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 HENRY W. SAGE 
 
 1891 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
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 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924030718468 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 EIGHT LECTURES 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE LOWELL INSTITUTE 
 
 BOSTON OCTOBER-NOVEMBER I917 
 
By the courtesy of Harvard Illuslraled, 
 
 MR. BAKER, SECRETARY OF WAR, IXSPKCIIN(i THE HARVARD R.O.T.C. 
 
 FRESH PO-ND, CA^H^RIDGE, MASSAt.HUSETTS, I917 
 
 Left to right: President Lowell, Secretary Baker, Senator Lodge, Lieutenant Morize 
 
 Leut. Colonel Azan 
 
THE WARFARE 
 
 OF TO-DAY 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUT. COLONEL PAUL AZAN, Litt.D. 
 OF THE French Army 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 MAJOR JULIAN L. COOLIDGE, U.S.R. 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 1918 
 
COPYRIGHT, I918, BY HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPAMY 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 Published March iqlS 
 
TO ' 
 
 MY FRENCH COMRADE 
 
 LIEUTENANT ANDRfi MORIZE 
 
 IN REMEMBRANCE 
 
 OF OUR COMMON EFFORTS IN THE SERVICE 
 
 OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
CONTENTS 
 Introduction xv 
 
 I. The Present War i 
 
 A war of all the people — A war of positions — A war 
 of materiel — A war of attrition — A war of brutalization. 
 
 II. Training an Army for Modern War- 
 fare 29 
 
 Part played by the different arms in an army — Organi- 
 zation of the instruction of an army — Practical organi- 
 zation of the instruction in the French army — Organiza- 
 tion of the instruction of the American army. 
 
 III. The Trenches 74 
 
 Description of the ensemble of a system of trenches — 
 Detailed study of a system of trenches — Life in the 
 trenches — The liaison — Supply and relief. 
 
 IV. Preparation of an Attack . . . .145 
 
 Detailed study of the two opposing positions — Ma- 
 terial amenagement of the departure position — Smash- 
 ing the enemy's position — The physical, professional, and 
 moral training of the troops. 
 
 V. The Attack 189 
 
 Attack of the first-line trenches — The struggle inside 
 the position — The organization of the conquered posi- 
 tion. 
 
 VI. How TO ACHIEVE VICTORY .... 235 
 
 The general principles which determine success — Tac- 
 tical principles — Study of the two phases — March of 
 approach. 
 
 vii 
 
CONTENTS 
 VII. The Defence of a Position . . . 267 
 
 The organization of the defence — Material amSnage- 
 ment of the position — Defence of the position — Retreat 
 — Retour qffensif — Conclusion. 
 
 VIII. Officers and Soldiers .... 306 
 
 The feelings of a soldier — The qucilities of the com- 
 mander — The military situation in France — The French 
 troops. 
 
 Glossary 343 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, inspecting the 
 Harvard R.O.T.C. at Fresh Pond, Cambridge, 
 Massachusetts, in 1917 . . . . Frontispiece 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of Harvard Illustrated 
 
 The War of Mati&riel: A Munitions D6pot in 
 THE Rear of an Army ; Transportation of Sup- 
 plies BY A Narrow-Gauge Line along a Road 18 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L' Illustration 
 
 A Piece of Field Artillery under a Shelter . 42 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 A Piece of Heavy Artillery, 370 mm. Calibre 
 AND Camouflaged 42 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 Landing-Ground for Aircraft on the Aisne, 
 
 NEAR FiSMES, JANUARY 24, I917: A FrENCH 
 
 Machine carrying the Tricolor Identifica- 
 tion Marks ; A German Machine, carrying the 
 Black Cross, captured the same Day . . 44 
 
 From photographs by the author 
 
 An Observation Balloon on Landing; its Re- 
 moval to the Garage 46 
 
 From a photograph taken by the author on the Somme, 
 November, 19 16 
 
 Housing of an Observation Balloon in its 
 Camouflaged Garage 46 
 
 From a photograph taken by the author on the Somme, 
 November, 1916 
 
 ix 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 The Harvard R.O.T.C. at Wakefield, Massa- 
 chusetts, IN June, 1917 : Critique by Lieut. 
 Colonel Azan after Mancextvres ... 68 
 
 The Harvard R.O.T.C. at Camp Azan near 
 Barre, Massachusetts, July- August, 1917 . 68 
 
 The Iron Battalion manceuvring before Gen- 
 eral Hodges, U.S.A. ... ... 70 
 
 The Iron Battalion assembling for the Cri- 
 tique AT Waverley, Massachusetts, Septem- 
 ber, 1917 70 
 
 First-Line Trench near Ypres early in 191 5: 
 A Watcher in the First Line . . . .112 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 First-Line Trench in front of Langemarck, 
 January 17, 191 5, with Captain Azan resting 
 AT HIS Command Post 112 
 
 Watcher and Sniper (Private Eneau) in a 
 Trench near the Yser in December, 1914 . 114 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 A Sniper waiting for a Chance, Yser, Decem- 
 ber, 1914 114 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 The Great Square at Ypres in April, 1915: 
 Chevaux-de-frise carried by British Soldiers 128 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 Arrival of the Sergeant in Charge of the Post 
 Office at the Command Post of Major Azan 
 
 AT GrAVENSTAFEL NEAR PaSSCHENDAELE IN 
 
 April, 1915 128 
 
 X 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 A Relief marching through a Boyau . . 134 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of the Section Photogra- 
 phique of the French Army 
 
 134 
 
 Fresh Supply of Munitions at the Mort- 
 HoMME near Verdun 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of the Section Photogra- 
 phique of the French Army 
 
 Well-cared-for Grave of a French Cuiras- 
 sier, BETWEEN BoESINGHE AND LANGEMARCK 
 
 (1914) 142 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 Rxhns of THE Church of Langemarck, Decem- 
 ber 3, 1914: View taken from the House of 
 Lawyer van der Meersch 142 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 Preparation of the Attack, Battle of Artois 
 (1915): Two Staff Officers, coming to Cote 
 
 107 NEAR ficURIE, ApRIL 27, I9I5, AT THE COM- 
 MAND Post of Major Azan, to accompany him 
 ON A Tour of Inspection of his Trenches ; the 
 Ruins of the £curie Chateau, in April, 1915, 
 between the Departure Trenches and the 
 Places d'Armes for the Reserves . . . 152 
 
 From photographs by the author 
 
 Fire of the French Artillery on the Enemy's 
 Lines on the Somme : French Soldiers watch- 
 ing the Effects of the Fire . . . .164 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 Effects of the French Artillery Preparation 
 AT THE Battle of the Somme (July-Novem- 
 ber, 1 91 6): The Village of Maurepas; The 
 
 xi 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Least Destroyed Part of the Village of 
 Maurepas i66 
 
 From photographs by the author 
 
 The Attack : Two Views of Attacking Waves at 
 THE Chemin des Dames, Battle of the Aisne, 
 May 5, 1917 . . 200 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 German Soldiers surrendering to the Men of 
 the First French Wave, Battle of the Somme, 
 
 July 2, 1916 202 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 The Combatants in the Demolished Trenches 
 and Shell-Holes : Photograph of the Attack 
 of October id, 1916, taken from an Airplane: 
 The "Guillaume Trench" 208 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 Photograph taken from an Airplane at the 
 Attack of October 10, 1916, at Bois Hart . 210 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 An English Tank, at the Battle of the Somme 
 IN 1916, Halted and in Difficulties, between 
 Leuze Wood and Combles 222 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 Battle of the Somme in 1916: Capture of the 
 Village of Combles: A House on the West 
 Side of it 222 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 Liaison: Motor Wireless Station; Portable 
 
 Wireless Station 254 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of the Section Photogra- 
 phique of the French Army 
 
 xii 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 After an Advance: A Conquered German 
 Trench, Region of the Mort-Homme near 
 Verdun; Engineers constructing a Route, 
 NEAR Moulin de Laffaux, Battle of the Aisne 258 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of the Section Photogra- 
 phique of the French Army 
 
 After an Advance: To the Northeast of Bix- 
 schoote, Belgium: Supply Station of German 
 Sappers: A Minenwerfer in the Foreground 260 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L' Illustration 
 
 Defence of a Position: Fort Vaux, near Ver- 
 dun, April 17, 1916; Fort Vaux during a Bom- 
 bardment 288 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 Defence of a Position: An Artillery Barrage 
 
 at Verdun 292 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 Defence of a Position: Troops ready for a 
 Counter-Attack, under the Bursts of Shrap- 
 nel, AVOCOURT, NEAR VeRDUN, ApRIL 30, I916 . 294 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 The Retour Offensif: Attack near Douau- 
 mont, in the Region of Verdun: Advance of 
 a French Wave 302 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L 'Illustration 
 
 The Famous Mill of Langemarck near Ypres 
 
 in I9I4, OFTEN taken AND RETAKEN . . . 322 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 The Church of St. Jltlien, near Ypres, in April, 
 1915 322 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 ?ciii 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 A General's Command Post in July, 1915 . . 332 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L' Illustration 
 
 Telephone Men repairing a Line after a 
 Frencp Advance, August, 191 7 . . . . 332 
 
 Reproduced by the courtesy of L' Illustration 
 
 In a German Boyau at the Labyrinth : A Runner 
 establishing the Liaison during the Attack: 
 Battle of Artois, May 10, 1915 .... 340 
 
 From a photograph by the author 
 
 The Wounded must leave the Boyaux clear for 
 the Advance: Major Azan in the German 
 Position at the Labyrinth, Battle of Artois 340 
 
 The title-page device is the button of the French in- 
 fantry. 
 
 The end-papers are reproductions in one color of a 
 French battle map of the Soy^court section, corrected to 
 June 17, 1916. The map bears the legend "Secret. Not 
 to be taken into the first-line trenches." 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 ' It was a great honor for a professional soldier, 
 such as I am, to be called to the Lowell lecture- 
 ship, which has usually been reserved for the 
 most distinguished scientists and men of letters. 
 Indeed, I hesitated to accept the invitation. In 
 the first place, I felt myself unprepared to un- 
 dertake this new task, since I am neither a pro- 
 fessor nor a lecturer; in the second place, I hold 
 that in this war the abilities and energies of each 
 one of us should be solely utilized to bring the 
 Allied nations nearer to the goal of their desire, 
 victory. The fruit of this victory, let us never 
 forget, will be the liberty of the nations and the 
 civilization of the world. The period in which we 
 live is far too solemn for any one, especially an 
 officer, to pause for a moment from active work. 
 
 On further reflection I saw that in giving these 
 lectures my object would not be to seek an in- 
 tellectual recreation, nor even to entertain an au- 
 dience, no matter how sympathetic it might be. 
 J came to the conclusion that here was another 
 way in which, with the assistance of my hear- 
 ers, I could continue to do my duty as a soldier. 
 In that course of lectures I proposed to study 
 the present war in its different aspects. In the 
 
 XV 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 effort to explain the ideas which I had gathered, 
 I was obHged to define and classify them more 
 exactly. My audiences thus helped me to build 
 up on solid foundations a theory of modern 
 warfare. 
 
 Moreover, you, my reader, can cooperate with 
 me in active fashion. If you accept certain theo- 
 ries in which I believe, you can help to dissemi- 
 nate them. Although, little by little, logic and 
 common sense do triumph over routine and pre- 
 judice, there are certain simple truths which it 
 seems to me are often lost sight of on the other 
 side of the water as well as on this. You will 
 compel the acceptance of these truths. You 
 will become apostles, capable of expounding 
 them, missionaries, whose duty it will be to 
 carry them wherever you go. Do not fear that 
 your r&le will be that of preachers of violence and 
 bloodshed, glorifying slaughter and the horrors 
 of war. On the contrary, your duty will be the 
 much more humane one of advocating methods 
 which will involve the least possible amount 
 of bloodshed, in a war which must be carried 
 through to the bitter end. 
 
 These lives which we must seek to spare are 
 very dear to you, the lives of your brothers, your 
 sons, your husbands, who have gone, or are soon 
 to go, across the seas to fight for the common 
 cause. You have a powerful influence in your 
 
 xvi 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 hands, for you represent public opinion, and this 
 opinion, in a free country Hke yours, renders a 
 just verdict, which even the most recalcitrant 
 must respect. 
 
 I have already discovered, in a more limited 
 field, what a beneficent influence upon public 
 opinion may be exercised by a group of ardent 
 and devoted disciples. Let me recall to you 
 the part played by my splendid soldiers of the 
 Harvard R.O.T.C., the very flower of Ameri- 
 can youth. Those boys learned the fundamental 
 principles and methods of modern warfare long 
 before the official regulations had adopted them : 
 they were thus able, not only during the train- 
 ing at Harvard, but subsequently, to dissemi- 
 nate these principles and methods. Similarly, the 
 five hundred and fifty American reserve officers 
 whom the War Department sent after them to be 
 taught by the French Military Mission, became 
 enthusiastic converts to the new ideas. You can 
 continue, if you will, the work of propaganda, 
 which they have begun in the interest of the 
 American people. 
 
 I believe, then, that at this time, when each of 
 us should reflect upon the practical effect of every 
 one of his acts, these lectures may be useful in 
 helping the cause of victory. Since they are the 
 fruit of my experiences at the Front, they will 
 inevitably oblige me to speak occasionally of 
 
 xvii 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 events in which I have been involved. I crave 
 your pardon for this. If I quote personal ex- 
 periences, it is to show you how I have been led 
 to formulate certain principles or to demonstrate 
 their soundness. There are, of course, many ex- 
 amples which I could cite over and above those 
 in which I myself have been concerned; but as 
 a historian, I know full well that the perspective 
 is still too short to ascertain the exact truth as 
 to what has occurred. It is for this reason that 
 I shall draw from my own experience; my anx- 
 iety for the truth shall be my excuse. 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 I 
 
 THE PRESENT WAR 
 Lecture of October 15, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 Why the present war differs from previous wars: — 
 
 A war of all the people. — The abilities of each are utilized, of men 
 of all ages, of women and of young girls. — The reactions on indus- 
 trial and financial conditions. — Need for general knowledge on the 
 part of the commander-in-chief and the ofiScers. 
 
 A war of positions. — Simultaneous development of the power of 
 artillery and of entrenchments. — Tactical features which have 
 appeared in recent wars. — The errors committed in military studies 
 before the war; Kriegspiel and the war of movement. — Definitions 
 of position and war of positions. — Movement in the war of positions. 
 
 A war of materiel, and of use of materiel. 
 
 A war of attrition: attrition in men; attrition in materiel. — 
 Danger of attrition for a country of limited human reserves. — At- 
 trition in morale. 
 
 Unsuitableness of the term "trench warfare." — Absurdity of the 
 term "war of position" (without the final s). — A German disciple 
 of the war of positions: General von Below. 
 
 A war of brutalizaiion. — Cruelty organized as a system by the 
 Germans. — Violation of treaties and of international law by the 
 Central Powers. — Reasons for this barbarity: Pan-Germanism. 
 
 The present war for the annihilation of free peoples will not over- 
 throw them: France will survive. 
 
 It is a common remark that the present war 
 differs from all previous ones. To the question, 
 In what does this difference consist? the usual 
 reply is that now we dig trenches, employ a large 
 
 I 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 amount of artillery, make manifold useof airplanes, 
 and refrainfrom launchingcavalrycharges. These 
 observations are true in themselves, but do not 
 go to the root of the matter, do not pass from 
 the phenomena to their underlying causes. They 
 indicate a lack of study and reflection which, un- 
 fortunately, is not confined to the amateur strate- 
 gists who hold forth at parlor meetings or fash- 
 ionable resorts. They neglect those essential 
 characteristics of the present war which give rise 
 to the methods and practices in use. 
 
 The present war differs from preceding wars in 
 various ways. Primarily, it is a war in which all 
 the people participate; on the tactical side it is 
 a war of positions; it is also a war of materiel, a 
 war of attrition, a war without pity. These are 
 the factors which distinguish it from preceding 
 wars, and which should be studied in detail. 
 
 The essential characteristic of the present war 
 is that it is waged by the whole people, instead of 
 being merely the affair of professional soldiers. 
 This condition was foreseen by the majority of 
 the European countries, and all able-bodied men 
 were incorporated into the army at the moment of 
 mobilization. If, however, it is true that war on 
 a national scale was foreseen, yet the immediate 
 consequences of such a war were much less clearly 
 
 2 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 perceived. The mobilization in France, organized 
 by professional soldiers, was perfect so far as con- 
 cerned the calling of all Frenchmen to the colors. 
 E^ch one had in his possession a leaflet indicating 
 the day, the hour, and the place where he should 
 present himself to the military authorities, as a 
 mere consequence of the publication of the mo- 
 bilization order. But in this assignment too lit- 
 tle attention was paid to each man's individual 
 capacity ; the only question was whether a man 
 should serve in the infantry, the artillery, the 
 cavalry, the engineers, or the auxiliary services. 
 Every one went to the firing-line. With the ex- 
 ception of the railroads, whose necessity was 
 evident for the concentration of troops and their 
 prompt supply, the majority of the vital indus- 
 tries were stripped of indispensable elements. 
 
 This mistake, once committed, presently be- 
 came patent to every one. It was then necessary 
 in hot haste to recall to the factories skilled work- 
 men scattered all along the Front, to seek out 
 motor drivers and aviators, to organize the med- 
 ical services, especially the evacuation of the 
 wounded, in more orderly fashion; and so on 
 indefinitely. 
 
 ' When a people is at war, all organizations use- 
 ful for that war should not only be kept running, 
 but should render their maximum output. Each 
 citizen has his appropriate place. No one should 
 
 3 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 say, " I am too old, or too weak, or too badly 
 wounded to be of use to the country." There is a 
 use for every sort of activity. But if all individual 
 capacities are to be suitably utilized, it is neces- 
 sary that they be directed by a competent author- 
 ity who should point out what needs must be met. 
 Good-will, without direction and without disci- 
 pline, is ever in danger of running into abuses. 
 For instance, I have seen vigorous young men, 
 capable of becoming magnificent infantry officers, 
 undertaking medical studies under the pretext 
 of "consecrating" themselves to the work of the 
 hospitals. It was a noble task when America was 
 not in the war, and when Americans were not al- 
 lowed to be combatants; it is still a noble task for 
 those who are of the medical profession ; but to- 
 day the trenches offer the field where unemployed 
 athletes should aspire to serve. 
 
 In the general mobilization the women likewise 
 can employ their intelligence and their capacities 
 in the service of their country, in many cases re- 
 placing men who fight at the Front. Indeed, this 
 is the most beautiful and most sober expression 
 of that tendency which we call feminism. But 
 the women must have the courage to fulfil duties 
 that are, by no means, always agreeable. In 
 France and England they have shouldered these 
 burdens; I feel sure that the women of America 
 will show a like devotion. 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 It is essential that these patriotic desires be 
 classified, organized, and directed. Many women 
 wish to go to France. It is easy to see how 
 they, especially the younger ones, are attracted 
 to the Front, as moths are to the light. They 
 long to draw near to those regions which are 
 lit up by shells and illuminating rockets, to 
 shudder by night at the distant thunder of can- 
 non, to stand by when the wounded are brought 
 in still bleeding to the dressing-stations. Far be 
 it from me to disparage the services which have 
 been rendered to France by devoted women ; I am 
 glad to express to them the gratitude and the 
 admiration of the French army. Nor do I forget 
 that, personally, I had two charming American 
 girls at my bedside for weeks together, when I lay 
 wounded at the Hotel Ritz. I do, however, think 
 it right to oppose the subconscious impulse that 
 urges a certain number of them to cross the 
 water, without any certainty of being really use- 
 ful when they reach the other side. 
 
 I have had the curiosity, as a result of ques- 
 tioning young women whom I have met in 
 America, to draw up a statistical table showing 
 the duties which they would prefer to perform; 
 the percentages are as follows : — 
 
 Caring for wounded officers 37 per cent 
 
 Caring for wounded officers or enlisted men 4 
 Knitting sweaters or socks 16 
 
 5 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Making hospital bandages 3 per cent 
 
 Driving automobiles 21 
 
 Teaching English to French soldiers, or 
 
 French to Americans 8 
 
 Amusing French or American soldiers at 
 
 rest camp by giving dancing lessons 7 
 
 Doing farm work 3 
 
 Serving as typewriter-secretary in French 
 
 and English I 
 
 Total 100 per cent 
 
 I should advise every one of them to stay at 
 home, except, perhaps, the typewriter-secretary, 
 whom I would gladly take back with me. When 
 millions of young American men have gone to 
 France, these women will be needed in America 
 to take their places. 
 
 It appears, then, that the participation of the 
 whole nation in the struggle is the essential qual- 
 ity that differentiates this war from all that have 
 preceded it. Every man, every woman, has a r61e 
 in the great drama which is being acted. The 
 nation is a vast society engaged in an enterprise 
 on which its safety depends. Those who try to 
 hinder the progress of the machine, or even refuse 
 to contribute their strength thereto, are unwor- 
 thy to be members of the society; they are bad 
 citizens. 
 
 The comparison of the present war with an 
 industrial enterprise is more to the point than 
 might at first be supposed. The war dominates 
 the international relations, the industry, the 
 
 6 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 commerce, manufactures, agricultural produce, 
 and wealth of the country. It requires enormous 
 sacrifices, carried through to the bitter end. But 
 in case of success, it brings a proportionate re- 
 turn ; for over and above any material profit that 
 may eventually follow a victorious conclusion, 
 there are moral gains whose value is incalculable. 
 To console ourselves for all the horror and all the 
 destruction which we see on every side, we may 
 be permitted to hope that, in the great convul- 
 sion, Humanity will find a re-birth at a moment 
 when it seemed on a dangerous decline. Per- 
 haps from all these fearful collisions there will 
 arise, as many people like to hope, a new Society 
 of Nations! 
 
 But it is not my province to study after-war 
 problems, economic or moral, important as their 
 solution may be. For the moment we must win, 
 and that is the only way to end the conflict. 
 Now, the conqueror must be perfectly conversant 
 with all the means of obtaining victory which are 
 at his disposal. The generalissimo in a modern 
 war must be not only a leader of men ; he must be 
 a geographer, an historian, an economist, a busi- 
 ness man, a scientist, — in a word, a man of en- 
 cyclopaedic knowledge. Indeed, this principle has 
 always held; Caesar and Napoleon were great 
 generals because they were men of universal 
 comprehension, because their minds grasped 
 
 7 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 every problem that related to their respective 
 countries. 
 
 This general principle has been forgotten in 
 almost every army. Little by little, as peace has 
 continued, or the habitual calm has been merely 
 ruffled by wars of small extent, the army has 
 become separated from the nation. The mili- 
 tary profession has been regarded as a technical 
 occupation, consisting in maintaining and trans- 
 porting groups of men, who lived together under 
 a special discipline. Many persons had the 
 pleasing idea that the perfection of accomplish- 
 ment for a general was to draw up a review or a 
 defile of well-aligned troops, to the great satis- 
 faction of the spectators. Other more widely 
 informed people thought that an infantry com- 
 mander who could make his men execute a long 
 march, could deploy his battalions and launch 
 them in a bayonet charge, was qualified to lead 
 them to victory. Similarly, a cavalry officer who 
 could gallop in front of his squadrons faster and 
 farther than they, was certain to carry every 
 position. 
 
 In what army was it recognized that an of- 
 ficer should study the lessons of history, the 
 secrets of geography, the laws of economics, 
 the productiveness of industry, the mechanism of 
 transportation, the resources of commerce, the 
 psychology of peoples? The rare officers who 
 
 8 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 ventured on such studies ran the risk of being 
 considered as lacking in devotion to their profes- 
 sional duties! 
 
 How about the soldiers who pretended that 
 they did not need to know subjects outside of 
 their calling? Did they have an accurate con- 
 ception of the principles which have given to 
 modern combat its present form? Many had 
 suspected nothing, had ignored the modifications 
 which the incessant development of artillery had 
 made in the tactics of the battlefield. They have 
 even, when forced to face the realities of the war 
 and the bloody lessons of the first encounters, 
 expressed their surprise with amusing naivetd. 
 They have been imitated by military critics and 
 journalists, who continue to write daily that 
 all the laws of war have been changed, revised, 
 overthrown. 
 
 Now, this sudden change has occurred only in 
 their own minds, and might have been avoided 
 by a careful study of recent campaigns. Even 
 back in the time of the American Civil War, 
 as one of its noble veterans pointed out to me 
 recently, trenches were dug. In the Boer War 
 trenches were constantly constructed, as I have 
 heard from General d'Amade, who was present. 
 In the Russo-Japanese War did not the murder- 
 
 9 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ous effectiveness of modern artillery compel the 
 troops to protect themselves by trenches which 
 have since become famous, for instance those at 
 Mukden? Major-General Kuhn, of the American 
 army, was able, some years ago, to deduce from 
 just these facts many of the principles underly- 
 ing the present war. Finally, the Balkan wars 
 have still further illustrated the importance of 
 entrenchment. Some wounded Serbian officers, 
 with whom I talked at the beginning of 1916, 
 at the hospital in Paris where we were together, 
 recalled many instances to my mind ; it is suffi- 
 cient to mention one example familiar to every 
 one, the famous Tchataldja lines. 
 
 The episodes of these different campaigns have 
 been popularized by articles in magazines and 
 pictures in the papers. Besides these, books 
 of a more serious sort have been published on 
 the subject. Instead of multiplying citations, I 
 will content myself with mentioning a recent 
 experience which I had at Harvard University. 
 I gave my students the task of finding in the 
 library, for each of the preceding campaigns, quo- 
 tations showing their analogy with the present 
 war. Two days later I was in possession of such 
 a number of references that I should need a whole 
 hour to enumerate them. 
 
 There are, moreover, other factors besides 
 trenches and heavy artillery, whose intervention 
 
 10 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 in the present war might have been foreseen. I 
 do not wish to be put down as a prophet after 
 the event; we shall have plenty such later on. 
 Let me confine myself to mentioning one of these 
 factors, because as much as thirteen years ago 
 I published detailed historical studies thereon,^ 
 because I have been proclaiming the necessity 
 for it for more than two years, and because I 
 have not yet seen it in its proper form: I mean 
 infantry cannon. I shall have occasion to show, 
 in speaking of the attack on a position, how help- 
 ful it would be for the infantry to have regimen- 
 tal or accompanying artillery, analogous to the 
 "battalion cannon" formerly used by Gustavus 
 Adolphus. I hope also that the actual solution 
 of the problem — I mean the cannon themselves 
 — will be found by the Americans. 
 
 Why have industrious and conscientious mili- 
 tary men failed to grasp the novel character of 
 the war? Because they have not studied history; 
 or, at least, because in their study of recent his- 
 tory, they have not followed the development of 
 offensive arms and the resulting modification 
 of the tactics of the battlefield. They have con- 
 fined themselves to the study of the campaigns 
 of Napoleon, or those of the Franco-German War 
 
 * " Etudes historiques sur I'artillerie r6gimentaire," Revue 
 d'Histoire (edited by the General Staff), vols. 13, 14, 15. (Paris: 
 Chapelot, 1904.) 
 
 II 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 of 1870. From this study they have deduced 
 an unshakable theory, which they have handled 
 with grace and confidence and imposed upon all 
 with that absolute trust which springs from mili- 
 tary discipline. A blind adhesion to this theory 
 paved the way to any reward. " Extra ecdesiam, 
 nulla salus." Without the theory, no salvation. 
 In order to point out this danger, I published, in 
 1907, a little volume which, under an historical 
 disguise, was intended to illustrate the perils of 
 such absolutism.^ 
 
 In most of the Allied countries a gathering 
 of officers used to take place around immense 
 tables, covered with juxtaposed maps. Chess- 
 men or flags represented the troops of all arms 
 engaged in the war game, which we in France 
 called by the German name of " Kriegspiel." 
 It must be acknowledged that this game had 
 the advantage that it gave the participants 
 practice in making decisions and drawing up 
 reports. How the cavalry used to send out bold 
 scouting parties, how the infantry made forced 
 marches and seized positions at the point of the 
 bayonet, how the artillery galloped over hill 
 and dale! The engineers appeared little, except 
 for the defensive organization of villages or the 
 hurried building of bridges; as for the aircraft, 
 
 * Le Colonel Rocquancourt et les Scales miUlaires. (60 pp. in 8vo. 
 Paris: Chapelot, 1907.) 
 
 12 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 that was conspicuous by its absence. What was 
 waged was a "war of movement." After the bat- 
 tle there was a distribution of prizes, and a crit- 
 icism by those who had evolved the theory; no 
 danger that the awft^l spectacle of human heca- 
 tombs would give the lie to the arbiter in chief! 
 
 It thus came about that, instead of seeing 
 things as they were, the majority of professional 
 soldiers wandered about in a land of fancies and 
 theories. In fact, the influence of these long- 
 pondered theories has been so strong upon some 
 persons that to-day, after three years of experi- 
 menting, the idea of the prompt reappearance of 
 a war of movement still haunts their dreams. 
 
 The day when this sort of war reappears will 
 be the day of victory, the war will be virtually 
 over. The present war, to use a term which I 
 have wished to see adopted for the last two 
 years, is a war of positions. This definition is 
 easily understood when one observes how a 
 Front really comes into being. Take the case of 
 the present Front in France and Belgium. The 
 French and German armies, after marching 
 toward one another, came into collision. The 
 French army, led away by enthusiasm, threw 
 itself without protection against the cannon, 
 the machine guns, and the trenches of the Ger- 
 man army; and left thousands of dead on the 
 first battlefields. It retreated. At the Marne it 
 
 13 
 
THE WAEPARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 offered a superb resistance, once more sacrific- 
 ing thousands of lives. Then the German army re- 
 treated in its turn, but established itself solidly 
 on the Aisne, protected by previously prepared 
 trenches. The French army dug in opposite. 
 E^ch adversary, finding himself unable to dis- 
 lodge the other by direct assault, tried to out- 
 flank him. Thereupon began the famous "race 
 to the sea"; the two armies stretched out 
 trenches, face to face with one another, all the 
 way between two impassable obstacles, the sea 
 and Switzerland. 
 
 The common Front is composed, in either case, 
 of a series of linked positions. A position usually 
 corresponds to some geographical region; it 
 comprises several less important elements, also 
 corresponding to the terrain, called centres of re- 
 sistance. Its importance depends upon many fac- 
 tors, its topography, its relation to the contigu- 
 ous positions, the strength and configuration of 
 the positions opposite, the number and activity 
 of the opposing troops. The geographical area 
 is generally considerable, at least several square 
 miles. The garrison, whose strength depends 
 both upon the geographical area and the mili- 
 tary importance of the position, is composed of 
 one or more large units, such as divisions. The 
 different parts are linked together by systems of 
 trenches which insure the continuity of the Front. 
 
 14 
 
THE PRESENT WAE 
 
 Just as the Front is continuous laterally, in 
 order to oppose resistance to the enemy at every 
 point, so also is it organized in depth to stop the 
 enemy's advance at every point in case he suc- 
 ceeds in seizing one or more of the first posi- 
 tions. There are thus second, or second-line 
 positions, organized in the same fashion as those 
 of the first line, but not always continuously 
 joined. Behind these second-line positions there 
 may be those of the third line. These last, how- 
 ever, are but weakly organized and occupied 
 in proportion to their distance from the Front, 
 since they are useful only in case a hostile of- 
 fensive penetrates to the point where they are. 
 
 How shall an army, which is face to face with 
 such a scheme of defence, set out to achieve vic- 
 tory? Its aim should always be the destruction 
 of the opposing army, not the capture of any 
 particular stretch of territory. But to destroy 
 the enemy, it is necessary to overthrow the bar- 
 rier which protects him, that is to say, to seize 
 a number of positions, contiguous both laterally 
 and in depth. When the, breach so made is wide 
 enough and deep enough, the defensive elements 
 near those destroyed will be threatened from 
 the rear and must be abandoned by their de- 
 fenders. The whole Front will crumble, and the 
 enemy will be obliged to re-form on. a new line. 
 While covering the distance between two succes- 
 
 15 
 
THE WARFARE OF TaDAY 
 
 sive positions, there will be a war of movement. 
 It will take place when, as a result of the opening 
 of a breach, the troops move between two posi- 
 tions one behind the other; it will also take place 
 when the attackers, after the breach is made, 
 turn against bodies of the enemy in process of 
 evacuating other parts of the Front in order to 
 reach new positions. If there are no other posi- 
 tions to defend, or if the enemy does not choose 
 to defend them, then, indeed, there will be a 
 war of movement according to the old definition ; 
 but in my judgment it will mark the end of the 
 struggle. 
 
 There is another limitation upon movement, 
 even in the pursuit of a retreating enemy, be- 
 sides the encountering of defensively organized 
 positions : the rapidity and extent of every move- 
 ment will depend upon the facility with which 
 the heavy artillery can be deplaced. An army 
 which should venture into hostile territory with- 
 out accompanying artillery, including heavy 
 pieces, would court disaster. 
 
 It results from these considerations that vic- 
 tory must be sought by attacking vigorously in 
 a determined zone, so as to break the Front and 
 paralyze resistance. That is exactly what both 
 adversaries have been trying to do for the last 
 three years. Why has neither side succeeded? 
 I shall later show in detail sufficient reasons 
 
 i6 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 for this want of success; for the moment I shall 
 limit myself to a single reason. Since the army 
 attacked has been menaced in a single spot only, 
 it has always been able to bring up sufficient re- 
 serves to stop the advance of the assailants. In 
 order to prevent the bringing up of these re- 
 serves, it would have been necessary to keep the 
 enemy in ignorance of the intended zone of at- 
 tack, and, to that end, to simulate an attack 
 along the whole Front. Now, an attack is an- 
 nounced by artillery preparation, and a general 
 artillery preparation has been impracticable for 
 lack of sufficient cannon and munitions. 
 
 The present war, much more than any pre- 
 ceding one, is a war of materiel. An offensive, 
 even a partial one, requires not only an enormous 
 supply of cannon, munitions, and machines, but 
 also factories capable of producing them, rail- 
 roads and highways sufficient for their circula- 
 tion, ships, cars, and trucks in plenty to bring 
 them up, and special dep&ts for their storage. 
 
 Moreover, it is not enough to have an immense 
 amount of materiel : it is essential to know how to 
 utilize it. A single cannon, well served, is worth 
 twenty badly served; for a few well-aimed shells 
 can destroy an objective, while tons of steel 
 showered haphazard over a large area do no 
 
 17 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 good at all. Similarly, two or three airplanes 
 which can follow exactly an itinerary laid out in 
 advance, or can plant their bombs with precision 
 on a factory, are worth twenty airplanes which 
 scatter their bombs all over the woods and fields. 
 Thus the need of instruction for an army is para- 
 mount over all others. 
 
 On account of its national character, as well as 
 its length, this is a war of attrition. In previous 
 wars professional soldiers fought with their own 
 resources, and settled between themselves the 
 quarrels of nations. To-day, it is the nations, 
 with all their forces, human and material, that 
 take part in the struggle; they fight till one of 
 the adversaries is completely exhausted. Thus 
 attrition, which applies to both men and mate- 
 riel, is bound to be a factor of importance in 
 deciding the war. 
 
 Attrition in men is irreparable ; it takes twenty 
 years for a child to reach the fighting age. It 
 may be estimated by comparing the total num- 
 ber of men called to the colors at the beginning 
 or during the course of the war, with the total 
 number of killed, permanently disabled, and 
 captured. 
 
 • Attrition in materiel can be offset by greater 
 activity in the factories, but these factories must 
 
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 THE WAR OF MATERIEL — A MUNITIONS DfiPOT IN THE REAR OF AN ARMY 
 
 THE WAR OF MATERIEL TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES BY A NARROW- 
 GAUGE LINE ALONG A ROAD 
 
THE PRESENT WAR ' 
 
 be sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well 
 equipped to meet the needs of the army under all 
 circumstances. If, at any moment, there should 
 be a shortage, either of raw material, such as 
 copper, iron, coal, or cotton, or else of machinery, 
 or of workmen, so that the requirements of the 
 army could not be met, the result might be a 
 catastrophe. 
 
 Attrition in men is not very dangerous for 
 countries which have sufficient human reserves, 
 such as Russia, nor yet for those like France and 
 Great Britain which can draw on their colonies. 
 On the other hand, it is highly dangerous for 
 countries like those of Central Europe, where 
 human resources are strictly limited. For these 
 countries there will inevitably come a time 
 when, in spite of the utilization of prisoners, citi- 
 zens of conquered countries, women, and chil- 
 dren, it will be impossible to find enough men 
 to hold the Front and to run the factories. The 
 choice must then be made between leaving the 
 Front insufficiently defended, or the factories 
 insufficiently manned. Either means defeat. 
 
 Attrition in morale may have the same result 
 as attrition in men and in materiel; it consists 
 in the disintegration of moral power, especially 
 of the sentiment of patriotism. It leads on to 
 the voluntary abandonment of the conflict even 
 though the country may still possess the human 
 
 19 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 and material resources necessary for its contin- 
 uance. This attrition in morale is sometimes 
 effected by the secret activities of the enemy, 
 who makes use of a skilful propaganda to sow 
 discord among the citizens, and to cause dis- 
 couragement to permeate the armies and the 
 civil population. 
 
 Thus the present war, which I have defined 
 as a war of positions, is, from another point of 
 view, a war of mat6riel and a war of attrition. 
 It is not a war of trenches, even though that terra 
 is now sanctioned by usage. No description of 
 the conflict seems to me worse than the phrase 
 "trench warfare," which appears in all the mag- 
 azines, all the newspapers, and on the title-pages 
 of many books. It is likely to lead to most 
 unfortunate conclusions. It was invented by 
 people who took the means, or, rather, one of the 
 means, for the end. 
 
 No, the present war is no more a "war of 
 trenches" than it is a "war of artillery," a "war 
 of asphyxiating gas," or a "war of grenades." 
 It is, I must repeat, a war of positions, spelled 
 with the final s. Certain writers, hearing this 
 term, have seized upon it, but, unable to shake 
 off the idea that this was a war of trenches, car- 
 ried on in holes in which the troops perma- 
 
 20 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 nently remained, have described it as a "war of 
 position" (without the final s). This meant, in 
 their minds, a war where each side stayed in one 
 position, whereas the characteristic of a war of 
 positions (with the s), is precisely the attempt to 
 pass from one position to another. 
 
 Little by little the principles which seem to 
 me to dominate this war are gaining recognition. 
 Since the close of 19 15, when I wrote the book 
 which has been so kindly received this year by 
 my American friends,^ many of these principles 
 have been generally recognized. A doctrine of 
 modern warfare has gradually crystallized in the 
 Allied armies, through the medium of numberless 
 official regulations; it would be interesting to 
 make a synthesis of these in each of the armies, 
 in order to reconcile and classify them. A long 
 step has been made in this direction in the French 
 army in the ". Manuel du chef de section," which 
 has been translated for the benefit of the Amer- 
 ican army. 
 
 Strangely enough, it was in a German docu- 
 ment that I first saw a succinct resume of the 
 essential principles of the war of positions. This 
 was drawn up by General von Below, who com- 
 manded one of the German armies on the Somme 
 in the latter half of 1916. It must have fallen 
 
 1 The War of Positions. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press, 1917.) , 
 
 21 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 into the hands of our troops in the course of the 
 battles of 1 91 7, or through some other means; at 
 any rate, it was published in "L' Illustration" 
 for September i, 1917, under the title, "Prin- 
 cipes de la guerre de position" (without the s). 
 I read it with the greatest astonishment, for I 
 found therein certain passages almost identical 
 with some used in my own work. It is quite im- 
 possible that any of the forty typewritten copies 
 which I distributed in the spring of 19 1 6 should 
 have reached the enemy; the coincidence simply 
 shows how two men, considering the same series 
 of events, seen from one side or the other of the 
 battle line, will be led by logical steps to the 
 same conclusions. 
 
 Just the same, it was piquant to find in the 
 camp of the enemy the most faithful adherent 
 to a doctrine which I have at heart. 
 
 On the other hand, there is one characteristic 
 which the Germans have impressed upon this 
 war, which no civilized man can join them in 
 approving, namely, inhumanity and cruelty. 
 "The more frightful the war is," say some of 
 them, "the shorter it will be. Let us treat our 
 enemy without pity; he will then be obliged to 
 cry for mercy." Europe, since the barbarian 
 invasions, and the other continents since the As- 
 
 22 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 Syrian wars in Asia, or the wars of slave traders 
 in Africa, have never seen such atrocities. 
 
 Humanity had the right to expect that war, 
 if it were indeed a necessary curse, should never- 
 theless become progressively more humane in 
 practice. The Middle Ages, and the ages which 
 followed, had furnished the spectacle of chival- 
 rous conflicts between honorable adversaries. 
 The memorable wars between the English and 
 the French were strewn with episodes analogous 
 to that of the battle of Fontenoy. " Messieurs 
 les Anglais, tirez les premiers," was the cour- 
 teous word of our infantry commander; a piece 
 of courtesy which cost the lives of a good many 
 French officers and men. In the same way, 
 during the Napoleonic wars, our armies had 
 conquered almost the whole of Europe, with- 
 out molesting the civil populations, and passed 
 through countless towns, without damaging them. 
 Even in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the 
 excesses of the German army, such as the burn- 
 ing of ChS,teaudun, were exceptional and isolated; 
 they were generally limited to the pilfering of cer- 
 tain household articles, among which clocks and 
 silverware occupied the leading place. 
 
 In order to restrict abuses in time of war, the 
 Powers had established certain principles of in- 
 ternational law through the medium of agree- 
 ments. Such were the Geneva Agreement of 
 
 23 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 July 6, 1906, relative to relieving the distress of 
 the sick and wounded of the armies in the field; 
 the Hague Agreement of October 18, 1906, con- 
 cerning the laws and usages of warfare on land ; 
 the Hague Declaration of July 29, 1899, pro- 
 hibiting the use of projectiles whose object was 
 to spread harmful or asphyxiating gases. 
 
 France, trusting and credulous, felt sure that 
 these conventions would be observed. A large 
 part of the official instructions for the field serv- 
 ice of our army had to do with the principles of 
 international law which officers and enlisted men 
 were required to know. In the pages of these 
 regulations we read that Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey gave their full 
 adherence to these humane agreements! 
 
 Let it be clearly understood : the Central Em- 
 pires solemnly signed every one of these agree- 
 ments; they have since deliberately violated 
 every one, thus excluding themselves forever 
 from the society of civilized nations. Do we need 
 to recall the fact that from the beginning of the 
 war Germany has violated the territory of Bel- 
 gium, a country whose neutrality was protected 
 by special treaties, and which might conse- 
 quently hope to live in peace? The violation 
 sprang from the cynical principle expressed in 
 the famous adage, "Might makes right." Ger- 
 many deemed that all means were good which 
 
 24 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 helped her toward victory. She hoped, by pass- 
 ing through Belgium, to take France unaware, 
 and to destroy her in a short time. The plan very 
 nearly succeeded. I have often been asked in 
 America, "Why had not your General-in-Chief 
 planned a concentration of French troops along 
 the Belgian frontier?" I am not in the secrets of 
 Marshal Joffre, even though I had the honor to 
 be in his confidence, and to serve under him on 
 the General Staff, yet I can reply without hesi- 
 tation: "Because the General-in-Chief is a man 
 of honor." Incapable himself of violating the 
 promises made by France, he never imagined 
 that Germany would break her plighted word. 
 In a contest with an unscrupulous adversary, a 
 man of honor is at a disadvantage, because he has 
 scruples about the means to be employed. The 
 Germans and their allies have not been bothered 
 with scruples. They have even committed atroc- 
 ities which had no practical utility. Let me 
 recall some episodes familiar to all: the use of 
 the French civil population or of prisoners as 
 a screen to prevent the adversary from firing; 
 the use of the Red Cross, either to draw near 
 to our trenches without arousing suspicion, or to 
 induce our soldiers to show themselves; the 
 slaughter of wounded; the systematic destruc- 
 tion of villages, gardens, trees, and cultivated 
 ground; the bombardment, for no miUtary rea- 
 
 25 
 
THE WAHFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 son, of public monuments, such as Rheims Ca- 
 thedral; the mining of historic structures, such 
 as the Chateau de Coucy; the enslavement of 
 the population of invaded territories; cruelty 
 to prisoners, etc., etc. If we turn from the Ger- 
 mans to their allies, we remember the hanging 
 of the Italian patriot Battisti by the Austrians ; 
 the treatment meted out to the Serbians at the 
 hands of the Bulgarians; the massacres of the 
 Armenians by the Turks. 
 
 It all seems like a nightmare, when one ob- 
 serves the cruel and savage dementia which has 
 seized our enemies. I could cite a hundred ex- 
 amples, of which I have the proof, either by the 
 testimony of irreproachable witnesses or by my 
 own eyes. But I am a soldier, and my business 
 is to fight, not to rake up horrors ; I merely note 
 those of which I have actual knowledge against 
 the time when the tribunal of civilized nations 
 shall know how to judge the guilty! 
 
 What possible motive can have driven the 
 Germans to such actions? It is a strange per- 
 version, gradually born of the Pan-Germanic 
 idea. The famous device, "Deutschland fiber 
 Alles," has engendered a desire for the abase- 
 ment of other peoples. First of all, it was neces- 
 sary to enslave France, to modify the French 
 spirit, and to make it similar to the German. 
 To that end it was needful to abolish the past, to 
 
 26 
 
THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 attack historical monuments, to destroy every 
 vestige of French national history. There would 
 thus be accomplished a great work of intellectual 
 and moral regeneration, the necessity for which 
 the German propaganda sought to demonstrate 
 to the world, by hypocritically discrediting 
 France. This work was carried on, not only in 
 the name of German superiority, which should 
 compel recognition by the whole world, but also, 
 Heaven help us! in the name of the old German 
 god, who was called to reign over this new hu- 
 manity. " Gott mit uns" is on the belt-buckles 
 of the soldiers who are going to death for this 
 grand cause! 
 
 It is by these vital moral questions that the 
 present war is differentiated from previous wars. 
 It is not a quarrel between two or more peoples, 
 on account of contested territorial or economic 
 interests ; it is a conflict on which hangs the lib- 
 erty of nations, and the civilization of the world. 
 
 There can be no doubt as to the outcome of 
 this war. In spite of the "Gott mit uns" of the 
 Germans, it is not their god of war and carnage 
 that will regenerate the world after that victory 
 which we shall achieve in common; it is our God, 
 the God of peace and love. And in spite of their 
 device, "Deutschland uber AUes," the Allied 
 
 27 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 peoples will resume their peaceful development 
 without waiting for permission from the Wil- 
 helmstrasse. 
 
 The war of annihilation which has been waged 
 against France, more than against any other 
 nation, will have the effect of giving my beloved 
 country a new lustre. Doubtless we have sus- 
 tained losses the extent of which we cannot 
 exactly estimate from this distance. We have wit- 
 nessed the deaths of our brothers, our fathers, 
 our friends; we have seen our territory invaded, 
 our towns and fields destroyed, our fortunes 
 carried away in the tempest. But beyond all 
 these disasters something remains; there re- 
 mains the soul of France, more pure, more heroic, 
 more resplendent than ever. No; France is not 
 stricken down; France will live; France is im- 
 mortal ! 
 
II 
 
 TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 Lecture of October 22, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 Instruction saves losses and gives victory. — Definition of instruc- 
 tion. — To whom it is directed. — Principles of specialization and 
 of coordination. 
 
 Part played by the different arms in an army. — Infantry: the 
 movement and its fire; arms of low and high trajectory; the bayonet; 
 the 37- mm. cannon ; the knowledge that an infantryman must possess ; 
 courage his essential quality. — Artillery: its part on the offensive 
 and on the defensive; trench artillery; assaulting artillery; artillery 
 on rapid motor vehicles; field artillery; heavy artillery; high-power 
 artillery. — The engineers: their instruction as a whole, and the in- 
 struction of special units. — Cavalry: its decreased importance; its 
 use as infantry. — Aircraft: airplanes for information, for the ad- 
 justment of fire, for fighting, for bombing; balloons; dirigibles. — 
 Specialization. — Coordination. 
 
 Organization of the instruction of an army. — The problem of in- 
 struction is a permanent one. — Demonstration of four essential 
 principles governing the organization of instruction. — Instruction 
 must begin from the top, not from the bottom. 
 
 Practical organization of the instruction in the French army. — 
 How the necessity of this organization appeared. — Schools for 
 officers and schools for specialists. — Permanence and continuity 
 necessary for schools. — Ajrmy schools: divisional dep6ts and their 
 schools; battalions of instruction and their schools; d6p6ts and camps 
 in the interior. — Essential function of array schools. — Choice of 
 the director of instruction of an army and of his collaborators. 
 
 Organization of the instruction of the American army. — The Ameri- 
 can Mission at Paris. — The French Mission at Harvard University. 
 — Proposals made in April and in May, 1917. — Part played by the 
 Harvard R.O.T.C. and the Iron Battalion. — Arrival of the Anglo- 
 French Mission: its dispersion in the camps. — Logic will sooner or 
 later vanquish error. — We must "conquer without_ dying." 
 
 In order to wage war, the first step is to learn 
 how. Troops who are well taught before going 
 
 29 
 
THE WABFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 to fight are sure of two advantages: their losses 
 will be relatively less, and they will be better 
 prepared to conquer. On the other hand, if their 
 training has been insufficient or ill-conducted, 
 they will surely be slaughtered, and, needless to 
 add, they will not be victorious. 
 
 What is meant by "training an army"? It is 
 the preparation for war. Now, the present war 
 is a war of the whole people; that is to say, it 
 makes use of all the forces of a nation. To train 
 an army means, not only to instruct the first- 
 line troops in trench-digging and formations; it 
 involves also teaching the masses who stay in the 
 rear how to render the best service in the struggle. 
 
 The national character of the war implies a 
 many-sided education for the nation at large. 
 Not only must the infantrymen, the artillery- 
 men, the aviators, the engineers, and the cavalry- 
 men all be trained; it is equally essential to 
 instruct men who can be of use in the medi- 
 cal corps, in the quartermaster's department, 
 the ordnance, the railway service, the motor 
 transport, the information service, the topo- 
 graphic service, etc. Finally, even the civilians 
 must be taught; those who help to win the war 
 by their labors in the factories, the fields, or the 
 hospitals, by practising economy in the con- 
 sumption of provisions, by material and moral 
 collaboration at all times. 
 
 30 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 Two great principles dominate this kind of 
 education: specialization and coordination. On 
 the one hand, each man should receive special 
 training, not only in his own arm or branch of 
 the service, but also in his particular function 
 in that arm or branch ; on the other hand, he will 
 not really understand his r&le, nor fulfil it well, 
 unless he has some idea of the general conduct of 
 his arm or branch, and of its relation to the army 
 as a whole. For this reason it is needful that each 
 one should receive, even during the period of 
 practical detailed training in his own specialty, 
 a general education in the conduct of the opera- 
 tions of the war. 
 
 The training of that part of the nation which 
 remains away from the war zone is the affair of 
 the departments of ordnance, industry, commerce, 
 supply, agriculture, etc., and of their various 
 representatives. I therefore merely mention this 
 side of the general problem, without studying it. 
 
 The training of that part of the army which 
 is not combatant, in the strictest sense of the 
 word, — that is to say, of the sanitary service, 
 supply and quartermaster service, railways, 
 motor transport, topographical service, etc., — 
 involves special methods, to be devised by the 
 chiefs of these various services; I shall not con- 
 sider this training either, although insisting upon 
 its importance. 
 
 31 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The "training of an army" will thus mean, in 
 my exposition, what was formerly understood 
 by that phrase; that is to say, the training of the 
 infantry, the artillery, the engineers, the cavalry, 
 and the aviation. Before studying how this train- 
 ing should be given, it is essential to know ex- 
 actly what is the r61e of each of these arms in 
 modern warfare. 
 
 The infantry is destined to occupy the ter- 
 rain. On the offensive, the progress of its first 
 line measures the success of the attack; on the 
 defensive, the maintenance of its position im- 
 plies a check administered to the enemy. In 
 neithier case can it dispense with the aid of the 
 artillery. 
 
 The infantry has two methods for accomplish- 
 ing its aims — movement and firing. By move- 
 ment, I mean advancing; by firing, I mean the 
 discharge of all the weapons that are suitable to 
 the infantry. 
 
 Before the present war it was believed that 
 sufficient fire preparation for an infantry attack 
 could be effected by the infantry's own arms; 
 that is, by the rifle. In company manoeuvres, 
 the men took advantage of the accidents of the 
 terrain ; for instance, they lay down and shot, so 
 as to force the adversary to take coyer; then they 
 
 32 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 jumped up and made a short rush, before the 
 enemy had time to shoot. A frequent proceed- 
 ing was to have each group of skirmishers ad- 
 vance or retreat under the fire protection of the 
 adjoining group. 
 
 To-day, the effects of artillery and machine 
 guns have obliged the troops to dig trenches. 
 As long as the enemy remains in his trenches, 
 the fire of rifles, machine guns, and, in fact, of 
 all infantry weapons of flat trajectory, is quite 
 powerless against him; the only danger is for 
 the man who may imprudently raise his head 
 above the parapet. For this reason it is impos- 
 sible to advance against a properly constructed 
 trench unless that trench has previously been 
 subjected to artillery fire; infantrymen who 
 should attempt to seize it unaided, even if they 
 ran like hares and brandished their bayonets 
 ferociously, would be slaughtered just as surely 
 as the quarry is slaughtered by the watching 
 hunter. How many times have I had occasion, 
 during the first exercises of the Harvard 
 R.O.T.C, to ask the men what they were 
 firing at: — 
 
 "At the enemy's trench," would come the 
 
 reply. 
 
 "You won't do it any great harm," was my 
 answer; "and even if any man were idiot enough 
 to offer himself as a target for your practice, that 
 
 33 
 
THE WAEFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 would be no great loss for the enemy, as they 
 would only lose a fool of a soldier." 
 
 Even after the artillery preparation is fin- 
 ished, the assailant's task is often difficult. In 
 the enemy's shattered trenches there will still 
 remain defenders who must be overcome. This 
 is especially true when the attacking troops have 
 passed the first-line trenches, and are in the 
 region, either of other trenches less thoroughly 
 destroyed, or of new trenches constructed in 
 haste. At such a moment the infantry should be 
 able to advance by the aid of its own resources, 
 for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the artil- 
 lery relieves the infantry of the necessity of mak- 
 ing any effort whatsoever. To reach the enemy's 
 trenches it must in this case make use of high 
 trajectory weapons, such as hand grenades, 
 rifle grenades, and the different sorts of bombs 
 thrown by infantry weapons. 
 
 When the infantry are obliged to attack the 
 last surviving defenders of a trench at close 
 range, they either attack them from the parapet 
 with automatic machine rifles or grenades, or 
 else they jump into the trench and use these 
 same weapons. Since the bayonet is hard to use 
 in the restricted space where such fighting takes 
 place, it is often well to use the knife. 
 
 The flat trajectory arms — that is to say, the 
 rifle, the automatic rifle, the automatic machine 
 
 34 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 rifle, and the machine gun — lose none of their 
 effectiveness on the defensive against an enemy 
 who advances in the open. Similarly, these are 
 useful on the offensive when the enemy leaves 
 his trenches or his boyaux. No one should fall 
 into the mistake, recently pointed out by Gen- 
 eral Pershing, of decrying the usefulness of the 
 rifle in the present war. The rifle is not used at 
 the outset of the combat; yet it may be of con- 
 siderable use in the succeeding phases, especially 
 in one of its derived forms as a machine gun, 
 automatic machine rifle, or automatic rifle. 
 
 The arms with high trajectory are those to use 
 against an entrenched enemy, and, since the en- 
 emy is always seeking to entrench, they are use- 
 ful at every stage of the combat. Hand grenades, 
 rifle grenades, and bombs are of the great- 
 est use when it is possible to have them in suf- 
 ficient numbers. But the greatest difficulty is 
 to secure an adequate supply during the prog- 
 ress of the advance. An excellent expedient is 
 to use the d^p&ts of munitions of like sort to be 
 found in the enemy's lines, and for this purpose 
 it is well to teach the soldiers how to handle the 
 enemy's grenades, as well as those of his own 
 army. For instance, at the battle of the Somme, 
 the Sixth Army had seized such a supply of 
 grenades that I was able, when charged with the 
 organization of army schools, to institute among 
 
 35 
 
THE WARFARE OP TO-DAY 
 
 the grenadiers a special course for studying the 
 use of German grenades. 
 
 The "arme blanche," the bayonet, is less used 
 than in previous wars. It and the knife are, 
 primarily, "cleaning-up" weapons, to use a 
 phrase familiar to all. The bayonet was much 
 used at the time when rapid-fire rifles were less 
 perfect than they are at present; its use per- 
 mitted the attackers to charge the enemy while 
 the latter was attempting to reload. It was 
 formerly the favorite arm of the French infan- 
 try. But to-day, as long as the adversary has a 
 firearm or a grenade, he cannot be reached by 
 the bayonet; if he is unarmed, despatching him 
 is simply a species of assassination. 
 
 Certain officers maintain that it is well to 
 make the enlisted men believe that the bayonet 
 is really effective; they assert, for instance, that 
 the men thus acquire confidence in their individ- 
 ual arms, and are less tempted to run away, or 
 at least to halt, when they have no more gre- 
 nades or ammunition. This theory seems to me 
 to present two disadvantages. First, just as cer- 
 tain people, who tell the same lie a great many 
 times, end by believing it, so some officers end 
 by insisting in all good faith that the bayonet 
 can really win the battle. I have met such. Sec- 
 ondly, soldiers who have acquired this confidence 
 in their bayonets, advance holding them ten- 
 
 36 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 derly to their breasts, and are decimated without 
 accomplishing any great result. In France the 
 soldiers know the truth. When they go forward 
 to the attack, they know what little help the 
 bayonet will really bring and how exceptional 
 are the circumstances under which they can use 
 the knife; nevertheless, they do go forward. I 
 think that this intelligent courage is, from every 
 point of view, of more value than a courage 
 based upon artificial stimulation. 
 
 The 37-mm. cannon is, at present, the most 
 powerful weapon in the possession of the infan- 
 try. On the offensive it is used to prepare the 
 attack on a position, to accompany the troops 
 during their advance, and to help occupy the new 
 position. On the defensive, it can assist in the 
 barrage, especially by enfilading fire upon points 
 reconnoitred in advance. This cannon has great 
 virtues, among which are to be reckoned mo- 
 bility and precision, but its principal function 
 is to destroy machine guns which have escaped 
 the artillery fire. It is a " counter machine gun " ; 
 it is not an accompanying cannon permitting the 
 infantry to overcome obstacles by means of their 
 own resources. As for this desired infantry cannon , 
 let us hope that some day its necessity will be 
 recognized, and some inventor found to design it. 
 
 The infantry should learn the technical use 
 of these various arms, and acquire the greatest 
 
 37 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 possible familiarity with their management. It 
 should, moreover, learn their tactical use. Ac- 
 cording to the different phases of the combat, 
 even according to different aspects of the same 
 phase, different arms should be used. Any tacti- 
 cal mistake in the use of the arms placed in the 
 hands of the infantryman condemns him to fail- 
 ure and death. The technical and tactical use 
 of arms forms but a small part of the soldier's 
 training. The infantry should, beyond this, know 
 what formations to adopt during different phases 
 of the combat or during different episodes of the 
 same phase. For instance, it must know that it 
 must not present dense formations, as column 
 of fours in a zone where artillery projectiles are 
 falling; it should be able to organize the terrain 
 by digging suitable trenches along intelligently 
 chosen lines, etc. 
 
 The infantryman, even when well trained in 
 all of these details, has yet the hardest sort of 
 r&le to fulfil. He is obliged, even more than a 
 soldier in one of the other arms, deliberately to 
 risk his life and freely to shed his blood, unob- 
 served by all, in order to achieve success. To do 
 this, he must have enthusiasm and dash. These 
 qualities are innate in the true American, as in 
 the true Frenchman ; they will appear fast enough 
 when called to life by a few well-chosen words. 
 
 The essential r61e of the artillery is to coUab- 
 38 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 orate with the infantry, for without such col- 
 laboration, the infantry is helpless. 
 
 On the offensive, the artillery first effects a 
 thorough fire preparation; thereafter it protects 
 the infantry during the attack, and helps its 
 progress. It is deplaced forward when needed, 
 either to retain possession of conquered territory, 
 or to help in the pursuit, or to prepare for an 
 attack on the next position. 
 
 On the defensive, the artillery arrests or im- 
 pedes the enemy's advance by every available 
 means. The best way to do this is by a barrage, 
 which is intended to deluge a specified zone with 
 projectiles, thus preventing the enemy's passage 
 across it. 
 
 On the offensive, as on the defensive, the artil- 
 lery, thanks to the range of its pieces, can effect 
 a concentration of fire on any important point. 
 In former times it was the regiments of infantry 
 which were hastily rushed to certain parts of 
 the battlefield where the victory was at stake; 
 to-day, it is the fire that is concentrated, by the 
 simple process of modifying the grouping of 
 the pieces, and designating to each the objectives 
 to be reached. 
 
 Artillery is divided into the following kinds: 
 trench artillery, assaulting artillery, rapid motor 
 artillery, field artillery, heavy artillery, and high- 
 powered artillery. 
 
 39 
 
THE WARF-^RE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Trench artillery is meant to be placed in the 
 trenches, to prepare an attack. It is composed 
 of short-range mortars, throwing highly charged 
 projectiles, and is able, unaided, to destroy the 
 enemy's first line. These mortars are of 58, 150, 
 240, or 340 mm.; even the 58's, which are the 
 lightest, are not sufficiently mobile to constitute 
 a true ' ' infantry artillery ' ' advancing in the wake 
 or at the disposition of the infantry units. If 
 they were sufficiently mobile, their supply with 
 projectiles would be next to impossible. 
 
 Motor artillery includes pieces of two kinds: 
 the first are heavy and slow to move — these 
 are called "assaulting artillery"; the second are 
 light and hence mobile — these are "motor can- 
 non" and "motor machine guns." 
 
 Assaulting artillery is composed of special 
 motor pieces, called "caterpillars," such as tanks, 
 which move across every sort of terrain; it ac- 
 companies or precedes the infantry, to facilitate 
 its task. It is the only strictly accompanying 
 artillery that has been created so far; the 37-mm. 
 being too weak and the trench mortars too im- 
 mobile. 
 
 The rapid motor artillery is composed of 
 motor cannon and motor machine guns. It is 
 especially useful in the interval between the 
 capture of one position and the encounter with 
 the next. It frequently replaces cavalry, or sup- 
 
 40 
 
TRAINING AN AJRMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 plements it by moving in concert. It is able 
 to make bold manoeuvres, thanks to its rapidity 
 and its invulnerability to rifle bullets or shrap- 
 nel ; but it should never engage the enemy with- 
 out a rapid preliminary reconnaissance, and must 
 be withdrawn in haste when exposed to artillery 
 fire. 
 
 Field artillery can be rapidly deplaced, moved 
 across all sorts of country and set up in batteries 
 without delay. It includes 75, 80, and 90 mm. 
 guns. Its function is to destroy accessory de- 
 fences and light shelters, to shell the personnel, 
 and to neutralize the fire of such of the enemy's 
 artillery as is within range. Its mobility enables 
 it to follow the infantry during an attack, to 
 support it, and to take an active part in all 
 phases of the combat. 
 
 Heavy artillery is divided into heavy field artil- 
 lery and heavy fixed artillery. Heavy field artil- 
 lery is moved by tractors, or by horses; heavy 
 fixed artillery derives its name from having no 
 regular means of progress. 
 
 Heavy artillery is charged with the task of 
 destroying those defensive works which have 
 been established for a long time and constantly 
 strengthened, so that the field artillery is helpless 
 against them. Its fire should be directed against 
 clearly defined and sharply delimited objec- 
 tives. It has also the task of destroying, or at 
 
 41 
 
THE WAKPABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 least of neutralizing, the enemy's artillery. It in- 
 cludes both long and short cannon. The long can- 
 non, — 95, 105, 120, and 155 mm. respectively, 
 
 — thanks to their great range, are able to attack 
 distant objectives. The short cannon or mortars 
 
 — 155, 220, and 270 mm. — are able, in conse- 
 quence of their high trajectories, to take under 
 fire objectives on a reverse slope. As a result of 
 the great explosive force of their projectiles, they 
 can destroy highly organized works. 
 
 High-powered artillery includes pieces which 
 are moved on railways or towed by tractors. 
 Its function is to shoot at places of tactical 
 importance, or at elements of hostile artillery 
 which the field artillery has been unable to de- 
 stroy, thanks either to their great distance, or 
 to their protective works. 
 
 The most important of the longer guns are of 
 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 32 cm., 305 and 340 mm.; the 
 principal shorter guns are the 370 and 400 mm. 
 howitzers. 
 
 Each of these different kinds of artillery re- 
 quires a personnel that has been thoroughly 
 trained not only in its own special branch of 
 artillery, but even in particular functions in 
 connection therewith. The artilleryman charged 
 with serving a 155-mm, gun has nothing in com- 
 mon, but the name, with the artilleryman who 
 takes his place in a trench. 
 
 42 
 
A PIECE OF FIELD ARTILLERY UNDER A SHELTER 
 
 A PIECE OF HEAVY ARTILLERY, 37O MM. CALIBRE AND CAMOLTFLAGED 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODEEN WARFARE 
 
 The engineers are a constant and indispen- 
 sable auxiliary to the infantry. Their duties con- 
 sist in helping the infantry to organize positions, 
 in establishing or improving means of communi- 
 cation, and in carrying out or directing sapping 
 or mining. 
 
 The establishing or improving means of com- 
 munication involves tasks of the most diverse 
 natures; the building of permanent, temporary, 
 or pontoon bridges; the construction of railways 
 or roads; the running of telegraph lines; the care 
 of searchlights and carrier pigeons. 
 
 The engineers, in consequence of this, need 
 even more special training than do the men of the 
 other arms. But it should not be forgotten that 
 those who are destined for the principal tasks 
 should be able, according to the exigencies of the 
 moment, to execute any one of these tasks ; for 
 instance, to construct a road, a shelter, or a post, 
 to destroy works, or to repair them. We are 
 coming more and more to use mechanical means 
 for making earthworks. 
 
 If the engineers alone were loaded with all of 
 these duties, their task, in a war where so much 
 digging is going on all the time, would be quite 
 an impossible one. In many cases, however, al- 
 though the engineers are charged with directing 
 the works, or giving advice about them, it is 
 the infantry, the cavalry, or the artillery that 
 
 43 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 actually furnish the laborers needful for their 
 execution. 
 
 The cavalry has a r61e of minor importance in 
 the present war. Its former r61e consisted in 
 exploring as far as possible, in obtaining in- 
 formation about the enemy, and in covering the 
 front of the troops during the march. To-day, 
 the aircraft has taken the place of the cavalry for 
 exploration and reconnaissance. During those 
 phases where there is movement, namely, the 
 pursuit and the march of approach, the cavalry 
 may, in part, resume its former r61e. As soon as 
 it is exposed to the fire of infantry under cover 
 of machine guns or of artillery, it runs the great- 
 est risk of annihilation. It can hold the ground 
 for the time being only by fighting on foot. In 
 like manner, during a period of stationary fight- 
 ing, the cavalry is used as infantry, and shares 
 in the occupation of the trenches. Hence the 
 most important specialty for a cavalryman is to 
 be a foot soldier. 
 
 The aircraft has an important r&le. It re- 
 connoitres behind the enemy's lines, observes 
 the first-line troops and watches their move- 
 ments; it also takes active part in the combat. 
 The machines consist of different types of air- 
 planes, observation balloons, and dirigibles. 
 
 The airplanes are called upon to obtain all 
 manner of information about the enemy's posi- 
 
 44 
 
A French machine, carrying the tricolor identification marks 
 
 A German machine, carrying the black cross, captured the same day 
 LANDING-GROUND ON THE AISNE, NEAR FISMES, JANUARY 24, 1917 
 
TRAINING AN AEMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 tions. To this end they are provided with per- 
 fected photographic apparatus, by means of 
 which they are largely instrumental in keeping 
 up to date the maps showing the enemy's works, 
 his batteries, railways, etc. 
 
 During the course of the combat, the air- 
 planes watch the progress of their own infantry, 
 communicating with them by means of signals; 
 they also keep an eye on the enemy's infantry, , 
 so as to discover preparations for a counter- 
 attack or to indicate the direction of a retreat. 
 
 The fire-adjusting planes are entrusted with 
 the duty of directing the artillery fire to its ob- 
 jective; that is to say, they adjust the fire by 
 signalling whether the shots are too long or too 
 short. 
 
 The fighting planes have the special respon- 
 sibility of preventing raids by the enemy's air- 
 craft. We all know how skilful certain aviators 
 have become at this game. Some of these men, 
 provided with special machines, have the duty 
 of setting fire to the enemy's observation bal- 
 loons or dirigibles. 
 
 The bombing planes pass over the enemy's ,, 
 lines, and drop bombs upon points of tactical 
 importance, such as railroad stations, factories, 
 camps, dep&ts, reserve cantonments, collecting 
 stations, and centres of communication. They 
 sometimes succeed admirably in this. I well 
 
 45 
 
THE WAEPARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 remember a night on the Somme in the au- 
 tumn of 1916 when, at about 10 p.m., the Ger- 
 mans blew up an enormous ammunition d6p6t 
 situated at Ch^risy and belonging to the Sixth 
 Army. I was there with Major Boussavit, at 
 present in America, in a shed at M6ricourt, not 
 far from the dep6t. The effect at night was 
 terrific; the fire gained little by little, and the 
 explosions continued until nearly noon the next 
 day. It appeared that the airplane which had 
 performed the feat was not a special bombing 
 plane, but, thanks to great audacity on the part 
 of the pilot, it had descended, under cover of 
 a dark night, to a height of two hundred metres, 
 right over an ammunition train which was ar- 
 riving at the dep&t station, and had managed 
 to bomb this train. 
 
 Last of all, the airplanes can undertake to in- 
 jure the enemy's troops by dropping bombs on 
 them, or by shooting at them with small cannon 
 or machine guns. But, except in the case of an 
 important objective like a column at close 
 quarters, or artillery in retreat, the effect is more 
 that of causing panic than the infliction of seri- 
 ous loss. The reason is that an airplane can carry 
 but a limited stock of projectiles, and has no 
 means of obtaining a fresh supply. 
 
 The observation balloons are in place during 
 periods of stationary fighting. They are placed 
 
 46 
 

 
 
 
 
 ^1 
 
 
 Ml 
 
 1 
 
 w- 
 
 ^^^•^ 
 
 m^j^ 
 
 ^- . -•■^■^iifl 
 
 
 iUp^ 
 
 ■ 
 
 1 
 
 
 FT 
 
 1^ 
 
 .g'^.l 
 
 ■f% 
 
 
 m\ 
 
 AN OBSERVATION BALLOON ON LANDING; ITS REMOVAL TO THE GARAGE 
 ON THE SOMME, NOVEMBER, I916 
 
 HOUSING OF AN OBSERVATION BALLOON IN ITS CAMOUFLAGED 
 GARAGE. ON THE SOMME, NOVEMBER, I916 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 at a discreet distance behind the Front, allowed 
 to rise to a specified height by letting out their 
 cables, and connected with the ground by tele- 
 phone. They are auxiliaries to the Command, 
 and to the artillery. Since they are unable to 
 protect themselves, they are protected by fight- 
 ing planes, which prevent the enemy's planes 
 from approaching. They are usually out of the 
 range of the enemy's gims, but when, by chance, 
 they find themselves within range of his fire, they 
 have no resource but to come down, in case their 
 own artillery is unable to silence the enemy's 
 pieces. 
 
 I was present when an incident of this sort oc- 
 curred in the beginning of 191 5 at Elverdinghe 
 in Belgium, where I was in a rest camp. I had 
 gone out on horseback along a road, near which 
 was an observation balloon. All at once some 
 German shells began to burst around it in a 
 very determined fashion. The balloon came 
 down without losing a minute, much to the 
 relief of a number of soldiers who were struck 
 by shell splinters falling on the road and ad- 
 joining country. 
 
 The object of dirigibles is to bombard the 
 enemy's territory; they have the advantage 
 that they can carry a large amount of ammuni- 
 tion. But they can travel only at night, owing 
 to the large surface they expose to artillery fire; 
 
 47 
 
THE WARPAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 they also have serious difficulties in accomplish- 
 ing any military objects they may have in view, 
 so that in practice they do not manage to do much 
 but slaughter old men, women, and children. 
 In fact, this seems to be the only object which 
 the Germans have in view when they set out 
 to bombard towns in France or England which 
 have neither garrison nor military organization. 
 Instead of terrorizing the inhabitants, as the 
 Germans fondly imagined would be the case, 
 they have filled them with a desire for vengeance 
 and with a frenzy of patriotism. 
 
 The true use of dirigibles seems to be to fly 
 over the seacoast, since their crews can see a 
 submerged submarine or a mine, just as one sees 
 a fish in a river. 
 
 A superiority in aviation secures, for which- 
 ever side possesses it, an immense advantage 
 over its adversary. If this superiority should 
 be incontestable, if through a manifest advan- 
 tage in equipment it should end in completely 
 blinding the enemy, this in itself would insure 
 victory. 
 
 It is quite as needful in the air service, as in 
 the other arms, that each man should be a spe- 
 cialist, should thoroughly understand the ma- 
 chine with which he is entrusted, its virtues, its 
 defects, and its tactical use. He must be an ex- 
 pert photographer if his duty be to take photo- 
 
 48 
 
TRAINING AN AEMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 graphs, an excellent machine gunner if he must 
 shoot at an aerial adversary, a good artillerist if 
 he must adjust the fire of batteries. 
 
 The preceding exposition of the multifarious 
 rdles which the fighting arms must fulfil shows 
 that the training of an army, even when we mean 
 thereby the training of the first-line elements, in- 
 cludes a large number of specialties. Further- 
 more, I have passed over in silence a large 
 number of specialists, because their total num- 
 bers were small compared with the army total. 
 I might have mentioned motor drivers, cartog- 
 raphers, camoufleurs, periscope observers, and 
 men in charge of special apparatus, such as that 
 for listening to subterranean noises, that foi" 
 discharging asphyxiating gas, for meteorological 
 observations, for throwing flaming oil, for sound 
 observations, for acoustic signals (mechanical 
 trumpets), etc., etc. I have also omitted certain 
 specialties which every soldier should know, such 
 as the construction of shelters, or the means of 
 protection against asphyxiating gas. 
 
 No matter how perfect the knowledge which 
 each specialist might possess of the machine en- 
 trusted to his care, and of his specific task, yet 
 no fruitful result could be obtained unless there 
 existed a perfect coordination between the dif- 
 ferent specialists of the same arm and between 
 those of different arms. The coordination con- 
 
 49 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 sists of the sum total of general knowledge and 
 of practical means which permit the different 
 arms, and the different specialists of the same 
 arm, to support one another, and to work to- 
 gether for victory. 
 
 General knowledge is the corner-stone of co- 
 ordination in the sense that without it no initia- 
 tive can be taken and no practicable decisions 
 made. It is based upon instruction covering the 
 war as a whole. First, each specialist must know 
 the place of his arm in the whole scheme of 
 things, and the means of coordinating his per- 
 sonal activity with that of other specialists. 
 Secondly, he must have clear ideas as to the 
 functions of the other arms, the help which he 
 may expect from each of them, and the help 
 which he must render in turn. This coordina- 
 tion is the particular care of the commanders 
 throughout the various grades of the hierarchy. 
 
 It is a curious fact that the importance of gen- 
 eral principles is frequently overlooked by the 
 neophyte in military affairs. I have found this 
 to be the case, and my subordinates have had 
 the same experience when we were giving lec- 
 tures at Harvard University; in fact, I experi- 
 enced it even more than they, for I reserved for 
 myself the more important lectures which con- 
 tained general ideas. For instance, when I set 
 forth the necessity for collaboration between the 
 
 50 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 infantry and the artillery, not a hearer took 
 notes; when one of my comrades explained that 
 the bottom of the trench was 1.7 m. below the 
 surface of the ground, and 2 m. below the top of 
 the parapet, or that the automatic machine rifle 
 weighed with its case 9.1 kg., every pencil jotted 
 down the precious information. Many fledg- 
 ling soldiers consider that general ideas are too 
 high for thern, suitable only for their superiors, 
 whereas they thirst for precise information as 
 to lengths, distances, weights, etc., the sort of 
 knowledge that they must possess in practical 
 form. Consequently, when they hear that such 
 and such insignificant details have been altered 
 for one reason or another, they announce to all 
 and sundry that the methods of warfare have 
 been changed once more. 
 
 The means of effecting coordination may be 
 epitomized in two words, information and liai- 
 son. 
 
 Coordination is, furthermore, greatly facili- 
 tated by the existence of a general training, the 
 same throughout the army. If all the combatants 
 are steeped in the same essential principles, follow 
 the same general methods, and act upon the same 
 broad lines, it will be easy to forward information 
 at the right moment and to the right place, and 
 liaison will be easily established wherever needed. 
 Coordination, like specialization, is obtained by 
 
 51 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 training; it is not epitomized in a chapter headed 
 "liaisons," but results from the sum total of 
 general knowledge regarding modern war. 
 
 I have tried to show what an army ought to 
 know, before explaining my ideas of how it 
 should come by that knowledge. This exposition 
 has seemed to me needful for two reasons. The 
 first is that the importance of specialization has 
 escaped and still escapes the attention of many 
 observers. The second is that the necessity for 
 coordination demands a very special organiza- 
 tion of the methods of training. 
 
 Before undertaking to study how an army 
 should be trained, I will make one general re- 
 mark. This problem of training is one of a per- 
 manent nature. It is never safe to say that any 
 army is completely trained; new detailed pro- 
 cesses and new machines are constantly being 
 devised, new recruits arrive to swell the ranks, 
 wounded men rejoin their units after a long ab- 
 sence, men pass from clerical to active service, 
 etc. Finally, even when no changes have taken 
 place, the soldiers grow slack after a long stay 
 in the trenches, and must brush up their knowl- 
 edge during rest periods behind the Front. 
 
 I shall study the problem in its most general 
 aspect, by considering the case of an army that 
 
 52 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 is utterly untrained. My exposition will still be 
 true of a trained army, if account be taken of the 
 amount of training already received. 
 
 The basis of organization for training rests 
 upon certain extremely simple principles, so sim- 
 ple in fact that they seem almost self-evident. 
 Yet, as a matter of fact they have been misunder- 
 stood in the past, and still are misunderstood 
 to-day. They are the following: — 
 
 (i) No army can be trained without teachers. 
 
 (2) The teachers must be taught before the 
 troops can be. 
 
 (3) To train these teachers there must be 
 schools for officers of all arms. 
 
 (4) To organize these schools it is necessary 
 to bring together the officers best qualified to 
 give instruction. 
 
 These principles have prevailed, not without 
 opposition, in the French army. Since my ar- 
 rival in America I have proclaimed them from 
 the housetops, for I am convinced that they are 
 correct. Let me now try to explain them, and 
 prove their correctness. 
 
 No army can he trained without teachers. This 
 principle is evident; why is it so often misunder- 
 stood? 
 
 The people who misunderstand it are in error 
 as to the meaning of the word " training." Train- 
 ing, to their minds, means drill in bodily move- 
 
 53 
 
THE WARF.\IIE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ments and attitudes, marches and alignments, 
 rifle practice and bayonet exercise, etc. A knowl- 
 edge of these things is supposed to be enough 
 to make a trained soldier. This mistake has been 
 made in every army by those who believed that 
 the military profession consisted in the accom- 
 plishment of certain rites, and not in the ap- 
 prenticeship for war. Teachers whose knowledge 
 did not extend beyond these rites could teach 
 nothing more to the officers and soldiers con- 
 fided to their care; such teachers are quite in- 
 capable of teaching modern warfare. This is the 
 idea which so many of my friends have mis- 
 understood when they have asked me : — 
 
 "How long a time do you think is needful to 
 train an officer?" 
 
 I have invariably replied : — 
 
 "A few months, if he is intelligent, and put 
 under the care of a competent teacher; a year, 
 eighteen months, or two years if his teacher is 
 mediocre; and in the latter case all that he will 
 accomplish will be to lead his men to be slaugh- 
 tered." 
 
 It happened one day that a young American 
 girl asked me just this question, I replied that 
 I would answer it by asking her a question in 
 turn : — 
 
 "I am going to teach you Chinese," said I; 
 "how long will it take you to learn it?" 
 
 54 
 
TRAINING AN AEMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 "It is a pretty hard language," said she; "I 
 shall need a long time." 
 
 "Oh, no, you are very intelligent, and you 
 will learn quickly enough." 
 
 "So you know Chinese yourself?" 
 
 "Not a word — come on, let's begin." 
 
 She burst out laughing, she had understood. 
 
 It is clear that there can be no training with- 
 out teachers. We come thus to principle No. 2. 
 
 The teachers must he trained before the troops 
 can he. This principle is equally misunderstood; 
 the reply is made : — 
 
 "We must hurry up. We can't waste time in 
 training teachers. Since no one knows anything, 
 we must begin by shaping the men in the rough; 
 after that we will look about." 
 
 This is a dangerous error. Men who get a bad 
 start in their training are much harder to teach 
 than those who have received no instruction at 
 all. First of all they must forget what they have 
 learned, and we all know how hard it is to get 
 rid of bad habits. It is, therefore, quite wrong 
 to say that we save time by training the troops 
 before providing proper teachers. In this case, 
 as in so many others, the application of rational 
 methods leads not only more certainly, but also 
 more quickly, to the desired end. 
 
 I now come to principle No. 3. 
 
 To train these teachers there must he schools for 
 55 
 
THE WARFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 officers of all arms. There has never existed any 
 method of teaching Hterature, art, or science to 
 a number of men, other than the creation of 
 schools. Now, according to my favorite for- 
 mula, "The present war is not a sport, it is a 
 science." Consequently it must be taught like 
 other sciences. 
 
 I have never believed that the fruits of teach- 
 ing, except, perhaps, in the case of a spoken lan- 
 guage, could be gathered merely by bringing to- 
 gether the man who knows and the one who does 
 not. One does not learn mathematics by taking 
 meals and playing tennis with a mathematician; 
 the only means is by following his demonstra- 
 tions, taking note of his explanations, and work- 
 ing out problems under his direction. 
 
 Schools are necessary, not only for specializa- 
 tion in each of the kinds of arms, but also for 
 coordination and general understanding. It is a 
 good plan to establish, in proximity to one an- 
 other, schools for officers of different arms, and 
 schools for teachers of specialties; this arrange- 
 ment permits of combined meetings and re- 
 ciprocal visits, which establish coordination, 
 without interfering with specialization. 
 
 These considerations lead to the fourth prin- 
 ciple: — 
 
 To organize these schools it is necessary to bring 
 together the officers best qualified to give instruction., 
 
 56 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 This principle of concentration is the antithesis 
 of the principle which I shall call dispersion, and 
 which consists in scattering the best teachers 
 throughout the army, each one working for the 
 benefit of some small handful of officers. If the 
 best teachers be united in this way in one group 
 and provided with the best pupils, there will 
 quickly be formed a large number of officers 
 capable of giving instruction anywhere. 
 
 The officers to be sent to the schools should be 
 those best qualified to take advantage of them. 
 These are the most mature and the best equipped, 
 for when they return to their units they can in- 
 troduce the new methods with all the authority 
 that comes from their rank and their knowl- 
 edge. If, on the other hand, it is the youngest 
 and most ignorant who attend such schools, they 
 will be in danger, when they return, of wound- 
 ing the susceptibilities of their seniors attached 
 to the old methods, or of being looked upon as 
 scatter-brained or undisciplined. They will also 
 run the risk of being unable to hand on a doc- 
 trine which is not well fixed in their minds. 
 
 The logical conclusion to draw from these prin- 
 ciples is that in any army, instruction must begin 
 at the top, not at the bottom. Any other system 
 will lead to difficulties, mistakes, and delays. 
 By centralizing instruction and entrusting it to 
 thoroughly qualified officers, there will arise a 
 
 57 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 uniformity of doctrine and of methods which 
 will constitute the best liaison of all, unity of 
 will and purpose. 
 
 How may we realize in practice a system based 
 upon these principles? I shall answer this ques- 
 tion by referring to the experiments which I made 
 a year ago when the French army was facing 
 the problem of creating schools at the Front. 
 
 The General Staff had at that time reached 
 the conclusion that a methodical organization of 
 training was essential, even in an army which 
 had been fighting without respite for more than 
 two years. This of itself is enough to show that 
 training is an ever-present necessity. 
 
 As a result of the losses in the ranks of the 
 junior officers, up to and including majors, since 
 the beginning of the war, certain officers and 
 N.C.O.'s had gained their advancement with 
 great rapidity. They were the bravest, fre- 
 quently the most intelligent ; they had spent two 
 years in the trenches; nevertheless, their knowl- 
 edge was insufficient. These had to be taught, 
 and others in turn after them, to make up for 
 future losses. 
 
 It was furthermore needful to perfect the sys- 
 tem of specialized instruction. As far back as 
 May and June of 1915, the majority of soldiers 
 
 58 
 
TRAINING AN AEMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 of my army corps had shown themselves, through 
 lack of training, incapable of using the grenades 
 which had been distributed to them for the 
 first time. On the Somme in 191 6, the soldiers 
 who had received automatic machine rifles had 
 jammed the mechanism and thrown the arms 
 away as heavy and useless. 
 
 It was evident, from these facts, that two 
 sorts of schools were needed ; schools for officers 
 and schools for specialists. The first were re- 
 quired by the principle of coordination; the sec- 
 ond by the principle of specialization. 
 
 The successful operation of such schools re- 
 quires, in my judgment, two conditions, stabil- 
 ity and continuity. Stability insures comfort, 
 which is indispensable for the performance of 
 good work and the installation of the necessary 
 apparatus. Continuity insures the perfecting 
 of details of method and the utilization of the 
 experience acquired with the first pupils for the 
 benefit of the later ones. 
 
 I have had a chance to ascertain in practice 
 how true these principles are. In January, 1917, 
 when the Sixth Army was transferred from the 
 Somme to the Aisne, and was put under a new 
 commander, I received an order to close all the 
 schools and to dispose of teachers, pupils, and 
 equipment. The army, so they said, was to de- 
 liver a decisive attack, and would need all its 
 
 59 
 
THE WARFARE OP TaDAY 
 
 officers; what would be the use of reserving any 
 for purposes of instruction? I tried to insist on 
 an idea which I had at heart: since the schools 
 constituted a permanent reserve, they could 
 always be drawn upon if a bloody engagement 
 deprived the units of a large number of officers 
 or N.C.O.'s. It was all of no avail. I had to de- 
 stroy with my own hands the edifice that I had 
 erected with so much labor. 
 
 The Command later saw new light. I was 
 instructed to start some of the schools again 
 on the Aisne, and I succeeded, in spite of great 
 difficulties. After a few weeks of operation, the 
 schools were threatened once more, on the ground 
 that the army was going to attack. I defended 
 them with all my might, but as soon as I was 
 ordered to America, they were once more dis- 
 solved. I have learned from correspondents that 
 since that time it has been necessary to open the 
 schools once more. What time and energy would 
 have been saved if the authorities had appre- 
 ciated the need for permanence in the system of 
 training, and had respected as far as possible 
 the principles of stability and continuity! 
 
 I do not wish to undertake a detailed exposi- 
 tion of the system which was in operation while 
 I was director of training in the Sixth Army. 
 This system, which is the same in all the French 
 armies, could indeed be made more rational and 
 
 60 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 more simple. In fact I had already submitted to 
 general Headquarters a plan for its modification, 
 by suppressing, for instance, the army corps 
 schools, which were too unstable in consequence 
 of changes and reliefs; and this has been adopted 
 since my arrival in America. All I wish to do 
 for the moment is to define in outline the offi- 
 cial scheme of training, simplified according to 
 my personal views. 
 ^N All general ideas, principles, methods, and 
 devices for carrying on the war should be de- 
 veloped at the Front. The unit for instruction 
 should be the army, each army including a vari- 
 able number of corps. The instruction should be 
 given in army schools intended to form teachers 
 for the army itself and for the zones in the rear 
 which correspond to that army. 
 
 The army schools are of two sorts: schools for 
 officers and schools for specialists. 
 
 The schools intended to train officers include: 
 infantry schools for majors (student captains), 
 others for captains (student lieutenants), and 
 others for section leaders (student N.C.O.'s); 
 artillery schools including a finishing school for 
 superior officers and captains, and a fire school 
 for captains and lieutenants; engineer schools 
 comprising a school for section leaders and one 
 for N.C.O.'s. The aviation schools are in special 
 camps in the interior. 
 
 6i 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The schools for specialists include infantry 
 schools composed of one for grenadiers, one for 
 machine-gun men, one for automatic machine- 
 rifle men, one for 37-mm. cannon men, and one 
 for liaison agents and signallers : artillery schools 
 comprising a school for trench artillery, one for 
 receiving officers, and additioncd schools for di- 
 verse specialties. 
 
 These schools are in the immediate neighbor- 
 hood of the Front in reserved zones away from 
 the lines of passage between the interior and the 
 Front. They include officers and N.C.O.'s, all 
 destined to become instructors. 
 
 In the vicinity of the army schools are the di- 
 visional depots, which are in the nature of re- 
 servoirs between the interior and the Front, to 
 furnish reinforcements to the various divisions 
 when needed. They have exclusively schools for 
 infantry specialists: here the instructors turned 
 out by the army schools train, in the case of 
 each regiment, a number of N.C.O.'s or privates 
 sent from the trenches or the rest camps. 
 
 Between the Front, properly speaking, along 
 the border of which the divisional d6p6ts are sta- 
 tioned, and the interior of the country are found 
 the training battalions. It is in these that train- 
 ing is given to recruits, to men formerly dis- 
 charged who have since become eligible, and to 
 men turned over to the infantry from other arms. 
 
 62 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 They are established in specially reserved zones, 
 and constitute a second reservoir, to send rein- 
 forcements, either to the divisional dep&ts or to 
 the first-line units, according to need. They have 
 schools for infantry specialists who are taught by 
 the instructors trained in the army schools. 
 
 Lastly, in the interior of the country are the 
 dep6ts corresponding to the regiments at the 
 Front. It is to these that wounded men go from 
 the hospitals after their recovery. They are 
 then sent to the divisional dep&ts, when rein- 
 forcements are called for. 
 
 Training is given in the interior in vast camps 
 where there are schools for infantry specialties. 
 
 There is a continual passage to and fro be- 
 tween these various echeloned elements, so 
 that instruction is everywhere given according 
 to the same principles. These principles come 
 from the army schools, which, in turn, receive 
 them from general Headquarters. 
 
 The army schools train all the officers and in- 
 structors destined either for the training bat- 
 tahons, the divisional schools, or the bodies of 
 troops of the army. They thus receive their pu- 
 pils, on the one hand, from the training battal- 
 ions; on the other hand, from the divisions or 
 extra divisional units. These pupils are taught in 
 successive groups and for a specified period ; at 
 the end of that time they return to the elements 
 
 63 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 to which they belong. Some are meant to be 
 instructors in the different schools of specialties, 
 others are utilized by their various regiments 
 in the specialties they have learned. A current 
 account of transfers is established, even in the 
 instruction camps in the interior; it is intended 
 to prevent the same officers or N.C.O.'s from 
 remaining too long outside the fighting zone. It 
 also helps to diffuse the teachings of the army 
 schools, not only throughout the corps of this 
 army, but also in the interior. 
 
 An officer, usually a general or a colonel, is the 
 director of training for the army; he watches, as 
 a representative of the Commander of the army, 
 the operation of the army schools, the divisional 
 schools, and the training battalion schools. He 
 constitutes a direct liaison between the schools 
 for officers and those for specialists, and sees to 
 it that the schedules include general conferences 
 and reciprocal visits. 
 
 The officers placed at the heads of the army 
 schools must be men of the highest merit, intel- 
 ligence, knowledge, experience, and health. The 
 value of the officers depends upon them. In the 
 same way, officers and N.C.O.'s sent as pupils, 
 being destined to become teachers, should be 
 chosen with great care. To be sent to an army 
 school is not a furlough or a rest, it is an honor 
 involving obligations. 
 
 64 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 Such, in broad outline, is the system which is 
 in use in France, and which is producing excel- 
 lent results. The English have adopted it; I 
 think that it will also be adopted in General 
 Pershing's army. So far it has not been tried 
 in America; let us hope that some day it will be. 
 
 We have now studied the problem of training 
 in its general outlines; let us see what solution 
 has been found for this problem in the United 
 States. 
 
 At the moment when war was declared, not 
 one of the methods of modern warfare was in 
 practice in the American army. Europe had been 
 fighting for more than two years, but the general 
 sentiment here was that the United States would 
 never go to war: at any rate, no preparations were 
 made for that eventuality. It is fair to say that 
 there was in Paris an American military mission, 
 composed of admirably chosen men, with whom 
 I personally had the honor of being in contact 
 for two or three weeks before coming to America, 
 and who had made some studies which the Amer- 
 ican military attache, Captain Carl Boyd, had 
 forwarded to Washington. In fact I saw these 
 studies in the middle of May in the archives of the 
 Army War College. But they had produced no 
 great effect in the army, because no one on this 
 
 65 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 side of the water had seen the war, and no docu- 
 ments, however excellent, are sufficient to teach 
 the mass of men; that can only be done by 
 teachers. 
 
 It is to the eternal credit of Harvard Univer- 
 sity that at this time she grasped the truth. She 
 looked upon war as a science which should be 
 taught by those who understood it. She wished 
 to see that science taught within her doors, for 
 she foresaw the exigencies which the future might 
 have in store. President Lowell requested, 
 through the intermediary of the French Am- 
 bassador, M. Jusserand, that French officers be 
 sent to train the Harvard Regiment. The request 
 was granted. When war was declared the French 
 Mission to Harvard became a means of liaison 
 with the American army. I was thus enabled to 
 observe carefully the evolution and realization 
 of plans for military instruction. 
 
 From the very beginning I advised, both in my 
 conversations with the military authorities and 
 in my official reports, the creation of schools 
 destined to train teachers. I suggested three dif- 
 ferent means: — 
 
 (i) Send immediately to France one hundred 
 or one hundred and fifty French-speaking offi- 
 cers, to study for five or six weeks in our army 
 schools. I believed that this plan would avoid 
 all loss of time, and might bring great results, 
 
 66 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 and that these American officers, with the help 
 of a few French comrades, would form a body of 
 teachers in the schools destined to turn out mili- 
 tary instructors. 
 
 The objection was raised that the small num- 
 ber of officers in the American regular army 
 would preclude the possibility of sending these 
 men. But if they had been sent, they would 
 have been back long ago, and would by now 
 have trained thousands of others ; no time would 
 have been lost. Moreover, this plan is still feasi- 
 ble, in spite of the months that have intervened; 
 all that is needed is to bring back to America 
 some officers from General Pershing's army. 
 
 (2) Send to France a small expeditionary 
 force, to establish, as soon as possible, army 
 schools like ours behind the Front. These schools 
 would train teachers for the American troops in 
 France and in America, until such time as the 
 schools on this side of the water should be in 
 complete operation. 
 
 (3) Send to America a small number of French 
 officers, chosen with the greatest care, who 
 should, with the aid of the best American of- 
 ficers, create higher schools to train teachers for 
 the American army. 
 
 After suggestions and negotiations whereof I 
 know nothing, it was decided to send to this 
 country a large number of French officers, of 
 
 67 
 
THE WAIIFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 whom all but a few were, as far as I could see, 
 specialists. 
 
 While this scheme was being considered by 
 the higher authorities, my great personal desire 
 was to prove to the American people the neces- 
 sity for modifying the methods of military train- 
 ing. I wished to offer a great object lesson in 
 modern warfare. For this purpose I had an 
 invaluable auxiliary in Harvard University, and 
 a marvellous means of demonstration in the 
 Harvard Regiment. 
 
 Let me here pay my respects to those young 
 men, who have been modest and devoted col- 
 laborators in this work for the American army. 
 For months they worked with an intelligence, 
 a zeal, and an enthusiasm which were entirely 
 praiseworthy. After all their efforts, not one 
 obtained his commission, although all had been 
 taught by regular officers of the French and 
 American armies. They stood by and saw their 
 comrades, taught by the old-fashioned methods, 
 receiving commissions at the end of three 
 months. I felt their disappointment keenly, 
 but I (Saw how the War Department could not 
 make an exception in favor of one unofificial 
 camp, without stirring up claims on the part of 
 other universities. There was something very 
 fine and very American in the way that these 
 young men sacrificed their personal interests for 
 
 68 
 
THE HARVARD R.O.T.C. AT "WAKEFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, IN JUNE, I917 
 Critique by Lieut. Colonel Azan after manceuvres 
 
 THE. HARVARD R.O.T.C. AT CAMP AZAN NEAR BARRE, JULY, 19^17 
 Colonel A2an stands near the French flag in front of his tent 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 the sake of an idea. And as is always the case, 
 by being victims to this idea, they became its 
 propagators. 
 
 As a result of all this, there gradually spread 
 abroad the idea that something new was being 
 taught in Cambridge, but this novelty, charac- 
 terized in many people's eyes by the Fresh Pond 
 trenches, was, to my great despair, called 
 "trench warfare." Many persons believed that, 
 in reality, nothing had been changed, that war 
 was still to be learned from small manuals, such 
 as "U.S. Military PoHcy," "Small Infantry 
 Problems," based upon the battles of the Civil 
 War or the campaigns against Indians; it was 
 merely needful, in order to be up to date, to 
 study an appendix called "Trench Warfare." 
 
 The idea was wrong, but it produced a most 
 happy result. The War Department sent to 
 Cambridge five hundred and fifty reserve offi- 
 cers, majors, captains, and lieutenants, who had 
 just received their commissions at the various 
 training camps, in order to complete their train- 
 ing under the direction of the French Mission. 
 These officers arrived immediately after the dis- 
 solution of the Harvard R.O.T.C. They gave 
 themselves the name "Iron Battalion," by anal- 
 ogy from the famous French "Iron Division" 
 in whose ranks I had formerly been wounded. 
 
 The first school for teachers was founded. It 
 69 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 was called by the newspapers, and by certain 
 official personages, "School for trench warfare"; 
 but this inappropriate title was corrected by 
 "Iron Battalion," and most of all by the fact 
 that our American comrades were learning many 
 things besides the method of digging a pit or 
 constructing a shelter. A group of five French of- 
 ficers, without the help of American instructors, 
 were able, in four weeks, to train five hundred 
 and fifty American military teachers. They were 
 not a finished product, of course, but they were 
 in possession of a consistent body of knowledge 
 and ideas. These teachers were in a position to 
 diffuse everywhere the principles which they had 
 learned. 
 
 The school was closed as a result of a new 
 scheme of organization, growing out of the ar- 
 rival of a large number of French and English 
 officers and N.C.O.'s. These officers will be sent 
 in groups of ten to each of the divisional camps; 
 they will go solely to teach their specialties. 
 The English will teach five of these specialties 
 — the machine gun, the light trench mortar, 
 fencing and bayonet exercise, liquid flame and 
 asphyxiating gas, and sniping. The French will 
 teach five other specialties — artillery, the auto- 
 matic machine rifle, hand and rifle grenades, 
 liaison service, and sapping. The coordination 
 between the English and French in each camp 
 
 70 
 
THE IRON BATTALION MANCEUVRING BEFORE GENERAL HODGES, U.S.A. 
 Left to right: Aide-de-Camp to General Hodges; Captain Solbert, U.S.A. of the Iron Bat- 
 talion; General Hodges, commanding at Camp Devens, Massachusetts; Captain Amann 
 of the French Mission; Lieut. Colonel Azan; Captain Nicholas Roosevelt, U.S.R.. of 
 the Iron Battalion 
 
 THE IRON BATTALION ASSEMBLING FOR THE CRITIQUE AT WAVERLEY 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS, SEPTEMBER, I917 
 
 Standing, left to right: Lieut. Colonel Azan, Captain Nicholas Roosevelt, Captain Amann 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 will be established by a group leader, as well 
 as by certain inspection officers. 
 
 I see, by reference to the map, that the Eng- 
 lish and French officers will cover the whole of 
 the United States. But let us not confuse geo- 
 graphical distribution with methodical organiza- 
 tion. The essential question is. What may we 
 expect to accomplish with these few hundred 
 English and French officers and N.C.O.'s? I am 
 told that they are going to train the American 
 army; but how? 
 
 Are they to train the enlisted men? There are 
 two millions of them; the task is impossible. 
 
 Are they to train the new officers? There 
 are one hundred and twenty to one hundred 
 and fifty thousand of them; still an impossible 
 task. 
 
 Are they to train military instructors? It is 
 the only feasible plan. But in this case we must 
 make groups of properly chosen teachers and 
 start schools. 
 
 I am absolutely convinced that this last 
 method will force its way in the end, for truth 
 always triumphs eventually. But when? Time 
 flies, and time is precious. Each week of war 
 costs us thousands of lives and millions of dol- 
 lars. More than that, the loss of a few weeks 
 may bring on the season of bad weather and 
 prolong the war for a whole year. 
 
 71 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 I often hear people say: "The troops will be 
 trained later in France." 
 
 Why not train them on this side of the water? 
 Are we sure that there will be enough ships to 
 transport them rapidly? And while waiting for 
 these ships, are we going to train them not at 
 all, or, at most, train them badly? They will 
 then need several months in Europe for the final 
 grooming. Why not train them here? 
 
 I am no pessimist, I have absolute faith in the 
 future of America. She is sometimes slow in 
 finding her path, but, once found, she follows it 
 with headlong speed; she will overcome every 
 obstacle with irresistible force. 
 
 What I desire is that victory should be bought 
 as cheaply as possible. The American army must 
 profit by the experience of the English and the 
 French armies. The blood of the men who fell 
 by hundreds of thousands in the first months of 
 the war, because neither they nor their com- 
 manders were properly trained, must not remain 
 a vain sacrifice. 
 
 "We never profit by the mistakes of others"; 
 so runs an old proverb. This saying must be 
 proved wrong, at least in the case of America. 
 I have seen all the friends of my childhood lose 
 their lives in France; now I do not wish to see 
 the death of my American friends also. 
 
 There is on the flag of our school at Saint-Cyr, 
 72 
 
TRAINING AN ARMY FOR MODERN WARFARE 
 
 the school where I was trained, a device which 
 I have always admired: — 
 
 " lis s'instruisent pour vaincre." 
 
 Let us think on this device. 
 
 I know another, very noble in its exaltation of 
 the spirit of sacrifice : — 
 
 " Mourir pour vaincre." 
 
 This, however, is by no means intended to 
 exalt the profitless sacrifice of lives, valuable 
 to home and country. In place of this device I 
 propose the following, which is the very conse- 
 quence of training: — 
 
 "Vaincre sans mourir." 
 
Ill 
 
 THE TRENCHES 
 
 Lecture of October 29, 19 17 
 
 Summary 
 
 Relative importance of trenches in the present war. — The stay in 
 the trenches corresponds to the period of stationary fighting in the 
 war of positions. 
 
 Description of the ensemble of a system of trenches. — Creation of 
 the trenches: their defensive r6Ie; their offensive r61e. — Difference 
 between the war of positions and the war of sieges. — The position. 
 — Plan of organization: view of the ensemble and sense of continu- 
 ity; nothing provisional. — Various elements of the system. 
 
 Detailed study of a system of trenches. — The first-line trench; con- 
 tinuity; interior shape; loopholes, traverses, etc. — The doubling 
 trench; transversal trenches: characteristics and aims. — The sup- 
 port trench. — Machine guns in the trenches. — Boyaux: the dif- 
 ference between them and trenches; tactical aim, form, policing. — 
 The line of redoubts. — Various works: shelters, latrines, command 
 posts, observation posts, telephone posts, first-aid posts, dep6ts, 
 places d'arm^s, observing-stations. — Rear of a position: camps, 
 hospitals, d6pdts of materiel, roads, railroads. 
 
 Life in the trenches. — Existence organized but not minutely reg- 
 ulated. — Combat and work. — Distribution of effort and specializa- 
 tion of workmen: riflemen and grenadiers; observers and watchers; 
 patrols. — Local rules for the trenches. — The commander in the 
 trenches: necessity for his presence. 
 
 The liaison. — Means of information: ground and aerial observing 
 stations; liaison officers. — Means of transmission: telephone, tele- 
 graph, runners, signallers, etc. — Regimental bulletin of information; 
 newspapers; books; letters; godmothers. 
 
 Supply and relief. — Supply of food. — Kitchen and cooks. — 
 Supply of munitions and materiel. — The relief: initial reconnais- 
 sance, execution. — Stay in the rear of the front. 
 
 R61e of the trenches in the daily life of the soldier. — Their different 
 aspects. — The numberless graves. — A monument for the future. 
 
 "The trenches." These words stand in the 
 eyes of the public for the sum total of warfare. 
 
 74 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 This is sometimes the case even with military 
 men, the proof being the unceasing succession of 
 books and articles bearing the title "Trench 
 Warfare," written with the intention of describ- 
 ing warfare as it is to-day. The fact is that the 
 details of the construction of trenches or the in- 
 cidents of life in them are supposed to epitomize 
 modern war. How often have I heard the fol- 
 lowing course of reasoning: "These young men 
 are first going to learn the soldier's trade; after 
 that they will learn trench warfare, in order to 
 know everything necessary to beat the Germans." 
 In this view trench warfare appears as a special 
 chapter appended to the old one which dealt with 
 the war of ambush and of movement. 
 
 Now, modern warfare, on the contrary, is based 
 on certain general conceptions, and without a 
 knowledge of these it is impossible to understand 
 its particular aspects. When once modern warfare 
 is understood, all other wars are understood like- 
 wise, for they are but simplified examples. It is 
 a mistake to say that there are different sorts of 
 warfare according to different theatres of opera- 
 tion; it is merely that there are wars where one 
 side is less well armed, or insufficiently supplied 
 with artillery, aircraft, or engineers. In such a 
 case victory is more easily won, and war takes 
 on the aspect of a man hunt. 
 
 I am told sometimes: "War is not the same 
 
 75 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 in Russia as it is in France; in the former country 
 cavalry is used." There are, indeed, differences, 
 but they are not differences of principle. The 
 fact is that the Russians have often been short 
 of ammunition, through the fault of their ad- 
 ministration ; it is also true that the Russian army 
 has, at this moment, a diminished morale. When 
 the day comes that Russian affairs are honestly 
 and efficiently administered, and the morale of 
 the army is restored to its former excellence, then 
 they too will wage a war of positions, and will 
 contribute to the final victory. If not, they will 
 not fight any more at all. 
 
 The trenches represent no more than one aspect, 
 or, more properly, one method, of modern war, 
 the method suited to the period of stationary 
 fighting, where the combat is not active. The 
 two adversaries watch one another, and prepare, 
 and wait. 
 
 One day Major-General Edwards, with whom 
 I was talking, said to me laughingly : — 
 
 "This is a miserable kind of war; it is warfare 
 in the sewer." 
 
 "General," said I, "we certainly do have to 
 hide in the sewers until it is time to come out. 
 True warfare begins when we do come out, and 
 that is the sort of warfare which I hope we shall 
 wage side by side." 
 
 It is nevertheless true that a study of the 
 76 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 trenches is essential. I propose, therefore, to 
 give, in turn, a general description of trenches, 
 a detailed account of their different parts, and a 
 bird's-eye view of life therein. 
 
 The first trenches were constructed when the 
 infantry, halted in its advance, was obliged to 
 dig in for protection against the fire of artillery 
 and machine guns. They were, first of all, a sort 
 of long ribbon, stretched along the front of the 
 armies as a protective barrier; later, as this bar- 
 rier seemed too insecure, other trenches were 
 dug behind, till a whole system was established. 
 This system has, little by little, become so strong 
 that the object of each of the opposing armies is 
 to destroy it at one or more points, in order to get 
 at the other army. 
 
 A nation which, in time of peace, had con- 
 structed such an obstacle all along its frontier, 
 would have been safe from a surprise attack. And 
 yet we used to make fun of the Chinese who 
 formerly built the Great Wall of China to defend 
 their borders, as well as of the French ofificer who, 
 at the time of the conquest of Algeria, proposed to 
 defend Algiers by a continuous trench! 
 
 We should never forget that the trenches have 
 an offensive as well as a defensive function. If 
 they are a means of stopping the enemy from 
 
 77 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 passing, they are also a means of clinging to the 
 terrain, in order to advance. 
 
 This offensive function of trenches has often 
 given rise to a false idea, namely, that modern 
 warfare is really nothing but siege warfare. 
 Now our present trenches do not, in the least, ful- 
 fil the same r61e as those used in a siege. When 
 we advance, we are not, as in a siege, endeav- 
 oring to reach a specific objective, the conquest 
 of which will bring victory. What we endeavor to 
 reach is the enemy's army. Even the capture of 
 his capital, which may be looked upon as the final 
 goal towards which all trenches lead, will not 
 give the victory if his army remains intact. The 
 capture of trenches to a dozen miles in width, or 
 even to a dozen in depth, is nothing but an un- 
 important geographical gain, if unaccompanied 
 by the capture of many prisoners and many 
 cannon. 
 
 It is true that siege warfare may appear here 
 and there in special instances, such as the attack 
 on an important point of support, or on an ob- 
 serving station affording a wide view; in this case 
 all of the usual siege methods, such, for instance, 
 as sapping and mining, are brought into play. 
 Here each gain of ground brings the desired objec- 
 tive nearer. But in the general case the trenches 
 do not really bring us closer to the goal; they 
 merely afford shelter while awaiting the attack. 
 
 78 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 Trenches are grouped in systems, of which the 
 most extensive is called a "position." 
 
 A position is divided into "centres of re- 
 sistance," each including one or more "points 
 of support." These latter correspond to geo- 
 graphical configurations suitable for purposes of 
 resistance; they must, however, always be or- 
 ganized with a view to camouflage, so as not to 
 catch the eye of the enemy's aviators, or become 
 a target for his artillery. 
 
 The trenches of a position are divided, for pur- 
 poses of garrison, into sectors and sub-sectors. 
 These are arbitrary partitions, corresponding to 
 military units such as divisions or regiments; 
 their size is variable according to the density of 
 occupation needful at that point. 
 
 The organization of a position should be car- 
 ried out according to a definite plan, which 
 considers both its offensive and its defensive 
 function. This plan includes two parts, plan of 
 defence and plan of attack. 
 
 It is essential that a commander who draws 
 up such a plan should have from the outset some 
 comprehensive idea, and that, in carrying this out, 
 he should follow a methodical procedure. These 
 conditions have not always been realized, because 
 too many officers have had a part in laying out 
 the trenches, and the multiplicity of schemes 
 has further been complicated by reliefs. The 
 
 79 
 
THE WAHPARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 outermost line of trenches, that is to say, the first 
 line, is determined by the accidents of the com- 
 bat; it corresponds to the line where the most 
 advanced combatants were halted. It is some- 
 times needful, for the sake of the general good, 
 to modify this line at some points, however ex- 
 cellent it may be for local purposes. Yet no one 
 but the commander of the position, thoroughly 
 conversant with the whole plan, should order such 
 a modification, even though it should be the means 
 of saving many human lives. To this end it is 
 essential that a permanent body, in charge of 
 the organization of the trenches, shall be con- 
 stantly on hand, independently of reliefs, at the 
 post of the commander of the position, or at least 
 that the plan adopted by any commander shall 
 not be modified by his successor. 
 
 For example, in Belgium, during March, 1915, 
 at Passchendaele, where I commanded a centre 
 of resistance, one of my company trenches was 
 seriously exposed to the enemy's artillery, and 
 was, furthermore, enfiladed by the machine guns 
 and rifles of several of the opposing trenches. 
 A modification of this outline, to which my 
 superiors agreed, would have improved the sit- 
 uation. But my trench was next to one belong- 
 ing to another army corps, whose deplacement 
 would have been involved. Moreover, in the 
 trenches on the one side and on the other, at 
 
 80 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 different dates, there was a relief every four days, 
 and this involved a change of commanders and 
 of units. No agreement could be reached before 
 I left that part of the Front. I lost, during my 
 stay at that centre of resistance, more men in 
 the condemned trench than in my other three 
 trenches put together. 
 
 In the construction of trenches, as in every- 
 thing else appertaining to war, it is an essential 
 principle to avoid temporary measures. Many 
 a mischance has come to those who ignored this 
 principle, whether in the construction of light 
 first-line shelters, or of factories in the interior. 
 Some officers contended that since the trenches 
 were a temporary expedient, they should be 
 hastily constructed. "What is the use of doing 
 more?" said they. "We shall leave soon and 
 move on." They have been in those trenches for 
 the last three years. 
 
 The same reasoning that was used by a friend 
 of mine when he saw the beginning of the con- 
 struction of an ammunition factory in July, 1915: 
 " It is ridiculous to build a factory now; the war 
 will be finished before the factory is." The fac- 
 tory has been turning out ammunition for more 
 than a year; the war is likely to be with us for 
 some time more. 
 
 Still, this same reasoning was offered to me in 
 January, 1917, when I was warmly defending 
 
 81 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the principle of schools for the army: "What is 
 the use for teaching now? This is the decisive 
 moment; every one must join in the combat." 
 After our offensive had been checked, the schools 
 had to be brought into being again, and officers 
 sent to them to be trained. 
 
 I dwell on these mistakes which have been 
 made in my country, not to belittle the value of 
 its efforts or the merits of its leaders, but to save 
 America from falling into the same errors. 
 
 The plan of organization of a position is, above 
 all, based upon common sense and tactical con- 
 siderations; it can afterwards be modified accord- 
 ing to local circumstances. It is important not 
 to prescribe invariable rules, nor to stipulate 
 certain measurements for every case. Still, we 
 may assume that every position includes the 
 following elements : — 
 
 (i) A first-line trench which is continuous, pre- 
 ceded by listening-posts and protected by acces- 
 sory defences. 
 
 (2) A doubling trench (sometimes miscalled a 
 "cover trench") fifty to one hundred yards be- 
 hind the first-line trench. 
 
 (3) Transversal trenches, varying in number. 
 
 (4) A support trench, five hundred to eight 
 hundred yards behind the first-line trench. 
 
 (5) A line of redoubts (sometimes miscalled 
 "reserve trenches") not continuous, which is often 
 
 82 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 used both to stop the enemy's advance and to 
 protect important groups of artillery. 
 
 (6) Boyaux, running from the rear up to the 
 first-line trench, and serving for communication 
 between the various trenches which are, with the 
 possible exception of the transversal ones, roughly 
 parallel to one another. 
 
 (7) In the different trenches, and between them, 
 shelters for the men, command posts, observa- 
 tion posts, depSts for munitions, food and water, 
 first-aid stations, places d'armes, to collect the 
 troops, etc. 
 
 Thus a subterranean city is dug out little by 
 little, echeloned in depth, and continually im- 
 proved in point of comfort and security. 
 
 The first-line trench has usually an initial out- 
 line determined by the chances of the conflict; 
 this outline can be made conformable to the acci- 
 dents of the terrain, but is not restricted by any 
 fixed principles. A field of fire of about one hun- 
 dred yards in front of it is sufficient; the ground 
 beyond ought to be easily covered by friendly 
 artillery. There is advantage in placing the first- 
 line trench on the farther side of a slope, as such 
 a location insures the possession of good observ- 
 ing-stations. 
 
 The first-line trench is a firing trench; it is also 
 
 83. 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 used to observe the enemy. The accessory de- 
 fences are in front of it; they are composed of 
 networks of barbed wire, attached to posts, 
 chevaux-de-frise, and other obstacles wherewith 
 to stop the enemy's advance. They are forty to 
 fifty yairds from the trench, enough to prevent a 
 simultaneous adjustment of the enemy's artillery 
 upon these defences and upon the trench, and to 
 afford protection against liquid fire. 
 
 Listening-posts, reached by boyaux, and used 
 at night, are constructed wherever it seems neces- 
 sary to have a means of closer observation or 
 more effective system of flanking fire. 
 
 It is essential that the first-line trench be con- 
 tinuous. This is needful, both to secure lateral 
 liaison, and to insure the defence of the position. 
 A point which seemed completely protected, 
 for instance, by a swamp, would be secure no 
 longer in summer when the swamp was dried 
 up by the sun, or in winter when it was frozen 
 hard. 
 
 It is possible, in such a continuous trench, to 
 have certain points occupied only by watchers 
 here and there. In fact the first-line trench is, 
 on principle, but lightly occupied by the de- 
 fenders. But there should never be absolutely 
 passive zones; that is to say, zones with no 
 trenches at all, protected solely by accessory 
 defences and flanking fire. If the accessory 
 
 84 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 defences were destroyed by artillery, and the 
 flanking fire neutralized, a road would be open 
 to the enemy. Furthermore, a counter-attack 
 would be without shelter, and the defenders of 
 points of support isolated, without means of 
 succor. Such points of support become "bomb- 
 nests" from the fact that they are clearly visible 
 to the enemy's aviators. 
 
 The interior form of a trench depends upon the 
 purpose which it is to fulfil and the nature of the 
 terrain. What is the use in saying that it should 
 be 1 .7 m. (5 ft. 7 in.) deep if, as in the Yser region, 
 water is found at .3 m. (10 in.) ? Really, in such a 
 case, there is no trench, properly speaking. There 
 is merely a parapet built up above the level of the 
 ground by any available means, especially bags 
 of earth, fascines, and gabions. During the night 
 gangs of men bring empty bags, which are filled 
 on the spot, and serve to form new elements of 
 parapet, or to repair sectors breached during the 
 course of the day. Such breaches are often nu- 
 merous, for it is easy to see what a target this 
 parapet offers to the enemy's artillery. 
 
 The loopholes were used for shooting, at the 
 beginning of the war. This is no longer the case 
 for the three following reasons : First, if they are 
 numerous and visible, they attract the enemy's 
 shots, while themselves affording a very limited 
 field of fire. Secondly, firing against trenches is 
 
 85 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 now the work of high trajectory weapons. Lastly, 
 they are destroyed by the artillery preparation 
 before a hostile attack, and so have ceased to 
 exist at the moment when they might be of use: 
 in fact, it is always better to shoot over the top 
 of the parapets. They have become, for the most 
 part, means of surveillance and observation ; they 
 are few in number, but strongly built and care- 
 fully camouflaged; and they furnish shelters suf- 
 ficient to protect the observer against severe 
 weather and against fragments of shell. 
 
 The traverses are heaps of earth about three 
 metres in width, thrown up at intervals at the 
 time the trench is dug; the trench goes around 
 them in order to maintain its continuity. They 
 effect the division of the trench into compart- 
 ments which cannot be hit by fragments of the 
 same projectile. The splinter-proofs are artificial 
 mounds of earth brought in baskets or bags; they 
 are constructed after the trench is dug and serve 
 the same purpose as the traverses. When the 
 time is lacking to build traverses, the outline of 
 the trench can be turned back here and there to 
 avoid over-long straight stretches. In case of an 
 enemy attack, the traverses can be used to con- 
 fine it to the section of the trench which it has 
 penetrated. To this end bags of earth, chevaux- 
 de-frise, or herissons, made ready beforehand, 
 serve to obstruct the space left free for going to 
 
 86 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 and fro. Thus a traverse forms a barricade pro- 
 tecting the trench from flank attack. 
 
 In Belgium during the winter of 1914-15, the 
 Germans made use of an ingenious scheme to 
 decimate our assaulting troops. They dug sec- 
 tions of trench in the shape of a V, with the point 
 turned towards us; our troops naturally ap- 
 proached the trench at this point; the two 
 branches of the V were bordered by traverses 
 with loopholes, which enabled them to enfilade 
 the branches and destroy without fail all who 
 were in them. 
 
 The doubling trench is one located some dis- 
 tance, generally about 100 metres (109 yds.), be- 
 hind the first-line trench, where the men can find 
 shelter, rest, and sleep. There are constructed the 
 shelters for the troops who are to relieve the vari- 
 ous positions in the first-line trench and to defend 
 it in case of attack. In it are generally placed the 
 command posts of the leaders of the platoons on 
 duty in the first line. 
 
 In exceptional cases it is impossible to dig a 
 doubling trench, supplied with shelters, at a 
 suitable distance from the first line. The troops 
 then have but precarious quarters on the line of 
 sentries, where their rest is constantly disturbed 
 by the going and coming of the men on fatigue 
 duty and the patrols, by the firing and the alarms. 
 
 That is what happened to us in Belgium when 
 87 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the Twentieth Corps was in the trenches about 
 Ypres. It was impossible, on account of the water, 
 to dig boyaux from the first Hne to the rear, or a 
 covering trench. My men of the 153d and myself 
 could obtain no other shelters in the Langemarck 
 sector than pieces of tent-canvas or tarred paper 
 stretched on wooden pickets against the parapet ! 
 Less precarious arrangements could be authorized 
 only rarely, in order that the parapet might be 
 left clear in case of attack: the canvas could be 
 raised instantly if the enemy were signalled, and 
 replaced as easily, whereas more substantial cov- 
 erings would have required a serious waste of time 
 in taking down and putting up again. But one 
 can imagine what our rest amounted to in those 
 muddy shelters, in horrible weather. There we 
 were, our clothes soaked by the water, without 
 fire, without warm food, our legs either folded 
 under us or bent up to the chin. My young men 
 of the 1 91 5 class made their debut at the front in 
 those trenches ! 
 
 The transversal trenches are trenches of all sorts 
 and all lengths which are dug behind the doubling 
 trench. They provide for the following essentials: 
 for echelonment in depth, which is indispensable 
 for serious resistance ; for the numerous needs of 
 the position in works of all sorts, such as shelters, 
 command posts, observation posts, dep8ts, ma- 
 chine-gun emplacements, posts for bomb-throw- 
 
 88 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 ers, places d'armes, and the like; and, lastly, for 
 lateral communications, which cannot always 
 be managed through the first-line or doubling 
 trenches, without danger to those who undertake 
 them or without throwing the occupants of the 
 trenches into confusion. For greater facility in 
 these communications, it is well that the trans- 
 versal trenches, even when they are intended to 
 contain but one work, as a dep6t or a command 
 post, should not end at that work, but should be 
 prolonged as far as a boyau or another trench. 
 In this way they become, at need, communica- 
 tion trenches, which must not be confused with 
 the boyaux. The transversal trenches generally 
 contain the command posts of captains com- 
 manding companies on duty in the first line. 
 
 When the character of the terrain interferes 
 with the digging of doubling or transversal 
 trenches, it is well to construct false ones. The 
 advantages of this subterfuge are that it attracts 
 a large part of the enemy's artillery fire to these 
 false trenches, and that it does not permit him to 
 detect the weakness of a tenuous first line. 
 
 During the winter of 1914-15 our lines in Bel- 
 gium had a very slight power of resistance, just 
 by reason of the absence of doubling and trans- 
 versal trenches. Let our immense semi-circle be 
 pierced by an enemy attack at any point what- 
 ever, which was relatively an easy matter, and the 
 
 89 
 
THE WAEFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 adjoining parts of the line would be taken in the 
 rear and our front would have to be rectified in 
 haste. But our foes, who had almost everywhere 
 a better terrain than ours, were not destined to 
 learn the precarious state of our positions. Be- 
 hind our first-line trenches there were numerous 
 old and abandoned trenches, both German and 
 French, which had the appearance, at a little 
 distance, of a complicated system. As their loca- 
 tion often made them more visible, the enemy 
 artillery would concentrate its fire on them for 
 hours continuously, to our great delight. This 
 was the case in February and March, 191 5, in 
 the centre of resistance at Passchendaele, where 
 I was in command, and especially on the hill of 
 Gravenstafel where my command post was. 
 
 At Langemarck, where I had been a few weeks 
 before, the French High Command had taken note 
 of the danger of our situation. Thinking, doubt- 
 less, that the situation could not be bettered be- 
 cause of the lack of labor, it sent, without any 
 request from me, a gang of men to dig doubling 
 trenches during the night. These trenches in- 
 stantly filled with water to the brim and were 
 never used ; but they were of great service to me 
 at a time when the artillery became very active, 
 by attracting almost all the projectiles. 
 
 In the offensive, doubling and transversal 
 trenches assist in bringing together, at the trench 
 
 90 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 from which the start is to be made, the units which 
 follow the first assaulting troops; they provide 
 them with shelter and prevent them from getting 
 crowded. Thus, at the time of the offensive 
 movement of May 9, 1915, in Artois, three bat- 
 talions of the 26th Infantry, which formed the 
 first three "waves," were able to form in a space 
 of little depth, thanks to the system of trenches 
 developed in the Ecurie sector. Then, when the 
 first two waves had broken against the machine 
 guns and rifles with which the Labyrinth front 
 was bristling, my battalion of the 69th, assigned 
 to form the fourth wave, executed with great 
 ease a lateral movement, to debouch at another 
 point in the line, and the battalions in reserve 
 were able to take their places at once. There was 
 a perfect maze of deep trenches and strongly built 
 shelters there, making it possible to keep several 
 battalions in close proximity to the theatre of the 
 battle, in relative safety. 
 
 In the defensive, doubling and transversal 
 trenches not only have the advantage of afford- 
 ing shelter to the eventual defenders of the first 
 line and saving them from useless risks or fatigue; 
 they also facilitate manoeuvres through the boy- 
 aux, to envelop the enemy in case he should 
 have penetrated portions of the front line. In 
 Belgium, in December, 1914, my company of the 
 153d was occupying a trench that formed a 
 
 91 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 salient, on a little hill beyond the Strombeck 
 Brook. Thanks to the character of the terrain, 
 I had been able to dig a doubling trench — the 
 only one, I believe, in the whole region at that 
 time. The Germans, who were a very short dis- 
 tance away, held a boyau that reached to Avithin 
 three metres of my first line, and seriously threat- 
 ened a section of trench. I had lateral boyaux 
 dug by which the men resting in the doubling 
 trench could envelop the limited front on which 
 a surprise attack was possible. However, I was 
 simply copying a manoeuvre by means of which 
 the Germans had inflicted considerable losses on 
 us on several occasions; for instance, at Saint- 
 Julien on December li, 1914. 
 
 The support trench has for its object to check 
 the enemy in case the first-line and the trans- 
 versal trenches should be penetrated. It is in- 
 tended not only to constitute an obstacle, but 
 also to shelter the troops who are to make a 
 counter-attack or a return offensive. Its location 
 is fixed by the plan of organization. It should be 
 selected in such wise as to place the trench be- 
 yond the range of the enemy's barrage, which, 
 when an attack begins, seeks to isolate the front 
 trenches from the interior of the position. It 
 is from 400 to 1000 metres (440 to 1 100 yds.) from 
 the first Hne. If it can be on sloping ground it 
 has a great advantage. It is in this trench, when 
 
 92 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 it is not too far away, that we find the com- 
 mand posts of the battaUon commanders whose 
 battalions are in the front line. 
 
 The transversal trenches, like the support 
 trench, are of such a nature that troops stationed 
 in them can, by their fire, check the enemy's 
 advance; they are, therefore, with the exception 
 of some transversal trenches, arranged before- 
 hand for rifle fire and for throwing bombs; they 
 are even supplied often with accessory defences. 
 
 On the Yser, in 1914-15, although it was im- 
 possible to construct boyaux, we managed a few 
 transversal and support trenches. At Lange- 
 marck, for example, as they could not be dug in 
 front of the village, both because of the enemy 
 artillery and because of the nature of the soil, 
 they were placed behind it. I constructed and 
 occupied several, between Langemarck and 
 Pilken, to block the road to Boesinghe Bridge; 
 they were all swiftly transformed into canals in 
 December, 1914, and January, 191 5. For this 
 reason the local commander caused to be con- 
 structed, by the engineer corps assisted by la- 
 borers, on a more favorable terrain a magnificent 
 system of trenches which almost constituted a 
 second position, by virtue of its distance from 
 the first line as well as its strength. Its course 
 passed near Pilken and Wieltje, and covered the 
 approach to Ypres as well as the bridges over 
 
 93 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the Yser behind Langemarck and Saint-Julien. 
 The troops sent back temporarily to rest, about 
 Ypres and Boesinghe, had to learn its location 
 without delay, so that they could resort to it in 
 case the first line was attacked. We had no 
 means of knowing what part these trenches had 
 played when, a few days after our departure, 
 late in April, 191 5, our successors were attacked 
 with asphyxiating gas ; we thought they ought 
 to suffice to prevent the approach to the Yser 
 Canal. 
 
 The machine guns must be echeloned in depth, 
 in order to insure the defence of the position. 
 They are not numerous in the first line, where 
 they are too often in danger of being injured or 
 destroyed, and where they have no chance to 
 take part except in case of an enemy attack. 
 They are, therefore, for the most part, echeloned 
 in the transversal trenches. They are placed be- 
 hind stout and invisible shelters, from which they 
 emerge only in case of necessity. Their r61e is to 
 intervene mostly by a flanking fire and by sur- 
 prise; they should have well-defined zones of 
 action so as to produce sure results. 
 
 In the first line their firing-stations are arranged 
 beforehand ; but as these emplacements are often 
 knocked out by the bombardment, the machine 
 guns may be stationed, when the time comes, at 
 any favorable point — a section of trench or a 
 
 94 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 shell hole; they are often more advantageously 
 placed in the latter than elsewhere, in view both 
 of the effectiveness of their fire and of their own 
 safety. 
 
 The machine guns echeloned in the transver- 
 sal trenches are placed there to close all import- 
 ant avenues of passage, such as ravines, bridges, 
 cross-roads, open stretches, and every sort of 
 place when the enemy is obliged to approach on 
 a narrow front. They are stationed sometimes in 
 casemated embrasures, provided with accessory 
 defences, where their crews hold out to the last 
 moment: a sheltered boyau or subterranean pas- 
 sage makes possible the removal to the rear of 
 crew and equipment. The machine guns in sup- 
 port trenches are placed in salients which can 
 bring a flanking or enfilading fire to bear on 
 those parts of the terrain by which the enemy 
 may advance. 
 
 Although some of the machine guns are not 
 much employed except in case of an irruption of 
 the enemy into our positions, they ought always 
 to have their full complement of men and to be 
 in perfect working order: these conditions are 
 insured by practice in response to sudden alarms. 
 In fact, machine guns may absolutely arrest an 
 enemy offensive if they intervene quickly and 
 boldly. 
 
 Machine guns are often grouped in regular 
 
 95 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 batteries, which are used like batteries of artil- 
 lery. They may deliver a barrage fire in case 
 of an enemy attack. They may also cause great 
 harm to the enemy every day by executing indi- 
 rect fire on tactical points which are much fre- 
 quented by the enemy or otherwise important. 
 The indirect fire is carefully adjusted like artil- 
 lery fire. 
 
 The boyaux are built to connect the various 
 trenches with one another and with the rear; they 
 are used for reliefs, reenforcements, bringing up 
 supplies, evacuations, and communications. Their 
 general direction is at right angles to the first-line 
 trench and to the general trend of the others. 
 
 They differ essentially from the trenches in 
 that they are simply media of communication, 
 instead of being elements of fighting and of shel- 
 ter. A body of troops should never be stationed 
 in a boyau except in Ccise of absolute necessity, 
 whereas they live in the trenches proper, and 
 fight there. The very purpose of the boyaux 
 requires that they be clear of all impedimenta: 
 therefore no one must bd allowed to dig shel- 
 ters, individual or collective, along their walls, 
 or holes for material, munitions, water, or provi- 
 sions, which would entail very serious obstacles 
 to free movement. To provide places for such 
 matters transversal trenches should be dug. 
 
 In defensive fighting, if the trenches are over- 
 96 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 run, the boyaux become, by exception, fighting 
 ground; by the chance of events, if the enemy 
 forces his way into a certain zone, the uninvaded 
 boyaux near by become actual trenches; but it 
 would be useless labor, and a mistaken policy, to 
 transform beforehand a boyau into a trench cap- 
 able of firing or supplying defences on either side. 
 Only by barricades constructed at intervals and 
 by platforms for bomb-throwers and machine 
 guns echeloned in the transversal trenches will the 
 enemy's advance be held in check. 
 
 One must think first of all of the daily service 
 of the boyaux, which is to facilitate communica- 
 tions from the front to the rear and vice versa; and 
 of their r61e during offensive fighting, which is to 
 facilitate the progress of reserves to the front. 
 The boyaux must be left free to serve these pur- 
 poses. It would be easy for me to cite many ex- 
 amples in which neglect of this principle has de- 
 layed the coming up of reserves and consequently 
 has endangered the success of an attack. 
 
 The interior form of the boyaux is not the 
 same as that of the trenches. The boyaux are 
 theoretically deep and narrow, so as to protect 
 as much as possible the troops passing through 
 against the effects of the fire of the enemy; but 
 their dimensions depend largely on the character 
 of the terrain. 
 
 The outlines of the boyaux are not always the 
 
 97 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 same, vaiying according to the use for which they 
 are intended. Those for bringing up troops are 
 not built in a straight line, in order to avoid being 
 swept by an enfilading fire; they follow a zigzag 
 course sufficiently marked to afford a natural 
 protection and to form compartments. On the 
 other hand, the evacuation boyaux, which have 
 to afford easy passage for a stretcher with a 
 wounded man, or even for Decauville cars, must 
 have a shape and width adapted to this r61e. 
 
 In ordinary boyaux, where their narrowness 
 makes passing in opposite directions difficult, it 
 is well to make recesses at intervals, so as to 
 allow troops to pass, or to rest, or to set down 
 wounded men. 
 
 Furthermore, regulation of the passing to and 
 fro is necessary. To this end a scheme of direc- 
 tion may be fixed upon, certain boyaux being 
 used for going to the front, others to the rear. 
 Signs are posted, with arrows to indicate the 
 direction, and, if necessary, sentries see to it 
 that the orders issued are obeyed. When the num- 
 ber of boyaux is too small to permit uninter- 
 rupted circulation in both directions, the move- 
 ments have to be governed by signals or by sen- 
 tries, as on single-track railways; but, above all 
 things, new boyaux should be dug as soon as 
 possible. When the demands of the Front take 
 precedence of all others, as for example in offen- 
 
 98 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 sive fighting, then all the boyaux may be used 
 for passage to the Front, except those reserved for 
 evacuation; in such case the direction of the 
 arrows is changed wherever it is necessary, and 
 the sentries are notified. 
 
 The main boyaux bear a simple name from 
 their beginning at the rear to the first-line trench. 
 Secondary boyaux branch off from them, more 
 and more numerous as one approaches the front; 
 at each fork is a sign bearing the name of the 
 secondary boyau and that of the trench to 
 which it leads; the names, letters, or numbers by 
 which the boyaux and trenches are designated, 
 are shown on the battle maps. The signs — and, 
 at night, lanterns suitably placed — should en- 
 able one to find readily, even without the help 
 of a battle map, units, command posts, or de- 
 p6ts of any sort. Sentries are posted at all im- 
 portant forks, in shelters which do not impede 
 circulation. 
 
 In certain districts the character of the soil 
 prevents the digging of boyaux. Such was the 
 case in the Yser region. There the boyaux were 
 simply routes carefully selected; they were 
 marked by boards placed on fascines in swampy 
 tracts, or thrown over ditches full of water; 
 sometimes, indeed, they were simply laid on 
 sticks, or stakes bearing telephone wires. When 
 you stepped aside from these paths, which were 
 
 99 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 bad enough, Heaven knows! you were mired in 
 ditches, shell holes, or swamps. It was impossi- 
 ble to cross those open spaces except at night. 
 When telephone men wishing to repair their 
 lines, or agents de liaison carrying orders, ven- 
 tured upon them in daylight they risked their 
 lives every minute. 
 
 Behind the support trenches, and sometimes 
 confused with them, are redoubts, intended to 
 offer a particularly stout resistance to a hostile 
 attack. These redoubts are not necessarily iso- 
 lated works; they are arranged along a line known 
 as the " line of redoubts " ; it is not a continuous 
 line, but it includes sections of trench, or nests 
 of resistance, together with machine-gun em- 
 placements. 
 
 The line of redoubts, or, in default of it, the 
 line of trenches which takes its place, has re- 
 ceived the name of " covering line " for artillery. 
 This official designation has one disadvantage: 
 it may lead to the belief that the artillery is 
 disposed on a line, or, at all events, echeloned 
 from a fixed line as a starting-point; and even 
 that this echelonment depends on the range of 
 the guns. Nothing of the sort is true. Pieces of 
 artillery may be placed, both for offensive and 
 for defensive work, even in front of the support 
 trenches. As for their calibre, that depends not 
 on their distance from the enemy position, but 
 
 100 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 from the paxt allotted to them. We must under- 
 stand, then, by covering line for the artillery, 
 the line of trenches or redoubts which covers the 
 most numerous assemblages of guns echeloned 
 behind it. 
 
 Companies or battalions belonging to the same 
 units as the companies or battalions of the first 
 line are given the task of occupying these works, 
 and are held there in reserve. For this reason 
 the latter are sometimes miscalled "reserve 
 trenches." 
 
 The command posts of colonels are usually 
 placed near them. 
 
 A system of trenches is, as will be seen, a com- 
 plicated whole, subject to certain general prin- 
 ciples and laid out according to a complete plan 
 which is not held down to any fixed rule. Com- 
 mon sense and ingenuity are, in many cases, the 
 best guides in deciding upon this system. By 
 the same token, there are no rules for echeloning 
 units in depth ; we must give troops as much rest 
 as possible, while making sure that the position 
 is properly guarded and the different services 
 properly attended to. Nor are there any rules 
 for the distribution of men in the trenches, or for 
 the duties assigned to them. There are none, 
 either, as to the necessary ratio between ma- 
 chine guns and artillery, or as to the method of 
 echeloning the guns, etc. 
 
 lOI 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The trenches contain a great number of items, 
 such as shelters, latrines, command posts, ob- 
 servation posts, telephone posts, first-aid posts, 
 depots, places d'armes, observing-stations, and 
 the like. Neither the shape nor the location of 
 these various things is subject to fixed rules. It 
 would be at once foolish and hazardous to under- 
 take to determine beforehand dimensions, depths, 
 thicknesses, or topographical conditions. 
 
 At most it is possible to lay down for them a 
 certain number of conditions, sometimes contra- 
 dictory, which commanding officers, in their dif- 
 ferent ranks, should comply with so far as they 
 can, taking into account the dispositions of the 
 enemy, the circumstances of the moment, and 
 the terrain. 
 
 The shelters for the use of the men should 
 theoretically be buried so as to withstand heavy 
 shells. They may be hollowed out like caves, with 
 an overhead protection the thickness of which 
 depends on the character of the soil — about six 
 metres in unworked land. They may also be dug 
 without a covering, then covered with a roof 
 made of earth and round posts or rails; these 
 last can be dug more rapidly than the caves, but 
 they also collapse more easily. 
 
 However constructed, shelters should always 
 have several entrances, two at least, in case one 
 is blocked by bombardment, and to facilitate 
 
 102 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 communications. These entrances are protected 
 by doors of water-tight canvas, or, failing that, 
 by coverlets saturated with hyposulphite as a 
 protection against gas. The shelters should not 
 be too large, so as not to expose too many men at 
 once; they are always supplied with spades and 
 pickaxes. 
 
 The light shelters are intended simply to put 
 the men out of reach of fragments of shell and 
 bad weather; they should not be so built as to 
 weaken the parapets or to make their defence 
 more difficult. They are sometimes nothing more 
 than sheet-iron plates, curved or corrugated, and 
 covered with earth. 
 
 The latrines are generally dug in small trans- 
 versal trenches with a single exit; they should be 
 rather numerous and kept in perfect condition, 
 so that the sanitary condition of the trench may 
 be perfect. 
 
 A command post should comply with this con- 
 dition above all others — it should be located 
 near the observation post of the officer for whom 
 it is intended. It should be easy of access, and 
 easily found by means of the signs posted in the 
 boyaux. Steps are taken beforehand to provide 
 for the speedy destruction of all papers in case 
 it should be necessary to evacuate the post 
 under pressure of the enemy. i - 
 
 An observation post is generally not single; 
 103 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 it should be double or triple, as well to afford 
 a field of vision, which a single one does not al- 
 ways afford, as to lessen the effect of artillery 
 fire aimed at one of them. 
 
 Telephone posts adjoin the command post or 
 the observation post; they are always supple- 
 mented by optical posts which can be substituted 
 for them instantly. 
 
 The first-aid posts are placed near the evacu- 
 ation boyaux and in locations as quiet and well 
 sheltered as possible. 
 
 The depots for munitions, food, and water 
 are so placed as to be easy of access to all units 
 and not to impede circulation when they are in 
 use; they are generally in shelters similar to those 
 constructed for the men, but of larger capacity. 
 
 The places d'armes are intended to make pos- 
 sible the assembly of reenforcements or reserves 
 during a comparatively short time, near the 
 first-line trenches; they are supposed to comply 
 with two contradicting conditions — to keep the 
 different units from scattering, and to avoid 
 too much massing of the men. They are either 
 formed by transversal trenches assigned tem- 
 pprarily to that use by the commander, or are 
 specially constructed for the purpose. 
 
 The rear of the position is the locus of a large 
 number of items which are indispensable to the 
 welfare of the Front. 
 
 104 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 The camps are to provide shelter, back of the 
 Front, for troops in reserve or resting. They are 
 made up of wooden huts, or, faiUng these, of 
 tents; they always include sheds for the horses, 
 for whom some degree of comfort is indispen- 
 sable if a heavy mortality among them is to be 
 avoided. These camps are especially numerous 
 in districts devastated by the war and in those 
 where there are large numbers of troops. They 
 must be built rapidly by companies of engineers 
 specially trained for this work. 
 
 Hospitals and infirmaries are in places care- 
 fully selected as being as healthful and quiet as 
 possible. Those nearest the Front, for example 
 those for wounded who cannot be moved, or for 
 those awaiting the despatch of sanitary trains, 
 are either in wooden huts, or in special tents, or 
 in houses adapted to the purpose. The removal 
 of the wounded is guided by the twofold princi- 
 ple of not sending into the interior men who are 
 likely to return to the Front without a period of 
 convalescence, and of not encumbering the Front 
 with wounded or sick men who need long-con- 
 tinued treatment. 
 
 The dep6ts for materiel are built at points 
 which permit the receipt, storage, and distribu- 
 tion of materiel of every kind. 
 
 The roads are an essential item, and their 
 up-keep demands constant attention, especially 
 
 105 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 when there is a considerable circulation of heavy 
 motor vehicles. The railways are managed by 
 their ordinary professional personnel, but are 
 under the control of a military director of rail- 
 ways, who issues all orders relative to the trans- 
 port and provisioning of the troops, through the 
 medium of the railway service officers. On the 
 wise handling of the roads and railways depends 
 the arrival of troops at the proper time, the reg- 
 ular supply of provisions, and of a sufficient stock 
 of munitions — all of which are essential condi- 
 tions of victory. 
 
 Life in the trenches is not the same through- 
 out the zone in which there are trenches. When 
 one passes from the first-line trench to the sup- 
 port trench, or from the latter to the head- 
 quarters of the division commander, the scene 
 changes, occupations vary, the atmosphere is 
 different. 
 
 Genuine "trench life" should be studied in a 
 forward part of the position, that is to say, be- 
 tween the first-line trench and the line of re- 
 doubts. 
 
 It is an existence which is strictly regulated 
 without any rules providing for the employment 
 of the troops hour by hour. There is no fixed 
 time for getting up, for meals, or for sleep; there is 
 
 1 06 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 a fight to be fought, and works to be constructed; 
 there is unceasing activity to be distributed 
 among the occupants of the trench. The duty is 
 always done by reliefs: this term is applied to the 
 watcher or observer who is replaced by a com- 
 rade after an hour or two of service at his post; 
 it is applied as well to the small unit in the first 
 line, to the division, or to the army corps, which, 
 after a turn of duty of variable duration, is with- 
 drawn from the trench zone and sent to the rear 
 to rest and reorganize. 
 
 Life in the trenches is summed up in two 
 words: fighting and work. 
 
 The fighting, although it has slackened some- 
 what, is continuous; it has its surprises, its haz- 
 ards, its heroisms. The enemy, with his bom- 
 bardment, his grenades, his mines, tries to destroy 
 the trenches, to make them untenable, to inflict 
 heavy losses. The occupants of the trenches do 
 the like as to him; the lookouts are alert; the 
 trench-gunners do their best to destroy, with 
 their heavy projectiles, the important points in 
 the enemy's position — observatories or machine- 
 gun shelters. 
 
 In this incessant duel the strokes of chance are 
 frequent. 
 
 Sometimes an agent de liaison arrives at the 
 command post. 
 
 "So-and-So has been killed." 
 107 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 "What? I saw him less than an hour ago." 
 "True; but when he left you he took Boyau K; 
 on Cote 207 a shell came along — and there you 
 are!" 
 
 "A bad corner, known and marked." 
 This is the every-day dialogue. They go out to 
 investigate: against the blood-stained wall of the 
 trench they find the mangled remains of a com- 
 rade. The next day, however, it will be neces- 
 sary for others to pass through the same place 
 which they know to be deadly. 
 
 The work, too, is never-ending. The trench 
 requires labor without respite, night and day 
 alike. The least relaxation of effort has to be 
 paid for; first of all is the inrush of water, then 
 the undermining of the walls which fall in huge 
 masses, collapse of the shelters, burial in the 
 ruins, and sometimes death. 
 
 At nightfall the trench becomes a vast lum- 
 ber-yard, a veritable factory. The gangs which 
 could not go about by day bring to the first line 
 the necessary materiel: posts, boards, wire, bags 
 of earth, gabions, hurdles, corrugated sheet-iron, 
 gratings, fuses, boxes of cartridges and grenades. 
 All of this is impatiently awaited. It must be 
 forwarded with great care, to make sure that 
 nothing is destroyed or wasted or lost. Work- 
 shops are set up in the darkness, often in the 
 mud, sometimes amid falling projectiles. Here a 
 
 108 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 new trench must be dug; yonder a boyau must 
 be prolonged or another one made. 
 
 If an offensive movement is in preparation, 
 there are sometimes several kilometres of boyaux 
 or trenches to be built or made over, either as 
 lines of departure or as points of assembly, or 
 as avenues of access or evacuation. Lastly, the 
 enormous daily labor of up-keep and repair 
 must be attended to; all sorts of hostile attacks 
 on the trench must be met — the bombard- 
 ment, which pulverizes it, and the rain, which 
 overflows and destroys it. 
 
 Drainage is an urgent problem and difficult of 
 solution. The health of the men and the safety 
 of the trench and the shelters are dependent on it. 
 Every infantry officer must transform himself 
 into a hydraulic engineer, and all the privates 
 into sewer-men. In the dampest or rainiest sec- 
 tions of the Front — in Belgium, Artois, or the 
 Argonne, prodigies of toil and devotion have 
 been performed. 
 
 Rare are the men who, not having lived this 
 life, have any idea of the vast amount of work 
 thus performed. How many officers are there, in 
 the trenches, who have not received from the 
 rear orders or advice so little consonant with 
 the stern conditions of reality, that they have 
 had to smile at them in order not to lose their 
 temper! 
 
 109 
 
THE WARFAKE OF TO-DAY 
 
 In Belgium one of our superior officers thought 
 that our troops did not work as they should on 
 the trenches. So he ordered that the company 
 commanders should make a sketch every day, 
 showing the projected works in blue chalk and 
 the completed portions in red chalk. After con- 
 siderable difficulty in securing the colored chalks, 
 I was hard put to it to use them. Even on a 
 large scale the work done would appear only as 
 a few tiny points of which I was a little ashamed. 
 And yet my men worked unremittingly, organ- 
 ized, led, and overlooked by my officers and 
 myself. I could have increased the blue tract by 
 projecting pretentious works; but that subter- 
 fuge seemed to me unworthy of the genuine ef- 
 forts put forth by my brave troops. 
 
 To make our task easier, we received some in- 
 valuable bits of advice. A zealous staff officer 
 sent us a prescription warranted to bring about 
 the best results: he informed us that one third 
 of the men should keep watch at the loopholes, 
 while another third applied themselves to the 
 works, and the last third rested. One can imagine 
 the reception that this scheme, worked out in a 
 comfortable office, met with when it was commu- 
 nicated to the denizens of the trenches, whose 
 rest was more than uncertain and whose lives were 
 constantly in peril. 
 
 The organization of the service, which is end- 
 
 IIO 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 lessly variable according to the circumstances of 
 the moment, must be left to the initiative and 
 conscientiousness of the leaders of the small 
 units. The essential thing is that every one shall 
 work. 
 
 They must work because, if the men's minds 
 are not kept constantly on what is in front of 
 them, they will inevitably get to thinking of the 
 rear. The idle man in the trenches sees nothing 
 ahead but his "relief," and this anticipation in- 
 hibits any sort of effort. Idleness becomes the 
 mother, if not of all the vices, at least of coward- 
 ice and faint-heartedness. 
 
 They must work, too, because, even in the 
 "quiet sectors," they must envisage the possibil- 
 ity of an offensive against the enemy, which 
 means preparatory labor; also, the hypothesis of 
 an enemy attack, which demands the constant 
 strengthening of the defensive works. 
 
 The principles which govern the work are dis- 
 tribution of the effort put forth and specializa- 
 tion on the part of the executives. The soldiers 
 in the trenches have tasks common to all, such 
 as building earthworks, keeping the shelters in 
 repair, and "fatigue" jobs; but a certain num- 
 ber are given special work according to their 
 individual capacities, and are employed as 
 "snipers," as observers, or as patrols. 
 
 All of the men must know how to fire a rifle or 
 III 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 to throw a grenade ; among them there are picked 
 shots and picked grenade-throwers, to be em- 
 ployed in certain cases. In addition, there are men 
 drilled in firing V.B. grenades, in firing trench- 
 mortars, in the indirect firing of machine guns, 
 and in handling jets of burning oil, etc. During 
 the first months of the campaign, the only firing 
 was with the rifle, through loopholes; now the 
 methods of firing are manifold. 
 
 Not only does the firing interest the men and 
 give them practice — it also occasions very con- 
 siderable results in the way of loss to the enemy. 
 I was never tired of repeating to my men on 
 the Front this argument: " If a company by dint 
 of unceasing watchfulness succeeds in putting 
 two Germans hors de combat each day on a 
 front of 400 metres ('which is about its scope), 
 that will make five men put out each day on 
 a front of one kilometre. Assuming that the 
 French Front covers 600 kilometres, there will 
 be 3000 Germans accounted for each day, and 
 90,000 a month. If the artillery achieves a like 
 result, there will be 180,000 Germans hors de 
 combat each month, even without a serious en- 
 gagement." 
 
 In this respect the Germans set an example 
 of successful patience and watchfulness. The 
 first wound I received in that campaign, al- 
 though trifling, is a proof of this. It was on Janu- 
 
 112 
 
FIRST-LINE TRENCH NEAR YPRES EARI.Y IN I915. A WATCHER 
 
 FIRST-LINE TRENCH IN FRONT OF LANGEMARCK, JANUARY I7, I9I5 
 
 Captain Azan, resting at his command post, in military cloalc and knitted helmet. He 
 
 received his first wound in this same first-line trench on that very day 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 ary 17, 191 5, before Langemarck. The German 
 "snipers" in the trench facing mine had a ma- 
 chine gun or a rifle on a support; they had been 
 patiently firing for a long time at the same spot 
 in the wretched parapet, made of bags of dirt 
 and mud ; they had pierced some of the bags, the 
 contents of which had fallen on the outer side of 
 the parapet. When I passed that point, at 3 p.m., 
 while making a tour of inspection of the trench, I 
 was hit by a bullet in the arm, most unexpect- 
 edly, for I thought myself protected by the para- 
 pet. Several men on our Front were killed or 
 wounded by this means. 
 
 All the men should know how to observe and 
 to watch; and each one of them should give his 
 chief the advantage of such information as he 
 may gather. But certain ones are especially 
 adapted to this r&le and are selected to per- 
 form it. They are stationed in lookouts* posts in 
 the first-line trench, or in listening-posts estab- 
 lished in front of that trench. Some have to 
 watch a very limited sector and observe any- 
 thing of interest that may take place there: these 
 are the sector watchers. Others have to watch 
 points that are of special importance either be- 
 cause of their tactical situation or because of 
 their insecurity in case of attack; in the latter 
 case they are armed with rifles with reflectors 
 or with rapid-firing rifles: these are watchers for 
 
 113 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 special points. Lastly, special lookouts are sta- 
 tioned near the shelters, to give the alarm in case 
 of attack or of a gas-discharge, or to repeat signals. 
 In the first months of the campaign the watch- 
 ers supported by marksmen assisted materially 
 in inflicting losses on both sides. I could cite nu- 
 merous instances, showing how I lost men as a 
 result of the patient watchfulness of our adver- 
 saries, and how, on the other hand, I inflicted 
 losses on them. I remember, for example, the 
 death of Private Paul Brochard, who, on De- 
 cember 15, 1914, in my trenches on the Strom- 
 beck (Belgium) was jumping up and down to 
 warm his feet, unconscious that at every jump 
 his kepi went just above the parapet. He fell 
 without a word into the arms of his twin brother 
 Pierre, whom I had placed in his squad. On 
 the 1 6th, during the night, a famous watchman- 
 marksman. Private Eneau, orderly to Sub-Lieu- 
 tenant Bertrand, observed that the enemy's 
 loopholes lighted up one after another: it was an 
 inspection by an officer who carried an electric 
 pocket-lamp. When the light shone through one 
 especial loophole, thirty or forty metres from 
 us, at which his weapon was carefully aimed, he 
 fired: a shriek of pain rent the air, followed by 
 prolonged groans and an uproar in the German 
 trench. The shot had gone home ! Brochard was 
 avenged. 
 
 114 
 
WATCHER AND SNIPER (PRIVATE ENEAU WITH THE GLASS) IN A TRENCH 
 NEAR THE YSER IN DECEMBER, I9I4 
 
 A SNIPER WAITING FOR A CHANCE, YSER, DECEMBER, I9I4 
 In the trench, a shelter for a squad 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 All the men should be fit to act as patrols. Save 
 in exceptional cases, in sheltered or broken coun- 
 try, patrols go their rounds by night. The units 
 in the line are notified of their hour of starting, 
 the route, and the probable hour of their return, 
 to avoid accidents or mistakes. 
 
 There are men endowed with special qualifi- 
 cations for this work. In my battalion of the 
 69th I had some genuine specialists, who per- 
 formed many a prodigy. The whole battalion 
 was notified exactly when the patrols would leap 
 over the parapet; but the riflemen continued 
 their fire, aiming into the air, in order not to 
 arouse the enemy's suspicion by their silence; 
 then we all awaited with considerable anxiety 
 our comrades' return. Gallant, heroic Sergeant 
 Montalbetti performed to the letter every time, 
 with incredible audacity, the duties that I en- 
 trusted to him, always bringing his patrol in with 
 full ranks; the men followed him with blind con- 
 fidence. 
 
 The sending out of patrols should have a use- 
 ful end in view. "To accustom the men to fight- 
 ing," or "to make a show of activity," is not in 
 itself an adequate motive. Such a method of 
 handling affairs leads to dangerous excitement 
 or to fruitless losses. 
 
 The commander's duty is constantly to safe- 
 guard his men's lives. To that end he issues 
 
 115 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 *' general orders" in the trenches, the result of the 
 daily observations. These orders are either per- 
 manent, and form part of the budget of informa- 
 tion which is in the hands of every commander of 
 a trench, as a centre of resistance or of a sector; 
 or they are temporary, in which case they are de- 
 livered to the watchers, sentries, and men on fa- 
 tigue duty. Their careful observance may avert 
 many misunderstandings and save many lives. 
 How often have I seen, as the result of neglect- 
 ing these orders, staff officers fall when sent out 
 for information, or officers coming from the rear 
 to take command of a unit, or impetuous young 
 lieutenants coming from reserve dep6ts, or artil- 
 lerists sent forward for observation, or absent- 
 minded or boastful privates! 
 
 I recall Colonel Devaux, Chief of Staff of the 
 Twentieth Corps, going out at nightfall, on 
 November 28, 1914, to inspect the Langemarck 
 trenches, with Captain de Suzannet. As General 
 Balfourier, in my presence, urged him, above all 
 things, to be careful, Devaux said to me, shaking 
 my hand, "There are officers who overdo the 
 precautionary business and sometimes doze a bit; 
 I propose to see about that." Four hours later 
 he fell, mortally wounded. On January 6, 1915, 
 Private Feitknecht was killed at my side, by a 
 bullet in his head, just as I had called his atten- 
 tion to a slight caving-in of the parapet which 
 
 116 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 enabled the Germans to see him if he did not 
 stoop low enough. And so many others — 
 
 One of the permanent orders is not to let one's 
 self be seen, and, above all, not to disclose the 
 location of important points, such as observing- 
 stations, observation posts, and command posts. 
 In February, 1917, 1 was a witness of a deplorable 
 piece of carelessness, at an observation post in 
 the front line, at the "Poteau d' Allies" facing 
 the Chemin des Dames. I was at that post, with 
 Captain Martin, when a group of subalterns, 
 belonging to a colonial regiment then occupying 
 that sector, walked all about us. When I called 
 their attention to their carelessness, they replied 
 that they were perfectly familiar with the place 
 and did not think that they were guilty of im- 
 prudence. Only a few moments later, Captain 
 Martin and I were followed along the boyau we 
 were passing through, by well-aimed salvos of ar- 
 tillery. And the next day two officers and a sub- 
 altern, stationed in that same observation post, 
 were suddenly caught by a violent discharge of 
 artillery and killed. 
 
 Silence is one of the essential rules of the 
 trenches. It should become an invariable habit 
 with the men, because of the advantages it in- 
 sures : it leaves the enemy in ignorance as to the 
 numbers in occupation of the trench; it enables 
 the riflemen and watchers to perform their duties 
 
 117 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 more efficiently and to hear the faintest sounds; 
 it makes it possible for a commander to transmit 
 an order from man to man without raising his 
 voice; and in case of an alarm it makes easier the 
 prompt stationing of each man at his post. This 
 is one of the most essential qualities of a well- 
 disciplined body of troops. 
 
 Silence is hard enough to obtain in a body in 
 which it is not a fixed habit. Whenever I took 
 command of a new unit, I always imposed silence 
 when on duty, and I secured it. It even came 
 about that the men spoke only in undertones 
 while we were on the march and in the rest can- 
 tonments ! Their gayety and enthusiasm were in 
 no wise lessened thereby, while the maintenance 
 of good order was greatly facilitated under many 
 circumstances, especially in actual fighting. 
 
 The commanding officer should be careful to 
 observe himself the orders given to his command. 
 He has more obligations than anybody else. He 
 seeks by every means to inspire confidence in his 
 troops; to that end, he often shows himself among 
 them, going to inspect them in their trenches. In 
 planning the frequency of these visits, he takes 
 into account the technical ability of his subor- 
 dinates, the morale of his command, the mission 
 which is entrusted to him, and all the other cir- 
 cumstances. He has not, however, the same ob- 
 ligation whether he commands a large unit or a 
 
 Ii8 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 small one, for it is not the duty of a general of 
 division to go through some one of the innu- 
 merable trenches under his command each day. 
 On the other hand, it is the duty of a battalion 
 commander or of a captain to be perfectly famil- 
 iar with all the trenches occupied by his troops. 
 There is no hard-and-fast rule to be laid down, 
 unless it be that a commanding officer should 
 act according to his conscience and the necessi- 
 ties of the situation. 
 
 I recall the effect produced by a visit in broad 
 daylight to my trenches at Passchendaele, when 
 there was no boyau by which I could go there. 
 I was not guilty of imprudence, for a dense mist 
 made it impossible to see more than a few metres ; 
 but my officers and troops, whom I could inspect 
 only at night, manifested great delight because 
 I had come to see the works at the first oppor- 
 tunity. Moreover, I was able that day to take 
 account of many details which had escaped me 
 in the darkness. 
 
 Only the frequent presence of the commander 
 will enable him to ascertain whether his orders 
 are carried out. When a command knows that 
 an officer will check up its work, that he will 
 approve or censure, it works hard, as a matter 
 of affection no less than of self-respect. 
 
 I remember an anecdote apropos of this sub- 
 ject. It was on the night of March 31, 1915. 
 
 119 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 I had ordered Captain B , who commanded 
 
 my reserve company, to dig in a hurry some 
 transversal trenches, for the better protection of 
 a glacis which separated my first-line trenches 
 and support trenches, and which the Germans, 
 in case of an offensive, must necessarily cross. 
 Between half-past nine and a quarter to eleven I 
 went with him and the platoon leaders to decide 
 upon their location. The next night I found that 
 the work was barely begun and was being carried 
 on by a very small crew. I went to the captain's 
 command post, and he detailed all the difficulties 
 he had encountered, especially the enemy fusillade 
 which made the work extremely dangerous. I 
 made no comment, unless by the coldness of my 
 manner, and told him to get his platoon leaders 
 together. Then I went over the terrain with him, 
 
 Sub-Lieutenant P , and some subalterns, 
 
 walking with calculated deliberation, marking the 
 lines of the trenches to be dug and distributing the 
 work. The bullets have rarely been so numerous 
 as they were that night, and one of the subalterns 
 saw fit to call my attention to the fact. I replied 
 in my most phlegmatic tone, " It 's much to be re- 
 gretted." However, by a happy chance, not one 
 
 of our party was hit. But B understood the 
 
 lesson and never again compelled me to repeat 
 an order; indeed, he fell gloriously two months 
 later. 
 
 120 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 The inspection of the trenches and checking- 
 up of the work, which are necessary even with 
 a picked body of men, have another advantage 
 than that of insuring the faithful carrying-out of 
 orders. They enable the commander to give his 
 orders with full knowledge of conditions. The 
 chief who has seen the terrain with his own eyes 
 can express his wishes in terms of absolute pre- 
 cision and certainty; and, above all, he gives 
 only orders that can be executed. 
 
 One of my generals of the Twentieth Corps, 
 General Chretien, may be cited on this subject. 
 On January i8, 1915, he came to the trench north- 
 east of Langemarck occupied by my company 
 of the 153d. To get there he had to follow in 
 the darkness a route where in places one sank 
 in up to the knee; where immense shell holes 
 were spanned by slippery, unsteady pieces of 
 timber, where there were ditches two metres 
 broad, filled with water, and miry tracts swept 
 by missiles. 
 
 He finally arrived at my command post, located 
 against the parapet. It was a wretched shanty, 
 with a roof of tarred paper stretched over stakes; 
 and the earth floor was under water. I shared it 
 with my orderly and four agents de liaison! Only 
 by stooping down could one get into it, and when 
 it rained, the tarred paper burst, letting the water 
 from the sky through the holes, to join the 
 
 121 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 water on the ground. The general entered and 
 crouched there a moment to talk with me; then 
 he walked along the parapet of mud and bags of 
 dirt, which my men were constantly rebuilding 
 and behind which one could not walk except 
 bent double. He had a chance to see the shel- 
 ters of my men, also situated against the para- 
 pet by force of circumstances, and even more 
 wretched than mine. He got a glimpse of the 
 works we had improvised against the water : holes 
 and canals and ditches — which I pointed out to 
 him so that he might avoid them. He talked with 
 the soldiers and could appreciate their cheerful 
 humor and spirit of discipline amid so many hard- 
 ships. Then he went away, carrying with him a 
 vivid picture of all he had seen that night. We 
 could always discern in his orders his knowledge 
 of actual conditions. 
 
 A commanding officer who visits his trenches 
 learns to esteem and love his troops; furthermore, 
 he makes himself known to them, he wins their 
 confidence. Later, when he has to intervene at 
 a critical time, his ascendancy is already estab- 
 lished, his authority is increased threefold. 
 
 Liaison is the most important among the du- 
 ties of the troops in the trenches. In present-day 
 warfare, this word does not mean simply all the 
 
 122 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 methods of effecting communication between 
 different units of the same arm, or between 
 different arms. It includes both the methods of 
 collecting information and the methods of trans- 
 mitting it. 
 
 The abundance and accuracy of information 
 are, indeed, among the most important factors 
 of every action, offensive or defensive. It would 
 serve no purpose to have safe means of commu- 
 nication, if they were not used for transmitting 
 reliable and useful information. In a word, in- 
 formation takes precedence over transmission. 
 
 Methods of obtaining information are studied 
 and provided for by officers of every rank in the 
 zones assigned to them. They are set forth in a 
 "plan of observation." 
 
 The observing-stations may be on the ground 
 or in the air. 
 
 Those on the ground have the advantage of 
 working in all weathers and of being hidden from 
 the view of the enemy. They should be carefully 
 camouflaged, and supplied with shelters to which 
 the occupants can retire in case of danger. The 
 paths leading to them are closed to visitors and 
 sight-seers, so that they may not be detected by 
 the enemy; only the officers and men on duty are 
 allowed to go there, as well as staff officers and 
 officers of artillery, a part of whose duty it is to 
 pass some time in these observing-stations. 
 
 123 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Often the precautions are slackened just when 
 reliefs are taking place. For instance, I recall that, 
 in February, 1917, when the Twentieth Corps 
 had taken over a sector opposite the Chemin des 
 Dames, the troops who were leaving the sector 
 had left no officer, no private, no paper, in cer- 
 tain very important observing-stations. The 
 artillery officers arrived to make their reconnais- 
 sance. I met several of them wandering through 
 the boyaux, and even outside of them, searching, 
 as I was, for the observatories; some of them went 
 where they could be seen from the German 
 positions. In a few minutes a German aeroplane 
 fiew over the spot where we were; and, despite 
 the fire of several of our batteries, was able to 
 get a perfect idea of the points about which our 
 reconnaissance was going on. The Germans were 
 careful not to fire : they had the information they 
 desired, and reserved the destruction of the ob- 
 serving-stations in question for the day when it 
 would be of service to them — that is to say, the 
 day when we should begin an attack. 
 
 The aerial observing-stations have the advan- 
 tage of being able to change their position accord- 
 ing to the information to be obtained: they are 
 balloons and airplanes; their disadvantage is 
 that they cannot work in all weathers. They can 
 secure information of the most minute precis- 
 ion and accuracy, thanks to photography, and 
 
 124 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 can follow the works of the enemy from day to 
 day. But the reading of photographs is decidedly 
 difficult unless one is prepared for it by special 
 training. Then, too, it is necessary to take into 
 account the camouflage by which the enemy 
 may have concealed his actual works, and the 
 false trenches, false gun emplacements, and false 
 earthworks which he may have marked out on 
 the ground to lead us astray. 
 
 The agents de liaison are human instruments 
 of information for the High Command. While in 
 small units they are confined almost entirely to 
 the r61e of instruments of transmission, bearers 
 of orders or information, on the other hand, in 
 large units and in the artillery they are instru- 
 ments of information. They are officers sent by 
 the generals commanding large units to the lesser 
 units, with instructions to keep them posted as 
 to what is taking place. They are artillery officers 
 or subalterns sent to infantry units, with the 
 mission of keeping the infantry commander, on 
 the one hand, and the batteries of artillery, on 
 the other, fully informed at every moment. Thus 
 their presence permits the liaison to work 
 smoothly. 
 
 Transmission comprises all the methods which 
 make it possible to establish swift and sure com- 
 munications between different troops. 
 
 One method dominates all others — that is, the 
 125 
 
THE WAEFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 moral liaison, secured by a perfect knowledge of 
 the mission assigned to the troops, and of the 
 commander's intentions. If the fighting men in 
 all ranks know the end to be attained, they run 
 less risk of making mistakes ; and if all the means 
 of communication should be destroyed, they will 
 know what to do. 
 
 The instruments of transmission are numer- 
 ous. Those most used are the telephone, the tele- 
 graph with or without wire, runners, signallers, 
 rockets, Bengal fires, pigeons, dogs, motor cycles, 
 automobiles.^ They are employed according to 
 the circumstances and the terrain ; consequently, 
 they have to supplement and replace each other, 
 and are all constantly in use. Three of them are 
 used more generally than the others — the tele- 
 phone, wireless telegraphy, and couriers. The 
 telephone makes possible the establishment of 
 complete systems of communication, as well 
 between the commanding officer and the troops 
 under his command, as between the artillery 
 officers, their observatories, and the infantry 
 whom they support. Wireless telegraphy per- 
 mits communications of all sorts, but especially 
 between aircraft and the ground. Runners are, 
 in certain critical cases, the only means that can 
 be employed. 
 These various methods of transmission make 
 ' See The War of Positions, under " Liaison," pp. 54-60. 
 126 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 it possible to insure the communications later- 
 ally as well as from front to rear. They do not 
 operate, however, without the personal, individ- 
 ual fearlessness of those who make use of them. 
 I could tell many a tale showing the devotion to 
 duty of the telephone crews going out to repair 
 their lines under fire; the coolness of the avia- 
 tors transmitting, amid enemy anti-aircraft fire, 
 the information essential to the High Command 
 or to the artillery; the heroism of infantrymen 
 who came forward to offer to carry messages that 
 might help to win a victory, over a terrain swept 
 by machine guns and artillery. 
 
 The liaison service must be included in the 
 plan of organization of a position, and must be 
 made certain for all ranks. 
 
 In each unit larger than a regiment a staff 
 officer looks after the liaisons. 
 
 In each regiment it is looked after by an offi- 
 cer, generally the officer in charge of the tele- 
 phone service. There is also a regimental officer 
 in charge of the information service; he must 
 be active and intelligent, must seek information 
 instead of awaiting it. 
 
 The colonel of a regiment should always issue 
 a daily bulletin at his headquarters contain- 
 ing the information sent down to him from his 
 superior and that which he collects from 
 his subordinates. This bulletin forms a useful 
 
 127 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 source, not only of information, but also of diver- 
 sion for his officers and troops. The men in the 
 trenches are out of the world to a degree that one 
 can hardly imagine. They have little news from 
 the rear or from other portions of the Front . News- 
 papers arrive seldom, with great difficulty, and in 
 only a small number of copies ; they are already 
 old, and they soon become mere rags and tatters 
 with water, mud, and dirt. Books are an encum- 
 brance which very few men think of taking with 
 them, their burden of indispensable articles is so 
 heavy; and in truth they could not be read at- 
 tentively or connectedly. Letters are the most 
 precious mental and sentimental sustenance. 
 They are brought to the battalion commander's 
 station by the sergeant in charge of the post- 
 office. From there they are distributed among 
 the agents de liaison of the companies, who carry 
 them to the captains. They give each man news 
 of his family and of the friends who are fighting 
 at other parts of the Front; they also bring news 
 of those charming persons, known or unknown, 
 who are called "godmothers." 
 
 There are two varieties of godmother: those 
 who try to afford the soldier greater physical 
 comfort, and those who lavish sentimental at- 
 tentions upon him. The former send sweaters, 
 drawers, jams, cigarettes — everything capable 
 of ameliorating the well-being of the soldier: they 
 
 128 
 
THE GREAT SQUARE AT YPRES IN APRIL, I915 
 
 Chevaux-de-frise carried by British soldiers. In the foreground, the mechanism of 
 
 the great clock in the tower of Ypres, which has fallen into the square 
 
 ARRIVAL OF THE SERGEANT IN CHARGE OF THE POST OFFICE, AT THE 
 
 COMMAND POST OF MAJOR AZAN AT GRAVENSTAFEL IN APRIL, I915 
 
 Distribution of letters to the agents de liaison of the companies 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 are true benefactresses. The latter write letters 
 in which pretty fancies flutter among the lines, 
 with the hope of a meeting during the next fur- 
 lough ; if one of them sends a sweater it is because 
 it will be worn, in preference to any other, by 
 him who, amid shells and rifle-balls, often sends 
 forth his loyal thoughts in her direction. They, 
 too, are benefactresses; for the Frenchman is 
 always in need of a little blue flower to embel- 
 lish the garden of his heart. He who has neither 
 wife nor fiancee finds himself very lonely in the 
 trenches. While his comrades receive letters 
 which they read with ardor and emotion, he is 
 conscious of no sentimental agitation on reading 
 his serious epistles. So his godmother gives him 
 a share in the happiness which he lacked. Even 
 when the imagination plays the chief part in these 
 epistolary adventures, a momentary diversion is 
 the result. Such was the case with that infantry- 
 man who, after three months of an enchanting 
 correspondence, went to call on his godmother 
 on his first visit to Paris, and found — an old 
 grey-bearded man! But his heart had been 
 deeply stirred for three months; moreover, he 
 had an excellent dinner with the old gentle- 
 man. Then he set out in search of another god- 
 mother. 
 
 129 
 
THE WARFARE OP TO-DAY 
 
 The supplying of the trenches with sentiment 
 and even with such material articles as may be 
 furnished by these "war godmothers," is only 
 a pleasant but not indispensable supplement to 
 the general provisioning in food-supplies, muni- 
 tions, and materiel, which is planned and organ- 
 ized by the High Command. 
 
 Provisioning in food-supplies is operated from 
 the interior zone to the Front by successive dis- 
 tributions and reforwardings. The daily supply 
 trains carry the supplies for the large units to the 
 railway distribution stations. There, the com- 
 missary-general of each large unit takes posses- 
 sion of them and transports them to a provision- 
 ing centre in the vans of his train. At this centre 
 the commissary department distributes them 
 to the supply officers of the regiments, who have 
 them loaded on the regimental vans and de- 
 spatched to the companies. When the regiment 
 is near the distributing station the commissariat 
 naturally delivers the supplies on the spot to the 
 supply officer. In the regiments the captains 
 receive funds for the purchase of additional sup- 
 plies, either from the near-by district or through 
 the commissariat. 
 
 The food is prepared in the kitchens, which 
 are set up in places as sheltered as possible from 
 the sight and the fire of the enemy. Travelling 
 kitchens are a special type of vehicle which per- 
 
 130 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 mit of the preparation of food and transporting 
 it hot to the point where it is to be distributed 
 among the platoons and squads. But from that 
 point, too, it is necessary to use mechanical 
 methods of transport as much as possible, not 
 only to spare the carriers, but also to make sure 
 that the food shall be hot on reaching its des- 
 tination. 
 
 The cooks are modest heroes, whose conduct, 
 especially in the first year of the war, cannot be 
 praised enough. I have seen instances of superb 
 devotion to duty on the part of those men, who 
 made it a point of honor that their comrades 
 should have their food on the moment and in good 
 condition. In Belgium, before Passchendaele, 
 my cooks, installed in the ruins of Saint-Julien, 
 travelled five kilometres on foot to the trenches 
 over ground constantly under fire. Carrying in- 
 credible burdens (for I was niggardly with men 
 for fatigue duty), they went bravely through the 
 darkness, trying to avoid shell holes, old trenches, 
 and ditches. They made this journey to and 
 from the Front just before dawn and again at 
 nightfall. In April, as the nights got too short to 
 carry the food twice and do the twenty kilometres, 
 they carried hot soup only once, before daybreak; 
 we kept a cold meal for the day, 
 
 I do not understand why the cooks were not 
 oftener killed or wounded; but they chose their 
 
 131 
 
THE WARFABJE OF TO-DAY 
 
 route and their time with extraordinary skill. 
 Frequently they were the oldest men in their 
 company, and fathers of large families. They had, 
 however, no protection in performing their func- 
 tions. I remember one poor fellow who was hit 
 near my command post, and whose greatest anx- 
 iety was to know how the food that he brought 
 was to find its way to his comrades ! 
 
 Bringing in supplies of munitions and ma- 
 teriel is a delicate operation because of the diffi- 
 culty, augmented by the danger, of transport up 
 to the first-line trenches. It is essential, as in the 
 matter of food -supplies, to use, as far as possible, 
 narrow roads and mules and donkeys, to decrease 
 the number of men employed and to save them 
 from fatigue. 
 
 One excellent method consists in always giving 
 munitions or materiel to small units on their way 
 to the Front, when not too heavily laden; they 
 leave them at the dep6ts, and the process goes on 
 until the dep6ts are sufficiently stocked to meet 
 all possible demands. By the establishment of 
 successive dep6ts in the army corps, the divis- 
 ion, the regiment, and the battalion, it is possi- 
 ble to arrange that no company shall be without 
 materiel for its immediate needs; for sometimes 
 it takes a very long time to bring up materiel 
 from the rear. The dep6ts are not set up, as 
 some too forehanded superintendents sometimes 
 
 132 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 imagine, to remain full when the units are in 
 pressing need ; they must be depleted in case of 
 necessity, and be filled again as soon as possible. 
 These operations should be conducted without 
 bureaucratic red-tape, which exasperates the 
 parties in need and confuses the deliveries. 
 
 Nevertheless the distribution of materiel to 
 the units must be carefully supervised if we 
 would avoid wastage and negligence. The com- 
 manders of units make known their needs daily, 
 and they are supplied, completely if possible, or 
 in proportion to the quantities requested and in 
 conformity with the tactical situation. It is al- 
 ways advisable to give to the head of the party 
 transporting the supplies, a concise list of the 
 munitions and materiel of which he takes charge; 
 he brings back a receipt signed by the officer to 
 whom the supplies are given. 
 
 My first battalion depot was set up on my 
 initiative, because I had found that my men, in 
 order not to be burdened, when they were re- 
 lieved, with the boxes of cartridges they had 
 brought in, had a habit of firing them aimlessly 
 or throwing them away. I ordered that, when- 
 ever we left the trenches, all the boxes of unused 
 cartridges should be collected, and a memoran- 
 dum of them handed to the relieving unit. And 
 the same with the materiel : during the weeks when 
 the demands were not very urgent, I installed, 
 
 133 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 near my command post, a dep6t of the most use- 
 ful things — wire, chevaux-de-frise, bags of dirt, 
 pickets, gabions, hurdles, timbers, etc. This store 
 was of great service to me after days of bombard- 
 ment when my trenches had been pounded to 
 pieces. 
 
 The provisioning in men is called "relief." This 
 operation consists in replacing a unit occupying 
 a limited zone by a fresh unit from the rear. It 
 demands at every stage much consideration, sys- 
 tem, and care. 
 
 There is no period definitely fixed for the stay 
 of a unit in the trenches. We may assume that 
 six or eight days in the first line are enough; but 
 that length of time may be increased or short- 
 ened according to the condition of the men, 
 ivhich depends on the weather, the arrangement 
 of the shelters, the activity of the enemy, and 
 so forth. 
 
 The relief is generally preceded by a recon- 
 naissance by the commander of the corps, the 
 battalion commanders, the company command- 
 ers, and some inferior officers. It is executed, so 
 far as possible, unit by unit, without change in the 
 distribution of the troops. There will previously 
 have been occasion to make allowances for the 
 variations in effective strength, sometimes con- 
 siderable, between units of the same order; these 
 variations, in fact, lead to difficulties in regard to 
 
 134 
 
A RELIEF MARCHING THROUGH A BOYAU 
 
 ^&*jK^^;,i,g*M^^_~lIl 
 
 ■ . / ■ .' • r - — .o. -'J. 
 
 FRESH SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS AT THE MORT-HOMME NEAR VERDUN 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 trench-guards, assignment of shelters, etc. The 
 relief is handled by the officers of the units re- 
 lieved, who know the lay of the land and the 
 special orders. These officers are careful to trans- 
 mit, with all needful explanations, the informa- 
 tion concerning the zone they are leaving; they 
 emphasize those orders which may save the new- 
 comers from heavy losses ; finally, a certain num- 
 ber of them stay on for a day with the relieving 
 officers, to assist them with their experience and 
 advice. 
 
 It is of essential importance that the occupants 
 of a trench shall be properly acquainted with their 
 surroundings. When one arrives at night, often 
 after a fatiguing march through strange trenches, 
 this is no easy matter. 
 
 I could tell many anecdotes on this subject. 
 I will confine myself to one which is especially 
 typical. During the night of December 15, 1914, 
 with my company of the 153d I had relieved 
 another company stationed just beyond the little 
 stream called the Strombeck; on my left a nar- 
 row, swampy tract lay between me and Captain 
 Andre Laffargue's company; on my right a much 
 broader, inactive zone, through which the stream 
 flowed, separated me from another' company, in 
 relation to which I was in a salient. As my trench 
 was only 30 or 40 metres from the Germans, 
 some observers of the company on my right, see- 
 
 135 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ing the trenches so near together in the same Hne, 
 thought that they belonged to the same organi- 
 zation, and opened fire on my right platoon. I 
 went myself to see what was going on: one man 
 was dying, two others wounded; I myself, as 
 well as Sub- Lieutenant Bertrand, came within an 
 ace of being hit. Upon examining the parapet to 
 find the projectiles that were coming into it, one 
 of my sergeants extracted a bullet of the French 
 pattern of 1886! There was no further doubt as 
 to the source of the firing. Moreover, our batter- 
 ies of seventy-fives, replying to what they took 
 for a bombardment of Laffargue's company, sent 
 a volley which was aimed short, and fragments 
 of shell flew all about us! Communication with 
 the rear was almost impossible by day, because 
 one had to pass across a hillside on the other side 
 of the stream that was completely swept by the 
 German fire. Two brave fellows took their lives 
 in their hands by signalling with their kepis on 
 the ends of their rifles. The infantry fire ceased ; 
 but it might begin again and I dared not reoccupy 
 my trench. Two volunteers offered to go, one to 
 the battalion commander, the other to the neigh- 
 boring company. We followed their progress in 
 an agony of apprehension. They reached their 
 destinations and order was restored. But I did 
 not fail to learn from that incident the lesson that 
 it taught. 
 
 136 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 The establishment and verification of all means 
 of liaison is one of the first duties of the com- 
 manders of units. 
 
 How many accidents and mistakes would have 
 been avoided if that rule had always been faith- 
 fully observed ! I had many opportunities to real- 
 ize it; but one of the most characteristic was the 
 adventure that befell me on February 20, 191 5. 
 That night for the first time I and my battalion 
 of the 69th went through the relief in the Pas- 
 schendaele centre of resistance. A company of 
 Territorial Infantry had been left there, framed 
 in on each side by my companies, whom I had 
 ordered to be careful to establish communications 
 with it. When, on making the rounds of my line, 
 I came to the Territorial company, it was im- 
 possible for me to find the platoon leaders: the 
 men had no definite orders, no precise orienta- 
 tion ! At the end of a half-caved-in trench which 
 was lost in the water, no one could tell me where 
 the next one began; so I went on with Lieuten- 
 ant Dardaine and the agents de liaison I had 
 brought with me, following as best I could the 
 old inundated trench. But we suddenly discov- 
 ered that we must be between the two lines; 
 the trench had been moved back because of the 
 water. On climbing out of it we ran the risk 
 of being taken for German patrols; luckily the 
 Territorials in that section were negligent in doing 
 
 137 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 their duty and allowed us to get back into the 
 lines by marching diagonally. 
 
 When I attempted to leave that company and 
 return directly to my command post, I asked the 
 captain for a guide. He replied that the "liaison 
 man " who had been with me had just started for 
 my post, and that nobody else knew the way. 
 I had to find my road for myself, over the glacis 
 swept by rifle-bullets and shells, consulting my 
 compass under my cape, by the light of an electric 
 pocket lamp, forced without reason to run the 
 risk of an idiotic death! The officers who were 
 guilty of these errors were fine fellows, no doubt, 
 but spoiled by their inertia, their carelessness, 
 their lack of initiative, or else badly trained be- 
 cause of the inefficiency of the leaders who had 
 had them in charge. 
 
 I had other adventures of the same sort. So 
 that I was led to prescribe the following exer- 
 cise : every day at a certain hour, an order started 
 from my command post through the right of my 
 line; it was to come back to me by way of the 
 left, bearing the signatures of all the captains 
 and platoon leaders with a note of the time when 
 it passed through their hands. This exercise, 
 varied by divers combinations, enabled me to 
 assure and to check up, from the time of my 
 arrival in a sector, the liaisons both laterally 
 and in depth. 
 
 138 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 The men coming from their cantonments ought 
 to arrive at the trenches in good condition. To 
 this end they must be spared all unnecessary- 
 fatigue ; for example, by bringing them in motors 
 as near the Front as possible. Noise and lights 
 and cigarettes should be forbidden, to avoid 
 putting the enemy on the alert. 
 
 The relief is subject to a certain number of 
 rules, ^ some of which vary with the different 
 sectors. It must be effected with the most per- 
 fect order. The units relieved go away with the 
 same precautions taken by those of the relieving 
 force, in order not to reveal the operation. 
 
 The sojourn behind the Front, in camps, in 
 barracks, or in villages, gives the officers a chance 
 to get their troops in hand, to restore the co- 
 hesion and mobility which life in the trenches 
 tends to diminish; and, above all else, to resume 
 and perfect their instruction. It is the officers' 
 duty to maintain strict discipline, while keeping 
 up friendly and paternal relations with their men; 
 for example, to insist upon the salute, which is 
 the external sign of a well-trained force ; to look 
 to the cleanliness and neatness of clothes and 
 weapons; to establish pleasant relations between 
 the troops and the civil population ; and to pro- 
 tect their men against dishonest tradesmen who 
 sometimes try to cheat them. 
 
 1 See The War of Positions, under " Relief," pp. 68-75. 
 139 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Taken as a whole, it is a special type of exist- 
 ence, too common to be described, which affords 
 a well-earned relaxation between periods given 
 over to danger and to suffering. 
 
 A complete description of trenches and trench 
 life would include the whole geography of the 
 Front, the whole history of the war. 
 
 Although trenches do not constitute an epit- 
 ome of modern warfare in ail its development, 
 they do occupy a preponderating place in the 
 life of the combatants. It is in them, indeed, 
 that they pass weeks and months, waiting for the 
 moment to cross the first-line parapet. There it 
 is, in fulfilling the daily tasks imposed by the 
 proximity of the enemy, or waiting for long hours 
 in dark and ill-ventilated shelters, that the sol- 
 dier makes the acquaintance of the comrades 
 with whom he is one day to risk his life. From 
 there he watches the departure of the wounded 
 to the hospitals, there he fulfils the last sad 
 offices for the dead. 
 
 Each trench is associated in the mind of who- 
 ever has lived there with innumerable memories. 
 Tiny events in themselves, having none but local 
 importance, for the horizon is limited by the 
 trench itself, yet they are carved forever in the 
 memory. How often in my dreams at night, 
 
 140 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 or in the daytime, in the midst of a numerous 
 and happy throng, do I see before my eyes the 
 trenches of France! 
 
 The trenches of Belgium in 1914, deep in the 
 mud that Hnes the Yser; the rehefs, when men 
 filed through the swamps where no boyau could 
 be dug; the parapets made in part of human 
 bodies, above which the first defenders had 
 heaped mud; the poor wounded who had to be 
 removed at night, with bullets whistling on 
 every side; the dead who were buried where they 
 dropped, for lack of means of removal, and whose 
 graves were marked by crosses of sticks. These 
 were trenches of desolation, suffering, sadness, 
 and death. 
 
 The trenches of Artois in 19 15 in the chalky 
 soil, opposite the famous Labyrinth, and Neuville 
 Saint- Vast, trenches relatively comfortable, in 
 which my men peacefully carved little chalk 
 figures, before going to that combat where so 
 many of them were to lose their lives. 
 
 The trenches of the Somme in 1916, the suc- 
 cessive, lines of which marked on the ravaged 
 earth all the phases of a successful offensive 
 carried on for months together; the improvised 
 niches, in which the soldiers of the Twentieth 
 Corps were installed opposite a German trench 
 on the reverse slope, in a sunken road; the 
 trenches of the Moulin de Fargny face to face 
 
 141 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 with the celebrated German position which we 
 called "Le chapeau de gendarme." 
 
 The trenches of the Aisne in 191 7, with the 
 calm days of the beginning of the year, when we 
 could see from a first-line observation post the 
 German sappers digging new boyaux in the open, 
 half a mile from us; where we could admire, 
 from the commanders' observing-stations, the 
 peaceful aspect of the "Chemin des Dames" 
 and the enigmatical towers of the cathedral of 
 Laon. Then the feverish activity of the prepara- 
 tion of the offensive, and the numerous tasks 
 connected with the emplacement of batteries, 
 the maintenance of roads, the organization of 
 railways, and the creation of depots of all sorts, 
 the whole silent and peaceful zone suddenly 
 turned noisy and bustling. 
 
 In all of these regions there lie countless little 
 wooden crosses, marking the spots where lie the 
 dead. Sometimes they are scattered, as in Bel- 
 gium, where they disappear, little by little, in 
 the mud, together with bodies that were never 
 buried : or on the Somme, where the slopes facing 
 Maurepas or Combles were dotted with these 
 humble monuments, often made of two sticks 
 from the remains of some tree. Sometimes they 
 are grouped in numerous cemeteries, as at Saint- 
 Julien, and Saint-Jean, near Ypres, where I have 
 seen so many of my friends laid to rest, or at 
 
 142 
 
WELL-CARED-FOR GRAVE OF A FRENCH CUIRASSIER BETWEEN 
 BOESINGHE AND LANGEMARCK (19I4) 
 
 RUINS OF THE CHURCH OF LANGEMARCK, DECEMBER 3, I9I4 
 View taken from the house of Lawyer van der Meersch 
 
THE TRENCHES 
 
 Maricourt, facing the Somme, where I had the 
 greatest difficulty in finding the grave of one of 
 my bravest comrades of the Sixty-ninth, Captain 
 BoUe. 
 
 In Champagne there is a grave which I have 
 never seen. A little cross bears the name of him 
 who was my second father, of him who was for 
 long years my loving guide, of him who died 
 gloriously in the offensive of 1915. It is safely 
 sheltered from the devastation of the Germans, 
 and I know that it is kept in order by the pious 
 care of the officers in that region. 
 
 But why should not the Government, and the 
 village authorities, decide to preserve, alongside 
 of the cemeteries, and isolated graves, the re- 
 mains of these trenches, where soldiers of Eng- 
 land, of Belgium, of Canada, of the United 
 States, of Portugal, of Russia, and of France, 
 have lived and suffered? The ground is con- 
 vulsed by earth-slides, robbed of its trees by 
 shells, ravaged by explosions, and little fit for 
 cultivation or building for long years to come. 
 They would be, in their tragic simplicity, pre- 
 cious monuments for the generations yet to be. 
 Built with a little of the earth of France and the 
 blood of so many brave men, they would per- 
 petuate the memory of the heroic years, when 
 the men of all civilized nations triumphed over 
 the barbarian hordes. They would constitute a 
 
 143 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 sanctuary where our little children would come, 
 like pious pilgrims, to render homage to those 
 who, in our noble and serious age, have suffered, 
 grown old, and fought for years, and to those 
 also who gave their lives freely for the cause of 
 Liberty. 
 
IV 
 
 PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 Lecture of November 5, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 The attack in the present war. — The four phases of offensive 
 combat in the war of positions. — Two of these phases, the pursuit 
 and the march of approach, will be described theoretically, as they 
 have not yet taken place. 
 
 The preparation of the attack is a long process. — The plan of 
 action. — The four parts of the preparation. 
 
 Detailed study of the two opposing positions. — Position of de- 
 parture: battle maps; reconnaissances. — Position to be attacked: 
 information by aviation, artillery, infantry; battle maps; study by 
 personal observation. 
 
 Material amenagement of the departure position. — Plan of ame- 
 nagement. — R61e of the engineers. — Line of departure. — Works 
 for the artillery. — Ways of approach : railroads, roads, narrow- 
 gauge roads, boyaux. 
 
 Smashing the enemy''s position. — Plan of action of the artillery. — 
 Aerial and ground observation. — Artillery preparation. — Recol- 
 lections of a period of preparation (April-May, 1915). — Failure, 
 with appalling loss of life, of attacks executed without sufficient 
 preparation. 
 
 The physical, professional, and moral training of the troops. — 
 Physical training: sports, drink, food. — Professional training: in- 
 struction camps for large units. — Moral preparation: religious, 
 patriotic, and humanitarian ideals. — Influence of the commander 
 before the attack. — Development of confidence in the troops. 
 
 An attack well prepared must succeed. 
 
 It is never a wise move in modern warfare to 
 make an isolated attack, for the enemy is always 
 able in such case to mass his reserves behind the 
 threatened zone. Moreover, an attack should 
 
 145 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 not be carried out on too narrow a front. Such 
 an attack can, at best, achieve merely a local 
 success, the value of which is out of proportion 
 to the loss of men, the wastage of materiel, and 
 the expenditure of ammunition. 
 
 Every attack should be accompanied by one 
 or more others, carried out at different points, 
 and launched, if not simultaneously, at least 
 within a few days of one another. The object 
 of an attack is to gain possession of a position, 
 or of several positions in lateral contact, and the 
 corresponding positions echeloned behind. The 
 capture of these positions has the effect of break- 
 ing the enemy's front; his army may be struck 
 through the breach and disorganized. 
 
 In order to study an attack as a whole, it is 
 needful to consider only so much of it as afTects 
 a single position; the combat in the adjacent 
 regions is developed in similar fashion. 
 
 There are always four successive phases in 
 a modern combat, namely : — 
 
 (i) The preparation of the attack. 
 
 (2) The attack itself. 
 
 (3) The pursuit beyond the position. 
 
 (4) The march of approach toward the next 
 position. 
 
 These phases reappear in one unending cycle, 
 as long as there remain unconquered positions, 
 echeloned in depth. The combat may, however, 
 
 146 
 
PREPABATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 begin with any one of the four. For instance, 
 if there is a surprise, without preparation, the 
 first phase may be the attack, the second the pur- 
 suit; if contact has been lost, the first phase will 
 be the march of approach, the second the attack. 
 Once the combat is joined, the phases succeed one 
 another in the order named. 
 
 One or more of the phases may be but slightly 
 developed. If the positions echeloned in depth 
 are very close to one another, the pursuit may 
 be limited to a few hundred yards or less, and the 
 same is true of the march of approach. It should, 
 however, be accepted as a matter of principle, 
 that all the phases are present in one form or 
 another; the failure to recognize this has involved 
 the Allied armies in frequent mistakes. 
 
 The commonest error, and the most disastrous, 
 the error which still lingers in the minds of many 
 persons, consists in believing that after one or 
 two positions have been captured, there will be 
 no more behind. Were that the case, had the 
 enemy prepared and occupied no other positions, 
 he would be powerless or demoralized, and the 
 victory would already be within reach. 
 
 These are principles which are fundamental 
 in the theory of the war of to-day, to which I 
 have given the name "War of Positions." 
 
 147 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 An attack must be prepared according to a 
 methodical scheme, often taking weeks or months 
 before all is ready. 
 
 The preparation is, in part, the work of the 
 troops who, in turn, occupy the departure posi- 
 tion; it is also, in many respects, dependent upon 
 the intentions of the commander, when he de- 
 cides upon executing the attack. These inten- 
 tions are explained in a document called the 
 "plan of action" which sets forth the limits of 
 the zones of attack, the duties of the various 
 troops, and the successive objectives to be at- 
 tained. 
 
 The commander of the attacking army and 
 his staff begin by making reconnaissance. The 
 commander then draws up his plan of action, 
 which comprises: a definite disposition of all 
 the available divisions, and the assignment of the 
 duties and objectives of each; the location of 
 the reserves, and their eventual duties; the artil- 
 lery plan of action, drawn up in consultation 
 with the artillery commander; the duties of the 
 engineers; the distribution of the air service; 
 the orders for operations in the rear, including 
 those for supply and evacuation; the arrange- 
 ments for reliefs, or for manoeuvres which may 
 become needful during the course of the combat; 
 the specification of the troops who are to con- 
 stitute these reliefs or manoeuvres. 
 
 148 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 It is a fact that manoeuvring enters more 
 into modern warfare than some persons imagine. 
 Usually a nest of resistance which halts the 
 advancing troops is conquered by outflanking, 
 and not by a repetition of sanguinary and profit- 
 less direct assaults. For this reason, in preparing 
 an attack, it is better to put relatively few troops 
 in reserve before the obstacles which are be- 
 lieved to be difficult of conquest, and to have 
 many troops echeloned in depth before those 
 zones where progress will be easy. 
 
 When the army commander has drawn up his 
 plan of action, he communicates it to each of 
 his subordinates. Thereupon the officers of the 
 different grades in the hierarchy draw up their 
 plans also. It is necessary that the duties of each 
 unit should be sharply defined and its objec- 
 tives clearly indicated. Even if there be an ob- 
 jective beyond which the troops should not go, 
 it is well to make some plans for the succeeding 
 attack, lest excessive prudence prevent reaping 
 the entire fruits of success. 
 
 The preparation of an attack is generally long 
 and minute if the enemy has been long in his 
 present position, for he will have had time and 
 opportunity to fortify it at every point. On the 
 contrary, the preparation may be reduced to a 
 minimum if the enemy has been in place for a 
 short time only, in order not to leave him the 
 
 149 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 leisure to construct strong defences. The com- 
 mander decides whether or not to attack hur- 
 riedly, according to the information which he 
 receives. 
 
 The preparation of an attack includes, in 
 principle, four parts which may be carried on 
 simultaneously: — 
 
 (i) The detailed study of the two opposed 
 positions. 
 
 (2) The material preparation of the departure 
 position. 
 
 (3) The complete shattering of the position to 
 be attacked. 
 
 (4) The physical and moral training of the 
 attacking troops. 
 
 The detailed study of the two opposed posi- 
 tions is a work calling for method, patience, and 
 conscientiousness. 
 
 As far as the departure position is concerned, 
 the task is relatively easy; it is merely needful to 
 prepare accurate maps. These maps are called 
 "battle maps" {plans directeurs). At the begin- 
 ning of the present war this title was reserved 
 for the "firing maps" {plans directeurs du tir), 
 used for regulating and adjusting the fire of the 
 heavy guns. To-day the simplified title applies 
 to the maps for directing operations. These maps 
 
 150 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 are made by a special service, called "fire sketch 
 groups " {groupes de canevas de tir) , which is inclu- 
 ded in each army, and represented by topograph- 
 ical sections in each army corps. A central serv- 
 ice, called the ' ' geographical service of the army , ' ' 
 resident at Paris, has the duty of reproducing 
 all the battle maps and plans made by the fire 
 sketch groups. The standard scales for these re- 
 productions are i : 20,000, i : 10,000, and i : 5,000; 
 the officers of the American army should become 
 familiar with these maps. The battle maps 
 which give the French trenches are usually 
 drawn to the scale of i: 10,600; they are secret, 
 and distributed in limited numbers, since their 
 capture would convey valuable information to 
 the enemy. The Command must see to it that 
 these maps are always kept up to date, for new 
 works are continually being made, especially in 
 periods of preparation. 
 
 It is essential that officers should not only 
 study the battle maps, but should also recon- 
 noitre in person the trenches which are under 
 their authority. It is the only way to make sure 
 that work is properly carried out, that what is 
 foreseen is in accordance with actual needs, and 
 to discover what further work may be necessary. 
 This is essential also in order that an officer shall 
 be able, at the moment of attack, to give his 
 orders with certainty and to direct his troops with 
 
 151 
 
THE WARFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 effect. To this end the officers should further- 
 more study, on the ground, the sectors next to 
 those occupied by their own men; this sort of 
 reconnaissance is useful, both for maintaining 
 liaison and for possible lateral deplacements. 
 
 I have had many occasions to verify these 
 principles ; I have also continually called them to 
 the attention of my subordinates. 
 
 In the course of the period which preceded our 
 attack of May 9, 1915, against the "Labyrinth," 
 we occupied for several days trenches near the 
 village of Ecurie, whence we were to start for the 
 assault. I gave written orders to my company 
 commanders to send their N.C.O.'s and privates, 
 during rest hours, in small groups, to reconnoitre 
 the trenches, the command posts, and the boyaux 
 of the adjacent units. In spite of this precaution, 
 we had a misadventure the day of the attack. 
 
 The fifth company, with which I was march- 
 ing, had as its departure station a trench which 
 it had occupied during a previous stay. To get 
 there it had to pass through boyaux which 
 spread out toward the Seventeenth Army Corps, 
 placed on our right, and toward the Twenty-sixth 
 Infantry, scheduled to start before us. At a 
 fork the guides led the troops in the wrong direc- 
 tion. I at once saw the mistake, and gave orders 
 to halt. An intense bombardment was scattering 
 shell fragments and earth in every direction, 
 
 152 
 
Two staff cfficers (on the right, Captain de Suzannet) coming to Cote 107, near Ecurie 
 April 27, 191S, at the command post of Major Azan, to inspect his trenches 
 
 The ruins of the ^^curie Chateau, in April, 191S. near the departure trenches 
 PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK, BATTLE OF ARTOIS (1915) 
 
PREPAHATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 the wounded of the Seventeenth Corps were look- 
 ing for a road to the first-aid station, and their 
 unwounded comrades seemed uneasy. Fortu- 
 nately I had been through these boyaux a 
 hundred times, and they were all familiar 
 to me. I hastened to the front of the company 
 and turned them in the right direction. I did 
 not fail to point out sarcastically to the offi- 
 cers and N.C.O.'s that my orders for interior re- 
 connaissance, which had surprised and amused 
 them, had been fully justified by the event. 
 
 On this very same day, May 9, another episode 
 went to confirm the necessity for preliminary 
 reconnaissance. The first two waves of the 
 Twenty-sixth Infantry, which were assaulting 
 the Labyrinth in front, had been decimated 
 by rifle and machine-gun fire, the third wave 
 could not even debouch from the sap. My bat- 
 talion was the fourth, having as its objective 
 "The Lindens." I wrote a note to my colonel 
 in my report No. 5 of 3.10 P.M. : " I shall probably 
 be obliged to file far over to my left, since all the 
 saps from A14 to A5 are enfiladed by machine 
 guns. Either these machine guns must be de- 
 stroyed by artillery, or they must be taken in the 
 rear by following in the footsteps of the Sev- 
 enty-ninth, and afterwards bearing back to the 
 right." I then made the preparatory manoeuvre 
 of drawing my battalion to the left. 
 
 153 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 At 3.40 P.M. I received word from my brigade 
 commander to carry out the manoeuvre I had 
 planned. It happened that during my occupa- 
 tion of these trenches with six companies of my 
 regiment, I had placed two companies of another 
 battalion, the Eleventh and Twelfth, at the left 
 of my line, so that the officers and N.C.O.'s of the 
 companies I then had were not familiar with the 
 spot. But I myself had often in person examined 
 the liaison with the brigade on my left and passed 
 through its trenches and boyaux; I was able to 
 guide my battalion, and bring them to the Ger- 
 man trenches without losing a man. Hesitation 
 or delay in the boyau would have produced a 
 deplorable effect. 
 
 The study of the position to be attacked is of 
 the first importance. It is carried out by all arms 
 simultaneously: aviation, artillery, and infantry; 
 even the Command takes a hand. 
 
 In a work of this sort all the diflFerent means 
 must be used so as to supplement one another. 
 The scouting and observation planes take photo- 
 graphs which are studied in order to discover 
 true or sham trenches, the emplacement of bat- 
 teries, new works, and the progress of the work 
 of destruction by the artillery. Captive balloons 
 discover important facts. Artillery observing 
 stations on the ground, usually used for finding 
 objectives, as well as the stations for artillery 
 
 154 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 adjustment, note significant signs. The posts for 
 detection by sound or flash determine the situ- 
 ation of the enemy's batteries. The infantry 
 observation posts, the reconnaissances and pa- 
 trols, are means of more immediate observation; 
 sometimes, in fact, a reconnaissance will have 
 the effect of drawing the fire of an unsuspected 
 machine gun, a patrol may capture prisoners, or 
 pick up deserters who can furnish valuable in- 
 formation. Even the observing stations for the 
 Command, following a methodical scheme of 
 observation, can discover noteworthy facts. All 
 the information obtained in these various ways 
 is collated at the staff headquarters of each 
 army, and subjected to a comparative exami- 
 nation. 
 
 The information obtained is put down upon 
 battle maps, similar to those which represent 
 the French trenches. The scales of these are 
 usually 1 : 20,000, i : 10,000, or 1 : 5,000. The first- 
 named are especially used by the Command and 
 the artillery, for they give a general view of the 
 hostile positions; the i : 10,000 maps are also used 
 by the staff and the artillery; both are distrib- 
 uted as far down in the scale as to battalion and 
 battery commanders. The 1:5,000 maps repre- 
 sent either the whole or a part of the enemy's 
 first position, and are useful in arranging the 
 infantry units in attack formation; they are 
 
 155 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 distributed as far down as platoon leaders. 
 They contain no details as to the French posi- 
 tions, lest they fall into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 In view of the possibility that the attack might 
 be followed by a pursuit through a long distance, 
 there are some maps drawn to the scale i : 50,000 
 showing the topography of the positions beyond 
 those which are attacked. 
 
 The battle maps indicate all of the obstacles 
 which will have to be overcome. Beyond this, 
 the staff announces in a daily bulletin all infor- 
 mation that has been collected concerning the 
 enemy. The reason for this publicity is that a 
 body of troops is much less discouraged by dif- 
 ficulties which are foreseen than by unexpected 
 obstacles. 
 
 The study of the enemy's position must be 
 made by the officers and N.C.O.'s, not only on 
 the battle maps, but by personal observation. 
 Generals and staff officers should frequently 
 visit their observing stations, observation posts, 
 and trenches; similarly, the commanders of units 
 should be frequent visitors at the observation 
 posts and trench watchers' posts, in order to fix 
 the terrain clearly in their minds and to familiar- 
 ize themselves with landmarks. Then, when the 
 attack takes place, they will have less difficulty 
 in realizing where they are, and will find their 
 way about without consulting the map. 
 
 156 
 
PREPABATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 This study of the positions should be carried 
 out constantly during the period of stationary 
 fighting; it is likewise necessary, before an at- 
 tack, to give the troops a few days in the trenches 
 in order that they may feel at home. This gives 
 them the same advantage that a man has who is 
 hunting or fighting in a country where he knows 
 every road and every feature. 
 
 When the Twentieth Corps was sent from 
 Belgium into Artois to take part in the attack 
 of May, 1 9 15, the officers received, a few days 
 before the attack, some remarkably accurate 
 1:5,000 maps covering the enemy's position, 
 sufficient in number so that all could consult 
 them. Moreover, the different battalions were 
 instructed to occupy, turn and turn about, the 
 trenches from which they were to start for the 
 attack. Finally, special reconnaissances were 
 carried out by officers under the direct control of 
 the generals, in order to establish contact be- 
 tween the infantry battalion commanders and 
 the artillery majors, and to facilitate an exami- 
 nation of the German trenches and the eventual 
 objectives in all of their different aspects. All 
 these measures had the most excellent effect 
 upon the course of events. 
 
 One omission, not chargeable to the account 
 of the Command, unfortunately diminished the 
 amount of this effect. The printed maps con- 
 
 157 
 
THE WARFAKE OF TO-DAY 
 
 tained no hints as to the enemy's means of de- 
 fence, such as blockhouses, batteries, or machine 
 guns ; furthermore, the emplacements for these, 
 being variable, can readily be carted about in 
 each sector in accordance with fresh informa- 
 tion. The troops whom we relieved, and who 
 had been there for long months, left us no infor- 
 mation on this score; at least, I myself, though 
 in command of six companies stationed in front 
 of the Labyrinth, cbuld obtain none. I was 
 unable, in spite of the devotion of my men,, to 
 acquire all the requisite information in a few 
 days; I could put down on my map only a few 
 machine-gun emplacements, at a time when the 
 Labyrinth was honeycombed with them. Had 
 their presence in such numbers been known, it 
 is probable that our artillery preparation would 
 have been carried out more completely, and the 
 Twenty-sixth would not have been so cruelly 
 decimated. 
 
 The study which I had made of the position 
 at least enabled me, when I executed a rear at- 
 tack upon the Labyrinth, to give my orders and 
 draw up my reports calmly and confidently, in 
 spite of the whistling of bullets and the explod- 
 ing of shells, always somewhat disconcerting. 
 When I was wounded. May lo, alongside of 
 Captain Lafontaine and Lieutenant Denoyelle, I 
 wrote an incomplete report in my notebook. I 
 
 158 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 had no need to look at the terrain or even to con- 
 sult my map. In fact, it would not always have 
 been easy to unfold this map. I had been obliged 
 to do so only once or twice that day to make 
 sure of my location, the axis of my advance, and 
 my successive objectives. 
 
 The material am^nagement of the departure 
 position is intended to facilitate the initial task 
 of the attacking troops and the continuation of 
 the combat until the next position is conquered. 
 It should be undertaken at the beginning of the 
 period of stationary fighting, even before any 
 orders for the attack have been given. There 
 are three reasons for this: — 
 
 (i) When the attack is once decided on, a good 
 part of the preparation will have been completed; 
 this saves time. 
 
 (2) If the same sort of work is in progress all 
 along the Front, the enemy will find it hard to 
 determine, by any means at his disposal, just 
 where the attack will be launched. 
 
 (3) Most of the work carried out in prepara- 
 tion for an attack is also useful for defence. 
 
 The amenagement of the position is not 
 merely a question of organizing the line of de- 
 parture, or even the first trenches. It involves 
 an organization extending a long distance in 
 
 159 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 depth and includes: the installation of artillery 
 with spare emplacements; the preparation of 
 observing stations and battery emplacements 
 for advancing the artillery; the establishment of 
 new means of liaison, and improvement of those 
 already in existence ; the arrangement of systems 
 of liaison to be run before the first line; and the 
 improvement and increase of the roads and 
 other facilities, either for bringing up reserves or 
 supplies, or for evacuating mat6riel, wounded, 
 or prisoners. 
 
 The plan of am6nagement is drawn up by the 
 commander of the position. It coordinates the 
 various tasks and allots them an order of ur- 
 gence. It fixes the date at which the various 
 works should be finished, not overlooking the 
 fact of experience that a house is never com- 
 pleted nor an exposition opened on the day set. 
 A certain number of available days are always 
 left between the presumed date for the comple- 
 tion of the work and that for the opening of the 
 attack. 
 
 The engineer corps is especially charged with 
 the execution of work of this sort. At the same 
 time the smallness of their numbers prohibits 
 their undertaking anything but the general con- 
 trol and surveillance, except in the case of cer- 
 tain very technical tasks which they alone can 
 execute. The Command details working units 
 
 1 60 
 
PREPAEATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 from the troops in rest camp or from the ter- 
 ritorial troops composed of older men. The re- 
 lations between the commanders of these troops 
 and the engineer officers or N.C.O.'s must be 
 defined with precision. The officers in charge of 
 the units should retain effective control over 
 their men, and possess the sole authority to reg- 
 ulate their movements or delimit their duties; 
 on the technical side they should, of course, 
 always have the advice of engineer officers and 
 N.C.O.'s. 
 
 The line of departure for the assault should^ 
 never be more than three or four hundred yards 
 from the enemy's first trench; it is well placed 
 when the distance is two hundred Hyards. This 
 is, in fact, a sufficient distance for the artillery 
 preparation to be carried out without danger to 
 the attackers and for a barrage to be placed be- 
 tween the two adversaries. The line is achieved 
 by covered saps which enable advanced ground 
 to be gained without attracting the enemy's at- 
 tention. It is straight, without traverses, and 
 so directed as to place the attacking troops, not 
 parallel to the enemy's first trench, but face to 
 face with the objective toward which they must 
 march; this avoids changes in the direction of 
 the march, always difficult to feffect. 
 
 It is often advantageous, in order not to put 
 the enemy on guard, to start an attack from 
 
 i6i 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the trenches themselves. In this case steps or 
 ladders must be prepared for climbing out ; if the 
 troops start from several successive trenches 
 at once, light footbridges must be thrown at 
 the proper moment over those trenches which 
 have to be crossed. 
 
 The tasks for the artillery are very consider- 
 able, for it is their duty: to install a consider- 
 able number of batteries, echeloned in depth, 
 preparing spare emplacements, and erecting ob- 
 serving stations; to establish lines of communi- 
 cation between the batteries and the observing 
 stations; to construct false batteries; to create 
 shelters for munitions; to install supply routes 
 and means for visual or telephonic communica- 
 tion ; and to prepare the necessary roads for the 
 forward movement, with new emplacements and 
 observing stations. 
 
 The great number of tasks that are necessa- 
 rily involved by the artillery offer no excuse for 
 undertaking others which are useless. To be 
 sure, all batteries at a sufficient distance from 
 the enemy should be protected by camouflage; 
 yet I have seen shelters requiring tons of wood 
 and huge earthworks constructed for batteries 
 which were never the target for serious fire by 
 the enemy. It was all a waste of time and energy. 
 
 The munition dep&ts should be so situated 
 that the bringing-up, unloading, and distributing 
 
 162 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 of ammunition is easily carried out. They must 
 be large enough not to be congested and so that 
 an aerial bombardment or a fire shall not pro- 
 duce a general disaster. 
 
 The means of access from the rear are of vari- 
 ous sorts : — 
 
 There are the railways which serve to estab- 
 lish connection, both with the rear and with 
 other parts of the Front. No section of them 
 should be exposed to the enemy's fire for fear 
 that transportation might be interrupted at a 
 critical moment; when threatened with this, it 
 is easy to construct a section of line beyond the 
 zone of fire. It is frequently necessary to dou- 
 ble or triple existing lines and to create spurs 
 running toward the Front. 
 
 The roads must be kept in good order, so that 
 motor convoys may pass at all times. This main- 
 tenance demands, in the periods preceding an 
 attack, an amount of effort which is hard to 
 imagine. On the Aisne, at the time of the prepa- 
 ration for the attack of March, 1917, the roads 
 were cut to pieces with great rapidity, owing to 
 the alternations of frost and thaw; at times it 
 was necessary to stop all traffic in order to re- 
 pair them. This work was so important that 
 whole regiments were assigned to do it in each 
 sector. 
 
 The proper operation of the railways and roads 
 
 163 
 
THE WAEPABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 has considerable importance; on this depends 
 the rapid arrival of troops at the desired points, 
 and, hence, the possibiHty of surprise; the supply 
 of the troops and the arrival of reserves during 
 the combat also depend on this. 
 
 Toward the Front there are installed a large 
 number of narrow-gauge railways, used to trans- 
 port munitions and materiel of all sorts. Trans- 
 versal trenches are made in as large numbers 
 as may be necessary. Care should be taken 
 to construct evacuation boyaux through which 
 wounded and prisoners may pass without ob- 
 structing the boyaux by means of which troops 
 ^nd supplies are brought forward. 
 
 The plan of amenagement defines positions for 
 d6p6ts to contain munitions, water, food, and 
 grenades, and arranges for the construction of 
 shelters, places d'armes, command posts, and 
 observation posts, sufficient for all purposes. It 
 indicates localities suitable for the passage of 
 artillery, of cavalry, or of convoys, in case the 
 attack succeeds. It also arranges that telephone 
 lines, optical telegraphs, and wireless apparatus 
 shall be ready to be put in operation beyond 
 the departure position. 
 
 The shattering of the enemy's position is in- 
 tended to facilitate the advance of the infantry, : 
 
 164 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 by destroying defensive works and silencing the 
 enemy's batteries. 
 
 It is executed throughout the whole extent 
 of that position, and of adjacent positions, and 
 is extended pari passu with the advance of the 
 guns. This permits an easy, continuous, and 
 deep advance. 
 
 The artillery plan of action arranges the group- 
 ing of the pieces, fixes their situations and zones 
 of action, determines their duties, organizes their 
 liaisons, arranges for their supply, and makes 
 plans for their deplacement. Such groups are 
 never huddled in a narrow space; they are 
 echeloned in depth, not according to calibre or 
 range, but according to the tasks which they 
 must fulfil. Moreover, the disposition of the 
 batteries is largely influenced by the expected 
 development of the attack. Certain batteries 
 are sometimes placed very near the front line so 
 as to be in place as soon as the advance begins; 
 in such a case it is essential to have them prop- 
 erly sheltered and protected by camouflage; 
 they should not be revealed to the enemy before 
 the moment when they can be of use. 
 
 While these groups are being installed, the 
 trench artillery takes its station and establishes 
 its ammunition dep&ts. The transportation of 
 bombs for the trench mortars is by no means 
 easy on account of their weight and the difiti- 
 
 165 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 culties of passage through the boyaux; some 
 ammunition should be brought up at every con- 
 venient opportunity; as, for instance, when a 
 fatigue detail goes to the front line. All am- 
 munition necessary to carry out the mission 
 entrusted to the trench artillery must be trans- 
 ported to its destination by the day fixed for 
 the beginning of the preparation. 
 
 When the artillery pieces of all calibres are 
 prepared to open fire, the observation service, 
 both in the air and on the ground, becomes more 
 and more active. This service must furnish all 
 the details for adjusting the fire, and note, day 
 by day, the progress of the shattering. 
 
 The airplanes communicate with the ground 
 by radio telegraph, wireless telephone, pro- 
 jectors, weighted messages, and rockets. For 
 fire adjustment, the wireless receiving stations 
 signal to the planes by means of cloth panels. 
 The airplanes must also drive hostile aircraft 
 away from the position, lest they discover the 
 preparations for the attack. 
 
 Balloons communicate with the ground by 
 telephone; the anchorage is in telephonic or 
 radio-telegrapic communication with the artil- 
 lery. They must remain half a dozen miles 
 from the front line on account of their vulnera- 
 bility, and at an altitude not exceeding some 
 sixteen hundred yards on account of the wind. 
 
 i66 
 
The village of Maurepas 
 
 The least destroyed part of the village of Maurepas 
 
 EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH ARTILLERY PREPARATION AT THE BATTLE OF 
 THE SOMME (jULY- NOVEMBER, I916) 
 
PREPAKATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 When all these arrangements have been made 
 to overthrow the enemy's position, the artillery 
 preparation begins. It is continued long enough 
 to obtain a complete result; it may even be 
 kept up some days longer, till the day when the 
 attack is let loose. This day cannot be abso- 
 lutely fixed in advance ; atmospheric conditions 
 have such an important effect upon the avia- 
 tion, the artillery fire, the march of the infantry, 
 and the liaisons, that they may not be ignored. 
 
 The air service begins by blinding the enemy. 
 To this end the airplanes swoop down upon his 
 balloons and drive them to the ground; they get 
 the upper hand of his planes, driving them off 
 as soon as they appear. This obviously puts the 
 enemy at a disadvantage; he is a target for fire, 
 but cannot shoot back with any certainty of 
 effect. Such a condition was established at the 
 beginning of the battle of the Somme in July, 
 1916, and maintained, at least in part, during 
 the months which followed. The Bulletin of 
 the Sixth Army gave us weekly an eloquent 
 comparison of the success of French and German 
 aviation. 
 
 The artillery pieces of different calibres per- 
 form different duties. The trench artillery 
 smashes the enemy's first lines; the field artillery 
 shoots at his accessory defences, his troops, and 
 his batteries; if necessary it delivers a barrage; 
 
 167 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the heavy artillery destroys defensive works and 
 hostile batteries, the condition of which is always 
 clearly marked on the fire map; the high-pow- 
 ered artillery accomplishes the same sort of 
 thing against better resistant or more distant 
 objectives. 
 
 Artillery preparation is carried out, not only 
 against the first position, but against succeeding 
 positions. It has the further use that it impedes 
 the forwarding of supplies, reserves, and reliefs; 
 the zone to be attacked is surrounded by a circle 
 of fire. 
 
 The airplanes which follow the artillery prepa- 
 ration can give it active support by bombing 
 tactical objectives such as railway stations, junc- 
 tions, ammunition d6p6ts, centres of communi- 
 cation, etc. 
 
 The infantry sometimes feigns an attack in 
 order to see if any means of defence, such as 
 machine guns, are still intact. 
 
 The engineers may help in the shattering of 
 the enemy's position by exploding, at the last 
 moment, mines laid beneath important points, 
 such as flanking works. It is, however, a mistake 
 to exaggerate the usefulness of these mines; their 
 effects are purely local and are frequently dis- 
 proportionate to the efforts which they have 
 cost. 
 
 The effect of the artillery preparation is some- 
 i68 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 times so great that scarcely anything remains 
 of the positions taken under fire. The pictures 
 in the illustrated papers have often shown us 
 villages which were completely wiped out, or 
 woods reduced to a few tree-trunks cut off at 
 different heights. The most complete destruc- 
 tion of this sort which I, personally, have ever 
 seen, was that of the villages of Hardecourt 
 and Maurepas on the Somme, attacked by the 
 French in 1916. The destruction of these vil- 
 lages was carried out to such an extent that, little 
 by little, it became impossible to determine 
 where they had been; the debris of the houses 
 was used to ballast the roads ; otherwise it would 
 have been necessary to bring stone from a great 
 distance. One day I was traversing the region 
 in company with two British officers, Colonels 
 Leggett and Robertson. When they reached the 
 spot where Hardecourt had been, they looked 
 at the battle map which I had given them, and 
 asked me : — 
 
 "Where is Hardecourt?" 
 
 "Right here; you must be in the centre of the 
 village." 
 
 The artillery preparation had certainly been 
 good; in fact, the first stages of the attack had 
 been marked by insignificant losses. 
 
 A commander should under no circumstances 
 launch an attack until he is satisfied that the 
 
 169 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 artillery preparation has been sufficient to allow 
 the troops to advance. Sending troops against 
 a position which is but slightly damaged is not 
 only a crime, but a useless crime, since such an 
 attack is bound to fail. For this reason it should 
 be permissible for officers of every grade to point 
 out possible improvements in the fire preparation. 
 Such freedom should not occasion abuses, or serve 
 as a cloak for lack of dash or courage. On the 
 other hand, when well used, it may save many 
 lives and so contribute to success. 
 
 A specific example, backed by documentary 
 evidence, may serve to show what sort of thing 
 is going on in the mind of a commander of a small 
 unit at the time of preparation for an attack. 
 This example is illustrated by the advice which 
 I took it upon myself to give, in May, 191 5, 
 to my superiors. Colonel Pesme, the commander 
 of the Sixty-ninth Regiment, and General Aim6, 
 since fallen at Verdun. 
 
 There was nothing but the heavy artillery 
 which was able to shatter the Labyrinth, or 
 even to destroy the first-line organizations. I had 
 not had the time, during my short stay in the 
 trenches, to determine completely the organiza- 
 tion and strength of this centre of resistance; 
 I had, however, realized its importance, and I 
 was curious to know, before the opening of the 
 assault, just what were the results of the artillery 
 
 170 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 preparation. I was, therefore, very glad when an 
 order came to the officers in the waiting can- 
 tonments to go, with their artillery comrades, on 
 May 3, to Cote 107 and receive instructions from 
 the brigadier-general. 
 
 General Aim6 gave us information and offered 
 us advice. He finally pointed out the importance 
 of the artillery fire, already executed or still in 
 prospect, and notified us that for the four com- 
 panies constituting each wave there would be 
 sixteen breaches opened in the enemy's wire 
 entanglements. He added that thereafter the 
 success of the attack would not depend upon 
 the majors of artillery, but upon the majors 
 of infantry. He then suggested that these two 
 groups of officers should carry out together all 
 of the reconnaissances which might seem to them 
 useful. 
 
 At that point Major Gouvy, whose artillery 
 battalion had rendered me valuable assistance 
 in Belgium, asked permission to speak. He 
 wished to say before everybody that the infantry 
 need not expect to find sixteen breaches opened 
 and cleared with mathematical exactness; the 
 defences would be destroyed as thoroughly as 
 possible at sixteen different places. 
 
 We then went off on reconnaissance, and 
 this gave me, personally, a chance to examine 
 thoroughly our fire preparation, to question the 
 
 171 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 artillerymen of every grade, to go into the observ- 
 ing stations, and to study the views, to take ac- 
 count of the results of the fire, and to examine 
 the telephonic connections. I was disillusioned 
 by my investigations, and thought it my duty 
 to communicate the fact to my superiors. 
 
 At 8.50 o'clock on that same evening I sent a 
 telephone message to my colonel upon the sub- 
 ject, and told him that I was sending a detailed 
 report to the brigadier-general. This report, 
 which I drew up forthwith, was in the most pre- 
 cise terms; for instance, it read: — 
 
 "The responsibility laid upon the infantry 
 battalion commanders for the success of the task 
 assigned to each is a flattering honor for them, 
 but they cannot undertake this responsibility 
 unless the liaison between them and the artillery 
 battalion commanders is perfectly secured, both 
 during the preparation of the attack and during 
 its subsequent phases. Now this liaison is still 
 open to improvements which are important, not 
 to say indispensable." 
 
 I then studied the different phases of the ap- 
 proaching combat, in which my battalion was 
 required to pass the first waves and go right to 
 the objective. The artillery were expected to pre- 
 pare the attack on the first German line, yet even 
 in fine weather they could see from their obser- 
 vation posts Cote 94 near Maroeuil (see i : 80,000 
 
 172 
 
PREPAEATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 map) only a part of the defences to be destroyed, 
 and could not sufficiently judge the effectiveness 
 of their fire. During the fight in the interior of 
 the position, they would be unable to maintain 
 a proper liaison with the infantry either by vis- 
 ual or telephonic means. 
 
 " Not by visual means," I wrote, " because they 
 will not be able to see the red flags with which 
 the infantry will signal; they will not even see the 
 general situation of the line of infantry itself; 
 nor yet by telephone, because the eight or ten 
 lines which I have seen are all aerial ones. These 
 lines, which are carried on single poles, will cer- 
 tainly be cut at the beginning of the assault, 
 repairs will be difficult, and will if attempted 
 probably result in mixing up different lines." 
 
 I made plans, not only for moving forward 
 the artillery observation posts, but also for the 
 preliminary installation of a battery in an ad- 
 vanced position in order to avoid the difficulty of 
 subsequently having to move it forward under 
 fire. It would not reveal its presence except at 
 the word of command, during the progress of the 
 action. 
 
 "Of course," I added, "this battery will be 
 subject for some hours to the same risks that the 
 infantry habitually run, but it will be protected 
 in the same fashion, by counter-batteries en- 
 deavoring to silence the enemy's artillery. The 
 
 173 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 circumstance of having some of their own com- 
 rades in such a situation will serve to quicken 
 the zeal of the artillerymen." 
 
 This latter suggestion would have been impu- 
 dent and unjust, if it had not been intended 
 merely to draw attention to the importance of 
 providing a counter-fire against that artillery 
 which might eventually stop the progress of my 
 battalion. 
 
 I concluded in these terms : — 
 
 "The necessary improvements would seem to 
 be the following: — 
 
 "(i) Replace aerial telephone lines by under- 
 ground ones. 
 
 " (2) Discover, by means of reconnaissance, 
 situations for observation posts much nearer the 
 scene of action; such, for instance, is the post 
 of the Famelard battalion before Ecurie. From 
 there the artillerymen can watch the movements 
 of the infantry, ascertain the results of the fire, 
 and receive, after brief delay, liaison agents sent 
 back from the front. By constructing several 
 such posts, the artillery observers could go to 
 them as necessary, and change from one to an- 
 other, in case of bombardment. 
 
 " (3) Detail to each battalion commander ar- 
 tillery observers having a perfect knowledge of 
 the terrain as seen from the artillery observation 
 posts, whose duty it shall be to inform the bat- 
 
 174 
 
PREPARATION OP AN ATTACK 
 
 teries, in accordance with the preliminary artil- 
 lery sketches and plans, what points should be 
 subjected to fire. Any other proceeding would 
 give rise to unfortunate misunderstanding, owing 
 to differences of nomenclature and a complete 
 change of outlook. 
 
 "(4) Let the battalion commander be fol- 
 lowed by a telephone line at as short a distance 
 as possible. 
 
 "(5) Arrange beforehand for the rapid de- 
 placement of some batteries or the preliminary 
 stationing of one or more nearer the first line, 
 for instance, near ficurie, in order to facilitate 
 the progress of the infantry toward its objec- 
 tive, and to insure the continuity of the move- 
 ment toward the north. At the same time 
 arrange for the deplacement of the observation 
 posts. 
 
 "The success of the attack would not, then, 
 seem to depend upon the majors of infantry, but 
 on the commanders of artillery battalions, whose 
 duty it is to open a road for an ardent and en- 
 thusiastic body of troops, joyfully offering them- 
 selves as a sacrifice for victory." 
 
 The general called us together again on the 
 4th of May at Haute-Avesnes for a rocket sig- 
 nal test intended to perfect the means of liaison 
 between the infantry and the artillery. My re- 
 port had not yet reached him, but this seemed to 
 
 175 
 
THE WAEPARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 me a good chance to inform him of its contents. 
 He heard me with great kindness and took notes 
 upon his pad on what I said. In fact, he was 
 always trying to improve the preparation and 
 would have brought it to perfection had there 
 been a few more days available; but we were 
 only recently arrived, and it is always necessary 
 to be liberal in counting the time required for 
 the preparation of an attack. 
 
 By adopting the principle that the command- 
 ers of the attacking units have the right, and, 
 in fact, the duty, to point out to the Command 
 those parts of the front line where they believe 
 the artillery preparation to have been insufficient, 
 there will be a real gain in keeping up a proper 
 spirit, in comradeship, and even in discipline. 
 
 There was, indeed, one question which fre- 
 quently arose in our intimate discussions: sup- 
 pose that the commander of an infantry unit 
 finds out that the artillery preparation is noto- 
 riously insufficient, is he, nevertheless, obliged to 
 obey the order to attack, and to lead his men 
 to a certain and useless death? For my part, I 
 never hesitated to reply in the affirmative, for if 
 the right is given to any soldier to discuss his 
 orders and not to execute them, then discipline 
 is no longer possible. But the absolute right to 
 send men to death imposes upon the Command , 
 an immense responsibility which it must recog- 
 
 176 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 nize; an officer who needlessly sacrifices the fives 
 of his subordinates should receive a more seri- 
 ous censure than the gruesome but indirect one, 
 so often contained in the citations of the Jour- 
 nal Officiel : " Died valiantly while trying to cross 
 an undamaged section of the enemy's wire en- 
 tanglements." I have never been able to read 
 these lines, so often repeated (in the case of other 
 corps than my own), without a shudder of in- 
 dignation and horror. 
 
 The preparation of an attack requires, finally, 
 the physical, professional, and moral training of 
 the troops. 
 
 The physical training is given in the region 
 behind the Front, whither the attack units are 
 sent turn and turn about. A stay in the trenches 
 has the effect of stiffening the men's bodies; it 
 is important that, at the moment when the great 
 effort must be made, their full measure of sup- 
 pleness, agility, and endurance shall be restored. 
 Bayonet exercise is excellent for this purpose, 
 as are football, baseball, running, and jumping. 
 Marches are useful for conditioning the feet and 
 legs, to meet the possibility that success might 
 involve a long pursuit; but, in general, the ex- 
 ercise should be as amusing as possible, to keep 
 up the spirits of the men. 
 
 177 
 
THE WAEFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The soldiers are cautioned to avoid every sort 
 of excess, especially excess in drinking. Not only 
 is the abuse of alcohol a degrading vice, but 
 it diminishes a man's efficiency for the combat, 
 since alcohol poisons the blood. Alcoholics die 
 of wounds which are not fatal to men whose 
 blood is pure. 
 
 I think it wise before a combat to avoid over- 
 feeding. I have noticed that my comrades fol- 
 lowed two opposing theories in this matter. 
 Many of them ate a heavy meal the day before 
 the attack, because they foresaw a lean period 
 for several days to come; others, including my- 
 self, ate lightly on that day; we believed that 
 the human body is better able to resist the ef- 
 fects of wounds if not engaged in the process of 
 digestion. 
 
 It is indispensable that the soldier should carry 
 on his person all that he may need on the days 
 of the attack, without, however, being burdened 
 with a useless load. In the Twentieth Corps 
 every regiment had worked out a light fighting 
 kit; the men left useless articles with the com- 
 pany wagons and carried with them ammunition, 
 food, water, and other necessaries. I personally 
 saw to it that every one of my men had a full 
 water-bottle, a blanket, and a tent-cover, for a 
 soldier who suffers from hunger and cold is in 
 danger of losing his morale. 
 
 178 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 I am not in favor of the practice of distribut- 
 ing alcohol before going to the attack; I have 
 never given it out to my men, and I have never 
 regretted this policy; they have always done 
 better without it. I suppose that a certain num- 
 ber of soldiers, affected by alcohol, without being 
 actually drunk, lose their sense of danger; they 
 then expose their lives uselessly in a way they 
 would not do had they all their wits about them. 
 Probably it is just to remove this anxiety that 
 they ask for alcohol. In my judgment alcohol is 
 not needed for troops with a finely tempered 
 morale. 
 
 In the period preceding an attack military 
 instruction should be resumed, in order that the 
 liaison between the different arms and the co- 
 ordination of the various specialties may be in 
 perfect working order. A unit, such as a divi- 
 sion, should be sent, for perhaps a fortnight, to a 
 camp near the army schools; it can thus utilize 
 the teachers and material equipment of these 
 schools. The instruction in specialties should 
 be reviewed by means of short individual exer- 
 cises; the instruction of the small units should 
 always be given with the specialists in their 
 places. During this period the generals should 
 perfect the training of their subordinates by col- 
 lecting the available officers for special exercises 
 on the ground. 
 
 179. 
 
THE WARFABE OF TaDAY 
 
 After all this has been done, it is necessary to 
 organize combined manoeuvres, in which every 
 phase of the conflict — the attack, pursuit, and 
 march of approach — is rehearsed. The forma- 
 tions to be adopted, the rdles of the various arms, 
 and the duties of the specialists are different in 
 these different phases; a fact which is too often 
 overlooked. Manoeuvres of the large units are 
 quite as important as those of the small ones; 
 for instance, it is only in these large manoeuvres 
 that it is possible to find out what practical diffi- 
 culties may arise in the course of the attack, such 
 as difficulties for the Command or for the system 
 of liaisons. These manoeuvres should be carried 
 out under conditions as closely analogous as 
 possible to those which obtain in actual com- 
 bat. There is no other time when it is possible to 
 study the liaisons between the different arms, 
 to practice the infantry in marching under the 
 eyes of the accompanying aviators, to give the 
 artillery a chance to advance by rushes, to effect 
 the relief of exhausted troops by others going 
 past them. 
 
 The moral preparation of the soldiers is a long- 
 continued process which cannot be relegated to 
 special days or special hours, but must result 
 from the ever-present influence of men of high 
 standards. The officer must be a watchful 
 shepherd of his men. His example and the nobil- 
 
 i8o 
 
PREPAEATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 ity of his character must excite their enthusiasm 
 and stimulate their spirit of sacrifice. 
 
 Every sort of faith and conviction should be 
 cultivated in the soldiers who are going to fight. 
 Love of country has a peculiarly strong effect 
 on ardent souls; the love of liberty spurs every 
 citizen of a free country to overthrow the oppres- 
 sor; the love of humanity summons every honest 
 man to stop the barbarians from further crime; 
 faith in God fills the believer with contempt of 
 death ; confidence in their commander brings to 
 the soldiers the certainty of victory. 
 
 In the days which precede any event as solemn 
 as an attack for the men in the first line, impres- 
 sions take on a peculiarly vivid form. There are 
 moments which remain ineffaceably engraved 
 upon the minds of all who manage to survive 
 in this mighty drama, be they moments of en- 
 thusiasm, of tenderness, or of sadness. 
 
 How well I remember the review in Belgium, 
 where my regiment was encamped next to the 
 little village of Woesten. It was then that I re- 
 ceived the cross of the Legion of Honor at the 
 hands of my general. I have no words to express 
 my feeling at that moment. Many a Frenchman 
 will face death just to see the emblem of glory 
 in the shape of the cross of the Legion of Honor 
 or the Croix de Guerre pinned on his breast. 
 What we see in such a cross is the symbol of that 
 
 i8i 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 courage which we love, of that spirit of sacrifice 
 which we admire. 
 
 The reviews which are held in the vicinity 
 of the Front have often a different character 
 from those held in time of peace, because they 
 affect the soldiers deeply. I held a review a few 
 days before the offensive in Artois April 20, 
 191 5, at Conteville. I massed my men in a some- 
 what theatre-like arrangement. I made them an 
 address upon the attack which we were going to 
 deliver. I promised that they might rely upon 
 their superiors, and upon myself; that we knew 
 the value of French lives, and would not shed 
 their blood in vain. I showed them the necessity 
 of making an end of our barbarian enemies, and 
 pointed out what glory awaited them after vic- 
 tory. In conclusion I called up the vision of their 
 return, accompanied by the plaudits of the whole 
 of France, and their triumphant march down 
 the Champs Elysees, with flowers in the ends 
 of their guns. Phrases, which it would be point- 
 less to repeat now, found that day an echo in 
 the heart of each, owing to the solemnity of the 
 moment. I could read on the silent faces of my 
 brave men the signs of their devotion and their 
 resolution. 
 
 In the days which precede the attack there are, 
 besides the moments of enthusiasm and exalta- 
 tion, moments of disquieting melancholy. Each 
 
 182 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 is ready to sacrifice his life, yet he cannot help 
 wondering whether, indeed, it is his fate to be 
 one of those left on the field of battle. I remem- 
 ber one sunny day at the end of April, 1915, 
 when I was lunching with my brave and devoted 
 Adjutant Huron in a little village behind the 
 Front. I said to him, looking out of the open 
 window at the fruit trees in flower: "How pretty 
 the country is at this time, Huron, and what 
 a pity it seems that we shall never see the 
 leaves come out green upon these trees." I was 
 looking so attentively at the apple trees in 
 blossom that I still seem to see their flowering 
 branches. 
 
 It is certain that the idea of death is at first 
 disagreeable when one is young and strong and 
 in good health, and in the enjoyment of all that 
 makes for happiness. But one becomes used to it, 
 little by little, and acquires a sort of resignation. 
 This resignation is peculiarly striking in the case 
 of men who believe in God, because they see, 
 beyond this earthly life, the heavenly life await- 
 ing those that are called thereto. The religious 
 instinct is strongly developed in time of war, at 
 least among the fighting troops, as, indeed, it is 
 at all times when Humanity is suffering. Just 
 as in the Middle Ages unhappy multitudes found 
 in their churches a source both of comfort and 
 of hope, so at the Front the soldiers come in 
 
 183 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 crowds to the little village churches, or to the 
 altars in the open air, that they may pray to 
 the God of armies and find rest in Him. 
 
 I have been present at many a touching scene, 
 like that of the 8th of May, 1915, during the 
 night that preceded the attack on the Labyrinth. 
 It fell to the lot of my battalion to lead the 
 Sixty-ninth Regiment. I left the little village 
 of Hermaville shortly before midnight, to go to 
 my departure station in the trenches. My bat- 
 talion was to assemble on the road leading to 
 Maroeuil. The night was dark. The companies 
 were drawn up along the road, silently awaiting 
 the moment fixed for their departure. There- 
 upon the Catholic chaplain of the regiment asked 
 my permission to perform his sacred office dur- 
 ing the few moments which remained. I gladly 
 granted his request, and he turned to the first 
 company, with these words: — 
 
 "Dear friends, you are going out to fight. In 
 a few hours many of you may have fallen for 
 your country. Turn your thoughts for one mo- 
 ment to God, ask Him to forgive your sins. I 
 will grant you absolution. Let every man who 
 believes in God kneel down." 
 
 Before me there were Catholics, Protestants, 
 Jews, and atheists. I saw in the darkness every 
 man on his knees; not one remained standing. 
 The chaplain granted absolution. In every one 
 
 184 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 of my companies there was the same address, and 
 the same result. 
 
 I wished to add my own words of encourage- 
 ment, in my capacity of military leader, to those 
 of our spiritual guide. I collected about me all 
 of my company commanders and all section or 
 platoon lea4ers in my battalion. I spoke a few 
 words to them, ringing with confidence and hope, 
 then I shook the hand of each, asking each to 
 repeat his name, because I could not distinguish 
 faces in the darkness. And then as I heard their 
 names I felt their strong and hearty hand-clasps 
 conveying without words their affection and their 
 devotion. Little by little my throat contracted 
 and my eyes became dim, but it was dark and 
 none could see. When I had taken the last hand 
 in mine, I said simply : — 
 
 "Good-bye, friends; let us all hope to meet to- 
 morrow at our objective. The Lindens." 
 
 Ah, there was many a one of those brave hands 
 that I was never to grasp again! 
 
 I was not satisfied that day to have come in 
 contact with the officers and N.C.O.'s; I meant 
 also to reach the men. While my battalion filed 
 along the road leading to Marceuil, several miles 
 from the trenches, I rode past the whole column 
 on horseback, stopping alongside of each section 
 or rank of soldiers and saying a few words to 
 each. I could perceive, in the replies of those 
 
 185 
 
THE WAEFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 noble fellows, all their aflfection, all their con- 
 fidence in me, and I was deeply moved. There 
 is no higher moral satisfaction than to have men 
 devoted to one's self because one has been able 
 to touch their hearts. The leader who feels this 
 realizes how much he must labor, and ponder, 
 and sacrifice himself in order not to waste the 
 precious lives so freely given to his care. 
 
 It must always be the constant care of each 
 officer not to risk the lives of his men needlessly. 
 I had filled my officers and N.C.O.'s with this 
 same idea, and I tried by every means to estab- 
 lish between us a perfect accord of thought and 
 feeling. It was I who had given the last touch 
 to their military training by drawing tight the 
 bonds which should unite all officers of a small 
 unit such as a battalion. In rest camp I used 
 to summon them to familiar discussions in the 
 parlor of an inn or the bedroom of a farmhouse. 
 I brought the notes drawn up by the High Com- 
 mand, as well as my own personal ones, since 
 published in the "War of Positions." After a 
 short exposition, I allowed each one in turn to 
 offer his opinion, and justify it by examples 
 drawn from recent combats. We thus elabo- 
 rated, under my authority, our tactical system 
 for the small unit; we combined our intellectual 
 and moral strength, as well as our physical pow- 
 ers, in the common task of hastening victory. 
 
 1 86 
 
PREPARATION OF AN ATTACK 
 
 I shall never forget those little meetings — 
 they were so hearty, so intimate. There was 
 the last one, for instance, before the attack on the 
 Labyrinth, held at Maroeuil April 24, 1915, in a 
 little house at the entrance to the village. I 
 then explained to my officers and N.C.O.'s all 
 my ideas as to the support which they might ex- 
 pect from the artillery, as well as those dealing 
 with the necessity for liaison with neighboring 
 bodies of infantry, with the artillery, and with 
 the Command. Little by little I felt their hopes 
 for victory take shape and their confidence in- 
 crease. 
 
 Confidence, — that is the feeling which a 
 commander must at all times and at all seasons 
 instill into his subordinates. On the morning 
 of May 9, 1915, my companies of the Sixty- 
 ninth, after having passed by Maroeuil, had ar- 
 rived at the ruined village of Ecurie, enmeshed 
 in the trenches from which we were to start. To 
 reach their departure station, my men had to go 
 past Cote 107, where there was an observation 
 post giving a view of many of the enemy's posi- 
 tions. I took my place therein. The fire of our 
 artillery, which was infernal at that moment, 
 was making a deafening roar, knocking the 
 German trenches to bits, and raising a dust that 
 filled the atmosphere for a long distance. I exhib- 
 ited the greatest satisfaction with what I saw, 
 
 187 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 dilated upon the effects of our projectiles, and 
 called frequently to my liaison N.C.O.'s or to 
 my officers : — 
 
 "There won't be any Germans left when we 
 get there." 
 
 The fact was that I was afraid that my doubts 
 as to the success of the preparation might have 
 filtered down to my troops, and I was anxious 
 to keep their confidence and enthusiasm intact. 
 
 The disadvantage of this procedure, which 
 consists in over-exciting the troops, is that the 
 reaction is all the more violent if the attack does 
 not succeed ; and it is hard to restore their con- 
 fidence for another effort. It is, therefore, better 
 to give up an attack entirely than to try one 
 which has not every chance of success; not only 
 does a check incur serious losses, but it seriously 
 weakens the morale of the survivors. 
 
 But an attack which has been carefully pre- 
 pared, and whose different phases have all been 
 carefully foreseen, ought to succeed. No form 
 of defensive works can resist the fire of heavy 
 cannon and of trench mortars. The infantry 
 should reach the enemy's first line with great 
 ease. Thereafter the combat depends upon the 
 qualities of the officers and the training of the 
 troops. A good start increases confidence, and 
 confidence, backed by materiel and artillery fire, 
 is the advance guard of victory. 
 
V 
 
 THE ATTACK 
 Lecture of November 12, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 Object of the attack. — Choice of date. — Secrecy during the 
 preparation; rapidity in execution. — R61e of the different arms. — 
 Swiftness and continuity. — The phases of the attack on a position. 
 
 Attack of the first-line trenches. — Plan of engagement. — For- 
 mations for the attacking units: the waves. — Moments before the 
 attack; trial waves. — The first wave or line of combat. — The mean- 
 ing of the word "waves"; confusions to be avoided. — The mechan- 
 ism and march of the successive waves. — The place of the com- 
 mander. — The moving artillery barrage. — The liaison between the 
 line of combat and the artillery. — Aircraft. — R61e of the tanks. — 
 R61e of infantry weapons. — Curtains of steam; clouds of gas; 
 streams of liquid fire. — The success of this phase depends upon the 
 preparation of the attack. 
 
 The struggle inside the position. — Shell holes; nests of resistance; 
 trenches on counter-slopes. — March of the line of combat. — The 
 liaisons: ground and aerial observation; accompanying planes; bal- 
 loons; code of signals; telephone. — R61e of the artillery: moving 
 barrage; neutralization of the enemy's artillery; direct support of the 
 infantry. — The liaison between the artillery, the command, and the 
 infantry. — The centre of information of a division. — The forward 
 deplacement of the artillery; its support of the infantry; an example. 
 — The manoeuvres of the infantry. — Trenches on counter-slopes. — 
 R61e of infantry weapons. — The tank considered as an infantry 
 cannon. — Relief of the line of combat by passing. — The direction: 
 necessity of compasses. — March of the reserves; their r61e and that 
 of the engineers. — Night fighting: coups de main; r61e of the artillery 
 and the aircraft. — Forwarding of reserves, munitions, and food. 
 
 The organization of the conquered position. — Plan of ensemble. — 
 Same principles as for the organization of a position. 
 
 Uselessness and danger of partial attacks. — Exception for the 
 observing stations. — How the attack of a position can succeed. 
 
 The object of an attack is to obtain possession 
 of a position, and then pass on to other positions 
 
 189 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 beyond, in order to strike the enemy's army, to 
 pursue, and to destroy it. 
 
 An attack is launched on a day determined be- 
 forehand. The choice of this day depends upon 
 strategic considerations which are settled by a 
 superior council of the allied armies, if the at- 
 tack is carried out by several nations, or by the 
 General-in-Chief, if it affects the strategic plan 
 of one nation alone. The choice of day may also 
 be affected by political exigencies, such as the 
 psychological effects of a success, even if only 
 a local one. Under all circumstances, however, 
 this date must be chosen with due regard to the 
 success of the artillery preparation and the state 
 of the weather. If the defences of the hostile 
 position are intact, or only partially destroyed, 
 an attack has no chance of success. Similarly, 
 if rain renders the ground slippery and water- 
 soaked, if fog prevents the airplanes from flying 
 and the artillery from adjusting its fire, the at- 
 tack will be started under unfavorable condi- 
 tions. 
 
 An additional element needful for success is 
 secrecy during the period of preparation. 
 
 This secrecy is insured by imposing rigorous 
 regulations upon correspondence, so that men 
 who are present during the preparations carried 
 out along the Front shall make no mention of 
 them in their letters. Soldiers, like the civil pop- 
 
 190 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 ulation, should be impelled by patriotism to keep 
 silence about everything having to do with the 
 course of the war. Many persons who consider 
 themselves loyal patriots cannot resist the temp- 
 tation of repeating any information they may 
 happen to obtain, merely for the pleasure of ap- 
 pearing to be "on the inside"; it is a serious 
 fault. Even newspaper men must learn to drop 
 their professional habits, and submit themselves 
 to the same discipline of silence; a single indis- 
 cretion might cause the death of thousands of 
 their fellow-countrymen, by bringing information 
 to the ears of the enemy. "Taisez-vous, mefiez- 
 vous, les oreilles ennemies vous ecoutent!" This 
 familiar phrase, which every one has read in 
 Paris, has often proved to be true. 
 
 Rapidity of execution consists in launching an 
 attack just as soon as the preparation is com- 
 plete; leaving the enemy as little time as possi- 
 ble to make ready for the danger whose approach 
 he must have foreseen during the last days. 
 There should be no pause between the time of 
 beginning the artillery preparation and the 
 launching of the attack; the enemy will thus 
 have no chance to gather himself together. On 
 the other hand, if an artillery fire can be main- 
 tained, even in those sectors which are not favor- 
 able to an offensive, the enemy will not know, 
 till the very last minute, just which point of his 
 
 191 
 
THE WARPAKE OF TO-DAY 
 
 line is endangered ; the attack will be in the nature 
 of a surprise. 
 
 All arms come into play in the attack. The 
 artillery continues its preparation of the position 
 as a whole, and of successive positions; it pro- 
 tects the infantry by batteries giving direct 
 barrage support, by batteries following the en- 
 emy's movements, and by counter-batteries. The 
 infantry occupies in turn the various parts of 
 the terrain which have been swept by the artil- 
 lery, and organizes them. The aircraft prevent 
 the enemy's aviators from adjusting his artillery 
 fire and from obtaining information; they also 
 accompany the infantry. The engineers are busy 
 helping the different arms to advance, keeping 
 them under cover, and holding the ground which 
 has been won. 
 
 To seize a position, it is necessary to overcome 
 those of the enemy's troops who have remained 
 at their posts, and to seize the batteries of artil- 
 lery, one behind the other. Speed and continuity 
 are the two essentials to this end, for they pre- 
 vent the enemy from reorganizing at successive 
 well-chosen points. 
 
 The attack develops in succeeding phases which 
 have varying characteristics and demand differ- 
 ent forms of battle tactics. Many people, blind 
 to this fact, wish to lay down invariable rules for 
 the troop formations and the choice of weapons. 
 
 192 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 An attack develops in the following phases, of 
 which no two are alike : — 
 
 The attack on the first trenches. 
 
 The daylight struggle inside the position. 
 
 The fight during the night. 
 
 The organization of the conquered position. 
 The .study of these successive phases shows 
 that there are special rules for each. 
 
 The grouping of troops for the attack is carried 
 out according to the orders laid down by the 
 commander of each unit in his plan of engage- 
 ment. 
 
 The smaller the unit, the simpler is this plan, 
 but it is absolutely indispensable, if each man, 
 whatever his grade or function, is to know just 
 what he is to do. It establishes that most impor- 
 tant of all liaisons, unity of idea and of will, be- 
 cause it indicates what are the Commander's 
 wishes and the task and objectives of each unit. 
 It also gives needful details as to the forma- 
 tions to be adopted, the liaisons to be main- 
 tained, the use of machine guns, the watch for 
 possible breaks in the line, and the measures to be 
 taken in case of a counter-attack. It finally gives 
 the starting-time or signal of the attack. 
 
 The troops are drawn up in successive 
 "waves." The first wave is stationed in the 
 
 193 
 
THE WAEFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 departure parallel, if there be one, otherwise 
 in the first-line trench; it is provided with the 
 necessary means of egress. The following waves 
 are stationed in the doubling, transversal, or 
 support trenches, and in places d'armes especially 
 constructed to shelter them. It is, in fact, neces- 
 sary to try to reconcile two somewhat incompat- 
 ible conditions ; to hold the troops ready to move 
 forward without delay, and to avoid exposing 
 them to bombardment in compact groups. 
 
 The moments which precede an attack are 
 solemn, indeed. The men know the hour fixed, 
 they await it with stoic resignation. They are 
 generally silent; each one draws into himself, 
 and struggles with his instinct of self-preserva- 
 tion. In those brief moments one's thoughts 
 turn instinctively to one's nearest and dearest, 
 mother, wife, sister, sweetheart; a thousand de- 
 tails of one's former life, of familiar scenes, of old 
 friends, pass through the mind. These moments of 
 silent waiting are most painful for those whose 
 morale has not been well tempered; they must 
 be made as short as possible by not bringing the 
 troops to their departure station any sooner than 
 necessary. 
 
 A man is profoundly affected by his first at- 
 tack. The young soldier who is to go over the 
 top makes frantic efforts not to appear too much 
 upset. There is a story of a man who was at 
 
 194 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 the Front for the first time and who was shaking 
 in every limb while awaiting the starting signal. 
 
 "Well," said one of his companions, "are you 
 trembling for your skin?" 
 
 "No, not for mine, for Fritz's; he doesn't 
 know I'm here." 
 
 Jokes of this sort are sometimes made by 
 men who are trying to keep up their courage or 
 hide their fear, but they form an exception; the 
 moment is too solemn. 
 
 This is the time when the leader may exert 
 a most powerful influence by his personal atti- 
 tude. He must inspire his subordinates with the 
 confidence needed to leap over the parapet with 
 complete steadfastness of mind. 
 
 It is sometimes useful to start a sham attack 
 before the real one is launched, in order to see 
 whether the enemy's watchers are on the alert 
 and if his machine guns are still in place and, 
 consequently, if the preparation has been suf- 
 ficient. The most practical scheme is to send out 
 trial waves, usually composed of volunteers, at 
 times specified in advance. If the enemy is not 
 sufficiently disorganized, he will receive them 
 with a fire which will show the situation of his 
 barrage batteries and machine guns. This will 
 enable the artillery to destroy them. Moreover, 
 when the enemy comes out from his shelters to 
 receive the wave which he believes to be the first 
 
 195 
 
THE WARF.iRE OF TO-DAY 
 
 one of the attack, he is met by a redoubled artil- 
 lery fire which causes him losses. If this trick be 
 repeated two or three times, he will not come out 
 when the real attack is launched. 
 
 It is also possible, when sending out trial waves 
 would be too dangerous, to execute a sham at- 
 tack by means of artillery fire; certain batteries 
 force the batteries of the enemy to unmask, 
 thus causing them great damage. 
 
 The attack on the enemy's first trenches begins 
 at a moment specified in the plan of engagement. 
 The word "assault," by which we often designate 
 this advance of the infantry, is likely to give rise 
 to false ideas. In its usual sense it means a vio- 
 lent operation, in which the infantry flings itself 
 forward as quickly as possible, in order to fight 
 the enemy hand to hand. The present form of 
 attack bears no superficial likeness to this old 
 type of assault. 
 
 The first infantry line, or fighting line, leaves 
 the departure trench at a footpace, in deployed 
 formation. It does not fire during its advance, 
 but is preceded by an artillery barrage. This 
 formation astonishes people who have heard 
 nothing of modern warfare, and who are haunted 
 by visions of advanced guards, flank guards, and 
 rear guards. The advanced guard was used for 
 reconnaissance and for protection ; now the ob- 
 jectives, or, at least the first ones, are perfectly 
 
 196 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 known by means of photographs; as to the pro- 
 tection of the troops, that is effected by the can- 
 non. Flank guards are no longer possible be- 
 cause the Front is continuous ; they are replaced 
 by liaison groups and other means of contact, 
 so long as the chances of combat have not made 
 gaps in the line. Finally, the rear guard has no 
 longer any raison d'etre; it is superseded by an 
 echelonment in depth, and by the great lines of 
 the supply and evacuation services running back 
 into the interior of the country. 
 
 The word "waves," used to designate the suc- 
 cessive lines of the attacking troops, calls up a 
 vision of the billows of the sea. The comparison 
 is correct in so far as the lines succeed one an- 
 other without interruption, as the sea combers 
 dash upon the beach; it is also correct in so far 
 as waves pour over an isolated obstacle, such as a 
 rock, and reunite beyond ; but it would give quite 
 an erroneous impression of the combat if one 
 imagined that the human waves dash themselves 
 one after another against an impassable barrier. 
 Under these circumstances, the first wave should 
 halt, and the others come to a standstill wher- 
 ever they are. 
 
 The uselessness of infantry assaults against 
 powerfully defended objectives should be con- 
 stantly emphasized in every way, shape, and 
 manner. Such assaults have cost the Allied 
 
 197 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 armies hundreds of thousands of lives. I wrote 
 in the beginning of 1915: "The contest between 
 a human projectile and a nietallic one is un- 
 even." 
 
 The word "waves " has caused regrettable con- 
 fusion. The first wave is, in fact, composed of 
 two successive lines of combatants, sometimes 
 also called, by analogy, "waves," and a third 
 line of trench-cleaners or "moppers-up," called 
 the "third wave." Unlike the proper procedure 
 for the following waves, the three lines of the 
 first wave may unite in the first line when that 
 one meets an insuperable obstacle. On the other 
 hand, the following waves must keep their dis- 
 tance, so as not to increase needlessly the density 
 of the fighting line, but to maintain echelonment 
 in depth. 
 
 The approximate distances between the vari- 
 ous lines of the first wave are governed by the 
 regulations: about fifteen paces between the first 
 two, twenty paces between the second and the 
 third. The regulations indicate the distribution 
 of the different specialists, such as hand grena- 
 diers, rifle grenadiers, and automatic machine 
 riflemen, among the lines of the first wave. 
 
 I do not wish to enter into the details of this 
 formation, as that would merely encourage a 
 mistake that is already too common. There is a 
 tendency to memorize the distances between the 
 
 198 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 lines and the distribution of the specialists, as 
 if therein lay the secret of victory; and when 
 there is a change in the proportions of the dif- 
 ferent specialists in the company, or when the 
 distances between the lines are slightly modified, 
 people say that war has been changed. I remem- 
 ber how, during my first combat exercises with 
 the Harvard Regiment, the young soldiers would 
 halt in a place exposed to front and flanking 
 fire, in order to rearrange their lines at the reg- 
 ulation intervals. I am certain that they would 
 not have done this in battle. Moreover, after a 
 little while they acquired the consciousness of 
 the enemy's presence, and adopted principles 
 based on common sense and the instinct of self- 
 preservation. 
 
 The second wave follows the first in a similar 
 formation, at a distance of about fifty paces; its 
 third line also is composed of trench-cleaners. 
 The second wave may be accompanied by ma- 
 chine guns. 
 
 The succeeding waves are at varying distances; 
 the third, for instance, is two hundred yards be- 
 hind the second. Instead of being deployed in 
 line, it is made up of small columns, to facilitate 
 marching and manoeuvring. The machine guns 
 and 37-mm. cannon usually go with this wave. 
 The following waves are also in small columns. 
 
 The waves are made up of units, in close touch 
 199 
 
THE WAJRFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 with one another and echeloned in depth. This 
 form of echelonment is, in fact, a fundamental 
 principle of attack offering many advantages. It 
 enables the leader to command his unit with 
 ease and to manoeuvre from the start; it facili- 
 tates the reenforcement of the fighting line by 
 other men of the same unit, familiar with the 
 same leaders, and knit together by esprit de 
 corps. It maintains order and cohesion for two 
 reasons: first, because all detachments of the 
 same unit march automatically toward the 
 same objective and have the same rallying-point; 
 and second, because these detachments can be 
 watched from the rear by a small detail, whose 
 presence serves to urge forward any soldiers 
 tempted to loiter in a shell hole or trench. 
 
 The place of the commander at the start is 
 indicated on the plan of engagement. This is 
 no more unalterable than are the other disposi- 
 tions, but it is governed by certain fixed rules. 
 The only leader who can survey his whole unit 
 at once is the section leader, and even this unit 
 is often split up into little groups, in each of 
 which the bravest and best man takes command. 
 The combat group should, therefore, be rather 
 the platoon than the half- platoon ; it is always 
 under the command of a leader who commands 
 and guides it. The platoon leader in a fighting 
 wave marches in the second line; the platoon 
 
 200 
 
' THE ATTACK 
 
 leader in a reenforcing wave marches at the head, 
 in order to guide his men. 
 
 In the case of a company, the captain marches 
 in front, so long as the engagement has not 
 begun; when the men are engaged, he marches 
 with the fighting wave in order to direct the 
 movement, but takes care not to lose liaison 
 with the reenforcing units. In a battalion, the 
 major marches in the lead so long as his unit is 
 not engaged; thereafter he is often at the head 
 of the reenforcing company, and always in the 
 place whence he can best guide the action. 
 
 The commander must take care not to expose 
 his life from mere bravado or love of glory, as 
 so many officers did at the beginning of the pres- 
 ent war. In the first combats the French officers, 
 who were distinguished from the enlisted men by 
 their uniforms and their stripes, their kepis and 
 swords, were a particular target for the German 
 sharpshooters; the recent graduates from Saint- 
 Cyr arranged to go to the assault with plumes 
 and white gloves, as though to a itte; this ill- 
 advised exuberance caused many to fall victims 
 to the enemy's fire. Not only have the officers 
 to-day cut down their stripes to a minimum, but 
 they wear exactly the same uniforms as do the 
 enlisted men and do not even carry swords. 
 There are plenty of chances for a man to be 
 killed in the discharge of his duty, without his 
 
 201 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 having to hunt up others. The commander 
 should not risk his Hfe unnecessarily, because his 
 troops have need of him. 
 
 At the chosen moment or at the specified sig- 
 nal, the three lines of the first wave leave the 
 trench together, in order to avoid the hesitation 
 or delays that might come from successive de- 
 partures. The intervals between the three lines 
 are assumed in the course of the advance. 
 
 The succeeding waves leave at the command 
 of their respective leaders, either by going to 
 take their stations in the departure trench or 
 by starting directly from the trenches where 
 they are. Their echelonment is so arranged as 
 to facilitate reenforcement, relief, and manoeu- 
 vring at the proper moment, and to effect the 
 occupation and retention of the designated ob- 
 jective. 
 
 The first wave or fighting line is preceded 
 by an artillery barrage, which advances contin- 
 uously and is intended to clear the enemy's 
 trenches as much as possible. The rate of ad- 
 vance for this fire is precisely that specified for 
 the infantry before the attack. This rate is 
 determined by the difficulties of the terrain, so 
 that the barrage shall not advance more rapidly 
 than the infantry and give the enemy a chance 
 to come out from his shelters. It is usually one 
 hundred yards in three or four minutes. Fur- 
 
 202 
 
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 M 
 U 
 O 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 thermore, the range of the preparatory fire on 
 the position is not lengthened except as the in- 
 fantry advances. 
 
 The fighting line follows the barrage as closely 
 as possible; it reaches the limit of the zone cov- 
 ered by the explosion of the shells. The nearer 
 the infantry are to this zone, the better their 
 chance of finding the enemy hidden in his shel- 
 ters or places of refuge. Certain officers have 
 maintained that this fighting line should follow 
 so closely that ten per cent of its effectives should 
 be put out of action by its own artillery bar- 
 rage; if it is farther back, say these critics, it will 
 be even more cruelly decimated by the enemy's 
 fire. But we cannot admit such a principle, or 
 sacrifice the lives of soldiers, by firing on them, 
 unless we are certain that they are running the 
 most serious risks in approaching the enemy. 
 The advance of the infantry must be helped 
 by great care in the fire preparation and great 
 precision in the barrage, with the least possible 
 dispersion, and not by sanguinary losses in their 
 own ranks. 
 
 There is, evidently, one critical moment, 
 namely, when the barrage leaves the enemy's 
 trenches to advance farther, for at that moment 
 the fighting line is still some one hundred or one 
 hundred and thirty yards from the trench. If the 
 defenders perceive that the barrage has passed 
 
 203 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 on, they can run quickly to their fighting stations. 
 But after the terrible bombardment to which 
 they have been subjected, the defenders are 
 generally in a dazed condition and find it hard 
 to determine the precise moment when the bar- 
 rage left them. The fighting line should, at that 
 moment, mend its pace, so as to reach the trench 
 as soon as possible; it does not take long to cover 
 one hundred or one hundred and thirty yards. 
 Moreover, the two first lines shower the trench 
 with hand or rifle grenades before getting there. 
 They cross it without stopping, while the trench- 
 cleaners take charge of the remaining occupants. 
 
 The liaison between the infantry and the ar- 
 tillery is, essentially, a question of time-schedule. 
 It is determined for each minute by the plan of 
 action drawn up before the attack. The general 
 of division must arrange to halt the progress of 
 the fighting line from time to time, so that the 
 infantrymen may take breath and re-form, thus 
 maintaining the desired cohesion; the barrage 
 must likewise halt during these intervals. 
 
 Liaison by time-schedule has one drawback; 
 for, if the fighting line is halted, partially or com- 
 pletely, and the barrage continues to advance, 
 the infantry will be without artillery support. 
 There must, therefore, be established a system 
 of signalling from fighting line to artillery. The 
 signals, which should be prescribed by the 
 
 204 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 General-in-Chief, are three in number. The first 
 calls for lifting the barrage, as, for instance, when 
 it is not wise to let it remain on a certain line 
 during the entire time agreed upon; the second 
 calls for holding the barrage in place beyond the 
 allotted period; and the third, for an increase in 
 intensity, as when, for instance, unexpected dif- 
 ficulties have held up the advance.' It is never 
 safe to ask that the barrage be brought back, 
 owing to the dangers to which advanced ele- 
 ments might be exposed by this proceeding; the 
 artillery might mow down their own infantry, 
 and some of the bravest of them at that. 
 
 The aircraft participate in the attack from 
 the start. Some of them continue to adjust the 
 artillery fire, others watch the enemy's move- 
 ments, and still others accompany the infantry 
 troops and keep the Command informed as to 
 their progress or their difficulties. 
 
 Difficulties at the start, such as the existence 
 of nests of machine guns not destroyed by the 
 artillery preparation, can be overcome by means 
 of tanks (assaulting artillery). Tanks meet the 
 infantry's need for accompanying cannon to 
 overcome obstacles in the way. 
 
 It was formerly held that when the moment 
 came, the trench artillery could accompany the 
 infantry. In 1915 I was ordered to make use, 
 during my progress through the Labyrinth, of 
 
 205 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 some old mortars which had been left in the 
 departure trench, but they could not be moved. 
 Similarly on thel Somme in 1916, the 58-mm. 
 mortars were supposed to follow the troops, but 
 neither they nor their ammunition could be car- 
 ried very far across the terrain where the attack 
 was in progress. For a long time afterwards I 
 saw 58-mm. bombs left lying around in the 
 boyaux or here and there in the fields, because 
 the men detailed to transport them had been 
 killed or wounded, or just discouraged by the 
 difficulties of transport. In consequence, at the 
 time of the attack on the Aisne in April and May, 
 19 17, my comrade Hauet, trench artillery com- 
 mander for the Sixth Army, made up his mind 
 to leave the 58-mm. pieces in place and to use 
 the trench artillerymen as porters and supply 
 men during the attack; at the same time a large 
 number of mules and carts, which had been used 
 for transporting ammunition for these pieces for 
 the preparation, could be utilized for forwarding 
 supplies. 
 
 Trench cannon could not accompany the fight- 
 ing line on account of their weight; machine 
 guns and 37-mm. cannon are more easily moved, 
 but even they could not go forward with the 
 troops without risking almost certain destruc- 
 tion. It was logical, therefore, to provide these 
 pieces with protective armor, and next to make 
 
 206 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 them self- transporting; the outcome was the 
 tank. 
 
 The mobility of a tank depends upon the sort 
 of cannon which it contains. It can play either 
 the part of real accompanying cannon if it car- 
 ries 75-mm, cannon, or that of armored 37's 
 and machine guns. Its invulnerability to rifle 
 bullets and shrapnel enables it to go right up to 
 nests of resistance and overthrow them. It can 
 beat down accessory defences not sufficiently de- 
 stroyed by the artillery, — for instance, those 
 on a reverse slope, — and open a wide path for 
 the infantry's progress. Finally, a light tank 
 can be used as a command post for the leader 
 of an attacking unit, and thus permit him to 
 direct the advance of his troops. This task 
 would be more difficult to accomplish under 
 fire if this leader were in an observation post, 
 which is sure to be a target for the enemy's ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 The tanks should precede or accompany the 
 first wave of infantry. If they precede it, they 
 can replace the artillery in the task of destroying 
 the enemy's first defences, thus facilitating sur- 
 prise; they can even replace the moving bar- 
 rage and assume its functions. The infantry 
 can follow in their track as far as the first enemy 
 trenches. A nest of machine guns against which 
 the artillery can no longer fire must be destroyed 
 
 207 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 by tanks, not by grenades, still less by bayo- 
 nets. In order that they may not be liable to 
 sudden assaults by groups of infantry, they must 
 order their progress in such a way that each may 
 always be flanked by the other's fire. 
 
 The rifle grenade and hand grenade are the 
 principal weapons of the infantry during the 
 first phase of the attack. The enemy is in his 
 holes, where he can be reached only by high 
 trajectory weapons. Of course he may be en- 
 countered in the boyaux and spitted with the 
 bayonet, but this performance should not be 
 glorified into a sort of cruel sport. Moreover, the 
 sport may become cruel for the participants if 
 they take a notion to try to capture a nest of 
 machine guns. A few men may reach the objec- 
 tive and take it, but how many will remain dead 
 on the field, while the same result could have been 
 accomplished without loss by using artillery, or 
 a tank, or even a 37 ! In war we should consider, 
 not the artistic appearance of a success, but its 
 cost in human life. 
 
 The rifle is of very little use in the first phase 
 of combat; the automatic machine rifle may be 
 of some use in spraying a trench or boyau. 
 
 With regard to other means, clouds of smoke 
 may serve to hide the advance of the attacking 
 waves from the enemy; clouds of gas may force 
 him to put on his gas mask, which diminishes 
 
 208 
 
'n 
 
 ■■*i 
 
 '■,•* 
 
 jy... 
 
 W- 
 
 
 THE COMBATANTS IN THl 
 Photograph of the attack of October 
 
'■■'i0i- 
 
 .,m 
 
 SHED TRENCHES AND SHELL-HOLES 
 
 iken from an airplane. The "Guillaume trench" 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 his capacity for resistance; they may even cause 
 him distress and loss. Still, gas is a two-edged 
 weapon, and may, in case of a change of wind 
 or a rapid advance, play havoc with the side 
 that has used it. Streams of liquid fire may, 
 under certain circumstances, promote the ad- 
 vance of the infantry, by forcing the adversary 
 to burrow into the earth, to retreat, or to sur- 
 render. 
 
 When an attack has been well prepared, its 
 initial phase, which consists in seizing the 
 enemy's first trenches, should take place almost 
 without loss. On the Somme in 1916 certain 
 battalions sustained losses which were well-nigh 
 negligible, but they did not fail to capture the 
 objectives assigned to them. 
 
 The struggle in the interior of the position 
 constitutes the second phase. It takes a differ- 
 ent form and presents greater difficulties. The 
 enemy is no longer in a system of trenches which 
 are familiar to the assailant through long study; 
 he is scattered about in the remains of boyaux, 
 in shell craters, and in unsuspected or newly 
 constructed trenches; he no longer offers a good 
 target to the artillery. Isolated resisting groups 
 will be found here and there, taking the ad- 
 vancing troops in enfilade. Trenches suddenly 
 
 .209 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 reveal themselves on reverse slopes, protected 
 by accessory defences which the artillery has 
 been unable to destroy. The tanks are too 
 slow and clumsy to follow. The artillery will be 
 obliged to move forward in order to be within 
 effective range, and so must create new em- 
 placements and observing stations. The work 
 of destruction will be found less complete. 
 
 The distinguishing characteristics of this phase 
 were well observed at the battle of the Somme 
 in 19 16. Certain officers, instead of noticing 
 that a new phase of the attack had opened, 
 announced : " The tactics of the war have 
 changed again; there are no longer continuous 
 trenches, only organized shell craters; we must 
 forget all that we have learned." When the day 
 comes that we see the pursuit, the march of ap- 
 proach, and the rapid attack on a position of in- 
 ferior organization, we shall hear once more that 
 tactics have reached an unforeseen stage; really 
 it will be the logical development of the combat. 
 
 The struggle in the interior of the position is 
 carried out only by the first wave or fighting 
 line. The following waves join in to help at the 
 proper moment, to repel counter-attacks and 
 hostile manoeuvres; their r61e consists in insur- 
 ing the continuity of the attack and the reten- 
 tion of the conquered terrain. 
 
 The fighting wave is not actually arranged in 
 210 
 
-!t_'-_„*~_-_;:ji. 
 
 PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN FROM AN AIRPLANE AT 1 
 
IE ATTACK OF OCTOBER 10, I916, AT BOIS HART 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 the regular and rectilinear fashion prescribed in 
 the books. After a short period of combat it is 
 generally useless to look for the intervals be- 
 tween the three lines, or the locations of the spe- 
 cialists; often it is futile to look even for small 
 organized units such as companies or sections. 
 The men are divided into groups, seldom larger 
 than half-platoons, and they advance with the 
 help of such accidental protection as they may 
 find, such as boyaux, shell craters, sunken roads, 
 ditches, etc. 
 
 It is difficult for the commanders of various 
 units to follow the accidents of the combat; yet 
 it is essential that they should do so if they are 
 to give orders to their subordinates and to trans- 
 mit information, each to his immediate superior. 
 Consequently the system of liaison must be in 
 perfect working order during this phase of the 
 combat. 
 
 Observation from the ground continues to be 
 of great importance. The commander of a unit 
 should choose a new observation post each time 
 he advances, and place his command post in 
 the near vicinity. Observing stations for infor- 
 mation and for the artillery should be established 
 during the course of the advance in convenient 
 spots ; they must enable the observers to follow 
 the progress of the combat and the signals of 
 the attacking line. 
 
 211 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Aerial observation is even more important 
 than observation from the ground, from the 
 point of view of liaison. The accompanying 
 planes should never lose sight of the infantry 
 line; they must keep in communication with it 
 and watch the opposing troops. The Command 
 planes should watch the enemy in specified 
 sectors, and keep the Command inform'ed as to 
 his situation, his concentrations, and his move- 
 ments. Finally, messenger planes must main- 
 tain liaison between the Command and the 
 troops, carrying orders and information. Bal- 
 loons perform similar duties, never neglecting, 
 however, their function of adjusting the artillery 
 fire: infantry balloons watch the line of attack 
 and transmit its signals ; Command balloons fol- 
 low the progress of the attack, so as to keep the 
 Command fully informed. 
 
 Liaison is maintained between the troops and 
 the aircraft by divers means. The attacking line 
 shows its position to the accompanying planes 
 by means of Bengal lights, or pieces of cloth 
 called "marking panels" {panneaux de jalonne- 
 ment) stretched out on the ground, or by flash- 
 lights or mirrors, or other means. The signals are 
 made from lines agreed upon in advance, or at 
 the request of the airplanes, or on the initiative 
 of the company commanders; all other troops 
 besides those of the attacking line must be for- 
 
 212 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 bidden to make signals for fear of confusion. 
 Behind the line the command posts for bat- 
 talions, regiments, and larger units signal to 
 the airplanes and balloons; they use special 
 pieces of cloth, called "identification panels," 
 stretching them on the ground to show their 
 situation; they also use panels or flashlights to 
 send messages. 
 
 The accompanying planes fly as low as possible 
 in order to be in touch with the infantry; they 
 identify themselves by acoustic or cartridge sig- 
 nals. They communicate with the infantry by 
 cartridge signals, receive the return signals, and 
 take note of the location of the troops. They 
 send urgent information to the Command by 
 means of wireless; other matter is sent by 
 weighted messages which often consist in sketches 
 prepared in advance and filled in with the in- 
 formation obtained. 
 
 Balloons are used for liaison in the same way. 
 There is usually one balloon for each infantry 
 division. It receives messages from the attack- 
 ing line and the command posts. In order to 
 address a post, it first gives the call signal (in- 
 dicative) of the point with which it wishes to 
 communicate, and then makes one of the very 
 simple signals, such as "Understood," or, "Re- 
 peat." It sends information received to the 
 ground by telephone; this, in turn, is trans- 
 
 213 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 mitted to its proper destination by telephone, 
 or, if need be, by wireless. 
 
 It is essential that the signals should be the 
 same throughout all the armies on the same 
 front; in this matter, as in all others, coordina- 
 tion is one of the essential conditions of success. 
 Let us, therefore, hope that the same signals will 
 be used, not only by all the armies of one nation, 
 but by those of all the allied nations fighting on 
 one front. 
 
 During the struggle in the interior of the 
 position, telephone lines must follow the troops 
 as closely as possible. Furthermore, it is neces- 
 sary to plan in advance just how the system 
 must be constituted, and to put it into operation 
 without delay. 
 
 As long as the artillery can progressively 
 lengthen its range according to the time-sched- 
 ule settled by the plan of action, it continues 
 to deliver a barrage fire. There comes a mo- 
 ment, however, when it is obliged to break up 
 into elements, as is the case with the infantry 
 likewise, for fear of inflicting losses upon the 
 elements which are advancing in ragged forma- 
 tion, or of hindering the progress of those ele- 
 ments which have been most fortunate or most 
 audacious. 
 
 The artillery has, in fact, two important 
 duties, besides lending the help of a moving 
 
 214 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 barrage; first, it should destroy or neutralize 
 those of the enemy batteries which have been 
 unmasked; second, it should constantly protect 
 the fighting line against counter-movements on 
 the part of the enemy. 
 
 The destruction or neutralization of the en- 
 emy's batteries is entrusted to special groups 
 of artillery called "counter-batteries." The list 
 and plan of the enemy's observing stations and 
 battery emplacements is always kept up to date. 
 If it happens that in spite of the precision and 
 the continuous methodical execution of the fire, 
 in spite of the amount of ammunition expended, 
 it has still proved impossible to destroy the 
 enemy's batteries during the period of prepara- 
 tion, then they must be neutralized during the 
 struggle in the interior of the position. This 
 operation consists in silencing them during the 
 period when the infantry is advancing. It is 
 effected by firing at top speed and sending gas 
 shells when the atmospheric conditions are favor- 
 able. This will enable the infantry to advance 
 and sometimes even to go right up to the silenced 
 batteries. This fire must be carried out accord- 
 ing to a methodical plan and by the efforts of 
 all the batteries designated for the purpose. 
 
 The constant protection of the fighting line 
 against hostile counter-movements is the duty 
 of other groups of batteries. These must fire on 
 
 215 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 all counter-attacks and isolate the fighting zone 
 by shielding its immediate surroundings, and 
 the more remote roads and tracks leading to it. 
 If, during the course of the attack, any point 
 becomes particularly important, these batteries 
 must concentrate their fire thereon; concen- 
 trated shell fire is to-day thrown into the com- 
 bat at one point or another, just as formerly 
 reserves of infantry were thrown in. 
 
 In order that the artillery may fulfil its 
 function of directly supporting and constantly 
 protecting the infantry, the liaison between the 
 infantry and the artillery must be of the closest 
 possible nature. To this end the artillery should 
 always detail liaison agents to follow the infan- 
 try. Thus, each artillery battalion should have 
 a liaison and observation group detailed to the 
 infantry unit which it must support directly. 
 The leader of this group informs the artillery 
 battalion commander as to the situation and 
 needs of the infantry, and tells the commander 
 of the infantry unit what support he may ex- 
 pect from the artillery. 
 
 The artillery must be constantly informed of 
 the exact geographical position of the infantry, its 
 tactical situation, its intentions, and its needs. 
 This information will also come to the artillery 
 through the Command, but its own liaison sys- 
 tem will duplicate that through the Command, 
 
 216 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 and prevent delays. In fact, rapidity in trans- 
 mitting information may be of the highest im- 
 portance, whether it be a question of firing on a 
 counter-attack or concentrations of the enemy's 
 troops, or Hfting the fire to permit the infantry 
 to advance, or even, perhaps, to rectify a mis- 
 take. For this reason various means of com- 
 munication are employed: rockets and visible 
 signals have the advantage of being instantane- 
 ous; messages sent by hand or telephone are 
 less rapid, but more explicit, though not always 
 practicable. 
 
 ' The liaison between the infantry and the 
 artillery does not imply that the infantry com- 
 mander may call at will for the fire of those 
 batteries with which he is in connection. Even 
 the artillery battalion commander can take such 
 an initiative only when the case is urgent and 
 the objective shifting, — for instance, in case of a 
 counter-attack, a concentration or movement of 
 the enemy's troops; he must, furthermore, report 
 his action immediately to his superiors. The 
 artillery troops must be at the disposal of the 
 division commander, assisted by the artillery 
 commander, in order that they may be utilized 
 for the greatest general good. 
 
 The division commander obtains much of his 
 information from airplanes and balloons. These 
 machines communicate with the information 
 
 217 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 centre by means of flashlights, rockets, and 
 weighted messages. The information centre is 
 in the near vicinity of the command post of the 
 general commanding the division, and follows 
 his movements; it is connected directly with 
 the landing-field for the airplanes. This general 
 arranges and alters the grouping of his batteries 
 in accordance with the information he receives; 
 he may put a certain number of them at the 
 disposal of the officer in command of his infantry, 
 or of his colonels. 
 
 While the infantry is advancing in the interior 
 of the position, the artillery keeps up its fire 
 against the enemy's batteries and against his 
 troops and organized defensive works. To this 
 end it should be moved forward in successive 
 echelons in such wise that a sufficient number 
 of pieces are always in battery. This deplace- 
 ment, which temporarily puts some of the pieces 
 out of action, should be planned beforehand in 
 the most careful and methodical manner. New 
 emplacements will have been arranged for as far 
 £is the departure trench, but, beyond that, every- 
 thing has to be improvised in the briefest possi- 
 ble time. In deplacement speed is of the highest 
 importance, because the infantry cannot venture 
 beyond the protection of its artillery without ex- 
 posing itself to the cruellest of ordeals. Thus the 
 advance of the infantry depends not alone on 
 
 218 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 the ease of the terrain which it has to cross, but 
 even more on the readiness with which the heavy 
 artillery can be deplaced. Special gangs of work- 
 men must be trained and kept in readiness in 
 order to carry out this deplacement speedily. The 
 new observing stations and emplacements must 
 be picked out beforehand by the liaison and ob- 
 servation details which advance with the infantry. 
 
 The deplacement of cannon and of observing 
 stations is a dangerous procedure, and should be 
 carried out, whenever possible, during the night. 
 Still, as it cannot be dispensed with if the infan- 
 try is to advance, the move sometimes has to be 
 made by day. The artilleryman must expose his 
 life fearlessly when it is a question of saving the 
 lives of others. 
 
 During the first years of the war, the authori- 
 ties were not sufficiently well aware of the neces- 
 sity for artillery to give support to the infantry. 
 Let me tell the story of one of those who clearly 
 saw this necessity, which is to-day so well rec- 
 ognized, and who bravely gave his life for the 
 faith that was in him. My stepfather, Honor6 
 de Villard, had reentered the service at the be- 
 ginning of the war as major of artillery. He had 
 studied and outlined, as early as March, 1915, 
 a system of liaison permitting the airplanes to 
 adjust the artillery fire, but what occupied his 
 thoughts especially, as he wrote to me April 13, 
 
 219 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 19 1 5, was the "fire liaison" between the infantry 
 and the artillery, during the period of stationary 
 fighting as well as during the attack. He had 
 drawn up a report on the subject, but dared not 
 count on its producing an impression, owing to 
 the fact that the different arms of the service 
 refused to recognize their interdependence. 
 
 In the month of September, 1915, he was in 
 Champagne, where the great autumn offensive 
 was in preparation. In all of his letters he spoke 
 to me of the liaison between the artillery and 
 the infantry. 
 
 On the 3d of September, he wrote, describing 
 the work of preparation : — 
 
 "Here we are, for the last six days, almost 
 out of communication with the outside world, 
 in a cold drizzle, but in the feverish activity of 
 a great preparation. Some people are moving 
 about beams and joists and earth, others are 
 fiddling with the coordinates on the battle 
 map, others are trying to pierce the veil of the 
 enemy's wire entanglements. Each is working 
 heartily, although the supply service leaves a 
 little to be desired. I am tending my liaisons 
 with the infantry; let us hope that there will be 
 no slip-up in that direction." 
 
 On the I ith of September he let me infer from 
 the grave tone and precise detail of his letter 
 that the day for the attack was drawing near: — 
 
 220 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 "During the forthcoming attack my battle 
 command post will be in the first-line trenches. 
 As soon as the infantry has set foot in the Ger- 
 man trenches, I shall go to those trenches and 
 choose another observation post, from which I 
 can watch the farthest zone that our infantry 
 must cross. This infantry is to advance behind a 
 curtain of fire which must stretch before it. You 
 see that my task is delicate. If I come back safe 
 and sound, I shall have had a good run of luck. 
 Do not think that I am being intentionally im- 
 prudent; there simply is no other place where I 
 can do my duty. I am no dare-devil. I am 
 anxious that if anything happens to me, I shall 
 not bear that reputation. I am merely trying to 
 get the best results with my fire, and to that end 
 / must be on the spot and nowhere else." 
 
 The attack took place September 23. On the 
 1st of October I received one of the postal cards 
 which those who are going to the attack write 
 to their nearest and dearest: — 
 
 "Two hours before the attack. I send you all 
 a greeting from the bottom of my heart. I hope 
 soon to send you news. If not, write to Major 
 Bordeux, Sector 43. To all of you most, most 
 affectionately ..." 
 
 I received the card October i. The next day 
 a letter came from Major Bordeux, his friend of 
 many years' standing: — 
 
 221 
 
THE WABFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 "Dear Paul: It's awful. Honor6 was killed 
 this morning with the first assaulting wave." 
 
 Little by little I obtained the details of his 
 death. When the infantry had reached the first 
 German trench, he went there to choose an ob- 
 servation post from which he could train his 
 batteries on the next nest of machine guns which 
 might halt their progress. Since, however, this 
 new post was not arranged for observation, he 
 was obliged to raise his head above the parados, 
 and received a bullet in the neck which killed 
 him outright. 
 
 The sacrifice of a man of his age and worth 
 showed his juniors the way that duty lay; since 
 then many others have given their lives in trying 
 to spare those of the infantry, or in trying to open 
 for them a road to victory. We should not weep 
 for those who die thus, but rather envy their 
 chance to do so much for the mother country of 
 them all. 
 
 By dint of the help of the artillery, the in- 
 fantry can continue its advance into the interior 
 of the position. If a part of the fighting line is 
 halted by a point of resistance, the adjacent 
 parts continue their advance, outflank the point, 
 cut its communications, and force the defenders 
 to surrender. 
 
 There are still cases where manoeuvring is 
 difficult and artillery support impossible. The 
 
 222 
 
AN ENGLISH TANK, AT THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME IN I916, HALTED AND 
 IN DIFFICULTIES, BETWEEN LEUZE WOOD AND COMBLES 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME IN I916 
 Capture of the village of Combles: a house on the west side of it 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 infantry must then overcome the obstacle by its 
 own resources. This case, which may sometimes 
 occur in the initial stage of the attack, is quite 
 common in the struggle in the interior of the 
 position. One of the most dangerous obstacles 
 is a trench on a reverse slope. The fighting line 
 reaches the zone which is taken under the fire 
 of such a trench without being forewarned. If 
 it seeks to advance farther, it hurls itself against 
 accessory defences, which are still intact, with- 
 out any means of destroying them. Thus, in the 
 battle of the Somme in 1916, after their initial 
 success, the units of the Twentieth Corps found 
 themselves beyond Hardecourt confronted by a 
 sunken road on a reverse slope which held them 
 up for days. They suffered considerable losses, 
 and imagined that they were opposite a strongly 
 organized work, when really there was nothing 
 but a few inches dug in haste. The enemy's 
 field of fire was eighty to one hundred yards at 
 most, but it was enough. They were only en- 
 abled to put an end to the business when the 
 artillery could advance on the adjoining sector, 
 and take the sunken road in enfilade. 
 
 The infantry cannot demand a complete 
 sweeping of the terrain by the artillery, for that 
 is impossible. It should be able by its own 
 eflForts to overcome such obstacles as reverse- 
 slope trenches and nests of machine guns. But 
 
 223 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 how? It cannot count on the portable arms of 
 flat trajectory, such as rifles, automatic machine 
 rifles, and machine guns; it is useless to think 
 of the bayonet; hand and rifle grenades can be 
 of service only if the enemy's works are under 
 the open sky; a 37-mm. cannon might reduce the 
 obstacles, especially with an explosive shell; but 
 this weapon is neither sufficiently well protected 
 nor sufficiently powerful. 
 
 At the present moment there is nothing but 
 the tank which seems to unite all the qualities 
 necessary to replace the artillery in giving real 
 help to the infantry; that is, if it is armed with 
 such a weapon as a 75. 
 
 Can the tank advance easily through the posi- 
 tion? The nub of the whole matter is just there. 
 On the Somme in 19 16 I saw some English tanks 
 in a sad state, abandoned on the slopes down 
 which they had started to charge. Apparently in 
 the last attacks of 191 7 the English and French 
 tanks worked wonders. 
 
 The tank must keep in constant touch with 
 the infantry, the artillery, and the aviation, if 
 it is to overcome every obstacle. The infantry, 
 which it helped in the beginning, can now give it 
 great aid in return by clearing and preparing the 
 terrain before it. Details of men hurriedly fill 
 up, with earth or fascines or material of any sort, 
 wide ditches or shell craters which might stop it. 
 
 224 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 Turn and turn about, the tanks open a road for 
 the infantry, and the infantry for the tanks. 
 The airplanes fulfil their functions of accohi- 
 paniment and surveillance, and even their fire- 
 adjusting functions, by pointing out instantly 
 any batteries which might shell the tanks, and 
 adjusting the fire on them. 
 
 So regarded, the tank is really an armored in- 
 fantry cannon which, if its means of locomotion 
 permit it to travel far enough, becomes an ac- 
 companying cannon for overcoming obstacles. It 
 can never replace heavy artillery, which is indis- 
 pensable for overcoming modern defences, but 
 it can fulfil two functions: it can replace the 
 preparatory fire on the accessory defences, thus 
 making possible a surprise attack; it can de- 
 stroy points of resistance encountered on the 
 way, so that the infantry can advance into the 
 interior of the position with a minimum of loss. 
 
 The infantry suffers heavily in the thousand 
 little combats of the groups which compose it. 
 The fighting line cannot advance indefinitely 
 without its units getting into bad shape. It is 
 never wise to use up a body of troops to such an 
 extent that it can never be reconstituted. For 
 this reason relieving units must be introduced 
 during the course of the struggle. This relief 
 is effected by sending the rearmost unit forward; 
 the units already engaged come to a halt at a 
 
 225 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 fixed moment and the relieving units pass them, 
 picking up useful information as they go by. 
 The attack is continued by fresh troops, while 
 the troops relieved are successively passed by 
 those behind them, until at last they find them- 
 selves in the rear, and become reserves. 
 
 The advance of the units in a specified direc- 
 tion is not always easy on account of lack of land- 
 marks in a country that is devastated, swept 
 bare, and shorn of features easily recognized be- 
 fore the battle. The fact that the troops must 
 hide themselves as much as possible from the 
 enemy's observation and from his batteries 
 makes it difficult to keep a fixed direction. The 
 darkening of the atmosphere by shell explosions 
 and by dust renders the situation still more 
 difficult. For this reason the pocket compass 
 should be brought into general use. All officers, 
 platoon and half- platoon leaders, and, in fact, if 
 possible, all N.C.O.'s, should carry compasses, 
 and know how to use them. This precaution will 
 save hesitation and delay in the march of the 
 units. 
 
 During the advance of the fighting line, the 
 reserves continually move forward. They are 
 not idle, even when they are stationary for a cer- 
 tain time, because they take part in organizing 
 the conquered terrain. 
 
 The engineers help in that part of the work 
 226 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 which calls for their special technical knowledge 
 and give their advice at whatever point it is 
 needed; they are distributed by the Command 
 in such a way as to be most useful. 
 
 Fighting during the night is the natural con- 
 tinuation of that during the day, but does not 
 have the same characteristics; it can, in fact, 
 merely serve to consolidate results already ob- 
 tained. Night is the time when works can be 
 undertaken without too much danger and relief 
 or supply executed most easily. 
 
 Work must be carried out by night as well as 
 by day, even in case of bombardment; for at 
 night one can begin work on a boyau or trench 
 over a large space of ground and make enough 
 shelter so that the operation may be continued by 
 day. Rapidity in constructing defensive works 
 saves many lives and helps greatly toward re- 
 taining the conquered terrain. 
 
 The advance can sometimes be continued dur- 
 ing the night if the troops are perfectly familiar 
 with the ground, or if the enemy is completely 
 demoralized ; in any other case they run serious 
 risks of falling into murderous ambuscades or 
 making costly mistakes. Liaisons must be main- 
 tained and made certain, each move of one unit 
 being communicated to the units adjoining. 
 
 The only operations usually possible during 
 
 22^ 
 
THE WABPABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the night are local raids intended to seize such 
 objectives as a favorably situated observation 
 post or a useful trench, to overcome a point 
 of resistance or capture an important post, in 
 order to prepare for the advance of the mor- 
 row. Such raids are, naturally, carried out with- 
 out the help of artillery, and depend for their 
 success on two principal factors: surprise, if the 
 raid has been well prepared and skilfully exe- 
 cuted, and the weakness of the enemy's defen- 
 sive works which may well have been hurriedly 
 constructed. One must get such information as 
 one can, and carry out these raids at the mo- 
 ment when the enemy is executing a relief or is 
 busy strengthening his defences. The troops in- 
 volved generally go lightly armed, without gun 
 or bayonet, in order to secure greater freedom 
 of movement, and more complete silence. They 
 approach as close as possible to their objective, 
 then fall upon it with grenade, revolver, and 
 knife. 
 
 Watchfulness must not be relaxed during the 
 night. It is important to gather all possible 
 information that may be of use in resuming the 
 advance the next day. Active surveillance will 
 often show that it is possible to occupy points 
 temporarily stripped of their defenders, or to 
 follow the enemy in case he tries to free himself 
 by a retrograde movement. 
 
 228 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 Artillery can offer no assistance to night oper- 
 ations; at most it can deliver a barrage at ranges 
 worked out before nightfall. Heavy artillery can 
 pour a disturbing fire on certain much-used lines 
 of passage, cross-roads, and other important 
 points. Night is also the natural time to deplace 
 the artillery, to construct new observing stations, 
 emplacements, or telephone connections. 
 
 The airplanes and dirigible balloons take ad- 
 vantage of the night, and set out to bomb im- 
 portant railway dep6ts and railroads, canton- 
 ments and bivouacs of reserves, warehouses, 
 factories, and parks of artillery situated behind 
 the enemy's fighting Hne. 
 
 The night is often used to supply the fighting 
 line with men or food or ammunition, and to 
 remove the wounded and all sorts of materiel. 
 These operations behind the first-line troops 
 give rise to an immense movement behind the 
 whole of the fighting forces because of the large 
 numbers of effectives involved; they are carried 
 on both by day and night. 
 
 The bringing-up of reserves, munitions, and 
 food, as well as the work of evacuation, consti- 
 tutes one of the most important cares of the 
 Command during the whole period of the attack. 
 There can be no continuity of forward move- 
 ment where there is no continuity of supply and 
 evacuation. If the reserves do not arrive at the 
 
 229 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 right moment, if ammunition is exhausted even 
 momentarily, if food is lacking, success is com- 
 promised. 
 
 The sending-up of reserves when they are 
 needed depends, above all, upon the complete- 
 ness with which the Command is informed of 
 the situation. To this end the system of liaison 
 must be well established, and reports must be 
 frequent and clear. Success will also depend 
 upon the manner in which orders are given to 
 the reserves, and upon the organization, condi- 
 tion, and maintenance of the roads leading to the 
 Front. The officers who draw up the time-sche- 
 dule must have very definite knowledge of the 
 rate of progress of troops in the boyau or across 
 difficult country, and the roads to be followed 
 must be free from all obstacles. Finally, the 
 reserves must have guides able to lead them day 
 and night, and to acquaint them with their posi- 
 tion at any moment. 
 
 The supplies of food and ammunition are for- 
 warded by means of railroads and highways in 
 the rear, and by narrow-gauge lines toward the 
 Front. Success in forwarding supplies will de- 
 pend upon a careful preparation as far as the 
 departure position is concerned, and for the 
 rest of the route, upon the rapidity and success 
 of the work of amenagement in the conquered 
 terrain. 
 
 230 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 The removal of the wounded, of prisoners, 
 and of materiel, is carried out as soon as possible 
 by means of boyaux, roads, and railway lines 
 especially reserved for the purpose. Success in 
 these operations depends almost entirely upon 
 thoroughness of preparation. 
 
 The organization of the conquered terrain is 
 the last phase of the attack. It starts at the 
 same time as the attack, and continues as long as 
 it is in progress. A general scheme, drawn up 
 by the Command, must govern all the works and 
 lay down the order of urgence. To leave the 
 small units to their own initiative would effect 
 nothing but a waste of time and effort. 
 
 To begin with, the first-line trench must be 
 joined to the first of the conquered trenches by 
 means of boyaux; beyond that, the enemy's old 
 boyaux may be used. Then the successive 
 trenches must be put in order, repaired, and 
 reversed, constituting new lines of resistance in 
 case of a retour offensif on the part of the enemy. 
 The only exception to these rules occurs when the 
 advance covers a considerable depth of territory 
 in a short time; in this case, the first thing is to 
 organize the terrain which the fighting line has 
 reached. Moreover, it is just here that there will 
 be a lack of works which can be of use to a further 
 
 231 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 advance, in case the attack develops success- 
 fully; they must be constructed. 
 
 All the rules for organizing a position apply 
 to one that has been captured. The first parts 
 to be put into condition for defence are those 
 against which a retour offensif might be directed. 
 Detachments of engineers must be placed at the 
 disposition of the commanders of sectors and 
 sub-sectors to help this work of organization. 
 The Command must immediately draw up a plan 
 of the works. 
 
 One essential principle must ever be borne in 
 mind. A position once captured must never be 
 lost. This is not all. A conquered position repre- 
 sents a step in advance toward the enemy, its 
 capture is a prelude to breaking the Front. One 
 idea must ever be present to the Commander 
 who captured it: "Can I take the next posi- 
 tion?" 
 
 I have tried to describe, with as few technical 
 terms as possible, all the measures to be taken in 
 the course of an attack. The difficulties of the 
 enterprise are evident. 
 
 An attack should never be undertaken without 
 a fixed determination to carry it through to com- 
 plete success ; that is to say, to capture the oppos- 
 ing position and the positions beyond, and to 
 
 232 
 
THE ATTACK 
 
 strike the enemy. Under any other conditions 
 an attack is nothing but an unpardonable waste 
 of men, of energy, and of materiel. 
 
 Of course an attack on a limited front, with 
 limited effectives, will cause the enemy loss. 
 Generally, however, the amount of attrition ef- 
 fected is out of proportion to the effort expended. 
 Moreover, such attacks produce reaction, es- 
 pecially when they succeed, so that they tend to 
 create centres of perpetual conflict which must 
 be supplied with men, although perhaps in zones 
 where this is highly undesirable. 
 
 These local attacks are really useful only when 
 they yield important observing stations; under 
 those circumstances they are really advantage- 
 ous and accelerate the rate of attrition. 
 
 An attack should succeed from the start, and 
 be continued without pause until the opposing 
 position has been completely conquered. If the 
 enemy is able to re-form in the interior of the 
 position, he will have an excellent chance of stop- 
 ping the attack; his position will merely have a 
 new contour. In this case the attack has failed; 
 it is useless to attempt to advance farther with- 
 out a new preparation. To do so would entail a 
 futile sacrifice of lives. 
 
 This mistake has been committed many times 
 in the course of the present war. An attack 
 would succeed at first; then it would be halted 
 
 233 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 for one reason or another: the reserves did not 
 come up, the objectives aimed at were too re- 
 stricted, the Command was frightened by the 
 losses which had been suffered. Thereupon the 
 enemy would entrench rapidly and carry out 
 retours offensifs, supported by artillery, which 
 would rivet the attacking troops to the spot 
 where they were. 
 
 Success at the beginning of an attack depends 
 almost entirely upon the preparation. Complete 
 success also depends thereon in many respects, 
 owing to the vital importance of the work of 
 supply. Yet much lies in the hands of the lead- 
 ers of the small units of infantry who carry on 
 the combat in the interior of the position, and 
 on the leaders of units of the other arms who lend 
 their support and aid. In this great drama, each 
 actor must play his part with sure knowledge 
 and boundless devotion, and must always know 
 how to make his personal activity fit into the 
 total scheme and contribute to the total result. 
 Finally, much lies in the hands of the com- 
 mander, who must know how to make a judi- 
 cious use of all the forces at his disposal ; he must 
 know how to bring into play the full powers of 
 his troops, how to spare them wisely, to meet all 
 their needs, and to coordinate all their efforts. 
 
VI 
 
 HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 Lecture of November 19, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 The general principles which determine success are the same in 
 war as in business. — Coordination at four successive stages: among 
 the Allied nations (superior council) ; among their armies (general- 
 issimo); between the arms and the services of an army; between the 
 specialists of an arm or a service. — Coordination among the Allied 
 nations. — R61e of each of the nations: France, England, the United 
 States, Italy, etc. — The pooling of resources. — Coordination among 
 the Allied armies: r61e of the generalissimo. — Tactical coordination. 
 
 Tactical principles. — How to destroy the enemy's army. — 
 Breach of the Front sought by attrition. — The choice of zones of 
 attack is the whole of modern strategy. — Simultaneous attacks. — 
 The principal attack chosen by the generalissimo according to the 
 results. — Pursuit and march of approach. — The absence of posi- 
 tions marks the end of the war. — Justification of this theory. — 
 How the victorious army advances. 
 
 Study of the two phases which will occur when victory is won: 
 pursuit and march of approach. — Pursuit: rapidity; continuity; 
 liaison. — Troops entrusted with the pursuit: cavalry; light motor 
 artillery; infantry; artillery; aircraft; engineers. — Formation of 
 march; use of the specialists. — Deplacement and supplying of the 
 artillery. — Sudden attacks. — March of approach: study of the 
 position; formations to be adopted; r61e of the different arms. 
 
 Necessity of strengthening the ties between the Allied nations. — 
 Deeds, not words. — Keeping up of the morale. — Victory by arms. 
 
 We must have victory. But how are we go- 
 ing to get it? 
 
 Far be it from me to tell you that I have any 
 infallible recipe, or to criticize the generals who 
 are in command of the Allied armies. I do not 
 
 235 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 wish to be counted as one of the armchair strate- 
 gists who lean over the war maps, place their 
 fingers on this or that point, and say: " If I were 
 Marshal Jofire ..." or, "If I were General P6- 
 tain ..." They thereupon explain their strate- 
 gical plans, turn the enemy's flank in a short 
 time, and win a decisive battle, after which they 
 proudly wait for some one to say: "Why has no 
 one ever thought of putting you at the head of 
 the armies, instead of Marshal Joffre or General 
 P^tain?" These undiscovered Napoleons are nu- 
 merous; every one must have met them. The 
 only reply is that if victory were so easy, Marshal 
 Joffre or General P6tain would doubtless have 
 achieved it ere now. 
 
 No, indeed, victory is not easy. Yet, if it is 
 not possible to trace the exact road which the 
 future victorious armies must follow, it is still 
 possible to exhibit the simple general principles 
 which will open that road to them. 
 
 The principles which [bring success in war 
 are, in large measure, the same as those which 
 bring success in business. For that reason the 
 Americans will be the first to grasp them. War 
 is an enterprise, and a very big enterprise to be 
 carried through successfully. There must, con- 
 sequently, be a board of directors, and at the 
 head of that board a chairman who sees to it 
 that the wishes of the board are carried out. 
 
 236 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 What would happen to an industrial organi- 
 zation if the workmen went ahead without the 
 advice of the technicians, if those who made 
 machines did not bother about the needs of 
 manufacture, if the sales department paid no 
 heed to the wants of the public, if the treasurer 
 ran up expenses in ignorance of the revenue? 
 What would happen even if in one branch of the 
 enterprise all the employees were not working 
 towards the same end? The whole thing would 
 go to smash. 
 
 It is the same in war. The Governments of all 
 the Allied nations should establish a perfect co- 
 ordination with one another. In the same way 
 the head generals of the armies of each of the 
 Governments should be under a single general- 
 issimo. In each particular army the different 
 fighting arms and the different services should 
 act in perfect harmony. Finally, in each arm the 
 specialists should work together harmoniously. 
 Thus, at four successive stages — and at this last 
 one more insistently than ever — crops up the 
 word to which I attach an almost magical power 
 — coordination. 
 
 Germany established coordination with her 
 allies by forcing her will upon them. She has 
 pooled all of their resources and used them to her 
 own advantage. The Allied nations, jealous of 
 their individuality, proud of their past, and care- 
 
 237 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ful of their self-esteem, have merely been busi- 
 ness partners; they have never been fused into 
 one homogeneous whole. We are free peoples, 
 and none of us will permit even the suggestion 
 of subjugation to another. For this reason we 
 have not sufficiently understood the value of 
 coordinated effort under one supreme control 
 and the proper utilization of all the forces at our 
 disposal. The fact is that we are all in the same 
 boat, and each should be given his special indi- 
 vidual task in the common effort. 
 
 France, for the last three years, has borne 
 nearly the whole burden of the war. She is not 
 yet exhausted, she still has millions of soldiers 
 under arms, from boys just out of school to mid- 
 dle-aged men with grey hair. Little by little she 
 is spending the savings accumulated through 
 many years by her hard-working people. She 
 will keep on fighting. At the present moment she 
 has a great army in Greece, and she is sending 
 many troops to Italy, while she holds in an iron 
 grip the greater part of the Western Front. But 
 there is a limit to the efforts which any true 
 friend can ask her to make. One asset she has 
 which her Allies can count on — experience. 
 Among the officers who have survived the terri- 
 ble battles of the last three years, there are many 
 who have a right to give advice to the new 
 armies. These armies need feel no false pride 
 
 238 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 about receiving such advice; experience bought 
 at the price of so many lives has an incalculable 
 value. 
 
 England is fortunate in the numbers of her 
 soldiers, which have not yet been sensibly dimin- 
 ished by losses, heavy as these have been. Her 
 army, put on a war footing and trained by an 
 enormous effort, has reached great proportions. 
 It is able to constitute to-day the driving mass 
 on the Western Front. England has also the 
 resources which come from her great industrial 
 and commercial situation and her vast territorial 
 possessions. She can go into battle with well- 
 trained and well-supplied troops. 
 
 America, coming late into the war, has, dur- 
 ing the first two years, reaped considerable 
 advantages and augmented the national wealth. 
 She has money, which constitutes, according 
 to an old proverb, the sinews of war. She has 
 other forms of wealth, food, metals, coal, etc., 
 and if she is wise enough not to waste these 
 precious possessions, she can help largely towards 
 achieving victory. Moreover, she has many men. 
 It may well be her army which will make the bal- 
 ance tip definitely towards victory for right and 
 justice. To that end the American army must be 
 trained, and trained quickly, for the denouement 
 of the war is approaching rapidly. Germany is 
 trying to eliminate each of her adversaries in 
 
 239 
 
THE WAEFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 turn by overwhelming it with all the forces of 
 the Central Powers. America must take part 
 before this design is accomplished; she must 
 not find herself alone, surrounded by exhausted 
 allies. It is for this reason that it is so neces- 
 sary to give a proper direction to the training of 
 the American army, to avoid half measures 
 which may delay for several months or perhaps 
 years the entrance of American troops into the 
 battle line. I am anxious also to spare them the 
 sacrifice which the other Allies have known, of 
 hundreds of thousands of their men, needlessly 
 slaughtered for lack of preliminary training. 
 Without tiring, without discouragement, I shall 
 insist upon the importance of training. 
 
 Italy, up to the present moment, has held 
 fairly large numbers of the enemy's troops upon 
 her borders and has, in this way, rendered im- 
 portant service to the common cause. At this 
 moment she is passing through a period of trial 
 the end of which, nevertheless, we may soon 
 hope to see. The Allies, face to face with events 
 of such gravity, are at last putting the principle 
 of coordination into practice. Italy herself is 
 learning at the cannon's mouth the experience 
 of the Franco-British armies, and is organizing 
 positions echeloned in depth. She may continue 
 to fulfil her defensive r&le, she may even, at the 
 opportune moment, change to an offensive which, 
 
 240 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 thanks to the "furia" of her enthusiastic troops, 
 will yield back the conquered territory, and more 
 besides. 
 
 Russia had a noble record during the first 
 months of the war. She may still be of use if she 
 manages to find herself. We must hope that she 
 will be able to purge herself of the preachers of 
 anarchy and the emissaries of the German espion- 
 age. If she does this, she should be able, without 
 great effort, to hold on her frontier a consider- 
 able fraction of the forces of the Central Empires. 
 Japan, Rumania, Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, 
 Portugal, and the others can collaborate, each 
 in accordance with its resources. 
 
 In this vast association of peoples, united for 
 the triumph of liberty, all resources must be 
 held in common and used for the greatest general 
 good. A system of loans and exchanges must be 
 established under advantageous conditions, as 
 between friends, so that each associate shall be 
 exposed to a minimum of suffering and want, 
 and shall have a maximum of means to fulfil his 
 special task. To this end it seems that we should 
 have a superior Inter-AUied Council to examine 
 and pass upon important questions. Already 
 some governments, as those of France and Great 
 Britain, have deliberately entered on this path. 
 Let us hope that the plan will spread. Born 
 during the travail of war, such an understanding 
 
 241 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 between governments will be the firmest basis 
 for the future Society of Nations. 
 
 The coordination between governments should 
 have, as a corollary, a coordination between 
 their armies. Just as the governments regulate, 
 by means of treaties, all questions of a political 
 or economic nature, so should the commanding 
 generals of their armies draw up a common plan, 
 to be sanctioned by the single generalissimo who 
 is in charge of its execution. This generalissimo, 
 supported by an Inter- Allied staff, should be not 
 only a consulting officer who keeps the Allied 
 governments informed as to the military situa- 
 tion, but also an executive officer in direct 
 charge of military operations. His r61e should 
 be large. He should see to it that effectives and 
 materiel are wisely distributed, that supplies are 
 sent to each Front in due proportion, that gen- 
 eral reserves are assigned to such of the Allies 
 as need them; finally, he should definitely indi- 
 cate to each army its particular mission, with- 
 out, however, entering into details. Such is the 
 strategic coordination needed to secure the suc- 
 cess of our armies. 
 
 What about tactical coordination? I have in- 
 sisted so often upon the necessity for this that I 
 need not return to it now. Based upon adequate 
 preparation, it is effected by an experienced 
 commander. There must exist during each phase 
 
 242 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 of the struggle perfect liaison between the vari- 
 ous fighting arms, infantry, artillery, aviation, 
 engineers, cavalry, and the different services of 
 a great unit, such as ordnance and supply, sani- 
 tation, highways, etc. There must also be proper 
 liaison between the different specialists belonging 
 to the same arm or the same service. 
 
 The great principle of coordination is the 
 prime condition for victory. There are, however, 
 other conditions and principles bearing on the 
 direct conduct of operations and their execution 
 in practice, which are likewise indispensable. 
 
 Victory is theoretically won by destroying the 
 enemy's army. In practice this end can never 
 be completely realized. Modern armies have 
 enormous effectives. They are echeloned later- 
 ally along an immense front which rests at each 
 end on an impassable barrier. They are eche- 
 loned in depth upon successive positions reaching 
 all the way back to where the general reserves 
 are held. The enemy's army can never be struck 
 in its entirety as used to happen in the Greek 
 and Roman and Napoleonic wars. What is pos- 
 sible is to break the Front, or a part of it, by 
 seizing successive positions, and thus obtain, 
 little by little, a collapse of the whole. While 
 the enemy's line is retreating to other positions 
 
 .243 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 prepared in the rear, the fragments of his army 
 may be attacked in detail, pursued, and de- 
 feated, so that he may be unable to re-form. 
 
 Thus it appears that, in order to achieve vic- 
 tory, it is necessary to upset the equilibrium at 
 some one point. This is accomplished, in part, 
 by the process of attrition. Each day in the 
 trenches, each local skirmish, hastens the mo- 
 ment of final triumph. The enemy loses men 
 daily, so that daily the numbers of his general 
 reserves grow less. Day by day he has fewer men 
 in the factories; he must use women and pris- 
 oners to replace the men taken to fill the gaps 
 in his fighting line. His capacity for resistance 
 on those different fronts which he is obliged to 
 hold diminishes at every point. If the general- 
 issimo of the Allies is sufficiently well informed 
 to pick out the weakest points, he will hurl at- 
 tacks against them. If he is really successful at 
 a single point, a victory, more or less complete, is 
 assured. 
 
 The determination of the points where attacks 
 should be launched, and the choice of the appro- 
 priate times to launch them, are the corner-stones 
 of strategy. Strategy, contrary to the usual be- 
 lief, should be mainly occupied with the choice of 
 zones of attack, and not with the possibilities 
 which might arise after the attack has taken 
 place. Strategic plans for an offensive, and choice 
 
 244 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 in advance of the lines of march of armies in 
 regions which they are by no means certain to 
 conquer, are sure to end in costly mistakes. The 
 armies, obsessed with the idea of carrying out a 
 preconceived plan, will insist on trying to over- 
 come insurmountable obstacles, to the neglect of 
 some open space. This would be to repeat, in 
 the domain of strategy, a mistake which has 
 already been often committed in that of tactics 
 during the present war; namely, that of exhaust- 
 ing the troops in an attempt to achieve the im- 
 possible, instead of seeking to attain the maxi- 
 mum results with the minimum of effort. 
 
 If a general offensive were possible it would 
 be the best means to try out the enemy at every 
 point, to test his powers of resistance, and to find 
 his weak spots. But it would require too many 
 men, too large a supply of materiel, munitions 
 and supplies, and consequently an impossible 
 wealth of raw material of railways, roads, and 
 factories. It is impracticable on account of the 
 enormous length of the Fronts. We must, there- 
 fore, be content with partial attacks. On the 
 other hand, we should try to give the enemy 
 the impression of activity on all parts of the 
 Front, in order to keep him in a state of sus- 
 pense, yet the actual attacks should be launched 
 only in specified zones. Moreover, they should 
 be launched simultaneously, or at intervals of 
 
 245 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 a few days, so that the enemy may not know 
 where to send his general reserves, and so that 
 if he does send them to any one point, he will 
 presently feel the necessity of having them at 
 other points also. 
 
 The strategy of the Allies has made notable 
 progress in this matter of simultaneity. In the 
 years 1914, '15, and '16 the system of many 
 attacks at once could not be carried out, doubt- 
 less owing to insufficient means, especially in- 
 sufficient artillery. The offensive on the Somme 
 in 19 1 6 was not more than twenty- five miles 
 wide, and was, moreover, isolated. The Ger- 
 mans were able to resist it with an enormous 
 number of divisions, and to replace them in turn 
 till they had completely paralyzed our effort. 
 In 19 1 7, on the other hand, there was a marked 
 simultaneity of attack. On the 15th of August 
 the Canadians attacked at Lens, on the l6th the 
 British and French attacked at Ypres, on the 
 19th the Italians attacked on the Carso, and on 
 the 20th the French attacked at Verdun. At 
 other parts of the Front, as on the Aisne, or in 
 Moldavia, the struggle already in progress was 
 continued during the same period. This, indeed, 
 is real modern warfare! 
 
 It is fair to say that simultaneity of attack 
 does not imply that all attacks need be launched 
 on the same day. In fact, it is often better 
 
 246 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 to start the attacks one after another, since 
 modern battles last for weeks, sometimes for 
 months. Under this arrangement the enemy is 
 all the more upset and uncertain. For instance, 
 if he has stripped one zone, and an attack is 
 launched there, excellent results may be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Suppose that several attacks are started in this 
 way, is it right to decide a priori which shall 
 be the principal one, which shall bring victory? 
 Most strategists are of this opinion. They dis- 
 tinguish between the principal attack and the 
 secondary ones. The latter are mere feints, in- 
 tended to immobilize some of the enemy's troops, 
 or to draw off some of his reserves. But victory, 
 they go on to say, depends upon the success of 
 the principal attack. They expect that the stra- 
 tegic gains from this attack will lead to Berlin 
 or beyond. They draw up elaborate plans for 
 such an advance, sailing gayly beyond the ene- 
 my's positions as though they did not exist. 
 In these dreams of victory they overlook one 
 factor, which, nevertheless, has a certain import- 
 ance, — the enemy. For he is there, and may 
 well take upon himself to bring them back to 
 cold facts, for if the attack fails after a couple 
 of days, our strategists will find themselves 
 a couple of miles from the point of departure, 
 their troops decimated and shot down, before 
 
 247 
 
THE WARFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 positions which they were unable to capture. 
 The whole plan will go up in smoke before the 
 first phase is completed. 
 
 Even if the principal attack should succeed, 
 the plan for further advance may be upset at the 
 start by unforeseen factors. If twenty such plans 
 were drawn up instead of one, nevertheless the 
 force of circumstances would render them all 
 valueless. Of course, this is not to say that the 
 commander should not always be looking ahead, 
 but he must base his calculations upon precise 
 information, upon results already attained, not 
 bare hypotheses. 
 
 It seems to me that the generalissimo should 
 not designate any one attack as the principal 
 one. Let him choose the zones for attack, — 
 that is the true strategy, the only kind that will 
 avoid disappointment. He should leave to the 
 commanders in charge of the individual attacks 
 the task of foreseeing all possible favorable re- 
 sults which might come from each. He should 
 launch his attacks simultaneously, or at least at 
 intervals of a few days. He may have a personal 
 predisposition towards one attack rather than 
 another, as it may seem to him to promise most 
 rapid or decisive results; he has also a right to 
 foresee its possible consequences. But he must 
 keep his preferences to himself. Each attack 
 commander should feel that he has the fate of 
 
 248 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 the country in his hands; each should be pro- 
 vided with the means of following up a success 
 to the utmost limit. In short, it should be pos- 
 sible to convert any attack which succeeds into 
 a decisive one — a general victory. 
 
 The real qualities of the generalissimo and of 
 his staff have a chance to show themselves during 
 the days when the attacks are in progress. The 
 generalissimo should be kept informed all the 
 time as to the progress of each individual at- 
 tack. Here again we see the importance of liai- 
 son; the decisions of the generalissimo will be 
 entirely dependent thereon. Success, for one rea- 
 son or another, may come at that point where 
 it was least expected. It must not be allowed to 
 escape. At this decisive moment the generalis- 
 simo, who up till then has played a passive r61e, 
 will come on the scene with all his reserves. He 
 will circumscribe the area and the objectives in 
 those zones where he does not wish to employ 
 large forces, and will give all his attention to that 
 attack which seems to be succeeding. It is then, 
 and not till then, that, as a result of success al- 
 ready attained, this attack becomes the principal 
 one. It is fed from the general reserves, because 
 it is expected decisively to break the enemy's 
 Front and to bring a true victory. 
 
 What will happen at this critical moment? 
 The successful attack will have involved the 
 
 249 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 capture of a certain number of positions, and a 
 breach will have been opened through which the 
 reserves can begin the pursuit. This pursuit, 
 moreover, will not take place along a single line, 
 but will spread out laterally so as to take adja- 
 cent positions in the rear, at the same time that 
 it advances in depth. It will call for a large 
 number of troops. 
 
 If the enemy's army re-forms and faces the 
 attackers, it is obliged, in order to protect it- 
 self against artillery fire, to occupy a position 
 that has been created already or to create a 
 new one. In order for the advancing troops to 
 reach the enemy, it becomes necessary to attack 
 this new position, and, to that end, to approach 
 it with certain precautions, in certain forma- 
 tions; this is the phase which constitutes the 
 march of approach. 
 
 Thus the existence of positions has had the ef- 
 fect of confining strategy within new limits. We 
 cannot to-day make plans for the march of an 
 army, without taking account of the obstacles 
 which it must meet, that is to say, of positions. 
 Little by little some people have come to recog- 
 nize the existence of positions, or, rather, of a 
 single position. The departure from the position 
 occupied or the capture of the opposing one is, 
 in their minds, merely the prelude to the war of 
 movement, the only kind that is worthy of their 
 
 250 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 notice, the only one wherein their genius can find 
 its full scope. 
 
 When will people learn that to-day"this war 
 of movement can be nothing but the pursuit? 
 Movement is the outward and visible sign of a 
 victory in the war of positions, and this is the 
 only kind of war possible between two armies 
 supplied with modern materiel. 
 
 Suppose that there are no more positions, says 
 the objector? Then the war is over. It is im- 
 possible to hold the open field against artillery; 
 an army making the attempt would be wiped 
 out. An army wishing to fight must establish a 
 position at the point at which it stops; to guard 
 its flanks it must establish contact with the ad- 
 jacent elements; in a word, it must reconstitute 
 the Front. When this reconstruction is impos- 
 sible the fragments of the army will be destroyed 
 in the open country or in the isolated positions 
 where they have taken refuge. 
 
 This theory is said to rest on mere hypothesis. 
 Until very recently the accusation had a certain 
 justification, although there is a difference be- 
 tween vague suppositions based on fancy and 
 logical deductions. But recent events in Italy 
 have shown that this theory rests upon solid 
 facts. 
 
 The extraordinary thing is that the partisans 
 of the war of movement deduce an argument for 
 
 251 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 their theory from these same events; they say: 
 "See, the war of movement has reappeared!" 
 Oh, yes, I see it. I see, according to such in- 
 formation as I possess, that the positions in the 
 rear of those in the front line were either non- 
 existent or unoccupied or badly defended. I see 
 that the pursuit will be finally stopped when the 
 Italian army is established in positions which 
 are sufficiently strong and are provided with 
 artillery. It seems to me that the fundamental 
 principles of the war of positions were imperfectly 
 understood, and that the cause of the retreat, 
 over and above the disintegration of the Italian 
 morale by German propaganda, lies in this fact. I 
 certainly take no special pleasure in justifying my 
 theory by citing these facts, for my heart goes 
 out to my Latin brothers; yet I may not pass 
 the matter over in silence, but rather hope that 
 thus we shall be able to avoid the recurrence of 
 similar mishaps in future. Moreover, I have the 
 firm hope that, thanks to the organization of 
 new positions, the heroism of the Italian troops, 
 and the help of the Franco-British auxiliaries, 
 the present danger will soon be over. 
 
 This description of the war of positions, with 
 its four phases, shows that the pretended war of 
 movement, to which some people are still so 
 fondly attached, is nothing but that phase of 
 the combat which is properly called the piu'suit. 
 
 252 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 But the pursuit, considered in its strategic whole, 
 is quite different from a true war of movement, 
 for the reason that movement therein is on a very 
 reduced scale. The advance of the victorious 
 army must be like the passage of a great rake, 
 cleaning up the terrain, and bringing about the 
 fall of the occupied positions. Of course, at some 
 moments parts of the Front will be in advance 
 of others, but that is because it is precisely this 
 advance that causes the fall of the adjacent por- 
 tions of the enemy's line. As soon as this retreat 
 is accomplished, the Front straightens out of 
 itself. Strategic manoeuvring is reduced to its 
 simplest terms; it consists in an organized and 
 methodical advance of the Front until it en- 
 counters an obstacle. 
 
 We have now examined, in its general aspect, 
 the mechanism of a great victory. It remains to 
 examine those phases of the combat which take 
 place between one position and the next; that 
 is to say, the pursuit and the march of approach. 
 Without repeating in detail those rules which I 
 have endeavored to formulate in my "War of 
 Positions," I should still like to make a few re- 
 marks about them. 
 
 These phases have not so far been seen, in their 
 full development, on the Western Front. They 
 
 253 
 
THE warfahe of today 
 
 occurred only at the beginning of the war, first 
 when the Germans invaded France, then when 
 the French drove the Germans back from the 
 Marne to the Aisne. At that time, however, 
 neither the armament nor the training of the 
 troops had reached the perfection that has come 
 with three years of warfare, so that all of the 
 lessons that could be learned from them would 
 be tinged with error. They have been seen re- 
 cently in Italy, as a result of the German victory, 
 but cannot yet be known in all their details. 
 
 On the other hand, these phases have suc- 
 ceeded one another under conditions which are 
 not at all comparable with those which prevail 
 upon the Western Front. The Russians, for 
 instance, had an army which lacked artillery, 
 arms, and munitions, but was protected by the 
 extent of territory and the difficulties of com- 
 munication. The Serbian army had no positions, 
 but believed it could defend the country with 
 rifles, and bayonets, and patriotism. In Rumania 
 the army was insufficiently trained and supplied. 
 It is impossible to compare such operations with 
 those which would take place in a theatre of war 
 where the two adversaries were of comparable 
 material and moral strength as is the case on the 
 French Front. I shall, therefore, give an ideal de- 
 scription of these two phases instead of an account 
 based on my own experience, as I have done in 
 
 254 
 

 
 F 
 
 jja 
 
 ^^^^PHH 
 
 
 ^Ir * '"^Hl 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 the case of the other two phases. But in the 
 present war, if we are willing to be led by logic 
 and common sense, we. are not likely to go far 
 astray. 
 
 The pursuit is that phase of the combat where, 
 after the capture of a position, the object is to 
 reach the retreating troops, to prevent their re- 
 establishing touch with the adjacent units, and 
 to cause the downfall of such positions as are 
 still intact. 
 
 The essential condition for success is speed. 
 The enemy must not be given the chance to 
 reorganize. In order that the troops may ad- 
 vance rapidly, the progress of the reserves and 
 the forwarding of the supplies of food and am- 
 munition must be prepared with care. Further- 
 more, the first-line troops must constantly keep 
 in touch with the enemy. 
 
 In this phase, as in the preceding ones, the 
 commander is dependent upon the information 
 which he receives, and bases upon it such orders 
 as shall insure a continuous forward movement. 
 The greatest care must be bestowed upon the 
 establishment and the working of the liaisons. 
 
 The pursuit should usually be carried out by 
 fresh troops drawn from the reserves. Some of 
 them should be ordered to follow close upon the 
 heels of the troops which were driven from the 
 conquered position; others must take the adja- 
 
 255 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 cent positions in the rear. These troops may have 
 some difficulty in crossing the zone of shell 
 craters and trenches, but usually they will find, 
 after a short time, roads which are in good condi- 
 tion, because the enemy, who has needed them 
 up to the last minute to evacuate his artillery 
 and his convoys, has not had the time to de- 
 stroy them. Moreover, detachments of engi- 
 neers, assisted by fatigue parties, are given the 
 task of repairing these roads as well as putting 
 in order whatever else may be needed. 
 
 The cavalry finds in the pursuit the chance to 
 play a long-awaited r6Ie which is at once gallant 
 and useful. It possesses both speed and resisting 
 power; speed through the use of its horses, re- 
 sisting power by fighting on foot. It can throw 
 the enemy's troops into disorder and demoral- 
 ize them, pouncing upon isolated detachments 
 and convoys. It can fire on such objectives as it 
 sees, destroy important centres of communica- 
 tion, and disorganize positions which are still in- 
 tact by taking them in the rear. It can also, in 
 its numerous encounters with the enemy, pick 
 up much information of value to the Command. 
 
 Alongside of the cavalry, or even ahead of it, 
 armored automobiles, motor cannon, and motor 
 machine guns can play a considerable part. By 
 means of surprise and by means of fire they can 
 involve the enemy in serious difficulties and cap- 
 
 256 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 ture many prisoners. They can, in fact, cut off 
 the retreat of whole corps, destroy or halt bat- 
 teries or convoys, throw columns into a panic, 
 and cut the communication between the front 
 and rear of the adjoining positions. The infor- 
 mation which they obtain and bring in them- 
 selves with all speed to some point in touch with 
 the Command, may be of the greatest value. 
 
 The infantry is anxious, above all things, to 
 press forward in order to strike the enemy. It 
 alone is able to occupy and hold the conquered 
 terrain ; it digs in as soon as it is obliged to stop. 
 Certain detachments are advanced rapidly and 
 avoid fatigue by being transported in automobiles 
 to the points where they can be of most use. 
 Cyclist detachments also take part and help in 
 establishing liaisons. They can also constitute a 
 flying column, going rapidly wherever they are 
 needed. 
 
 The artillery must take care constantly to ac- 
 company the infantry and to support it, either 
 by destroying the enemy's artillery or by de- 
 livering a barrage against a retour offensif or 
 counter-attack, or by demolishing obstacles 
 which might hinder the advance. To this end 
 it always should advance in echelons, according 
 to the same principle as in the course of the 
 attack. A sufficient number of groups must be 
 always in place to fulfil the before-mentioned 
 
 257 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 duties, while others are in process of deplace- 
 ment. Rapidity of deplacement is of enormous 
 importance, for thereon depends the rate of the 
 pursuit. Everything possible must be done to 
 faciHtate this rapidity. The artillery can also 
 help to destroy and demoralize the adversary, 
 by pursuing him by its shells and by firing on 
 all favorable objectives, such as bodies of troops, 
 convoys, villages, cross-roads, etc. 
 
 The aircraft operates according to rules anal- 
 ogous to those which hold during the combat 
 in the interior of the position. The planes are 
 still specialized in their activities; some adjust 
 the fire of the batteries, others are accompanying 
 planes, and still others messenger planes. The 
 fighting planes bringdown the enemy's planes and 
 balloons, while the bombing planes attack con- 
 centrations of troops, convoys, railways, etc. It is 
 largely thanks to the information brought by the 
 planes that the commander can make his decisions. 
 
 The engineers take charge of technical works 
 for accelerating the pursuit and organizing the 
 conquered terrain. 
 
 The supply service, both for food and muni- 
 tions, takes on a great importance during this 
 phase of the combat, for thereon depends in no 
 small measure the success of the pursuit. If the 
 troops are short of food or munitions, all their 
 courage will be of no avail. 
 
 258 
 
Region of the Mort-Homme near Verdun: a conquered German trench 
 
 Near Moulin de Laffaux, battle of the Aisne (1917) : Engineers constructing a route 
 AFTER AN ADVANCE 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 The pursuit is characterized by a special tac- 
 tical use of the different arms, infantry, artil- 
 lery, aviation, engineers, and especially cavalry. 
 Moreover, the march formations are not always 
 the same throughout ^ each arm. The troops 
 form in column whenever possible, instead of 
 deploying in line, as the first-named formation 
 is more suitable to advance. They have special 
 marching zones where the roads are distributed 
 between the various columns. The specialists 
 are no longer used as before; the flat trajectory 
 weapons recover their importance; the rifle, auto- 
 matic rifle, automatic machine rifle, and machine 
 gun find many occasions where they are of use; 
 the high trajectory arms are less needed. There 
 is a special duty for the trench-cleaners. With 
 the aid of specialists from the engineers, they 
 seek out and destroy traps set by the enemy, such 
 as prepared mines, cleverly arranged infernal 
 machines, poisoned food left in evidence, etc. 
 
 In order that the pursuit may succeed, two es- 
 sential conditions must be realized : the artillery, 
 especially the heavy pieces, must be deplaced 
 rapidly and they must always be supplied with 
 the necessary ammunition. 
 
 It often happens, in fact, that not only are the 
 pursuing troops^ the object of counter-attacks, 
 but they also run against organized positions. 
 It is highly important that the infantry should 
 
 259 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 not be held up by these positions, as a temporary 
 halt might easily turn into a definite check, per- 
 mitting the enemy to re-form. If, therefore, a 
 rapid attack is possible, the mobile troops at 
 the head of the pursuing columns, the light 
 armored automobiles, the cavalry, the cyclists, 
 etc., should make the attempt. Successes, which 
 at first sight seemed impossible, have often been 
 secured when the enemy is demoralized by a 
 close pursuit. He may pass quickly through 
 the best-organized positions, instead of making 
 a stand in them. To sum up, prudence is the 
 watchword during the preparation, and even 
 during the attack itself; but audacity is an essen- 
 tial virtue in pursuit. 
 
 If the pursuing troops recognize that they can- 
 not, even with the help of their accompanying 
 artillery, seize the new position by a sudden at- 
 tack, they must once more follow the counsels of 
 prudence. The troops must come as close to the 
 position as possible before undertaking a new 
 preparation and a new attack. They should fol- 
 low the example of the caterpillar, who stretches 
 out to go ahead, but curls up when he wants a 
 good start for his next advance. This new phase 
 of the combat is called the "march of approach." 
 
 The march of approach is intended to bring 
 the troops within assaulting distance of the new 
 position with a minimum of loss. 
 
 260 
 

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HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 The success of the operation depends upon how 
 correct and specific is the available information 
 about the position to be attacked. The troops 
 should in fact be brought opposite to their ob- 
 jective, faced in a direction suitable to the under- 
 taking before them, and sheltered from useless 
 and premature losses. 
 
 The mobile pursuit troops should give pas- 
 sage to the infantry, furnishing them with all 
 possible useful information. The infantry should 
 also learn all it can for itself. It should remain 
 in column as long as possible, but never, on pain 
 of enormous losses, present this formation to 
 artillery fire. It must be on watch to form in 
 small columns or in line as soon as the moment 
 comes. 
 
 The other arms cooperate to protect the in- 
 fantry and to reconnoitre the opposing position. 
 The artillery follows at a proper distance, in- 
 stalling observing-stations and emplacements. 
 The aircraft accompanies the infantry and ad- 
 justs the artillery fire. The engineers mend the 
 roads and improve the means of access. The 
 cavalry returns to its old place, in the rear of the 
 other arms. 
 
 After a longer or shorter preparation, and after 
 the Command has given the order, the attack 
 is launched. If it fails, then a new period of 
 stationary fighting begins, with the usual system 
 
 261 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 of trenches. If it succeeds, the pursuit will 
 continue until the enemy is destroyed, or, at 
 least discouraged enough to acknowledge him- 
 self beaten. 
 
 If we take a general view of those means 
 which can bring victory, we see that in the front 
 rank stands coordination. The Allied Powers 
 must be drawn together still closer in the bonds 
 of friendship and cooperation if they are to reach 
 the goal at which they aim. The common use 
 of their resources should be carried out without 
 selfish calculations and fruitless discussions, in 
 which each participant reckons up the value of 
 his stake and the winnings which it may bring. 
 
 In a crisis of this magnitude we must think 
 in large terms. The Allied nations are fighting 
 for something else besides the restoration of 
 territory seized by force or the satisfaction of 
 personal aims; they are fighting to rid the earth 
 of autocracy, violence, and barbarism; to make 
 way for liberty, justice, and peace. 
 
 Let me at once say that America, perhaps 
 more than any other nation, has given proof of 
 her devotion to these ideals. She entered the war 
 with no hope of material gain. The realization 
 of her ideal will, moreover, permit her to develop 
 freely in future; an impossibility were Germany 
 
 262 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 victorious. President Wilson recently pointed 
 out this truth to the American workingmen in 
 his Buffalo speech. He said, in substance, that 
 any one who supposes that industrial freedom 
 could be maintained in the world after the real- 
 ization of Pan-Germanic ambitions, must be as 
 mad as the dreamers in Russia. 
 
 Are there no silly dreamers except in Russia? 
 Alas, they are everywhere. They prate of peace 
 when whole nations are groaning in misery and 
 slavery, and barbarism is methodically and scien- 
 tifically organized as never before. They even 
 talk of the Right, saying that in the forthcoming 
 negotiations it will protect the weak and the in- 
 nocent. Did the Right protect Serbia which made 
 humble submission to keep the peace? Did it 
 protect Belgium, the victim of savage aggression 
 in spite of treaties? Did it protect the French 
 provinces, invaded as a result of the violation 
 of Belgium? Have those who now talk of peace 
 faced the consequences of a premature peace? It 
 would be a slavish peace, handing over the free 
 peoples to the brutal omnipotence of Prussian 
 militarism. It would be a shameful peace, throw- 
 ing humanity back centuries in its progress. 
 
 These same dreamers are asking whether the 
 Allies, when they are finally victorious, will 
 demand territorial guarantees, annexations, and 
 conquests. What is the use of such questions 
 
 263 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 while our soldiers are still fighting? This is not 
 the moment for discussion, but for action. We 
 must first make siire of the triumph of liberty 
 over violence; after that we shall judge the 
 crimes against humanity. We shall know how 
 to be just and generous, but, first of all, we must 
 be victorious. 
 
 This war will never be won by economic means 
 or steps taken to aggravate Germany's economic 
 condition. How often have people imagined that 
 privations, lack of raw material, and shortage 
 of food would finally vanquish Germany! All 
 these conditions may add to the sufferings of our 
 adversaries, and so help to wear them down 
 physically and morally; but they cannot bring 
 victory. The Germans, under the Mailed Fist, 
 have sterilized their emotions and given their 
 bodies over to slavery; they are not so sensitive 
 as people imagine to moral and physical attri- 
 tion. They suffer greatly, but they resent their 
 suffering like an animal who does not understand 
 the cause of his distress. We must always repeat 
 the famous phrase: — 
 
 "Victory goes to that contestant who is able 
 to suffer a quarter of an hour longer than his 
 adversary." 
 
 The German morale has not sunk so low as is 
 sometimes imagined, but it is sinking. Already 
 their prisoners, instead of taking an arrogant 
 
 264 
 
HOW TO ACHIEVE VICTORY 
 
 tone, repeat unceasingly: "We never desired this 
 war." This is a symptom betraying fear of pun- 
 ishment. We must always maintain a morale 
 higher than theirs, and to that end we must know 
 how to support that suffering which the war in- 
 evitably brings. America, so far, has suffered 
 little. She will be obliged to suffer in the near 
 future, and she will know how to bear her suf- 
 ferings. And she will have to suffer much less 
 than Germany. 
 
 Victory will come only by force of arms. We 
 have already had victories in France, but they 
 were of a defensive sort; the Marne halted the 
 barbarian invasion, the Yser kept open the line 
 of communication with England, Verdun broke 
 the supreme German effort against France. 
 Germany has since learned that she can do 
 nothing against a people who resist in such 
 fashion; she has sought for compensation in 
 other quarters. Now it is our turn to break the 
 Front, now it is for us to win an offensive victory 
 with thousands upon thousands of prisoners, to 
 gather laurels and garlands in the gardens of 
 Berlin. It can be done. Twice, at least, before 
 now, we have been close to victory; in Artois 
 in May, 191 5, when all that was needed was a 
 few reserves to pour through the breach which 
 had been opened; on the Somme in July, 1916, 
 when we should have pushed boldly ahead, 
 
 265 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 instead of being over-prudent. We have missed 
 these chances, but we shall have others. We 
 know our weaknesses; we have but to mend 
 them. We have all that is needed to win, men, 
 money, materiel; we merely need to learn to 
 coordinate our efforts, and to act with energy, 
 method, and discipline. 
 
 Victory depends entirely upon us. It is a 
 question of will; let our will for victory be the 
 stronger. All of us, men and women, must bend 
 our strength and intelligence to the service of 
 that sacred cause which binds us together. When 
 we do that, I promise you that the bright star 
 of victory shall shine in our sky. 
 
VII 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 Lecture of November e6, 1917 
 
 Summary 
 
 Definition of defensive combat. — Definition of the defence of a 
 position. — Case in which the defence is imposed. — Forms of the 
 defensive: stationary fighting, defensive combat. — The four phases 
 of the defence of a position. 
 
 The organization of the defence. — Detailed study of the two op- 
 posing positions; battle maps; personal inspection of the position to 
 be defended; ground and aerial observation; posts for location by 
 sound; ground telephoning; coups de main ; an example. 
 
 The material amSnagemenl of the position. — Plan of defence: plan 
 of reenforcements; plan of works. — Echelonment in depth. — Con- 
 tinuity of the first line. — Execution of a reenforcement. — The 
 rear of a position. — Measures in case of retreat. 
 
 The physiceil and moral preparation of the troops. 
 
 Defence of the position. — The maintenance of the troops under 
 bombardment; measures adopted. 
 
 Defence of the first line; mines; accessory defences; fighting against 
 the tanks; rdle of the infantrymen; machine guns; r61e of the artil- 
 lery; hand-to-hand combat. 
 
 Fighting in the interior of the position; counter-attacks; liaisons. 
 
 Retreat. — Its two forms. -^ Realignment of the Front and its 
 advantages. ' — Retreat under hostile pressure and its difficulties; 
 the r61e of the artillery; holding of a new position. 
 
 Retour offensif. — Its rules. ^- Its results. 
 
 Conclusion. — The defence of a position may be a victory like 
 Verdun. 
 
 The defensive along a front or in a position 
 may be defined as the situation of a body of 
 troops whose object is to defend themselves 
 against hostile attack. 
 
 267 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The defence of a position consists in the sum 
 total of the measures taken by the troops to pre- 
 pare and execute a combat against an attacking 
 enemy. 
 
 The defensive in itself can never lead to a 
 decisive result. For that reason it is permissible 
 only when the end in view is to wait for a favor- 
 able moment to undertake the offensive. 
 
 At certain points the defensive is necessary. 
 There may be an insufficient supply of men or 
 materiel or of munitions. The geographical or 
 topographical situation may be unfavorable. 
 There may be tactical advantages in holding the 
 occupied points. 
 
 The first of these cases is the most frequent. 
 On account of the enormous effectives required 
 for an offensive, it is necessary to stay on the 
 defensive in a certain number of zones of the 
 different fronts. The second case results from 
 the difficulties and the consequent useless losses 
 of men and of energy which would result from 
 an offensive in certain zones. The third case 
 arises when the occupied positions give a great 
 advantage over the enemy. For instance, the 
 possession of certain observing-stations may 
 make it possible to cause him daily serious losses, 
 thus increasing his rate of attrition. A gain of 
 territory would be of no benefit at all if it in- 
 volved the loss of this advantage, and especially 
 
 268 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 if it placed the seemingly victorious troops in a 
 less favorable tactical situation. In such a case 
 there is no advantage in a deplacement, unless 
 the whole Front moves forward as a result of a 
 success in a different zone. 
 
 When the enemy is not attacking, the defen- 
 sive amounts merely to occupying the terrain. 
 This is the period of stationary fighting which 
 has been already studied. It is life in the trenches. 
 Duties in the position, frequently called also 
 duties in the sector, consist in preparing the 
 terrain both for the defence of the position and 
 for the attack of the position opposite, which 
 must always be kept in mind. 
 
 When the enemy attacks, the defensive takes 
 the form of combat — that is to say, of defensive 
 combat. This is usually carried out along a con- 
 siderable front, including several positions in 
 lateral contact. If it takes an unfavorable turn, 
 it may be continued in successive positions eche- 
 loned in depth. In fact, when one position is 
 lost, the only way to stop the enemy is to de- 
 fend another position, and so on. 
 
 On the defensive as on the offensive, in order 
 to have an idea of the whole combat, it is suffi- 
 cient to study the defence of a position. 
 
 The defence of a position is intended to keep 
 that position; but this particular aim is subordi- 
 nate to the main object of the war — the destruc- 
 
 269 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 tion of the enemy's army. In fact, the defence of 
 a position offers excellent opportunities to inflict 
 losses upon the enemy and may even sometimes 
 bring about his defeat. 
 It includes four parts: — 
 (i) The organization of the defence. 
 
 (2) The defence itself. 
 
 (3) The retreat, if the enemy is victorious. 
 
 (4) The retour offensif, to retake lost ground. 
 
 The description of the first two phases will give 
 opportunity to recall many of the principles 
 which were explained in the description of life in 
 the trenches, or the period of stationary fighting. 
 
 The organization of the defence includes a 
 number of parts, usually carried out at the same 
 time. These are: the detailed study of the two 
 opposing positions; the material amenagement 
 of the position to be defended ; the physical and 
 moral preparation of the troops. 
 
 The detailed study of the two opposing posi- 
 tions presents the same advantages as in the case 
 of the preparation for an attack. Certain details, 
 however, are particularly important. 
 
 The position to be defended is known by the 
 guiding maps. These maps are generally drawn 
 to the scale of i : 10,000. They show all the 
 
 270 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 trenches and all the boyaux as well as such works 
 as narrow-gauge railways. They do not, how- 
 ever, contain any indication of the accessory de- 
 fences, the command posts, the distribution of the 
 troops, the machine guns, or the artillery. These 
 maps are never given to any officers of lower 
 grade than regimental commander of infantry or 
 group commander of artillery. They are com- 
 pleted by their individual owners, when that is 
 necessary. But they are kept secret. For that 
 reason they are never taken to the first-line 
 trenches, for fear of being captured in a hostile 
 raid. 
 
 Besides this the officers and men should go 
 about in the position. This is the only way in 
 which they can learn thoroughly the system of 
 trenches and boyaux as well as the different 
 passages. This knowledge has numerous advan- 
 tages. It permits of rapid and easy execution 
 of reliefs. It diminishes losses, by causing pre- 
 cautions to be taken at dangerous passages. It 
 facilitates, even during the night, the lateral 
 movements or reenforcements, retreats, retours 
 offensifs, and counter-attacks. 
 
 The opposing position should also be known as 
 well as possible. The attacking troops of the 
 enemy will start from there and their plans and 
 dispositions will be dependent upon its nature. 
 
 Preparations needful for an attack are always 
 271 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 considerable. Even if the enemy does not give 
 the alarm by a particularly intense artillery 
 preparation or by a redoubled activity of his 
 aircraft, he is forced to make certain arrange- 
 ments of his positions which should attract at- 
 tention, such as the construction of new emplace- 
 ments for batteries and observing-stations, the 
 digging of trenches and boyaux, the concentra- 
 tion of troops at certain fx)ints, the creation of 
 dep6ts for munitions and food, increased use of 
 railway lines and roads, and works of preparation 
 on the first line, such as saps, departure par- 
 allels, and openings in the accessory defences. 
 
 The observers, both aerial and on the ground, 
 should redouble their vigilance to note all these 
 signs. 
 
 Aerial observation makes it possible, by the aid 
 of photography, to furnish plans of the enemy's 
 works, to show their form, to keep the battery 
 maps up-to-date, and to point out movements 
 and concentrations. 
 
 Observation on the ground is indispensable to 
 complete and sometimes to replace aerial obser- 
 vation. It has the advantage that it can be 
 carried on in all weathers, both by night and by 
 day. Not only is it permanent, but it is more 
 detailed, because it includes many matters which 
 the aviators cannot see. At times it is even more 
 rapid on account of telephonic connection. The 
 
 272 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 artillery observer, like the infantry information 
 officer and the watcher at his post, should feel the 
 importance of bits of information which at times 
 appear insignificant. These should be communi- 
 cated to all the units and to all the arms which 
 may be interested as well as to the Command. 
 
 One means of observation which has sometimes 
 given excellent results is the location of batteries 
 by sound. My stepfather, Honore de Villard, 
 who was an advocate of this method and who 
 experimented with it in his artillery regiment at 
 the beginning of 191 5, explained its utility in the 
 following terms of his report: — 
 
 "We can evidently not pretend to execute a 
 rapid or sure fire upon a battery if we cannot 
 adjust this fire; that is to say, if we do not see 
 what we are doing. 
 
 "The observers on the ground, even when they 
 see the flashes and the smoke, which is seldom 
 the case, are yet unable to pick out the emplace- 
 ments, which are almost always out of sight. 
 The observers in the air, even if they see these 
 emplacements, cannot generally be sure that they 
 are occupied unless they see the flashes. 
 
 "In our ordinary daily firing the enemy's 
 batteries are in action so intermittently that 
 we can seldom find them by means of airplanes. 
 As for the stationary balloons, the necessity to 
 keep them in safety makes it impossible for them 
 
 273 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 to do any very effective observation. We are 
 thus forced, during daily artillery duels, to have 
 recourse to another sense, namely, hearing, to 
 help out where our sight fails us. 
 
 "The consequence of all this is that fire ad- 
 justment is impossible. We must resort to zone 
 fire. 
 
 " My method for discovering batteries, which 
 is founded upon a knowledge of the calibres, and 
 fire tables, and on the velocity of sound, has no 
 other pretension than to reduce the limits of 
 the zone of fire. The photographs of the airplanes 
 should serve as a check. The method will be 
 complete only when all the infantry N.C.O.'s 
 help us with their eyes and ears. It has already 
 been of real service and has saved not a little 
 ammunition." 
 
 This method was adopted in the month of 
 June, 1915, by General Joffre, who ordered the 
 explanation of it and the numerical tables for its 
 use to be printed for all the armies. Special posts, 
 called " posts for locating by sound," were created 
 and improved little by little. 
 
 If several of these posts hear the sound of one 
 of the enemy's pieces, and note their observa- 
 tions simultaneously, the comparison of these 
 diverse data makes it possible to determine the 
 location of the pieces. In this way it is possible 
 to locate a piece Within a square one hundred 
 
 274 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 yards on a side, or even less, so that the field 
 which an airplane must observe, either visually 
 or photographically, is considerably reduced. It 
 is easy to see how important it is for the de- 
 fence to know the situation of the enemy's bat- 
 teries. It is fair to say, however, that this means 
 of observation works well only when the enemy 
 is firing little. 
 
 Telephoning through the ground is a highly 
 useful method of observation. With regard to 
 this, however, it is not permissible to give de- 
 tails, even though it is perfectly well known to 
 our enemies and was probably used by them be- 
 fore we found it out. It is often the means of 
 learning important secrets. 
 
 A raid constitutes a very good way to get exact 
 information of the enemy's position. In a raid 
 prisoners can be captured, from whom we may 
 learn the details of the enemy's position, the 
 works which he has undertaken, and the inten- 
 tions of his officers. It is also possible to pick 
 up the numbers of the regiments engaged, as well 
 as documents, letters, or papers giving precious 
 information. Finally, a raid may have, in addi- 
 tion, results of a tactical or moral nature. 
 
 On the 23d of February, 191 5, when I was in 
 command of the centre of resistance of Passchen- 
 daele, I had occasion to carry out a raid, I in- 
 vented, without suspecting that my method would 
 
 275 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 one day be regularly employed, the system of 
 a rolling barrage in front of my reconnaissance. 
 I also ordered lateral barrages to be laid down at 
 the same time to prevent a counter-attack. My 
 quartermaster-sergeant, Montelbetti, who has 
 since been killed, was thus able, in broad daylight, 
 at the head of a few men, to go four hundred 
 yards from our trenches along the famous slopes 
 of Passchendaele and to bring back information 
 without losing a man. 
 
 Brigadier-General Aim6, who has since been 
 killed, heard of my raid before receiving my offi- 
 cial report on the subject, and sent me a note 
 which showed his proper anxiety to avoid useless 
 operations: — 
 
 "Being unable to see clearly the utility of the 
 reconnaissance, carried out yesterday, the 23d 
 of February, by the second battalion of the Sixty- 
 ninth Regiment, the general commanding the sec- 
 tor begs the commander of the Sixty-ninth to in- 
 form him of the exact object of this operation." 
 I drew up a new report in the following terms: 
 "The exact object of this operation was: — 
 " I . To destroy an observation post, from 
 which, according to the reports of the preceding 
 days, an artillery observer was apparently able 
 to adjust a very accurate fire on the Sixth Com- 
 pany (e.g., the command post of the captain 
 was destroyed and, on the 21st of February, the 
 
 276 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 shelters constructed the night before by the 
 engineers for the Sixth Company, were taken 
 under fire) ;to stop or lessen in thisway a fire which 
 was very destructive to the right-hand end of 
 the line. 
 
 "2. To carry out a search in this post by means 
 of a detail for sketches, information, blank-books, 
 notes, shoulder-straps, etc, which might be found 
 on dead or wounded or prisoners, after the de- 
 struction of the post. 
 
 "3. To reconnoitre the general condition of 
 the adjacent German trench, from which every 
 night rockets are sent up and rifle fire is let loose, 
 in order to see if it is strongly or weakly organ- 
 ized, if there is water in it, and also, in case of a 
 further offensive, if we could cling on to it. 
 
 "4. To determine in advance the ease or diffi- 
 culty of a possible forward movement, by suc- 
 cessive feeling-out of the Front. 
 
 "5. To reconnoitre the road which a counter- 
 attack might follow in case of a hostile offensive. 
 
 "6. To show the battalion the effect of bar- 
 rage and to give it confidence in the support of 
 our artillery. 
 
 "7. To maintain among the companies of the 
 battalion a spirit of activity, a taste for the offen- 
 sive, and military competition — all of which have 
 a tendency to grow less in trench fighting, but 
 which will doubtless be necessary in the spring. 
 
 277 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 "8. Lastly, these different objects are in ac- 
 cord with the wish expressed only this morning 
 by the general commanding the sector, on the 
 occasion of his visit to the Front, that we should 
 show a certain amount of activity." 
 
 This report epitomizes in a single example the 
 different purposes which a raid might accom- 
 plish. It was, moreover, well received at Head- 
 quarters. For one thing, Montelbetti was men- 
 tioned in orders and his companions were all 
 nominated soldiers of the first class. 
 
 Another possible object of a raid is to conquer 
 an observing-station. Under these circumstances 
 it is really a small offensive action, because it 
 helps to keep the ground. It is justified by the 
 principle that we should try to keep the enemy 
 from seeing us while we continue to see him. 
 
 The commander of a small unit should never 
 carry out a raid merely with the object of taking 
 a few hundred yards of trench. The real reason 
 for a raid of this sort is heedless ardor or an un- 
 healthy desire for notoriety. Such operations 
 have been too often undertaken by the Allies in 
 the course of the campaign and have cost a large 
 amount of useless bloodshed. 
 
 The material aminagement of the position is 
 intended to prevent the enemy's troops from 
 getting into the position, to hold them up if they 
 
 278 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 get there, and to drive them out. It is carried 
 out according to a plan drawn up by the com- 
 mander of the position, which is called the 
 " plan of defence." Before drawing up this plan 
 the commander of the position, aided by officers 
 of his staff, carries out the necessary reconnais- 
 sance. He takes account of all the ways and 
 means by which the enemy can execute an at- 
 tack, and makes arrangements to meet every 
 eventuality. 
 
 The plan of defence is drawn up for the gar- 
 rison which habitually occupies the position and 
 should defend it from attack. It points out the 
 special duties assigned to each unit, studies the 
 liaisons which should connect the various units, 
 and makes all the necessary arrangements for 
 bringing up supplies and for sending back the 
 wounded. 
 
 The plan of reenforcement consists in arrang- 
 ing to bring into the position supplementary 
 units, to increase its capacity for resistance. 
 This plan arranges the places which the new 
 units should occupy, the way in which they 
 should establish their liaisons or amalgamate 
 with the troops already in place. It arranges 
 what groupings shall be made and what systems 
 of command are suitable. 
 
 The plan of works is the important corollary 
 of the plan of defence, the fundamental ideas of 
 
 279 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 which it carries out in practice. It is carried out 
 by all the troops involved, — infantry, artillery, 
 and engineers, — each one being employed on 
 the works which belong to it. There are also fa- 
 tigue parties sent to help with these works, the 
 engineers acting in an advisory capacity. The 
 plan of works is carefully kept up-to-date and 
 must be neither modified nor neglected at the 
 time of reliefs. It is kept in the archives of each 
 sector and under the charge of certain officers 
 permanently stationed there, to maintain a con- 
 tinuity in plans and to facilitate reconnaissance. 
 The officers of the staff should make sure of the 
 proper execution and of the state of advance- 
 ment of all works, and propose such improve- 
 ments as may seem to them necessary. 
 
 The great principle which should guide the 
 commander in making his various plans is 
 echelonment in depth. Trenches, field works, ma- 
 chine guns, and batteries should be arranged in 
 this way, so that if the enemy captures the first 
 he will find others behind. 
 
 Too dense occupation of the first line has the 
 disadvantage of exposing masses of men to bom- 
 bardment by hostile artillery. Of course deep 
 and strong shelters can be constructed; but if 
 such shelters are fired on by the enemy, they 
 are certain to be destroyed together with a 
 considerable number of men. Moreover, if 
 
 280 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 the entrances to these shelters are blocked by 
 bombardment, or if there is a cave-in, they be- 
 come tombs. The first line should, therefore, be 
 defended only by isolated posts. The posts of 
 the watchers should be reenforced at the points 
 which seem most liable to attack. 
 
 A too great insistence on the principle last 
 enunciated has given rise to the idea that it is 
 better to have a discontinuous first line made up 
 of little watching-posts isolated from one another. 
 This procedure has serious disadvantages. Not 
 only" are posts which communicate with one an- 
 other with difficulty less able to transmit infor- 
 mation, but they are less secure in themselves 
 and can easily be captured by a patrol or a raid. 
 
 The fact that a sufficient artillery preparation 
 always transforms a continuous trench into a 
 discontinuous one is not a sufficient reason for 
 making the trench originally discontinuous. Sep- 
 arate elements of trench would be objectives for 
 the combined fire of the enemy, whereas in the 
 case of the continuous trench the enemy cannot 
 know which elements are selected to offer resist- 
 ance. If he reaches an unoccupied element, he 
 can be enfiladed by an automatic machine rifle 
 alongside, or decimated by grenadiers on a lateral 
 platform. If he arrives at an occupied element, 
 he is surrounded by reinforcements arriving by 
 contiguous unoccupied elements. 
 
 281 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 The trenches, like the troops, and the shelters 
 which contain them, are arranged in depth, pre- 
 senting a decreasing density from the front 
 towards the rear. The troops in the rear can 
 always, upon the first alarm, come to the help 
 of those in front. And even if they are a little 
 late, they can automatically carry out a counter- 
 attack. They have had the advantage of remain- 
 ing under shelter during the bombardment and 
 they arrive, fresh and intact, at the very moment 
 when they can be most useful. 
 
 It must be remembered that reenforcement 
 does not imply a forward movement of all the 
 troops arranged in depth. On the contrary, cer- 
 tain units of infantry, machine guns, and groups 
 of grenadiers should be stationed in trenches 
 or other suitably arranged works to halt the 
 enemy's advance. These troops are expected to 
 execute a counter-attack either by movement or 
 by fire. When they are expected merely to fire, 
 they should be placed in a carefully chosen situa- 
 tion, such as trenches on a counter-slope, flank- 
 ing elements, or barricades blocking the way. 
 
 Concealment of the field works by the slopes 
 of the ground is an essential principle in the 
 amdnagement of the interior of the position. 
 Camouflage is no less important, and leaves the 
 enemy in ignorance as to where he may expect 
 to encounter resistance. It is especially neces- 
 
 282 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 sary to hide the observing-stations, as their dis- 
 covery, and consequent destruction, deprives the 
 defence of one of its principal elements. 
 
 The rear of the position should be prepared 
 with as much care as the interior. All ways of 
 communication serving to bring up troops, 
 munitions, and food should be multiplied and 
 maintained. Certain fatigue parties should be 
 entrusted with their permanent maintenance. A 
 rigorous policing of traffic will prevent conges- 
 tion and delay. All arrangements must be made 
 both for supply and evacuation. If a retreat 
 becomes necessary, neither materiel nor supplies 
 nor munitions should be allowed to fall into the 
 hands of the enemy. What cannot be removed 
 must be destroyed. Moreover, it must be ar- 
 ranged to destroy all means of communications 
 so as to retard the enemy's advance. 
 
 Retreat is a regrettable operation, yet it must 
 be taken into account, on pain of leaving troops, 
 without officers and without orders, exposed to 
 a victorious enemy. For this reason, the com- 
 mander of a position should work out all the 
 measures necessary to install his troops in a 
 second position and to define the duties which 
 they must fulfil therein. To this end he must 
 make sure of his liaisons both with the front and 
 the rear, taking such wise precautions that a 
 local failure will not turn into a general disaster. 
 
 283 
 
THE WARFAKE OF TO-DAY i 
 
 The physical and moral preparation of the 
 troops is the same as for the attack. But the 
 troops who have been to rest are expected not 
 only to relieve the tired troops in the trenches, 
 but to furnish units ready to execute counter- 
 attacks. 
 
 In every case the officers should inspire the 
 men with a real affection for the position en- 
 trusted to their care. They should impress upon 
 them that its retention is a point of honor. A 
 body of troops should be ready to be killed to 
 the last man rather than abandon the terrain to 
 the enemy. This feeling is much easier to develop 
 than might be supposed, especially when the 
 men have been for a long time in the same place. 
 For instance, in Belgium in the sector of Lange- 
 marck, Saint-Julien, Zonnebeke, my soldiers, 
 who knew every nook and corner of the region, 
 were really attached to the spot, in spite of their 
 terrible sufferings there. When, in April, 1915, 
 a few days before our departure for Artois, they 
 learned that their position had been captured by 
 the Germans, they felt the same consternation 
 that a man does who hears of the capture of his 
 native town. This feeling will greatly strengthen 
 the power of resistance. 
 
 284 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 The defence of a position is intended to prevent 
 the enemy from seizing that position, by inflict- 
 ing the greatest possible losses upon him. 
 
 It includes various parts: the maintenance of 
 the troops under bombardment, the defence of 
 the first line, and, if this first line is forced, the 
 struggle in the interior of the position. 
 
 The maintenance of the troops under bom- 
 bardment is the first requisite for a good de- 
 fence. Whatever care is taken to avoid losses, 
 there is only one way to prevent the enemy 
 from invading a position — that is, to keep the 
 position constantly occupied. Of course the men 
 should be scattered about and sheltered. But 
 their disposition should always be sufficiently 
 close-knit, so that an attacking body may not 
 advance easily by merely breaking through in 
 two or three places. 
 
 Every attack is preceded by an artillery prep- 
 aration. The men must be able to meet this, 
 while fulfilling more carefully than ever the duties 
 of the position, such as observing the enemy 
 and firing on his organizations or his batteries. 
 The artillery preparation is carried out on the 
 whole of the position, but it is generally more 
 violent and more carefully directed on the first 
 line of trenches. The necessary watchers should 
 be protected as well as possible and should be 
 placed in the vicinity of shelters where they can 
 
 285 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 find cover instantaneously. It is even permissible 
 for one or more of them to be under cover while 
 one alone is observing. The necessity for contin- 
 uous observation must, nevertheless, take the 
 precedence of considerations of personal safety. 
 The slightest inattention may let slip that critical 
 moment when the enemy's attack is launched, 
 and may consequently prevent an effective reply. 
 Instead of being in shelters which are carefully 
 organized, but are targets for the enemy's fire, 
 it is often well for the watchers to be in shell 
 craters arranged for them beyond the regular line 
 of trenches. They may find themselves most ad- 
 vantageously situated there, both for observation 
 and for safety. 
 
 The defenders of the position echeloned in 
 depth should be as well protected as possible. 
 Most of them are in deep dugouts, provided 
 with two or more entrances, and with sentinels 
 at the mouths. The object of these sentinels is 
 to give the alarm in case of gas or of an attack. 
 Every soldier, no matter what he is doing, must 
 always have his arms and his gas mask by him. 
 
 The period of bombardment requires a much 
 greater show of energy than the period which 
 precedes going over the top. It is hard to imagine 
 the impression which is produced by an intense 
 and continuous bombardment, lasting several 
 days. The men must remain underground with- 
 
 286 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 out the light of the sun or pure air. Shells are 
 continually arriving, any one of which may im- 
 mediately bury them. They are relatively iso- 
 lated on account of the, difficulty of communi- 
 cation. All these things produce in many men 
 a real state of stupor. Besides this, the bringing- 
 up of supplies, even during the night, becomes 
 sometimes quite difficult, so that this trouble is 
 added to the others. Last of all, after most try- 
 ing days, the mfen must have the courage to 
 work at night to repair the damage caused by 
 the shells in order to maintain the smooth work- 
 ing of the communications, the capacity of resist- 
 ance of the various obstacles, and the security 
 of the shelters. 
 
 The only way to diminish the intensity of the 
 bombsirdment is to silence or to neutralize the 
 enemy's batteries. Observers in the air and on 
 the ground make every effort to find out where 
 these batteries are, and to adjust the fire to 
 them. A zone fire will not suffice; specific ob- 
 jectives are needed. If the destruction of the 
 hostile batteries cannot be effected, a discharge 
 of gas shells, either poisonous or lachrymatory, 
 may have the result of visibly diminishing the 
 intensity of the enemy's fire and, hence, of light- 
 ening the task of the defenders of the position. 
 
 The defence of the first line is carried out by 
 means of close collaboration of all the arms — 
 
 287 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 infantry, artillery, and aircraft. It must be seen 
 to with the greatest care, for even though the 
 capture of this line does not cause the fall of 
 the position, it may still have a considerable 
 moral effect on the defenders and facilitate the 
 progress of a bold enemy. 
 
 The use of offensive mines cannot produce an 
 important result in this sort of defence. It is a 
 good plan to have subterranean listening-posts 
 to find out the enemy's plans, and it is necessary 
 to construct counter-mines in order to destroy 
 his mines; but generally it is unwise to undertake 
 a subterranean war without any precise object. 
 The only useful defence of this sort is to con- 
 struct fougades and mines to be exploded if the 
 enemy manages to seize an important point, such 
 as an observing-station. Even in this case the 
 effort required is generally disproportionate to 
 the result obtained. 
 
 Accessory defences, such as wire entangle- 
 ments, chevaux de f rises, and trous de loup, con- 
 stitute the surest means to break the spirit of the 
 attacking troops. They must be kept up as well 
 as possible and repaired during the night. Even 
 if they have been considerably damaged by the 
 bombardment, they suffice to hinder the advance 
 of the assailants and to hold them for a con- 
 siderable time under the fire of the defending 
 artillery and infantry. 
 
 288 
 

 
 Fort Vaux, near Verdun, east of the Meuse, April 17, 1916 
 
 Fort Vaux, during a bombardment 
 DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 As soon as the enemy's attacking wave leaves 
 the trench, the observers give, the alarm. The 
 barrage is then laid down before it, while a vio- 
 lent fire is directed upon the departure trench and 
 the trenches behind, where the attacking troops 
 are assembled. 
 
 If tanks precede the infantry, they should be 
 taken immediately under a direct artillery fire. 
 For this purpose certain counter-batteries should 
 be especially designated to fire on them, for tanks 
 are a real mobile artillery which it is necessary 
 to destroy, the moving barrage being replaced 
 by the pieces themselves. There are, moreover, 
 other means of interfering with the advance of 
 the tanks. For instance, it is possible to prepare 
 large and carefully concealed ditches at the points 
 where the monsters are likely to pass. This 
 procedure, which is nothing but a development 
 of the traps set for wild beasts, makes the tanks 
 tumble over in such a way that the infantry 
 cannot possibly set them up again. 
 
 The tanks can produce surprise by appearing 
 unexpectedly and destroying the accessory de- 
 fences by the simple process of passing through 
 them, without the aid of artillery preparation. 
 But their advance up to the first line is beset with 
 difficulties when the observers are attentive. If, 
 in spite of the artillery fire and in spite of all the 
 means taken to upset them, such as trenches, 
 
 289 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 mines, explosions, etc., a certain number of 
 tanks break through the accessory defences, the 
 first-line defenders need not be alarmed. These 
 moving monsters cannot come and trouble them 
 individually in the trench elements or shell holes 
 where they have taken refuge. 
 
 Isolated pieces of artillery, and even advance 
 batteries, which have previously been silent in 
 order to avoid premature destruction, are un- 
 masked at the proper moment and open fire either 
 on the enemy's infantry or on his tanks. Under 
 these circumstances pieces which are moved on 
 rails can be brought almost immediately to em- 
 placements which have been prepared in advance 
 and carefully concealed, and can render invalu- 
 able services. Moreover, the rails will make it 
 possible to move them under cover as soon as 
 their task is accomplished. 
 
 The defenders of the first line are composed, not 
 only of the watchers and the small posts scat- 
 tered round in the shell holes, but also of units 
 from the vicinity, from the doubling trench and 
 the transversal trenches. At the first alarm all 
 these men run to the stations which have been 
 assigned to them. It must not be imagined that 
 they are placed like the fighters in the illustrated 
 magazines, at successive loopholes through which 
 they poke their rifles. At this stage there are 
 no more loopholes, if there ever were any. And 
 
 290 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 in many places there are no more parapets. 
 There is no more trench. There are merely cer- 
 tain shattered trench elements in which groups 
 of men decide to offer resistance. They have 
 kept their arms in good condition during the 
 whole period of bombardment and are ready to 
 meet the attack. 
 
 Machine guns are placed at good points for 
 flanking and have a considerable effect. Auto- 
 matic machine rifles, automatic rifles, and rifles 
 are placed on the relics of the parapet or are 
 arranged in shell craters. Hand and rifle gre- 
 nades are also used when the distance is suit- 
 able. The men who handle these weapons become 
 less and less exposed, owing to the fact that the 
 enemy's artillery preparation and barrage must 
 go beyond the first trench in order that his 
 infantry may enter it. For this reason the first 
 line of defence can cause considerable losses to 
 the assailants, especially when these are strug- 
 gling with the remains of the accessory defences. 
 If tanks have opened good passages through, 
 these passages constitute, as it were, defiles, 
 where a well-directed fire of machine guns and 
 of artillery may have considerable effect. 
 
 The artillery delivers the barrage, arranged in 
 the plan of defence or called for by the infantry. 
 It may also have the chance to take hostile 
 columns obliquely or in enfilade ; and it must not 
 
 291 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 let such a chance escape. To this end the Com- 
 mand can arrange a certain amount of regroup- 
 ing of the artillery, a part of which may have 
 been decided on in the plan of defence. 
 
 In spite of all the means of defence so far de- 
 scribed, it seldom happens that a well-pre- 
 pared and energetically carried-out attack does 
 not manage to reach the first line. At that mo- 
 ment the defenders resort especially to the gre- 
 nade and the bayonet. The attackers, further 
 reduced by this hand-to-hand fighting, are some- 
 times so much exhausted by their efforts and 
 demoralized by their losses that they are ready 
 to surrender. If groups of the enemy have man- 
 aged to seize one element of trench and endeavor 
 to go forward, the defenders of the adjacent 
 elements attempt a retour offensif at this point, 
 before the new occupants have had the time to 
 organize. 
 
 The defence of the first line does not at all 
 resemble a regular combat spread along a defi- 
 nite line, but a struggle composed of a thousand 
 little incidents. As on the offensive, it is unity 
 of aim which establishes the most certain liaison 
 among all the troops. Every fighter knows that 
 he must resist at all hazards and preserve the 
 terrain which he occupies. It is this thought 
 which tells him at any moment what to do. 
 
 The struggle in the interior of the position 
 292 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 presents certain analogies to the defence of the 
 first line, since it consists in defending successive 
 trenches. It has, however, one different charac- 
 teristic, owing to the fact that the assailant, 
 instead of appearing in the open, finds numerous 
 means of shelter, such as elements of trenches, 
 sections of boyaux, or shell craters; barrages 
 have become difficult, because the position of the 
 attacking line is hard to determine; in the confu- 
 sion of the fight they might produce deplorable 
 results. The combat tends more and more to 
 split up, and is the work of small groups of men 
 frequently employing high trajectory arms. 
 
 There are, nevertheless, many occasions to use 
 the flat trajectory arms also. Machine guns, 
 echeloned in depth and placed in advance in 
 transversal trenches or suitably chosen emplace- 
 ments, may fire obliquely or in enfilade upon 
 those passages which the enemy must follow. 
 They may thus come into play unexpectedly, at 
 the very moment that they can cause the great- 
 est loss, and can produce a considerable effect, 
 both on the moral and on the material side. 
 A single machine gun, which has been kept intact 
 by an armored and concealed shelter, can hold 
 up important effectives for a long time, thus 
 giving a chance for the defenders to re-form, or 
 for reenforcements to arrive. 
 
 Trenches on the counter-slope are among the 
 293 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 most serious obstacles which the assailant can 
 encounter, and should, consequently, be organ- 
 ized whenever pxDssible. They may be artificially 
 created by digging away the ground. It is hard 
 to adjust artillery fire upon their accessory de- 
 fences, and the form of the ground itself gives 
 additional protection. If the assailant is to over- 
 come them, he must have with him either mor- 
 tars or tanks. The mortars which have been used 
 up to this point cannot follow the infantry in the 
 capacity of accompanying cannon, but the tanks 
 can. They can overthrow these trenches if they 
 manage to get up to them; but here, even more 
 than in the first line, it is possible to put the 
 tanks out of action by artillery fire, by large 
 ditches, and by explosions. 
 
 Counter-attacks are the best means of stop- 
 ping the progress of an assailant within the posi- 
 tion. They are carried out by fresh troops and 
 are launched at the moment when the enemy, 
 fatigued or discouraged, shows signs of hesita- 
 tion. They can be delivered at night, for the 
 defenders, familiar with the position, have a 
 great advantage over an enemy who has not had 
 the time to learn its details. 
 
 Under all circumstances liaisons play an im- 
 portant part in defence. They permit the differ- 
 ent troops to help one another. They are fre- 
 quently quite hard to maintain at critical 
 
 294 
 
DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 Troops ready for a counter-attack, under the bursts of shrapnel 
 
 Avocourt, near Verdun, April 30, 1916 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 moments, requiring boundless devotion on the 
 part of the men entrusted with them. When one 
 position is attacked, the men in the adjacent 
 positions, whether or not engaged themselves at 
 that moment, must pay careful heed to what is 
 going on. They may frequently, by a counter- 
 attack, executed at the proper moment, give a 
 chance to the defenders of the position to regain 
 the ascendant. 
 
 Retreat is the consequence of a partial or total 
 success of the enemy's attack either upon the 
 position itself or upon a neighboring position. 
 It consists in abandoning, at the order of the 
 Command, a part or the whole of the position. 
 It involves evacuation of the personnel and the 
 materiel and their installation in a new position 
 chosen beforehand. It is carried out with the in- 
 tention of retaking the evacuated terrain. 
 
 Retreat assumes two different forms, according 
 as it takes place at a moment chosen by the de- 
 fenders, or under the exigencies of the attack. 
 In the first case it is called a realignment of the 
 Front; in the second, a retreat under pressure of 
 the enemy. It is always the result of a success 
 on the part of the adversary and is intended to 
 avoid useless losses among the defending troops. 
 
 The realignment of the Front is intended to 
 295 
 
THE WAEPARE OF TaDAY 
 
 maintain liaison with troops who have met with 
 defeat in an adjoining zone, or to improve a 
 tactically dangerous situation. 
 
 When a part of the Front has been success- 
 fully attacked, and the enemy has seized it, it is 
 necessary, in order to avoid a breach in the line 
 of positions, to reestablish a continuous front. In 
 the same way, if one part of the Front, as a re- 
 sult of the chances of battle, has come to form 
 a salient, the holding of which does not give im- 
 portant technical advantages, but involves, on 
 the contrary, considerable daily losses, it is wise 
 to abandon it. 
 
 The realignment of the Front must be carried 
 out rapidly and without the enemy's perceiving 
 it, for it is a very delicate operation. If the artil- 
 lery is removed little by little, so that its activity 
 decreases progressively, the enemy may launch 
 a sudden attack, catch the infantry undefended, 
 and destroy it. If, on the other hand, the artillery 
 is kept in place until the last moment, and is 
 obliged to leave, in large numbers at a time, at 
 the same moment as the infantry, thus encum- 
 bering the roads, an attack taking place during 
 this confusion might cause a disaster. 
 
 The realignment of the Front should be care- 
 fully planned in advance. Withdrawal of the 
 troops should be carried out as much as possible 
 during the night, in order to escape the observa- 
 
 296 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 tion of the enemy. The enemy must not be put 
 on guard, for fear of a sudden attack and intense 
 bombardment. 
 
 When the Front has been realigned unob- 
 served, not only are there no losses, but it is 
 possible to inflict loss on the enemy, which is, 
 after all, the object of all operations in war. To 
 this end a line of lightly armed infantrymen 
 can be left in the abandoned position, in order 
 to occupy the enemy's attention. When the 
 enemy does at last notice the weakness of the 
 resistance, he undertakes an attack. He obtains 
 an easy success and, growing bolder, begins a 
 forward movement. At that moment he may 
 be decimated by skilfully -placed batteries or by 
 mines prepared in advance. 
 
 This operation, which had never been exe- 
 cuted on a large scale before 191 7, was first seen 
 at that time. It was carried out by the Germans 
 along a considerable front, in just those forms 
 which I had personally foreseen from logical con- 
 siderations.^ That, however, which I could not 
 foresee was the barbarity with which the Ger- 
 mans, in order to prevent an attack on the new 
 position, devastated the evacuated zone. Not 
 only did they cut the means of communication, 
 but they destroyed villages, cellars, and even 
 historic ruins. They threw the bodies of animals 
 
 » The War of Positions, " Retreat," pp. 168-70. 
 297 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 into wells. They destroyed the springs. They 
 cut down the fruit trees. Their object was to 
 make of this region an uninhabitable country, 
 a fearful desert, where for weeks and weeks no 
 soldiers could be stationed without suffering and, 
 consequently, no attack could be prepared. This 
 procedure was dictated by the brutal logic of our 
 enemies. But like many 'others which they had 
 followed, it finds no place in military art as that 
 should be understood by civilized people. 
 
 Retreat under pressure of the enemy has as its 
 object to escape from the adversary's embrace 
 and to reach a new position where it is possible 
 to resist. It must not be carried out without 
 formal orders, for the premature retreat of one 
 unit may have a considerable effect on the rest 
 of the position and even on the rest of the Front. 
 If the commander of a unit finds himself too 
 hard-pressed, he makes all the proper arrange- 
 ments for resistance. He informs his immediate 
 superior of the difficulties which he is facing and 
 also sends word to the neighboring units. But 
 if he does not receive the order to retire and is 
 not sufficiently reenforced, he must remain and 
 be killed with all his men on the spot. Such a 
 sacrifice is often indispensable for the sake of 
 the large units. 
 
 Retreat, more than any other operation, calls 
 for organization and order. For that reason it 
 
 298 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 should be planned beforehand. It is essential, 
 however, that the commander should not make 
 undue haste in the actual execution of the retreat. 
 It is a critical moment when he will need more 
 than ordinary coolness. The communications 
 have become for the most part difficult. The 
 telephone lines are cut. Signals are impossible. 
 The messengers have been killed. It would 
 take longer than usual for an order to reach the 
 front line, even if it should get there at all. All 
 these circumstances must be kept in mind, and 
 the hour for the retreat fixed in such a way that 
 all of the units shall be warned, and warned in 
 time. The only way to be sure that orders have 
 reached their destination is to require a receipt. 
 In this way it is certain that no unit will be for- 
 gotten. 
 
 If the pressure of the enemy is not too great, it 
 is best to carry out the retreat during the night, 
 although preparing for it in the daytime. The 
 order to retreat should indicate on what position 
 troops should make a stand against the enemy. 
 It should point out the mission, the objective of 
 each unit, and the itineraries to be followed. 
 The main roads should be reserved for the artil- 
 lery and materiel. 
 
 Retreat is carried out under the protection of 
 troops of all arms designated for the purpose. 
 These troops sometimes have to be sacrificed 
 
 299 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 to the last man, resisting wiiere they are. They 
 seek especially to deliver counter-attacks, which 
 have all the more effect when launched at the 
 best moment. Moreover, the artillery lays down 
 barrages which can help materially in delaying 
 the enemy's advance. 
 
 The infantry must at no moment be without 
 artillery protection. To this end the artillery 
 should always retire in echelon. The heavy pieces 
 should leave early enough not to be captured by 
 a swift enemy during their deplacement. Once 
 more, then, appears the necessity for echelonment 
 in depth, for the artillery, for the infantry, and 
 for the machine guns. The installation of the 
 heavy pieces is a particularly long process, and 
 for that reason it is necessary, especially when a 
 position is in danger, to make sure that this eche- 
 lonment is observed and that the position behind 
 is furnished with a sufficient number of pieces. 
 Artillery cannot fire while it is in movement, so 
 that if it is all being moved at once, not only is 
 the infantry left without protection, but the ar- 
 tillery is quite likely to be captured. Under these 
 circumstances, the second position, deprived of 
 the pieces which should help in its defence, can 
 offer but a feeble resistance. 
 
 Although the moment for the retreat of the 
 artillery should be chosen by the Command, a 
 certain amount of independence may be left to 
 
 300 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 the commanders of artillery groups or the battery 
 commanders, for they alone are in touch with the 
 situation at every moment. In some cases it is 
 wise to retreat a considerable distance in order to 
 be in position when the time comes to fire. In 
 other cases it is necessary to keep on firing until 
 the last moment, perhaps to sacrifice the guns, 
 which should be put out of commission if they 
 cannot be removed. The old feeling, that an 
 artilleryman lost caste if his piece was captured 
 and he was not killed with it, was highly honor- 
 able, but it is not in accord with the laws of 
 modern war. A piece which has been of real use 
 has fulfilled its task, and may be sacrificed. As 
 for the men who serve it, they should save their 
 lives in order some day to serve another piece. 
 If they are separated from the artillery they 
 should join the nearest body of infantry and 
 fight side by side with it. 
 
 During the execution of the retreat the liaisons 
 are more necessary than ever. They enable the 
 troops to transmit important information and to 
 help one another, and they enable the Command 
 to make decisions. 
 
 On the other hand, all means should be em- 
 ployed to break up the enemy's formations and to 
 delay his progress. Obstacles, traps, fougades, and 
 mines should be placed in suitable spots. Lines 
 of communication should be cut or destroyed. 
 
 301 
 
THE WARF.^RE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Since the object of the retreat is to resist in a 
 new position, the Command should fix the limits 
 of this position if it includes a part of the old one, 
 and should indicate its exact location if it is at 
 some distance. Generally, this position is already 
 occupied by reserves of all arms. In this case the 
 retreating troops have merely to pass through 
 it as rapidly and in as good order as possible. 
 They leave behind all materiel, munitions, and 
 supplies which may be of use to the defending 
 troops. 
 
 If no position has been organized and occupied 
 to the rear of the evacuated one, that shows mis- 
 take or negligence. The only way to stop the 
 retreat is to create one. This, however, cannot 
 be done under fire from the enemy. It is difficult 
 to fight and to create works at the same time. 
 The best plan is, then, to retreat a considerable 
 distance, making use of the night as much as 
 possible, to choose a new position and to install 
 the artillery there at once. 
 
 In either case the retreat will stop only when 
 the enemy encounters a position furnished with 
 artillery, and has no other alternative than to see 
 his troops destroyed in the open country or to 
 create a position for himself. If he chooses the 
 second alternative, the Front is created once 
 more. 
 
 302 
 
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 m 
 
 2 a 
 
 fa ^ 
 
 O > 
 
 !A 'S 
 
 O § 
 
 g a 
 
 w 5 
 
 H .S 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 The retour offensif is intended to recapture 
 the position which has been lost. It should be 
 carried out as soon as possible in order that the 
 enemy may not have the time to organize the 
 ground which he has conquered. 
 
 If the enemy does not attack the second posi- 
 tion, it is generally because he does not feel that 
 he is strong enough to capture it at once.' The 
 retour offensif is to be carried out before he is able 
 to be reenforced. If he does attack the second 
 position, he exhausts himself considerably and 
 is often obliged to give up the attempt. Then is 
 the proper moment to try a retour offensif. 
 
 The retour offensif follows the same rules as the 
 attack on a position. In reality it is an attack in 
 which the amount of artillery preparation has 
 been greatly reduced, because it is necessary to 
 act quickly, because the enemy has no works 
 which have been established for a long time, and 
 because the position to be attacked is well known 
 to the attackers. It is important to take advan- 
 tage of this last fact by making use of troops 
 who have occupied the position. 
 
 If the retour offensif succeeds, the situation 
 may turn to the advantage of the troops who 
 obtain this success. The reserves attack and 
 demoralize the enemy, throw him back on his 
 departure position, follow him into it, and per- 
 haps manage to carry it. In this way a result is 
 
 303 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 obtained which might be difficult to obtain di- 
 rectly ; it may even be the beginning of victory. 
 
 This exposition of the different phases of the 
 defence of a position brings back continually to 
 my mind one of the most glorious pages in the 
 history of this war — Verdun. Of course every- 
 thing was not perfect at Verdun, especially at the 
 beginning. There were serious faults in the organ- 
 ization of the defence, such as centres of resist- 
 ance, isolated one from another, which expected 
 to prohibit passage through the intervening zones 
 by delivering a flanking fire. These " nests for 
 bombs" were naturally attacked by the Germans 
 and captured without being able to aid one an- 
 other. Doubtless other errors were committed 
 which cost France the life of many a brave sol- 
 dier. 
 
 One thing was truly admirable in defensive 
 battles — such as Verdun, or the Marne — that 
 was the heroism of the French troops who, when 
 they were told, "You must hold on!" did so, no 
 matter what the cost. At Verdun, if the troops 
 had not held, there would have been a catas- 
 trophe. The English army was still too small at 
 that moment to support a great part of the 
 weight of the war. But there remained the 
 French soldier, always ready, whatever his age, 
 
 304 
 
THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION 
 
 whatever his native province, to meet death for 
 the sake of his beloved country. There remained 
 also a leader worthy to command such troops, 
 General Petain. His arrival at Verdun, together 
 with that of De Castelnau, effected a magical 
 transformation of the situation. To-day he is at 
 the head of our armies. He has the knowledge, 
 the experience, the wisdom, the audacity, which 
 go to make a great general. There is a leader, 
 indeed! We may have confidence in him for the 
 great days to come! 
 
VIII 
 
 OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS ^ 
 Lecture of December 3, 1917 
 Summary 
 
 The feelings of a soldier. 
 
 The qualities of the commander: education; necessity of general 
 knowledge; orders; initiative. — The qualities of the soldier: dis- 
 cipline; confidence. 
 
 The military situation in France: — The intellectual training of 
 the officers; I'ficole de Guerre. — Troop officers and staff officers; 
 their initial differences and their complete reconciliation. — Troop 
 officers; officers of the active army; reserve officers. — Homogen- 
 eity of the body of French officers. — Comradeship in the small 
 units. — The comradeship of arms; infantry and artillery: Honor6 
 de Villard: infantry and aviation: Guynemer; engineers; cavalry; 
 the services of the army. 
 
 The French troops: — The infantryman is the hero of this cam- 
 paign. — His patriotic idealism. — His undying will to conquer. — 
 His generosity towards the enemy. — His various qualities. — The 
 example of the veterans. — Esprit de corps. — The love of the flag. 
 — The sense of glory. — The pride of the wounded. — The sacri- 
 fice of life. — The dawn of a new future. 
 
 What is a soldier? He is a man who is ready 
 to give up his Hberty because he recognizes that 
 his superiors have the right to dispose of all his 
 powers of mind and body. He is ready to sacri- 
 fice his life if that be necessary for the safety of 
 his country. These two feelings, the spirit of dis- 
 cipline and the spirit of sacrifice, are the corner- 
 stones of the military profession. 
 
 MiUtary virtues are the same from the top 
 
 306 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 to the bottom of the hierarchy. But the same 
 qualities are not requisite to the same degree in 
 the different grades. An officer must first of all 
 know how to command, while a private's first 
 duty is to know how to obey. 
 
 It is worth while to make a rapid examination 
 of the general principles which permit an officer 
 and his men to act in harmony. By studying the 
 conduct of officers and soldiers in the course of 
 the war, we shall be able to define the qualities 
 which must be cultivated in an army. By study- 
 ing the evolution which has taken place during 
 the last three years in the French army, we shall 
 be able to deduce practical measures for the army 
 of the United States. Of course I shall not ac- 
 tually formulate these measures: it is the duty 
 of the military authorities of my second mother 
 country to adapt those ideas, which seem to 
 them of value, to the spirit and traditions of the 
 troops under them. 
 
 An officer must know how to command. The 
 first condition of being able to command is to be 
 trained; and training does not consist, as some 
 people imagine, in knowing a certain number of 
 special rules of the military art: it is a result of 
 general culture, which includes literature, science, 
 and art. Nothing but this culture can give to 
 
 307 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 the mind that suppleness and fineness of per- 
 ception which enable one to observe, to reason, 
 to make decisions. When a commander really 
 knows, he is neither timid nor embarrassed. He 
 does not have to look at a book or manual to find 
 out what to do. He merely makes up his mind 
 with a clear understanding of the circumstances 
 actually present. 
 
 In war there are nothing but particular cases. 
 It would be absurd to try to plan in advance 
 for all possible events. A general who tried to 
 remember how Napoleon manoeuvred at Auster- 
 litz or Jena, in order to repeat these manoeuvres, 
 would make dreadful mistakes. A subaltern 
 who wondered what page of the Regulations 
 would apply to the present case, would make a 
 mistake of the same sort. The orders to be 
 given should flow as a simple, logical result from 
 the officer's total knowledge. 
 
 Orders should be clear, precise, and complete. 
 They must also be given at the right moment, 
 and in battle this moment is fugitive. The well- 
 trained officer has the advantage of avoiding all 
 hesitation, all vagueness, and of expressing his 
 ideas immediately in the best form. Years ago 
 one of our poets said : — 
 
 " Ce que Ton congoit bien s'^nonce clairement, 
 Et les mots pour le dire arrivent ais6ment." 
 
 308, 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 First, last, and all the time, orders should not 
 be countermanded. An old French military pro- 
 verb gives the reason in three words : — 
 
 "Ordre, contre-ordre: desordre." 
 
 Nothing could be more true. When a body of 
 troops have received an order, and, still more, 
 when they have begun to execute it, they are 
 completely disconcerted if the order is counter- 
 manded. They conclude at once that the com- 
 mander is ignorant or vacillating. In the same 
 way, orders which are too frequent and, in con- 
 sequence, are useless or incomplete, produce a 
 most unfortunate impression. 
 
 An officer who really knows, gives orders which 
 are complete and gives them with precision. He 
 leaves nothing undefined, and assigns to each 
 subordinate his exact duty. When this duty has 
 been assigned, he makes sure that it is carried 
 out; in fact this is one of the essential parts of his 
 responsibility, without which the best possible 
 orders may remain ineffective. 
 
 If an order is to be well carried out, it must be 
 practicable, and this condition also depends on 
 the general training and the practical knowledge 
 of the officer. An order which is perfectly logi- 
 cal in theory may be impossible of execution. It 
 would produce a most unfortunate effect upon 
 the troops and tend to cause insubordination. 
 Under these circumstances it is the duty of the 
 
 309 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 subordinate to inform his superior immediately 
 of the difficulties of execution. 
 
 An order should be precise and definite. It 
 should by no means take away from the sub- 
 ordinate the privilege of initiative. Initiative is, 
 in fact, a necessary quality in every grade of the 
 army. It enables an officer to make choice of the 
 means of execution as soon as he knows the inten- 
 tions of his commander and has received a defi- 
 nite assignment. It does not consist in modify- 
 ing an order upon the pretext that another will 
 produce a better result. That would be disobe- 
 dience. It does, however, make it permissible to 
 point out the difficulties involved in the execu- 
 tion of an order, to point out and to adopt par- 
 ticular means for attaining the desired end, and 
 even to give orders when the superior has failed 
 to do so. Initiative should be combined with 
 knowledge and tact, but also with prudence, and 
 should be confined to the special purpose in view. 
 Even if at times it causes mistakes, it should 
 still be developed in order to combat that fear of 
 responsibility which leads to supineness. Supine- 
 ness is one of the worst faults which a com- 
 mander can have, for it leaves his troops a prey 
 to the hostile designs of the enemy with no en- 
 deavor to oppose them. The excuse of having 
 received no orders should never be admitted in 
 such a case. The subordinate should either ask 
 
 310 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 for orders or, if time is short, give them himself 
 and report the fact. 
 
 The soldier must know how to obey. For that 
 reason orders are given without explanations. In 
 war the moment is fleeting. Time is short and 
 must be spent in acts, not in words. Of course, 
 a body of troops like to know the object of their 
 endeavors. They should be told as soon as possi- 
 ble about them, for the soldiers of a free country 
 will go ahead with much more enthusiasm if they 
 know what they are trying to do. Moreover, if 
 the commander has taken pains to set forth 
 his general intentions, his particular orders will 
 explain themselves. Even when the immediate 
 end in view is not perfectly evident, a subor- 
 dinate officer should yet refrain from criticism. 
 Such criticism not only gives a very bad example 
 to the men, but may turn to the disadvantage of 
 the critic himself, for the reasons for an order 
 may appear later and show the foolishness or in- 
 competence of those who criticized it. 
 
 It is best, then, that soldiers should learn to 
 obey passively. This is the principle that French 
 military men have epitomized in an ironical 
 phrase addressed to those who ask for explana- 
 tions: "Obeissez sans chercher k comprendre." 
 
 If the necessity for an order does not become 
 clear by the course of events, it is well to explain 
 it subsequently to the troops. The next time they 
 
 311 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 will still obey passively, but with greater con- 
 fidence. 
 
 Confidence in the commander is one of the 
 most important factors in discipline and, hence, 
 in success. It is based upon two feelings: the 
 respect which the soldiers have for the ability 
 of their commander and their personal affection 
 for him. The ability of a commander depends 
 upon his knowledge, his energy, his courage, his 
 thoughtfulness, and his coolness, — in a word, 
 on all those qualities which make it possible 
 for him to command. His personal character is 
 shown in the uprightness of his life, his care for 
 his soldiers, and his justice towards them. When 
 a commander has gained the confidence of his 
 men, he has a far greater authority over them 
 than any which comes from his grade. 
 
 One of the surest means to acquire this con- 
 fidence is, of course, the force of example. Under 
 difficult circumstances, when the troops are wor- 
 ried, when they are suffering, when they are in 
 danger, they watch their leader. They ask only 
 to find in him the support which they need. If 
 they see that he is calm, stoical, brave, they 
 gather new courage and give themselves more 
 completely to the performance of their duty. 
 An officer cannot have a more splendid reward 
 than to perceive that he has produced this effect 
 upon his men. 
 
 i 312 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 An officer should understand what a splendid 
 part he can play under these circumstances. He 
 should make use of his influence over his soldiers 
 to obtain from them all those sacrifices which 
 war requires. But he must always have in mind 
 the means of lessening their sufferings and spar- 
 ing their lives. 
 
 In France the military calling has always been 
 considered the highest of all. For centuries the 
 right to command soldiers was reserved almost 
 exclusively to the better families. The career of 
 arms offered a patent of nobility to those families 
 which could show four or even fewer generations 
 of officers. On account of these traditions, before 
 the war, the officers were recruited almost ex- 
 clusively from the most distinguished families in 
 the country. 
 
 A man became an officer either through family 
 tradition or personal predilection, especially in 
 those families where, as a result of a prejudice 
 which is now beginning to disappear, commerce 
 and industry were looked down upon. In fact, an 
 officer served in consequence of his ideals or his 
 devotion to his country; he served for honor, 
 for his pay was very small. Still, he did not care 
 about money. The second lieutenant, who re- 
 ceived two hundred and ten francs a month, felt 
 
 313 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 far above a grocer who got ten thousand francs 
 in the same time, and would never have thought 
 of exchanging his epaulets for the desk of a 
 merchant. It may be that this attitude of mind 
 is changing in the present century, when a love 
 of money is beginning to destroy many tradi- 
 tions. Still, it was very common before this war 
 among our officers, who were accused by certain 
 XX)litical parties of being undemocratic. 
 
 We should not decry shoulder straps. They 
 have their uses. It is possible to be perfectly 
 democratic and yet have a high opinion of the 
 military profession. It is a mistake to try to level 
 down a whole people by wiping out all the tradi- 
 tions of its history. In England and the United 
 States many official and university ceremonies 
 have been retained which, under certain circum- 
 stances, involve wearing the dress of past cen- 
 turies. In France we keep our military traditions, 
 which spring from our long and glorious history. 
 The French officer has behind him a long series 
 of gallant figures, which still inspire him: the war- 
 riors of the Crusades and those who long fought 
 against England, now our friend, the illustrious 
 leaders in the wars of Louis XIV, the group of 
 officers who followed Lafayette to America, those 
 who shared the glories of Napoleon, and those 
 who, foot by foot, won for France Algeria and 
 her colonial domain. Why should we try to root 
 
 314 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 those traditions out from our soil when they fos- 
 ter the noblest sentiments and still constitute the 
 glory of our race? 
 
 The officers before the war had, perhaps, a 
 tendency to form a caste. They had so many no- 
 ble and solid qualities that this small fault might 
 well be pardoned in them. It is fair to analyze 
 them now, for they belong to history. Many 
 are dead or mutilated, and the others will be 
 profoundly changed at the end of the long 
 tragedy. 
 
 Officers generally had a special cast of mind, 
 and confined themselves to the practice of their 
 profession. They forgot that future wars would 
 make use of all the human and material forces 
 of the nation. They regretted to see some of 
 their number take part in the work of the uni- 
 versities — study, discuss, and write. They were 
 ready to look down on these men as non-mili- 
 tary, without ever taking account of what they 
 had really done in their profession. 
 
 Those officers who wished to rise above the 
 mass went to the £cole de Guerre, which was 
 intended to furnish officers for the staff. It was 
 a necessity for their advancement. Those who 
 seemed to dread the thankless tasks involved, 
 the prospect of further years of schooling, were 
 made to see that this was the only safe way. 
 The preparation for the entrance examination 
 
 315 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 had the advantage of making many go to work 
 who perhaps were Httle used to effort without a 
 tangible object and a definite plan. The sojourn 
 subsequently with the different arms completed 
 these studies. Finally, a stay of two years at 
 the school enabled the pupils to acquire a method 
 of work, to clarify their ideas, and to learn those 
 methods of analysis and synthesis, necessary for 
 the proper drawing-up of orders and reports. In 
 a word, the Ecole de Guerre developed the 
 general culture and the professional knowledge 
 of those who went there. Unfortunately, it also 
 developed two faults: in most cases a belief in 
 the infallibility of the doctrines learned; and, in 
 some cases, a pretentious and tactless feeling 
 of self-satisfaction. The prejudice which existed 
 against the school, whose usefulness should not 
 be forgotten, is accounted for by these faults. 
 
 In the course of the war the officers of the 
 line and the staff officers found themselves 
 very differently placed, especially during the 
 first year. The officers of the line, exposed in 
 the trenches to shells, to bullets, and to the in- 
 clemency of the weather, fought day and night 
 with the enemy, with the cold, with the rain, 
 and mud, and insects. The staff officers were, 
 together with the generals, stationed in the rear 
 in farmhouses or ch&teaux, safe from projec- 
 tiles, with good fires and beds. This difference 
 
 316 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 was inherent in the conditions of war and did 
 not cause grumbling on the part of the ofificers 
 of the line. But when they received impracti- 
 cable orders relating to certain works or certain 
 operations, they became indignant, and vented 
 their indignation, not on. the commanders who 
 were responsible for these mistakes, but upon 
 the staff officers whose duty it was to trans- 
 mit these orders and to see that they were car- 
 ried out. There thus sprang up during the first 
 year of the war a serious disagreement between 
 the ofificers of the staff and the officers of the 
 line. What made it worse was that the staff 
 officers, who did not have to risk their lives, had 
 also the best chance for rapid promotion. 
 
 Little by little this state of affairs came to the 
 knowledge of the High Command, which took 
 measures to alter it. The staff officers were re- 
 quired to pass a certain number of months with 
 the troops and behaved admirably. Unfortu- 
 ■ nately, like all newcomers in the trenches, they 
 often fell victim to their inexperience in the prac- 
 tice of this war. But they won, by their personal 
 courage and their enthusiasm, the warm affec- 
 tion of the units which they were called on to 
 command. Most of them have now stayed long 
 enough with the troops to raise them above all 
 criticism. 
 
 The officers of the line were divided at the 
 
 317 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 beginning of the campaign into two categories: 
 officers of the active army and reserve officers. 
 The officers of the active army were graduates 
 of Saint-Cyr, a school for infantry or cavalry 
 officers; of theEcole Poly technique and Fontaine- 
 bleau, schools for artillery and engineer officers; 
 of Saint-Maixent, a school for infantry N.C.O.'s; 
 of Versailles, a corresponding school for artillery; 
 and of Saumur, for cavalry. Those who came 
 from the schools for N.C.O.'s had usually less 
 general culture and professional knowledge and, 
 since they became officers at a more advanced 
 age, their prospects for the future were not so 
 good. But all were animated with the highest 
 feelings. They showed magnificent devotion in 
 the accomplishment of their daily tasks. 
 
 These tasks were sometimes misunderstood by 
 a part of the nation, infected with pacifist ideas 
 and convinced of the uselessness of standing 
 armies. But so soon as the war broke out, every 
 Frenchman recognized the splendid qualities of 
 these men and bestowed on them the praise 
 which they richly deserved. These officers were 
 the first to die fighting bravely. Their blood 
 paid the price for that experience of modern war 
 which should to-day save many lives. We must 
 never forget it. With the solid and devoted 
 band of professional officers who are to-day in 
 the American army, a body of troops can enter 
 
 318 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 the war and be certain of being well led. For 
 they have a quality which neither the greatest 
 intelligence nor the most complete theoretical 
 knowledge nor the most brilliant courage can 
 replace, namely, experience of command. 
 
 The reserve officers came in time of peace, at 
 long intervals, to serve for a few weeks in their 
 regiments. When they had completed their 
 service in the active army, they had a certain 
 amount of experience, but not always in exercis- 
 ing the actual command which would be theirs in 
 future. The reserve captain or lieutenant who 
 had completed his service as a private or an 
 N.C.O. had still to learn the duties of his proper 
 grade, which is by no means easy to do in a 
 few weeks. These officers, whose willingness 
 and devotion were very great, had frequently 
 the chagrin of seeing their efforts misunderstood 
 by censorious comrades of the active army. 
 But from the very first days of the war they 
 won admiration on all hands by their self-denial 
 for their country. They showed themselves the 
 equals of their comrades of the active army, 
 quite as ready to teach by example, to lead 
 their men, and to give their lives. Their con- 
 duct was all the more commendable, in that 
 they had been suddenly snatched from their 
 homes and had not had the chance to realize 
 fully what the necessary sacrifice would be. 
 
 319 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 They made this sacrifice with a simplicity and 
 an enthusiasm above all praise. 
 
 Little by little they acquired the experience 
 which they lacked at the start. After the first 
 year of the war many of them were put in com- 
 mand of companies as a result of vacancies in 
 the ranks. Now, after three years of war, dur- 
 ing [which they have often fulfilled the most 
 thankless and dangerous tasks, no further dif- 
 ference should be made between them and the 
 officers of the active army. As a matter of fact, 
 for the most part, they have spent their time in 
 fighting units, because it was hard for them to 
 gain access to the staff. Nevertheless, they are 
 now capable of rendering good service in the 
 latter department, and, indeed, they are being 
 admitted thereto. There are also new laws ad- 
 mitting them to the ranks of the active army 
 and permitting them to win their promotions 
 when they have given proof of their worth and 
 courage. It is simple justice. 
 
 In truth, there are among these officers men 
 of high intelligence, of whom our military organi- 
 zation, based upon the needs of peace times, 
 does not yet take full advantage; but gradually 
 in the course of the war each man will find his 
 rightful place. 
 
 At the present moment the body of French 
 officers has acquired perfect homogeneity. This 
 
 320 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 homogeneity exists, not only among the officers 
 of the same regiment or of the same arm, but 
 among those of the whole army. After seeing 
 trying days in the trenches and bloody days of 
 battle where the different arms and the different 
 services work together, the officers have learned 
 the importance of mutual support for success. 
 Little by little they have renounced an inju- 
 rious particularism, which sprang from foolish 
 rivalries and ended in disregard of the general 
 interest. 
 
 A commander of a small unit, more than any 
 other, is forced by circumstances and by the 
 necessity of maintaining his ascendancy, to live 
 in the midst of his soldiers. When these latter 
 are exposed to bad weather, he must stay with 
 them and not seek refuge in a comfortable shelter. 
 When they are insufficiently fed, he must share 
 their privations and not hunt additional supplies 
 for himself. When they are downcast or dis- 
 couraged, he must show cheerfulness and con- 
 fidence in victory. A captain is a real father to 
 the soldiers under his orders. He must look after 
 their welfare, both material and moral, know 
 them individually, take part in their anxieties 
 and their pleasures, recompense them impartially, 
 keep them always in the bonds of discipline, and 
 restrain them from waste. These functions call 
 for care and effort at every moment. The officers 
 
 321 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 of the French army have fulfilled them with a 
 tact and intelligence which have won them the 
 boundless affection of their soldiers. 
 
 The spirit of comradeship between the officers 
 of a company, battalion, or regiment is estab- 
 lished with the same facility as between the 
 officers and the soldiers. The reunions in the vil- 
 lages in the rear, the improvised mess, — where 
 the officers seated round a rickety table cele- 
 brate, after the battle, by the light of primitive 
 candles, the good fortune of one of their number 
 in winning promotion or the cross of the Legion 
 of Honor, — have helped greatly by their rustic 
 simplicity to cement this affection. 
 
 That comradeship between the different arms 
 which has brought homogeneity, took a long 
 time to establish. The infantry officers, by their 
 cruel sufferings and their heavy losses, were 
 sorely embittered against the officers of the 
 other arms who suffered less than they. When 
 anything went wrong in one sector, they had a 
 tendency to say that the artillerymen and the 
 aviators had not done everything possible and 
 had lost interest in them. In the same way the 
 artillerymen and the aviators, at some dis- 
 tance from the first line, did not always ap- 
 preciate the critical conditions in which the in- 
 fantry found themselves and were tempted to 
 consider them nervous and timorous. 
 
 322 
 
THE FAMOUS MILL OF LANGEMARCK NEAR YPRES IN I914 
 OFTEN TAKEN AND RETAKEN 
 
 THE CHURCH OF ST. JULIEN NEAR YPRES IN APRIL, I915 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 I can show by examples better than by any 
 theoretical discussion what efforts were needed 
 to root out this particularism from the army. I 
 will take some from the letters written to me by 
 my stepfather, Honore de Villard, one of the first 
 to demand the development of liaison between 
 the artillery and the infantry. 
 
 He had devised a method of locating the 
 enemy's batteries by sound, since adopted by 
 General Headquarters for all our armies. One 
 of his superiors in the artillery had urged him 
 to suppress, in his description of the method, the 
 passage in which he said the object must be to 
 protect the infantry in the exposed trenches. In 
 fact, he received from the general commanding 
 the army corps a letter of congratulation, dated 
 March 29, 191 5, in which it was said that his 
 method made it possible to determine "the dis- 
 tance of the German pieces which are firing on 
 our batteries." Now, in his own «yes, as he often 
 wrotfe to me, the principal use of the method was 
 to spare losses to our infantry, by silencing the 
 enemy's batteries that were firing at them. 
 
 In the same way he wrote to me, April 13, 
 1 915: "We must make every effort to establish a 
 better liaison between the infantry and the artil- 
 lery. Two months and a half ago I made a report 
 to the general commanding the artillery upon 
 this subject. I know that this report was com- 
 
 323 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 municated to my new colonel. But I fear that it 
 did not have the necessary success, owing to that 
 prejudicial particularism with which the different 
 arms have surrounded themselves." 
 
 De Villard himself was devoted body and soul 
 to his comrades in the infantry and wished to 
 save them from the fire of the enemy's artillery. 
 He wrote to me June 23, 1915: "The Germans 
 are out of range of our cannon, and fire almost 
 exclusively upon our trenches. The need for 
 long-range artillery is being felt. Moreover, in 
 my opinion, we should greatly shorten the period 
 of preparation for an attack, so as not to leave 
 our infantry for so long a time a prey to the 
 enemy's fire, in trenches which are easy targets 
 and necessarily attract shells. It is sad to see so 
 many infantrymen fall, while so few artillerymen 
 are hit. What is still more sad is that this pro- 
 duces in the infantry bitter reflections, not only 
 among the troops, but even among the officers. 
 All this is no help towards the problem of liaison, 
 which will be much more easily solved by friendly 
 relations than by any regulations." 
 
 He noted sadly, that the particularism which 
 existed among our artillerymen was no less pro- 
 nounced than that of the infantry. A few days 
 later, the 2d of July, he observed an incident 
 that showed the recriminations of the infantry 
 against the artillery were found even in the higher 
 
 324 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 ; 
 grades of the hierarchy. He told me, in his let- 
 ter of the 6th of July, how the infantry colonel 
 commanding the sector had accused a battery 
 of coming into action too late and of not firing 
 sufficiently. De Villard then showed me how 
 the captain of the battery had done his whole 
 duty and in fact had even greatly exceeded his 
 allotted supply of munitions, and added: "It's 
 all very sad. We dispute in presence of the 
 enemy, instead of trying to aid one another. 
 What we lack is not liaison, but mutual under- 
 standing and good- will. The complaints of the 
 officers have an unfortunate recoil upon the men. 
 For that reason I am asking for a period of 
 service with the infantry in the first line in the 
 regiment of that colonel who has been accusing 
 the artillery. I shall thus be able to give an 
 example of harmony. We must absolutely put 
 an end to these childish squabbles. If it costs 
 me my life, no one will suffer but myself and it 
 may help towards the good of all." 
 
 He did not obtain permission to serve in the 
 infantry, but he had the excellent idea of invit- 
 ing to his improvised mess, from time to time, 
 officers of infantry, and of establishing the de- 
 sired liaison in this way. "I am anxious," he 
 wrote to me, in describing this happy solution, 
 "that we should see clearly that each is doing 
 what he can." 
 
 325 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 This conviction was brought home by his 
 death, which came just when he was trying to pro- 
 tect the infantry from the fire of his batteries. 
 The proof of the results which come from such 
 devotion can be seen in the letter from an in- 
 fantry officer who had seen him at his work : — 
 
 "We are losing a noble military figure. It is 
 a great loss for the artillery, for the army, and 
 for France. They must be heartbroken, those 
 brave men from the Jura in his battalion, who 
 were so fond of their commander and who often 
 said, 'The major! Ah! We have confidence in 
 him ! He is a real artilleryman ! ' It is not for me 
 to tell you what eminent services M. de Villa rd 
 rendered to my division. In the course of the 
 trips which he made in the first-line trenches, 
 he had always some friendly words or proofs of 
 interest to maintain the morale of my dear 
 infantrymen. He loved the infantrymen, because 
 he saw how they suffered. He found a glorious 
 death in seeking to lessen their sufferings and to 
 spare their lives for France." 
 
 These typical details make it possible to under- 
 stand how the intimacy and the affection be- 
 tween the artillery and the infantry, which did 
 not exist at the beginning of the war, have been 
 developed, and how to-day they facilitate in 
 great measure their collaboration on the field of 
 batde. 
 
 326 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 Misunderstandings of the same nature existed 
 at the beginning of the war between the infantry 
 and the aviation. When they were not risking 
 their lives in the air, the aviators, youthful and 
 thoughtless, made a point of leading a happy life, 
 behind the Front, or in Paris. The infantrymen, 
 usually tied to their trenches, were shocked by 
 these youthful manifestations, and rushed to the 
 conclusion that the aviators were amusing them- 
 selves instead of giving their attention to aerial 
 observation, to combat, and to adjusting the ar- 
 tillery fire. But, little by little, they found out 
 what the life of the aviators really was. Perhaps 
 a few of the latter, and those the ones that did 
 the least, felt the need of amusing themselves 
 ostentatiously; but the majority, and especially 
 the better ones, led a life whose rigid austerity 
 and heroic devotion are too little understood. 
 Saving their strength for the excursions which 
 they must take at any moment in all weathers, 
 risking their lives every time they mount into 
 their planes, they highly deserve the esteem and 
 affection which to-day they receive. 
 
 One name personifies the whole legion of the 
 heroes of the air — Guynemer. This boy of 
 twenty-three, with a feeble and delicate body, 
 was possessed of an extraordinary energy. In 
 twenty-five months of campaign, he was men- 
 tioned twenty-seven times in orders and had 
 
 327 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 fifty-four officially counted victories to his credit, 
 a number which would probably reach one hun- 
 dred if all his successes could have been verified. 
 He had belonged to Squadron No. 3, called the 
 "Squadron of the Storks," which was founded in 
 1915, with ten pilots, and at the end of October, 
 1 91 7, counted twenty-two killed or missing and 
 twenty- three wounded. His renown has been 
 perpetuated by a memorial at the Pantheon. 
 The Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously to 
 inscribe his name in this temple reserved for the 
 great men of our land as "a symbol of the aspira- 
 tions and enthusiasm of the army and of the 
 nation." 
 
 The reasons for this decision are even better 
 seen in the letter which Major Brocard, a friend 
 of Guynemer, wrote to Deputy Lasies: — 
 
 "Guynemer had the qualities which are char- 
 acteristic of the land which he so bravely de- 
 fended — tenacity, perseverance and effort, care- 
 lessness of danger, united with a most generous 
 heart. His short life knew neither bitterness nor 
 suffering nor disillusionment. From the Lycee, 
 where he learned the history of France and which 
 he left only to add a page to that history, he 
 went directly to the war, his eyes formally fixed 
 on the goal, driven by some mysterious force 
 which I respected as one respects death or 
 genius. 
 
 328 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 "The poor boy fell facing the enemy, struck by 
 a bullet in the head in the midst of his triumph. 
 A few days before he had sworn that the Germans 
 would never take him alive. 
 
 "Of course his heroic fall is no more glorious 
 than the death of the artilleryman who falls be- 
 side his piece, of the infantryman struck down in 
 the assault, or the more poignant agony of the 
 soldier swallowed up in the mud. But for the 
 last two years we all saw him above our heads, 
 outlined in every sky, under the brightest sun- 
 shine or the most lowering storm, bearing on 
 his wings part of our dreams, of our faith in suc- 
 cess, and of the confidence and hope of our hearts. 
 
 "It was for the engineers, the artillerymen, 
 and the infantrymen that he fought with all the 
 violence of his hate, all the audacity of his youth, 
 all the joy of his triumphs. He knew that the 
 struggle would one day prove fatal, but he had 
 the consciousness that with the wings of his bird 
 of war, he saved the lives of thousands. He saw 
 other fighters grow up in his image, and he re- 
 mained faithful to the sacrifice to which he had 
 consecrated himself in advance, and to which he 
 looked forward with calmness." 
 
 It is impossible to find more eloquent terms to 
 express the magnificent devotion of the aviation 
 to the other arms. It encounters risks for them 
 and can expect no services in return. In view 
 
 329 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 of the countless sacrifices, like those of Guyne- 
 mer, the prejudices which existed for a time 
 against the aviators have fallen away and given 
 place to the most affectionate esteem. 
 
 The engineers, whose devotion has been mag- 
 nificent throughout the whole war, and especi- 
 ally during the first months, have not been criti- 
 cized in the same way as have the other arms. 
 They have thus been avenged for the criticisms 
 which were directed against them a few years 
 ago, when the partisans of the war of movement 
 spoke of the uselessness of field works, which 
 could only lower the spirit of the infantry. 
 
 The cavalry, on the other hand, has been the 
 object of a good deal of remark on account of its 
 uselessness for the last three years. Many of 
 its officers have passed over to the infantry and 
 have given striking proof of their intelligence 
 and courage. Others have had occasion to show 
 themselves excellent foot soldiers in the regi- 
 ments of dismounted cavalry. They may no 
 longer hope for their arm the varied and bril- 
 liant r61e which it formerly fulfilled, but in the 
 glorious days of the pursuit they will have 
 their chance to play an important part and will 
 forget the years of waiting. They certainly de- 
 serve pity, and we must be careful not to speak 
 sarcastically of them, forthey suffer deeply in their 
 amour-propre and their patriotism for not being 
 
 330 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 able to take that part in the war which they had 
 dreamed. 
 
 As for the auxiliary services of the army, from 
 the medical corps, which is often exposed in the 
 first line, to the railway service, which during a 
 period of active operations is terribly overworked, 
 the fighting arms now understand their im- 
 mense importance. No one who to-day enters 
 these services is the subject of unfavorable com- 
 ment, as was the case at the beginning of the 
 war. The reason is that each man is fitted into 
 his proper place. The younger men have joined 
 the units on the Front; the older or less vigorous 
 are assigned to safer tasks. This equitable em- 
 ployment of the capacity of each has greatly 
 helped to abolish rivalry and particularism. It 
 has established the remarkable unanimity which 
 to-day characterizes the officers of the French 
 army. 
 
 It would take too long to study the French 
 army in all its details and its countless spe- 
 cialties from the front to the rear. In order to 
 have an idea of the troops, their feelings, and 
 their idealism, it is sufficient to observe the fight- 
 ing units, that is to say, those who occupy the 
 trenches, assault the enemy, shed their blood. 
 They speak little, but they have the noblest feel- 
 
 331 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ings and are proud of their sacrifice, jealous of 
 their reputation, and very sensitive to indiffer- 
 ence or injustice. They are typified by that arm 
 which has remained more than ever the " queen of 
 battles ' ' — the infantry. 
 
 The infantryman has remained the hero of this 
 war. Young or old, he has shown from the very 
 beginning magnificent dash, admirable bravery, 
 and boundless self-abnegation. The soldiers of 
 the initial campaign are largely dead or muti- 
 lated; only a few have escaped by miracle from 
 death, or have returned to the Front after con- 
 valescing from their wounds. But those who 
 have replaced them have the same spirit. It is 
 by seeing multitudes of men continually renewed 
 and always ready for sacrifice that we learn the 
 grandeur of the French race which can furnish 
 heroes without number. 
 
 The certainty of being hit one day or another 
 is in the mind of every infantryman, but does 
 not dampen his enthusiasm. The man who has 
 already dedicated his life finds in the thought of 
 his sacrifice a stronger stimulant. The physical 
 suffering which he undergoes, the risks which he 
 runs, the anxiety and the regrets to which he is 
 a prey through his affections — these all become 
 for him sources of secret satisfaction, since "it 
 is for France." These words, simple and sublime, 
 are on the lips of all who suffer, all who are at 
 
 332 
 
A GENERAL S COMMAXD POST IN JULY, I915 
 
 TELEPHONE MEN REPAIRING A LINE AFTER A FRENCH ADVANCE 
 AUGUST, I917 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 the point of death, and are in the hearts of all 
 who fight. 
 
 The noble exaltation which inspires the soldiers 
 is found in their letters, in their intimate diaries, 
 in their mutual confidences, more or less diluted, 
 and in more or less articulate form, accord- 
 ing to the character of the individual. Phrases 
 which were picked up by a journalist from the 
 letters of a dead man, words which were im- 
 mortalized by a mention in orders, these have 
 been spoken or written by thousands in almost 
 the same form. They are not only the proof of 
 individual courage, but the reflection of the hero- 
 ism of all. 
 
 Frequently the simple language in which a poor 
 peasant expresses his thought is more touching 
 than the formal style of the man of education. 
 How many times have I seen the pitiful relics 
 taken from those who had sacrificed their lives; 
 letters begun and never finished, letters received 
 and treasured, diaries, last instructions! Before 
 tying up the packet and writing thereon the name 
 of one soon to weep for the loss of a son, a hus- 
 band, or a brother, I saw that the brave sol- 
 dier, after speaking of the coming harvest in his 
 fields, his sheep or his cows, begged his loved 
 ones, in words of splendid simplicity, not to 
 mourn if his death were needed for the welfare 
 of his country, 
 
 , 333 
 
THE WARFABE OF TO-DAY 
 
 Patriotic feeling is often stimulated by the 
 thought that France did not wish the war, but 
 that she will "see it through." I was much sur- 
 prised to discover that men of little education, 
 little general culture, who seldom read the papers, 
 had yet felt deeply the insults and threats which 
 their country had for some years suffered at the 
 hands of Germany. I saw that, true lovers of 
 peace, they had suffered these unacknowledged 
 humiliations in silence, but that their native 
 pride had been suddenly aroused, and that their 
 long-smouldering resentment had burst into 
 flame when the German mobilization made a 
 rupture inevitable. They declared that they 
 were fighting to insure to their children the ben- 
 efits of peace, that they wanted to put Germany 
 in such a situation that in the future she could 
 do no harm, and they were determined to go 
 through "to the bitter end." 
 
 The cruel losses of loved ones and of property 
 merely stimulated this feeling within them. The 
 atrocities of every sort committed by the Ger- 
 mans increased their desire for an avenging jus- 
 tice, but never suggested to them analogous acts 
 of cruelty as reprisals. They are anxious to settle 
 accounts, but not by the old formula: an eye 
 for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. French soldiers 
 would be incapable of assassinating a prisoner, 
 of shooting the innocent, of maltreating and kill- 
 
 334 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 ing women and children, of reducing families to 
 slavery, or of destroying without motive tri- 
 umphs of art. No. What they wish is punish- 
 ment for the guilty. First of all, the Kaiser and 
 the military party, as being responsible for the 
 war. Then, the individual criminals, whether 
 generals or private soldiers, who have committed 
 outrageous acts in Belgium, in France, and in 
 every land where the German armies have pene- 
 trated. The soldiers will demand this justice be- 
 fore the tribunal of civilized nations which will 
 be called upon to judge the crimes. 
 
 The enthusiasm of the troops is more con- 
 scious, more energetic, and more the result of re- 
 flection than it was at the beginning of the war. 
 It has no longer the exuberant form which was 
 seen in the men called to the colors, still in citi- 
 zens' dress, collected at the Gare de I'Est to join 
 their regiments, or in the fully equipped soldiers 
 whom the concentration trains carried towards 
 the frontier in flower-decked cars resounding 
 with song. Since the Battle of the Marne, the 
 men have understood that it was a question of 
 saving France, that this task called for sacrifice 
 of every sort. Songs have given place to thought- 
 ful silence. The hard and monotonous life of the 
 trenches has had the effect of modifying their 
 characters. They have curbed the national im- 
 petuosity which drove them forward in the wars 
 
 335 
 
THE WARFAEE OF TO-DAY 
 
 of former times with fixed bayonets and an 
 irresistible dash. They have learned by bloody 
 experience that such dash has merely the effect 
 of thinning their ranks by useless slaughter. 
 
 Here we recognize the essential qualities of the 
 French peasant, bred to slow and laborious toil, 
 his harvest always threatened by disaster, accus- 
 tomed to the fight with the elements, — qualities 
 which have become characteristic of the entire 
 body of our fighting men: patience, resignation, 
 obstinacy. There are also the qualities learned 
 with age, taught to the young soldiers by those 
 of the older classes, grouped in the same unit: 
 wisdom, firmness, obedience. 
 
 Example is contagious. The older officers gave 
 it to the younger, and the younger to the 
 N.C.O.'s. Such example has cost many lives; 
 but it was indispensable if the spirit of sacrifice 
 was to flourish throughout the army. I often 
 remember these lines of my stepfather, dated 
 March ii, 1915, in the letter in which he con- 
 soled me for the death of one of my officers 
 about which I had written to him: — 
 
 "It is certainly very sad to lose the best of 
 the officers. No matter what people ordinarily 
 believe, a good leader of men cannot be impro- 
 vised in a few days, because courage is not enough, 
 even though it is indispensable. With our count- 
 less effectives, we have greater need than ever of 
 
 336 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 a large number of experienced officers. Of course, 
 it is difficult, on the one hand, to avoid loss, and 
 on the other to make sure that the officers shall 
 give the necessary example. Victory will go to 
 that side best able to satisfy these two opposing 
 conditions." 
 
 The older officers and the older soldiers, who 
 went through their term of military training at 
 a time when discipline was stricter, and the feel- 
 ing of authority more firmly fixed, contributed 
 a solid foundation, on which the new national 
 army was built up. It was in part owing to them 
 that the spirits of our troops have shown no sign 
 of faltering. A word, a gesture, was enough 
 to remind the younger men that they, "the old 
 stagers," were also suffering and in pain. The 
 younger classes and the men not accustomed 
 to army life acquired little by little the senti- 
 ment of discipline and the important idea of the 
 military hierarchy which is derived therefrom. 
 
 Certain regiments or battalions have acquired 
 these sentiments more completely thanks to their 
 esprit de corps. Indeed, some corps possess tra- 
 ditions which are so powerful that the frequently 
 renewed contingents, which are incorporated in 
 their ranks, become impregnated therewith and 
 so maintain their distinctive quality. Examples 
 may be found in men of the Foreign Legion, the 
 infantrymen of the Division de Fer, the Chas- 
 
 337 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 seurs k Pied, the Zouaves, and the Tirailleurs. 
 Their greatest desire is to honor the glorious 
 corps in which they are enrolled and to go heroi- 
 cally to death to show themselves worthy of the 
 reputation of their regiment. 
 
 These noble sentiments are similar to those 
 which are felt with regard to the flag, and which 
 you know so well in America. I have often no- 
 ticed how men's hearts, on this side of the water 
 as on the other, are moved by the sight of this 
 emblem of their country. And now that I have 
 lived with Americans, now that I have worked 
 with their army in this particularly solemn time 
 of war, I also feel profoundly moved when I see 
 the Stars and Stripes pass before me. I remember 
 a review of the Harvard Regiment, which my 
 comrade in arms. Major James A. Shannon, ar- 
 ranged with a peculiar delicacy in honor of our 
 French national fSte on the 14th of July last. At 
 the march-past, the flags of our two countries 
 were side by side. When they arrived in front of 
 me, a gust of wind entwined their folds and, for 
 a moment, I saw the Stars and Stripes in close 
 embrace with the Tricolor of my country. This 
 unexpected and touching symbol of the Franco- 
 American friendship, more intimate than ever 
 since the blood of our two peoples was to be shed 
 over there in a common cause, moved me deeply. 
 As I saluted the two emblems my eyes filled with 
 
 338 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 tears. Of course, in reality these pieces of bunt- 
 ing are small things. Yet every citizen of our two 
 republics will go to death for the ideas which they 
 represent. 
 
 The French military song which successive 
 generations have sung in time of war, begins as 
 follows: — 
 
 "Mourir pour la Patrie 
 
 C'est le sort le plus beau, le plus digne d'envie . . ." 
 
 This popular song expresses exactly the feeling 
 of the masses, all ready to give their lives. It also 
 explains the pride of the wounded and the muti- 
 lated who are happy to have shed their blood for 
 their country. They are eager to be congratu- 
 lated and honored for their soldierly devotion to 
 their country. They refuse to be commiserated. 
 I have been really shocked sometimes by the 
 point of view of people who, lacking a developed 
 patriotic sense, have looked at my arm support 
 and said, "Too bad." Not a bit of it! It is n't 
 too bad! In fact, I said one day to a lady who 
 seemed sorry for me, " I would n't sell this wound 
 for $100,000." Imagine what she replied! "Of 
 course, with that wound you are certain not to 
 have to go back to the Front." 
 
 Not to go back to the Front! That's the worst 
 punishment that can be inflicted on a wounded 
 man whose heart really beats. Why don't people 
 understand this? How can they thus bruise a feel- 
 
 339 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 ing which is shared by every man whose dearest 
 hope is to bear arms once more? No man has 
 ever done enough for his country. He owes her 
 everything, to the last drop of his blood. And 
 the man who is mutilated, and even disfigured, is 
 really beautified by his willing sacrifice. This was 
 expressed in a pretty picture which I recently 
 saw in the magazine, "Town and Country." 
 A young girl stands in front of her wounded 
 sweetheart whose face is covered with bandages, 
 and is saying to him, " I love you all the more 
 now." The picture and the sentiment are the ex- 
 pression of a delicate comprehension of womanly 
 kindness and patriotic affection for a hero. 
 
 Indeed, they deserve this kindness and affec- 
 tion, the mutilated and the blind, for whom so 
 much has been done, especially in America. Too 
 much cannot be done to improve the lot of those 
 men who have sacrificed themselves for the great 
 principles for which we are fighting. 
 
 But there are others of whom I often think. I 
 think of the countless soldiers who have died ob- 
 scurely at a turn in the road, in a furrow in the 
 field, in an isolated trench, in a shell hole, when 
 none might know their heroism, and not even 
 a mention in orders might come to bring their 
 families the consolation of an heroic memory. 
 These splendid men, the peasants of France, 
 whom neither military inheritance, nor moral 
 
 340 
 
IN A GERMAN BOYAU AT THE LABYRINTH. A RUNNER ESTABLISHING THE 
 
 LIAISON DURING THE ATTACK. BODY OF A GERMAN IN THE FOREGROUND 
 
 BATTLE OF ARTOIS, MAY ID, I915 
 
 THE WOUNDED MUST LEAVE THE BOYAUX CLEAR FOR THE ADVANCE 
 
 MAJOR AZAN, IN THE GERMAN POSITION AT THE LABYRINTH, ON THE 
 
 SLOPE BY THE SIDE OF THE ROAD FROM BETHUNE TO ARRAS 
 
 BATTLE OF ARTOIS, MAY 10, I915 
 
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
 
 development through education, nor intellectual 
 growth through instruction, nor the, practice of 
 the profession of arms, had prepared for such a 
 sacrifice, have yet endured it with a noble sim- 
 plicity and have ended often in the common 
 ditch without so much as a wooden cross to 
 carry their names. 
 
 Oh, my dear soldiers, soldiers of peace-times, 
 whom I led singing along the highways and across 
 the fields of France, soldiers of war-time whose 
 sufferings and dangers and hopes and joys I have 
 shared, to-day you are in the grave! How often, 
 without your knowing it, have I looked at you 
 with affection, with admiration, when your frank, 
 clear eyes were fixed on me in that splendid 
 attitude of the French military salute where the 
 soldier seems to be saying to his commander, " I 
 am yours, count on me." If I survive this war 
 it is my wish to tell the future generations how 
 truly great and fine you have been. I should like 
 to see a splendid monument erected in your mem- 
 ory, so large that all the cannon which we shall 
 take from the Germans in the day of victory will 
 not furnish the metal needed for the construction. 
 I weep for you. I love you. 
 
 No, I do not weep for you. I have no right to 
 do so, any more than I weep for the men of my 
 family or my dearest friends. You have done 
 your duty. A survivor may have but one regret, 
 
 341 
 
THE WARFARE OF TO-DAY 
 
 that is, that he has not done as much as you for 
 the mother country. 
 
 The blood which you have shed will prepare 
 the ground for new generations, more beautiful, 
 more strong, and more moral, than any we have 
 yet known. And from the midst of these count- 
 less tombs there will spring up a new race, more 
 truly imbued with feelings of goodness, justice, 
 and humanity. The civilized nations will find a 
 means to unite themselves in a new society, which 
 will prevent the repetition of all the horrors we 
 have seen. 
 
 Of course, we must not cherish the Utopian 
 idea that war will disappear from the face of 
 the earth. One might as well expect that crime 
 and robbery would disappear from among men. 
 But a strongly organized international police will 
 be able to limit future conflicts and to lessen their 
 necessary hardships. Let us have confidence in 
 the future of our civilization which has been won 
 as a result of centuries of effort. We must hope 
 that the war which is going on to-day, instead of 
 throwing it back, will advance it to a new stage. 
 When that time comes, the motto of the liber- 
 ated nations may be, in memory of the sacrifices 
 made by France, that which is seen on the flag 
 and on the monuments of my country : — 
 
 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 Reprinted from The War oj Positions 
 
 By Lieut. Colonel Paul Azan (Harvard University Press 
 
 Cambridge, 1917) 
 
 With additions and corrections 
 
 Accessory defences (defenses accessoires): Material obstacles such 
 as barbed-wire entanglements, chevaux-de-frise, pitfalls, etc., for 
 the purpose of obstructing the approach to temporary or perma- 
 nent fortification., The word " obstacles " has been frequently 
 employed in English for this purpose, but should be avoided, since 
 obstacle in military French has a totally different meaning. 
 
 Amenagement (amSnagement): Preparation of a terrain or of a posi- 
 tion for the purpose of a military operation. It includes the con- 
 struction of all sorts of works, the bringing-up and installation of 
 materiel, the organization of communications, etc. 
 
 Artillery: 
 
 (o) Field artillery {artillerie de campagne — A. C): In this book 
 this term is used in its French sense. In France field artillery 
 includes only the smaller calibres such as the 75 (3-inch), the 
 80 (3.2-inch) and the 90 (3.6-inch), which correspond to what 
 is called " light artillery " in the United States. The larger 
 calibres, including the 95 (3.8-inch) and upwards, are classed 
 in France with the heavy artillery; but in the United States 
 some of these larger calibres are included, together with the 
 light artillery, in the term " field artillery." 
 
 (&) Heavy artillery {artillerie lourde — A. L.): In this book this 
 term has also been used in its French sense. In France heavy 
 artillery includes the 95 (3.8-inch) and upwards; it is subdi- 
 vided into heavy artillery of medium calibre, up to the 155 
 (6-inch), and heavy artillery of larger calibre, from the 155 
 upwards. 
 
 (c) Light artillery (in the United States) {artillerie Ugere): This 
 term no longer exists in France, and it is not used in this book. 
 The American light artillery is the same as the French field 
 artillery. (See under " Field Artillery.") 
 
 345 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 (d) Trench artillery {artUlerie de IranchSe — A. T.): Includes all 
 ballistic weapons, bomb-throwers and mortars of all calibres 
 and of all models which are set up in trenches and served by 
 artillerists called trench mortar-men. 
 
 (e) Assaulting artillery (ariillerie d'assaut) : Armored motors, such 
 as tanks, carrying cannon of small calibres and machine guns, 
 which precede or accompany the infantry in an assault, and 
 may be utilized in the continuation of the attack. 
 
 (/) Light motor artillery {artUlerie Ugire automobile): Armored 
 cars, carrying cannon of small calibres and machine guns, 
 capable of rapid motion, and utilized in pursuit. 
 
 (g) Fixed artillery {artUlerie de position) : Artillery not regularly 
 provided with means of transportation, and intended to re- 
 main at the same emplacements until a change of position is 
 recognized to be advisable. 
 
 Attrition {usure): Indicating wastage of men and of materiel, and 
 deterioration of morale. 
 
 Automatic machine rifle {JusU mitrailleur) : An automatic rifle which 
 works by a long recoil of the barrel, and is loaded with semi-circular 
 clips containing twenty cartridges each. It weighs about eighteen 
 pounds and is served by a marksman and two loaders. The term 
 " French automatic rifle," formerly used to designate the fusU 
 mitrailleur, is no longer employed in this sense, because a regular 
 automatic rifle has been invented and is now in use in France. 
 The term "automatic rifle " is henceforth reserved for this weapon. 
 On the other hand, care must be taken not to confuse the auto- 
 matic machine rifle with the machine gun. 
 
 Barrage {barrage): A wide curtain of fire, formed usually by shells, 
 but also sometimes by projectiles shot by infantry weapons, for 
 the purpose of creating an impassable zone in front of friendly 
 troops. 
 
 A barrage may be either defensive or offensive. 
 
 A defensive artillery barrage is delivered at a moment's notice, 
 in order to stop an attack, a counter-attack, or a retour offensij by 
 enemy troops. An offensive artillery barrage is a moving barrage, 
 which precedes by the shortest possible distance the attacking 
 infantry of the same side that delivers it, and advances at the same 
 rate with that infantry. 
 
 Battle map {plan directeur) : Detailed maps, on the French scales of 
 WTR^' nrJinr ^"d s^, giving the fullest and most minute informa- 
 tion obtainable in regard to the enemy's trenches and organiza- 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 tion. These maps may show only the enemy's trenches, or they 
 may show those of both sides; in this latter case, they are not given 
 to commanders of lower rank than majors, and must never be 
 taken up into the first line. 
 
 Formerly these battle maps were called " firing maps " {plans 
 directeurs du tir), and were made for the use of the artillery. But 
 now that the necessity of having detailed maps for all arms of the 
 service, for the staffs, and for officers of all ranks has become gen- 
 erally recognized, these battle maps have developed rapidly, and 
 their use has been greatly extended. 
 
 American officers of all ranks should familiarize themselves with 
 these French battle maps, and with the French scales. 
 
 Boyau (boyati): A ditch used for circulation between the trenches 
 and the rear in the dangerous zone. The boyaux run in a direc- 
 tion generally perpendicular to the front, and are used solely for 
 circulation, while trenches are used for combat and run in a di- 
 rection generally parallel to the front. The English call these 
 boyaux " communication trenches," which is likely to cause con- 
 fusion. The word boyau is in accord with the French usage. To 
 avoid errors which might result from the adoption of the English 
 terminology, the term " communication trenches " has been kept 
 out of this book. For the same reason the term " communicating 
 trenches," which has been sometimes employed to designate "doub- 
 ling trenches " (not boyaux) should also be avoided. 
 
 Camouflage (camouflage) : Any means of concealment of works, bat- 
 teries, materiel, roads, trenches, troops, or any other implement of 
 warfare. 
 
 Command (commandement): Designates in a general way leaders of 
 high rank whose duty it is to make decisions and to give orders; 
 it also includes their staffs. 
 
 High Command (Haul Commandement): Designates leaders of the 
 highest rank such as the Commander-in-Chief, Generals of army 
 groups and of armies. 
 
 Command-post {paste de commandement) : Place where a commander 
 places himself, either in the trenches (organized shelter) or during 
 the course of the combat (improvised shelter). 
 
 In current usage the word " station " is sometimes employed, 
 together with the rank of the commander occupying it: e.g., 
 " Colonel's station." 
 
 347 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 Counter-attack (contre-attaque): Partial attack directed against an 
 attacking body of hostile troops for the purpose of preventing its 
 advance. 
 
 Depot (depdi): Place where provisions, water, ammunition, or ma- 
 teriel can be set down. In zones exposed to artillery fire it is a 
 shelter or a wide space where munitions are spread out so as to 
 escape the danger of destruction by enemy airplanes. 
 
 In the French military vocabulary the word has another mean- 
 ing, namely, the unit comprising available troops who are await- 
 ing their departure for the front, as, e.g., dSpdts des rSgiments (in 
 the cities far behind the lines) or dSpdt divisionnaire (near the 
 front). 
 
 Echelon, verb {tchelonner) : To arrange a body of troops in echelons, 
 that is to say, to divide it into two or more portions placed one be- 
 hind the other. 
 
 Echelon, noun {ichelon) : 
 
 1. A portion of a body of troops arranged in echelons. In the case 
 of artillery, " to move by echelons " means to move the echel- 
 oned portions one after another in such a way that the rearmost 
 passes in front of the foremost. 
 
 2. In a special sense a portion stationed behind and to the right 
 (or left) of another portion of the same body of troops. This 
 is in fact the usual significance of the word in English. " To 
 retreat by echelons " means, in the case of infantry, to move 
 back the different portions one after another in such a way that 
 one of them is placed behind and to the right (or left) of the one 
 adjacent to it and under its protection. 
 
 3. In French the word echelon has also several other meanings: 
 (o) Mchelon de combat (artillery) signifies combat train; 
 
 (i) Rchelon, in the case of a machine-gun company, designates 
 a portion of that company consisting of the means of trans- 
 port for those guns and their ammunition which are to go 
 directly to the firing line. 
 
 Echelonment {Schelonnement): Arrangement by which a body of 
 troops is divided into echelons. 
 
 Effectives (effectifs): Number of men (officers, N.C.O.'s, and soldiers) 
 in a body of troops. 
 
 Emplacement (emplacement): Point or portion of the ground which 
 is or can be utilized to install a weapon, an implement, an organ 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 of command, materiel, or a body of troops. The " location " is the 
 topographical determination of the emplacement. 
 
 Enfilading fire (tir d' enfilade) : A fire which catches a linear objec- 
 tive longitudinally, whether from the side or from the front; end-on 
 fire. 
 
 Fascines (fascines) : Faggots about eight feet long used in field forti- 
 fications. 
 
 Field works {ouvrages de campagne) : In contrast to permanent for- 
 tifications. 
 
 Flanking fire (Hr d'echarpe) : With reference to an element of a front 
 to be defended, a fire whose object is to catch an assaulting enemy 
 on the flank. 
 
 Fougade (Jougasse) : Buried charges of powder or melinite sometimes 
 covered overjwith stones and exploded by an electric current or by 
 a detonating fuse. 
 
 French automatic rifie: Term at first used to indicate the automatic 
 machine rifle, q.v., in contrast to the regular automatic rifle. It 
 has now been definitively supplanted by the term " automatic 
 machine rifle." 
 
 Gabion {gabion): Cylindrical basket without a bottom, composed 
 of branches tied around stakes and filled with earth, sand, or 
 gravel; utilized in field fortifications. 
 
 Group {groupement, — d'arlillerie) : The word groupe in French des- 
 ignates the regular artillery unit corresponding to the American 
 artillery battalion. The group (groupement), on the other hand is 
 a temporary conjunction of different units, — usually of different 
 calibres, — as, for example, a battalion of field artillery and a 
 battery of heavy artillery. 
 
 Guide-plan: Phrase sometimes used to indicate plan directeur. See 
 under Battle map. 
 
 Indicative (indicatif, — aviation) : Prearranged signal by means of 
 which an airplane or balloon can either call the station on the 
 ground with which it wishes to communicate (by wireless or by an 
 electric flash light on board) or can make itself known by an iden- 
 tifying cartridge with one or several flashes. 
 
 349 
 
GLOSSAEY 
 
 Listening post {paste d'(coute): Post situated in front of the first line 
 trench for observing and listening to the movements of the enemy. 
 
 Location by sound (jeperage par le son) : Method by which it is possi- 
 ble to determine, from the sound of the cannon, the location of the 
 batteries where they are. Posts furnished with specialized instru- 
 ments and a specially trained personnel (called posts for location by 
 sound), are established for this purpose. 
 
 Observation post (poste d' observation): Position selected to enable 
 commanders of every rank to observe the enemy or the terrain. 
 It should be close to the command-post and consequently deter- 
 mines the choice of the latter in the case of an advance; it is or- 
 ganized as completely as possible, but lacks the extensive equip- 
 ment of an observing station. 
 
 Observing station (observatoire): A construction specially organized 
 for purposes of observation in a place selected because of its topo- 
 graphical location and the views it commands. Observing sta- 
 tions are provided with a special personnel and a special outfit; 
 they are carefully concealed from the sight of the enemy and pro- 
 tected against bombardments. There are observing stations for 
 the Command and observing stations for the artillery. 
 
 The French word observaloire is also applied to airplanes and 
 balloons. One speaks of aerial observatoires in contrast to those on 
 the ground. 
 
 Radio officer (officier radiotllegraphiste): Officer in charge of the radio 
 service in the army and army corps staffs. See Receiving officer. 
 
 Receiving officer (officier d'antenne) : Artillery officer who makes a 
 specialty of receiving the wireless messages sent by the adjusting 
 airplanes. The term "radio officer" may be reserved to desig- 
 nate the officers in charge of the radio service in the army and 
 army corps staffs, and particularly of that for the aircraft. 
 
 Retour offensil {retour offensif) : An attack whose object is to retake 
 a trench, a work, a terrain, or a position which the enemy has 
 seized. 
 
 Rifle grenade (grenade d, fusil, e.g., obvs V. B., q.v.): A grenade of 
 cylindrical shape fired by means of a sort of cannon (called in 
 French tromUon) which can be fitted to an ordinary rifle. The shell 
 is propelled by the powder in the rifle cartridge; it explodes from 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 five to seven seconds later, through the action of a firing powder 
 which is lighted by a trigger set off by the bullet of the rifle. 
 
 Sap (sape): An excavation which may be subterraneous or not dug 
 by men who advance foot by foot; in contrast to a trench or a 
 boyau which is made by men all digging at the same time. 
 
 Sapper (sapeur): Soldier of the engineers; in a special sense one who 
 digs a sap. 
 
 Stationary fighting {stationnement) : A period of the war of positions 
 during which the troops remain in the same trenches and are un- 
 able to advance. 
 
 Traverse {traverse) : A piece of natural soil around which the trench 
 turns, and so placed as to protect adjacent portions of it. 
 
 V. B. (Viven-Bessieres): Names of the inventors of the V. B. rifle 
 grenade used in the French army. (See under Rifle grenade.) j; 
 
 Trench (tranchh): A ditch dug to protect troops from the enemy, 
 and to permit them at the same time to remain face to face with 
 him. 
 
 Trenches have an offensive object; in that they enable the men 
 to remain in close proximity to the enemy, to cause him losses, 
 and in that they furnish a place from which to launch attacks. 
 
 They have a defensive object; in that they make it possible to 
 resist the enemy's attacks, and to confront him with a number of 
 successive lines, difficult to take. 
 
 They differ, in interior shape, in tactical purpose, and in the 
 general direction in which they run, from boyaux, which are used 
 for circulation between the trenches and the rear. Boyaux should 
 therefore never be designated by the name " communicating 
 trenches," as is so often done. 
 
 On the different kinds of trenches, — first line, doubling, trans- 
 versal, support, see pp. 83-106. All these trenches may become 
 " firing trenches," in case the enemy attacks and advances into 
 the interior of the position. 
 
 The use of other designations (such as "cover trench'' for 
 "doubling trench" and "reserve trenches" for "line of redoubts") 
 to describe or define the different kinds of trenches can only lead 
 to dangerous confusions and mistakes. 
 
 Trous de loup (trous de loup) : A kind of accessory defence, consist- 
 ing of holes dug near each other (diam. about six feet; depth about 
 four feet), with sharpened stakes in the bottom. 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 Wave (vague): A wave is a formation for combat. It is composed 
 of units (platoons, companies, etc.) placed side by side, and be- 
 longing to other larger units disposed in depth. (See pages 191 ff.) 
 
 The attacking wave or first wave includes two lines, which are 
 sometimes incorrectly called " waves " in common parlance; these 
 lines are placed about fifteen paces from one another; a third line, 
 composed of trench-cleaners, and often improperly called " the 
 third wave," marches about twenty paces behind the second. The 
 whole of this formation goes forward en bloc like a wave; but also 
 like a wave, it tends, if it encounters an obstacle, to resolve itself 
 into a single line, through the piling up of the rearward elements 
 on the foremost. 
 
 The following waves (second, third, etc.), which are intended 
 to serve as reinforcing and manoeuvring troops, start at various 
 distances behind the first: these distances are secured by the com- 
 mand, either by means of a prearranged time-schedule, by spacings 
 on the ground or by signals. 
 
 The frequent and incorrect use of the word waves to designate 
 the different lines of one and the same wave has created numerous 
 confusions and ambiguities which it is important to terminate. 
 
 Zone (zdne) : Space of terrain of variable size. 
 
 (a) A zone of the front might be as much as fifty miles long and 
 twenty deep. Such a zone may be defined by limits existing 
 in either of the adversaries' lines. 
 
 (b) A zone of attack, of march, or of stationary fighting is the por- 
 tion of territory, of limited extent, which is assigned to a large 
 or small body of troops, in any phase of the combat (attack, 
 pursuit, march of approach, or stationary fighting). 
 
 (c) Zone fire is an artillery fire directed on a limited space which 
 constitutes the target, without designation of any more special 
 objective inside it. 
 
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