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 THE JAMES VERNER SCAIFE 
 
 COLLECTION 
 
 CIVIL WAR LITERATURE 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 JAMES VERNER SCAIFE 
 
 CLASS OF 1889 
 
 1919 
 
Cornall University Library 
 E 47535 B32 
 Battle of Chancellorsvjile. By Samuel P^ 
 
 iliiilM 
 
 3 1924 032 281 788 
 olln 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032281788 
 
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THE BATTLE 
 
 OF 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 BY 
 
 SAMUEL P. BATES. 
 
 JV/ien Sylla, after all his victories, styled hitnself a happy rather than a great gen- 
 eral, he discovered his profound knowledge of the military art. Experience taught him 
 that the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another — the obstinacy, the ignorance, or 
 the treachery of a subordinate officer, was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan ; 
 that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any apparently triv- 
 ial accident, viight determine the fate of a whole army. It taught him that the vicis- 
 situdes of war are so many, disappointment will attend the wisest combinations ; that 
 a ruinous defeat, the work of chance, sometimes closes the career of the boldest anci most 
 sagacious of generals ; and that to judge of a commander by the event alone, is equally 
 unjust and unphilosophical, a refuge of vanity and ignorance, — Napier. 
 
 MEADVILLE, PA.: 
 
 1882. 
 

 /\.3'SH-S-l{ 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1882, by- 
 
 SAMUEL P. BATES, 
 
 In tlie Clerk's Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 
 
 WM. RUTTER A CO., 
 
 BOOK MANUFACTURERS, 
 
 SEVENTH ft CHERRY STS., FHILA. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 E PEYSTER, in his " Critical Review of the 
 Battle of Chancellorsville," says, "Of all 
 the battles of the rebellion, the writer has 
 found Chancellorsville the most difficult to 
 comprehend in all its turns and phases. 
 Even yet, some of its movements continue 
 to be enigmas to him." And so able a soldier and 
 keen a strategist as General Humphreys, who was him- 
 self a prominent actor on the field, says, in his testi- 
 mony, " Probably I know less in regard to the battle of 
 Chancellorsville than any other battle I ever took part 
 in." It should be added that there has been doubtless 
 more misapprehension, and, in consequence, downright 
 misleading of the public mind respecting this battle than 
 any in the long catalogue of the four years of the late 
 
 war. 
 
 (3) 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 As a military study, no battle presents so many broad 
 questions, that require, for their correct solution, the best 
 talent of the student, and the most profitable employment 
 of his faculties. Many of the great principles of the 
 military science — tactics, strategy, and logistics — are ex- 
 emplified in a remarkable manner, in this campaign. 
 
 To understand well a campaign it is necessary to know 
 at every moment of time where the two opposing armies 
 are. They must be known etnd watched, as the dis- 
 patcher, on a line of railway where innumerable trains are 
 moving, follows his trains. Unless one can answer for the 
 position of all the troops, who are parties to the contest at 
 every conceivable epoch in its progress, he is constantly 
 liable to be imposed upon by false testimony and false 
 opinions, and to be perpetually led astray in his own judg- 
 ments. But with this knowledge in mind, he is prepared 
 to detect error, and misrepresentation, and easily trace the 
 real phases of the fight. The erroneous testimony given 
 respecting this battle, which has' formed the basis and 
 framework of the accounts of it that have, from time to 
 time, been published, was the result of not knowing where 
 the rebel army was, at the times which the testimony 
 touched, and not of any intentional deceit. 
 
 The writer has attempted to give what he conceives to 
 be a truthful outline and coloring to his narrative. K he 
 has failed in any respect to compass this result, none will 
 
PREFACE. 5 
 
 feel more sorrow than he, and none will be more ready 
 than he to repair a wrong. Trusting that he has, in some 
 good degree, made plain an extremely intricate subject, he 
 
 submits it to the public. 
 
 S. P. B. 
 
 Fountain Side, Meadyillb, 
 
 June Qth, 1882. 
 
CONTENTS: 
 
 Chapter Page 
 
 I. — Preliminaries to the Campaign, 9 
 
 II. — Peepa rations of the Two Armies for the Onset, 25 
 III. — Plan of the Campaign. Movements op the 
 
 Cavalry, 36 
 
 IV. — ^The Army of the Potomac Unleashed, . . 45 
 V. — The Contending Hosts Brought Face to Face, 60 
 
 VI. — A Day of Manceuvres, 81 
 
 VII. — A Crisis in the Battle, lOC 
 
 VIII. — A Morning op Bloody Conflict, 116 
 
 IX. — Retirement of 'ihe Union Forces to the Final 
 
 Line of Battle, 130 
 
 X. — Sedgwick at Fredericksburg and Salem 
 
 Church, . . ' 140 
 
 XI. — Conduct op the Battle, 160 
 
 XII. — Numbers Engaged, Losses, the "Wounded, the 
 
 Dead, 197 
 
 XIII. — The Injuries op Hooker, the Wounds of Jack- 
 son, THE Charge of Keenan, 211 
 
 Appendix. Official Orders, Telegrams, and 
 Testimony, 237 
 
 (7) 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Page 
 Map of the Chancellorsville Field, 57 
 
 Map of the Feedekicksbukg and Salem Chukch Field, 195 
 
 Geound Sketch of the Charge of Keenan, . . . 233 
 
 PORTRAITS. 
 
 Joseph Hooker, Frontispiece. 
 
 Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson, , to face page 110 
 (8) V 
 
HISTORY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 iATTLE OF aiHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PBELIMINABIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 N the rigbt bank of the Potomac, a few miles above 
 its confluence with the Rappahannock, stretching 
 along the shore for a considerable distance, is the 
 estate of Mount Vernon, once the home of Wash- 
 ington, and where repose his mortal remains. In 
 his lifetime, all this section of country, diversified 
 by hill and dale, skirtings of forest and far-stretch- 
 ing meads, was familiar ground. At Fredericks- 
 burg, a few miles away, he attended church on the 
 Sabbath, whither he often rode on horseback, where 
 Mary, his mother, lived, and where she lies buried. In moving up 
 and down the river, which is here a lordly stream, the mansion and 
 the tomb of the chief are plainly visible, and in passing, it is the 
 invariable custom to dip the ensign of the craft, and strike the bell 
 in measured note, the pilgrim standing with uncovered head. It is 
 a mark of veneration bred of those exalted qualities displayed in 
 cabinet and field, for the founding and unification of a country, of 
 which he is aptly termed its Father. As his eye rested in his later 
 days upon the repose and quiet of this beautiful landscape, the river 
 rolling at his feet, orchards and green meadows sweeping up on 
 every side, the blue hills of Virginia in the back-ground) and he 
 
 (9) 
 
10 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 contemplated, with just satisfaction, his life-work successfully ac- 
 complished, is it possible that a shade of sadness was ever brought 
 to that serene brow, by visions of a broken and disrupted country, 
 the fragments warring over these fields to destroy what he gave his 
 life to build up and cement ? 
 
 The perpetual murmur which falls upon his ear, as he rests in 
 his tomb by the stream gliding onward to the sea, was often broken 
 during the years of fratricidal conflict, by the crash of arms, as 
 venomous strife appealed to the red hand of battle. By a singular 
 fatality, the line which bounds the horjzon of Mount Vernon 
 encircles fields on which were some of the most desperate and 
 deadly conflicts of the war. 
 
 The Potomac river, which forms the northern boundary of Vir- 
 ginia, was the limit of the seceding States, east of the Appalachian 
 range of mountains, and was the line which the Confederate armies 
 sought, in the early stages of the war, to defend. The next stream 
 south, of sufficient size to be capable of being made a line of defense, 
 is the Rappahannock. When, therefore, their armies were pushed 
 back from the former stream, they entrenched themselves upon this, 
 and here, consequently, was the ground where grand campaigns had 
 their initial, and where the finest armies, on both sides of the con- 
 test, struggled for the mastery. 
 
 Shortly after the close of the summer campaigns of^ 1862, which 
 had raged upon the Peninsula, at Bull Run before Washington, 
 and at South Mountain and Antietam in Maryland, McClellan, 
 Pope, and McDowell, who had been holdiug command of the Army 
 of the Potomac, either in whole or in part, ware superseded by 
 Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside. It was on the 8th of No- 
 vember that he assumed command of the consolidated Potomac 
 army. In the first battle of Bull Run he had proved himself a 
 brave and skillful ofiicer, and in a subsequent campaign, under- 
 taken by sea, into North Carolina, upon a dangerous and tempestu- 
 ous coast, he had displayed remarkable enterprise, and the disposi- 
 tion to press forward unceasingly — qualities which the government 
 and the country, on account of the ill success and seeming dilatori- 
 ness of former commanders, were eager to see displayed. 
 
 The autumnal rains had already set in, and, under ordinary con- 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. H 
 
 ditions, the time of campaigning would have been considered past, 
 and preparations made to go into winter-quarters, to await, during 
 the inclement season, the settled weather of the spring. But he 
 well knew the impatience which was oppressing every heart, and 
 being constituted of that stern stufF, which never cowers before 
 obstacles and hardships, he had no sooner assumed command than 
 he opened an active campaign. Feigning a movement towards 
 Gordonsville,* he made a real march towards Fredericksburg, 
 where he hoped to cross the Rappahannock, and occupy the heights 
 beyond before the opposing army should divine his motive. But 
 General Robert E. Lee, who was pitted against him in command of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, was possessed of enterprise akin 
 to his own, and had placed himself in position to oppose the pas- 
 sage at that point, long before Burnside was ready to cross, the lat- 
 ter having been unaccountably delayed by the failure of the proper 
 officers to bring up the bridge-train. 
 
 It was the 13th of December, 1862, before his preparations were 
 completed for offering battle. The passage of the stream was reso- 
 lutely effected, and the necessary bridges having been laid, the 
 grand army moved over. But, at a distance of a mile to two miles 
 back from the river, on a line of rugged, wooded blufife, lay the 
 opposing legions in impregnable fastnesses, awaiting the advance. 
 It was boldly made. But, though wave after wave of living valor 
 dashed madly against those rocky heights, guarded in front by 
 walls of stone, little impression was produced, and when all hope 
 of success by direct advance was gone, on the night of the 15th, 
 Burnside withdrew his entire array without molestation. 
 
 Inspired with a resolution which knew no impediment nor delay, 
 and stung with mortification at his previous misfortune, he was 
 scarcely settled in his camp before he commenced preparations for 
 another attempt. His infantry was to cross some six or seven miles 
 below Fredericksburg,t at a point opposite the Sedden house, near 
 Hayfield, while a demonstration was being made above the town ; 
 and, in case he was discovered and prevented from crossing below, 
 then the demonstration above was to be converted into a real progress. 
 
 * " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 643-650. 
 t" Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 717. 
 
12 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 A cavalry force, consisting of 2,500 men, the best in the service, he 
 divided into two columns, and while one made demonstrations upon 
 the upper Kappahaunock, the other, consisting of a thousand picked 
 men, with four pieces of artillery, was to cross the Rappahannock 
 at Kelly's ford, and the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and, sweeping 
 around, fall upon Lee's communications, blow up the locks on the 
 James river canal, destroy the iron bridge on the Richmond and 
 Lynchburg railroad at the place of crossing, and the bridge over 
 the Nottaway, on the Richmond and Weldon railroad. When this 
 was well accomplished, Burnside, with the main body, was to cross 
 the river, as indicated, and complete the severance of Lee'o main 
 line of supply, or defeat him in battle. The cavalry expedition was 
 well on the way, and all the dispositions had been made for cross- 
 ing, positions for the artillery to cover the movement having been 
 Selected, and logs cut for corduroying the roads, when, on the 30th 
 of December, General Burnside received the following telegram 
 from President Lincoln : " I have good reason for saying that you 
 must not make a general movement without letting me know of it." 
 A messenger was immediately dispatched to arrest the cavalry, and 
 all movements were at once suspended. 
 
 So numerous were the sympathizers with the seceding States, in 
 and about the army, and in all the departments of the government, 
 that it was impossible for a plan of campaigns to be divulged beyond 
 the breast of him who formed it, without being immediately com- 
 municated to the enemy. So disastrous was this evil found to be 
 that the General-in-Chief of the Army, Henry W. Halleck, had 
 directed General Burnside not to telegraph any of his plans to Wash- 
 ington.* What the objection to a movement was, Burnside was at a 
 loss to conceive, as the President had always manifested impatience 
 
 * Question. Did the President know at the time he sent you the telegraphic dis- 
 patch suspending your movement, what movement you contemplated ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; nothing except that I had ordered a movement. I take it, he 
 knew that. General Halleck knew it. None of them knew my plans. In fact, 
 General Halleck telegraphed me distinctly and positively to send nothing at all over 
 the wires in regard to my plans. 
 
 Question. Did those who communicated with the President know your plans ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; not a. General in my command knew my plans. They knew 
 they were to cross, that was all. — Testimony of General Burnside, " Conduct of 
 the War," Part I., p. 722. 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 13 
 
 at delay. Oii visiting Mr. Lincoln, he learned that two of his 
 general officers, when they found that a movement was about to 
 be undertaken, had been to Washington, and, in a roundabout 
 way,* had told the President, with whom they sought an interview, 
 that there was dissatisfaction in the army, and that their belief was 
 that another movement across the river would end disastrously, 
 that the men would not fight f with that enthusiasm necessary to 
 success. 
 
 Before leaving. General Burnside desired to have an order from 
 the President or General Halleck, explicitly directing a forward 
 movement. This General Halleck refused to give, but gave some 
 general principles which should govern in the management of 
 campaigns, J and took care to assert that he had always favored a 
 forward movement. The President indorsed this paper, and, 
 understanding from its purport that a movement was desired by the 
 government without explicitly directing it, General Burnside de- 
 
 * " I also found myself in a very delicate position in this oonversfition. I did not 
 wish to tell the President, and I did not tell him at any one time, that the troops had 
 no confidence in General Burnside. I could not tell him that, although, so far as I 
 was concerned, that was my firm belief. But that was a most delicate thing for me 
 to say, and therefore I had to go, as it were, around it Indirectly. ... If I could 
 have gone to the President and said to him, ' Mr. President, the army has no con- 
 fidence in General Burnside, that is the whole trouble down there,' my conversation 
 would not have lasted five minutes ; but that was manifestly improper. I could not 
 say it, although I did believe it firmly." 
 
 .... "Qaestinn. Do I understand you to say that this lack of confidence in the 
 army arose from a want of confidence in General Burnside's military ability ? 
 
 "Answer. That is my firm belief. 
 
 "Question. And do I understand you to say that that opinion was pretty universal 
 in the army ? 
 
 "Answer. That is the misfortune — that it was almost universal. That was my 
 firm belief from all I could hear. 
 
 " Question. Did you communicate that fact to the President in any manner ? 
 
 "Answer. As I have already remarked, I thought it would be highly improper for 
 me to come square out and say that. I say, as I have before stated, that I tried to 
 convey to the President, indirectly, this idea — that the troops had no confidence in 
 General Burnside."-^Testimony of Geneeal John Newton, " Conduct of the 
 War," Part I., p. 731-2-7. 
 
 ■f- My meaning was this, that they would fight to a certain extent, but they would 
 not fight with that rush and impetuosity which the situation of affairs on the 
 Bappahannock absolutely demanded as the first element of success. — Testimony of 
 General John Newton, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 733. 
 
 t Testimony of General Burnside, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 719. 
 
14 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 termined to again put his army in motion. On returning to camp, 
 however, he found that all the details of the cavalry movement which 
 he had formed were known to the enemy,* as well as his entire plan 
 of campaign. This determined him to give up entirely the campaign 
 in this particular form, and to cast about for other dispositions. 
 
 On examining the ground above Falmouth, he believed that a 
 crossing could be effected at Banks' and United States fords. He, 
 accordingly, made all the necessary surveys and preparations as 
 before, only reversing his tactics, and making the feint to cross a 
 few miles below. On the 20th of January the command had been 
 given to move, and the camps were astir, when there came on one 
 of those wintry rains so common to the Virginia climate. It 
 seemed as if the windows of heaven had been opened, and were 
 pouring out all their torrents. The earth soon became like a 
 saturated sponge, and the roads impassable, a full team scarcely 
 sufficing to draw an empty wagon. Teams were doubled and 
 quadrupled to move the heavy guns which soon sank in the 
 yielding mud, blocking the way, and creating inextricable con- 
 fusion. Single horsemen , were unable to advance, and were 
 obliged to dismount. The delay thijs occasioned robbed the 
 movement of whatever of secrecy and surprise had been intended, 
 and enabled the ever watchful enemy to divine its purpose and 
 prepare to meet it. 
 
 Satisiied that all attempts to assail the enemy in this direction 
 would be fatal, he reluctantly on the 22d of January, for the third 
 time, ordered his army to return to camp. But the return proved 
 even more difficult than the advance, and in the midst of the sorest 
 labors to extricate the artillery and trains, the hostile soldiers, who 
 stood guard on the opposite side of the river, commiserating their 
 opponents in these troubles, in mockery offered to come over and 
 lend a helping hand. Thus ended what in common parlance was 
 known as, the "Mud March." 
 
 In the meantime it had come to the knowledge of General Burn- 
 side who the officers were that had made the gratuitous repre- 
 sentations to Mr. Lincoln, and what ones in the army shared in their 
 views. He had learned, moreover, that these soldiers believed it 
 
 *" Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 718. 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 15 
 
 impracticable* to cross the river in the face of an active foe. 
 General Burnside distinctly saw that he could never prosecute suc- 
 cessful campaigns, with a portion of his officers so little in sympathy 
 with his plans and purposes, and accordingly went to his tent and 
 drew up, what is known as, order No. 8 of his series, dismissing 
 certain officers from service, and relieving others from duty with 
 the Army of the Potomac. This he ordered his Adjutant-General 
 to issue ; f but was prevailed upon, by a cool-headed adviser, to first 
 lay it before the President, whose approval it required to give it 
 validity. He accordingly went to Washington, and placed in the 
 hands of Mr. Lincoln this order, together with his own resignation 
 as a Major-Genera], with the explanation, that if the President 
 would approve the order and see it executed, he would withdraw 
 the resignation ; otherwise its acceptance was desired. 
 
 After due consultation with his jmilitary advisers, th^ President 
 decided to relieve General Burnside but not to accept his resigna- 
 tion, deeming him to be an energetic and faithful officer. Im- 
 pressed with the lofty sense of duty and responsibility of each in- 
 dividual , to serve his country entertained by the President, the 
 General generously oflFered to waive every motive of pride or ambi- 
 tion, and to return to the command of his old corps, or any other 
 service required of him.J But who should succeed to this fear- 
 fully responsible position — the command of the Army of the 
 
 *It was my belief, my military belief, that with the best troops in the world we 
 would have failed at that time. ... It is laid down by the very best military writers — 
 not merely theoretical, but practical military writers — that the passage of a river in face 
 of an opposing force never succeeds, except by mere chance ; that the instances of 
 success are so rare that the rule is proved by the exceptions ; that it is impossible to 
 pass a river except what is called by surprise ; that is, at a point so far removed from 
 the main body of the enemy, or do it so suddenly that you have time to get your 
 troops over, and not only get them over but also in order of battle so as to be ready 
 to meet an attack ; for, if the enemy charge upon you before you get in order of 
 battle, the more troops you have over the worse for you. — Testimony of Geneeal 
 Newton, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 738. 
 
 t " Conduct of the "War," Part I., p. 720, 721. 
 
 X General Burnside always distrusted his ability to command the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, as will be seen from the following testimony : " I told them what my views were 
 with reference to my ability to exercise such a command, which viaws were those I 
 had always unreservedly expressed — that I was not competent to command such a 
 large army as this. I had said the same over and over again to the President and 
 Secretary of War."— "Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 650. 
 
16 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 Potomac, the largest of the national forces, and upon which was 
 the chief reliance of the government for the safety of the Capital 
 and its own integrity. To this time it had had a peculiarly unfor- 
 tunate history. In its varied encounters at Bull Eun, upon the 
 Peninsula, and now before Fredericksburg, 
 
 " Unmerciful disaster 
 Followed fast and followed faster, till its songs one burden bore, 
 Till the dirges of its hope the melancholy burden bore." 
 
 This army was not wanting in able soldiers. But who, Ia the 
 midst of its countless complications, could harmonize conflicting 
 wills, and successfully wield its hundred thousand men? Who 
 should prove the disenchanter ? 
 
 " Who should snatch the wand ? 
 Who, with the rod reversed, 
 And backward mutters of dissevering power," 
 
 could break the spell, and so reorganize and inspire that army with 
 confidence in itself and in its leader, as to make it invincible? 
 Who could dissipate the gloom, and bring sunshine and the un- 
 clouded sky ? 
 
 President Lincoln, upon whom the decision finally rested, deter- 
 mined unhesitatingly to confer this grave responsibility upon 
 Major-General Joseph Hooker, who had been with the Army of 
 the Potomac from its origin, and by his heroism in the hour of bat- 
 tle had won the familiar title of "Fighting Joe Hooker." At 
 Williamsburg and at Charles City Cross Roads, in the Peninsula 
 campaign, he had rendered signal service, holding his division with 
 great gallantry at the latter point, when opposed by superior num- 
 bers, where, had he yielded, the disaster would have been irrepara- 
 ble. But it was on the field of Antietam that he had given bril- 
 liant proof of his exalted qualities as a soldier, having opened the 
 battle and borne the brunt of the heavy fighting, successfully 
 assaulting the enemy in his chosen position and driving him back, 
 leaving that memorable " cornfield," * in front of the little church, 
 
 * Mr. Lincoln visited the Antietam field immediately after the close of the battle, 
 and, when conducted over the ground where General Hooker fought, and the " corn- 
 field" into which the corps of Stonewall Jackson had poured until the bayonets of hia 
 men were as the corn-blades for number, and upon which Hooker had opened with 
 his artillery at the opportune moment and cut them down in ranks as they stood the 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 17 
 
 literally strewn with the dead and the dying, and never staying in 
 his course until he was himself borne from the field with a painful 
 wound.* 
 
 At the time of the retirement of General McClellan from the 
 command of the Potomac army, General Hooker had been urged 
 as his successor, and the President is understood to have favored it; 
 but General Halleuk, who was then General-in-Chief of all the 
 armies, made objection, and General Burnside was chosen. But the 
 President was now decided, and though Halleck still opposed, his 
 voice was impotent. The President himself saw faults in the 
 character of General Hooker, or conceived he did, and took occa- 
 sion to point them out, freely and unreservedly, in his letter notify- 
 ing the General of his appointment. As au example of the President's 
 simplicity and frankness, and his exalted sense of justice £.nd of 
 right, it is here cited, and though he was entirely at fault in the 
 opinion he entertained of General Hooker's lack of ready obedience 
 to his superior's orders, it proved the shortest and best way to its 
 rectification, and convinced the object of his reproof that Mr. Lin- 
 coln was at heart his best and truest friend. 
 
 President had conceived a strong liking for General Hooker, and from that moment 
 appears to have been impressed with the belief that here was Ihe general who ought 
 to be at the head of the army. 
 
 [From the original autograph letter of General McClellan to General Hooker.] 
 
 Headquabtbes Akmy Of the Potomac, Sharpsburg, Sept. 206h, 1862. 
 
 My dear Hookbe : — I have been very sick the last few days and just able to go 
 where my presence was absolutely necessary, so I could not come to see you, and 
 thank you for what yon did the other day, and express my intense regret and sympa- 
 thy for your unfortunate wound. Had you not been wounded when you were, I be- 
 lieve the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Eebel army 
 — for I know, with you at its head, your corps would have kept on until it gained the 
 main road. 
 
 As a slight expression of what I think you merit, I have requested that the briga- 
 dier-general's commission, rendered vacant by Mansfield's death, may be given to you. 
 I will this evening write a private note to the President on th6 subject, and am glad 
 to assure you that so far as I can learn it is the universal feeling of the arpy, that 
 you are the most deserving of it. 
 
 With the sincere hope that your health may soon be restored, so that you may 
 again be with us in the field, I am,^ my dear General, 
 
 To Majok-GeneeaL Hookeb, Your sincere friend, 
 
 Commanding corps. Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General. 
 
 '2 ' 
 
18 T^E BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 Majoe-Geneeal Hookee: — I have placed you at the head of the 
 Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear 
 to me to be sufficient reasons. And yet I think it best for you to know- 
 that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied 
 with you. I believe you to be a brave and a skilful soldier, which, of 
 course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politicswith your profes- 
 sion, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, yhich 
 is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, 
 which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm. But I 
 think that during; General Burnside's command of the army, you have 
 taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you 
 could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most 
 meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way 
 as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the 
 Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in 
 spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those Generals 
 who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is 
 military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government 
 will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor 
 less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that 
 the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising 
 their commander, and withholding confidence from him, will now turn 
 upon you. I shall assist you, as far as I can, to put it down. Neither 
 you, nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an 
 army, while such a spirit prevails in it. 
 
 And now, beware of rashness — Beware of rashness, but with energy, 
 and sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victories. 
 
 General Hooker immediately repaired to Washington, and in a 
 personal interview disabused the President's mind of the erroneous 
 impression under which he was laboring, and satisfied him that he 
 had given prompt and ready support to every order and require- 
 ment of General Burnside, even though his judgment might not 
 have approved of their wisdom.* General Halleck and Secretary 
 
 * In the few paragraphs that can be devoted to the operations of the army under 
 General Burnside, wp have simply stated the leading facts in the case without attempt- 
 ing to argue the justness of the one view or the other. But the subject cannot be 
 fairly dismissed without a few words of explanation. General Burnside in his order 
 dismissing some of his officers and relieving others, seemed to be laboring under the 
 impression that these ofScers were purposely trying to thwart his plans. Indeed the 
 opinion prevailed at the North, that these Generals saw in the disaster of Burnside 
 their own advancement, and the tone and temper of Mr. Lincoln's letter would seem 
 to imply that he was tinctured with such an idea. In the battle of Fredericksburg 
 Burnside had made strong front attacks on commanding, impregnable positions forti- 
 fied after the best military art. Four separate attacks were made on the right, upon 
 Marye's Heights, by powerful columns, led respectively by French, Hancock, Howard, 
 
PBELIMINAItlES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 19 
 
 Stanton were present at the interview. To the question whether, 
 in addition to the command of the Army of the Potomac, he de- 
 sired that of the Department of Washington, and of the upper 
 Potomac, as his predecessor had had, he answered in the negative — 
 not much in the spirit of dictatorship — assigning as a reason, that 
 in the then condition of the Army of the Potomac, all his time 
 would be required to bring that army up to the full state of effi- 
 ciency necessary to win battles. He was aware that General Halleck 
 was inimical to himself, and had opposed his appointment ; hence, 
 in this interview, he stated to the President, that he had but one 
 request to make of him, that he would stand between himself and 
 the commanding general of the army.* That he should have 
 been under the necessity of making such a request, upon his en- 
 trance to duty, was by no means a propitious circumstance. On the 
 31st of January, the Ninth corps, of which General Burnside had 
 resumed command, was withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, 
 and transferred to the Department of the Ohio. 
 
 Regardless of the weather and the wintry season — from early in 
 November to near the close of January — Burnside had kept the 
 army astir, having planned and attempted the execution of three 
 distinct campaigns, involving the employment of the entire army. 
 But General Hooker was convinced of the futility, as well as the 
 
 and Humphreys, wliioh made not the least impression, while each wave as it went for- 
 ward suffered terrible slaughter. Burnside, not satisfied, wished to persevere in these 
 front attacks and hurl other columns upon the foe. Old soldiers like Sumner and 
 Hooker were frank enough to remonstrate with him against this futile waste of life, 
 and these were two of the names included in order No. 8. A soldier who regards with 
 unclouded eye these assaults cannot fail to see that they were ill-advised and none 
 probably came to regard them with more regret than General Burnside himself. 
 
 * " This was the only request I made of the President on assuming command. As I 
 then stated, I deemed it heoessary, for the reason that the commanding general had, 
 to a limited extent, been identified with the Army of the West and seemed to think 
 there was no other army in the Kepublic. He wrote apd spoke freely of the army 
 he had commanded at the expense of onethe had never seen. His disparaging com- 
 parisons and reflections had been communicated to the army, and neither it nor its 
 commander expected justice at his hands. Besides, I had been reliably informed that 
 he had opposed my appointment to the command of the army against the wishes of 
 the President and a majority of the Cabinet,' when the removal of Major-General 
 McClellan from command was in contemplation on two occasions; and that I was 
 again opposed by him on the removal of Major-General Burnside." — " Conduct of the 
 War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 111. 
 
20 TMJS BATTLE OF OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 inhumanity, of attempting a general movement at this inclement 
 season. He says : " My experience of the previous winter had sat- 
 isfied me that a winter campaign in that climate, and on that soil, 
 would be unwise, and more likely to be ruinous to ourselves than to 
 the enemy." * 
 
 It was natural for the people of the North to glory in the apparent 
 strength and power of the national army. For, had there ever been 
 seen such a spontaneous and unquestioning uprising before? The 
 question with the government at this stage of the war was not, how 
 can we compel men to enter the ra!nks, but how can we find a place 
 for them ; and with the soldier it was not, how can I escape the 
 dreaded conscription, but what influences can I bring to bear upon 
 my member of Congress, or the governor of my State, to induce the 
 acceptance of myself, my squadron, or my company. It was believed 
 by the people at home that the immense forces sent to the field were 
 the essential requisites to success, and they were perplexed and in- 
 capable of comprehending why rebellion was not subdued. 
 
 But notwithstanding the fact that countless numbers of recruits 
 had flocked to the field, it must be confessed that when General 
 Hooker came to the command of the army he found it in a deplor- 
 able condition. The great disaster at Fredericksburg, and the 
 intense suficring there endured from cold and exposure, with the 
 two subsequent fruitless attempts to renew the conflict, added .to the 
 failure of all the previous campaigns, immensely wearing, and de- 
 structive of human life, had caused a widespread feeling of gloom 
 and despondency, if not originating among the soldiers themselves, 
 yet among their less courageous friends at home, which, in its reflex 
 influence, was hardly less potent. The proclamatioii of Emancipa- 
 tion, the notice of which had been given in the previous September, 
 had just been issued; and, however we may attempt to overlook and 
 disguise the fact, removed as we are from the time of its issue, and 
 with all the favoring circumstances attending its success, there can 
 be no doubt that it had, for the time, a depressing influence, and 
 greatly interfered with the efficiency of the army. There was a 
 considerable party in the ranks, and a much larger one at home, 
 who believed, that in putting down rebellion the institution of 
 
 •"'Conductof the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 111. 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 21 
 
 slavery should not be disturbed, and who fancied they saw, in the 
 inauguration of the emancipation policy, a change in the purpose 
 and object of the war. 
 
 "At the time the army was turned over to me," says General 
 Hooker in his testimony,* taken on the 11th of March, 1865, 
 "desertions were at the rate of about two hundred a ,day. So 
 anxious were parents, wives, brothers and sisters to relieve their 
 kindred, that they filled the express trains to the army with pack- 
 ages of citizen clothing,t to assist them in escaping from service." 
 A return of the absentees of the army, which the commander at this 
 time caused to be made, showed that 2,922 commissioned officers, 
 and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates — a great army in 
 itself — were away from their commands, scattered over the whole 
 country, the majority absent from causes unknown. Desertion was 
 at this time known as French furlough. "I entered upon my 
 duties," says General Hooker, "with many misgivings and appre- 
 hensions. When it was announced to rae that I had been placed in 
 command of the Army of the Potomac, I doubted, and so expressed 
 myself, if it could be saved to the country." 
 
 That this gloomy view is not colored nor exaggerated, we have 
 corroborative testimony from an entirely different source, but of the 
 highest character for integrity and impartiality — from. President 
 Lincoln himself — and it is not merely confirmatory of the desperate 
 condition of the army, but of the utter failure of the people at large 
 to understand and appreciate the fact. A little previous to this 
 time a "Women's Council, gathered from all sections of the country, 
 had assembled in Washington to confer upon the interests of the 
 Sanitary Commission, and, before separating,' had called in a body 
 on the President to get from him some word of entjpuragement 
 respecting the condition of the country. " I shall never forget," 
 says the annalist,J "the shock that his presence gave us at that 
 time. Not more ghastly nor rigid was his dead face as he lay in his 
 coffin, than on that never-to-be-forgotten night. His introverted 
 
 *" Conduct of the War," 1865. Vol. I., p. 112. 
 t " Conduct of the War," 1865, VoL I., p. 192. 
 J Mrs. Mary A. Livermore in the " Ladies' Repository." 
 
22 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 look and his half-staggering gait were like those of a man walking 
 in his sleep. He seemed literally bending under the weight of his 
 burdens. To the suggestion that they desired from him some word 
 of encouragement, something to cheer and stimulate, ' I have no 
 word of encouragement to give,' was his sad and blunt reply. 'The 
 military situation is far from bright, and the country knows it as 
 well as I do. The fact is, the people have not yet made up their 
 minds that we are at war with the South. They haven't buckled 
 down to the determination to fight this war through. They've got 
 the idea into their heads that they're going to get out of this fix 
 somehow by strategy. That's the word, strategy ! . . . They've no 
 idea that the war is to be carried on, and put through by hard, 
 tough fighting. And no headway is going "to be made while this 
 state of mind lasts.' 
 
 " Some one ventured a remonstrance against this, and reminded 
 the President how hundreds of thousands had rushed to arms at the 
 call of the country — how bravely the army and navy had fought at 
 Forts Henry and Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh and New Orleans, 
 and how gloriously they had triumphed. He admitted this, but 
 returned to his first statement. ' The people haven't made up their 
 minds that we are at war, I tell you,' he repeated with great posi- 
 tiveness ; 'they think there is a royal road to peace. The army has 
 not settled down into .the conviction that we are in a terrible war, 
 that has got to be fought out — no, and the officers haven't, either. 
 When you came to Washington, ladies, some two weejis ago, but few 
 soldiers came on with you — that you will all remember. But when 
 you go back you will find every car and every conveyance crowded 
 with them. You won't find a city, town, or a village, where soldiers 
 and officers ^on furlough are not plenty as blackberries. There are 
 whole regiments that have two-thirds of their men absent — a great 
 many by desertion, and a great many on leave granted by company 
 officers, which is almost as bad. There is a constant call for more 
 troops, and they are sent forward, but the deserters and the fur- 
 loughed men outnumber the recruits. To fill up the army is like 
 undertaking to shovel fleas; you take up a shovelful' — suiting the 
 word with an indescribably comic gesture — 'but before you can 
 dump them anywhere, they're gone. It's like trying to ride a 
 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 23 
 
 balky horse ; you coax, and cheer, and spur, aud lay on the whip, 
 but you don't get ahead an inch ; there you stick.' 
 
 '"Do you mean that our men desert?' we asked incredulously; 
 for, in our glorifying of the soldiers, we had not conceived of our 
 men becoming deserters. 
 
 " ' That's just what I mean,' replied the President, ' aud the 
 desertion of the army is just now the most serious evil we have to 
 encounter. At the battle of Antietam General McCIellan had the 
 names of about 180,000 men on the army rolls. Of them 70,000 
 were absent on leave granted by company officers, which, as I said 
 before, is almost as bad as desertion ; for men ought not to ask for 
 furloughs with the enemy drawn up before them, nor the officers to 
 grant them. About twenty thousand more were in hospital or were 
 detailed to other duties, leaving only some ninety thousand to give 
 battle to the rebels. General McCIellan went into the fight with 
 this number, but in two hours after it commenced, 30,000 had 
 straggled or deserted, and so the battle was fought with 60,000, 
 and as the enemy had about the same number, it proved a drawn 
 game. The rebel army had coiled itself up in such a position, that 
 if McCIellan had only had the 70,000 absentees, and the 30,000 
 deserters, he could have surrounded Lee, captured the whole rebel 
 army, and ended the war at a stroke without a battle. We have a 
 straggler's camp out here at Alexandria, in connection with the 
 convalescent camp, and through that camp, in three months, 75,000 
 deserters and stragglers, who have been arrested, have been returned 
 to their regiments. Don't you see that the country, the army, and 
 the officers also, don't yet believe that we are engaged in one of the 
 greatest wars the world has ever seen, and which can only be ended 
 by hard fighting?' 
 
 " ' Isn't death the penalty of desertion ? ' we asked. 
 
 "'Yes.' 
 
 "'Why not enforce it, then? You would not order many hun- 
 dreds to be shot before this wholesale depletion of the army would 
 be ended.' 
 
 "'Oh, no, no,' replied the President, shaking his head ruefully; 
 ' that can't be done ; it would be unmerciful, barbarous ! ' 
 
 " ' But isn't it more merciful to stop desertions and fill up the 
 
24 
 
 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 army, so that when a battle comes off, it may be decisive instead of 
 being a drawn battle, as you say Antietam was?' 
 
 "'It might seem so; but if I should go to shooting men by 
 scores for desertion, I should soon have such a hellabaloo round 
 my ears as I haven't had yet. You can't order meu to be shot by 
 dozens or twenties. People won't stand it, and they oughtn't to 
 stand it. No, we must change the condition of things in some 
 other way. The army must be officered by fighting men.'" 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PEEPAEATIOSrS OP THE TWO AEMIES FOB 
 THE ONSET. 
 
 *0 such a pass had affairs come at the period when 
 General Hooker was assigned to the command of 
 the Potomac army, and such a feeling of despon- 
 dency was oppressing the President, that the thing 
 which he seemed to desire above all others was for 
 "officers that were fighting men," which had im- 
 pelled him in his first letter to the General to close 
 it in these impressive words : " With energy and 
 sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victo- 
 ries." But could the army be saved? Could the pernicious 
 notions, which had been imbibed from th^ outset respecting fur- 
 loughs and absenteeism, be eradicated, and the resistless power of a 
 well-disciplined force be realized ? 
 
 The first care of General Hooker was to correct the discipline of 
 his troops, and to try his skill in making it a real army. The lan- 
 guage of his first order, giving notice of his assuming command of 
 the army, is in a tone of hopefulness and confidence, and breathes 
 the spirit of one who is treading no doubtful nor untried ground. 
 * " By direction of the President of the United States, the under- 
 signed assumes command of the Army of the Potomac. He enters 
 upon the discharge of his duties with a just appreciation of the 
 responsibilities which they impose. Since the formation of that 
 army he has been identified with its history. He has shared with 
 his comrades in its glories and reverses, with no other desire than 
 that these relations tnight remain unchanged until its destiny should 
 be accomplished. In the record of our achievements there is much 
 
 * " Conduct of the War," Vol. I., 1865, p. 183. 
 
 (25) 
 
26 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 to be proud of, and with the blessing of God we will contribute 
 something to the renown of our arms and the success of our cause. 
 To secure these ends, your commander will require the cheerful and 
 zealous co-operation of every officer and soldier. In equipment, 
 intelligence, and valor the enemy is our inferior. Let us never 
 hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him. The under- 
 signed only gives expression to the feelings of the army when • he 
 conveys to its late commander, Major-General Burnside, cordial 
 good wishes for his future." 
 
 It is a singular circumstance that the very first order which 
 General Hooker issued, after announcing his stafi",* was one grant- 
 ing furloughs to both officers and men. It provided that one 
 brigade commander, one field officer and two line officers of a regi- 
 ment, and two enlisted men for every hundred on duty, might be 
 absent at one time for a period not exceeding fifteen days to the 
 more distant States, and ten days to the nearer ones. On receipt of 
 the intelligence that such an order had been issued. President Lin- 
 coln was astounded, and instantly telegraphed for General Hooker 
 to come to Washington. One of the crying evils in that army had 
 been absenteeism, and he could not understand why, instead of 
 attempting to bring back the lost, he should begin at once to give 
 to those present liberty to go. The President's first salutation, on 
 the entrance of General Hooker to his presence, was, "You have 
 ruined your army by that order for furloughs. If you let your 
 men loose in that way, from Dan to Beersheba, you will never get 
 them back again." But the General was not frightened. He 
 understood camp-life and the temper of soldiers better than tlie 
 President, and respectfully, but firmly, urged that the order be 
 allowed to remain in force three weeks, when the result of the fir,-t 
 
 * Maj .-Gen. Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff; Brig.-Gen. Seth Williams, Asst. Adjt.- 
 Gen. ; Lieut.-Col. Joseph Dickinson, Asst. Adjt.-Geu. ; Brig.-Gen. James A. Hardie, 
 Judge Adv.-Gen. ; Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery ; Brig.-Gen. M. E. 
 Patrick, Prov.-Mar.-Gen. ; Col. Eufus lugalls, Chief Quartermaster; Lieut.-Col. F. 
 Myers, Dep. Chief Quartermaster; Col. H. F. Clark, Chief Commissary; Surgeon 
 Jonathan Latterman, Med. Director; Capt. Samuel T. Gushing, Chief Sig Off ■ Lieut 
 D. W. Flagler, Chief Ord. Off.; Maj. William H. Lawrence, Aide-de-Camp; Capt! 
 William L. Chandler, Aide-de-Camp ; Capt. Alexander Moore, Aide-de-Camp ; Capt. 
 Harry Eussell, Aide-de-Camp.— GcMerai Order, No. 2, January 29th 1863. 
 
PMEPARATIONS FOB THE OIHtiKT. 27 
 
 furloughs would be known. After urgent appeals the President 
 finally consented. 
 
 General Hooker had drawn the order with great skill, and on 
 mature deliberation. He believed that soldiers must be treated as 
 men and not as brutes. The order provided at the outset that a 
 furlough should be granted to those men only who had the most 
 excellent record for attention to all duties. It also required that 
 a register should be kept at the headquarters of each regiment, 
 battery, and detachment, and exact reports made to General 
 Hooker's headquarters weekly, of all furloughs granted, accom- 
 panied with remarks respecting the description and probable 
 whereabouts of deserters. If a soldier failed to return at the ex- 
 piration of his furlough, he was, when found, tried by court-martial, 
 and aii furloughs for his company, and if an officer, for his regi- 
 ment, were stopped. If the inspector found a regiment in remarka- 
 bly good condition, the furloughs in that command were increased 
 to three for each hundred men, in place of two ; and if one was 
 found in a low state of discipline and efficiency, furloughs were 
 stopped altogether. Officers were not allowed to visit Washington, 
 except by permission of the War Department, uuder pain of dis- 
 missal from the service. The express trains were examined, and 
 all citizens' clothing found in transitu to the army was burned. 
 That these regulations should be judiciously and scrupulously car- 
 ried out, staff departments, especially that of the Inspector-General, 
 were thoroughly reorganized, and filled with the best men to be 
 found in the army. Disloyal officers were dismissed from the ser- 
 vice. To prevent idleness, the great bane of all armies, vigorous 
 efforts were put forth to keep the troops employed, and whenever 
 the weather would permit, they were engaged in field exercises. 
 
 Under the control of these stern regulations, the army rapidly 
 improved in discipline. Each soldier saw, that, in the course of the 
 winter, a way was open to a furlough, but only by strict attention 
 to duty, and the display of the highest soldierly qualities, with 
 exact adherence to its/limitations. Indeed a furlough was made a 
 premium for efficiency. President Lincoln never had occasion to 
 annul, nor to modify that order.* 
 
 * An officer in command of one of the most efficient regimeifts in the Potomac army 
 
28 THE BATTLE 'OF OHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 The cavalry, previous to this time broken up into detachments, 
 had been little more than adjuncts to the headquarters of the 
 infantry commanders, and had never acted as an independent body. 
 It was now reorganized and consolidated as a distinct corps, and in 
 order to stimulate the men by successes, however small, over their 
 adversaries, expeditions were fitted out to attack the enemy's pickets, 
 and outposts. "Our artillery," says General Hooker,* "had 
 always been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, 
 except in discipline, and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, 
 never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and file vastly inferior 
 to our own, intellectually and physically, that army has, by 
 discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency 
 unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We 
 have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near 
 approximation to it in the other rebel armies. During the time 
 allowed us for preparation, the army made rapid strides in dis- 
 cipline, instruction, and morale, and early in April was in a con- 
 dition to inspire the highest expectations. Its ranks had been filled 
 by the return of absentees. All were actuated by feelings of con- 
 fidence and devotion to the cause, and I felt that it was a living 
 army, and one well worthy of the Republic." 
 
 This feeling of confidence expressed by' General Hooker was 
 shared by his corps commanders,t as is evinced by their answers to 
 the question of the committee at their examination, " how did he 
 
 has repeatedly declared to the writer that the effect of General Hooker's discipline 
 was almost immediately perceptible ; that an entirely new and improved morale was 
 infused into the entire ranlc and file of the army ; that the very atmosphere of the 
 camp seemed to breathe the spirit of the new copimander. 
 
 * Testimony before Committee on Conduct of War, 1865, Vol. I., p. US. 
 
 t The system of picket duty was changed. The lines were made perfect ; the duty 
 was vigilantly performed; the pickets were constantly inspected, and, finally, deser- 
 tions were stopped through the means of all these measures of which I have spoken. 
 A better spirit soon manifested itself in the army, and it gradually came up to as fine 
 a condition as I have ever known it to be during my service with it from its organiza- 
 tion — I think better than I ever knew it before; great esprit du corps obtained 
 
 throughout the army, and a great feeling of confidence The intervening 
 
 time after General Hooker assumed the command was taken up In this improvement 
 of the army. General Hooker devoted himself constantly to personally ascertaining 
 the condition of the army and devising and improving means and remedies for any 
 evils that existed. Great care was given to the commissariat. Commissaries were re- 
 
phepabations fob the onset. 29 
 
 succeed in elevating the tone and improving the discipline of his 
 army ? " One of them is reported to have replied : " He succeeded 
 well; so well that, in my judgment, when he entered upon the 
 Chancellorsville campaign, that army was, for its numbers, more 
 efficient in all respects than it had ever been before. As corps com- 
 mander I had many opportunities of judging of its condition." * 
 
 In the previous campaigns of the army, especially upon the 
 Peninsula, straggling had proved a serious evil. From the fact 
 that there existed no system for tracing a soldier to his own organ- 
 ization, it was impossible to hold officers to proper responsibility for 
 permitting it. If a man was found away from his command and 
 was asked the division and corps to which he belonged, he would 
 answer to any but the true one. It was General Hooker's crowning 
 merit as a disciplinarian, that he so systematized his government of 
 the army that he held under his own eye the complete operation of 
 every part, even to the minutest circumstauce, and if a soldier in a 
 remote detachment had deserted, he knew within a few hours that 
 soldier's height, complexion, and complete description, where he 
 deserted, under what circumstances, and his probable whereabouts. 
 But, for the ready identification of a soldier, when not in his 
 immediate command, there existed no means. To remedy this 
 defect, and to provide an unmistakable method of knowing, at sight, 
 the exact place in the army where every member of it belonged, 
 General Hooker invented the corps badge,t an ingenious device, 
 hitherto unknown in the army, but which soon became an in- 
 separable part of army ensigns, as much so as the flag under 
 which it fought, and is still cherished aS' one of the fondest memen- 
 tos of army life. The system was afterwards adopted by other 
 armies in the field, and finally extended to every military organi- 
 zation in the service of the general government. 
 
 quired by general orders to issue to the troops vegetables and fresh bread twice a 
 week. This order was rigidly enforced, and greatly improved the general health of 
 the army. The ratio of sickness decreased from something above ten per cent, to 
 below five per cent. It saved the lives of many wounded men subsequently. " Con- 
 duct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 74. 
 *"Conduct-of the War," 1865, Vol, I., p. 3. 
 
 ■f The following is a copy of the original order, dated March 21st, 1863 : 
 " For the purpose of ready recognition of corps and divisions of this army, and to 
 
30 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLORSVILLE. 
 
 General Hooker gave himself unreservedly to the improvement 
 of his army, and lost no opportunity of increasing its comfort on the 
 one hand, and of opening the way to honorable distinction on the 
 other. He was especially desirous of giving the cavalry an oppor- 
 tunity of measuring swords with the enemy, who, to this time, had 
 claimed decided superiority in this arm of the service. Accordingly, 
 by his directions. General Averell moved with his command, on the 
 17th of March, 1863, to Kelly's ford, forced a passage of the Rap- 
 pahannock, making prisoners of a portion of the guard stationed 
 there, and advancing soon came upon the rebel cavalry, led by 
 Stuart and Fitz-Hugh Lee, and well supplied with artillery, 
 Averell at once attacked, and a warm engagement ensued. Charge 
 and counter-charge followed, and the best tactics and manoeuvres 
 were employed on both sides to gain an advantage. The artillery 
 was used with effect when an opportunity offered. Until nightfall 
 the battle raged with unabated fury, when, having pushed the rebels 
 back until he came upon a position where they had entrenched upon 
 formidable ground,,and the shades of evening settling down, Averell 
 retired and returned to camp, the men greatly elated with their suc- 
 cessful encounter with the much-vaunted rebel cavalry. An eye- 
 witness, in describing the battle, says : " It was a square, stand-up 
 cavalry fight, of over four hours'-duration, and the result proves 
 that our cavalry, when well handled, is equal, if not superior, to the 
 enemy." This was the first considerable cavalry battle in the Army 
 of the Potomac. That a single, unsupported command should 
 boldly cross the Rappahannock in face of an opposing foe,*and, 
 
 prevent injustice by reports of straggling and misconduct through mistake as to their 
 organizations, the chief quartermaster will furnish, without delay, the following 
 badges, to be worn by the officers and enlisted men of all the regiments of the various 
 corps mentioned. They will be securely fastened upon the centre of the top of the 
 cap. The inspecting officers will at all inspections see that these badges are worn as 
 designa!ted : 
 1st Corps, a Sphere, Red for 1st Div., White for 2d Div., and Blue for 3d Div. 
 
 2d 
 
 
 a Trifoil, 
 
 3d 
 
 
 a Lozenge, 
 
 5th 
 
 
 a Maltese Cross, 
 
 6th 
 
 
 a Cross, 
 
 inb 
 
 
 a Crescent, 
 
 12th 
 
 
 a Star, 
 
 The sizes and colors will be according to pattern. 
 
PBEPABATIOm FOR THE ONSET. SI 
 
 resolutely advancing, offer battle on his own ground, and gain a de- 
 cided advantage, was received as a fortunate omen, and gave new 
 hope to the whole army. 
 
 While under the command of General Burnside, the forces in the 
 field had been organized in three grand divisions. Deeming this an 
 impediment to its proper discipline and the character of service it 
 might be called upon to perform, General Hooker, by general order 
 dated February 5th, 1863, directed its discontinuance, and the adop- 
 tion of the corps organization instead. To the command of the 
 First corps he assigned Major-General John F. Reynolds, with 
 Wadsworth, Robinson and Doubleday commanding respectively its 
 First, Second and Third divisions; to the Second corps, Major- 
 General Darius N. Couch, with Hancock, Gibbon and French com- 
 manding divisions ; to the Third corps, Brigadier-General Daniel 
 E. Sickles, with Birney, Berry and Whipple commanding divisions; 
 to the Fifth corps, Major-General George G. Meade, with Griffin, 
 Sykes and Humphreys commanding divisions ; to the Sixth corps, 
 Major-General John Sedgwick, with Brooks, Howe and Newton 
 commanding divisions.; to the Eleventh corps, Major-General Franz 
 Sigel, subsequently Major-General O. O. Howard, with Devens, 
 Steinwehr and Schurz commanding divisions; to the Twelfth corps, 
 Major-General Henry W. Slocum, with Williams and Geary com- 
 manding divisions; to the Cavalry corps, Major-General George 
 Stoneman, with Pleasanton, Buford and Averell commanding 
 brigades. 
 
 General Lee, in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, was 
 no less active in reorganizing his troops and bringing them to a 
 high state of discipline. He had been placed at the head of that 
 army soon after the battle of Fair Oaks, before Richmond, fought 
 near the close of May, 1862, in which General Joseph E. Johnston, 
 who had held the chief command, was severely wounded. Strenuous 
 efforts were made to gather in, and lay up in convenient depots, the 
 supplies necessary for the regular support of the army. Arms, 
 ordnance and equipments were repaired, or replaced by new. The 
 forges at Richmond were fairly ablaze night and day during the 
 whole winter, and the mechanics were kept constantly employed. 
 The conscription act, which the Confederate government, irrespective 
 
32 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLORSVILLE. 
 
 of State boundaries or the rights and powers of State governments, 
 remorselessly enforced, became an efficient instrument for gathering 
 in recruits from every nook and corner of the territory over which 
 it bore sway. The system of filling up their army was far more 
 sensible and efficient than in that of the Union. When the Con- 
 federates wanted fresh recruits, and brought in men who knew 
 nothing of military duty," they put them into old and depleted 
 organizations, where each new soldier could stand beside a veteran, 
 and have a veteran officer- to drill and discipline him, and where he 
 soon became equal in duty to his comrade, brenzed and begrimed 
 with service. If the Union government wanted recruits, men 
 prominent for political or other reasons were sent out to make stump 
 speeches and enlist their squads. The squad could not be put into 
 an old organization, where it would have experienced officers to lead 
 and drill it, and where its surroundings would inspire confidence, 
 because he who had recruited it must be made a lieutenant, and a 
 more consequential personage must be made a field officer, and hence 
 all was new and untried, while the old regiments were often forced 
 to remain mere skeletons. The consequence was that, while the 
 Union army had a much larger number of regiments than the Con- 
 federate, the veteran ones had far less men in them,* and were weak 
 and inefficient in comparison, while the new regiments, though their 
 ranks were full, were weak, because green and untried. 
 
 So effectual was the conscription of rebel soldiers that General 
 Lee found the strength of his army rapidly augmented. General 
 Jackson's corps alone, in three months, increased from twenty-five 
 to thirty-three thousand muskets, equivalent to forty thousand men, 
 and other portions in like proportion. f 
 
 General Lee having foiled all attempts by General Burnside to 
 drive him from his position, and having greatly strengthened the 
 natural advantages of his ground by elaborate works — a rapid river 
 rolling between the two armies — understanding the policy of General 
 
 *Late writers and speakers on the Confederate side have argued, because the Union 
 army had more regiments that it had more men than the Confederate ; a futile con- 
 clusion. It may have been true, but not for this reason, because by placing the new 
 recruits in old organizations instead of making new ones, their veteran regiments 
 were always larger than the Union. 
 
 -\ Returns for April. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE ONSET. 33 
 
 Hooker to be to remain quiet in winter quarters till the opening 
 of the spring, believed that he would be entirely safe in parting 
 with a portion of his veteran troops for an independent campaign. 
 
 The rebel government had always regarded the occupation of the 
 Virginia and North Carolina coast, south of the James, by Union 
 armies as a menace to^ its capital. This river was looked upon as 
 only second in importance to the Confederacy, to that of the Missis- 
 sippi, and it was undoubtedly 4n contemplation * sooner or later to 
 withdraw from the barren wastes of northern Virginia to the line 
 of the James, and recover possession of all the Atlantic coast to the 
 south of it, so as to use Portsmouth and Norfolk as ports for their 
 iron-clads and contraband trade. 
 
 General Lee, accordingly, detached a portion of the forces under 
 his immediate command, and, with other forces collected from vari- 
 ous quarters, amounting in all to some forty thousand men, sent 
 them, on the 26th of February, 1863, to operate in that direction. 
 A new department was created, known as the Department of Vir- 
 ginia, and Lieutenaut-General James Longstreet was put in com- 
 mand, with headquarters at Petersburg, and was supported by such 
 subordinate commanders as D. H. Hill, Pickett, Hood, Garnett, 
 French, Jenkins and Pettigrew, names familiar in the Gettysburg 
 campaign. Posting 15,000 men upon the Blackwater, and a like 
 force between Petersburg and the river, along the lin6 of the rail- 
 road, he sent Hill and Pettigrew with a strong force into North 
 Carolina to operate against General Foster, who commanded the 
 Union troops in that State, either to carry the fortified places and 
 capture the garrisons, or failing in that, to make such demonstra- 
 tions as to cause forces to be detached from his own front and sent 
 thither, and thus increase his chances of success. Foster was 
 present in person when the demonstration was made upon Little 
 Washington, the principal point, and directed the defence, thwart- 
 ing every effort of the vastly superior force by which the place was 
 invested. Finally, on the 15th of April, despairing of success, and 
 learning that a heavy detachment had been ordered thither to the 
 support of Foster from the column in Virginia, Hill raised the 
 siege, and hastened to join Longstreet. 
 
 •General John J. Peck's official report, "Moore's Reb. Rec," Vol. XI., p. 121. 
 3 
 
34 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 Major-General John J. Peck was in command of the forces at 
 Suffolk, the key to the approaches to Portsmouth and Norfolk, 
 under the immediate direction of General Dix, who was at the head 
 of the Department of the James, with headquarters at Fortress 
 Monroe. Peck had in all some fourteen thousand men, and three 
 small gun-boats. 
 
 On the 11th of April, in anticipation* of the speedy arrival of 
 General Hill with his army from North Carolina, General Long- 
 street having perfected his plans for active operations, ordered his 
 forces to move. Hood advanced on the South Quay road, Pickett 
 on the Sommerton, Jenkins on the Edenton, and a large force on 
 the Providence. Heavy skirmishing ensued with Peck's van- 
 guard. But the overwhelming force of Longstreet's advancing 
 columns drove everything before them, until they came within 
 range of Peck's artillery from within the fortifications, which had 
 been skilfully planned and constructed under' his own eye. Here 
 they were swept with terrible effect, and after maintaining the 
 struggle until all hope of carrying the works by assault was lost, 
 Longstreet recalled his decimated ranks, and immediately prepared 
 to lay siege to the place. For twenty-four days the operations were 
 relentlessly pressed, during which nearly ten miles of covered ways, 
 rifle-pits, and field-works were constructed. 
 
 The highest hopes had been entertained by the people of the 
 South of the success of this army under Longstreet. The Peters- 
 burg Express, of the 15th of April, said : "Our people are buoyant 
 and hopeful, as they ought to be. We have in that direction as 
 gallant an army as was ever mustered under any sun, and com- 
 manded by an officer who has won laurels in every engagement, 
 from the first Manassas to that at Fredericksburg. Such an army, 
 commanded by such an officer as Longstreet, may be defeated'; but 
 such an event is scarcely within the range of possibility." It must 
 be confessed that gallantry and skill were not wanting, and that the 
 siege was prosecuted with a zeal and untiring pertinacity rarely 
 witnessed. But all was to no purpose, and on the night of the Sd 
 of May, after having failed to gain any advantage of moment, 
 Longstrieet quietly withdrew, the operations having involved the 
 
 *" Moore's Reb. Rec," Vol. XI., p. 126, Docs. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE ONSET. 35 
 
 loss of the celebrated Farqui6r Battery and nearly two thousand 
 men. ' 
 
 During the time that these operations were in progress before 
 Suffolk, General Lee was busily employed in disciplining the forces 
 under his command, and introduced many improvements in the 
 organization of the staff service. His artillery he consolidated in a 
 single body, it having been previously broken up into detachments, 
 and left subject to the control of the other arms of the service. 
 Much labor was also performed on the fortifications along the whole 
 line confronted, or even threatened by the Union army. His forces 
 were organized in two grand divisions, the Second commanded by 
 Lieutenant-General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, and the First 
 by Lieutenant-General James Longstreet. Jackson's First division,, 
 or what corresponded to the Union corps, was led by Major-General 
 A. P. Hill, with Heth, Pender, Archer, McGowan, Lane and 
 Thomas as his lieutenants; the Second by Major-General D. H. 
 Hill, with Ramseur, Eodes, Doles, Iverson and Colquitt for his 
 lieutenants ; the Third, Trimble's, by Brigadier-General E. E. 
 Colston, with Paxton, Jones, Nicholls and Williams as his lieuten- 
 ants; the Fourth by Major-General Jubal A. Early, with Gordon, 
 Hays, Smith and Hoke for his lieutenants. General Longstreet's 
 First division was commanded by Major-General R. H. Anderson, 
 with Mahone, Posey, Wilcox, Perry and Wright for his lieutenants ; 
 the Second by Major-General L. McLaws, with Kershaw, Simms, 
 Wofford and Barksdale as his lieutenants. The two remaining 
 divisions of this corps, under the immediate command of General 
 Longstreet in person, were, as already detailed, operating before 
 Suffolk, south of the James. The cavalry division was under the 
 command of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, with Fitz-Hugh Lee, 
 Hampton and W. H. F. Lee leading his brigades. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 PLAN OP THE CAMPAIGN. — MOVEMENTS 
 OF THE CAVALRY. 
 
 ^REAT impatience ejsisted in the public mind to 
 have the Army of the Potomac move on an 
 aggressive campaign. The sad fortune which 
 had attended that grand body of men — the result 
 of the spontaneous outburst of loyal sentiment 
 throughout the North — armed and equipped, 
 tutored in the military art, and supported in the 
 field at enormous expense, caused the heart of 
 the nation to throb, with ever-increasing stroke, 
 for its success. The question that was trembling in the breast of 
 the Chief Magistrate, and shared by every earnest wisher for the 
 perpetuity of the Union, was, "Will that army never be trium-- 
 phant?" "Is the war to be a failure?" "Can this rebellion 
 never be put down?" General Hooker felt this anxiety as keenly 
 as any of his constituents and supporters, but he at the same time 
 realized the intricacy of the problem he was set to solve. 
 
 Military critics, familiar with the battle-fields of the old world, 
 and unacquainted with the ground on which General Hooker was 
 compelled to operate, can form no conception of the difficulties he 
 had to encounter. The great plains of Europe, with only an occa- 
 sional curtain of wood, or gentle declivity, present a most enviable 
 field for the deployment of troops and the marshaling of legions 
 for the grand conflict. Such a field is a perpetual delight to a 
 really great captain. But the prominent characteristic of the 
 topography * of the entire region from the Potomac to the James, 
 and from the Blue Ridge to the Chesapeake, is a dense forest of 
 
 » Report of General G. K. "Warren, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 51. 
 (36) 
 
PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. 37 
 
 oak or pine, with occasional clearings, rarely extensive enough to 
 prevent the riflemen concealed in one border from shooting across 
 to the other; a forest which, with but few exceptions, required the 
 axeman to precede the artillerist the entire distance, from the slash- 
 ings in front of the fortifications of Washington, to those of Rich- 
 mond. "A proper understanding of the country," says General 
 Warren, Topographical Engineer-in-Chief of the Army, "will help 
 to relieve Amsricans from the charge, so frequently made at home 
 and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in battle — 
 battles that had to be fought out hand-to-hand in forests where 
 artillery and cavalry could .play no part, wh^e the troops could 
 not be seen by those controlling their movements, where the echoes 
 and reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall 
 ihe strongest hearts engaged, and yet where the noise would often 
 scarcely be heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the 
 generals on either side, shut out from sight or from hearing, had to 
 trust to the unyielding bravery of their men, till couriers from dif- 
 ferent parts of the fipld brought word which way the conflict was 
 resulting before sending the needed support. We should not 
 wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual ex- 
 hiaustion of the contending forces, but rather that in all these 
 struggles of Americans against Americans, no panic on either side 
 gave victory to the other, like that which the French, under 
 Moreau, gained over the Austrians in the Black Forest." 
 
 Such was the country in which General Hooker was required to 
 make war; but its taugled wilds and impenetrable thickets were 
 not his first or chief difficulties. His own army was encamped 
 along the left bank of the Rappahannock river, having the Aquia 
 railroad and the Potomac river as a base of supply. On the oppo- 
 site side, along a line of bluffs, varying from a half mile to two 
 miles back from the stream, hugging elaborate fortifications, was a 
 powerful and vigilant foe. Between the two armies rolled a deep 
 and difiicult stream. 
 
 General Newton, regarded in the army as a military expert, had 
 distinctly declared, in his testimony already cited, that to cross a 
 stream presenting such difficulties as this, in face of an enemy, was 
 regarded by military authorities as impracticable, and only success- 
 
38 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS VILLE. 
 
 ful by chance. This he states as a general principle. But in 
 addition to the obstacles presented by nature, were elaborate works 
 wrought upon under the direction of the best engineering skill, and 
 diligently prosecuted for a period of six months. At the battle of 
 Fredericksburg, the heights occupied by the enemy had been put in ' 
 the most complete state of defense. As the two subsequent plans 
 of Burnside were developed to the foe, additional lines of defense 
 to meet the changed ground selected were made, and.when the new 
 commander of the Union army came,, knowing full well his subtle 
 methods of conducting operations, still further precautions were 
 taken, until the whole line for a distance of twenty-five miles was 
 one complete network of fortifications. 
 
 Messrs. Hotchkiss and Allan, Topographical Engineer and Ord- 
 nance officers in the Confederate service, in their account of this 
 campaign, say: "During the winter. General Lee extended and 
 strengthened the fortifications in rear of Fredericksburg, and con- 
 structed a system of elaborate works along his whole front. This 
 Jine, reaching from Bank's Ford to Port Eoyal, extended for more 
 than twenty-five miles. No time, labor, nor skill was spared in its- 
 construction, and when completed an almost impregnable barrier 
 was presented to the progress of the Federal army throughout this 
 whole distance. Behind these works the Confederate army was as 
 secure from attack in front as Wellington at Torres Vedras." In 
 addition to these works masked batteries had been placed in com- 
 manding positions close in upon the river, where there was a possi- 
 bility of the Union army attempting to cross. "On the occasion 
 of both these intended crossings of the Federal army," say the 
 authors cited, "dispositions were made to meet the threatened 
 attack. Jackson even concealed, at convenient points near the 
 crossings on his line, artillery which might be brought into im- 
 mediate use whenever the attempt to cross should be made, but the 
 position of which, in the meantime, could not be suspected." 
 
 Hence, " how to get at them " was at the outset a most perplexing 
 question ; an enterprise full of hazard. There were several points 
 along the river, below Fredericksburg, where the blufife, on the 
 Union side, were so close in upon the stream, that artillery planted 
 upon them commanded the opj)osite bank, which ren(Jered it practi- 
 
Pr,AN OF TJJE OAntPAIGN. 39 
 
 cable for troops to cross under cover of their fire ; but, when once over, 
 they would be so hemmed in on all sides by fortified heights, brist- 
 ling with bayonets, that the possibility of advancing was no better 
 than was Burnside's at Fredericksburg. "His troops" (the 
 enemy's), says General Warren,* " were so disposed as to be readily 
 concentrated on any threatened point. Interspersed along these 
 lines of intrenchments were battery epaulements advantageously 
 located for sweeping the hill-slopes and bottom lands over which our 
 troops would have to march to the assault, and which effectually 
 protected the enemy's artillery from our own. Abatis, formed of 
 fallen timber, and impassable swamps in places, still further 
 strengthened his line and reduced the number of assailable points. 
 ... In front every little rise of ground that could shelter the 
 enemy and enable him to check our advance was intrenched and 
 prepared for us." 
 
 fTo reach out beyond the enemy's position towards the Potomac, 
 and turn his right flank^ was equally impracticable. To construct 
 roads, necessary for moving the pontoon trains and artillery in that 
 direction, was so difficult, and would require so much time, that the 
 enemy could intrench the opposite heights faster than these roads 
 could be built, and the stream, as it riears the Potomac, perceptibly 
 widens, which would require the use of cumbersome bridge trains.J 
 General Lee's spy system was so perfect, that the simplest move- 
 ment inaugurated was quickly reported to him, and he could readily 
 make his dispositions to checkmate it. 
 
 For turning the left flank of the Confederate army the obstacles 
 were even more formidable. As far up as Fredericksburg the 
 Kappahannock is navigable. But, a short distance above the city, 
 the bluffs close in upon the stream, and the sides, for the most part 
 densely wooded, are precipitous and rugged, so that the approach to 
 the stream, or exit on the opposite side, was impossible. The first 
 
 »" Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. ^2. flbid. 
 
 X " The difSoulty of constructing practicable roads towards King George's Court- 
 House was great. The side streams running into the Rappahannock and those run- 
 ning into the Potomac interlace each other at their sources so as to quite destroy the 
 continuity of the main dividing ridge, and on every road presented transverse ravines 
 with steep hills and oozing springs of water, which our wheels soon mixed with olay 
 and turned literally to streams of mud." Warren's Report, 1865, Vol. I., p. 53 
 
40 THK BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 opening in the heights where the river could be approached was at 
 Banks' ford, six miles above. So important was the defense of 
 this ford considered to be, that General Lee had thoroughly fortified 
 the commanding positions* on the opposite side, and kept constantly 
 near a strong force for its protection. 
 
 The next point, which was capable of being made practicable for 
 crossing, was seven miles farther up the stream, at United States 
 Mine, or Bark Mill ford. But, even here, a vast amount of work 
 would have to be done to prepare the road leading down to the 
 stream for the heavy trains, and while it was being executed the 
 enemy could readily concentrate for its effectual defence, besides 
 "the enemy had already erected long lines of infantry parapets 
 with battery epaulements, and an ample force was encamped near to 
 occupy them." Just above this ford the Rapidan pours its flood 
 into the Rappaliannock, and hence to move above their confluence 
 would involve the crossing of two unfordable streams, and to 
 march an army thither, with bridge trains, so far from its base, was 
 regarded as utterly impracticable, without observation in time to pre- 
 vent it. Indeed so certain were the rebel officers that this could not 
 be effected, that at the very time the campaign opened they were 
 themselves engaged in rebuilding a bridge at Germania ford, over 
 which a portion of our troops actually crossed.f 
 
 Some idea may now be formed of the obstacles which Greneral 
 Hooker found in his way in forming his plan of campaign. He well 
 knew that secrecy was absolutely requisite to success iu getting his 
 army across the river, and so concentrated as to be in a position to 
 
 *" His earth parapets, placed so as to sweep with musketry every crossing place 
 and practicable slope^ were in three lines from the water's edge to the summit of the 
 slope, and traversed so as to quite protect the defenders from our artillery fire. It 
 might seem that these successive lines would be of little use after the first one was car- 
 ried, as those who fled from the first would mask the fire of the others, so that pursued 
 and pursuers might enter together. The tactics of the rebels, however, provided for 
 this. The first lines generally surrendered when overpowered instead of running, aud 
 thus no confusion was produced in the succeeding lines. At Banks' ford, moreover, 
 two of these lines were so close to each other that both could in places bring tlieir fire 
 upon a party crossing the river, the rising slope permitting the rear line to shoot over 
 that in front. The obstacles here were so great to our forcing a passage that the 
 enemy forebore to place a redoubt on the summit of the hill, thus as it were inviting 
 us to try it." — General Warren's Report, p. 53. 
 
 ■f General Warren's Testimony, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 54. 
 
PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. 41 
 
 defend itself. Hence, while he listened to the advice of his asso- 
 ciates, he kept his own counsels. General Warren says, *" Whatever 
 General Hooker's plans were, they were kept perfectly secret from 
 everybody until the movements themselves developed them. I did 
 not know any of his plans until I saw them being carried into 
 operation." 
 
 There were several reasons why General Hooker was eager to 
 move on his campaign as early as the weather and the roads would 
 possibly permit. He had in his army about 40,000 nine months' 
 and two years' men, whose term of service would shortly expire, and 
 if he would have their aid he must move within its limitation. 
 Though opening his campaign earlier than he otherwise would, he 
 was still obliged to give orders to his corps commanders to leave 
 behind, for guard and other duty, troops whose terms were likely to 
 expire before the probable close of the campaign. It was also sus- 
 pected that the part of Longstreet's corps which, as we have seen, 
 had been operating south of the James, would return to its place in 
 Lee's army, if there was a prospect of a battle. The impatience of 
 the country to see the fruits of his generalship was likewise 
 prompting him. 
 
 About the middle of April, 1863, his plans had been matured 
 and his decisions taken. No order promulgated them, but as they 
 stand revealed in the light of their execution, they may be briefly 
 thus stated : His entire cavalry corps, except one brigade, was to 
 move above the junction of the Eapidan with the Rappahannock, 
 cross these streams, routing the enemy's cavalry at various points 
 opposing it, and moving around upon the Aquia and Richmond 
 railroad. General Lee's main avenue of supply, break it up, destroy 
 its bridges, and, by felling timber and destroying bridges on the 
 great highways leading to Richmond, obstruct his progress, should 
 I he attempt to fall back. It was believed that if this were thor- 
 oughly accomplished, the rebel army would be compelled to retreat 
 from Fredericksburg for lack of supplies, as it was understood that 
 it had very small stores in hand beyond what was needed for daily 
 consumption. When it was judged that this movement was well 
 accomplished, the main body of the army was to cross the Rappa- 
 
 * General Warren's Testimony, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 43. 
 
42 THE BATTLE OF CHANGELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 hannock a short distance below Fredericksburg, and if any signs of 
 retreat were visible in the rebel army to' fall upon it in its famish- 
 ing condition, and, with unsparing hand, follow up every advan- 
 tage till that army was either captured or dispersed. 
 
 The importance which General Hooker attached to the part 
 assigned to the cavalry to perform, and the stress which he laid 
 upon its complete accomplishment, may be judged from some pas- 
 sages from the instructions issued at starting to General Stoneman, 
 who was to lead the cavalry force. "It is expected that you will 
 be able to push forward to the Aquia and Richmond railroad, 
 somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's Junction, destroying along 
 your whole route the railroad bridges, trains of cars, depots of pro- 
 visions, and lines of telegraphic communication. The General 
 directs that you go prepared with all the means necessary to accom- 
 plish this work effectually. As the line of the railroad from Aquia 
 to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to retire on, it 
 is more than probable that he will avail himself of it, and the 
 usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose ; in 
 which event you will select the strongest positions, such as the 
 banks of streams and commanding heights, in order to check or 
 prevent it, and, if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, attack 
 his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted and 
 out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the 
 army in pursuit. If the enemy should retire by Culpepper and 
 Gordonsville, you will endeavor to hold your force in his front, and 
 harass him day and night, on the march and in camp unceasingly. 
 If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, the General 
 desires that you will not fail to take small ones. Let your watch- 
 word be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight, bearing 
 in mind that time is as valuable to the General as the rebel car- 
 casses. ... It devolves upon you, General, to take the initiative in 
 the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your 
 noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and 
 brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity and 
 resolution are everything in war, and especially is it the case with 
 the command you have and the enterprise on which you are about 
 to embark." 
 
PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. 43 
 
 Ten or twelve miles above the junction of the Rapidan with the 
 Rappahannock is Kelly's ford, which, at this time though pitted 
 and abattised, was feebly defended. Though this route involved 
 the crossing of " two rivers, both mountain torrents, and sensitive 
 to the slightest rains," * yet it was the only one open, and this it 
 was determined to take. 
 
 In all military operations unforeseen events are liable to greatly 
 modify the best laid schemes. The cavalry moved on the 13th of 
 April, and in two days had brushed away the opposing force, and 
 were passing the stream above Rappahannock station. But on the 
 second day out a violent rain-storm set in from which the river was 
 so swollen that further crossing had to be arrested, and the division 
 already over was obliged to swim their horses in returning. 
 General Hooker immediately ordered the command to encamp 
 in the position in which the storm left it, and await the 
 modification of his plans rendered necessary by this interposition 
 of the elements. 
 
 This crossing of a division and then withdrawing it probably 
 had the effect upon the enemy to allay suspicion, for he was doubt- 
 less led to regard it in the light of a feint, designed to mask other 
 more important movements. This view is strengthened by the fact 
 that no donsiderable force was dispatched to guard these avenues 
 for turning the left flank of his army. That the difficulty of 
 eluding the vigilance of the foe at this juncture, and of getting into 
 position where he could hope to fight with any hope of success, was 
 fully realized by General Hooker, is evinced by the following tele- 
 gram sent on the 21st of April to General Peck, at Suffolk : "Am 
 glad to hear good tidings from you. You must be patient with 
 me. I must play with these devils before I can spring. Remem- 
 ber that my army is at the bottom of a well, and the enemy holds 
 the top." t 
 
 It was not until two weeks later, the 27th of April, that the 
 floods had so far subsided as to render it practicable for the cavalry 
 again to move. In the meantime, General Hooker had decided to 
 modify his first plan materially, and instead of making the success 
 of the campaign hinge almost entirely on the operations of the 
 »Geu! Hooker's testimony, t " Conduct of the War," telegrams, 1865, Vol. I., p. 218. 
 
44 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 cavalry, he had determined, though still relying upon that arm of 
 the service to break up the enemy's communications, to put the 
 main body ol his forces where they could strike for the rebel army 
 itself, instead of attempting to force it back upon its line of retreat. 
 He had been undoubtedly led to see, by the interruption which the 
 storm had caused in the movements of Stoneman, that still other 
 contingencies might arise to interfere with the complete accomplish- 
 ment of all that he had designed for the cavalry to do, and to make 
 provision so that if one part of his plans went amiss, another would 
 still be open for winning a triumph. 
 
 His plan fot turning the enemy's flank, and putting himself in 
 rear of the rebel army, where its fortifications would all be unavail- 
 ing, was ingenious. The utmost vigilance was practised by his 
 guards to prevent any one from passing the lines of the army, who 
 could by any possibility carry news of his movements to the foe. 
 All camps in sight of the enemy were suffered to remain unchanged. 
 A column was to be sent down the river a long distance, bearing 
 pontoon trains, to make a noisy demonstration, as if to cross and 
 turn the rebel right. A strong force, consisting of nearly the half 
 of his army, was to proceed below Fredericksburg and actually 
 make a crossing, and stand in readiness, under cover of the guns on 
 the opposite bank, to make a spring upon the rebel entrenchments. 
 While this was transpiring in full view of the enemy, the other 
 wing of his army was to proceed secretly, by hidden ways, to the 
 upper fords of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and, having 
 effected a crossing of these streams, uncover the United States mine 
 and Banks' fords, when the balance of his army could readily join 
 him by those avenues, which would then be in his full possession.* 
 
 * In these operations General Hooker acted upon the most approved principles of 
 military science. Jomini, in his chapteron the " Passage of Eivers and other Streams," 
 lays down the following as the first rule in conducting such operations : "It is essen- 
 tial to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, that he may not accumulate an 
 opposing force there. In addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must 
 be made near the real ones, to divide the attention and means of the enemy. For 
 this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to make a great deal of noise 
 at the points where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect silence should be 
 preserved where the real attempt is to be made."— Jomini's "Art of War," Chap. V., 
 Art. xxxvii., p. 226, Lippincott's Ed. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 UNLEASHED. 
 
 >HE plan of campaign involved ceaseless activity in 
 every part of the great army, and every available 
 force was put early in motion except the few whose 
 encampments were in view of the enemy. General 
 Doubleday, of the First corps, was ordered to pro- 
 ceed with his division, on the 19th of April, down 
 the river to Port Conway, opposite the village of 
 Port Royal, where he made a demonstration of 
 crossing on pontoons which he had taken with him, 
 and at night lighted camp fires enough for half the army, placed 
 some Quaker guns in commanding positions, and, having thoroughly 
 aroused the attention of the enemy, returned to camp.* On the 21st 
 a force of infantry f demonstrated at Kelly's ford and the Rappahan- 
 nock bridge. Shortly afterwards a minor detachment was sent to 
 Port Royal, under Colonel Morrow, of the Twenty-fourth Michigan, 
 who laid a bridge and actually made a crossing. These demonstra- 
 tions had the desired effect, inducing General Jackson to move down 
 with a portion of his corps to repel any advance from that quarter, 
 and prevent the sudden turning of the rebel position. 
 
 This activity, so long before the real movement commenced, 
 served to- keep the enemy in a, state of excitement and uncertainty, 
 and, having roused himself so often at the cry of " wolf," was 
 finally quiescent when the wolf actually came. General Lee held 
 his army in his fortifications ialong the bluffs, Jackson's corps 
 
 * General Doubleday's testimony. 
 
 •f- General Lee's official report, " Conduct of the War,"'p. 114. 
 
 (45) 
 
46' THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 on the right, stretching from Massaponax creek to the neigh- 
 borhood of Deep run, and Longstreet's opposite and above 
 Fredericksburg. 
 
 Orders for the movement of the Eleventh corps, which was to 
 take the lead, and the Twelfth, which- was to closely follow, were 
 issued by General Hooker on the evening of the 26th of April, with 
 the direction that the matter of destination should be regarded as 
 strictly confidential. At daylight, on the morning of the 27th, 
 these two corps moved out, encamping that night near Hartwood 
 churcii, a distance of fourteen miles, and on the following night in 
 the neighborhood of Kelly's ford, on the Rappahannock, a distance 
 of fourteen miles more. Here General Slocum, of the Twelfth, re- 
 ceived orders from General Hooker to assume general command of 
 both corps, and, after having laid a bridge, to cross the Rappahan- 
 nock and press immediately forward to the Rapidan, which he was 
 also to pass without delay. Accordingly 400_ men of General 
 Buschbeck's brigade crossed the stream in boats, and having driven 
 away the force which was on guard, without molestation laid the 
 bridge, under the direction of Captain Comstock, At 6 p. m. of the 
 28th, the bridge was begun, and by 10 it was completed, and the 
 column commenced crossing. Owing to the darkness the movement 
 was considerably hindered, and it was daylight before all were over. 
 In the march of the 29th the Twelfth corps took the lead, and dur- 
 ing the progress encountered the cavalry brigades of Fitz-Hugh 
 and W. H. F. Lee, under the command of General Stuart, The 
 Sixth New York cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel McYickar, led 
 the column of Slocum, and skirmishing was -Icept up the entire day, 
 in which some captures were made, but the march was not materially 
 delayed. The Eleventh corps followed the Twelfth, and its rear 
 was annoyed by two light pieces of the enemy, supported by cavalry. 
 The Seventeenth Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel Kellogg, acted as 
 rear guard, and with the assistance of a portion of Stoneman's cav- 
 alry, which by chance came up, amply protected the Union forces. 
 The Fifth corps, under command of General Meade, also marched 
 for Kelly's ford, and arrived iu time to cross and commence the 
 march on the 29th, simultaneously with the other two, but on a 
 parallel road leading to Ely's ford, some distance below the G«r- 
 
ABMY OF THE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. 47 
 
 mania. The Germania crossing was disputed * by two companies 
 of infantry, which were at the time engaged in rebuilding the 
 bridge. When apprised of the approach of the Union forces, they 
 took shelter in a mill near by and opened an annoying fire. The 
 Second Massachusetts and the Third Wisconsin regiments were 
 wheeled into line, and, advancing, soon compelled them to surrender. 
 Under the direction of Generals Geary and Kane, the bridge was 
 rapidly completed, and by 4 o'clock on the morning of the 30th the 
 three corps were across. A short distance to the left of these corps, 
 at United States ford, was a considerable force of the enemy — the 
 brigades of Mahone and Posey, of McLaws' division — which could 
 have seriously delayed the passage at these fords had they been 
 skilfully handled ; but they seem not to have been aware of the ad- 
 vance of the Union forces until they were already across both 
 streams, when all opposition by a slender column would have been 
 futile. 
 
 It would seem that General Lee himself had received no infor- 
 mation of the strength of the demonstration being made against 
 him from this quarter, nor had a suspicion that General Hooker was 
 to attack him from that direction, until mid-day of the 30th. It is 
 true that he says in his official report that General Stuart had 
 reported to him that a body of troops was moving up the Rappa- 
 hannock, and that during the forenoon of the 29th that officer had 
 reported that the enemy had crossed in force near Kelly's ford, and 
 later in the day had announced that a heavy column was moving 
 from Kelly's towards Germania ford, on the Rapidan, and another 
 towards Ely's ford on that river. But what preparations did Lee 
 make to check this advance? He sends General Anderson, a 
 division commander, with one brigade, Wright's, to Chancellorsville, 
 which he was to use, together with such detachments as he could 
 gather up in that vicinity, to hold that place, at the very moment 
 when three corps of the Union army were engaged in crossing the 
 Rapidan, and in a few hours would be upon him. Is this the 
 provision which a commander, with the foresight and experience of 
 General Lee, would make for checking it, if he supposed that the 
 main body of the Union army, led by General Hooker in person, 
 
 * General Slocum's official report. 
 
48 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLK 
 
 was advancing in force from that quarter ? " On the night of the 
 29th," I quote General Lee's words, "General Anderson was 
 directed to proceed towards Chancellorsville, and dispose Wright's 
 brigade, and the troops from Bark Mill [United States] ford to 
 cover these roads." But what dispositions Was General Lee mak- 
 ing in other directions for joining battle, which he was now con- 
 vinced, by the activity in the Union camp, was impending? His 
 official report informs us : "As in the first battle of Fredericksburg, 
 it was thought best to select positions with a view to resist the 
 advance of the enemy, rather than incur the heavy loss that would 
 attend any attempt to prevent his crossing. Our dispositions were 
 accordingly made as on the former occasion." That is, with his 
 entire army, save one brigade, he was marshaling, in his old 
 position facing the river, to meet, an advance from that direction. 
 General Sedgwick, in his official report, says : " During the day, 
 Wednesday, April 29th, the command was held in readiness to 
 cross, while the enemy was rapidly intrenching on his entire front, 
 and occasionally shelling Reynolds' position on the left." This, 
 then, was what General Lee was doing during the 29th, and up to 
 noon of the 30th — preparing to meet an attack from his front, and 
 entirely unconscious of the fact that the main body of the Union 
 army had already opened the doors, which for six months he had 
 endeavored to keep locked with so great vigilance, and was already 
 in his rear. But the proof of General Lee's unconsciousness of the 
 direction from which the blow aimed at him was to come, does not 
 rest alone upon inferential evidence. In his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Pleasanton, who 
 commanded the Union cavalry in the advance to Chancellorsville, 
 says : "At a place called the Wilderness I captured a courier from 
 General Lee with a dispatch * in Lee's own. handwriting. It was 
 dated at 12 o'clock that day, and I captured it at 1 o'clock 
 [of the 30th], only one hour from his, Lee's, hands. It was 
 addressed to General Anderson, and read : 'I have just received 
 reliable information that the enemy have crossed the river in force. 
 Why have you not kept me informed ? I wish to see you at my 
 headquarters as soon as possible.' " Thus, by Lee's own confession, 
 
 * " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 27. ~ 
 
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. 49 
 
 at noon of the 30th, he had but just received reliable information 
 that the Union forces had crossed the river in force, when at that 
 moment three corps of that army were already at Chancellorsville, 
 or in close proximity thereto, and other corps with a base of supply 
 already open, marching thither. Such an exploit is scarcely 
 matched in the annals of > warfare ! 
 
 The three corps, which as we have seen crossed the Eapidan on the 
 night of the 29th, resumed the march early on the morning of the 
 30th. The Fifth corps. General Meade, crossing alone at Ely's 
 ford, and having the inside and shortest route, reached Chancellors- 
 ville at 11 A. M.* of that day. The column on the Germania 
 ford road, the Twelfith and Eleventh corps, moved at daylight of 
 the 30th, the White star division, General Geary, leading. General 
 Stuart, in command of the main body of the rebel cavalry, 
 having sent Colonel Owen's regiment in advance to delay the march 
 of the Union column, himself hung upon its right flank, and at 
 the Wilderness tavern took position and attacked, bringing up two 
 pieces of artillery ; but two of Geary's regiments were promptly 
 deployed and soon cleared the way. The Twelfth corps reached 
 Chancellorsville about two o'clock on the aflernoon of the 30th, 
 and the Eleventh, which followed closely, encamped in rear in the 
 vicinity of Doudall's tavern. General Slocum, in pursuance of 
 orders received on his arrival at Chancellorsville, assumed command 
 of the three corps there concentrated. He was directed if he 
 fouud,t by a rapid advance of his cavalry towards Fredericksburg, 
 that the enemy were not detaching forces from the main body, in 
 any considerable strength to oppose him, to advance at all hazards, 
 until he uncovered Bank's ford, where he was to select a strong 
 position and fortify ; but if he found the enemy in force in his 
 front to select the best position he could about Chancellorsville, and 
 prepare to defend himself. 
 
 It would seem that General Slocum, on his arrival at Chancel- 
 lorsville, did not feel himself justified in pushing forward and un- 
 covering Bank's ford, though he says nothing in his official report 
 of having made any attempt to ascertain whether there was a 
 
 » Meade's official report, MS. 
 
 tOrder G., issued A;)ril 28th, "Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 119. 
 4 
 
50 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 reasonable chance of doing so, and one would gather no inkling 
 from reading it that his orders required him to do so.. . Nor does 
 General Pleasanton, in his testimony, make any reference to any 
 reconnoissance having been made at this juncture towards Fredericks- 
 burg, with this end in view. We learn, however, from the enemy's 
 reports that the Union cavalry did manifest considerable activity. 
 When General Anderson, who had been sent out to Chancellorsville 
 with Wright's brigade, arrived at that point, at midnight of the 
 29th, he found that the brigades of Mahone and Posey, which had 
 been on duty defending United States ford, had retired, with the 
 exception of a small detachment, and were already there. But 
 General Anderson, after consultation with these officers, determined 
 to retire further towards Fredericksburg, as the position at Chan- 
 cellorsville was not favorable for defense.* General Anderson 
 says in his report : " Wright's and Posey's brigades retired from 
 Chancellorsville by the plank road and Mahone's by the old turn- 
 pike. Whilst they were moving off, and before the pickets had 
 been called in, the cavalry of the enemy, under cover of fog and 
 rain, dashed upon the picket on the Ely's ford road, and captured 
 a part of one company. They subsequently attacked the rear guard 
 of Mahone's brigade, but were so effectually repulsed that we were 
 no further annoyed by them during the movement." .General 
 Stuart t also says: "Hearing that the enemy had already reached 
 Chancellorsville by the Ely's ford road, I directed my march by 
 Todd's tavern for Spottsylvania Court-House. Night overtook us 
 at Todd's tavern, and anxious to know what the commanding 
 general desired me to do further, I left the command to bivouac 
 here, and proceeded with my staff towards his headquarters, near 
 Fredericksburg; but had not proceeded a mile before we found 
 ourselves confronted by a party of the enemy, double our own, 
 directly in our path. I sent back hastily for a regiment, which, 
 coming up (Fifth Virginia cavalry. Colonel Tyler), attacked and 
 routed the party. But, in the meantime, another body of the 
 enemy's -cavalry came in rear of the Fifth. Eeceiving notice of 
 this, I gave orders to withdraw the Fifth from the road, and sent 
 
 » General Anderson's Rep., " Reb. Rec," Vol. X., p. 262, Does. 
 
 t Official Report of General Stuart, " Reb. Rec," Vol. X., p. 269, Does. 
 
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. 51 
 
 for tlie brigade to push on at once. This was done, and by the 
 bright moonlight a series of charges routed and scattered this ex- 
 pedition which had penetrated to within a mile or two of Spottsyl- 
 vania Court-House. It has been since ascertained thatrtlHS expedi- 
 tion was by no means an insignificant affair, and but for the timely 
 arrival of this cavalry on the spot, and jts prompt and vigorous 
 action, might have resulted disastrously. Artillery, as well as 
 trains, were passing Spottsylvania unprotected at the time." 
 
 General Slocum contented himself with posting his forces in an 
 advantageous position about Chancellorsville, the Twelfth corps in 
 the woods on a line nearly parallel to the Plank road, with the left 
 resting near Chancellorsville, and the right connecting with the 
 Eleventh corps, which reached out to Hunting run along the Plank 
 road and Germania ford road, and the Fifth corps extending from 
 Chancellorsville towards the river, covering United States ford. 
 
 Thus these three corps having, by a circuitous route, reached 
 their destination at Chancellorsville, the Second was brought up by 
 the direct road. Leaving Gibbon's division near Falmouth, General 
 Couch had moved, with the divisions of Hancock and French, on 
 ^ the morning of the 28th to Bank's ford, and while a demonstration 
 of crossing was made here by throwing up works,* Carroll's brigade 
 was sent forward to United States ford to open a road to the river, 
 and lay two pontoon bridges. At 10 o'clock on the morning of 
 the 30th, the advance of the other corps across the Rapidan having 
 practically uncovered this ford, the bridges were laid, and at 3 
 p. M. the columns commenced crossing. By 9 P. M. the corps was 
 in bivouac near Chancellorsville. 
 
 While these operations were proceeding so successfully and with 
 so little annoyance, the rest of the army was no less active^ though 
 the purpose of all these movements, and where the blow that was 
 impending was to fall, remained a secret with him who had conceived 
 them. General Hooker well knew that he could never transfer 
 his army to the right bank of the Eappahannock and flank the 
 rebel position, if his opponent knew his designs. Hence he em- 
 ployed four of the seven corps of his army to mask the movement 
 of the other three. 
 
 * General Couch's MS. Eeport. 
 
52 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 As we have already seen, the Second corps had been set to 
 digging in front of Bank's ford, as if to force a passage, on the 
 28th. This ford is six miles above Fredericksburg by the north 
 bank, but only three by the south. "Wilcox's brigade of Long- 
 street's corps was guarding it on the rebel side, with Perry's brigade 
 of the same corps in supporting distance in the direction of Fred- 
 ericksburg. The three remaining corps of General Hooker's army 
 — the First, General Reynolds, the Third, General Sickles, and 
 the Sixth, General Sedgwick, all under the general direction of the 
 latter — moved from camp oh the 28th, and by nightfall were in the 
 positions assigned them in readiness to cross the river, the Sixth 
 corps near the mouth of Deep run, the place of Franklin's cross- 
 ing of the December preceding, the First corps a mile lower at the 
 mouth of Pollock's Mill creek, and the Third corps between the 
 two in readiness to spring to the assistance of either, as necessity 
 might require. The troops encamped without fires so as not to 
 attract the attention of the foe, nor disclose the numbers engaged 
 in the movement. Under cover of darkness boats were noiselessly 
 taken on the shoulders of the men to the river's bank. At the 
 Pollock's Mill crossing, General Reynolds detailed seventy-five 
 men to each of the forty-four boats to be employed in crossing. It 
 was daylight before they had arrived at the bank of the stream. 
 Three thousand men of General Wadsworth's division stood ready 
 to force the passage. Scarcely had twenty boats touched the water 
 before the enemy, on the opposite shore, opened a hot fire of 
 musketry from his rifle-pits, and was soon after reinforce^ by an 
 additional regiment. In the face of this fire it was impracticable 
 to cross, and the Union sharp-shooters disposed along the river's 
 bank were insufficient to silence it. Seeing that the enemy were 
 hugging closely their fortifications, and were unsupported, the 
 Twenty-fourth Michigan and Sixth Wisconsin regiments, Colopels 
 Morrow and Bragg, having been taken beyond range below, were 
 ferried over, and flanking the hostile pits, under the leadership of 
 General Wadsworth in person, quickly put to flight their defenders, 
 when the remaining regiments of th^, brigade crossed. By a little 
 past 10 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, two bridges had been 
 constructed under the direction of General Benham, and the re- 
 
ABMY OF THE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. 53 
 
 maining brigades of Wadswortb's division crossed. To completely 
 cover the bridges it was necessary to extend the line well to the 
 left, so as to occupy the high bluft towards the mouth of Massa- 
 ponax creek, and som/e rifle-pits and light defences were thrown 
 up. Ransom's and Stuart's batteries were also thrown over and 
 put in position. The loss in this operation was about sixty killed 
 and wounded. Ninety prisoners were taken from the Sixth Louis- 
 iana and the Twenty-third Georgia regiments, including several 
 officers. The remaining two divisions of the corps were brought 
 down near the crossing and sheltered in the ravines of the creek. 
 
 At the upper crossing, near the mouth of Deep run, shortly 
 before daylight of the 29th, Brook's division of the Sixth corps 
 crossed in boats, Russell's brigade leading. The enemy made some 
 resistance, but was soon driven, and his works occupied. Three 
 bridges were then laid, and the remaining divisions were held in 
 readiness to cross. In the meantime. General Hunt, chief of artil- 
 lery, was busy fringing the crests of the bluffs along the left bank 
 with guns to protect the bridges, and check any advance of the 
 enemy. *Ten guns of the artillery reserve, and twenty-four light 
 rifles of the Sixth corps were ranged on the bluff covering the 
 bridges of the upper crossing, while upon the river bank, so 
 arranged as to get a cross-fire on the enemy's pits, were planted 
 twelve light twelve-pounders, the whole under command of Colonel 
 Tompkins, of the First Rhode Island. At the First corps crossing 
 twenty light rifled pieces were put upon the bluffs, and a like num- 
 ber close in upon the river bank, which were commanded by Col- 
 onel Waynwright, of the First New York. A mile further down, 
 near Traveller's Rest, so disposed as to command the bridge aci:oss 
 the Massaponax, and cover the left of the troops that had crossed, 
 were sixteen guns under Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Warner, Inspec- 
 tor of Artillery. 
 
 Seeing this activity in the Union army, and five bridges laid, 
 with forces already across in position for their protection, the 
 heights, on the Union side overlooking these operations, bristling 
 with artillery, General Lee evidently concluded that it behooved 
 him to bring up his availa'ble forces to meet so formidable demon- 
 
 * General Hunt's ofSoial report, MS. 
 
54 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 strations. Accordingly, that part of Jackson's corps which had 
 been in camp at Grace Church, was hurriedly moved forward, and, 
 about the time the bridges were completed,* commenced moving 
 into position in great strength, his skirmishers occupying the Bowl- 
 ing Green road, and apparently formed iu two lines of battle in the 
 railroad cut and rifle-pits just behind the crest which had been the 
 Union line in the first Fredericksburg battle, with reserves in the 
 woods. The rebel force which had been sent to Port Royal to 
 check any demonstrations that might be made in that quarter, was 
 called in, but, on approaching Massaponax bridge, was compelled, 
 by the fire of the Union artillery posted at Traveller's Eest, to 
 make a wide detour in reaching its position in Jackson's corps. 
 During the night of the 29th and the entire day of the 30th, there 
 was little change or activity in the rebel lines save in fortifying. 
 
 At midday of the 30th, at the moment when the right wing of 
 the Union army was arriving at Chancellbrsville, and the Second 
 corps was well on its way thither by United States ford, General 
 Sickles, with the Third, quietly withdrew from his support of 
 Sedgwick and Reynolds, and marched away to join the forces at 
 Chancellorsville, crossing United States ford early on the morning 
 of the 1st of May, and^reporting at his destination at 9 A. M. The 
 withdrawal and the march were skillfully masked, and the enemy 
 seemed not to have detected tlje movement. Thus were five corps 
 concentrated at Chancellorsville by the morning of the 1st, with 
 Reynolds and Sedgwick still threatening to cross below Fredericks- 
 burg. 
 
 At 5 p. M. of the 30th, General Jackson having strengthened his 
 works and awaited theadvapce of the Union lines, began to be 
 restive, and opened fire from his batteries iu position on the hill 
 near Captain Hamilton's house, on Wadsworth's working parties 
 and upon the bridges. The rifled guns on the opposite bluffs re- 
 plied. The fire was kept up until nearly dark, during which it 
 became necessary to move the Second division of the First corps, 
 which had been massed in the ravines where it was sustaining some 
 damage, to the shelter of the river road. One of the boats in the 
 bridges was struck, which necessitated its replacement. With these 
 
 » General Beyuolds' report, original MS. 
 
AJRMY OF TEE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. 55 
 
 exceptions no injury resulted to the Union forces from this noisy 
 demonstration. As soon as night closed in one of the two bridges 
 at the lower crossing, and one of the three at the upper, were taken 
 up and removed to Bank's ford, in anticipation of its being uncov- 
 ered by the advance of Slocum from Chancellorsville, as General 
 Hooker had purposed, if by any possibility practicable. 
 
 The campaign thus far had been signally successful. Every 
 movement undertaken had been carried to a triumphant issue in 
 the time allotted, without impediment, and with trifling molesta- 
 tion. Every feint and every demonstration had been made pre- 
 cisely as ordered. A powerful and vigilant enemy had been thrown 
 completely off his guard, and signally foiled in every attempt to 
 oppose or to checkmate the series of movements being made from 
 almost every point of the compass. What had been looked upon 
 as the insurmountable difficulty — the crossing of the river and 
 getting at the foe — had been overcome without a mishap or a seem- 
 ing hazard. The thirty-two miles of out-post and intrenchment, 
 executed with endless labor, to make the stream impassable, had 
 been brushed aside as though it had been gossamer, and the major 
 part of the Union army had been planted in rear of its old antagon- 
 ist with scarcely the loss of a man or the firing of a shot. What 
 General Newton had characterized as a tactical impossibility, and 
 only effected by accident, had been deliberately planned and 
 brought to consummation without a miscarriage. 
 
 Colonel MacDougal, of the British army, one of the ablest of 
 living military writers, has published a book on "Modern Warfare," 
 in which he devotes no inconsiderable part to the Passage of Rivers, 
 describing in detail and with a master hand the most celebrated in- 
 stances, and classes this movement of General Hooker across the 
 Rappahannock with Hannibal's passage of the Rhone, Alexander's 
 of the Hydaspes, Napoleon's of the Po and the Danube, and Wel- 
 lington's of the Douro and Adour. He says : " The passage of the 
 Rappahannock by General . Hooker, in April, 1863, manifested 
 higher military qualities than any which had previously been un- 
 dertaken by the United States forces, and is instructive on account 
 of the secresy, rapidity and energy of the different movements." In 
 
66 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 his remarks ou Stratagems he says : * " It will be found that all 
 great generals have employed largely this element of victory — the 
 dolus or stratagem — for the purpose of making their enemy believe 
 what they wished him to believe ; and, consequently, as actions are 
 regulated by belief, of making him act as they wished him to act. 
 There is no operation in which a great advantage may not be gained 
 by imposing a false belief on an enemy." And on opening his 
 chapter on the Passage of Rivers, he says: "The passage of a con- 
 siderable river in the face of an enemy is one of the most difficult 
 operations of war, if attempted by open force. The examples of 
 this are, however, comparatively few. There are two methods 
 which have usually been employed by offensive armies for the pas- 
 sage of great rivers: 1. Wholly by stratagem, in deceiving the 
 enemy as to the intended point of passage, so that he is induced to 
 guard especially one portion of the river to which his attention has 
 been purposely directed by the measures of his opponent, while the 
 latter then effects a passage by surprise at an unguarded point. 
 2. By a mixture of force and stratagem combined. Napoleon's pas- 
 sage of the Po, in 1796, at Piacenza; of the Beresina, in 1812; 
 Wellington's passage of the Adour, in 1813; Louis Napoleon's 
 passage of the Ticino, in 1859, and Hooker's passage of the Rappa- 
 hannock, in 1863, are examples of the first. Wellington's passage 
 of the Douro, at Oporto, in modern times ; Alexander's passage of 
 the Hydaspes, and Hannibal's passage of the Rhone, in ancient 
 history, are examples of the second." f 
 
 On the evening of the 30th of April, having brought his army 
 into position, in accordance with his original design, leaving Gen- 
 eral Butterlield, his chief of staff, in whose capacity and judgment 
 he had confidence, to represent him at that point. General Hooker 
 broke up his headquarters at Falmouth and transferred them to 
 Chancellorsville. On his arrival there he felt, as was natural, 
 having accomplished so great a military feat, some degree of ex- 
 ultation. In his most sanguine expectations he had not anticipated 
 that his corps would all reach their positions without severe strug- 
 
 » " Modern Warfare and' Modern Artillery, by Colonel MacDougal," p. 67. London : 
 John Murray, 
 t MacDougal, p. 293. 
 
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNLEASHED. gg 
 
 gles, as is shown by his provision for corps on the march or in 
 their demonstrations in front of the enemy to go to each other's as- 
 sistance; He felt that in its complete accomplishment a tactical 
 victory had ali:eady been achieved, and accordingly announced his 
 success to the army in the following congratulatory order : " It is 
 with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces 
 to the army that the operations of the last three days have deter- 
 mined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out 
 from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, 
 where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, 
 Eleventh and Twelfth corps have been a succession of splendid 
 achievements." 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CONTENDING HOSTS BROUGHT 
 PACE TO FACE. 
 
 t 
 
 General lee became aware at noon of the 
 30th, about the hour when General Sickles was 
 starting for Chancellorsville, that the Union 
 troops had crossed the river, in force, far above 
 Fredericksburg. He had heard, through mes- 
 sengers from General Stuart, that Union col- 
 umns were demonstrating on the upper Rappa- 
 hannock ; but he had a considerable force in 
 that direction, and he appears to have had little 
 solicitude about any real advance from that quarter. General J. E. 
 B. Stuart, one of his most reliable generals, with the rpg,in body of 
 the cavalry, was between the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, 
 who, had he been on the alert and disposed to make a stand, could 
 have greatly delayed the column at Kelly's ford. Generals Mahone 
 and Posey, with two full brigades, were at United States ford. 
 General Wilcox, with a brigade, was at Banks' ford, and General 
 Perry in supporting distance of Wilcox, on the heights overlooking 
 Falmouth. Lest the demonstration from the fords aboye might 
 prove to be something more than he anticipated, at 9 o'clock on the 
 evening of the 29th General Lee ordered Anderson to proceed to 
 Chancellorsville with Wright's brigade. Wright was bivouacking 
 at the time near Anderson's headquarters, on the military road, and 
 at 12 midnight was on the march. Anderson, having ordered the 
 column in motion, rode for>vard, and arrived at Chancellorsville at 
 about the same hour that his column commenced to move, 12 mid- 
 night. General Posey, in his oiHcial report, says: "On the evening 
 of the 29th ult., beihg then in camp with Brigadier-General Mahone, 
 (60) 
 
THM HOSTS BROUQHT FACE TO FACE. 61 
 
 near the United States ford, we were advised by our scouts and the 
 cavalry pickets, who were posted at Ely's ford and Germania bridge, 
 that the enemy had crossed in heavy force at these points, and were 
 advancing on the Ely and plank roads towards Chancellorsville. 
 Upon consultation, we concluded to leave five companies of my 
 brigade (Nineteenth Mississippi regiment) and one regiment of 
 General Mahone's brigade, to watch and defend the United States 
 ford, while we moved our brigades to Chancellorsville." Hence, on 
 the arrival of General Anderson at Chancellorsville, at midnight 
 of the 29th, he found these two brigades already there, and in posi- 
 tion covering the Germania and Ely's ford roads. Wright's brigade, 
 having ten miles or more to march, did not arrive until daylight on 
 the morning of the 30th. 
 
 General Anderson had decided that he could make no headway 
 in opposing the advancing columns of Hooker in this flat, wilder- 
 ness country, with only his three brigades. Good highways lead 
 from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg; but the numerous streams 
 emptying into the Rappahannock cross these roads at right angles, 
 and have worn away numerous little ravines and slight depressions, 
 which make good defensible positions for blocking an advance from 
 either direction. Accordingly, at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 
 30th, Anderson led these brigades back some four or five miles 
 towards Fredericksburg, Wright's and Posey's by the plank road, 
 and Mahone's by the turnpike, aind having selected good ground on 
 which to make a stand, where were cultivated fields and ample 
 opportunity for manoeuvring troops and observing the approach of 
 an enemy, fell to fortifying. "At 8 o'clock A. M.,"* says General 
 Wright in his report, " I reached the desired position, and formed 
 line of battle on a range of hills in rear of Hopewell nursery, with 
 my right resting upon the plank road. My men had marched 
 twenty-seven miles in less than twenty-one hours, and most of the 
 time in a heavy rain and through deep mud, and when I halted 
 were almost completely exhausted. After a hasty reconnoissance 
 of the position, I concluded to change my line to the crest of a 
 range of hills, upon which the small-pox hospital and an old church 
 were situated, and about three-quarters of a mile in rear [towards 
 
 * Official report, ." Rebellion Eeoord," Vol. X., p. 288. 
 
62 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 Fredericksburg] of my first position. Here I formed as before, 
 with my right resting upon the plank road, and my left upon the 
 Fredericksburg and Gordonsville railroad. During the afternoon, 
 having received a few intrenching tools, I commenced digging a line 
 of rifle-pits in front of my position, and by working during the 
 whole night I had, by seven o'clock on Friday morning (May 1st), 
 my entire line well protected, having also, during the night, kept a 
 detail at work throwing up an epaulement for two pieces of artillery 
 on the right of the plank road." 
 
 Posey took position ; his left connecting with Wright at the plank 
 road, and his line extending to the intersection of the mine road with 
 the turnpike, and Mahone, in continuation of the line of Posey, on 
 a line slightly refused, along an extended clearing upon a ridge 
 leading off towards Bank's ford, and covering it from an advance 
 from the direction of Chancellorsville. "Upon arriving," says 
 General Anderson, "at the intersection of the old mine and plank 
 roads, I met Colonel W. P. Smith, chief engineer, army of North- 
 ern Virginia, and Captain Johnstone of the engineer corps, who had 
 been sent by the commanding general to examine the position and 
 establish the line of intrenchments. The work of intrenching was 
 commenced immediately after the line had been selected, and was 
 continued with great diligence and activity throughout that day 
 (the 30th), the night following, and the early part of the next 
 morning." 
 
 It will thus be seen that the best engineering skill in the rebel 
 army was employed in laying out that line, and, though the troops 
 were worn out with hard marching, they labored uninterruptedly 
 from the morning of the 30th to nearly noon of the 1st of May in 
 throwing up works. Lunettes were constructed around the guns) 
 and the whole line was made as strong as skill and labor could 
 render it. At midnight of the 30th, General McLaws, with three 
 brigades of his division, Kershaw's, Semmes' and Wofford's, left 
 the intrenchments at Fredericksburg and moved up to the position 
 of Apderson, where they were put into the works already constructed 
 along the continuation of this ridge in the direction of Bank's ford, 
 but partially en echelon, and sharply refused, forming nearly a right 
 angle with the main line stretching along the crest of Smith's hill, 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 63 
 
 the left connecting with the right of Anderson. Perry's brigade 
 was also brought up and formed on the right of Wofford's ; and 
 Wilcox's, which was near by, was formed on the right of Perry. 
 " * This," says General Wilcox, in his report, " brought my com- 
 mand to occupy a line of rifle-pits running from Bank's ford to 
 within a few hundred yards of the mine road." 
 
 If the topography of the country at this point is examined, or the 
 map, which shows the configuration here very clearly, it will be seen 
 that the ridge, extending from a point overlooking Bank's ford, 
 along the divide between Mott run and the head waters of Massa- 
 ponax creek, and abutting upon the left on the old railroad bed, is 
 an excellent one for defense. It would seem as though the clear- 
 ings and roads along its rear had for years been preparing for the 
 precise purpose to which it was now put. By sunrise on the morn- 
 ing of the 1st these intrenchments, so skilfully planned and elabo- 
 rately constructed, were amply manned. On the afternoon of the 
 30th strong reconnoissances were sent out from Chancellorsville by 
 the Union forces already arrived there, though Slocum, who was 
 distinctly charged by the orders of General Hooker to do so, makes 
 no mention of it in his report. But General Meade says : "As soon 
 as Chancellorsville was occupied, I directed General Devin, with his 
 whole cavalry force, to send out a strong picket on the plank road, 
 and to send another party out on the Bank's ford, or river road, to 
 feel for the enemy and ascertain how much of our front was uncov- 
 ered. About 3 P. M. I received a report from Colonel Devin, that 
 he had driven in the enemy's pickets at the Bank's ford road, and 
 had pursued them till he could see their line of battle, and from 
 the wagons visible he concluded they were about to evacuate the 
 position. I immediately directed General Griffin to advance a 
 brigade to support the cavalry, and if practicable to drive in the 
 infantry and uncover Bank's ford. About an hour afterwards, 
 Griffin reported to me that he was with his brigade in the presence 
 of a superior force of the enemy, and that he would require support 
 if he had to maintain his position. I then ascertained to my surprise 
 that the cavalry, instead of going down the Bank's ford road as 
 they reported and led me to believe, had gone down the old Kich- 
 
 » Official Report, "Keb. Bee," Vol. X., p. 294. 
 
64 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. ) 
 
 mond turnpike, which makes a detour to Chancellorsville, coming 
 in again to the plank road about three and a half miles from Chan- 
 cellorsville. Upon referring to Major-General Slocum, who had 
 arrived and assumed command, the question of withdrawing or sup- 
 porting Griffin, it was determined to withdraw him, which was 
 accordingly done." 
 
 General Mahone, who was lying in a position to meet the head 
 of any Union column moving from that direction, says, in his re- 
 port : " Shortly after we' had taken up our new line, at the inter- 
 section of the mine and turnpike roads, the enemy came down the 
 turnpike in considerable force of cavalry and infantry ; but nothing 
 occurred at this point beyond a little skirmishing with his sharp- 
 shooters and reconnoitring parties." 
 
 General Hooker, in his order to Slocum, instructing him to take 
 command of the three corps upon their arrival at Chancellorsville, 
 apparently desired that his lieutenant should push on and get a 
 position uncovering Bank's ford, as it would thus bring the two 
 wings of his army into close proximity, and would enable one to go 
 to the support of the other, if hard pressed. But he did not make 
 the order imperative, and adds a final clause* indicating that he 
 would be satisfied if Slocum should reach Chancellorsville and make 
 all close and safe there. He evidently did not desire that Slocum 
 should take any great risks ; for he realized th^t the Union column, 
 as it approached Fredericksburg, would be constantly nearing the 
 main body of Lee's army, and there would be danger that Lee would 
 fall upon it, if he saw it approaching unsupported and isolated from 
 the main body, and destroy it piecemeal. " If your cavalry is well 
 advanced from Chancellorsville you will be able to ascertain whether 
 or not the enemy is detaching forces from behind Fredericksburg to 
 resist your advance. If not in any considerable force the General 
 desires that you will endeavor to advance at all hazards, securing a 
 position on the plank road, and uncovering Bank's ford, which is 
 also defended by a brigade of rebel infantry and a battery." Biit, 
 as if fearing that this bold advance might involve Slocum in a 
 movement that he would be unable to execute, and, as if impressed 
 with a presentiment of the existence of Anderson's line of intrench- 
 
 * See the exact wording of this order in the Appendix. 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 65 
 
 ments which we have just described, which Slocum would have run 
 into had he attempted it, Hooker adds : " The General desires that 
 not a moment be lost until our troops are established at or near 
 Chancellorsville. From that moment all will be ours." And, still, 
 as if hardly satisfied with this, and strongly desiring Bank's ford, 
 he adds, as a sort of postscript : " It will be much easier to replenish 
 batteries, ammunition, etc., by Bank's ford than by United States 
 ford, if you should succeed in uncovering it." 
 
 No sooner had General Hooker arrived at Chancellorsville, 
 which he did on the night of the 30th and established his head- 
 quarters, than he began to concert measures for securing what he 
 unmistakably coveted so strongly, the uncovering of this ford. His 
 purpose was to advance his army five or six miles nearer Fredericks- 
 burg, provided he could do so without hazarding too much ; but in 
 no event to let go the position which he had taken up at Chancel- 
 lorsville, or yield control of the avenues leading to United States 
 ford, until he was absolutely certain of having, and securely hold- 
 ing. Bank's ford. His orders, therefore, for the movement of his 
 corps, and the posting of his forces were with a view to these two 
 ends. The Fifth corps was to be thrown upon the river road 
 accompanied with three batteries, and was to advance to a point 
 midway between Mott and Colin runs^the identical position taken 
 up by Anderson and McLaws, and which had been so elaborately 
 traced by General Lee's engineers, and strongly fortified by Ander- 
 son's division — the movement to be completed by 2 o'clock on 
 the afternoon of the 1st of May. » The Twelfth corps, including its 
 batteries, was to advance by the plank road, and take position along 
 the ridge passing near Tabernacle church, where it was to be by 
 12 M., and at this church General Hooker's headquarters were to 
 be established — the very ground which, for twenty-four hours, had 
 been held and fortified by the rebel forces, and the self-same church 
 where had been the headquarters of Generals Anderson and Mc- 
 Laws, but all unknown to the Union commander. The Eleventh 
 corps was to follow up the Twelfth, and be massed along the plank 
 road, one mile in rear of the latter, as a support, and to cover tliat 
 flank in the event of the right being turned. These three corps, in 
 the positions indicated, were to constitute the moving column, and 
 
66 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 were to take the offensive. The remaining forces were to act as 
 corps of observation, and to defend Chancellorsville and the United 
 States ford roads. One division of the Second corps, with one bat- 
 tery, was to take position at Todd's tavern, with strong detachments 
 thrown out in the direction of the enemy. The other divisions and 
 batteries of the Second corps were to be massed out of the road 
 near Chancellorsville. The Third corps was to be massed, as fast 
 as it arrived, about one mile from Chancellorsville, on the United 
 States ford road, excepting one brigade and a battery, which were to 
 take position at Dowdall's tavern. General Pleasanton, with the 
 cavalry not engaged, was to remain at Chancellorsville. Thus, 
 with an iron grasp. General Hooker clung to Chancellorsville, and 
 at the same time made provision for the advance to the new posi- 
 tion. From the moderate force put in the moving column it was 
 evidently not intended for the fighting of a general battle. 
 
 At 11 o'clock, on the morning of the 1st, General Slocum com- 
 menced the advance on the plank road. General Sykes' division of 
 regulars took the turnpike, and Griffin, followed by Humphreys, the 
 river road. 
 
 If now we turn from these dispositions of General Hooker to the 
 camp of General Lee, we shall discover what forces the Union corps, 
 which constituted the moving column, will be likely to encounter as 
 they advance. General Lee, in his official report, says: "The 
 enemy in our front, near Fredericksburg, continued inactive, and it 
 was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our 
 flank and rear. It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient 
 troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of the army to 
 give battle to the approaching column. Early's division of Jack- 
 son's corps, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division, with part 
 of the reserve artillery, under General Pendleton, were intrusted 
 with the defence of our position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight, 
 on the 30th, General McLaws marched with the rest of his com- 
 mand towards Chancellorsville. General Jackson followed at dawn 
 next morning (May 1st), with the, remaining divisions of his corps. 
 He reached the position occupied by General Anderson at 8 A. M., 
 and immediately began preparations to advance. At 11 a. m. the 
 troops moved forward upon the plank and old turnpike roads." 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 67 
 
 Thus, at dawn of the 1st of May, the whole rebel army, with the 
 exception of an insignificant forCe left in the iiUrenchments before 
 Fredericksburg, was ou its way towards Chancel lorsville, and by 8 
 o'clock A. M. had arrived at the fortified position at Tabernacle 
 church, held by Anderson and McLaws, and, at 11 a. m., under 
 the command of General Jackson in person, was commencing an 
 advance from this position towards Chancellorsville at the precise 
 hour when Generals Slocum and Meade, at Chancellorsville, were 
 commencing the movement on the same roads in the direction of 
 Fredericksburg. Thus, at an hour before midday of the 1st, the 
 heads of the two armies, scarcely three miles apart, were commenc- 
 ing a movement towards each other. Anderson, with the brigade& 
 of Wright and Posey, took the lead on the turnpike; McLaws,, 
 with his three brigades, Mahone leading, on the plank road ; Wilcox 
 and Perry, of Anderson's division, co-operated with McLaws ; and 
 Jackson's troops followed Anderson on the plank road. Wright 
 had not- proceeded far before he met the skirmishers of Slocum, and 
 on coming up to the main body, which was deployed along the 
 skirt of a heavy forest with an open field in its front, disposed his 
 forces for an encounter. Under the immediate orders of General 
 Jackson, Alexander's battalion of artillery was wheeled into posi- 
 tion and opened a heavy fire upon Slocum's line, the rebel infantry 
 pushing up and engaging warmly the Union troops. Finally, 
 Wright was withdrawn, and ordered to gain the bed of the Fred- 
 ericksburg and Orange railroad, and push rapidly forward so as to 
 flank the Union right. This was accomplished with little opposi- 
 tion, and Wright pushed on to\^%rds Welford's furnace. On the 
 turnpike, Sykes met Mahone's brigade, and *drove in the rebel 
 advanced line, but soon encountered a much heavier force than his 
 own, which outflanked him on all sides. General Warren, who 
 was with Sykes, immediately reported the situation to headquarters. 
 But General Hooker had already discovered that he was encounter- 
 ing the concentrated forces of the Confederate army, and that his 
 own were hemmed in on three narrow roads leading through an 
 almost impenetrable forest, where it was impossible for him to 
 manoeuvre them ; and, moreover, that he was being flanked on the 
 
 * Testimony of General Warren, " Conduct of War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 45. 
 
68 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 right. He accordingly determined to arrest the movement and 
 withdraw his moving columns to the position about Chancellors- 
 ville, which they had occupied the previous night and partially 
 fortified. This was easily accomplished without loss, and the 
 enemy followed up and took position conforming to that of the 
 Union line. The Fifth corps, General Meade, was placed on the 
 left extending along the Mineral Spring road, which follows the 
 ridge between Mine run and the Mineral Spring run, and reaching 
 down to the river bank, Humphreys having the left. Griffin next 
 him, and Sykes on the right, though the two latter did not take 
 their positions until daylight on the morning of the 2d, having been 
 detained in front of ChancellorSville until the coming up of the 
 Second corps, Sykes having a brisk skirmish at six o'clock on the 
 evening of the 1st, handsomely repulsing the enemy's overventure- 
 some advance. Upon the right of Sykes was French's division of 
 General Couch's corps, the Sfecond, which reached the turnpike and 
 covered Chancellorsville. Hancock's division of this corps was in 
 an anomalous position in front of French, but on advantageous 
 ground which it would have been disastrous to have allowed the 
 eneniy to occupy, with his right connecting with the left of General 
 Slocum's corps, the Twelfth, which held a long stretch along the 
 old turnpike, nearly at right angles to the general line already indi- 
 cated. Geary, commanding the Second division of the Twelfth., was 
 upon the left between the turnpike and the plank, and his right ex- 
 tending across the plank along the crest overlooking an eastern 
 tributary of Lewis creek, and stretching out nearly to Hazel grove, 
 where it was joined by the First division, Williams', which reached 
 around to a church on the Orange plank road, a mile and a half from 
 Chancellorsville westward, the line of the corps describing substanti- 
 ally a half circle, whose diameter was nearly two miles on the Orange 
 plank. At the point in the Twelfth corps, lying nearest to Hazel grove, 
 Birney's division of the Third corps was interposed, facing south 
 and striking the plank again in the neighborhood of Melzi Chan- 
 cellor's. Finally the three divisions of the Eleventh corps. General 
 Howard, in the order of Steinwehr, Schurz and Devens, Second, 
 Third and First, were posted along the plank and Germania ford 
 roads, its extreme right, and the right of the whole army resting 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. QQ 
 
 upon the crest of the ridge overlooking the west branch of Hunting 
 run. This line, thus hastily assumed, in face of the pressure of the 
 enemy, had been in some portions partially fortified, but was now 
 rectified and" improved with the anticipation of here fighting a gen- 
 eral battle. 
 
 It was a position liable to many objections ; but the best that 
 was attainable. It had several angles where portions of the line* 
 were liable to be enfiladed by the enemy's artillery. It was, with 
 the exception of the left, near the river, almost a dead level with 
 scarcely any commanding positions, where the artillery could play 
 to advantage. It was in the midst of a dense forest, " *of not very 
 large trees, but very difficult to get through, mainly of scrubby oak, 
 what they call black-jack there, so that a man could hardly ride 
 through it, and a man could not march through it very well with 
 musket in his hand, unless he trailed it." The extreme left had a 
 good natural barrier for its protection — the river ; but the right 
 rested in the forest, where, though far removed from the direction 
 from which the enemy was expected to advance, it was still liable 
 to be turned unless vigilantly guarded and protected by works. 
 
 General Hooker had anticipated that, if the cavalry, which he 
 had sent out under Stoneman and Averell to sever the communica- 
 tions in rear of the rebel army and break up its avenues of supply, 
 was successful. General Lee, when he found the Union army upon 
 his rear, would retreat either in the direction of Gordonsville or 
 Richmond. Hence, in making the forward movement from Chan- 
 cellorsville, General Hooker had not anticipated serious opposition. 
 When, however, he found that he must fight a battle against nearly 
 the entire rebel army, with but a fragment of his own in hand, he 
 decided to retake the position from which he had advanced, and 
 which be still firmly held with his reserves, rather than to risk a 
 battle, where the advantages of position would all be on the side of 
 the enemy. i 
 
 In his last order to Sedgwick, before leaving his headquarters at 
 Falmouth, he said: "fit is not known, of course, what eifect the 
 advance will have upon the enemy, and the general commanding 
 
 * General Warren's testimony, " Reb. Eec," Vol. I., p. 44. 
 t " Conduct of the War," 1865, Veil. I., p. 123. 
 
70 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 directs that you observe his moveinents with the utmost vigilance, 
 and should he expose a. weak point attack him in full force and 
 destroy him. If he should |Show any symptoms of falling back, the 
 general directs that you throw yoiir whole force on to the Bowling 
 Green road, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, turning his 
 fortified positions by the numerous by-roads which you can make 
 use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces 
 should pass off to the east of the railroad, you will, by detachments, 
 pursue until you destroy or capture him." But, notwithstanding 
 these explicit orders. General Sedgwick remained quiet the whole 
 day, although it was known on his lines that the enemy had with- 
 drawn from his front; for General Reynolds says, in his official 
 rejiort : " The 1st of May was passed by the troops holding the 
 same position. The enemy's force opposite us was very much 
 diminished, though still strong on their extreme right where their 
 battery was posted." On the morning of the 1st of May, that the 
 rebel forces might be detained as long as possible in their position 
 before Fredericksburg, and thus favor the movement from iChancel- 
 lorsville to Bank's ford. General Hooker sent orders for General 
 Sedgwick to make a demonstration in force at 1 o'clock p. m. of that 
 day. It was to be as severe as possible without being an attack, 
 and this threatening attitude was to be preserved until further orders. 
 By some mischance in the transmission the order did not reach Sedg- 
 wick* until 5 o'clock that evening, four hours after the demonstration 
 was to have been made, and was not received by General Reynolds 
 until 6 P. M. Orders were giv6n by General Sedgwick for making 
 the demonstration as directed, and the First corps, with General 
 Newton of the Sixth in support, was displayed in force as if to move 
 to the attack. But the troops had scarcely gained their positions 
 before notice, countermanding the order, was received from General 
 Hooker. But the demonstration would have been unavailing had 
 it been made at the time required by the terms of the order, as the 
 movement of the rebel army out of its fortifications had commenced 
 at midnight of the 30th, twelve hours before this demonstration was 
 to have been made, and by 9 o'clock, on the morning of the 1st of 
 May, the head of that army was already moving into General 
 
 * Official Reports of Sedgwick and Eeynolds, Original MSS. 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 71 
 
 Anderson's line of intrenchments covering Bank's ford from the 
 direction of Chancellorsville. 
 
 General Hooker had formed large expectations from the devasta- 
 tion which his cavalry had been set to accomplish. This anticipa-- 
 tion was fully shared by General Halleck, and by President Lin- 
 coln himself. In General Halleck's communication to General 
 Buriiside, under date of January 7th, 1863, in which he urges in 
 strong terms a forward moyeraent, he says : *" In all my communi- 
 cations and interviews with you since you took command of the Army 
 of the Potomac, I have advised a formal movement across the Rap- 
 pahannock. . . I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and 
 light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his 
 supplies and engage him at an advantage. . . Advantages can be 
 gained by crossing smaller forces at other points, to cut off his 
 lines, destroy his communications, and capture his rear guards, out- 
 posts, etc." Mr. Lincoln was so impressed with the importance of 
 the operations of the cavalry in this Chancellorsville campaign, 
 that in a communication of the 7th of May, after the campaign 
 itself was ended, counselling a renewal of active operations, he had 
 counted on a complete breaking up, as the result of the cavalry raid, 
 of Lee's communications with Richmond ; for he says in a telegram 
 of the 14th, t" When I wrote on the 7th, I had an impression 
 that possibly, by an early movement, you could get shme advan- 
 tage, from the supposed facts that the enemy's communications were 
 disturbed, and that he was somewhat deranged in position." Gen- 
 eral Hooker had justly placed great reliance on his cavalry, as it 
 had been organized and drilled with extreme care, and had come to 
 possess real self-reliance and efficiency. 
 
 In the orders already noticed given to General Stoneman, who 
 comiflanded the cavalry corps in making the movement which was 
 commenced on the 13th of April, and which was arrested by the 
 rain, is found the substance of what was required of it when the 
 march was resumed two weeks later. It was to turn the position 
 on the enemy's left, and, coming in between 'the rebel army and 
 Richmond, isolate it from its supplies, check its retreat, and inflict 
 
 « " Conduct of the War," Part I., 1865, p. 186. 
 t" Conduct of the War," Part I., 1865, p. 150. 
 
72 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 upon it every possible injury which would tend to its discomfit- 
 ure and defeat. By the original instructions the entire cavalry 
 force of the army of the Potomac, bating one brigade, was to move 
 in a body to Culpepper, demolish Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry bri- 
 gade, understood to be stationed there, destroy the infantry guard 
 at Gordonsville, known to be insignificant, and then strike for the 
 Richmond and Acquia Railroad, which, being the shortest route 
 from Fredericksburg to Richmond, was Lee's main avenue of sup- 
 ply. From the 13th to the 27th Stoneman had remained on the 
 upper Rappahannock, where the storm and floods had left him. 
 On the latter day he had received notice from the commanding 
 general to be prepared to move on the contemplated raid on the 
 29th, but on the same day he, in company with his subordinate 
 commanders, was notified to meet a representative from head- 
 quarters at Morrisville, a point a little back from Kelly's ford, at 
 2 p. M. of the 28th, General Hooker went up in person, and gave 
 him additional written instructions, and such verbal directions and 
 exhortations as should inspire him with an earnest zeal in the under- 
 taking. By these supplemental instructions, the cavalry force, in- 
 stead of moving as one body, was divided into two columns. The 
 one under Stoneman's immediate command, consisting of Gregg's 
 division and Buford's brigade, of Pleasanton's division, was to 
 proceed direct for the Richmond and Acquia Railroad, and com- 
 mence its destruction at once, while the other, under Averell, w^s 
 to first operate against the rebel forces on the line of the Orange 
 and Alexandria railroad, a movement which was to serve as a mask 
 to the other column, and then turning south join Stoneman in his 
 work of destruction. The instructions respecting the purpose of 
 Averell's movements, and that he was to rejoin the main column, 
 were explicit ; even the point where it was recommended that they 
 should unite was suggested, " You are further directed," says the 
 order, " to determine on some point for the columns to unite, and it 
 is recommended that it be on the Pamunky and near that line," 
 Lest there might be some mistake or misapprehension as to the or- 
 ders, it was added : " You will please furnish the officers in com- 
 mand of these two columns with a copy of this and your original 
 instructions."* 
 
 * Testimony of General Hooker, " Conduct of War," 1865, Vol. I. p. 137. 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 73 
 
 The cooference at Morrisville did not break up till five o'clock 
 p. M. The instructions to General Stoneman required all his forces 
 to cross the Eappahannock that night, or if that should be impracti- 
 cable, it was imperative that all should be over by eight o'clock 
 A. M. of the 29th. Immediately on receiving his orders, Stoneman 
 proceeded to call in his command and commenced the passage. He 
 could find but one point where the river was fordable, aud it was 
 5 p. M., instead of 8 A. m., before* he was across. On the first 
 day out the column of General Averell had some artillery practice, 
 and some sharp skirmishing with the Thirteenth Virginia cavalry, 
 under Colonel Chambliss. At 10 P. M. of the 30th Stoneman 
 crossed the Eapidan at Raccoon ford, Buford having crossed be- 
 low and sent up a detachment on the south bank of the stream 
 which dispersed the rebel guard, capturing an officer and a few pri- 
 vates. At 2 A. M. of the 2d of May, Gregg arrived with his 
 command at Louisa Court-House, on the Virginia Central rail- 
 road, and by 10 A. m. the entire column with Stoneman had con- 
 centrated there. At this point the troops were set to work destroy- 
 ing the road itself, telegraph lines, bridges, water-tanks, and depots, 
 which was accomplished for a distance of eighteen miles, and the 
 bridges along the main highways leading to Richmond. During 
 the night of the 2d, Stoneman, having marched by the way of Yaucey- 
 ville, reached Thompson's cross-roads, where, having broken his 
 column into a number of detachments, he sent them out in all di- 
 rections to continue the work of devastation and create all possible 
 consternation. * " One party, the First New Jersey, under Colonel 
 Wyndham, was to strike the James river at Columbia, at the junc- 
 tion of the James and Rivana rivers, to destroy, if possible, the large 
 canal in the direction of Richmond, doing all the harm possible. 
 If thought expedient, a party was to be sent across the James river 
 to make a dash on the railroad bridge over the Appomattox. 
 Another party, the Second New York, was to push on to the rail- 
 road bridge over the Chickahominy, destroy it and the telegraph, 
 and operate in the direction of Richmond, which is only four miles 
 distant from the bridge. Another force. Twelfth Illinois cavalry. 
 Colonel Davis, was to strike the two railroads at or in the vicinity 
 * General Stoneman's Official Rep., MS. . 
 
74 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 of Ashland on the Fredericksburg, and A tier's on the Virginia Cen- 
 tral, and do all the harm it could. Another party, the First Maine, 
 and First Maryland, with a section of artillery, all under General 
 Gregg, was to follow down the South Anna river, destroy ail the 
 road bridges thereon, and, if possible, the two railroad bridges across 
 the river. Another party, the Fifth cavalry, under Captain Drum- 
 mond, was to follow this last, and see that the destruction was com- 
 plete. Captain Merritt, with a flying party of the First Maryland, 
 was sent out to do what he thought he could accomplish in the way 
 of destroying bridges." 
 
 These parties all got off by 3^ a. m. of the 3d, and were allowed 
 twelve hours to get to their several destinations, all to be ready to 
 strike in concert, so that information should not be conveyed by 
 telegraph, and opportunity be given for concentrating and guard- 
 ing the vulnerable points. Colonels Wyndhara, Kilpatrick and 
 Davis were directed either to return to the point of rendezvous, or 
 to push on to Yorktown or Gloucester point. The rest were ordered 
 to return. A company under Captain Harrison, of the Fifth regu- 
 lars, was sent to Shannon cross-roads, where it had an encounter with 
 a force of rebel cavalry, in which it suffered some loss in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners, before the main body under Buford could 
 come up, when the enemy made good his escape in the direction of 
 Charlottesville. Of the detachments which had been sent out. 
 Colonels Kilpatrick and Davis pushed on through to Gloucester point. 
 The rest all returned to the standard of Stoneman, who had, on the 
 morning of the 5th, moved to Yanceyville on the South Anna, 
 whence, having accomplished all that he felt capable of undertak- 
 ing, having heard nothing of Averell, who was expected to join 
 him, and his supplies running low, he determined to return again to 
 the Rappahannock, where he arrived and crossed on the 8th of May. 
 
 As has been already observed, Stoneman's entire cavalry force 
 had, by the supplemental orders received on the 28th at Morrisville, 
 been divided into two columns, of which Buford had command of 
 one, with which Stoneman himself moved and exercised the gen- 
 eral command, whose movements we have just considered, and 
 Averell had direction of the other. The latter's command com- 
 prised the brigades of B. F. Davis, Mcintosh, and Sargeant, and 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 75 
 
 Tidball's battery of six guns, in all about 3,400 sabres. This 
 column had been sent in the direction of Gordonsville and Culpepper 
 at the beginning of the expedition, for a diversion in favor of the 
 main column with Stoneman, and was to rejoin the latter as soon 
 as this diversion had accomplished its purpose. ' Soon after sepa- 
 rating, Averell received from Stoneman the following direction : 
 " *The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have 
 been delayed by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push 
 the enemy as vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, 
 and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan station. He 
 turns the enemy over to you." Interpreting this notice as a sort 
 of release from rejoining the main column, as directed by the posi- 
 tive and reiterated orders of General Hooker, he skirmished over 
 the field of the battle of the 17th of March, in which he easily 
 drove the enemy, passed Culpepper on the following day, moved 
 over the old battlefield of Cedar mountain of the previous year, 
 and -bivouacked at night at Rapidan station. A day was here 
 spent in fruitless attempts to force a passage of the river — the cavalry 
 of W. F. H. Lee holding the opposite bank. Abandoning the 
 attempt he marched at 6.30 A. M., of the 2d, for Ely's ford on the 
 Rapidan, where he arrived at 10.30 p. M. Here he reports hav- 
 ing had some slight skirmishing with the enemy; but here he re- 
 mained, for the most part inactive, during the night of the 2d, and 
 day of the 3d — the most trying and critical period of the battle of 
 Chancellors ville, the smoke of the field sweeping his nostrils, and 
 the echoes of the terrible fray saluting his ears. 
 
 Thus was this whole cavalry expedition, on the results of which 
 General Hooker and the authorities at Washington had built high 
 hopes, rendered almost wholly abortive. It was estimated by General 
 Hooker at the time, and subsequent disclosures prove his estimates 
 to have been under, rather than in excess of the reality, that either 
 of the two commands, into which Stoneman's force was divided, 
 outnumbered the entire rebel cavalry force between the Rappahan- 
 nock and the James.f Why then was the outcome of the expedi- 
 tion so barren of results ? A few facts will make plain the mys- 
 
 » " Conduct of the War," 1865, p. 139. 
 f Hotchkiss and Allan, p. 24. 
 
I 
 76 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 tery. General Hooker's instructions, as contained in his orders of 
 the 12th and 28th of April, could not have been made more ex- 
 plicit. In the former he had said : " You will march with all your 
 available force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the 
 enemy's position on his left, and of throwing your command be- 
 tween him and Richmond — isolating him from his supplies, check- 
 ing his retreat, and inflicting every possible injury," etc 
 
 " From there it is expected that you will be able to push forward 
 to the Acquia and Richmond railroad, somewhere in the vicinity of 
 
 Saxton's junction," etc "As the line of the railroad from 
 
 Acquia to Richmond presents the shortest one for the enemy to re- 
 tire on, it is more than probable he will avail himself of it, and the 
 usually travelled highways on each side of it, for this purpose ; in 
 which event, you will select the strongest positions, such as the 
 banks of streams and commanding heights, in order to check or pre- 
 vent it." . . . . " The general desires you to understand that he 
 considers the primary object of your movement the cutting of the 
 enemy's communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg 
 route, checking his retreat over those lines, and he wishes, to make 
 everything subservient to that object." . . . . " Bear in mind that 
 celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and espe- 
 cially is it the ease with the command you have, and the enterprise 
 on which you are about to embark," In the supplemental order 
 of the 28th, he says : " The operations of this column [Averell's] 
 to be considered as masking the column which is directed to move 
 by forced marches to strike and destroy the line of the Acquia and 
 Richmond railroad." .... "You are further directed to deter- 
 mine on your point for the columns to unite, and it is recommended 
 that it be on the Pamunkey, and near that line, as you will then be 
 in position with your full force to cut off the retreat of the enemy 
 by his shortest line." 
 
 Thus it will be seen that the whole burden of these instructions 
 was, " Get upon the line of the Acquia and Richmond railroad, 
 and break up and destroy the enemy's line of communications by 
 that route." To Stoneman he says this is " the primary object of 
 your movement," "push forward to the Acquia and Richmond 
 railroad," " move by forced marches to strike the Acquia and Rich- 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 77 
 
 mond railroad," " the columns to unite on the Pamunkey, as you 
 will then be in position with your full force to cut," etc. Indeed, 
 so anxious is the commanding general to impress upon the minds 
 of the leaders of his cavalry what the special thing is that he 
 wants them to do, that he iterates and reiterates it even at the 
 expense of good taste in the rhetorical style of his orders. 
 
 Any student of military history who reads these instructions and 
 asks himself, " what was the plain duty of Stonemau ? " can arrive at 
 no other conclusion than that he should have pushed for that line 
 of road, and without let or hindrance broken up and destroyed it, 
 and held every highway and defended every ridge to the last ex- 
 tremity, even if it had been at the utter sacrifice of his command. 
 
 But what are the facts? Did Stoneman go to this line of road at 
 all ? No ! Did he march as if he would go there ? No ! Was 
 he met by the enemy and cut to pieces, and thus prevented from 
 going there ? No ! He scarcely saw an armed man in his whole 
 expedition, going and coming, and suffered no loss. Why then did 
 he not obey his instructions, and march to that line of railway and 
 break it up ? Crossing the Eapidan at Eaccoon ford, he marched 
 to Louisa Court-House, to Yauceyville, to Thompson's cross-roads, 
 keeping on the line about midway between and as far away as pos- 
 sible from the lines of the Acquia and Eichmond, and the Orange 
 and Alexandria railways, the two roads on which troops would be 
 likely to be moving, and on which he might be expected to encoun- 
 ter opposition, contenting himself with destroying the line of the 
 Virginia Central railroad, a line running east and west off into 
 the Shenandoah valley, having no significance whatever as a line of 
 supply to the enemy's army, and not mentioned in the commanding 
 general's orders. At Thompson's cross-roads, which was the limit 
 of his advance, he fixed his headquarters, and breaking his column 
 up into fragments, so weak and insignificant as to have no power nor 
 capacity to successfully meet a foe, he sent them out in every con- 
 ceivable point of the compass, a part to destroy what they were not 
 sent to destroy, and when arrived at their destination found that 
 they had come unfurnished with the means* requisite to accomplish 
 
 * Colonel Wyndham, who had been sent " to destroy the large canal aqueduct over 
 the Bivanna," found on his arrival at the aqueduct that he had no blasting material 
 in hand with which to accomplish his purpose. 
 
78 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 the destruction which they desired to effect, or were too weak to 
 accomplish it, and a part were sent upon the Acquia line to break 
 it, or to cross it on their way to Gloucester point, whither they were 
 to rendezvous. By substantially the same route as he came, Stone- 
 man returned again to the starting-point upon the Rappahannock. 
 General Averell with his division did not even cross the Rapidan 
 in the execution of his part of ^ the breaking up of the Acquia rail- 
 way, losing sight entirely of Saxtofi's junction, and the railroad 
 crossing of the Pamunkey named in the commanding general's 
 orders, and recrossed the Rappahannock on the 4th of May at 
 United States ford, with a loss of one killed and four wounded. 
 
 But why did not these officers obey their instructions, and march 
 at once to the breaking up of the Acquia railroad, and the holding 
 it with a firm grip at all hazards ? Why should the leader of the 
 expedition refuse, or neglect to attempt to reach the point desig- 
 nated, and why content himself with destroying 'a road that did 
 not lead at all in the direction of the enemy's lines of supply, and 
 his second in command — invested with equal numbei's as his own — 
 manifest so little desire to join his chief in the grand purpose of 
 the raid? General Hooker, in his testimony on the "Conduct of 
 the War," puts a very mild construction upon their conduct. He 
 says : " *It is charitable to suppose that Generals Stoneman and 
 Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on 
 operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations." 
 But this is hardly a satisfactory explanation. 
 
 fGeneral Stoneman, in his official report, says : " The desire of 
 the commanding general that I should ' understand that he considers 
 the principal objects of your movement the cutting of the enemy's 
 connections with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking 
 his retreat over those lines [that line], and he wishes you to make 
 everything subservient to that object,' was fully carried out, as 
 not only the railroad bridges on the two railroads leading? out from 
 Richmond northward were destroyed, but all the road bridges 
 across the South Anna and several across the North Anna were 
 completely destroyed." But General Hooker testifies before tlie 
 committee: "One party, under General Kilpatrick, crossed the 
 
 * " Conduct of the War," 1865, p. 140. ' t MS. copy. 
 
THE HOSTS BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. 79 
 
 Acquia and Richmond railroad, and the fact that on the 5th the cars 
 carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Rich- 
 mond, will show to what extent the enemy's communications had 
 been interrupted. An examinati,on of the instructions General 
 Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his 
 operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a 
 greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accom-. 
 plished less in so doing."* 
 
 Respecting the progress which he expected the two columns to 
 make, General Hooker says: "From the place of crossing the 
 river, Kelley's ford, the infantry had about twenty-five miles to 
 march to Chancellorsville, and the cavalry between fifty and sixty 
 to their post on the Acquia and Richmond railroad. Hence I con- 
 cluded that they would reach their respective destinations about the 
 same time. The infantry, it will be remembered, reached Chancel- 
 lorsville at noon on the 30th of April ; the cavalry, without encoun- 
 tering any resistance deserving mention, not until the 3d and 4th 
 of May, and was disposed of in utter disregard of the spirit and 
 letter of their instructions in a manner to be of no service to us or 
 injury to the enemy." 
 
 Of the reason of this dilatoriness on the march and delay in 
 getting to the ground, which, by his own quoting of Hooker's 
 command cited above, he well understood to be the scene of opera- 
 tions, "which were the principal object of the movement," we can- 
 not well divine, but a single expression in his note to Averell may 
 furnish a clue. "The major-general commanding [Stoneman] 
 directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, etc., 
 and he desires you to push the enemy." The infantry forded the 
 Rapidan considerably below where the cavalry did and was not at 
 all delayed, either at the Germania, or Ely's ford. The " etc." in 
 this communication is ambiguous. It would seem as though he 
 ' was a little troubled to frame his excuse for being delayed, and 
 concluded to lump it under the general " etc." At all events that 
 " etc." is unfortunate. 
 
 For the seeming unwillingness of General Stoneman to go where 
 his orders required him to go, a clue is given by another paragraph 
 
 * " Conduct of the War," 1865, p. 140. 
 
80 1^'HE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 found in his official report. It will be remembered that General 
 Hooker in his orders had told him that he would be " likely to run 
 against Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry consisting of about 2,000 
 men," which he assured him was all the cavalry force that would 
 trouble him, and that his watchword should be " fight, and all his 
 orders fight, fight, fight." By turning to that part of General Stone- 
 man's report, which details his return, there will be found the follow- 
 ing frank statement : "After thinking the matter over [his return], 
 1 determined to send General Buford with 650 picked horses of his 
 brigade to threaten any force in the vicinity of Gordonsville, and 
 induce Lee and Hampton to believe that we were going to get out 
 by that way, and another force under Captain Rodenbaugh was 
 sent in the direction of Bowling Green, with the view of threaten- 
 ing the enemy's communications in that direction, and, under cover 
 of night with the main body, to take the middle road leading 
 through Tolersville, and crossing the North Anna near Victoria 
 iron works, from thence to Orange Springs, where all were to 
 rendezvous the next day. All our plans and calculations worked 
 admirably, and though we had no little difficulty in finding and 
 following the almost impassable roads, owing to the inky darkness 
 of the night and the incessant pouring of the rain, the whole com- 
 mand was assembled at Orange Springs at 12 M. of the 6th." 
 
 The purpose of General Stoneman was not then to seek the enemy 
 and fight, as his instructions required him to do, but the object of 
 his strategy was, how " to get out " without meeting an armed foe, 
 and to that end to steal away " under cover of night," by " the 
 middle road." In a communication to General Halleck and the 
 War Department of May 9th, General Hooker says :* " It is un- 
 necessary for me to add that this army will never be able to accom- 
 plish its mission under commanders who not only disregard their 
 instructions, but at the same time display so little zeal and devotion 
 in the performance of.their duties." 
 
 ♦Telegrams, " Conduct of the War," 1865, p. 231. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 A DAY OF MANCEUVEES. 
 
 I^ENERAL LEE had no sooner reached the Union 
 front at- Chancellorsville, than he pushed vigor- 
 ously up on all sides, till he had developed the 
 exact position and strength of General Hooker's 
 lines. Colonels Owen and Wickham, of the 
 cavalry, were sent out upon the right, the one 
 upon the river road, and the other upon the Old 
 Mountain, or Mine road, who found all firm 
 and strong upon that flank. In the immediate 
 front of Chancellorsville he was confonted by heavy intrenchments 
 crossing the turnpike and plank roads, well protected with abatis 
 and artillery advantageously posted to sweep all approaches.* Gen- 
 eral Stuart, with a portion of Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, was at the 
 Welford iron furnace, whither Wright's brigade was sent, and 
 where a brisk action was had at evening of the 1st, with the 
 skirmishers of Slocum's corps, which had been pushed out to meet 
 them. Wright sent for guns, but only to discover the Union line 
 strongly held by infantry and artillery. 
 
 By these demonstrations Lee was satisfied that the major part of 
 the Union army was concentrated in and about Chancellorsville, 
 and to undertake to attack at any point on his front, from Scott's 
 dam on the Rappahannock on his right, to Welford furnace on his 
 left, would entail immense slaughter, and probably end in defeat. 
 Like his own position at Fredericksburg, the power of numbers 
 and skill in attack would avail little against it. He accordingly 
 turned, for a solution of the difficult problem presented, to some 
 
 * General Lee's official report, see Appendix. 
 6 (81) 
 
82 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 means of flanking the position. His headquarters, on the night of 
 the 1st, were at the point where his own line crossed the plank 
 road. There, under the shadow of a pine tree, seated on some cast- 
 away cracker- boxes, General Jackson and himself discussed the 
 situation. There was apparently but one vulnerable point in the 
 Union lines, and that was the right. The right had no natural 
 defence like the left, as it rested in a' comparatively flat country on 
 the Germania ford road. This latter fact would be readily inferred, 
 as the distance to the Rapidan or the Rappahannock is too great 
 for the Union line to have reached to either. The two generals 
 had their maps spread out before them, on which they readily traced 
 the position of the Union army. General Jackson proposed to 
 take his whole corps present,* and, ' marching quite around the 
 whole Union front, plant himself on the flank and rear of the 
 Eleventh corps, where, if he were once drawn up unobserved, he 
 could strike that corps, and crumple it like a leaf in havoc's 
 hand. 
 
 But, in the meantime, what would be left to fight the Union 
 army, and keep it in position? Only the two divisions of the 
 First corps, Anderson's and McLaws'. But these were heavy and 
 efficient divisions, and were already well intrenched. Besides, Gen- 
 eral Jackson would nowhere be so far away from the Union line, 
 but that he could a4 any moment turn into position and move down 
 upon Hooker's front, should it become troublesome. There were 
 two circumstances which greatly favored this plan. It was well 
 known to the rebel leaders, that both the Union generals and the 
 Union government had anticipated that a raid by cavalry on the 
 rebel communications would cause the rebel army to retreat. The 
 later plans of Burnside had been based on that idea. Could the 
 impression prevail in the Union camp that Lee was in full retreat, 
 apprehension of an attack would be lulled, and preparations to meet 
 it circumvented. But the condition which most strongly favored 
 the manoeuvre was the nature of the country in which the two 
 armies were placed. On the open battle plains- of Europe it would 
 have been madness to have proposed thus to sever the two wings 
 of an army in the face of an opposing foe, and present each in turn 
 
 * General Lee's official report, see Appendix. 
 
A DAY OF MANmVVBES. 83 
 
 to be overwhelmed. But here was an impenetrable forest — the 
 "wilderness" indeed — where almost everything was screened 
 from view, and where it was next to impossible to make rapid 
 movements, and at the opportune moment, on which alone success 
 depends. Hence, a plan of operation, which, under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances, would have evinced an utter lack of sound military 
 policy, in the present position had a fair promise of success. It 
 was accordingly adopted, and Jackson withdrew his corps from the 
 front, McLaws taking the place of Jackson's troops upon the rebel 
 right and Anderson upon the left, and prepared for the march. 
 
 The night of the 1st was passed in both armies in comparative 
 quiet. At the Union headquarters lihe question was discussed, 
 whether to attack or await attack. The latter policy was adopted. 
 At a little past midnight, General Hooker telegraphed to General 
 Butterfield at Falmouth, " Direct for all bridges to be taken up at 
 Franklin's crossing and below, before daylight, and for Reynolds' 
 corps to march at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters." 
 Reynolds* received the order at 7 A. m., and immediately put two of 
 his divisions in motion for United States ford, by way of Bank's ford,, 
 having received an intimation that the latter ford might possibly be' 
 open. His other division, that of Wadsworth, which had crossed 
 the river and was still upon the Fredericksburg side, was withdrawn 
 to- the north bank, the enemy opening with his artillery upon the^ 
 bridge, and destroying one of the boats, while the division was in 
 motion. This fire was soon silenced by the Union artillery posted 
 on the opposite shore, the boat replaced, and the crossing completed,, 
 when Wadsworth followed the rest of the corps. At 6 p. m., at 
 about the hour when Jackson was opening his attack upon Howard, 
 General Reynolds reported in person at Chancellorsville, and re- 
 ceived orders to post his corps. 
 
 General Jackson was not in haste to commence his flanking move- 
 ment, waiting until the morning was well spent.f The most con- 
 
 * General Reynolds' official report, MS. copy. 
 
 t General Dole, who led on the march, passed Aldrich's tavern between 6 and 7 
 o'clock.— Dole's " Kep. Keb. Ree.," Vol. X., p. 279. 
 
 Note. In his report General Dole speaks twice in this connection of Todd's tavern. 
 
 He evidently means Aldrich's tavern, as Todd's tavern was it from five to seven miles 
 away by the nearest road, that it could be reached from the plank road and the post-, 
 tion Dole was in on the night of the 1st. , 
 
84 THE BATTLE OF OHANGECLOBSVILLE. 
 
 venient road for his column to move upon was one leading from 
 Aldrich's tavern, on the plank road, across Lewis creek to the fur- 
 nace road, and it presented the advantage of being screened from 
 view throughout its whole course. Moreover, Dole's brigade, 
 which led the column, had been encamped for the night in the 
 immediate vicinity of the tavern. But Jackson chose to take the 
 road which led along the rebel intrenchments to the Welford fur- 
 nace, with the evident purpose of protecting the rebel left as long 
 as any part of his corps was in supporting distance, and he may 
 have desired that his march should be observed, to strengthen the 
 impression in the Union army that a retreat was in progress. In- 
 deed, if we follow him on this march we cannot avoid the conclusion 
 that he very adroitly masked the flank movement, and made it 
 appear almost beyond question to be a retreat. There are a num- 
 ber of roads leading to the right, bearing across the Union front, 
 on which he might have moved, materially shortening his route, 
 and saving precious time, where he would have been equally 
 screened from view as upon the one ihe took. But, instead of tak- 
 ing them, he moved several miles in precisely the opposite direction 
 to that in which he needed to go. When, finally, he came to the 
 Brook road, apparently the last highway by which he could reach 
 his destination, instead of turning abruptly to the right and filing 
 on to it, he turned to the left and marched directly away towards 
 Todd's tavern. It is reported that scouts were sent off at this point, 
 who, entering the Union lines, testified that the head of the rebel 
 column had taken the direct road to Richmond. But Jacksou had 
 not proceeded more than half a mile before he wheeled to the right 
 on to a private road, which for about two miles runs nearly parallel 
 to the Brook road, into which it finally debouches within a mile 
 and a quarter of the Orange plank road. These views respecting 
 the design of General Jackson in taking the line of march he did 
 may be entirely fanciful, as they rest only upon inferential evi- 
 dence. Indeed the report was current at the time that Jacksoa 
 had decided on no definite route before starting, but inquired his 
 way of the inhabitants as he went. 
 
 General Jackson had no sooner got under way, than General Lee, 
 with the forces left to him, commenced a vigorous demonstration, 
 
A DAY OF MANCEVVMES. 85 
 
 beginning on his extreme right, and having the attacks taken up in 
 succession by his forces further to the left, until he had completely 
 compassed the whole Union front. These demonstrations in the 
 immediate vicinity of Chancellorsville were made with strength, 
 involving the use of infantry and artillery ; but further to the Union 
 right were less violent, and apparently with only cavalry and light 
 artillery. General "Warren, chief engineer of the Union army,- in 
 his report* says: "On the morning of Saturday, May 2d, the 
 enemy from the heights on our left opened his guns upon our 
 wagons iu the open field near Chancellorsville, but without much 
 effect, i He also made his appearance on the plank road near, and 
 our fire wounded a few men, who reported that they had missed the 
 road, and that they were marching toward our right. During the. 
 forenoon the enemy made several feints of attack by a sudden rush 
 upon our lines, seizing our advanced skirmishers, drawing our fire, 
 and getting the location of our line and its strength. These opera- 
 tions were repeated at intervals, gradually extending to our right." 
 General Sickles, in his testimony, says,t " There had been a little 
 skirmishing, as I supposed, and an occasional rattle of musketry 
 going along in the front, at different points, but no firing which 
 would indicate a serious engagement." General Pleasanton is even 
 more explicit.J " I had noticed in the morning that the enemy had 
 commenced on our line — that is, near Chancellorsville, and would 
 throw in a couple of regiments or so of troops, with a yell and a 
 volley ; there would be a little skirmishing, and then there would 
 be no more of it at that point. I then noticed that that would 
 occur at intervals still further to our right, as if a body of troops 
 was following us around. We were in a dense wood there. This 
 thing had attracted my attention early in the morning, and I was 
 noticing these different attacks; that they would throw in a body of 
 skirmishers, and if they found resistance from us they would go 
 somewhere else." 
 
 "The firing we heard," says General Schurz in his report, "all 
 along the line of the army during the day, seemed to indicate that 
 the enemy was feeling our front in its whole length. Toward 
 evening the enemy began to throw shells from two pieces placed op 
 
 ♦ "Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 57. flbid., p. 6. J Ibid., p. 28. 
 
;36 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 an open space in the woods opposite General Devens' left, but doing 
 
 no injury," 
 
 In the Union camp during that night of the 1st, and morning of 
 the 2d,there was no less anxiety and vigilance. General Warren 
 says,* " I was in favor of advancing ; " but has the candor to admit 
 that he "urged it with more zeal than convincing arguments/' 
 General Hooker strongly favored the awaiting the attack of the 
 enemy, and of contracting and strengthening the lines. Upon the 
 right he felt apprehensive, but Generals Slocum and Howard ex- 
 pressed themselves so confident of being able to hold their positions, 
 that he reluctantly yielded, and did not order their contraction a? 
 he had contemplated. General "Warren says,t "The general's 
 original determination to await the attack had in it also the design 
 to contract our line, and throw back the right to a better position, 
 our left being secure. On the assurance of the commanders on 
 the right that they were abundantly able to hold their position 
 against any force which the nature of the ground in their front 
 would enable the enemy to bring against them, and because 
 they thought to fall back would have some of the demoral- 
 izing influence of a retreat, it was decided to make no change 
 in the line, but to strengthen it with breastworks and abatis. 
 The sound of the axe broke the stillness along the lines of both 
 armies." 
 
 Nevertheless, early on the morning of the 2d, General Hooker 
 ordered both Generals Slocum and Howard to contract and corre- 
 spondingly strengthen their lines, and directed Geueral Sickles to 
 throw in one of his divisions upon the space thus vacated, which 
 resulted in pushing the enemy from the commanding ground about 
 Hazel grove, which proved on the following day of vital moment. 
 Ho also directed General Sickles to make a reconnoissance in front 
 ' and to the left of Chancellors ville. { " Two reliable regiments led 
 by circumspect and intrepid commanders," the Eleventh Massachu- 
 setts, Colonel Blaisdell, and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, Colonel 
 
 * Testimony,." Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 56. 
 t Eeport, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 56. 
 
 J.General Sickles' official report, MSS. ; also Adjutant-General's Kep. of Mass., 1863, 
 p. 592. 
 
A DAY OF MAN(EUVRES. 87 
 
 Tilghman, with a detachment of Berdan's sharpshooters, were sent 
 in the direction of Tabernacle church, on General Hancock's front, 
 and proceeded until checked by the enemy's intrenchments, where 
 they remained the whole day, bringing in some prisoners, and 
 closely watching the enemy's movements. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 1st, General Graham, with a battery of 
 light twelves, was sent to Dowdall's tavern to report to General How- 
 ard to strengthen the Eleventh corps. General Birney, to whose 
 division Graham belonged, says : " General Howard met General 
 Graham, and seemed surprised that he had been sent there ; stated 
 that his position was very strong, and the Eleventh corps fully able 
 to hold it. He told him to halt and not take position until he 
 (Major-General Howard) could advise with Major-General Hooker 
 of the situation of affairs. General Graham sent me word of this, 
 and soon after I received an order countermanding the previous one, 
 and Graham with brigade and battery rejoined the division at the 
 Chancellor house."!, General Sickles, on the, morning of the 1st, 
 noticing as he was crossing United States ford that it had no guard, 
 left Mott's brigade and Seeley's battery to hold it, and after massing 
 his corps near Chancellorsville directed Whipple to connect by out- 
 posts with Mott on the right, and with Graham, who had been 
 ordered to Dowdall's tavern, on his left, thus making the circuit 
 of the army complete. But, subsequently, when the army resumed 
 
 *" Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 34. 
 
 t The conversation between Howard and Graham, as reported by an aide-de-camp 
 of the latter, was given in an article contributed to " Onward " for December, 1869 : 
 " Howard met Graham halfway from Chancellorsville to Dowdall's tavern. ' Where 
 are you going ? ' Howard asked Graham. ' To Dowdall's tavern.' ' Perhaps you 
 mean Todd's tavern ? ' ' No, Dowdall's.' ' That cannot be ; there must be some mis- 
 take about this. My [Howard's] headquarters are there.' ' I do not know anything 
 -about that,' replied Graham ; ' such are my orders. Perhaps they are afraid of an 
 attack, and I am sent to support you.' ' That cannot be,' replied Howard. ' I would 
 send my compliments to th^ whole rebel army, and invite them to attack me in my 
 present position ; and if it was not out of compliment to General Sickles, I would 
 order you back.' To this Graham, having observed that he 'would not be justified 
 in obeying such an order,' turned to Briscoe, of Birney's staff, and said to him : 
 ' There seems to be some misunderstanding here ; you had better go back with 
 Ballard, his aid, to General Birney and find out.' Graham then proceeded to Dow- 
 dall's tavern, where he found General Carl Schurz and a number of officers of the 
 Eleventh corps ; while Howard kept on to Chancellorsville to see General Hooker." 
 
88 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOMSVIjLXE. 
 
 its position at Chancellorsville, these dispositions for guarding 
 .the rear were abandoned and the divisions of Sickles' corps were 
 called in. 
 
 General Hooker, ever vigilant, early on the morning of the 2d, 
 rode along his entire line, examining the position of his troops, and 
 their readiness for receiving thfe enemy. He was accompanied upon 
 the right by General Sickles, who now commanded the old corps of 
 General Hooker, which was posted upon that wing. In some places 
 the dispositions were not satisfactory, and General Hooker sug- 
 gested some changes, which were promptly made. In Jthe main 
 the posting of the troops and their defensive works for meeting a 
 front attack — and he had no intimation at that time of there being 
 any other — seemed judicious, and were approved. On this tour of 
 pspection General Hooker was everywhere received with the 
 warmest enthusiasm, clearly showing that the army reposed implicit 
 confidence in him. General Sickles says, in his official report: 
 " It is impossible to pass over without mentioning the irrepressible 
 enthusiasm of the troops for Major-General Hooker, which was 
 evinced in hearty and prolonged cheers, as he rode along the lines 
 of the Third, Eleventh, and' Twelfth corps." 
 
 At a little past 9 o'clock, on the morning of the 2d, General 
 Hooker, having completed his inspection of the lines and returned 
 to his headquarters, found awaiting him couriers from General 
 Birney, who had fortunately that morning established himself on 
 the commanding ground about Hazel grove, informing him that a 
 column of the enemy was visible moving continuously across Gen- 
 eral Birney's front towards the right, accompanied by trains, guns 
 and ambulances, and had been so moving since 8 o'clock. This 
 was the head of Jackson's corps, which had by this time reached 
 the point on the flanking march, where the road he was following 
 crosses Lewis' creek, and winds up the hill on the opposite bank 
 over clear ground. This intelligence put an entirely new phase on 
 the aspect of afiairs, and impressed General Hooker with the deepest 
 solicitude. He immediately dictated the following despatch, dated 
 at 9.30 A. M., to Generals Slocum and Howard : " I am directed by 
 the major-general commanding to say that the disposition you have 
 made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the 
 
A BAY OF MANCEVVRES. 89 
 
 enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes 
 you to examine the ground and determine upon the position you 
 will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him 
 in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have 
 heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right 
 of-your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial 
 defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to 
 be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general's opinion^ 
 as favorably posted as might be. We have good reason to suppose 
 that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your 
 pickets, for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order 
 to obtain timely information of their approach." 
 
 It should be observed that, although this notice was addressed to 
 Generals Slocum and Howard, it could have little application to the 
 former, as he was now separated from the latter by the intervention 
 of General Sickles' corps, and General Slocum was already well 
 intrenched and in the proper position for meeting an attack. But 
 it could not have been framed in more explicit or pointed terms 
 to apprise General Howard of the falsity of his position for meeting 
 a flank attack, and of the importance of throwing up works, having 
 heavy reserves in hand, and pushing pickets far out upon his 
 front. It is difficult to conceive how what actually occurred some 
 nine hours later could have been more completely foretold, and 
 the preparations needed to meet the emergency more fully 
 pointed out. It should be remembered that when General 
 Hooker visited the lines in the morning, and expressed himself 
 satisfied with the position of Howard's corps, it was before any 
 intimation had been received that the enemy had a purpose to turn 
 his right flank. But now, having been apprised that the rebel 
 legions were on the move, he instantly grasped the situation, and 
 saw clearly that Howard was in no condition to withstand a flank 
 attack. 
 
 It is evident, too, that the Eleventh corps was thoroughly 
 apprised of Jackson's movement, and General Hooker was ex- 
 plicitly informed that preparations were in progress to meet the 
 threatened advance. For General Howard sent a despatch, dated 
 May 2d, 10 A. M. to 11 o'clock, at headquarters of the Eleventh, 
 
90 THE BATTLE OF CHANCE LLORSVILLE. 
 
 corps, to General Hooker, in these words : *" From General Devens' 
 headquarters we can observe a column of infantry moving westward 
 on a road parallel with this on a ridge about one and a half to two 
 miles south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from 
 the west." "With this assurance General Hooker felt reliance that 
 the necessary measures were being taken to make a stout resistance. 
 Portions of the Second and Third corps were drawn up and held 
 in reserve near Chancellorsville, in readiness to be thrown in any 
 direction as emergencies might demand. 
 
 A further evidence that General Hooker fully comprehended the 
 significance of this movement of Jackson, will be found in the dis- 
 position which was made of Williams' division of the Twelfth corps, 
 which was posted on a line at right angles to the plank road, look- 
 ing westward, upon a ridge a mile and a half from Chancellorsville, 
 "Williams' left connecting with the right of Geary, and his right ex- 
 tending in the direction of United States ford. This position was 
 fortified^ and constituted a second interior line in exactly the posi- 
 tion required to check an attack of the enemy on Howard's right 
 flank, should Howard be unable to meet it. This order quoted 
 above, sent to General Howard at 9.30 a. m., and this fortified 
 position in which he had put General Williams, is a sufficient answer 
 to any imputation upon the commander of the Union forces that he 
 believed the rebel army retreating, and was taken unawares by the 
 movement of Jackson. The te'legram sent to Sedgwick, " We know 
 that the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles' 
 divisions are among them," is quoted as evidence that Hooker mis- 
 conceived the purpose of Jackson. But his testimonyf before the 
 committee of Congress discloses his purpose in sending the message. 
 He was desirous of hastening the movements of Sedgwick, and sent 
 this despatch immediately on its receipt from Sickles, though he 
 distrusted its accuracy. General Hooker says : "At the time this 
 news was received by me I was of the impression that the general 
 was mistaken, but nevertheless felt that no harm could follow from 
 its transmission to General Sedgwick." 
 
 * Original copy. This despatch is written in pencil on a half sheet of commercial 
 note paper, crumpled and stained, and the words, " Respectfully, O. O. Howard, 
 Major-General," are in General Howard's own hand. 
 
 t " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 147. 
 
A DAY OF MANCEUVSES. 91 
 
 The position which General Howard occupied was a good one to 
 meet either a front or a flank attack, there being several command- 
 ing ridges running at right angles to the plank road, where 
 resolute stands could have been made, and the ground looking 
 southward, where the line of defences along the plank road had 
 been thrown up, was also good for meeting an advance from that 
 direction. 
 
 General Sickles had no sooner been informed of the passage of 
 this column of the enemy at the furnace, than he hastened to the 
 point of observation on General Birney's front, and directed that 
 officer to open upon the moving troops with artillery. Clark's 
 rifled guns* were immediately placed in position, and by a few 
 well-directed shots compelled Jackson's infantry to take to the 
 woods, thus disappearing from view, and the artillery and trains to 
 hasten on in great confusion. This continuous column, consisting 
 of all arms, had been observed for nearly three hours, showing 
 that it was a movement in force, either in retreat or for a flank 
 attack on the right. General Sickles says, in his testimony : " The 
 direction which the enemy's column took, judging from what in- 
 formation we had of the country, and from the maps we had, was 
 susceptible of two interpretations. It was, perhaps, a movement in 
 retreat ; for they had a large train with them, a great many wagons, 
 and all arms, except cavalry, were in large force." General Sickles 
 immediately communicated the intelligence of these movements to 
 the general-in-chief, and also to Generals Howard and Slocum, and 
 received orders to advance cautiously with a sufficient force to ascer- 
 tain the significance of the movement, and if possible sever the two 
 wings of the rebel army. 
 
 When General Jackson, who moved at the head of his column, 
 had arrived at this point in the morning, he posted the Twenty- 
 third Georgia regiment. Colonel Best, on the road leading up to 
 Hazel grove, to guard the approaches to the road on which his corps 
 was passing, and, subsequently, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown placed 
 a battery in position to meet a threatened advance of Union troops. 
 
 * This battery of rifled guns, it may be observed in passing, was the one which 
 opened the battle of Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d of July, when the column 
 of Longstreet, moving to flank the Union left, was first observed. 
 
92 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 \ 
 
 General Lee also sent Posey's and Wright's brigades of Anderson's 
 division to this point, which were posted at right angles to the road 
 on which Jackson's corps was passing and facing Lewis' creek ; and 
 the brigades of Archer and Thomas of Hill's division — the rear of 
 Jackson's column — seeing that there was likely to be trouble, were 
 turned back and went ihto position on the opposite side of Lewis' 
 run in support of the guns of Browrl. 
 
 Sickles had no sooner received orders to move than he put Birney's 
 division in motion with two battalions of Berdan's sharpshooters 
 thrown forward as skirmishers, and accompanied by Livingstone's 
 and Randolph's batteries. Realizing that he would be likely to 
 meet serious opposition at so vital a point in the rebel lines, Sickles 
 was directed by General Hooker to call on the commanders of the 
 Eleventh and Twelfth corps for supports, which he did, and Bar- 
 low's brigade of Steinwehr's division was sent by General Howard, 
 which advanced in support of Birney's right, and Williams' divi- 
 sion by General Slocum, which formed on Birney's left, and at the 
 same time Whipple's division of the Third corps was brought up in 
 support. Sickles was thus prepared to make a strong attack. Some 
 time was consumed, however, in making the advance,* streams and 
 swampy places requiring to be bridged for the passage of the artillery. 
 On nearing the iron foundry Birney was checked by the opening of 
 a battery of the enemy at short range in position near Welford's 
 house. Livingstone immediately replied, quickly silencing the 
 rebel guns. The prospect of now completely severing the enemy's 
 lines and roUing up his wings in detail seemed good. A turning 
 movement upon Lee's left was entrusted to General Williams. He 
 says, in his official report ; " My division was ordered to make a 
 detour to the left and front, move out two or three miles through 
 the woods, so as to strike the enemy's rifle-pits, and other temporary 
 works of the enemy, on the flank and rear, and then sweep both 
 sides of the plank road toward Chancellorsville." This was a most 
 admirably planned movement for ctushing in the left flank of the 
 wing remaining with General Lee. Connecting with Whipple on 
 the right, and Whipple with Birney still further to the right, with 
 the First and Third brigades, Knipe's and Ruger's, in advance, 
 
 * See motto of title page. 
 
A DAY OF MANCEUVMKS. 93 
 
 closely supported by Ross of the Second, the division swept for- 
 ward, rapidly penetrating the dense evergreen thickets, its left 
 amply protected by the well-fortified division of Geary. Knipe 
 had already opened a brisk fire upon the enemy, driving them 
 before hira, and Birney in making a simultaneous advance had cap- 
 tured the Twenty-third Georgia regiment, and was making pris- 
 oners from Anderson's division, and Pleasanton, with three regi- 
 ments of cavalry, who had been ordered up by General Hooker to 
 join in the movement, was in readiness on the, open ground above 
 the run to charge, when the whole movement was arrested by a 
 sudden disaster to the Eleventh corps. 
 
 When General Jackson, in his long flanking movement, had 
 reached the Orange plank road, at three o'clock in the afternoouj 
 h€ halted the head of his column to reconnoitre. Here he came up 
 with the cavalry of Fitz Hugh Lee, which had been skirmishing 
 along the Union front, and had ascertained the exact position occu- 
 pied by the ]Jnion right.* Fitz Lee was at this moment engaging 
 the pickets, and Colquitt's brigade was placed in ambush along the 
 road in hope of entrapping Howard's forces, which were reconnoi- 
 tring in front and expected to advance. 
 
 At this point there is an eminence which commanded a full view 
 of the whole Union position, and from this General Jackson in- 
 tently examined every peculiarity of ground, and formation of* 
 troops. He decided, after careful consideration, not to make his 
 attack here, but to pursue his flanking movement still further. He 
 accordingly rnoved on until he had reached the Germania ford road, 
 or turnpike leading to Orange Court-House, a little to the east of- 
 the Old Wilderness tavera. As the head of his column debouched 
 into this road, it moved on it in the direction of Chancellorsville a 
 half mile or more, until it reached the open ground at Luckett's, 
 when he formed in three lines of battle nearly at right angles to the 
 plank road, half of each line on either side of it, Rodes' division in 
 fi-ont, Colston's next, and A. P. Hill's in rear, each line presenting a 
 front of nearly two miles and about 200 yards apart, with skirmishers 
 400 yards in advance. As he had now brought his corps close in 
 
 upon the Union lines it was necessary that extreme caution should 
 
 1 ■ 
 
 * Colquitt's and Rodes' reports. 
 
94 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORISVlhL,E. 
 
 be exercised so as not to excite attention. Directions were given 
 that all orders should be delivered in a subdued tone, that loud 
 talking be prohibited, and that no cheering be indulged in as the 
 general moved along the lines. After getting into position the 
 troops were allowed nearly two hours for rest and refreshment, 
 having arrived upon the ground at half-past three to four* 
 o'clock. 
 
 Such was the position in which General Jackson's corps stood, at 
 6 o'clock, on the evening of the 2di, with every preparation made 
 which skill and forethought could devise for a sudden and terrible 
 onset. The flying artillery had kept pace with the head of the 
 column and was placed in the front line ready to open. In what 
 condition was the Union right for receiving such a blow ? The 
 Eleventh corps, in a line nearly a mile and a quarter in length, was 
 resting parallel with, and in some parts, upon the road leading from 
 Chancellorsville to Germania ford, and was, consequently, at right 
 angles to the formation of Jackson, and ready to be stricken upon 
 end. The extreme right of the corps was slightly refused. At the 
 head of an open field, upon a road leading up from Hawkins' 
 house, and terminating at the wood, was the Fifty-fourth New 
 York in reserve. From a point somewhat in advance of this open 
 field, extending in a line slightly curving outward through wood 
 tod partially cleared fields to the Germania road, was the One 
 Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania, a green regiment, which 
 had never been in battle before, in formation more as a close line 
 of skirmishers, than a regular line of battle, the men being ordered 
 to stand three feet apart. Turning to the left in the direction of 
 Chancellorsville, nearly at a right angle on striking the flank, there 
 was posted upon the road two pieces of artillery, and in succession 
 the Forty-fifth and Forty-first New York facing southward, with 
 the Seventy-fifth Ohio in reserve on the north of the road. These 
 constituted the brigade of General Von Gilsa, the first of the First 
 division, General Devens commanding. Extending on towards the 
 left were in succession the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-seventh Ohio, 
 and the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Connecticut, and Diekmann's- 
 battery in line, and the Fifty-fifth Ohio in reserve, which formed the 
 
 * Bodes' and Doles' reports. 
 
A DAY OF MANCEUVRES. 95 
 
 Second brigade, General McLean commanding. General Schurz's 
 division, the Third, stood next, with the Seventy-fourth Pennsyl- 
 vania, Sixty-first Ohio, and Sixty-third New York in line, and the 
 One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York and Eighty-second 
 Illinois in reserve, which constituted General Schemmelfinnig's 
 brigade, the First, and the One Hundred and Nineteenth New 
 York, Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, and Dilger's battery deployed, 
 and the Eighty-second Ohio, Fifty-eighth New York, and Twenty- 
 sixth Wisconsin in reserve, forming Colonel Kryzanouskig's brigade, 
 the Second. Finally was the First brigade of General Von Stein- 
 wehr's division, the Second, commanded by General Buschbeck, 
 having the Twenty-ninth New York and the Seventy-third and 
 Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania and four guns of Weiderick's battery 
 deployed, aud the One Hundred and Fifty-fourth New York with 
 the remaining artillery of the corps in reserve. A company of 
 cavalry also operated upon this wing. General Barlow's brigade, 
 as will be remembered, had been sent to the support of General 
 Sickles at the furnace. Here, then, the extreme left of the divi- 
 sion rested a little to the left of Dowdall's tavern, where General 
 Howard had his headquarters. The line thus occupied was in- 
 trenched, the works facing southward along the Chancellorsville 
 and Germania ford road, with skirmishers thrown out. It will 
 be seen that the formation was to meet an attack coming from 
 the south, and was in no condition to withstand a blow from 
 the west, the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania regi- 
 ment being the only force in line facing west, and that drawn 
 out in a thin formation,, but recently recruited, and untried in 
 battle. 
 
 When the order issued by General Hooker at half-past nine on 
 . the morning of the 2d, informing General Howard of the move- 
 ment of the enemy to turn the right flank of the army, stating that 
 his corps was all out of position to meet a foe from that direction, 
 and requiring him to make the necessary changes of position to 
 meet the enemy from the new direction in which they were now ex- 
 pected to come. General Schurz happened to be at the headquarters 
 of General Howard. General Howard complained of being tired, 
 and asked General Schurz, as being next him in command, to open 
 
96 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. 
 
 any dispatches that might come, while he went to lie down to take 
 a little rest, directing that he should be awakened in case there were 
 any of immediate importance. Shortly afterward a courier arrived, 
 bringing General Hooker's dispatch, above recited. General Schurz 
 immediately took it to General Howard and read it to him, and 
 while the two were speaking about it, a second courier, or a young 
 staff officer, arrived from General Hooker with a second dispatch 
 of virtually the same purport. General Howard arose and the two 
 officers went out upon the porch of the house, where they discussed 
 the matter. General Schurz was of the opinion* that General 
 Deveus' division, as well as his own, should be withdrawn from the 
 positions they then occupied, and be formed on the open space on 
 which they then were, and in the adjoining woods at right angles 
 with the Chancellorsville road, so as to present a good front to the 
 attack threatened by Jackson's movement, keeping a strong reserve 
 well in hand. But General Howard insisted that his right flank 
 was sufficiently protected by the two regiments of General Devens' 
 division, which had been formed at right angles with his line of battle. 
 He added that General Hooker had inspected the position of the 
 Eleventh corps that morning, and found it good, referring to the 
 ride of the general-in-chief along the line in company with Gen- 
 eral Sickles, not considering that when General Hooker made that 
 inspection he knew nothing of the flank movement of Jackson, 
 not having been apprised of that feet until he had completed 
 the whole tour of inspection and returned to his headquarters. 
 General Schurz, however, was so impressed with the im.portance 
 of an entirely different formation to meet the altered prospect 
 of attack, that he, on returning to his own division, on his own 
 responsibilityt withdrew all his regiments which stood in the 
 second line from their position, and formed them on the open 
 ground on the north of the plank road, with their front to the 
 west. 
 
 During the afternoon great clouds of dust could be seen to the 
 south of General Howard's front, betokening the movement of a 
 heavy column to the west, which was reported to General Howard ; 
 
 * General Schuri's official report, p. 12, MS. f Ibid., p. 13, MS. 
 
A DAY OF MANCEUVRES. 97 
 
 but he returned the answer that the enemy was retreating. This 
 idea of a retreat was distrusted by General Schemmelfinnig, who 
 had reported the observation of the dust, and he was directed by 
 General Schurz to make a reconnoissance to ascertain what was in 
 front. One hundred gicked men were detached for this purpose, 
 and advanced south on a road intersecting the plank at right angles, 
 under command of Captain Von Fitsh, aid to General Schemmel- 
 finnig, and proceeded out a mile and a half, where the enemy was 
 found in force and where the detachment was fired upon, but re- 
 tired, and communicated the intelligence to corps headquarters. 
 Not satisfied to remain inactive when the fate of the corps might be 
 in danger, later iu the afternoon General Schemmelfinnig was again 
 ordered to make a reconnoissance. Putting the Seventy-fourth 
 Pennsylvania regiment in motion it was moved out until it came 
 upon the enemy iu great force. This is doubtless the party referred 
 to previously, which a brigade of the enemy was placed in ambush 
 to entrap, when the head of Jackson's column had reached the 
 Orange plank road. Major G. Schleiter, Adjutant-General to Gen- 
 eral Schemmelfinnig, was ordered by the latter to ride with all speed 
 to General Howard's headquarters and inform him of the facts. " I 
 nearly killed my horse," says Major Schleiter, "in riding to inform 
 General Howard of the fact that the enemy was massing troops on 
 our right flank, and was received with an incredulous smile, and 
 directed to tell General Schemmelfinnig to stop reconnoitring, and 
 remain in the position assigned to him. This was two hours before 
 the attack was made."* 
 
 The brigade of General Barlow was ordered away at about 4 
 p. M., and Generals Howard and Steinwehr both accompanied the 
 i)rigade to its position on General Sickles' right. General Howard 
 .soon returned to his headquarters, and at 5 o'clock, in company 
 with General Schurz, rode to the extreme right of the line, during 
 which the precarious situation of the corps was earnestly discussed ; 
 but General Howard firmly adhered to his first opinion that it was 
 unnecessary to change the position of the troops.f Major Frueauff, 
 of the One Hundred and Fifty-third Pennsylvania, who was serv- 
 
 » " History of Pennsylvania Volunteers," Vol. II., p. 895. 
 t Reports of General Schurz, MSS. 
 7 
 
98 , THE BATTLE. OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 ing on the staif of General Devens, states that two scouts from an 
 Ohio regiment reported in his presence, an hour before the firing 
 commenced, to General Howard, while riding along the line, and 
 when to the right of General Devens' headquarters, that the rebels 
 were massed, and had stacked arms in an open field fronting the 
 Union lines, and were taking refreshments ; that General Howard 
 discredited the report, and said that the enemy were retreating. 
 * "About the middle of the afternoon," says General Devens, " a 
 company of cavalry tried to go upon the road along which I was 
 posted, and was forced back by the enemy. At about the same 
 time two soldiers went out in front of our lines intending to repre- 
 sent themselves as deserters, if seized by the enemy. They came 
 in and reported to me that the enemy were massing in good force 
 upon the road. They were instantly sent to General Howard in 
 charge of an aid. This was probably earlier rather than later than 
 the middle of the afternoon." 
 
 General Schurz says, in his report : " Meanwhile we heard 
 General Sickles' artillery, but the firing did not continue long, so 
 that it seemed as if the attack on the flank and rear of that column 
 of the enemy, which we had seen marching towards our left, had 
 been checked or given up. It was between 3 and 4 p. M. when 
 the section of artillery attached to General Von Gilsa's brigade 
 gave two discharges, followed by a short musketry fire. We 
 hastened to the front and received the report that only a few 
 rebel cavalrymen had shown themselves on the old turnpike, 
 and that the artillery had fired without orders. All became 
 quiet again. I ordered General Schemmelfinnig to push another 
 reconnoissahce up the plank road. The instructions he received 
 from [corps] headquarters were to the efiect that he should avoid 
 eyerything that might bring on an engagement. The reconnoi- 
 tring party returned after some time with the report that they 
 had heard the yells and shouts of a large number of men behind 
 the enemy's line of skirmishers." 
 
 It is thus clear, that," to the general officers of this corps, it was 
 reported that the enemy in force were in position for a powerful 
 attack. Whether the report was fully accredited is still in ques- 
 
 * " History, of Pennsylvania Volunteers," Vol. IV., p. 774. 
 
A DAY OF MANOEUVRES. 
 
 99 
 
 tiou. It would appear from a clause in General Howard's report, 
 that he, at least, was under the conviction that the enemy were 
 retreating. " During Saturday, the 2d, the same General [Schem- 
 raelfinnig] made frequent reconnoissances. Infantry scouts and 
 cavalry patrols were constantly pushed out on every road. The 
 unvarying report was ' the enemy is crossing the plank road 
 and moving towards Culpepper.'" 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE CEISIS OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 I T a quarter past five,* on the evening of the 2d of 
 May, having made every preparation, and ordered 
 the commanders of brigades in the rear line to 
 go to the assistance of the line in advance, when 
 called upon, without waiting to refer the applica- 
 tion to division commanders, General Jackson 
 gave the word for his army to advance. The 
 signal was communicated by the sound of the 
 bugle,t and the moment the advance came upon 
 the Union front a tremendous crash of musketry awakened the 
 echoes of the forest, and two pieces of Stuart's horse artillery, which 
 accompanied the first line, threw shells in rapid succession, com- 
 pletely enfilading the main line of battle of General Devens alotig 
 the Germania road. The men were at rest sitting upon their knap- 
 sacks, their guns stacked, when the sudden crash of battle came. 
 The first shell killed the major of a New York regiment and 
 wounded several, and the rapid whirring of other shells alike de- 
 structive, aroused all to a sense of their peril. A volley was poured 
 in from the weak advanced line in reply, and a rapid fire was con- 
 tinued: But the cannoniers of the two pieces of Devens' artillery 
 on the road fled at the first discharge, and the regiments to left and 
 right being out of position could make no defence and fled likewise, 
 when, both wings having been turned,J the One Hundred and 
 Fifty-third Pennsylvania was forced to give way and retired rapidly. 
 
 * Doles says &.15 o'clock ; Eodes 5.—" Eeb. Reo.," Vol. X., pp. 279-300. 
 t" Reb. Eec," Vol. VI., p. 590. t Ibid. 
 
 (100) 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. 101 
 
 General Doles was in the front line of Jackson's forces, and his 
 brigade was so formed upon the right centre as to first strike the 
 Union front. He says : * " The brigade moved as rapidly as pos- 
 sible through a very thick wood, and skirmishers were immediately 
 engaged by those of the enemy. Our forces, marching rapidly for- 
 ward, assisted in driving in the enemy's sharpshooters, where we 
 were subjected to a very heavy musketry fire, and grape, canister, 
 and shell." Being somewhat checked by this fire, General Rodes 
 called on Colonel Warren of the second line to come to his assist- 
 ance, and both Jones and Warren pushed forward their brigades 
 into the first line. It had been anticipated that some difficulty 
 would be encountered at the open and commanding position at 
 Tally's house. " Each brigade commander," fsays General Rodes, 
 "received positive instructions, which were well understood. The 
 whole line was to push ahead, keeping the road for its guide. The 
 position at Tally's house was to be carried at all hazards, as, from 
 the best information that could be obtained, it commanded the 
 second position of the enemy at Melzie Chancellor's house. After 
 taking the heights at Tally's, if the enemy showed a determined 
 front on the next ridge, my men were to be sheltered until our 
 artillery could come up and dislodge them. Under no other cir- 
 cumstances was there to be any pause in the advance." But the 
 advance of Jackson's troops yras so sudden and unexpected, and the 
 Union troops were so out of position, that it was impossible for 
 them to change front and make any considerable stand on the com- 
 manding ground at Tally's. At a point near the Wilderness 
 church is a little eminence, where Melzie Chancellor has since 
 erected a house, on which the regiments faced to the west by Gen- 
 eral Schurz, took their stand, and made some resistance. This was 
 another favorable position, and, had intrench ments been thrown 
 up, a stout defense could have been made; but having scarcely 
 any preparation for holding it, it had likewise to be speedily 
 abandoned. 
 
 But the best position for checking Jackson's advance, on this 
 whole field occupied by the Eleventh corps, was at Melzie Chan- 
 cellor's, or Dowdall's tavern. Here was commanding ground, and 
 
 * " fieb. Rec," Vol. X., p. 279. t Ibid., p. 301. 
 
102 ffi? BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 a long stretch of cleared fields in front, over which Jackson was 
 obliged to advance, would have given the Union troops an oppor- 
 tunity rarely presented on any field of battle, to have swept the 
 enemy's advancing columns with both infantry and artillery, and 
 carried swift destruction to his ranks. , With good troops that posi- 
 tion could never have been taken by direct advance. And here a 
 fair stand was made. An irregular line of rifle pits had been 
 thrown up, stretching out in a northerly direction across the fields, 
 conforming to the irregularities of ground, facing to the west. Behind 
 this Schemmelfinnig's brigade took position, and a few of the troops 
 of Devens' division joined him. Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's 
 division, which had been posted on the south of the plank, by taking 
 the opposite side of their intrenchments, could deliver an effective 
 flank fire, as the enemy in dense masses came madly on.* Dilger's 
 battery was likewise brought into position for delivering a flanking 
 fire. For the space of an hourf these troops, unheeding the wild 
 race of a portion of the corps as it broke frantically over them in 
 its flight to the rear, made a stubborn and most destructive fight. 
 " It was," says General Schemmelfinnig, " the second line of your 
 division, which changed front from south to west in less than two 
 minutes time, and the brigade battery, commanded by Captain 
 Dilger, on the left, which checked the heavy column of the enemy 
 
 pouring into us from the front, and from both flanks Your 
 
 two brigades, and that of General Buschbeck, together comprising 
 not quite four thousand muskets, alone received the entire shock 
 of the battle, and held the enemy in check for at least an hour." 
 General Doles,|: who was in the front line of Jackson's force, says : 
 " We pursued his retreating forces about three hundred yards over an 
 open field, receiving a very severe fire from musketry and a battery 
 of four pieces on the crest of the hill, that commanded the field 
 below; his infantry was in large force, and well protected by rifle 
 pits and intrenchments." 
 
 It was in carrying this position that Colston's division, which 
 formed Jackson's second line, was brought up throughout its entire 
 
 * General Howard's ofiScial report, MS. ' 
 t " Eeb. Rec," Vol. VI., p. 589. 
 t "Eeb. Rec," Vol. X., p. 279. 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. , IQH 
 
 length to the support of the first, and the two divisions liencefor- 
 ward went on as one. Presenting thus a vastly outnumbering 
 force, and outflanliing the Union front by a long sweep on either 
 flank, it was not in the power of men, however resolute, long to 
 stand up against it. But the soldiers of Buschbeck and Schemmel- 
 finnig, though pushed by overwhelming battle-lines from their po- 
 sition, were in no haste to retire, and withdrew with their faces to 
 the foe. * " The attack of the enemy," says General Stein wehr, " was 
 very powerful. They emerged in close columns from the woods, and 
 had thrown the first and second divisions, who retired toward 
 Chancellorsville, in great confusion. Colonel Buschbeck Succeeded 
 to check the progress of the enemy, and I directed him to hold his 
 position as long as possible. The men fought with great determi- 
 nation and courage. Soon, however, the enemy gained both wings 
 of the. brigade, and the enfilading fire which was now opened upon 
 his small force, and which killed and wounded nearly one-third of 
 its whole strength, soon forced them to retire. Colonel Buschbeck 
 then withdrew his small brigade in perfect order toward the woods, 
 the enemy closely pressing on. Twice he halted, fired a round, and 
 at last reached the rear of General Sickles' corps, which had been 
 drawn up in position near Chancellorsville. 'Here he formed his 
 regiment in close column, and you will recollect offered to advance 
 again to a bayonet charge." General Howard, who had exerted 
 himself from the opening of the attack to stay his broken and panic- 
 stricken troops, calling upon them not to disgrace him by their 
 flight, could effect little, and General Devens, who was wounded 
 early in the battle, was carried to the rear. 
 
 When, therefore, the fight made by Union troops at Melzie 
 Chancellor's was overcome, there was little of the Eleventh corps 
 left to stay the onward progress of a triumphant and exultant 
 enemy, who from the start had fought with unexampled impetuosity, 
 and had rushed on with those unearthly yells peculiar to the army 
 of Northern Virginia, which, having been once heard, were never 
 to be forgotten. From this point the Eleventh corps disappeared, 
 and for all the practical purposes of staying the onward course of the 
 victorious foe was, as the flame of a candle, extinguished. The es- 
 » Report of General Steinwehr, " Eeb. Eec.," Vol. VI., page 579. 
 
104 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 sential form of the Union line before the attack of Jackson was that 
 of a right-angled triangle. By the dispersion of the Eleventh corps, 
 one of the legs of that triangle was taken away, and only a straight 
 line was left. On the proper front of that line Lee was pressing, 
 and from the opposite direction on the rear Jackson was moving in 
 apparently irresistible columns in the full tide of success. Lee had 
 given explicit orders for the troops under his immediate command 
 to press forward and make a vigorous attack along his whole line, 
 the moment they heard the guns of Jackson. This was promptly 
 done, and as Jackson rolled up the Eleventh corps, and came dash- 
 ' ing on wiih shoutings of success upon the rear, the Union line was 
 being pressed on both sides and in peril of being crushed, as between 
 the upper and nether mill-stone. What can save it in its dire ne- 
 cessity ? To the mind of a skilled soldier, necessities are opportu- 
 nities. The great calamity opens the way for the happy use of the 
 resources at hand. The great captain never loses the equipoise 
 of his faculties, but wheels squadron and guns into position, 
 strikes where the foe least expects it, and lights up the field 
 with the flame of his own genius. It is in the moment of peril 
 that he feels his strength and rejoices in the putting forth of his 
 power. 
 
 General Hooker had retained near his headquarters, as his only 
 reserve. Berry's division of the Third corps — his own old division 
 — the legion that had followed him in many a desperate conflict, 
 and before whose intrepid valor the stoutest had been made to quail 
 and bite the dust. General Hooker was, at the time that Jackson 
 opened his attack, absorbed with the operations of Sickles upon the 
 flank of Lee, and had just sent forward strong columns in support of 
 the movement. But no sooner had it become known to him that an 
 attack was being made upon his right flank, and that the Eleventh 
 corps was giving Way, than he called on this division to move into 
 tbe breach. Unfortunately, one brigade,- that of Mott, was wanting, 
 having been left to guard the United States ford, but with the two 
 present a line was formed perpendicular to the plank road, which 
 steadily, notwithstanding the trains and fugitives of the Eleventh 
 corps in wild disorder were breaking over it, advanced through the 
 almost impenetrable forest to the crest of the hill beyond Fairview, 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. 105 
 
 where a breast-work of logs was quickly thrown up, and its bayo- 
 nets formed a wall of steel. His artillery reserve was near at hand, 
 and, marshaling it in position upon the brow of the gentle eminence 
 at Fairview, he, in a short time, had thirty-eight guns* in line 
 bearing upon the approaches from the west, and ready to open upon 
 the enemy. 
 
 But the fugitives of the broken Eleventh corps did not follow 
 exclusively the plank road towards Chancellorsville, but took to 
 the right, pursuing the line of works leading diagonally away from 
 it, towards the cleared ground at Hazel grove. What was the con- 
 dition of the Union line here? When the movement upon the rear 
 of Jackson's flanking column at the furnace led by Birney, and 
 upon Lee's left flank led by Williams, was in full tide, as previously 
 described, and ready to fall with crushing power, " an aid of Gen- 
 ' eral Howard," says General Sickles, " (I presume fbe was an aid, 
 though he did not so announce himself), came to me and reported 
 to me to be careful of my rear — that Stuart's cavalry was moving 
 in my rear, and if I was not careful would cut me off; and, he 
 added, that a strong column of Jackson's infantry was also very 
 near me, and that our troops were retreating. I felt very indignant 
 at this communication ; I utterly disbelieved it, for I felt assured that 
 no such thing could have occurred without a serious engagement 
 with General Howard's force, and of course I would have heard 
 the musketry and the noise of battle. This officer left, having 
 given his information ; or, as I thought at the time, having failed 
 in an absurd effort to stampede me. In a minute or two another 
 messenger, an officer who announced himself as an aid to General 
 Howard, and who seemed to be much more self-possesged and 
 methodical in his communication, arrived and said that he came to 
 me by General Howard's orders, begging me to send him a regi- 
 ment of General Pleasanton's cavalry — that his corps had given 
 
 * Dimmick's, H, First U. S., six twelve-pounders; Oosby's, F, Fourth U. S., four 
 twelve-pounders; Winegar's, M, First New York, six ten-pounders; Fitzhugh's, K, 
 First New York, four three-inch ; Thomas', C, Fourth U. S., four twelve-pounders ; 
 Winslow's, D, First New York, six twelve-pounders ; Hill's, C, First Virginia, two 
 three-inch ; Dilger's, G, First Ohio, six twelve-pounders, relieved on the morning of 
 the 3d by Hampton's Third Pennsylvania six ten-pound parrotts. 
 
 t Testimony of General Sickles, Report on '(Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., 5. 
 
106 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 way, and that our right flank had been carried by the enemy, and 
 that Jackson was in my rear." 
 
 At the moment when Sickles received this startling intelligence 
 he was on the point of ordering Pleasanton, with two regiments of 
 cavalry, the Eighth and Seventeenth Pa., and Martin's battery of 
 horse artillery, to move forward to the furnace, and charge upon the^ 
 enemy. But, being now satisfied that calamity had fallen upon 
 Howard, he recognized the necessity of instantly preparing to meet 
 it. Thus far his attacking column had been entirely successful, 
 having captured eight or nine hundred prisoners, and the enemy 
 in his front fast giving way. But with Jackson in the position 
 which he had attained at the moment when Howard's messengers 
 reached him, Sickles' force could not have been in a more critical 
 situation, either for its own safety, or for rendering assistance to the 
 rest of the army. He immediately sent orders to Birney and 
 Whipple to withdraw as rapidly as possible, and himself rode back 
 towards the position he had recently left. He had not far to go 
 before he was convinced by ocular demonstration of the truth of 
 the messages from General Howard. The enemy themselves were 
 visible, and the fugitives of the Eleventh corps came rushing on 
 over the hill, and literally stampeded his artillery, which he had 
 left near his intrenchments at Hazel grove. » 
 
 Upon the open ground at this point, which was slightly elevated, 
 a considerable force of artillery, and the two regiments of cavalry 
 named above, were halted. The moment Pleasanton received the 
 call from Howard for cavalry to check the confusion in his corps, . 
 he determined to act at once, and called on Major Keenan, of the 
 Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, a resolute and daring officer, to lead 
 his command to the assistance of Howard upon the plank road, and, 
 as the movement resulted, made one of the most daring and heroic 
 charges recorded in the annals of war. 
 
 That a veritable account may be given of the important disposi- 
 tions made at this point for checking the victorious columns of 
 Jackson, and arresting the progress of the disaster which had be- 
 fallen Howard's troops, I quote the language of General Sickles' 
 official report, and a brief passage from the report of General Hunt, 
 as corroborativa of the language of Sickles. General Sickles' report 
 
THE CBISIS OF THE BATTLE. 107 
 
 is dated on the 20th of May, 1863, only a few days subsequent to 
 the battle, and contains a very full and complete account of the 
 -operations of his corps. 
 
 " I had only time," he says, " to despatch my staff officers to 
 recall Birney and Whipple, when the enemy's scouts and some 
 dragoons disclosed themselves, as I rode towards the bridge, across 
 Scott's run, for the purpose of making dispositions to meet and 
 arrest the disaster. Meeting General Pleasanton, we hastened to 
 make the best available dispositions to attack Jackson's column on 
 its right flank. I confided to Pleasanton the direction of the 
 artillery — three batteries of my reserve, Clark's, Lewis' and Turn- 
 bull's, and his own [Martin's] horse battery Time was 
 
 everything. The fugitives from the Eleventh corps swarmed from 
 the woods, and swept frantically over the cleared fields in which 
 my artillery was parked, the exulting enemy at their heels mingled 
 yells with their volleys, and in the confusion which followed it 
 seemed as if cannon and caissons, dragoons, cannoniers, and infantry, 
 could never be disentangled from the mass in which they were sud- 
 denly thrown. Fortunately, there was only one obvious outlet for 
 these panic-stricken hordes — after rushing between and over our 
 guns — and this was through a ravine crossed in two or three places 
 by the head waters of Scott's run. This was soon made impassable 
 by the reckless crowd choking up the way. 
 
 "A few minutes Was enough to restore comparative order, and 
 get our artillery in position. The enemy showing themselves oh 
 the plain, Pleasanton met the shock at short range, with the well- 
 directed fire of twenty-two pieces, double shotted with canister. 
 The rebels pressed up the plank road rapidly, and, as General 
 Pleasanton justly observes in his report herewith transmitted, ' they 
 advanced in silence, and with that skill and adroitness which they 
 often display to gain their object.' The only color visible was an 
 American flag with the centre battalion. To clear up this doubt 
 my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thompson, Fii;st New York cavalry, 
 rode to within a hundred yards of them, wheii they called out to 
 him, ' We are friends,' ' Come on,' and he was thus induced to go 
 fifty yards closer, when the whole line, in a most dastardly man- 
 ner, opened on him with musketry, dropped the American color, 
 
108 rSE BATTLE OF CSANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 and displayed eight or ten battle-flags. Lieutenant Thompson 
 escaped unhurt, and our batteries opened on the advancing columns 
 with crushing power. The heads of the columns were swept away 
 to the woods, from which they opened a furious, but ineffectual, fire 
 of musketry. Twice they attempted a flank movement, but the 
 first was checked by our guns, and the second, and most formidable, 
 was baffled by the advance of Whipple and Birney, who were com- 
 ing up rapidly, but in perfect order, and forming in lines of brigades 
 in rear of the artillery and on the flanks." 
 
 To this graphic account of these vitally important operations, 
 prepared at the time by General Sickles, the' following from the 
 official report of General Hunt, chief of artillery, army of the 
 Potomac, dated August 1st, 1863, corroborates, the statements of 
 Sickles and Pleasanton. 
 
 " When the Eleventh corps was broken up and routed on the 
 2d, its batteries are reported as having behaved well. General 
 Pleasanton collected some batteries belonging to different corps, and 
 with them formed a large battery of twenty-four guns.* The re- 
 treating troops swept through and around this battery, carrying off 
 horses and caissons and even overturning one of the guns, but as a 
 whole it held firm, and when the enemy, flushed with success, 
 appeared before it, met them with a storm of canister, first check- 
 ing, and then driving them back into the woods from which they 
 emerged at 300 yards distance. It was a desperate combat between 
 artillery and infantry, in which the artillery repulsed the infantry, 
 flushed as they were with a great success which they were following 
 up when checked by this battery." 
 
 In the meantime the divisions of Birney and Whipple, having 
 retraced their steps, had come up just in time to checkf a deter- 
 mined advance of the enemy upon these guns of Pleasanton, in which 
 they sought to flank and capture them. But the Jinfantry support 
 made this position at Hazel grove secure, though the guns and 
 
 * Martin's horse artillery, Sixth N. Y., six three-inch guns ; Clark's, B, First N. 
 Y., six ten-pounders; Lewis' Tenth N. Y., six light twelve-pounders; TurnbuU's, f 
 and K, Third U. S., six twelve-pounders.— Hunt's MS. report. 
 
 t Report of General Hunt, chief of artillery, MS. 
 
 X General Sickles' report, MS. 
 
TUB CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. 109 
 
 troops were now facing precisely in the opposite direction from that 
 in which they were in the morning, and on the reverse side, of their 
 breastworks. So strong did Sickles feel here that he courted 
 attack, and as twilight began to deepen, his troops uttered cheer 
 upon cheer in a vain endeavor to challenge the foe to renew the 
 combat. 
 
 The two foremost lines of the enemy, which, as we have seen, 
 after crossing the works at Melzie Chancellor's, had become inter- 
 mingled and united as one, were so badly disorganized by this 
 advance on Pleasanton and Sickles, and still farther to their left by 
 the advance in the thick forest, that it became necessary for them 
 to reorganize and reform the disjointed column. General Eodes, 
 who commanded the first line, accordingly sent to General Jackson 
 notice of their condition, and " urged him to push forward the fresh 
 troops of the reserve line to take the place of his."* " There being 
 no other place," says General Colston, who commanded the second 
 line, " but the open ground at Melzie Chancellor's suitable for such 
 a purpose [reforming], I withdrew all my troops, except Colquitt's 
 brigade, then on guard, to reform them at that point." Colston, 
 who now took the second line as in the morning, reformed his 
 troops, " which had become very much confused, the different regi- 
 ments, brigades and divisions mixed up together," near the log 
 hospital which had been used for the Union wounded, and Rodes 
 formed his just in rear of Colston, on the line of Howard's works, 
 at Melzie Chancellor's. Accordingly A. P. Hill's division, which 
 at starting had been the third, pushed up to the front, and cautiously 
 advanced through the darkness of the night, which was heightened 
 by the sombre shadows of the forest. General Jackson was at the 
 front with Hill's troops, and was very eager to make an immediate 
 advance, judging that there was nothing more to be feared from the 
 Eleventh corps, and hoping to find that the panic created in that 
 might have extended to the other corps. His immediate object was 
 to get possession of United States ford, and thus cut off all way of 
 retreat for the Union army. But the density of the wood, and the 
 darkness which was already settling down upon the field, made him 
 cautious about ordering an advance, until he knew more definitely 
 
 » Report of General Eodes, "Keb. Eec.," Vol. X., p. 301. 
 
110 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 what was in his' front. Accordingly, while Hill's division was 
 forming and advancing to the position which had been. vacated by 
 the divisions of Rodes and Colston, Jackson determined to ride for- 
 ward with his' staff and a small escort, and 'ascertain what really 
 was in his front, so that he might regulate his operations intelli- 
 gently, but apparently with the full intent of pushing his advantage 
 immediately. The shock produced by the charge of Pleasanton's 
 regiment of cavalry led by Keenan, which had gone to its destruction 
 that it might for the moment check the wave that was rolling with 
 such resistless might, had undoubtedly created some nervousness in 
 the rebel lines, and they were ready to fire on anything seen 
 approaching them from the direction whence the Union forces 
 might be expected to come. 
 
 As we have already observed, the reserve artillery of the Union 
 army, nearly forty pieces, had been brought into position at Fair- 
 view, pointing westward, and upon an elevation so that by using 
 solid shot it could fire over the heads of the infantry, in line 
 five hundred yards farther to the front. A section of Dim- 
 mick's battery had also .been thrown forward to a point on the 
 plank, near the line of the infantry. Such was the position of the 
 Union troops when General Jackson rode out in front of his own 
 line to reconnoitre. In his immediate rear was the brigade of Gen- 
 eral Lane, of Hill's division, which was just then coming into posi- 
 tion, his skirmishers already advanced. They had been ordered to 
 fire upon any force seen advancing. Jackson was upon the rebel 
 left of the plank road, but a rod or two away from it, in a lane or 
 cart-path leading into the forest, and had advanced far enough to 
 discover Berry's skirmishers, and draw their fire, when, turning to 
 ride back to his own lines, his own troops mistaking the cavalcade 
 approaching for Union cavalry, fired a volley into it. * " The 
 skirmishers on both sides," as is reported by his staff, " were firing 
 and as Jackson approached his lines, he, with his escort, was mis- 
 taken for Federal cavalry, and received a volley from the Confeder- 
 ate line of battle. Several of the party fell killed and wounded. 
 The general turned to his left, and, entering the thicket, continued 
 
 *"The Battle-Fields of Virginia," by Hotchkiss and Allan, of the staff of General 
 Jackson, p. 53. 
 
"STONEWALL" JACKSON. 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. m 
 
 to go on toward his troops. A moment more, and his party, still 
 mistaken for Federal cavalry, were fired into by a brigade on the 
 south of the road, and at a distance of not more than thirty or forty 
 yards. Jackson received three balls, one in the right hand, and 
 two in the left arm, one of which shattered the bone two inches be- 
 low the shoulder, and severed the artery. Half his escort, including 
 Captain Boswell, of his staff, were killed and wounded. His horse, 
 frightened by the fire, and now without guidance, turned and 
 rushed towards the Federal lines. As he was thus carried through 
 the brushwood, he was struck by the overhanging limbs, and at one 
 time nearly unhorsed by a bough, which bore him backward and 
 tore off his cap. Recovering himself, he managed to check 
 his horse with his bleeding hand, and to turn it into the plank 
 road. Here Captain Wilbourn, of his staff, seized the bridle and 
 quieted the frightened animal. The general now attempted to move 
 his broken arm, to ascertain the extent of the injury. This caused 
 so much pam that he fell exhausted and bleeding into the arms of 
 Captain Wilbourn, and was borne to the roadside and laid under a 
 tree. Captain Wilbourn despatched his only companion at the mo- 
 ment for a surgeon, while he attempted to locate the wound and 
 stanch the blood. While thus engaged. General Hill rode up with 
 his staff, and, hearing of the misfortune, threw himself from his 
 horse, and hurried to the side of the wounded leader. Seeing the 
 rapid flow of blood, he bandaged the arm above the wound. 
 Though so much exhausted by pain and loss of blood, no time" was 
 to be lost in removing Jackson. . . Having been raised from 
 the ground, he was supported for a few steps by Captain Leigh, and 
 theu was placed upon a litter. He had been carried but a little way 
 in this manner when the Federal artillery opened, and a perfect 
 storm of canister swept down the road. The general's horse, 
 which was being led, broke away and dashed into the Confederate 
 lines. The road was cleared in a few moments of everything, ex- 
 cept the party bearing the wounded chieftain. In another moment 
 one of the litter-bearers was struck dead, and Captain Leigh caught 
 the falling litter. They were compelled to set it down. The gen- 
 eral attempted to rise, but was made by Lieutenant Smith, his aid, 
 to lie down. The whole party lay flat on the ground for several 
 
112 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 minutes, while the canister tore over and past them. The direction 
 of the Federal fire changed in part to the left. The general was 
 assisted to rise, and leaning on his aids. Lieutenants Smith and 
 Morrison, turned slowly into the woods on the right of the road. 
 Here they soon came upon the Confederate line of battle, occupied 
 at this point by Pender's brigade of A. P. Hill's division. Jackson 
 had instructed his attendants from the first to conceal his fall from 
 the soldiers. As they passed through and over the troops, who were 
 for the most part lying down to avoid the terrible artillery fire, 
 to the numerous inquiries of 'Whom have you there?' the answer 
 was returned, 'A Confederate officer.' General Pender, however, 
 who met the party at this moment, recognized Jackson, and, after 
 expressing the deep concern at the misfortunes, said, ' The troops 
 have suffered by the enemy's artillery, and are somewhat disordered. 
 I fear we cannot maintain our position here ! ' The exhausted and 
 fainting soldier for a moment recovered his former fire, as raising 
 his head, he replied in his usual quick, decided tone, ' You must 
 hold your ground. General Pender; you must hold your ground, 
 sir ! ' A little after he asked to be allowed to sit down and rest. 
 The firing still being too heavy to admit of this with safety, he was 
 again placed upon the litter, and carried forward as rapidly as the 
 dense, tangled brush would admit. One of the bearers stumbled 
 and fell, and this time the general was thrown from the litter upon 
 his wounded arm. For the first time a groan escaped him. Again 
 he was placed upon the litter ; the party turned from the wood into 
 the road, and carried him some distance to the rear, until they came 
 up with an ambulance. Here Dr. McGuire met them, and having 
 readjusted the bandage, so as to more completely stop the flow of 
 blood, placed him in the ambulance, which already contained Col- 
 onel Crutchfield, and accompanied them to the hospital at Wilder- 
 ness Tavern." 
 
 Jackson had received his mortal hurt; he had given his last 
 order, he had fought his last battle. He lingered for a week and 
 then passed quietly away. When the next sad conflict came for 
 his companions in arras, he was beyond the reach of mortal harm, 
 where the clash of charging squadrons and the dread clangor of 
 battle never come. 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE. 113 
 
 But the calamities to Jackson's corps did not cease with the fall 
 of its leader. That fire of artillery under which Jackson was car- 
 ried to the rear not only produced consternation in the rebel lines, 
 and caused great slaughter, but General A. P. Hill, who was next 
 in command, and upon whom the entire responsibility of the man- 
 agement of the battle devolved, received a serious wound which 
 incapacitated him for further duty. The command then devplved 
 upon General Rodes, the next in rank, who decided to bring his 
 army into position for attack, but to withhold the blow until morn- 
 ing. In the meantime. Major Pendleton, of Jackson's staff, had 
 been instructed to send for General Stuart of the cavalry to take 
 the command. General Rodes says: *" I yielded the command to 
 General Stuart, not because I thought him entitled to it, belonging 
 as he does to a different arm of the service — nor because I was 
 unwilling to assume the responsibility of carrying on the attack, as 
 1 had already made the necessary arrangements, and they remained 
 unchanged, but because, from the manner in which I had been 
 informed that he (Stuart) had been sent for, I inferred that General 
 Jackson or General Hill had instructed Major Pendleton to place 
 him in command." 
 
 But General Stuart was not at hand to assume the management 
 of the battle. He had been with Jackson's column when the 
 attack was made upon the Eleventh corps, and remained with it 
 until dark, when, seeing no further opportunity for the use of his 
 cavalry, he proposed to General Jackson to lead it back to Ely's ford, 
 to defend the passage of the river against Averell, who had arrived 
 on the opposite bank and was threatening to cross. The proposi- 
 tion was approved by General Jackson, and Stuart was ordered to 
 act upon the suggestion. He had hardly reached the ford, and was 
 giving orders for the posting of his command, when Major Pendle- 
 ton, of General Hill's staff, came post haste to inform him of the 
 misfortunes which had befallen both Generals Jackson and Hill, 
 and to request him to hasten to the front and take command of 
 Jackson's corps. Stuart was five miles away. But immediately 
 turning over his cavalry to another he rode rapidly to the front, 
 where he arrived at 10 o'clock. General Stuart says, in his report, 
 
 « "Reb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 302. 
 
114 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 that he had determined to press the pursuit that night ; but, finding 
 on his arrival that the Union troops were reformed and disposed to 
 contest the ground, he decided to postpone further operations until 
 morning, and in the meantime prepare for a vigorous attack. 
 
 General Slocum, of the Twelfth corps, had no sooner discovered 
 that an attack was being made upon Howard, than he ordered 
 General Williams, who had just then reached his position on the 
 left of Sickles at the furnace, and was about to strike General Lee's 
 left, to cease operations in that direction, and return immediately 
 to his position on the Chancellorsville line. At double-quick, but 
 in good order, the brigades fell back, only to find the whole ground, 
 which they had left, filled with the fugitives of the Eleventh corps, 
 and the debris of the retreat. General Williams rode on in advance, 
 and, with Lieutenant-Colonel Dickenson, of General Hooker's stafij 
 endeavored to stop and reform the disorganized mass; but with little 
 success. Euger's and Knipe's brigades moved by the flank along 
 the entire line of woods south of the plank, and, having faced to 
 the front, with a loud cheer advanced into the woods to regain 
 their breastworks. By this movement the progress of the rebel 
 line was immediately checked. Ross' brigade, which was upon the 
 left and connected with the right of Geary's division, was able to 
 regain its position behind the works it had vacated. Ruger's 
 brigade, which stood next, was able to regain a portion of its 
 barricades. A marsh farther to the right interfered with a con- 
 tinuous movement, and part of a regiment, which had to be de- 
 tached to avoid the marsh, was captured by the enemy, who had 
 got possession of their works further to the right. Finding it im- 
 practicable to regain this part of his intrenchments Williams took 
 up a new line along the interior edge of the woods, in front of the 
 ravine near Fairview, and conuecting on the plank road with the 
 left of General Berry, who now removed the part of his division 
 south of the plank, to the north of it. At 9 o'clock General William 
 Hays' brigade, of Couch's corps, was sent to take position on the 
 right of Berry. By this formation the right wing of General 
 Hooker's army, though considerably contracted, was again whole, 
 and ready for the enemy's advance should he choose to make it dur- 
 ing the night. Sickles' artillery, which Pleasanton had used with 
 
THE CBISIS OF THE BATTLE. II5 
 
 SO good effect in checking the enemy at night-fall, was in command- 
 ing position and had already silenced the enemy's guns, posted in 
 the open ground about Melzie Chancellor's. The powerful bat- 
 teries at Fairview were able to reach the greater part of the front 
 looking west, and the infantry line was well posted and ready to 
 repel any attack which the enemy might choose to deliver. There 
 was a line of works reaching out diagonally from Williams' left 
 towards Melzie Chancellor's, which a division of Sickles had 
 occupied in the morning before advancing to the furnace, which 
 the enemy now held, where some of Whipple's ammunition train, 
 caissons, and two or three guns, had, in the absence of this division, 
 fallen into the enemy's hands. To regain these works and material 
 General Sickles sought permission of the general-in-chief to make 
 a night attack. This was granted and the order given to make it. 
 Accordingly at midnight Birney led two of his brigades, Ward's 
 and Hayman's, to the attack. It was made entirely with the 
 bayonet, with uncapped muskets, and was gallantly executed. The 
 works and material were retaken in face of a terrific infantry fire, 
 and a flank sweep of artillery fire planted near Melzie Chancellor's. 
 The encounter was not confined to Birney's forces, but was taken up 
 along the whole rebel front, reaching around to his extreme left. 
 This fire disclosed the position and extent of the enemy's line, upon 
 which the Union artillery at Fairview at once opened with terrible 
 effect, and the infantry on the right of the line, where it would 
 not compromise the movement of Birney, joined. War presents 
 few spectacles of such awful grandeur as this. It lasted for an 
 hour, in which the forest resounded with the crash of musketry and 
 the deep roar of artillery, and the whole heavens were lighted up 
 with sulphurous flame. Finally, the noise of battle died away, 
 and the weary soldier slept on his arms. An hour had scarcely 
 passed when it broke forth afresh, as some position of the rebel line 
 was changed, or an attempt made to regain lost ground, and the 
 sound of the conflict was even more terrible than before. But it 
 sooner ceased, and the rest of the night was passed in quiet. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 
 
 >HE almost simultaneous fall of both Jackson and 
 Hill, the two officers highest in rank in Jackson's 
 corps, late at night, necessitated the assumption of 
 command by General Stuart, with no knowledge 
 whatever of the condition of his army, or what were 
 the plans of his predecessors for continuing the battle. 
 Supposing that General Jackson had definite de- 
 signs, and not wishing to interpose his own, which 
 would of necessity have to be impromptu and formed 
 upon imperfect information, he sent Major Pendleton to confer with 
 him and receive his instructions. It was half-past three on the 
 morning of the 3d when the major arrived at the hospital at the 
 Wilderness Tavern, where the wounded chieftain was lying. So 
 critical was his condition considered to be, that the surgeons refused 
 to allow him to be disturbed. But on representing the urgency of 
 the case, the major was finally admitted. * " When he entered the 
 tent, the general said, 'Well, Major, I am glad to see you; I 
 thought you were killed.' Pendleton briefly explained the condi- 
 tion of affairs, gave Stuart's message, and asked what should be 
 done. General Jackson was at once interested, and asked in his 
 quick, rapid way several questions. When they were answered he 
 remained silent for a moment, evidently trying to think. He con- 
 tracted his brow, set his mouth, and for some moments was ob- 
 viously endeavoring to. concentrate his thoughts. For a moment it 
 •was believed he had succeeded, for his nostril dilated, and his eye 
 
 * HotohkisB— Allan, p. 121. 
 
 (116) 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. I17 
 
 , flashed its old fire, but it was only for a moment. His face relaxed 
 again; presently he answered very feebly and sadly, 'I don't 
 know; I can't tell; say to General Stuart he must do what he 
 thinks best.' " 
 
 Being left to his own resources. General Stuart spent the night 
 in examining the positions of his troops, and preparing to renew the 
 battle at early dawn. No communication had yet been had with 
 General Lee, who remained with the troops on the right ; but during 
 the night Stuart sent a courier to him, asking him to extend his 
 line upon the left, and he would extend his own upon the right, and 
 endeavor to join hands. He found upon the front line Hill's di- 
 vision, now commanded by General Heth, somewhat broken and 
 confused upon the right, where Sickles confronted its flank. Upon 
 the right of the plank road, with its left abutting upon it, was 
 Lane's brigade, occupying the reverse side of the breastworks from 
 which Williams' division, of Slocum's corps, had been withdrawn 
 in the afternoon of the 2d. Pender's brigade was upon the left 
 of the plank in line with Lane, also behind abandoned works. Upon 
 the right of Lane were in succession the brigades of McGowan and 
 Archer, and on the extreme left joining Pender was posted the bri- 
 gade of Thomas, while Heth's own brigade, now led by Colonel 
 Breckenbough, was held in reserve. The night attack of Sickles 
 had caused the drawing back of the right of this division, so that 
 while the left faced Chancellorsville, the right looked towards Hazel 
 grove. In the second line was Colston's division, with the brigades 
 of J. V. Williams (Colston's) and Jones on the right of the plank, 
 and those of Paxton and G. IVf. Williams' (Nichol's) on the left of 
 the road. In the third line, a little in advance of Melzie Chancel- 
 lor's, was the division of Rodes, which had borne the brunt of the 
 battle on the preceding evening, with the brigades of O'Neal (Rodes) 
 and Iverson on the left of the plank, and those of Ramseur, Dole 
 and Colquitt on the right. The latter was subsequently detached 
 and sent ,to the extreme left. In addition to these dispositions of the 
 infantry, Colonel E. P. Alexander, * senior officer of artillery in the 
 corps, was directed to occupy with his guns every available position 
 along the whole line, in which duty he was engaged the whole night. 
 
 » General Stuart's ofBcial report, "Eeb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 260. 
 
lis THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 At the Union headquarters the night of the 2d was spent in de- 
 vising new combinations for meeting the changed aspect of affairs 
 brought about by the sudden yielding and disappearance of the 
 Eleventh corps. While the battle of Saturday evening was still 
 raging at about the hour of nine, General Hooker dispatched an 
 order to General Sedgwick, by an aide-de-camp, in the following 
 words : * " The major-general commanding directs that you cross the 
 Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, on receipt of this order, and at 
 once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until 
 you connect with him, and will attack and destroy any force you 
 may fall in with on the road. You will leave all your trains behind 
 except pack trains of your ammunition, and march to be in the 
 vicinity of the general at daylight. You will probably fall upon 
 the rear of the forces commanded by General Lee, and, between you 
 and the major-general commanding, he expects to use him up. 
 Send word to General Gibbon to take possession of Fredericks- 
 burg. Be sure not to fail." 
 
 This order was delivered to General Sedgwick at 11 p. m., two 
 hours from the time it was issued, and it found him across the river 
 at Franklin's bridge, instead of on the north bank, as General 
 Hooker supposed he was at the time of penning the order. He had 
 previously informed General Sedgwick that there was only Early's 
 division left in the works at Fredericksburg on his front, and hence 
 that he would not be necessarily long delayed by it in getting in 
 motion. Tljat the force in his front was insignificant was corrob- 
 orated by the facts that, from several points, columns and trains had 
 been observed moving on the morning of the 1st towards Chancel- 
 lorsville, and that points on the Fredericksburg heights and along 
 the rebel entrenched line seemed to be feebly held, all of which had 
 been faithfully reported to General Sedgwick, so that he could have 
 no doubt that the main body of the enemy had gone. At midnight 
 General Butterfield sent the following to General Sedgwick: 
 " From the statements brought by General Hooker's aid, it seems 
 to be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with 
 crushing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance 
 to one who will do all that the urgency of the case requires." To 
 « " Conduct of the "War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 129. 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. HQ 
 
 General Gibbon, commanding a division of the Second corps, Gen- 
 eral Butterfield sent the following : " Your command must cross 
 the river to Fredericksburg to-night. Pontoon bridge now at Lacy 
 house. Get under way soon. General Sedgwick is ordered to 
 move through Fredericksburg towards Chancellorsville. Look out 
 you do not come in contact with him. You must see to the laying 
 the bridges." Lest these several orders and communications 
 should not sufficiently inf^ress the commander of this corps with 
 the urgency of the case and the need of celerity of movement. Gen- 
 eral Hooker sent General Warren, his engineer-in-chief, who was 
 familiar with the topography of the country and the roads on which 
 the advance was to be made, and likewise the exact position of 
 General Hooker's troops at Chancellorsville, and was consequently 
 well able to judge how they could be best approached and a junc- 
 tion of the two wings of the army formed, to urge a rapid forward 
 movement. "I pointed out to General Warren," says General 
 Hooker, " on the map where I wanted the Sixth corps to go, and 
 told him what time 1 desired it to be there ; I also impressed upon 
 him the necessity of a prompt compliance with my orders on the 
 part of General Sedgwick." 
 
 *Mott's brigade of the Third corps, which had been left at 
 United States ford, was ordered up to Chancellorsville during the 
 night, and arrived at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 3d, when it 
 was posted in rear of the right of General Williams' division, with 
 its right resting on the plank road, just in front of the artillery on 
 the Fairview heights. The position of General Hooker's forces, 
 facing Jackson's corps, when fighting ceased at 2 o'clock on the 
 morning of the 3d, was as follows : On the extreme left reaching 
 around towards Dowdall's tavern and facing substantially northward 
 were Birney's and Whipple's divisions of the Third corps intrenched, 
 with guns advantageously posted. Connecting with Sickles' right 
 was Williams' division of the Twelfth corps, forming nearly a right 
 angle at the point of junction, and stretching onward to the plank 
 road on which its right abutted facing westward, and 500 yards in 
 front of the artillery at Fairview. On the right of the plank in 
 continuation of Williams' line was Berry's division of the Third 
 
 * Sickles' official report, MS. 
 
120 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 corps, and upon its right General William Hays' brigade of the 
 Second corps. In rear of Williams, as we have just noticed, was 
 the brigade of Mott, and in rear of all, ujJon the edge of .the open 
 ground about Fairview, were thirty-eight pieces of artillery, which 
 during the night had been intrenched. ' The First corps; under 
 General Reynolds, which had begun to come up during the evening 
 of the ^2d, took position on a line overlooking Hunting run, nearly 
 at right angles with the line of William^ and Berry, but did not 
 quite connect with it. It will thus be seen that if only Jackson's 
 corps was to be met, Hooker's dispositions could not have been 
 better for routing and overwhelming the entire body. Hooker 
 was virtually on the three sides of a square, the left leg shorter 
 than the right, and the ground favorable for meeting an attack, the 
 position about Hazel grove being especially advantageous for 
 artillery, and had raking range of the rebel right flank. The 
 ground where Williams stood was seamed by little ravines worn by 
 the tributaries of Lewis' creek, which gave good lines of defense. 
 
 But the battling with Jackson's corps was only a part of the 
 problem presented. Lee, with nearly half of the rebel force, un- 
 broken, and fresh for the conflict, was at hand and might at any 
 moment move upon this part of the field. While Sickles was in 
 admirable position for doing execution upon the troops confronting 
 him of Jackson's corps ; yet he knew not at what moment the forces 
 of Lee would strike him in rear, when he would have been be- 
 tween two fires and liable to capture. , The morning hours were 
 not very far advanced before Anderson's division of Longstreet's 
 corps did swing round, and, coming upon the rear of this very 
 position of Sickles, connected with the right of Jackson. 
 
 General Hooker plainly saw the great danger to which Sickles 
 was here exposed, and, although it was with extrem'e reluctance that . 
 he yielded the commanding ground about Hazel grove, admirable 
 as it was for the artillery, yet he deemed it too hazardous to expose 
 his troops thereon, and consequently decided to draw in the im- 
 perilled parts and establish a new line of battle considerably more 
 contracted, covering the open ground about Fairview and Chancel- 
 lorsville. He accordingly ordered Sickles to withdraw at daylight, 
 and moving up the little ravine formed by the tributary of Lewis 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 121 . 
 
 creek, which runs in front of Fairview, and take position in the in- 
 trenchments along the new line. General Hooker would have 
 ordered the movement at an earlier hour ; but there had been so 
 much noisy fighting during the night, and the troops manifested so 
 much nervousness, that he feared, if the transfer was made in the 
 darkness, it might be attended with peril. 
 
 Whipple commenced the movement, preceded by the artillery of 
 both divisions, except Huntington's battery, which was in admir- 
 able position for covering the withdrawal, and was closely followed 
 by Birney. All had passed out in good order and without conflict, 
 until Graham's brigade, which brought up the rear of the column, 
 was about to march, when the enemy struck him with terrific vio- 
 lence, and charged on Huntington's battery. And now was seen 
 the magic virtue of a cool head, and the prompt obedience of men 
 M'ho had perfect confidence in their leader. Graham gave the 
 word, "About face and give those people a volley." But one volley 
 did not satisfy the resolute men of Graham, and they poured in 
 round after round until the enemy was willing to keep at a respect- 
 ful distance. Huntington's battery, too, in its commanding posi- 
 tion, swept the plain on which the enemy deployed for this attack, 
 and assisted to quell the ardor of the rebel onset. Graham then 
 withdrew in good order ; but the battery in crossing Scott's riin 
 lost some of its horses and material. 
 
 General Stuart, in his report, explains how this attack upon 
 Graham, which opened the battle of Chancellorsville, came to be 
 made, without having intended it.* "At early dawn," he says, 
 "Trimble's division (Colston's) composed the second line, and 
 Rodes' division the third. The latter had his rations on the spot, 
 and, as his men were entirely without food, was extremely anxious 
 to issue. I was disposed to wait a ^hort time for this purpose ; but 
 when, as preliminary to an attack, I ordered the right of the fjrst 
 line to swing around, and come perpendicular to the road, the 
 order waa misunderstood for an order to attack, and that part of 
 the line became engaged. I ordered the whole line to advance, 
 and the second and third lines to follow." It will be remembered 
 that the evening fight made by Sickles, from the position he had 
 
 » General Stuart's official report, "Reb. Eeo.," Vol. X., p. 260. 
 
122 TSE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 just abandoned, and the midnight charge made by Birney, was 
 upon the rebel right flank which caused the front line of that flank 
 to be refused. It was the attempt to rectify this irregularity, pre- 
 paratory to opening the battle, which brought on the attack upon 
 Graham. 
 
 But this shortening of lines, and taking up a more contracted 
 position about Chancellorsville was only preliminary to, and a step 
 towards other dispositions which General Hooker had decided on. 
 Should General Sedgwick come up, as there was reason to expect, 
 and attack Lee in rear. Hooker would hold on to his position about 
 Chancellorsville and co-operate with him. But should Sedgwick 
 fail to come. Hooker had determined to take up still another line 
 of battle, from a half to three-quarters of a mile in rear of the first, 
 and to this end his engineers had during the night examined the 
 ground and traced its location. Commencing at Scott's dam on the 
 Rappahannock, it followed the general direction of the Mineral 
 Spring road, already occupied by the Fifth corps, around to White 
 House on the Ely's and United States Ford road, where, turning to 
 the right, nearly at right angles, it followed very closely the course 
 of Hunting run down to its confluence with the Kapidan. This 
 was a very strong position, and had the great advantage of having 
 both wings protected by a deep and rapid river. The First corps, 
 as it began to arrive early in the night of the 2d, went into position 
 on the right of this new line, facing Hunting creek, Wadsworth's 
 division on the extreme right, Robinson's next, and Doubleday's 
 reaching up nearly to the centre, Sykes' division 6f the Fifth corps 
 alone interposing on the right centre. The Eleventh corps, as it 
 was reformed, was sent during the night to relieve the Fifth corps' 
 on the Mineral Spring roa^i, which was brought up upon the 
 centre. 
 
 General Hooker was led to the adoption of thig new line by the 
 false position into which he was thrown by the giving way of the 
 Eleventh corps, and the utter loss of the vital points of the ground 
 that he had selected on which to fight the battle. The plateau at 
 Talley's, where the extreme right of his army originally rested, was 
 the most elevated and commanding of any on the field, constituting 
 the divide between the waters of the Ny and the Rapidan. When 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 123 
 
 this was yielded, and in succession the positions at the Wilderness 
 church, Melzie Chancellor's, and that on which Williams' division 
 of the Twelfth corps had been posted before its withdrawal to go to 
 the assistance of Sickles, General Hooker felt that he had no suffi- 
 cient ground left on which to fight a general battle, as he could 
 only use a moiety of his men, and in that cramped position he was 
 a prey to an artillery fire that could be concentrated upon],him from 
 almost every point of the compass. Forced, as he was, suddenly 
 and unexpectedly, into this pinched and constrained situation, the 
 change of position was the only thing left for him to do. 
 
 But the determination to hold the more contracted position about 
 Fairview a reasonable time for the arrival of Sedgwick, necessitated 
 a battle. Indeed, the enemy would not have allowed the with- 
 drawal to the new line, if Hooker had been disposed to move at 
 once, without hard fighting. As we have seen, the battle was 
 precipitated earlier than the enemy intended, one division being 
 obliged to move before breakfasting. The sun had no sooner dis- 
 pelled the mist which, on that morning, enshrouded the field, than 
 the eagle eye of Stuart caught a view of the open, elevated ground 
 about Hazel grove,* which Sickles had been obliged to abandon, 
 and immediately ordered thirty pieces to be concentrated thereon, 
 which was speedily effected. The rapid concentration of such a 
 weight of metal upon a point where it was brought within easy 
 range of almost every part of the Union lines around Chancellors- 
 ville, proved very unfortunate for Hooker. These guns completely 
 enfiladed the intrenchments of Geary, and the lines of Williams 
 and Berry, and were in easy range of the artillery at Fairview. 
 They could be answered by the guns at Fairview, but were too 
 numerous and variously disposed to be silenced. 
 
 As already observed, the battle opened in an attempt of Heth, 
 who led the front line of the enemy, to advance the right of his 
 division, which had been doubled in by the attacks of Sickles on 
 his flank. This was about the dawn of day, and the struggle, which 
 
 * "As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the 
 ridge on the extreme riglit was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I imme- 
 diately ordered thirty pieces to that point, and under the happy effects of the bat- 
 talion system it was done quickly. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's batteries 
 was superb."— General Stuart's official report, "Eeb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 260. 
 
124 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 commenced with Graham's brigade, was the signal for the whole 
 corps of Jackson to advance to the assault. The artillery at Fair- 
 view commanded much of the ground over which the rebel lines 
 were advancing, though the density of the forest prevented a view 
 of them.* It was early spring time, and the buds were just bursting 
 into leaf, while some of the more forward of the flowering plants 
 and shrubs were already in blossom, and the pine thickets were in 
 their perennial dress. But the skirmish line behind the outer 
 barricades of the Union front, by their temporary resistance, served 
 to develop the position of the oncoming masses of the enemy, and 
 thus direct the fire of the artillery. By aiming low, the missiles, if 
 they found an unobstructed passage from the trees, would ricochet, 
 and if hurled into the bodies of the trees, produced no less conster- 
 nation and destruction by the scattering of the fragments of the 
 shivered trunks. On the extreme right of the Union line the 
 artillery could not be used, as the ground was level, and would not 
 admit of firing over the heads of the infantry, as was possible further 
 to the left. Consequently, when the general advance was made, 
 Thomas' brigade of Heth's division, and a regiment of Pender's 
 brigade, which stood next, not encountering the Union artillery 
 fire, continued to advance a long distance beyond the point where 
 the rebel centre and right were checked and driven back.f The 
 consequence was that General Hays, of the Second corps, who was 
 on the extreme Union right, and whose line was considei-ably re- 
 fused to protect Jihis flank, was furiously attacked by the rapidly 
 advancing troops of Pender and Thomas, and himself was wounded 
 and iaken prisoner with members of his staff. The troops of Thomas 
 and Pender were, however, repulsed and driven back By this gal-, 
 lant brigade, French's division of the Second corps, Carroll's 
 brigade in front, was rapidly moved to the support of Hays, and 
 drove the enemy, taking about 300 prisoners, and recapturing a 
 
 * But let me here say that the thickness of the undergrowth very much obstructed 
 the view of operations the whole of this day. 
 
 t My left regiment (Thirteenth North Carolina) not being subjected to the artillery 
 fire, did not fall back, but continued to advance for a long distance, with the brigade 
 on my left, and in, this advance Lieutenant Ireland, Company E, rushed gallantly 
 forward and captured Brigadier-General Hays and staff.— Pender's report, "Eeb. 
 Rec," Vol. X., p. 274. 
 
A MOnmNG OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 125 
 
 regiment which had fallen into the enemy's hands. Caldwell's bri- 
 gade of Hancock's division, and Meagher's brigade which had been 
 covering a point to right and rear of the whole line, were in succes- 
 sion ordered up, upon the Union right. 
 
 Upon the centre and left, where Berry and Williams had been 
 originally posted, the fighting was of the most determined charac- 
 ter. Again and again were the rebel lines brought up, only to be 
 hurled back with incalculable slaughter. General Berry, one of the 
 finest officers in the service, who was now leading the Second 
 division (Hooker's old) of Sickles' corps, in the midst of the fight, 
 and after having marshalled his men, when inextricable confusion 
 and disaster seemed impending, and fought with an jron-hearted 
 resolution the ever fresh masses of the foe, received the fatal bullet 
 by which he was forever removed from the arena of battle. He 
 seems to have had a presentiment of his impending fate; for in a 
 conversation with General Geary on the field during the night of 
 the 2dj he expressed the belief that he would not survive the conflict 
 of the ensuing day. 
 
 The Third Maryland regiment, of the Twelfth corps, which 
 occupied the left of Berry's line, gave way at a most critical stage 
 of the battle, and Mott's brigade of that division was sent forward, 
 and drove back the enemy, who had gained the left of Berry, with 
 indescribable destruction. Not satisfied with regaining the lost posi- 
 tion, Mott crossed the works, and repulsing the hostile masses, took 
 many prisoners with their colors. Graham's brigade of Birney's 
 division, which had opened the battle in the early dawn, had 
 scarcely reached Chancellorsville, in obedience to the orders for 
 contracting the lines, when it was again formed and ordered forward 
 to the support of Williams, a portion of whose troops had nearly 
 expended their ammunition, where it repulsed every fierce assault 
 of the foe, and repeatedly charged across the breastworks and drove 
 them back at the point of the bayonet. Colonel Franklin's brigade, 
 of Whipple's division, was also sent to the support of Berry's hard- 
 pressed line. The battery on the left of the road having been with- 
 drawn from its advanced position, this brigade crossed to the left, 
 and by a resolute charge turned back the oncoming tide of the 
 enemy, sweeping everything before it. It was in this charge that 
 
126 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 the intrepid Lieutenant-Colonel Chapiu was mortally, and Major 
 Higgins severely wounded. The Second brigade of Whipple's 
 division, under command of Colonel Bowman, was posted in the 
 iaimediate front, and to the left of the batteries at Fairview, where 
 it was obliged to stand under the showers of minies poured into it 
 from the charges of the rebel infantry, and the no' less destructive 
 but far more terrible shelling of artillery posted in range upon the 
 heights at Hazel grove. - The sharpshooters of Colonel Berdan, so 
 famous for their marksmanship, were thrown upon the front and 
 did excellent execution, the enemy fearlessly advancing in plain 
 view. It was such a harvest of death as had never before been 
 forced upon them to gather. 
 
 At the very height of the battle, when the enemy on all sides was 
 pressing with overwhelming force, and the troops upon the con- 
 tracted line were holding their positions only by the most desperate 
 valor, General Hooker was struck, and for a considerable time ren- 
 dered incapable of command. He was standing at the moment 
 immediately in front of the Chancellor House, where were his head- 
 quarters, watching the progress of the battle. The enemy, by 
 pushing up and occupying every available spot for his artillery, was 
 able to bring a concentrating fire to bear upon this part of the field. 
 While thus standing and anxiously directing the battle, a solid shot 
 struck one of the pillars of the piazza, splitting it from end to end, 
 and throwing one-half of it violently towards him, the concussion 
 rendering him senseless, and for a few moments he was thought to 
 be dying. The rumor spread rapidly that General Hooker had been 
 killed. But he soon revived sufficiently from the effects of the stun 
 to show himself to his troops, and by great force of will mounted his 
 horse. He rode forward towards the White House; but just as he 
 had reached the open field in front, the pain from the injury which 
 he had received returned with such violence that he would have 
 fallen, had hot his staff rushed to his side and supported him to the 
 ground. A blanket was spread, and he was laid upon it. Some 
 remedy was administered, and he again revived sufficiently to be 
 borne to a less exposed position ; but scarcely had he been 
 raised before a solid shot from one of the enemy's guns at Hazel 
 grove struck the blanket in the identical spot where he had for the 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 127 
 
 moment rested. Nearly the entire day he suffered so great pain, as 
 not to have the command of his faculties, his right side being par- 
 tially paralyzed, and for weeks his side was livid, giving evidence 
 of the terrible blow he had received. 
 
 It was a most critical juncture in the battle, and more thau at any 
 previous moment there was needed the unclouded judgment of the 
 commanding general. General Couch, the next in rank, was sent 
 for 5 but such was the force of will of General Hooker that he 
 would not entirely relinquish the supreme authority, though 
 enduring such intense bodily suffering as, in the judgment of his 
 associate officers who were about him, to seriously affect his mental 
 faculties and rob him of that dash, that rapidity of mental opera- 
 tion, which was a marked characteristic of his generalship. The 
 paralysis, with which during his later years his entire right side was 
 affected, was the result of this blow. 
 
 General Hooker's chief anxiety was, as it had been from the 
 opening of the fight at the early dawn, to get his troops upon the 
 new line of battle. He had now given up all hope of any co- 
 operation from Sedgwick. But the enemy was pressing with too 
 much violence upon the troops still holding the lines to withdraw 
 them rapidly without incurring disaster. Sickles, who, with Wil- 
 liams, of Slocum's corps, had from the firing of the first gun been 
 bearing the brunt' of the battle, had now put in his last reserves, and 
 the ammunition was running low. It was the Sabbath, and the 
 hour had come when holy bells toll Christian congregations to 
 worship Him whose mission was peace upon earth and good-will to 
 men. But war, which exists by appeals to the fierce and angry 
 passions, knows no sacred days. For five hours one of the most 
 desperate and bloody conflicts known in the annals of warfare had 
 been raging. It was a contracted field, scarcely a mile in length, 
 and but a few rods in width, and around and over all was the 
 gloomy, tangled wilderness, which even the unencumbered hunter 
 rarely essayed to penetrate, and where game was as in its native 
 wilds. Here brave men were subjected to such a fiery ordeal as 
 could scarcely be matched in the prolific brain of a Milton or a 
 Dante. Neither party would yield, while with the energy of despair 
 charge and counter-charge were delivered with unsparing hand. 
 
128 THE BATTLE OF CHANGELLOB.SVILLE. 
 
 The storm of buck and ball, and tearing minie, was little more 
 regarded than the hail of a summer shower, as the lines swept on 
 and over breastworks bristling with bayonets, only to be driven 
 back decimated and fainting from utter exhaustion. The fields 
 literally ran blood, and the streamlets of the forest were crimsoned 
 with the purple tide. A dense cloud of sulphurous smoke was 
 perpetually rolled upon the field from the fiery mouths of a hundred 
 brazen monsters. Bursting shells and deadly missiles were hurtled 
 in the dense air like the thick coming snow-flakes in the midnight 
 blackness of a storm-encumbered sea. The crash of musketry, the 
 ear-bursting, deep-mouthed thunder of the artillery, the screech of 
 the assailants, and the steady cheer of the counter-charge, were 
 mingled in a cadence more fearful than the voice of the storm when 
 awakened jjy the pealing of heaven's artillery, or the hoarse waves 
 ai^ier^Sn when aroused by the wintry tempest. 
 
 To add to the ordinary horrors of a fiercely contested field, the 
 cry went down the lines, " The forest is on fire ! The forest is on 
 fire ! " It was too true. Lifted by the intense heat, the flames 
 mounted heavenward and carried upon their wings the charred 
 fragments of leaves, and needles of the pine, the accumulations of 
 annual foliage, \<'hich the bursting shells had fired, until the signal 
 «f-the-burning field was visible to the two great armies, and the 
 conn try far around. It was a standard whose fiery folds challenged 
 and defied the puny elements of man's warfare and the skill which 
 directs mortal conflict. The fiery battle-ground was thickly covered 
 with the wounded, the dead, and the dying. Brave men as ever 
 slept on tented field, or faced a foe in the hour of battle, by the 
 chances of the conflict had been left bleeding and helpless on that 
 fatal ground. And could no human sympathy reach them ? Must 
 they thus miserably perish, wrung with the martyr's anguish? 
 The path of the conflagration was along the most desperately con- 
 tested ground, and the course of the fight went on unchecked. 
 Tongues of flame licked up the dry foliage, and leaped onward 
 unstayed. Scarcely had the fire spent itself, and passed to feed 
 upon new material for. its insatiate maw, before the charging 
 squadrons rushed on over the charred remains of fallen comrades, 
 and were scorched by live coals in their fiery course. It was not a 
 
A MORNING OF BLOODY CONFLICT. 
 
 129 
 
 time to question the manner of death. A victory must be gained, 
 and the mad ambition that ruled the hour recked not of bleeding 
 "wounds nor bursting heart-strings, of slow torture nor glowing pyre. 
 Of the more than 20,000 who went down in the dread fight, by far 
 the larger part fell on this little belt of forest through which a soli- 
 tary brook murmured, unheeding the clamor above and around, 
 and unquenched by the blazing tide that swept over it. 
 9 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 RETIREMENT OP THE UNION FORCES TO THE FINAL LINE 
 
 OF BATTLE. 
 
 >'HE contracted field over which the battle of the 
 morning of the 3d was waged enabled the enemy 
 to bring up his troops in heavy lines, and as fast as 
 one was broken and exhausted another was ready 
 to take its place. Instead Qf seeming to be weak- 
 ened, the longer the struggle was maintained, the 
 more recklessly were his troops rushed on, until 
 they appeared to come in crowds rather than in any 
 regular formation. * " The enemy commenced his 
 attack," says General Williams, of the Twelfth corps, " at the earli- 
 est dawn of the 3d, pushing his column through the woods in our 
 front with wonderful vigor and obstinacy. He was successfully re- 
 sisted at all points of my lines, and, although his attacks were almost 
 without cessation, he was repeatedly driven back in confusion dur- 
 ing three to four hours, always, however, replacing his broken col- 
 umns with fresh troops. . . . This desperate struggle in front and 
 flank by artillery and infantry continued almost without cessation 
 until about half-past 8 A. M. My regiments had literally exhausted 
 their ammunition. Some of them had been twenty-four hours with- 
 out food, and most of them for several nights with but little sleep 
 while engaged in intrenching. My regiments had several times 
 crossed the breastworks to attack the enemy's repulsed columns ; 
 but the nature of the ground, the thickness of the underbrush, the 
 heavy and greatly outnumbering columns of the enemy always at 
 hand, as well as their positions on either flank of my line, admon- 
 
 (130) 
 
 * General Williams' official report, MS. 
 
TIIJE FINAL LINE OF BATTLE. 131 
 
 ished me to act on the defensive until a more favorable moment for 
 the offensive should present itself." 
 
 In the meantime Anderson, of Lee's column, had pushed forward 
 his left until it connected with the right of Jackson's forces, thus 
 reuniting the two wings of the rebel army, and General Lee had 
 now arrived upon the field and was directing the battle. Sickles 
 had noticed that the enemy pressed with special pertinacity upon 
 his extreme left and upon his right centre, near the plant road, and 
 here he was obliged to concentrate his force, and bring every avail- 
 able gun into requisition. Already his ammunition began to fail, 
 and he called for reinforcements to take the places of his decimated 
 columns. But fresh troops failed to come, and the vital points of 
 the line could not yet be abandoned. His worn and wasted troops 
 were ordered to hold their positions with the bayonet, and made re- 
 peated charges over the breastworks after their last round of ammu- 
 nition was gone, and the moiety gathered from the bodies of the dead 
 had been expended. The calls for support were made more urgefit^ 
 but it was now the policy of the commanding general to bring in all his 
 troops upon the new line, and, under cover of the terrible fire of the 
 artillery, the lines facing the east began to move in. Artillery ammu- 
 nition had been freely spent. But it was now becoming momentarily 
 more hazardous to fetch up new supplies. Finally the artillery was 
 drawn in midway between Fairview and Chancellorsville, where it 
 again went into position, and the infantry retired to the breast- 
 works vacated by the artillery, where a fresh supply of ammunition 
 was distributed. The enemy were quick to follow up their advan- 
 tage, and rushed forward to profit by the movement. But the in- 
 fantry of Sickles were well posted to receive them and check their 
 exultant progress. And now the artillery being unprotected by 
 intrenchments suffered severely from the fire of the rebel infantry, 
 and the loss in both men and horses was severe. Resolutely the 
 infantry held their ground. " Charge after charge," says General 
 Sickles,* " was made by this gallant brigade (Mott's) under 
 Colonel Sewell, of the Fifth New Jersey, before it was withdrawn, 
 terribly reduced and mutilated, from the post assigned it. Its stern 
 resistance to the impulsive assaults of the enemy, and the brilliant 
 * General Sickles' official report, MS. 
 
132 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0R8VILLE. 
 
 charges made in return, were worthy of the ' Old Guard.' No sol- 
 dier could refuse a tribute of admiration in remembrance of the last 
 charge made. A small body, for a regiment, drove the enemy out 
 of the rifle-pits near Fairview before withdrawing, and returned 
 with forty men, whose sole reliance in this charge was in the bayo- 
 net — every cartridge having been expended moments before." 
 
 Sickles now withdrew his artillery, which passed to the new po- 
 .sition, and formed his infantry in three lines about the Chancellor 
 house, on the right of General Hancock, of Couch's corps. Tyler's 
 brigade, of Humphrey's division of the Fifth corps, had also been 
 ordered out to the support of French upon the right of the line in 
 front of and to the right of the White House, where a hot fire was 
 kept up until its ammunition was expended, and where the enemy 
 vigorously assailed it. 
 
 It was now past ten o'clock. Since five in the morning the battle 
 had been raging with scarcely an interruption. In accordance with 
 the plan of the commanding general, the Union line had been grad- 
 ually drawn in, and had finally begun to pass to the ground he had 
 selected on which to receive the rebel attacks. The guns of Lewis, 
 Seeley, and Randolph were the last to make a stand on the Fair- 
 view front, never slackening fire until every round of ammunition 
 was expended. But now there was visible exhaustion in the ene- 
 my's ranks, and when Seeley finally withdrew his guns he 
 " brought with him all the harness from thirty or forty of his dead 
 and wounded horses, leaving no trophy of his battery on the field 
 except the memorable loss it had inflicted on the enemy." When the 
 infantry likewise moved back to the junction of the United States 
 and Ely's ford roads, it moved deliberately and without serious mo- 
 -festation, the enemy refusing to follow up, and General Sickles re- 
 ports having taken " at least four hundred prisoners," while retir- 
 ing. Lepine's battery of the First corps, however, was furiously 
 assailed on this part of the field, and in thirty nrinutes lost by death 
 and wounds three out of four officers, forty men, and as many horses, 
 the infantry being obliged to withdraw the pieces by hand. 
 
 Late at night, or rather early on the morning of the 3d, General 
 Hooker had issued the following order for the posting of troops oa 
 the new line : " General Reynolds will post his corps, the right 
 
THE FINAL LINE OF BATTLE. 133_- 
 
 resting on the Rapidan, on the east bank of Hunting run, and ex- 
 tending along that run up to the crossing of the Chancellorsville 
 and Ely's ford roads, and thence along that road in the direction of 
 Chancellorsville. General Sykes will form on his left along the 
 same road, and this whole line will be supported by the remaining 
 portion of any corps of General Meade. General Reynolds will 
 throw well out to the front a line of skirmishers to give him timely 
 notice of any approach of an enemy. General Howard will throw 
 his corps on to the line now occupied by General Meade, and will 
 also throw his pickets well out along his whole line, for the purpose 
 of keeping himself, informed of the movements of the enemy. 
 These lines must be held at all hazards. The Second, Twelfth, and 
 Third corps will hold their present positions until further orders, 
 sending all their wagons and spare batteries immediately to take 
 post in the vicinity of United States Ford." 
 
 It was in the position indicated by this order that General 
 Hooker's army stood at the opening of the great battle on the 
 morning of the 3d, the fighting being almost exclusively done by 
 the Third, Twelfth, and Second corps, the most desperate and per- 
 sistent attacks being delivered upon the Third corps and Williams' 
 division of the Twelfth. But as soon as it was decided to abandon 
 entirely the position at Chancellorsville, and gather all in upon the 
 more contracted line, new dispositions were ordered. The Eleventh 
 corps had, early in the day, relieved the Fifth, which had been 
 brought up to the centre, where Humphrey's had been put into the 
 battle, Sykes had been placed on the right centre of the new line 
 on the left of the First, and Griffin in support. As the Third 
 corps retired it was at first put in support of the Fifth, but was 
 subsequently brought up to the front, occupying the apex of the 
 new line at the centre and connecting with Sykes of the Fifth on the 
 right. On the left of Sickles wag Couch of the Second corps, who 
 connected with the right of the Eleventh, and on the extreme left, 
 beyond the Eleventh, overlooking the Rappahannock, were posted 
 the remnants of the two divisions of the Twelfth corps. On ac- 
 count of the thick wood which covered almost this entire ground 
 there were few positions where artillery could be used to advantage. 
 Ground was, however, selected and the guns placed in three large 
 
134 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 batteries, one on the left of the line of thirty guns, twenty rifles and 
 ten light twelve-pounders under Captain Randal, one of forty-eight 
 guns, twenty-four twelve-pounders, and twenty-four three-inch, at 
 the angle of the line near the White House, under Captain Weed, 
 and one of thirty-two guns, twenty light rifles and twelve twelve- 
 pounders on the right of the line near Hunting creek, commanded 
 by Colonel Wainwright.* 
 
 This then was the position in which the Union army finally stood, 
 and which it proceeded to fortify, covering the front with tangled 
 abatis. The enemy did not immediately attack, but at the angle 
 threw out a cloud of skirmishers and sharpshooters, who greatly an- 
 noyed the men while attempting to establish 'and strengthen the 
 line. But the rebel officers, whatever may have been the disposi- 
 tion of the men, were eager to push forward and press the Union 
 troops to the last extremity. General Jackson j just before he re- 
 ceived his mortal wound, was remonstrated with for exposing him- 
 self so much. " There is no danger," was his answer. " Go back 
 and tell General Hill to press on." He was preparing to make a 
 fresh onset when he was stricken down. An aide had reported to 
 General Lee that it had been the expressed intention of General 
 Jackson to " press the enemy on the morrow (Sunday).- " Those 
 people shall be pressed," was the laconic reply of Lee. And well 
 was the sentence executed. Accordingly, when the battle at Chancel- 
 lorsville closed, a little respite was given in the rebel army for re- 
 plenishing ammunition and taking some refreshments, but only for a 
 brief interyal, and then the pressure was resumed. The rebel soldiers 
 were worn out with long marching and incessant and desperate fight- 
 ing, but the battle must be renewed, and the whereabouts and con- 
 
 «■ Waterman's, C, First R. I. (second sec), four three-inch ; Barnes', C, First N. Y., 
 four three-inch ; Phillip's, E, First Mass., six three inch : Hazlett's, D, Fifth U. S., six 
 ten-pounders ; Randal's, E, First U. S., four twelve-pounders ; Martin's, C, First Mass., 
 six twelve-pounders; Kirby's, I, First U. S., six twelve-pounders; Fitzhugh's, K, 
 First N. Y., four three-inch ; Rickett's, F, First Pa., four three-inch ; Ames', G, First 
 N. Y., six twelve-pounders ; Martin's, I, Fifth U. S., four three-inch; Gibbs', L, First 
 Ohio, six twelve-inch; Waterman's, C, First R. I. (first section), two three-meh ; 
 Bruen's Tenth N. Y., six twelve-pounders; Edgell's, A, First N. Y., six three inch; 
 Ransom's, C, Fifth U: S., six twelve-pounders ; Stewart's, B, Fourth U. S., six twelve- 
 pounders ; Hall's Second Maine, six three-inch ; Weidieck's, I, First N. Y., foUr three- 
 inch ; Knapp's First Pa., four ten-pounders ; Reynold's, L, First N. Y., six three- 
 inch. 
 
THE FINAL LINE OF BATTLE. 136 
 
 dition of the Union line must be known. * " It was now about 
 twelve o'clock," says General Colston, who commanded Hill's divi- 
 sion of Jackson's corps. " The enemy was driven beyond Chancel- 
 lorsville. The troops of my division were almost entirely without 
 ammunition, having expended all their own, besides a large quantity 
 of Yankee ammunition. They were accordingly withdrawn to the 
 rear, and supplied with fresh ammunition and with rations, of 
 which they stood in great need, and their shattered ranks were re- 
 formed. No further movement took place until about three 
 o'clock (p. M.) At this time I received an order to report in person 
 to General Lee. Upon my doing so, the general ordered me to, 
 form my division perpendicular to the road leading from Tfie 
 Chancellorsville house towards the United States ford, to throw 
 forward skirmishers, and to advance for the purpose of feeling and 
 ascertaining the enemy's position, not of taking his batteries. To 
 this he added that the road turned to the right at about a quarter 
 of a mile distant, but that I would probably meet opposition before 
 I got there. I accordingly formed my troops on both sides of the 
 road, Nichol's and Colston's brigades being on the left, and Jones' 
 and Paxton's on the right. I ordered Lieutenant Hinrichs, of the 
 engineers, to advance with the skirmishers and reconnoitre the 
 enemy's position. The command was then given for the division 
 to move forward. Hardly had they advanced a few paces, when a 
 terrific fire of shell and canister was opened by the enemy, from a 
 battery of twelve pieces of artillery. I ordered a section of Napo- 
 leon guns to advance up the road, and to reply to the enemy's fire. 
 There was no other spot than the road in which they could be 
 placed, and that was too narrow to allow a large number of pieces 
 to be put in battery. Finding that they would be speedily silenced, 
 and probably with useless loss of life and material by the enemy's 
 superior artillery, I ordered them back after a few rounds. In the ^ 
 meantime, perceiving some confusion on the left of the road, I pro- 
 ceeded there and found the Tenth Louisiana regiment exposed to a 
 perfect storm of grape and shell, and rapidly giving way. Sec- 
 onded by my aid, Lieutenant Tosh, and by the gallant exertions of 
 the officers of this regiment, whose conduct deserves the highest 
 
 * General Colston's official report, "Eeb. Eec.," Vol. X., p. 272. 
 
136 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORS VILLE. 
 
 praifee, I succeeded in arresting this retrograde movement, in spite 
 of the enemy's continued fire ; but the carnage in this small regiment 
 was great. In less than two minutes, fifty officers and men fell, 
 killed and wounded, by my side, including Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Leggett, who was instantly killed by a shell. The remainder of 
 the brigade suffered in a less degree, some portions having advanced, 
 inside of the point wherei the enemy's shot were falling. By this 
 
 lime it-«vas ascertained that the enemy occupied a formidable posi- 
 tion ; twelve pieces of artillery were planted in barbette, at the top 
 
 ■afthejrst hill, and a line of intrenchments, occupied by infantry, 
 stretched out on each side of the artillery, occupying a front much 
 wider than that of my division. Another line of infantry, preceded 
 by skirmishers, was drawn up outside of the works. To advance 
 in the face of such a force, with a division so much reduced as mine 
 was^ would have been only to have insured its destruction, and 
 would have been contrary to the instructions I had received from 
 the general commanding. I accordingly reported to General 
 Stuart, who was, for the time, my immediate commander, that ray 
 division was not able to attack, with any prospect of success, the 
 position of the, enemy." This passage, which is taken from General 
 Colston's official report, makes a long story out of a very short one. 
 Had he said that he advanced with his division, consisting of four 
 brigades, against the new Union line, and was repulsed with great 
 slaughter, he would have simply said all that there was to say. 
 
 The fact was that the position itself was strong, was being well 
 fortified, and was defended on all sides by troops that felt as resolute 
 and ready for fight as they had at any time since the opening of the 
 battle. Indeed they now challenged attack. But the enemy at once 
 settled down upon a line confronting that taken by General Hooker, 
 and set vigorously to work to fortify. It was now evidently the 
 iirtention of neither of the contending armies to take the initia- 
 
 vfcive. and beyond strong reconnoissances sent out all along the 
 lines from each side to try the strength and vulnerability of the 
 other, and vigorous sharpshooting upon the skirmish lines, nothing 
 was undertaken, neither party being' willing to take the chances of 
 a general battle by advancing upon the other while awaiting attack 
 behind his intrenchments. These reconnoissances, however, were 
 
THE FINAL LINE OF BATTLE. 137 
 
 frequent and forceful. "On Sunday evening," says Captain 
 Brockway, of Ricketts' Pennsylvania battery, "we relieved Seeley's 
 regular battery, which had lost fifly mep and as many horses. The 
 distance across the field to the enemy was only two hundred and 
 fifty yards, and you can imagine with what intensity we watched 
 their movements. We unhitched our horses and sent them to the 
 rear, as the orders were to hold the place at all hazards, ani^iireat 
 could not be considered. We silently piled the canister by the 
 muzzles of our pieces, as no other ammunition would avail much at 
 that distance. An attack at ten o'clock in the evening drove in our 
 pickets, and we double-shotted our guns with canister. The balls 
 flew thicker than hail ; but no fear nor trepidation was evinced, and 
 the enemy were compelled to retire. They advanced several times 
 during the night, but dared not charge up to the muzzles of our 
 guns. The infantry, to protect themselves, commenced throwing 
 up intrenchments, which were nearly completed by daylight. On 
 Monday, the 4th inst.. Griffin's division made a reconnoissance from 
 our front, and found the enemy heavily intrenched along the plank 
 road, and evidently .waiting to be attacked. Throughout the entire 
 day we were annoyed by their sharpshooters. General Whipple* 
 (commanding the Third division of Sickles' corps) was shot by one 
 of them close to our battery. Some of Berdan's sharpshooters 
 finally silenced them, except one persistent fellow, stationed behind 
 a large tree, in the forks of which he rested his rifle. He put six 
 bullets on the sapling which covered one of Berdan's men. He was 
 finally brought down by setting three men at work upon him. On 
 his person was found $48 in gold, $4.50 in silver, $200 in green 
 backs, $50 in Confederate money, and three packs of cards." 
 
 This brief fragment from the diary of an officer who was at the 
 fore front, on the new line of battle, is a fair specimen of the man- 
 ner in which either side tried the strength of the other during the 
 three days in which the two armies thus confronted each other. 
 During the 3d General Reynolds reports that his pickets and 
 
 *The works were begun under an annoying fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, who 
 were soon handsomely driven by Berdan, to whom the outposts were confided, but not 
 until the brate and accomplished Brigadier-General A. W. Whipple, commanding 
 the Third division, had fallen mortally wounded while directing in person the con- 
 Btruction of the field works in his front. General Sickles' report, MS. 
 
138 THE BATTLE OF CHANGELLORSVILLE. 
 
 scouts* thrown forward from his front were constantly bringing in 
 prisoners from the woods, while his troops were employed in 
 strengthening their position and clearing the ground for. placing the 
 artillery. On the 4tb, the skirmishers on the left of his line were 
 engaged more or less during the entire day, and somewhat later, 
 those on the right, in frant of the division of General Robinson, were 
 for a short time engaged, while an attack was threatened. During 
 the afternoon of this day two regiments of infantry, with a section 
 of artillery, General Robinson in command, were sent, utider orders 
 from General Hooker, to reconnoitre the road to Ely's ford, and 
 reported that the position was occupied by the enemy in force. 
 Towards five o'clock a brigade of the Third division, under Colonel 
 Roy Stone, was ordered to follow up Hunting creek in the direction 
 of the plank road, nearly due south, which, after having driven in 
 the enemy's skirmishers, found itself in the presence of what ap- 
 peared to be a brigade of infantry, with the road which it had fol- 
 lowed barricaded by fallen trees. It being nearly dark before the 
 brigade reached its positiop, it was deemed inexpedient to attack, the 
 fact having been already clearly developed that the enemy was 
 present in force, and strongly posted. 
 
 The posting and forming the troops of the enemy on the new con- 
 fronting line was given to General Rodes. f "As soon as our artil- 
 lery fire," he says, " would permit, the heights were occupied by the 
 infantry, and, by order of General Stuart, I took charge of ar- 
 ranging all the troops found on the field in line of battle, parallel 
 to the plank road. . . My troops were located as follows : Iverson's 
 brigade on the right, extending from Chancellorsville house up the 
 plank road ; next, Rodes' brigade, then Ramseur's brigade, and 
 finally Doles' brigade, all parallel and close to the road. Doles was 
 subsequently thrown across the road, and at an angle of forty-five 
 degrees with it, connecting with General Pender, by whom this line 
 was continued on to the left. Colston's division, now attached to 
 my command, was located on the turnpike road, to the right, and 
 in continuation of my line. Colquitt's brigade was placed &n echelon 
 with reference to both Iverson and Colston, and one hundred yards 
 
 * Report of General Keynolds, MS. 
 
 t General Bodes' offioial report, " Eeb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 303. 
 
THE FINAL LINE OF BATTLE. 139 
 
 in rear, to enable our artillery to operate in the interval. This po- 
 sition was strongly fortified, and was held without molestation until 
 Tuesday morning, when I pushed forward my whole line of skir- 
 mishers to feel the enemy. He was discovered to be in very great 
 force, both of infantry and artillery, with formidable intrench- 
 ments." Heth's division (Hill's) was posted to the right, confront- 
 ing the Twelfth and Eleventh corps, and McLaws and Anderson's 
 divisions, until their withdrawal, were in support of these and 
 uniting their lines. In mentioning Lieutenant Brown, who was 
 several days in charge of the sharpshooters of his brigade. General 
 Pender says : * " He is a young man who deserves promotion. He 
 held his skirmishers so close to the enemy's breastworks on Monday 
 and Tuesday as to pick off their artillery horses, men working on 
 their trenches, and any one seen mounted. He drove in their skir- 
 mishers on all occasions." General Doles, of Rodes' division, says : 
 f " On Tuesday, the 5th, the skirmishers were ordered to press for- 
 ward and feel the enemy, and ascertain his position and strength. 
 They found him in strong numbers and well intrenched." 
 
 * General Pender's official report, " Reb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 27S. 
 t General Doles' official report, " Eeb. Eec," Vol. X., p. 280. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 SEDGWICK AT PEEDERICKSBtTEG 
 AND SALEM CHUBCH. 
 
 >HEN General Hooker sent the order at 9 o'clock, 
 on the evening of the 2d of May, to General 
 Sedgwick, to cross the river at Fredericksburg 
 and march immediately to form junction with 
 him at Chancellorsville, and to accomplish this 
 by dawn of the 3d, it was with the expectation 
 that he was still on the north bank of the Rap- 
 pahannock. But General Sedgwick had pre- 
 viously received two orders, the one at a little 
 before dark on the evening of the 2d, directing him " to cross the river 
 as soon as indications would permit, and capture Fredericksburg, and 
 vigorously pursue the enemy;" the other, very shortly after, at five 
 minutes past seven, directing him to pursue the enemy on the Bowl- 
 ing Green road. In obedience to these orders General Sedgwick 
 called in the two divisions of his corps still on the left bank, and 
 at 9 p. M. crossed the river at Franklin's crossing. On attempting 
 to advance on the Bowling Green road, he immediately encountered 
 the enemy, and sharp skirmishing ensued. Little progress was, ac- 
 cordingly, made, and at eleven o'clock that night he received the 
 imperative order to march to Chancellorsville. 
 
 It was the opinionxof General Warren,* who was sent by General 
 Hooker from Chancellorsville, to advise with General Sedgwick 
 about the route to be taken, and to urge him to expedition in the 
 march, that the enemy, as soon as they discovered the movement of 
 Sedgwick's corps to the soutli bank of the river, had placed a line 
 of skirmishers around his column, so that the moment he attempted 
 to move in any direction he would run into it, and the enemy would 
 
 * Warren's testimony, " Conduct, of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 47. 
 (140) 
 
SEDGWICK AT FREDERIOKSBURQ. 141 
 
 thus be immediately advised of the direction in which he was at- 
 tempting to go. 
 
 General Sedgwick was in line of battle, on the river opposite 
 Franklin's crossing, when the order to move reached him, and he 
 at once made preparations to put his column upon the march. 
 General Newton, commanding his Third division, took the advance, 
 followed by General Howe of the Second division. The First 
 division, under General Brooks, was left to confront the enemy, 
 with whom it was at the time skirmishing, and, by vigorous dem- 
 onstrations, to detain the forces of the foe in the intrenchments 
 on the heights in his front, until the works about Fredericksburg 
 were carried. No sooner had the head of Newton's column com- 
 menced to move, than the rebel skirmish line was encountered, 
 which kept up a scattering fire as it fell back before the advancing 
 troops, thus notifying the enemy of the progress which the Union 
 column was making. 
 
 When the main body of the rebel army, under Lee and Jackson, 
 abandoned their fortifications at Fredericksburg, and marched away 
 to Chancellorsville, the division of General Early, and Barksdale's 
 brigade of McLaw's division, with a reserve of artillery under 
 General Pendleton, were left to hold these works, and guard an im- 
 portant depot of supplies at Hamilton's crossing. General Early, 
 with his entire division, was on the right of the rebel line, stretch- 
 ing from the Bowling Green road to a point opposite the Howison 
 House. Barksdale's single brigade held the heights from Early's 
 left to Taylor's hill, a point on the Rappahannock above the city. 
 Pendleton had made a good use of his artillery, placing it in com- 
 manding positions along Marye's hill, Lee's hill, and the interme- 
 diate ground. Being instantly advised of the advance of the Union 
 column, by the firing of their skirmishers, the enemy were every- 
 where on the alert. The activity of Sedgwick early in the evening, 
 on the Bowling Green road, now favored his advance on Freder- 
 icksburg, as the enemy was kept in doubt about the direction from 
 which the blow was to come, and the leaving of Brook's division 
 on Early's front kept that general with his entire division on that 
 part of the field, thus compelling Barksdale, with one brigade, to 
 cover nearly three miles of front. 
 
142 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0B8VILLE. 
 
 It was daylight before the head of Newton's column reached the 
 city, and immediately on entering, four regiments from Wheaton's 
 and Shaler's brigades were ordered to advance upon the rifle-pits in 
 front of the enemy's works. They made the charge upon that part 
 of the line protected by the famous stone-wall, at the foot of Marye's 
 hill, where, in the previous December, Burnside had suffered, and 
 in vain assaulted with terrible slaughter. . They approached within 
 twenty yards of the, works, but were finally repulsed by the fire 
 from the rifle-pits, and the batteries on the heights. This attack 
 served to develop the strength and position of the enemy bn this 
 part of the field, as well as to put them on the alert for meeting 
 other attacks, which it was now evident were soon to come. 
 
 General Gibbon had been ordered early in the night to cross from 
 Falmouth with his division, and join Sedgwick in driving the enemy 
 from the heights, and when that was accomplished, to hold the town, 
 so that Sedgwick might have his entire corps with which to make 
 his advance. The laying of the bridge, for the passage of his divi- 
 sion, which was commenced early in the night, opposite the Lacy 
 house, was not completed in time for him to cross before daylight 
 of the 3d. At two o'clock A. m. General Barksdale was apprised 
 of the preparations of Gibbon for crossing, and General Hays with 
 his brigade was sent, by General Early, to the help of the rebel left, 
 and General Wilcox, who was at Bank's ford, sent down a part of 
 his brigade to the same destination. After the failure of the first 
 advance of Sedgwick, which must be regarded more in the light of 
 a feint, than a serious attack, preparations were made for" a general 
 assault, and, as preliminary thereto, a hot artillery fire was opened 
 along the Union line, which was answered by General Pendleton 
 from all the heights, this artillery duel lasting from six until 
 nearly ten o'clock.* General Gibbon was at first ordered to proceed 
 upon the extreme Union right, and turn the left of the rebel posi- 
 tion ; but, upon advancing, he found that a canal, which takes water 
 from the river above and conducts it in rear of the town for manu- 
 facturing purposes, was flooded, and all the bridges taken up, and 
 he would be obliged to work under fire in relaying them. General 
 Howe, who had not yet crossed Hazel run, and who had been 
 * Colonel Johus' testimony, " Conduct of tho War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 39. 
 
SEDGWICK AT FREDERICKSBURG. 143 
 
 ordered to advance, and endeavor to turn the right of the rebel 
 position on Marye's heights, found that the character of Hazel run, 
 and the force displayed in his front, precluded any hope of success 
 on his part. 
 
 Meanwhile General Sedgwick had determined to storm the rebel 
 works in his front. But it was eleven o'clock before the storming 
 parties were formed ready for the onset. Preparatory thereto. 
 Colonel Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts, was early thrown into 
 the city cemetery, an elevated piece of ground within the corporate 
 limits, surrounded by a brick wall, where he could securely observe 
 the movements of the enemy, and prepare for the charge. The 
 troops composing the storming parties were formed in two columns. 
 The right, commanded by Colonel George C. Spear, consisted of the 
 Sixty-first Pennsylvania, Major Dawson, and Forty-third New York, 
 Colonel Baker, supported by the Sixty-seventh New York, Colonel 
 Cross, and the Eighty-second Pennsylvania, Major Bassett, led by 
 Colonel Shaler. The left consisted of the Seventh Massachusetts, 
 Colonel Johns, and Thirty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Welsh. The line of battle, commanded by Colonel Burnham, con- 
 sisted of the Fifth Wisconsin, Colonel Allen, Sixth Maine, Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Harris, Thirty-first New York, Colonel Jones, and 
 Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Ely, the latter volunteering. 
 The column moved along the plank road, and to the right of it 
 directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the double 
 quick to the left of the plank, against the rifle-pits, neither party 
 halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the enemy from their 
 lower line of works. "At ten minutes past eleven o'clock," says 
 Colonel Johns, "I moved by the flank on the telegraph road. 
 This road led through the enemy's works. The stone wall near the 
 base of Marye's hill crossed the road, extending on each side of it. 
 I moved my troops up in good order. I noticed the rebels looking 
 at us, and -was surprised that they did not fire sooner. They did 
 not fire at us at all until we got within perhaps three hundred yards 
 of the wall. They then opened upon us, with which, however, they 
 did not efi"ect much, as they could not get depression enough to strike 
 us. But we had a strong enfilading fire from both sides. I noticed, 
 as we approached, men poking their. heads up over the wall. They 
 
144 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 commenced firing upon us. It seemed to me that the men inside 
 the wall stood as thick as they possibly could. I thir^k that there 
 were two ranks of them; the front rank would fire, and then be re- 
 lieved by the rear rank. At all events, apparently the greater por- 
 tion of their force was crowded in behind the stone wall on each 
 side of the road. I advanced at the head of the brigade and made 
 a charge ; but we were repulsed. They broke the head of my column 
 badly at the first fire. The men were moving, up in good order, but 
 this tremendous fire coming so suddenly, broke the head of my 
 column ; the rear of the column did not break. I rallied them, and 
 got up perhaps fifliy yards nearer. This firing continued all the 
 time, and it is very difficult to rally men under actual fire. Still, I 
 rallied them, and came up again. But the head of my column 
 broke again. It of course received the severest part of the fire. I 
 was struck myself at that charge, but not disabled. I got my men 
 up a third time, and we went right ahead then and did not stop at 
 all. A portiou got through on the road, and a portion went oif on 
 the right, and got over the wall and behind the enemy, and that 
 gave us possession of the works. At the last charge I was struck 
 again, and very seriously injured, and was carried off the field. In 
 about fifteen minutes one of my wounded men came back, and said 
 that the regiment had carried the heights, and our colors were 
 there." 
 
 With equal determination, but with less delay, the column on the 
 right went forward, and carried the heights in its front. Colonel 
 Spear, who led, received a mortal hurt. In the meantime General 
 Howe, who was still below Hazel run, received orders to join ill the 
 assault. Hastily forming in three lines he awaited the signal of 
 attack upon the right. At the sound of the first gun he moved on- 
 ward, keeping to the left of Deep run, and entered the enemy's lines 
 at'the Howison house. Immediately veering to the right, he swept 
 down the rebel lines, taking prisoners and guns, and clearing Lee's 
 hill, the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Mississippi regiments, and the 
 celebrated Washington artillery being captured. The victory was 
 complete; but was purchased at the sacrifice of a thousand men. 
 Though opposed by a much smaller number, yet, sheltered as the 
 enemy were, by strong works, and having full opportunity for con- 
 
SEDGWICK AT FMEDEBICKSBUBG. 145 
 
 centrating upon the threatened points, they were able to make a 
 formidable resistance. Hays' brigade, which had been dispatched 
 by General Early from below, and the regiments of Wilcox, sent 
 from above, were unable to give much direct support, so quickly did 
 the Union troops carry the works when once in motion. As soon 
 as the struggle was decided, (jeneral Early withdrew his forces from 
 their position on the heights, and formed across the telegraph road 
 at the point where the military road meets it.* 
 
 General Sedgwick now brought up his entire corps. Brook's divi- 
 sion, which he had left confronting Early and covering the Franklin 
 bridge, having over two miles to march, was awaited, and upon its 
 arrival was put in advance to lead the column in the march to join 
 Hooker, followed in succession by Newton and Howe. It was three 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3d, before the corps got fairly in 
 motion. General Wilcox, who had come with his brigade from 
 Bank's ford to the assistance of Barksdale, having no sooner learned 
 that the Fredericksburg heights had been carried, and that Barks- 
 dale had been routed, than he proposed to General Hays to form 
 line on the heights in front of the Stanbury hill, reaching across the 
 plank road, and make a stand. But Hays had received positive 
 orders to retire, and rejoin the division of General Early. Being 
 left alone, Wilcox, with a courage and a resolution rarely witnessed, 
 determined to show a bold front with his single brigade, and, ac- 
 cordingly, drew it up in line at right angles to the plank, upon a 
 crest just in front of Stanbury's, placing two rifled pieces in rear of 
 the left of his line, and two others just in front of his right, and 
 awaited the approach of Sedgwick. The artillery on both sides 
 opened at long range, and the skirmishers of Sedgwick cautiously 
 approached, the artillery duel being kept up, his line of battle ap- 
 parently reluctant to advance. Having delayed the column a con- 
 siderable time, and judging that Sedgwick was outflanking him, 
 Wilcox withdrew by the river road, and hastened forward to Salem 
 church. As the plank is a much more direct route to the church 
 than that by the river, Sedgwick could easily have beaten Wilcox in 
 the march thither. But the lattei- was first on the ground. That 
 he might delay Sedgwick as much as possible, and give himself time 
 
 » General Howe's testimony, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 21. 
 10 
 
146 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVJLLE. 
 
 to reach the church and throw up some protection, Wilcox sent 
 Major Collins with a company of cavalry over to the plank, with 
 orders to deploy a part of his command dismounted as skirmishers, 
 on either side of the road just in rear of a thicket of pine. The 
 firing of these troopers from this concealed position made the head 
 of Sedgwick's columns cautious. By the time this little force had 
 been routed, Wilcox had reached Salem church and taken position, 
 at right angles to the plank, upon the crest which crosses the road 
 near the toll-gate, and as soon as Sedgwick made his appearance 
 opened fire upon his column with artillery, and followed it up with 
 infantry. In the meantime, Lee had been studiously kept informed 
 of Sedgwick's movements, and when he found that the heavy fight- 
 ing on his immediate front at Chancellorsville was over — hearing 
 that the heights at Fredericksburg had been taken, and that the 
 Union line was commencing to advance towards Chancellorsville — 
 determined to detach a sufficient force from his main body to crush 
 the single corps of Sedgwick. He accordingly ordered General Mc- 
 Laws to go with his division, and Mahone's brigade of Anderson's 
 division, to the support of Wilcox. McLaws arrived at Salem 
 church just as Wilcox was going into position at the toll-gate, and 
 before the columns of Sedgwick had come up. 
 
 After maintaining a brisk skirmish here for a short time, Wilcox 
 retired to the rear of Salem church, where he took up the position 
 which he had chosen at right angles to the plank, with large open 
 fields in rear, and a dense curtain of wood in front, where some 
 works had boen thrown up, posting tjvo of his regiments on the 
 right of the road, and two on the left, his line being well garnished 
 with artillery, and a body of sharpshooters thrown forward to the 
 church and the school-house a short distance in front of the line. 
 Upon the arrival of General McLaws he assumed command, and 
 posted General Semmes' brigade in line, on the left of Wilcox, and 
 General Mahone's brigade still further towards the river, on the lefl; 
 of Semmes; upon the right of Wilcox he planted Kershaw's brig- 
 ade, and upon the right of Kershaw the brigade of General Wof- 
 ford. This was a strong position, with open ground to the rear over 
 which troops and guns could be wheeled to right or left, as the ex- 
 igencies of the fight might require, besides having considerable arti- 
 
SEDOWICK AT SALEM CHURCH. 147 
 
 ficial cover. It will thus be seen that there was upon this line the 
 _ division of McLaws, and two brigades of Anderson, all fresh troops, 
 and eager to engage. Besides, the division of Early was somewhere 
 upon the rear in a threatening attitude. General Gibbon confined 
 himself to the occupation and defense of Fredericksburg, which he 
 partially fortified. Hence, he was practically out of the fight, not 
 even holding Early on his front. 
 
 Supposing that he had only the brigade of Wilcox to oppose him, 
 which he had easily driven, General Sedgwick went forward with 
 the greater confidence. Wilcox, in his stand at the toll-gate, had 
 shrewdly held the troops arriving from Chancellorsville out of sight,, 
 concealed behind the dense woods, where they were kept busy iu 
 intrenching. Upon the first appearance of opposition at Salem 
 church. Brooks' division, which was in advance, was formed to at- 
 tack, Bartlett's brigade in line of battle on the left of the road, 
 Torbet's New Jersey brigade on the right, and Russell's, with the 
 artillery, upon the centre, ready to act as occasion might require. 
 It was known that the enemy was in the woods in front ; but it was 
 supposed to be the rear guard of his retreating column, and the in- 
 formation had been obtained from rebel deserters, perhaps sent back 
 to mislead, that the enemy's trains had fallen into hopeless confusion 
 and might easily be captured. Without pausing to shell the woods, 
 or develop the strength of the foe on his front. Brooks' division was 
 pushed forward, on the very heels of the skirmishers, until it came 
 suddenly upon the well-massed rebel forces drawn up in ambush, 
 awaiting the advance. Brooks found himself vastly outnumbered, 
 and outflanked on either side, by forces under cover of skilfully 
 constructed rifle-pits and barricades, while' his own men were march- 
 ing up all unconcerned and unsuspicious of any considerable confront- 
 ing force, presenting the best possible marks for the rebel riflemen. 
 The consequence was that Brooks was overwhelmed and driven back 
 at the first onset, with a loss of at least a quarter of his division, 
 which fell with particular severity upon oflScers. Wheaton's brigade 
 of Newton's division was sent out upon the right of Brooks, and 
 other troops of the corps were pushed up to the support of his hard- 
 pressed men. Wheaton went into position by the Morrison house, 
 and advancing, crossed a deep ravine, and ascending the blufis on 
 
148 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 the opposite side, found, on crossing the ridge beyond, the enemy 
 behind earthworks in timber, and the undergrowth filled with rifle- 
 pits and abatis, and was soon engaged under a terrific fire of 
 musketry from a hidden foe. "To sustain this fire many minutes," 
 says General Wheaton in his report, " was evidently impossible, and 
 I immediately dispatched staff officers to the rear to bring up troops 
 with which to form a second line, and others to assist in delaying 
 the retirement of my two small regiments, which it was anticipated 
 must soon occur. Before they were pushed back, the troops on the 
 left were driven towards us in confusion, by overwhelming odds, 
 and by the time the second line was formed, the battalions of the 
 enemy were rushing up the ravine we had just crossed, and for a fevr 
 minutes it seemed hardly possible to hold our position ; but the rebel 
 regiments could not keep formed under our heavy fire, and gradually 
 retired with heavy loss, while our most advanced line moved off in 
 good order by its right flank, and formed in rear of the batteries 
 behind our second. As the enemy retired, our lines advanced; but 
 to attempt the woods again, with our present force, was not deemed 
 possible, and we held the crest this side. Night came on, and we 
 turned our attention to procuring ammunition, and aid for our 
 wounded." 
 
 Attacking, as the corps did, at a great disadvantage, practically 
 , plunging headlong into an ambuscade, it lost heavily without inflict- 
 ing any corresponding injury upon the foe. In illustration of the 
 loss sustained, the Ninety-fifth Pennsylvania may be taken as an 
 example. Of about three hundred, present for duty when the 
 movement opened, five officers and eighteen enlisted men were 
 killed, eight officers and one hundred and two enlisted men were 
 wounded, more than thirty of them mortally, and thirty-seven were 
 taken prisoners and missing, an aggregate of one hundred and sixty- 
 nine. Colonel Town, Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, Captain Chapman, 
 Adjutant Dunton and Lieutenant Hailer were of the killed, and 
 Major Town, Captains Roberts and West, and Lieutenants Stewart, 
 Town, Gelston, Topham and Jones of the wounded. The losses 
 in the One Hundred and Nineteenth Pennsylvania were hardly 
 less severe. Of four hundred and thirty-two for duty, it had twelve 
 killed, and one hundred and twelve wounded. Nearly a fifth of the 
 whole corps was by this time hors du combat. 
 
SEDGWICK AT SALEM CHURCH. 149 
 
 General Early, who, upon the capture of the heights above Fred- 
 ei'icksburg by Sedgwick, had retired upon the telegraph road towards 
 • Spottsylvania Court-House, and taken up a defensive position, ad- 
 vanced on the morning of the 4th, and reoccupied the works from 
 which he had been driven. Gibbon holding his small division within 
 the city, having fortified it afld put it in a state of defence. * "The 
 next morning," (the 4th) says General Barksdale, " the line of battle 
 was formed on the river road, General Gordon in front. General 
 Hays on the left, and my brigade on the right of the road. It was 
 soon discovered that Lee's and Marye's hills had been abandoned by 
 the enemy. General Gordon took possession of Marye's hill with- 
 out opposition. My brigade was ordered to the stone wall in front 
 of the hill ; and I was ordered to send out skirmishers, and if the 
 town was not strongly defended to storm and take it. I at once 
 sent out both scouts and skirmishers, both of whom reported that, 
 in their judgment, the town was in a state of strong defence : that 
 rifle-pits had been dug across the streets, and that cannon had been 
 planted on both sides of the river, which completely commanded the 
 entire town." 
 
 As the fighting on Brooks' front, at Salem church, had not com- 
 menced till towards nightfall, active operations were finally checked 
 by darkness, the Union troops sleeping on their arms on the field, 
 and the enemy holding on to their intrenchments and rifle-pits. 
 General Lee finding that the Sixth corps had been making a stub- 
 born fight, determined to go in person and take command, and to 
 order up Anderson with the three remaining brigades of his division 
 — Wright's, Perry's and Posey's, not already there, to the aid of Mc- 
 Laws and Early. General Lee arrived at Salem church at 11 a. m. 
 of the 4th, simultaneously with the head of Anderson's column. 
 To this time McLaws had done little more than keep up a vigorous 
 skirmishing, evidently intent on hugging his breastworks in his 
 advantageous position, and endeavoring to induce General Sedgwick 
 to attack. But the latter had now given up all intention of resum- 
 ing the offensive, and was only solicitous to bring his corps into a 
 position where he could hold his own. He accordingly ordered 
 Greneral Howe to about face, and extend his division to the left and 
 « Barksdale's official report, " Reb. Rec," Vol. X., p. 286. 
 
150 X'HE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 rear, until his left should reach to the river, as he now saw indica- 
 tions of an intention upon the part of the enemy to move upon his 
 left flank. Unfortunately for General Sedgwick, he was early in 
 the day informed that a force of 15,000 men had come up from the 
 direction of Richmond, and taken position upon the Fredericksburg 
 heights, thus cutting off his communications with the town. JS^o 
 such force had arrived, and no rebel force was on his rear other than 
 Early's division and Barksdale's brigade, which had been confront- 
 ing him from the first; but the report, doubtless, multiplied his 
 anxieties. During the night of the 3d, General Sedgwick had sent 
 back his wounded to Fredericksburg, but the occupation of the 
 heights by Early and Barksdale, on the morning of the 4th, had cut 
 off all communication in that direction with General Gibbon, and 
 compelled him to look to Bank's ford for the only avenue of retreat, 
 should he be compelled to withdraw across the river. As soon as 
 Wilcox had withdrawn his brigade from the defence of Bank's ford, 
 which he did early on the morning of the 3d, General Benham, of 
 the Union force, who was in command on the opposite bank, at once 
 laid a pontoon bridge, and threw across a force for its protection, 
 thus opening communication with General Sedgwick, and affording 
 him an open way to the north bank. The form which Sedgwick's 
 line had finally assumed was that of three sides of a square. The left 
 of his line rested on the river, or rather commanded the approaches 
 to it, commencing midway between Bank's ford and Fredericksburg, 
 and extending along the heights facing the latter place, till it crossed 
 the plank road, when it turned to the right, and for a mile continued 
 on a line parallel to that highway, when it again turned to the right 
 and occupied the position assumed in front of Salem church, extend- 
 ing to the right until it again covered, the approaches to the river. 
 A line of such length was necessarily attenuated, but advantage was 
 taken of the ground, and Colonel Tompkins, chief of artillery, had 
 posted his guns so as to protect the weak points. 
 
 Lee arrived on the field at a little before midday, and began to 
 make his dispositions for attack. McLaws, with the brigades of 
 Anderson which were with him, was allowed to remain substantially 
 in the position he was in during the previous niglit, while Anderson 
 was pushed forward so as to face the part of Sedgwick's line parallel 
 
SEDGWICK AT SALEM CHURCH. 151 
 
 to tho plank road, and Early was brought up to confront the left of 
 the Union line stretching forward to the river. The plan of attack 
 as finally adopted by General Lee was for McLaws to hold his 
 position, while Anderson and Early moved upon the Union left and 
 rear. It is marvellous that Lee, with such a force as he had in hand, 
 should have been so dilatory in making his decisions, and in opening 
 the battle, and his sluggishness can only be accounted for upon the 
 supposition that he had hope that Sedgwick would take the initia- 
 tive, or what is more probable, that he had already had about all 
 the fighting that his troops wanted, and that he was only anxious to 
 get Sedgwick across the river with as little exposure of his men and 
 consequent loss as possible. 
 
 Sedgwick, on his part, felt the precariousness of his situation ; but 
 he had put his corps in a good position, and had partially intrenched it, 
 and had he even been earlier attacked would have made a good fight. 
 General Warren, Chief Engineer officer of the army, had been with 
 Sedgwick from the commencement of the march, and remained with 
 the column until the close of the fighting before Salem church, on 
 the evening of the 3d. He then crossed on the bridge which had 
 been laid by General Benham at Bank's ford, and returned by 
 United States ford to General Hooker's headquarters, near Chan- 
 oellorsville, which he reached at 11 o'clock p. M. After full con- 
 ference with the commanding general, and learning that the army 
 was now in position to court an attack from the enemy, and no 
 longer to need the assistance of Sedgwick, Warren sent the follow- 
 ing telegram at midnight to Sedgwick :* " I find everything snug 
 here. We contracted the line a little and repulsed the last assault 
 with ease. General Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow, 
 if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force, un- 
 less he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away 
 for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep 
 up communication with General Benham at Bank's ford and Fred- 
 ericksburg. You can go to either place if you think best. To 
 cross at Bank's ford would bring you in supporting distance of the 
 main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericks- 
 burg." 
 
 * General Warren's official report, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 60. 
 
152 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 This dispatch* was not received by General Sedgwick until the 
 forenoon of the 4th was well advanced, owing to the circuitous 
 course it had to take, and not until after a pressure was beginning 
 to be felt on both his flanks, and upon his proper front. To retire 
 to Fredericksburg was out of the question, and to withdraw from 
 the presence of the enemy in any direction, in the temper in which they 
 then were, vigilant and ready to seize every advantage, was equally 
 impracticable. At about the time this message was received. Gen- 
 eral Howe was attacked by a force advancing from the direction of 
 Fredericksburg, evidently with the design of feeling the way to 
 Bank's ford, or to give Sedgwick notice that he had better cross. 
 But the demonstration was feeble, and was readily repulsed, and a 
 battle-flag and some two hundred prisoners were taken. Fifteen 
 minutes after the receipt of this telegram Sedgwick replied : " The 
 enemy threaten me Strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for 
 such attack. It was assumed for attack and not defence. It is not 
 improbable that the bridges at Bank's ford may be sacrificed. Can 
 you help me strongly if I am attacked? My bridges are two miles 
 from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from 
 attack, with the additional assistance of General Benham's brigade 
 alone."t This, it must be confessed, was not in a very hopeful strain, 
 and the intimation that he might be compelled to give up Bank's 
 ford discloses his desire to be ordered to recross there : for what 
 could he hope if Bank's ford was taken from him ? He had pre- 
 viously been telegraphing to General Hooker substantially in the 
 same strain, one message at nine in the morning, and another at 
 eleven, about the hour that he received the one from Warren, and 
 
 * The form of this dispatch, as given in General Sedgwick's report, differs materially 
 from the one above quoted. It seems that the following form was the one first sent, 
 for General Sedgwick says, " General Warren left me at 12 o'clock on the night of May 
 3, to' go to Chancellorsvllle, and immediately upon reaching Chancelloj-sville wrote 
 me this dispatch, ' I have reported your situation to General Hooker. I find that we 
 contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last 
 assault with ease. The troops are in good position. General Hooker says you are 
 separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to 
 force the position you attacked at 5 P. M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can 
 retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Bank's ford; the latter would enable 
 you to join us more readily.'" General Sedgwick's official report, "Conduct of the 
 War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 97. 
 
 t Sedgwick's testimony, " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 99. 
 
SEDGWICK AT 8ALKM CHURCH. I53 
 
 at a quarter past one in the afternoon he sent the following : * " I 
 oncupy the same position as yesterday, when General Warren left 
 me. I know of no means of knowing the enemy's force about me ; 
 deserters say 40,000. I shall take a position near Bank's ford, and 
 near the Taylor house, at the suggestion of General Warren. Of- 
 ficers have already gone to select a position. It is believed that the 
 heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the 
 enemy. I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank 
 of the Eappahannock until to-morrow." The tone of this is no less 
 despondent than the others, and in the disposition to make large 
 estimate of the forces opposed to him, is disclosed his strong anxiety 
 to retire. It was a great misfortune that these dispatches were so 
 long in reaching their destination, varying from five to eleven hours, 
 and it is not improbable that they were all taken off by the enemy. 
 General Hooker was very desirous of maintaining a foothold at 
 Bank's ford, and, fearing that Sedgwick would unnecessarily yield 
 it, at 11 in the morning of May 4, sent the following: "The major- 
 general commanding desires me to say that he does not wish you to 
 cross at Bank's ford unless you are compelled to do so. The bat- 
 teries at Bank's ford protect the position. If it is practicable for 
 you to maintain a position on the south side of the Rappahannock, 
 near Bank's ford, do so. It is very important that we should occupy 
 the position at Bank's ford ; General Tyler commands the batteries 
 there." To emphasize his desire, a half hour later, he said : " If 
 the necessary information can be obtained to-day, and if it shall be 
 of the character the commanding general anticipates, it is his inten- 
 tion to advance upon the enemy to-morrow. In this event the 
 position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will 
 be as favorable as the general could desire. It is for this reason 
 that he desires that your corps should not cross the Rappahannock." 
 But when these messages went. General Hooker had not received 
 the lugubrious ones of Sedgwick ; when, however, these came, seeing 
 that there was little hope of the Sixth corps holding tlie position it 
 was then in, he sent the following: "The commanding general 
 directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, if practicable, a 
 position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which 
 * " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 99. 
 
164 ' THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 you can hoid securely until to-morrow. Please let the commanding 
 general have your opinion in regard to this by telegram from Bank's 
 ford as soon as possible." 
 
 The day was now rapidly waning, and little was being done on 
 this intermediate battle-ground, but telegraphing on the one side, 
 and some moving of troops on the other. General Lee, having 
 finally got his preparations made, at a little before sundown com- 
 menced to move. The principal attack was to be made by Early 
 on the extreme Union right, supported by Anderson at the plank 
 road, while McLaws was to await the action of the others, and then 
 press forward. Notice was given to the latter when the battle was 
 about to open, and at the sound of the guns of Early, Kershaw and 
 Wofford went forward through the dense woods, and Colonel Alex- 
 ander, who had a strong battery on a prominent hill, opened fire. 
 General Early had opposed to him a skilful soldier — General 
 Howe, not easily frightened, and the manner of the fight is best told 
 in his own words. " Our advance on the Chancellorsville road had 
 been checked ; a night had passed, and time had beeii given for the 
 enemy to make movements advantageous to him, and I was fully 
 satisfied that a strong effort would be made to cut the Sixth corps 
 off from the river. About 5 o'clock p. m. an attack was made upon 
 my division from the Fredericksburg heights, on Marye's heights. 
 My line, as I then occupied it, was nearly two miles in length, the 
 left extending to the Rappahannock, and my right resting near what 
 is known as Guest's house. I had less than 6,000 men on that line. 
 The attack was made by three divisions of the enemy, delivered 
 with a violence that I had never before encountered. I had made 
 arrangements to occupy two positions, the first to check them until 
 their point of attack was developed, and the other, a stronger posi- 
 tion, to be occupied afterwards. The troops with me understood 
 the points to be occupied after the first dash. "We resisted the fii-st 
 attack better than I expected, and our own loss was less than I had 
 supposed it would be, and at a favorable time the left of my line 
 was thrown back, partially behind some woods. As I expected, the 
 enemy seemed to be under the impression, from this movement, that 
 we were giving way. They rallied and advanced, moving well to- 
 wards the river, until they reached a point that we could have de- 
 
SEDO WICK AT SALEM CHURCH. 155 
 
 sired above all others they should have advanced upon, and where 
 a reserve force which I had placed under cover had an opportunity 
 to get a flank fire upon them with full effect. When the fire from 
 our new position struck them, it was but. a short time before they 
 were entirely broken, and fell back in a rout. It was near dark 
 when we had completely repulsed them." ~ 
 
 It is somewhat amusing to notice the very delicate colors with 
 which General Early, from the opposite side, draws the same occur- 
 rences. * " Subsequently," be says, " I was sent for by General Lee, 
 and having received his instructions, at the signal agreed on. Hays', 
 Hoke's, and Gordon's brigades, which had been placed in position, 
 were advanced against the enemy. Hays advancing in the centre, 
 from the foot of the hill opposite the mill and Hazel run ; Hoke on 
 the left, advancing across the hill on which Downman's house is 
 situated, and below it; and Gordon on the right up the hills on the 
 north of the plank road, driving the enemy before them. This 
 movement was commenced very late, and Hays' and Hoke's brig- 
 ades were thrown into some confusion by coming in contact after 
 they crossed the plank road, below Guest's house, and it becoming 
 difficult to distinguish our "troops from those of the enemy on ac- 
 count of the growing darkness, they had therefore to fall back to 
 re-form, which' was done on the plain below Guest's house." 
 
 But wherefore fall back to re-form if the trouble simply resulted 
 from the two brigades coming in contact? The question naturally 
 arises, Has not the General made a slight mistake in this, and in- 
 stead of two brigades of his own troops coming in contact with 
 each other, did not the Louisiana Tigers, for such were the troops 
 engaged, encounter the troops of Howe, and get terribly punished? 
 In his official report General Early says that he lost 136 killed, 838 
 wounded, and 500 missing, exclusive of Barksdale's brigade and the 
 artillery. The question arises where were so many, lost, if not here, 
 as little severe fighting was done by him except at this point. 
 
 As had been agreed on, there was an advance by the rebel forces 
 all along the line, as soon as the guns of Early were heard ; but on 
 many parts the ground was difficult, and one portion of the line had 
 to wait upon another, and night coming on the pressure was no- 
 where else very persistent or effective. 
 
 •General Stuart's ofBcial report, " Reb. Eeo.," Vol. X., p. 268. 
 
156 THE BA-TTLE OP CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 In conformity with the last order from General Hooker, directing 
 him to occupy a more contracted line on the south bank of the river, 
 if he found it inadvisable to remain in the position he was in on the 
 4th, as soon as darkness had fairly settled upon the field, General 
 Sedgwick began to draw in his lines. Newton and Brooks went 
 first, thus uncovering the right of Howe without proper notificsition 
 to that officer that such a movement was in progress, and leaving 
 him in a precarious situation. But the enemy took no advantage 
 of their opportunity, and the withdrawal was made without serious 
 molestation. Soon after he had got his troops in upon the new and 
 contracted position around Bank's ford, General Sedgwick sent the 
 following telegram, which was dated at the ford. May 4th, 11.45 
 p. M., to General Hooker : " My army is hemmed in upon the slope 
 covered by the guns from the north side, of Bank's ford. If I had 
 only this army to care for I would withdraw it to-night. Do your 
 operations require that I should jeopard by retaining it here? An 
 immediate answer is indispensable. I may [unintelligible] to with- 
 draw." This niessage was received at 1 a. m. of the 5th, and plainly 
 indicated that Sedgwick was getting very nervous. Whereupon 
 General Hookefr telegraphed him at 1 o'clock A. m. of the 6th : " Dis- 
 patch this moment received. Withdraw ; cover the river and pre- 
 vent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt." This was joyful 
 intelligence to Sedgwick, and be immediately commenced the move- 
 ment over the river. But previous to receiving this order he had 
 sent a message, the exact date of which is not given, but probably 
 some time before midnight, in response to the one above given from 
 General Hooker, urging his retention of ground upon the south 
 bank- of the river, in these words: "I shall hold ray position, as 
 ordered, on south side of Rappahannock." This was not received 
 by General Hooker until 1.20 A. m. on the 5th, just twenty minutes 
 after he had sent the order to cross. Whereupon Hooker imme- 
 diately telegraphed: "Yours received 1 a. m. saying you should 
 hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge 
 both." But it seems that the order to withdraw travelled faster 
 than the order to remain, the order to remain not reaching its des- 
 tination till twenty minutes past three on the morning of the 5th. 
 By that time the crossing had been nearly completed, and to return 
 
SEBOWIOK AT SALEM CHURCH. 157 
 
 then was impossible. The movement across the river was antici- 
 pated by the enemy, and they were on the alert. As soon as the 
 noise of crossing was detected, they commenced dropping shells, from 
 batteries advantageously posted, upon the bridge and its approaches, 
 where the troops, in dense columns, were assembling and passing. 
 This fire proved very annoying. By morning, howeVer, the corps, 
 with all its material, was across, the tangle of telegrams was cut 
 short, and the fighting was at an end. 
 
 But two courses were now open to General Hooker in his new 
 position near Chancellorsville ; either to assume the offensive, inas- 
 much as the enemy could not be induced to attack, and endeavor to 
 break through the enemy's position confronting his own, or to retire 
 across the river and form new combinations. To attack the enemy 
 from the position in which he then was would be attended with 
 many difficulties, and with only moderate prospect of success. His 
 army was in the midst of the Wilderness, with few roads over which 
 artillery could be moved. Reconnoissances fully demonstrated that 
 the enemy had all these avenues thoroughly cut off by elaborate 
 works, amply covered with artillery, against which it would be cer- 
 tain destruction to advance by direct approach. To advance through 
 the tangled undergrowth, which rose like a sea far and wide, was 
 next to impossible, and would of necessity have to be made by slender 
 columns, against which the enemy would be enabled to fight from 
 behind well-constructed breastworks, where a small force could suc- 
 cessfully match a much larger one. When the army started on this 
 campaign the men took with them but eight days rations. The 
 theory of the campaign was that something decisive would be effected 
 before the expiration of that time. Seven days had already elapsed, 
 and owing to circumstances which the commanding general could 
 not foresee nor provide against, nothing had been effected by either 
 side to prevent the other from wishing an attack. They simply 
 stood there facing each other in intrenched positions, from a half 
 mile to a mile apart, and had stood so for two and a half days, 
 attempting nothing beyond powerful reconnoissances to try each 
 other's positions and strength. 
 
 General Hooker felt that to advance upon these intrenchnients 
 would be the Burnside-Fredericksburg problem over again, and 
 
JJ8 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 even worse ; for there the open ground gave the utmost freedom for 
 manoeuvring troops. Besides a treacherous stream was behind him, 
 that in a few hours could be flooded by the spring rains, which 
 were even now threatening, and might carry away his frail bridges, 
 his only avenue to the north bank. Should his communications be 
 interrupted, -^ith his rations nearly exhausted, the safety of his 
 army might seriously be compromised. In view of his instructions 
 to'cover Washington, and of President Lincoln's emphasized advice, 
 in his letter giving him command of the army: "Beware of rash- 
 ness — beware of rashness," it was General Hooker's decided con- 
 viction, that the wisest course to pursue was to withdraw his army 
 from its present position, and to make entirely new combinations 
 for another campaign, rather than to trust to the fortunes of battle- 
 with the odds so strongly against him. He laid the matter before 
 his corps commanders, with a^ statement of his instrtfctions, and 
 sought their counsel. There was some difference of opinion among 
 them, General Meade holding that the enemy would not permit a 
 withdrawal, and General Howard voting to remain and try to give- 
 battle, that an opportunity might be given for redeeming the mis- . 
 haps in the previous fighting; but all substantially agreeing that a 
 retrograde movement should be made if it could be safely effected. 
 The order was accordingly issued on the morning of the 5th, to 
 make preparations to withdraw. As a precautionary measure, Gen- 
 eral Warren and Captain Comstock were directed to lay out a new 
 and contracted line, covering the approaches to the bridges, and new 
 and direct roads were opened from the position of the different corps 
 to the ford. "A continuous cover and abatis was constructed," 
 says General Warren, "from the Rappahannock, at Scott's dam, 
 around to the mouth of Hunting run, or the Eapidan, a distance of 
 three miles. The roads were also put in order, and a third bridge 
 laid." But no troops occupied this new line, except the rear guard, 
 which was not until daylight of the 6th, when the passage of the 
 river was nearly completed. 
 
 It was not until twenty-four hours, after the decision had been 
 made to re-cross, that the movement was fairly inaugurated, and 
 nearly the same time had elapsed since Sedgwick had commenced 
 to re-cross at Bank's ford. The whole day of the 5th, from dawn ta 
 
SEDGWICK AT SALEM CHURCH. 159^ 
 
 darkness, had been given the rebel army to concentrate and attack 
 General Hooker, had its commander been so disposed. The force 
 which had been confronting Sedgwick could easily have come up in 
 two or three hours, and a fifteen minutes ride would have brought 
 Genei"al Lee to General Hooker's front. 
 
 At half-past seven p. m. on the 5th, the Union army began to 
 re-cross the river. Scarcely had the artillery commenced to move, 
 when a sudden rise in the river, from the storm which had for 
 several hours, since half-past four, been prevailing, interrupted the 
 passage, the ends of the bridges on the north bank being submerged, 
 and the strength of the current threatening to sweep all away. It 
 was indeed a fearful night, the rushing of the waters, the pitchy 
 darkness, and the ceaseless descent of the rain, combining to make 
 it a dreary march. But Captain Comstock was equal to the emer- 
 gency, and taking up his upper bridge and using it to piece out his 
 other two, he finally had them passable and the retirement was 
 resumed. General Meade, who was charged with covering the 
 movement, brought his rear guard into the new line at a little after 
 daylight, and by eight in the morning of the 6th, the last of the 
 army was across without the loss of men or material or the firing 
 of a gun, the enemy refusing to follow or to attempt the interruption 
 of the progress. Thus was ended eight eventful days in the life of 
 the Army of the Potomac. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 I BOUT none of the great battles of the late war does 
 there exist so much misapprehension as about 
 Chancellorsville. As this was one of those en- 
 gagements respecting which a committee of the 
 National Congress made a very elaborate and 
 exhaustive inquiry, and has been more written 
 about, and illustrated by the best topographical 
 skill, on the part of both the contending parties, 
 than any other, it would naturally be inferred, 
 that the great salient features, the rationale of the fight would be 
 well understood. But the inferences, drawn by the leading writers, 
 upon the management of this battle, have been founded upon state- 
 ments and opinions given under a misunderstanding, or partial 
 view of the facts. Many of these opinions have been given with 
 entire honesty, by soldiers of great eminence and strict probity, who 
 would, under no considerations, have conveyed a wrongful impression 
 had they known it to be such ; but who have misled by having 
 based their statements on a partial knowledge of the case. 
 
 The plans of General Hooker, for getting his army across the 
 deep and rapid stream behind which his antagonist had taken post, 
 and had for long distances opposed, at almost every possible point 
 of crossing, intrenched camps vigilantly guarded, were laid with 
 unquestioned skill, and executed with a completeness and a success 
 scarcely paralleled in the annals of warfare. A condition which 
 most powerfully contributed to the success of his movements was 
 the ever watchful care with which he kept his counsels. 
 (160) 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 161 
 
 The conditions imposed upon General Hooker in planning and 
 executing this part of his campaign are concisely stated by the 
 eminent English soldier and critic, Colonel MacDougall, in his 
 chapter on the passage of rivers, in his admirable work on " Mod- 
 ern Warfare," already referred to. " The part of the stream," he 
 says, "which appears to have been specially guarded by the Con- 
 federates, extended from United States ford, at the junction of the 
 Rapidan with the Rappahannock, that is to say about twelve miles 
 above Fredericksburg, to Port Royal, about twenty miles below. 
 General Anderson guarded the United States ford with two brigades. 
 Jackson's corps seems to have been posted in observation on the 
 river from Port Royal to Fredericksburg. The main force of Con- 
 federates was on the heights overlooking the town, which had been 
 the scene of their easy victory over General Burnside. Their posi- 
 tion was formed by an amphitheatre of hills surrounding Freder- 
 icksburg, resting on the river above and below the town, but 
 leaving between their foot and the river a plain about seven miles 
 long, and one mile and a half wide. The crest of the hills was 
 thickly studded with Confederate batteries, whose converging fire 
 crossed over the plain in their front, and the problem which Hooker 
 had to solve was, to cross the Rappahannock and advance on Rich- 
 mond without being obliged to assault .this formidable position, and 
 at the same time without unduly exposing his own line of retreat. 
 Although his plan had long been matured, and for many days only 
 awaited favorable weather for its execution, he seems to have taken 
 no person into his confidence. In general terms his measures were 
 calculated to induce Lee to concentrate in the Fredericksburg posi- 
 tion by a cunningly devised demonstration in that quarter, while he 
 intended to pass the mass of his army over the river at Kelly's ford, 
 twenty-seven miles up stream, and to place it in such a position as 
 should threaten the enemy's communications with Richmond, and 
 would so compel Lee either to retreat upon that city, or to march to 
 attack the Northern army in a chosen position prepared for de- 
 fence. It was at the same time a necessary condition that the 
 Confederates should not be able to intercept the communication 
 between that position and Washington, without leaving open the 
 road to Richmond." After rapidly sketching the movements of 
 
162 TBI! BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 Hooker to execute this grand design, MacDougall adds, " Hooker's 
 arrangements had so far been crowned with complete success. His 
 artifices had kept Lee's army in mass behind Fredericksburg, their 
 eyes anxiously turned towards the northeast, while he placed four 
 corps d'armee, numbering at least 70,000 men, on the left rear of 
 the latter, threatening their communication with Richmond. At 
 the same time Sedgwick and Reynolds, below Fredericksburg, were 
 in readiness to cross the river and act against the army of General 
 Lee, supposing the latter to move against Hooker. There is no 
 doubt Lee was taken entirely by surprise by the apparition of 
 Hooker at Chancellorsville." Even more complimentary is the 
 language of our own eminent war critic : " If Hooker had been 
 killed," he says, " making a reconnoissance; on the morning of 
 Friday, May 1, 1863, in the same way that a twin spirit, Kearny, 
 lost his life, in the performance of a like imperative duty on the 
 evening of September 1, 1862 — had. Hooker, we say, fallen while 
 riding forward to investigate for himself the field on which he was 
 about to act — as he had done a year previous, shortly after day- 
 break, Monday, 5th of May, 1862, before his first great fight at 
 Williamsburg, his successful crossing of the Rappahannock, and 
 complete out-generalling of Lee, taken in connection with his pre- 
 vious record as a first-class fighter and a wonderful organizer, would 
 have justified the country in claiming that it had produced a great 
 commander ; one who had shown himself worthy to rank among 
 the few great captains competent to make, and make use of, an army 
 of over one hundred thousand men. And the nation would have 
 been justified in boasting, that an untimely but glorious death had 
 cut short the career of one of those rare great captains, whose bril- 
 liant inner lights were worthy his magnificent presence on the 
 battle-field ; a presence replete with grace and grandeur, unexceeded 
 and very rarely equalled." 
 
 The general officers commanding in General Hooker's army are 
 unanimous in awarding the highest praise to this transfer of the 
 army across the river, and to the rear of the enemy. Even those 
 criticising most severely other parts of the campaign freely ac- 
 knowledge this to rank among the finest examples of its class in 
 the history of military operations. General Humphreys, a soldier 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. I63, 
 
 of keen insightj and large attainments in military science in addition 
 to his unsurpassed valor as a field marshal, says of it : " This ex- 
 pedition, so far as moving to Chancellorsville, was admirably 
 planned. It was an expedition in which up to that point was ac- 
 complished everything we could have desired. We surprised the 
 enemy completely, and crossed the river without their knowing 
 anything about it apparently. It was admirably planned, so far as 
 that was concerned, and admirably executed." Thus, by the testi- 
 mony of foreign critics and our own ablest soldiers, this operation, 
 conceived at the outset to be the most difficult of solution, was 
 accomplished with entire success, and will forever link the name 
 of its author with the renowned captains of the world. 
 
 The conduct of the campaign, after the head of General Hooker's 
 column had reached Chancellorsville, has been the subject of much 
 sharp criticism and free comment, which must now claim careful 
 examination. It has been emphatically maintained that the three 
 corps which first arrived at Chancellorsville should not have paused,, 
 but should have pushed on five or six miles further towards Fred- 
 ericksburg, andtaken' position on the high ground, uncovering and 
 commanding Bank's ford. That, indeed, was a consummation de- 
 voutly to be wished. But let us see what the possibilities were for 
 its accomplishment. It will be remembered that the Twelfth, 
 Eleventh and Fifth corps marched on the 28th of April,, crossed the 
 Rappahannock and Rapidan, and bivouacked ■ on the night of the 
 29th, on the right bank of the latter stream. General Hooker ac- 
 companied the column to the fords of the Rappahannock, where it 
 was to cross, and on taking leave of it, placed General Slocum, of 
 , the Twelfth, in command of the three corps, and bade him lose no 
 time till he had crossed the streams and uncovered United States 
 ford. He was then to push on to Chancellorsville, and, if he found 
 on arriving there, and making a strong reconnoissance with his 
 cavalry, that the probabilities were that troops had not been de- 
 tached from behind Fredericksburg to oppose his advance, and he 
 could do so without encountering too considerable a force for him 
 to master, he was to push forward at all hazards, and uncover 
 Bank's ford. It will thus be seen that General Hooker strongly 
 desired that this advance should be made, and emphatically ordered 
 
164 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0B8VILLE. 
 
 it, provided that there was any fair prospect of success. At day- 
 light on the morning of the 30th, General Slocum says that he 
 moved from Germania, ford, and at the same hour General Meade 
 started from Ely's ford, Sykes' division, led by the First squadron 
 of the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, taking the United States ford 
 road, and arrived at Ohancellorsville, the Twelfth corps at 2 p. m. 
 of the same day, and the Fifth corps somewhat earlier. A detach- 
 ment of cavalry had been sent forward early in the morning, and 
 had taken a few prisoners, and later in the morning the cavalry had 
 been heavily engaged with rebel infantry sent out from Fredericks- 
 burg, to oppose the Union advance, and had been driven back with 
 considerable loss. General Anderson, of the rebel army, in de- 
 scribing this encounter in his report, says : " Wright's and Posey's 
 brigades retired [at daylight] from Ohancellorsville by the plank 
 road, and Mahone's by the old turnpike. Whilst they were moving 
 off, and before the pickets had been called in, the cavalry of the 
 enemy, under cover of a fog and rain, dashed upon the pickets on 
 the Ely's ford road, and captured a part of one company. They 
 subsequently attacked the rear guard of Mahone's brigade, but were 
 so effectually repulsed that we were no further annoyed by them 
 during the movement." Accordingly, Slocum, on arriving at Ohan- 
 cellorsville at 2 p. M., and finding that the rebel infantry in force 
 had so roughly handled his cavalry, and learning that the division 
 of Sykes had been thrown forward until confronted by a superior 
 force behind breastworks, taking this to be sufficient evidence of the 
 presence on his front of a considerable force from the intrenchments 
 before Fredericksburg, decided not to attempt an advance to Bank's 
 ford, and at once took up a position before Ohancellorsville, and 
 began to fortify. General Slocum, it will thus be seen, obeyed the 
 letter and the spirit of his instructions. Ought he to have acted 
 differently? Something was left to his discretion. Could he judi- 
 ciously have hazarded more ? The fact that this wing of the army 
 had for three days been making forced marches with heavy burdens, 
 and had crossed two large and difficult streams, and all this at a 
 season of the year when exhaustion is most easily induced, need not 
 be considered ; for if a great advantage was to be gained, that army 
 without a murmur, though fainting by the way, .would have marelied 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 165 
 
 five miles further, and fought, had there been need, to have gained 
 the coveted position. Now, had they marched on without stopping 
 at Chancellorsville, could they have uncovered Bank's ford and held 
 the position ? Let us understand the exact facts. 
 
 General- Anderson, who had been sent out by General Lee from 
 Frederieksburg during the night of the 29th, with Wright's brigade 
 to meet the brigades of Posey and Mahone retiring from United States 
 ford, and, with the united force, to check the advance of Slocum, 
 had decided, upon his arrival at Chancellorsville, not to make a 
 stand there, but to countermarch to the elevated ground by the 
 Hopewell nurseries, where he could make a stout defence, hold and 
 cover Bank's ford from troops advancing from Chancellorsville, and 
 preserve a position where he could quickly be reinforced from Fred- 
 ericksburg. Arriving at that point — the neighborhood of the 
 Tabernacle church — early on the morning of the 30th, he was met 
 by the chief engineers of Lee's army, who immediately proceeded 
 to lay out a line of defence, and during the entire day, though 
 fatigued by a long march, Anderson's men worked diligently in 
 intrenching. What, therefore, would have been the consequence 
 had Slocum, with these three corps, gone forward without stopping 
 at Chancellorsville ? He would have marched on over these five 
 weary miles, and, as he was emerging at near nightfall from the 
 flnbroken forests through which the roads pass, and across which 
 the enemy had built their works, would have encountered a powerful 
 force, well disposed behind intrenchments, with artillery trained to 
 sweep all the approaches, and would, in all probability, had he made 
 a determined attack, suffered a disastrous and bloody repulse, find- 
 ing, when too late, that he could neither gain the crests and open 
 ground in his front, nor uncover Bank's ford. We conclude, there- 
 fore, that Slocum fully obeyed his instructions in stopping at Chan- 
 cellorsville, and that it was most fortunate that he did not transcend 
 those instructions by a too liberal interpretation, and attempt to 
 march on. 
 
 General Hooker remained at his headquarters at Falmouth, until 
 the three corps under Slocum had arrived and taken position at 
 Chancellorsville. On the afternoon of their arrival, Hooker pro- 
 ceeded to the latter place, and assumed command, reaching there be- 
 
166 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 tween^five and six o'clock of. the 30th, simultaneously with the ap- 
 prbach of the Second corps. Captain Wickersham's squadron of 
 the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry picketed during the night in front 
 of Chancellorsville, and early on the morning of the 1st of May 
 was attacked by the enemy's infantry, but gallantly held his own, 
 until the remainder of the regiment arrived. Spirited charges were 
 made, and the enemy were unable to advance beyond the edge of 
 the woods which they occupied, although they made several strong 
 attempts to do so, the cavalry suffering severely in the sTiirmish. 
 On the pike, General Warren had ridden out some three miles with- 
 out encountering any enemy. Believing that no considerable force 
 was on his immediate front, and anxious to get bis army out of the 
 Wilderness where it now stood, and especially desirous of opening 
 Bank's ford, General Hooker determined to advance and force his 
 way, along the several roads leading towards Fredericksburg, to the 
 more open ground, where he could manoeuvre his army. At 11 
 o'clock A. M. the movement commenced; but after advancing a short 
 distance his centre was heavily engaged, and at the same time his 
 right flank was being turned, while he was still upon the narrow 
 roads leading through the dense wood, where he could neither use 
 his artillery, nor form his infantry. \ He accordingly determined to 
 regain his position of the morning, which had been partially in- 
 trenched, and where he had some chance to meet his antagonist oil 
 equal terms. This decision of General Hooker, and consequent 
 change of position, has been condemned, and the opinion has been 
 expressed that the army should have pushed forward, and fought 
 the enemy there. It is asserted that the several columns of the 
 Union army had arrived at, or had come close in upon the posi- 
 tion which General Hooker had designated to be taken, that they 
 had advanced until the coveted ground waS within their grasp, and 
 easily attainable, when they were drawn back to the inferior position 
 about Chancellorsville. Let us examine these statements and see if 
 they are tenable ; for, if they are, General Hooker was certainly 
 guilty of a great military sin. 
 
 When General Hooker gave the order to advance on the morning 
 of the 1st, he undoubtedly believed that there was no such force of 
 the enemy between Chancellorsville and Bank's ford, as would stop 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 167 
 
 his onward progress. At the moment when he took his decision there 
 really was no force between himself and the rebel intrenchmeuts 
 at the jiinction of the plank road and the pike. Bat at daylight on 
 the morning of that day the whole rebel army was in motion, and 
 before the movement of Hooker had commenced, the whole aspect 
 of the case was changed. 
 
 To understand exactly the situation, the distances between the 
 two armies must be considered, the progress which each had made 
 when they encountered, and the situation in which General Hooker 
 found himself at the moment of collision, before we can decide 
 whether the manoeuvre was a blunder or a mark of military skill. 
 From Chancellorsville to Tabernacle church, which General Hooker 
 had designated as the point where his headquarters were to be es- 
 tablished, is five and one-sixteenth miles by the plank road, on 
 which Siocum with the Twelfth corps, followed by the Eleventh, 
 was to advance ; by the pike, on which Sylces of the Fifth corps, 
 followed by Hancock of the Second, was to move, is four and one- 
 eighth miles. From Chancellorsville to Bank's ford, which was the 
 objective, or to a point intermediate between Mott and Colin runs, 
 which was designated in the order of General Hooker, and which 
 is substantially the same, by the river road, on which Griffin fol- 
 lowed by Humphreys of the Fifth corps was to move, is seven and 
 three-eighths miles. By the reports of the officers named above it 
 appears that the movement of the several columns commenced at 
 11 o'clock A. M. 
 
 What was the position and ordering of the rebel' army at the 
 moment that these corps of the Union army were commencing this 
 advance? Anderson's division was intrenched on commanding 
 ground about half way between Tabernacle church and Hopewell 
 nursery, near the junction of the pike and plank roads, extending 
 from the bed of the abandoned railroad, to Bank's ford, which it 
 covered. At midnight of the 30th, General McLaws was ordered 
 up to the support of Anderson, and at daylight of the 1st General 
 Jackson was ordered to follow with the balance of the army, save a 
 few regiments left to hold the fortifications about Fredericksburg 
 under General Early. McLaws reached the breastworks of Ander- 
 son before dawn, and fell to fortifying, carrying the works around 
 
168 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 to the Rappahannock between Mott and Colin runs. General 
 Jackson arrived at the intrenchments at 8 A. M., and gave orders to 
 stop fortifying and to advance. At 11 o'clock, the very moment 
 that General Hooker's columns commenced moving from Chancel- 
 lorsville, the whole rebel army, under the immediate command of 
 Generals Lee and JacksOn, moved out from their admirably chosen 
 and intrenched position, under cover of which it could retire as to 
 a fortress, if obliged to fall back, and pushed forward by the plank, 
 .the pike, and the Old Mine roads, while a fourth column moved by 
 the bed of the unfinished railway. We thus have the two contend- 
 ing armies starting out at the same hour of the morning, from two 
 positions that by the shortest road were a little over four miles 
 apart, and by the longest something les§ than eight miles. As 
 General Jackson gave the order to advance at 8 o'clock in the 
 morning, it is probable that the rebel skirmish line marched a little 
 earlier. Where, then, would the clash be likely to occur? General 
 Slocum in his official report says: "On Friday, at 11 a. m., pur- 
 suant to orders, I moved the Twelfth corps from Chancellorsville 
 towards Fredericksburg on the plank road. We met the skir- 
 mishers of the enemy about a mile from the Chancellorsville house, 
 formed in line of battle and advanced, the enemy falling back to^ 
 wards the heights of Fredericksburg." General Williams, who 
 commanded the First division of Slocum's corps, says : " Notwith- 
 standing the density of the underbrush and evergreen thickets, the 
 division moved rapidly to the front, driving before them the pickets 
 of the enemy. During the most of the advance we were under 
 artillery fire, which, however, inilicted no injury. I had crossed 
 some open fields, perhaps two miles in advance of Chancellorsville, 
 to a point where a sight was first obtained of the enemy's intrench- 
 ments and rifle pits, and had halted Knipe's brigade to establish my 
 line, and put the reserve brigade in position. My skirmishers were 
 sharply engaged with those of the enemy, and the troops seemed 
 never so eager to engage, when an order was received to return to 
 my original po'sition." . . . From the statements of both Slocum 
 and Williams it wquld seem that the rebel advance had started 
 earlier than 11 o'clock, for the rebel skirmishers were met almost 
 immediately on leaving Chancellorsville, and Slocum's column was 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 169 
 
 under artillery fire nearly the whole way. Williams estimates that 
 lie had gone two miles, and had crossed some open fields, when he 
 came in sight of the enemy's intrenchments and rifle-pits. What 
 intrenchments and rifle-pits? Not the works beyond the Hopewell 
 nursery, for they were five miles out by the road he was following ; 
 \)ut the position which Jackson's forces had taken up and hastily 
 fortified for a fight. On the pike or middle road, Sykes' division 
 of the Fifth corps had the advance, closely followed by Hancock's 
 division of the Second corps, and met the enemy at once. General 
 Hancock says : " General Sykes met the enemy immediately on 
 leaving Chancellorsville, and forced him back about two miles. 
 According to the order of the day, the headquarters of General 
 Hooker that night were to have been at a point on the Fredericks- 
 burg road some distance in advance of the {)oint at which General 
 Sykes' advance had arrived, the distance from Chancellorsville being 
 about ten miles. General Sykes was subsequently forced back some 
 distance." Sykes deployed his column, and used Weed's battery 
 with good effect ; but he found himself outflanked on either hand, 
 and vastly outnumbered, and was unable to form connection with 
 either of the other advancing columns. His furthest advance was 
 only about two miles, and, from his being on the direct road, got, in 
 an easterly direction, further than either of the columns on his 
 flanks. It was something over four miles by the way on which he 
 was moving to Tabernacle church, the position which he was ex- 
 pected to reach. Sykes, therefore, in his most advanced point, had 
 only reached two miles, half of the distance he was to go, and from 
 even that was forced back. But General Warren says : " When we 
 had advanced about a mile and a half, we found the enemy ad- 
 vancing and driving in our cavalry. General Sykes moved forward 
 at double quick, and drove the enemy back and gained the position 
 that had been assigned him." What position assigned him ? Not 
 the one at Tabernacle church, for he was still two miles away from 
 it, and the enemy since 11 o'clock had pushed forward from his in- 
 trenchments, which were a considerable distance on the Chancellors- 
 ville side of Tabernacle church. What therefore General Warren 
 characterizes " as the position assigned him" (Sykes) was consider- 
 ably less than half way there, and in the position he did gain found 
 
170 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 himself cut off from the other columns, hard pressed, and actually 
 forced back. 
 
 What of the column advancing on the river road ? It moved 
 simultaneously with the others, and received the order to return at 
 the same time that they did. From not meeting any considerable 
 opposition, it may have gone over more distance than the others. 
 But it was seven and three-eighths miles to Bank's ford. Meade, 
 who had the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys on this road, may 
 have gone a little beyond the point where the Old Mountain road 
 debouches into the river road; for Wilcox's rebel brigade ad- 
 vancing on the road leading from Alsop's on the pike, past Daver- 
 son's mill on Mott riin, made prisoners of three stragglers from 
 Meade's corps near this point. General Humphreys says : " I fol- 
 lowed closely on the first division, and, as I understand, we had 
 nearly approached the place, were within a mile or two of the posi- 
 tion that we were to take, when General Meade received an order 
 countermanding the one under which we had been acting, and we 
 were immediately brought back to Chancellorsville." General 
 Hancock, basing his opinion on this statement of General Hum- 
 phreys, it may be, sa;ys in his testimony : " General Meade had 
 approached Bank's ford, and had practically opened it ; that is, he 
 had met no enemy and had got close to it." Now what are the 
 facts ? In the first place is it supposable that in the time inter- 
 vening between the hour of starting and that of receiving, the 
 command to return, the column had time to march seven and three- 
 eighths miles ? In thp second place the enemy left a force to guard 
 Bank's ford, and to hold the intrenchments which covered the ford, 
 and Meade had no encounter with this guard ; for all the testimony 
 is agreed that Meade met no determined opposition. Besides, Gen- 
 eral Humphreys, who was of this column, simply says : "And, as 
 I understand, we had nearly approached the place, were mthin a mile 
 or two of the position that we were to take." This language it will 
 be observed is very indefinite. It will thus be' seen that the idea 
 that Bank's ford was ever uncovered was a misapprehension. On 
 the contrary we know positively that Bank's ford was held by the 
 enemy, who were undisturbed. 
 
 It is thus clearly established that the idea that General Williams 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. ' 171 
 
 had come on the plank road within sight of the position assigned 
 him, that Sykes on the pike had reached his position, and that 
 Meade had practically uncovered Bank's ford is entirely erroneous. 
 
 Every author who has written upon this battle has founded his 
 statements upon the testimony of these officers, and has represented 
 General Hooker as having marched out, and, after having nearly 
 gained the position which he desired, suddenly and unaccountably 
 abandoned it, and retired to Chaiicellorsville. But the fact is Gen- 
 eral Hooker had his three columns in motion on three roads leading 
 through an impenetrable forest, ways which he himself likens to 
 causeways, and forest which General Warren says it was impossible 
 to penetrate without trailing arms, and while his corps were 
 stretched out on these narrow causeways, and before the heads of 
 the columns had reached half the distance assigned them to go, they 
 were met by the whole rebel army, drawn up on ground of its own 
 choice in solid line, with breastworks thrown up and artillery ad- 
 vantageously^ posted. "Would General Hooker have been justified 
 in attempting to hold his ground on such unequal terms? Would 
 any man, knowing all the facts which have been adduced, maintain 
 that General Hooker should have held his ground and attempted to 
 advance? What would have been the consequence had Gen- 
 eral Hooker continued to push forward? General Meade would 
 have been cut off on the river road by the rebel column advancing 
 on the Old Mountain or Mine road; Sykes would have found him- 
 self unable to cope with the rebel centre, and would have been 
 pushed back still further than he was ; and Slocum would have been 
 overborne by the force on his front, and by the flanking column 
 moving down rapidly on the unfinished Orange railroad. It was, 
 therefore, a movement dictated by the highest military policy, for 
 General Hooker to call in his diverging and unsupported columns, 
 and place them behind the intrenchments which he had but just 
 left, on ground where he could concentrate and properly manoeuvre 
 his army. 
 
 It should here be observed that when the officers whose testi- 
 mony has been adduced above gave their opinions, the reports of 
 rebel officers had not been given to the public, nor maps made il- 
 lustrating the intrenched rebel positions and the ground occupied. 
 
172 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 This is not the first instance in the progress of warfare that the 
 contingencies of the field have induced a commander, and that 
 wisely, to change his tactics, when, by so doing, he could improve 
 his position and prospects. General Eosecrans at Stone river had 
 planned to strike Bragg's right, and, doubling it up, sweep up the 
 centre, and cut oif his way of retreat. But Bragg on his side had 
 planned to strike the right of Kosecrans in precisely the same way. 
 Bragg got his blow in first, and Eosecrans was obliged to relinquish 
 his plan aud parry as best he could the telling assaults of his antag- 
 onist. The Duke of Wellington is reported to have said in reply 
 to an inquiry as to what his secret was for winning battles, that he 
 had no secret, that he did not know how to win battles, and that no 
 man knew. All that man could do was to look beforehand steadily 
 at all the chances, and lay all possible plans beforehand ; but from 
 the moment the battle begun, no mortal prudence was of use, and 
 no mortal man could know what the end would be. A thousand 
 new accidents might spring up every hour, and scatter all his plans 
 to the winds; and all that man could do was to comfort himself 
 with the thought that he had done his best, and to trust in God. 
 
 "And though thou thinkest that thou knowest sure 
 Thy victory, yet thou canst not surely know. 
 For we are all like swimmers in the sea, 
 Poised on'the crest of a huge wave of fate, 
 That hangs uncertain on which side to fall ; 
 And whether it will heave us up to land, 
 Or whether it will roll us out to sea. 
 Back out to sea to the deep waves of death, 
 We know not, and no search will make us know ; 
 Only the event will teach us in its hour." 
 
 The position taken up by General Hooker, on returning to Chan- 
 cellorsville, was substantially the same as that selected by Slocum 
 on the previous day, though considerably extended and improved 
 on the left, where General Humphreys examined and marked the 
 line. This position, which the army finally settled down upon, on 
 the afternoon of the 1st, in expectation of fighting a battle, has 
 been characterized as a weak one. When compared with the posi- 
 tion held by the Union army at Gettysburg, or by the rebel army 
 at Fredericksburg, it was weak. But for this Wilderness country, 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE- 173 
 
 nearly a dead level, only gently rolling, and covered. by an almost 
 unbroken forest, it was as good a position as could have been found. 
 Both Lee and Stuart regarded it as well chosen. Lee says: " Here 
 the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surround- 
 ed on all'sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in 
 the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with 
 trees felled in front, so as to form an impenetrable abatis. His artil- 
 lery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be ap- 
 proached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." Gen- 
 eral Stuart says : " The enemy had a fine position, and if time had 
 been given him to recover from his first surprise, and mass troops on 
 that front, it would have been a difficult task to dislodge him." It 
 seems, by the testimony of General Warren, that General Hooker 
 expressed solicitude for the safety of his right wing, at the consulta- 
 tion of officers on the night of the 1st, and was disposed to draw it 
 in ; but so confident were the officers on that part of the line that 
 they could hold their ground against any force which could be 
 brought against them, that he suffered the troops to remain as they 
 were. This solicitude is evinced by the position in which he posted 
 General Williams' division, covering, as it did, the right flank by 
 an interior line stretching from Hazel grove away towards United 
 States ford, crossing the plank road a mile or more from Chancel- 
 lorsville, facing the west, and protected by a breastwork of logs. 
 
 The turning movement ordered by General Hooker on the after- 
 noon of the 2d, to be made by the way of Welford furnace, was an 
 exceedingly important one, but has never received the attention it 
 deserves. As soon as he discovered that a heavy column of the 
 rebel army was moving off across his front in the direction of Gor- 
 donsville, judging this to be a vulnerable point in Lee's front, and 
 that the rebel centre could here be pierced, he ordered Sickles to 
 advance with two divisions of his own corps, accompanied by a force 
 of cavalry, and subsequently strengthened the column by Williams' 
 division of the Twelfth corps, and a brigade of the Eleventh. When 
 Sickles bad succeeded in penetrating the enemy's line, which he suc- 
 cessfully accomplished, and had brought in a regiment of Georgia 
 troops as prisoners, Williams, with his fine division, was to turn the 
 left of Lee's severed army, and wheeling upon his flank, come in 
 
174 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 upon his rear with crushing power. The effect of such a manoeuvre 
 can well be imagined, and had it been followed up vigorously on all 
 sides, as it doubtless would have been, the rebel army would have 
 been beaten in detail. In twenty minutes more, that movement 
 would have been fully inaugurated, and in full tide of execution. 
 In the hands of such an ofBcer as Williams, directed and supported 
 by so determined and fearless a soldier as Sickles, there can be little 
 question but that it would have been carried to a successful issue. 
 But Jackson delivered his blow first, and Williams, with his arm 
 upraised, had to be instantly recalled. 
 
 The giving way of the Eleventh corps, which was the crisis of 
 the battle, has been a subject of much comment and bitter criticism. 
 It is quite the custom, in writing and speaking of this campaign, 
 to glibly pronounce its failure due to the yielding of this corps, 
 and the yielding of this corps to the cowardice of its men. But 
 such a view is void of just discrimination, and conveys an impres- 
 sion utterly at variance with the facts. To one who' carefully ex- 
 amines all the evidence, it is not difficult to fathom the exact state 
 of the case, to understand how, and why, the corps gave way, and 
 to fix the responsibility where it justly belongs. 
 
 Posted as the corps was along a narrow road, facing southward, 
 with no preparation worth mentioning to meet an attack on its fiank 
 and rear, it was in no position to resist, or to speedily get into posi- 
 tion to resist, and hence was encircled by none of the conditions fit 
 to inspire confidence. That corps, as it there stood to receive the 
 attack made upon it, was iu the attitude of a pugilist with his hands 
 pinioned, when about to encounter an antagonist unbound and free 
 to act. Could any equal body of men in a similar situation have 
 long withstood the terrible onset coming upon it like an avalanche, 
 precipitated from an Alpine height? 
 
 It must be acknowledged, even by those most bitter in their de- 
 nunciation, that a portion of this corps, and not an inconsiderable 
 part, notwithstanding the disadvantageous position in which it was 
 encountered, and the want of time for changing front, rushed hastily 
 into line and made a good fight. The habit which has largely pre- 
 vailed of stigmatizing the men of this corps as having been recruited 
 in, or having come frdm a particular locality or state, would scarcely 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 175 
 
 be worthy of notice, were it not for the persistent misrepresentation 
 in regard to it which has gained currency. That the facts may be 
 fairly before us, we give the composition of the corps, except Bar- 
 low's brigade, which was absent with Sickles at the Furnace, and 
 did not participate in the struggle. There were nine infantry regi- 
 ments from the State of New York, viz. : 54th, 45th, 41st, 63d, 
 29th, 154th, 157th, 58th and 119th; six from Ohio, the 75th, 25th, 
 65th, 107th, 61st and 82d; five from Pennsylvania, the 15,3d, 75th, 
 74th, 27th and 73d; two from Connecticut, the 14th and 17th; one 
 from Illinois, the 82d; and one from Wisconsin, the 26th; aggre- 
 gating twenty-four regiments. 
 
 There is no question but that the whole plan of the battle was 
 changed and defeated by the sudden giving way of this corps. Why 
 did it give way? Many explanations have been made. General 
 Hancock says : " I have no doubt that proper precautions had not 
 been taken. I do not know who was in fault. The ground in front 
 of General Howard, and on his right, had not been properly ex- 
 amined to see what was going on there, or this could not have oc- 
 curred." General Warren testifies: "In the first place, I think they 
 were attacked by a very superior force; and I have a theory of my 
 owji, that they had allowed their ambulances, and ammunition- 
 wagons, and pack-mule train, and even beef cattle, actually to come 
 up on their line, and as a matter of course, when the fighting began 
 all these ran away. I know that the first drove of fugitives I saw 
 was nothing but these ambulances and pack-mules, enough to run 
 any man down' who attempted to go in an opposite direction." 
 General Birney says : " I think the Eleventh corps, through disre- 
 gard of rules of warfare, had its pickets too close to the main body, 
 and was surprised by the sudden massed attack of the enemy on its , 
 right flank and rear, and fled in instant confusion." 
 
 General Howard himself, in closing up his official report, adds : 
 "Now as to the causes of this disaster to my corps: 1st. Though 
 constantly threatened and apprised of the moving of the enemy, 
 yet the woods were so dense that he was able to mass a large force, 
 whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances, nor scouts 
 ascertained. He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and 
 outflanking my right. 2d. By the panic produced by the enemy's 
 
176 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 reversed fire, regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon 
 those in position. 3d. The absence of General Barlow's brigade 
 which I had previously located in reserve, and in echelon with 
 Colonel Von Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank. This was the 
 only general reserve I had." Finally he adds, " I feel confident 
 that this command will yet honor itself, and the noble cause we sus- 
 tain, and I ask for it another opportunity for demonstrating its true 
 spirit." 
 
 But do any of these expositions meet the case ? To answer this 
 question we need to be satisfied whether this advent of Jackson 
 upon the right flank was a surprise to the officers and men of the 
 Eleventh corps. It will be remembered that General Hooker, early 
 on the morning of the 2d, feeling a solicitude about his right flank, 
 rode along the lines of General Slocum and General Howard, and 
 after making some corrections in the formations, expressed himself 
 suited with their position. But, on returning to his headquarters, 
 he was apprised that a heavy body of infantry, artillery, and trains, 
 could be seen passing across his front towards his right. This put 
 an entirely different phase on the condition of his troops upon the 
 right, and he immediately sent an order to General Howard, stating 
 the fact that the enemy were on the march in force in that direction, 
 and instructing him to prepare to receive them from the west, in- 
 stead of the south, to examine the ground and select his positions 
 with reference to such a contingency, to have heavy reserves well in 
 hand, to put up artificial defences, and to advance his pickets so as 
 to obtain timely information of their approach. There has been a 
 baseless story in circulation, to the effect that General Howard placed 
 this despatch in his pocket without reading it, and that he did not 
 , know the tenor of its contents until several days after the battle was 
 over ; and the fact is adduced in proof of this theory that this order 
 was not copied into his " Letters Received " book until .after orders 
 and despatches of the 12th of June, No. 76, some six weeks after- 
 ward, had been entered. This would be a very charitable but a 
 very senseless view to take of it. It is true that this order was not 
 copied and made of record at the headquarters of the Eleventh 
 corps until the date mentioned, and why it was thus withheld until 
 a new campaign was in full tide of execution may be fairly inferred. 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. I77 
 
 But the evidence in regard to the receipt of the order is well 
 attested. The order was in fact received by General Schurz, while 
 in temporary charge of corps headquarters, General Howard 
 having retired to take a little rest. But General Schurz called him 
 up and read to him the order, and while the two officers were 
 discussing it on the porch of the Dowdall tavern, a second courier 
 came in hot haste from General Hooker, bringing a message of the 
 same purport as the first, thus evincing the solicitude of the general- 
 in-chief, and the urgency of the order. " The matter was largely 
 discussed," says General Schurz, in his official report, " at your 
 headquarters, and I entertained and expressed in our informal 
 conversations the opinion that we should form upon the open 
 ground we then occupied, with our front at right angles with the 
 plank road, lining the church grove and the border of the woods 
 east of the open plain with infantry, placing strong echelons behind 
 both wings, and distributing the artillery along the front on ground 
 most favorable for its action, especially on the eminence on the 
 right and left of Dowdall's tavern. In this position sweeping the 
 open plains before us with our artillery and musketry, and checking 
 the enemy with occasional offensive returns, we might be able to 
 maintain ourselves, even against superior forces, at least long enough 
 to give General Hooker time to take measures according to the 
 exigencies of the moment." But in opposition to this careful repre- 
 sentation of the case, exactly in accord with the order just received 
 from General Hooker, General Howard maintained that the two 
 regiments of General Devens sufficiently protected the flank, and 
 added that General Hooker had inspected and approved the position 
 of the corps, referring to the visit of the latter before knowing of 
 the movement of the enemy past his flank. 
 
 Reconnoissances made under direction of General Schurz, by 
 General Schemmelfennig, showed the enemy in force on the extreme 
 right of the corps. Staff-officers were repeatedly sent to General 
 Howard informing him that the enemy was massing on his flank, n 
 " Soon after," says General Devens in his official repiort, " two men, 
 who stated that they had been sent out from another portion of the 
 line as scouts, were brought in by my pickets, reporting that the 
 enemy were moving in great force upon our right flank. They 
 12 
 
178 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 were immediately sent by me to corps headquarters, under charge 
 of a trusty, sergeant, with orders that after reporting to General 
 Howard, they should at once proceed to the headquarters of 
 the major-general commanding the army. Several reconnois- 
 sances made by a small body of cavalry placed at my disposition 
 discovered, early in the afternoon, bodies of the enemy's cavalry 
 moving upon our right .... Colonel Von Gilsa's skirmishers were, 
 between three and four in the afternoon, attacked by the skirmishers 
 of the enemy with the evident intention of feeling our position." 
 The report of General Schurz is to the same purport. " It was 
 between three and four p. M., when the section of artillery attached 
 to Colonel Von Gilsa's brigade gave two discharges, followed by a 
 short musketry fire. We hastened to the front and received the 
 report that only a few rebel cavalrymen had shown themselves on 
 the old turnpike, and that the artillery had fired without orders. 
 All became quiet again. I ordered General Schemmelfennig to' 
 push another reconnoissance up the plank road. The instructions 
 he received from (corps) headquarters were to the effect that he 
 should avoid everything that might bring on an engagement. The 
 reconnoitring party returned after some time with the report that 
 they had heard the yells and shouts of a large number of men 
 behind the enemy's line of skirmishers. The cavalry, which 
 had been attached to your (Howard's) command but a few days 
 before, and whose business it was to clear up our front and flank, 
 repeatedly reported that at some distance from our pickets they had 
 been fired upon and that then of course they could go no further." 
 The statement of General Schurz respecting the reconnoitring of 
 General Schemmelfennig corroborates the testimony of Major 
 Schleiter, adjutant of the latter general: "I nearly killed my horse 
 in riding to inform General Howard of the fact that the enemy was 
 massing troops on our right flank, and was received with an incred- 
 ulous smile, and directed to tell General Schemmelfennig to stop 
 reconnoitring, and remain in the position assigned to him." "About 
 half an hour or perhaps an hour," says General Schurz, " before 
 Jackson's attack took place, I ■ rode with General Howard to the 
 ejftreme right of our line, all the time discussing the precarious 
 situation in which we found ourselves ; but he adhered with great 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 179 
 
 confidence to his first opinion, that it was unnecessary to change our 
 position." 
 
 Is there, then, any doubt that both General Howard and his 
 division commanders were apprised of the gathering of the enemy 
 on the right flanl?, and of the imminence of an attack from that 
 quarter ? But even supposing that they were not fully apprised of 
 the fact of the enemy's arrival, was, not the order of General Hooker 
 of the most positive character, and did it not most explicitly declare 
 that the corps was out of position for meeting an attack from the 
 west, that it had no sufficient artificial protection, that the enemy were 
 expected from that direction, and expressly command him to readjust 
 his formation, intrench his lines, select the ground for his guns to 
 meet an attack from that direction, and, most of all, keep his pickets 
 and reconnoitring parties well out, so as to be fully apprised of the 
 enemy's whereabouts and intentions? If then it was known tO' 
 General Howard and his division officers that the enemy was 
 expected, and was sure to come from the west, and more than all 
 had been notified early in the day what they were to expect, and 
 how they should prepare to meet it, by the general-in-chief of the 
 army, did they make such dispositions and preparations as they 
 were in duty bound to make? 
 
 What are the facts ? In what manner were the instructions of 
 the general-in-chlef executed? In what position, and with what 
 preparation did this corps encounter the foe ? To meet the onset 
 of Stonewall Jackson's whole army, barely two regiments were 
 drawn up to face it. One of them, the One Hundred and Fifty- 
 third Pennsylvania, a green regiment, enlisted for only nine months 
 service, never in battle before, covered the greater part of that front, 
 not in regular line of battle, but standing three feet apart more as a 
 close line of skirmishers than a battle-line, with no artillery for 
 shelling the woods in front, and no breastworks. On its right was 
 the Fifty-fourth New York, standing at the head of an open field, 
 covering but small space, and illy prepared to hold its position. 
 Bating two pieces of an inefficiently commanded battery, standing 
 upon the pike, which could be faced south or west as needed, this 
 was absolutely everything prepared to meet Stonewall Jackson. 
 The rest of the corps on the front line stood facing the south, 
 
180 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 hemmed in between their breastworks and abatis in front, and a 
 narrow road with fences and thickets of pine, and the impedimenta 
 of the army in rear. A considerable number of regiments were in 
 reserve, but not at all in hand, being scattered over a square mile 
 or two of space, as will be seen by a reference to General Howard's 
 own map. How could any corps thus disposed and hampered make 
 a stand against a powerful foe striking it fairly in flank? The 
 breastworks along the plank and pike were of no avail, for they 
 faced the wrong way, while the enemy's artillery ploughed down 
 the lines in reverse. 
 
 What then was the cause of the giving way of this corps ? The 
 fault was plainly not of the men who composed it. General Schurz 
 avers that he realized the importance of radically changing the posi- 
 tion of the corps, and repeatedly urged it upon General Howard ; 
 but that General Howard would allow no material change. Gen- 
 eral Schurz thereupon, on his own responsibility, ordered two of 
 his regiments into position by the Wilderness church ; but he had 
 no sooner done so than General Howard ordered them into line 
 again upon the front facing south, but allowed General Schurz to 
 place two other regiments in the position he desired. But why was 
 not General Schurz directed to put them to intrenching, and bring 
 other of his reserve regiments into position ? The ground at the 
 church was not disadvantageous for making a good stand. 
 
 General Devens declares that he was strongly impressed by the 
 middle of the afternoon that the attack was coming from the west, 
 and that the corps ought to be put in a position to meet it. Why 
 did he not then put his division in position to meet it ? Why did 
 he leave. a green regiment, almost unaided and alone, disposed in 
 litt,le better than a skirmish line, to receive the brunt of the whole 
 attack ? He pleads in excuse that he could not have changed the 
 position of his men without orders from his superiors. But is this the 
 fact? Is not a division commander always at liberty to relieve and 
 change the position of his men as he deems expedient, provided he 
 holds the position he is directed to hold ? The position at Talley's 
 was a good one. The ground was the most commanding on that 
 part of the field, and the enemy by their own reports were expect- 
 ing obstinate resistance there. He had been some forty-eight hours 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 181 
 
 on that ground. For several hours he had known that the attack 
 was to come from the west. He had ten regiments of infantry, a 
 complement of artillery, and a company of cavalry at his disposal. 
 Was there any impediment to his clearing the thickets in his front, 
 making an abatis, throwing up a well-intrenched line, having an 
 ample force upon it, and making a stout resistance when the onset 
 came? 
 
 A San Francisco paper some time ago published a statement from 
 General Howard, respecting the giving way of his corps, which has 
 never to my knowledge been disowned, and i is probably correct. 
 He says: "It was my fault, and I will explain why. I had just 
 been appointed to the command of the corps. There was some dis- 
 affection, some incongruous elements, and I should at once have 
 given the command a careful inspection, made changes where neces- 
 sary, and made myself thoroughly acquainted with its condition, and 
 put it in the best possible shape as soon as I couH. But I felt a 
 delicacy in interfering with the details of my subordinates, and so 
 deferred the matter for a day or two, and trusted entirely to them 
 fot attending to the details until I had been a few days longer in 
 command." The first four words of this confession are" unquestion- 
 ably true, but the explanation of how the fault was his fails entirely 
 to meet the case. The fact, if it was a fact, that there were incon- 
 gruous elements in the corps, is entirely foreign to the question. 
 General Howard had received from the commander-in-chief an ex- 
 plicit order early in the day directing him to put his corps in a posi- 
 tion to meet a flank attack. Were there any incongruities in his 
 corps which prevented him from obeying that command ? On the 
 contrary, his division commanders urged in the strongest terms the 
 changes required ; but General Howard refused utterly to be coun- 
 selled by them. Courier after courier came bringing intelligence 
 that the enemy was massing on his flank, but still he refused to 
 give heed to the portents of an attack. To General Schemmelfinnig, 
 who was eager to find out what was going on on his front, he gave 
 orders to avoid bringing on an engagement, to stop reconnoitring, 
 and take the position assigned him. It was not then the incongruities 
 in his corps, but his own refusal to put his corps in position to meet 
 an attack from the west, when he had received the explicit orders 
 
182 THE BATTLE OF OSANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 of his chief to do so, and was constantly receiving intelligence which 
 confirmed the necessity of a prompt and unhesitating compliance 
 therewith, which brought the disaster. It has been argued, in ex- 
 tenuation of the breaking of the corps, that it was attacked by 
 superior numbers. General Howard had some ten thousand men. 
 Is it to be supposed, that with such a force, properly disposed be- 
 hind breastworks, on the excellent positions which he had at his 
 command, with artillery well posted and protected, that he could 
 not have held the enemy in check until supports could be brought 
 up ? Was it not in his power, with such a force, to have made for 
 himself on that line a point d'appui, from which he could have held 
 back the whole rebel army? Could the position at Dowdall's 
 tavern have been held, and the commanding ground at Hazel grove 
 been firmly occupied, there can be no doubt what would have be^n 
 the result of the battle. What then must we conclude was the 
 cause of the rapid giving way of the Eleventh corps, and thus 
 endangering the integrity of the whole army ? Can it be put in 
 any milder form than that it was due to the criminal negligence of 
 General Howard in not carrying out the orders of the general-in- 
 , chief? 
 
 When the position at Dowdall's tavern was lost, it necessitated 
 the abandonment of the open, commanding eminence at Hazel grove, 
 and General Hooker found himself with uo ground to stand upon, 
 being hemmed in so closely in front, flank, and rear that missiles 
 from the enemy, aimed at the line in front, could carry to the line 
 facing in the opposite direction ; and the Chancellor house, where 
 were the headquarters of the army, was the centre of a concentric 
 fire bearing down upon it from the segment of three-quarters of a 
 circle. At Hazel grove, the enemy's artillery could take in reverse 
 both the fortified line occupied by the infantry of General Geary, 
 and the infantry and artillery at Fairview. With the giving way 
 of the Eleventh corps, and the disasters which it directly entailed, it 
 became imperative to withdraw to other ground, where some reason- 
 able chance could be afforded to manoeuvre the army. Biit, not-' 
 withstanding General Hooker was thus cramped and hemmed in by 
 this sudden loss of his position, his army stood at bay, and for five 
 hours made one of the most magnificent fights known in warfare. 
 
CO h' DUCT OF THE BATTLE. 183 
 
 Hancock and Geary faced Lee and easily kept him in check. But 
 the corps of Sickles, and the division of Williams, outnumbei-ed by 
 the army of Jackson together with the division of Anderson brought 
 to its support, and vastly overreached in position, only held their 
 ground by the most determined bravery. The rebel leaders had 
 taught their men to believe that one Confederate was as good as 
 three Union men. But they here learned, to their sorrow, that one 
 man in blue was as good as one and a half in gray. It was on this 
 ground that their leader, Jackson, fell, and here a vast number of 
 their bravest and their best went down. It was called by the Con- 
 federates a glorious victory. According to the usual estimates of 
 warfare it was. But it would have required only a few more such 
 victories to have ended the rebellion. Chancellorsville was one of 
 those heavy blows, however it may be regarded by the inconsiderate, 
 which finally brought the Confederacy to destruction. 
 
 The fall of General Hooker, by a solid shot which struck the 
 pillar of the Chancellor house, near which he was standing, and 
 rendered him senseless, inflicting, what was believed at the time, a 
 fatal injury, robbed the Union army at the supreme moment of the 
 battle of his directing hand. It was at a time when Sickles' corps 
 was inflicting terrible slaughter. The enemy wfere evidently weak- 
 ening under his ponderous blows. But his ammunition was fast 
 being consumed, and it was impossible to replenish it in face of this 
 terrific fire. He called for reinforcements. But the tongue, whose 
 utterance would have instantly responded, was paralyzed by the 
 terrible shock. It was some time before General Couch, who was 
 next in rank, could assume command. In the meantime. Sickles 
 again and again called for help, but none came. General Couch, 
 when once in command, determined to act upon the evident inten- 
 tion of General Hooker in the early morning, to put his army upon 
 a new line which his engineers had selected during the night, and, 
 hence, did not respond to the calls of Sickles, at a time when there 
 was a fair prospect of beating the enemy on the contracted line then 
 occupied, and the opportunity passed away. Thus, a second time, 
 was the promise of success clouded by a fatality beyond the com- 
 mander's control. 
 
 When once the Union army was drawn in upon the, new position, 
 
184 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELL0B8VILLE. 
 
 where the whole force could be deployed and used, General Hooker 
 earnestly courted battle, and though he remained in this position for 
 three days, and until the eight days rations with which he started 
 were completely exhausted, the enemy could not be induced to at- 
 tack, except to try the position, and in every case was repulsed with 
 fearful slaughter. The two arniies had not been long in the new 
 positions, before they were strongly intrenched, the troops looking 
 forth from their fortifications, and each party awaiting and endeav- 
 oring to tempt the other to advance. What was to be done? Gen- 
 eral Hooker says : "Early in the war I had come to the conclusion 
 that, with the arms now in use, it would be impossible to carry 
 ^orks by au assault in front, provided they were properly con- 
 structed and manned I do not know of an instance in this 
 
 war where rifle-pits, properly constructed and properly manned, 
 have been taken by front assaults alone, either on our side or that 
 of the enemy." To open a new campaign with entirely new com- 
 binations, from his present position, was, under the circumstances in 
 which he found himself, out of the question, and he wisely deter- 
 mined to withdraw. 
 
 At a council of officers held before issuing orders to withdraw. 
 General Meade said that he was for remaining, because he did not 
 think that the enemy would allow the army to retire. General 
 Reynolds, who complained of being tired, had thrown himself upon 
 a bed and fallen asleep, but had previously stated that his opinion 
 coincided with General Meade's. Generals Couch and Sickles were 
 for retiring. General Slocum was not present. General Howard 
 was for advancing, because the army had been driven from its 
 original position by the conduct of his corps. 
 
 The matter has been much discussed whether General Sedgwick 
 faithfully obeyed the order of his chief to move to the assistance of 
 the hard-pressed troops at Chancellorsville. The order reached him 
 at 11 o'clock on the evening of the 2d, and was absolute and im- 
 perative. It required him to form junction with the main body by 
 daylight on the morning of the 3d. From a fragment of the tes- 
 timony of General Howe, it would be inferred that General Sedg- 
 wick determined at the outset not to make a forced march, as would 
 have been necessary in yielding a prompt compliance with the order. 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 185 
 
 General Howe says, " Not'long after the order was received, Gen- 
 eral Sedgwick said to General Newton, ' Newton, you move on ; 
 Howe will follow, and Brooks and I will take a little nap.' " There 
 is one consideration not usually taken into the account in judging 
 his conduct. General Hooker had informed General Sedgwick what 
 force was in his front, and that correctly. Numerous dispatches 
 had been sent confirmatory of this estimate. But General Sedgwick, 
 who was across the river when the order reached him, had been 
 skirmishing with the enemy opposite Franklin's bridge, and had 
 found them very strong. It is now well known that General Early 
 had the greater part of his force concentrated about Hamilton's 
 crossing, in the immediate front of Sedgwick, and the latter may 
 have, consequently, inferred that the rest of the Fredericksburg line 
 was equally strong, and that General Hooker was mistaken in his 
 information, or that Early had been reinforced subsequent to Hook- 
 er's receipt of intelligence. Such, however, was not the fact: the 
 rest of the rebel line, above Hamilton's crossing, and opposite 
 Fredericksburg, was feebly defended ; and had he resolutely put his 
 command in motion, and moved rapidly forward, there would have 
 been scarcely any resistance oifered. It was a bright star-light night, 
 according to the testimony of General Howe, and if he had broken 
 through the rebel line without much hindrance, he could in six 
 hours have easily reached General Hooker's front, which would 
 have been a full compliance with the orders he had received. The 
 officers under General Sedgwick, who have given their testimony 
 upon this point, very generally agree that this forced march might 
 have been successfully made, and with the probability of only trifling 
 loss. If 22,000 fresh troops could have been in readiness to have 
 precipitated themselves upon General Lee's flank at sunrise on the 
 morning of the 3d, there can be little question but that the rebel 
 army would have been driven in utter rout. Thus again were Gen- 
 eral Hooker's plans balked by an utter failure of his lieutenant to 
 comply with his orders. In a superstitious age such a succession 
 of miscarriages of plans would have been attributed to the cross 
 purposes of the unseen powers; and is it possible that in the counsels 
 of Divine Providence the time had not yet fully come for the triumph 
 of the national arms? — that Inscrutable Wisdom required still 
 
186 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 greater trials and patient endurance for the purging away of national 
 transgressions ? 
 
 By waiting until eleven o'clock on the morning of the 3d before 
 attempting to break through the enemy's lines, Sedgwick gave them 
 time to take every precaution, point every gun, and get every man 
 into position, and when he did make his advance a thousand of his 
 best troops were sacrificed in carrying that feeble line — a needless 
 sacrifice. By three o'clock in the afternoon he was ready to com- 
 mence his advance, thus giving the enemy ample time to prepare a 
 skilfully planned ambuscade at Salem church, into which he ran 
 without suitable precautions, suffered a bloody repulse, and soon 
 found himself surrounded by a largely outnumbering force, out of 
 which he was Obliged to fight his way, sustaining again grievous 
 losses, making the aggregate of his casualties greater than in any 
 other corps in the army, and all this without inflicting any serious 
 damage upon the enemy, or gaining any tactical advantage what- 
 ever. This failure was no fault of the men : for a braver body 
 never carried muskets than the men of this corps, nor were there to 
 be found more resolute ofScers in the army than Sedgwick had for 
 his lieutenants. Had he moved promptly,' he would have every- 
 where taken the enemy by surprise. But moving thus deliberately, 
 he allowed the enemy everywhere to take him by surprise. His 
 final withdrawal was fortunately conducted, his troops acting with 
 great firmness and skill, especially the wing under the command of 
 General Howe. 
 
 It was the desire of General Hooker, when he found that the 
 enemy was not likely to attack him in his final position at Chan- 
 cellorsville, that General Sedgwick should hold apd fortify the 
 heights on the south side of the river, covering Bank's ford, while 
 he, leaving a sufficient force in the fortifications to engage the atten- 
 tion of the enemy, should withdraw and join the corps of Sedgwick, 
 thus again completely turning the enemy's position. This was 
 feasible, as the ground in that vicinity is open, and very bold, where 
 a small force could have easily held the whole rebel army at bay, 
 had it been well intrenched. But Sedgwick had become very ner- 
 vous, and in the multiplicity of cross telegrams, and unaccountable 
 delays in the delivery of messages, the corps had recrossed before 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 187 
 
 the orders of General Hooker were received, and thus was the final 
 purpose in the plan of ihe campaign brought to naught. 
 
 The critieisnj has been made that the battle was lost to the Union 
 commander for lack of cavalry present with the army upon the 
 Chancellorsville field. Indeed it was the opinion of the writer 
 upon a partial consideration of the case, and before going upon the 
 field, that the vital defect in the plan of campaign was a deficiency 
 in that arm of the service. But after spending sufiicient time 
 upon the ground to thoroughly inspect every part, that view was 
 modified. 
 
 As a general rule in warfare there is a well-established lavv regu- 
 lating the proportion as to numbers and equipment which the three 
 arms of the service — infantry, cavalry and artillery — should bear to 
 each other, which a commander cannot disregard in entering upon a 
 campaign without thereby imperilling his chances of success. Least 
 of all can a leader dispense with his proper complement of cavalry 
 when making a campaign in an enemy's country, and upon ground 
 with which he is unfamiliar. Cavalry is indispensable to the se- 
 curity of an army. Cavalry ascertains the whereabouts, and dis- 
 positions, and purposes of the enemy, and screens from view what 
 is being done in its own ranks. 
 
 But while these truths are of general application they admit of 
 some modification in particular instances. On a field like Gettys- 
 burg, or Antietam, where, with the exception of thin curtains of 
 woods, all is cleared ground, giving ample opportunity for ma- 
 noeuvring, fighting dismounted, and using light artillery, the quota 
 of cavalry laid down by military writers as proportioned to the 
 other arms of the service cannot be safely curtailed or dispensed 
 with. But here, where there was scarcely one acre of cleared 
 ground to one hundred of wood, which General Warren accurately 
 characterized as "very dense woods, not very large trees, but very 
 difficult to get through, mainly of scrubby oak, what they call 
 black jack there, so that a man could hardly ride through it, and a 
 man could not march through it very well with a musket in his 
 hand, unless he trailed it,". and where General Hooker aptly com- 
 pares the roads to "causeways," what could be done with horses? 
 The narrow ways through the impenetrable thickets could be swept 
 
188 THE BATTLE OF CHAJHCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 by artillery. Open fields did not exist for deploying, and where 
 could the horses be sent in fighting dismounted ? The only use that 
 could possibly have been made of cavah-y in such a country was to 
 find and report the whereabouts of the enemy. But was it not 
 better to send out light columns of infantry and artillery at once, 
 than to be hampered with the "care of horses? There were only 
 two stages of the battle when cavalry could have been of great 
 advantage for this purpose — ^on the morning of the 1st, to have 
 ascertained whether the enemy was in force in advance of Bank's 
 ford, and on the evening of the 2d, to have found what was in 
 Howard's front and flank. In the first case the enemy commanded 
 all the narrow roads with artillery and a heavy skirmish line close 
 up to Chancellorsville, and would not allow the Union cavalry to 
 advance upon them, and there was no other way of forcing the 
 rebel line except by long detour. In the second case Howard knew 
 by the middle of the afternoon, as did his ofBcers, that the enemy 
 were concentrating on his flank, and had he been solicitous to know 
 more, a few regiments of infantry and some flying artillery could 
 have developed the position and strength of the enemy at any 
 point in a half hour's time; whereas it would have been impossible 
 for cavalry to have coped at all in the midst of this dense under- 
 growth with the enemy's skirmishers covering all the roads. 
 
 It may be asserted that the enemy used cavalry to screen the 
 flank movement of Jackson, and to develop the position of the 
 Union right, and the question may arise could not Union cavalry 
 have gone where the rebel horse successfully made their way, and 
 accomplished their purpose? It is true that Fitz-Hugh Lee's cav- 
 alry did move across the whole front of Howard, at intervals, 
 charging upon his lines, until Howard's exact position had been 
 clearly ascertained. But why allow this to go on? Why not 
 have stopped it in its incipiency? And would not a light line of 
 infantry with howitzers have been much more efiectual in pre- 
 venting its progress than cavalry would have been? Nothing more 
 strongly marks the inefficiency, to use a mild term, of the Eleventh 
 corps commander than his failure to stop this reconnoitring column, 
 and his fear of bringing on a battle. 
 
 It will also be averred that a single regiment of cavalry, at the' 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. Igg 
 
 most critical moment in the fight, so checked the onset of the foe, 
 as to enable the artillery to get their position and pour a terrible 
 \veight of metal full in the faces of the oncoming masses. This is 
 true. But it went to its destruction, and the sacrifice could only- 
 he justified on the ground of dire necessity. 
 
 The question has been gravely considered whether the cavalry, 
 sent out under General Stoneman, accomplished anything helpful 
 to the rest of the army; or anything at all proportionate to th? 
 preparations made, or execution required by the orders of the 
 commander-in-chief. It must be confessed that he marched far 
 enough to have reached the ground on which he was sent to operate, 
 and the time he was required to stay he stayed, and when that had 
 expired that he successfully made his way back to rejoin the army. 
 At the outset, that he might purchase immunity from peril from 
 the rebel cavalry, which he feared would be disposed to follow him, 
 he left a full third of his command for the purpose of amusing and 
 detaining the rebel horse on the upper Rapidan, whereas his instruc- 
 tions required him to move with his entire force. When arrived at 
 his destination, which was miles away from the destination fixed by 
 his orders, where the principal destruction was to be effected, the 
 fragment of his command which he had with him was broken into 
 six parts, and sent in different directions, neither of which was 
 strong enough, single-handed, to contend with the enemy success- 
 fully, and when arrived at their destinations, one of them, at least, 
 found that the means for effecting the destruction of the work or- 
 dered had been forgotten. Some bridges were partially destroyed, 
 and flouring mills and water-tanks ; and some track was torn from 
 the road on which were brought General Lee's supplies ; but the 
 whole damage done was repaired in less than twenty-four hours. 
 No such destruction was effected as was done to the Cumberland 
 Valley road, when occupied by the rebel forces, where for miles the 
 rails were heated and twisted, and the ties burned, or to the Weldon 
 road, when occupied by the Union forces. It was consequently of 
 little, if any, advantage to General Hooker, in conducting his 
 campaign on the Rappahannock, and when, day after day, he looked 
 anxiously for some intelligence of decided success, which should 
 encourage him to prosecute the campaign, there was no sign, and he 
 
190 ' THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 was left to infer that little decisive had been done. Consequently, 
 should he advance from his Chancellorsville position, the enemy, 
 with unbroken communications, would be left free to retire behind 
 the next river or ridge, and again be ready to fight, as he did in the 
 subsequent campaign of the Wilderness. General Hooker had sent 
 word to Sedgwick that he was purposing on the 5th to make a gen- 
 eral offensive movement, which would have the effect to leave Sedg- 
 wick free to act. This purpose was founded upon the confident 
 expectation of hearing, in the meantime, that his caValry had com- 
 pletely severed the, rebel communications, and was holding a strong 
 position on the enemy's rear. He could not be brought to believe 
 that his cavalry would so completely disobey his instructions, and 
 so succtessfully shun every hostile encounter, and fail to go pear the 
 railroad which he had particularly and repeatedly pointed out as 
 the one it was to advance upon and break up, and that it would 
 neglect to take and hold strong positions on that line. But when 
 no word was brought that any of these things had been done, when 
 Richmond papers of Sunday morning made no mention of disturb- 
 ance, and when, finally, by. the long silence, he came to suspect that 
 nothing effectual had been accomplished, then it was that he saw 
 clearly that should he assume the offensive and succeed in driving 
 the enemy back, if that enemy's communications . were intact, it 
 would prove of little practical advantage, and he would be assuming 
 a risk without any adequate motive. 
 
 Of the generalship on the rebel side little need be said. There 
 is nothing so much praised as success, and over this, from one 
 end of the Confederacy to the other, were sounded paeans. 
 
 The dispositions made upon the upper Rappahannock, and the 
 Rapidan, either for checking an advance, or for penetrating the in- 
 tentions of the advancing Union troops, were neither carefully 
 made, nor did the force operating in that direction make so much 
 opposition at the passage of the rivers as they were easily capable 
 of doing. The consequence was that the Union column crossed 
 both streams and moved on and occupied Chancellorsville without 
 hindrance. But by remaining in his intrenchments behind Fred- 
 ericksburg until his antagonist's plans were fully developed, Lee 
 still held the heavy body in his front at bay, and was in readiness 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 191 
 
 to turn at a moment's notice in the direction where needed. The 
 conduct of General Anderson was eminently judicious. The with- 
 drawing from United States' ford and falling back from Chancellors- 
 ville to a position completely covering Bank's ford was an excellent 
 stroke of policy, for it secured the possession of commanding ground, 
 effectually guarding the ford, and was at the same time so near to 
 the main column that it could with scarcely any delay be strength- 
 ened, and amply manned. The position thus assumed- effectually 
 kept the two witigs of the Union army asunder. The fearless atti- 
 tude assumed by General Jackson on arriving with the main body 
 of the army, at Anderson's iiitrenchments, ordering as he did the 
 cessation of fortifying and an immediate advance, gave a decided 
 advantage, as it enabled him to check the iheads of the Union 
 columns before issuing from the dense forests where, had they been 
 allowed • to come, they could have deployed on advantageous 
 ground. 
 
 After arriving in presence of General Hooker at Chancellorsville, 
 the plan of battle adopted of dividing the army and moving by a 
 wide detour with the larger part to attack the Union right-flank, 
 was a hazardous one, and had it not been for the dense forests by 
 which the movement was successfully screened from the observation 
 of the opposing force, might have proved very disastrous. Had 
 the Union commander got his troops into position at the Welford 
 furnace but a single hour earlier, the attack which he was on the 
 point of delivering would have been made. The chief objection to 
 the manoeuvre lay in the length of the circuit to be traversed, which 
 required its separation for so long a time from the body left with 
 General Lee in reaching the point of attack. " It may be laid down," 
 says Jomini, that prince of tacticians, "as a principle, that any 
 movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy 
 an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder 
 of the army in position." In this regard this movement of Jackson 
 was particularly faulty. 
 
 The massed attack made by Jackson when once in position, and 
 the provision made for reinforcement of one column by the line next 
 behind it, without waiting to refer the application to the commander 
 of the corps, was admirable, and while it exposed his force to terri- 
 
192 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOESVILLE. 
 
 ble destruction, if skilfully opposed, was almost certain of success. 
 No man knew so well how to make such an attack as did Jackson. 
 The same thing was attempted by Hood before Atlanta, and at 
 Franklin, but in both cases with the most disastrous results. Gen- 
 eral Pleasanton, when asked by the committee on the conduct of the 
 war, what produced the panic in the Eleventh corps, replied, " The 
 combined effect upon "their imaginations of the sound of the mus- 
 ketry and increasing yells of the rebels, and their increasing artillery 
 fire. It was a theatrical effect that Stonewall Jackson could pro- 
 duce better than any other man I have ever seen on the field of 
 battle. You could tell one of his attacks anywhere." The yells 
 here referred to were sui generis. The Union cheer was a deep 
 sonorous hurrah, but the rebel note was pitched on the highest key 
 that the voice is capable of reaching, and in its united sound resem- 
 bled more the continuous screech of a power buzz saw .heard at 
 night from the stillness of the forest, than a human cry. 
 
 General Hooker made the declaration to the same committee: 
 " Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as 
 was also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not 
 necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army." On being sub- 
 sequently asked to explain more particularly what element of supe- 
 riority he here referred to, he said : " I can only say in speaking of 
 them (rebel infantry) that I attached a technical meaning only to 
 the word discipline. In my own mind I only referred to their 
 vigorous and vehement mode of making their attacks. This may 
 be said to be their characteristic mode of assaulting all through my 
 experience in the war jn the army of the east. I never felt it in the 
 west except at Peach Tree creek. Their attacks in the east were 
 blows. I felt thqm particularly at Williamsburg, and Frazier's, 
 farm, and the shock seemed to make the earth tremble on which 
 we stood. With whom this mode of attacking originated I have 
 never been informed, and but from being confined generally to the 
 armies in the east, I should think it was a concentrated expression 
 of their unity, their bitterness of feeling towards their adversaries. 
 In no other respects that I know of did they show any superiority 
 over our own troops. They were all, however, whether from the 
 east or the west, hard customers for an enemy to wrestle with." 
 
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE. 193 
 
 The temerity of General Jackson in pushing his advantage after 
 making his charge upon the Eleventh corps, was unexampled and 
 cost him his life. It was of a piece with most of his military ex- 
 ploits, which were characterized by rashness which would utterly 
 fail of justification upon the ordinary principles of military science. 
 His turning of the right of Pope in the Second Bull Run campaign, 
 should have cost him the destruction of his corps, had he been 
 matched against a skilful commander with an army well in hand, 
 and his raid in the valley, just previous to the Peninsula campaign, 
 upon all human probabilities, should have ended alike disastrously. 
 His estimate of the temper of the men who were facing him on 
 that final night at Chancellorsville was totally at fault. To his 
 com])anions who cautioned him not to expose himself so needlessly he 
 replied, " There is no danger : the enemy is routed. Go back and 
 tell General Hill_ to press on." Could he have been on that field 
 during the remainder of the night and the morning hours of the 
 next day and witnessed the terrible slaughter of his corps, he would 
 not have so judged. 
 
 The result of the Chancellorsville campaign upon the final issue 
 of the war is a consideration with which this chapter may fittingly 
 close. The spirit of the troops was uot broken by the encounter. 
 They returned to their camps without having accomplished all that 
 had been hoped of them, for reasons which have been set forth ; but 
 they inflicted a terrible wound upon the Confederate cause. They 
 lost no honor, they received a great lesson in the costly school of 
 experience, and it should be remembered that these same men two 
 months later, under the same commander, to within two days of the 
 battle, upon the field of Gettysburg, gained the great turning victory 
 of the war. In his congratulatory order to the army General Hooker 
 said : " In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock 
 before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has 
 given renewed evidence of its confflence in itself and its fidelity to 
 the principles it represents. By fighting at a disadvantage we 
 would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, 
 and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, 
 the army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its in- 
 terests or honor may command it." The gold market, which was the 
 13 
 
194 
 
 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 most sensitive test, at this time, of disaster, was scarcely disturbed. 
 Secretary Stanton telegraphed on the 7th of May, the day after 
 the recrossing of the army : " The result at Chancellorsville does 
 not seem to have produced any panic. Gold has only risen sjx 
 per cent, in New York, and at the close of the day had gone down 
 four. The public confidence seems to remain unshaken in the 
 belief of your ultimate success." 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 NUMBERS ENGAGED, LOSSES, THE 
 WOUNDED, THE DEAD. 
 
 *0 be told in round numbers the' enumeration of 
 each of the contending armies in a battle, gives 
 but an imperfect knowledge of the strengths actu- 
 ally brought to bear against each other in the pro- 
 gress of the struggle. To fully appreciate the real 
 value and potential force of troops, it is necessary 
 to' know the numbers of the organizations actually 
 pitted against each other, and the position of all the 
 parts of the armies at the time of impact. A nice 
 discriminatiou would require a knowledge of the location of the 
 field, iu its relations to home or country, and the temper of an army 
 towards the cause for which it fights. 
 
 The last monthly return made of the Army of Northern "Vir- 
 ginia, commanded by General Lee, before the opening of the Chan- 
 cellorsville campaign, gives the aggregate of the army present and 
 detached at 109,859, exclusive of the artillery of the Second army 
 corps, which would increase the number to at least 112,000, dis- 
 tributed as follows : Anderson's division 14,419, McLaw's division 
 13,741 — an aggregate of Longstreet's corps present of 28,160 ; A. 
 P. Hill's division 19,411, D. H. Hill's division 15,703, Early's 
 division 14,470, Trimble's division 12,478^an aggregate of Jack- 
 son's corps of 62,159; Stuart's cavalry division 12,275; valley 
 District 4,863, artillery 2,384 ; artillery of Second corps (estimated) 
 2,259. These figures do not include the three divisions of Pickett, 
 Hood, and Ransom, which were absent with Longstreet, and D. H. 
 Hillj south of the James, and before Little Washington. This ag- 
 
 (197) ■ 
 
198 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 gregate is the number with which General Lee stands charged as 
 under his immediate command, on the monthly return of the army 
 now on file among the rebel archives held in the War Department. 
 The aggregate strength present by the above returns is 73,583, dis- 
 tributed as follows : Anderson's division 9,960, McLaw's division 
 10,095, A. P. Hill's division 13,614, D. H. Hill's division 11,418, 
 Early's division 9,936, Trimble's division 8,095, Stuart's cavalry, 
 8,453,* artillery 1,929. But this record was made twenty-seven days 
 before the campaign opened, and this was at a time when the army 
 was rapidly filling up. Messrs. Hotchkiss and Allen f say: 
 " Prompt measures were taken to prevent desertion, and those who 
 had deserted were brought back in large numbers. The number of 
 absentees from various causes was very great in the beginning of 
 the year. By the spring it was reduced more than half. The con- 
 scription act, now fairly put into operation, increased the strength 
 of the army daily. Jackson's corps grew in three months from 
 twenty-five to thirty-three thousand muskets" 
 
 By a field return of General Lee's army, made on the 20th of 
 May, scarcely two weeks after the battle, the aggregate strength 
 present was 65,250, distributed as follows: Anderson's division 
 8,890, McLaw's division 8,416, A. P. Hill's division 11,035, Rodes' 
 (D. H. Hill's) division 8,910, Early's division 7,951, Johnson's 
 (Triml)le's) division 6,356, Stuart's cavalry division 8,193, artillery 
 5,503. But these figures do not represent the losses that were sust 
 tained in the campaign. By adjusting these losses, and.making due 
 allowances for the sick and those in arrest, we have what may be 
 accepted as a fair estimate of Lee's available force on entering the 
 campaign, viz. : 71,777, distributed as follows : Anderson's division 
 9,779, McLaw's division 9,257, A. P. Hill's division 12,138, D. 
 H. Hill's division 9,801, Early's division 8,746, Stuart's division 
 9,01 2, J and the artillery 6,053. The Confederate authorities, 
 Hotchkiss and Allen, give the aggregate of muskets in Lee's army 
 at .58,200 ; but add in a foot-note : " We have not the exact data 
 on which to give the effective strength, but an addition of 4,000 to 
 the total above would be a liberal estimate," which plainly demon- 
 
 » Hampton's division ab.sent. f Hotchkiss and Allen, p. 14. 
 
 J Deduct Wade Hampton's division. 
 
NlIMHKliS JUNGAGJlHJ LOSHJi'S. 199 
 
 strates that they can lay no claim to accuracy for these figures. The 
 4,000 added to the aggregate given above would make Lee's whole 
 force 62,200, which is manifestly considerably below the number of 
 men present for duty, as shown by the returns as aboye, in the Con- 
 federate army at the time Hooker crossed the Rappahannock. 
 
 Fortunately we have a consolidated morning report of the Union 
 army, made on the 30th of April, on the very eve of the battle, 
 which furnishes definite information respecting its strength. Ex- 
 clusive of commissioned officers the whole number was 123,726, but, 
 including officers, 131,519, distributed as follows: First corps 15,782, 
 Second corps 15,907, Third corps 17,568, Fifth corps 14,867, Sixth 
 corps 22,427, Eleventh corps 12,169, Twelfth corps 12,929, cavalry 
 11,402, and artillery 8,468. 
 
 At the various stages of the battle, when the issues were being 
 tried most severely, the numbers pitted against each other were as 
 varying as the fortunes of the day, and it is curious, as well as in- 
 structive, to note them. In the first encounter of the two armies at 
 a little past noon of the 1st of May, there were less than 27,000 
 Union troops in hand, and in position to be used, whereas they were 
 confronted by upwards of 47,000, exclusive of the cavalry, in per- 
 fect readiness for action, with good ground on which to manoeuvre, 
 and heavy breastworks prepared in which to retire if hard pressed. 
 
 The three divisions of Jackson's corps, which he had with him in 
 his flank movement on the 2d, numbered 28,930, exclusive of cavalry 
 and artillery. With the exception of the two brigades of Archer 
 and Thomas, of Hill's division, which had turned aside from tiie 
 line of march at the Welford furnace, that numbered between 
 three and four thousand men, Jackson had this entire body in hand 
 and in position for attack, when he made his grand onslaught upon 
 the Eleventh corps, while Howard had but 12,929, and of this num- 
 ber Barlow's brigade, numbering between one and two thousand 
 men, had been detached and was miles away when the attack was 
 made. 
 
 When Sedgwick made his advance at Fredericksburg he had his 
 entire corps, numbering 22,427, whereas Barksdale and Early had 
 less than 11,000 men to oppose him. 
 
 At Chancellorsville, on the morning of the 3d, Jackson's entire 
 
200 THE BATTLE OP CHANCELLOB.SVILLE. 
 
 corps was up and in hand, 28,930, exclusive of cavalry and artillery, 
 bating the losses ot the previous evening in the encounter with 
 Howard ; and to this force there stood opposed the corps of Sickles, 
 Williams^ division of the Twelfth corps, and William Hays' brigade 
 of the Second corps, between twenty-one and twenty-two thousand 
 men. 
 
 There are some considerations respecting the real strength of 
 Hooker's army which should be taken into the account in contrast- 
 ing it with the strength of Lee's. There were some forty regiments 
 of nine months and two years men, whose time had either fully ex- 
 pired, or was so near expiring, that they could not be counted in 
 the effective strength, and it will be seen by reference to General 
 Hooker's orders, that corps commanders were directed to leave such 
 regiments in camp or on detached duty. Then, four thousand of 
 the number embraced in the above estimates acted as pioneers. 
 Again, with the exception of three small regiments, the entire cavalry 
 corps was on detached service, miles away from the field, where it 
 was of no earthly use to the general, and accomplished scarcely 
 anything it was set to do. On the contrary Lee had a homogeneous 
 army, standing on its own soil, composed of men who were im- 
 pelled by one idea. If all these conditions be taken into considera- 
 tion it will be seen that the numbers actually in hand for service 
 were much nearer an equality than has been generally supposed. 
 
 The losses sustained in the several encounters, extending through 
 nearly eight da:ys, are quite accurately ascertained from official 
 sources, though in the rebel account there are some discrepancies 
 between the tabulated record made by the medical director, and the 
 numbers given in the official report of officers. From a remark 
 which occurs in General Colston's report, after giving the losses in 
 the division that he commanded, viz. : " Two hundred and sixty- 
 seven killed, fifteen hundred and ninety-two wounded, making 
 eighteen hundred and forty-nine casualties, not counting the very 
 slightly wounded," it may be inferred that the discrepancies can be 
 accounted for by supposing that the very slightly wounded are 
 not counted in the lesser enumerations. Following will be found 
 in tabulated forms the losses by killed aud wounded in the two 
 armies. 
 
NUMBERS ENOAOED— LOSSES. 
 UNION AEMY LOSSES, OFFICIAL. 
 
 201 
 
 First corps 
 
 Second corps 
 
 Third corps 
 
 Fifth corps 
 
 Sixth corps 
 
 Eleventh corps....! 
 
 Twelfth corps 
 
 Artillery corps 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 Total 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 1 
 
 Total. 
 
 34 
 
 104 
 
 138 
 
 145 
 
 ■ 1,045 
 
 1,190/ 
 
 361 
 
 2,559 
 
 2,920 
 
 70 
 
 470 
 
 540 
 
 473 
 
 2,536 
 
 3,009 
 
 218 
 
 1,163 
 
 1,381 
 
 248 
 
 1,427 
 
 1,675 
 
 55 
 
 281 
 
 336 
 
 8 1 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 1,612 
 
 9,591 
 
 11,203 
 
 CONFEDERATE AEMY LOSSES, OFFICIAL. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 "Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 136 
 418 
 298 
 397 
 186 
 213 . 
 13 
 4 
 
 838 
 2,260 
 1,720 
 1,856 
 1,049 
 1,296 
 55 
 7 
 
 974 
 2,678 
 2,018 
 2,253 
 1,235 
 1,509 
 68 
 11 
 
 A. P. Hill's division ..-. 
 
 Trimble's division 
 
 D. H. Hill's division 
 
 Anderson's division 
 
 McLaws' division 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 1,665 
 
 9,081 
 
 10,746 
 
 These figares have been carefully collated from the official reports 
 of the division and brigade commanders, and may be regarded as 
 representing as nearly absolute accuracy as data can be made. 
 
 The number of "missing in action" is not set forth in all the re- 
 ports of the commanding generals in the Confederate army, though 
 they are given by a part of them. General Early reports 500 miss- 
 ing from his division, General Eodes, from D. H. Hill's division, 
 713, General McLaws, from his division, 380. If a proportionate 
 number was missing from the other four divisions, it would give a 
 total of missing in action or taken prisoners of 3,626. The missing 
 from the Union army is reported at 6,232, a somewhat larger num- 
 ber than that reported for the opposing army, but doubtless repre- 
 sents the full loss sustained in the campaign. 
 
 During the progress of a great battle, no duty is more imperative, 
 
202 '^HE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 both for preserving the integrity of an army, and for humanity's 
 sake, than the care for the wounded. Indeed, on the medical 
 direction of an army largely depends its efficiency. The power of 
 endurance, the vigor requisite to ward off disease, and the temper 
 of mind and body favorable to rallying from the effect of wounds, 
 is largely in the keeping of the medical staff. Fortunately for the 
 Army of the Potomac, its medical director, Surgeon Jonathan Let- 
 terman, was a man of eminent ability, of enlarged and enlightened 
 views, and was intensely devoted to the discharge of his great duties. 
 It was a fact, notorious in army life, that after the three fruitless 
 campaigns undertaken by Burnside, there was a feeling in the army 
 of utter despondency, and that it required the utmost exertions 
 of General Hooker to bring it up to a state of efficiency and relia- 
 bility. Indeed, if there is any one thing for which General Hooker 
 has won the gratitude of his country, it is for having disciplined 
 and made that army self-reliant, a power, real, and commensurate with 
 its numbers and resources, and which carried it successfully through 
 the great campaign of Gettysburg. As we have already seen. 
 Colonel MacDougall has ranked the passage of the Rappahannock 
 as one of the great military feats in all countries and of all ages. 
 But the passage, unopposed, of the Kappahannock, was but the 
 game of a child compared with the feat accomplished in inspiring 
 the hundred thousand men who followed him with the spirit of 
 soldiership. In this herculean labor, General Hooker was greatly 
 aided by his faithful lieutenant, Surgeon Letterman. In his 
 general report, published after the close of the war, he justly re- 
 marks upon the measures inaugurated at this period : * "A corps 
 of medical officers was not established solely for the purpose of 
 attending the wounded and sick ; the proper treatment of these 
 sufferers is certainly a matter of very great importance, and is an 
 imperative duty ; but the labors of medical officers cover a more 
 extended field. The leading idea, which should be constantly kept 
 in view, is to strengthen the hands of the commanding general by 
 keeping his army in the most vigorous health, thus rendering it in 
 the highest degree efficient for enduring fatigue and privation, and 
 for fighting. In this view, the duties of such a corps are of vital 
 * " Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac," Letterman, p. 100. 
 
THE WOUNDED. 20a 
 
 importance to the success of an army, and commanders seldom 
 appreciate the full effect of their proper fulfilment. Medical officers 
 should possess a thorough knowledge of the powers, wants, and 
 capabilities of the human system, the effect of food, raiment, and 
 climate, with all its multiplied vicissitudes, the influences for evil 
 which surround the health of an army, and the means necessary to 
 combat them successfully. They should also possess quickness of 
 perception, a sound judgment, promptness in action, and skill in the 
 treatment of medical and surgical diseases. It is the interest of the 
 government, aside from all motives of humanity, to bestow the 
 greatest possible care upon its wounded and sick, and to use every 
 means to preserve the health of those who are well, since the greater 
 the labor given to the preservation of health, the greater will be the 
 number for duty, and the more attention bestowed upon the sick 
 and wounded, the more speedily will they perform the duties for 
 which they are employed, or be discharged from a service which 
 they can no longer benefit. When medical officers consider this 
 subject attentively, all their high and important duties will natur- 
 ally occur to them. The measures resulting from my views of the 
 duty of a medical staff exerted a beneficial influence upon the troops, 
 whose dispirited condition was so perceptible after the battle of 
 Fredericksburg. Whatever may have been the cause of this de- 
 pressed feeling, there was no doubt of its existence ; and constant 
 watchfulness and determination were required of the medical officers 
 to detect the numerous instances of feigned sickness, to prevent the 
 lists of sick being swelled by men who magnified trifling ailments 
 to avoid duty, and to break up the existing mania for being sent to 
 general hospitals, from which they too seldom returned to their 
 commands." 
 
 The results of the intelligent and persistent labors of Director 
 Letterman were abundantly successful. "My anticipations," he 
 says, " were realized, as will be perceived from the fact that this 
 army, which numbered over one hundred and forty thousand, 
 infantry and artillery, had, in defiance of the numerous and pow- 
 erful influences for evil acting upon the health of the men, a sick 
 report under four and a half per cent. Not only was the percentage 
 small, but those not on the lists of sick were in vigorous health,. 
 
204 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 and in buoyant spirits arising therefrom. More soldiers die by- 
 disease than by violence, and if a medical staff can secure their 
 health, its officers contribute largely to the success of a campaign. 
 I had a two-fold object in perfecting the physical condition of the 
 troops. First, that the commanding general- should have an army 
 upon whose health he could rely. Second, that those who might 
 be wounded should be in a condition to bear the shock, and the 
 operation, the suppuration, and confinement, with every prospect 
 of recovery. No commander ever had an army in better health or 
 in higher spirits, no wounded ever progressed more favorably than 
 those from the field of Chancellorsville." 
 
 It was the intention of Surgeon Letterman, had the way been 
 opened, as had been hoped it might, to remove the Union wounded 
 directly to Fredericksburg, where smooth roads would have been 
 available, and the distance but some ten miles, instead of that by 
 United States ford, which was twenty-five miles, and the ways very 
 rough. The wounded of the First and Fifth corps, on the 1st of 
 May, were taken first to the Chancellor house, and subsequently, as 
 it became evident that this edifice would come under the enemy's 
 artillery fire, were removed to hospitals established to right and left 
 of the United States ford road, a mile or two in rear. The wounded 
 of the Eleventh corps, in the encounter with Jackson on the evening 
 of the 2d, were also removed' farther to the rear in the same direc- 
 tion. With the opening of the battle on the morning of the 3d, 
 the number of the wounded was vastly multiplied. But the ar- 
 rangements for removing them to the hospitals, and attending to 
 their hurts, were ^.dmirably planned and most efficiently executed. 
 The necessities of the service induced the commanding general to 
 forbid any wagons following the troops across the river, and but two 
 ambulances to each division. The medical supply, and ambulance 
 train in excess of this number, was parked on the north bank of 
 the river in clo§e proximity to the ford. The lack of these facilities 
 on the field were felt, when, on the morning of the 3d, tlie wounded 
 rapidly accumulated. But the efficiency and energy displayed by 
 the medical and hospital corps caused the work of removal to be 
 rapidly done. As fast as the wounded were cared for and could be 
 got ready, they were sent to the permanent corps hospitals at Potomac 
 
THE WOUNDED. ' ;j05 
 
 creek and Brook's station. When, on the morning of the 3d, the 
 army abandoned its first position about Chancellorsville, and took 
 up the more contracted line covering United States ford, it was im- 
 possible to carry all the wounded back, and a considerable number 
 was left upon the abandoned portion of the field, who fell into the 
 enemy's hands. In each of the field hospitals a Union surgeon re- 
 mained in charge on the final withdrawal across the river. Surgeon 
 George Suckley, medical director of the Fifth corps, and a number 
 of other surgeons stayed by the wounded, rendering efficient aid. The 
 entire number of Union wounded who thus fell into the enemy's 
 hands, on the Chancellorsville field proper, was some twelve hundred. 
 
 When the Sixth corps, under Sedgwick, made its advance upon the 
 works at Fredericksburg, at noon on the 3d of May, the loss in killed 
 and wounded, in about twenty minutes time, was nearly a thousand. 
 The latter were immediately removed to hospitals established in 
 the town, and were eventually, with the exception of the desperately 
 wounded, sent acrpss the river. In the terrible fighting on the 
 evening of the 3d, at Salem church, midway between Fredericks- 
 burg and Chancellorsville, the wounded were taken back to Fred- 
 ericksburg, where the hospitals were in charge of Gibbons' division 
 of the Second corps. During the night of the 3d, the heights above 
 Fredericksburg were reoccupied by the enemy, and the way to the 
 town was cut ofi". But the bridges at Bank's ford had now been 
 laid, and the wounded of the 4th were retired by that avenue, though 
 some difficulty was experienced, as the enemy held the heights above 
 Colin run, and could drop his shells in uncomfortable proximity to^ 
 the crossings. Nevertheless, the work was so studiously prosecuted 
 that only about seventy-five fell into the enemy's hands upon the 
 final retirement of the corps. 
 
 The utmost solicitude was manifested by General Hooker for the 
 care of, and speedy recovery of those unfortunate men, who, by the 
 chances of war, had to be left upon the field, and negotiations were 
 opened with General Lee for^ their relief, when the smoke of the 
 battle had scarcely cleared from the field. On the evening of the 
 7th of May, General Hooker addressed tlie following communica- 
 tion to General Lee: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
 of your two communications of May 6th and 7th, this moment. If 
 
206 TELE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 agreeable to you, I would like to send medical supplies and attend- 
 ance to my wounded, and at such time as the state of the stream wilt 
 permit, send ambulances for them via the fords designated in your 
 communications, viz., United States ford and Bank's ford. I will, 
 with your consent, send parties to those fords with supplies at an 
 early hour to-morrow. The swollen state of the Rappahannock 
 probably preventing the crossing of any vehicles with supplies, I 
 shall have to depend upon you for transportation for them. I will 
 receive the wounded at the points named as soon as it can be done. 
 I will send an oflScer to Chancellorsville, with your consent, to ar- 
 range the details, which, judging from your letter, with the state of 
 the river, cannot now be determined by correspondence. Upon an 
 intimation from you as to any deficiency in your immediate neces- 
 sities of medical supplies of your own, by reason of their use for my 
 wounded, or other causes, I shall with pleasure replace them. I 
 would be obliged for approximate information concerning the num- 
 ber of wounded, that sufficient amount of supplies may be forwarded. 
 I would be under obligations for an early reply." 
 
 It was not in the heart of General Hooker to regard suffering 
 with indifference even in a foeman, and while he struck with relent- 
 less hand while in battle array, and smote with terrible earnestness 
 his enemies in the hour of conflict, yet when the noise of the en- 
 counter was hushed, and the moans of the gashed and famishing 
 were heard, he was touched with compassion, and whether friend or 
 foe they shared equally while he had the means of relief. In com- 
 pliance with the suggestions of this communication, and in accord- 
 ance with arrangements entered into between surgeons Letterman and 
 Guild, medical directors of the two armies, to whom were referred the 
 details of caring for and removing the Urlion wounded, on the 8th of 
 May, Dr. Asch, with twenty-six Union surgeons, and five army wagons 
 laden with blankets, stimulants, lint, bandages, chloroform, and beef 
 stock was sent to their relief. On the sahie day six hundred ra- 
 tions of fresh bread, beef, coffee, sugar, salt and candles were sent 
 to Bank's ford for the use of the wounded left in that vicinity, and 
 on the following day two thousand rations of the same articles were 
 despatched to Chancellorsville. These twenty -six surgeons, together 
 with the nineteen who were taken prisoners, or voluntarily remained, 
 
THE WOUNDED. 207 
 
 formed a force ample for the care of all the wounded left upon the 
 field. The presence of these officers, with the nourishing food and 
 stimulants, revived and encouraged the suffering heroes. These 
 supplies reached the wounded, says Surgeon Asch in his report, 
 "very opportunely; the wounded were cheered by the knowledge 
 that some provision was being made for them, and many lives were 
 saved by the free use of stimulants, and the nourishing food dis- 
 tributed." 
 
 General Lee promptly offered free passage to the camps of the 
 wounded, and, doubtless, touched by the humane sentiments of the 
 Union commander-in-chief in tendering medical relief to the suffer- 
 ing men of both armies, considerately sent a message offering free 
 entry by the Union ambulance corps to the battle-ground, thus 
 relieving these unfortunate soldiers from the suffering Which they 
 would have been compelled to endure had there been a necessity for 
 transfer at the river. Thus the amenities, even of war, were not 
 without their compensations upon that very battle-field, and of their 
 influencg in conducting other and remote campaigns none can make 
 computation. 
 
 As soon as it was announced that the Union ambulances could 
 freely cross the river, four hundred and fifty of these conveyances, 
 carrying two thousand seven hundred pounds of beef stock, were 
 despatched to the United States ford, and a requisite number also 
 to Bank's ford and Fredericksburg. Some delay was occasioned in 
 securing the laying of a pontoon bridge, as the waters were still high, 
 the river being entirely too deep for fording; but on the 13th, 
 bridges were completed and the ambulance train, now increased to 
 five hundred and fifty, crossed over, and by nine o'clock of the 
 15.th the sufferers, numbering eleven hundred and sixty, were 
 within the Union lines. 
 
 It is a sad commentary ou the burial of the dead in this battle 
 that so few were identified, when they came to be removed to the 
 cemetery prepared for their reception by the authority of the gen- 
 eral government. Of the 1 5,257 gathered from the fields of Chan- 
 cellorsville, Fredericksburg, Wilderness, and Spottsylvania, all but 
 2,488 are unknown. This burial-place was appropriately chosen, 
 being upon the summit of that noted hill known as Marye's heights. 
 
208 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 at the base of which, arid in front of the stone walls which encircled 
 it, so many of those, now resting there, braved death, and heroically 
 offered up their lives. It is about a mile west of the city, of Fred- 
 ericksburg, on the southern extremity of the bluff, and contains- 
 twelve acres. The ground was selected, and work commenced upon 
 it in the summer of 1866, and the removals were all made, and the 
 improvements completed by the fall of 1869. The surface of the 
 eastern portion is arranged in terraces, nine upon the right and 
 eleven upon the left of the main avenue, each containing one row of 
 graves, and \ following the slope of the original surface, including 
 about one-fourth of its area. The remaining portion is nearly level^ 
 excepting the extreme southern part, which is broken by a ravine- 
 Near the centre of this part is a small circular mound, in which 
 stands a graceful flag-staff, from which the stars and stripes float 
 daily from sunrise to sunset. 
 
 Near the flag-staff in the angles of the four sections centering at 
 that point are planted four large cannon, as gun monuments, on 
 one of which is a bronze sliield bearing the name of the, cemetery,, 
 date of its establishment, and number of interments, with the national 
 coat of arms. In 1867-8 several hundred shade-trees and shrubs 
 were planted. The grounds are inclosed by a substantial brick 
 wall. The superintendent's lodge, which stands upon a gentle emi- 
 nence to the right of the entrance, is a one and a-half story cottage- 
 of some architectural pretension, appropriately built of the stones 
 of that frowning wall behind which the enemy was sheltered, and 
 which the Union troops were obliged unprotected to face. 
 
 The graves have been well sodded, the roads and walks gravelled, 
 and brick gutters laid along every section arid down the margin of 
 every road. The graves are marked by granite tablets, with the 
 j)roper inscriptions. The officer of highest rank buried here is 
 Colonel James Crowther, of the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsyl- 
 vania volunteer infantry. Upon the title-leaf of the roll of honor * 
 which records their names and various designations are these 
 significant lines : 
 
 " Let summer send her golden sunbeams down 
 In graceful salutations for the dead, 
 And autumn's moving host of leaflets brown 
 Break ranks above the fallen soldier's head." 
 
 » " Roll of Honor," p. 1, Vol. XXV. 
 
THE DEAD. ^09 
 
 The spectre corps ! Fifteen thousand strong ! And does reveille 
 arouse them at nsiorning light, and the sentinel cease to challenge 
 the' approaching footstep? Does the proud bird of the sun lead 
 them to battle, and the star-lit banner float out from the rifted 
 clouds that roll up from the thickening fight? Does the hea"rt of 
 the veteran thrill at the tramp of the legion ? Does the cheer of 
 victory carry gladness to the heart, and when the battle is won does 
 he march on to new conquests ? Does the mutilated victim groan 
 out his agony upon the night air, and is he left in loneliness while 
 life ebbs away ? When the campaign is ended and recruits again 
 fill the ranks, does the legion with quick step and gleaming musket 
 march to the parade, and preserve the glorious circumstance of war? 
 Does the tent shelter the dreamer of home, and loved ones? Is the 
 camp aroused at midnight to march stealthily by the flank, and 
 crossing river or mountain-chain, come in upon the foe from an 
 unguarded side? Does the leader pass sleepless nights in planning 
 the discomfiture, and utter rout of his adversary ? Does the scout 
 in his masked garb and with his feigned accent, thread the mazes of 
 the hostile battlements, count the white tents that compass all the 
 plain, or watch on some rugged eminence for a view of the evening 
 camp-fires where repose the unsuspecting foe ? Does the steed paw 
 in the valley, and rejoice in his strength, and go on to meet the 
 armed men ? Does ha mock at fear, and turn not back from the 
 sword? Does the quiver rattle against him, the glittering spear 
 and the shield? Does he swallow the ground with fierceness and 
 rage, nor believe it the sound of the trumpet? Does he say among 
 the trumpets ha ! ha ! and does he smell the battle from afar, the 
 tiiunder of the captains and the shoutings? 
 
 Nay, nay ! This is the camping-ground of the spectre legion ! 
 Not the frosts of the mountain nor the wild blasts of the plain can 
 longer touch the reposing squadrons! The burning sun of the 
 summer, and the torrid heats of the desert can overcome them no 
 more ! No more will they be called to dare the swollen stream ! 
 The plague a'tad the pestilence cannot come near them ! The clash- 
 ing of steel cannot make afraid ! The bursting shell can no longer 
 tear limb from limb ! The fatal bullet has no power to hurt ! Envy 
 and jealousy have had their last spite ! Ambition and glory their 
 14 
 
210 THE BATTLE OF CHANGELL0B8VILLE. 
 
 last triumph! At length they have rest! On fresh camping- 
 ground, by sweet flowing streams, their silent tents are spread. 
 
 " The neighing troop, the flashing blade. 
 The bugle's stirring blast. 
 The charge, the dreadful cannonade, 
 The din and shout are past ; 
 Nor war's wild note nor glory's peal 
 Shall thrill with fierce delight, 
 Those breasts that never more may feel 
 The raptures of the fight." 
 
CHAPTEK XITI. 
 
 THE INJURIES OF HOOKER THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON THE 
 
 CHARGE OF KEENAN. 
 
 >HE Injuries of Hooker. — lu its order in the 
 narrative, the particulars respecting the manner of 
 General Hooker's injury, on the morning of the 3d! 
 of May, are given as he himself has described them 
 in his testimony before the Committee of Congress. 
 Dr. Letterman, in his "Recollections,"* says:. 
 " The headquarters of General Hooker were much 
 exposed to the fire of the enemy. On the 3d of 
 May, a round shot struck the stone steps of the 
 which the commanding general stood, watching 
 of the battle, knocked down a solid wooden 
 struck him and felled him to the floor. Being 
 feet of him at the time of the accident, I saw 
 him fall, and was instantly with him, and had him taken to his 
 room ; he was very much stunned by the blow, although no bones 
 were broken. The rumor spread rapidly that General Hooker 
 was killed, and to dispel that idea he appeared to the troops, though 
 scarcely able to sit upon his horse. The effect of this blow and 
 fall lasted for some hours." 
 
 There can be no doubt that the injury General Hooker received 
 at this time was of a most serious character, and it was only by the 
 exercise of his indomitable will, under a sense of his great responsi- 
 bilities, that he was enabled to keep the field and show to the army 
 that he was still at its head. The injury was received, too, just at 
 that time in the battle when the pinch had come, and when rein- 
 
 * " Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac," Letterman, p. 137. 
 
 (211) 
 
 portico, upon 
 the progress 
 pillar, which 
 within a few 
 
212 THE BATTLE OF CHANCEL LORSVILLE. 
 
 forcements needed to be sent where called for on the instant, and 
 the gravest decisions promptly made. It was at a time, of all others 
 in the progress of the campaign, when the army could least afford 
 to spare its directing power. General Sickles, in his testi mony, says : * 
 " The attack of the enemy on Sunday was made on my front in 
 great force. They attacked as they generally do — the favorite 
 field tactics of Jackson — in heavy columns. General Hooker, of 
 course, not knowing precisely where the attack would be made, had 
 his forces disposed as usual, in double line of battle, but sufficiently 
 extended to cover all the points of attack available to the enemy. 
 I reported to him the great force of the enemy in my front, and my 
 ability, in my judgment, to hold my position as long as my ammu- 
 nition would last ; but that the force of the enemy enabled him 
 constantly to bring fresh troops up to the attack — that my last 
 reserves had been put into position, and it was very important, as 
 that seemed to be the point that the enemy were bent iipon attacking, 
 that I should be supported. An aide-de-camp, Major Tremaine, 
 took this last and most urgent communication to General Hooker. 
 Of course I had made frequent reports to him of the progress of 
 things in my immediate front. That communication I regarded as 
 of the most important character. It was taken to him at the time 
 when he had been struck down by a piece of the door or pillar 
 of the apartment, which he was occupying, at Chancellorsville, 
 being knocked against him. He was knocked senseless, and Major 
 Tremaine was unable to make the communication to him. Some 
 of General Hooker's staff were present ; and from his appearance 
 and the character of the blow, they supposed at the time that the 
 injury would result fatally. 
 
 "I received a report of this from Major Tremaine, and sent him 
 back again. , I think I sent the same officer ; at all events I sent a 
 staff officer, for the purpose of making the communication to the 
 next senior officer who would take command. I received no official 
 communication from headquarters, however, and no support came to 
 me. And my artillery ammunition having been exhausted, I with- 
 drew my artillery from the defences thrown up during the night — 
 
 *• " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 8. 
 
THE INJUEIES or MUUKEB. 213 
 
 withdrew it in good order and without loss. I also withdrew my 
 infantry, which had been somewhat in front, to the second line be- 
 hind the works, expecting to hold them for a time with the bayonet, 
 and looking every moment for support to come up. The enemy 
 seemed to be satisfied with having forced me to withdraw my infantry 
 from their front line to this second position, and the battle pause/i 
 for a half au hour or more. The loss inflicted upon the enemy, 
 especially by my artillery, waa most severe. ' Their formation for 
 the attack was entirely broken up, and from my headquarters they 
 presented to the eye the appearance of a mass, a crowd, without 
 definite formation ; and if another corps had been available at that 
 moment to have relieved me, or even to have supported me, my 
 judgment was that not only would that attack of the enemy have 
 been triumphantly repulsed, but that we could have advanced on 
 them and carried the day. And that undoubtedly would have 
 been done in ample season, and before my ammunition gave out, 
 and compelled me to withdraw, but for the injury that General 
 
 Hooker received As near as I can fix the time, I suppose 
 
 he must have received this injury at quite an early hour in the 
 morning — I should say, perhaps, between eight and nine o'clock — 
 and I had no communication from him indicating him to have been 
 in command until, perhaps, between three and four o'clock in the 
 afternoon. He was then, I should say, in a condition, from his 
 injury, that forbade his resuming command ; he was e\{idently 
 suffering great agony, and I suppose nothing but the highest sense 
 of duty could have prompted him to resume command under such 
 circumstances. He was mounted on his horse, and was perfectly 
 clear in all respects as to orders and everything, but was evidently 
 suffering great bodily pain." 
 
 "Question. Were his mental faculties impaired in any way when 
 you saw him ? " 
 
 "Answer. No, sir; except that they might be by bodily suf- 
 fering." 
 
 "Question. Do you suppose, if he had been well enough to have 
 answered your request for reinforcements, it would have turned the 
 whole tide of battle?" 
 
 "Answer. Yes, sir ; I have no doubt the battle would have been 
 
214 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 I 
 
 won in thirty minutes; at least, it would have been won in an 
 hour. It would have been won just as soon as you could have 
 got ten thousand men from the right or left to have repulsed that 
 attack." 
 
 General Birney, in his testimony* upon this point, says, "I think 
 that if on Sunday morning we had been properly supported — that 
 is, if the troops that were there had been brought up, the enemy 
 could have been defeated then. I regard not doing this a great 
 mistake." 
 
 "Question. Why was not that done?" 
 , "Answer. I have understood that it was owing to the accident to 
 General Hooker early in the morning." 
 
 "Question. How long a time, as you understood, was General 
 Hooker really incapable of taking the charge of affairs there ? " 
 
 "Ansioer. It was some two hours that he was reported to me as 
 being almost insensible." 
 
 "Question. And that during the most essential and critical time 
 there was ? " 
 
 "Answer. In the height of it. I understood the injury resulted 
 from a round shot striking a pillar of the house against which he 
 was leaning, the severe concussion knocking him insensible. I 
 saw a great deal of him during the afternoon. He remained a 
 part of the afternoon at the position I occuj)ied upon the road." 
 
 "Question. What was his condition after that accident?" 
 
 "Answer. He seemed to show its effects a great deal in his man- 
 ner ; that is, he was more quiet than usual with him ; it seemed to 
 have the stunning effect that a very severe blow would naturally 
 have upon any one." 
 
 "Question. And you have reason to suppose that that had a very 
 <lisastrous effect upon the operations of the army?" 
 1 "Answer. I think so ; that is, the movements early in the morn- 
 ing of Sunday. The statements that I have heard that he was 
 under the influence of liquor, I think, are utterly false." 
 
 General Hancock testified as follows in answer to the question if 
 he saw much of General Hooker on the field : " Not on the last 
 day ; I only saw him on horseback at a distance. I recollect the 
 
 % " Conduct of the War," 1865, Vol. I., p. 36. f Ibid., p. 70. 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 215 
 
 confusion incident upon the occasion when he was hurt. I saw the 
 colonnade fly when the ball struck it, but I had no conversation with 
 him on that day." 
 
 The "Wounds op Jackson. — The event of the Chancellorsville 
 conflict which caused intense sorrow to the enemy, and which was 
 regarded as fentailing the greatest injury to their cause, was the fatal 
 wounding of General Jackson. In the proper place in the narra- 
 tive, we have made a somewhat lengthy quotation from the work 
 of Hotchkiss and Allen, that we might give the exact impression 
 which the rebel authorities themselves desire to have pass as a 
 veritable version of this sad theme. But while giving their authors 
 the benefit of their own testimony, it would be unjust to withhold 
 the fact, that it is held by many, that the wounds of which Jackson 
 died were inflicted by the fire of the Union infantry. There have 
 been undoubtedly extravagant pretensions set up for having 
 performed the feat of directing the fatal bullets, as though there 
 were some merit or honor in having been the instrument of his de- 
 struction. Perhaps the most absurd of these claims is that set up 
 ■ by General Pleasanton, that Jackson was killed by the fire of his 
 artillery in front of Hazel grove ; whereas it is known from the 
 circumstantial account given by the rebel surgeons, that his wounds 
 were produced by bullets such as are used in the Springfield mus- 
 kets, and from the testimony of his aids and escort, that he was 
 wounded in the vicinity of the Orange plank road ; indeed, but a 
 few feet from that road, as pointed out to me by Major George E. 
 Chancellor, the son of Melzi Chancellor, whose home has always 
 been' in the neighborhood, who was a member of Stuart's cavalry, 
 and was at the time on the field, and would be likely, at least, to 
 know the beliefs entertained by the enemy themselves. General 
 Pleasanton says in his testimony, "But I think the whole turn of 
 the battle was the death of Stonewall Jackson, or his being mortally 
 wounded. According to the statements of the prisoners taken 
 that night, he was wounded by this very fire [his artillery]." 
 
 General De Peyster, who has studied this subject very thoroughly, 
 and has sifted all the evidence with that keenness and care for which 
 he is noted, has given the following results of his investigations in 
 
216 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 an article published in the December number, 1869, of the "On- 
 ward," a magazine conducted by Captain Mayue Eeid : " The 
 moonbeams," he says, " were pouring their silvery radiance through, 
 the partially developed foliage, casting long fantastic shadows across 
 the corpse-strewn openings and glades, when, about nine o'clock 
 (according to one acfcount, but most likely at a later hour), Stone- 
 wall Jackson rode out to reconnoitre, and by a personal examina- 
 tion prepare himself to deliver anothfer similar shock upon our line 
 on the eiisuing morning, 3d of May, as that crowned with such 
 success at the, sunset of the 2d. It was the last sunset he was ever 
 destined to behold. In the adjacent works lay the First Massachu- 
 setts infantry. They had marked the approach of the strange cav- 
 alcade, a,nd with true aim delivered a volley, among many others 
 laying low the greatest soldier, and the most brilliant military 
 genius lihat gave glory to the Confederate cause, throughout its four' 
 years' brave but ill-starred struggle for the subversion of the Re- 
 public. The Confederates claim that their own bullets, fired at 
 random, cost them this precious sacrifice. Well may Chaplain 
 Cudworth ask: 'If, as the rebels claim, Jackson had been fired 
 upon by one of his own regiments, why did his staff turn and flee?' 
 .... Why should any Northern man doubt, deny, or strive to 
 disprove this claim of the staunch, and bold, and true old Bay 
 State? It is easy to understand why the South should do so. If 
 it is any alleviation of their inestimable loss, let them continue in this 
 way of thinking. A New Yorker, however, here feels it a solemn 
 duty to present the claim of Massachusetts ; and no Northerner will 
 seek to diminish the magnitude of that sharp volley poured into the 
 moonlit glade, smiting to dust the brain, and eye, and tongue, and 
 victory-bearing arm, with which the arch rebel, Lee, might have 
 been assured success; and without which all his laurels that had 
 been twined by Jackson, withered and crumbled, neVer to bud again 
 on another battle-field. . . . But, whether he fell by the bullets of 
 his o\vn men or by the balls of the opposing Unionists — as is much 
 more probable — it matters not. The result was of incalculable 
 advantage to the latter. Stonewall Jackson's influence as a power 
 was annihilated. There, in the moonlit glade of that mysterious 
 Wilderness, just bursting into leaf and blossom, the leaves and 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 217 
 
 flowers of his own great life shrivelled and died, blasted by a shat- 
 tering volley, as unlocked for as the levin bolt when it falls from 
 a sudden cloud upon some overtowering tree, that has long stood, 
 the admiration and wonder of all who gazed upon its pre-eminent 
 grandeur." 
 
 The question arises, " By whom was this report first made that 
 Jackson was killed by his own troops?", The account given by 
 Hotchkiss and Allen of Jackson's fall is very guarded, many of 
 the "cock and bull " parts of the story, as narrated by other writers, 
 being omitted ; yet they give no authorities for their statements, and 
 adduce no testimony to substantiate their positions, leaving the 
 reader to take the facts entirely on trust. In a " Life of General 
 Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet" (Eichmond, 1864), p. 182, the following 
 account of Jackson's fall is given : " General Jackson ordered Gen- 
 eral Hill to advance with his division^ reserving his fire unless cav- 
 alry approached from the direction of the enemy; and then, with that 
 burning and intense enthusiasm for conflict which lay under his 
 calm exterior, hastened forward to the line of skirmishers who were 
 hotly engaged in front. Such was his ardor at this critical moment, 
 and his anxiety to penetrate the movements of the enemy, doubly 
 screened as they were by dense forest and gathering darkness, that 
 he rode ahead of his skirmishers, and exposed himself to a close 
 and dangerous fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, posted in the 
 timber. So great was the danger which he thus ran, that one of 
 his staff said, ' General, don't you think this is the wrong place for 
 you?' He replied, quickly: 'The danger is all over, the enemy is 
 routed. Go back and tell A. P. Hill to press right on ! ' Soon 
 after giving this order General Jackson turned, and, accompanied 
 by his staff and escort, rode back at a trot on his well-known ' Old 
 Sorrel,' toward his own men. Unhappily, in the darkness — it was 
 now nine or ten o'clock at night — the little body of horsemen was 
 mistaken for Federal cavalry charging, and the regiments on the 
 right and left of the road fired a sudden volley into them with the 
 most lamentable results. Captain Boswell, of General Jackson's 
 'staff, was killed, and borne into our lines by his horse; Colonel 
 Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, was wounded, and two couriers 
 were killed. General Jackson received one ball in his left arm. 
 
218 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 two inches below the shoulder-joint, shattering the bone and sever- 
 ing the chief artery ; a second passed through the same arm, be- 
 tween the elbow and wrist, making its exit through the palm of 
 the hand ; a third ball entered the palm of his right hand, about 
 the middle, and passing through broke two of the bones. He fell 
 from his horse, and was caught by Captain Wormly, to whom he 
 said, 'All 'my wounds are by my own men ! ' The firing was re- 
 sponded to by the enemy, who made a sudden advance; and the 
 Confederates falling back, their foes actually charged over Jackson's 
 body. He was not discovered, however ; and, the Federals being • 
 driven back in turn, he was rescued." 
 
 The quotation made above opens with the statement that " Gen- 
 eral Jackson ordered General Hill to advance with his division, 
 reserving his fire unless cavalry approached from the direction of 
 the enemy." But wherefore this order? It required General Hill 
 to advance in the face of a foe, and if he saw infantry charging 
 down upon him he was to withhold his fire, and let that foe pour in 
 his rounds with impunity. Or if he saw a battery wheel into posi- 
 tion in good musket range, he was to withhold his fire and let the 
 battery have a good, unopposed aim upon him; but,if cavalry ap- 
 proached from the direction of the enemy then he was to blaze away. 
 Now can any man in his senses be justified in believing that any 
 such order as that was ever given ? Does it not bear upon its face 
 the marks of a pure invention to give color to the idea that Jackson 
 was killed by his own men? Jackson was upon the point of riding 
 out, in company with his staff and escort, in front of his own lines 
 to reconnoitre. Would it not be natural before going to caution 
 General Hill about firing into a cavalcade as they might, possibly, 
 in the gathering shades,' do injury to himself? But what possible 
 object could he have in giving positive orders to withhold fire, if 
 infantry or artillery approached from the direction of the enemy, and 
 deliver it upon cavalry ? Neither General Hill nor General Lane, 
 ■who commanded the brigade covering the plank road, make any 
 mention in their official reports of any such order. It is evident 
 that Hotchkiss and Allen give no credence to such an order having 
 been given, for they do not repeat it in their book. 
 
 This writer also states that Colonel Crutchfield was wounded by 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 219 
 
 this volley, which killed Captain Boswell and two couriers, and 
 wounded Jackson. Was Colonel Crutchiield of this party at all ? 
 Was he not at this time directing the fire of his artillery, posted 
 near Melzi Chancellor's, upon Pleasanton's artillery at Hazel Grove? 
 and did he uot receive his injury at that point? 
 
 The statement is also made that "he [Jackson] fell from his 
 horse, and was caught by Captain Wormly, to whom he said, 'All 
 my wounds are by my own men ! ' " Was it in the nature of Jack- 
 son to have spoken in this reproachful way ofj and to his own men? 
 Could any word from the lips of Jackson haye carried with it any 
 more keen or stinging remorse to a true soldier and a sensitive mind? 
 This utterance also we notice is not referred to by Hotchkiss and 
 Allen. 
 
 But the most remarkable fact stated in this whole tissue of 
 wonders is this : " The firing was responded to by the enemy, who 
 made a sudden advance ; and the Confederates, falling back, their 
 foes actually charged over Jackson's body. He was not discovered, 
 however, and the Federals being driven back in turn, he was res- 
 cued." The Confederates probably fell back, that is, ran and left 
 their fallen leader bleeding, to be run over and captured by the 
 Federals, out of consideration for, and obedience to the order of 
 Jackson, which required them to withhold their fire for everything 
 except cavalry charging, which they were to give no quarter. It 
 was a bright moonlight night. Would the Federals have been 
 likely to have charged over a lieutenant-general, and his dead and 
 wounded staff, and not noticed them, or known who they were 
 trampling under foot? Do any of the reports of Union officers 
 mention any such charge having been made on this part of the field 
 at this particular hour? Neither Sickles nor Williams mention 
 such an advance. Besides, who were the Confederate poltroons who 
 could possibly be guilty of such cowardice and shameful disregard 
 of duty as to run and leave their general, wounded and dying, to 
 fall into the hands of the enemy? It is observable, too, that Hotch- 
 kiss and Allen make no mention of this extraordinary mishap of 
 their general. 
 
 If now we return from these statements, which seem to rest upon 
 no other authority than the word of the narratoi-s (for, as we have 
 
220 'J^HE BATTLE OF OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 observed, even Hotchkiss and Allen, guarded as they are, give no 
 authorities), to the official reports of the officers who were on the 
 front, and ought to know of so important an event as the killing 
 of their general, what dp we find ? The brigade of General James 
 H. Lane, of A^P. Hill's corps, was on the rebel front, on both sides 
 of the plank road, at the point where General Jackson made his 
 reconnoi^sance. This is the language of his official report : "After 
 ,it was ascertained that the enemy were rapidly falling back, it 
 [Lane's brigade] pushed forward with the artillery beyond the third 
 and second lines to within a short distance of the first. Here Gen- 
 eral A. P. Hill ordered me, at dark, to deploy one regiment as 
 skirmishers across the road, to form line of battle in rear with the 
 rest of the brigade, and to push vigorously forward. In other 
 Words, we were ordered * to make a night attack, and capture the 
 enemy's batteries in front if possible. Just then they opened a 
 terrific artillery fire, which was responded to by our batteries. As 
 soon as this was over, I deployed the Thirty-third North Carolina 
 troops forward as skirmishers, and formed line of battle to the rear, 
 the Seventh and Thirty-seventh to the right, the Eighteenth and 
 Twenty-eighth to the left, the left of the Thirty-seventh and right 
 of the Eighteenth resting on the road. I had moved forward the 
 Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth to within a short distance of our line 
 of skirmishers, and was about to move the Seventh and Thirty- 
 seventh to a corresponding position before ordering the whole line 
 forward, when ' Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of a Pennsylvania regi- 
 ment, entered our lines with a white flag, and wished to know if we 
 were Confederate or Union troops. Considering this' an illegitimate 
 , use of the white flag, as he expressly stated it was not his object to 
 surrender, and not wishing to let him return, I sent Lieutenant Lane 
 to General A. P. Hill to know what I should do. Our skirmishers 
 on the right soon after fired upon a few of the enemy, who had ap- 
 proached tolerably near, and a few random shots were fired by the 
 Seventh aud Thirty-seventh regiments, without orders, which appear 
 to have drawn the enemy's artillery and infantry fire. I understand 
 
 •» This order, as will be seen, is in the very teeth of the order reputed to have been 
 given to Hill by Jackson, " to reserve his fire unless cavalry approached from the 
 direction of the enemy." 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 221 
 
 from the official report of the commanding officer of the Eighteenth 
 North Carolina troops, that General A. P. Hill, staff and couriers, 
 were in the road in advance of them at the time, and to avoid the 
 enemy's fire some of them dashed into the woods, over the Eigh- 
 teenth regiment, which fired into them, mistaking them in the dark 
 for the enemy's cavalry." Thus it will be seen that General Lane, 
 who was in immediate command of the five regiments which were 
 upon the ground from which Jackson made his reconnoissance, and 
 the only rebel troops at this time upon this part of the field, and 
 who made his report from his own knowledge and from the reports 
 of his regimental commanders, knew nothing of Jackson being 
 wounded by his own men. He records the fact that General Hill 
 and escort were fired into by mistake, but not a word is said about 
 any such mistake having been made in the case of Jackson. ,If so 
 important a fact had transpired in connection with the operations 
 of his troops, would not he or some" one of his regimental com- 
 manders have been likely to have known it? General Hill, who 
 of course founded his report upon those of his brigade commanders, 
 says : " Whilst Lane's brigade was forming its lines for advancing, 
 and throwing out his skirmishers. General Jackson was wounded." 
 And this is absolutely all that he says upon the subject. He men- 
 tions the fact that Jackson was wounded, while Lane was " forming 
 his lines for advancing and throwing out his skirmishers." He 
 does not state that by a mistake Lane's troops fired upon Jackson's 
 oavalcade, from which fire the general received his mortal wound. 
 If such had been the fact, would he not have known it? Would it 
 not have been reported to him from the part of the line where it 
 occurred, and would he not have given a particular description of 
 the event occurring in his own line ? 
 
 General Jackson's conversation, from the time he received his 
 wound until his last moments, have been minutely recorded, as we 
 shall show; but no word is he reported to have uttered in regard to 
 the circumstances of his wounding. To a man so magnanimous, 
 and tender-hearted, and thoughtful as Jackson, would it not have 
 been in keeping with his character, if he had been wounded by his 
 own men, to have expressed his regard for them as soldiers, know- 
 ing, as he did, that they were acting witii the greatest intrepidity 
 
222 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 and courage, and in a manner worthy of troops whom he had trained, 
 and who had earned and preserved a place in his own great corps ? 
 How grateful the recollection of 'such words would have been to 
 those troops, if they had really done what is imputed to them. But 
 no such words are reported to have been spoken. 
 
 Jackson may have been wounded by his own men, as is alleged; 
 but the silence of those in authority, who ought to know, and could 
 speak officially, throws a shade of doubt over the testimony, and the 
 fact that a portion of the circumstances attending it are so mani- 
 festly unreliable, tends to deepen the doubt. The probabilities are 
 that Jackson believed the whole Union army was in retreat. Indeed 
 he said so. " There is no danger. The enemy is routed. Go back 
 and tell General Hill to press on." It is natural, therefore, to 
 suppose that lie rode forward with coniidence, not anticipating any 
 , determined stand to be made, and when he came upon the line of 
 Berry, already settled behind barricades, his cavalcade received a 
 crash of musketry that was as appalling as it was unanticipated. 
 
 Dr. Hunter Maguire, medical director of the corps, has recorded 
 many interesting particulars respecting the last hours of the general, 
 which are given by his biographers and by writers upon this battle. 
 The account by Hotchkiss and Allen, as being the most connected 
 and complete, will be chiefly followed in the condensed account we 
 can here give. When Dr. Maguire came up to the wounded chief- 
 tain, " the doctor knelt down by him and said, ' I hope you are not 
 badly hurt, General.' He replied, very calmly, but feebly: 'I am 
 badly injured, doctor; I fear I am dying.' After a pause, he con- 
 tinued: 'I am glad you have come. I think the wound in my 
 shoulder is still , bleeding.' " General Hill had placed a ligature 
 around the arm above the wound to stop the bleeding, but it had 
 slipped and the flow of blood from the broken artery was still pro- 
 ceeding, and he was already greatly weakened from its loss. " His 
 suffering at this tir&e was intense. His hands were cold, his skin 
 clammy, his face pale, and his lips compressed and bloodless." Col- 
 onel Crutchfield, who had been severely wounded in the leg, was 
 with him in the ambulance, for whom the general expressed the 
 deepest sympathy. They were taken back to the corps hospital at 
 Wilderness tavern, where the general was placed in blankets and 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 223 
 
 given stimulants; but so great was the exhaustion that two or three 
 hours elapsed before sufficient reaction had taken place to justify an 
 examination. As soon as he was in a condition to warrant it, he 
 was told that an anesthetic would be administered and his wounds 
 examined, and was asked if amputation of his arm was found ne- 
 cessary, which was probable, if the operation should be performed. 
 "Yes, certainly," he replied. "Dr. Maguire, do for me whatever 
 you think best." The ball from a Springfield musket, which had 
 entered his right hand and lodged under the skin upon its back, was 
 first removed. The left arm had received two severe wounds. One 
 about three inches below the shoulder, by which the bone had been 
 fractured and the artery severed. In the other a ball had entered 
 the forearm, just below the elbow, and made its way diagonally 
 through, issuing upon the other side near the wrist. This arm was 
 quickly amputated just below the shoulder, and with slight loss of 
 blood. He slept several hours, was free from pain, and seemed to 
 be doing well. His aide-de-camp, Morrison, was sent to convey to 
 his wife the tidings of his injuries, and to bring her to see him. A 
 note from General Lee was read to him expressive of his sorrow 
 and sympathy, and congratulating the wounded general upon the 
 victory gained by his "skill and energy." To which he imme- 
 diately responded, " General Lee should give the praise to God." At 
 ten o'clock on Sunday morning he complained of a severe pain in 
 his right side, and asked to have it examined, believing he had in- 
 jured it in falltng from the litter the night before, striking upon a 
 stone or stump of a sapling. But no outward indications of injury 
 could be discovered. The battle had been raging with great fury, 
 and the ceaseless roar of infantry and artillery, which, even here, could 
 be feintly heard, arrested his attention, and he directed all of his 
 attendants, except Captain Smith, to return to the battle-field, and 
 attend to their several duties, thus evincing his deep interest in the 
 triumph of his troops, even in intense sufiering. " By eight o'clock 
 on Sunday night the pain in his side had disappeared, and in all 
 respects he seemed to be doing well. He inquired minutely about 
 the battle and the different troops engaged, and his face would light 
 up with enthusiasm and interest when told how this brigade acted, 
 or that oflScer displayed conspicuous courage, and his head gave the 
 
224 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 peculiar shake from side to side, and he uttered his usual, ' Good, 
 good,' with unwonted energy, when the gallant behavior of the 
 Stonewall brigade was alluded to. He said : ' The men of the brig- 
 ade will be some day proud to say to their children, " I was one 
 of the Stonewall brigade." He disclaimed any right of his own to 
 the name Stonewall. ' It belongs to the brigade and not to me.' " 
 Apprehension was entertained by General Lee that Jackson might 
 fall into the hands of the Union troops, who were threatening to 
 cross at Ely's ford ; but Jackson expressed a willingness to remain 
 in his tent, and added : " If the enemy do come, I am not afraid 
 of them. I have always been kind to their wounded, and I am 
 sure they will be kind to me." In compliancd with the repeated 
 wish of General Lee, early on Tuesday morning he was taken by 
 ambulance to the Chandler House at Guinea Station. He was 
 cheerful and apparently bore the journey well. He expressed a 
 curious opinion about the battle, which was now over, to the effect 
 that he had intended to cut the Union troops off from the river by 
 United States ford, and taking position between the bulk of the 
 Union army and the river, oblige it to attack him. This shows that 
 he had little conception of the real situation of Hooker's army. 
 For at the instant the Eleventh corps began to give way, Sykes' di- 
 vision of the Fifth corps had been pushed out on the Ely's ford 
 road, covering United States ford, and at about the same hour the 
 First corps was beginning to arrive on the field, and before morning 
 Hooker had a strong stretch of works on the interior line extending 
 from the Rapidan to the Rappahannock, and manned by the First 
 and Fifth corps ; so that after encountering the Third and Twelfth 
 corps, as his troops did on the following morning, he would still 
 have been obliged to fight two strong fresh corps before he would 
 have cut the Union army from United States ford. 
 
 In alluding to his wounds, he said : " Many would regard them 
 as a great misfortune ; I regard them as one of the blessings of my 
 life." Captain Smith replied, "All things work together for good 
 to those that love God." " Yes," he answered, " that's it, that's it." 
 He ate with a relish and slept, and his wounds were thought to be 
 doing well. So great confidence was inspired in the breast of the 
 general by these favorable symptoms, that he asked the surgeon how 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 225 
 
 long he judged it would be before he could again take the field. He 
 had once or twice suffered from nausea, but a cold application had 
 relieved him. At daylight on the morning of Thursday, however, 
 he suffered great pain, and an examination disclosed pneumonia of 
 the right lung, caused, doubtless, by the fall from the litter. To- 
 wards evening he was better, and strong hopes were cherished of, 
 his ultimate recovery. His wife arrived on the same day, and her 
 presence with their young child, which he Called his " little com- 
 forter," was a source of great joy and satisfaction to him. " Notic- 
 ing the sadness of his wife, he said to her tenderly, ' I know you 
 would gladly give your life for me, but I am perfectly resigned. 
 Do not be sad. I hope I may recover. Pray for me, but always 
 remember in your prayers to use the petition, ' Thy will be done.' " 
 His wounds were dressed on Friday, and seemed to be healing, the 
 pain in his sjde had subsided, but he breathed with difficulty and 
 complained of exhaustion. " He said to Dr. Maguire, ' I see by 
 the number of physicians that you think my condition dangerous; 
 but I thank God, if it is his will, that I am ready to go.' About 
 daylight on Sunday morning, Mrs. Jackson informed him that his 
 recovery was very doubtful, and that it was better he should be 
 prepared for the worst. He was silent for a moment, and then 
 said, ' It will be infinite gain to be translated to heaven.' " He, 
 however, had hope of his recovery still, but desired, in the event 
 of his death, to be buried at Lexington, in the Valley of Virginia. 
 " His exhaustion increased so rapidly that at eleven o'clock Mrs. 
 Jackson knelt by his bed and told him that before the sun went 
 down he would be with his Saviour. He replied, ' Oh, no, you are 
 frightened, my child. : death is not so near. I may yet get well.' 
 She fell over upon the bed, weeping bitterly, and told him again 
 that the phy.sicians said there was no hope. After a moment's pause 
 he asked her to fall Dr. Maguire, who was standing in the ante- 
 room. ' Doctor, Anna informs me that you have told her that I 
 am to die to-day ; is it so ? ' When he was answered he turned his 
 eyes towards the ceiling, and gazed for a moment or two, as if in 
 intense thought, ^ihen replied, 'Very good, very good, it is all right.' 
 . . . Colonel Pendleton came into the room about'one o'clock, and 
 he asked him, ' Who is preaching at headquarters to-day ? ' When 
 15 
 
226 THE BATTLE OF CHANGELLORSVILLE. 
 
 told that the whole army was praying for him, he' replied, ' Thank 
 God, they are very kind.' He said, ' It is the Lord's day ; ray 
 wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday.' His 
 mind now began to fail and wander, and he frequently talked as if 
 in command upon the field, giving orders in his old way ; then the 
 scene shifted, and he was at the mess-table with members of his 
 staff; now with his wife and child ; now at prayers with his mili- 
 tary family. Occasional intervals of the return of his mind would 
 appear, and during one of these he was offered some brandy and 
 water, but he declined it, saying, ' It will only delay my departure, 
 and do no good. I want to preserve my mind, if possible, to the 
 last.' About half-past one he was told that he had but two hours 
 to live, and he answered again, feebly but firmly, ' Very good, it is 
 all right.' A few moments before he died, he cried out in his de- 
 lirium, ' Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action — pass the infantry 
 to the front rapidly — teU Major Hawks — ' then stopped, leaving 
 the sentence unfinished. Presently a smile of ineffable sweetness 
 spread itself over his pale face, and he said quietly, and with an 
 expression, as if of relief, ' Let us cross over the river, and rest 
 under the shade of the trees.' And then without pain, or the least 
 struggle, his spirit passed from earth to the God who gave it." 
 
 Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson was born on the 24th of 
 January, 1824, at Clarksburg, Harrison county, West Virginia. 
 Glowing with youthful ardor for the profession of arms, he threaded 
 his way on foot to "Washington, where he sought and received the 
 appointment of a cadet at West Point, entering in 1842 and gradu- 
 ating in 1846, the seventeenth in a class of fifty-nine, which em- 
 braced George B. McClellan, John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, Darius 
 N. Couch, Albert L. Majilton, Truman Seymour, Samuel D. Stur- 
 gis, George Stoueman, Innis N. Palmer, Alfred Gibbs, and George 
 H. Gordon, of the Union army, and John. A. Brown, John Adams, 
 William D. Smith, Dabney H. Maury, David R. Jones, Cadmus 
 M. Wilcox, William M. Gardner, Samuel B. Maxy, and George E. 
 Pickett, of the rebel army, all of whom attained to distinction. 
 Jackson was appointed brevet second lieutenant of the First Artil- 
 lery at graduation, and scarcely had he become inured to the ser- 
 vice before the Mexican war broke out — that training school for so 
 
THE WOUNDS OF JACKSON. 227 
 
 many of the eminent soldiers in the War of Rebellion — in which 
 he served with distinction to the close, rising to the rank of brevet 
 major. It was during his service here that he manifested some of 
 those striking eccentricities which were remarked throughout his 
 whole career, and which are mentioned by his companions in arms,, 
 and are alluded to by some of his biographers. A strange hallu- 
 cination caused him to stoutly maintain that all the nourishment of 
 one of his legs entered it at the expense of the other. 
 
 Upon his return from Mexico he was appointed to the chair of 
 natural and experimental philosophy and artillery practice, in the 
 Virginia State military institute, at Lexington, where he continued 
 until the breaking out of the rebellion. In a conversation with 
 General Jackson's father-in-law, the late George Junkin, D. D., 
 LL. D., who was President of Washington College while Jack- 
 son was a professor, he bore testimony to his unswerving and devout 
 attention to all his public and private religious obligations, though 
 his faculties in prayer and exhortation were almost morbidly slug- 
 gish. He never absented himself from the prayer and conference- 
 meetings of his college, and his church, and considered it his duty 
 always to take part ; but often stumbling and stammering in a man- 
 ner to excite the commiseration and sympathy of every one present. 
 At the breaking out of the rebellion he was given an independent 
 command by Governor Letcher, of Virginia, where he organized the- 
 brigade with which his name was identified ; but was soon after 
 superseded in the chief command by General Joseph E. Johnston,, 
 under Confederate authority. His service in the first battle of Bull 
 Run, where he earned the soubriquet of " Stonewall," and his sub- 
 sequent brilliant career in the Shenandoah Valley, attracted the 
 attention of his friends, and intensified the fear of his foes. At 
 Gaines' mills, and the fighting incident to McClellan's noted change 
 of base, at Cedar Mountain, Manassas, Harper's Ferry, Antietam, 
 and Fredericksburg, he was the right arm of the army of North- 
 ern Virginia, and sinote with terrible earnestness. At Chancellors- 
 ville was his characteristic and largest operation, and the one ever 
 mifemorable as his last. 
 
228 ^SE BATTLE OF CHABOELLOBSVILLE. 
 
 The Charge of Kebna^. — One of the bravest and most dar- 
 ing charges ever made on any field was that of Major Keenan, and 
 the Eighth Pennsylvania davalry, at dusk on the 2d of May. Major 
 Carpenter, who rode with Keenan in this hopeless but necessary 
 sacrifice, has furnished an extract from his diary, which gives a 
 more definite idea of the exploit than was possible to give in the 
 regular narrative of the battle. Of the circumstances attending the 
 call for the chai'ge. General Pleasanton has put on record a state- 
 ment in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
 "Jackson," he says, " had been moving his corps of twenty-five or 
 thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the 
 2d of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and 
 about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of 
 the Eleventh corps with one of those characteristic attacks, that 
 made the rebel army so terrible when he was with it, and which was 
 lost to them in his death. In a very short time he doubled up the 
 Eleventh corps into a disordered mass that soon sought safety in 
 flight. My command of three cavalry regiments, and one battery 
 of six guns, happened to be near this scene, and, perceiving at a 
 glance that if this rout was not checked the ruin of the whole array 
 would be involved, I immediately ordered one of the regiments to 
 charge the woods from which the rebels Were issuing, and hold them 
 until I could bring some guns into position ; then charging several 
 squadrons into our flying masses to clear ground for my battery, it 
 was brought up at a run, while staff officers and troops were dis- 
 patched to seize from the rout all the guns possible. The brilliant 
 charge of the regiment into the woods detained the rebels some ten 
 minutes ; but in that short time, such was the energy displayed by 
 itiy command, that I placed in line twenty-two pieces of artillery, 
 double-shotted with canister, and aimed low, with the remainder of 
 the cavalry supporting them." 
 
 It was at that juncture in the progress of the fight, when the 
 enemy, having put to flight the entire Eleventh corps, was follow- 
 ing up the advantage gained in dense masses, with the confidence 
 of assured victory and with the expectation of routing other corps 
 with the same ease that he had done the Eleventh, that this regi- 
 ment was led to the charge in the face of the oncoming legions. 
 
THE CRABOE OF KEENAN. 229 
 
 Colonel Hney,. who commanded the regiment, was not at hand for 
 the instant, but Major Keenan, who commanded one of the battalions, 
 was, and to him the order was given. " I heardj" says Carpenter, 
 " Pleasanton instructing Keenan to be careful and not ' blow ' his 
 horses by moving too rapidly, and Keenan gave all the orders that 
 I heard. He ordered my squadron to ' draw sabre ' and ' charge.' 
 Colonel Huey, however, rode at the head of the column, immedi- 
 ately in front of me and beside Keenan. Major Keenan was a re- 
 markably fine officer, and always ready for an emergency." The 
 diary of Major Carpenter, from which I am permitted tp quote, con- 
 tains the following graphic account of this now celebrated charge : 
 " On the morning of May 2d the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry re- 
 turned to its brigade, and with the Seventeenth Pennsylvania cavalry 
 was formed in an open field in the rear of Sickles' line of battle. 
 Here the brigade dismounted and were quietly awaitihg the moment 
 when General Sickles' sharpshooters, who were steadily driving the 
 enemy before them, should reach the Fredericksburg turnpike, when 
 it was understood that the brigade under Pleasanton would push 
 forward, charge down the road, and harass the rear of the enemy's 
 column, which, it was believed, was in retreat towards Gordonsville. 
 The proper point had nearly been reached, and the brigade stood in 
 momentary expectation of mounting and moving to the front, when 
 a staff officer from General Howard dashed up to General Pleasan- 
 ton, with the news that a fierce attack had been made on the right 
 of the line, and that Howard's corps was being driven back, and 
 with a request from General Howard* that a regiment of cavalry 
 be sent to stop and rally the panic-stricken troops. This officer 
 was followed by another of Hooker's staff with directions to send 
 the regiment required. The Eighth Pennsylvania was selected, 
 and ordered to take a narrow wood road — with room only for two 
 
 * In General Sickles' testimony he says : " In a minute or two another . messenger, 
 an officer who announced himself as an aide-de-caipp of General Howard, and who 
 seemed to be much more methodical and self-possessed in his communication, arrived," 
 etc. In his official report Sickles says : " I confess I did not credit this statement 
 (that Howard was in rout) until an aide-de-camp of General Warren of General 
 Hooker's staff confirmed the report and asked for a regiment of cavalry to check the 
 movement." This aide-de-camp of Warren is the one probably referred to by Car- 
 penter as Hooker's. 
 
230 THE BATTLE OF CliANOELLOESVILLE. 
 
 horsemen to ride abfreast^which ran parallel with Williams' interior 
 line of battle facing west. This wood road terminated at the 
 Orange plank road, at a point some distance in the rear of How- 
 ard's line of battle. 
 
 "After proceeding along this road at a gallop, until they were 
 about half way between the point from which they had started and 
 the Orange plank road, it was discovered that the enemy had 
 advanced, and that their skirmish line occupied the woods on the 
 right hand side of the road, while their line of battle was plainly 
 visible through the trees, not more than seventy yards distant on 
 the left ! At this time the position of the regiment was extremely 
 critical. It was marching by twos, at a gallop, in a narrow road 
 with the enemy on both sides, subjected to a destructive fire, with 
 no possibility of turning back without utter confusion ! Major 
 Keenan, who commanded the First battalion, realizing the desperate 
 strait into which they had fallen, called upon the First squadron to 
 stand by him, and ordered them to ' draw sabre,' and ' charge ! ' 
 Reaching the plank road, and turning to the left, this squadron was 
 precipitated directly upon Jackson's rebel infantry, literally sacri- 
 ficing itself. It did its work nobly ! Nearly one-half of the men 
 of the squadron were either killed or wounded. Five officers rode 
 at the head of the column. Colonel Huey, Major Keenan, Captain 
 Arrowsmith, Lieutenant Carpenter, and Adjutant Haddock. Of 
 these only two escaped with their lives — Colonel Huey, and Lieu- 
 tenant Carpenter, and the horse of the latter was subsequently shot. 
 The other three officers were killed. The effect of this bold dash 
 was to alarm the enemy and check his advance. Time enough was 
 thus secured to extricate the regiment from its perilous position. 
 Captain Wistar, with the Sixth squadron, was obliged to make his 
 way through the woods to the right, he and his men leaping their 
 horses over the barricades and rifle-pits of an interior* line which had 
 been thrown up by our infantry. Ca-ptain Wistar'fe horse was shot. 
 In the meantime Martin's battery had been enabled to get into 
 position, and to open upon the enemy — a nucleus upon which other 
 artillery and troops formed sufficient to check permanently the 
 
 « Probably the barricades of Williams' division, which had been left in the afternoon 
 to make the flank movement with Sickles upon Lee. 
 
THE CHARGE OF KEENAN. 231 
 
 advance of Jackson's column. Private Eckenbrine^ of Company L, 
 a youth not twenty years of age, distinguished himself in the charge 
 of the First squadron, showing great bravery and intrepidity. He 
 escaped unhurt." 
 
 A far more graphic and circumstantial account of this matchless 
 charge of cavalry has since been prepared for me by Major Car- 
 penter.* The occasion of its preparation was my application to 
 liim for such a description, as would enable an artist to paint the 
 wild dash and mortal struggle, for an embellishment to the bio- 
 graphical sketch of Major Keenan, contained in "Martial Deeds 
 of Pennsylvania." But as the drawing was never made to my 
 satisfaction, I give the sketch of Major Carpenter, together with 
 the flat drawing just as he prepared it, trusting to the imagination 
 of the reader to supply the life — the dusky lines of rebel infantry, 
 their faces stained with the smoke and dust of tlie fray, their mus- 
 kets black with exposure to the elements and ceaseless use, and the 
 charging squadron dashing down the narrow wood road until it 
 found itself between the two hostile lines, and then plunging upon 
 the very heart and centre of Jackson's corps. The note is as 
 follows: "I have never felt before the need of the talent of 
 drawing, of which I am entirely devoid, so keenly as I do now. 
 Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to transfer to paper, 
 or canvas, the vivid impression of the Chancellorsville charge, 
 which I have in my mind. The engraving, if it is to be inserted 
 in your work, ought to be as true as the nature of the case will 
 admit. A sensational picture, drawn from imagination, would be 
 worse than none, in my opinion. 
 
 "I can give you my impressions, as they are stamped on my mind, 
 but I know of no one here to whom I could apply to have the draw- 
 
 * James Edward Carpenter, who had the command of the leading squadron in this 
 eyer memorable eharge of the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, was born in Kent county, 
 Maryland, being descended from a family of English Quakers, which emigrated to 
 America shortly after the arrival of William Penn in this country. He was educated 
 in the academic department of the University of Pennsylvania, and at the breaking 
 out of the rebellion was a student at law in the office of Theodore Cuy ler, Esq., of 
 Philadelphia. He served with credit for a term of three years with the Eighth cavalry. 
 Since the war he has practised his profession, and is a prominent member of the 
 Pennsylvania Historical Society. 
 
232 THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 ing made. The general features are these : Keenan rode in advance 
 on a black horse. I saw him fall. He was actually among the 
 bayonets of the enemy, in their line of battle, which was badly 
 thrown out of order by our charge, He fell forward, pitching 
 headlong in the direction of the enemy, and in the direction in 
 which his horse was moving. Captain Arrowsmith rode a bay 
 horse, and fell with his horse, both horse and rider sinking down 
 together. Both Keenan and Arrowsmith were slightly in advance 
 of me, Arrowsmith on the right of the road, and Keenan still 
 slightly in advance of him on the left. Huey rode with us when 
 we turned into the Orange plank road, and took the charge; but I 
 cannot remember him afterwards. Haddock rode about opposite 
 me. He was alive when my horse was shot, about the time that 
 Keenan and Arrowsmith, fell, but I cannot now remember clearly 
 whether I saw him fall. I do not remember seeing him after I 
 turned to fall back. About the moment that Keenan and Arrow- 
 smith were shot,, my horse received a ball squarely in his breast — 
 cutting his breast strap — which caused him to rear up almost per- 
 pendicularly, and throw himself directly around facing the rear. 
 This gave me an opportunity to see what terrible havoc had been 
 going on among the men of my squadron, who were lying in great 
 profusion in the road, the survivors using their sabres upon the 
 enemy who were among and around us, on the sides of the road and 
 in the woods. We had pierced entirely through their skirmish line, 
 and were mixed up indiscriminately with their line of battle, which 
 I have since learned was three lines deep — that is, six ranks. ■ 
 
 " Undoubtedly the time for your drawing should be the moment 
 of Keenan's and Arrowsmith's fall. That was the climax of the 
 charge. A moment afterwards the charge was spent, and our men 
 were breaking to the right and left in retreat. At that moment the 
 charge was at its height, not a man had turned, and every horse was 
 at the height of his speed. The enemy in our immediate neighbor- 
 hood were stricken with terror. Many offered to surrender; but it 
 was impossible to listen to them. I remember distinctly seeing one 
 of the enemy offer his musket to one of my men, but his head was 
 split open with a sabre in the very act, and by the man to whom he 
 wanted to surrender. Following is a rough draft of the situation. 
 
THE CHARGE OF KEENAN. 
 
 233 
 
 " The position of the small white house which had been used as 
 a hospital may not be quite correct. I cannot remember which side 
 of the small I'oad it was — whether towards the enemy or towards 
 
 flRROmSMJIlt lt\.\.JO V 
 
 
 :jR 
 
 3SKJRKj.lSyERS3cp«. 
 
 )r }J r-, nr -.'-^ri^ i-'rV 
 
 
 ^HOSPlfAU^ 
 
 
 THE ENEMYO:yjC(«y 
 
 
 Chancellorsville, Of course, in a general plan of this kind, I can- 
 not show the mixed-up state of the enemy and our troops. They 
 were intermingled — gray and blue." 
 
 Three officers, fifty-six men, and ninety-two horses were sacrificed 
 
234 THE BATTLE OF OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 in the flashings of that terrible strife, out of less than two hundred 
 who made the perilous charge. By that daring plunge the whole 
 corps of Jackson was checked, and the rout of the Union army, 
 which was strongly threatened, was averted. Keenan was a power- 
 ful man, and just before he fell he was flourishing his sabre with 
 unexampled rapidity, in the very midst of, and hand-to-iiand with 
 the enemy. The record of so brilliant a charge, led in the face of 
 such hopeless prospects, — nay, certain destruction — made with all 
 the assurance of a certain victory, and with the courage of men 
 fighting on equal terms, has few parallels in the records of heroic 
 daring. " No man," * says DePeyster, " has ever laid sufficient 
 stress upon this turning point of Chancellorsville, nor given due 
 credit to that brigadier-general of cavalry, who, after displaying a 
 consummate tact in the selection of a position, and even greater 
 capacity in the massing and handling of artillery, with the magical 
 influence of a superlative manhood, which could convert a few hun- 
 dred troopers into an impassable barrier of human determination, 
 and by a single will hold up his scanty force, like a wall, in that 
 desperate fight — not of minutes, but of an hour — converting a rout 
 into the equivalent of a victory. But the hero of that supreme 
 hour and effort was Peter Keenan; and Pennsylvania owes him a 
 grander monument than any the State has yet erected, or contem- 
 plates erecting." 
 
 * " Onward," Dec, 1869, p. 483. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 (236) 
 
ORDERS, TELEGRAMS AND TESTIMONY. 
 
 General Order of the War Department, January 25, 1863. 
 
 I. The President of the United States has directed : 
 
 First. That Major-General A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be 
 relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 Second. That Major-General E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be 
 relieved from duty in the army of the Potomac. 
 
 Third. That Major-General W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty 
 in the army of the Potomac. 
 
 Fourth. That Major-General J. Hooker be assigned to the command 
 of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 II. The officers relieved, as above, will report, in person, to the adju- 
 tant-general of the army. 
 
 General Order of the Army of the Potomac, No. 1, January 
 
 26, 1863. 
 
 By direction of the President of th^ United States, the undersigned 
 assumes command of the army of the Potomac. He enters upon the 
 discharge of his duties with a just appreciation of the responsibilities 
 which they impose. Since the formation of that army he has been 
 identified with its history. He has shared with his comrades in its 
 glories and reverses with no other desire than that these relations might 
 remain unchanged until its destiny should be accomplished. In the 
 record of our achievements there is much to be proud of, and with the 
 blessing of God we will contribute something to the renown of our arms, 
 and the success of our cause. To secure these ends your commander 
 will require the cheerful and zealous co-operation of every officer and 
 soldier. In equipment, intelligence, and valor the enemy is our inferior. 
 Let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him. 
 The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of the army when 
 he conveys to its late commander, Major-General Burnside, the most 
 cordial good wishes for his future. J. Hooker. 
 
 Halleck to Hooker, respecting the management of the Army, 
 January 31, 1863. 
 
 In regard to the operations of your own army, you can best, judge 
 
 (237) 
 
238 APPENDIX. 
 
 when and where it can move to the greatest advantage, keeping in view 
 always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, 
 either directly, or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of 
 the enemy sent against them. 
 
 Geneeal Oeders, No. 3, Aemy of the Potomac, January 30, 
 
 1863. 
 
 The following rules will govern officers empowered to grant leaves of 
 absence : 
 
 I. No leave will exceed fifteen days. 
 
 II. Leaves to commanders of corps, divisions, and cavalry brigades 
 will only be granted upon approval at these headquarters. One brigade 
 commander only in a corps to be on leave at one time. 
 
 III. Not more than one field officer of a regiment to be absent on 
 leave at one time, where the full complement of field officers is pres- 
 ent. When less than that number, leaves to be granted only in ex- 
 treme cases. 
 
 IV. ■ Not more than two line officers to be given leave from any regi- 
 ment at the same time. Not more than one from any battery or de- 
 tachment. 
 
 V. Leaves not to exceed ten days except to residents of the following 
 States, when it may be given for fifteen days, viz. : Maine, New Hamp- 
 shire, and Vermont; Ohio, Michigan, and the States west of these last 
 named. 
 
 VI. Furloughs to enlisted men must in no case exceed two for every 
 one hundred men present for duty in the regiment, battery, or detach- 
 ment, and not to be gralnted to any men, but those having the most 
 excellent record for attention to all duties. 
 
 VII. In case of the failure of any officer or soldier to return before 
 his leave expires, leaves will not be granted to others, from the same 
 commands until his return. All applications will by endorsement or 
 otherwise state the number of officers or men absent on leave from the 
 command, and the failure to return of any person will be notified im- 
 mediately to the provost-marshal-general, with a memoranda of the 
 leave, residence of the party, and description of enlisted men. ; 
 
 VIII. A return from each regiment, battery, and detachment will be 
 forwarded to these headquarters within eight days from the date of this 
 order, showing the number of officers and men absent from duty, from 
 any cause whatever. 
 
 IX. Under the head of "remarks" for all enlisted men absent will be 
 given a complete description, age, height, etc., etc. ; where enlisted ; 
 whether or not dropped from the rolls — when and where deserted — 
 where supposed to be — furloughed, detailed at hospital, where, etc., etc. 
 
 X. Under the head of remarks for officers, when the absence is of 
 such a nature as to cause dismissal from service, it should be so stated 
 that action may be taken thereon. 
 
APPENDIX. 239 
 
 General Orders, No. 12, Army of the. Potomac, February 19, 
 
 1863. 
 
 The attention of the officers and men of this army is directed to the 
 general order of the President of November 15, 1862, and to general 
 order No. 7, of September 6, 1861, from these headquarters respecting 
 the observance of the Sabbath. The major-general commanding enjoins 
 a strict compliance with the requirements of those orders upon all under 
 his command. 
 
 Hooker to Stoneman, April 12, 1863, Commanding Cavalry 
 
 Corps. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that 
 you will march at 7 o'clock a. m. on the 13th inst., with all your avail- 
 able force, except one brigade, for the purpose of turning the enemy's 
 position on his left, and of throwing your command between him and 
 Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat and 
 inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discom- 
 fiture and defeat. 
 
 To accomplish this, the general suggests that you ascend the Rappa- 
 hannock by the different routes, keeping well out of the view of the 
 enemy, and throwing out well to the front and flank small parties to 
 mask your movement, and to cut off all communication with the enemy 
 by the people in their interest living on this side of the river. To divert 
 suspicion, it may not be amiss to have word given out that you are in 
 pursuit of Jones' guerillas, as they are operating extensively in the 
 Shenandoah Valley, in the direction of Winchester. He further sug- 
 gests that you select for your place of crossing the Rappahannock some 
 point to the west of the Alexandria and Orange railroad, which can 
 only be determined by the circumstances as they are found on the 
 arrival of your advance. 
 
 In the vicinity of Culpeper you will be likely to run against Fitz- 
 hugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, 
 which it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without 
 delay to your advance, or detriment to any considerable number of your 
 command. At Gordonsville the enemy have a small provost guard of 
 infantry, which it is expected you will destroy, if it can be done without 
 delaying your forw'ard movement. From there it is expected that you 
 will be able to push forward to the Acquia and Richmond railroad, 
 somewhere in the vicinity of Saxton's junction, destroying along your 
 whole route the railroad bridges, trains of cars, depots of provisions, 
 lines of telegraphic communication. The general directs that you go 
 prepared with all the means necessary to accomplish this work effectu- 
 ally. . 
 
 As the line of railroad from Acquia to Richmond presents the short- 
 est one for the enemy to retire on, it is more than probable that he will 
 avail himself of it, and the usually travelled highways on each side of 
 
240 ' APPENDIX: 
 
 it, for this purpose; in which event you •vfiQ. select the strongest posi- 
 tions, such as the banks of streams, commanding heights, etc., in order 
 to check or prevent it, and if unsuccessful, you will fall upon his flanks, 
 attack his artillery and trains, and harass him until he is exhausted 
 and out of supplies. Moments of delay will be hours and days to the 
 army in pursuit. 
 
 If the enemy should retire by Culpeper and Gordonsville, you will 
 endeavor to hold your force in his front, and harass him day and night, 
 on the march and in camp unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from 
 his columns large slices the .general desires that you will not fail to 
 take small ones. Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders 
 be, fight, fight, fight, bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the 
 general as^ the rebel carcasses. It is not in the power of the rebels to 
 oppose you with more than five thousand sabres, and those badly 
 mounted, and, after they leave Culpeper, without forage and rations. 
 Keep them from Richniond,*and sooner or later they must fall into our 
 hands. 
 
 The general desires you to understand that he considers the primary 
 object of your movement the cutting of the enemy's communication 
 with Richmond by the Fredericksburg route, checking his retreat ov6r 
 those lines, and he wishes to make everything subservient to that object. 
 He desires that you will keep yourself informed of the enemy's where- 
 abouts, and attack him wherever you find him. If, in your operations, 
 an opportunity should present itself for you to detach a force to Char- 
 lottesville, which is almost unguarded, and destroy depots of supplies 
 said to be there, or along the line of the Acquia railroad in the direction 
 of Richmond, to destroy the bridges, etc., or the crossings of the Pamun- 
 key, in the direction of West Point, destroying the ferries, felling trees 
 to prevent or check the crossing, they will all greatly contribute to our 
 complete success. You may rely upon the general's being in communi- 
 cation with you before your supplies are exhausted. Let him hear from 
 you as often as necessary and practicable. 
 
 A brigade of infantry will march to-morrow morning at eight o'clock 
 for Kelly's ford, with one battery, and a regiment to United States ford 
 and Bank's ford to threaten and hold those plates. It devolves upon 
 you, general, to take the initiative in the forward niovement of this 
 grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend, in a 
 great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind 
 that celerity, audacity, and resolution are everything in war, and espe- 
 cially is it the case with the command you have, and the entei:prise on 
 which you are about to embark. ' 
 
 HooKEE TO Stoneman, SUPPLEMENTAL Oedee, April 28, 18o3. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that 
 the instructions communicated for your government on the 12th inst. 
 are so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such 
 
APPENDIX. 241 
 
 points as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock fords, 
 and for a portion of your forcelto move in the direction of the Raccqon 
 ford and Louisa Court-House, while the remainder is engaged carrying 
 iiito execution that part of your original instructions which relates to 
 the enemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and 
 Orange railroad, and the line itself; the operatipns of this column to 
 be considered as masking the column which is directed to move by 
 forced marches to strike and destroy the line of the-Acquia and Rich- 
 mond railroad. 
 
 You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns 
 to unite, and it is recommended that it be at the Pamunkey, and near that 
 line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off the 
 retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects your 
 iistructions, as before referred to, will remain the same. You will 
 direct all your forces to cross to-night, or, if that shall not be practic- 
 able, to be brought to the river, and have it all thrown over before 8 
 o'clock to-morrow morning. If the fords should be too deep for your 
 pack animals and artillery, they will be crossed over the bridge at 
 Kelly's ford. You will please furnish the officers in command of 
 these two columns with a copy of this, and of your original instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 HOOKEE TO SlOCUM AND HoWARD, COMMANDEES OF TwELPTH AND 
 
 Eleventh Coeps, April 26, 1863. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that 
 the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, in the order naimed, will begin their 
 march at sunrise to-morrow morning ; the former to encamp as near 
 Kelly's ford as practicable without discovering itself , to the enemy, and 
 the latter as nearly in its rear as circumstances will permit. They will 
 be established in their camps on or before 4 o'clock p. M. on Tuesday, 
 the 28th inst. Corps commanders will be held responsible that the men 
 are kept in camp and do not go to the river. 
 
 Each corps will march with one battery and two ambulances to a 
 division and the pack train of small ammunition. If necessary, a small 
 number of wagons can accompany the column to the camp with forage 
 for animals. The balance of the trains will be parked in the vicinity 
 of Bank's ford, off the road, and convenient to crossing the river at that 
 point. The ammunition wagons and ambulances being in readiness to 
 take the lead in the column, no extra guards for this part of the train 
 will be required. Corps commanders can leaive behind such men of 
 those whose time of service is about to expire as they think proper, with 
 such instructions for the safety of the camps and preservation of the 
 public property as they may deem necessary. All property not removed 
 with the troops must bei, turned in to the quartermaster. Corps com- 
 manders will consider so much pf the above as relates to the destination 
 of thejr commands as strictly confidential. 
 16 
 
242 APPENDIX. 
 
 HooKEE TO Couch, Commanding Second Coeps, April 27, 1863. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs that you move at sunrise to- 
 morrow morning two divipions of your corps, to encamp as near as 
 practicable at Bank's ford, without exposing your camps to the view 
 of the enemy. That one brigade and one battery of one of these two 
 divisions take position at United States ford, the movement to be made 
 quietly, the officers and men restrained from exhibiting themselves, or 
 making any show or appearance upon the river beyond the necessities 
 of picket duty. The division left in camp should be the one whose 
 camps are most exposed to the view of the enemy. All of the artillery 
 attached to the 'two divisions moving up the river must move with 
 them, and be ready to be thrown into position to cover the passage of 
 the river, and to drive the enemy from his defences thrown up opposite 
 that point. Two ambulances to each division will move with them, and 
 a few wagons only allowed, to carry sufficient forage for the animals for 
 four or five days. The pack mule train, for small-arm ammunition, will 
 move with the column, or, in lieu of it. General Couch having none 
 organized, a reserve of ammunition in wagons, to be kept out of the 
 way of troops and the communications, ready to move foj-ward if needed. 
 The troops will have the (eight days) rations heretofore provided in 
 orders. The trains left will be parked to the rear of the Falmouth 
 station, and out of sight of the enemy, and out of the way of the "busi- 
 ness of the station. The division left in camp will be directed to keep up 
 the picket line on the river, and in readiness to repel any attempt that 
 may be made by the enemy to cross the river. Should the demonstra- 
 tion of the enemy prove of sufficient strength to indicate such a pur- 
 pose, the Third corps will be available for support. The division left 
 in camp, as well as the division at Bank's and United States fords, will 
 be held in readiness to follow up any successful movements without 
 delay. In moving from camp or breaking camps the practice of large 
 fires and burning camp rubbish will not be permitted. If there are 
 any two years men that you consider unreliable in consequence of the 
 near expiration of their term of service, you will leave them on duty 
 with the division left behind. The commanding general desires that 
 you command in person the two divisions going up the river. 
 
 HooKEE TO Meade, Commanding Fifth Coeps, April 27, 1863 — 
 
 1 A. M. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs me to inform you that your 
 corps is to march to-morrow, so as to reach the vicinity of Kelly's ford 
 by Tuesday at 4 p. m. The corps of Generals Slocum and Howard 
 take the same direction (and will be on the same route probably) from 
 Hartwood. The provisions as to rations in former circular (eight days) 
 will be complied with, The trains will be left at the vicinity of Stone- 
 man's switch. Such two years men as you may desire to leave for the 
 purpose may remain with them as guards. Further details pf the 
 
APPENDIX. 243 
 
 orders will be sent you early to-morrow morning. Two ambulances 
 and one battery only will accompany each division, with the pack train 
 of small arm ammunition — a few wagons only to accompany the column, 
 sufficient to carry forage for the animals. The destination of your 
 command will be strictly confidential. General Couch has been 
 directed to send a regiment to Bank's ford, to relieve your regiment 
 there. 
 
 Hooker to Meade, Commanding Fifth Corps, Moreisville, April 
 
 28, 1863. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to request that you 
 will exercise all* of your accustomed zeal and devotion in hastening 
 the passage of the troops across the Kappahannock. He feels assured 
 that you will. It is a great object to effect the passage of the Rapidan 
 to-morrow, as you well know, and in so doing the United States ford 
 will be uncovered, and our line of communication established with the 
 left wing of the army. I enclose herewith copies of instructions to- 
 Major-General Slocum, to Brigadier-General Pleasanton, and Captain 
 Comstock, and also reports of the strength of the enemy's forces hold- 
 ing fords on the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan. 
 I hope that you will be able to pick up some of them. Use your 
 cavalry freely, and send them well out to bring you timely informa- 
 tion. Would it not be well to detach a division to seize the ford ? 
 From the most reliable information in our possession the ford must be 
 a good one now. The cavalry can ascertain. The general will join 
 you as soon as he can, probably not until the United States ford is 
 opened. A portion of Couch's corps now hold it on our side. The gen- 
 eral will direct two aides-de-camp to report to you to furnish him with 
 information. Use them freely. Brigadier-General Warren will report 
 as soon as you cross the Rapidan. 
 
 Hooker to Slocum, Commanding Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, 
 MoRRisviLLE, April 28, 1863. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that 
 so long as the Eleventh and Twelfth corps are operating on the same 
 line, you will exercise the command of both. The general directs that 
 the Eleventh corps cross to the opposite side of the river to-night, and 
 that the Twelfth corps commence crossing at daylight to-morrow morn- 
 ing, and to be thrown over with all possible rapidity, and both corps 
 march by the most direct route, without delay, and seize the bridge, if 
 standing, and the ford at Germania mills. He suggests that you make 
 use of a cavalry regiment and three or four smart marching regiments 
 to execute this duty, and that you cross both of your corps over the 
 Rapidan river to-morrow. You will find guides in General Pleasanton's 
 cavalry. 
 
244 ■ APPENDIX. 
 
 Major-General Meade will move on almost a parallel line at the same 
 time, and will be in easy communication with you. He will cross 
 Ely's ford. If his passage should be disputed, as you will probably be 
 able to learn from the firing, or through your communication with that 
 officer, the general directs that you despatch a corps along the south 
 bank of the Rapidan, to knock away the enemy to enable him to cross, 
 and when the Fifth corps is across, that you push on with both of your 
 corps to Chancellorsville, at which point the three corps will come to- 
 gether, and which you will command by virtue of your seniority. The 
 enemy have a brigade holding the United States ford, which they will 
 abandon as soon as they hear of your approach. This will open the 
 United States ford to us, when bridges will at once be thrown across 
 the river, and will afford you a direct communication with headquar- 
 ters. Telegraphic communication is established from that point. 
 
 If your cavalry is well advanced from Chancellorsville you will be 
 able to ascertain whether or not the enemy is detaching forces from be- 
 hind Fredericksburg to resist your advance. If not in any consider- 
 able force, the general desires that you will endeavor to advance at all 
 hazards, securing a position on the plank road, and uncovering Bank's 
 ford, which is also defended by a brigade of rebel infantry and a bat- 
 tery. If the enemy should be greatly reinforced, you will then select a 
 strong position, and compel him to attack you on your ground. You 
 will have nearly forty thousand men, which is more than he can spare 
 to send against you. Every incident of your advance you will com- 
 municate to the general as soon as communication is established by the 
 United States ford. Two aides-de-camp are sent to report to you for 
 the service. You are already advised of the operations going on below 
 Fredericksburg. The general desires that not a moment be lost until 
 our troops are established at or near Chancellorsville. Froin that' 
 mopient all will be ours. A copy of this will be furnished Major-Gen- 
 eral Meade. It will be much easier to replenish batteries, ammunition, 
 etc., by Bank's ford, than by the United States ford, if you should suc- 
 ceed in uncovering it. 
 
 Hooker to Sedgwick, Commanding Sixth Corps, April 27, 1863. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs that the Sixth corps, Major- 
 General Sedgwick, First corps, Major-General Reynolds, Third corps, 
 Major-General Sickles, put themselves in position to cross the river as 
 follows : Six;th corps at Franklin's crossing. First corps at the crossing 
 below, at Pollock's mill creek, the Third corps, as a support, to cross at 
 either point. These movements to be made so that the .respective corps 
 are imposition, the First and Sixth on or before 3i A. M. of the 29th, 
 the Third corps on or before 4i a. m. of the 29th. The ambulances 
 and trains to be parked in the rear, and concealed behind the range of 
 hills visible to the enemy, and ready to move when desired. The 
 troops, as far as possible, ought to be^ concealed up to the moment the 
 demonstration is made. 
 
APPENDIX. 245 
 
 Such batteries of the corps mentioned, and of the reserve artillery as 
 are required, to be placed in position under the direction of the chief 
 of artillery to cover the crossing. • The orders of the chief of artillery 
 for the necessary disposition of the batteries to carry out the purposes 
 and plans of this movement will be complied with, and he will be 
 charged with the responsibility of the duties intrusted to him. Trains 
 wilL be loaded with supplies of forage and provisions, to include, at 
 least, eight days' short forage for the animals. Whenever an opportu- 
 nity occurs, without interference, the supplies that may have been con- 
 sumed will be replaced. The troops will have the eight days' rations 
 as heretofore provided in orders. The bridges, two at each crossing, to 
 be laid complete before 3J A. M. of the 29th, under the supervision of 
 General Benham, who is charged with the responsibility thereof. Any 
 troops needed to assist the engineer brigade in the performance of this 
 duty will be furnished to General Benham, under the direction of Gen- 
 eral Sedgwick. General Sedgwick, pending the operation, will be 
 charged with the command of the three corps mentioned, and will 
 make a demonstration in full force on Wednesday morning upon the 
 enemy's defences, with a view to securing the telegraph road. 
 
 In the event of the enemy detaching any considerable part of hia 
 force against the troops operating at the west of Fredericksburg, he 
 will attack and carry their works at all hazards, and establish his force 
 on the telegraph road, cutting off all communication by the enemy, in 
 order to prevent their turning his position on that road. In case the 
 enemy should fall back on Richrnond, he will pursue them with the 
 utmost vigor, fighting them whenever and wherever he can come up 
 with them. The major-general commanding suggests that a part of his 
 force be thrown on the Bowling Green road in case the enemy retire, 
 and pursuit be made on both these lines. The columns, if they move 
 with equal rapidity, will be within supporting distance, and should be re- 
 quired to march to each other's assistance as circumstances may require. 
 The ammunition trains and ambulances will be held in readiness to 
 move first. General Sedgwick will give such further instructions as may 
 seem to him necessary to carry out the plans and wishes of the major- 
 general commanding. 
 
 HooKEE TO Sedgwick, Commanding Left Wi^g^) April 30, 1863 — 
 
 8i A. M. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to instruct you to 
 make a demonstration on the enemy's lines in the direction of Hamil- 
 ton's crossing at 1 o'clock, the object being simply to ascertain whether 
 or not the enemy continues to hug his defences in full force, and if he 
 should have abandoned them, to take possession of his wqrks and the 
 commanding ground in the vicinity. In his opinion a corps should 
 be used for this service — a portion of it advanced, while the balance is 
 held in supporting distance, and your whole force held in readiness to 
 
246 APPENDIX. 
 
 spring to their relief should an effort be made to overpower them, or 
 to cut them off. This demonstration will be made for no other purpose 
 than that stated. The enemy must not be attacked behind his defences 
 if held in force. No train but that of a few ambulances should accom- 
 pany the column. As soon as the required information is obtained the 
 column can return. Look well after the defences of your bridge heads 
 during this movement. If you are certain that the enemy is in full 
 force in your front, I am instructed by the commanding general to say 
 that the demonstration herein directed will not be made. The general 
 must know the position' of affairs, and be advised fully ; also as to what 
 you do, at once. The enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The 
 general expects that you will not permit them to cross the river. When 
 ,you move forward, if you want all your artillery, the batteries of the 
 reserve here can be called for. 
 
 HooKEE TO Couch, Commanding the Second Corps, April 30, 
 
 1863. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs me to inclose you copy of 
 instructions to Generals Slocum and Meade. You are directed to cross 
 as speedily as practicable with your infantry, artillery, ammunition 
 wagons, and a few .wagons for forage, and two ambulances to a division. 
 You will have the bridge laid without delay as soon as the enemy leaves. 
 Don't let a small force keep you back. Establish rapid communica- 
 tions with the telegraph at Bank's ford, and with Meade and Slocum, 
 as the telegraph from Bank's to United States ford works so slow. You 
 will move to support Slocum. Be careful that no trains cross at United 
 States ford until further orders, as they will only be in the way. 
 Meade's ammunition wagons may have to cross. The trains should 
 cross at some point to be designated. The general directs me to add, 
 in moving in support of Slocum, move towards the heaviest firing, in the 
 event of his advance being disputed. The general wishes -you to be up 
 with him to-night. 
 
 Hooker to Sickles, Commanding Third Corps, April 30, 1863 — 
 
 12.30 p. M. 
 
 Upon the receipt of this order you will proceed with your corps, with- 
 out delay, by the shortest road, concealed from view of the enemy, to 
 United States ford. The batteries taken from your command and 
 placed in position to cover the crossing will be relieved, it is expected, 
 in time to join you. It is desired that your troops and your trains, 
 entire, in marching, should be concealed from the sight of the enemy, 
 that they may not be aware of your movement. Your pack mules, 
 small arm ammunition train, and two ambulances to a division to 
 accompany you. Forage for animals for two days from to-day. 
 
APPENDIX. 247 
 
 The greatest promptness in executing this movement and arriving at 
 your destination is expected of you. As much of your corps as can 
 cross on the bridge at United States ford to cross to-night, and all to 
 cross by 7 A. m. to-morrow. General Couch precedes you, and the 
 batteries left by General Meade also. After crossing, you will take up 
 your line of march towards Chancellorsville. Keep your troops in as 
 good condition as possible, while fully complying with your orders. 
 Don't burden yourself with any transportation not absolutely needed. 
 Every wagon is one too many in the way when they can be dispensed 
 with. Send some one ahead to see your road clear, and use your pioneers 
 when necessary. 
 
 HooKEE TO Sedgwick, Commanding Left Wing, April 30, 1863. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that 
 his headquarters will be at Chancellorsville to-night. It is proposed that 
 the army now at that point will assume the initiative to-morrow morn- 
 ing, and will advance along the line of the plank road, uncovering what 
 is called Bank's ford, where the bridges will be at onee thrown across 
 the river, which route will then become the shortest line of communica- 
 tion between the two wings of the army. Major-General Butterfield 
 will remain at the present headquarters, and will at once transmit to 
 the major-general commanding any communications you may desire to 
 send him. It is not known, of course, what effect the advance will have 
 upon the enemy, and the general commanding directs that you observe 
 his movements with the utmost vigilance, and should he expose a weak 
 point attack him in full force and destroy him. If he should show any 
 symptoms of falling back, the general directs that you throw your whole 
 force on the Bowling Green road, and pursue him with the utmost vigor, 
 turning his fortified positions by the numerous by-roads which you can 
 make use of for that purpose. If any portion of his organized forces 
 should pass off to the east of the railroad you will, by detachments, pur- 
 sue until you destroy or capture him. Simultaneous with the advance 
 of your column on the Bowling Green road, if at all, a column will 
 also advance on the telegraph road, and between you will sweep the 
 country between the two highways and the railroad. You will be 
 within easy communication, and both columns will spring to one an- 
 other's assistance in case of encountering any considerable resistance, 
 which can best be judged of by the magnitude of the fire. Keep your 
 provisions and ammunition and forage replenished, leaving as much of 
 your train to be brought afterwards as practicable. Trains will only 
 embarrass and check your forward movement, and must not accompany 
 you, unless it be the pack train. It may be expedient for you to join 
 the right wing on the south bank of the river, and under cover of it to 
 Fredericksburg. Be observant of your opportunities, and when you 
 strike let it be done to destroy. When you move forward, if you want 
 all your artillery, the batteries of the reserve here can be called for. The 
 
248 ■ APPENDIX. 
 
 enemy have at Hamilton's a pontoon train. The general expects that 
 you will not permit them to cross the river. You will find an able 
 commander in Major-General Reynolds. 
 
 Hookee's Circulae, May 1, 1863, to Coeps Commanders. 
 
 The Fifth corps, including three batteries, will be thrown on to the 
 river road by the most direct route, the head of it advanced to near 
 midway between Mott and Colin runs, the movement to be masked 
 by small parties thrown out in advance, and to be completed at 2 
 o'clock. 
 
 The Twelfth corps, including its batteries, will be massed below the 
 plank road, the head of it resting near the Tabernacle church, and 
 masked from the view of the enemy by small advance parties, and the 
 movement to be completed at 12 o'clock to enable the Eleventh corps to 
 take its position. 
 
 One division of the Second corps, with one battery, will take a posi- 
 tion at Todd's tavern, and will throw out strong detachments on the 
 aj)proaches in the direction of the enemy. The other division and bat- 
 teries of the corps, will be massed, out of the road near Chancellorsville. 
 These dispositions to be made at once. 
 
 The Third corps will be massed, as fast as it arrives, about one 
 mile from Chancellorsville, on the United States ford road, except- 
 ing one brigade with a battery, which will take position at Dowdall's 
 tavern. , 
 
 General Pleasanton will hold his command, excepting those otherwise 
 engaged, at Chancellorsville. After the movement commences head- 
 quarters will be kt Tabernacle church. 
 
 The Eleventh Corps, with its batteries, will be massed on the plank 
 road, about one mile in rear of the Twelfth.. This movement to be 
 completed at 2 o'clock. 
 
 Telegram of Hooker at Chancellorsville to Butteefield, 
 Chief op Staff at Ealmouth, May 2, 1863—1.55 a. m. 
 
 Direct for all the bridges to be taken up at Franklin's crossing and 
 below before daylight, and for Reynold's corps to march at once, with 
 pack train, to report at headquarters. 
 
 CiECULAE, Directed to Slocum and Howard, May 2, 1863 — 
 
 9.30 A. m. 
 
 I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the dis- 
 position you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front 
 attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he 
 wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the positions 
 
APPENDIX. 249 
 
 you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him 
 in whatever direction he, advances. He suggests that you have heavy 
 reserves well in hand to meet the contingency. The right of your line 
 does not appear strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming 
 have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at 
 that point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as 
 might be. We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving 
 to our right. Please advance your pickets, for purposes of observation, 
 as far as maybe safe, in order to obtain timely information of their 
 approach. 
 
 Telegram from Hookee to Sedgwick, Sixth Coeps, dated 11.30 
 A. M., May 1, received 4.55 p. m. 
 
 Direct Major-General Sedgwick to threaten an attack in full force 
 at 1 o'clock, and to continue in that attitude until further orders. Let 
 the demonstration be as severe as can be, but not an attack. 
 
 BuTTEEFiELD TO Sedgwick, May 1 — 11.20 o'clock. 
 
 General Hooker telegraphs you to throw your whole force on the 
 Bowling Green road, and no other. My telegraph communication to 
 the general is round about, and takes about three hours time. 
 
 BuTTEEFiELi) TO Sedgwick, May 2, 1863 — 9.55 A. m. 
 
 General Hooker telegraphs that you are 'all right ; you have but 
 Early's division in your front ; balance all up here. 
 
 Hooker to Sedgwick, May 2, 1863 — 9 p. m. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs that you cross the Rappahan-. 
 nock, at Fredericksburg, on the receipt of this order, and at once take 
 up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect 
 with him, and will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with 
 on the road. You will leave all your trains behind except pack trains 
 of your ammunition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at 
 daylight. You will probably fall upon the rear of the forces com- 
 manded by General Lee, and between you and the major-general com- 
 manding, he expects to use him up. Send word to General Gibbon to 
 take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. 
 
 Butteefield to Sedgwick, May 1, 1863 — 10.25 a. m. 
 
 The following dispatch of a column of infantry and artillery wagons 
 in motion towards our right just received, "A column of the enemy's 
 
250 APPENDIX. 
 
 infantry, artillery, and wagons, extending whole length of ridge and 
 south of Tyler's battery, head of column out of sight, moving from 
 direction of railroad station towards our right. The tbrce is apparently 
 heavy. . The stone wall under Marye's heights is apparently not occupied 
 this morning. There is also reduction of force in railroad cut and 
 trenches from the city to a mile south of it. The trench in rear of Hen- 
 derson's is evacuated from the house and Hazel run." 
 
 BUTTEKFIELD TO HooKEE, May 1, 1863 — 11.32 A. M. 
 
 The column of enemy's troops has been seen passing Captain Hamil- 
 ton's house by new road on the ridge through Temple's to the plank 
 road near Barren's since the sun cleared up the fog. Not so many 
 troops passing now as trains visible. 
 
 BuTTEEFiELD TO Sedgwick, May 2, 1863 — 12.35 p. m. 
 
 Gibbon reports all quiet in his front. Few enemy to be seen. The 
 hills back of Fredericksburg, near telegraph road, occupied. Small 
 force in rifle-pits opposite Falmouth. This force increased last night. 
 Probably anticipated a dash on our front. 
 
 BuTTEEFiELD TO Sedgwick, May 2, 1863 — 12 midnight. 
 
 From the statements brought by General Hooker's aid, it seems to 
 be of vital importance that you should fall upon Lee's rear with crush- 
 ing force. He will explain all to you. Give your advance to one who 
 will do all that the urgency of the case requires. 
 
 BUTTEEFIELD TO GiBBON, COMMANDING DIVISION OF THE SeCOND 
 
 CoEPS AT Falmouth, May 2, 1863. 
 
 Your command must cross the river to Fredericksburg to-night. 
 Pontoon bridge now at Lacy house. Get under way soon. General 
 Sedgwick is ordered to move through Fredericksburg towards Chancel- 
 lorsville. Look out you do not come in contact with him. You must 
 see to the laying of the bridges. 
 
 Waeeen foe Hookeb to Sedgwick, May 4, 1863. 
 
 I find everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and 
 repulsed the last assault with ease. General Hooker wishes them to 
 attack him to-morrow if they will. He does not desire you to attack 
 them again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says 
 
APPENDIX. 251 
 
 you are tco far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your 
 corps, and keep up communication with General Benham, at Bank's 
 ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think it 
 best to cross. Bank's ford would bring you in supporting distance of 
 the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericks- 
 burg. 
 
 HooKEE TO Sedgwick, May 4, 1863 — 11 a. m. 
 
 The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not 
 •wish you to cross the river at Bank's ford unless you are compelled to 
 do so. The batteries at Bank's ford command the position. If it is 
 practicable for you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, 
 near Bank's ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain 
 position at Bank's ford ; General Tyler commands the reserve artillery 
 there. 
 
 Hooker to Sedgwick, May 4, 1863. 
 
 The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you 
 reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the 
 Rappahannock, which .you can hold securely until to-morrow. Please 
 let the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by 
 telegram from Bank's ford as soon as possible. 
 
 Sedgwick to Hooker, May 4, 1863 — 11.15 a. m. 
 
 The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad 
 for such attack. It was assumed for attack, and not for defence. It is 
 not improbable that the bridges at Bank's ford may be sacrificed. Can 
 you help me strongly if attacked ? 
 
 As my bridges are two miles from me, I am compelled to cover them 
 above or below from attack with the additional assistance of General 
 Beuham's brigade alone. 
 
 Sedgwick to Hooker, May 4, 1863 — 11.45 p. m. 
 
 My army iS hemmed in upon the slope covered by the guns from 
 the north side of Bank's ford. If I had only this army to care for I 
 would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should 
 jeopard by retaining it here ? An immediate answer is indispensable. 
 I may [unintelligible] to withdraw. 
 
 Received at 1 a. m. May 5, 1863. 
 
 Answered, Withdraw and cover. D. B. 
 
252 APPENDIX. 
 
 ! 
 
 Sedgwick to Hooker, May 5, 1863. 
 I shall hold my position as ordered, on south side of Eappahannock, 
 
 Hooker to Sebgwick, May 5, 1863 — 1.20 p. m. 
 
 Yours received 1 A. m., saying you should hold position. Order to 
 withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both. 
 
 Sedgwick to Hooker, May 5, 1863 — 5 a. m. 
 
 The bridges at Bank's ford are swung and in process of being taken 
 up. The troops are much exhausted. The dispatch countermanding 
 my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed. 
 
 Hooker to President Lincoln, May 6, 1863 — 3 p. m. 
 
 Have this moment returned to camp. On my way received your 
 telegrams of 11 and 12.25 o'clock. The army had previously recrossed 
 the river, and was on its return to camp. As it had none of its trains 
 of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of 
 giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I 
 desire ; not to exceed three corps of the troops on the right have been 
 engaged ; for the whole to join, there is a better place nearer at hand. 
 Will write you at length to-night ; am glad to hear that a portion of 
 the cavalry has at length turned up. One portion did nothing. 
 
 Hooker to President Lincoln, May 7, 1863. 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of this date, 
 and, in answer, have to state that I do not deem it expedient to suspend 
 operations on this line, from the reverse we have experienced in endeav- 
 oring to extricate the army from its present position. If in the first 
 efl^ort we failed, it was not from want of strength or conduct of the small 
 number of troops actually engaged. 
 
 After its occurrence, the chances of success were so much lessened 
 that I felt another plan might be adopted in place of that we were 
 engaged in which would be more certain in its results ; at all events a 
 failure would not involve disaster, while in the other case, it was certain 
 to follow the absence of success. I may add, that this consideration 
 almost wholly determined me in ordering the army to return to its old 
 camp. As to the best time for renewing our advance upon the enemy, 
 I can oiily decide after an opportunity has been offered to learn the 
 feeling of the troops. They should not be discouraged or depressed, for 
 it is no fault of theirs, if I may except one corps, that our last efforts 
 were not crowned with glorious victory. I suppose that details are not 
 iwanted of me at this time. I have decided in my own mind the plan 
 
APPENDIX. 253 
 
 to be adopted in our next effort, if it should be your wish to have one 
 made. It has this to recommend it, it will be one in which the opera- 
 tions of all the corps, unless it be a part of the cavalry, will be within 
 ray personal supervision. 
 
 Testimony of General Hookee before Committee of Congress. 
 
 I said that Chancellorsville had beeu called a disaster. I lost under 
 the operations, one piece of artillery, I think five or six wagons, and 
 one ambulance. Of course, many of the Eleventh corps lost their arms 
 and knapsacks. In my opinion there is nothing to regret in regard to 
 Chancellorsville except the failure to accomplish all that I moved to 
 accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except in one corps, and we lost 
 no more men than the enemy ; but expectation was high, the army in 
 splendid condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at 
 a time, too, when the nation required a victory. 
 
 Question. What corps had you in the action of the 3d of May ? 
 
 Answer. The Twelfth and part of the Second, the Third and a small 
 part of the Fifth. The Eleventh corps I put on the left, where it was 
 not exposed.- The Eleventh and First corps were not engaged at all, 
 as was also the case with, perhaps, two-thirds of the Fifth corps. 
 
 Question. Why were not those corps brought into action ? 
 
 Answer. They could not be put into position. When the corps com- 
 manders assembled on the night of the 4th and 5th, I submitted to them 
 the mode of attack I should have to adopt in case of an advance ; that 
 it could only be with slender columns if an advalnce was made at all. 
 On the roads we would have to make use of for that purpose the enemy 
 was particularly strong, and was pressing his defences throughout the 
 line. Early in the campaign I had come to the conclusion that, with 
 the arms now in use, it would be impossible to carry works by an 
 assault in front, provided they were properly constructed and properly 
 manned. I was of that impression at the battle of Fredericksburg, and 
 requested General Burnside not to insist upon an attack being made 
 under those circumstances ; I said to him that I would advise him not 
 to attack then. He said it was necessary, and of course I made it, and 
 it was made with great vigor, with all the force that men ever carried 
 into action with them. I concentrated my artillery fire upon the point 
 where I was to make'my attack, and kept it up till sundown, making 
 the attack at the very last possible moment, but the nearest I could get 
 my men to their works was perhaps fifteen paces, and there the heads of 
 the columns would vanish. They could destroy men faster than I could 
 throw them on their works ; it was the cotton bags of New Orleans over 
 again. ' 
 
 Again, in the west, I was ordered to make an attack at New Hope 
 church, and lost ne«rly 2,000 men, while the enemy's loss did not pro- 
 bably exceed 50. Sherman had divided his army into two parts at 
 Etowah, and we were to concentrate at Dallas. Dallas was three miles 
 
254 APPENDIX. 
 
 from us, but one only for the enemy at Alatoona. Johnson threw his 
 army between the two columns to prevent a junction ; and, in order to 
 bring'it about, I fought from Pumpkinvine creek, driving the enemy be- 
 fore me, until I reached New Hope church, a distance of four miles, 
 where I found the enemy in position and intrenched, where I attacked 
 him, but with the same results that I had experienced at Fredericks- 
 burg. The most that I could do was to establish my corps on a line 
 about eighty paces distant from that of the enemy ; and it was on that 
 the army developed itself, taking a week to accomplish it. I do not 
 know an instance in this war where rifle-pits, properly constructed and 
 properly manned, have been taken by front assaults alone, either on 
 our side or that of the enemy. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY. 
 
 SECOND CORPS, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THOS. J. JACKSON. 
 
 Command. BfiiGADB. Division, 
 
 Fifth Louisiana Hays', Early's. 
 
 Sixth Louisiana Hays' .!".!!.!. [...Early's. 
 
 Seventh Louisiana Hays' Early's. 
 
 Eighth Louisiana Hays' Early's. 
 
 Ninth Louisiana Hays' Early's. 
 
 Thirteenth Georgia Hays' Early's. 
 
 Thirteenth Georgia Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Twenty-sixth Georgia Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Thirty-first Georgia ^ Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Thirty-eighth Georgia Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Sixtieth Georgia Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Sixty-first Georgia Gordon's Early's. 
 
 Sixth North Carolina Hoke's ^ Early's. 
 
 Twenty-first North Carolina Hoke's Early's. 
 
 Twenty-fourth North Carolina Hoke's Early's. 
 
 Fifty-seventh North Carolina Hoke's Early's. 
 
 First North Carolina Battalion Hoke's Early's. 
 
 Thirteenth Virginia Smith's Early's. 
 
 Forty-ninth "Virginia Smith's Early's. 
 
 Fifty-second Virginia Smith's Early's. 
 
 Fifty -eighth Virginia Smith's Early's. 
 
 Forty-seventh Virginia H. Heth's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fifty-fifth Virginia H. Heth's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-second Virginia Battalion H. Heth's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fortieth Virginia H. Heth's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 First South Carolina McGowan's A. P. Hills. 
 
 Orr's Rifles i McGowan's .A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Twelfth South Carolina McGowan's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirteenth South Carolina McGowan's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fourteenth South Carolina McGowan's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fourteenth Georgia Thomas' A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirty-fifth Georgia Thomas' A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Forty-fifth Georgia * Thomas' A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Forty-ninth Georgia Thomas' A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Seventeenth North Carolina Lane's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Eigliteeuth North Carolina Lane's ., A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-eighth North Carolina J.Lane's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirty-third North Carolina Lane's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirty-seventh North Carolina Lane's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 First Tennessee - Archer's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Seventh Tennessee Archer's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fourteenth Tennessee Archer's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Fifth Alabama Battalion Archer's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirteenth Alabama Archer's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirteenth North Carolina Pender's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 (255^ 
 
256 APPENDIX. 
 
 Command. Bkigade. Division. 
 
 Sixteenth North Carolina Pender's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-second North Carolina Pender's ,.A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirty-fourth North Carolina Pender's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Thirty-eighth North Carolina Pender's A. P. Hill's. 
 
 Teiith Virginia Colston's Trimble's. 
 
 Twenty-third Virginia... Colston's Trimble's. 
 
 Thirty-seventh Virginia Colston's Trimble's. 
 
 First North Carolina Colston's Trimble's. 
 
 Third North Carolina Colston's Trimble's. 
 
 Second Virginia E. P. Paxton's Trimble's. 
 
 Fourth Virginia E. F. Paxton's Trimble's. 
 
 Fifth Virginia E. F. Paxton's Trimble's. 
 
 Twenty-seventh Virginia .....\ E. F. Paxton's Trimble's. 
 
 Thirty-third Virginia E. F. Paxton's... Trimble's. 
 
 First Louisiana F. T. Nichols'. Trimble's. 
 
 Second Louisiana F. T. Nichols'! Trimble's. 
 
 Tenth Louisiana , '..... F. T. Nichols' Trimble's. 
 
 Fourteenth Louisiana F. T. Nichols' ."Trimble's. 
 
 Twenty-first Virginia Jones' :. Trimble's. 
 
 Forty-sefcond Virginia Jones' Trimble's. 
 
 Forty-fourth Virginia Jones' Trimble's. 
 
 Forty-eighth Virginia Jones' Trimble's. 
 
 Fiftieth Virginia Jones' ...' Trimble's. 
 
 Twelfth Alabama Rodes' D. H.Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-sixth Alabama Rodes' D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Fifth Alabama Rodes' .' D. H.Hill's. 
 
 Sixth Alabama Rodes' D. H. Hill's, 
 
 Third Alabama Rodes' D.H.Hill's. 
 
 Sixth Georgia Colquitt's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-third Georgia Colquitt's D.H.Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-seventh Georgia Colquitt's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-eighth Georgia , Colquitt's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Nineteenth Georgia ; Colquitt's D. H.Hill's. 
 
 Fourth Georgia '. Dole's D. H.Hill's. 
 
 Twelfth Georgia Dole's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty-first Georgia ...Dole's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Forty-fourth Georgia Dole's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Thirtieth North Carolina Ramseur's '., D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Fourth North Carolina Ramseur's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Fourteenth North Carolina Ramseur's ....D. . Hill's. 
 
 Second North Carolina Ramseur's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Fifth North Carolina „..Iverson's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twelfth North Carolina Iverson's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twentieth North Carolina Iverson's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 Twenty -third North Carolina Iverson's D. H. Hill's. 
 
 FIRST CORPS, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET. 
 
 Twelfth Virginia Mahone's Anderson's. 
 
 Sixteenth Virginia Mahone's Anderson's. 
 
 Forty-first Virginia Mahone's ; Anderson's. 
 
 Sixty-first Virginia Mahone's Anderson's. 
 
 Sixth Virginia Mahone's Anderson's. 
 
 Grandy's battery Mahone's '. ; Anderson's. 
 
 Eighth Florida Perry's , Anderson's. 
 
 Second Florida Perry's Anderson's. 
 
 Fifth Florida Perry's .s Anderson's. 
 
 Eighth Alabama Wilcc>x's Anderson's. 
 
 Ninth Alabama Wilcox's Anderson's. 
 
 Tenth Alabama Wilcox's Anderson's. 
 
 Eleventh Alabama Wilcox's : Anderson's. 
 
 Fourteenth Alabama Wilcox's Anderson's. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 257 
 
 Command. Brigade. Division. 
 
 Lewis' Battery.......... Wilcox's Anderson's. 
 
 Sixteenth Mississippi Posey's Anderson's 
 
 Twelfth Mississippi Posey's Anderson's'. 
 
 Nineteenth Mississippi Posey's Anderson's 
 
 Forty-eighth Mississippi Posey's Anderson's 
 
 Second Georgia Battalion Wright's Anderson's 
 
 Twenty-second Georgia Wright's Anderson's' 
 
 Third Georgia ...; Wright's.., Anderson's! 
 
 Forty-eighth Georgia Wright's Anderson's. 
 
 Eighteenth Georgia Wofford's McLaws'. 
 
 Twenty-fourth Georgia Wofford's MeLaws'. 
 
 Sixteenth Georgia.. L... Wofford's , McLaws'. 
 
 Cobbs' Legion... Wofford's McLaws'. 
 
 Phillips' Legion Wofford'.s McLaws'. 
 
 Fifteenth South Carolina Kershaw's McLaws'. 
 
 Seventh South Carolina Kershaw's McLaws'. 
 
 Second South Carolina Kershaw's McLaws'. 
 
 James' Battalion Kershaw's MpLaws'. 
 
 Third South Carolina Kershaw's McLaws'. 
 
 Thirteenth Mississippi Barksdale's McLaws'. 
 
 Seventeenth Mississippi Barksdale's McLaws'. 
 
 Eighteenth Mississippi Barksdale's McLaws'. 
 
 Twenty-first Georgia Semmes' McLaws'. 
 
 Tenth Georgia i.. Semmes' '. McLaws'. 
 
 Fifty-third Georgia • Semmes' McLaws', 
 
 Fifteenth Georgia , Semmes' McLaws'. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 First Virginia Cavalry., Fitz-Hugh Lee's J. E. B.Stuart's. 
 
 Second Virginia Cavsdry Fitz-Hugh Lee's J. E. B. Stuart's. 
 
 Third Virginia Cavalry Fitz-Hugh Lee's J. E. B. Stuart's. 
 
 Fourth Virginia Cavalry Fitz-Hugh Lee's J. E. B. Stuart's. • 
 
 Fifth Virginia Cavalry Fitz-Hugh Lee's J. E. B.Stuart's. 
 
 Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry W. H. F. Lee's J. E. B. Stuart's. 
 
 Seventh Virginia Cavalry W. H. F. Lee's J. E. B.Stuart's. 
 
 Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry ...., W. H. F. Lee's ^...J. E. B. Stuart's. 
 
 -Ninth Virginia Cavalry W. H. F. Lee's J. E. B.Stuart's. 
 
 Second North Carolina W. H. F. Lee's J. E. B.Stuart's. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 Page's Battery Carter's Battalion, 
 
 Fry's Battery Carter's Battalion. 
 
 Carter's Battery Carter's Battalion, 
 
 Jeff. Davis Battery Carter's Battalion. 
 
 Carrington's Battery Jones' Battalion. 
 
 Garber's Battery Jones' Battalion. 
 
 Thompson's Battery Jones' Battalion, 
 
 Fauver's Battery Jones' Battalion. 
 
 Marye's Battery Walker's Battalion. 
 
 Latham's Batteiy Walker's Battalion; 
 
 Bronson's Battery Walker's Battalion, 
 
 MoGraw's Battery Walker's Battalion, 
 
 Crenshaw's Battery Walker's Battalion. 
 
 Davidson's Battery Walker's Battalion. 
 
 Bice's Battery Mcintosh's Battalion, 
 
 I Lnsk's Battery Mcintosh's Battalion, 
 
 Hart's Battery Mcintosh's Battalion. 
 
 Johnson's Battery Mcintosh's Battalion, 
 
 Smith's Battery Brown's Battalion, 
 
 Watson's Battery Brown's Battalion, 
 
 17 
 
258 APPENDIX. 
 
 Dauce's Battery Brown's Battalion. 
 
 Huff's Battery Brown's Battalion. 
 
 Brooke's Battery. Brown's Battalion. 
 
 Jordan's Battery Alexander's Battalion. 
 
 Ehett's Battery Alexander's Battalion, 
 
 Moody's Battery Alexander's Battalion. 
 
 Parker's Battery Alexander's Battalion. 
 
 Eubank's Battery Alexander's Battalion. 
 
 Lewis' Battery Garnett's Battalion. 
 
 Grundy's Battery Garnett's Battalion. 
 
 Moore's Battery , Garnett's Battalion. 
 
 Maurice's Battery Garnett's Battalion. 
 
 McCarthy's Battery Cabell's Battalion. 
 
 Manly's Battery CabeU's Battalion. 
 
 Andrew's Battalion, 
 
 Horse Artillery.- 
 
 Beserve Artillery. 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 Anderson, General (Conf.), sent to Chan- 
 
 cellorsville, 50. 
 reinforced by Kershaw, Semmea 
 
 and Wofford, 62. 
 dispositions to cover Bank's ford, 
 
 166. 
 ATerell, General, skirmish at Kelly's 
 
 ford, 30. 
 remains upon the Bapidan, 74. 
 marches for Ely's ford, 75. 
 
 Bank's ford, bridges brought tg, 55. 
 Barlow, General, sent to support Sickles, 
 
 92. 
 Berry, General, killed, 125. 
 Birney, General, makes a night attack, 
 
 115. 
 Bijrnside, General, commands Potomac 
 army, 10. 
 asks for an explicit order to attack, 
 
 13. 
 his order No. 8, 15. 
 resigns, 15. 
 Buschbeck, General, makes a brave stand, 
 102. 
 
 Cavalry, expedition under Burnside, 12. 
 Cemetery, Fredericksburg and Chancel- 
 
 lorsville, 209. 
 15,257 Union soldiers buried there, 
 
 207. 
 Chancellorsville reached by the head of 
 
 the army, 49. 
 Couch, General, commands Second corps, 
 
 31. 
 assumes command gf the army of 
 
 the Potomac, 127. 
 
 Devens, General, attacked, 100. 
 Doubleday, General, sent to Port Royal, 
 45. 
 
 Early, General (Conf.), left the intrench- 
 
 ments, 141. 
 Ely's ford crossed by the Fifth corps, 49. 
 Emancipation proclamation, 20. 
 Express, Petersburg, 34. 
 
 Fire in the forest, 128. 
 
 Foster, J. G., at Little Washington, 33. 
 Fredericksburg, battle of, 11. 
 
 Germania ford disputed, 47. 
 Graham, General, reports to Howard, 87. 
 retires with face to the foe, 121. 
 
 Halleck, General, commands the army, 12. 
 Hays, General Wm., takes position on 
 
 Hooker's right, 114. 
 Hill, General (Conf.), at Little Washing- 
 ton, 33. 
 Hooker, General, placed over the army 
 of the Potomac, 16. 
 
 at Williamsburg, 16. 
 
 at Charles City Cross-roads, 16. 
 
 at Antietam, 16. 
 
 his request to President Lincoln, 19. 
 
 order on assuming command, 25. 
 
 on granting furloughs, 26.' 
 
 orders corps badges, 30. 
 
 obstacles to crossing river, 40. 
 
 his plans kept secret, 41. 
 
 plan of campaign, 41. 
 "^ captures a courier from Lee, 48, 
 
 congratulatory order, 58. 
 
 order to Slocum, 64. 
 
 arrives at Chancellorsville, 65. 
 
 orders an advance, 65. 
 ' orders concentration at Chancel- 
 lorsville, 67. 
 
 position of his forces, 68. 
 
 great expectations from cavalry, 71. 
 
 his plans for the battle, 86. 
 
 rides along the right of his line, 88. 
 
 orders Howard to change his line, 
 88. 
 
 calls for Berry's (his own) divi- 
 sion, 104. 
 
 decides on a new line of battle, 122. 
 
 injured by the falling column, 126, 
 
 concentrates upon the new posi- 
 tion, 133. 
 
 orders Sedgwick to remain, 157. 
 
 decides to withdraw across the 
 river, 159. 
 
 plans for crossing the river, 160. 
 
 law regulating proportion, infan- 
 try, cavalry and artillery, 187. 
 
 his use of cavalry, 188. 
 
 (259) 
 
260 
 
 GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 Hooker, General, value of the battle, 183. 
 sends ambulances for wounded, 
 
 207. 
 offers medicine and'supplies, 206. 
 his injuries, 211. 
 unable to answer calls, 212. 
 Howard, General, commands Eleventh 
 corps, 31. 
 receives order from Hooker, 88. 
 position of his corps, 94. 
 refuses to rectif7 his line, 96. 
 receives notice of enemy's posi- 
 tion, 98. 
 his responsibility, 181. 
 gives his explanation, 175. 
 Howe, General, repulses enemy at Tay- 
 lor's Hill, 152. 
 Hopewell nursery, position taken, 61. 
 Humphreys, General, opinion of the 
 strategy of Hooker, 162. 
 
 Jackson, General (Stonewall), commands 
 Second corps, 35. 
 
 concentrates before Fredericksburg, 
 54. 
 
 plan of attack, 82. 
 
 course of march, 84. 
 
 orders an advance, 100. 
 
 presses his advantage, 104. 
 
 rides forward to reconnoitre, 110. 
 
 mortally wounded. 111. 
 
 carried back to Wilderness tavern, 
 112. 
 
 unable to give commands, 116. 
 
 misapprehended the temper of 
 Union strength, 134. 
 
 Orders to stop fortifying and to ad- 
 vance, 168. 
 
 plan faulty, 191. 
 
 his wounds, 215, 
 
 how received his wounds, 216. 
 
 reports silent, 218, 
 
 amputation if necessary, 223, 
 
 death, 226. 
 
 Lee, Fitz-Hughj develops position on 
 
 Union right, 85. 
 Lee, General K. E. (Conf.), commands 
 
 army of Northern Virginia, 11. 
 fortifies along all the river, 38. 
 first learns of the advance of 
 
 Hooker, 47, 
 preparation to join battle, 48. 
 leaves Fredericksbiirg, 67. 
 develops the position of Hooker, 81. 
 reforms his disordered column, 109. 
 tries the new position of Hooker, 
 
 135. 
 arrives at Salem church, 149, 
 attacks Sedgwick, 151. 
 his dispositions, 190. 
 Lincoln^ President, stops Burnside, 12, 
 his letter to Hooker, 18. 
 
 Lincoln, President, conversation, 22, 
 
 fear of furloughs, 25. 
 Longstreet, General (Conf.), at Peters- 
 burg, 33. 
 Letterman, Surgeon, 202. 
 
 his humane sentiments, 203. 
 
 care of wounded, 204. 
 Losses, 200. 
 
 tabulated statement, 201. 
 
 McDongall, of British army, 55. 
 
 his opinion of Hooker's strategy, 
 55. 
 , on the passage of rivers, 161. 
 McClellan commands Hooker at Antie- 
 
 tam, 17. 
 Mary the mother of Washington, 9. 
 Meade, General, commands Fifth corps, 
 
 31. 
 Mount Vernon, 9. 
 
 Numbers engaged, 199. 
 
 Peck, General, at Suffolk, 34. 
 Pleasanton, General, orders a charge, 106. 
 gathers in his artillery, 107. 
 
 Reynolds, General, commands First 
 corps, 31. 
 marches to Chancellorsville, 83. 
 Bichmond and Acquia Bailroad, 72. 
 
 SohemmelfinBig, General, advances to 
 
 reconnoitre, 97. 
 Schurz, General, reconnoissance, 97. 
 
 urges a reformation of line, 177. 
 Sedgwick, General, crosses the river, 53. 
 
 receives orders from Hooker, 70. 
 
 ordered to Chancellorsville, 118. 
 
 carries the Fredericksburg heights, 
 143. 
 
 is met at Salem church, 147, 
 
 loses heavily, 148. 
 
 retires across Bank's ford, 154, 
 
 ordered to hold on at Taylort Hill, 
 186. 
 
 to fortify under the guns of Ben- 
 ham, 187. 
 Sickles, General, commands the Third 
 corps, 51. 
 
 arrives at Chancellorsville, 51. 
 
 orders artillery to open on Jack- 
 son, 91. 
 
 orders Birney to advance, 92, 
 
 movement arrested, 93, 
 
 notified of disaster to Eleventh 
 corps, 105, 
 
 withdraws his forces from the fur- 
 nace, 106. 
 
 desperate fighting, 127, 
 Slocum, General, commands Twelfth 
 corps, 31, 
 
GENERAL INDEX. 
 
 261 
 
 Slocum, General, put in command of right 
 wing, 46. 
 to uncover Bank's ford if possible, 
 164. 
 Smith, Colonel W. P. (Conf.) lays out 
 
 rebel line, 62. 
 Spectre corps, 209. 
 
 Stoneman, General, commands cavalry, 31. 
 plan of campaign, 72. 
 reaches Thompson's cross-roads, 73. 
 Kilpatrick and Davis go to Glou- 
 ' oester point, 74. 
 
 returns to the Rappahannock, 74. 
 his instructions from Hooker, 76. 
 duty incumbent on him, 77. 
 his strategy, 80. 
 conduct of the cavalry, 189. 
 Stuart, General (Conf.), at Todd's tavern, 
 50. 
 
 Stuart, General, takes command of Jack- 
 son's corps, 122. 
 concentrates his artillery, 123. 
 
 Tabernacle church, fortified position, 67. 
 Topography of the field, 36. 
 
 Von Gilaa attacked, 178. 
 
 Watten, General, 37. 
 
 Wilderness chiirch, 101. 
 
 Williams, General, fortified position, 90. 
 
 returns to his position, 114. 
 
 Wilcox, General (Conf), covers Bank's 
 
 ford, 63. I 
 
 delays Sedgwick, 146. 
 Women's council call on Mr. Lincoln, 21. 
 Wright, General (Conf.), intrenches, 62. 
 
1 ^i 
 
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