenders for public works should be 
 assigned to the person making the most advantageous offer, re- 
 gardless of nationality. The following are the relevant articles : — 
 
 " io8. As soon as it shall have been decided to proceed to the 
 execution of particular public works by calling for tenders, the 
 Shereefian Government shall notify such decision to the Diplo- 
 matic Body, to which it shall in due course communicate plans, 
 specifications, and all documents annexed to the call for tenders, 
 so that the nationals of all the signatory Powers may obtain infor- 
 mation respecting the projected works and be in a position to 
 compete for them. A sufficient time-limit shall be fixed for this 
 purpose in the call for tenders. 
 
 " no. The contracts shall be made in the form and according 
 to the general conditions prescribed by regulations to be drawn 
 by the Shereefian Government with the assistance of the Diplo- 
 matic Body." 
 
 Page 218. — Treaties. 
 
 By the Norwegian Constitution of 191 1 all treaties and agree- 
 ments with foreign Powers have to be communicated to Parlia- 
 ment for inquiry by a Special Committee. If the Government 
 thinks it necessary, or has agreed, to keep some treaty or article 
 of a treaty secret, these have to be communicated secretly to the 
 Parliamentary Committee concerned; but any member of the 
 committee has the right of bringing the whole matter before 
 Parliament (which of course may discuss it with closed doors). 
 
 As is well known, the Senate of the United States is, along with 
 the President, the treaty-making organ. 
 
 The French Constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1848 required the 
 sanctioning of every treaty by the Legislative Assembly. (See 
 Recueil des Rapports de V Organisation Centrale pour une Paix 
 durable, tom. ii. p. 146.) 
 
 With regard to the treaties constituting the Triple Alliance, 
 Bernstein writes (ibid., p. 220) that Bismarck left instructions that 
 the complete treaties were never to be published, even in the 
 
224 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 case of the dissolution of the Alliance. It would be difficult to 
 find a clearer proof, of the sinister nature of these secret inter- 
 national agreements. Here was one, it would seem, which could 
 never bear the light ! And because of it (among other things) we 
 have the world war. Bernstein goes on to quote from the historian 
 Helmholtz, writing in the Revue Politique Internationale for April 
 1914, to the effect that the full text of the treaties is known only 
 to the Minister President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
 that only their successors, from time to time, may see it. The 
 diplomats are only informed verbally, under pledge of secrecy, of 
 what it is necessary for them to know. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to refer once more to the secret clauses of 
 the Morocco treaty, negotiated between this country and France 
 in 1904, and kept secret all through the negotiations at Algeciras. 
 We wait for further light on this episode. 
 
 The following article on the treaties of Austria-Hungary with 
 Italy and with Roumania appeared in the Arbeiter 'Zeitung 
 (Vienna) of September 5, 1916: — 
 
 " Austria-Hungary was allied with two States, and when she 
 found herself in danger and misery, they did not help her, but 
 declared war upon her. It is to be noted that the treaty with Italy 
 and with Roumania was a treaty for war; it was concluded for 
 war, made in view of the possibility of war, and in war it was to 
 prove its utility. But neither Italy nor Roumania came to the 
 rescue when the war the treaties envisaged actually broke out. 
 After having kept neutral for a considerable time, they declared 
 war upon their allies. How was this possible? We, of course, 
 know that these alliances were somewhat curious : lip-service to 
 love, hatred and wrath in the heart. In Italy as well as in Rou- 
 mania, there existed the deepest longing to claim the ' unredeemed 
 brothers ' of Austria-Hungary. . . . For a long time each of these 
 allies made the secret reservation not to keep these treaties. Once 
 Austria-Hungary got into difficulties, difficulties that gave the best 
 opportunity, a pretext for breaking the treaty would readily pre- 
 sent itself. . . . 
 
 " The question arises, how a whole people, first the Italian, then 
 the Roumanian, could deny a solemn obligation and join right away 
 in the war against the ally. That a monarch or a statesman denies 
 his word may not be surprising; but peoples in their totality have 
 a strong feeling of honour — and it would be difficult to find such a 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION S25 
 
 denial of indubitable obligation in history. But did the peoples in 
 both these cases realize that they had entered into obligations and 
 concluded a treaty and given their word? The treaty with Italy 
 became public only after the war broke out. And as to Roumania : 
 nobody in Austria-Hungary knew of the existence of a treaty; 
 everybody was greatly surprised when Count Tisza spoke in the 
 Hungarian House of the Roumanians as allies. It is only now 
 that we learn that a regular treaty was concluded in 1883 and 
 renewed in 1888 up to 1920; nobody knew of this in Austria- 
 Hungary and, except perhaps for the ministers, nobody in Rou- 
 mania. We do not want to enter into the question that alliances 
 concluded by governments only, or worse, by monarchs only, can 
 hardly command binding force in countries with parliamentary 
 rule; but how is the obligation contained in the treaty to impress 
 the mind of the people if the people know nothing about it and 
 thus derive no sense of breach of loyalty from repudiation of the 
 alliance? Grovernments change, kings die, peoples remain. Could 
 the game with the alliance of the present Italian and Roumanian 
 rulers have succeeded, could it have been possible, if the treaty had 
 been concluded in full publicity, if Parliament had discussed it and 
 registered it as a law? . . . We see here glaring examples of the 
 worthlessness of secret treaties; examples which make it possible 
 to speak of the debacle of diplomacy, which imagines to have built 
 for eternity, when it has really built on the sand. 
 
 " If secret treaties between the governments were abolished, the 
 chief element of insecurity in the relations of nations would vanish. 
 . . . Only treaties made between peoples, to which the peoples 
 agree through their Parliaments — only such treaties can gain 
 binding power and will be acknowledged and understood as obliga- 
 tions by the nations. Clearness and truth would put them on a 
 basis which would be shaken in vain by intrigue and cunning" 
 (cited Cambridge Magazine, October 28, 1916). 
 
 I cite the statements of fact in this extract with reserves. It 
 seems difficult at present to get certain information about the 
 alleged treaty between Austria and Roumania. 
 
 The author of Nationalism and War in the Far East suggests 
 (p. 380) that popular interest in foreign politics had the effect, 
 in the Balkans, of weakening the moral obligation of treaties. 
 He means that popular feeling is more impatient than diplomacy 
 would be of obligations that do not correspond to present equity. 
 
2m THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 That may sometimes be true. The remedy he suggests is, that 
 every country should publish annually a list of the treaties it con- 
 siders to be " alive." But clearly a nation must not be allowed to 
 repudiate at any moment by a one-sided act any treaty with which 
 it is discontented. The periodical revision of treaties before an 
 international authority, as suggested in the text, appears to be the 
 right solution. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The whole of the preceding proposals towards inter- 
 national organization depend for their realization upon a 
 good will to put them into effect. Does that good will 
 exist ? 
 
 Naturally, I cannot answer that question. I can only try, 
 as I am doing here, to create the good will. But I may 
 point out that two distinct questions are involved. One is 
 the state of mind of governments and nations when the 
 peace settlement is made. It is that that will determine, in 
 the main, the fate of civilization. Make a wrong peace, one 
 that involves the perpetuation of the European anarchy and 
 a preparation even more intense for an even more terrible 
 war in the near future, and nothing that may be done or 
 attempted later will be able to effect salvation. Make a 
 right peace, and the turn will have been taken in a direc- 
 tion along which watchfulness and wisdom may lead civ- 
 ilization to security. But there is little opportunity allowed, 
 during the stress of war, to guide opinion towards a sane 
 and wise outlook, and little willingness in opinion to be so 
 guided. So that, after all, we shall have to rely largely on 
 the wisdom and foresight of statesmen at the peace confer- 
 ence, and can only hope that they may possess those quali- 
 ties, and that public opinion may permit them to exercise 
 them fruitfully. 
 
 Supposing, however, that a right settlement is made, or 
 
 one not too irredeemably wrong, will it be a condition of 
 
 evolution towards internationalism and peace that foreign 
 
 policy should be subjected to democratic control? 
 
 227 
 
238 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 This is a question which has been much discussed, and 
 with a good deal of heat. It is urged on the one hand that 
 democratic control is the only way to prevent diplomacy 
 from plunging the world into war; on the other hand, that 
 the people are more passionate and ignorant and less careful 
 for peace than the statesmen and diplomats. What is the 
 truth? 
 
 One thing, of course, is clear. The individual members 
 of all social classes have the same human nature ; the same 
 instincts of pugnacity, pride, cupidity; the same response 
 to the same corporate egotism; the same capacity for sac- 
 rificing to this the narrower egotism of their own individu- 
 ality. Their motives when they go to fight are of the 
 same character, ranging from a simple sense of patriotism 
 and duty through all the gradations of vanity, love of excite- 
 ment and adventure, down to purely economic considera- 
 tions. But once the war spirit is let loose, the response is 
 equal from all classes. A financier or merchant will be as 
 sentimental and irrational as an artisan, and a dock-labourer 
 as disinterestedly patriotic as a duke. 
 
 It should be noticed, however, that it is not these passions 
 that make wars, though they are the condition of wars being 
 waged. The passions do not awake until the war is on the 
 horizon or actually present; and they can be aroused with- 
 out any knowledge or comprehension of the causes and 
 issues involved. To most men it is enough that their 
 country is at war for them to give it their wholehearted 
 support. But this natural, almost instinctive response is 
 commonly further stimulated by appeals which are irrele- 
 vant or simply mendacious. 
 
 Thus, to take some obvious examples, the Franco-Prus- 
 sian War was precipitated by the famous telegram in which 
 Bismarck gave a deliberately misleading account of what 
 had happened between the French Ambassador and the 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 229 
 
 King of Prussia. In 1877 " false telegrams about the 
 entry of the Russian Army into Constantinople were sent 
 home to disturb and paralyse and reverse the deliberations 
 of Parliament." ^ Our second war with Afghanistan was 
 provoked by an exaggerated if ,not false statement that 
 the Ameer " had refused to receive a British mission with 
 insult and with outrage, and that insult and outrage were 
 represented as at once enlisting our honour and reputation 
 in the case, making it necessary to administer immediate 
 chastisement. . . . That intelligence was sent — we were 
 never undeceived about it until we were completely com- 
 mitted to the war and until our troops were in the country. 
 The Parliament met: after long and most unjustifiable 
 delays the papers were produced and carefully examined; 
 we found there was not a shred of foundation for that out- 
 rageous statement, andi^/^that the temper and pride of the 
 people of this country had been wrought up and the spirit 
 of wrath fomented and kindled in their bosoms by intelli- 
 gence that was false intelligence, and that somebody or 
 other having access to high quarters, if not dwelling in 
 them, had invented, had fabricated for the evil purpose 
 of carrying us into bloody strife." ^ Lastly, to take an 
 example that will be fresher in the reader's mind, the 
 German people were induced wholeheartedly to support the 
 present war by statements that it was a war of aggression 
 against Germany, and that before Germany had taken any 
 military action the Cossacks had invaded East Prussia and 
 the French dropped bombs on Nuremberg and crossed the 
 frontier in Alsace and Belgium, statements which have since 
 been admitted to be fabrications by the Germans them- 
 selves.* This fabrication of false news in order to arouse 
 
 1 See Gladstone's speech of April 2, 1880. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
 SI find this admission in German writers. See, e.g.. Die Friedens- 
 
230 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 the latent patriotism of the people is part of that " device " 
 of the " just cause " to which I have referred above,^ and it 
 is recommended in the books of those who advocate, in 
 theory and in practice, the militarist philosophy and ethics. 
 For the other side of the, gospel of force is the gospel of 
 lies. And the people, since they are not spontaneously 
 aggressive, since they do not naturally desire to kill and be 
 killed, must be duped into the requisite state of passion. 
 
 This passion, however, as I have said, though it is a 
 necessary condition of war, is not a direct cause of it. The 
 cause is policy. And in the direction of policy the people 
 have no part. Policy is dominated by statesmen, and 
 statesmen are apt to be influenced by cliques and perverted 
 by theories. I have already dwelt at length on that theory 
 of Power for the sake of Power and Expansion for the sake 
 of Expansion which lies behind international policy. But 
 that is not a theory of the people, it is a theory of the 
 governing and educated classes. It is professors and pub- 
 licists (not only German) that formulate and defend it, 
 and politicians that practise it. The mass of the people, 
 who have to wage the wars to which it gives rise, have no 
 knowledge of it and no interest in it. If their support is 
 to be had for a war, the fact that it is a war for power and 
 territory must be carefully concealed from them, as in fact 
 it always is. They must be told, as they always are, that 
 it is a war for self-defence or liberty, for something that 
 appeals either to the instinct of national self-preservation or 
 to those idealistic emotions which it is so easy to arouse and 
 so easy to mislead. 
 
 And as the theory of power and expansion is not a theory 
 of the people, so the interests that use it as a cloak are not 
 
 warte, August-September 1916, article on "Das Deutsche Volk und 
 der Militarismus," by Hermann Fernau. 
 iP. 10. 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 231 
 
 their interests. The operations of international finance, 
 and all that lies behind it, are a real menace to peace. I 
 am aware of all that can be said on the other side. I am 
 aware that normally, and in the great bulk of their opera- 
 tions, financiers and traders desire and promote peace. But 
 the exceptional cases exist and are important. The compe- 
 tition of international finance in undeveloped countries is a 
 real cause of war. China, Persia, Asia Minor, Morocco, 
 Mexico, are the danger centres. And in such countries the 
 ambitions of governments coalesce with the interests of 
 finance and trade to create situations that are pregnant 
 with war. 
 
 At bottom this question, like all political questions, de- 
 pends for its solution on a comprehension of cause and 
 effect. To risk war for the sake of profit would seem mon- 
 strous, even to the gamblers, if they realized the series of 
 events they were putting in motion; if they perceived clearly 
 that one reason why at this moment thousands of young 
 men are dying in agony on the field of battle is that some 
 innocent lady in an English village wanted a good invest- 
 ment, and that an accumulation of such demands gave the 
 opportunity to financiers to "penetrate" some unhappy 
 country, not in order to benefit it, but in order to make profit 
 out of it; at the risk, in the existing condition of anarchy, 
 first of war to subdue that country, then of a European war 
 arising largely out of the chagrin of the nations left out 
 against the nations that have profited. Some democrats are 
 so much impressed by this financial vampirism that they 
 hold it idle even to attempt any improvement of interna- 
 tional relations while the propertied classes continue to 
 direct the policy of States.^ This is perhaps to err as much 
 in one direction as Mr. Hartley Withers ^ (in my judgment) 
 
 iSee, e.g., Fred C. Howe, Why War? (Scribners, New York, 1916). 
 2 In International Finance (Smith, Elder & Co., 1916). 
 
232 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 does in another. Short of a complete revolution in every 
 country which would take the investment of capital out of 
 the hands of private owners, there is much to be hoped 
 for from publicity and from an extension of real knowledge 
 about the facts of international life. But meantime we 
 have to note, what is so little understood or so adroitly 
 concealed in this country, that the Socialist case is a true 
 case ; that war is in fact largely fostered by the competition 
 of capital for lucrative investment in countries where the 
 government is feeble and the natural resources large and 
 undeveloped, and by the backing given by governments to 
 their own nationals. It cannot be too often and too 
 plainly said that all profit made in that way, at the cost of 
 war, is blood-money. 
 
 Now, in its broadest sense, what democratic control 
 means is publicity and consequently free and open discus- 
 sion and criticism. It may be admitted that in the state 
 of international anarchy in which we live there are good as 
 well as bad reasons for secrecy. A public statement of the 
 real facts about an existing tension might precipitate the 
 catastrophe that is dreaded. And it may be reasonably held, 
 for example, that Lord Grey was justified in refusing a 
 frank and full account of the European situation during the 
 years preceding the war, on the ground that he might thus 
 have actually provoked a crisis which he hoped to avoid. I 
 do not here suggest that the motives for the secrecy of states- 
 men are always bad, nor that secrecy may not sometimes 
 have averted a war which publicity might have precipitated. 
 But the other side of the matter must be looked at. The 
 secrecy of our Government before the war is, in fact, gen- 
 erally condemned, both by militarists and by pacifists. The 
 militarists say : " You ought to have come forward, said 
 that the war was imminent, and prepared for it." The 
 pacifists say : " You ought to have come forward, told us 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 23S 
 
 into what a catastrophe your policy was drifting, and taken 
 us into your counsel as to how we could alter it, by sub- 
 stituting for the Entente a common understanding between 
 all the nations." It must indeed be admitted that secrecy 
 precipitates war at least as much as it prevents it. For 
 instance, the secret negotiations and treaties about Morocco 
 were a contributory cause of the present outbreak. And, 
 more generally, secrecy maintains that attitude of universal 
 suspicion which is bound to end in a catastrophe. No meet- 
 ing of sovereigns or foreign secretaries can take place with- 
 out a swarm of rumours and conjectures immediately buzz- 
 ing about it. Take, for example, the curious continental 
 myth (I assume it to be a myth), that King Edward, of 
 his personal initiative, originated in Europe a deliberate 
 plot to isolate Germany by a ring of hostile Powers. Se- 
 crecy enabled that myth to gain currency ; and it is notorious 
 how largely the belief in it affected German opinion and 
 policy. The interview of King Edward with the Czar at 
 Reval, the interview of the Kaiser with the Czar at Pots- 
 dam, sent shivers through the nerves of statesmen and 
 journalists. The dispatches of ambassadors to their gov- 
 ernments are filled with rumours and conjectures. And on 
 these, decisive acts of international policy may be founded. 
 One result is that even if a minister tells the truth he is not 
 believed. The relations between Germany and Great Brit- 
 ain had been worked up into such a condition by fear and 
 suspicion flourishing in an atmosphere of secrecy, that the 
 genuine attempt at an understanding made in 1912 was 
 foredoomed to failure. The risks of publicity rtiay be great. 
 But there is no security in secrecy. 
 
 In an article to which I have already referred,^ Hermann 
 Fernau writes : — 
 
 Let us suppose that in the last days of July 1914 people like 
 
 1 See above, p. 230. 
 
gS4 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Rohrbach, Harden, Reventlow, Chamberlain, Keim, Bernhardi, 
 etc., had come before the German people and said, what they had 
 previously been saying only too loudly, " We are strangling. We 
 need more land. We need a place in the sun. We are the 
 strongest, we have the highest culture, and we have therefore a 
 sacred right to wage a war of conquest," is there a single man who 
 would so insult the German nation as to assert that it would have 
 assented with enthusiasm to this war program? No! The im- 
 mense majority of the German people stood then, as always, on 
 the side of Bebel and his degenerate successors. That is to say,. 
 they did not become enthusiastic for the war until it had been 
 made clear to them that Germany had been treacherously attacked 
 and must defend herself. 
 
 What the people in fact were told was false, as this 
 author admits. The point is, that it was necessary to lie 
 to them to get their support for the war. And let not the 
 English people suppose, because it was not necessary to 
 lie to them this time, that it never has been and never 
 will be necessary. As I have illustrated, wars have been 
 started in England in the past, and are likely to be started 
 in the future, unless we change our temper and our methods, 
 by lies as deliberate and calculated as those which brought 
 the German people on to the side of their Government in 
 19 14. Many wars that have been fought in Europe could 
 never have been fought if governments had told the people 
 truly for what reasons or causes they proposed to fight them. 
 Imagine, for example, that a minister were to come down 
 to the House of Commons and say something like this: 
 " We are giving support to such and such an enterprise in 
 Morocco or Persia or Turkey. We expect, by that means, 
 to assist British capital in securing a good investment, and 
 further to gain a political influence and prestige which will 
 open to Britishers in future further lucrative concessions 
 and loans. In doing this, we shall probably be led to inter- 
 vene by force in the internal affairs of the country con- 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 233 
 
 cerned, and we may also find ourselves involved in trouble 
 with one or other of the Great Powers; but we think it 
 worth while to take those risks for the sake of the profits to 
 the British groups involved " — if any Government came 
 down to the House of Commons and said that, what sort 
 of reception would they get? But the approach is made, 
 and the policy entered upon, behind the scenes. Presently, 
 when the situation " develops," there begin to appear in 
 the Press articles paid for, one way or another, by the 
 interests involved. The writer, very likely, is a shareholder 
 or a director in the company that has been formed. The 
 Imperialists perceive that the enterprise in question may 
 lead to the " expansion " of which they dream. They 
 probably combine financial profit with patriotic ambition. 
 The whole sorry business goes on in a kind of twilight — 
 ministers, if challenged, refusing information on the ground 
 of public policy — till, when it is too late, an international 
 " crisis " arises. And even then the essential facts are 
 concealed from the public, who are told that some other 
 Power has unwarrantably interfered Jn what does not 
 concern it, and that nothing but a full assertion of our 
 strength, with the patriotic support of all parties, can 
 suffice to save our " honour " or secure our " vital inter- 
 ests." It is thus that rumours of wars and wars come 
 about. And they come about thus because of the secrecy 
 which envelops all the initial stages of the transaction. 
 
 In considering the question of democratic control of 
 foreign policy, these are the kinds of facts that must be 
 attended to. The people may be pugnacious and unreflect- 
 ing, but it is not their pugnacity and their lack of reflection 
 that prepares war. War is prepared by a few and sprung 
 upon the many. As Mr. Churchill well put the matter, in 
 speaking of that deliberate fostering of hostility between 
 
236 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 the Germans and the English which led up to the present 
 conflict : — 
 
 If a serious antagonism is gradually created between the two 
 peoples, it will not be because of the workings of any natural or 
 impersonal forces, but through the vicious activity of a compara- 
 tively small number of individuals in both countries and the 
 culpable credulity of larger classes.^ 
 
 This is the common course of events. Wars are not 
 made because of the passions of the many, but because 
 of the intrigues of the few ; and those intrigues are possible 
 because they are pursued in the dark. De mocratic cont rol, 
 then, means publicity. It has its risks, in foreign as in 
 domestic affairs. But since secrecy has not only its risks, 
 but its demonstrated catastrophic failure, there can be no 
 reason for preferring secrecy. 
 
 Indeed, if democratic principle be accepted at all, there 
 is, on the face of it, something preposterous about exempting 
 from it foreign policy. An Insurance Bill, a Shop Hours 
 Bill, an Education Bill, a Land Bill, are canvassed eagerly 
 and passionately in Parliament and the country. The whole 
 Press is set in motion ; public meetings are held, deputations 
 are arranged, ministries rise and fall. But where hundreds 
 of millions of money and hundreds of thousands of lives 
 are concerned; where the very existence of the country is 
 at stake; where the decision to be taken involves not an 
 extra tax, or a tentative experiment in social legislation, 
 easily to be recalled or modified if it does not succeed, 
 but the immediate summoning of the whole manhood of 
 the country to kill and be killed in ways of unimaginable 
 horror; when, in short, that very thing to the fostering 
 and development of which every act of man, private and 
 public, is rightly and exclusively directed, when life itself 
 
 1 April 14, 1909. Letter to the Chairman of the Liberal Association 
 at Dundee. 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 237 
 
 is to be destroyed wholesale, that decision, the most terrible 
 any nation can be called upon to take, is precipitated by the 
 fiat of half a dozen men, working in the dark, without 
 discussion, without criticism, without a " by your leave " 
 or " with your leave " ; and those who are to sacrifice in 
 pursuance of it, everything which hitherto they have created 
 and cherished, have no other choice than to accept the 
 decision and pay the intolerable price. Surely only a god 
 should have such power over men! And we give it to 
 an emperor or a secretary of state! 
 
 That, in brief, is the general case for democratic control 
 of foreign affairs. And to any one who believes at all in 
 the root principle of democracy, the control by men of their 
 own lives and their own affairs, it must seem a strong one. 
 There are, however, real difficulties felt in accepting it 
 even among men otherwise democratically minded. And 
 these difficulties must be fairly considered. 
 
 It seems to be thought by many that there is something 
 about foreign policy peculiarly difficult to understand; that 
 it is a thing of mysteries and special faculties, so that, al- 
 though the methods of representative government may be 
 trusted to conduct us safely through all the intricacies of 
 our home affairs, though the people, roughly and in the last 
 resort, are fit to decide about free trade and tariff reform, 
 contributory or non-contributory / insurance, the nearer or 
 remoter effects of this or that method of taxation, and all 
 the innumerable questions, difficult even to experts, that are 
 raised by almost any of the legislative measures adopted 
 year by year in progressive countries; yet the same people 
 are specially and peculiarly unfit to judge about international 
 relations. 
 
 This contention appears to me mistaken. Foreign ques- 
 tions, I suggest, are commonly simpler and more comprehen- 
 sible than domestic ones. The difficulties connected with 
 
238 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 the former are rather moral than intellectual. The hard 
 thing is not to see what would be the right thing, but to get 
 the right thing done, where, on every side, there is suspicion, 
 fear, jealousy, and bad will. 
 
 Let me illustrate from some contemporary issues. Take 
 the case of Morocco. Essentially, what was it? The 
 French wanted to annex Morocco. The Germans were 
 opposed to this, partly because they were interested in the 
 trade and resources of the country ; partly, perhaps, because 
 they themselves wished to annex territory there. The Brit- 
 ish were willing to consent to a French annexation, so long 
 as the strip of coast opposite Gibraltar did not fall into the 
 hands of the French or of any strong Power. Nothing can 
 be simpler than all this. It is not an intellectual problem 
 at all. It is a contention for power and influence and 
 wealth. Compare it, for difficulty of an intellectual kind, 
 with the question of the ultimate effects on employment, 
 wages, and prices of a protective tariff. Yet it never occurs 
 to any one to withdraw this latter question from the ultimate 
 control of the people. 
 
 Take again the Balkan question. It is, of course, intri- 
 cate. It requires for its solution knowledge of a number of 
 facts about races, boundaries, and the like. But so far as 
 questions of general policy are concerned — questions that 
 alone could be laid before a Parliament — the matter is 
 simplicity itself. Is Austria to eat up those peoples? Is 
 Russia to eat them up? Or are they to eat up one an- 
 other? Or is such an arrangement to be promoted as will 
 separate out the nationalities, so far as may be practicable, 
 and permit each to develop freely in its own way ? The diffi- 
 culty here is to get people to do the right thing, not to see 
 what the right thing is. And so far as the Balkan question 
 concerns this country, I conceive Parliament to be as com- 
 petent to decide what attitude we should adopt toward it as 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 239 
 
 it is to decide upon the desirability of fixing by law the wages 
 of agricultural labourers. 
 
 Or take the question between Mexico and the United 
 States. It is complicated, of course. But the main diffi- 
 culty for the ordinary citizen in forming an opinion about it 
 is that he is kept ignorant of essential facts, such as the 
 operations of the American and British oil or railroad inter- 
 ests, and their influence on the political situation. But if 
 the facts were sufficiently made known, it seems clear that 
 the decision of American policy would turn upon the an- 
 swer to be given to certain questions which are exactly of 
 the kind that ought to be submitted to the people, as: 
 Ought we to recognize any government that can keep order 
 in Mexico, or only such a government as stands for the in- 
 terests of the Mexican people ? Does American honour re- 
 quire us to go to war because the American flag has been 
 insulted, or because American citizens have been murdered 
 on the frontier? Is the Mexican anarchy so serious and 
 incurable that the United States have an interest and a duty 
 to end it at the cost of a long and bloody war ? 
 
 These are not easy questions to answer, even when the 
 relevant facts are known. They will be answered differ- 
 ently by different temperaments. But they are not — like 
 tariff questions, for example — questions for experts. 
 There can be no experts in such matters. The problems 
 are moral — for what issues will we take what risks and 
 make what sacrifices ? And it is exactly such questions that 
 a democracy exists to answer. 
 
 . It may be urged, in reply, that the objection to democratic 
 control of foreign affairs is not that the questions are too 
 complicated, but that they are too important for popular de- 
 cision. Their importance is, I think, often misrepresented 
 by those who concern themselves with international rela- 
 tions. They are apt to assume that the real business of a 
 
240 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 State is its foreign policy, and that domestic policy is a kind 
 of sordid game, dividing a nation and weakening it in the 
 pursuit of its true purposes. Whereas a just estimate 
 would show that the contrary is the case : that, for example, 
 the domestic questions that have been rightly preoccupying 
 England and France during the last decade touch vitally 
 those real needs of men and women which it is difficult to 
 bring into any relation at all to the issues that led up to the 
 war. Still, foreign policy is very important, if only because 
 it may produce war. But then, what reason is there to 
 suppose that, for this reason, the people, if properly in- 
 formed, would be unfit to deal with it ? 
 
 In fact, two opposite charges are brought against them, 
 either of which might be true at one time or another. It 
 is supposed that they would not be ready to face the test 
 of war, when it was vital to the nation's interest that 
 they should. And it is supposed that they would rush into 
 war when their wise counsellors would have kept them 
 out of it. 
 
 Either of these things might certainly happen. But 
 what happens now? What has been happening for cen- 
 turies? Let us take the present war. What are all Eng- 
 lishmen, Frenchmen, Russians saying? Are they not 
 accusing the German Government of precipitating upon 
 Europe a monstrous and unnecessary war? Are they not 
 urging that the only way to prevent such a catastrophe in 
 the future is the democratization of the German Constitu- 
 tion? That is, precisely, the calling in of the people to put 
 an end to aggressive jingoism ! Perhaps that method 
 might be unsuccessful. My point is, that the other method 
 has also been unsuccessful. Or look at Austria. These 
 diplomats who sent the ultimatum to Serbia, who refused 
 to extend the time-limit, who rejected recourse to arbitra- 
 tion, who rejected diplomatic mediation — could the Parlia- 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 241 
 
 ment of a democratic country have done worse? Is it not 
 practically certain that it would have done otherwise and 
 better? Or turn to the case of Italy. The Italian Govern- 
 ment, we are told, was forced into the war by popular 
 enthusiasm. I do not know whether this is true. But, if it 
 be, for those who believe in the catise of the Allies it is an 
 example of the sound instinct of the people defeating the 
 erroneous calculations of statesmen. 
 
 It is true that upon foreign policy issues of life and 
 death hang more immediately and perilously than upon 
 domestic. It is true that Parliaments and peoples cannot 
 be trusted to decide with infallibly right judgment. But 
 that is true also of statesmen and diplomats. There is 
 nothing special about foreign policy which makes demo- 
 cratic principles less applicable there than in other de- 
 partments of national life. Broadly, almost every question 
 of foreign policy is one of power, or of the prestige which 
 is a guarantee of power. And it is precisely on these ques- 
 tions of power that the people ought to pronounce, since 
 it is their blood that has to purchase or maintain the power. 
 What bearing has this " power " on the good life of men, 
 our own or that of others for whom we may be rightly 
 responsible ? There is the most general problem of foreign 
 policy, put as it ought to be put. How the people would 
 answer it I do not take upon myself to say. I think they 
 would' answer it otherwise than the diplomats have done. 
 But, in any case, it is for them to answer it, if it is for 
 them to answer anything at all. I doubt whether any one 
 will deny this who at all accepts the principle of De- 
 mocracy. 
 
 There is then, I would urge, on the face of the facts, 
 the same reason for subjecting to public control the issues 
 of foreign policy that there is for so subjecting any other 
 issue. This does not imply the dispensing with training 
 
242 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 and knowledge. It implies the putting of that training and 
 knowledge at the disposal of the nation for its instruction, 
 and the acceptance of the verdict of the nation thus in- 
 structed. We, in England, require a Salisbury, a Lans- 
 downe, a Grey. Americans require a Root or a Lansing. 
 But in a, democracy these men are required, not to direct 
 a passive nation, but to take it into their confidence and 
 then leave to it the decision. Now it is clear that, in 
 Europe, at any rate, the people have no control over foreign 
 policy, even in countries otherwise democratic. This war 
 certainly was sprung upon the British nation. True, after 
 it had been so sprung, the nation endorsed it. But it was 
 in the years preceding that the control ought to have been 
 exercised. How the control would have operated must be 
 matter of conjecture. But it is clear that, from a demo- 
 cratic point of view, the nation ought to have known what 
 policy was being pursued and what the risks were. It could 
 then have decided whether it would pursue a policy that 
 might land it at any moment in a European war (in which 
 case, presumably, it would have made the requisite prepara- 
 tions), or whether it would alter the whole direction of its 
 policy, by proceeding, for example, on the lines indicated by 
 Sir Edward Grey in his often-quoted dispatch.^ Or if it 
 should have become evident, in attempting that change, 
 that Germany was bent upon war, it would have been all 
 the better that the fact should be known and the requisite 
 measures taken. The result of not taking the nation into 
 the confidence of the Government was about as bad as any- 
 thing could be — a policy drifting into war without making 
 any adequate preparations for war. 
 
 1 " And I will say this : if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and 
 the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote 
 some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she 
 could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued 
 against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves jointly or 
 separately" (British White Paper, No. loi). 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL ^43 
 
 That the peoples of Europe have, in fact, even in coun- 
 tries otherwise democratic, no control over foreign policy 
 will hardly be disputed. But the question remains, how 
 does this come about ? In detail, the answer will be differ- 
 ent in different countries, according to the details of con- 
 stitutional machinery and parliamentary procedure. But 
 one fundamental fact applies generally. The people in no 
 country have cared to know or control. In England, and 
 no doubt in other countries, it is plainly true that the advent 
 of democracy has meant, so far, not more but less interest 
 in foreign policy. The new classes admitted to the fran- 
 chise have, naturally enough, concentrated their interest 
 on the domestic legislation that bears directly on the 
 conditions of their life. This legislation, more and more,, 
 has taken up the time and attention of Parliament. The 
 front benches have profited by the situation to withdraw 
 foreign policy from the arena of party controversy. And 
 this withdrawal has meant that discussion has been dis- 
 couraged, and that the Foreign Secretary has been able to 
 evade requests for information, with the full approval of 
 the bulk of members in the House. It is thus that the 
 almost incredible thing has occurred, that the whole of our 
 foreign policy has received a new direction, that Great 
 Britain has moved away from her old friend Germany, and 
 toward her old enemies France and Russia, that she has 
 abandoned the policy of isolation and adopted that of alli- 
 ances, and that Englishmen have made themselves liable 
 to be involved in a European war on a gigantic scale and to 
 be converted, contrary to the whole tradition of their liber- 
 ties, into a military and conscript nation, almost without no- 
 tice being taken in the country of this tremendous transform- 
 ation, carried out by the Foreign Secretary and a handful of 
 officials at the Foreign Office, without ever becoming, even 
 in a subordinate way, an issue at a general election. 
 
244 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Now, it would hardly be honest to put the blame for all 
 this on the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office. 
 They prefer, no doubt, to conduct foreign aifairs auto- 
 cratically, and are sceptical of the new point of view that 
 an instructed democracy might bring to bear upon them. 
 But, after all, in the English system any matter can be 
 made public and brought under control, if the people are 
 determined to do it. And in England it must be admitted 
 that, if this has not been done, it is because the people have 
 not cared to do it. A Foreign Secretary would have 
 had to give information, if it had been made clear that 
 otherwise there would be a vote of censure. And improve- 
 ments in the machinery of our parliamentary government, 
 useful and necessary as they may be, will not ensure demo- 
 cratic control unless the people are determined to have it. 
 Will they be determined? I cannot say. But after the 
 experience of this war, it does not seem likely that they 
 will revert to the illusion that foreign policy does not 
 concern them. 
 
 The popular control of foreign policy will become pos- 
 sible, then, in democratic States, if, and only if, the people 
 care enough about it to insist upon having it. But not all 
 States are democratic, or likely to become so in the imme- 
 diate future.^ And it is urged that democratic diplomacy 
 must be at a disadvantage when it has to deal with an 
 autocracy. But this is not self-evident. Has autocratic 
 diplomacy, in fact, shown itself to be so intelligent and 
 effective ? German diplomacy certainly has not. It has led 
 Germany into a war in which she is faced by a coalition 
 unexampled since that which combined against Napoleon; 
 and no one is more critical of German diplomacy than the 
 German people. 
 
 Autocracy is no guarantee of good diplomacy. Nor, 
 
 iThis was written before the Russian revolution. 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL S45 
 
 of course, is democracy. There can be no such guarantee. 
 The advantage of democracy is that it puts responsibility 
 for failure where it should reside, with the people who 
 have to take the consequences. And to those who urge 
 that the people, in fact, would be less careful of the national 
 interest, and less willing to make sacrifices for it than 
 professional diplomats, it must be replied, first, that there 
 is no evidence of this ; secondly, that if it were true it would 
 still be no argument. 
 
 The time has gone by for entrusting the destinies of. 
 nations to the supposed wisdom of experts. Experts, if 
 indeed they exist, should advise, they should not control. 
 The decision must rest with the nation, that is, with the 
 total result of all the forces, material, moral and intellectual, 
 progressive and regressive, pacifist and militarist, ^ which 
 combine in it and contend for mastery. To desire to 
 withdraw foreign affairs from the control of this growing 
 life, to keep them as a mystery for a profession, or a 
 clique, or a class, is to attempt to fasten upon the present 
 and the future the stamp of the past, to assume in this 
 one department of life unchanging facts and principles and 
 a finished science. People who so think have too narrow 
 a conception of democracy. Democracy is the whole sum 
 of the arrangements whereby all the faculties of a nation 
 are brought to bear upon its public life; and the representa- 
 tive system — itself, no doubt, capable of and requiring 
 much improvement — is the machinery by which the de- 
 cisions thus reached are translated into action. Our present 
 conduct of foreign affairs, even in countries otherwise 
 democratic, is a survival from a different order ; one where 
 a nation was regarded as mere passive stuff from which a 
 few men, with credentials held to be divine, should shape 
 what figure they might choose. That order has passed 
 away, with the conceptions on which it rested. A new order 
 
246 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 is struggling into life. And from the principles of the new 
 order no department of life can claim to be exempt. 
 
 Supposing democratic control to be established, what 
 would be its effect on peace and war? I am one of those 
 who think it would make for peace. Not that I suppose 
 the mass of men to be less pugnacious and bellicose than 
 the class that has hitherto conducted foreign policy. Once 
 let a war be on the near horizon, and the people will lose 
 their heads just as much as any one else. But it is in 
 the process of getting the war on to the horizon that I 
 should expect a change. The governing classes have been 
 influenced in their foreign policy partly by the abstract idea 
 of power, partly by class interests. They have been ap- 
 pealed to by the pride of being a " dominant race " ; by a 
 sporting feeling about war; by an instinct that war puts 
 them back into the position of ascendancy to which they 
 feel that they have a natural right. These are the " aristo- 
 cratic " motives, plainly very strong in Germany, and not 
 without considerable influence in England. To these must 
 be added the more modern motives of plutocracy: the in- 
 trigues with governments of financiers and traders to push 
 their particular interests; that whole competition between 
 the capitalists of different nations which, directly or indi- 
 rectly, has been the cause lying behind recent wars. These 
 motives democratic control would set aside. It would insist 
 upon putting the plain question that has hardly begun to 
 influence governments in their conduct of foreign affairs, 
 though it is the only relevant question: How does your 
 policy bear upon the life of the people ? A radical transfor- 
 mation was begun in the whole direction of domestic policy 
 when the much-maligned utilitarians brought that question 
 forward in a way in which it could no longer be evaded. 
 But the question has never yet been put effectively, and so 
 that it cannot be evaded, to the directors of foreign policy. 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 247 
 
 Democratic control would mean th'at it would be put; and 
 the consequences, I believe, would be all favourable to 
 peace. And that, not because the people are, as individuals, 
 all pacific, nor because they are idealists, but because their 
 general interest and outlook is favourable to peace.^ 
 
 Granting that the people in the different States should 
 have an effective will to control foreign affairs, the ma- 
 chinery of constitutional government will have to be adapted 
 to this purpose. The method of doing this must be worked 
 out in each case by those who are conversant with the 
 constitutional theory and practice of the countries con- 
 cerned. It is, however, important to insist that there 
 must be international as well as national publicity. All 
 nations must have an opportunity, in the case of an acute 
 dispute, of knowing the position and claims of all other 
 nations. This can be done only through a full inquiry by 
 an international authority such as has been advocated in the 
 preceding pages. 
 
 There is no magic means of conjuring war. The pas- 
 sions, the cupidities, possibly even the convictions of nations 
 may provoke it in the future, as they have done in the past. 
 But at least it should be possible to secure that, if there is 
 to be war, it should be the people themselves that choose 
 it with their eyes open; and that, if whole generations of 
 young men are to be destroyed, at least they should see the 
 catastrophe coming and be able to affirm with full knowledge 
 that so it had to be and that to them no choice was given. 
 TS,v 8e <l>da Kal oXeaaov. " Destroy US, if it must be so. But 
 let it be in the light." 
 
 1 That is, to international peace. I am not here discussing the causes 
 or possibility of civil war. 
 
348 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 228. — Democratic Control, 
 
 The question of democratic control of foreign policy has been 
 mooted, since the war, in all countries. (See, e.g., notes from the 
 foreign Press in the Cambridge Magazine for August 19 and 
 October 28, 1916.) It is to be noted that the demand for demo- 
 cratic control comes as much from the Militarist as from the 
 Liberal or Socialist Press ; the truth being that every one feels that 
 public opinion can never again be as passive to the issues of war 
 and peace as it has been in the past, and that each party hopes to 
 capture public opinion for its own policies. This is as it must be, 
 and should be. It is the determination to have control that is the 
 first and essential point in getting control. The rest is machinery. 
 
 Of this machinery there has been some discussion. I may refer, 
 so far as England is concerned, to Mr. Ponsonby's book, Democracy 
 and Diplomacy (Methuen, 191 5) ; and, for the general question, to 
 the articles on the subject contained in the second volume of 
 the Recueil des Rapports de ['Organisation Centrale pour une Paix 
 durable, especially to that of Bernstein. Bernstein, it may be 
 noted, throws doubt, from his experience in the German Reichstag, 
 on the efficacy of a Parliamentary Committee to secure Parlia- 
 mentary control of policy. 
 
 Page 229. — How Wars are Brought About. 
 
 Gladstone's view about the reception of the mission by the 
 Ameer is endorsed in more cautious language by the writer of 
 the chapter dealing with this period in the Cambridge Modern 
 History, who says that Lord Lytton "described the arrest of the 
 mission with undoubted exaggeration as a forcible repulse, and 
 clamoured for permission from the Home Government to launch 
 across the frontiers the troops that were already massed at the 
 entrance to the passes." Those patriots who imagine that British 
 policy is invariably fair and just may be recommended to read 
 the history of the events that led up to the second Afghan War. 
 (C M. H., vol. 12, chap. 16.) 
 
 From Nationalism and War in the Near East, by " Diplomaticus " 
 (P- ^77) t I cite the following further examples. 
 
 At the origin of the Balkan War of 1912, the author says — 
 
 "The supposed massacre o"f Serbs at Sienitza, the reported 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 24.9 
 
 massacre of Montenegrins at Berane, and the provoked massacre 
 of some hundreds of Bulgars at Kochana, were in the circum- 
 stances likely to be as decisive as ' the formal declaration of war.' " 
 
 And he adds the following note : — 
 
 " The Sienitza incident, first announced as a massacre of thou- 
 sands of Serbs, reduced itself to the murder of one — but only after 
 the required effect on public opinion had been produced. Whether 
 the bomb-throwing at Kochana, which provoked the killing of 
 Bulgar peasants there, was a Macedo-Bulgar incitement to mas- 
 sacre or a Young Turk intrigue to excite war, matters little to the 
 argument here, which only asserts that it was one or the other." 
 
 Again he says (ibid., p. 230, note) : — 
 
 " In the winter of 1912 the Viennese militarists wanted to stir 
 up war with Serbia. M. Prochaska, Austrian Consul at Prisrend, 
 had associated himself with Albanian opposition to the Serbian 
 occupation. The Serbian Government having complained of him 
 and other Consuls, and the Austrian Government having failed to 
 get into communication with him, stories were spread of his having 
 been maltreated, and later that he and others had been murdered. 
 The report of a commission of inquiry, which showed these tales 
 to be tendentious inventions, confirmed Austrian public opinion 
 in its opposition to a policy of adventure." 
 
 Of the same episode Fernau says (Because I am a German, 
 p. 144) that the reports of the massacre were circulated by the 
 Austrian Foreign Office, which knew all the time that they were 
 false. 
 
 No sooner is a war well on the horizon than it is the cue of 
 governments and the Press to pretend that there is immense 
 popular enthusiasm behind it. The process of lying, which is the 
 regular and necessary accompaniment of every war, begins at that 
 point, and people soon even cease to know what they really do feel, 
 in the flood of talk about what they are supposed to be feeling. 
 Any one then can get up popular demonstrations, as any one can 
 write inflammatory articles in the Press. What was really the 
 value of the alleged popular demonstrations which are said to 
 have compelled the Italian Government to go to war? I do not 
 pretend to know. But I am exceedingly sceptical about these 
 "popular" demonstrations. In an interesting article which ap- 
 peared in the Westminster Gazette at the beginning of the war, 
 Mr. Arthur Ransome describes what looks like the truth about the 
 mobilization in Russia. I cite the following: — 
 
250 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 " Stefan Stefanovitch was sitting, alone on a seat in a corner of 
 the garden. He had been in Petersburg the night before, and had 
 only come down to the country that afternoon. 
 
 " He shook me by both hands. 
 
 " ' It is war,' he said; ' and I hate war. We all hate war. And 
 now I have got to go and kill people I never saw before in my 
 life.' He laughed, but went on to tell how the porter at his rooms 
 in town had also received the paper ordering him to join the 
 colours; how he had seen that there was a similar paper for his 
 master; and how he had brought the letter in, with the tears 
 running down his face. . . . 
 
 " The most remarkable thing during the days that followed the 
 mobilization order was the silence. The men were silent, or very 
 quiet. The place seemed at first stunned, and then too serious 
 to shout. Such shouting as there was came, I believe, from the 
 throats of hooligans, except in a few instances of sudden and 
 explicable enthusiasm. 
 
 " Down the Nevsky Prospect a group of Reservists trudged in 
 their working clothes, coloured shirts, broad belts, high boots, 
 rope-shoes, or even with rags wound about their feet. They 
 carried their belongings in little boxes, or handkerchiefs, or string 
 bags. Some of them had brought their own kettles with them. 
 A number of women, many with little children, walked with them. 
 The tears were running down the faces of some. They marched 
 quite silently, except when people on the pavement cheered them, 
 and then they cheered back, dreadfully, like men only partly 
 awakened from a dream. . . . 
 
 " These last few days the streets have been filled with processions 
 called manifestations of popular enthusiasm, but really of a very 
 different origin. Small groups of hooligans, the worst blackguards 
 of the town, start through the streets with flags. They begin a 
 hymn and are soon joined by people of genuine enthusiasm. 
 Every one they meet is compelled to take his hat off. By accident 
 I fell among the leaders of one of these manifestations. A rough 
 crowd of vicious-faced, undersized men and boys, stinking horribly ! 
 Nothing could be a better comment than the sight of the men who 
 are going to fight trudging seriously along and turning down a side 
 street in order to get out of their way." 
 
 I will here cite, as illustrating the uncertainty that reigns on the 
 question of whether a war is popular, the following passages from 
 Mr. GUver's Ordeal by Battle:^ 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 251 
 
 ( 1 ) " This is a people's war surely enough, but jtist as surely the 
 (German) people had no hand in bringing it about." 
 
 (2) " To regard it as a Kaiser's war or a bureaucrats' war is 
 merely to deceive ourselves. It is a people's war if ever there was 
 one." (Cited in The Future of Militarism, by "Roland," p. 126.) 
 
 The following passage from Vingt et un propos d' Alain, written 
 in 1912, gives a good picture of the kind of elements in society 
 that are always pushing for war : — 
 
 " Et qu'est que c'est que ces terribles gens ? Des hommes du 
 metier, qui voudraient essayer leurs armes : et cette opinion est 
 naturelle. Mais a cote de cela, beaucoup d'hommes d'age, ce qui 
 est assez choquant : car celui qui n'ofifrira pas sa poitrine aux coups 
 ne doit point faire le guerrier: c'est un peu trop facile. Aussi, 
 bon nombre de femmes elegantes, que je suppose conduites par 
 une passion aveugle centre la liberte, et par I'esperance de quelques 
 tyrannie victorieuse. Mais enfin comment une femme peut elle 
 pousser a la guerre? Comptons aussi tous les ennemis du peuple, 
 qui souhaitent confusement on ne salt quelle catastrophe ovi Ton 
 risquerait tout, avec la consolation d'y ecraser siirement la 
 republique. Mais derriere ce petit bataillon d'aristocrates, qui par 
 eux-memes ne peuvent rien, je vols une masse de gens qui repetent 
 ce que Ton dit et qui crient comme les autres, sans s'interroger 
 eux-memes serieusement. C'est cette abandon de soi qui est 
 redoubtable, chez I'etranger comme chez nous. II faudrait reveil- 
 ler tous ces dormeurs, qui ont peur de tout excepte d'une guerre 
 atroce et ruineuse ; il faudrait leur montrer de belles choses a faire 
 et assez difficiles deja, contre I'ignorance, contre la misere, centre 
 la maladie, contre le crime. lis ne sont qu'endormis. C'est pour- 
 quoi je crois que la paix et le progres en Europe dependent du 
 bon sens, de 1' eloquence, du courage de dix hommes peut-etre dans 
 chaque pays." 
 
 In illustration of the necessity of overcoming by some device 
 the natural reluctance of the people to make war for the sort of 
 reasons for which wars in fact are made, I may cite the following 
 passage from Nationalism and the War in the Far East. Speaking 
 of the preparation of the Italian war on Tripoli, the author 
 writes : — 
 
 " The Abyssinian adventure had left so deep an impression on 
 Italy that the war-party, consisting of the Southern townsmen, 
 especially in Sicily and Rome, and of clerical, financial and military 
 interests had no easy task in prevailing over the commercial. 
 
252 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 Liberal, and labour interests of the better educated Lombards, 
 Piedmontese, and Venetians." 
 
 Again, summing up the causes which led Turkey into the first 
 Balkan War, the same author writes: — 
 
 " So once again an organized and obstinate minority forced an 
 unorganized and obedient majority to fight for the privileges of 
 the minority; once again Imperialism forced an Empire to fight 
 against its true Imperial interest." 
 
 In the case of the United States and Mexico we have the re- 
 markable, and, so far as I know, the unique fact that the head of 
 a government has publicly accused financial interests of working 
 for war with a view to their own profit. After sending his expedi- 
 tion into Mexico to capture Villa, President Wilson warned the 
 nation "that there are persons all along the border who are 
 actively engaged in originating and giving as wide currency as 
 they can to rumours of the most sensational and disturbing sort, 
 which are wholly unjustified by the facts.'' " The object of this 
 trafiic in falsehood," he concluded, " is obvious. It is to create 
 intolerable friction between the Government of the United States 
 and the de facto Government of Mexico, for the purpose of bring- 
 ing about intervention, in the interest of certain American owners 
 of Mexican properties.' This object cannot be obtained so long as 
 honourable men are in control of this Government, but very serious 
 conditions may be created, unnecessary bloodshed may result, and 
 the relations between the two Republics may be very much em- 
 barrassed. The people of the United States should know the 
 sinister and unscrupulous influences that are afoot, and be on their 
 guard against crediting any story coming from the border." (See 
 a statement made from Washington, March 25, 19 16.) 
 
 If there had been in office in the United States a man less 
 courageous, humane, and honourable than Mr. Wilson, it is pretty 
 certain that war would have resulted. But it is not often in history 
 that a man of Mr. Wilson's calibre has controlled foreign policy in 
 any State. 
 
 In the same connexion the following passage is worth quoting. 
 It is written by Mr. Gulick, the well-known authority on Japan and 
 her relations to the United States. 
 
 "In this connexion, I wish to speak of the grave injury that 
 is being done to both Japan and America by the irresponsible 
 statements in the Press regarding the motives and actions of each 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 253 
 
 country. Every evil suspicion and surmise apparently is voiced as 
 assured news. Only last Wednesday two senators were quoted by 
 the Washington Post as saying that they had positive information 
 that the Japanese Government were aiding the Mexican Govern- 
 ment with arms in order to embarrass our Government. This 
 statement was positively denied by President Wilson a couple of 
 days later, but the story served to do its share of the work in 
 making both countries suspicious of each other. I regard as one 
 of the most serious dangers to the right relations of Japan and 
 America the irresponsible and apparently maliciously fabricated 
 ' news ' that finds such ready utterance in so many of our papers " 
 ("Two Addresses " by Professor Sidney L. Gulick, p. 32). 
 
 A special study c^f the activities of the Press in inflaming 
 international relations, and of the motives dictating its action, 
 would be of extraordinary interest and importance. But it would 
 be difBcult to penetrate the secrecy in which the whole matter is 
 involved. As an example of the kind of thing I mean, I may 
 refer the reader to some letters by Mr. E. D. Morel which appeared 
 in the Daily News during October 191 1. Mr. Morel there con- 
 tends that certain articles in the Temps dealing with Franco- 
 German relations were dictated by the financial interests of the 
 N'Goko Sangha Company in the French Congo. And he is able 
 to quote from the report of the Budget Committee of the French 
 Chamber for 191 1 the following passage: — 
 
 " It is necessary that it should be henceforth known that articles 
 in Le Temps dealing with foreign affairs are not solely inspired by 
 the Government; there they are, on the contrary, sometimes 
 directed against the Government, to compel the Government to 
 embark upon financial enterprises which every one can appreciate. 
 No greater service can be rendered to the foreign policy of our 
 country than to demonstrate the necessity of accepting the policy 
 of the foreign editorials of Le Temps with the greatest circumspec- 
 tion." 
 
 Further, Mr. Morel cites from the same report the following 
 remark made to a French Colonial Minister in his own oflSce by the 
 director of the N'Goko Sangha Company : — 
 
 " You will not give us satisfaction to which we are entitled. 
 Very well, we shall obtain it without you, for I have behind me 
 the whole Press and two hundred members of Parliament." 
 
 I have verified these citations. (See Chamhre des Deputes, 
 No. 376, session de 1910.) 
 
254. THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 On the subject of secret diplomacy, the following passage from 
 Jaures is worth quoting: — 
 
 " The adversaries of Socialism," he says, " forget, or pretend to 
 forget, that even in democratic countries war can be unchained 
 without the consent of the people, without its knowledge, against 
 its will. They forget that, in the mystery with which diplomacy 
 is still surrounded, foreign policy too often escapes from the 
 control of the nations; that an imprudence, a fatuity, an imbecile 
 provocation, or the iniquitous cupidity of certain financial groups, 
 can unchain sudden conflicts; that it is still in the power of a 
 minority, of a tiny coterie, of a systematic and infatuated man, to 
 involve the nation, to create the irreparable, and that war and 
 peace still move outside the law of democracy. . . . 
 
 " The vast personal combinations of M. Hanotaux conducted 
 France to the verge of war with England. The vast personal 
 combinations of M. Delcasse conducted France to the verge of 
 war with Germany. . . . The antagonism of French and German 
 financiers put the peace of Europe in peril" (Jaures, L'Armee 
 nouvelie, p. 459). 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have indicated the kind of 
 international reorganization which will be required if we 
 are to escape universal militarism. I must now ask those 
 readers who have followed me so far to go yet one stage 
 further, and to consider how the policy of a League of 
 Nations must affect, if it is to be adopted, all the other con- 
 ditions of the settlement after the war. This aspect of the 
 matter has been fully and ably discussed by Mr. Brails ford 
 in his book A League of Nations} I am in substantial 
 agreement with his conclusions, to which I would refer the 
 reader. And I will confine myself here to a few of the 
 more obvious points. 
 
 The Allies have defined their war-aims as " Restitution, 
 Reparation, and Security." The two former I need not 
 here discuss. I take it for granted that any peace the Allies 
 could accept, short of their defeat, will include the restora- 
 tion of the territory occupied by the Central Powers and 
 compensation for injuries inflicted. Security is the problem 
 I am concerned with. And I argue for the security a 
 League of Nations might give, as against the security that 
 may be hoped from a crushing defeat of the enemy, fol- 
 lowed by the attempt to hold him down. Neither security 
 can be absolute, as every candid man will recognize. My 
 contention is that the League of Nations plan is much more 
 hopeful than the other. 
 
 What is the other plan? The traditional one of crush- 
 ing the enemy, so that he can't begin again, and leaving 
 
 1 Headley Bros., 1917. 
 255 
 
256 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 the matter there. To men who have little knowledge of 
 history, strong passions, and a desire to win for the sake of 
 winning, this plan seems to be beyond question the only 
 one. The position, as they see it, is very simple. " Ger- 
 many made the war, gratuitously and unprovoked. Put it 
 out of her power to do it again, and there will not be 
 another war." But this simple view leaves out almost the 
 whole of the facts. In the first place, Germany did not 
 make the war gratuitously and unprovoked. It was not a 
 peaceful Europe upon which she sprang it; it was the 
 Europe of armed anarchy on which I have dwelt. That is 
 the essential fact. The relative responsibility of different 
 States, during the ten years of diplomacy preceding the war, 
 though not unimportant, is secondary. I cannot here 
 digress into the question of how that responsibility should 
 be distributed. I have discussed it at length in another 
 place.* But if we remember that there were wars before 
 Germany was united, wars in which no German State took 
 part, wars in which the British fought on the side of Ger- 
 man States, wars in which the menace of " domination " 
 came not from Germans, but from Frenchmen or Russians, 
 we shall see at once that the causes of war go far deeper 
 and are far more complex than the ambition of any par- 
 ticular State. It follows that the cure for war must go 
 deeper than the reduction of one State to impotence. 
 
 Further, even if it were true that the present war had 
 been caused exclusively by German aggression, it would not 
 follow that by crushing Germany we should obtain a per- 
 manent security against her. Let us turn to history. For 
 twenty years Europe fought France, as the Power menacing 
 the liberties of all other States. France, in fact, did suc- 
 ceed, as Germany has not, in conquering and incorporating 
 with herself a great part of Europe. The force she de- 
 
 ^The European Anarchy (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1916). 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 257 
 
 veloped, relatively to that of her enemies, was incomparably- 
 greater than that which Germany has shown. After almost 
 continuous war for twenty years she was beaten, beaten to 
 her knees, and her capital occupied in triumph. Did she 
 thereafter cease to be a menace ? On the contrary. During 
 a great part of the nineteenth century the ambition of 
 France was still the bugbear of Europe, and especially of 
 England. Every internal revolution in her government was 
 expected to unchain a war either of liberty or of domination. 
 She was the firebrand of the world, or so believed to be ; and 
 was so far from being reduced to impotence by all she had 
 suffered that she could still think herself, even up to 1870, 
 invincible. 1871 appeared to have annihilated her. Did 
 it ? Look at her now ! 
 
 Again. After Jena, Prussia was " crushed " with a com- 
 pleteness that seemed to leave nothing more to be desired. 
 Half her territory was taken from her. She was disarmed, 
 and bound by treaty never to have on foot a larger army 
 than 42,000 men. A few years later, she was beside the 
 English crushing Napoleon at Waterloo. I infer from 
 these examples that no military victory can reduce to perma- 
 nent or even to long enduring impotence a nation which is 
 capable, numerous, tenacious, and proud. A military de- 
 feat of Germany, however complete it might be, would be 
 no guarantee against her doing again what she did in 19 14, 
 if she had the will, or the need, to do it. It may be replied 
 that the resurrection of Prussia after Jena and of France 
 after 1815 and 1871 were possible because the balance of 
 forces changed in Europe, and the once defeated Powers 
 found new allies. No doubt. And what is going to pre- 
 vent that in future? Nothing, unless it be such a change 
 of international outlook and policy as I have been advo- 
 cating. The members of the present alliance against the 
 Central Powers have no common interest to hold them 
 
258 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 permanently together unless they make a common interest of 
 the peace of the world. Short of that, the causes that have 
 always disrupted alliances will disrupt this one, namely, the 
 competing ambitions of the States allied. Look once more 
 at history. In 1814, immediately after the defeat of 
 France, while the negotiations for peace were still proceed- 
 ing, war almost broke out again, not between the Allies and 
 France, but between England and Austria ranged on the 
 side of France against Prussia and Russia. In the Crimean 
 War, England and France fought Russia. In 1859, Italy 
 and France fought Austria. In 1866, Prussia fought Aus- 
 tria. In 1870, Germany fought France. In 1877, Russia 
 fought Turkey. In 1904, Russia fought Japan. Finally, 
 in 1917 England, the secular enemy of France and of Rus- 
 sia, is fighting on their side, Germany, who fought Austria 
 in 1866, is fighting on her side. Russia, who fought Japan 
 in 1904, is fighting on her side. Turkey, who fought on 
 England's side in 1854, is fighting against her. Bulgaria, 
 who fought on Russia's side in 1877, is fighting against her ; 
 and both Italy and Roumania are fighting States to which 
 they were actually bound, at the outbreak of the war, by 
 treaties of alliance. This mere summary is sufficient to 
 show that we can no more rely on alliances than on military 
 victory to secure permanent peace, unless alliances are to 
 have a different object from any they have had in the past. 
 An alliance that is to be effective for the purpose must be a 
 league to keep the peace and support public law. 
 
 If that be granted, then the question of Germany comes 
 up in a new form. Is the best security against future 
 aggression on her part her exclusion from the League or 
 her inclusion in it ? I have already argued in favour of her 
 inclusion. But as the point is very important I will recur 
 to it here. 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 259 
 
 First, if we exclude Germany, we make our League a 
 league against her. We revert, that is, to that division of 
 Europe into two armed camps which led up to the present 
 war. It will be urged that an alliance as strong as that 
 which now confronts the Central Powers would be strong 
 enough, if it held together, to prevent Germany from risking 
 another war, especially if she were prevented from con- 
 summating the dreadful " Mittel Europa." That may be 
 true. But there are other points to be considered. In the 
 first place, Germany and her allies would regard such a 
 League as a constant menace to themselves. Outlawed 
 from the comity of Europe, they would never trust the 
 League not to abuse its preponderant power. They could 
 not reasonably do so; for preponderant power has always 
 been abused. The outlook of Europe therefore would not 
 be international. There would be two rival groups of 
 nations, each pursuing aims of power at the cost of the 
 other. It follows that there would be competitive arming 
 and counter-arming, as before 19 14. The Allies indeed 
 might, if they secured a crushing victory, impose a tempo- 
 rary disarmament on the Central Powers. But how could 
 they maintain it, short of a permanent occupation of 
 German territory? There could never be a good will to 
 disarmament in Germany unless all States disarmed. And 
 a Germany determined to arm, and indeed compelled to 
 arm, would find the means to arm. 
 
 Further, Germany excluded would be Germany intriguing 
 to break up the League. She might or might not succeed. 
 But that would and must be her effort. Rejected from the 
 new order, she would be unable to be loyal to it. She would 
 have far more motive to intrigue against it than she could 
 have if she were included in it, and she would have as good 
 opportunity to do so. Germany, beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
260 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 would be a greater menace to peace outside than inside 
 the League. 
 
 Lastly, and most important of all, if the German Powers 
 were excluded, the United States would not come in. I 
 think this may be said with confidence. The United States 
 may enter a League to guarantee peace on a basis of equal 
 rights and equal opportunities for all. They will not enter 
 an alliance of some European Powers against others, with 
 the chance of being dragged into a conflict which might 
 not be one of Right at all, and which, so far as America is 
 concerned, would not even be one of interest. The Amer- 
 ican proposal is for a new order, not for a perpetuation of 
 the old one in new combinations.^ But the guarantee of the 
 United States is the most important condition of the coming 
 into being and the effective working of a League of Nations. 
 And if for no other reason than to ensure American support, 
 the German Powers must be admitted. 
 
 These arguments are very strong. Two objections, how- 
 ever, may be brought forward, either of which, if true, 
 would be conclusive. The first is, that the feeling among 
 the allied nations will be such that they would not enter into 
 any treaty with Germany. But in fact they must enter into 
 a treaty, or they can make no peace at all. It is merely a 
 question what the form of the treaty shall be. And I 
 venture to believe that war passion is not so strong as to 
 override, in the belligerent nations, the desire for a durable 
 peace. In any case, their leaders in Church and State 
 should make every efifort to prevent such a catastrophe. 
 
 Next, it is urged that Germany would never enter into 
 such a League. That is speculation. The German Chan- 
 cellor has expressed officially the willingness of his country 
 to come in, and important organs of the German Press 
 
 1 This was stated explicitly and in detail by President Wilson in his 
 speech to the Senate in January 1917. See Notes to this chapter. 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 261 
 
 urge the same course.^ The reader, of course, has the 
 right, if he chooses, to discount that. The event, and that 
 only, can decide. Meantime, my argument is that Ger- 
 many should be invited to come in. If she refuses, the 
 consequences to herself and to Europe will be on her 
 head. 
 
 Further, if, as I argue, it is essential for the success of the 
 League that the Powers of Central Europe come in, then all 
 the other conditions of the settlement must be such that it 
 shall be possible for them to come in. We must aim not 
 at crushing and holding down the enemy States, but at 
 removing from all States the apprehensions and hindrances 
 which led up to the war. The only possible basis of a 
 successful League is the guarantee of equal Right to exist- 
 ence and peaceful development for all the States concerned. 
 To that end, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, any 
 changes of political allegiance made at the settlement must 
 be dictated solely by the needs and desires of the populations 
 it is proposed to transfer, and not by ambition for aggran- 
 dizement on the part of the States to whom they may be 
 transferred. There must be no conquests for the sake of 
 conquest; and whatever conquest may have taken place 
 must be used merely to satisfy national aspirations. 
 
 Secondly, there must be no attempt to hamper and restrict 
 the economic development of any State. The Paris Resolu- 
 tions point straight to the wrong kind of peace; to one that 
 cannot be durable, but must be a prelude to another war. 
 The passage in the Allies' Note to the United States where 
 they say that they recognize and propose to establish " the 
 right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the 
 enjoyment of full security and free economic development " 
 appears to be a definite repudiation of those Resolutions. 
 But it is plain that in all countries, not excluding England, 
 
 1 See Notes to this chapter. 
 
262 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 there are powerful parties and interests working for a pred- 
 atory and imperialistic settlement. If we intend a League 
 of Nations, those ambitions must be sacrificed. 
 
 Thirdly, where any State needs an outlet for its com- 
 merce by routes and ports not comprised in its own terri- 
 tory, the satisfaction should be given not by annexations, 
 but by international guarantees of free transit for peaceful 
 traffic. The problems of the Dardanelles, of Trieste, of 
 Fiume, of Dantzig, and other such, could and should be 
 settled so. Roads closed to armies but open to trade is 
 what a peaceful world needs. And by the application of 
 that policy claims might be fairly satisfied which otherwise 
 either could not be met at all, or met only at the cost of 
 annexation, leaving behind new causes of war. 
 
 All these questions I purposely leave unelaborated here. 
 But I could not conclude without making clear to the 
 reader that the policy of a League of Nations is not one for 
 after the war (as the Governments and the Press seem to 
 assume), but, if intended at all, must be intended here and 
 now, so that all other war aims may be correlated with it. 
 
 I am aware that to many readers the solution here sug- 
 gested will seem Utopian. I do not know whether it be or 
 no, for that depends upon the temper of nations and of 
 their Governments. But I do know that, if this be Utopia, 
 then Reality will be hell. For the alternative to a League 
 of Nations is universal militarism, as outlined in the first 
 chapter of this book. Either, at the close of the war, the 
 Nations will perform a great action of faith in themselves 
 and in one another, or they will succumb to an era of new 
 wars, which then they will regard as a fate, but which will 
 be, in fact, their own bad will writ large. 
 
 Is the will, then, really bad? I do not think so. What 
 finds expression, now, in the Press and in Parliament is bad. 
 But this does not utter the soul of men, nor their intellect; 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 263 
 
 it reflects and distorts their surface passions. The men 
 who are fighting this war are not fighting it for punishment 
 or revenge, for territory or power. They are fighting it for 
 a better world. They do not know how to achieve their 
 object. They will have no voice in the settlement. But 
 those who will have the voice will betray the living and the 
 dead, if they offer them nothing better than a new handicap 
 in the old race to ruin. If England is to give these men 
 what they have fought for, she must be content to take 
 nothing for herself. When she has vindicated Liberty and 
 Right, she must lay those gifts on the altar of mankind, and 
 retire with hands clean because they are empty. Only a 
 nation thus disinterested can be trusted. And of the temple 
 we have to build, trust is the corner stone. 
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 Page 260. — The United States and the League of Nations. 
 
 The following passage from President Wilson's speech to the 
 Senate of January 22, 1917, states clearly the point made in the 
 text : — 
 
 " No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the 
 peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe 
 against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the 
 peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of 
 that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy 
 the principles of the American Government, elements consistent 
 with the political faith and the practical convictions which the 
 peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken 
 to defend. 
 
 " I do not man to say that any American Government would 
 throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Govern- 
 ments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when 
 made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that 
 mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even 
 the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace 
 secure. 
 
 " It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a 
 
264. THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater 
 than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto 
 formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of 
 nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be 
 made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized 
 major force of mankind. 
 
 " The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine 
 whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. 
 The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of 
 the world depends is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and 
 secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only 
 a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who 
 can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? 
 Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, 
 not a balance of power, but a community of power ; not organized 
 rivalries, but an organized common peace." 
 
 The whole speech should be carefully studied; it is perhaps 
 the most important international document of all history. And it 
 bears in the most direct way on the kind of peace that is possible 
 and desirable after the war. The reader may be referred to an 
 article on this subject in War and Peace for April 1917. 
 
 Page 260. — The German Chancellor and the German 
 Press on a League of Nations. 
 
 The following message, reproducing the Chancellor's remarks in 
 the Reichstag, was transmitted by Bernstorff to the American 
 League to Enforce Peace at their banquet on November 24, 1916 : — 
 
 "We have never concealed our doubts with regard to the 
 question whether peace could be permanently guaranteed by such 
 international organizations as arbitration courts. I shall, however, 
 at this place, not discuss the theoretical aspects of the problem, 
 but we must now, and at the time of the conclusion of peace, from 
 the point of view of facts, define our position with regard to this 
 question. When, at and after the end of the war, the world will 
 become fully conscious of its horrifying destruction of life and 
 property, then through the whole of mankind will ring a cry for 
 peaceful arrangements and understandings which, as far as lies in 
 human power, shall avoid the return of such a monstrous catas- 
 trophe. This cry will be so powerful and so justified that it must 
 lead to some result. Germany will honestly co-operate in the 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 265 
 
 examination of every endeavour to find a practical solution of the 
 question, and will collaborate to make its realization possible. 
 This all the more if the war, as we expect and trust, will create 
 political conditions which do full justice to the free development 
 of all nations, the small ones as well as the great nations. Then 
 it will be possible to realize the principles of justice and free 
 development on land and of the freedom of the seas. The first 
 condition for evolution of international relations by way of arbitra- 
 tion and peaceful compromise of conflicting interests should be 
 that no more aggressive coalitions are formed in future. Germany 
 will at all times be ready to enter a league for the purpose of 
 restraining the disturbers of peace." 
 
 In the original speech in the Reichstag (November g, 1916) the 
 Chancellor used the phrase, which gave offence in England, that 
 Germany would " put herself at the head " of such a League. He 
 officially stated later that he meant to imply by this phrase no 
 hegemony of Germany, but merely her readiness to take the lead, 
 rather than hold back, in such a movement. 
 
 The following remarks attributed to Count Karolyi are worth 
 citing in the same connexion, though they do not explicitly refer 
 to the League of Nations. Speaking of Naumann's Mittel Europa, 
 he is reported to have said : — 
 
 "We feel shy of the economic dangers of an economic hloc of 
 the whole of Middle Europe, as we should by it perpetuate the 
 economic war between the two groups of States. Such a state of 
 affairs after the war we cannot possibly wish for. On the con- 
 trary, we must work for an enduring peace, both political and 
 economic, with the other group." 
 
 As to the German Press, the following passages from the Ber- 
 liner Tageblatt (anything but a "pacifist" organ) are worth cit- 
 ing. The article is dealing with Lord Grey's speech in favour of a 
 League of Nations : — 
 
 "The lesson of this war for all the nations which have taken 
 part in it will be the necessity of doing everything in the future to 
 prevent the repetition of such a terrible misfortune. When once 
 the war spirit has passed away the nations will be able to reflect 
 calmly on the human as well as the material losses which this war 
 has caused. They will be burdened for generations with the pay- 
 ment of the interest and sinking funds of the war loans, with the 
 pensions for the war invalids and the dependants of the fallen, and 
 
266 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 all these burdens will have to be borne by a smaller number of 
 producers, so that the desire for a peaceful understanding will 
 become so strong in every nation that ideas of war will be very 
 slow to appear. 
 
 " Among the German people, who by an enormous majority 
 regard this war as a war for their existence (and they regard it 
 still more so after the resolutions of the Paris Conference and 
 the speeches of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George), there is an 
 intense desire to see this war ended by a durable peace in which 
 they can pursue their culture quietly and peacefully. We are not 
 striving for dominion; we do not wish to destroy or oppress any 
 nation. We should very much like to see differences of opinion 
 and causes of strife between nations settled by an international 
 court of arbitration. And if that is also England's peace aim the • 
 war need not be continued, ten thousand men need not be slaugh- 
 tered or maimed every day, and Europe need no longer be morally 
 and materially ruined. 
 
 " Also with Grey's last demand, the demand for an international 
 agreement on the methods of conducting war, we could declare 
 ourselves in thorough and willing agreement, as well as with the 
 warnings that would make it clear to every nation that departed 
 from these agreements that it would be regarded as the common 
 enemy of the human race by the whole world. . . . 
 
 " According to the repeated declarations of the Chancellor, we 
 are ready for a peace which has the guarantee of permanence, and 
 which secures for us the possibilities of development. If the 
 durability of peace can be guaranteed by an international organiza- 
 tion, our support may certainly be counted on" (cited in the 
 Westminster Gazette of November 18, 1916). 
 
 The very able IVelt am Montag, another Berlin organ enjoying, 
 I am told, a large circulation, printed several articles warmly 
 supporting the American League to Enforce Peace. Similar 
 articles, of course, are common in the Socialist Press. 
 
 On the other hand, such jingo organs as the Tageszeitung are as 
 sceptical of and hostile to the whole idea as our own Morning Post. 
 Militarists everywhere see in the idea of a League of Nations the 
 deathblow to their ambitions and hopes. 
 
 Page 262. — International Routes. 
 
 The " internationalization " of rivers has long been a recognized 
 fact. "In 1815 the Congress of Vienna decided that the great 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE SETTLEMENT 267 
 
 rivers of Western Europe should for the future be open to navi- 
 gation, and that the tolls to be levied on each of them should be 
 settled by common accord among the riverian Powers. In pur- 
 suance of this agreement, the Rhine, the Elbe, and other rivers 
 were at various times after 1815 opened to free navigation, on 
 payment of such moderate dues as were sufficient to recoup the 
 territorial Powers for their expenditure upon the waterway. The 
 Danube was freed by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and a European 
 Commission was charged with the duty of executing the necessary 
 engineering works at its mouths, and permitted to levy tolls 
 sufficient to pay their cost." * Similarly the navigation of the 
 British portion of the St. Lawrence was thrown open " for ever " 
 (by the treaty of Washington of 1871) to American citizens. 
 What is plainly required, and may naturally follow this precedent, 
 is a right to transmit goods in bond by railway across foreign 
 territory, or to ship them through certain sea-channels analogous 
 to rivers. However the Dardanelles be disposed of, it should be 
 forbidden by international law to close them to trade, even in time 
 of war. The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are already (by 
 treaty) open to war ships, as well as merchant ships, in war-time 
 as well as in peace. 
 
 Page 263. — The Soldiers' Aim in the War. 
 
 I do not suppose that most of the soldiers formulate their 
 purpose or have the knowledge either to accept or reject any 
 particular terms of settlement. But, from all I can learn by in- 
 quiry, I should conclude that their deepest wish is that such a war 
 may never occur again. The following passage from a letter from 
 a British soldier probably gives a view widely held: — 
 
 " We must finish this job, and this is going to be the last war. 
 
 Don't you make no mistake about it — - no more of this b y rot 
 
 for the kids — and chance it ! " ^ 
 
 Here are two explicit statements from educated youths at the 
 front. The first is from an Austrian : — 
 
 " We go to battle for freedom and justice — and our struggle is 
 for a lasting peace. ... If this lasting peace is really attained, 
 then I shall not have yielded up my young life in vain. For when 
 you read this letter I shall be resting under the sod. My spur to 
 
 1 Lawrence, International Law, p. 187. 
 
 2 Cited by C. R. Ashbee in The American League to Enforce Peace, 
 p. 88 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1917). 
 
268 THE CHOICE BEFORE US 
 
 endurance was the thought of the world peace which is to follow 
 on this world war. I left this world unwillingly. . . . Do not 
 forget what I lived for — what in the end I died for — the building 
 up of a better order which shall create happier men" (Arbeiter 
 Zeitung, December 19, 1915). 
 
 The other is from a young Cambridge man personally known 
 to me, one of the many whose promise has been cut off by this 
 war: — 
 
 " The younger generation, both of officers and men, is fighting 
 not for England only, but for Germany and the World as well. It 
 is convinced that militarism is a curse : and that a sane democracy, 
 however dimly realizable, would be a blessing. It sees that if, 
 after this war, Europe becomes a camp more completely armed 
 than ever, the sacrifice will have been in vain. It sees that Ger- 
 many alone can cure her own disease ; that she alone can crush her 
 military caste; and that reform, to be more than outward, must 
 come from within." 
 
 Further statements of soldiers at the front will be found cited in 
 the Cambridge Magazine for July 8, 15, and 29, 1916. 
 
 THE END