BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND* THE GIFT OF Stenrg M. Sage 1891 ^\5.}^^JrJr. n..i:i..|j^o^ Cornell University Library UD310 .F99 The art of marching / olin 3 1924 030 757 128 3 lb T93 THE ART OF MARCHINa. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. MILITARY TRANSPORT. MOBILIZATION AND EMBARKATION OF AN ARMY CORPS. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. INFORMATION IN WAR. MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BEYOND THE SEAS. PROVISIONING ARMIES IN THE FIELD. THE AET OF MAECHING. BY COLONEL GEORGE ARMAND FURSE, C.B., LATE 01? THE BLACK WATCH. II y a dcB hommcs heureux que la fortune favoriee et aux souhaita deequels tout r^ussit. Ne t'imagine pas etre un d? ces homraes : mats de ton cote' toutes les chances possible de snccfes. Ne neglige aucun moyen, pas m6me le plus petit. Un grand rdsultat final est plus fr^quemment produit par beaucoup de combinaisons vulgaires, re'unies ou successives, que par I'effet d'un seul et puissant effort. Caloule tout, prdvois tout, organise tout, et rends — toi bien conipte des moyens dpnt tu disposes, afin de i^e compter que sur ceux-ci. — Lk Marechal Bugeaud. LONDON: WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LIMITED, 13, CHARING CROSS, S.W. 1901. /\' \/\ H-l-x-z- LONDON : PRINTED BY WII-LIAM CLOWES AMD SONS, LIMITED, STAMPiJED STKEEr AKD CHAEING CROSS. IN iReverent ibomaae TO VICTOEIA THE GEEAT, QUEEN AND EMPRESS, WHOM THE WHOLE EMPIKE MOURNS WITH PKOFOUND SOEROW, AND WHO WAS ALWAYS SO PROUD OP THE VALOUR OF HER SOLDIERS. Vivit post funera virtus. a 3 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/cletails/cu31924030757128 PREFACE. The art of war is a deplorable art ; nevertheless, as wars are inevitable, it is of the highest importance to bring the art as near as possible to a state of perfection. The section of it treated in these pages is one of the greatest possible interest for an army; but though many books might be written on it, we have none in our language. A very few articles and lectures comprise all that our writers seem to have given us. Not appalled by the difficulty of dealing in an adequate manner with a subject of such vast import- ance, I have put together a mass of notes principally collected in the happy days when I was serving my Queen and my coiintry, believing that they may possibly be of some use to the military student. I advance nothing on my own authority, but rely principally on the experience and learning of the historians. An officer who has made his mark in the army might speak ex cathedra and lay down principles, but not so one whose career has been extremely commonplace, and who can barely be said to have ever exceeded his duty. I have been reproached for having in my last viii Preface. work quoted largely from other writers, and have been reminded that such a course tends to spoil smoothness of style. The reproach, no doubt, is well merited; nevertheless, as a prophet is not without honour but in his own country, amongst his own kin, and in his own house, so it is with the military writer, in a country in which military teachings from foreign experts are chiefly deemed worthy of attention. Many of the authors from whose works quotations have been taken have been eyewitnesses of the events they have related, have lived in times when those events were still quite recent, or have consorted with individuals who were actors in them. To recast their narratives or their opinions, simply for effect of style, would not have been honest, whilst it would have failed in making the views advanced acceptable, by ignoring that foreign origin which our officers hold in such high consideration. Volumes might be written on marching; I have tried to condense the subject into the space of a single one, so as not to bewilder and tire the reader. G. A. PUESE. Alphington, Feimley, Sukrey, 31si December 1900. CONTENTS. cuaPtek tagk I. Or MAiii'iiES IX Gknkkal ... ... ... ... 1 II. MeMOHABLE BI.UICHES ... ... ... ... 2.5 III. Some Eemakk.vble M.uu'iies in Isdia ... ... ... 82 I^'. TbAININC FOK the M.VIiCH ... ... ... ... 100 \'. Pheliminaey iNsri-.CTiox.s ... ... ... ... 122 VI. PllEPAr.ATIOSS FOB THE MaKCII ... ... ... 135 VIL Co.NDlTIOXS WHICH BEAU I.NFLl'ENCE ON MaECHING... ... 159 Vm. The Rate of Mahciilnc; ... ... ... ... 190 IX. LeKCTH of M.iRCHES ... ... ... ... ... 216 X. Cavalry covekixu the M.Uicii of an" Akmy ... ... 241 XI. Pbinciples of Explokation ... ... ... ... 263 XII. Dispositions foe the Maech ... ... ... 296 XIII. Distkibtjtion of the Teoops in the CoLiTMN OF March ... 335 XIV. The Maech op the Convoy ... ... ... 362 XV. ' Night Marches ... ... ... ... ... 393 XVI. Retreats ... ... ... ... ... ... 429 XVII. Pursuits ... ... ... ... ... ... 468 XVIII. Mov.vble Columns ... ... ... ... 484 XIX. Cavalry Raids ... ... ... ... ... 501 XX. Outposts, and P.iteollin(; ... ... ... ... 532 XXI. Camps, Cantonments, axd Bivouacs ... ... ... 552 Index ... ... ... ■■• ■■• ■•• 577 LIST OF MAPS. TO FACE PAGE Hannibal's Eoute into Italy ... ... ... ... ... 30 Part of Belgium ... ... ... ... ... ... 1C4 Roads used by the Fkekch axd Austki^vjiS before Solferisto ... 319 Maklbokouoh's CE0S.si>.fi OF the non plus ultra Lines ... 404 Hill's SunrELSE at Akoyo Molino ... ... ... ... 423 Pdksuit after Jena ... ... ... ... ... 475 Morgan's Kentucky Raid ... ... ... ... ... 503 Stuart's Raid across the RAPi>An.A.NN0CK ... ... ... 514 Stuart's Raid into M.uiylasd and Pennsylvania ... ... 516 THE ART OF MAECHING. CHAPTER T. OF MAKCHES IN GENEEAL. Marching is a subject of itself— War is a combination of marching and fighting— The number of battles is small in comparison with the number of marches Logistics— Marching is an art by itself— Marches considered under two head- ings : in time of peace, in time of war— Performed either at a distance from, or near the enemy — Regular marching only possible at a distance from the enemy — It is thus at the commencement of a campaign — Troops close to each other may be halted to fight at any moment — Tactical marches beyond the scope of this book — Marches have a destructive effect — Examples of — To estimate for men to repair the first waste — Mobility a great element of success- Secrecy the soul of all great designs — To march quickly and keep one's counsel best means for effecting a surprise — The enemy surprised by rapid marching — Hannibal— Fabius Cunctator — Alexander — Csesar — Gustavus Adolphus — Turenne — Marl- borough — Frederick the Great— Napoleon— Wellington — Prussians outmarch the French at Waterloo — Prussian armies join issue at Sadowa — Campaigns of 1757 and 1866 — Prussians learn a lesson — Stonewall Jackson — Long marches deteriorate armies^Habit of marching lessened by facility of locomotion What great marches depend on — Men to be worked judiciously to engage the enemy in a fair bodily condition — Must give marching men adequate food and repose — Physical strength to be assisted by moral — Soldier to be educated to march — When cavalry cover the army effectively, the necessities of the troops can be well looked after — The strategical result of several days' march must be considered — Precedents give a useful code of principles — Order and regularity will reduce the chances of exhaustion of the troops — Marches not to be too long — Troops to be housed and fed — Soldiers after fatigue must have repose and substantial nourishment — Should march in the coolest hours of the day — Nothing definite can be laid down — Division of distance into stages — To pass from the marching to the fighting formation — Fatigue duties at the end of the march. Most works on the art of war treat to a certain extent on marching as part of the general subject, because operations of war entail a very large amount of movement. Marching, nevertheless, may be said t)6 constitute a subject of itself, for it is a very complex study, and one in which a multitude of different circumstances play a prominent part. Clausewitz, in his large work on war, devotes three chapters to this subject. In the iirst book he draws a distinction between marches and evolutions. By the latter 2 The Art of Marching. name he designates the marches or movements in the combat ; marches outside the battlefield he defines as the instrument of strategy. An army is made to move and to fight. M. de Ternay declares that, were military lore classified in strict keeping with the importance of the subjects embraced, it would be found that marches constitute the most essential part of the great art of war. Mobility has at all times been the secret of success both in strategical and tactical manoeuvres. General Bronsart von Schellendorfif holds that "an army which, in comparison with other armies, is below the standard in marching power, must be considered as lacking in one of the most essential qualities necessary for carrying on warfare." There is scarcely an operation of war which can be carried out without a series of marches. A frontier cannot be well defended unless troops can be moved speedily from one part of it to another. It is by marches that the enemy is surprised, or that he is anticipated at some important point. We must perform marches to go and relieve a besieged or blockaded city, or to succour a force hard pressed or struggling under grave difficulties. Order of battle cannot be formed without a march, and, lastly, what would be the use of a victory, when gained, if the conqueror were to rest satisfied with the possession of the battlefield and abstained from pursuing the beaten army. War consists of a combination of marching and fighting. This, above all, is found in wars of invasion, which cause a con- siderable amount of hard marching, for, as Frederick the Great rightly put it, to conquer is to advance. The art of marching comprises all the art of war, because in reality it is by marches that all strategical combinations are carried into effect. We cannot count on railways beyond what can be effected by their aid in the great strategical concentra- tions, carried out as far as the confines of the theatre of opera- tions. Beyond that point, the adversary has such interest in destroying them that of a certainty there will be nothing left to do but to march. Though the general issue of a campaign may be determined by the result of one or more battles, still the number of these will be small in comparison with the number of marches to be executed. The history of the most brilliant campaigns shows Of Marches in General. 3 that marching is the normal state in war, that it is by far the most ordinary occupation of troops in the field, and that it incontestably constitutes the most important element in military learning. Logistics is that branch of the military science which has for object the maintenance of an army in the field, its immunity from sudden attack, and the performance of the movements necessary for bringing the troops up to the enemy in the best condition for fighting. This last, which is the main scope of all logistical operations, constitutes a very important study. The term comes from Logista, the intendant of the Roman armies, and is derived from the Greek XoyigriKog, "skilled in calculating." Colley divides the operations of war into strategy, logistics, and tactics. " The first, strategy, deals with the great concep- tions which govern the plan of campaign ; the second, logistics, with the scientific combination of marches, the calculation of time and distance, and of economy of men's powers, by which the strategical conception is worked out to the desired combina- tions." In these words he explains the relation that exists between the first two. In foreign armies, logistics are treated as a distinct subject, and important works have been specially written on this branch of the art of war. But even there such works are not plentiful, and their number, in comparison to other professional books, is i-emarkably small. The Archduke Charles defines strategy in these words : " Strategy is the science of war ; it sketches out the plans, it embraces and determines the progress of military operations ; it is, to speak correctly, the science of the General." Hamley tells us that its object is "so to direct the movements of an army, that when decisive collisions occur it shall encounter the ■enemy with increased relative advantage." Moltke's definition was even more homely : " Strategy is the application of sound common sense to the conduct of war." Strategy (a science in which our generals are greatly deficient *) * Nations fight muoli in accordance with their peculiar characteristics. The ■Greeks were perhaps unrivalled in the art of deceiving the enemy skilfully, and in their estimation, he who conquered by skill, that is, by stratagems, ranked much higher than the general whose success depended on superior numbers. The Romans, in the beginning of their power, disdained to resort to stratagems, but at a later period they did avail themselves of them. "We English exaggerate the importance of bravery, and despise tactical lore. We are very fond of fair play, sneaking and any circumvention of the enemy find little favour in our eyes ; however, it does not 4o always, as we have lately seen at our cost, to take the bull by the horns. 4 The Art of Marching. is the art of manoeuvring armies, tactics the art of leading troops in action. It is the former that shapes the grand conception of a plan of campaign. Strategy prepares beforehand the total of all the operations. Taking into account the adversary's forces and resources, the strong and weak points of his position, it prepares a battle or an engagement for a given point, a diversion for another ; it fixes beforehand the positions and camps where the army will go successively with the object of reaching eventually a given locality which is the end in view of the plan of campaign. What strategy orders, tactics execute. The first principle of offensive strategy is to make the enemy's army the object of all our movements. Strategy is a precise science, the principles of which are immutable. This is not the same with tactics, for in this branch of the great art of war every change in the organization of armies, every alteration and improvement in weapons, every- thing added to the mobility of the combatant body, necessarily demands a more or less radical alteration of guiding rules. Napoleon expressed the opinion that in order to keep ahead of our enemies, it was necessary to adopt a fresh system of tactics every ten years. With strategy this is not quite so, for its principles, as we have said, are more lasting and take a very much longer time to change. Marching is indeed an art in itself, and a complicated one too, as so many circumstances, amongst others the season of the year, the nature of the climate, the state of the roads, the actual physical and moral condition of the troops, the attitude of the population, and the urgency of the situation, have all to be taken into account. The more numerous an army is, the more difficult it becomes to move it, the more imperative becomes the necessity for methodical arrangements in everything which concerns its transition, down to the most minute details. The three principal factors in all marches resolve themselves into calculation of time, distance, and men's physical power. Staff officers should be practised in calculating time and distance, in the formation of columns, and in their combined movements over several roads. They should become familiar with the com- pilation of orders, and with the measures for exploring a country in front and on the flanks. A military writer says with much truth that the incidents of battle have a stronger interest thaa Of Marches in General. 5 the details of the weary marches that precede it. It is this very fact which we so much wish to coiubat, for it is in every branch of his profession alike that the oflScer should make himself proficient. Marches may be considered under two headings — marches in time of peace, marches in time of war. The latter again can be subdivided into strategical and tactical marches. The ordinary movement of a body of troops which quits any locality whatsoever with the intention of transferring itself to another, whether it be in the theatre of war or out of it, is called a march. In war, marches are either performed at a distance from, or else in close propinquity to the enemy, and this differ- ence exercises considerable influence on the manner in which they are to be conducted. Marches at a distance from the enemy comprise all those in which the distance between the contending bodies being great, or the front being well explored at a sufficient distance in front of troops, makes it almost absolutely certain that the adversary's troops will not be encountered on the way ; in other words, that no unexpected collision is in any way possible. Every movement of a body of troops from one point to another comes under the head of a march. The circumstances only congiitute the difference. When marches are undertaken for ordinary purposes, for a change of garrison, manoeuvres, or even concentration, the comfort of the troops becomes the para- mount consideration. All the dispositions in such cases should be made with a view to maintaining and husbanding the physical powers of the soldier. Though this point should receive careful attention in all marches, nevertheless, from the very nature of things, it cannot be observed to the same extent when the march is executed with, the object of attacking the enemy's position, or with the very probable contingency of meeting his forces. In the latter case the dispositions must vary to a large extent ; the different parts of the column must then be arranged in the order in which they will be called to take part in the action, and the troops must be freed as much as possible of their trains and other impedimenta. Marching proper, the regular stepping of an average number of miles, going from point to point, and travelling on the roads of a country, is only practicable when at a certain distance from the 6 The Art of Marching. enemy. If, on the other hand, two armies are in presence of each other, so close that their advanced posts are, we might say, within touch, then the troops must be kept in the best formation for fighting, and in such array they can only gain ground by marching across country for short distances. Therefore it will be seen that marching is performed under two essentially different conditions. Some marches have no other scope than to pass troops over the distance which intervenes between one point and another ; such are those which form part of the yearly reliefs, changes of garrison, or to and from manoeuvre areas. Even in the actual theatre of war, marches are often con- ducted so far from the adversary as to place beyond all possibility any chance of the troops being disturbed on the way, or of the march ending in an engagement. It is so, generally speaking, in the early stages of a campaign, at its commencement, when the enemy's position has not yet been definitely ascertained by cavalry reconnaissances ; the distance which separates the two armies then precludes their coming into contact. On the contrary, there are marches in which our troops are divided from the enemy by such a short distance that they are liable to be attacked suddenly, or to be arrested in their progress by a strongly occu- pied position. In like circumstances, the troops may have to be halted at any moment to repel an attack or to allow proper dispositions to be taken for engaging the enemy. This essential difference has led to its being established as a principle that when an army is in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, the marches must be governed by tactical considera- tions; when at a distance, with a view to ensure the ease and comfort of the troops. In a battle it is the initiative which mostly contributes, towards success. Any unexpected eventuality which was not foreseen and provided for must be promptly and skilfully met. Troops must be moved, and moved speedily, to the most decisive points. Tactical marches are principally the result of all the drill and instruction instilled into the troops in peace time as a preparation for war ; being akin to mauojuvring, they are, how- ever, beyond the scope of this work. As a general rule we should endeavour to get over the ground as quickly as practicable ; in other words, to cover a certain dis- tance in the shortest possible period of time. As marches, how- ever, have a destructive effect upon an army, they must necessarily Of Marches in General. 7 be conducted with due regard to the physical capabilities of the men and of the horses and other animals. Their physical power must not be taxed beyond just limits, for marches more than battles cause heavy losses.* The waste in a war rich in movements will always be far beyond conception. In the retreat from Cunaxa the Greeks lost two-fifths of their number. As Polybius states that, in their retreat from the upper provinces of Asia, the Ten Thousand traversed the whole country of their enemies without being encountered by any force that was able to stand before them, we may rightly assume that their losses by the sword were small. In 1800, when Bonaparte crossed the Alps and issued on the plains of Piedmont', Melas endeavoured to concentrate his forces. The Austrians had 6000 men guarding Ancona on the Adriatic ; these were called to Turin. This body of troops came up by forced marches in twenty to twenty-two days, but only one-half ever arrived, and those that did arrive were out of condition for fighting, so utterly were they worn down by fatigue. Clausevvitz quotes, as an example of the losses sustained in constant marching, Bliicher's campaign of 1813 in Silesia and Saxony, " a campaign very remarkable, not for any long march, but for the amount of marching to and fro, York's corps of Bliicher's army began this campaign on the 16th of August, about 40,000 strong, and was reduced to 12,000 at the battle of Leipsic, 19th October. The principal combats which this corps fought, at Goldberg, Lowenberg, on the Katzbach, at Wartenburg, and at Mockern (Leipsic), cost it, on the authority of the best writers, 12,000 men. According to that, their losses from other causes in eight weeks amounted to 16,000 men, or two-fifths of the whole." t The Prussian Guards Corps, when it quitted the Rhine on the 3rd of August 1870, numbered about 30,000 bayonets. Of this number it lost about 8000 men at St. Privat. On the morning of the battle of Sedan it numbered 13,000 men, of whom 350 fell in that battle. As it reached the suburbs of Paris to take part in the investment, it was only 9000 strong. When the casualties in battle are deducted, it will be seen that, between * "Car toute arm^e qui debute reaiste diffioilement aux premieres epreuves de la guerre, et, si elle a de plus uu long trajet Ji faire pour aller combaltre, diminue en proportion des distances k paroourir " CThiers, " Consulat et TEmpire," vol. i. p. 231). t Clausewitz, " On War," chap. xiii. p. 39. 8 The Art of Marching. the 3rd of August and the 19th of September, in forty-seven days, the corps lost by fatigue and exposure alone about 12,650 men. The infantry of the German army, when it made its first appearance before Paris on the 19th of September 1870, had been reduced by one-third. The certitude of heavy losses from fatigue (of men lost to the army for a long or short period of time), and the probability of greater still from battle, show how conterminous with the mobilization of the army we must put on a war footing the troops that will be required to meet the first waste. Instead of counting only the number of men who are actually to take the field, we are bound in addition to estimate and get ready those who will be needed very shortly to set out with the object of keeping the field army up to its intended strength. Mobility is such an element of success in war that the efSciency of an army must to a great extent depend on the capacity of the troops for executing long marches without incurring any deleterious effect. Lloyd makes the strength of the European armies depend on their good composition and on their mobility. Napoleon once declared that the strength of an army, like the power of mechanics, was to be estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity. Montecuccoli held that rapidity is of importance in concealiilg the movements of an army, inasmuch as it leaves no time to divulge the intentions of its chief. The fundamental principle of war being to be stronger at a given time and place than the adversary, nothing will conduce so much to really being so than good marching. In 1805 the French marched across France to the Ehine with astonishing rapidity, the Russians moved westward more slowly; had the two forces marched at the same rate, there can be no doubt that the cam- paign would have been fought under different conditions. In the operations before Sedan the French were outmarched by the Germans ; had MacMahon's troops marched as rapidly as those of the Crown Prince, they would have gone far towards effecting the relief of Metz. Celerity and decisiveness are very powerful factors in war. Always to forestall the enemy is one of the leading principles of the art. By marching rapidly, a general can appear suddenly •where he is least expected — always a great point in favour of an assailant. Of Marches in General. 9 The great object is to steal a inarch or two on the adversary, but success in this often depends on the profound secrecy- observed in the first few moves. Once we have the start of him, every endeavour must be made to maintain it. Secrecy has well been termed the soul of all great designs. The object in secrecy and in feints is to mislead the enemy as to our real designs, in order to deliver a blow which he is unpre- pared to receive. The stratagems of war are the principal elements of victory, by employing which a cunning general will often overcome a learned one, and a small army sometimes triumph over a larger one. Macchiavelli was not far wrong when he wrote that he preferred for a leader a fox to a lion. If we desire to effect a surprise, to take the enemy unawares, so that he may not have time to get under arms, or make the best dispositions for defence, we must not only march with quickness, but keep our counsels. Our preparations and our march should be so regulated that our opponent should not have the smallest intimation either of our destination or of our having set our troops in motion. We must conceal our march till the moment arrives when we come upon his forces. All ostensible preparations, all special orders which will give rise to the idea of some important operation being contemplated, should be carefully avoided. Should special measures have to be taken, it will be prudent to dissemble and to spread reports freely of some other project being in view than the real one. The troops should be got under arms suddenly and in profound silence. Secrets are betrayed in a thousand ways, and the keen- witted emissaries and spies are ever on the watch, and always ready to start off with the object of warning our enemy. A very good plan to prevent this is to send forward on the roads which lead towards the enemy, an hour or two before the departure of the column, a non-commissioned ofScer with a few men. The party should have orders to lie in ambush close to the road, and arrest every individual found passing. Eopes should be provided for binding to trees all persons so detained. No more admirable example of secrecy in the preparations exists than in Bonaparte's crossing of the Alps in 1800. Medi- tating over his famous campaigns at Saint Helena, Napoleon explains the precautions he had to take for surrounding the small army of reserve he was leading down the slopes of the Alps with an impenetrable veil of secrecy. " A similar plan," he wrote in 10 The Art of Marching. his memoirs, "demanded for its successful execution speed, profound secrecy, and great daring : to keep the secret was the main diflSculty ; how to hide the movements of the army from the numerous spies of England and Austria ? " The secret was in the keeping of a very few trustworthy officers, and infinite pains were taken to induce Melas to dis- believe entirely in the existence of the so-called array of reserve. Many skilful measures were taken to conceal its strength and march, and it was only on the 21st of May that the Austrian commander-in-chief received information of the passage of the French troops over the Great St. Bernard. Lannes, with the advanced guard, was then nearing Ivrea, and Bonaparte's troops were already issuing into the Plains of Piedmont. General Sir J. Maurice says, " In whatever way strategy is employed, surprise and concealment are essential to success ... in all the brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of the army in such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what direction the blow would be struck." Another notable case of craft and concealment occurred in the advance of the French after the battle of Hohenlinden in the same year. On mature consideration, Moreau had resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn, on the road to Salzburg. In order, however, to deceive the Austrians, he caused all the boats on the Iser to be assembled at Munich, gathered the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that it was his intention to cross at the lower part of the river. At the time that the boats of the Iser were conducted, with the utmost possible display, to the Lower Inn, Lecourbe directed bridging equipment to be secretly moved by night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg. Then, having collected some 35,000 men close by, he established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8 th of December at N"eub6vern, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. On the following morning, whilst it was still pitch dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was entirely unobserved by the Austrian vedettes, opened a furious cannonade, so well directed that the Austrians were compelled to retire. The French instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the right bank. Of Marches in General. 11 Lecourbe was speedily reinforced by Grouchy's and Decaen's divisions. The most formidable military lines in Europe were in this way broken through in the space of a few hours, without tbe loss of a single man. Moreau's demonstration against the Lower Inn had the desired effect, for it removed the right wing of the Austrian army three or four marches from the locality where the real attack was to be delivered. Stratagems being enterprises in which secrecy is especially important, our designs should be imparted only to the individuals who are charged with their execution. Even then, nothing more should be divulged at one time than what is absolutely indis- pensable. We should restrain from confiding our projects even to our most intimate associates, because they have their friend* to whom in turn our secret would soon be communicated.* Mohammed II., surnamed Bujuk (the Great), the founder of the Turkish power in Europe, when any one found coiirage to ask him the object of a fresh enterprise, curtly replied, " Were a hair of my beard to know it, I would instantly pluck it out." It was one of the sayings of Frederick the Great, "If 1 thought my coat knew my plans, I would take it off and burn it." Stonewall Jackson's remark was very true, " If I can deceive my friends, I can make certain of deceiving the enemy." Lieut.- Colonel Henderson, in his life of that able general, writes, " The infinite pains with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff-officers, his intentions and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless." We are often bound to dissimulate, to pretend the contrary to what we meditate, and must guard against betraying ourselves even by our looks. Though Wellington despised the use of dis- simulation, he had quite a talent for keeping his men in thei dark. In a surprise, all depends on good arrangement ; it may oftfen be favoured by the negligence of the enemy, or by bad weather. If the adversary is accustomed to protect himself by employing patrols, we must ascertain, through spies or from the inhabitants, what roads these patrols frequent, at what hours they move, whether there is any way to avoid falling in * To be in the secret is not always an advantage. When Napoleon informed Drouot of the departure from Elba, he asked him if he knew where he was about to go. " No, sire," replied Drouot, " and I do not wish to know it, for if X weie so informed, possibly I would not follow you at all." 12 The Art of Marching. with them or of cutting them off. If the adversary employs no patrols, this improves our chances of success. If he has no advanced posts, or performs outpost duty in a careless manner, the surprise can hardly fail to be successful. To Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, is due the credit of having infused a certain order in the march of an army. He it was who divided it into several columns, so that the march might be accomplished quicker, and the order of battle assumed more speedily. Mommsen attributes Hannibal's successes to his rapid marching, and to the adventurous shifting of the war to and fro. Dodge states, " Hannibal was always in motion. This was partly necessary for his subsistence ; it was partly his method. He was always an unknown quantity to the Bomans ; and the fact that they never could guess where he would be next day, or what his aim might be, explains to a certain extent their constant ■dread of him." * The marches of the Carthaginian leader were always carefully made, with proper van, rear-guard, and flankers at a time when such precautions were generally unknown. Up to the middle of the second Punic war, the Eomans were not acquainted with the science of marching ; it was Hannibal who taught it to them, and they learnt their lessons by bitter experience. Fabius Cunctator observed great prudence in his marches. It was greatly to his credit that all Hannibal's able manoeuvres and stratagems proved useless ; they could not force him to fight. Alexander, in his wars with Darius, accomplished wonderful feats, but in his pursuit he had generally to leave his infantry behind, and trust to his cavalry alone. This seems to have been the; experience of Wellington, Lake, and others in India. Of all the generals of antiquity, Caesar possibly was the one ■who made the quickest marches. Audacity and rapidity were his principal weapons. It may be truly said of Csesar that it was to his marvellous celerity of movement that he owed most of his successes. He was a consummate leader, and as such knew how to obtain the most willing response from his legionaries. The season of the year, the difiSculties of the roads, the great tlistances to be got over, nothing daunted him ; he marched day and night, and, by doing so, nearly always surprised his adversaries. Csesar often sinned in temerity, but he counted on his renown, his genius, and his fortune. * Dodge, " Hannibal," p. 523. Of Marches in General. 13. The Romans conquered all the nations through their discipline ; they made of war a continual study, and they always put aside their usual methods as soon as they found better ones. It was only when their discipline grew lax that their successes diminished. Amongst the masters of modern war, Gustavus Adolphus- owed his pre-eminence to the celerity of movement and power of fire which he promoted in his infantry. He brought about a notable change in the art by substituting wars of marches for wars of sieges. In his time marches were slow, for the roads were bad, the army trains were long and cumbersome, and there was no limit to the number of non-combatants suffered to more with an army. In the months of October and November, 1632, the king, at the head of 20,000 men of all arms, marched over bad roads, from Donauworth to Naumburg, a distance, by the route taken, of something like 270 miles. ' This march was accomplished in 18 days, at the rate of 15 miles a day. Turenne was always intent on daring and far-reaching move- ments in the theatre of war. His marches were extraordinarily bold for that age, and would now be deemed singularly daring. His winter marches in 1646 and 1672 were fine examples. His march behind the Vosges in the winter of 1674, was a remarkable exhibition of calculation, insight, and profound stratagem. Besides being very precise in his calculations and very sound in his- judgment, Turenne had the gift of appreciating time and distance with great exactitude. He always tried to get the better of an adversary by skilful movements in preference to closing with him in decided conflict, being himself superior as a strategist than as a tactician.* Turenne and his adversary, Montecuccoli, in their last campaign, made marches and counter-marches ; the two armies were inces- santly on the move, side by side, always in readiness to attack. This in a wooded and broken tract of country, at the most from 25 to 30 miles long, by 10 to 13 miles broad. History tells us that Marius used to taunt Popodius Silo, who defied him by saying, "If you are such a great general, compel me to deliver battle in spite of myself." Turenne and Montecuccoli tacitly said the * The invasion of Holland by Louis XIV. placed William of Orange promi- nently on the scene, but William was always slow and unready for war, and ia 1672 he was anticipated by a much more active adversary, Turenne. 14 Tlie Art of Marching. same to each other by their marches and counter-marches in their famous campaign of 1675. Marlborough delighted in perplexing his adversary as to the real point of attack by marches and counter-marches, so as to win by skill what he could not achieve by force. He was endowed with such a coup d'.odl, that he quickly detected the least fault made by his opponent, and lost no time in taking full advantage of it. It can be said of Frederick the Great that his faults of temper were eclipsed by his courage, fertility of resources, and indomitable resolution. He always made good use of his advantages. His great secret was to assume the initiative, which he retained even in the midst of appalling dangers. It was to the subordinacy of his opponents to his plans that he owed the larger portion of his success. His armies in the early years of his wars were slow, till he made them quick and subtle, and taught his generals rapidity of motion. No man ever knew how to make an army march better than Napoleon, His directness of purpose and rapidity of action are too well known. His words were, " A rapid march increases the morale of an army, and augments the chances of victorj'." No better judge could be found, seeing how often he had been indebted for victory to the marching powers of his troops. His method of making war was to march and to fight. He held that what was required was to seek the enemy, to meet him face to face, and to crush him in the battle-field. Amongst our officers, Wellington had a very keen appreciation of the value of time in war. This is shown by one of his obser- vations. "How true it is," he wrote, "that in all military operations time is everything ! " His brilliant campaign of 1813 was a splendid feat in itself. On the 23rd of May Wellington assembled his troops at Ciudad Eodrigo. On the 4th of June he had crossed the Douro, and was at Valladolid ; four days later he was across the Carrion. By the 14th of June he had reached the Ebro, and on the 21st beat the French army in the battle of Vitoria. Early in the following month he was besieging San Sebastian and Pampeluna. In his observations on the battle of Vitoria, Napier writes, "In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington marched with 100,000 men 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops out of Spain." * * Napier, ■" Peninsular War," book xx. chap. viii. Of Marches in General. 15 Men of genius cannot remain long inactive ; their mind ranges over many combinations, urges them to some alluring enterprise; they are impelled to follow the bent of their restless imagination. It is owing to marches that an army has often been over- powered by numbers alone. It was the resolute march of the Prussians tbat resulted in Napoleon being outnumbered on the field of Waterloo. It was the same on the day of Sadowa, when the army of the Crown Prince joined forces with Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and in their united efforts crushed the Austrians under Biinedek. With regard to this campaign, there is a great resemblance between Frederick the Great's invasion of Bohemia in 1757, and that of William I. in 1866. In both, two bodies advanced by two completely separate lines of operations, wide apart, marching in several columns, and having their point of junction in hostile territory. The Prussians were much criticized for having in 1866 acted thus, but they carried out a dangerous scheme with extreme vigour and daring, and accomplished in a few days what Frederick spent weeks over. Much of this was due to the fact that, not only the organization of armies has been much improved, but that marches are now easier and quicker, since telegraphs and railways have considerably augmented their power of action. A point, nevertheless, which we should not overlook is, that in 1866 the Prussian staff had prepared their marches well by recon- noitring in time of peace. Vial remarks on this campaign, " Both in 1757 and in 1866, the Prussians owed their success to the same causes : efBcient and complete preparation for war, daring strategy executed with precision and energy, and tactics based on mobility, rapidity of fire, and skilful use of ground." The same accounts for much of the German success in the war of 1870-71 in France. " The German plan of campaign," also writes Vial, " was studied with great care for several years, and was based on exact appreciation of ground, and of the opposed forces." Their laudable preparation for war was based on the lessons ■offered by the wars waged by other military powers since 1815. The Prussians did what every wise nation should do, they learnt a lesson and profited by it. This borrowed experience is very valuable if put to a proper use. In military matters it is wrong to adhere obstinately to old customs and rules, and to be too 1 6 The Art of Marching. conservative ; and here more than in anything else, possibly, it is necessary to keep pace with the times. In the war of 1866, the Prussian cavalry did not cover the movements of the Prussian army. The whereabouts of the Austrian forces, which were concentrating only a few miles in their front, were not accurately known at the Prussian head- quarters on the eve of Sadowa. The Prussian staff was taught a lesson, and one that they took to heart, viz. that the place for the largest portion of the cavalry of an army is in advance of the marching columns. The principle followed that cavalry should be largely used for reconnaissance and for procuring information, as offensive movements by that arm on the battle-field are now rare. Of this fact there is convincing proof in the Franco-German war of 1870-71, in which brilliant cavalry combats were very few. If marching has frequently favoured the combined action of overwhelming forces, it has also enabled weaker forces to make head against stronger ones. Stonewall Jackson's words at the beginning of 1863 were, "We must make this campaign an exceedingly active one. Only thus can a weaker country cope with a stronger ; it must make up in activity for what it lacks in strength. A defensive campaign can only be made successful by taking the aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully prepared, but he struck him the first blow. " Napoleon was the first to show what an army could be made to accomplish. He had shown what was the value of time as an element of strategic combination, and that good troops, if well cared for, could be made to march twenty-five miles daily, and win battles besides." * In the civil war in the States, Lee and Stonewall Jackson owed their successes mainly to the marching of their troops, aud to the pluck with which their men often bore great hardships. " I had rather," Stonewall Jackson said, " lose one man in marching than five in battle ; " and in order to achieve an easy triumph, his men were marched till they dropped by scores. But the marches which strewed the wayside with the footsore and weaklings won his battles. The enemy, surprised and out- numbered, was practically beaten before a shot was fired, and success was attained at a trifling cost." f * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. E. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol i n 514 t Ibid., p. 594. ' ^ Of Marches in General. 17 " But whatever could be doue to render fortune powerless, that Jackson did. By means of his cavalry, by forced marches, by the careful selection of his line of march, of his camps, of his positions, of his magazines, and, lastly, by his consistent reticence, he effectually concealed from the Federals both his troops and his designs. Never surprised himself, he seldom failed to surprise his enemies, if not tactically — that is, while they were resting in their camp — at least strategically." * " His generals had learned to trust him. Success and adulation had not, indeed, made him more expansive. He was as reticent as ever, and his troops — the ' foot-cavalry,' as they were now called — were still marched to and fro without knowing why or whither. But men and officers, instead of grumbling when they were roused at untimely hours, or when the marches were prolonged without apparent necessity, obeyed with alacrity, and amused themselves by wondering what new surprise the general was preparing. ' Where are you going ? ' they were asked as they turned out for an unexpected march. ' We don't know, but " Old Jack" does,' was the laughing reply. And they had learned something of his methods. They had discovered the value of time, of activity, of mystery, of resolution." f Of Stonewall's Brigade it has been written, for more than two months they had been marching and fighting without cessation. Since they left Elk Eun, on the 29th April, until they fell back on the capital on the 8th July, their camp had never stood on the same spot for more than four days in succession. We have said that long marches cause heavy losses in men, but that is not all.J Alluding to his successful campaign of 1813, against King Joseph, this is what Wellington writes to Lord Bathurst on this point : " An army which has made such marches and has fought such battles as has that under my command, is necessarily much deteriorated. Independent of the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and sickness, many men and officers are out of the ranks for various causes. The equipment of the army, their ammunition, the soldier's shoes, etc., require renewal ; the magazines for the new operations require to be collected and formed, and many arrangements to be made without which the Army could not exist for a day." § * Lieut-Colonel G. F. K. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. ii. p. 596. t Ibid., vol. ii. p. 351. % The waste is particularly large as regards cavalry and train. ^ Ayellington's letter to Lord Bathurst, August 8, 1813. 18 The Art of Marching. The troops, after a long spell of marching, require to be rested and re-equipped. Wellington was convinced that all soldiers, whether young or old, could march long distances and answer all calls that could be made on them in reason, as long as their officers were properly attentive, saw to the men's food, prevented them from straggling from their corps on the march, and could influence them to withstand the temptation of wine. There is no gainsaying that the multitude and facility of the present means of locomotion haye a tendency to make us lose the habit of marching. For all that, if troops cannot march, much of the fault lies with the officers. It shows that they have failed to recognize the immense importance which marching has in the operations of war. Great marches depend on the popularity or enthusiasm evoked by the undertaking, on unparalleled success, on the per- sonality and magic influence the leader exercises over his troops, and on the pluck of the men. On the latter head there is not the slightest doubt that good marching is a matter of pluck, of deter- mination not to give in. It is for that quality, resolution, that the old soldier is more valuable than the young one. The veteran is ashamed to declare himself beaten. To fall out, as- long as his comrades who move alongside of him and endure the same fatigues can carry on, his soldierly pride will not permit. How often do we not hear it said that the British soldier,, when well led by his regimental oflicers, is prepared to go any- where, and to do anything ? It has, nevertheless, been asserted that the present army has not the stamina and marching power of the old. "Why should it be so? Are men, in whose veins- young blood is flowing, less fitted to endure the hardships of war than men of more advanced age, than men like the Peninsular soldiers, whose constitutions were ruined by drink? Let the reader call to mind at what period of his life he was best able to support the fatigues inherent to training or field sports, and he will be bound to admit that it was when he had about the average- age of our present-day soldiers. If it is intended to mean that old soldiers show more endurance, granted ; but why is it so, but because in the course of years the weakly have been weeded out, leaving none but the robust? Far from decrying old soldiers, experience has shown that they are more confident in each other, more experienced, more reliable, more to be depended on, and Of Marches in General. 19 less imaginative, not likely to be carried away by apparent and supposed dangers, so that fewer panics are possible. They aro more wedded to the name and credit of their corps, and more likely to lay down their life for it. The conditions which should be sought for in all move- ments of troops when in the field are to conduct the marches in such a way as will impose the least possible fatigue and distress on the men and horses. To obtain the best results, men and animals must be worked up to such a state as to be thoroughly fit to engage in the struggle, once they come to confront the enemy. Wachet would have embarrassed Melas greatly had he made his appearance on the 14th June 1800, about the plain of Marengo. Tbat he did not do so was partly due to the fact that many of his soldiers had been starved, and had suffered in health, at Genoa during the siege ; they had become so emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms and equipments. In a fight, one fresh man is worth four fagged with weariness and loss of sleep. Certain rapid marches are very necessary, but the end in view is always the battle. It is unnecessary to show the intimate relation that exists between marches and combats ; what is beyond dispute is that men and animals which have become enfeebled through over-marching, and whose health and comfort have been overlooked or neglected, will never be in a condition to take part in a long and severe contest, or to answer a call for some extraordinary effort. We are compelled, therefore to attend carefully to their feeding, so that they may recuperate their expended forces ; to secure them all the repose compatible with a state of war, and the precautions necessary to prevent being taken unawares. In short, we are bound to enlist every chance on our side, by selecting the best and most direct roads ; by utilizing every road which leads in the desired direction, so as to reduce the length of the columns ; by dividing a given distance, as far as it is practicable, into equal and just portions; by choosing, should the weather be sultry, the coolest hours for the march, and so on. Should the march be a forced march, it may be even deemed prudent to relieve the foot-soldier of his valise, which would then be carried for him. The physical strength of the troops should be assisted by the moral, by that force which enables men to bear up with fatigue, and spurn all idea of giving in. Soldiers who will not be 20 The Art of Marching. beaten cannot be conquered ; they may be annihilated, but not subdued. What constitutes the real strength of an army, more than physical power, is self-confidence and faith in success. The bravest man often feels fear. The man who realizes danger and confronts it without flinching, actuated by a deep sense of duty, is really braver than the man who is constitutionally without fear. There are exceptional men, endowed with extraordinary strength of mind, who can coolly face the greatest danger. Dorsenne was one of Napoleon's bravest officers. He would turn his back to the enemy and face his regiment, which was being riddled with balls ; there he would stand immovable, calling out, " Close your ranks," never dreaming to look behind him. Courage is of many different kinds. . Such are the savage instincts in man that his blood is soon roused to devilry. Men are, however, made brave by other motives ; from ambition, from the habit of facing danger, from emulation, from shame of showing that they are possessed by fear, from strong physical nerves, from a natural combativeness of character. In war, the bravest soldiers are the men who face death, well knowing that they may be hit at any moment, and fearing to be shot down. It is from an heroic sense of duty that such men face death, and their courage inspires their less resolute comrades.* But it is not only on the battle-field that their noble example reflects itself on their comrades, for it exercises also a beneficial influence in getting the latter to support the fatigues of the march and the hardships and privations of the campaign. Marches in ordinary times constitute a part of the military training. The soldier must be educated to march with regularity and to harden his frame, so as to be in a fit condition to bear the fatigues inherent to a march. Marching, consequently, should form as much as possible a part of the ordinary exercises. When long distances have to be traversed, and a series of marches to be performed, the well-being of the soldier and of the animals is a paramount consideration. This point gains more importance as the length of the movement increases. * The man who is constituted -without fear, who is slow to recognize danger, is the one to be trusted on an emergency, for the really courageous man confronts an unexpected and unaccustomed danger without getting flurried, and with an unflinch- ing determination to do his best. Of Marches in General. 21 Again, when a commander knows that the country has been diligently reconnoitred far ahead, so that the cavalry can give notice of the enemy's advance at least twenty-four hours before an attack can take place, he can arrange the march of his columns, looking principally to the necessities of his troops. The march of itself does not constitute a distinct and inde- pendent act or performance in the operations of war, but, being the means to an end, must bear a proper relation to the strategical situation. The object of each day's march needs, therefore, to be considered in relation to the accomplishment of the strategical aim which occupies the mind of the general commanding. Several days' marching are necessary in a given enterprise or strategical evolution, and it is the result of their total which we are bound principally to consider. If an army is in close contact with the enemy, then both the daily marches performed, and the roads by which they are accomplished, must be guided mainly by tactical considerations. There are certain indispensable conditions and certain given data to which, notwithstanding the endless variety of ground and circumstances, every march, to be correctly executed, must con- form. The lessons taught us by past wars, and the practice of great leaders, have formed of them a code of general principles which should be strictly adhered to if we desire to obtain the best results. A daily movement of large masses of men, horses, bat animals, and vehicles of all sorts cannot be effected with any degree of promptitude without observing some system which will ensure regularity and absolute freedom from confusion. Experience shows that it is well in all movements of large masses of troops to adopt, as a guide, a normal order of march. This, never- theless, should be elastic, so as to be applicable with certain modifications to the many eventualities which are likely to occur. The normal order of march should never hamper the action of a commander, paralyze his happy inspirations, or cripple his bold conceptions. Order and regularity are the principal elements of a well-con- ducted march, and by paying all due attention to certain points, the exhaustion which continuous marching causes to the troops can be considerably lessened. Anything which tends to give unnecessary labour in opera- tions which, of themselves, entail a considerable amount of bodily 22 The Art of Marching. exertion is vicious. Simplicity should govern everything connected with military arrangements, down to the minutest details, Marches should not be too long, and at the conclusion of each day's march great care must be observed that the troops are found in shelter and food. The labour of some will not end with the march, for a certain proportion of the men are required to go on outpost and scouting duty. As these duties are trying, great pains should be taken to reduce them to the strictest necessity, not, being made more severe than circumstances actually require. The foot-soldier is the one who has to withstand most fatigue. The exercises, the manoeuvres, and the marches he has to under- take entail a very considerable expenditure of strength, which is not always made up by adequate nutriment. Eepose and a substantial nourishment is what the soldier must have after having endured great fatigues. Man recovers by means of food the strength which he has lost, and acquires fresh vigour. In this condition he is in a state to oppose greater resistance to fatigue; he consequently becomes less debilitated than were he to march fasting. In 1800, the Austrian troops concentrated at Alexandria by several forced marches. On reaching that city they found no bread, and the majority fought the memorable battle of Marengo in a debilitated condition. The proper supply of food to troops in the field is a matter of the highest moment, for experience shows that a well-fed army is capable of more exertions, and has always less sick than another which is indifferently fed. Hunger plays the deuce with discipline. Should the weather be sultry, should the roads lend themselves to the raising of much dust, the coolest hours, those in which men and animals can march without being seriously distressed, should be chosen. When the days are long, when day breaks at a very early hour, there is no advantage in wasting the coolest part of the day by making a late start. All circumstances being even, if we can inarch off as easily at 5 or 6 a.m. as at 9 a.m., we should choose the first hour, for it would enable us to bring the bulk of the troops into camp before the heat becomes oppressive. The movements of troops during a campaign are subject to such a variety of conditions as to defy all rules. Nothing can be l^id down definitely; we may recognize a few principles, but beyond that nothing more. The actual circumstances of the Of Marches in General. 23 moment must guide us in making our dispositions. In tliis study we sliall inquire as to which are the principles and the rules which might be said to be constant in their application. Given certain guides, the execution always becomes more easy, i'or every one comes to know exactly his own position and that of the rest. When the same men will have to do pretty much the same thing, it is desirable that they should know beforehand what is expected of them, what they are charged with, and for what they will be held responsible. Then there can be no hesitation ; confusion and disorder are avoided, and, come what may, the results from a general point of view should be more or less good. Grenerally speaking, most of the marches are made beyond the immediate presence of the enemy, and have no other object but to get over a certain distance which separates one point from another. This distance must be divided into stages. As the troops must be quartered or encamped in the most convenient localities, in such as have water and firewood, in a series of marches there will be longer or shorter stages. Besides this, there will be days of complete rest, with the object of giving the troops and animals a chance of recovering their strength and overhauling the equipment. It w'ill rest with the officer commanding to fix the length of the different stages, so as to have at the end of each day's march those favourable conditions so necessary for the maintenance of the troops. In any case, from the information supplied by the cavalry covering the front of an army, the general commanding will be in a position to know if there is any prospect of the march being obstructed by the enemy. When there is such a prospect, the march must be arranged in such order as to be able to pass as quickly as possible from a marching formation into a fighting one ; in other words, to reduce as rapidly as possible the depth of the column, to quit a perpendicular formation and draw up in order of battle. This possibility must always be kept in view in marches conducted in the vicinity of the enemy. To pass from one ■disposition to the other, the column of route should be formed in accordance with the sequence in which the troops will have to take part in the battle. In arranging our marches, we should take into consideration the fatigue duties which have to be performed at their conclusion. 24 The Art of Marching. the time required for cooking the soldiers' food, the grooming and feeding of the horses, and the daily routine work. At the end of his march, the exhausted soldier cannot get at once the food needed to repair his wasted strength, and then lie down and take his rest. In calculating the fatigues he will have to endure, we must, therefore, add the duties he will be called upon to perform on arrival in camp, and the irritant delays which must occur before his wants can be satisfied. CHAPTER II. MEMORABLE MAECHES. I. Hannibal's march from Spain to Italy — II. Consul Nero marches to join his- colleague Livius at Sena — III. Turenne's winter march behind the Vosges in 1674 — IV. Marlborough's march to the Ehine and Danube in 1704^V. Napo- leon's march to the Khine in 1805— "VI. Stonewall Jackson's march to join Lee before the Seven Days' battle— VII. March of the Prussian army on Vienna in 1866. HiSTOBY has always been pronounced by great leaders and military critics to be the most fruitful of studies. It is on this account, and not because we were anxious to glorify the past at the expense of the present, that we have selected historical facts to illustrate any principle of the art of war which we were discussing. It is in history alone that the student will find the principles and maxims of war. Looking at the endless varieties of conditions which present themselves in war, it would be vain to seek them in any other code. The great teacher of the art, Napoleon, has told us : " Con- duct offensive war as did Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick; read again and again their eighty-eight campaigns; take them for your models, — for this is the only way of becoming a great leader and of mastering the secrets of the art. Your mind, enlightened by such study, will make you reject methods opposed to those followed by these great men." Acting on this principle, before proceeding to look into the details of the art of marching, we have thought it desirable to give a brief descriptive account of a few memorable marches, from which the student will be able to gather what measures some of the best captains have taken when conducting large masses of combatants over long distances, or in anticipating or surprising their adversary by rapidity of movement. Historical incidents have been largely quoted in this work, not only as apt illustrations of theory, but also to reduce the severe and formal tone which cannot but be wearisome to the 26 The Art of Marching. reader. By alternating precepts and examples, it was considered possible to allure attention to this important subject. Every principle of war, every precept of the art, is to be found in history. Granted that it is a voluminous work to dip into, but it has the great advantage that it will prevent the study being too theoretical or pedantic. History deals with a mass of facts, the results being the consequence of what has gone before, and the incidents leading from one to another. Seldom does any event of importance rest on any one thing in particular. It shows in tliis most clearly that success depends not in paying attention to one single branch of the art, but that, on the contrary, ■only that officer will acquire renown who, besides being favoured with the opportunity, has a fair knowledge of all the parts of his calling alike. The study of the art of war is a study which demands an immense amount of industry and unremitting attention. It most unfortunately always seems to require a disaster to point a military moral. What that is worth winning is ever won without an effort or without difSculty ? Eare individuals may score a success without any apparently great effort, but for the mass it is not so. Amongst Marshal Saxe's remarks, there is one which should never be for- gotten : " Of all, the art of war is the one which demands most practice and application." Humility is one of the greatest of human virtues, and the good, reflective soldier, who has toiled for years to learn his profession, will often be too ready to confess that much remains for him still to learn. I. — Hannibal's March from Spain to Italy, 218 B.C. Many marches made in ancient times are deserving of note, few, however, compare with Hannibal's march from Spain through Oaul to Italy. In the year 219 B.C., Hannibal began the siege of Saguntum, a city which was in alliance with the Romans, con- sequently he indirectly declared war against Eome. The rulers of Carthage, who had not ordered the laying of the siege, suffered the operations to proceed. The city was taken by storm, after a siege which lasted eight months, and Hannibal sent the spoils to Carthage for distribution. The story is well known of what came of the Koman embassy which went to Carthage to demand the surrender of the general ; how the Eoman spokesman, interrupting an attempt at justifica- Hannibal's March from Spain to Italy. 27 tion, declared that he held in his bosom both peace and war, and that the Carthaginians might choose which ever of the two best pleased them. How the choice having been left to the Eoman, he offered war, which was most willingly accepted. Hamilcar's grand idea was to take up the conflict with Kome in Italy. He had foreseen that the Iberian peninsula was likely some day to furnish him with a base from which, by the aid of the Iberians and Eome-hating Gauls, he might carry the war and attack his hereditary foe on his own soil. It was to his son that was left the execution of this audacious plan. Like Alexander, Hannibal was a famous soldier's son; bred in camp, early as a youth making himself a name for courage and strategic skill ; he had the imagination that cherishes mighty designs. Before attempting this difficult enterprise, he thought it necessary to provide for the peace and security of the mother country, and this he contrived to do by getting a body of African troops to cross over into Spain, and sending in their place a body of Spaniards to garrison Metagonia and the city of Carthage, thus connecting both those countries in bonds of reciprocal fidelity. With Hasdrubal, in Spain, he left a land force, consisting of 2,550 cavalry, 12,650 infantry, and 21 elephants. Polybius explains how it was in his power to give accurate details of Hannibal's forces and other matters, through the dis- covery at Lacinium of a brass table, on which, by Hannibal's orders, all these circumstances had been engraved.* As a proof of the truthfulness of his narrative, he states: "With regard to myself, I may be allowed to speak of these things with some con- fidence ; for I not only received my accounts from persons that lived in the times of which I am writing, but have also passed the Alps, for the sake of gaining a more full and accurate know- ledge of the truth." The historian was born about 204 B.C., and arrived in Eome in 168 B.C., thirty-five years after Hannibal had been recalled to Carthage. He enjoyed the protection and friendship of Scipio .ZEmilianus, who procured him access to public documents, and aided him in the collection of materials for his great historical work. Now, before setting out on his march for Italy, Hannibal had, like a prudent commander, sent individuals to reconnoitre the route he intended to follow. These agents were enjoined to find * " General History " of Polybius, book iii. chap. iv. 28 The Art of Marching. out what like was the country he would hare to traverse ; what was the spirit and extent of the population ; whether the tribes entertained any resentment against Eome, the result of former wars ; if he could count on receiving any assistance from the G-auls ; if the resources of the country beyond the Alps were such as could satisfy the needs of a large army. The help of the Gauls, in particular, was necessary to him, for it seemed only possible to carry on the war through the co-operation of allies. With this object he sent messengers to all the chiefs who abided on the Alps, and also to those who dwelt in the country beyond, to allure them to side with, him by every kind of promise. After some time his messfengers returned with news that the Gauls were quite disposed to further his design, and were eager to welcome him ; also that the passages across the Alps, though difficult, might be accomplished when the spring advanced. When he had thus, with the utmost care, rendered himself familiar with the route he must follow — its peoples, its climate, its topography — and had secured friends along the proposed path, he brought out his forces from their winter quarters, and openly declared his intention of making war against Eome. He decided upon an expedition which to ordinary people would have seemed impossible. If it failed in the end, it was because every defeat stimulated the Eoman people to further efforts and further sacrifices, whilst the Eoman generals learnt from his methods. In the spring of 218 B.C., Hannibal, who had formed the whole plan of his march long beforelmnd, set out from Carthagena at the head of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse, of whom about two-thirds were Africans, and the other third Spaniards. With this army he had thirty-seven war elephants. The Numidian horsemen were reputed the finest light cavalry of the age. These were wonder- fully active and expert in their own method of fighting. Their principal employment was to reconnoitre, to forage, to attack convoys, to make raids on the baggage of their foe, to annoy a rearguard, in short, to harass the enemy in every possible way. Folard says that they were bold and enterprising, exceedingly hardy, and very rapid in their movements. Hannibal crossed the Ebro and the country which lies between that river and the foot of the Pyrenees. On the way he encountered very vehement resistance from the inhabitants, fought many obstinate engagements, and lost a large number of men. The keeping of this part of Spain he committed to the HannibaVs March from Spain to Italy. 29 march off from the 2nd to the 5th of September, by way of Cassel, Lille, Namur, Luxembourg, Sarre-louis, and Deux Pouts to Mannheim, and to arrive at the latter place by the 25th.* The troops from Boulogne, under Blarshal Soult, were to begin to get under way on the 29tli, marching by Saint-Omer, * Curely, -who was with Davout's corps, says that his regiment marched by way of Cassel, Bailleul, Lille, Tournay (rest), Ath, Mens, Binohe, Charleroi (rest), Namur, Ciney, Marohe-en-Famfene, yaint Hubert, Neufchateau . . . Sarrebriiek, Deux Fonts, Kaiserlaiitern, double march from (Tiiinstadt. From Neufchateau he went to visit his friends, and picked his regiment up at Sarrebriiek. Napoleons March to the Rhine, 1805. 67 Duai, Cambrai, Mezieres, Sedan, Verdun, Metz, and Landau to Spires, to arrive likewise on the 25th of September. The 5th Corps, under Marshal Lannes, was to set out from Vimereux on the 30th of August, and to reach Strasburg on the 23rd of September, preceding the 4th Corps as far as Metz by- one day's march. The troops from Etaples, commanded by Marshal Ney, were to start on the 28th of August, moving by way of Hesden, Arras, Peronne, La Fere, Reims, Toul, Nancy, Luneville, and Zabern, timed to reach Hagenau on the 25th of September. The 7th Corps from Brest, under Marshal Augerau, was not intended to reach the Ehine until fifteen days after the others ; being fifteen days in rear, it was to be considered in the light of a corps of reserve. The Imperial Guard was timed to arrive at Strasburg on the 22nd of September, and the great headquarters were to be estab- lished there. The two reserves of cavalry, under the orders of Murat, were to precede the army, and to be in the departments of the Upper Ehine at Pirmasens, Schlettstadt, Molsheim, and Obernheim between the 16th and 21st of September ; the headquarters were to be at Schlettstadt. It was calculated that the entire army could thus arrive on the banks of the Ehine between the 21st and the 25th of Septem- ber. The army was to occupy a position with the extreme right at Strasburg, the centre at Spires, and the left at Mayence. Officers provided with funds were sent forward by each of these routes to look after the collection of the provisions and forage needed for the troops that were coming. The prefects were also written to, and enjoined to have all that was likely to be required for the troops collected in their respective depart- ments. The men passed by ten or fifteen thousand at a time, and were provisioned without difficulty ; they were cantoned in the towns and villages on the route. Napoleon's secret was confided to Berthier and to Daru ; to every one else the emperor gave out that he was dispatching 30,000 men to the Ehine. To further deceive the public and to hide his projects, he remained for six or seven days at Boulogne after the troops bad departed. Daru was enjoined to attend to everything himself, and not to take a single official into his confidence. It will be easily understood how a period of days must naturally 68 The Art of Marching. have passed before the Austrians would hear of the raising of the camp at Boulogne. The troops were marching in their own country, and their moves would have to be notified first to Paris, and from Paris transmitted abroad ; this, with the slow travelling which obtained in those days, required considerable time. Marshal Augerau was ordered to form his divisions in Brittany, then to march by Alenpon, Lens, Langres, and Belfort. He was to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend from the Black Forest to the Alps of the Tyrol. Murat, as we have said, Savary, and Bertrand were sent to Franconia, Suabia, and Bavaria to explore and to ascertain the nature of the routes which led from the Ehine to the Danube. They were to take note of all the military positions on these routes, to gather information on the local resources, and to ascer- tain the best points for crossing the Danube. General Thiard was sent to Carlsruhe to negotiate an alliance with the Grand Duke of Baden. Overtures of the same nature were made to the ruler of Wiirtemberg. Napoleon alleged that, from the prepara- tions Austria was making, he could foresee the war, nevertheless never letting out up to what point he was prepared to com- mence it. Napoleon witnessed the departure of most of the divisions of his army. The soldiers were full of ardour, happy in the promise held out to them of a great and eventful war. The enthusiasm they had shown for the ' prospective invasion of England was surpassed when they heard that they were to march against an enemy they had previously defeated. All ranks stepped out full of spirit, only too eager to come soon to blows with the foe. Their long stay in camp had hardened them to fatigue and dangers ; a far-oif expedition and prospective combats were welcomed as holding out for them so many chances of satisfying their ambition and greed of glory. The emperor intended at that time to return some day to Boulogne, to resume liis preparations for the invasion of England. To this effect, he gave most detailed instructions for the pro- tection of the flotilla. A force of thirty-six battalions, under Marshal Brune, was left for its protection, and extensive earth- works were thrown up round Boulogne to shelter the fleet and the immense magazines he had formed. On the 2nd of September he left Boulogne, arriving at Malmaison on the 3rd. No one had the least idea of the stupendous plans he had formed. Napoleon's March to the Rhine, 1805. 69 The corps from Boulogne arrived on the Ehine between the 20th and 26th of September. The 3rd corps was at Oggersheim on the banks of that river on the 26th ; the 6th corps was at Seltz below Strasburg. On the day indicated, at the hour appointed, all had arrived at their destination. The march had commenced on the 28th and 29th of August, and the mean distance travelled was as near as possible 400 miles. The troops covered this distance in 27 days, marching on an average 14"8 miles a day. The allies had not calculated on such rapid marching, and had persuaded themselves that it would take the French at least 65 days to get from Boulogne to the Lech. Not a single complaint was uttered against the troops. There were many conscripts in the ranks, but they bore the march admirably. There were few sick, no laggards, and the men who had been given leave to spend a few hours with their families had all rejoined before the passage of the Ehine. Bourrienne does not think that any very large body of men were really conveyed en paste, as has often been stated, as all the ordinary means of transport, he presumes, were required for the usual accompaniment of an enormous army. It was General Count de Segur who was supposed to have given origin to this report, by representing Napoleon as saying to the Mayor of Lille, " Feast my divisions on their march, and organize chariots to double their marches ; allow for 25,000 men, let them go by post : you will thus give the movement a first, great, and useful example." Possibly nothing more was done beyond providing ample transport for the weak and footsore men. The veterans, Alison relates, said to each other, " The little corporal has dis- covered a new method of carrying on war — he makes more use of our legs than of our bayonets." The more we study the narratives of this march, the more marvellous it appears. The speed with which the army rolled on like a torrent towards the Ehine was well calculated to deceive the enemy. What seems almost incredible is, that after having marched 400 miles at the end of the summer and the commence- ment of the autumn, with hardly a single day's rest, the army should have been so free of sick or laggards. The excellent results of this march must be principally attributed to the following circumstances: that there was no possibility whatever of the enemy obstructing it; that the 70 The Art of Marching. emperor moved his troops coming from Boulogne by different roads, each corps being divided into several echelons, so that the troops marched in small units; that he utilized the resources of the country, the troops being fed and sheltered by their own countrymen; lastly, that the prospect of fighting under the guidance of their fortunate emperor evoked unbounded enthusiasm in his troops. "Never was amazement equal," writes Thiers, "to that which the unlooked-for arrival of the army spread all through Europe. Everybody believed it on the shores of the ocean, and behold, in twenty days, that is, barely in the time necessary for the rumour of its march to get bruited about, it appeared on the Rhine and overran Southern Grermany. This was the result of extreme promptitude in making up one's mind, and of a profound ability in concealing the determination taken." Having iormed his army, Napoleon divided it into corps as follows : — Commander. 1st Corps, Bernadotte 2nd „ Marmont 8rd „ Davout 4th „ Soult ... 5th „ Lannes 6th „ Ney ... 7th „ Augerau Imperial (Infantry and Guard \ cavalry Cavalry reserve and Horse Artillery Strength. Men. 17,000 20,000 26,000 40,000 18,000 24,000 14,000 7,000 22,000 188,000 Generals of Division. . La Eaffiniere, d'Erlon. , Boudet, Grouchy, Dumonoeau. Friant, Goudin, Boursier. Vandamme, Legraud, Saint-Hilalre. Oudinot (Grenadiers), Suohet. Dupont, Loison, Slather. /Baraguay d'Hilliers (Foot Dragoons) \ Mathieu, Dejaidins. Mortier, Bessieres. To this should be added the 50,000 men who were under Massena keeping the Archduke Charles occupied, 25,000 Bavarians, and 7000 or 8000 troops from Baden and Wiirtemberg. The artillery numbered 340 pieces. Each corps was complete only in infantry. It had the necessary guns and no more, and of cavalry it had some regiments of light cavalry, hussars and chasseurs, just what was sufficient for its safeguard. The emperor had a large reserve of artillery and cavalry under his own immediate direction, from which he completed any of his corps with guns and horsemen as he deemed necessary and in keeping with any contemplated operations, the nature of the country, or any other special circumstances. Napoleon's March to the Rhine. 1805. 71 The reserve cavalry consisted of six divisions, two of heavy cavalry, carabiniers and cuirassiers, and four of dragoons. The first division of heavy cavalry was commanded byj General Nansouty, the second by General D'Hautpoul ; the first reserve of dragoons by General Bleim, the second by General Walter, the third by General Beaumont, and the fourth by General Bourcier. The ordnance was assembling cattle along the Rhine, and the commissariat collecting provisions from Landau to Spires. The troops were to take notliing with them that might delay the march, and no articles that could be obtained at Strasburg were to be removed from their late quarters on the coast. The crossing of the Rhine was a veritable festival for the troops. The soldiers had adorned their headdresses or their uniforms with sprigs of oak or green leaves, and marched past their generals uttering loud shouts of Vive VEmpereur. On the 25th of September, Murat with a portion of the cavalry and some battalions of the 5th corps crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, making apparently for the defiles of the Black Forest, the 6th corps crossed at Lauterburg, the 4th at Spires, the 3rd at Mannheim. Having accompanied the Grande Armee to the Rhine, it is beyond our purpose to follow its operations in detail from the river to the plains of Moravia. In this famous campaign much of Napoleon's success was due to his marches, which were planned with consummate skill and executed with wonderful precision. It has been said, and with great truth, that nothing was impossible to the Grande Armee, led by Napoleon and transported by success. The Austrians were mystified and strengthened in their belief that Napoleon purposed to advance through the passes of the Black Forest. On the 25th of September the main body of the French cavalry crossed the Rhine at Kehl and showed itself in front of the outlets of the Black Forest, to convey the idea that the Emperor intended to advance into Germany through the passes. In this opinion the Austrian commander was strengthened by demonstrations and false reports. In the mean- while, the Emperor was working to his left until he had got between the Russians and the Austrians, and after several conflicts and most brilliant strategical mano3uvres, cut off Mack's army from its line of communications and enclosed it in Ulm. It was only the 20th of October, and in twenty days, without fighting a battle, in consequence of a series of masterly marches and some 72 The Art of Marching. combats, of an army numbering 80,000 men, 30,000 had been captured, and about 30,000 more had been forced to surrender. Then followed the march of the French army across the valley of the Danube, with the passage of the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens, and its entry into Vienna on the 13th of November. The Austrians had renounced the defence of their capital, and had retired beyond the Danube. Then by what the French call a ruse audaeieuse, but, more properly speaking, by a tissue of falsehoods and daring, they got possession of the bridges over the Danube.* Turning this unexpected windfall to account,. Napoleon hurried Soult, Lannes, and Murat across the river, and on the 19th of November the French entered Brunn, the capital of Moravia.t On the 2nd of December was fought the ever- memorable battle of Austerlitz, in which the Austrian and Eussian armies were signally defeated. The victory was complete, the allies were utterly crushed. Thus ended a campaign of unheard-of successes. It had lasted only three months. The events had occurred exactly as Napoleon had sketched them out at Boulogne. He had captured an Austrian army at Dim without striking a blow; he had crushed the Eussians at Austerlitz, released the Italian kingdom by his offensive march on Vienna, and rendered impotent the attacks of the coalition on Hanover and Naples. Europe was at the feet of the conqueror ; the coalition had been totally vanquished. The fierce struggle at Austerlitz laid low many brave com- batants, but it also shortened the life of the man who was the principal instigator of the coalition. Pitt, already stricken by disease, could not survive the news of the victory, and Napoleon's stupendous success hastened his end. He died on the 23rd of January, 1806. During the last days of his life that singularly able minister had a peculiar crushed mien, which Wilberforce termed the Austerlitz look. Now is the stately column broke ; The beacon light is quench'd in smoke ; The trumpet's silver voice is still ; The warder silent on the hill. Walter Soott. * The Austrians were told that an armistice was signed or about to be signed, and that negotiations for the conclusion of the war were in progress. Such was the wile made use of by Murat. t At Hollabriinn the French came up with the Eussian rear-guard. Lannes attacked and defeated it with great slaughter. The French army was so exhausted by fatigue that, determined as tlie Emperor was to grant no pause to the Russiau army, he thought it prudent to halt his troops and rest them for a day. Stonewall Jackson marches to join Lee. 73 Pitt died at the age of forty-seven, while still in the zenith of his intellectual powers. His spirit passed away, but how little could the earnest statesman who did so much to frustrate the invasion of our country by the French, and whose expiring words were, " Oh, my country ! how I leave my country ! " foresee that ten years would barely elapse when the tents of the British army would be pitched in the Bois de Boulogne, and a British general would review his troops at Montmartre ! No greater tribute to his deeds can be found than in Alison's words, " he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Eoman Empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms." VI. — Stoneivall Jackson's March to join Lee lefore the Seven Days' Battle, 1862. " To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war." — Stonewall Jackson. Whilst, in the spring of 1862, McClellan was aiming a blow at Richmond, and only remained inactive waiting for the promised reinforcements to arrive, Lee was preparing a counterstroke on a large scale. His plan was to bring Jackson from the Shenandoah valley, and in conjunction Avith his forces to attack McClellan, who was astride of the Chickahominy, and who had extended his right far enough to the north to join McDowell, then at Frede- ricksburg, so as to get the assistance of his corps without quite uncovering Washington. To carry his plan into effect, it was necessary to act with great circumspection ; it was desirable to detain McDowell's force iii the Shenandoah valley as long as possible — to convey to his mind the idea that Jackson was still there and was being reinforced so as to be in a position to assume a vigorous offensive. Knowing how very sensitive Mr. Lincoln was as to uncovering the capital, the belief was to be fostered that Washington was threatened. Time was to be gained, for it would never have done to have seen Jackson arriving on the battle-field closely followed by McDowell. At the right moment Jackson was to take part in the attack, was to sweep down on the Federal right wing, to advance between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey and cut McClellan's commu- nications. He was to leave a small body of troops to watch the country and to guard the passes, and with his main body, including Swell's division, Lawtoh and Whiting's brigades, was ■74 The Art of Marching. to move rapidly to Ashland by rail or road, and co-operate with the army from Eichmond. Lee and Jackson kept their own counsel ; only Colonel Munford, who was to hold the valley, was taken into their confl- -dence. Even the staff were kept in the dark. The departure of the troops sent to reinforce Jackson, on the other hand, was announced ostentatiously, and everything was done to allow the Federal prisoners who were about to be exchanged or dismissed on parole to witness the measures taken for reinforcing the army of the Shenandoah. Fremont had fallen back from Port Eepublic, had evacuated Harrisonburg, and was followed by Munford's cavalry, though far in advance of all support. The latter, by acting boldly, imposed on the enemy. The bearers of flags of truce were imbued with the notion that the Confederates were on the point of advancing in great strength. No civilians were suffered to pass through the ■outposts. Munford was to spread false reports of an advance on the Potomac. The engineers were ordered to prepare a series of maps of the valley ; this fact was sedulously divulged and passed 'from mouth to mouth, till everybody felt sure that Jackson intended a pursuit of Fremont. On the 17th of June Lee wrote to Jackson, advising him that the sooner he could unite with his (Lee's) army the better, as the favourable moment for a junction of the two armies had arrived. He wrote, "In moving your troops, you could let it be understood that it was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dis- pose those to hold the valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the Pamunkey. To be efficacious the movement must be secret. Let me know the force you can bring, and be •careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose and your intention of personally leaving the valley. The country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately carried to the enemy." The great necessity for secrecy was urged above all with the object in view of keeping McClellan from altering the distribution of his forces, which was very faulty. Jackson neglected no measure that could conceal his real purpose or bewilder the enemy. The most rigorous precautions were adopted to keep his movements secret. "A long line of •cavalry, occupying every road, covered the front, and prevented Stoneioall Jackson marches to join Lee. 75 any one, soldier or civilian, preceding them towards Kichmond. Far out to either flank rode patrols of horsemen, and a strong rearguard swept before it camp-followers and stragglers. At night every road which approached the bivouacs was strongly picketed, and the troops were prevented from communicating with the country people. The men were forbidden to ask the names of the villages through which they passed; and it was ordered that to all questions they should make the one answer, 'I don't know.'" * ' Ewell's division marched to Charlottesville, followed by the remainder of the Valley troops. Whiting's and Lawton's brigades had marched from Staunton to Mount Meridan ; they were then taken back to Staunton, where they entrained for Gordonsville. On the 21st the leading division arrived at Frederickshall, no more than fifty miles from Eichmond. The rolling-stock available on the railway lines was small in quantity, and the trains had to be moved backwards and forwards on the line, bearing the infantry brigades in succession. The cavalry, artillery, and convoy proceeded by march route.' On the 25th of June, Jackson's troops passed the night east of Ashland, between that village and the Virginia Central Kailroad, fifteen miles to the north of Richmond. His march had been con- ducted with such skill that the Federal generals were absolutely ignorant of his whereabouts. Such was the secrecy observed, that until the evening of the 26th the Confederate troops themselves were ignorant of their destination. Munford had done his part well ; posted at New Market and Conrad's Store, his outposts were so watchful that no patrol, scout, or spy was able to pass through. The most vague and contradictory reports were rife in the Federal camps. Jackson's successive surprises in the Valley campaign had made his opponents anxious and apprehensive. The absence of all definite information regarding his move- ments led them to expect an attack, but no one could surmise where the blow would be delivered. The able conception of Lee and brilliant co-operation of Jackson kept 70,000 men from coming to McClellan's assistance in his attempt to restore peace to the Union by the capture of Eichmond. The insecure state of Washington, which preyed so much on the mind of the President and public opinion, was not all ; much was due to Lee's superior strategy, which showed him * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. K. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson." 76 The Art of Marching. where the weak point of the Federals lay— a threat against their capital — and how by boldly operating in the Shenandoah Valley McDowell's forces might be kept from reinforcing- McClellan's. In Lieut.-Colonel Henderson's words, " The Valley campaign practically saved Eichmond." Jackson's force, how- ever, was small, and could be easily handled by its capable and daring leader. VII. — March of the Prussian Army on Vienna in 1866. The campaign in Austria of 1866 offers an example of a march very rapidly executed by the Prussian army from the battle-field of Sadowa to within a few miles of Vienna. The Austrians, after the battle, crossed the Elbe at Lochenitz,. Predmeritz, Placka, and Pardubitz, and retired in three columns. The right-flank column — 2nd Corps and light cavalry division — reached Kosteletz and Tinist on the 6th of July, followed by the 6th Corps. The centre column — 1st, 3rd, and 4th Corps, with most of the Saxon and reserve artillery — made for Hohen- mauth and Holitz. The left-flank column — part of the Saxons, 8th and 9th Corps, the bulk of the cavalry — crossed at Pardubitz and went, some to Hohenmauth, others to Chrudim, Chrast, and Zwittau. Benedek decided to retire on Olmiitz, distant from Kceniggratz seventy miles. The army marched by two roads : three corps and the artillery by Hohenmauth, four corps and the second light cavalry division by Wildenschwerdt. The 8th Corps and the Saxons as a rearguard followed a day's march behind the columns, The 10th Corps, then much disorganized, and the cavalry of Prince Schleswig-Holstein were directed on Vienna by the Brlinn road. The distance to Vienna was 135 miles. Daring the 4th the Prussians rested. As one of their corps had hardly fired a shot, and as their cavalry had taken a very secondary part in the battle of Sadowa, it is difficult to account for there having been no attempt to follow the Austrians closely. However, a great victory, like a great defeat, always more or less disorganizes the army which has achieved it. An officer who has had no experience of active service can form a very bare conception of the confusion which exists after a victory; that after a defeat does not bear description. At Plevna it took Osman Pasha three days to restore order and co- hesion after his brilliant third victory. In 1866 Benedek was March of the Prussian Army on Vienna m 1866, 77 just able to restore a semblance of order ten days after his defeat on the field of Sadowa. Whatever may have been the reason, the fact remains that the Prussians lost touch of the enemy. On the 4th General Hart- mann's reserve cavalry division, about 3000 strong, was launched forward in the direction of Pardubitz in pursuit of the Austrians and to gather information. The planking of the railway bridge had been removed, and the bridge over the Elbe was in flames. Materials were requisitioned and measures were taken to re- establish the passage. On the 5th, the bridges having been repaired, Hartmann's cavalry crossed the Elbe. The same day Wnuck's brigade crossed the river by a ford somewhere above Pardubitz. On the 6th the Austrian headquarters were at Zwittau, the troops at Zwittau, Wildenschwerdt, Leitomischt and Policka. Hartmann was leading in pursuit. Very fortunately one of the patrols captured between Tribau and Miiglitz a courier travelling without an escort ; he was the bearer of orders addressed to the different detachments of the Austrian army, besides a mass of other correspondence. Thanks to this gross piece of carelessness, the instructions for the advance of the Prussians could be issued with the greatest certitude. It was now resolved that the Austrian army should be pursued in the direction of Olmiitz by the left wing of the Prussian army. The centre and right wing of the latter were to march on Vienna, the intention being to reach the Danube as soon as possible. The 2nd army was not to invest Olmiitz, but to protect the march of the centre and right wing. It was also to establish, as soon as practicable, a line of communications with Silesia. The 1st army, in the centre, tlie one which Prince Frederick Charles commanded, was directed on Briinn, by way of Chrudin and Neustadt. The right wing, the army of the Elbe, led by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, was ordered to march by Inglau ; and the left wing, the 2nd army, under the orders of the Crown Prince, had instructions to march on Prossnitz, keeping Olmiitz on the left towards the east. The 1st Prussian army and the army of the Elbe crossed the river Elbe on the 7th of July. On the 8th some letters seized at the Cerekwitz post office demonstrated in a very clear manner that the greater portion of the Austrian army was retiring on Olmiitz, and not on Briinn. If Benedek imagined that the 78 The Art of Marching. Prussians 'would not dare to marcli on the capital, leaving an army on their left flank threatening their communications, the course of events soon undeceived him. Vienna was not fortified, and the road to it via Brunn, besides being the shortest for the Prussians, was not held in any force by the Austrians. The Austrians continued their retreat practically unmolested, and after a continuous march of eight days entered Olmiitz in the evening of the 11th of July. They were never overtaken by the Prussians, inasmuch as they had gained a start of 27 miles on the Ist Prussian Corps, and of 49J miles on the Guards Corps. By this precipitate march the Austrian staff had certainly been able to avoid fresh encounters, but at the cost of the material and moral worth of the army, which, bad as it had been at the period of the battle, naturally sank lower and lower. There was no necessity for these forced marches so deleterious to discipline, for the wild and rugged ground in the hilly region which separates Bohemia from Moravia offered many positions favourable for a rearguard action, and if occupied with that intent, might have delayed the Prussian advance for four or five days. The 1st army and the army of the Elbe had executed their forward movement with such dispatch that on the 11th their advance guard was not more than one march distant from Brllnn. From that place it was possible to reach Lundenburg in a few days, to sever the communications between Olmiitz and Vienna, and to threaten the capital. The Austrian Government, having foreseen this possibility, determined on recalling to Vienna the greater portion of the army of the north. Accordingly, on the evening of the 11th the 3rd Corps left Olmiitz for Vienna by rail, and the Saxon Corps was to follow immediately. Herwarth von Bittenfeld met with no resistance on his march. He passed from Iglau to Znaym, a town which in a straight line is only 13 leagues from Vienna. His advanced guard entered Znaym on the 14th of July. Prince Frederick Charles met the Austrians on the frontier of Moravia, where his advanced guard had an engagement on the 10th with some of the Hussars ; this was followed by a fresh advanced-guard fight on the following day near Tishnowitz. On the morning of the 12th the advanced guard of the 1st army made its entry into Briinn, closely followed by the 6th Division ; the 5th and 7th arrived the next day. The distance from Kojuiggratz to Briinn in a direct line is March of the Prussian Army on Vienna m 1866. 79' 16 German leagues, and this will give a fair idea of the rapid movements of this army. The army of the Crown Prince, having quitted Koeaiggratz,. marched by Hohenmauth and Tribau to Prossnitz without being stayed by the Austrians; but it was delayed by the roads, which, bad as they were of themselves, had been rendered worse by th& inclement weather. The progress of the Prussian right and centre placed the Austrian forces more and more in danger of being turned ia the position they occupied at Olmiitz. Consequently, the Archduke Albert, who had been recalled from Italy, ordered Benedek to occupy the fortress of Olmiitz and its entrenched camp with an adequate force, and to fall back with the rest of his army on tO' the Danube, at a point where troops hurrying up from the Venetian provinces, were also collecting. Benedek, therefore,, issued orders for the army of the north to continue its march. On the 14th of July the 2nd and 4th Corps commenced their march from Olmiitz by way of Prerau. Benedek followed with the 1st and 8th Corps and Taxis' cavalry division on the 15th ;. the 6th Corps was sent by Meiszkirchen. But on the 15th the Prussian armies were nearer to Vienna than Benedek was, and General Malotki, who commanded the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 1st Corps of the 2nd Prussian army, had received orders to- proceed that day to occupy Tobitschau and Ti-aubeck, in order thereby to open a way for General Hatmann's division, which was to push a strong reconnaissance in the direction of Prerau. This brought on a fight with Rothkirch's Austrian Brigade,, which was marching on Tobitschau. The Austrians were driven out of Tobitschau and Traubeck. Benedek had sent by the same route a large portion of his artillery ; this had halted on the road during the fight between Malotki's and Rothkirch's brigades, and, having no escort, fell an easy prey to the enterprise of Bredow, who, at the head of the 5th Cuirassiers, attacked it and captured 18 guns.* This regiment had marched 200 miles in seven consecutive days, bivouacking each day, and often exposed to heavy rain. The Light Brigade of Landwehr cavalry attacked near Rokenitz the rear portion of Benedek's main column, which was moving between Gross-Teinitz and Prerau, and which * It is said that the Austrian gunners were led into error by the white uniforms of the Cuirassiers, and remained by their guus. This may, however, be doubted, for the Cuirassiers executed their charge under the fire of the guns. 80 The Art of Marching. comprised four batteries of artillery of reserve. With this body- marched Benedek himself and his staff. In the first dash, the Hussars overthrew the escort of the Austrian trains, made 250 prisoners, and captured some portion of the trains. The conflict at Tobitsehau on the whole had a very marked effect on the march of Benedek's forces, for the presence of the Prussians on his right flank made him understand that it was no longer safe to follow the direct road to Vienna. He had to take a route which, crossing the little Carpathian mountains, led into the valley of the Waag. On the 16th his troops were at Frei- stadt and HoUeschau, the 17th at Wisowitz and Slawitschin ; the 18th, after trudging with great fatigue over fearful roads, the crest of the Carpathians was reached, and the march continued to Trentschin. The Austrians then made their way following the course of the Waag, and marched by way of Leopoldstadt, Tyrnau and Bosing to Presburg. The 2nd Corps reached Presburg on the 22nd, but the 1st, 6th, and 8th not before the 26th. The Prussians, who followed a more direct route, had concentrated on the March Feld in front of Vienna between the 18th and 20th. On the 22nd the 7th and 8th Prussian divisions attacked the Austrians at Blumenau, when the combat suddenly terminated on the arrival of an intimation of the conclusion of the armistice. Whilst General Fransecky was carrying out his operations for the capture of Presburg, at about 7.30 a.m. he received the news that a suspension of arms had been arranged to commence that day at noon. It might appear somewhat strange that, instead of putting a stop to what must, under the circumstances, have been useless bloodsheddiug, he took advantage of the four hours of hostilities still remaining.* It was of great moment for the Prussians to prevent the junction of Benedek's army with the forces under the Archduke Albert. This could only be done by capturing Presburg, and, had not the armistice interrupted the operations, with the fall of Presburg, Benedek, with the major portion of his army, would have been driven back to the valley of the Waag. When the armistice put an end to the operations, the Prussians were at a great distance from their base, and were beginning to * It was only an ai'mistioe that -was abont to be proclaimed, which mio-ht have had no specific result ; had hostilities been resumed, the general possibly deemed it desirable to recommence them under the most favourable circumstances. March of the Prussian Army on Vienna m 1866. 81 suffer from privations and want of provisions. On approaching the frontier of Moravia, they also had to experience the ravages of cholera, and from the 12th of July onward were subject to serious losses.* Benedek had left 25,000 men in Olmiitz, on the left of their lines of communication, and the destruction of one of the bridges on their only line of railway, at the junction with the Dresden-Prague line, on the night of the 28th- 29th of July, by a sortie of the garrison of Theresienstadt (apparently in ignorance of the concluded armistice) made it difficult to bring forward provisions and stores. The Prussian staff, however, had brought a large portion of the Landwehr to the front, and no less than 103,000 men of that force were employed out of Prussia in garrisoning places and guarding supplies. * Amongst the vietims were General Mutius, who commanded the 6th Army Corps, and Lieut.-General F. W. de Clausewitz, son of the celebrated author of the book « On War." As this chapter commenced with Napoleon's well-known advice on the necessity for a thorough study of military history — a study which, unfortunately, is much neglected in our army — we may finish it with another of his sentences. " The generals- in-chief are guided hy their experience or hy their genius. Tactics, evolutions, the science of the engineer and that of the artillerist, can he learnt from treatise in the same manner as geometry, hut a know- ledge of the higher branches of the art of war can only be acquired through a study of the history of the campaigns and battles of the great captains." Gouvion St.-Cyr considered that a very large amount of instruction was contained in the letters from the battle-field. He writes on this point : " According to my ideas, in these letters, written at the moment the events occurred, and which were never intended for publication, one discovers the truth, whilst at the same time it is possible to form a fair idea of the character and military capacity of their authors. It is in the corre- spondence of the generals, if one could have it complete, that I should like to study a campaign. I flatter myself that in this manner I would understand it very much better than from their bulletins, or from the narratives of the historians." G 82 The Art of Marching. CHAPTEE III. SOME EEMAEKABLE MARCHES IN INDIA. Sir Eyre Coote pursues Law after Plassey — "Wellesley's pursuit of Doondiah — He captures Poouali — Battle of Assaye ; long march which followed it — Lake pursues Abaji, battle of Laswaree — Pursuit of Holkar in 1804 — Nott's march from Kandahar — First Sikh war — March of the British forces to Moodkee — Nicholson secures Fort Attock — Splendid march of the Corps of Guides to Delhi— March of the 43rd Light Infantry through Central India — Sir Donald Stewart's march from Kandahar — March of Sir Frederick Koberts from Kabul to Kandahar. In the former chapter we have endeavoured to narrate some remarkable marches made in Europe and America, but the exploits of our army in the East well deserve a chapter to themselves. The history of India contains several examples of long or swift marches performed by the Anglo-Indian forces. These will be found to compare well with the famous deeds of the troops which followed the standard of Hannibal, Marlborough, and Napoleon. We should bear in mind that what told so severely on the British troops in Indian marches was the intense heat of the climate. Eor all that, troops have had frequently to march in the hottest season and in the hottest hours of the day. In June 1757, Sir George Eyre Coote, after the battle of Plassey, was sent in pursuit of Law and the refugees from the French factories as they retired up country. With boats wretchedly manned and equipped, and a mutinous soldiery, Coote crossed about 400 miles of an almost unknown country in the most unhealthy and trying season of the year. Law and his Frenchmen eventually sought refuge in Oudh. Wellesley's pursuit of Doondiah in 1799 was a campaign of extraordinary marches. Doondiah, unimpeded by baggage of any kind, moved with extreme rapidity, but Wellesley, making a night march, overtook and beat him at Manawly. After this defeat the operations degenerated into a mere race. Wellesley came up again with Doondiah near the village of ConaghulJ, and. Some Remarhable Marches in India. 83 though he had only 1200 sabres to Doondiah's 5000, he formed his cavalry in one line without support and reserves, and attacked. The enemy was broken, and pursued ; Doondiah remained amongst the slain. Amrut Eao had in April, 1803, made preparations for burn- ing the city of Poonah on the approach of the British army. Wellesley was very anxious to prevent this, so, as soon as he arrived within 40 miles of Poonah, putting himself at the head of 400 troopers and a battalion of infantry, he set out at night- fall on the 19th of April and reached the city in the afternoon of the 20th. The troops had already, during the early part of the 19th, completed a 20-miles march under a tropical sun, and Wellesley says that, notwithstanding that he was detained six hours in getting his guns over the Bhore-Ghaut, he had marched 60 miles between the morning of the 19th of April and 2 p.m. on the 20th. This hard march saved Poonah, and therefore served its purpose. After capturing Ahmednuggur, on the 23rd of September of the same year, Wellesley won his first great victory at Assaye. The army of Scindia and of the Eajah of Berar, com- puted at about 40,000 men, with 128 guns, and very strong in cavalry, was drawn up behind the river Kaitna. Of this army some 10,000 men were commanded by French officers. Wellesley had not more than 8000 men all told, of whom 1600 were cavalry, and of the total only 1500 were Europeans. His ordnance comprised 17 pieces, which were drawn by exhausted bullocks. The general decided not to wait for a larger British force under Colonel Stevenson, which was on its way to join him, and, notwithstanding the declarations of the guides to the contrary, discovered a ford which he made use 'of for taking his army across the Kaitna. He then fought and won one of the bloodiest battles, as far as numbers went, of the many in which he commanded, for the odds against him were very great. The two British regiments which fought at Assaye, the 74th and 78th, lost 575 of their number. The 74th had 401 in killed and wounded; 13 of its officers were buried the day after the battle. With . the exception of the quarter-master, every officer present with the regiment was either killed or wounded. Wel- lesley's loss in killed, wounded, and missing, out of a total of 8000 combatants, was 1984. 84 The Art of Marching. The Maharatta war, with the capture of Ahmednuggur, the brilliant triumph of Assaye, the victory of Argaum, and the capture of the great fort of Gawulghur, constituted one of the most extraordinary campaigns on record. Nevertheless, when Sir Arthur returned to England he was hardly known, and had he not been backed by family influence his brilliant services would probably have received no recognition. He himself said, "The Horse Guards . . . thought little of an Indian victory; it was rather a ground of suspicion "than confidence." How different things are in the present days! What would be thought now of the fierce opposition in Parliament, and in the press, which the bestowal of a peerage on Sir Arthur Wellesley after his victory of Talavera evoked ? After the battle of Assaye, Wellesley marched seventy-five miles almost at a stretch. He started at about four o'clock one morning, and marched till noon; then rested his forces till eight in the evening, when he resumed the march till twelve noon the next day. After the capture of Delhi, 11th of September 1803, Lake set out to seize the almost equally important city of Agra, which, after a short bombardment, capitulated on the 8th of October. Agra secured, Lake turned against Abaji, a Maharatta of considerable fame as a military leader, who, disappointed in his hopes of relieving Agra, was watching for an opportunity of recovering Delhi. Waiting for this occasion, Abaji moved with the intention of occupying a position in the hilly Mewat country, the only access to which ran through an easily defensible pass. Lake was determined to bring him to battle before he could reach this formidable position. He set out in pursuit on the 27th of October, and on the evening of the 31st was close to the very ground on which Abaji's army had stood that morning. The pass he wished to seize lay thirty-three miles away, and the Maharattas were a day's march ahead of him. Nothing remained for Lake to do but to delay Abaji's march, and to bring him to battle before he could reach the pass. He determined to fasten on the foe with his cavalry, and thus gain time for his infantry to come up. Though the cavalry had already performed a hard day's work, at eleven o'clock on the night of the 31st of October, he started at the head of three brigades of cavalry, and the horse artillery guns. Marching through the night, in six hours his horsemen had covered twenty- Some Remarkable Marches in India. 85 five miles, and by sunrise of November 1st, he found the Maharattas near the village of Laswaree. Lake's object was nearly attained, but the enemy in his front presented an imposing appearance. However, he could not afford to hesitate, and boldly attacked Malpur and the Maharatta left flank with his first cavalry brigade, and their right flank with the third brigade.* He paid dearly for this daring attack, but gained his object, for the enemy did not attempt to slip away. The cavalry could not effect much without the assistance of the infantry, and towards noon was gladdened by the sight of the latter, who had accomplished a march of twenty-five miles since morning. After an hour's rest Lake attacked the enemy's position with her Majesty's 76th Foot, and two native regiments ; the guns were soon seized, the cavalry completing the capture of the enemy's position, and doing great execution. There was seldom a more stubborn or bloody fight, for the Maharattas stood their ground till the last 2000 surrendered themselves as prisoners of war. With the battle of Laswaree, brought about by Lake's rapid marching, the power of the Maharattas was shattered. In 1804 Holkar, having failed in his attempt to capture Delhi, retreated northwards, and, having crossed the Jumna near Paniput, prepared to ravage the Doab. On the 30th of October, Lake, with three British and three native regiments of cavalry, the horse artillery, and Don's reserve brigade of infantry, started in pursuit of him. On the 2nd of November Lake marched thirty miles in twelve hours, to rescue Colonel Burn's detachment, shut up in the mud fort of Shamli. The fort was reached the following day, but the Maharattas, on his approach, had decamped, and gone off north- wards. The 4th was a day of rest for the troops ; on the 5th they marched fourteen miles, and on the 6th twenty-four more to Sirdhana. On the 7th fifteen miles to Khatauli, and on the 8th they reached Meerut. On the 9th Lake was again in relentless pursuit, and at sunset he reached Ha' par ; the next day the same thing occurred, the Maharattas always twenty or thirty miles ahead of him, plundering, burning, and destroying, as they went along. As in the evening of the 16th, Lake reached the burning village of Aligunj, he learnt that Holkar was at Furruckabad, only * lat Brigade 8th Light Dragoons, Ist and 3rd Native Cavalry, 2nd Brigade 27th Light Dragoons, 6th Kative Cavalry, 3rd Brigade 29th Light Dragoons, 4th Native Cavalry. 86 The Art of Marching. thirty-six miles ahead. Provoked by his vain efforts to evertake the enemy, he determined to make a forced march by night, with the hope of coming suddenly on him. He set out at nine o'clock that night at the head of the British cavalry and horse artillery ; the march was lighted by a brilliant moon, and the men, seeing an early prospect of an end to their labours, rode in high spirits. This was enhanced by the news, which had just come in, of Fraser's decisive victory gained over the Maharattas in front of Deeg. As day was breaking the enemy's camp was surprised ; the guns opened with grape, and with the 8th Light Dragoons leading, Lake's cavalry plunged right into the startled mass. The surprise was complete, and the flying Maharattas were pursued for ten miles. Lake had marched from Delhi on the 31st of October, so in eighteen days he had covered a distance of 150 miles. In the final effort he had marched 70 miles in twenty-four hours. All was due to the untiring energy of the general, to his unexampled alacrity, promptitude of decision, and irresistible spirit of enter- prise. On three occasions, of which we have spoken in this volume, of marches performed under Lake, it was his personality which conceived them and carried them through. Lake was an infantry officer of the 1st Grenadier Guards, nevertheless, it was in the employment of cavalry that he was most conspicuous. He was untiring, and at the time of his march to Furruckabad, he was sixty years of age.* A pretty tough old man to stand the strain of these marches in the enervating climate of India. The forces of Lake and Wellesley were animated by that spirit of enterprise and enthusiasm which has done so much to create the British empire in India. Men are prone to be electrified by a master mind, they soon acquire a feeling of veneration for a man of action, they feel confidence in his star, and look to success as his due. The leader who can impress his fellows with a share of his spirits, who can draw to himself the love of his men, who can make them forget tliemselves and answer his calls, has natural qualifications for success, possibly greater than any which can be acquired through a long course of study. Learning may degenerate into pedantry, * When Murat led his pursuit of the Prussians after, the battles of Jena and of Auerstadt, he was thirty-eight or thirty-nine years old. Some Reviarkdble Marches in India. 87 caution into irresolution, but force of character and a strong spirit of enterprise are gifts which appeal to the men, and make them execute daring and renowned deeds. Major William Thorn, who kept a journal during his service in the East, when he took part in all the campaigns of Lord Lake, giyes some idea of the amount of marching done by the British army at this period. This in Lake's first campaign came to 1060 miles. „ second „ 1700 „ third „ 740 „ Total distance marched by the army during the war ... 3500 „ After the disasters which overtook the British troops retiring from Kabul, Nott marched from Kandahar to that city in 1842. This march was calculated to have a great moral influeace through- out Asia after the sad events of the previous months. Nott quitted Kandahar on the 8th of August ; but, as he was desirous to give General England a fair start for his march to Upper Scinde, he did not hasten the movements of his own force. The march at first met with no obstruction, the inhabitants remained in their villages and freely sent supplies to the camp ; the troops, on their side, were prohibited to enter any Afghan town or village. Great regularity was observed, and the soldiers were in high spirits. The progress continued smoothly until the 28th of August, when the enemy first appeared on the general's rear. On the 30th Nott was nearing Ghuznee, and, at Goine, Shumsoodeen, the Afghan governor, brought out the whole of the army, 12,000 strong, and approached the British camp. Nott moved out with half of his force, and, after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated him. A week after this affair at Goine, the British force was before Ghuznee. The Afghans abandoned the position they had taken near the town, and on the morning of the 6th of September, the fortress was found to have been evacuated. Orders were issued to destroy the citadel ; the engineers worked at this during the 7th and 8th, and sprung fourteen mines. The upper fort was completely destroyed, and the second line of works was extensively breached. The capture and destruction of Ghuznee was an important .affair, inasmuch as it was the first blow struck in the act of retribution. Shumshoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Afghan chiefs with a following of 12,000 men, tried to dispute Nott's further advance, but they were dislodged from a succession of strong 88 The Art of Marching. mountain positions in gallant style on the 14tli and 15th. Nott, however, did not have the honour of being the first in the city of Kabul, for it was Pollock who placed the British ensign upon the Bala Hissar. The Kandahar column reached the city on the 17th, two days later than the other. The performances of the Anglo-Indian troops on the outbreak of the first Sikh war are also well deserving of being recorded. After the demise of Nao Nihal Singh, Sher Singh became the ruler of the Punjab. He had gained the throne through the help of the army, and the army had become his master. From that moment until it invaded British territory, the Sikh army never ceased to be master in the Punjab. It has been said that Lai Singh and Tej Singh well understood this, and hoped to get rid of these all-powerful sc5ldiers by throwing them on the British bayonets. In 1845 the ill-will of the proud Khalsa soldiery towards the Power which had curbed their ambition, underrated their military worth, and used their country as a highway into Afghanistan, led to hostilities. The Punjab chiefs were too weak to curb the war- like spirit of the Sikhs, and, to gratify their aspirations, the Lahore Durbar went to war with the East India Company. The troops, roused to a determination to reconquer India, tumultuously crossed the Sutlej on the 11th of December 1845. The Sikh army possibly would have abstained from invading British territory in India, had they seen that our frontiers were well guarded ; but they saw that the frontiers were exposed, and believed that we were unprepared for defence — not the only time that this has happened. In the month of November 1845, the British forces on the Sutlej were much scattered. On the left, in the cantonment of Ferozepore, was a force of 7000 men, mostly natives, under Major- General Sir John Littler ; at Ludhiana, about 80 miles to the east of Ferozepore, was another force of 5000 men, under Brigadier H. M. Wheeler. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, was at Umballa in support. The troops there, with the addition of two European regiments, the 29th Foot and the 1st European Light Infantry, then stationed in the hills, numbered 10,000 men, under the command of Major-General W. E. Gilbert. This body was kept ready to move. Meerut, lying 130 miles further back, had a garrison of 9000 men, but not sufficiently equipped for taking the field. Some Remarkable Marches in India. 89 The Government of India did not believe that the Sikh army would ever cross the Sutlej ; this was also the personal opinion of the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge. General James Parson, who was at the time the Deputy-Commissary General, states that on the night of the 9th of December* an express arrived, reporting that the Sikhs had actually crossed. General Sir Charles Gough and Arthur D. Innes say that it was " on the 13th of December that Sir Henry Hardinge received the news that a body of the Sikh army had. crossed the Sutlej on the 11th." t A little further on, the day is changed to the 12th. " On the 12th he heard of the actual crossing by the Sikhs, and on the 13th he issued, his proclamation declaring war, dated from his camp about 25 miles from Ludhiana." % Orders for the immediate advance of the troops at Umballa towards the frontier were issued. All was ready, and within twenty-four hours of the receipt of orders the troops were on the march. Ferozepore, the point threatened by the Sikhs, lay about 160 miles from Umballa, but no time was lost ; in the space of seven days the troops had covered 155 miles of the way, and had fought their first battle with the Sikhs at Moodkee on the 18th of December. The force marched as follows : — 12th December Umballa to Bajpura 16 miles 13th Eajpura to Sirhind 18 „ 14th Sirhind to Isru 20 „ 15th Isru to Lattala ... about 30 „ 16th Lattala to Wadni 30 „ 17th Wadni to Charrak 20 „ 18th Charrak to Moodkee ... 21 „ The fatigue, the heat, and the dust were beyond description. The country, a dead flat, covered with thorny jungle ; the roads were unmetalled — often mere tracks — and very heavy for marching, owing to the deep sand. The heat was oppressive in the day, clouds of dust almost smothered the soldiers, there was little water, and often it was impossible to cook the food, for, owing * "I remember, particularly, I dined with Lord Hardinge on the 9th of December 1845, and on taking leave of his lordship, he, said he wished to ask me a question, which was, if I thought the Sikhs would cross the river or not ? I said, ' Certainly not ; the moment they did so they would lose their independence.' He said, ' That is my opinion also.' But that very night an express arrived, reporting that the Sikhs had actually crossed." t General Sir Charles Gough, V.C, G.O.B., and Arthur D. Innes, M.A., "The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars," p. 61. X Ibid., p. 73. 90 The Art of Marching. to the slow pace of the camels and the still slower pace of the bullock-carts, the cooking utensils did not come up till far too late. Altogether it was a most harassing march.* Even more remarkable was the performance of the two European regiments stationed in the hills. The 29th Foot was stationed at Kassauli, and the 1st European Light Infantry at Subathu. Both received orders to march at about 10 p.m. of the 10th of December, and both set out for the plains on the morning of the 11th. The 29th made a march of 23 miles that day, and reached Munny Majra in the evening. There it was directed to await the 1st European Light Infantry, which, having a longer distance to march, did not arrive till next day. The two regiments, with the heavy guns, left Munny Majra on the 13th, and pushed on by double marches, doing from 20 to 35 miles a day. On the evening of the 18th, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Moodkee, and the troops struggled to reach the battle-field, but it was not possible for them to join the Commander-in-Chief's army until the evening of the following day. They had marched nearly 200 miles in nine days. The marching of the 29th on the llth was a fine performance ; it is seldom that 23 miles are covered in the first day, when the troops are not inured to the fatigues of marching. A remarkable feat was performed in the months which preceded the outbreak of the second Punjab war. On the 9th of the month of August 1848, Nicholson, then prostrated by a sharp attack of fever, was warned of the danger that threatened the fortress of Attock. Indeed, it was nigh falling into the hands of the disaffected Sikhs. Enfeebled as Nicholson was, he started from Peshawur that night at the head of 60 Pathan horsemen and two companies of foot, which were to be followed next day by some Mahommedan levies. The fifty miles which lie between Peshawur and Attock he rode at a very swift pace, leaving the infantry to follow, and, on the morning of the' 10th, at the head of thirty of his men, he crossed the Indus, entered the fort, and «xpelled the Sikh company which formed its garrison. His promptitude and indomitable energy saved the fortress. The earliest British generals in India, Clive, Coote, Lake, Wellington, Baird, and some of the later leaders also : Cough, * It was remarked in the first Sikh war that the sepoys had not the same istamina and physical endurance as the British soldier. Some Remarhahle Marches in India. 91 Lawrence, Nicholson, Eose, recognized the fact that the safest way of dealing with Asiatics was to be audacious. When Henry Lawrence, at the head of some 10,000 of those very Sikhs who had fought against us at Ferozeshah and Sobraon, weat to place Goolab Sing into peaceful possession of Cashmere, he knew well what risks he was incurring. His masterly mind, nevertheless, had grasped this fact that boldness and promptitude wag the best game an Englishman could play. In all that relates to India, much of our success has been due to the exaggerated idea the rulers and people entertained of what European soldiers and European daring might accomplish. The restless enterprise, which leads to success in military operations when opposed to native sluggishness, was bound to conquer. A series of uninterrupted successful British operations soon infused discouragement amongst our slack disciplined opponents. Troops drilled by European officers, by Lally, Dudrenec, de Boigne, Allard, Ventura, Avitabile, and even the magnificent sepoy army which rebelled in 1857, were incapable of producing great effect for want of masterly leadership. It was this want of leading and the inability to rouse the enthusiasm of the troops which made us superior to our enemies in most of our Indian wars, notwithstanding the disparity in numbers. On the other hand, when availing our- selves of the native soldiery of Hindostan, we had the advantage of prestige, coupled with the exaggerated belief the sepoy has in the ihial, good fortune, of the British. At the period of the Indian Mutiny, the Corps of Guides, in the space of three weeks and a day, with only three halts, marched from Hoti Mardan to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles. The following is the text of this march contained ia the historical record of the services of the (Queen's Own) Corps of Guides. On the morning of the 13th of May 1857, a letter was received from Colonel Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawur, containing the announcement that the Bengal army was in open mutiny, and directing the Guides to march to Nowshera, when relieved by the 55th Native Infantry. By 11 a.m. of the same day, the 55th Native Infantry arrived, and at 6 p.m. the regiment * marched out of the Fort of Mardau, in Yusufzai, and on the morning of the 9th of June joined the British force before Delhi, having * Capt. Daly, commandant ; Lieut. Battye, second in command ; Lieut. Ken- nedy, cavalry commandant; Lieut. Hawes, adjutant; Dr. Stewart, assistant- Burgeon. 153 cavalry, 349 infantry. 92 The Art of Marching. got over a distance of 580 miles, or 51 ordinary marches in 26 days. Included in these 26 days, were three days' halts, made at different times by order of superior authority, and one day spent in burning villages in the Karnal district, so that the time expended in actual marching was only 22 days. This rate of marching, of course, could not be performed by the infantry on foot at that season of the year, so camels were allowed, one to every two men, and thus it was that they were enabled to keep up with the cavalry, and accomplish 30 or 40 miles between sunset and sunrise. Notwithstanding this turning of night into day, and vice versa, the number of men that reported sick was extremely small ; each man seemed to vie with the other in bearing up against all privations and fatigue. The village of Kaliran and two more were burnt. This was on the morning of the 7th, and that night a march of 30 miles, and again 30 miles on the night of the 8th, brought the Guides on the morning of the 9th of J une into the British camp before Delhi. Scarcely was there time to pitch the camp before the alarm sounded; the infantry were told off, under Captain Daly, with Lieutenants Battye and Hawes, to reinforce the right picket, situated on the ridge of a low line of hills running parallel to, and between the camp and the city. The advantages resulting from this celebrated march can be justly appreciated by considering how welcome the arrival of this fine warlike corps must have been to the small British force then holding the ridge outside Delhi. That city at the moment-was the focus of the rebellion, and its garrison was daily being raised by the fresh arrival of mutinied corps. The march was a splendid performance under the fierce heat of an Indian May and June ; it was only possible for a small body of troops. Though on leaving the Fort of Mardan the Guides did not muster more than 502 native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, they were reinforced by men who rejoined from furlough and by many recruits ; consequently, notwithstanding all their heavy losses during the siege, after the capture of Delhi the corps mustered stronger than when it had taken the field. A splendid feat of marching was that of the 43rd Light Infantry during the Mutiny. In 1858 the regiment, then quar- tered at Bangalore, received a route for Kamptee in the Nagpore Some Remarkable Marches in India. 93 country, a distance of 631 miles. All weakly men having been weeded out, the regiment set out, reaching Kamptee on the 28th of March ; marching was then resumed for a stretch of 156 miles to Jubbulpore, which was reached on the 17th of April. After this the regiment proceeded to Banda, where it arrived on the 30th of May and joined General Whitelock's division. After the capture of Kirwee, the 43rd Light Infantry was divided between Kirwee and Banda ; by the 1st of July all the companies were brought together at Hernapore, and on the 7th they marched out in the direction of Oalpee. On reaching Oalpee, a total march of 1300 miles — with an occasional halt at a large station for a few days — had been accomplished. Some idea, says the historical records, may be formed of the excessive exertion and fatigue undergone both by officers and men, when it is considered that this march was in most part performed during the hottest season of a year in which the mean temperature exceeded in heat that of any known during the fifteen preceding seasons.* The marches commenced before daylight, usually as early as 2 a.m., and it frequently happened that the rear of the column did not arrive in camp until 4 or 5 p.m. A mere country track constituted the only route, at times crossing chains of high precipitous hills, cutting through rocks and jungles for days together, traversing and passing numerous rivers, many of great breadth, without bridges or boats. Now and again the entire regiment was employed in dragging carts — some hundreds in number — containing ammunition, stores, etc., over almost insurmountable obstacles, where cattle were nearly useless. Under these trying circumstances the regiment kept its health most extraordinarily, but in the end the amount of wear and tear endured began to tell on the men's constitution. Sun- stroke was of constant occurrence, and death generally most sudden. From this and miscellaneous causes during the march, three officers and forty-four men died. Some notice should be taken of two notable marches which distinguished the last Afghan campaign ; these were performed over the same road, but by forces moving in opposite directions.! A force commanded by Oeneral Sir Donald Stewart was at * The monsoon that year did not visit Central India until the middle of the month of July. „ , ,. ■ •, „on t See Hough's description of Lord Kean s march in 1838. 94 The Art of Mm^ching. Kandahar in the spring of 1880. Of this force the main body, consisting of — Europeans 2145 Natives 5048 Combatants 7193 Followers 6207 13,400 Biding and draught animals 2589 Transport animals 6112 was called to Kabul, and started for that city on the last days of March. No special events called for this march; it was principally undertaken to convey to the Afghan mind an unmistakable idea of the British power. The general elections were at that moment going on in England, and these took the eyes of the public from Stewart's achievement. The Bengal Division, having been replaced by one from Bombay, left Kandahar on the 29th, 30th, and 31st of March, 1880. The mortality in camels had been so great that consider- able difficulty had been experienced in procuring the necessary transport. Nevertheless, by great efforts, and by a rigorous limitation of the impedimenta, a sufficient number of camels, elephants, and bullocks were collected in eight days. General Stewart marched through a country more or less unknown to him. As far as Shahjui no great difficulty was experienced in getting supplies ; after that the column entered a decidedly hostile country, with a daily increasing body of the enemy marching at some distance on its right flank. At the end of each march, on arriving at the new camping-ground, foraging- parties were sent out with all the available mules. These parties had to visit many villages, some many miles distant, often not returning before the evening, and then frequently almost empty- handed. The Afghans had deserted their homes, having buried their grain and provisions. The tribes had been incited to fanaticism by Mushk-i-Alam, and on the 16th of April at Karabagh, 190 miles from Kandahar, the general received trustworthy information of the numbers and constitution of the force gathering on his right. Two days later the enemy came into contact with a British reconnoitring party, and word was sent in that the Afghans were in force about three miles ahead. On the 19th of April was fought the battle of Some Remarkable Marches in India. 95 Ahmed Khel, at the close of which the Anglo-Indian division continued its march to ISTani, 17 miles beyond. On the 21st it encamped outside G-hazni, where it halted for three days, having on the 23rd a second combat with a body of 6000 Afghans at Orzoo. The division quitted Grhazni on the 25th of April, marching slowly on account of the wounded; on the 29th it effected a junction with Brigadier-General Eoss's force, after which it made by easy marches for the Logar valley, where it took up its summer quarters. The weather was splendid throughout. The division marched from Kandahar to Ghazni, a distance of 234 miles, in twenty-one days, with two halts, one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, the other at Kara- bagh; the actual marching consequently averaged a little more than eleven miles a day. It must be admitted, everything considered, that this was a creditable performance for a force which had been long inactive at Kandahar, in which the majority of the baggage animals were camels, whose gait is slow ; that it was accompanied by a heavy battery drawn by elephants, and by an ordnance field park, both of which retarded its movements, for the march had to be regulated by the pace of the heavy guns ; that, having an enemy hovering on one flank, it was necessary to send constantly patrols out to reconnoitre. The arrangements for the baggage were excellent ; notwith- standing the dlfSculties experienced in procuring forage, and the weak state of many of the camels at starting, in the whole march from Kandahar not more than three per cent. died,not a single camp follower was lost, nor was a single camel carried off by the enemy. Now we shall give some of the principal points of the other march which took place on the same road in the same year. In July 1880, the Northern Afghanistan Field Force, with head- quarters at Kabul, was preparing for its return march to India, for it was contemplated to withdraw the Anglo-Indian troops from the capital of Afghanistan entirely by the 15th of August. Much experience had been gained by both officers and men during the two years of continuous field service, the physique of the troops was excellent, and everything in the point of equip- ment was in the best of order. On the 28th of July the news of the defeat at Maiwand reached Kabul by telegraph. Some few days later, on the third of August, the Government approved of Sir Donald Stewart's suggestion of despatching a force from Kabul to the relief of 96 The Art of Marching. the Southern Afghanistan Field Force at Kandahar. Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts, about as experienced officers as the Ben gah army ever had, set to work and put together as fine a division of troops as any commander might have desired to lead. The force comprised three mountain batteries, four cavalry regiments, and twelve battalions of infantry ; it was divided into three brigades of four battalions each — one European, the others native. The Sikhs and Goorkahs were largely represented. The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force numbered as follows : — Troops 10,148 Followers 8,143 Cavalry horses and other animals 11,224 The impedimenta were reduced to a minimum ; the troops started with a given amount of provisions, other supplies of food and forage were to be drawn locally after the force arrived in camp. The field treasure-chest contained sufficient money to defray the ■expenses en route. It is much to the credit of the commissariat that throughout the march there was no case known in which either soldier or follower failed to receive his ration. The transport of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force was in a very high state of efficiency. Officers and men had for several months past been accustomed to the duties connected with the care of transport animals, and in controlling the carriage; all ranks had come to appreciate the value of the regimental transport. Before the division quitted Kabul, all sickly and debilitated animals were replaced, and to the regulated number was added a reserve of ten per cent, of mules and ponies. In this march Sir Frederick Eoberts had no base. With the efficient force he commanded, looking at the nature of the opposition he might have to incur from an undisciplined horde, there was no risk in severing his connection with Kabul. It was, moreover, deemed undesirable to weaken the force by dropping detachments on the road to guard the communication stations. This plan had often been followed in the border wars and found to answer. Having no base, when it can be prudently done, relieves a commander of much anxiety ; he has not to cast his eyes perpetually to the rear to see that his communications are safe. In this instance orders had been sent to pour provisions and other necessaries into Kandahar for the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, whilst special injunctions had been issued by the Ameer for the provisioning of the troops. So7ne Remarkable Mdrehes in India. 97 S. E. Wheeler, in alluding to the memorable and glorious march of General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, states, "The Ameer Abdur Eahman did what he could to facilitate the movements of the force that was to avenge the disaster of Maiwand. General Roberts was preceded by one of the Ameer's officers and a small party of subordinates, who were charged with the duty of collecting supplies and clearing the road of obstruc- tions. The latter task they fulfilled by telling the tribesmen that the new Ameer was sending a division of the infidel army out of the country by way of Kandahar, and threatening them, that if they stirred from their homes, or attempted to molest the English, even by as much as throwing a stone, they should suffer for it. The terms of the warning were not too complimentary to us, but the Ameer's message proved effective. Not even a stone was thrown at the force as it marched southward." * With regard to the spirit evinced by the troops, Lieut.-Colonel (now General) E. F. Chapman wrote, "The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts's Force with exceptional rapidity to Kandahar was an after-growth, evolved by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the leader himself." t There was not much fear after all of an attack, for the Afghan chiefs were not of accord ; some sided with Abdur Rahman, whom we had reinstated, others were adherents of Yakub Khan, and had gone to join Ayub Khan's army ; Mushk-i-Alam had ceased to stir up the tribes. The march from Kabul, in any case, was too rapid to give time to the tribes to gather in sufficient force. The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force marched out of Kabul on the 9th of August, and reached Ghazni in seven days. The stages were as follows : — t 9th August, Beni-Hissar to Zaidabad 16 miles. 10th „ Zaidabad to Zergunshahr 13 „ 11th „ Zergunshahr to Padkao-Eogani ISJ „ 12th „ Padkao-Eogani to A shrak or AtQir Killa ... 10| „ Cross the Zamburak Pass, 7000 feet. 13th „ Ashrak to Takia, in the valley of the Shiniz 12 14th „ Takia to Shashgao (Hiderkheld) 17 „ 15th „ Shashgao to Ghazni 12J „ Cross the Shere-i-Dahan Pass, 9000 feet 97J „ * S. E. Wheeler, " The Ameer Abdur Eahman," p. 90. t Houal United Service Institution Journal, No. ex. vol. sxv. p. 285. t The itinerary is taken from Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Chapman's lecture delivered at tL E.U.S.I. on the 9th of March, 1881. 98 The Art of Marching. A week was occupied in going over the first section of the road; the average daily march was a trifle less than 14 miles (13i|). The next section brought the Field Force to Khelat-i- Grhilzai, which was held by a detachment from Kandahar. This was reached on the 23rd of August, the troops having marched as under : — 16th August, Ghazni to Yerghalta 20 miles. 17tli „ Yerghalta to Chardeli 12 18th „ Ohardeh to Karez-i-Oba 16J 19th „ Karez-i-Oba to Mukur 14 20th „ Mukur to Panjak 21 2l8t „ Panjak to Gajai 18 22nd „ Gajai to Baba Kazai 16J 23rd „ Baba Kazai to Khelat-i-Ghilzai 16 J This stretch of 134J miles was got over in eight days, with an average daily march of 16 }f miles a day. After one day's halt at Ehelat-i-Ghilzai, the march was resumed. 25th August, Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Jaldak .. 26th , Jaldak to Tirandaz 27th , Tirandaz to Pomazai .. 28th , Pomazai to Eobat 29th „ Eobat to Mohmand 30th , Halt 31st , Mohmand to Kandahar 15i miles 16 ;) 15 19 J, Vi „ 13 „ The forced march ended at Eobat, but on the 27th Sir Frederick was aware of the fact that the villages east and south of Kandahar had been abandoned by the Ghazis and regulars, and that Ayub Khan had struck his camp on the 24th and had taken a position to the north of Kandahar on the Argandab river. There never had been in reality any siege of Kandahar, for there never were any works thrown up with the object of attacking the city ; the investment principally consisted in the occupation of the villages around. Eobat, where the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force encamped on the 29 th of August, lay 20 miles from Kandahar, and 297^ from Kabul. It had taken the force nineteen days to cover this distance, which gives a daily average of 14'6 miles. To gauge the exact worth of a march, there are many circum- stances to be taken into consideration. The principal are : First, the number of the troops that marched, inasmuch as the difficulty of a march, as we all know, augments with the number of men that are moving. Secondly, the number of consecutive days the troops were on the move, for though men can stand an exceptional Some Remarhable Marches in India. 99 call, they often break down when that call is prolonged too far. Thirdly, the nature of the country, the condition of the roads, the season of the year, and the state of the weather. Fourthly, the enthusiasm or indifference of the troops, for the soldier will accomplish a great deal when the cause appeals to his feelings. Lastly, the quality and sufficiency of the provisions, for to withstand fatigue and to continue an exertion for any length of time, the troops must be* adequately fed. If we compare the march of the 2nd German army from the Moselle to the Loire in 1870 with Lord Eoberts's march from Kabul to Kandahar ten years later, we cannot fail to recog- nize in both a very great emergency. One had to reinforce the weak German forces detached by the army investing Paris, and to make head against the newly raised French armies of Gambetta ; the other to relieve the troops under General Primrose shut up in Kandahar, and threatened by Ayub Khan. The first had to march 237 miles, which were covered in twenty days ; the second had to get over 297|- miles, which it did in nineteen days. The average daily march of the Germans was nearly 12 miles,* that of the Anglo-Indians was about 14f miles. Both marches were very creditably performed ; the conditions, nevertheless, under which the two armies marched were very different. Prince Frederick Charles's army was composed of three Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and one Infantry Brigade, whereas Lord Eoberts only led a total of 10,148 fighting men, or a weak division. Again, with regard to the rate of marching, the conditions were greatly in favour of Lord Eoberts. The Germans had been for a long time stationary, were unac- customed to long marches, and had in the ranks men who had bardly quite recovered from previous wounds. The Anglo- Indian force had the pick of the whole army at Kabul, and had iweeded out all its weakly men. The first had rain and cold, the ■second fine weather. Again, the first had to face the hostility ■of the population, had to contend with frane-tireurs, and found roads which had been more or less broken up ; the second had not only no enemy to contend with, but was helped by the ruler of the country, for, as it has been said, the Ameer of Afghanistan had sent forward orders that the British should not be molested. * For the first nine days the 9th Corps averaged 13 miles. From Troyes it .marched to Fontainebleau, 76 miles in four days— 19 miles a day. ]00 The Art of Marching. CHAPTER IV. TRAINING FOE THE MAKCH. Marshal Saxe's maxim, " The main part of the exercise regards the legs, and not the arms " — Great pains to he taken to turn the recruit into a good shot and a good marcher — Walking indispensable for the soldier — Marches in peace time form part of the training for war — Marching in India in the old times — Kail- ways have deprived troops of a certain amount of training in marching — Our recruits have done little walking — Their powers of marching must be gra- dually developed — The Romans and gymnastic exercises — Gymnastics revived by the Prussians after 1806— Physical training teaches the right use and command over our limbs — By gymnastics the recruit acquires freedom and elegance of step — Improve general health — The training to be done progres- sively — The ancients thought that nothing was more conducive to bodily health than regulated exercise — Gymnastic exercises employed by the Eomans — Training of the individual soldier — Our soldiers to be strengthened by a system of physical training — The drill in the barrack square is too rigid^The young soldier to be trained slowly and progressively — Wallace MacLarcn on a system of physical training for the army — Recruits to complete each drill by a march— They should be made to understand that a good soldier and a good marcher go together — Endurance on the march to be steadily encouraged — Training requires a great measure of self-denial — Men and horses to be brought to a state of fitness by steady work — Marches require great regularity — McDowell's march out of Washington — Route marching as performed now is insufficient — Every individual should be trained to march alike — The Duke of Wellington on marching — His orders on tbe subject— System of marching out adopted by the 52nd Light Infantry at Jhansi— The soldier to march with a load — The Chasseurs in the French army — Manoeuvres afford valuable in- struction in marching — Soldier to be taught how to preserve his feet. A SOLDIER, besides being a master of his weapons and well practised in his exercises, should be well disciplined and vigorous in body and mind. He is then fit for war. War is mainly a question of legs. Victory, generally speaking, lies in the rapid use made of them, in excelling the adversary in speed. Maurice de Saxe, in regard to whom Frederick the Great, in writing to Voltaire, said, "This general could teach all the generals in Europe," held that training in the use of weapons was very necessary to make the soldier supple and dexterous, but that it was not proper to bestow every attention to this alone. " The main part of the exercise," he said, " regards the legs, and not the arms; in the legs lies all the secret of Training for the Mar.jh. 101 manosuvres and combats, and it is with the legs that the principal pains should be taken. Whoever acts differently is a dolt, and has not mastered the elements of what goes by the name of the art of war." The success of a battle often depends on the marching power of an army, and on the rapidity with which it can manoeuvre. Whoever can outmarch his adversary can take the lead, and to have deprived him of the initiative is the first step to success. This result, which is the ultimate purpose of all military opera- tions, entails years and years of assiduous care in the formation of the soldier. In every army every part of his education should be most carefully supervised, and, above all, the greatest pains should be taken to turn him out a good shot and a vigorous marcher. A good shot, because, unless a soldier can shoot well in our days,* he is absolutely useless ; a good marcher, on account of the great mobility which characterizes present military operations. Walking, when performed under favourable conditions and free from having to bear a load, is the most healthy exercise man can take. It brings into play a number of muscles, it favours their development, and conjointly with this strengthens the constitution.! If walking exercise is good for all men, it is indispensable for the soldier, because for him marching constitutes one of the principal elements of his profession. It becomes, consequently, necessary for the soldier to become accustomed to it, so as to learn how to bear the fatigues which are inseparable from marching. To attain this object soldiers should be practised, and frequently, in special marches, carried out under the same conditions with respect to dress, arms, ammunition, kit, and provisions, as will obtain on active service. The infantry is the mainspring of a well-found army, and the foot soldier, to whom in particular this chapter refers, is the one who has to withstand a double fatigue, walking many miles in an abnormal condition and, in addition to this, carrying a burden. The burden he has to carry is distressing, for it exercises on the * The great importance of individual marksmanship is getting to be appre- ciated, but no soldier can hope to become a thorough adept with his rifle unless he spends a deal of his time on the ranges. t Trevelyan, in his " Early History of Charles James Fox," wi'ites, " He prided himself on his endurance as a pedestrian, and on the steadiness of pace which enabled him, almost infallibly, to calculate the distance he traversed by the time that he spent over it." ]02 The Art of MavcUng. shoulders and on the thorax, which have almost entirely to sup- port it, a compression which, by interfering with the movements of the chest, obstructs perfect respiration by the continual efforts which they demand, and which end by exhausting the strength of such men as have a feeble constitution. Marches in peace time form part of the training for war ; the soldier is then educated to march with regularity, and to bear with fortitude the fatigues inherent to a march. At this period the march should be conducted in conformity with those precepts which guide movements executed not in the immediate proximity of the enemy. In the old days in India, before the railways bad attained their present development, our troops were able to gain consider- able experience in marching. At that period regiments and batteries were often many weeks, sometimes even months, under canvas, marching from one part of India to another. This marcb hardened the men, and made them familiar with the pitching of camps and the loading and management of beas-ts of burden. Such a system of marching was not only good for the soldier, but it had also a certain moral effect upon the population of the districts traversed ; it was a display of force, tending to give a good impression of the power of the East India Company. The preliminary marches to the frontier were in former times, always considered as the very best preparation for the hard business of the campaign about to commence. The concentration of an army in the present day is done principally by rail, and, though this expedites the operation, it deprives the troops of a certain amount of training in marching. This is con- sidered a loss which is hardly made up by the advantage of the troops arriving without diminution through sickness. In our own case the concentration does not lead to much marching, for the troops are sent by rail to the port of em- barkation. As we do not get any practice in marching at that time, it appears more than ever necessary that our training in that respect should have been gone through beforehand. Our ofiScers are well acquainted with the fact that the class of individuals who are enticed to join the army consists of lad» who have never done much walking in their life. From the very beginning of his career — from the moment when he joins as- a recruit — the infantry soldier should" be initiated in the business of marching. He should be gradually broken to it, and marching Training for the March. 103 should as much as possible form a part of his ordinary exercises. The recruit must be hardened to it, and formed by constant practice into a regular trained pedestrian. This should, however, be done with judgment, and never carried to such an extent as to injure his constitution. Many youths, about the majority, when they join are awkward and clumsy, so that we must develop by all possible means their power of marching. Gymnastic exercises are a great preparation for the serious business of marching. It was by giving their children a good physical education, and by inculcating sound feelings of patriotism in their youths, that the Greeks and Eomans succeeded in having soldiers who were under every respect superior to those of the other nations. The Romans accorded great value to gymnastic exercises,* and, certainly, in those days when all men bore arms, and when victory sided generally with the strongest and most capable men in a hand-to-hand fight, such exercises were all-important. When, with the introduction of firearms, fighting at a distance was substituted for close combat, and personal encounters — in which strength of muscle went far to carry the day — became r&re, the attention paid to gymnastics decreased ; they were neglected, and gradually passed out of the military training. The revival of the science commenced in Prussia after the humiliating events of 1806, and it is universally acknowledged that to the training thus obtained by the youth throughout the kingdom, much of the vigour by which the French armies were driven out of Germany and followed up to Paris was due.f An admirable law of nature provides that — within certain limits — parts of the human frame increase in strength, aptitude, and size in proportion to the use made of them. The object of all physical training is to teach the right use of, and command over, our limbs, so that we may be always ready to use them in the most effective manner. Gymnastic exercises % — running, jumping, vaulting, clearing * The Eoman aoldier was not confined to exercises of a purely military descrip- tion. He was, besides, expected to make roads, mould bricks, build gateways and aqueducts. t In France, by an enactment whiob came into force in 1881, gymnastics became an obligatory subject in all elementary schools, colleges, and lyceums ; in the last it extends to military exercises. This law will render great services, for it tends to give the youths the means of gaining pliancy, strength, aud energy, which go so far towards making good and robust soldiers. J Plato, Aristoteles, and Galiennus distinguished three kinds of gymnastics, viz. the military, the athletic, and the medical. 104 The Art of Marching. obstacles, climbing, etc. — lead to a healthy development of all the muscles, and each man derives a lasting benefit from them in the progressive strengthening of the body. The joints are rendered supple, and the carriage is improved. A well-regulated course of gymnastics does more for the recruit than the rigid drilling in the barrack square, for it gives the men a well- developed and vigorous physique. It is from this that he will acquire freedom and elegance of step. Practice with the dumb- bells, bar-bells, and Indian clubs will help to bring out the muscles of the arm, making the handling of his weapons more easy and improving the accuracy of his shooting. If the exertion be not carried so far as to induce excessive fatigue, an improvement in the general health becomes soon manifest, and the mind^if simultaneously cultivated with judg- ment — increases in power and endurance. The treatment of the recruit demands judgment, patience, and tact. The general physique of the young soldier has been undermined by various unsanitary influences, and at the age when he undergoes his recruit course he is still growing. As the training should be proportionate to the bodily power of each individual, the instructor should strive to form a correct estimate of the possibilities of each lad under his charge. The exercises should be varied, for the aim is to promote the power of all the muscles. Deep-breathing exercises are of very great importance. The training must be carried out intelligently; the work should be progressive, so as to accustom the muscles first to the easier exercises, only passing to the more difScult when the necessary elasticity and suppleness have been gained. Abroad, where great attention is paid to the training of the soldier, great stress is laid upon the absolute necessity of this training being systematic, gradual, progressive, and continuous. But as a horse can be overtrained for a race, so can man's training be injudiciously exceeded. Care must be observed to avoid over-exertion in the training, for this might break down the bodily and mental strength of the young soldier. Severe exercise on an empty stomach, or after a full meal, are to be condemned. Most of the objections formerly urged against gymnastics have died out, now that great care is observed in practising them always with moderation and due regard to the strength of the individual. Certain dangers, overstraining, sprains, ruptures, etc., Training for the March. 105 are not entirely unavoidable ; however, it should be remembered that these accidents are inseparable from field sports, and that hardihood can in no way be obtained without running some risk. The ancients, and more espe,cially the Greeks, seem to have been thoroughly convinced that the mind could not possibly be in a healthy state unless the body was likewise in perfect health. No means were consequently thought, either by philosophers or physicians, to be more conducive to preserve or restore bodily health than well-regulated exercise. The Eomans adopted gymnastics from the Greeks ; their attention to developing and strengthening the body by exercises was considerable, though only for military purposes. The Eomans thoroughly understood the importance of hardening their levies by continual practice and of training tiiem to every evolution that was likely to occur in action. It was to this never-ending exercise in arms and the exact observance of discipline that they owed the conquest of the world. As is well known, the recruit received a military mark or brand, which was imprinted on the hands. This mark, neverthe- less, was not given before it had been ascertained that the recruit was in every way qualified for service, that he had sufficient strength and activity, that he had intelligence enough to learn his duties, and that he had a proper degree of military courage. Marching, with the Eomans, constituted the principal part of their exercises. The first thing their soldiers were taught was the military step, so as to accustom them to march quickly and together. It was laid down that they should march with the common military step twenty miles * in five summer hours, and with the full step, which is quicker, twenty-four miles in the same number of hours. When that pace was exceeded, the men no longer marched, but ran, in which case no certain rate could be The recruits were exercised in running in order to be able to charge the enemy with great vigour, to occupy speedily an advantageous position or post, to anticipate the enemy there, to reconnoitre quickly and to get back with great celerity, to follow a retreating enemy and to overtake him in pursuit. They were * The Roman mile contained 1617 Englisli yards, or 143 yards less than the English statute mile (Dr. William Smith, " A Dictionary of Greek and Eoman Antiquities," vol. ii. p. 171). 106 The Art of Marchmg. trained to leap, to teach them how to get over ditches or awkward places. Every young soldier without exception was tanght to swim ; the cavalry had, besides, to accustom their horses to swim, so as to be independent of bridges or fords. AH, veterans and recruits alike, were constantly exercised in vaulting. This was carried out at first without arms, afterwards completely armed. The cavalry were taught to mount and dismount on either side with equal facility and with drawn swords or lances in their hands. By assiduous practice their cavalry was brought to such perfection that, though they had no stirrups, they could mount their horses in an instant, even amidst the confusion of sudden and unexpected alarms. The soldiers were practised in general exercises, in throwing the javelins, in the use of the bow, in cutting and thrusting with the sword, in throwing stones with the hand and sling. They were accustomed to carry burdens as part of their training ; the recruits were frequently obliged to carry a weight of 50 Roman pounds,* to march with it in the ranks, so as to get inured to carrying their provisions in addition to their arms on difficult expeditions^ It was laid down in the ordinances, and it became a custom, to exercise both cavalry and infantry three times a month in marches of a given length which the Komans termed Ambulare. The infantry had to march completely armed the distance of ten, miles from the camp and return in the most exact order, keeping the military step, which they changed and quickened on some part of the march. These marches were not made only on plain and even ground, but both cavalry and infantry were taken inta difiicult and uneven places and made to ascend or descend hills and mountains, so as to familiarize them with every description of ground.! The Emperor Augustus, who paid great attention to drill and gymnastics, compelled the legions to make drill marches three times a month, with baggage often in excess of the regulated amount, and over every description of ground. * The libra, the unit of weight amongst the Romans, corresponded to 505O English grains, nearly 12 ounces avoirdupois. t The troops in Algeria now are trained to clear obstacles in heavy marching order. There is a sort of steeplechase course laid out round the drill ground of the Tirailleurs Indigenes. Some of the obstacles are really formidable ; they include a 6 feet wide jump, a water jump with a drop of at least 3 feet, and a revetted ditch 6 feet deep. The soldiers have to clear these in marching order with a rifle in their hands and a knapsack on their back. Training for the March. 107 The Eomans feared idleness more than their enemies. Their idea was that the best manner for keeping sound discipline was to find an occupation for the soldiers. According to this view,, they employed them in peace time in executing great public works, and, above all, in constructing roads. It resulted from this that the legionary, hardened by constant work, could, in war, easily withstand the fatigues and hardships of a campaign. The Roman armies marched rapidly. This continued up to the third century ; then the speed and distance decreased in a marked manner and this is accounted for in part, by the loss of good material, in part, by the greater amount of baggage and engines of war admitted in their armies. We, who do not keep huge standing armies, but who, for alii that, have a more continued series of fighting than any other military power, are very prone to search in the organization of foreign armies, German at certain periods, French at others, for the secret of their superiority in war. One point which most of us overlook in the German army is the amount of trouble taken in training the individual soldier. This, as we shall show in a subsequent chapter, was at the bottom of the excellence of Frederick's cavalry ; but not only in that arm is great attention paid to each individual man in all that relates to his training, for all competent judges have declared that it was to this systematic training of the infantry soldier that much of the grand success of the German armies in their last war was to be set down. Now that the troops fight, so to say, independently, and are made to use their own judgment, it becomes more necessary to train each man individually. In doing this the greatest pains should be taken, bearing continually in mind that the future conduct of the rank and file depends entirely on it. Bodily power, hardihood, and activity are the very essence of a soldier's life, and this bears out the words of one of our generals who said that in the strength of a soldier lies the foundation of success in a campaign. Our soldiers must have bodily strength to overcome fatigue and to endure privations, and this bodily strength can only be acquired through a system of physical training. This training will make the young soldier strong, active, enduring, and hardy,, and by it it becomes possible to create a reserve of strength which may be drawn upon when needed. We should start from the fact that it has been proved by 108 , The Art of Marching. ■experience that it is impossible for the human frame ever to approach full and uniform development without exercise. In the army we want man at his best, and must search in the various systems of military training for the one which will always keep the man ready to withstand hardships, for the one in which the whole of the muscular system will be exercised. The drill in the barrack square does nothing to supple and strengthen a man. In the very matter we are discussing, march- ing, the drill-sergeant teaches the recruit to walk uprightly and stifHy, to look straight to his front, and to hold his arms rigidly to his sides, a mode of progression which may be suited for evolutions, but which it would be impossible to continue for any great length of time. A system of physical training alone can give the soldier the energy and constitutional strength that he requires, and which ■constitute the essence of his power. For how often do we not see in a contest victory favouring the most robust and not the most brave. It is when a soldier first shoots as a recruit that he should receive the real foundation of sound musketry instruction. His novitiate is the golden time in this and all other parts of his tuition. The young soldier must be taken in hand and trained slowly and progressively, being asked at first to do nothing •which is beyond his power of endurance. Our own recruits fulfil one particular requirement, which is that physical training has been found to have the greatest effect at the period of the body's growth and development. MacLaren lays down that the exercises should be regulated by individual fitness. The in- structors should aim "to administer exercise on a clearly defined and comprehensive system, a system calculated to meet the requirements of every learner, weak or strong, to meet the re- quirements of the whole frame of every learner, and to give to the whole frame suitable and uniform and adequate employ- ment." "Without a training of this kind, it will be found that, whilst the parts of the body which have been actively employed are shapely and strong, the inactive and neglected parts are weak and stunted. Physical training, a graduated course of gymnastics, will produce an increase of chest measurement, of girth, thus giving additional space for the heart and lungs to work in. Wallace MacLaren, in his " Physical Education," speaks of Trainimi for the March. 109 the system necessary for the army in the following terms : " . . . a military system should be twofold, aiming first at cultivating the body to its highest attainable capacity, and then at teaching the manner in which this physical power may be applied to professional purposes. "A military system of bodily training should be so com- prehensive, that it should be adapted to all stages of the professional career of the soldier; should take up the un- developed frame of the young recruit as he is brought to the dep6t, and be to him in all respects a system of culture — a system gradual, uniform, and progressive — a continual rise from the first exercise to the last, in which every exercise has its individual and special use, its individual and appropriate place which none other can fill, in the general system ; a system of exercises which will give elasticity to his limbs, strength to his muscles, mobility to his joints, and above all, and with infinitely greater force than all, which will promote the expansion of those parts of the body, and stimulate to healthy activity those organs of the body, whose fair conformation, health, and strength will double the value of all his after-life ; which will give him the vital stamina that will be to him a capital upon which he is ta depend, and from which he is to draw at all times, at all seasons, and under all circumstances of trial, or privation, or toil. This should be the great object to be aimed at in the early stages of the system; the strengthening, the developing of his body, muscle and joint, organ and limb ; make him a man, and as a man give him power over himself." The training of our recruits could be changed with very great benefit to our anny. The drills could be made less stiff and more attractive. The object of the various exercises should be explained, and the young soldier should not be taught as mechanically as he is now. Bad marching is often set down to the fact of our having too many youths, immature soldiers, in the ranks. Their thews and sinews could nevertheless be hardened by degrees were marching made part of the training from the very first day of the soldier's life. Eecruits without arms, once they have been taught the rudiments of their paces, should, in our opinion, be made to march over a moderate distance at the conclusion of each drill. The same system should be followed after arms have been put in their hands. Finally, before the termination of the recruits' 110 The Art of Maoxliing. ■course, aud before they are dismissed, all young soldiers should be required to perform a given number of marches in full marching order. This moderate exercise, besides being a relief from the rigidity of the barrack-square training, will be found beneficial to their health. Continuous drilling in the barrack square wears the soldier out; from his very early days, he should be made to understand' that it is only the preliminary to the serious part of his career.* The idea that a good soldier and a good marcher go together should be deeply instilled in the mind of all ranks. The recruit, according to the trade or occupation he followed before joining, has only been in the habit of bringing certain (muscles into play. It is by every kind of exercise and gymnastics that he can acquire a thorough command over all his muscles. Eis comrades in the barrack rooms can do much in clearing away that awkwardness of gait, that rustic and unsoldierly bearing of the novice, saving him from being made the laughing- •stock of the drill-yard. • Marshal Saxe very justly observes, " Large armies are not those that win battles, but good ones." Now, what is a good ^rmy if not one with which great pains have been taken to render its training' as perfect as possible, and which possesses the •distinction of quality ? If endurance is one of the first qualities of the soldier, surely ■endurance on the march is one of the qualities which should be steadily encouraged. As the above experienced captain said, ■" Victory depends on the legs ; " but these legs must be exercised, their joints must be made supple, their muscles must be strength- ened, the feet must be hardened, and the respiratory organs invigorated. The ancient Eoman complained that his limbs had grown stiff; his spirits had drooped from lack of martial exercises. " The influence of the physical and moral condition of the troops is on this point so considerable, that the action to be exercised on the morale of the men, joined to the cares for their well-being, may be taken as the secret which alone has been able to confer on certain great commanders the possibility of obtaining * The Germans take their recruita into the country and teach them the use of ground. Their recruits are trained to march, beginning with 10 kilometres, carrying light equipments. Every week one kilometre more is added. At the end of the period they can cover 20 kilometres, carrying their field kit. Training for the March. Ill from their troops extraordinary marches which might seem to appear to be beyond the forces of man." * Man should neglect nothing, however trifling, which is con- nected with his calling. In all bodily contests, in all mental labours, in everything which human nature attempts, systematic and continuous training is the essential element of success. Mere size counts for little in the making of an efficient soldier ; it is the active and wiry man who best withstands the hardships of the marches and the fatigues of a campaign. The exertion which the soldier is called upon to make, besides being intended to accustom him to march, goes a long way in teaching him how to strengthen his resolution, how to surmount difBculties, and how to bear hardships with fortitude. Not only walking, but running drill is highly important, for the men must be got to make rapid rushes to the front, and clear 300 or 400 yards of rough ground at a rapid pace, being at the end in good condition to use the bayonet with effect. The ancients endeavoured above all to close with their foes, because their soldiers, being heavily accoutred, carried few hurling weapons; the melee with them was decisive. The present-day soldier also desires to close with his adversary, for he well knows that it is when long exposed to his fire that most casualties occur. Work with cold steel is soon over. An individual is said to be in good condition when, by follow- ing a given regime, he has rendered his frame as fit as possible for performing some feat of strength or endurance. Training requires a great measure of self-denial, constant hard and sharp exercise, great attention to the diet, and rigid abstinence. If we look at all which has been written about the gladiators, we shall see how they lived simply, temperately, and virtuously for months together. We endeavour to develop our recruits' muscles by a course of gymnastic exercises ; that is true enough, but the training ceases to be obligatory as the recruits are advanced to the category of drilled soldiers. There is an absence of continuity. When a long movement is in contemplation, both men and horses have to be brought into a state of fitness — what we call condition — by steady work, by a judicious system of training, by a well-defined system of exercise which shall, slowly and by degrees, become more rigorous. * EafSn, " Tactique de Pevizonius," torn. i. p, 45. 112 The Art of Marching. The physical state of the troops depends on their quality, whether old, hardy, and experienced, or immature, raw, and insufficiently trained. It depends besides on their food, on their clothing and equipment, on their lodging and habits, and to a very great extent on the care bestowed on them by their officers. The officer should be untiring in all that regards the soldier, so as to have him in the very best condition. Look at the trouble, the pains the owner of a race-horse takes, so that the animal may be in a fit condition to do his best to win. The company officer should bestow the same care on his men. " The fundamental principle," writes a German officer, " in the training of the German soldier, is to give the individual as much individual attention as possible. No duty is performed without the supervision of an officer. The recruit must feel the influence of the officer from the first day of his arrival. The non-com- missioned officer is a minor factor in the whole system, and it is the constant presence of the officer from the very outset which makes the touch between the ranks and the officers so keenly felt, both in times of peace as well as in war." * The great feature in the recruit's training is individual tuition, and the Germans reap in success their painstaking peace-time education. Our officers do not apply themselves to their profession as the country has every reason to expect that they should. Appli- cation and study are irksome, no doubt, but can any one explain why the military should have greater leisure than individuals following other professions? why sport should overrule every- thing? It is no use to fall back on the old saying, attributed to Wellington, that Waterloo was won in the play-fields of Eton, first of all, because it has been proved that Wellington never said so; secondly, because the standard of education throughout Europe in his time was ever so much lower than it is in our days. Kuskin, in a lecture delivered at Woolwich, reminded the cadets that "neither do the duties of your profession, which require you to keep your bodies strong, in anywise involve the keeping of your minds weak. . . ." His next words are replete with wisdom. "Never waste an instant's time, therefore; the sin of idleness is a thousandfold greater in you than in other youths; for the fate of those who will one day be under your * " The German Infantry Soldier : hia First Six Mouths' Training," by a German, OfBoer, United Service Magazine, June, 1899, p. 295. Training for the March. 113 command hang upon your knowledge; lost moments now will be lost lives then, and every instant which you carelessly take for play you buy with blood." * In point of education we cannot hold the military authorities quite blameless. They do very little to encourage or promote study. The advancement of oificers, apart from absolute seniority, being made to hinge entirely on the chance of their seeing active service — too often a matter of luck — is not fair, for study and application in peace time do bear fruit in time of war. An army needs able leaders, individuals who possess something more than ill-considered bravery. The officer whose ambition is to become an adept in his profession, must study day after day till the end of his career. The more he learns the more he will find that there is still to be learnt. In this let us not be wilfully misunderstood ; far is it from us to desire book worms — we only plead in favour of a fair proportion of work and pastime. An officer can have his fill of hunting and shooting, of cricket, football, or polo, and yet do a fair amount of studying. It is not the pursuit of sport and field games which is to be condemned, but the abuse of it, i.e. to live for them and nothing else. Under no pretext of injury to health, or from any feeling of tender-heartedness, should exercises entailing fatigue be sup- pressed. Without suffering any ill effects, man can endure a certain amount of fatigue, especially when trained to it pro- gressively and continuously. Such being the case, he should be always kept well up to the mark. It is indispensable to teach large units in peace time the manner to surmount the special difficulties of the march. Marches, and above all marches of large units, in which the conditions are more unfavourable, should be one of the most frequently enforced exercises : this because a body of men which has been thoroughly inured to the fatigues and the impediments of the march, is fit for immediate employment in the field. It is above all on the line of march that the discipline of an army reveals itself. Observant judges tell us that the worth of a * At Aldershot, the main camp of instruction for our land forces, there is a rich military library, which owes its origin to the industry of H.E.H. the late Prince Consort, and was thoughtfully presented by him to the ofBoers of her Majesty's army. It would be a strange revelation to learn the exact number of officers who avail themselves of that library during each twelve months. T 114 The Art of Marching. body of troops can be riglitly estimated by the number of men who fall out in a forced march. Marches should be as rapid as possible, but this condition will never be fulfilled unless great regularity and order reign in the marching body. The - regulations contain many excellent injunctions on this point. A just amount of severity, which will demand strict compliance with these dispositions, is what is needed to accustom the soldier, in peace time, to bear easily all the hardships which marching on active service entails. Here is an example of a march which was marred by want of practice and discipline, and the reader is left to conclude what might have happened had the adversary been able to seize the opportunity which was offered him. On the 16th of July, 1861, Washington was all astir to see McDowell's army defile before the President on their way to Centreville. The roads south of the Potomac were covered with 35,000 men, led by regular officers, well armed, well clothed, and with an abundant train of artillery. Scores of carriages filled with the elite of the city moved alongside of them, and a crowd of reporters rode beside the columns. All, soldiers and their friends, were full of enthu- siasm. The men thus animated stepped briskly forward. After a while, however, the excitement began to die away, and the recruits not broken in to marching, succumbed to the unusual exertion. The heat was oppressive, and the roads lay deep in dust ; the rifles, knapsacks, and blankets became a burden hard to bear. The columns opened out, all regular formation was soon lost, regiments mingling with regiments. The men fell out in numbers to appease their thirst at each roadside brook, and knots of stragglers surrounded every blackberry bush. The rear was a confused mass of laggards, and, heedless of their officers, of orders and remonstrations, scores of men quitted the ranks and sought repose in the surrounding woods. In the evening McDowell's army had not advanced further than six miles from their bivouacs, and many of the stragglers did not rejoin their corps till late the following day.* McDowell wrote in his report, " The trains hurriedly gotten * " The march demonstrated little save the general laxity of discipline ; for -with all my personal efforts I could not prevent the men from straggling for water, blackberries, or anything in the way they fancied. . . . AVe had good organization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, no respect for authority, no real knowledge of war" (Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. i. pp. 181, 182; Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," vol. i. p. 108). Training for the March. 115 together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagonmasters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and without order, and were the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward." We ourselves are not quite free from blame on this point. In 1892 a great outcry was made on account of the bad marching of our troops whea proceeding to the manceuvres ia Hampshire. Some battalions, in that instance, proved incapable of accom- plishing a short march without leaving a large percentage of their numbers behind. Again in 1895 the marching of the troops from Aldershot to the New Forest was severely criticized. The Federal troops at the beginning of the Civil war were volunteers, quite freshly enrolled, ours were battalions of the line, in which the young soldiers are being trained before being sent to join the battalion on foreign service. There is nothing which will bring out the qualities of the soldier like service in the field, and the marching of the British troops in South Africa, in a foreign climate and under a broiling sun, has been, by all accounts, a very creditable performance. There have been exceptions, such as the following, which has been justly criticized by a distinguished foreign officer.* " The exigencies of transport, together with the aversion of the English soldier to carry loads, and his habit, and that of the officers, of making himself comfortable everywhere, had a per- nicious effect on Sir Redvers BuUer's operations in January. When he tried to relieve Ladysmith by a wide flanking move- ment to the west, Lord Dundonald's cavalry brigade was the only one which marched rapidly. Warren's division, hampered by the cumbrous transport and by the habit of making short marches, took six days to cross a ford, unopposed by the enemy, and to accomplish marches that should have been done in two. The Boers had thus ample time, not only to take up new positions, but to dig trenches, so that when Warren attacked — first Taba Myama and then Spion Kop— he found the same difficulties of a frontal position as if he had not made the flanking movement ; there was the additional disadvantage of the men arriving more weaf y and loss well provided than if they had resumed the attack at Colenso. In the Orange Free State the great misfortune of the Boers was that the Field Marshal and his Chief of the * General Count Luohino dal Verme, "An Italian View of the Boer War," Boyal United Service Institution Journal, No. 269, p. 788. 116 The Art of Marching. Staff had organized a new system, breaking away from the old customs. Having arranged a proper transport independent of the railways, which did not exist during the first months of the war, they made the infantry march as they had never marched before, not paying much attention to whether the men and officers had their regulation baggage with them every day. By this means they were enabled to pursue and capture Oronje and his 3000 men. " Our ideas on the Continent are very different from those of the English as to the length of marches and the privations soldiers must endure at the decisive phase of a campaign . . ." Among the marches deserving special mention with reference to the South African war of 1899-1900 are the following :— The march of Yule's retiring column from Dundee ; the march of the Guards before entering Bloemfontein ; of the Queensland and Canadians to join Plumer before the relief of Mafeking ; and of the Shropshire Light Infantry and City Imperial Volunteers in the operations for heading off De Wet. All these were very creditable performances. Let no one imagine that we have forgotten, or wilfully ignored, that there is a yearly training in marching during the winter months ordained by regulation. We may well leave it to commanding officers to say whether the most is made of such training or not. The dislike for route marching is notorious; by all ranks it is considered a drudgery. This marching-out, especially in isolated stations, is besides carried out under too favourable conditions, generally by single corps, at a time of the year when the roads are not very dusty, when there is no oppres- sive heat, but, on the contrary, when brisk exercise helps to warm the body. The marching man is not hampered by the weight of ammunition or provisions. Eoute marching which takes place only once a week — when a large proportion of the officers and men are away on leave or on furlough — is insufficient, and cannot be looked upon quite in the light of training.* When it has to be done, we should like to see almost every man in the ranks, just as at an inspection parade, the minimum possible of employed men being exempted. -The employed men who do not march one day should be in the ranks * As Lieut.-Colonel John Luard very justly observes, a march from Portsmouth to Edinburgh would teach a soldier more than he can ever learn by merely walking out of his barracks twice or three times a week. Training for the March. 117 the next. The training should be for all alike ; there should be no exceptions, no excuses. We should likewise desire to see full advantage taken of all marches for large evolutions and manceuvres, ,to test the value of the dispositions made for the march, the discipline observed by all ranks, the pace and endur- ance of the troops. These marches should be made under service conditions, the various smaller units marching in a body, and not coming on the manoeuvring ground independently. In 1811, the British forces in the Peninsula had been some time in the field, nevertheless we find in the Wellington dispatches the following letter from Lord Wellington to Lieut.- G-eneral Sir Brent Spencer : — " Arganil, 20tli of March, 1811, half-past 1 p.m. " I have received your letter of this day and have issued an order on the subject it relates to. We certainly want a little practice in marching in large bodies, as at present no calculation ■can be made of the arrival of any troops at their station, much less of their baggage. " The order for the march yesterday was sent by Eeynett who reported that he had delivered it at 20 minutes to 11 ; the whole distance to be marched was not five miles, and yet the head of the column did not reach its ground till sunset ... In future I propose to order the period of departure and arrival of each division of the army, by which means I shall know exactly how all stands, and by degrees the troops will become more accus- tomed to march in large bodies on the same road." Wellington refers to the same subject in writing to Earl Bathurst. " Cuellar, 4th of August, 1812. " I am sorry to say that the British troops are by no means healthy, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to make moderate marches with them, and to encamp them in healthy situations, and that they have never failed to receive their regular food. ****** "The truth is, that neither ofiicers nor soldiers are accus- tomed to march. The soldiers are very irregular ; and, owing to their irregularities, are not able to bear the labour of marching an the heat of the sun." 118 The Art of Marching. Writing again to Earl Bathurst from Villa Toro, on the 27tb of September 1812, and alluding to the health of his army, he states, "lam afraid that our soldiers are not sufficiently exer- cised in marching, when at home or in foreign garrisons, and they become sickly as soon as they are obliged to make a march." In a letter to Lord William Bentinck he reminds him tliat the French' were better marchers than the English. It might be thought that troops in the field had enough to do without practising route marching. Evidently the Duke of Wellington was not of this opinion, as will be seen from the following orders he issued on the necessity of practising route marching during the Peninsular war. "G.A.O. " Badajoz, 31st of October, 1809. ".3. The Commander of the Forces requests the officers com- manding divisions will make their divisions march a distance of not less than three leagues in marching order twice a week, besides the formations which the nature of the ground may induce them to make iu the course of the march. The officers com- manding the cavalry and artillery will also, by frequent exercise, prevent the horses losing the habit of marching." "G.O. " Villa Formosa, 15th of April, 1811. "... It is particularly desirable that the soldiers should be kept in the habit of marching, and the Commander of the Forces requests the attention of General Officers Commanding Divisions to the orders which have been issued regarding route marching." "G.o. "Freinada, 7tli of October, 1811. " 2. The Commander of the Forces requests that General Officers Commanding Divisions will take the opportunity of the fine weather of the present moment to exercise the troops under their command respectively, according to former directions. " 3, It would tend materially to improve the health of the trooops, and would keep them in the habit of marching, if, besides the exercise, they were to march a few miles on the road once or twice a week." " G.o. " Madrid, 22nd of August, 1812. "The Commander of the Forces requests that the several Divisions of Infantry may be marched the distance of between six Training for the March. 119 and eight miles every third morning at dawn of day, and that the regiments may be exercised in some of the manoeuvres ordered for the troops, every day in which they are not marched as above ordered." It becomes indispensable for armies to be trained in peace time in all the marches that may have to be executed in time of war, marches of large and of small columns, long marches, forced marches, night marches, time marches, and combined marches. Training in marching, in moving as large masses, is in every way as necessary as training in tactics, and the conditions under which route marching should be practised in the winter should be plainly laid down in the regulations and very strictly enforced. Marching is a matter of habit, and a large portion of our soldiers take a minimum of walking exercise ; in any case what they take is of a very leisurely description, and often curtailed by restric- tions of bounds. In 1861 the second battalion of the Oxford Light Infantry (then the 52nd) was stationed at Jhansi. It having been represented to the colonel that the slothful life in cantonment was not conducive to health, he arranged to take the battalion out frequently into the country in the early morning. The companies, without arms, marched out for a distance averaging five or six miles from cantonments, when the halt was sounded ; this call was followed by the disperse, when the men had to make the best of their own way back to barracks. The soldier should not only be trained to march, but to march bearing a load, for in rapid marching the supply trains are always outdistanced. Then the troops will be compelled to rely almost entirely on what they carry. What a battalion un- hampered by any equipment can do is no criterion whatever. In practising marching we must endeavour to get conditions which approach as closely as possible to the circumstances of actual war. It has been stated that the best marching corps in the German army in the campaign of 1870-71 was the third army corps. The reason assigned for this fact was that when Prince Frederick Charles took over the command of the corps he com- pelled the men to wear their packs all through the drill season in peace time. The men accordingly were accustomed to march considerable distances bearing a heavy weight on their back ; their skin had hardened, and they could withstand the fatigues of the march without experiencing any very serious discomfort. 120 The Art of Marching. Soldiers should be practised in marching distances. In doing this the training should be progressive. The Chasseurs in the French army have a yearly training in marching, which is pro- gressive and as follows : first, by companies, when the men, with empty knapsacks, no blankets, great coats or share of tent, perform two marches a week, each march of 20 kilometers, or 121 miles; secondly, by battalion, when the men, carrying a certain amount of kit and a blanket, perform three marches a week, each march of 30 kilometers, or 18| miles ; thirdly, by regiments, in August, in full marching order, when they perform four marches a week, each march of 40 kilometers, or 25 miles. To accustom the troops to bear the fatigues of continuous marching, the practice should be carried out for several con- secutive days. In company training little real experience can be gained, for the march of such a small unit is a very easy affair. There is much to recommend in annual peace manoeuvres; in fact, there cannot be any better training for war. Large manoeuvres cost money, but money laid out in forming an army for the work which may at any moment be required of it, is never money thrown away. After all this expenditure, people complain of their unreality. This unfortunately cannot be otherwise; nevertheless there is one point above all iu which manoeuvres afford valuable instruction, and that is in marching. To derive, however, full advantage from this, all the regulations laid down should be strictly observed. When marching is universally acknowledged to constitute such an essential element of efficiency in an army, there appears to be much reason for expecting that commanding officers will pay great attention to this part of the soldier's training. There cannot be any great difficulty in making inspecting generals report on the proficiency of every battery, regiment and battalion in marching long distances, and on the apparent condition of the men and horses after this test. The great desideratum in our days is to pass rapidly from a peace to a war footing. To do this, not only do we require proper measures to have been taken in advance for recalling the reserves to the colours ; for sending them back to their respective corps ; for completing the organization of brigades, divisions, and army corps ; for drawing the necessary equipment, etc. ; but what we need more is to have accustomed the troops to sustain fatigue, and by a progressive course to have rendered them strono- and Training for the March. 121 able to undertake long and rapid marches. When the moment a,rrives that war is declared, so many will be the final preparations to attend to, that there will be no leisure to take in hand the training for the march, or any other training.* At the same time that we train the soldier in marching, we should teach him also the manner to preserve his feet, to examine his boots and his socks. Much of this can be done by oral instruction, the company officers explaining frequently the measures to be observed. The best method for preventing blisters and excoriations is to keep the boot or shoe in a very soft state by using some fatty substance. This should be particularly attended to in wet and snowy weather. The socks should be examined to see that the residue of the sweating does not accumu- late in them. Socks should be washed at least once a week. The feet should be frequently washed ; without this precaution, the fatty matter, largely secreted by the sebaceous glands of these parts, accumulates round the toes, and with the dust which adheres to the foot forms a hard crust, which during the march, as an extraneous body, gives rise to excoriations more or less deep. The nails should be cut, and those of the great toe should be cut round, so as to prevent the points at the sides pressing into the flesh. Soldiers run a threaded needle through a blister and leave the thread there ; this is not sufficient — the blister should be carefully pricked, and all the water squeezed out. * Many years ago General Sir John Mitchel was commanding H.M.'s 6th Foot at the Cape. Having forseen the probability of having sooner or later to fight the Kafirs or the Boers, and being desirous of preventing heavy losses inflicted by an enemy firing from the bush, he took extra pains with skirmishing drill, so as to teach his men the proper use of cover. Colonel Mitchel used to attend his adjutant's parades with his pockets full of stones, and, as he walked in front of the line of skirmishers, would throw a stone at any man who did not sufficiently conceal himself. 122 Tlie Art of Marclmig. CHAPTER V. PEELIBIINAEY INSPECTIONS. The men must be fresh and strong on the day of battle — A meJioal arid veterinary inspection to be made on the eve of a march — The boots to be carefully examined — Boots worn out in the retreat on Orense — Besult of foot-ailments — The boot the most important article of the soldier's kit — Marshal Bugeaud's two problems — The boot to lace low down — After a few days the number of footsore men decreases — "Frequent inspection of boots and socks — The wearing of socks — Foot wrapiJings — Marshal Saxe on wearing socks — One of the principal duties of the company officer is to look after the men's boots — The shoeing of the animals — Inspection of arms, equipment, and clothing — Our soldier's clothing not made for exertion — Difference in temperature between night and day — The weight to be carried by man and horse — Weight carried by troops in Algeria — Soldier not to be separated from his knapsack. Nothing is of greater importance than the. conduct of the march, for it is the severe strain caused by continuous marching that so thins the ranks. Marching is, in fact, more destructive than the enemy's fire. A prudent leader, who desires to be numerically as strong as possible on the day of battle, must pay the greatest attention to the marches, for, exactly in proportion to the care taken in the movements of his troops, will be the number of men available to cope with the enemy. In view to an engagement, which, for all we know, may be hotly contested, it is necessary to have soldiers who are fresh and strong; if they are debilitated by their daily efforts, they will not be in a position to endure the fatigues and strain of a .battle which may probably last for many hours. In battle there often occur incidents in which almost superhuman efforts are necessary, and at the end the best fruits of victory would be lost were the troops not in a state to pursue the enemy. Before, therefore, attempting- to explain the measures which should be taken to obtain the best results in marching, something should be said with regard to the health of the men and animals. Every man and every animal which breaks down on the march, and cannot keep up with the rest, is an impediment. Either Preliminary Inspections. 123 they will be a fruitful source of delays by reason of the slowness- of their pace, or will require to be carried or led, and afterwards- sent to the rear to be looked after. Parkes, the author of the "Practical Hygiene," considered the most effective armies to have been those in which the youngest soldiers were not below 22 years of age. Lads of 18, 19, and 20 are not fit for the field, for they have not the strength needed to undergo the hardships of military duty, they are not able ta endure the fatigue of marching. They are immature, and not equal to prolonged exertion. On the eve of a march a very careful medical and veterinary inspection should be made, so as to eliminate from the force every element of weakness : none but men and animals in the- best condition should be made to undergo the ordeal. Tlien,. during the progress of the movement, the medical and veterinary officers must keep a constant eye on their charges, so as to leave in depots, or send to the hospitals or sick horse depots in the- rear, such men and animals respectively as gradually become debilitated from the effects of fatigue and exposure. With regard to horses, those which have passed a certain ag& are not, as a rule, able to withstand the hardships and exposure of a campaign. It is prudent to set all such aside, and replace them so as to take the field under the best of conditions. The keen soldier often makes very light of small ailments or uneasy symptoms. He detests to give in, and often allows matters to go too far, by doing which he aggravates his state,. which, if taken in hand in proper time, would have been curable in a few days. It is on this account that the medical officers- cannot be over-careful. Next in importance to the medical inspection come the boots.^ Baron Lejeune states that at Boulogne, in 1805, he received orders from Marshal Berthier, whose aide-de-camp he was, not to- leave the place and follow the army to the Ehine till he had sent off by the quickest route for Germany 300,000 pairs of shoes, which were to be delivered to him from the military stores. Having completed his task, Lejeune rejoined the Emperor, and could not conceal from his Majesty the irritation he felt at having been used like a contractor. Napoleon upbraided him,, and took pains to make him understand the impotance of the service that had been assigned to him, for he said, " Shoes- help on marches, and marches win battles." But the French 124 The Art of Marching. managed to win battles even when poorly shod. After his iirst victories in Italy, in the spring of 1796, Bonaparte issued a triumphant proclamation to his soldiers. After reminding them of their deeds, he proceeds : " Destitute at first, you have now everything. You have gained battles without cannons ; passed rivers without bridges ; made forced marches without shoes ; bivouacked without bread." To Sir John Burgoyne's question addressed to Wellington — which was the first requirement of a soldier ? the Duke replied, " A pair of boots, the second a pair of boots for a change, the third a pair of soles for repairs." General Quentin, an able officer, had the bad fortune of being selected by the Directory to command in an invasion of England in the summer of 1796, the landing to be effected on the coast of Yorkshire. He was given a force of 3000 men, of whom only one-third were French. There were no stores, the men were in a piteous state of raggedness, and in wretched health ; they had no shirts, no shoes. Eeally this was a bad beginning for a difiScult enterprise. Much of the excellence of the march will depend on the shoeing of the foot soldier. The more pains the regimental officers take in seeing that their men are supplied with good serviceable boots, and with boots that fit them properly, the fewer will be the number of footsore and lame men. A soldier who becomes footsore is nearly as fruitless as a wounded man. Our army is small enough as it is, and cannot afford to lose a single man from the ranks. This consideration alone should make our officers very particular on this point. Shoes soon wear out. In the retreat on Orense the shoes of Craufurd's Brigade were nearly all worn out, from marching con- stantly in snow and rain over miserable roads. Many officers and men marched with bare feet. " It was not only that battle and sickness had thinned the ranks," writes Lieut.-Golonel Henderson with reference to the army of the Confederacy, "but that those whose health had been proof against continued hardships, and whose strength and spirit were still equal to further efforts, were so badly shod that a few long marches over indifferent roads were certain to be more productive of casualties than a pitched battle." * " What matter if our shoes are worn ? "What matter if our feet are torn ? " * Lieut.-Colonel G. P. E. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. ii. p. 251. Preliminary Inspections. 125 So sung the light-hearted Confederates sitting round their camp- fires ; but it did matter, and it mattered much, for Lee's army was reduced in effectives by the failure of thousands of barefooted men to march with him into Maryland. We might imagine that sufficient care was paid by the- Germans to the shoeing of their soldiers. Notwithstanding all the pains they generally take, the Prussian Guards corps, in 1870, was compelled to leave at Dieulouard, on the Moselle, 500 foot- sore men. Brandt von Lindow writes, "Foot ailments therefore lessen not only the number of serviceable recruits, but also of the soldiers required for daily duty; they render defective the marching power of the soldier, they diminish the pleasure of a soldier's calling, they tend to make him pusillanimous, faint- hearted, and churlish, and they fill the hospitals." The shoeing of the army has its special importance. Badly made shoes or boots injure the feet and prevent the soldier from marching. Badly sewn, and made of inferior leather, they soon wear out and compel the soldier to halt or to walk barefooted. Marbot exposes the crass Ignorance of one of the generals of the army of Italy. One of the better-educated officers serving under him one day " came to ask for leave to proceed to the neighbouring town to order himself a pair of boots. ' By Jove ! ' said the general, ' that will suit well ; as you are going to a shoe- maker, just come here and take my measure and order me a pair too.' The officer, much surprised, replied that he could not take his measure, as, never having been a shoemaker, he had not the least idea how to set about it. ' What ! ' cried the general. ' I sometimes see you pass whole days looking at the mountains, pencilling and drawing lines, and when I ask you what you are doing, you answer that you are measuring the mountains ; well, if you can measure objects more than a league away from you, what do you mean by telling me that you cannot take my measure for a pair of boots when you have got me under your hand? Come, take my measure without any more ado.' " Boots are, everything being considered, the most important article of the soldier's kit. The hand-sewn ammunition boot issued during the Nile campaign was a good boot ; it was made of good material ; the sole, however, was too hard and rigid, which made the marching man step out with the ungainly and heavy tread of the agricultural labourer. This could easily be 126 The Art of Marching. overcome, for the rigidity in the sole was simply adopted with the object of making the boot more durable. In long marches the sole of the boot wears out very rapidly, principally at the toe, and this comes about from the weariness ■of the soldier : for in that state he does not lift his feet properly, but drags his toes along the ground. This and the consequent repairs, which are not easy to be effected in the field, can be ■obviated by using toe-plates. The heels likewise should be so protected. That very practical soldier, Marshal Bugeaud, considered that possibly the two greatest problems in war were to find a harness which is not likely to gall the horses, and boots which do not hurt the feet. To the foot soldier he recommends to have souliers qui te chaussent legeretnent et commodement. Whoever, having to undertake a long walk, would ever think of putting on a new pair of boots ? He would pick out a pair which have, by wear, assumed the shape of his feet, and by greasing have become supple in the leather. It must be so a fortiori with the soldier when he commences a campaign : the boots he must take into wear should be such as he is accustomed to ; boots which are freshly issued from store are not the thing. The boot or shoe, to be good, should first of all be made of a good quality of leather; the sole thick, consistent, and well tanned. The boot or shoe should be loose rather than tight, in the interior a little longer than the foot. The heels should be broad and low. Boots should not be too heavy. A soldier lifts his foot 2112 times in a mile, and, if heavily shod, simply with a view to prolong the wear of his boots, it will be seen what a heavy extra weight he will have to lift in a day's march. If the boot is lightened by one ounce, there will be a saving of labour equal to ten ounces lifted off his back. It has been reported that the soldiers of the German army are now shod with shoes having soles made of a composition into which aluminium nails are driven, with the object of giving all the wear of the leather soles, with about one half of the weight of the same. Eussian soldiers are so accustomed to long boots, that they cannot understand how other troops can march in high-lows and gaiters. Their preference for long boots is easily understood when we take into account the awful mud of their country. Preliminary Inspectioiis. 127 The boot should be made to lace low down over the instep, so as to give full support to the foot. When this point is neglected, there is too much play of the foot, which will in turn give rise to sore heels. The foot gets hot, the skin gets tender, and a blister forms quickly. Have not all of us suffered from sore feet even when wearing the very best-made boots? For the first marches the footsore men appear to be usually on the increase. After some days the number of men suffering from foot ailments undergoes a very sensible reduction. Lecturing on the march of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force, Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Chapman says, "For some days after the march commenced, the daily increase in the number of men reported to be footsore or unable to march, through weariness or general debility, was calculated to make the General hesitate in maintaining the rate of marching ; the limit of the strain, however, seemed to have been reached when the long march ,out of Ghazni was accomplished, and from that time many footsore men rejoined the ranks." * Nothing is of more consequence than frequent inspections of boots and socks. These articles should be examined most minutely. The feet should also be inspected often, and the men instructed to wash thera, bathing them with tepid water, if pro- curable. A few lumps of alum, if to be found handy, should be dissolved in the water. It would be a sensible plan to have in each company an expert for cutting nails, paring corns, pricking blisters, and treating foot injuries generally. This should be his special duty on the line of march. The leather of the boots can be rendered soft by rubbing it with flsh oil, dubbing, or fat ; this will also make the leather last and to a greater or lesser extent waterproof. Soaping the inside of socks is a good plan. Quite recently Colonel von Spohr, in the pages of the Deutsche Eeeres-Zeitung, has expressed himself against wearing socks, and especially socks of woollen materials. He states that the bare foot inside the shoe or boot is far and away the best for sporting and military purposes. Woollen materials increase the perspira- tion, and then retain it, with the result that the skin is weakened, rendered more sensitive and less capable of endurance. If the * Lieut.-Colonel B. F. Chapman, Eoyal United Service Institution, Lecture No. ox., vol. XXT. p. 29tj. 128 TJie Art of Marching. soldier must wear some sort of foot covering under the boots, he recommends foot-wrappings of linen or cotton, which are more cleanly than the wearing of socks soaked with perspiration. He claims for foot- wrappings that they are more serviceable than any kind of sock or stocking, can be easily put on with a little practice, allow of a free movement within the boot or shoe, require no darning, and can be kept clean by regular washing. The dispensing with the sock is no new idea ; it was recom- mended by Marshal Saxe, on the grounds that experience had demonstrated that all the old French soldiers who wore no socks, but smeared their feet with tallow or fat, did so with advantage. The marshal states that by observing this precaution the feet never get excoriated on the march ; dampness does not penetrate to them so easily, because it is impotent to act on the grease, and the leather of the boot does not shrink. Socks, by retaining the humidity, cause much injury to the foot. Most of what refers to the soldier's boots falls into the province of the company officer, for he must be deeply interested in keeping as many men as possible in the ranks. To see that his men are well and comfortably shod is one of the principal duties of the infantry officer ; this important duty must not be confined to stated periods, it must go on continuously. If, after the ofScer has done all he can to see that the men are well fitted, to explain to them the best measures to observe to keep their feet in sound order, to inspect boots, socks, and feet frequently, men fall out footsore, then there must be some personal neglect, and for rendering himself unfit for duty, the soldier very justly lays himself open to punishment. The care which should be bestowed on the shoeing of the men applies in a- like manner to the shoeing of the troop horses and transport animals. Every attention must be paid to the state of their shoes, the animals being freshly shod for the march. It is well to remember that when any considerable amount of road work, or work on different grounds, has to be done, the duration of the wear of shoes will seldom exceed a fortnight. To shoe an animal too frequently, besides being more costly, causes injury to the foot. What shoeing is done should be done very carefully, and the materials should be of the best. The arms, rifles, and guns should be of the best ; the guns of the longest range. It is necessary to examine carefully the Preliminary Inspections. 129 arms, the equipment, and the uniforms. The clothing of the soldier has a good deal to do with his power of resisting the hardships of a march. The story is often told of what the Lifeguardsman who had done great deeds at Waterloo said he would prefer in the matter of dress for service. " I should like to take off my coat, and turn up my shirt-sleeves over my elbow." Readers of Marbot's Memoirs may remember his description of the eccentric General Macard, who, when he was about to charge at the head of his troops, invariably shouted, " Behold, I am going to dress like a beast." Thereupon he would remove his coat, his vest, his shirt, and keep on nothing except his plumed hat, his leather breeches, and his boots. " Stripped thus to his waist," writes Marbot, " General Macard offered to view a chest almost as shaggy as a bear's, which gave him a very strange appearance. When he had once got on what he very truly called his beast's clothing. General Macard would dash forward recklessly, sabre in hand, and swearing like a pagan, on the €nemy's cavalry." But he very seldom got at them, for the sight of this giant,, half naked, hairy all over, and yelling like a fury, was enough for his opponents, who fled on all sides. When we look at artisans and labourers employed in doing heavy work, what do we see, but that they discard any article of apparel which may impede the freedom of their movements. The neck and chest, above all, are bared. The cut of_ the soldier's dress is just the reverse, and there can be no better proof that his dress is not made for severe exertion than one of his very first acts in marching. He then unhooks the collar and un- buttons the top of his tunic, though to do so without orders is an act contrary to discipline. Amongst the drawbacks to the improvement of our uniforms stands the necessity of giving to our soldiers a smart, well set-up appearance, and a well-fitting dress which will induce other men to enlist.* I have heard it generally remarked that the uniform of the South Wales Lancers, when a squadron of that corps was over in * Napoleon, in 1806, dressed the infantry in a white coat, with a view of injuring British oommeroe, for the French oonld not procure the indigo for colour- ing the cloth of their uniforms except from England. White had been the colour of the uniforms of the Eoyalist troops ; but to clothe troops which were constantly bivouacking in white was preposterous, and the emperor had no sooner set eyes on •their dirty and stained coats than he abolished them. K 130 The Art of Marching. England, was very picturesque. It seems, nevertheless, a thousand pities that, when a uniform for that body of cavalry had to be devised, a new departure was not taken. It would have been more suitable to have given the men, in place of a close-fitting tunic— smart, but not serviceable — a blouse like the one worn by our Indian cavalry, gathered in at the waist, with ample sleeves, and forming a most serviceable dress for any cavalry, whilst by no means unbecoming.* We cannot boast of much taste or originality in our military clothing. A forage cap for our staif officers has lately been borrowed from a foreign military power, which gives our officers a look which is certainly anything but English. Lord Howe, who was second in command to General Aber- cromby in the expedition against Fort Carillon, at the junction of Lakes Ohamplain and G-eorge, at the end of the peninsula of Ticonderoga, in 1758, was a very practical soldier. Eecognizing that long coat skirts and long hair were not compatible with rough service in a densely wooded country, he ordered that both should be cut. He, besides, gave the soldiers leggings to protect their legs from briars, and caused them to carry in the empty space in their knapsacks, thirty pounds of meal, to make them independent of supply trains. The German soldiers sorely resented the cutting of their pig- tails. Horatio Gates writes on this point, " Lord Howe was mistaken in cropping the Germans. Some, nay, many of them, would sooner have parted with their scalps than with their plaited tails to be trimmed a la Sauvage." Owing to the long ranging powers and accuracy of modern arms, the soldier must now be dressed in a colour as nearly invisible as it is possible to devise. Military authorities have admitted that the old well-honoured and traditional scarlet of the British army is not adapted for service in our days, as it presents too distinct a mark for the enemy's artillery and rifle fire. In the Indian Mutipy we had regiments from the Punjab dressed in drab, and now khaki rung, or dye, is used as the most suitable material for colouring the uniforms on service. The colour adopted by the Punjab troops * The following was telegraphed home from Esoourt, November 5th, 1899 : " The Imperial Light Horse rode out to-day on patrol duty ; the men had left their khaki tunics behind, and were in their shirt-sleeves. This practice is likely to be generally followed before the campaign is over." Breliminary Inspections. 131 was iu keeping with the fawn colour of the hills and plains of the Punjab and Scinde. Not only have we adopted khaki as the colour for our service kit, but the white pipe-clayed belts have given way to brown leather, and the gun-carriages and ammunition-wagons for service are painted an olive-green colour, like khaki. The 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys), on arrival at the Cape, applied this shade of colour to their grey horses, to render them less conspicuous. We should always look at what is practicable and at what is dictated by common sense. The officer and non-commissioned officer, owing to their distinct duties of command, soon attract attention, and are made the mark for the rifle ; the conspicuous- ness of the officers is increased by a difference in their dress and weapons. The officers should consequently be dressed, and also armed, as much as possible like the men.* The colours are now no longer taken into action, for the colour party made too con- spicuous a target ; why should not all badges and distinctive articles be set aside as well ? In the light of recent events, it has been found necessary to preserve the officer from being a special mark for the enemy .f He is more valuable than the rank and file, therefore all dis- tinctions of dress, equipment, and armament which may point him out to the enemy's marksmen should be ordered to be put away. This should not be optional; it must come as an order. In many of the countries in which our army has to campaign, there is a marked difference in the temperature between the day and the night. As an instance, we may take the march from Kabul to Kandahar, of which it has been written that having to march in the same clothes when the thermometer was nearly at freezing-point as when it reached 110° was the cause of great inconvenience to the troops. In any case, when inspecting the clothing of the soldier, it is well to recollect that what might last for a year in garrison, will have to be replaced much sooner in the field. The clothing should fit easily, for tight-fitting garments wear out and tear much easier than loose ones. In a campaign which is likely to last for several seasons, it is prudent to see well beforehand what the * In some old prints of the first Highland troops, the oflScer is represented as carrying a musket besides his claymore. t The heavy losses in officers in South Africa may be found to have been brought about as much by the eagerness of the officers to be first to close with the enemy as from their distinctive dress. 132 The Art of Marching. troops will need in the way of clothing when the weather turns cold. A very important matter is the weight which the foot soldier and the troop horse should be made to carry. Their being burdened with a certain weight is done with the object of lighten- ing the trains; nevertheless, for both the weight should be reduced to a minimum, due allowance always being made for efSciency. A mass of men move slowly, but if bent under a heavy weight, they will move more slowly still. It will be necessary, therefore, to strive to determine the strictest necessary articles of apparel, ammunition, and provisions to be carried by the man or horse. All beyond this should be discarded. According to Napoleon, there are five things the soldier should never be without. His firelock, his ammunition, his knapsack, provisions (for at least four days), and his intrenching tools. The soldier should be cautioned against burdening himself with any article which is not strictly necessary. He should be reminded how more than one man and one horse have remained on the road on account of having one or two pounds too much on their backs. We have done much towards reducing the weight carried by the soldier. In Algeria the Zouaves and the Tiraillev/rs Indigenes — what we used to call Tureos in the Crimea — are charged with a load of great bulk and weight. Knapsack, great coat, mfess tin, portion of tente d'abri, camp cooking-pots, provisions, and ammu- nition. This load is carried on service under a tropical sun, in the desert, yet as a rule few of the men fall out on the march. This is due to the careful and very severe physical training the men are subjected to. The Tureos are a fine, hardy lot of men, and march with great elan." The French soldier is a wonderful beast of burden. Here is what Sergeant Bourgogne relates of the contents of his knapsack when he left Moscow on the 19th of October, 1812 : " I spent the time in making an examination of my knapsack, which seemed too heavy. I found several pounds of sugar, some rice, some biscuit, half a bottle of liqueur, a woman's Chinese silk dress, embroidered in gold and silver, several gold and silver ornaments, amongst them a bit of the cross of Ivan the Great — at least a piece of the outer covering of silver gilt, given me by a man in the company who had helped in taking it down. Preliminary Inspections. 133 Besides these, I had my uniform, a woman's large riding-cloak (hazel colour, lined with green velvet ; as I could not guess how it was worn, I imagined its late owner to be more than six feet high), then two silver pictures in relief, a foot long, and eight inches high ; one of them represented the judgment of Paris on Mount Ida, the other showed Neptune on a chariot formed by a shell drawn by sea-horses, all in tlie finest workmanship. I had, besides, several lockets and a Eussian prince's spitoon set with brilliants. These things were intended for presents, and had been found in cellars when the houses were burnt down." * Here is a curious inventory ; we should much like to know what Tommy Atkius would think of setting out for a march of 260 leagues with a knapsack so loaded. The curious part is the small number of cartridges the soldiers carried ; Bourgogne tells us that his cartridge-case contained sixteen. This famous knapsack was lost the day after the battle of Krasnoe, when the Guardsman had carried it a month all but a day. Want of mobility was the chief cause of the British disasters during the closing months of 1899 in South Africa. General Count Luchino dal Verme remarks on our troops at that period, " they require large convoys for their provisions, they have many infantry battalions well organized and well led, but with endless requirements for men and officers, and worst of all, they move slowly, the reason being that the English soldier does not march fast, that he carries very little, and grumbles a good deal at having to carry so much." It is in every respect objectionable to separate the soldier from his knapsack or valise. The difficulties of carrying extra rations and ammunition are much increased when this is done. Once the knapsacks are left behind, the greatest embarrassment is experienced in getting them back, and, should a combat end unfavourably, the men will most probably never see their kits again. The men must carry their intrenching tools ; if these are loaded on carts, they may not be forthcoming when the troops quit the roads, at a time when they are most required. There are occasions in which the packs are carried for the soldiers, but this can only be regarded as an exception, for it adds very much to the transport. The soldier should carry a very limited kit, but no roUing-up * " Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne," p. 57. 134 The Art of Marching. of things into a blanket, as it was done when landing in the Crimea, and on various other occasions. This plan has very seldom proved satisfactory. VVhatever equipment is considered best for adoption, it should be taken into use, and the soldier should be made to stick to it. Packets of reserve ammunition can be stowed away in the bottom of the valise. Eoom can also be found there for a pair of socks, a pair of camp shoes, a towel, and extra rations for one or more days. Similarly with the troop horses and transport animals, every care should be taken that they are not overloaded, and that the weight to be drawn is in strict proportion to the power of draught of the diffei'ent animals employed. In point of organization there is also the composition of the army trains to be considered. The impedimenta are always a great source of trouble, and it is very . necessary to limit the number of vehicles, or of pack animals, which follow closely on the combatants. Many of the above matters have been considered in peace time, and the conclusions have been incorporated in the different regulations ; nevertheless, it is necessary to give a personal super- intendence to each point, and to see by a far-reaching inspection that the injunctions have been strictly carried out. In exceptional cases it may be found necessary to make special arrangements. ( 135 ) CHAPTER VI. PEEPAEATIONS FOR THE MAKOH. Prepare a memorandum of things that require being attended to — Marshal Can- robert's advice — Orders to contain nothing superfluoua— G-eueral orders give a general idea — Officers to compile their own aide m^moire — Principal points to attend to on the eve of a march — The object in view — All that regards the enemy and the theatre of operations — The number of troops to be prepared ; the stores, provisions, and transport requisite for a given period — Distinguish between what is to be carried forward and what left behind — See that ample funds are provided — All detachments to be called in — ^Arrangements to be made for sick men and sick horses — Men and horses to be inured to hard work — Minute inspections by commanding officers— Provision of water-carts — Appointment of special officers — Troop of orderlies — Must have good maps — Officers employed to reconnoitre the roads — To be adequately escorted — Statistical information — Detail returns to be furnished — Measures for the lines of communication — Assign the roads best adapted for each arm of the service — Obtain reliable guides — Special body of scouts — Drawing up the order of march — Plan of action to be known by all— Feeding of the soldier before he sets out on a march — About orders — Lanterns to be provided for night marches — Transport vehicles to be distinctly marked — Eepairs of the roads — Orders for the crossing of the Belgian frontier in 1815." On service it is prudent not to trust entirely to one's memory. The ^multitude of matters which demand attention, the constant interruptions, and the sudden changes in the condition of things, often drive certain details out of the mind. It is wise, therefore, to make out a memorandum of things which require to be attended to, and to run one's eye over it daily to make sure that everything which should have been done has been remembered. Marshal Canrobert gave sound advice when he wrote, " An officer charged with the arrangements of any military movement or operation, should never trust to the iatelligence of the subordi- nates who are to execute them. He should anticipate and provide against all the misconceptions or stupidity which it is possible to foresee, and give all the minute directions which he would think necessary if he knew the officer charged with the execution of the operation to be the most stupid of mankind." There is a very true saying that what is everybody's business becomes nobody's business. A staff officer will have to attend to 136 The Art of Marching. many matters, simply as a precaution against some necessary thing being overlooked. In war it is no good to think of manif things, we must think of all, because it so often happens that the forgotten point is the very one of which the adversary will take advantage. Napoleon was not content with planning, he went much further, he devised the means, and sketched out the manner in which these plans were to be carried out. He had the capacity of supervising the operations down to the most minute detail, nothing escaped his penetrating eye, nothing was ever too great or too small for his notice. There are endless minutiae in arranging the details of the march which a staff ofScer should not neglect. To issue orders which are brief, explicit, and impossible to mistake, cannot be done without a certain amount of practice. The perfection of an order lies in this, that it contains in the clearest terms all that is necessary to be done, but nothing superfluous or confusing. The general orders confine themselves to a general idea, to general indications, giving the object of the march or movement, which should be so clearly expressed as to be almost impossible of misinterpretation. It is left to the generals who command the smaller units, divisions and brigades, to descend into details, and to indicate the manner in which the general idea is to be carried out. Orders and instructions may have to be framed at any hour of the day or night. This fact of itself shows how carefully a staff ofBcer should keep his appetites under control, so as to^have his mind always clear, because he may be called upon at any moment to draft a very important, and possibly, complicated set of instructions. Having the brain clouded by over-eating, and by too free libations, is not quite the state one would choose to be in when suddenly required to deal with a difScult subject. Prince Hohenlohe Ingelfingen quotes in his " Letters on Infantry," a most singular and almost incredible case. He writes : " I could name to you a certain staff which I by chance happened to join just as, in the evening after a very hard day, it took possession of a deserted house. Their supplies had not come up, and not an atom of bread or meat could be found in the house — nothing but raw eggs and a great quantity of champagne. Hungry and thirsty as they were, they fell upon what there was, and even the most, temperate became utterly drunk. In the middle of the night there was an alarm, and orders came for a Preparations for the March. 137 further advance. These orders had to be worked out with the map, various directions had to be given, and the orderly officers had to ride off. They all became sober at once ; no mistake was made in the orders, no directions were incorrectly given, and nothing was forgotten, nor omitted." In noting down what are likely to be the points which are sure to demand attention in preparing for a march, some items will certainly be touched upon with which some, or possibly many, ofificers are familiar. Let us persuade each ofiicer to pre- pare his own pocket-book, in which to insert only those things which he does not quite know, or finds hard to recollect. This aide memoire, which he has studied to compile, will serve him better than any of the printed memorandum books he can buy. The following are the principal points which strike us as having to be attended to by the staff on the eve of setting out for a march, so that there may be no necessity for retracing one's steps, and go twice over the same ground. First. To consider carefully the object of the intended march in relation to the general plan of operations. To endeavour to form a proper estimate of the difficulties which will have to be overcome. Secondly. To obtain from all possible sources the most reliable information regarding the organization, numbers, armament, tactics, and resources of the enemy, as well as of the positions he is likely to occupy. A fair knowledge must be obtained of the climate of the country to be entered or crossed, of its fertility^ means of communication, condition of the roads, direction of the paths, seasons of Hood, unbridged rivers, and periodical epidemics. Much of this can be gathered from statistical returns, narra- tives of travellers, and conversation with the most intelligent and well-informed people of the country itself. Much is generally furnished by the Intelligence Staff. Thirdly. Estimate the number and composition of the troops that will be required to effect the object in view; the gross amount of provisions, ammunition, warlike stores, shelter and appliances for the sick and injured, etc., that will be required for a given period of time; always allowing a good margin, both with regard to time and quantity. Calculate what amount of land transport all these will require, and ascertain what descrip- tion of transport is best suited to the country about to be entered. 138 The Art of Marching. Note what you already possess, what can be obtained locally, or from foreign markets, and how best it can be procured. A blow must follow a blow with regular succession and per- tinacity. The adversary once hard hit must not be given time to recover. This, nevertheless, cannot be done without transport, and that in good condition, for once the enemy gets on the run, the pace becomes fast, and it is then that difficulties of transport make themselves felt. Nothing is more striking than the measures taken during the Hundred Days to prepare the French army for the field. By all accounts, the army which crossed the Meuse in June 1815, if it was deficient in sound^discipline, it was, nevertheless, a magnificent one. However, it should never be forgotten that Frederick the ■Great, Napoleon, and some other great commanders, were despotic sovereigns, and how greatly this fact enabled them to give full -effect to their great abilities for organization. The animosity, the ill feeling which other nations have so very clearly shown towards England for so many years past, but more especially during the present war in South Africa, should give us ample food for reflection. This state of things should make us adopt measures for insuring a real preparedness for war. What we much need is some genius to elaborate a thorough and lasting system for calling out the forces of the empire in good time and in sufficient quantity, and then a really patriotic government which will pass it into law. At the bottom of our often-told state of unreadiness is the matter of cost; but, as a writer very justly remarks, unpreparedness costs ten times as much as what the most lavish overprovision would have cost. That Great Britain and the Colonies are prepared to make great sacrifices, has been proved in a very conspicuous manner during the last war. As Alison very justly observes, " energy cannot in a campaign ^tone for the neglect of previous preparations." Amongst other preparations, a deep study should be made of the theatre of war ; this study will help in determining the frontage to be occupied by the marching columns in accordance with the distance, greater or less, that they are from the enemy. We must see how it is practicable to cover the flanks, and what points will have to be occupied to secure that object. This study will assist in fixing the number of roads which can be turned to account. The total distance should be divided into suitable Preparations for the March. 139 daily marches, bearing in mind the nature of the country to be crossed, the difficulties and obstacles it presents. It will be further desirable to determine the system of provisioning best adapted to the circumstances, to define the zone assigned to each column for calling in aid the local resources, and to regulate the march of the rolling magazines.' Measures must be taken for the speedy repair of the tele- graph wires and railways on the line the army is intended to follow in its advance. Instructions must be drawn up for the officers commanding the independent Cavalry Divisions and for those commanding columns, indicating the general situation, the object of the movement, and the co-operation expected from all. Directions must also be framed for the proper execution of the work on the lines of communication, the protection of telegraphs and railways, instalments of hospitals, sick horse depots, etc. It may be assumed that the medical authorities will have earte blanche to order whatever they may think will be needed for the campaign. It is necessary to arrange for what is to be carried forward and for what is to be left behind. All that is not strictly necessary must be left behind, proper storage and caretakers being provided for it. Every article should also be distinctly labelled, so that no mistake could be possible afterwards. The subject of means will no doubt have been considered by the Government before it has come to recognize the necessity for undertaking warlike operations. It will nevertheless be prudent in the preparations to see that the funds at the General's disposal are ample, more than sufficient to meet all possible calls. Great undertakings are badly carried out with small means, and money never comes amiss at any time. If one has it not, one must do without it, but with it matters will always go much better and more rapidly. " Nothing can hamper the operations of an army more than the want of specie. The withholding of coin does not make a war less costly, but on the contrary raises prices, promotes frauds, and in the long run adds greatly to the gross cost." * The student who wishes to form a just conception of the serious embarrassments which arise from a want of funds, would do well to read Moreau's correspondence when he was preparing for his campaign of 1800 in Germany. * Lieut. -Colonel T. A. Le Mesurier, " Commissariat in the Field." 140 The Art of Marching. It seems almost impossible to realize Wellington's difficulties in the end of December, 1813. He wrote: — "We are over- whelmed with debts, and I can scarcely stir out of my house on account of the public creditors wanting to demand payment of what is due to them." Again the following month he says, " There is not in the military chest a shilling to pay for anything that the country could afford, and our credit is already gone in this country." Transport, to say nothing of provisions, will always run away with much money, and without transport an army cannot move. The history of our wars has shown the very great importance which the transport has in all military operations, but we will not go into this question, as we have already had our say on the subject in another of our works.* Here let us give an instance to show what want of money leads to. After the battle of Salamanca, Lord Wellington wrote : — " The want of money in the army has become a most serious evil ; and we may trace to this want many of the acts of plunder and indiscipline by which we are disgraced every day. We must be regularly supplied or we cannot go on.'' As the force should march as strong as possible, it is necessary to call in all detachments. If we accustom ourselves to do this on ordinary occasions, we shall not forget to do so on more vital ones. Frederick the Great reminds us that it was an ancient adage that he who separates his forces will be beaten in detail. That great commander esteemed it a most essential quality for a general to know how to induce the enemy to make large detach- ments in order that he could defeat them one by one, or attack the opponent's army during their absence. Napoleon laid it down as a rule that " no force should be detached on the eve of battle, because affairs may change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforce- ments which might enable him to resume the offensive and render your premature dispositions disastrous." It was a maxim ever on his lips to prepare for a decisive action by bringing in every available man, for no one could tell when the result might turn on the presence of a few men more or less. The reader will recall to his mind the action of the first Consul on the eve of the memorable Battle of Marengo. During * See " The Organization and Administration of the Lines of Communication," pp. 361, 395, 405. Preparations for the March. 141 tlie 13th June 1800, Bonaparte was impatient to learn the movements of the Austrian army. He feared lest Melas should ■escape him by making a detour round the right flank of the French army, or should withdraw to Genoa. To learn what was going on he detached Murat to the Scrivia, and sent Desaix, who had only quite recently rejoined him from Egypt, with a division to reconnoitre in the direction of Rivalta and Novi. As soon as Bonaparte became cognizant of the enemy's plans, he despatched one of his aides-de-camp to recall Desaix, and, as every one knows, that brilliant soldier arrived only in time to turn an incipient defeat into a dazzling victory. His adversary acted in the same way. On the morning of the eventful 14th of June, Melas was informed that shortly before, the Austrian squadron which occupied Acqui had to fall back before a large French cavalry corps. Melas, hastily concluding this corps to be Suchet's exploring cavalry, recalled from beyond the Bormida the cavalry brigade Nimptsch, of Elsnitz' cavalry division, and sent it in the direction of Canta- lupo. He thus weakened his cavalry, his most important arm, looking at the nature of the ground about Marengo, by 17 squadrons, or 2340 men. The searching medical inspection of the troops must be conducted betimes, after which arrangements must be made for the sick and weakly that are left behind. A due proportion of military and medical assistance must be detailed for this purpose. All the kits of sick men, their arms and accoutrements, should remain behind or be sent with them wherever they go. The same applies to the men attending on the sick or on sick horses. All sickly horses which have been weeded out will require a proper establishment of attendants. If practicable, remounts should be obtained to replace them, for it is necessary to keep each corps as much as possible up to its service strength. These and similar matters must be attended to in time, so as to prevent their troubling the mind of the staff officers at the time of starting. While all these things are being done, the men and horses should be gradually inured to hard work. The cavalry and artillery must be brought gradually into working condition, for horses distressed at the start never recover. Animals for service in the field must be robust, not too fat, and fit to endure serious fatigue. 142 The Art of Marching. Cavalry should not be collected in very large bodies before they are required in the campaign. This, both because a great number of horses gathered together becomes a fertile source of sickness, as well as on account of the difiSculty generally experienced in procuring forage for a large number of animals. An ample reserve of horses for cavalry, artillery, and mounted infantry should be forthcoming in time. What an insufficiency of horses actually means is revealed by what occurred in the campaign of 1812. Though Prussia, and every province the French army had passed through before crossing the Niemeu, had been swept of horses, yet, before it reached Wilna in June, the army, for want of horses, had been compelled to leave behind 100 guns and 500 wagons. This was at the very commencement of the campaign, with a very long march in prospect. It was a bad start. In the operations for the capture of Cronje's force, success was entirely due to the rapid movements of French's cavalry division. The operations after the capture of Bloemfontein were stayed by the debility of the horses. The necessity for making good the constant drain in horses is, possibly of greater consequence than the replenishing of the casualties made in the ranks of the men. We have absolutely unlimited resources to draw upon from all parts of the world, but we must see that things are not done meanly, and that proper steps are taken long before the necessity makes itself felt. However careful may have been the training of the men serving with the colours, those joining from the reserves will have more or less lost the habit of marching. Any opportunity which may present itself should therefore be taken advantage of to get them to regain the habit of covering long distances in marching order without distress. Everything must be in the best possible order and, as far as practicable, complete before the march commences, Commanding officers must be reminded to make a very minute inspection of their corps, and to note all that is wanting to complete or is in need of repair. It should be established beyond doubt that all indents for the authorized camp equipment, tools, ammunition, clothing, farrier's stores, provisions, forage, and transport have been sent in by all parties concerned ; that they have been provided in full, or otherwise it should be ascertained what steps have been taken to ensure the remaining deficiencies being made Preparations for the March. 143 good. Also that what has been obtained is in good order and in every way fit for use. For a march, a supply of water-carts is indispensable ; these should be distributed, amongst the different units. In India the Bheestie is a grand institution. This invaluable servant marches alongside of the troops with his mussuek slung on his back. As its contents are consumed, he runs to the nearest stream, spring, or well close to the line of route to refill ; he then runs up to overtake his company, filling the soldier's drinking-cups or giving them a drink out of his bag. The men get parched from heat and dust, and experience a constant desire for water ; * not only should the officers allow them to satisfy this longing, but they should facilitate the means for doing so. This can be done by furnishing the men on the outer side of the sections of fours with canvas buckets, which they can fill as they pass by streams, fountains, or wells. These buckets they can hand round to their comrades, a measure which will conduce to the men keeping their ranks. Orders might be passed forward for the inhabitants to place vessels filled with water along the road the troops are moving by ; the soldiers would then find water for refilling their water-bottles. In the march of Osman Pasha's army from Widdin to Plevna, the troops suffered much from thirst. The Pasha sent a mounted party with three- horse carts in advance of the column. This party had to estab- lish tubs with drinking-water for the troops coming on. We can never be too careful about water, for impure and contaminated water produces typhoid.t A marvellous thing in an Indian march is the doodh-wallah. A force marches out for the field, and soon every corps has attached to it in a mysterious manner a woman who procures and sells milk. These milkwomen march with the force, carrying milk upon their heads, though where they get it from is a puzzle. It is thus that by the spontaneous efforts of these enduring women each corps is supplied with milk. There are sometimes certain special officers to be appointed in orders, such as a baggage-master, an assistant provost marshal, a superintendent of signalling, an intelligence officer, a survey officer, a postmaster, a compiler of progress reports, a censor of * It is a well-known fact that playing with a straw in the mouth stays a craving for drinking water ; it has the eifeot of keeping the mouth moist. t Some medical officers hold as the main cause of typhoid the difficulty of disposing of the human exoretion,B. 144 The Art of Marching. the press. Were a list kept of officers possessing qualifications in languages, drawing, surveying, signalling, etc., this would facili- tate laying hands on a thoroughly capable officer when any special service is required. A troop of orderlies, men picked for their intelligence and courage, should be organized, and would be found more useful than orderlies furnished periodically by regiments. This troop should be attached permanently to headquarters, taking their orders only from the General Commanding and his staff. There is nothing more important in a campaign than good reliable maps. What is needed is not a skeleton map, but one rich in details. A good map should show not only the public roads and highways, but all the secondary roads and even some of the most practicable lanes. The latter may be useful in sending reinforcements to the lateral columns.* An officer on service will seldom find a necessity for using his sword, but he will have constantly to refer to his map. We who know the value of a good map and a good chart, can well pity Charles Neufeld's guide, who contemptuously called following one's progress by the aid of a map " walking on paper." It is taken for granted that a supply of reliable and up-to- date maps have been procured ; f these must be distributed. It is, besides, necessary to reconnoitre the actual state of the roads to the front. Sharp officers should be told oif for this duty, and if the enemy is about, these officers should be adequately escorted. The Duke in the Peninsula had several officers who assisted him in exploring and acquiring information. Colonel Waters % was unrivalled as an intelligence officer ; ubiquitous, keenly observant, he could assume any costume, play any part, speak fluent Castilian or the lowest patois, talk French if necessary with the German accent of the Alsatian. Colquhoun Grant was another of the same stamp, upon whose explorations and reconnaissances Wellington could put implicit trust. * Many of ua well recollect how, in the war of 1870-71, the French officers were furnished with maps of Germany, but with none of their own country. From South Africa complaints have reached England of the want of good and reliable maps of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. t A good map would have shown the absurdity of attempting to make a frontal attack with infantry over a river 15 feet deep, such as the river below the Modder Bridge. X The story is told that when Colonel Waters was captured during one of his reconnoitring excursions, Wellington would not have his belongings sent to him under cover of a flag of truce. " For," said his lordship, " Waters will soon find his way out," and sure enough in he came in a few days. Preparations for the March. 145 The character of the roads in advance should be ascertained as correctly as possible. The maps will give some fair idea of them, but this should be supplemented by reconnaissances and by questioning the people. We must besides take the weather into account. A change in the weather often occurs after the troops have set out ; it will be a lamentable occurrence, but it is one against which it is impossible to provide. Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich believes that the faculty of sur- veying ahead of the columns is not understood at all or appre- ciated. He writes, " If the country is at all hilly, he (the profes- sional surveyor) should be able to indicate the position and height of the hill in advance to a distance of at least a day's march, noting the lines of drainage, the position of roads, passes, and villages ; fixing the relative altitude of all noticeable features, and placing it absolutely beyond the power of any guide to mislead a column (even on the darkest night) within the limits of the ground that he can see from the highest points that he can reach." We should strive to ascertain by diligent reconnaissances the nature of all obstacles which lie on the route we intend to follow. Before the Marengo campaign. General Marescot, who commanded the Engineers, was busy reconnoitring the whole line of the Alps ; nevertheless the little fort of Bard unexpectedly stopped the pro- gress of the French army. Its strength had evidently been under-estimated. Any officer going out to explore or to do work of a like nature should report his going out to the senior staff officer, who will, if necessary, allot him an escort or a signalling party to keep up communicatioQ with the main body. Valuable officers have been lost from having been accompanied by too small an escort, or by one composed of native levies or allies, generally unreliable men in cases of surprise. On dangerous service, with troops that speak a strange language, and with a barbarous enemy who gives no quarter, the most reliable men should be selected to form the escort. This, by imparting more confidence to the officer, will enable him to devote greater attention to the object in view. It should be an established rule that, whatever the party is doing, one or more scouts should be thrown out well in front or on the flanks to prevent a surprise. A simple precaution of this kind would have saved the life of the Prince Imperial in the Zulu war. However plucky the ofiicer may be, care should be taken that he is not sacrificed. 146 The Art of Marching. In India it is always considered necessary to attach a sur- veying party to an army in the field. Stonewall Jackson was particular in acquiring topographical information. Major Hotchkiss writes, " I may add that Jackson not only studied the general maps of the country, but made a particular study of those of any district where he expected to march and fight, constantly using sketch-maps made upon the ground to inform him as to portions of the field of operations that did not come under his own observation." Statistical information relating to the country to be entered, notes on the peculiarities of the enemy's troops, describing their characteristics, their arms and tactics, and the -most likely manner to defeat them, are invaluable. It will be well to distribute a small pamphlet of practical instructions with notes for the preservation of health and on the in- conveniences and sacrifices the soldier must necessarily submit to. The cavalry and staff officers should be provided with per- ■ forated blank books for reports or messages. All officers should be reminded how field glasses, a compass, and a chartometer are almost indispensable articles in the field. Minute paper and envelopes should be always furnished to staff officers, to officers and to non-commissioned officers of cavalry. These will be much required for sending directions, leports, and information. The envelope should have places to indicate the locality, hour of despatch, and pace the bearer should proceed at. Most of these reports will have to be kept for future reference, for compiling a report of the day's work, for proving disputed points, for refuting charges, etc., so it will be convenient to have them all of a size. Each messenger despatched should be given a consecutive number, and each party should bear a distinguishing sign, letter, or mark. Detail in orders the returns to be rendered ; these should be few and simple, but complete. A specimen of each should be given. With a little study, a form can be compiled which will contain all the information required by the diiferent head- quarters. Should there be no special staff for the lines of communication, one should be appointed. Instructions regarding the entrenching of the several posts and other precautions to be taken to render them safe should be given. It will be necessary, also, to arrange for the regular despatch of letters between the several stations in Preparations for the March. 147 rear of the army, for the due patrolling of the lines of communica- tion, for the erection of a telegraph line, or a chain of signalling stations. For general guidance, it is well to lay down a normal order of march for an army corps or division. Tlie orders for the execution of a march should indicate the objective of the march, the roads to be followed, the localities where the various units are to join the rest of the troops and take their place in the column, any modifications in the normal order of march which special circumstances may demand, also the manner in which the troops are to be subsisted. In marches beyond a given length, if a long halt has to be made, the locality and duration of the halt should be given ; it should also be stated whether the troops on concluding the march are to be cantoned, to encamp, or to bivouac. On the margin should be a short diagram showing the succession of the troops in the column, and the hour in which the principal units are to find themselves at the initial point of the march. Select the best roads to be followed by the various columns, such as are least hilly, and clear of defiles or bush, set aside localities which are favourable for ambuscades, and allow to each arm the ground most suitable to it. To cavalry and transport assign areas in which forage is most easily obtainable ; to heavy train's, such as are most level, and have the best roads. Secure the most intelligent and reliable guides ; these should be questioned and examined so as to make quite certain that they are intimately acquainted with the roads it is intended to follow. This applies especially to all cases of a night march, in which the precaution should always be observed of distributing the guides, so that they shall not all march at the head of the column. In certain enterprises everything depends upon the fidelity of the guides. Hannibal, when he arrived on the Alps, found himself on the brink of destruction through the treachery of his guides. Owing to the disappearance of a guide, as we have seen, Hasdru- bal could not find the ford of the river Metaurus, and was dis- comfited by the consul Claudius Nero. It is well to remember that the worst guide is often worth more than the best map. A good guide points out many objects which the best maps fail to indicate ; he can furnish information about people, manners, and customs. Money should be kept in hand to pay the guides with. The temporary guides should be 148 The Art of Marching. dismissed by turn, and others taken on as soon as they come to the limit of their local knowledge. Sufficient and reliable guides, thoroughly acquainted with every road and path, and with all the peculiarities of the country near the enemy, should always be kept at headquarters. This will prevent having to seek them when wanted. In engaging them, preference should be given to men who have something to lose. Rural postmen are intimately acquainted with roads, by- paths, and short cuts. In default of cavalry, there should be a special body to attend to the scouting. An enterprising, adventurous, and keen officer should be picked out to lead the scouts ; the selection should be made to fall on one who is likely to gain their confidence. If found deficient in any of the qualities indispensable for this description of work, the officer had better be changed at once. The training of infantry in scouting duties should not be neglected. Though cavalry, on account of their mobility, are pre-eminently adapted for exploring work, there will be many occasions in which, the nature of the ground being ill adapted for the action of horsemen, the scouting will necessarily have to be undertaken by the infantry. The infantry must be taught to search, to observe, and to listen, and it should be impressed on them that what comes to their knowledge respecting the enemy's whereabouts and movements, and above all of any positions he may have evacuated, should be transmitted at once to the troops in rear. In the last instance, were the intelligence withheld, a valuable opportunity would be lost of inflicting a severe loss on the enemy while he is in process of retiring. Eeliable intelligence and thorough scouting would save many harassing marches and wretched bivouacs ; would prevent the occurrence of many mortifying incidents. Draw up the order of march. Describe the composition of the advanced guard, giving the name of the special officer appointed to command it. When troops are on the march, flanking parties and flankers should never be omitted. The cavalry should furnish them, according the preference to intelligent and observant men. Nicholson's Nek, Stormberg, Sauna's Post, Eeddersburg, Honing Spruit, Lindley, and other mishaps of a similar character would never have been recorded, had our officers not persistently neglected to take those precautions which are always found necessary in an enemy's country. Preparations for the March. 149 We should bear in mind that we are accused of guarding ourselves negligently, and that such a blot in our military reputa- tion requires to be wiped out. For all that, every care must be taken against unnecessary alarms, for these fatigue the troops and undermine their morale. This point demands attention principally when the soldiers are young and inexperienced. The orders should state the provisions to be carried by the infantry, the provisions and forage the mounted troops are to take with them. They should enumerate the rounds of spare ammunition to be provided, the strength of the sick bearers, field hospitals, supply trains, baggage, etc., showing the order of succession of all these in the column. They should likewise detail the strength and composition of the baggage and rear guards. In the orders for the march, it is well to mention the instructions concerning the parks, the baggage, and the other parts of the convoy. The commanders of tactical units should know where their impedimenta will have to be left, as it is important that they should be acquainted with the localities where the ammunition columns and hospitals are to be found. The commander of the convoy should receive^special and distinct orders regarding his duties. When there is no printing-wagon, it will be desirable to obtain some description of hectograph, or other apparatus, which will allow of many copies of orders, memoranda, sketches, and the like to be rapidly struck off and distributed. Should the march be the prelude to an engagement, the plan of action should be explained and made clear to every officer concerned. This precaution will bear fruit, for it will secure the co-operation of all, and will often prevent an attack taking a wrong direction. Troops marching should always carry provisions with them, at least for one day, so as to learn to be independent of any out- side help, to be prepared against any supply difficulties or against the transport coming up at a late hour. We should make it a point to accustom the soldier to carry his food, and should strive to make ,it as portable as possible combined with good keeping qualities. When marches are effected in the vicinity of the enemy, the precaution [of issuing provisions to the soldier is more than ever binding, for there is no saying in what direction and up to what point an engagement or the 150 The Art of MarcTiivg. enemy's movements may carry our troops.* With troops so supplied, their commander will be relieved from having to cast an anxious eye behind him for the arrival of his men's food when they are exhausted and need it to repair their wasted strength. There is a matter which is of considerable moment and deserves to be well considered— that is, the feeding of the soldier before he commences marching. As a rule, it is laid down that it is not good for him to perform a long march on an empty stomach ; to obviate this, the soldier's coffee is prepared for him before he falls in. On this and a little bread or biscuit he has to meet the fatigues of many hours' weary marching. Some writers lay down that the meal for the day should be cooked the previous night, which would enable the men to partake of a more substantial repast before setting out in the morning. In theory, early meals are considered injurious, and it is held that it is not every stomach which is inclined to take its chief meal in the morning. Chesney observes, " Troops that have had a long day's march in mire and rain, and a rest imperfect from lack of shelter, can- not always be got to take their rough morning meal and start on a new movement as early as the general desires." f Nevertheless, when considerable exertions are in prospect, and when it is very uncertain if the troops would be able to cook at all during the day, it would be a very commendable arrangement to order a substantial meal to be served in the morning, notwithstanding that it might not agree with all. Cooking takes some hours, and, should a sudden order to move arrive, or the enemy threaten an attack, it must be interrupted. The recommendation to cook in the -evening is therefore good, for at that hour there is less chance than at any other of the operation being disturbed, and the meal for the following day will then be ready for distribution. In any case, after the reveille, the men should be allowed time to eat their breakfasts. Jomini observes, " The first quality of a general beyond being able to form good plans, will be without question to facilitate the execution of his orders by the lucid way in which he issues them." Orders for the march should be so carefully drawn up that neither hesitation nor misconception may be possible ; we must * Supplementary provisions should not be issued, if possible, overnight, for it is a temptation for the men to eat them before the proper time, t Ghesney, " Waterloo Lectures," 6th edit., p. 198. Preparations for the March. 151 guard against delays or irresolution, particularly in moments of critical importance. The orders must be a thorough guide. With regard to orders, it is desirable to omit touching on such details as can be dealt with by subordinates. Some are given in a general way by the chief of the staff, to explain in a few sentences, though clearly, the object in view. The secondary commanders impart the necessary additional instructions to their subordinate leaders, helping to render as evident as possible the aim of the General Commanding in Chief. General orders are of no good unless the greatest supervision is exercised to insure their due execution. There should be few of them, but these few should be strictly complied with. No wilful infraction, no neglect of them, should ever be overlooked, but, on the contrary, should be punished with severity, so that an exemplary chastisement may prevent a recurrence of the irregularity. An ambiguous expression in Napoleon's despatch to Davout, received on the morning of the 14th of October 1806, made Bernadotte prefer to adhere to the letter of his instructions. In 1815, the vagueness of his orders was the cause of Grouchy's irresolution. Every one should know, though it is often forgotten, that it is not sufficient to give an order, but that what is even more important is to see that it is properly carried out. Many cases can be cited in which disaster originated in misunderstanding of, or non-compliance with, orders. Here is one instance: On the 27th of June, 1866, General Gablentz had ordered General Fleischhacker's brigade to take post at Prausnitz-Keile to protect him from the Prussian Guards, which might threaten his right flank and rear. But, there being two Prausnitzs, the brigade went to the wrong one, and took post at Prausnitz on the Elbe. Owing to this error, when on the following morning the 1st Division of the Prussian Guards Corps marched to Rognitz, in order to enable the 1st Corps to make good their advance by threatening the Austrians, it surprised the latter in their bivouacs. As Prausnitz-Keile was only two or three miles distant from Gablentz's headquarters, we may well wonder what the general's staff were about that they never discovered that Fleischhacker's brigade was not in the right place. Verbal orders are always liable to be wrongly delivered, and to be forgotten or misconceived. All orders should be written 152 The Art of Marching. down, if not by the sender, by the officer who receives thein, and every staff officer should be provided with a regula- tion field message-book, which he should always carry with him. In night marches lanterns should be provided for the purpose of reading messages, directions, sign-posts, etc. ; also to be able to examine maps, or to write reports or instructions. The cypher key * should be carried on the person by one of the staff officers, and not packed in the stationery-box. The transport should be distinctly marked ; some percentage of spare animals should be provided and a small squad of pioneers. The officers in charge of the transport should be reminded to take a supply of spare poles, wheels, linch-pins, ropes, tools, and articles for repairs. It should be very clearly understood that a report should be made the moment any wagons or carts become empty, or that there are no stores for beasts of burden to carry. Should the weather turn to frost, the precaution of rough- shoeing the horses should not be neglected, and an order to this purpose should be issued in time. We should not forget the mistake Napoleon made in not rough-shoeing the horses before leaving Moscow or when the frosty weather first set in. The march will eventually lead to partial engagements and to battles, in which the army cannot but suffer cruel losses. It is both in the interest of the commander and of the injured to have plenty of transport and other means for removing the wounded. In no war has the regular ambulance service ever proved sufficient ; it is consequently necessary to keep an eye on what transport can be requisitioned in the neighbourhood of the army. We have said that this is in the interest of the com- mander, and have said so purposely. Petiet, who fought at the battle of Marengo, states that in that battle one-third of the French armj' was placed Tiors de combat, and that, more than another third being occupied in looking after the wounded, there remained a very small portion of the army to withstand the onset of the Austrians. Bandsmen should never be used as sick bearers under fire, not only because they are unskilled in that work, but because they are wanted to play their instru- ments to cheer and animate their comrades. Some system for co-operating with the neighbouring columns * It should be destroyed when capture is imminent. Preparations for the March. 153 should be established. Some ready way of intercommunication should be arranged. Attention should be paid to the repair of the roads. Quite independently of intrenching tools, others will be required for this purpose. It will be an advantage to indicate the general formation of the camp. The orders issued by Marshal Soult for the crossing of the Belgian frontier in 1815 can be taken as a model. It is with the object of making them familiar to the student that they are given here in full. " Oedek of Makch. " Beaumont, 14 June 1815. " To-morrow, the 15th, at half-past two in the morning, General Vandamme's light cavalry division will mount, and proceed to the Charleroi road ; it will send parties in every direction to explore the country and to capture the enemy's posts ; each of these parties will not be less than 50 men strong. Before the division is set in motion. General Vandamme will make sure that it is supplied with ammunition. "At the same hour Lieutenant-General Pajol will assemble the 1st Cavalry Corps, and will follow the movement of General Demon's division, which will be under the orders of General Pajol. The divisions of the 1st cavalry corps will furnish no detachments ; these will all be taken from the 3rd division. General Domon will direct his battery of artillery to march behind the 1st battalion of the 3rd infantry corps. Lieutenant- General Vandamme will give him orders accordingly. "Lieutenant-General Vandamme will have reveille sounded at 2.30 a.m. ; at 3 o'clock he will put his army corps in motion, and will take the direction of Charleroi : the whole of his baggage and encumbrances will be parked in rear, and will not commence to move until after the 6th corps and the Imperial Guard have gone by; the former will be under the orders of the Baggage-Master General, who will unite them with those of the 6th corps, of the Imperial Guard, and of the general head- quarters ; he will issue his orders for their advance. "Every division of the 3rd army corps will be accompanied by its guns and its ambulances; every other vehicle found in the column will be burnt. 154 The Art of Marching. "Count de Lobau will have reyeille sounded at 3.30 a.m., and will set the 6th army corps in motion at 4 o'clock, to follow and support General Vandamme's movement; he will cause the same order of march to be observed as laid down for the regiments, artillery, ambulances, and baggage of the 3rd corps. " The baggage of the 6th corps will be united to those of the 3rd, under the orders of the Baggage-Master General, as before mentioned. " The Young Guard will sound reveille at 4.30 a.m., and will begin to march at 5 o'clock ; it will conform to the movement of the 6th corps on the Charleroi road. " The chasseurs a pied of the Guard will beat reveille at 5 o'clock, and will commence marching at 5J o'clock, to follow the movement of the Young Guard. "The grenadiers of the Guard will beat reveille at 5.30 a.m., and will start at 6 o'clock, to follow the movement of the chasseurs. The order of march for the artillery, ambulances, and baggage prescribed for the 3rd infantry corps will be observed likewise by the Imperial Guard. " The baggage of the Guard will be combined with that of the 3rd and 6th army corps, under the orders of the Chief Baggage- Master, who will direct the movement of the whole. "Marshal Grouchy will cause the one of the other three cavalry corps which is nearest to the road to mount at 5 o'clock, and will cause it to follow the movement in the direction of Charleroi. The other two corps will start in succession, with an hour's interval between each ; Marshal Grouchy will, however, take care to make the cavalry march on the roads adjoining the main road, which will be occupied by the infantry column, so as to avoid all obstruction, and also so that the cavalry may observe better order. He will direct the whole of the baggage to remain in rear, massed and parked till the moment the Chief Baggage- Master will give it the order to advance. " Count Eeille will have reveille sounded at 2.30 a.m., and will put the 2nd corps in motion at 3 o'clock ; he will direct it on Marchienne-au-Pont, and he will take measures to have it there before 9 a.m.; he will have all the bridges over the Sambre guarded, so that no person may possibly pass. Any detachments which he may leave behind will be successively relieved by the 1st corps. Count Eeille must strive to anticipate Preparations for the March. 155 the enemy at these bridges, so that they may not be destroyed, above all that of Marchienne by which his force will probably have to issue, and which, should it have been damaged, he will have at once to repair. " At Thuin and at Marchienne, as well as in all the villages- on his route. Count Eeille will question the inhabitants, so as- to gather news of the positions and forces of the hostile armies ; he will likewise cause all letters lying at the post offices to be seized and scrutinized, so that such information as he may have obtained may at once be forwarded to the Emperor. "Count d'Erlon will set the 1st corps in motion at 3 a.m.^ and will direct it likewise on Charleroi, following the movement of the 2nd corps, whose left he will endeavour to gain as early as possible, so as to second it and back it up if necessary. He will keep a brigade of cavalry in rear for his own security, and for keeping open his communications with Maubeuge by means of small detachments ; he will send parties on the further side of that place, in the direction of Mons and of Binche, as far as the frontier, to gather news of the enemy, which are to be com- municated at once. These parties will take care not to compro- mise themselves, and not to cross the frontier. "Count d'Erlon will have Thuin occupied by a division; and should the bridge of that town be destroyed, he will have it forthwith repaired, whilst at the same time having a bridge head traced and thrown up on the left bank. The division posted at Thuin will also guard the bridge at the abbey of Alnes, where Count d'Erlon will likewise have a bridge head constructed on the left bank. " The same order of march prescribed for the artillery, ambu- lances, and baggage of the 3rd corps, will be observed by the 2nd and 1st corps, which will cause their baggage to be collected and to march on the left of the 1st corps, under the orders of the senior Baggage-Master. " The 4th corps (army of the Moselle) has' received orders to take post to-day in front of Philippeville. If its movement has been carried out, and if the divisions which constitute this army corps are together, Lieutenant-General Gerard will make them march to-morrow at 3 a.m., and will direct them on Charleroi ; * he will take care to keep in alignment with the 3rd corps, with * Later on General Gerard received a fresh order, which enjoined him to pass- the Sambre with his corps at OhS,telet. 156 The Art of Marching. which he will keep up communication, so as to arrive at about the same time in front of Charleroi. But General Gerard will have its right explored, as also all the issues which lead in the direction of Namur. He will march closed up in order of battle, and will leave all his baggage and incumbrances at Philippeville, so that his army corps, being much lightened, may be in a better condition for manceuvring. " General Gerard will order the 14th cavalry division, which should have arrived at Philippeville to-day, to follow the move- ment of his army corps on Charleroi, where this division will join the 4th cavalry corps. " Lieutenant-Generals Keille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Pajol will place themselves in mutual communication by frequent parties, and they will regulate their march so as to arrive in mass and together before Charleroi. They will place as much as possible with the advance guard officers who speak Flemish, to interrogate the inhabitants and gather information from them ; these officers however, will give themselves out as being commanders of detachments, without saying that the army is behind them. "Lieutenant-Generals Reille, Vandamme, and Gerard will direct all the pioneers of their army corps (with all the necessaries for repairing bridges) to march in rear of the 1st regiment of light infantry, and will give orders to the engineer officers to have all the bad passages repaired, to open lateral communications, and to bridge the streams which the infantry are not able to cross without getting wet. " The sailors, the pioneers of the Guard, and the pioneers of the reserve, will march in rear of the leading regiment of the 3rd corps ; Lieutenant-Generals Rogniat and Haxo will be at their head. They will take with them no more than two or three wagons J the surplus of the engineer park will march on the left of the 3rd corps. Should the enemy be met, these troops will not take part in the engagement, but Generals Eogniat and Haxo will employ them in works connected with the passage of rivers, bridge heads, repairs of roads, opening communications, etc. The cavalry of the Guard will follow the movement on Charleroi, and will set out at 8 o'clock. " The Emperor will be with the advanced guard on the Cliarleroi road. The Lieutenant-Generals will take care to send to His Majesty frequent reports respecting their movements, and any information which they may have gathered. They are Preparations for the March. 157 warned that it is His Majesty's intention to pass the Sambre before noon, and to carry the army to the left bank of that river. "The bridging park will be divided into two sections : the first section will be subdivided into three parts, each of five pontoons and five advance-guard boats, to throw three bridges across the Sambre ; there will be with each of these subdivisions a company of pontoniers ; the first section will be attached during the march to the engineer park, in rear of the 3rd corps. " The second section will remain with the artillery reserve park, in the baggage column, and will be attended by the fourth company of pontoniers. The carriages of the Emperor and the baggage of the great headquarters will be assembled, and will begin to march at 10 o'clock. Immediately they have passed, the Baggage-Master General will start the carriages of the Imperial Guard, of the 3rd corps, and of the 6th corps ; at th& same time he will send orders to the column of vehicles of the cavalry of the reserve to commence marching, and to follow the direction taken by the cavalry. The ambulances of the army will follow the headquarters, and will march at the head of the, baggage ; but, in any case, this baggage, as well as the park of, the reserve artillery and the second section of bridge 'equipage,, will not come nearer than 3 leagues to the army, unless by direction of the Major-General, nor will they cross the Sambre except by order. " The Baggage-Master General will partition this baggage into sections, and will detail officers to command them, so as to be able to detach whatever portion may subsequently be called up to headquarters, or to meet the requirements of the officers. " The General Intendant will cause the whole of the baggage and transport of the army administration to join this column of carriages, and to them will be assigned a position in the column. The vehicles which are late will take the left, and will not be- allowed to quit the position assigned to them except by order of the Baggage-Master General. "The Emperor directs that all vehicles found amongst the- columns of infantry, cavalry or artillery be burnt, the same will apply to any vehicles of the column of equipage which may quit their place or invert the order of march, without the expressed permission of the Baggage Master. " For this purpose a detachment of fifty gendarmes will be 158 The Art of Marching. placed at the disposal of the Baggage-Master General, who is held responsible, as well as all the officers of the gendarmerie and the gendarmes, for the execution of these dispositions, on which may depend the success of the campaign. " By order of the Empbroe, " The Marshal of the Empire, Major-General Duke of Dalmatia." ( 159 ) CHAPTER VII. CONDITIONS WHICH BEAK INFLUENCE ON MAKOHING. The nature of tlie coimtry — Enclosed nature of our own country — Value of good roads for marching — Roads which remain good throughout the year — The report of the bad roads in Sixain make Sir John Moore divide his army — Marching through by-paths— Graham ordered to enter the Tras os Montes — Wellington's march to Vitoria — March of the Prussians on the 17th and 18th of June, 1815 — First notice of the coming of the Prussians— Reasons for the tardy arrival of some of the Prussian corps— Influence of bad roads on the day of Sadowa — Cattle drawing on soft roads — Continuous traflSc soon destroys good roads — Grouohy's march from Ligny — M'Clellan's report — Secondary roads to he used — Roads are of no use without transport — Marching in desert tracks fatiguing and distressing — Distress from want of water— The Russians in Central Asia — Influence of the seasons on the roads- Stonewall Jackson, Hannibal, and Napoleon — Mildly cold and clear weather the best for marching — Marching in intensely cold weather — Effect of rain, cold, and strong winds on the troops — Rain on the banks of the Chichahominy in 1862 — A hot-weather campaign at times cannot be avoided — Excessive heat — Bad conditions over- take the French near TJlm, in 1805 — A foreknowledge of the weather — Vegetius, Marshal Bugeaud— The determination of the soldier can be influenced for good — Napoleon's operations against Sir John Moore — His influence on his soldiers — Sentiment is the very essence of a soldier's life — Effect of discipline on the soldier — Prussians marching to Waterloo — The Confederates marching to the assistance of Beauregard. The conditions which exercise considerable influence on march- ing are many ; the principal are the following : — a. The general nature of the country — its roads, defiles, desert tracts, etc. &. The season of the year and the atmospheric influences. c. The physical and moral state of the troops, and the discipline maintained on the liae of march. d. Defects in the equipment — bad boots, badly balanced valises, overloading, etc. e. The insufSciency of provisions, forage, fuel, or water. /. The size of the trains which follow the combatants. The nature of a country is determined by the inequalities of the ground, and a country is particularly unfavourable for the passage of an army when the troops and the impedimenta, have contiuuously to ascend and descend steep inclines. The march 160 Tlie Art of Marching. through a flat country becomes trying on account of its monotony, but it is obviously nothing like so tiring as one carried out in a hilly region. The strictly enclosed nature of our own country would seem to be much against movements of large masses of troops ; how- ever, as a general rule, the more enclosed and parcelled a country is, the more numerous are the roads. Undoubtedly a country like ours demands a more extensive system of reconnoitring than would be needed in a more open and level country ; the exploring parties would also meet with considerable resistance, for the hedges and ditches which intersect the land in every direction offer much cover to an enemy. The swiftness with which troops can march will depend on the nature of the roads, whether naturally good or bad, or rendered indifferent or bad by the season. It will also be influenced by the character of the country, which may be level or more or less hilly. These conditions are open to an endless variety. In 1724, General Wade was sent to Scotland by the Govern- ment of George I., as Commander-in-Chief of the forces, with instructions to enforce the Disarming Act, and report on the state of affairs in the Highlands. This officer set to at once to open up the country from Stirling to Inverness by means of military roads and bridges.* His name is held in remembrance, and is gratefully recognized in the well-worn couplet — " Had you seen these roads before they were made. You -would lift up your hands and bless General Wade." Napoleon knew the value of good roads when the march of an army was concerned. In 1812, he writes to Prince Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, " I desire you to send me a sketch of the route you have followed since leaving Wilna, stating which is the best road to follow, what the strength of the villages is like, the nature of the country, the breadth of the rivers and the bridges where these can be crossed. All this is indispensably necessary to me." The roads of a country depend greatly on the nature of the soil. Only those causeways which have been converted into high- roads can be considered in a measure independent of the nature of the soil they run over. Even then the nature of the soil is of some consequence, for during a dry season, combined witli a * This is the road that Sir John Cope took when ordered to crush the insur- rection of 1745. Conditions affecting the March. 161 coiitiaiious and very heavy traffic, a road which has been con- structed in a sandy country will deteriorate and end by becoming unserviceable. The same will possibly happen in a very wet season to a road which has been constructed on a muddy or clayey soil. On the other hand, a converted causeway which passes over rocky or hard soil will resist for ever so long, quite independent of the use made of it, given always that the materials employed in its construction are suitable. The nature of the soil becomes of a certain importance when, from long continuous use, the roads have become so bad that it becomes a matter of consideration if it is possible to quit them and to make the troops march through the fields on either side of them. Only such roads as have a bottom of coarse sand, gravel, or stone continue good throughout the year. Such as run over clay or are sunk between banks will to a certainty turn bad after heavy and continuous rains. In hilly and wooded countries the roads are generally very narrow, and sunk between the banks. The best laid down roads, where the soil is heavy clay, become almost impassable in wet weather, after a certain number of troops have marched over them. Where the soil is sandy, as the water soon percolates, the surface speedily resumes its hardness. We should endeavour to ascertain the state of the roads at the end of autumn and in the winter. In seeking this informa- tion, however, it is well to bear in mind what degree of reliance can be placed on the reports of the inhabitants. By the aid of good maps, by taking the prevailing winds, the weather, and the season into account, some sort of safe conjecture can generally be made. Some writers censured Sir John Moore for having divided his army when advancing into Spain, in 1808. Napier, with much reason, defends his action, and shows how very little the critics knew of the circumstances. The march in separate bodies was due to nothing else but to the evil reports received of the Spanish roads. The ofScers of the country and its people declared that the roads north of the Tagus were impracticable for artillery. The British ofBcer sent to examine them, Captain Delancey, corroborated the general opinion. Then it was that Moore reluctantly ordered his artillery (with the exception of one battery), 20 pieces, his cavalry, 1000 sabres, and a park of mauy hundred carriages, escorted by 3000 infantry, all under the M 162 The Art of Marching. command of Sir J. Hope, to march by Talavera, ISTaval Carneiro, the Escurial, the Guadarama, Espinar, Arevalo and Salamanca. The remainder of the troops and one battery he led by Alcantara, Coria, Abrantes, and Coimbra to Ciudad Eodrigo. The truth regarding the bad nature of the roads was estab- lished by the immense difficulty and labour required to enable that one single battery to move with his column. To direct the march of an army with ability it is indispensable to possess a local knowledge of the country. It is prudent to acquire information regarding every road, track or pass. There are few which cannot be used by infantry, and history abounds in examples of the important influence which some of the most unlikely paths have exercised on the issue of a campaign or in the success of an offensive movement. Everywhere, almost, where a man on foot can pass, a thousand can follow ; wherever a man on horseback can pass, a thousand more can go ; it will only be a matter of time. Turenne's army, to go to the Abbaye de St. Pierre, passed by the Val-Bloterthal ; the horsemen were obliged to march in single file, and often on foot, leading their horses ; but, for all that, the whole army marched through that defile. In Bonaparte's daring march over the Alps, the Eort of Bard, of great natural strength, garrisoned by 400 men, and defended by 22 pieces of cannon and several mortars, stopped short the progress of the whole French army, and pent it up, as it were, in a narrow neck. This stoppage was alarming, for the French had only supplies to last them four days. Whilst endeavouring to take the fort by assault, Bonaparte resolved to effect his object by using another passage, which, by steering clear of the fort, might enable his troops to pursue their route. By dint of perseverance in research, it was found possible to escalade the rock of Albaredo. The men ascended this rock, which up to that moment had been deemed impracticable, obliged to follow one by one, and the horses, like the native goats, leaping from stone to stone. We have said that everywhere, almost, where a man on foot can pass, a thousand can follow. The word " almost " has not been used at random, for an exception should always be made with regard to spongy soil, or marshland superficially dried up by the sun. In places of this nature, the first who go by will find hard ground, but soon the tread of a number of men, and Conditions affecting the March. 163 what is far worse, of heavily equipped horses, will render the ground soft and impracticable. A march over certain roads might seem to present serious physical difficulties, nevertheless, a careful inquiry or diligent exploration may disclose that these difficulties are not, after all, insurmountable. In the middle of May, 1813, Wellington ordered Graham, with 40,000 men, to enter the Portuguese province of Tras os Montes by the valleys of the Sabor and Tua. He was to march north- wards, and then work eastwards through Braganza to the Esla. The French never believed that the road could be used by an army. But Wellington had had it surveyed, and had satisfied himself, on the reports that were rendered to him, that it was practicable for guns and carriages. G-raham, who started on the 15th of May, had executed his difficult task by the Slst of that same month. Wellington himself, in the same campaign, intending to move by his left flank, closely reconnoitred the mountainous district where the Ebro takes its rise. He was not deterred by the report that the country, like that in north Portugal, was unfit for wheel traffic ; his object, which was to shift his base from Portugal to the northern parts of Spain, justified running some risk. Napier writes, " With an eagle's sweep, Wellington brought his left wing round, and pouring his numerous columns through all the deep valleys and defiles, descended towards the great road of Bilbao, between Frias and Orduna. At Modina de Pomar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated ; neither the winter gullies or the ravines, nor the precipitous passes amongst the rocks, retarded even the march of the artillery ; where horses could not draw, men hauled ; when the wheels would not roll, the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes, and strongly did the rough, veteran infantry work their way through those wild but beautiful regions ; six days they toiled unceasingly ; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa's division, and all the small bands which came trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vitoria." * The day following the battle of Ligny, the Prussian army retired as follows : — * Napier's " Peninsular War," book xx., chap. vii. 164 The Art of Marcliing. 1st Corps from Tilly and Melioreux, early in the morning, by way of Gentinnes and Mount St. Guibert, towards Wavre. 2nd Corps by the same route on Wavre, at a later hour. 3rd Corps- remained at Gembloux till 1 or 2 p.m., then marched to Wavre by way of Corbaix. 4th Corps marched in two columns, by way of Walhain and Tourrinnes, to Dion-le-Mont, a village about two miles east of Wavre. It was unmolested ; no beaten army escaped so easily. That same morning, on learning from Lieutenant Massow the issue of the battle of Ligny,* Wellington intimated to Bliicher that he would retire to the position of Mont St. Jean, where he would give battle to Napoleon, if he were supported by a part of the Prussian army. When Massow reached Wavre, at noon on the 17th, the position of Thielemann's and Biilow's corps was not known. Biilow reached Dion-le-Mont at 10 p.m., and Thielemann's rear- guard did not reach Wavre till the morning of the 18th. At midnight on the 17th, the position of the various corps became known ; a despatch was then sent to Wellington to intimate that Biilow, with his corps, would move at break of day by way of St. Lambert, to attack the French right flank, that the 2nd Corps would support the 4th in this operation, and that the 1st and 3rd Corps would be held in readiness to act likewise. The Prussian staff had a serious problem before them in the early hours of the eventful 18th of June, nothing less than the march of their army across country, to lend a helping hand to Wellington. The country between Wavre and Mont St. Jean \ is broken into wooded hills, with country lanes in the hollows between them, which at that time had been rendered unusually bad by recent rains. The roads were frightfully muddy and * Ligny would have been a greater surprise for Bliicher had not a traitor, General Count de Bourmont, who commanded an infantry division of the ith Corps, gone over with five other officers to the Prussians at daybreak on the 15th of June. The count carried with him the order of the day of the 13th, which Napoleon desired to be kept secret. Astute Fouche, that most treacherous statesman, writes in his Memoirs, that, in 1815, Wellington was relying on him for information of Napoleon's plans, and describes how he played the British commander false. " On the very day of Napoleon's departure from Paris, I despatched Madame D , furnished with notes in cypher, narrating the whole plan of the campaign. But at the same time I privately sent orders for such obstacles at the frontier, where she was to pass, that she could not reach Wellington's headquarters till after the event." t The distance from Wavre to Mont St. Jean is about ten miles. Wellihgton puts down the distance from Wavre to Waterloo at some twelve. PART OF BELGIUM Scale of En^lisli Mile^ 1 % Conditions afecting the March. 165 heavy, progress by men on foot and on horseback was slow ; progression on wheels was slower still. It demanded the utmost exertions to get the artillery and wagons over the marshy ground of the Lasne. It is generally stated in the narratives of the campaign, that the condition of the roads made it impossible for the Prussians to join in the battle at an earlier hour. This was not exactly the case, much of their tardiness was due to a large portion of their forces not having been started until the cannonade put it out of doubt that Wellington was determined to hold the position in front of the^forest of Soignies. This might have had considerable influence on the result of the battle had Napoleon attacked at an earlier hour. That he did not do so may possibly be accounted for by the ground not having been in a fit state for the artillery, for, though the rain ceased at dawn on the 18th, it had come down heavily during the night, and the ground was not sufficiently dry before 11 a.m. Captain Tomkinson, 16th Light Dragoons, who took part in the battle, states that during the retreat from Quatre Bras, the troops were exposed to the heaviest rain ever seen. The rain ceased at nightfall on the 17th, but recommenced as it became dark, and it rained incessantly during the night. It was on the advice of Drouot, who commanded the artillery of the G-uard, that the attack was put off till 11 o'clock, to give the ground time to harden. Napoleon, Gourgaud and Siborne agree in this, that, by noon, the ground had become practicable for the artillery. Chesney states that soon after 8 a.m.. Napoleon proceeded to marshal his troops, and, according to Charras, by 10|- a.m., all the troops had taken up their position. Now, this is an im- portant point, inasmuch as the Emperor has been reproached for not having commenced the battle at an earlier hour than he did. The delay arose from another cause besides the soppy state of the ground. Sir Herbert Maxwell, in his " Life of Welling- ton," writes, "As soon as all the troops had come up from Genappe, which would be at 1 o'clock, the allied position was to be attacked in the centre." * Houssaye remarks that Napo- leon wished to have all his troops on the field before commencing the action. Many of the corps, the Foot Guards, Kellermann's Cuirassiers, Lobau's Corps, Durutte's Division, were well in rear. * Eight Hon. Sir Herbert Maxwell, '• Life of Wellington," vol. ii. p. 64. 16,6 The Art of Marching. Eeille's Corps, which was to commence the action, was at Caillou s Farm only by 9 a.m. Durutte affirms that he only took his place in the line of battle when the artillery was engaged all along the line, or at about noon. Henry Houssaye states, "The Emperor even thought he would not be able to commence the attack before 1 o'clock in the afternoon. ..." * It was nearly 11 when Napoleon returned to Eossomme, and after his arrival there, he dictated the following order to Marshal Soult : " As soon as the whole army is arrayed in battle order, towards 1 o'clock, and at the moment when the Emperor will give the order to Ney, the attack will commence by seizing the village of Mont Saint Jean, at the intersection of the roads." By the night of the 17th, Bliicher had concentrated round Wavre something like 90,000 men. For the morrow the 4th corps was ordered to march at daybreak from Dion-le-Mont for S. Lambert, to be followed immediately by the 2nd corps. ■In his Waterloo lectures, Chesney points out the error that was made, and which in part accounts for Billow's tardiness in reaching the field of Waterloo. Though his divisions were intended to lead the march on the following day, on the night of the 17th they bivouacked on the eastern side of the Dyle. The 4th Corps was to head the advance, for, not having yet taken part in a battle, it was hoped that it would display more energy than the others. It started, according to Clausewitz, who was present, at 7 a.m., and not at break of day as promised. It was detained afterwards by a fire which broke out in the narrow streets of Wavre, when its leading brigade had not quite got clear of the town. It was noon by the time its foremost brigade reached S. Lambert, having marched not more than eight miles. A halt of three hours was then made to allow the rear to close up.'l" Shortly before the charge of the 1st Corps (d'Erlon's), Napoleon had noticed a body of troops on the heights of S. Lambert, some few miles to his right ; these were part of Billow's corps. There could be no doubt on this point, for between twelve and one a Prussian hussar was captured ; the soldier was the * Henry Houssaye, "1815, Waterloo," translated by A. E. Maun, cUap. ii. p. 185, t General von Grolman's biographer states, that Bliicher and Gneisenau were very undecided, and, though the battle was raging, thoy delayed the attack. Conditions affecting the March. 167 bearer of a written message from Bliicher to Wellington, announcing the Prussian advance. Count D'Herisson, in " Le Cabinet Noir," states," Quite early on the day of the battle of Waterloo, an officer was despatched by General G-rouchy, son of the marshal, to requisition food in the neighbouring villages. This officer returned and informed him that he had fallen in with some Prussians, who had hindered him. Monsieur de Grouchy concluded that they must have belonged to Blucher's troops marching to join Wellington, and the matter appeared to him so important that he set spurs to his horse to get at the emperor. At about ten o'clock he was with Soult, to whom he communicated the circumstances. " Soult advised him to go in person and inform the emperor. The latter, having heard what Grouchy had to say, asked, ' Who is the stupid officer who could make a similar report? The Prussians are very far from here.' Monsieur de Grouchy returned to his brigade, and having repeated to the officer the emperor's remarks, told him that it was necessary to lay hold of some prisoners. The officer set out with a few volunteers, and Monsieur de Grouchy marched to support him. Soon two foot soldiers and a hussar were captured, and Monsieur de Grouchy hastened to convey them to the chief of the staff. " The emperor had them interrogated, and it was consequent on their statement that they formed part of Guttien's and Schmidt's brigades, that he was led to order Mouton to march so as to cover his right. It was then nearly two o'clock." Everything tends to show that the thought that the Prussians would be able to rally so soon after their severe defeat at Ligny was far from Napoleon's mind. Most of what has been written to account for Napoleon's defeat hinges on this fact. Eopes * reckons that it was after the repulse of the 1st Corps, certainly before 3 p.m., that Napoleon decided that he must employ the 6th Corps in confronting the Prussians. These were moving in the direction of the plateau of Rossomme, bent on cutting off the emperor's retreat by Genappe. To return to the rest of the Prussian army at Wavre, the 2nd Corps, which was to follow Billow's, and the 1st, which was to approach the battle-field by way of Chain, were not in full movement until noon. Thielemann, with the 3rd Corps, was ordered to remain at Wavre to defend the town. * Kopes, " The Campaign of Waterloo," p. 307. 168 The Art of Marching. Von Ollech explains the extraordinary delay in setting out by stating that Gneisenau doubted Wellington's assurances that he would really fight at Mont St. Jean ; that he had no trust in the Duke, and that it was left to the cannon of Waterloo to dispel his doubts. That G-neisenau had long been prejudiced against the Duke, is a well-authenticated fact. Also that he tried in vain to persuade Bliicher to retire on Liege, and thus secure his communications with Luxembourg. Gneisenau had been military attache at Wellington's head- quarters in the Peninsula, and had returned from Spain imbued with a profound distrust for the Duke. The Prussians might possibly not have been induced to fight at Ligny but for the Duke's promises, promises which, whether through any fault of his or not, he was unable to keep. Gneisenau gave his assent to the march to the field of Waterloo much against his inclination, and then he gave positive orders to Biilow not to stir until he was sure that Wellington was actually committed to a serious engagement. As in the middle of June the sun rises in Belgium, by the almanac, at about 3.30, the Prussian corps (1st and 2nd, the two on the west side of the Dyle) might have left Wavre at an earlier hour. There were many hours lost, and they did not arrive on the field before 7 p.m., when the last incidents of the battle, with the charge of the Imperial Guard, were occurring* The indecision, or, if we like better, the mistrust of Gneisenau — for which the events of the last two days had given some ground — seems to set at rest the story of Wellington's solitary ride to Wavre during the night of the 17th, with the object of having a personal communication with Bliicher. Though the story appears to have originated with the Duke himself, in 1833, eighteen years after the battle, he repudiated it in 1838, when he assured Baron Gurney that he had not seen Bliicher the day before Waterloo. Several learned writers seem inclined to believe that the interview actiially did take place ; however, it appears strange, if it did, that the chief of Bliicher's staff should not have been able to obtain personally from the Duke the assurance which he asked General Muffling to obtain the following day. * Hamley, in his " Operations of War,'' p. 191, states, " At five in the afternoon Billow's advanced troops issued on the French right at Planchenoit. " At seven in the evening Zieten's advanced troops joined Wellington's left at Frisohermont. "At seven also Pirch arrived in rear of Bulow,|and was directed on Maransart." Conditions affecting the March. 169 Bliicher was much shaken by being unhorsed in a cavalry encounter in the battle of the 16 th, and it is more than probable that, on the arrival of Wellington at the Prussian headquarters, the latter would have had a conversation with Gneisenau, who had been directing the movements of the Prussian army since Ligny. It is strange that the story of the ride should not have found its way in any of the Prussian accounts. There was, besides, not sufficient reason for it having been kept from the public after the victory, and for not having been adduced as a proof of the Duke's carefulness and activity in contrast to the reported lethargic demeanour of the Emperor on the field of Waterloo. That it was simply kept dark because it showed a want of confidence in his ally to support him, it is difficult to believe. During the night of the 17th — 18th of June it rained in torrents. The very fact of the Duke riding to Wavre in such dire weather would have given unbounded celebrity to his earnestness. Wellington received a letter from Bliicher, assuring him of his co-operation on the morrow. This letter was written by Grolman, who was Bliicher 's quartermaster - general, shortly before midnight of the 17th, when Bulow's arrival at Dion-le- Mont was notified to the Prussian headquarters. By all accounts this letter reached the Duke's headquarters at 2 a.m. on the 18th. Had the Duke been absent at that hour, the fact would have cer- tainly become known to his staff and spoken about. Now, having been told of the fighting atGenappe.and that Napoleon was pressing the rear of his army, he rode in that direction and remained on the ground till after dark, and, as the sun on the 17th of June sets at about 8.18, this narrows the time of Wellington's ride to about five hours, from 9 p.m. of the 17th to 2 a.m. of the 18th. By his own account he had to ride 14 miles to reach Bliicher's headquarters, and 14 miles back, or 28 miles in all ; on a horse he had ridden from .10 a.m., on a pitch dark and stormy night. He must have had an interview of certain importance, which must naturally have occupied some time, and there are very good grounds for believing that all this could not be done in five hours. Would " my man," in narrating the events he witnessed, have for ever remained silent over the portentous ride he had with the Duke the night before such a memorable battle ? After the charge of the 1st Corps had been repulsed. Napoleon 170 The Art of Marching. decided to employ the 6th Corps under Lobau in staying the Prussians, instead of supporting the 1st corps. Shortly after 4 p.m. the advance of Biilow's corps took the Emperor's attention from the British line. The Prussians were striving to carry Planchenoit and menace the communications of the French army. They were endeavouring to get control of the Charleroi road, the French line of retreat. The two leading divisions of their 4th Corps attacked Planche- noit at about 4.30 p.m. ; checked and reinforced, they drove Lobau out of it between five and six. Eight battalions of the Young Guard, led by Duhesme, recaptured it ; the fight was desperate, the enemy being driven from house to house. The Prussians drove the Young G-uard out of the village, which was retaken by two battalions of the Old Guard — the 1st of the 2ad Grenadiers, and the 1st of the 2nd Chasseurs — the Young Guard rallying under their protection. It was nearly 7 o'clock, and Napoleon believed that the Prussian attack was exhausted. But Pirch, at the head of the 2nd Corps, was only two miles in rear.* The Guard, when the rest of the troops gave way, stood and held the churchyard at Planchenoit, until surrounded and reduced in number to about 250 men. Then, under Pelet's command, they formed square, placed their eagle in the centre, drove off the cavalry which tried to block their way, and gained the main line of retreat with scarcely enough men left to keep their formation. The Imperial Guard fought very rarely; the soldiers of the line, who resented their privileges, called their comrades of the Guard the immortals on that account. It was reserved to join in the fray on great occasions. The mea of the Guard were the elite of the elite; the strongest and the bravest men, who had done * Though the Prussians arrived at a late hour on the field of battle, they had a heavy share in the fighting. Captain Berndt, of the Austrian General Staff, in " Die Zahl im Kriege," the statements in which are considered very accurate, puts down the losses at Waterloo as follows : — 8,360 English 3,180 Hollanders 2,230 Hanoverians 690 Brunswiokers 640 Nassauers 15,100 7,000 Prussians — most of whom fell in the desperate fighting round Planchenoit. 22,100 Conditions affecting the March. Ill not less than four years' service,* and had served in two campaigns,, were selected for it. They always marched on the high-road and fought in full dress, and the line got no supplies till the Imperial Guard had been served. The day before the battle of Wagram, twelve clerks of the victualling department were found guilty of selling the rations of the Imperial Guard ; these offenders were shot a few hours after. In the vexed question of Grouchy's conduct on the day of Waterloo, it has been pleaded in favour of the Marshal that his troops in any case could not have had any appreciable effect on the fortunes of the French in that battle. This resolves itself entirely into a question of marching and under what conditions the march would have been effected. The most direct line towards Napoleon by Moustier, the nearest bridge over the Dyle^ was over a country so rough and miry that, after the heavy rain which had fallen on the 17th, it was very doubtful if artillery could have gone over it. Bolthus, who commanded that arm, was of opinion that it was not practicable. The most practicable route leading to Planchenoit via Moustier was about 18 miles long, but the roads were soaked with rain, and Grouchy's troops were in a tired state. The conditions were so bad that the previous day Gerard's corps took seven hours to cover not quite eight miles. The Dyle at Moustier, deep and rapid, was spanned by one narrow bridge, with another at Ottignies, a quarter of a league further north, and of bridging^ materials Grouchy had none. The banks of the river were deep mud, and a winding road, rendered execrable by the .inclement weather, was the only approach which led to the bridge. It is a question somewhat difRcult to answer, how much time it would have taken the French to get to Moustier, cross the bridge, and march the seven miles which lay between it and the right of the French army. Troops have frequently performed almost impossible feats to reach a battle-field, to be partakers in the honours of a serious contest. What the Prussians did on the march from Dion le Mont and Wavre to Planchenoit, surely the French, who were better marchers, could have accomplished when led by Gerard. The statements regarding the distance Grouchy was from the battle-field differ greatly ; Napoleon in a careless way set * The Old Guard required twelve years' service in the army, the Middle Guard eight, the Young Guard at least four years. 172 The Art of Marching. it down at a two hours' march, Valaze at three, G-erard at four and a half, Jomini at five, Charras at eight or nine. Quinet rendered good service, in the interest of history, by having these conflicting statements tested. To set the question at rest, he persuaded two friends of his, Messrs. Lefebvre, to walk from Sart-les-Walhain to the clock tower of Planchenoit. It took the two pedestrians five hours and twenty-sevea minutes, walking at an ordinary pace by the carriage roads. Being unencumbered,* they walked at the rate of a little more than three miles an hour.j A large body of troops, fatigued from previous exertions, trudging over slippery and miry roads, possibly called to lend a hand in getting the artillery along, could not be calculated to do as much as two miles; consequently, if started from Sart-les-Walhain at noon, Grouchy's corps would not have reached Planchenoit before 9 p.m., or after the battle was over. There is another and a more recent example of the impedi- ment which heavy roads offer at a very momentous time. At about 11 p.m. on the 2nd of July, 1866, General Voigts-Rhetz arrived at the headquarters of the Prussian army at Gitschin, bearing information that the Austrians were in very large force in front of Prince Frederick Charles, between the Elbe and the Bistritz, and would probably attack him on the following day. The general, at the same time, explained the dispositions which had been taken by the Prince, either to repel an attack or to assume the offensive himself, according as circumstances might demand. Tiie King, after having approved of these dispositions, despatched at midnight an aide-de-camp to the headquarters of the Crown Prince, with orders for the Prince to march southwards with his entire army as early as practicable in the morning, so as to join the forces under Prince Frederick Charles by way of Cerekwitz. * Mons. Quinet does not say under what conditions of -weather this walk was made ; we may presume it was undertaken in fair, possibly fine, weather. + Itinerary — h. m. From Sart-les Walhain to Walhain-Saiut-Paul 20 „ Walhain-Saint-Paul to Nil-Saint- Yinoent 55 „ Nil-Saint-Vinoent to Corbaix 15 „ Corbuix to Moustier 1 45 „ Moustier to Ciroux 50 „ Ciroux to Maiansart 40 „ Maransart to Planchenoit 42 5 27 Conditions affecting the March. 173 These instructions were received by the Prince at 4 a.m. on the 3rd of July, and by 7 a.m. the greater part of the troops were on the move. The march proved very laborious; the clayey soil had become soaked with rain, the country was uneven, entailing constant ascending and descending. The artillery, in particular, suffered much from the bad state of the roads. Another cause of delay were the marshy bottoms of the Trotinka, which could only be crossed on the two roads of Jericek and of Luzian. It was only at about noon that the artillery of the Guard opened fire on the Austrians who were posted at Maslowied, Horzenowes, and Eacziz. Prince Frederick Charles's army had then been already hotly engaged for four hours, from 8 a.m. to noon.* The advanced guard of the 1st Guards Division traversed the 625 miles which lie between Daubrawitz and Jericek in two hours and a half, moving at the rate of two and a half miles an hour; all present attesting that it marched with an extraordinarily quick pace. The main body of the column marched a little slower, 2 miles and 307 yards in the hour. The country traversed was very undulating, the weather was bad, and the troops were moving across country. The other corps did not march anything so fast. The 1st Corps, which had bivouacked at Chranstow, took nine hours to cover 8 miles 174 yards, marching about 1574 yards per hour. The 2nd Division of the Guards, encamped at Eettendorf, took ten hours to cover a distance of 11 miles 894 yards, marching at the rate of 1 mile 265 yards per hour.t When a road has an even and hard surface, the men, horses, and vehicles can travel over it under the best conditions. When the roads have been rendered soft by rain or snow, tbe feet of the men and animals will sink into the slush, and so will the wheels of the carriages, calling for greater exertion in the act of moving forward. The average weight that animals are capable of drawing is generally based on work performed on good roads and in a moderately even country. When, on the other hand, draught animals have to work on a soft road, in which their feet and the wheels sink deep in the ground, the ordinary weight cannot be drawn with the same ease ; an increase of effort is needed. * Eeally it waa not much before 2 p.m. that the co-operation of the Prince- Eoyal began to have any decided effect. f Borbstcedt, " The Pranco-Qerman War to the Catastrophe of Sedan,'' p. 113. 174 The Art of Marching. With this comes a relenting of the pace, greater fatigue because more exertion is required, consequently more time is spent on the road and there is less rest for the cattle. The effect of the hoofs of some thousand horses stamping together on a dry road cannot but be to disturb the metal. The heavy trains which follow an army cause even greater damage, for they soon destroy the best roads. A road may be solid enough to bear the occasional passage of a very heavily laden wagon, but put a, string of some hundreds of such wagons drawn by several pairs of heavy horses, passing in close succession pretty nearly over the same spot, and the very best metal must get loosened. Once this is done the mischief sets in, and will progress steadily if the road must be used and cannot be closed for repairs. In estimating the comparative wear upon roads for wheeled ■carriages, and horses drawing them, G-eneral Morin, the eminent French engineer and director of the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers of Paris, found that two-thirds of the wear is due to the action of the horses' shoes, and only one-third to the wheels. The state of the roads and the nature of the soil will have a marked effect on the march of a body of troops. In the afternoon of the 17th of June, 1815, Marshal Grouchy, at the head of 33,319 men, commenced his pursuit of Bllicher's beaten army. The roads were in a bad state, and by ten o'clock of the same night the French with great difficulty reached G-embloux, which lies ■about eight miles only from St. Amand. General Gerard, never- theless, asserts that the troops stepped out as fast as it was possible for men to march. In Major-General G. B. McClellan's report on the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia and Maryland, page 93, will be found the following passages : — " On account of the small number and narrowness of the roads in this neighbourhood, movements were difficult and slow. "On the 15th, headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland, which was made a temporary depot. Couch and Casey were then near New Kent •Court House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. " On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. " On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter were with great difficulty moved to White House, five miles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one of Conditions affecting the March. 175 these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance, ..." * The main roads or principal highways are never very plentiful, and are not sufficient for the passage of a numerous army. Even in the most populated districts, main roads lie far apart, at the distance of several miles from each other. Other roads, what we might call secondary, will have often to be turned to account, if we desire to reduce the length of the columns. This will not present any serious difficulties, as long as their breadth is such as will admit of the troops passing over them in their ordinary formation, viz, infantry in fours, cavalry in sections, artillery in column of route. The least stony roads are generally allotted to the cavalry, and the firmest are reserved for the artillery and the trains, as artillery and trains require solid hard roads, not likely to give way under the pressure of heavily laden vehicles. Marshal Massena, when commanding the army of Portugal in 1810, wrote to General Montbran, who had charge of his advanced guard, " Whenever you furnish me with any reports on the roads, distinguish such as are good for infantry and artillery from those which are good only for infantry." To every army corps should be assigned at least one main road ; a road practicable in all seasons, so that when the parallel roads followed by the several divisions are not of the best, the heavy trains may travel on one that is good. Often the longest road is the best in the end ; it is constructed with more care, and Jias more easy gradients; it is therefore preferable to the rest. As roads of this class cross a district of some importance, studded with villages and towns, there is a better prospect of finding accommodation and provisions for the troops. As a general rule most side roads are very tortuous, narrow, and uumetalled, all points which render them undesirable for employment in the march of large bodies of troops ; the majority of them were originally intended for farming purposes. There could be no objection to their being used for the march of a small unit, but a continuous trampling by troops in bad weather would quickly render them impassable. If a battle is imminent, or actually in progress, everything may depend on the reinforce- ments reaching a certain point betimes. In such cases no one * White House on the Pamunkey, the Federal base, was twenty miles from Eichmond and ten miles from the Ohiokahominy. 176 The Art of Marching. would hesitate to use even the worst by-roads to get there. In June, 1815, for example, the Prussians, coming from Wavre to the field of Waterloo, marched by indifferent country roads. There were no highways available in that district, none that went east and west. These by-roads can be used with other scopes. Lieut.-Colonel G-. F. E. Henderson, alluding to Stonewall Jackson's methods, states, "The troops moved almost as often by country roads and farm tracks as by the turnpikes. The longer route, even when time was of importance, was often preferred, if it was well concealed, to the shorter. No precaution, however trivial, that might prevent information reaching the enemy was neglected." * However good the roads may be, the march of an army or of a large body of troops will be much retarded whenever there is not sufficient transport to carry all their pi'ovisions and neces- saries. We should always remember that insufficient commis- sariat arrangements hinder all free and rapid movement. An inconvenience in narrow, enclosed roads is the dust raised by a multitude of feet. This soon becomes insufferable. A mass of unwonted occurrences combine to retard the marches. Of these checks the passage of defiles is the most frequent. Bridges are the most habitual defiles. The passage over solid stone or masonry bridges does not interfere with the progress of the troops as long as they are sufficiently broad. It is otherwise, on account of the oscillations of the platform, when the rivers or streams are crossed by means of bridges of boats or suspension bridges. In order not to damage bridges of this description, the troops are made to pass over in small groups at given intervals. The defiling over a suspension bridge is effected at the rate of one-fourth of the pace marched on an ordinary road. Marches performed on desert tracts distress the troops through want of water to quench a burning thirst, caused by the dense clouds of very fine dust which parches the throat. The troops get also soon fatigued, owing to the yielding surface of the tracks and the feet sinking with every step that is taken. The scarcity of water, added to the disappointing effect of the mirage, drove the French troops distracted when campaigning in Egypt under Bonaparte. As he sped from Alexandria to Cairo his troops endured terrible sufferings. Captain Eozes writes * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. E. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackaon," vol. i. p. 518. Conditions affecting the March. 177 borne to his relatives, " We were many days without water, or victuals of any kind, and even without the means of procuring any. In five or six days — I speak without exaggeration — we lost six or seven hundred men by thirst alone. . . . We are exceed- ingly reduced in numbers. . . . We have had several soldiers who blew out their brains in the presence of the Commander-in-chief, calling out to him, ' Voila ton ouvrage.' " * The 17th of August, 1799, the day on which the battle of Novi was fought, was the hottest day of the century. Botta relates that the casualties on both sides not only comprised the killed and wounded, but also men overcome by weariness, by anxiety, by heat, and by thirst. Just before the battle of Salamanca, the British army, march- ing in the month of July, found the heat suffocating, and there being no water in the sunburnt plain about Castrejon, numbers of men dropped on the road, and, as they could not be carried along, fell into the hands of the enemy. MacGahan, in his " Campaigning on the Oxus," gives us some idea of what the poor soldier has to put up with when campaigning in desert regions. Eeferring to the Kinderley detachment, he writes, " During the first five days of the march, the troops had a foretaste of the horrors of the desert. The heat was excessive, and the sand blinding and scorching. The wind, instead of alleviating the heat, only added to it, for it came against the face like a blast from a furnace. From such an enemy the soldier had no protec- tion ; the sand and heat penetrated through the tents. Want of water soon began to be felt. The few wells that were found on the way were brackish, muddy, and full of insects. The soldiers bore all these hardships with cheerfulness; and although the camels and horses died by the hundred, the health of the men remained good. * » * * * * " The 9th and 10th of May were days of terrible suffering. It seemed almost as if the whole column were about to die of thirst. The well of Kol-Kinir, at which it arrived on the evening of the 9th, was so deep that the water could only be obtained very slowly, and thus but a small portion of the detachment could be supplied. It was now evening, and the troops had had * Intercepted correspondence. 178 ■ The Art of Marching. no water since mid-day ; nor was any to be obtained until they reached Alpai-Mass, a distance of thirty-five miles. On the evening of the 9th and the morning of the 10th both soldiers and animals had to remain without water." Fortunately two Kirghiz sent by Colonel Lamakin discovered a small well at the distance of about a mile to the north of the column, but the troops had a narrow escape from death. Pushing on to Kungrad to join General Verevkin's force, Lamakin's column had to sustain other severe trials. "The three days' march that followed," writes MacG-ahan, " were the severest the expedition passed through. There was no water the whole time, the only well on the road having been poisoned by the Turcomans, who threw the corpses of putrefying animals into it. On the night of the 22nd an attempt was made to continue the march, so as to arrive at Kungrad a day earlier. But so dense was the darkness that the troops, in spite of a number of torches, were continually going astray. So the army had to halt, and pass the night, without food, without water, in the middle of the desert." The seasons and the temperature exercise a certain influence on the condition of the roads ; this will be greater or less in proportion to the quantity of rain or snow which has fallen. In the spring and autumn, which, generally speaking, are the wet seasons, roads may be considered as being ordinarily in a bad condition; they are muddy. During the damp winter days the roads do not dry after rain, but remain often for days wet and soft, in which state they get soon cut up. For the greater por- tion of the winter season they are muddy and slippery, and can only be considered good when the cold is not great and there is a freedom from frost. Snow causes great deterioration to the roads, and when it falls in great quantity it has a retarding effect on the march. Hannibal commenced his march over the Alps at too late a period of the year. According to Lavalette's computation, he only reached their entrance in the middle of October. Polybius says that it was near the time of winter. The mountains were already deeply covered with snow. Had his march commenced a month earlier, it would have been more easy, for little snow to speak of lies on the mountains in September. With all Hannibal's experience, Hasdrubal left Spain so late in the year that he had to winter his army west of the Alps. Conditions affecting the March. 179 This gave his adversaries abundant time for making preparations to meet him. Bonaparte's march over the Great St. Bernard was better timed than Hannibal's. It commenced on the 16th of May, and no great difiSculty in the way of snow was experienced. On the other hand, he delayed his retreat from Moscow too long, and after he left that city, encountered such severe weather that his army broke up. After Marengo, Bonaparte, intending to lead an army by the Noric Alps to Vienna, ordered Macdonald to cross the Splugen and to enter the Italian Tyrol. , The season being far advanced, and the enemy in strength on the various positions, Macdonald sent General Dumas to explain the difficulties of the under- taking to the First Consul. " Tell Macdonald," was the reply, " that an army can always pass, in every season, where two men can place their feet." Macdonald obeyed. His advanced-guard, leaving Tusis on the 26th of November, marched by the Via Mala to Splugen. In ascending to the hospice, an avalanche swept off thirty dragoons, and so dismayed- those in rear that they retired to Splugen. The wind blew with violence for three days, and many avalanches fell. A fresh attempt was made, and by incredible efforts the advanced-guard reached the summit. Many men and horses were swallowed by avalanches. Two other columns, more fortunate, climbed the mountain in clear frosty weather on the 2nd and 3rd of December, but several men died of excessive cold. The last column, 7000 strong, marched on the 5th of December. Snow, however, had fallen in the night in large quantities, and had obliterated the track ; the road had to be made anew, and an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche, had to be cut through. In January 1862, Stonewall Jackson was much mortified by his failure to surprise the Federals at Bath. After halting for four days near Hancock, he resumed his march for Romney on the 13th. The outlook was not promising. His biographer writes, "The weather, too, grew colder and colder, and the mountain roads were little more than sheets of ice. The sleet beat fiercely down upon the crawling column. The men stumbled and fell on the slippery tracks ; many waggons were overturned, and the bloody knees and muzzles of the horses bore painful wifoess to the severity of the march . , . Attentive as he was to 180 The Art of Marching. the health and comfort of his men in quarters, on the line of march he looked only to the success of the Confederate arms. The hardships of the winter operations were to him but a neces- sary concomitant of his designs, and it mattered but little if the weak and sickly should succumb." * Cold following frost is favourable for the march of infantry. The frost, however, should not exceed 10 degrees, and the cold should not be accompanied by a penetrating wind. Mounted troops suffer more from cold than infantry. The hands and feet of the riders get numbed, and give rise to intense suffering. Mild, cold, and clear weather is the one which is best adapted for their march. For an example of the dire effects of marching in intense cold weather, we must look at Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in 1812. Not only was the French army nearly annihilated in its retreat to the Niemen, but the Eussians, on their side, lost an immense number of men. General Louis Philippe de Segur writes, " Winter, that terrible ally of the Muscovites, had sold them his assistance dearly. Their disorder pursued our disorder. . . . The 120,000 of Kutusoff's army were then reduced to 35,000. Of Wittgenstein's 50,000 scarcely 15,000 remained." The sudden passage from warm barracks to a bitterly cold bivouac was fatal. Of 12,000 men of the 12th French division, which was sent from Wilna to Ochmiana to meet the Old Guard, only 350 survived the march. Bad as the roads are in the rainy season, they are far worse should a thaw follow a period of heavy snow and intense cold. Not only have the season and temperature their effect on the condition of the roads, but they exercise also an influence over the physical state of the men and horses. Rain, cold and strong winds, all have a more or less injurious effect on a march. Much of course will depend on their intensity. A powerful head-wind, possibly, is the worst of all, for it' exhausts the powers of the men and horses having to advance against it. Eain, when it is con- tinuous, and when it is accompanied by wind, fatigues the troops, saturates their clothing, and makes it heavy and clinging. Showers are not so injurious, and in the summer are even refreshing. Eain has, moreover, a retarding effect on a march, inasmuch as it limits the view, and causes the head of the advanced-guard to move more slowly. Fog is even worse, for not only may the * Lievit.-Ooloiiel G. F. E. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. i. p. 235. Conditions affecting the March. 181 departure of the troops have to be postponed till it lifts, but the march cannot but be very slow ; it being impossible to recognize any land marks, there is every prospect of the troops quitting the right road and going astray. Troops have frequently failed to appear at a rendezvous, or to carry out certain intended operations in consequence of a fog. At Jena, the Prussians lost their way when trying to eject the French from the Landgrafenberg ; Erasmus' Free State com- mando failed to reinforce Meyer before Glencoe from a similar cause. The heavy rains in the latter part of May, 1862, had caused the Cbickahominy to rise rapidly, and the rush of water carried away the bridges. The whole country on its banks became a great swamp, and McCIellan's army was severed in twain. On the 31st the Confederates under Johnston attacked the Federals at Seven Pines. The object of the Confederates,' to crush the two Federal corps on the right of the Chickahominy, was not obtained, owing principally to a heavy rain storm which broke on the night of the 30th, and which transformed the fields into greasy mire, and rendered the passage of artillery difficult. The same cause delayed the march of General Huger's division, and prevented it from co-operating in the attack. The hazards of a hot weather campaign must be run when delay is fraught with danger, and prompt, bold, and resolute action is of great moral effect. In India, at the period of the great mutiny, the Anglo-Indian army passed two hot seasons in tents, constantly marching and fighting. The rebels did all they could to destroy the European troops, for they well knew how the sun and want of water would tell on their constitutions. They accordingly harassed them, and drew them out in the mid-day heat, but failed to cause the desired effect. The way in which the British troops endured this constant turning out in the heat must have angered their opponents. Scores of English soldiers fell ill from sheer exhaustion, others from nervous excitement, others from blood disorders and affections of the abdominal organs, others again from heat asphyxia, sunstroke ; but the mass bore up, destroyed all opposition, and eventually conquered. Heat causes a considerable slackening of the pace. When it is excessive, it is a greater drawback in marches even than extreme cold, for it has a deteriorating effect on the ardour of the soldier by bringing about a waste of physical forces. The fatigue, the 182 The Art of Marching. unbearable pressure of the load, the thirst caused by copious sweating, the choking clouds of dust, all combine to bring about a very considerable lowering of tone, prejudicial to discipline. Excessive heat affects infantry more than the other arms. ' The hardships of a march increase with the number of troops moving. The column of dust raised augments with the number of feet which stir it. It hangs above the road in clouds for hours at a time. The atmosphere gets more and more close, choking and unbearable. There will be little gained in the conditions of marching between long and short days. In the long days the heat has an exhausting effect on both men and horses, and puts a limit to the time which can be employed in marching, for the troops should not be on the road during the hottest part of the day. Nothing is so injurious to horses as putting on the pace during rain or great heat ; however, it is impossible to command always the most favourable weather. The manoeuvres for .the capture of Ulm in 1805 were carried out in horrible weather. It had been ilne up to the crossing of the Danube, then of a sudden the weather became dreadful. Snow fell thickly, it melted, turned into rniid, and rendered the roads impracticable. All the little streams running into the Danube were soon overflowing. The soldiers were up to their knees in mud or wading through swamps, exposed to all manner of privations. Over all the movements of an army in a campaign the weather holds despotic sway. The barometer and weather-wise natives should be consulted when an opportunity offers. A foreknowledge of the weather is very important, and though the weather is always liable to change, and cannot be ascertained beforehand with any degree of certainty, there are some indications which, from experience, have passed into a guide. Vegetius states changes of weather are foretold by many signs that appear in the orb of the moon as in a mirror. When the moon is red, it denotes wind ; when of a bluish colour, rain ; and when it has a mixture of both, it prognosticates heavy rains and violent tempests ; when cheerful and bright, it promises seamen the same serenity it wears itself, especially if on the fourth day of its age, its horns are not blunt, nor its disc ruddy or clouded by vapours. Many observations may be made on the rising and setting of the sun ; whether it shoots its rays with equal and uninterrupted Conditions afecting the March. 183 lustre,, appears of different colours by the interposition of clouds, or looks uniformly bright; when it appears fiery, it is a sign of wind ; and when pale or spotted, of approaching rain. Marshal Bugeaud writes : — " Besides the barometer, the moon, whatever the learned may say, is a sufficiently good guide for foreseeing the weather. Fifteen years' observation has taught me that the moon behaves as on the fourth day ten times out of twelve, as on the fifth, eleven times, if the weather does not alter on the sixth. There may well be some slight changes, but these do not last long. Should a change take place, it is when the moon changes in the quarter. If the weather does not change then, one is sure of it for the quarter." The Marshal formulated the following rule. If the fifth or sixth day of the moon be fine, and the barometer rising, there will be almost a certainty that the weather will keep fine for the remainder of the lunar month. If, on the contrary, on the fifth and sixth day of the moon the weather is bad, and it continues so after the first quarter, there are eleven chances on twelve that the weather will continue bad for the whole moon. At the headquarters camp there is usually a medical officer detailed to keep a register of meteorological observations. An officer, furnished with proper instruments, would not find it difficult to prepare a weather forecast to present daily to the General commanding, as a guide for any intended operations on the morrow. To some people with the emergency comes the energy required to encounter it. With a mass of men, such as an army is, it is more difficult to stir up the whole, for men are differently constituted ; still, as it has been observed, there are causes which will influence the determination of the soldier, and to such an extent as to cause him to make light of great exertions. Thus in war their alacrity can be roused by good words, by promises and hopes. Exhortations and promises will frequently cause men to forget their hardships, the risks they are running, and sometimes will even make them despise death itself. We should not allow ourselves to be deterred by difficulties, but should do our best to overcome them. Frequently the impossibility of doing many things, which is often declared, vanishes when one tries. It is an old saying that an unwilling commander is half beaten before the battle commences. Of Blucher Napoleon said : — " That old devil never gave me 184 The Art of Marching. any rest. I beat him to-day — good — he was ready to fight again in the evening. He suffered enormous losses, and according to all calculation, ought to hare thought himself too happy to be allowed to retire unmolested ; instead of which he immediately advanced upon me. Oh, the old devil ! " There is also the indomitable spirit of activity which will demand great efforts from the men, and the mesmeric influence or spell under which the latter lie and cannot refuse compliance with, however hard the demand. A brilliant instance of this is found in Napoleon's operations in Spain against Sir John Moore in the winter of 1 808. On the 19th of December the Emperor reviewed at the gates of Madrid 60,000 men, with 150 guns, and fifteen days' provisions in carts. This army was intended for the occupation of Portugal. On the 21st, having heard of Moore's march towards Burgos for the purpose of cutting the French communications. Napoleon arrested the march of his columns and directed 50,000 men towards the Guadarama hills, the base of which they reached in the evening of the 22nd. It was winter time. " A deep snow," writes Napier, " choked the passes, and twelve hours of ineffectual toil left the advanced guards still on the wrong side ; the General commanding reported that the road was impracticable, but Napoleon, placing himself at the head of the column, on foot and amid storms of hail and drifting snow, led his soldiers over the mountain. Many men and animals died during the passage, which lasted two days, but the Emperor, personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence, reached Villacastin, fifty miles from Madrid, on the 24th. The 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the divisions of Lapisse and Dessoles ; the dragoons of La Houssaye entered Valladolid the same day, and Ney, with the sixth corps, was at Eio Leco." * On the 22nd of December Napoleon was at Madrid ; on the 28th he was at Villalpando ; in six days he had, notwithstanding bad roads and wild weather, performed a march of 164 miles. That great master of war always knew his mind, and his purpose was inflexible. Napier shows how it was impossible "to resist even for an instant, the progress of a man who, in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpeutinos, had * Napier, " Peninsular War," book iv. chap, iv. Conditions affecting the March. 185 traversed two hundred miles of hostile country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish courier would have taken to travel the same distance ! " What an ascendency Napoleon must have exercised over his troops to obtain such efforts ! What an amazing proof of his energy f How true are Clausewitz' words, " Without an imperious com- manding will, the influence of which penetrates through the whole army, war cannot be well conducted." * General Savary, who was one of Napoleon's aides-de-camp, gives the following particulars with regard to this memorable march f : — " Napoleon quitted Madrid on Christmas Eve, 1808, to lead his troops against the British army, having learnt of its arrival at Zamora. " At starting it was fine, and we had the sun with us up to the foot of the Guadarama mountain. We found the road filled by a deep column of infantry, which was slowly ascending this mountain, which is high enough to be covered with snow up to the month of June. There was in front of this infantry a convoy of artillery, which was retracing its steps, as a hurricane of snow and ice accompanied by a frightful wind, rendered the passage dangerous ; it was as dark as night. The Spanish peasants kept telling us that there was a risk of being buried under the snow, as it had happened sometimes. We did not recollect having experienced such intense cold in Poland ; nevertheless, the Emperor was in a hurry to get his army across this defile, as it was accumulating at the foot of the mountain, where there were no provisions whatever. He gave the order that he was to be followed, and that he purposed to place himself at the head of the column. " Truly enough, he passed through the ranks of the infantry with the regiment of chasseurs of the guard ; he then caused this regiment to form a close column, occupying the entire breadth of the road ; after which, having made the chasseurs dismount^ he placed himself on foot in rear of the first platoon, and ordered the march to commence. The chasseurs marched on foot pell- mell with their horses, the mass of which rendered the hurricane powerless for those who followed them, and at the same time they trampled the snow in such a way as to leave a well marked * " Clausewitz on War," book iv. chap. xxx. t " Memoirs du Due de Eovigo," torn. iv. chap. ii. 186 The Art of Marching. track for the infantry. There was only the leading platoon which suffered a good deal. The Emperor was very much fatigued with walking, but there was no possibility of keeping on horseback. I marched by his side ; he took my arm to lean upon, and retained it up to the foot of the mountain, on the other side of the Sierra de G-uadarama." Difficulties, to the man who faces them boldly, lose half their force. Here we have a picture of a chief who had a soul, which, instead of sinking under difficult circumstances, rose and waxed stronger against them. It is to such that it is given to accom- plish mighty deeds. It is a strange fact the influence a man has over his fellows. In the horrors of the retreat from Moscow, the French soldiers remained loyal and devoted to Napoleon, the real cause of all their miseries. They had a rooted conviction that he would know how to save the army, and that soon everything would be well.* The magnetic power of attracting and subjugating people's hearts is given to a few choice spirits destined to rule men. Napoleon told the Abbe de Pradt et Warsaw on his return from Moscow, "I am never so well as in agitation: the greater the tumult the better I feel." t Of Wellington it has been recorded that under the roar of cannon his mental energies redoubled, and that never was his vision so clear as when the battle raged furiously and doubtfully around him. Perfect presence of mind is a gift of very high value in an ■officer. There is no quality soldiers admire more, aud it is invalu- able on account of the confidence it inspires. In every enterprise, but above all in war, confidence is an indispensable element of success. It is not enough for a general to possess talent ; he must also be lucky, for a certain superstition seems to attach to the reputation for good or bad fortune which attends a general or admiral. There is not the least doubt that special importance is attached to it. When any fresh man was proposed to Cardinal Richelieu for a military appointment, he invariably inquired if he were lucky. Fortune is nevertheless an arbitrary goddess, and there are some men with whom, in spite of their ability and merit, destiny deals very hardly. * This was plainly seen when the news that the Emperor had quitted the army became known. All hope vanished, the soldier fell a prey to despair. t At that time he was doing a good deal of Ijrag, trying to conceal the magni- rtude of his reverses. Conditions affecting the March. 187 When the soldier is properly commanded, when he has full confidence in the ability of his chief, then he is not borne down by sufferings or fatigues. There is sprightliness in the whole army ; the prospect of victory which will put a term to the privations and hardships of the soldier is enough to hold up his courage. On the other hand, the incapacity or bad luck of the chief renders the soldier distrustful and perturbed, capable even, in trying circumstances, to desert his flag. Moral force has its germs in esprit de corps, pride of one's regiment, which can be summed up in the following words, "the regiment first, the rest nowhere." A feeling like this grows by degrees until it comes to be graven into the heart of the good soldier. Sentiment is the very essence of the soldier's life, nothing enables him so well to face the hardships of a campaign. Esprit de corps is a great factor in the military service ; it is this and a bond of camaraderie which, probably even more than courage, has got armies out of many difficulties in war. To emulate the good example and pluck of his comrades is what many young soldiers strive to do. Discipline begets confidence, it adds vigour to the soldier, it conquers fear. It has its basis in habit, pays attention to small details, regards all orders as sacred, and only understands that what is ordered must be carried out. It is discipline which accustoms the soldier to obedience, respect and submission to his superiors, blind compliance with the regulations. History shows that no great commander was a blind follower of precedent; that is true enough, but for the mass it is well to uphold the rule that a perfect discipline should not wander from the definite instructions laid down. The injunctions and prohibitions may often at first sight appear harsh, arbitrary and unjust, however ; when sounded, they are found to have been dictated by reason and ordained in the interest of the soldiers. Let me quote an instance. During the retreat of the French from Portugal, a French soldier was shot for nothing more nor less than eating a bunch of grapes. The sentence, compared to the crime — one of disobedience — might appear excessive. Severity, nevertheless, was absolutely neces- sary, for as soldiers were dying by the dozen from dysentery, they had been forbidden to eat grapes, that fruit being the sole cause of the disease. A severe example had to be made, the consequence .being that no more grapes were eaten, and the 188 The Art of Marching. troops recovered their health. The principle of duty is one that must be instilled into the soldier until it becomes the motive power of his actions. Enthusiasm is short lived, but the true soldierly spirit throws roots deep into the soil and is difficult to eradicate. It is the officer who should constantly appeal to the soldier's sense of duty. At Spion Kop, Lieutenant H.A. C. Wilson, a young subaltern of the Middlesex Eegiment, set us a line example in striving by his heroic conduct to establish confidence in his young and untried soldiers under adverse circumstances. Alas! the Boer bullets had not our respect for so much bravery. Ah ! if the point of honour, if self-respect were not there to prevent a sneaking olf, what droll scenes would frequently be witnessed ! But each individual is observed by his neighbours, each desires to have the esteem of all, and not a man flinches. Under the influence of fatigue the soldier is very liable to become depressed, consequently we should look for anything that is likely to raise his spirits and render him gay. Music has this effect, but it is impossible for the bandsmen to play right through the march. Colonel Preston, who commanded the 45th Foot, held that a singing battalion would always march further than any other. Singing, in fact, appears to act on the spirits, and to make the men oblivious of the fatigue and strain they are undergoing. Marshal Saxe remarks that music has a secret power over us, and enables us to undergo great exertion ; this comes from the emotional influence it exercises on mankind. Any one who has marched with troops must have often seen how in the most trying circumstances a hon mot causes every trouble to be forgotten ; one gives rise to another, soon the air rings with merriment, the minds recover their balance and acquire new energy. A low moral state, abatement of spirits, from whatever source it may spring, is the condition which affects the march of an army most. Given the reverse, troops marching to the sound of the guns, expecting a speedy encounter with the enemy, or follow- ing a beaten foe, will often make efforts which might well be considered almost impossible. The movements of a newly-formed army will always lack regularity and energy. It cannot be otherwise. Alison states that in the advance to Erfurth, in April 1813, there was great Conditions affecting the March. 189 confusion and disorder in the French line of march. The ancient discipline and order of the army were at an end, and the admirable precisioa of the soldiers of Ulm and Austerlitz had been buried with the Grand Army in the Russian campaign. How the march was conducted can be seen by this remark : " During the whole march the imperial cortege was obliged to force its way, with almost brutal violence, through the dense crowd of infantry, carmen, horsemen, and wagons which encum- bered the highway." The enthusiasm caused by the prospect of partaking in a combat has often led to great efforts with respect to marching. A great emergency appeals to the imagination of the soldier, and incites him to launch, forth into great exertion. Here is a case taken from the Civil War in the United States of America, to show in what manner the spirit of soldiers is influenced by a few words spoken in season. At 1 a.m. of the 18th of July 1861, Gleneral Johnston received a sudden order to proceed with his troops to Manassas. As the soldiers began their march southwards, with their backs to the enemy, they were seized with discouragement. After having thus gone a few miles, the brigades were halted and a brief order was read to them. " Our gallant army, under General Beauregard, is now attacked by overwhelming numbers. The commanding General hopes that his troops will step out like men, and make a forced march to save the country," The effect of this appeal was instantaneous. Jackson says, " The soldiers rent the air with shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation." Whatever the conditions may be, troops should never fail to do their utmost to reach the locality to which they have been ordered to proceed. As an instance of troops straining every nerve to take part in a battle, there is nothing better than the march of the Prussians through the lanes of Belgium, which quite recent rains had made extremely muddy and heavy, with the object of lending a hand to the British army at Waterloo. The Prussians were full of animosity against the French ; they were mainly veterans, most of the officers and men having served through the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. The troops had unbounded confidence in the aged chief who had so often led them to victory ; they knew their business ; every man of them was ready to fight, and had a firm belief of being able to beat the enemy in the end. These were all very favourable conditions. 190 The Art of Marching. CHAPTER VIII. THE KATE OF MAECHING. Knowledge of the approximate rate of progress of troops very necessary— Cadenced pace revived by Marshal Saxe — MeasTirement of the infantry pace — French rate of march — Paces of cavalry — Best pace the slow trot — System of marching recommended by Gallifet and Bugeaud — Faulty marching in Jameson's raid — Prince Hohenlohe's system of cavalry march — Horse artillery and cavalry — March of a Prussian artillery column from Vienna in 1866 — Artillery bound to conform to the pace of the other arms — Pace of different animals employed in the army trains — ^Marching of a single individual — The individual marching in a column — -AH possible liberty to be allowed — Cavalry and artillery in some cases precede the infantry — Numbers aifect the rate of marching — The pace must be even — Duke of Wellington on lost distances — Kate of marching affected by the condition of the roads — Intervals — Halts — Long halts — To march on as broad a front as possible — Troops to conform to the rule of the road — Opening out — -Effect of discipline on this — The regimental officer on the line of march— Craufurd — His orders — Officers to watch the bearing of the soldier on the march — Duties of staff and regimental officers — Getting the troops echeloned for an intended march — ^Time occupied in crossing bridges or defiles — Bate of march increased by conveying troops en paste. The time taken by troops to get from one given point to anotlier is called the rate of marching. It is a matter of very great consequence for a commander to know, with a very close approximation to reality, the normal rate of progress of troops of all arms, in other words, the exact time in which they may be expected to cover certain distances. Troops which are marching in a long column must be ready at any moment to deploy into line of battle, and it is of very material importance to be able to calculate correctly the time which will be occupied in passing from column of march to battle formation. These calculations of time, which, however, are influenced by a number of circumstances, are extremely necessary in operations in which two or more bodies are operating in conjunction with each other. Battles have often been lost and very important combinations have often miscarried through a faulty calculation of the time necessary for supports, reinforcements, or distant detachments to come up or to appear at certain given places. The Rate of Marching. 191 The marching of infantry is a regular cadenced step taken by every individual soldier by raising and lowering the same foot at the same time. It is a mode of progression which consists in a series of successive movements, by means of which each leg is alternatively carried in advance of the other. A single one of these movements constitutes the pace, and the interval between the limb carried forward and the limb left behind measures the exact compass of the pace. It was Marshal Saxe who revived cadenced marching, which in the feudal ages, when infantry had sunk into disrepute, had been suffered to fall into disuse. In reviving it, the Marshal held that the cadenced pace was the military gait of the flomans, which enabled them to make such long marches. According to him, it is the time which exerts a powerful influence on the stepping of the troops. It is the scope of every march to obtain for the troops the greatest velocity of movement with the least consumption of energy. With regard to the marching of a body of troops, there are certain measurements which experience has demonstrated to be uniform and to give a good basis for calculation. The general length of step must be such as will not demand great exertion, and will be equally adapted to men of large and small stature. The ordinary step of an individual when in the act of walking is computed at two and a half linear feet. As in a disciplined body the step must be of a uniform length, to insure equality of gait, this requirement has been met by the adoption of 30 inches, five-sixths of a yard, as the ordinary regulation step for the infantry. Besides this measure of length, the number of such steps as the soldier would be called upon to take in a minute had to be fixed. This was fixed at 116, and gives a rate of marching of 3 miles and 520 yards in the hour.* When the movement of a large number of men is concerned, we must adhere to the pace most ordinary to man. An accelerated pace beyond the ordinary, such as that of the Italian Bersaglieri, requires constant practice and exceptionally robust constitutions, which all soldiers alike have not. Our infantry pace for manoeuvre is fixed at 100 yards per * The leBgth of the German infantry quick step is 31J inches, and 114 are taken in a minute. In their cavalry 125 paces are traversed in a minute at a walk,. 300 at a trot, 500 at a gallop. Under favourable circumstances, a large mixed body of troops is calculated to cover a kilometre, 1100 yards, in twelve minutes. 192 The Art of Marching. minute, which gives per hour 3 miles and 720 yards. If we deduct a halt of five minutes, the foot soldier, moving at that rate, will pass in an hour over 3 miles and 220 yards of ground. The rate of march laid down by the French for their infantry is 4 kilometres, or 2^ miles per hour, including a halt of ten minutes. Some corps, like the Chasseurs des Alpes, march at the rate of 5 kilometres, 3-1 miles, per hour, including a halt of ten minutes. G-eneral Lewal * gives the results of some trials made at the camp of Chalons, from which it resulted that the infantry marched at the mean rate of 86"06 metres per minute, equal to 5110 metres per hour. The general goes then to observe that these experiments were not to be relied on, inasmuch as the conditions were all in favour of the men. He concludes by admitting that the mean rate per hour for a column fractioned in reasonable parts, and moving with sufficient intervals, can be justly calculated at 4 kilometres, the equivalent of 2^ miles English. Marches in the vicinity of the enemy cannot be performed by separate arms, moving according to their own special rate. We are then obliged to unite artillery, cavalry, and infantry, so that with their peculiar qualities they may render each other mutual support. A column of troops of the three arms must naturally conform to the rate of going of that arm which marches the slowest of all. Next to the marching of the infantry — which constitutes by far the largest portion of every army — we must ascertain the paces of the horse. Cavalry horses ordinarily walk 4 miles per hour, trot 8 miles, and gallop 12. And, whereas the rest of the army seldom does more than 13 miles, the cavalry can march 25 to 30 miles a day. Walking 4 miles per hour, cavalry gets over a distance of 117^ yards in a minute. At a walk and trot combined of 5 miles per hour, it passes over 146 yards in one minute. At a trot of 8 miles per hour, it covers 234f yards in one minute. There are very pertinent reasons why cavalry should not for a long time march in rear of the columns, for cavalry suffers seriously from having to follow at a foot's pace. In the campaign in Italy, in 1859, the French cavalry suffered very much from this cause. In the mounted arms a change of pace relieves both men and horses. * General Lewal, " ConKrenoe^sur la Marohe d' un Corps d' Arme'e," pp. 86-89. The Rate of Marching. 193 Cavalry in liae occupies one yard per file, in fours, likewise, one yard per file ; in sections one yard per man, in half-sections or file two yards per man. When marching on a road cavalry moves by sections ; four troopers abreast occupy a front of 4 yards, and allowance being made for officers and serrefiles, the width of front extends to 5 yards, or 15 feet. Bight troopers ranged in two ranks occupy a front of 4 yards in line, but the same four of the front rank followed by their corresponding four of the rear rank occupy a depth of 8 yards on the line of march. A squadron of cavalry drawn up in sections will consequently occupy double the extent of ground on the march than it would in line. Our cavalry drill lays down that cavalry on the line of march will as a rule march in files, but, when a road will admit of its marching by sections, there will be a very considerable diminution in the length of the column, which is an important point. For cavalry the best pace is a slow trot, about 6 or 7 miles an hour, the men rising in their stirrups, and walking the horses up and down hill. Walking all the way really fatigues the men and horses much more than a smart trot ; proceeding in the first way, the horses are kept saddled for many hours longer than is necessary. The horse is always distressed by being too long under the saddle, the men get tired and unsteady in their seats, and give the horses sore backs. In cavalry the commander of each squadron should lead at a steady pace, taking no heed of the squadron in front of him : that is to say, not increasing or slackening the pace as the rear of the squadron in front of him does. General Gallifet gives as a standard for cavalry marches 5"6 to 6'2 miles per hour. That rate to be secured by alternating the pace according to circumstan-ces, by walking and trotting half an hour alternately, or by walking three-quarters of an hour and trotting the remaining quarter. Marshal Bugeaud recommends the following arrangement. The cavalry to start at 6 a.m. To walk for 45 minutes, then to halt for 10 ; 4000 metres will thus have been got over. For 12,000 metres more there will be no other halt ; this space will be traversed in 100 minutes at a walk and 100 at a trot alternately (1 hour and 40 minutes). Then halt, form up the column, and give an hour to the men for breakfast. The second half of the march will be accomplished in two periods, o 194 The Art of Marching. with a repose of from 5 to 6 minutes, alternating walk and trot so as to do 10 kilometres per hour. In this manner at 11 a.m., five hours after starting, the column would reach its destina- tion. For distances exceeding 32 kilometres and approaching 60 or 80, commence by a walk of 45 minutes, followed by a rest of ten. Then cover more than half of the remaining distance in two stretches, alternating the walk and trot, moving at the rate of 12 kilometres per hour. Then allow of a rest of two hours for breakfast, and complete the march by three stretches or spurts, the first and shortest at a walk, the others at a walk and trot, at the minimum rate of 10 kilometres per hour. To quote a recent case, in the ever-to-be-regretted Jameson raid a serious fault committed was that very little opportunity was given to the men for rest and food. In 70 hours the raiders did 130 miles ; the march may be said to have been continuous, for only half-hour halts were made after about every 20 miles to water and feed the horses, and to let the men eat. The same, or even a higher rate of speed, might have been attained by pressing faster for periods of a few hours, calling a longish halt at the end for rest and refreshment. The marching, however, was so continuous that, when a short halt was allowed, the men nere so overcome with fatigue that they dismounted and slept ; they did not care to partake of any food. Prince Hohenlohe - Ingelfingen recommends that a forced march of 30 miles by cavalry should be divided in the following manner : " I should start at a walk for half an hour, then trot 2^ miles, then walk for another half an hour, then trot for 4^ miles, walk half an hour, trot 2\ miles, and then again walk for half an hour ; I should thus, including a halt of half an hour, have marched 18 miles in 4 hours. I should now halt for from 2 to 3 hours, in order to allow the horses to be watered and fed, and for the men to cook their dinners. (I assume that they carry preserved provisions.) "The remaining 12 miles can be marched in 3 hours. In this manner the division will have advanced 30 miles in 10 hours." * The divisional cavalry will be, in a certain way, forced to submit to the drawback of having to regulate its pace so as to suit that of the infantry ; but the same does not apply to brigades * Prince Hobenlohe-IngelfiDgen, " Letters on Cavalry," pp. 142, 143. The Rate of Marching. 195 and divisions of cavalry. To start with, most of the cavalry will generally be in front of the army, but given that it is not so, by trotting it can overtake the rest of the column, allowing arrange- ments being made for a later start. For this the roads followed by the horsemen must be kept clear of baggage-trains and all encumbrances. It will greatly ease the horses if they are relieved of the pressure on their backs for some little space of time. This can be easily done by making the men lead them occasionally. When proceeding in this order attention must be paid to keep the men and horses well closed up. The men should quit the saddle at all halts. The depth of the marching column being always a weak point, every measure should be adopted that would in any way tend to reduce it. The march of cavalry is not necessarily confined to the roads ; where the country is open, cavalry can make its way across it, leaving the roads clear for the artillery and infantry. The British army retired from Quatre Bras to Waterloo in this order. Such an arrangement of marching over the fields was followed by the Prussians in the war of 1866, and also by the Vllth French corps under General Douay, when marching from Eheims to Sedan in 1870. A march conducted in this way requires favourable weather. On the 17th of June 1815, Napolean pressed on the rear of the British army by Grenappe, but a heavy thunderstorm with torrents of rain rendered the fields impassable for the French, and im- peded the advance of their pursuing squadrons.* The French had to confine themselves to the roads, their march ceased at Eossomme, and the last of their divisions did not reach their respective bivouac ground till after dark. It is also necessary to observe that marching through long grass and standing crops is to be avoided, for nothing is so fatiguing as this for men and horses alike. On this point we quote the following from the German OfScial Report of the war of 1866 : — " On the heights of Daubrowitz the reserve artillery received the order to place itself at the head of the main body of the 1st Guards Division. It trotted past the columns across country, and through corn which stood as high as * Througliout the afternoon of the 17th of June 1815, the air waa hot, heavy, and sultry ; when the storm broke, the rain fell in torrents. It put the French in mind of the storm during the night of the 4th of July 1809, the eve of the battle of Wagram, which was one of the most violent ever experienced. 196 The Art of Marching. a man, and which, owing to the wet state of the soil, twisted and clung in thick wreaths about the wheels ; it had to make such exertions that even at Jericek several horses fell dead in their harness from fatigue." When the troops have to cover a long distance, possibly marching 30 miles in the day, the horses should not be pressed ; it will be found to answer best to proceed at a moderate pace. The march should in every case commence and terminate at a walk. Horse artillery accompanying cavalry can march at the rate of 5 miles per hour; the horses, by changing alternately from a walk into a trot, find a relief from the tediousness of the march. The pace of the field artillery is not so quick, and averages between 3^ and 4 miles per hour. The pace in these batteries is limited by the fact that all the gunners cannot be carried. A battery of artillery occupies in line 95 yards, or, counting an interval of 28 J yards on each flank, 152 yards. In column of route, however, a battery covers a length of 420 yards. Its length, compared to the front it occupies in line, is more con- siderable than that of the other arms. This has occasionally been reduced by putting two guns or wagons abreast and advanc- ing in a double formation. Few roads are broad enough to allow of this way of marching, and there is considerable risk of causing a block. Should one of the gun or wagon teams break down, there will be no room left for the troops in rear of the battery to pass by. The artillery having to prepare the way for the advance of the infantry in the attack, should march, as much as it is com- patible with its safety, near the head of the column. If placed too far in rear, some considerable delay may be experienced in bringing it up past the other troops, to the detriment of losing the effect of its fire at the commencement of the engagement. Its position on the column of march must be assigned with judg- ment, and on no consideration whatever should artillery be suffered to march for any distance unaccompanied by the other arms. The rate of marching for artillery going alone is laid down in the Royal Artillery drill, vol. ii., page 252. It is fixed at 4 miles- per hour. (Walk First hour malt .. 30 minutes ,. 10 )« (Walk and trot .. 20 Walk and trot .. 30 J, Second hour Ditto 7th Kudniki 7 8th ii Paradomia 3 9th )» Halted 10th 5> Paulovo (At the castle of the Oount of Choiseuil) 4 11th 55 Oohmiana 6i 12th J» Smorgoni 8 13th Halted 14th )» Smorgoni to Zachkevitsohi 3i 15th Vileika 8 16th ») Kostenevitschi 6 17th 3) Dolgbinow H 18th S) Dokzice 7 19th ); Halted 20th J5 Berezino 6| 21st )3 Pouiclma 6J 22iid »J Kamen 6 23rd )> Botsoheivo 3| 24th )» From Smorgoni to BezenkoTltsohi 4 25th »' Soritza (three leagues on this side of Ostrowno) ... 4i 26th „ Combat (bivouac at the small castle of Dobrijk) 5§ 27th )) Bivouac before Witepsk 2i 28th )) Bivouacat Aghaponovchtohina H 29th 1) Sourai 5 30th Halted 31st 11 Ditto 1st August, Ditto 2nd )> Ditto 3rd )) Ditto 4th Ditto 5th )J Ditto 6th " Ditto * Bugfene Labaume, "Relation Oirconstanoie'e de la Campagne de Eussie," Appendix. Length of Marches. 239 Leagues. Halted Ditto Sourai to Janwiotsohi : 4 Halted Velechkovitaohi 3 J Liozna 2J Liouvavitsohi 5| Easasna ,., ... ... ... ... ... 4 Siniaki 7^ Katova 3 Bivouac (at a league from Korouitnia) 5 Bivouac (near the oMteau of Novoidvor) ... 5 Suburb of Smolensko IJ Passed the Dnieper (bivouac above Smolensko) ... | Bivouac same place Ditto Volodimerowa ... ... 6 Pologhi 7J Zazele ... ... ... ... ... ... 5J Mikaelovskoe 7J Agopoohina (passed the Niemen at Blaghove) ., . 4| Bivouac (round a chateau), a league beyond Bereski 4 Agopochina to Novoe 9 Halted Pokrow 6i ', Paulova ... ... ... 6| Woremiewo ... 2 Halted Louzos ... ... ... ,,. 5J Encamped on the heights of Borodino 4 Ditto Battle Ouspenskoe or Krasnoe 3J Eouza 6| Halted Alpalchtchouina 4J Zwenighorod , 3J Buzaievo 6J Khoreohevo 4f Moscow 2 Total from Pilony to Moscow 264i The Fourth Corps remained in the city of Moscow from the 15th of September to the 18th of October. 7th August, 8th »» 9th 9) 10th )) 11th 55 12th J» 13th 5» 14th 5) 15th JJ 16th J) 17th )» 18th 55 19th Jf 20th 55 21st 22nd )» 23rd 24th j^ 25th ,j 26th )5 27th J) 28th J> 29th 30th 55 31st 1st S lepteml 2nd ^ 3rd 55 4th }; 5th 6th ,, 7th )) 8th 55 9th 55 10th 55 11th 55 12th 55 13th 14th ^, 15th 35 Leagues. 18th October, Village on the road to Kaluga, a league from Moscow 1 19th „ Little village near Batoutinka, bivouac 5 20th » Inatovvo ^ 21st J, Pominskoe 3 22nd ,, Halted 23rd )S From Fominskoe to a village half a league beyond Borovsk, bivouac 7i 24th „ Battle of Malo-Jaroslavitz, bivouac 4i 25th Halted 26th ?» Ouvarovskoe, bivouac 4 27th Alfereva 4i 28th , Village a league beyond Borisov, supposed to be Mitiaeva 2J 29th „ Ouspenskoe, called Krasnoe, bivouac 4 240 The Art of Marching. SOtli October, 31st Ist November, 2nd )J 3rd 5) 4th 97 5tli }} 6th »» 7th T» 8th 5» 9th 10th )) 11th )» 12th 13th J) 14th S> 15th )» 16th S) 17th »5 18th 9' 19th S> 20th J5 21st J» 22ad J) 23rd J) 24th J5 25th )' 26th )5 27th a 28th 5» 29th )* 30th »» let December, 2nd )» 3rd 5» 4th J» 5th ») 6th J» 7th 8th ») 9th )» 10th )) 11th ;} 12th 91 Leagues. Village half-league on the right of the road between Kolotskoi and Prokofevo, bivouac ... 6 Ghiat, bivouac ... ... ... ... ... SJ Near Velitsohevo, bivouac 5 Foederovskoe, bivouac 6^ Battle of Viazma, bivouac half -league further ... 3 J Eouibki, a league from Semlevo ... ... ... 7 Jolkov Postola Door ... ... ... ... 3§ Doroghoboui, bivouac ... ... ... ... 6 From Fominskoe to ZazeM, bivouac 7 Slobod a, bivouac ... ... .. ... ... 4 From Sloboda passed the Woss, bivouacked at a little village half a league from this river ... 1 Doukhovchtehina 4 Halted Wolodimerowa, bivouac 6f Smolensko ... ... 5J Halted Hamlet three leagues from Smolensko, supposed to be Loubna 3J Krasnoe ... ... ... ... ... ... 7 Liadoui 4 J Doubrowna 8 Orcha 4 Halted Half a league before Kokanovo, bivouac ... 5 Bivouacked round a castle half a league this side of Tolsohin 5 Bivouacked three leagues from Tolsohin, near Jablonka ... ... ... ... 4 Bobr 4 Natscha, five leagues from Bobr, where there is an insulated church, bivouac 5 J From a village at Nemonitsa, to two and a, half leagues on this side of the Beresina, bivouac ... 5J Studzianca passage of the Beresina, bivouac ... 4§ Zembin, bivouac 4J Kamen 3J Niestanovitschi, near Zavichino 6 Iliia 4J Molodetsohino 6 Halted Village supposed to be Markovo, bivouac ... 7 Smorghoni 4J Joupranoui 5 Eovno-Pole, bivouac ... ... ... ... 5 Roukoni, bivouac 5j Wilna 5 Eve, bivouac 10 Zisniori 6 Kowno 10 Total 260J From the Niemen to Moscow 264f 525i ( 241 ) CHAPTER X. CAVALEY COVEEING THE MAECH OF AN AEMY. A general must push his cavalry in advance of his army — Cavalry retains its importance — Its services are as valuable as ever — Gustavas Adolphus first to appreciate the mutual assistance of the three arms — Hamley praises Frederick's employment of cavalry — Napoleon's employment of cavalry — Murat's exploits compare vfell with those of Frederick's best generals — Napoleon always better informed than Frederick — To cover the front and flanks with a great screen of cavalry — Moltke on probabilities — Thiers shows difficulties ia getting informa- tion in war — The adversary often a source of doubt — Intelligence to be sought well forward — Great importance of obtaining an accurate account of the doings of the enemy — The independent cavalry divisions — Keoonnoitring the most important business of cavalry — The reconnoitring cannot be done by the divisional cavalry — "Work for the divisional cavalry — Strategic advanced guards — A watchful cavalry relieves its infantry of much work — Grouchy fails to employ hia cavalry correctly on the 18th of June 1815 — ^The cavalry in the flank march after the battle of the Alma — The Austrian cavalry inert at Sadowa — French and German cavalry differently employed in the march on Sedan — Stonewall Jackson's employment of cavalry — How soon cavalry falls off in practical work — Russian cavalry in 1877 pronounced a dismal failure— Exploring defies any fixed rules — Two methods of conducting it— Details of these methods — The staff to have the general direction of reconnaissances — Every opportunity should be taken during manoeuvres to teach ofScers patrol work — Moraud and Napoleon on Cossacks. It might appear, at first sight, from the heading of this chapter, that we were digressing from the real subject of our work. A little consideration, however, will show that it is not so in reality. The science of the general consists in ascertaining the strength of the enemy at such and such a point, and his weakness at such another. He must gather reliable information about the enemy's strength, position, and movements; for, without knowing what actually lies before him, he cannot engage his army to march in any desired direction. He must know in good time that the roads are clear, and to obtain this information, he must push his cavalry far forward in advance of his army. Should he omit to do so, he will grope his way in utter darkness, and lay himself open to all manner of surprises. This happened to Schilder- Schuldner's brigade in the war of 1877-78. The General came E 242 The Art of Marching. stumbling along, without reconnoitring the ground in his front, and encountered the whole of Osman Pasha's army. It is therefore reasonable and proper to devote special atten- tion to the scouting of a country through which an army or a body of troops are in the act of moving. And here be it per- mitted to us to observe that, if the present efficiency of firearms and magazine rifles has somewhat narrowed the sphere of cavalry on the battle-field, that arm still retains the same importance as it ever did during a campaign, and, above all, during its opening period. Of the three arms, cavalry is the one which has the greatest mobility. The offensive is the only principle on which it should act on the battle-field ; to rush on the foe, overthrow him, and accomplish his destruction. This is done by the shock, the momentum of the weight and speed of the horse, and the keen edge of the sword. The imposing effect of an advance of cavalry at full speed produces a serious impression on the morale. Even the most courageous cannot gaze without dismay at the impetuous advance of the charging squadrons. The tramp of snorting and excited horses, the rattle of steel, the cheers and angry shouts, all com- bine to scare the assailed. The ground shakes under the horses' pounding feet, the compact body of horsemen approaches every instant closer and closer, it arrives suddenly and sweeps every- thing before it, its onslaught is irresistible, the effect is electric. The extension of the power of fire-arms has brought about a considerable diminution in the action of cavalry in battle, for the efficiency of this arm is much impaired when it comes into contact with well-drilled, well-led, and steady infantry. Nevertheless, the service cavalry can render in watching the enemy, in con- cealing the movements of the other arms, iu assisting in the final phases of the battle, either in taking up the pursuit or iu covering the retreat, remain as valuable as ever they were. Gustavus Adolphus, who was the first to revive the true principles of cavalry tactics in Europe, was also the first to appreciate the reciprocal assistance which artillery, cavalry, and infantry can afford to each other, a principle of mutual support, which, under the name of combined tactics, came to be thoroughly grasped in the wars of Napoleon.* * The infantry is the only arm which at need can dispense with the others, and the more the arms of precision are perfected the more it becomes self-suificieut. Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 243 Frederick the Great employed his cavalry in the field with great effect. Hamley states, to his credit, " no army has since possessed a cavalry leader or a body of horsemen who could claim any superiority over Seidlitz and his splendid squadrons. In fact, notwithstanding the huge masses of cavalry used in the later wars of Napoleon, their true use and efiiciency for combat seems to have been less understood then than in the time of Frederick." Hamley, undoubtedly, is a great authority to contradict; nevertheless, we hold that Napoleon's employment of cavalry was none inferior to Frederick's. The emperor fully recognized how it is the cavalry which paves the way for a battle by concealing the movements of the other arms, by keeping the enemy in view, by being incessantly in contact with him. Knowing also how the adversary's overthrow is accomplished by well-sustained cavalry charges during the progress of the contest, and how it is by cavalry that the beaten foe is pursued and hemmed in when flying, he kept his horsemen under one chief, who was subordinate to his personal. control alone. He thus determined to reserve to himself exclusively the means for preparing the victory, for rendering it decisive, and for reaping all its fruits. "In 1805 he formed his heavy cavalry, Cuirassiers and Carabineers, into one single corps, to which he added the dragoons, both mounted and dismounted. With these squadrons were a number of horse batteries, so that the horsemen, while wielding their swords, could at the same time be more effective, by their action being augmented by the fire of artillery. Murat's cavalr}'^, in the valley of the Danube, in 1805, cap- tured 12,000 prisoners in four days, marching incessantly in pursuit of the Archduke Ferdinand, about thirty miles a day. By overthrowing the Austrians, hurrying after them to Vienna, far ahead of the infantry, and seizing the bridges over the Danube, it astonished every one. The following year, in the plains of Saxony and Prussia, it pursued the Prussian army up to the shores of the Baltic, capturing almost the whole of it. Nolan reckons that out of twenty-two great battles fought by Frederick the Great, his cavalry won at least fifteen of them. We do not gainsay that Frederick's cavalry generals were brilliant officers, who had a very great knowledge of war, and were quick in seizing an opportunity for striking a powerful blow on the battle-field. All this, and much more, we fully admit, but we' maintain that none of them ever brought about such brilliant 244 The Art of Marching. results in the whole course of a campaign as did Murat in the years 1805 and 1806. That he owed many successes to his daring intrepidity and unsurpassed energy, rather than to sound ability, we avow. He certainly lacked the cautious judgment and promptness of decision which so distinguished Seidlitz and Ziethen. His achievements, however, due to his rapid marching, have been more momentous than any performed by Frederick's best generals. Frederick's cavalry excelled in manceuvring, biit, as Denison observes, Napoleon, " well knew the value of the cavalry service in every sphere of its duty. He fully appreciated the use of light cavalry for outpost and reconnoitring purposes, and was far superior to Frederick the Great in the most important quality of the General-in-Chief — the capacity to discover the position, the designs, and the movements of the enemy. Frederick, as we have seen, was continually incurring risks and defeat through his inability to discover the plans of his opponents. Napoleon was almost always well informed."* The same writer, having shown how the Prussian model, based on the main features of the Prussian cavalry of Seidlitz and Ziethen, came to be copied and imitated by the other European military nations, adds : " It was left to Napoleon to perfect the method of using cavalry by employing it skilfully in every phase of its duty, for he knew how to use it in covering the movements of his army in the campaign, in making decisive charges in action, in following up successes, and in covering retreats. His cavalry, however, were never so thoroughly and perfectly trained to manoeuvre at speed as were the Prussian horsemen." f Napoleon's instructions to his marshals in 1806, show how thoroughly he understood the correct employment of cavalry in covering the advance of an army. His employment of that arm in reconnoitring contributed to gain much renown for his masterly campaign in France in 1814. Setting aside the action of cavalry on the battle-field, the correct principle in war is to cover the front and flanks of the columns with a great screen of cavalry, which can move rapidly ahead, diving into woods, exploring the country in every direc- tion, and reconnoitring the enemy, with the object of furnishing the general in command with information on which to base his * Lieut.-Colonel G. T. Denison, " A History of Cavalry," p. 363. t Ibid., p. 339. Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 245 subsequent operations. This is what the great teachers of the art of war, Frederick II. and Napoleon, judged to be one of the principal employments of cavalry in a campaign. No one was more keen for exact news of the enemy than Napoleon. But knowledge of the adversary's dispositions and resources is never as full as one could desire. Frederick the Great said, " If we had exact information of our enemy's dis- positions, we should beat him every time." And this is exactly what we have not, for, like ourselves, our adversary tries to hide his movements, to mystify us, and to lead us into error. The two commanders grope in the dark, and are surrounded by what may be called the fog of war. This can only be lifted by sending out reconnoitring parties in every direction, by trusting to the law of probabilities, and by guessing from a mass of reports — often incomplete, contradictory, or exaggerated — the real state of things as neai; as practicable. In his " Franco-German War," Moltke remarks, " In war, it is for the most part with probabilities only that the strategist can reckon ; and the probability, as a rule, is that the enemy will do the right thing." It is well to form for one's self a correct picture of the serious difSculties which encompass the acquisition of correct information in war. Thiers has given us the best we have ever met with, and which we think worth borrowing. "Moreover, nothing is miore contradictory, more perplexing, than this multitude of reports coming from spies or from officers despatched on reconnaissance. Some locate an army corps where they have met nothing but detachments; others, simple detachments where they should have detected the presence of an army corps. Frequently they have not seen with their own eyes what they report, and have not done aught more than collect the hearsay of people wlio were frightened, amazed, or marvelling. The military police lies just as much as the civil, it exaggerates, and contradicts itself. In this chaos of reports, the higher intellect detects the truth, the mediocre mind gets lost. And above all, should an anterior pre- possession exist, if there should be an inclination to believe that the enemy will arrive by a certain point rather than by another, the accounts received are all interpreted in one sense, however little the facts may lend themselves to it. It is thus that great errors are produced, errors which sometimes undermine armies and empires." * * Thiers, "Histoire du Gonaulat et de 1' Empire," vol. vi. p. 8i. 246 The Art of Marching. Thiers remarks on things which the reconnoitrers have not seen with their own eyes, as if they had neglected a part of their duty. This is not so, for an alert enemy will take every possible measure to conceal the location of his forces, and to close the country to the adversary's explorers. Eumours and hearsay evidence cannot be rejected, they will have to be accepted, for even the most daring scouts will often be baffled in obtaining positive personal information. With regard to popular report or common talk, the same words are apt to produce different effects on different minds, it is only the expert who knows how much of it is worthy of credence. In the field, the great difficulty consists in knowing what state the enemy is in. What advantage it would have been for the Austrians at Essling to have known that the bridges over the Danube in rear of the French were broken, and that their ammunition was exhausted ! What might they not have attempted on the night of the battle of Wagram, had they been told that nearly the whole of the French were drunk ? * The adversary himself is often a source of doubt. When a general is face to face with a determined commander, it is possible for him to guess what measures the latter is likely to adopt, what course he will most probably follow. But when, on the contrary, he has to deal with an irresolute or bewildered opponent, he can never be sure of what the next move will be. It is then more than ever that he must provide for the unexpected. Intelligence must be sought well forward, and it is on this account that the duty of covering an army is made to devolve on the cavalry. The most mobile arm of the service is thus made to undertake the double duty of covering the movements of its own army, and of obtaining information of that of the enemy. Napoleon caused the reconnaissance reports collected nearest the enemy, with sketches done by special officers, to come in from the advanced-guard of cavalry, and on these he prepared his attacks. This duty was performed in his time at a smaller distance than it would have to be done now. The cavalry is bound to become familiar with the ground, to watch the enemy, and report every relevant incident or indica- tion which may come under its observation. There is no more * This cameabout from the practice in Austria for the cellars to be situated in. the grounds where the grapes are grown. When the troops became masters of the field they partook immoderately of the contents of the cellars. Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 247 important duty in war than to obtain an account, as exact as pos- sible, of the doings of the enemy, for it is on these that all military operations, and the plans of the general, must be based. The service which enables a chief to be at all moments accurately instructed on the situation, which will fix the location of the enemy, thus preventing our going blindly into the midst of his columns, has, as it will be seen, an importance which is secondary to none. As the enemy is neared, the cavalry screen yields its place to the outposts ; but as soon as practicable, after the conclu- sion of an engagement, the cavalry should resume its role of keeping touch with the enemy. In war, the acquisition of information is entrusted to the independent cavalry divisions.* These must be launched out well in front of an army, both to conceal the movements of the said army from the adversary, as well as to obtain for its commander that mass of reports and tidings which are so essential to enable him to direct the movements of his columns. The general commanding must himself assign to his cavalry the zone of the country it will have to explore if its services are to be of good use to him. No moment is too soon for doing what recon- noitring is to be performed. Marshal Saxe wrote, " Altogether the calling of cavalry is a shrewd profession, in which a knowledge of the country in which hostilities are being carried out is absolutely necessary, and in which penetrating insight and boldness of mind accomplish all." During the early stages of the campaign the cavalry becomes the most important of the measures of precaution an army can adopt. The service of recormoitring the country thoroughly is its essential and most important business.! Horsemen alone can * " Hodson, writing in 185i, urges the necessity of picked and trustworthy soldiers, trained in time of peace to acquire during war that accurate intelligence of the resources, strength, position, and movements of an enemy, the want of which has been so constantly deplored in the campaigns of the armies of India." Captain E. A. Stotherd, United Service Magazine, February, 1899. t The Purposes of Light Oa valet. Q. What is the object of light cavalry in a campaign ? A. To enlighten and to protect the march of an army. O. How is this end to be attained ? A By preceding our columns, feeling on the flanks, surrounding and covering all with a vigilant and fearless curtain; following the enemy step by step, harass- ing him, engendering uneasiness, discovering his projects, wearing out his forces m detail and by compelling him, in short, to waste m defence that offensive power from which he would otherwise have been able to derive the greatest advantages. De Brack, " Avant-Postes de Cavalerie Legfere." 248 Tlie Art of Marching. push rapidly ahead in any direction, and their mobility will impart an element of safety to many a daring enterprise. There is besides another important duty for the cavalry to perform, and that is to hide the movements of its own army. A brilliant example of the employment of cavalry for this purpose was given by Stuart in the early stages of the Civil War in the United States. In the spring of 1861, J. E. B. Stuart organized the 1st Virginian Cavalry. This corps was subsequently attached to the command of General J. E. Johnston, then in the Shenandoah valley, and was employed in observing Patterson, who had crossed the Potomac, and was threatening the southern forces at Win- chester. Stuart's regiment, in July 1861, was at Bunker's Hill, on the turnpike leading from Winchester to Martinsburg, where Patterson was encamped; it was diligently watching the move- ments of the Union army. At the same time as McDowell's movement against Beauregard began, Patterson commenced making a demonstration to keep Johnston at Winchester. The plan of the Southern generals was to avoid a battle in the valley, and to concentrate their forces at Manassas. Stuart's cavalry was to mask Johnston's march and to watch Patterson. The latter had been ordered by General Scott to feel strongly for the enemy, and not to allow Johnston to escape to Manassas to reinforce Beauregard. On the 15th of July Patterson advanced, and drove the Con- federates out of Bunker's Hill. Stuart had no artillery to reply to Patterson's guns. Patterson made no use of his cavalry, and remained at Bunker's Hill only one day, on the next he moved to his left, and marched down to Charlestown. Stuart hung close on his flanks, and as soon as the movement on Charlestown was developed, he sent intelligence to Johnston, who, seeing that Patterson had no intention to attack, could get ready to join Beauregard. He struck his tents accordingly, and quietly stole away. Stuart spread a curtain of cavalry between the opposing forces, which so effectually concealed Johnston's movement, that Patterson never suspected anything until Johnston's purpose had been accomplished. Stuart guarded with his cavalry every path- way between the line of defence which Johnston had just held and the Federals, and kept up an audacious front, as though the Confederates were on the point of advancing upon them, supported by tlie whole army. The Northern general only discovered on Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 249 the day of battle how he had been fooled, but it was then too late to render any assistance. Stuart was keen to have his share in the battle, and, after the infantry had been transferred to the railway, east of the Blue Kidge, he left a single company as a veil before Patterson, marched with the remainder, and the evening before the battle joined the army at Manassas. In the battle he charged Ellsworth Zouaves, and gave time for troops to come to the relief of Jackson, who was hard pressed by superior numbers. Afterwards, with a battery of artillery, he led the turning movement which caused the rout of the Federal forces. Were the cavalry to be placed in rear of the marching columns, it would not be in a position to render those services for which it is eminently adapted. It would be impossible for it to obtain for the army information on the whereabouts and movements of the enemy. To be well informed with regard to all that relates to him, it is absolutely necessary to be in constant contact with him. The protection of an army and the collection of information must be confided to separate bodies of troops. To secure the first object, it is sufiicient to detach from the main body an adequate force to occupy and watch the country in the immediate front and flanks of the camp or bivouac. This arrangement will prevent a surprise, and will gain time for the troops in rear to get ready for action. This force, however, cannot go far from the main body, on which alone it can rely for support ; therefore, as long as the enemy is distant, this body entrusted with the protection of the army cannot be in contact with the enemy. In war it often occurs that several days' march intervene between two opposing armies, and the information which is of such considerable importance to the army commander cannot be gathered except by a special body of troops, which can push well up to the front, and which runs no great risk of being destroyed in so doing. To cover an army we must trust to a quickly moving cordon of cavalry. The body employed for this purpose cannot be taken from the divisional cavalry, for there are other special duties to be performed by the small units of cavalry assigned to a division.* Distinct cavalry divisions have been organized for this purpose. The employment of these bodies of cavalry in greater or smaller * In 1870 the French had no cavalry especially attached to their infantry divisions. The want of a small body of mounted men made itself felt on many occasions. 250 The Art of Marching. number must depend entirely on the size of the army, on the nature of the country, and on the quantity, quality, and enterprise of the enemy's cavalry. The small body of horsemen which forms part of each infantry division, is very useful to the infantry for a variety of purposes. Some troopers can accompany reconnaissance parties, either to act as orderlies or to furnish patrols, others can keep up com- munication with the lateral columns, and, in battle, mounted men can be sent in all directions to obtain speedy information regarding the nature of the ground, the presence of the enemy, etc. The cavalry divisions covering the advance of the army become, so to speak, strategical advanced-guards, which precede an army with the intent of gaining time for the mass of its forces to complete their concentration, of concealing their movements, of discovering those of the adversary, and, if necessary, of hurliog the hostile cavalry back on its own infantry. This screening of an army, this covering its advance with an impenetrable veil, enables the main body to enjoy more security, favours the advance by several roads, and reduces the fatigues of the outposts. Abroad there is a movement in favour of separating the reconnoitring from the screening duties, on the grounds that most attention is likely to be paid to the latter to the detriment of the more important business of reconnoitring. A watchful cavalry^ conspicuous for its alertness, by harassing the enemy's infantry saves much labour to its own. It lightens the task of its infantry, it enables it to make longer marches under favourable conditions, for no patrolling or searching will have to be done as the columns move on. The necessary reconnoitring, which would otherwise considerably delay the progress of the columns, has been done beforehand. The cavalry screen ensures the safety of the main body in rear, a thing which the Light Division did in the Peninsula. In one instance this renowned division pushed across the Coa in the very teeth of Massena's troops, which it continued to watch night and day, month after jnonth, along a difficult and extensive tract of country, whilst the other divisions of the British army were in cantonments behind the Coa, perfectly at their ease and safe from surprise. In the Franco-German war of 1870-71, the army corps had not to trouble themselves with outpost duty, but only to provide for the immediate security of their bivouacs or cantonments. The Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 251 infantry were relieved by the cavalry of much hard work; the wearisome and harassing picket duty was considerably reduced. In the morning of the 14th of June 1800, Bonaparte would not have been surprised by the Austrian attack on Marengo had he used his cavalry for reconnoitring purposes. His cavalry, being a small force, was kept in reserve in rear of the infantry. On both sides, up to the commencement of the battle, the commanders-in-chief were ignorant of the intentions, strength, and position of their opponent. Neither had reconnoitred with his cavalry. A faulty employment of cavalry, a neglect in exploring thoroughly or at a sufficient distance, has led either to deplorable events, or has exposed a commander to serious risks, to risks which have militated against his reputation. On the day of Waterloo, Marshal Grouchy was pursuing the Prassians in the direction of Wavre. Notwithstanding that he had the 1st Cavalry Corps (Pajol's), the 2nd (Excelmans'), and Mauri^'s cavalry of the 4th Corps, in all about 6000 sabres, he knew nothing of the Prussian march in the direction of the field of Waterloo till six o'clock in the evening. Of this he was informed through a despatch he received from Marshal Soult, sent from the battle- field at 1 p.m. by Napoleon's orders. It was to inform him that Bulow was coming over the heights of St. Lambert on the French right flank. In the Crimean War, owing to the supposed strength of the defences on the north side of Sebastopol, and the objection Marshal St. Arnaud had to an attack of the Star Fort, it was arranged that the allied armies would undertake a march round the head of the harbour by Mackenzie's farm, cross the Tchernaya at Traktir Bridge, and transfer the operations to the south side of Sebastopol ; there the town was more open, and the fortifications in a very incomplete state. Mentschikoff, on the other hand, decided to leave Sebastopol, and to take the greatest portion of his army to Baktchi-Serai for the following reasons. He dreaded being shut up with his army in Sebastopol, with the allies in possession of his line of communications with the interior of the empire. It was vital for him to hold the command of the great homeward route which run through Baktchi-Serai and Simpheropol, over which reinforcements would come. Not to be cut off from his succours, the Prince determined — against much opposition on the part of Korniloff — to withdraw his army 252 The Art of Marching. from Sebastopol at night and to marcK by tlie Mackenzie heights towards Baktchi-Serai, so as to give a hand to the reinforcements he expected to arrive from Odessa and Kertch. With this object in view, the Kussians marched out of Sebastopol on the night of the 24th of September. The French had landed in the Crimea with no cavalry, but the British had put ashore 1000 sabres, which had not suffered any loss in the battle of the Alma. At 8.30 a.m. on the 25th of September the allies commenced their flank march. The British moved first, and the French were to follow. The march was a long, weary one, uphill and through dense wood until the Mackenzie heights were reached. The allies were moving in a long, trailing column, on a front so narrow, described by Kinglake " as to consist of one gun and one horseman," and all defiling through a forest or steep mountain paths with a day's march between van and rear. The British cavalry had diverged from the right direction — at one time it found itself close to Inkerman, at the head of the Sebastopol Harbour — and the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Eaglan, with his personal escort and a battery of horse artillery, whilst reconnoitring in a narrow lane, came suddenly upon a Russian wagon train and a body of Eussian infantry which was escorting it. The lane was so narrow that when the escort was advanced to the front it had to move in single file. The escort was soon joined by Lord Lucan's cavalry, and the Russians, tardy in recovering from their surprise, flew in the direction of Baktchi- Serai. Both sides were taken unawares ; the Russians, believing that they were about to be attacked in force, withdrew with all possible speed. The two armies had crossed each other's path, and actually came into contact at one point without discovering each other's designs, and without the cavalry coming together. For the British there was no excuse ; Kinglake's plan, plate 2, volume 4, shows the cavalry division moving in a long column of route, with flankers on each side, but not extended into a long line of reconnoitring parties, searching a broad extent of country to their front and flanks. It will be urged that the country was wooded and ill-adapted for cavalry exploration; still the fact remains that the road or track followed by Lord Raglan and by a battery of horse artillery, had no cavalry patrol on it. The flankers did not explore for any considerable distance in advance of the column. For the Russians there was much less ground for exoneration, for they knew that an army which had defeated Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 253 theirs some five days before was lying not very far on their left flank, and might have attacked them whilst marching. Mentschikoff took no steps to ascertain the movements of his adversary ; had he done so he would have known that the British army was moving in force in the direction of Mackenzie's farm. It was not that he was deficient in cavalry either, for he had about 3600 horsemen, viz., 16 squadrons of regular cavalry and 11 sotnias of Cossacks. His want of enterprise is difBcult to understand, for during the whole of the 25th he suffered himself to remain in sheer ignorance of the movements of an army of between 50,000 and 60,000 men, which had bivouacked at a distance of half an hour's ride from his headquarters. A splendid opportunity was lost, and the business of seeking information was postponed to the following day. A cavalry such as the British was in 1854, though admirably drilled for manoeuvring and show, may, nevertheless, have no capacity for the practical business of war. It has been written to the credit of Stonewall Jackson that " under his orders the cavalry became an admirable instrument of reconnaissance. He showed a marked sagacity for selecting scouts, both ofScers and privates, and his system of obtaining intelligence was well-nigh perfect. He had the rare faculty, which would appear instinctive, but which is the fruit of concen- trated thought allied to a wide knowledge of war, of divining the intention of his adversary, and the state of his morale. His power of drawing inference, often from seemingly unimportant trifles, was akin to that of the hunter in his native backwoods, to whom the rustle of a twig, the note of a bird, a track upon the sand, speak more clearly than written characters." * "Jackson placed much dependence on his mounted troops. Immediately he arrived in the valley, he established his cavalry outposts far to the front. While the infantry were reposing in their camps near Winchester, the south bank of the Potomac, forty miles northward, was closely and incessantly patrolled. . . . Jackson demanded something more from his cavalry than merely guarding the frontier. It was not sufScient for him to receive warning that the enemy was advancing. He wanted information from which he could deduce what he intended doing ; information of the strength of his garrisons, of the dispositions of his camps, of every movement which took place beyond the river. The * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. ii. p. 595. 254 The Art of Marching. cavalry had other and more dangerous duties than vedette and escort. To penetrate the enemy's lines, to approach his camps, and observe his columns — these were the tasks of Ashby's riders, and in these they were unrivalled. . . . They were acquainted with every country lane and woodland track. They had friends in every village, and their names were known to every farmer. The night was no hindrance to them, even in the region of the mountain and forest. The hunters' paths were as familiar to them as the turnpike roads. They knew the depth and direction of every ford, and could predict the effect of the weather on stream and track. More admirable material for the service of intelligence could not possibly have been found, and Ashby's audacity in reconnaissance found ready imitators." * " The use he made of his cavalry is perhaps the most brilliant tactical feature of the campaign. Ashby's squadrons were the means whereby the federals were mystified. Not only was a screen established which perfectly concealed the Valley army, but constant demonstrations, at far distant points, alarmed and be- wildered the Federal commanders. In his employment of cavalry Jackson was in advance of his age. His patrols were kept with two or three marches to front and flank ; neither by day nor by night were they permitted to lose touch of the enemy; and thus no movement could take place without their knowledge." I It is not so very surprising that Stonewall Jackson should have made such a masterly use of his cavalry, and should have revived the methods which served Napoleon fifty years before, for he had worked hard for four years at West Point, where the cadets receive a thorough military training, and had passed sufSciently high in his final examination to be posted to the artillery. In 1864 Lee never permitted the Federals to take him at a disadvantage. Much of this was due to the excellent service performed by his cavalry. He seldom was ignorant of G-rant's movements, for his horsemen always afforded him early intimation of his doings. What Colonel Henderson states, is very true, viz. that the methods of Napoleon were revived by an American soldier (Stone- wall Jackson), but what seems strange is that the teachings brought into prominence during the four years' contest between * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. i. pp. 274, 275. t Ibid., vol. i. p. 519. Cavalry covering the March of an Army, 255 the North and South should have been so overlooked by the Prussians, Italians, and Austrians in 1866, and by the French in 1870. A very good lesson to us not to waste the experience gained by foreign powers in their wars. At the battle of Sadowa (Kceniggratz), the Austrian and Saxon armies had a total strength of 270,000 men. Of this number about 28,000 men, or something like one-tenth part of the whole force, were cavalry. It seems inexplicable how, with this large number of horsemen, a whole army could have advanced on the Austrian right flank without anybody apparently having given information of the movement to the Commander-in-Chief. The very fact that Benedek took no vigorous steps to meet the danger seems to be a very clesir proof that he was not so informed. Had the Italian cavalry in 1866 been thrown forward in the direction of Verona, instead of being kept in rear of the infantry columns, the right of their army would not have been surprised on the march as it was. For MacMahon, Weissenburg was a surprise. Two days later he himself was attacked on the Saar. Hozier relates that the marshal had no idea of the strength of the attacking army, " and was even unaware of its exact whereabouts or proximate approach until within a few minutes of the hour at which he saw its vanguard appearing on the summits of the hills, exactly above his own ground, and about a mile and a half distant from him. He had no scouts nor spies thrown out, no organization of outposts, none of the precautions usually adopted by a leader of armies to warn him of his enemy's vicinity." MacMahon had at Worth Michel's Cuirassier Brigade, the 2nd Eeserve Cavalry Division, and Septeuil's Light Cavalry Brigade. Nansouty's Cavalry Brigade was also there, but it was distributed as divisional cavalry. Sufficient cavalry in all reason for reconnoitring purposes. When, later on, the marshal marched from Eheims to Sedan, he had at his disposal two divisions of reserve cavalry. His right flank was exposed to an attack from the 3rd German Army, but the cavalry was not employed in reconnoitring on that flank, and it was owing to this neglect that the Germans were able to approach, surprise, and rout one of his army corps. During the march to Sedan, the French kept the 1st Cavalry Division on their left flank, and the 2nd brought up the rear. The German cavalry, on the other hand, formed an impenetrable screen; it 256 The Art of Marching. clung close to the enemy, followed his movements, and often engaged in petty skirmishes. A little careful reconnoitring would have prevented the 21st Lancers going headlong into the midst of 3000 dervishes at Omdurman. The efficiency of a cavalry regiment now depends possibly more on the aptitude of the officers, nou-commissioned officers, and men for reconnoitring than on aught else. Alas ! nations get war-weary, and, in the years of peace which generally follow a long war, this fact is gradually forgotten; then most of the time is given to what concerns appearance, and to those exercises on which an inspecting officer is bound to report. Even the Prussian cavalry, during the last years of Frederick':* reign, had fallen off considerably, and continued to lose ground still more in the years which intervened between his death and the outbreak of the French revolution. Von Kaehler, commenting on the cavalry manoeuvres held at Berlin in 1821 — at a period so very close to the great wais against Napoleon — remarks how quickly the art of leading troops in the field is lost. In 1866, writes Denison, " The Prussian cavalry, in their outpost work, has not yet learnt the proper effective method of covering the advance of an invading army. Their cavalry in this war regulated its movements by the march of the invading columns, and did not precede them to a very great distance." The French in 1870, with the many lessons offered by the four years' struggle in the United States of America fresh in their mind, did not revive the traditions of Napoleon, and neglected to use their cavalry for outpost and reconnoitring purposes. But there is no better proof of this forgetfulness of the right principles of the employment of cavalry than that afforded by the war of 1877-78. So much had been said and written in praise of the very efficient reconnoitring of the German cavalry in the campaign of 1870-71, that it seems unaccountable how remiss the Russian cavalry was in discovering the march of Osman Pasha at the head of 40,000 men from Widditi to Plevna. The Pasha was permitted to settle down unmolested with his army at Plevna, only some twenty miles from the Russian position at Nikopolis. On the 17th of July the picket of the Caucasian Brigade, posted along the banks of the Vid, reported that a strong force of the enemy was coming from the west, and marching in the direction of Plevna. The Grand Duke Nicholas Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 257 and General Kriidener attached little importance to this report. Tiiough the Caucasian Brigade was twelve squadrons strong, no steps were taken to reconnoitre the country round Plevna, and Osman Pasha, with his army, arrived on the flank of the Russians without their knowing anything about it. On the 19th, as a portion of Kriidener's force was marching on Plevna, it was suddenly brought to a halt by the fire of the Turkish artillery, posted on the heights of Grivitza. The number of cavalry in the last Eusso-Turkish war was enormous, but it did nothing of importance in the course of the campaign. Kuropatkin, who was Skobeleff's A.D.C., and other officers, acknowledge that in that campaign the Russian cavalry were a dismal failure. Exploring far in advance of an army is a duty undertaken by large bodies of cavalry. Their action is initiated by the Commander-in-Chief, or by the commander of armies. This operation, being subordinate to many changeable circumstances, cannot be carried out in accordance with any fixed rules. The cavalry may be sent out to explore a country which is level, open, intersected by a plentiful number of roads, and in which cavalry in mass can manoeuvre with freedom ; on the other hand, it may have to work over undulating ground, largely cut up by obstacles, ravines, canals, thick woods, banks, and hedges, in which lateral communication is wanting or diffi- cult, and in which the explorers will have mostly to keep to the roads. Each case will naturally demand different dispositions. Consequently, in tracing the general conduct of the explora- tion or reconnoitring service, it will be found that there are two methods which are equally advocated. Both start with the employ- ment of a line of exploring squadrons and a main body ; but whilst one rests satisfied with these two essential parts, making the exploring line very thin so as to give the largest possible strength to the main body, the other is all for reinforcing the exploring line with sufficiently strong supports drawn from the main body. The first of these methods keeps to the consideration that, as long as the horsemen remain simply in contact with the enemy's cavalry, they will never acquire any information on the condition and position of the principal hostile units ; that it is necessary to pierce this concealing veil by acting with preponderating forces on one single point, and to push forward boldly, overturning every obstacle. Once having got through, it holds that it is imperative s 258 The Art of Marching. to fight at any moment, either to maintain one's position, or to withdraw and regain connection with one's own army, also that to prevent the enemy acting in a like manner, it will be necessary to oppose him by dealing sudden and vigorous blows. In short, this method is founded on the principle that, to retain the greatest power and liberty of action, it is incumbent to have few troops directly engaged, keeping the main reserves collected and independent. The second disposition is more methodical, it protects better all the parts of the command, and in this way it is adapted even for those countries in which lateral connection is difficult, or wanting either in part or altogether. The other side contend that exactly by trying to be passingly strong everywhere, a force is not able to give effect to vigorous efforts, and in the end can be broken with less difficulty than the simple veil behind the covering of which moves a united and imposing mass. Its forces, once broken at any point, are separated into two parts nearly equal, and therefore both weak. Evidently the first method of conducting the exploration is that which is likely to yield the best results ; at the same time, it admits implicitly that the liberty of action which the cavalry secures for itself must be favoured by the nature of the country worked over, consequently that the movements of the reserve should in no way be impeded by difficulties of ground. In other words, this method is applicable only to such countries as are level, open, and free from serious impediments. We are led to the conclusion that the first method, in the main, is accepted as the pattern, from which we should try not to diverge, except when the difficulties of the ground compel us. That is to say, that between the exploring veil and the main body of the cavalry there will be no other supports than those which are made indispensable from the condition, that without them it would become isolated through the want of easy communications. The principles to bear in mind with regard to the first method are the following — a. That a body of cavalry can effectively cover a front of half as many miles as the number of squadrons of which it is composed. I. That to explore, it is sufficient to employ a thin line of patrols — each one composed of a few horsemen, whose object is to observe and report — followed by a main body, which will have to engage the enemy, if necessary. Cavalry coverincj the March of an Army. 259 c. That the commander of a body of cavalry should never send out unnecessary detachments, and should keep its main body united and closed up. d. That the squadrons pushed forward for the object of furnishing the exploring patrols must by all possible means abstain from engaging in needless partial encounters, so that the decisive engagements may, as far as it is possible, be confined to the masses on both sides. The following diagram will give an idea of the disposition of a cavalry division in a level and open country. • • ■ , Patrols. o „• Patrols. . • CO ^ • 2^ ^ Bin ^ ^>l CoBtact Squadrons. ^^ s Main body of the f\ ? squadrons, adyanced-guard. ^ -H- ^- battery. I Sanitary Detachment. Q . a • a r A cavalry brigade, HT • u J '^ rl H. A. battery, Mam body. LI divisional artillery reserve 1^ I section Field Hospital, g ■ I squadron. % '■ Eear-guard. "** B Convoy. The division would march in the following order. First, the udvanced-guard, composed generally of a regiment for a brigade of two or three regiments, or of a brigade with a portion of the artillery for a division of two or three brigades. This would furnish the number of exploring squadrons absolutely necessary for reconnoitring the principal roads which lead in the direction of the enemy. The advanced-guard also sends small officers' patrols on the flanks, and often also to the front to effect such special reconnaissances as may at times be deemed indispensable. It will also send reinforcements to any 260 The Art of Marching. exploring squadron vigorously attacked and driven back by superior forces, though not necessarily so strong as to entail the engagement of a serious action. It serves lastly as the first body engaged when the main body is called to act tactically. Secondly, the main hody of the column, composed of the rest of the troops minus the rear-guard. Thirdly, the rear-guard, consisting of half a squadron furnished by the main body. Fourthly, the convoy — baggage, provisions, etc. The considerations which should guide the second method, when circumstances demand its adoption, are — a. That the limits of an effective exploration depend entirely on the number of main roads comprised in the region which has to be watched. h. That the main body cannot speedily come forward to aid by hostile demonstrations or attacks on any threatened points, because lateral communication will be mostly difficult or will demand considerable time. c. That the enclosed and difficult nature of the ground renders it necessary to divide the country to be reconnoitred into sections, and to confide the exploration of each section to a special column which, whilst striving to the uttermost to proceed in combination with the contiguous ones, can only rely principally on itself. The disposition of a cavalry division exploring in broken and enclosed country would be somewhat like the following. • •••••• Exploring Patrols. ^ ife ^ ^ ^ Contact Squadrons. lb ^ ^ Supports. ^ f- ► Half regiment, w\ W\ W\ division of artillery, ^ .^ fj S. A. A. wagon, Main body. Ambulance wagon. r A regiment, H. A. battery, Reserve. »^^ medical sectiou, ■- J artillery ammunition column. Convoy. M Convoy. M Convoy. M Cavalry covering the March of an Army. 261 Each exploring column is divided into advanced-guard and main body, but the main body of the advanced-guard, placing itself into more intimate relation with its own exploring squadrons, will have the principal end of constituting their support. Thus in every section of the exploration there will be really three lines, the exploring squadrons preceded by patrols, supports, and main body. The division can have a reserve ready to meet any eventual need, and this can advance following the directing line of march. One of the principal difficulties in carrying out the explora- tion is the maintenance of the lateral connection. It is to meet this difficulty that certain lines of intercommunication, well defined topographically, and distant from each other from one to six miles, should be indicated ; over these lines adjoining ex- ploring squadrons will be expected to try and combine and effect an interchange of information and views. It must be understood that the given lines of intercommuni- cation must be attained by the exploring squadrons. A longer or shorter halt will be made on these, either to give rest to the men and horses, or to attend until the connection with the lateral squadrons has been obtained. As the exploring squadrons, having reached these points, come to a halt, so do the other bodies halt at their relative distances. It will always be necessary to give the exact hour at which the troops have to set out again from the intersection of each line of connection, and in this manner the original formation will be resumed after each^halt. The Staff have the general direction of the measures of safety and reconnaissance. It is necessary to practise cavalry in time of peace in the duties of covering an army, so that it may acquire a fair knowledge of the mechanism of that duty. Cavalry should do this, working out in connection with staff officers some definite scheme. No one will deny how necessary it is to draw staff officers away from desk work. Activity of body should be fostered by substituting active for sedentary work. Staff officers should be in the saddle for long periods, travelling over varied country, exercising the eyes and the mind. Let any officer say if, when called, after four or five years of desk work, to take part in a campaign, he did not find he had become rusty on many matters. 262 The Art of Marching. In all our exercises, in all our training', we should never lose sight of the end for which an army is kept. That end is ivar, and we should, both in the drill-field and in manoeuTring, imagine ourselves face to face with the enemy. Every opportunity should be seized during manoeuvres to send out officers' patrols, so that officers maybe given really good opportunities for doing that duty as nearly as possible under service conditions, and, what is still more important, of learning how to forward the acquired information. Not only officers, but also non-commissioned officers, should be practised in this, for on service there will never be a sufficient number of officers to carry out the patrolling. We can never pay too great attention to the system of covering an army on the march, and in preparing all ranks for that duty. The words which General Morand applied to the Cossacks make a good definition of what cavalry should attain to be. " Ces hommes veillent sans cesse, se meuvent aveo une vitesse extreme, ont feu de hesoins, et de pensees guerrieres sont les seules que lew sens revcillent." Napoleon said of these same men that they were the most active and intelligent men that he knew; they could cross a country in which they had never been before in a most surprising manner. They were not formidable in a body ; indeed, they never contended against regular forces ; he did not see one at Borodino, but afterwards they annoyed him much, as they had done once before after the battle of Eylau. Thfey were seldom taken prisoners ; they were trained from infancy in their peculiar mode of warfare. One of the main causes of Napoleon's heavy losses in the Russian campaign of 1812 was the^ Cossack cavalry. The Cossacks mustered in great force ; they destroyed all the villages before the French could come up to them, cut off all small parties sent out to forage, and captured all convoys which were not guarded by very large escorts. A cavalry officer, writing to the Times on the 27th of December 1900, justly observes : — Tliere is no douht that, as far as the use and worhing of cavalvy is concerned, grave mistahes will he made if we looJc upon the lessons of South Africa as the conclusive standard for the future. ( 263 ) CHAPTER XI. PRINCIPLES OF EXPLORATION Cavalry to be several marches in advance — To push boldly forward — Frederick inculcates energy and rapidity of movement — The regulalions for covering an army to be elastic — A division to be told off to watch a given part of the enemy's forces— The breadth to be proportionate to the strength of the force — Stuart watches the Potomac — The I. C. Divisions to cover au army and not separate divisions — To keep communication with parties in rear, and not to get too far away from the supports — Cavalry to explore and not to iight — Scouts to avoid falling into ambuscades — Why prisoners speak — Schmidt recommends large use of ofBcers' patrols — British officers scout in the Peninsula — Not an immense amount of cavalry needed to acquire information — How Bernard owed his position to an intellioreut report — We ascribe too much wisdom to our fellow-creatures — It is on the flanks where important information can be gained — Scouting at Sedan and in the Civil War in the States — Horses to be spared — Ashby an indefatigable cavalry leader — Want of discipline in the Confederate cavalry — An officer of the General Staff to be attached to each independent cavalry division — The enemy found, the scouts never to lose touch — Training in scoutiug — Great point in war to know what the adversary is doing — How a patrol leader should know what to do — Questioning — Natives and colonists make good scouts — Eyes and ears both to be used in scouting — Where to search for information — Difficulty from difference of language — Every individual sent to reconnoitre should have the object of his mission explained to him — Every means of concealment to be used — Arabs' reconnoitring method — A patrol to be led by a daring individual — ^Precautions to prevent a surprise — Squadrons and detachment to subsist on the local resources — Troops brought in the field must have a complete education' — Efficiency in reconnoitring to be acquired only through time and labour — Passing information to the rear — Difficulties that may occur — The cyclist for carrying reports and despatches — The despatch to be carried in the barrel of a pistol — Course to be pursued if the enemy attempts to drive back the exploring patrols — Action of the German scouts in 1870 — Frederick the Great and Napoleon succumb to the activity and enterprise of irregular light horsemen — A cavalry division may have to fight to accomplish its task — What helped the German cavalry so much in 1870 — Two armies simi- larly trained will make the task of the advanced cavalry very difficult — Should the enemy assume the offensive, the squadrons not attacked to push forward — Cavalry, having performed its preliminary work, to take rest in rear of the army — Action of cavalry at the close of a battle — Harassing a retreating army. The foremost body of cavalry should not be only a few miles in advance of the army it is intended to cover, but one or two marches ahead of it, followed, if necessary, by reserves further in rear. If we assume a day's march for infantry to represent on an average 12 or 13 miles, the cavalry might well be 25 miles in advance of the main body. 264 The Art of Marching. We see this system pursued by the German cavalry divisions when marching on Paris after the battle of Sedan. These divisions were always several marches in advance of the rest of the army, and arrived before the capital two days before the infantry. The cavalry divisions should push boldly forward, forming an impenetrable screen, diligently examining, as they sweep on, the whole country on their way, turning all their faculties to profit- able account, and not halting until the enemy's advanced posts are struck. Small patrols and scouts should be largely employed to this end ; they should be sent in every direction along the front and flanks of the army, to discover the presence of the enemy, and to form an estimate of his strength and intentions. Frederick the G-reat inculcated on his cavalry the essential conditions of energy and rapidity of movement. The cavalry must act boldly, for the rapid advance of the invaders is always calculated to strike dread in a population; and once this effect has been produced, all fear of open resistance may be dismissed. The regulations anent the conduct to be observed in covering an army should be very elastic. The drill-book must be regarded as a useful but not as an infallible guide. The officers should be allowed a good measure of latitude, for, if all initiative is taken from them, they will adhere to some book formation, never looking to see whether it is adapted to the country and to the circumstances or not. Officers must reflect, and be guided by their own judgment, but habits of self-reliance and independence are not to be acquired suddenly, and can only be the result of training. It has very often been remarked that, when men are possessed with the idea that they have only to make up their mind to do a thing, they generally manage, somehow or other, to do it. In reconnoitring, an officer will often be perplexed ; there may be several courses open to him, and not a little difficulty in deciding quickly as to which will be the most profitable to follow. The general precept in such cases is to put one's self the question — what would I do were I in the enemy's place ? The commander of a cavalry division sent forward to explore should never fail to cover the main body with bis mounted men. He should be of a fearless constitution, but, though resolute and enterprising, he should be careful of the lives of his troops in action, and of everything which relates to the condition of his command. Principles of Exploration. 265 Every cavalry division should, when so employed, be told off to watch some given portion of the adversary's army, looking on that as its special objective. At the opening of the operations, until contact with the enemy has been attained, and the deploy- ment of its forces has been ascertained, each division would reconnoitre a certain zone in which it is presumable that sooner or later the enemy may be encountered. General Maurice justly remarks : " The development of roads has become so great that almost everywhere mounted men can, by passing along available paths and keeping up proper com- munication, search out nearly the whole country." * A cavalry division should so arrange its march as to be in a position to effect a rapid concentration. If composed of three brigades, one of them would advance on a central road, the other two on parallel roads, one on each side of it, but a little more in advance. Each brigade would march with its own advanced- guard, all the fractions being in connection with each other. The advanced-guards would furnish the scouts or feelers. Lateral roads and ground at a distance should be examined by special patrols under an officer, or else by detached squadrons. In foggy or snowy weather, in the misty grey of the morning, in thickly wooded or much undulating ground, it is not prudent for the advanced parties to be spread out to the same extent as would be done were the weather bright and clear and the country before us quite open. The aim is to reconnoitre the country thoroughly, but the breadth of it under exploration should, nevertheless, bear a proper proportion to the number of troops employed. It is very essential to guard from spreading the force to such an extent as will militate against its assuming the offensive and opposing a sufficiently strong barrier to tbe enemy. This would be a serious error, for, by wishing to be everywhere, one would end in being really nowhere ; the troops would be scattered to such an extent as to have no strength to resist an attack. Squadrons, regiments, and brigades would soon cease to be such. Should the adversary have equal forces, but in a more concentrated state, nothing would hinder his piercing the front of your line.f * The Wellington Prize Essay. t We can only speculate on what would be the action of two exploring cavalries following the same principles. To concentrate and pierce the other's line is not sufficient to make the adversary's cavalry impotent. For aa it pierces through a thin line, its destroying effect on that line will be small. To make the opposing 266 The Art of Marching. At the commencement of the Civil War in the United States, Stuart's cavalry did not number more than 300 sabres; still, with that small force, he watched the whole of the part of the Potomac comprised between Williamsport and Point of Rocks. This, in a direct line, measures 30 miles; but, as the river winds con- siderably, and makes a great bend at Harper's Ferry, the distance must have been much greater. In October 1862, that distin- guished cavalry leader, with three brigades, " picketed the line of the Potomac from the North Mountain to the Shenandoah, a distance of 40 miles." * In 1870 ten regiments covered the front of the 1st and 2nd German armies on a line of about 60 miles, each regiment having to explore 6 miles of front. The independent cavalry divisions should cover an array or an army corps, and not each separate division. Their duty is to screen the entire front of the army, to close the openings between the various columns, and to prevent the enemy's cavalry working round the flanks. Two things should be kept steadily in mind ; one, the possi- bility of keeping constant communication with the parties in the rear ; the other, not to get unreasonably far away from the sup- porting body. A contact squadron should always detail a rear- guard, which should keep a look out in the rear and face about when the rest are halted. This precaution is necessary to prevent being cut off. For short halts, some considered it better to call in the detached parties, advance and rear-guards to be reunited to the main body, leaving only some vedettes in front or rear for protection. In this arrangement the whole squadron can jump into the saddle and charge as one body. The more the adversary will find himself surrounded by enterprising scouts and unseizable patrols, which, whilst evading attack, are ready to reappear almost immediately without ever giving him a chance, and the more our forces will be prepared to concentrate to prevent the screen being pierced, the less will the adversary be able to screen himself from observation or discover any of our movements. The object of the cavalry employed in covering an army is not to fight, but to explore, to watch, and to report. The art lies cavalry really inefficient, a powerful cavalry battle will be needed, in wbicb one aide will be entirely swept off the field. * Lieut.-Oolonel G. F. E. Henderson, " Stonewall Jackson," vol. ii. p. 357. Principles of Exploration. 267 in uncovering one's self as little as possible, and not showing any- thing beyond the troops which are necessary for overcoming such resistance as is likely to be met with. The dexterity rests in seeing, whilst preventing things from being seen, in penetrating the enemy's movements, whilst steadily hiding those of our own troops. Concealment must be obtained by keeping the adversary at such a distance as will put it entirely out of his power to pro- cure any reliable information as to our dispositions and numbers. Getting on the track of the enemy cannot be done better than by employing a number of horsemen in twos or threes, spread out through a given portion of the country, and enjoined to feel along every road and lane. The horsemen should be always watchful, not pressing or attacking, still never suffering any hostile parties to evade them and get in rear of them ; always ready to fall back as soon as the enemy turns on them. The scouts must accomplish their ,work in a quiet mouse-like way, and should carefully avoid falling into an ambuscade. If pursued, they should rely on their horsemanship for distancing their pursuers.* A leader of light cavalry has laid down that a horseman can pass anywhere when he is determined to do so. Should any of the scouts fall into the adversary's hands, they may, like good soldiers, keep their counsel; nevertheless, their uniform will reveal to what regiment and division they belong. Much can also be learnt from their personal condition, and from that of their horses. Napoleon always asked that some prisoners might be captured. Davout, at Auerstadt, was perplexed about the intentions of the Prussians, and ignorant of their strength. He ordered a party of cavalry out, whose commander was directed to bring about an encounter and to secure some prisoners. From these the Marshal trusted to acquire valuable information. Prisoners often speak because they are awed by the rank of the interrogator, because they have an idea that lying will be detected, that the superior education and knowledge of the inter- rogator will make any misstatements of theirs of no avail. Occasionally they do so cunningly, intending to mislead the enemy or to impose on him. All statements made by prisoners should be verified. Here is * It may seem contrary to all soldierly idea to enjoin a timely retirement, however, a recognition of undeniable danger is not necessarily coupled with a decided feeling of fear. The expert will know when to withdraw, for danger is- often greatest when the appearance of it is least. 268 The Art of Marching. an instance in which this precaution was neglected. At the close of the year 1814 a British force quitted Halifax to undertake operations against New Orleans. After the capture of five United States gunboats near the Eigolettes, the British commander desired to ascertain the strength of Fort Ooquille, which com- manded the passage by the Eigolettes. For this purpose he questioned Lieutenant Jones, an officer who had been made prisoner when the gunboats were captured. That officer informed him that forty guns were mounted on the fort, and that it had a garrison of 500 men. No steps whatever were taken to verify this statement, coming from a prisoner, and the British com- mander, accepting it as correct, decided that the passage by the Eigolettes was impracticable. In reality there were only forty men in the fort, with eight pieces of artillery. Boguslawski explains in a few words how the German cavalry carried out their exploration in the last Franco-G-erman war. "If they found the way clear before them, they sent officers' patrols to push forward, at any risk, until they came upon the foe . . . and if here and there a cavalry patrol, some days' march in advance of the division, was dispersed or cut off, one or two horsemen generally made their way back to give intelligence, which was what was wanted." General von Schmidt recommends a large use to be made of officers' patrols, but he advises their employment to be restricted to the main roads or highways. The less important roads, in his opinion, should be patrolled by parties of two or three horsemen only. For keeping up communication with the rest of the division a,nd with the troops following it, he lays down that officers should only be employed under exceptional conditions. In the Peninsular War, single staff and cavalry officers, mounted on fast, well-bred horses, used to be sent out to watch the move- ments of the French army. These ofiicers kept just out of range till they could form a correct idea of the enemy's number and of the direction of their march. The French found that it was vain to give chase to them, even when employing such men as were best mounted. It is an error to believe that it needs an enormous amount of oavalry to be well informed. It is the good and intelligent em- ployment of the cavalry, and not its numbers, that will yield fruitful results. Lloyd was of opinion that 1500 cavalry were sufficient to explore for an army of 100,000 men. Principles of Exploration. 269 But if exploring does not demand a very considerable number of men on one hand, on the other, it wants men who have been carefully recruited, who have been well taught, and who are well mounted. It is the keen-witted and the sharp-sighted indi- vidual who gains the information ; reconnaissances which employ a large number of men only fatigue the men and horses, without gaining any better intelligence. A few adept men, well spread out, will gain more of it than a squadron. The personal results which may spring from being able tO' report well are illustrated by what happened to an engineer officer in the French army. Bourrienne, in his " Memoires de Napoleon Bonaparte," relates how Napoleon, whilst at Strasbourg, at the opening of the Austerlitz campaign, asked General Mare- scot, his chief engineer, whether he could recommend a brave, prudent, and intelligent young officer, capable of being intrusted with an important reconnoitring mission. Marescot recommended Captain Bernard of his corps. On his return from his mission Napoleon interrogated him, and was well satisfied with his replies. But Bernard, not content with answering verbally the questions put to him by the Emperor, produced a drawn-up report of what he had observed, and the different routes which might be taken. Amongst other things, he observed that it would be a great advantage to direct the whole army upon Vienna, without taking any notice of the fortified places ; for that, once master of the capital of Austria, the Emperor might dictate the law to all the Austrian monarchy. Napoleon pretended to be annoyed at the audacity of a young officer in tracing out a plan of campaign to him. To keep a man whose services might some day be useful to him out of danger, he directed Berthier to issue orders for the captain's departure for Illyria. Nevertheless, at the end of the campaign, the Empeior promoted Bernard chef de hataillon, and himself inserted his name at the top of the list of promoted captains of engineers.. The Emperor had forgotten the officer, but it so happened that before leaving Paris for the campaign of Eussia, 1812, he desired to gain some precise information respecting Eagusa and Illyria. He interrogated Marmont and several other generals, but was not satisfied with their answers : he did not get the exact information he needed. He then sent for General Dejean, who- had succeeded Marescot as first inspector of engineers. Dejean, when asked by the Emperor if he had amongst bis officers one 270 The Art of Marching. who was well acquainted with. Ragusa, after a little reflection, named Bernard as an officer who knew lUyria perfectly. Napo- leon remembered the name well, asked where that officer was stationed, and ordered the semaphore to summon him to Paris with all speed. A few days later Bernard was in the Emperor's cabinet in Paris. Napoleon, having received liim very graciously, said to him, " Talk to me about Ragusa." He was perfectly satisfied with Bernard's information respecting that country, so much so that when the chef de hataillon had finished speaking, he said, ■" Colonel Bernard, I am now acquainted with Ragusa." As the Emperor was going to preside at a council of state, he desired the new colonel to accompany him, and many times ■during the sitting he asked for his opinion upon the points which were under discussion. On leaving the council Napoleon said, "Bernard, you are in future my aide-de-camp." After the campaign Bernard was made General of Brigade, and soon after 'General of Division. A large number of men are easily detected, but not so easily an officer accompanied by one or more well-mounted orderlies. The latter can pass almost anywhere ; he can ascend commanding points from which a far-stretching view can be obtained, can dismount to ascend church steeples, the top of high buildings, etc., and by the aid of good glasses can view a large extent of country. If needs be, he can easily conceal himself and his few men, and remain for a certain time in hazardous situations.* All will depend on his shrewdness and audacity ; very frequently he and his men will have to rely for safety on the speed of their horses. In boldness lies not only the greatest safety, but also the attainment of the best results. The employment of too large a number of men in recon- noitring is a waste of force, and does in no way hold a prospect of our obtaining more complete information. We have a recent illustration of this in the war in South Africa. On the 15th of November 1899, an armoured train set out from Escourt to reconnoitre the whereabouts of the Boers, who were reported to be in the neighbourhood of Chieveley station, half-way to Colenso. The train carried a 7-pounder naval gun, ten blue jackets to man it, ninety men of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers * Cavalry should rightly appreciate the necessity for keeping led horses under cover. Principles of Exploration. 271 and eighty of the Durban Light Infantry. The train was attacked by a body of 500 Boers with field-pieces and wrecked, only the engine with some of the wounded got away. Two men were killed, twenty wounded and about eighty fell into the hands of the Boers. In this case an excessive number of men was employed, when half a dozen would have sufficed to see and report. Our officers, who have such admiration for daring deeds, will' admit the truth of Captain de Biensan's remark. " To be taken back by nothing, relying a good deal on one's self and a little luck, and always to go forward — such should be the rule of action of the cavalry officer," The best officer for service is the one who, whilst others go on croaking, grumbling, and giving vent to their dissatisfaction, always laughs and makes light of every difficulty. Bold enterprise is sanctioned by the fact that we usually err in ascribing too much wisdom to our fellow-creatures ; thus, as a rule, the enemy is prone to believe that the scouts cannot be too far away from their supports, that they would not have dared to ride very far ahead of them. With regard to the scouting parties, a few horsemen can impose on the population by giving them- selves out as the advanced party of a large body which is follow- ing very close upon their heels. Time can be gained, for such a statement cannot be verified at once. It is on the flanks where it is most easy to form a correct estimate of the adversary's strength and of the direction of his march. Officers or non-commissioned officers should be sent round to gain the flanks of the enemy, with instructions to slip in rear of his advanced-guard or columns, to watch from eminences or from any point from which his forces can be kept well in sight. By failing to reconnoitre with his cavalry round the British flanks on the forenoon of the day of Quatre Bras, Ney was led to believe that the allies were stronger than they actually were. This induced him to delay the attack! The German divisional cavalry rendered great services at the battle of Sedan by riding between the two lines of fire, in order to obtain information as to the enemy and ground. Patrols rode with singular audacity close up to villages which were destined to be stormed, bringing back tidings on the manner they were occupied by the enemy. In his "Letters on Cavalry," p. 80, Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelflngen writes, "I could relate many oases, which have been told to me, in which single horsemen 272 The Art of Marching. have watched the enemy from the very shortest distances without attracting attention ; and the hotter the -fight the easier was this to do." Lieut.-Oolonel G. F. E. Henderson observes, with regard to scouting in the Civil War in the States, " History has hitherto overlooked the achievements of the ' scouts,' whose names so seldom occur in the official records, but whose daring was unsurpassed, and whose services were of vast importance. In the army of Northern Virginia every commanding general had his own party of scouts, whose business it was to penetrate the enemy's lines, to see everything and to hear everything, to visit the base of operations, to inspect the line of communications, and to note the condition and the temper of the hostile troops. Attracted by a pure love of adventure, these private soldiers did exactly the same work as did the English Intelligence Officers in the Peninsula, and did it with the same thoroughness and activity. . . . Jackson had scouts who were more useful to him than many brigadiers." * It should never be forgotten in all this that the conditions in that war were quite exceptional; both sides spoke the same language, and had the same manners and ways, also many of the scouts were intimate with the country in which they carried out their scouting, and had friends and sympathizers amongst its dwellers. These were immense advantages, and the like are very rarely to be found in war. As soon as the friendliness of the people was lost, as occurred in Morgan's Ohio raid, the leaders, through want of timely information, found serious difficulties in getting out of the way of intercepting parties. This knowledge of the country, of the roads, passes, fords, etc., is of the greatest consequence. When, in 1805, the Bavarians were persuaded to make common cause with the French, Napoleon recommended their troops being employed in reconnoitring. He argued that, because they were thoroughly acquainted with the country, they could give the most reliable information on the march of the Eussians, who were coming from Vienna to Munich. Cavalry is constantly called upon to furnish parties for an endless variety of purposes, and should be carefully economised. Horses need more care than men, they must be regularly fed and rested. As a leading principle, therefore, not a single horse should be employed that is not necessarily required. The safety * Lieut.-Colonel G. F. R. Hondersou, " Stonewall Jaokaon," vol. ii. p. 427. Principles of Exploration. 273 of a rider often depends on the prompt obedience of his horse, but it will be hopeless to get obedience out of horses which are worn down by fatigue. The state of thoroughness with reference both to men and horses need hardly be touched upon, for it is too erident that when arduous work of this kind has to be undertaken, it is indispensable to have everything in as perfect an order as posssible. If the cavalry is kept continually on the move, without sufficient reason, it will soon be destroyed and rendered useless for other purposes. The horses will soon get tucked up, thin and weak, unable to perform their work, if not screwed. It should be borne in mind, consequently, that in most cases the smallest patrol will suffice; always, however, subject to the condition that the most intelligent aad bold men are employed, sure riders on good horses. It is unnecessary almost to declaim against super- fluous trappings and baggage. We must study how the cavalry can be made lighter, for when the troop-horse is overweighted, it takes the speed out of him. Like Marshal Saxe, we want cavalry lightly armed and equipped, in order that it may make rapid marches and sustain the accompanying fatigue. The cavalry divisions should be able to make marches of 28 to 30 miles for two or three consecutive days, without their tactical efficiency being thereby seriously affected. This can be done by a judicious alternation of pace, and halts sufficiently long to rest and cool the horses. The preservation of the horse should, as every one knows, be one of the principal cares of the cavalry officer and trooper ; but on service, in exploring, the men are on horseback for the best part of the day, and even during the night the horses must be kept saddled, and are therefore unable to lie down. In the campaign of 1806, in which the French cavalry was certainly not spared, we find the Chief of the Staff writing, "L' Mnpereur desire qu 'on ne fatigue fas inutilement sa cavalerie." The cavalry covering an army in the field is called upon to perform the hardest work at the opening of a campaign, and at a time when the horses are not yet inured to all the hardships of war. The exploration service, conducted by an enterprising commander, will be sure to wear out a considerable number of horses, and sore backs will be plentiful ; but sick or sorry, the horse must carry the rider till he drops, for it is impossible, as T 274 The Art of Marching. in peace time, to dismount every soldier whose horse has a sore back or is foot-weary.* The troops must do their best with the , horses they have, until their non-effective animals can be re- placed by trained remounts. It is doubtful then if these will, generally speaking, be as good in point of training as those which marched with the army at the setting out of the campaign. Those of our cavalry ofScers who have taken part in the Boer War of 1899-1900, will be able to tell us something with regard to the expenditure in horse-flesh, and how often their men were remounted during the campaign. Very interesting will be the ofScial account, but more particularly in all that relates to the mounted branches. In anticipation, we may say that we have heard of men being remounted iive times during the operations, and of squadrons and regiments being reduced to a very small effective indeed, owing to the large number of dismounted men in the ranks. A dashing cavalry leader must give constant evidence of his vigilance. This is what Ashby did ; he was indefatigable, he was the pattern of a light cavalry leader, and, besides fighting, he excelled in reconnoitring and in fathoming the adversary's intentions. Brilliant, however, as he was in the performance of light cavalry duties, Ashby suffered from a radical defect which marred much of his work. He did not know how to enforce discipline, and though his exploits attracted many recruits, so that he was in a short time at the head of 2000 troopers, Dabney writes: "One half was rarely available for duty. The re- mainder were roaming over the country, imposing upon the generous hospitalities of the citizens, or lurking in their homes. The exploits of their famous leader were all performed with a few hundreds, or often scores of men, who followed him from personal devotion rather than by force of discipline." f On the 24th of May 1862, as Banks was retiring on Win- chester, the Confederates overtook his rear-guard. Ashby and Stuart, with three regiments of cavalry, horse and field batteries, were pressing in pursuit ; but this ceased on nearing Newton, for, on coming up with the enemy's convoy, " nearly the whole of Ashby's cavalry," writes Dabney, "and a part of the infantry " All ranks in the cavalry and artillery should be impressed with the absolute necessity there is for sparing their horses as much as possible, t E. Ij. Dabney, "Life of Stonewall Jackson," vol. ii. p. 49. Principles of Exploration. 275 under his command, had turned aside to pillage. Indeed, the firing had not ceased in the first onset upon the Federal cavalry at Middletown, before some of Ashby's men might be seen, with a quickness more suitable to horse-thieves than to soldiers, break- ing from their ranks, seizing each two or three of the captured horses, and making off across the fields. Nor did the men pause until they had carried their illegal booty to their homes, which were, in some instances, at the distance of one or two days' journey." The same writer observes, " Assuredly our cavalry rendered much excellent service, especially when dismounted ; and such able officers as Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees in the east, Forest, Green, and Wheeler in the west, developed much talent for war; but their achievements, however distinguished, fell far below the standard that would have been reached, had not the want of discipline impaired their effect." * An officer of the general staff should be attached to each independent cavalry division to collect reports, and above all, to secure the special information which is so necessary for the general commanding the army to possess. It is also a wise plan to associate with each of these divisions one or more railway officers, who would thus, at the earliest moment possible, examine the railways, and determine well in advance all the repairs which will have to be made to restore the traffic, and who would form estimates of the number of working hands and materials re- quired. Men of the telegraph battalion should likewise march with these divisions, with the object of expediting the repairs of the lines. The commander should be furnished with money for the payment of guides, messengers, spies, and all other incidental expenses. The enemy once found, the scouts should keep him con- tinually under their eyes. The touch should never be lost, the scouts should gallop round the flanks, out of range, seeking to head the hostile columns, so as to form a correct estimate of their strength, and send a report to the supports. This demands highly trained men, and it is when the troops take the field that we shall reap our reward for all the pains we have taken in instructing cavalry in these very important duties in peace time. Scouting cannot be learnt on the parade field, or in very open * E. L. Dabney, " Life of Stonewall Jackson," vol. 11. pp. 101, 102. 276 The Art of Marching. downs; it should be practised, aud frequently, in more broken and varied ground. The generally enclosed nature of our country is eminently adapted for instruction in scouting. Special training in scouting for a percentage of the men does not commend itself; all ranks of cavalry alike should be in- structed in the principles of feeling for the enemy. This will not prevent a list being kept in each regiment or squadron of the most adept and best qualified men — what might be called first class reconnoitrers — for employment in leading patrols, or im- portant scouting work demanding extra intelligence and discern- ment. Scouting is the most hazardous work the individual soldier is called upon to perform. In a detached duty of this nature, it is within every officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier's power to bring his own worth, his own powers of observation and deduction, his own acuteness, his. own enterprising spirit, promi- nently forward. The principal characteristics to be looked for in a scout are good riding, good eye for ground, quickness of hearing, wit, skill in interpreting sounds, and ability in drawing correct deductions I'rom trifling facts, keenness of perception, which is the outcome of practice. He should know how to take advantage of every bit of cover, utilizing the general features of the ground to the utmost. To use a Boer expression, the scout should be schlimm, acute in deceiving and outwitting those opposed to him. Lieut.-Colonel T. S. Baldock shows by what means Cromwell obtained information of his enemy. " Swift aud accurate in- telligence of the movements and intentions of the enemy are the grounds on which every general must base his plans. In this respect the New Model army was as highly organized as it was in others. Neither Fairfax nor Cromwell ever lacked speedy and reliable information as to the enemies' actions. The duties of the modern ' Chief of the Intelligence Department ' were then performed by an officer of high rank, who enjoyed the far more compact title of ' Scoutmaster.' Watson and Eoe, who succes- sively filled that office under Cromwell, were men of great ability, and were sometimes employed on diplomatic missions of im- portance. By spies and scouts, countryfolk and prisoners, recon- noitring patrols and intercepted letters, they kept their chief well informed of all the enemy did and intended." * Much of our failure in the Boer War was due to insufficient * Lieut.-Colonel T. S. Baldock, E.A., " Cromwell as a Soldier," p. 522. Principles of Exploration. 27Y scouting, and to having given the enemy time to make ready to receive us. Napoleon, writing to Murat, 12th of October 1806, expresses liimself thus : "Inondez avee la voire (cavalerie) toute la plains de Leipzig." These words indicate briefly what the commander of an independent cavalry division should do. The year before the Emperor had been even more explicit, for he wrote, " Parcequ 'il faut qu 'un general de cavalerie suive toujours Vennemi Tepee dans les reins." The great point in war is to acquire all possible knowledge of the enemy's doings; the more you get to know of him, the better for you. The secret of Napoleon's victories lay largely in the care with which he studied his adversaries. We must learn all that which is vital to the safety of the army to know. Information must be procured in every possible manner, and nothing should ever be neglected to obtain it. No cost in men or money should ever be considered too great. The information sent in by patrol leaders often influences the whole dispositions of a commander. The officer who patrols must have a fair knowledge of war, a sound strategical percep- tion, that will enable him to grasp and appreciate justly the various military situations. He must acquire the habit of making clear and intelligent reports concerning the nature of the country, or the attitude of the population. He should possess the faculty of estimating quickly the strength of the enemy's forces, of distinguishing the different arms, guessing the direction of the march, and the general intentions of the adversary. He should be able to measure distances accurately, to calculate the time that will be required to cover them, the dangers which may result. Once the estimate is formed, no time should be lost in sending a terse but full report to the chief in the rear. Questioning must be done with intelligence. An officer must be knowing enough to draw out information from the uneducated, as well as from the unwilling. The post-master of a town or district is a good subject for examination, being likely to be acquainted with much that may be of general importance. It is not easy to make people say what they do not wish to let out. Menaces, very often far in excess of what could ever be carried into effect, will frequently succeed with the inhabitants of 278 The Art of Marching. an invaded country, and under intimidation the majority can be made to speak. Information can be gathered from people overtaken on the road, itinerant vendors, carriers, and the like. As all such cannot be suffered to give the enemy the least inkling of our presence, they will have to be detained and kept in custody. Any indi- vidual coming from the direction of the enemy should never be suffered to pass unnoticed. He should be closely questioned, for he may either give fresh information or corroborate what has already been received. A patrol may be fortunate in capturing one of the enemy's couriers. This is most important on account of the light which the despatches he carries will throw on the situation. On the 8th of June 1800, a courier sent by Melas to Vienna was captured by the French. His despatches fell into their hands, and not merely revealed the fall of G-enoa, but also put the first consul in full possession of his antagonist's movements and plans. The information drawn from peasants and country people is not very reliable, their estimates of numbers in particular are, as a rule, vague and inaccurate. Frequently, in order to stave off an engagement near their -farms and villages, peasants will be found reporting the advance of the enemy in strength, and purposely exaggerating his numbers. In any case, we should bear in mind their complete ignorance of military matters and of the organization of armies. If it is the strength of a body of cavalry that it is wished to ascertain, the people should be asked the pace it was moving at, the number of horses abreast, and the time it took the column to go by. Sportsmen in pursuit of game become intimately acquainted with the country they shoot over. In 1745, it was Eobert Anderson, a sportsman who lived at Tranent, close to Preston Pans, who indicated to Lord George Murray the path through the swamp by which the Highland army turned Sir John Cope's flank. Anderson had often been shooting snipe in the marsh, and in that way had discovered this path ; he was about the only individual acquainted with it. Natives of wild countries are specially qualified for the work of scouting ; they are adepts in tracking or spooring. No one can detect with accuracy the signs and vestiges of a foe as well as they do. The instinct which a South African has received by nature of interpreting the signs around him, and of ascertaining a foe Principles of Exploration. 2*79 from afar, is really marvellous. The crushed leaf or broken twig, the imprint of a hoof, the sound of a bird's note of alarm, the scolding of the rock rabbit, and the grunt of the baboons up a mountain side, are all evidence of a tell-tale character to him. Our colonists have an advantage over the generality of our countrymen, that most of them can read the ground like a book. They have picked up from the natives the principle of look and learn, they have been taught to scrutinize the ground to follow the spoor.* If the rider sees his horse cocking his ears forward, he will gain an indication that there are people about ; if he beholds the tops of bushes shaking when there is no wind, he will understand that somebody is crawling among them. To any one who acquires the habit of observing, nature is full of language, and the power of observing soon turns into a habit. The savage, from necessity, has the best memory for ground, and can most easily read certain marks and signs ; foresters, woodcutters, and peasants come next, and last of all the more highly-civilized being who is keen in field sports. It is habit and necessity which train the least educated man in this. lu place of life-long habit, our officers in pursuit of sport soon acquire some of the aptitude of the savage in this matter, show- ing that it is not so much a question of instinct, as a matter of habit and constant and attentive observation. Men whose tastes lie towards the chase always do best work as scouts. A Goorkha makes a fine scout. Mountaineer and sports- man alike from his early youth, he will climb up the hillside without giving the least indication of his presence. He will hold on to secure cover to the very last minute, and, if compelled to decamp, he will make his way downhill with extraordinary speed. In reconnoitring in some of our semi-barbarous wars there are certain indications of danger which will not escape the eye of the expert. Such, for example, as a village or kraal containing some four or five times the number of its normal inhabitants, most of the individuals about being males, few women to be seen, few children. A noticeable brisk alertness, strangely out of keeping with the ordinary demeanour of the people, a kind of excitement difficult to disguise entirely. In scouting, not only the eyes can be of great use, but also the * In Chapter XIX. will be seen how, by certain indications, Morgan's raiders .ooiild trace at night the direction followed by their comrades. 280 The Art of Marching. ears. In the campaign of 1799, in Italy, the Eussians frequently- resorted to the employment of listening posts at night. For this service they detailed groups of intelligent men, gifted with acute hearing, who were directed to approach the enemy's posts stealthily, to hide themselves quite close to him, and to listen. These groups communicated constantly with the main guards. On the night previous to the battle of Omdurman, four Jalin scouts were sent to the Surgham Hill to listen, and to apprise the Sirdar of any movement on the part of the Khalifa's army. A faint sound, inaudible to a townsman's ear, is soon cauglit and understood. A stone dislodged somewhere, does not roll down the hillside without some one to move it. It is well to remember that on a calm night, the tread of a company marching on hard ground can be heard at a distance of 600 paces ; the march of a squadron or battery at a walk at 800 paces ; of the same at a trot at 1200 paces ; the noise of a single horseman is audible beyond 150 paces. There are men born with a wonderful eye, and to whom a hundred petty details never escape. For scouting it is desirable to have the native article, the best of its kind, specialists in tracking and scouting, and to pay them at a high rate, as the Americans did in their Mexican and Indian wars. These, howevei', cannot always be had. Scouting, in default of these men, can be taught in time of peace, if we take the trouble to do it, though it will never be as good a schooling as the officers and men would get abroad and on the frontiers. It is useless to attempt scouting with untrained men ; by doing so we shall only lose many lives and good men. All the non-commissioned ofScers, and even the men, should know where they should look for information. The post-office must always be the foremost place to repair to, for the information gathered there is almost sure to be pretty fresh. On entering any village the first inquiries should regard the post-office, and the letters and newspapers lying there should be seized. Postmen met on the roads should be made to deliver their bags, trains should be searched, and the mail-bags secured. Maps are the most valuable documents, next in importance directories, which contain detailed local and departmental information. They give the names and addresses of all the officials, and are most useful in serving requisitions, as they contain the names of the principal owners and merchants, with statistics of the agricultural resources Principles of Exploration. 281 and local industries. The maps, directories, and other books of reference can be found by searching hotels, booksellers' shops, parsonages, and schools. The public offices and government buildings hold many valuable documents and administrative registers. The offices of engineers, land and road surveyors, should be searched for maps; notaries, tax collectors, and registrars' offices contain schedules of taxes, valuations, and financial infor- mation of all sorts. With any of these documents, a guide, and a directory, it is possible to go anywhere and to find what is principally desired to know. Inns, cafes, and private houses should be diligently searched for newspapers. Notwithstanding all the rigorous measures taken against divulging news in time of war, journalists are often guilty of indiscretions, something is sure to ooze out, therefore newspapers constitute one of the most valuable sources of inform- ation. They must be very carefully looked through. In the last rranco-Grerman War, the Germans became aware of the designs of the army of Chalons through information which appeared in Le Temps during the last days of August 1870. In covering the advance of an army, we are met by a very serious difficulty, namely the difference in the language. In the British army, unfortunately, the nirmber of cavalry officers who speak a foreign language fluently enough is very small. This ignorance of foreign languages means much more than some people might believe. Without a knowledge of the vernacular, how are the of&cials, people of the country, and prisoners to be questioned ? How are the despatches, letters, telegrams, news- papers, and documents which may fall into our hands to be read and examined? How are guides, requisitions, and other things to be demanded ? What important indications, what sources of information are not likely to be lost ? An interpreter may be associated with the officer command- ing, but this only half meets the difficulty. Interrogating through an interpreter is not always very satisfactory ; there is always a doubt as to his putting the questions exactly in the way they are intended, there is no absolute certainty that he conveys to us the exact meaning of the replies. Questioning direct has immense advantages, and is quite another thing. Often the individual under examination lets slip a few words which will not escape the ear of a military interrogator, and will lead to other important questions being put. The interrogator, from any "282 The Art of Marching. hesitation of the speaker or from the tone of the replies, may detect that something of importance is being held back. For there are occasions on which a man must part with half his secret in order to keep the rest. This is a question which is very difficult to solve, for the fault lies in the little attention bestowed to the study of modern lan- guages in our schools. Quite trae, French, German, etc. are taught, but taught in a very superficial way, and soon forgotten through want of colloquial practice. We must make the best of what we have by attaching to the advanced cavalry divisions as many officers as possible who are conversant with the language of the country. They will be needed to examine prisoners and deserters, to read intercepted despatches, captured letters, newspapers, etc. With these divisions should march some commissariat officers entrusted with the duty of demanding provisions and forage, by purchase or by requisition, for the troops that are following. In this way there will be more time for the collection of the articles required. The officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier who is ordered ■out to reconnoitre or to scout has a right to have all the indica- tions which bear on his mission clearly pointed out to him before he sets out. The orders should be worded very carefully, with uo vague terms or anything in them which may give rise to a wrong or double interpretation. He should have a map of the particular part of the country he will have to explore, and on this he should mark the direction he is intended to take. Should he have no map, then he should study one before he sets out, and if there is time, make a rough tracing or sketch of the part he will principally have to work in, to which he can add other details Jater on. It must be the endeavour of every soldier belonging to a small party or patrol, from the moment he starts, to impress on his memory the road his party is travelling over, for he may have to journey back over it to convey information, to retire on his t-upports, to rejoin his corps, or to guide some other party. It •will be a prudent precaution to leave some special marks at cross roads and difficult places, with the object of recogaizing the right road hereafter. As a rule, not only the officer, but every soldier in a recon- noitring party, should have explained to him the object of the Principles of Exploration. 283 mission and the means by which it is proposed to attain it. The most stupid man in the detachment may be the only one who is not cut off, and may be in a position to give important informa- tion which he would not think of obtaining if things had not been explained to him. The military instinct will induce a man to take all the precautions which suggest themselves whilst in an enemy's country, Not a word should be spoken save in the faintest of whispers, the party or patrol must hold on their silent course wide awake and alert, their faculties of sight and hearing being employed to their fullest extent. Possibly the most difficult thing to do for mounted men is to avoid being seen ; nevertheless, it is their business to keep from the enemy, as much as it lies in their power, the fact that he is being watched and reported on. Every means of concealment that offers should be taken advantage of, keeping under cover when practicable, and avoiding being delineated on the top of hills or high ground, A small party can easily find concealment in a fold of ground, or can make for a wood, and there, hidden from sight, can make observations. Nearer the danger, is in reality often the safest place. A party engaged in exploring is generally compelled by prudence to avoid villages or farms, places from which their presence can be reported. In the enemy's country you may always expect the first person you meet to denounce your presence, as long as he can do so without getting into any trouble. The rude warrior, the wild inhabitant of the desert, often teaches us a very valuable lesson in practical warfare. The young and promising ofiScer of the Royal Engineers who furnished us with one of the most valuable accounts of the expedition for the reconquest of the Sudan, describes in the following words the measures taken to ascertain the strength of the Dervishes at Abu Hamed. " The Ababdeh Arabs under Abd el Azim were ordered to make a reconnaissance, and to ascertain the strength of the place. This they did in a very ingenious way, and sent in a report that could not have been made better by an officer from the Staff College. They did not ride direct on Abu Hamed, but on a small village called Abteen, about seven miles below it. As they approached from the desert they opened out into a long line. 284 The Art of Marching. and riding rapidly forward, they drove in front of them every man they came across, and, gradually closing, they surrounded the place and closed in it all its inhabitants, so that no one could get away to give the Dervishes warning. They then got hold of the village Sheikh, and having threatened him with every threat imaginable, they got the most complete, and as it turned out, the most accurate information of the Dervish strength and disposition. They then watered their camels, and in order to avoid pursuit, they took all the inhabitants, man, woman, and child, out into the desert with them, so that they could not send news to the Dervishes. About six miles out they released them all, and rode back to Murat Wells." * We are told by the above officer that the Ababdeh Arabs with the General had drawn an excellent map of the place on the sand. Though the march should be concealed as much as possible, a detachment which has orders to seize a town or a village should move rapidly when nearing it, so as to give no time to the in- habitants to organize any resistance, to forestall the destruction of any documents, letters, telegrams, registers, etc., and to prevent intimation being sent to the enemy. When a patrol goes out with the object of exploring, it should always be led by a daring and enterprising man, who will search the ground in the required direction. The other men will follow him in single file, keeping a certain interval between each other. Should the leading man be set upon and captured, the others fall back speedily. Acting in this manner, a good soldier is certainly sacrificed, still the rest of the patrol have acquired certain infor- mation of the presence of the enemy. This is a very essential point to know, and at times may be of more real value than the services of a worthy soldier. A squadron or troop feeling for the enemy may have ventured too far, and may have to occupy a village lor the night. In such a case, and in many other circumstances as well, the troopers should take their carbines out of the buckets, and lay down to sleep, keeping them by their side. Arrangements should be made to meet a case of alarm, followed by an attack during the night. The principle is to defend stubbornly some of the most solidly constructed buildings, leaving the horses in the stables. * " Sudan Campaign," by an OfiScer, p. 103 Principles of Exploration. 285 The greatest care should be taken in selecting a place for the troops to halt. As a rule, inhabited places should be avoided, for an individual may slip out and acquaint the enemy, which will very possibly lead to a surprise. Secluded localities over- looking the ground all round are to be preferred. Look-out men should invariably be posted. When cantoning, the entrances to the village should be barricaded, and men should be detailed to guard and defend the approaches ; after this the horses should be rubbed down, watered, and fed.* Any carelessness in watching is quickly punished. When the Prussians were advancing towards Vienna, after the battle of Sadowa, the advanced-guard of one of their columns came upon the Austrian rear-guard near the frontier of Moravia. The Austrians were collecting together from all the different houses and farmyards. Mounted men, filing out of barns and straw stores, were riding slowly towards the rendezvous in the market- place, men who had not yet mounted were leading their horses, strolling carelessly alongside of them, when, by some fault of their sentinels, or possibly because these had not been posted far enough out, they were surprised by the Prussians. Captain de Biensan makes the following pertinent remarks. " We see from this example, which is not exaggerated, that the role of a contact squadron is by no means a sinecure, and it would be well if we were thoroughly imbued with the idea that it can only properly acquit itself of its task by making very great efforts. On this account, no precautions should be neglected for husbanding one's powers, such as dismounting at every halt, not hurrying the pace without really good reason, not employing more men on detached duties and patrols than are absolutely necessary, putting both men and horses under as comfortable cover as possible at night, not disturbing their rest without good cause, and lastly, getting them as substantial meals as the resources at our disposal may allow of." t Squadrons and smaller detachments on exploring duty can only rely on the local resources, they must manage to live on requisitions; their rapid movements prevent their being fed in any other way. Their numbers are not so great that even small villages cannot furnish what they need in provisions and forage. For the troops, the best plan to pursue is to get the inhabitants * The morning meal should always be prepared the previous night, t Captain de Kiensan, " Conduct of a Contact Squadron," p. 46. 286 The Art of Marching. to prepare their meals. This arrangement relieves the men from the trouble of cooking, and as there is no necessity to unpack their Talises, there is no time lost in case of alarm. The men will get a better meal, and a more liberal allowance than would be the case had they simply to rely on their rations. In explor- ing these are often insufficient, and not in proportion to the fatigues undergone. Double work, double ration, is a saying not approved of by the civil administration, but when men perform hard work for their country, they should not be stinted in food and treated niggardly. The food cooked in different houses will be ready much sooner than if undertaken by the troops. If necessary, one man can be detailed to superintend the cooking at each fire, and see that there is enough of food forthcoming. The cooking must in any case comprise what will be required for parties on vedette, patrolling, etc. The horses should be watered and fed by sections ; they should not be unbridled, nor unsaddled, or relieved of any part of their equipment. The men should not be allowed to leave their horses, nor to undress, nor to put aside their swords. There is no danger in letting horses drink while sweating, provided they are allowed to drink in moderation and move again immediately after. The excellence of Frederick the Great's cavalry was the result not only of the extraordinary capacity of two of his generals, Seidlitz and Ziethen, but of the careful training of the individual soldier.* How can we expect that officers, non-commissioned officers, and men will be able to make the best use of their opportunities when before the enemy, unless they have a previous knowledge of the true principles which should guide the action of their special arm of the service. When troops are brought upon active service in the field their education should be complete^ Confidence and self-reliance in the performance of a duty is what we look forward to ; this must always increase with the knowledge possessed by those to whom it is entrusted. In the fighting of to-day individualism must be encouraged and not suppressed. , * The training was severe, the troops manoeuvred in large masses over rough ground. Seidlitz was in the habit of exercising his regiment at full speed over very broken ground. The king once found fault with him on account of the number of deaths this occasioned. The general replied, " If you make such a fuss about a few broken necks, your Majesty will never have the bold horsemen you require for the field." Principles of Ex2)loration . 28T Do we lay too much stress on cavalry scouting ? Do we insist too much on the necessity for cavalry to be enterprising ? What has been said, in the light of recent events, is not too much to induce our ofScers to make a more practical study of the mounted arm. Our cavalry is not numerous, the more the reason why the little there is should be very efiScient in every part of their duties.. What we look to from our cavalry is not a brilliant appearance in Laffan's plain, as will satisfy the public in general, but real efficient work in the face of the enemy, great mobility, untiring enterprise. Efficiency in reconnoitring can only he acquired through a great expenditure of time and labour. The instruction should be theoretical as well as practical, the practical part being accorded most time. An important part of the first is map reading, or learning to know the conventional signs used in map drawing. It is the business of the individual trooper to find his way in an unknown country ; often he will have to trust entirely to his map. The practice should extend to every desoriptioa of ground, and working with a fair extent of front. It should be done by night as well as by day, for keeping touch of the enemy should not be permitted to cease with sunset. In war, what is wanted to know is the strength, position,, and movements of the enemy. The information must be accurate ,^ and to be valuable it must be in the hands of the commander as soon as possible.* The first point can only be obtained bv employing men endowed with considerable powers of observation and deduction ; the second by swiftness in travelling, and by a combination of scouting and signalling. With this object,, cavalry signallers and reconnoitrers should be constantly trained to work together. A combined service of scouting, signalling,, and cycling would impart great celerity to the transmission of information ; above all, when operating in a close country. Theoretically, no report or information should be passed to the rear by an ofScer until he is personally convinced of its exactness. The trooper is not always to be implicitly trusted in his reports. Owing to a lower standard of education, his terms are often vague, he omits to attach any importance to certain, seeming trifles, he does not say as much as one should like to hear. Were the ofScer, however, to hold back any item of * It is very remarkable -with what extraordinary speed tidings do travel ia India and amongst Kaffirs, more swiftly than the fastest rider could bear them. 288 The Art of Marching. importance which may have been revealed to him, there might olten arise a needless delay in its transmission, and with it the loss of a very favourable opportunity. To avoid this risk, on all occasions when the information is of great moment, and a certain time to verify its accuracy is required, the most commendable course to pursue will be to report the particulars to the rear, stating that they need personal verification. A second report should afterwards be sent, when the circumstances are found to be beyond doubt. With regard to information and reports coming from the extreme front, the chief difficulty lies in their transmission. In an enemy's country enterprising scouting parties are very liable to get completely separated from their squadrons and brigades. Now, though a chain of relays might be established in rear of them, it must be evident how this manner of acting, even if practicable, is open to serious difficulties. First of all, we may notice that this arrangement would lead to a considerable weaken- ing of the various bodies, and that squads of few horsemen are liable to be overpowered and captured by the people. Secondly, the essential point in the transmission of information, as every one knows, is rapidity ; but the horses may be fatigued, and little speed are we likely to get out of horses that may have marched many miles since morning, bearing a heavy weight, and having been possibly, for some days, insufficiently fed. If these animals are required to set out on a fresh journey, are they likely to cover the ground at a brisk pace ? Thirdly, a single horseman is always liable to be shot or captured. Independent of all this, moving through a strange country, there is every possibility of his not falling in with the first relay. Another element of uncertainty arises from the fact that a despatch which changes hands, as it is made over by one bearer to another, is never so certain to be carried to its destination as if it were carried direct by one individual. Once an orderly or a trooper starts for the rear with a message, there is always a doubt as to his rejoining or finding his way back to his troop, which may, during the interval, have moved forward and taken any direction. The telegraph might be employed in transmitting information, but in advancing through an enemy's country there is little prospect of finding the wires untouched. In any case it is not prudent to count on a system which is so very liable to be destroyed, and which can be rendered useless at any moment. Principles of Exploration. 289 Sir Herbert Edwardes shows of what value the telegraph was at the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. He states that Brendish, a very youthful operator, a mere lad, saved the Punjab. He was alone in the Delhi telegraph-office, and before fleeing sent this incoherent message. " We must leave office all the bungalows are on tire burning down by sepoys of Meerut. They came this morning nine Europeans killed." This message reached Umballa, was sent to Lahore, and then flashed on to Peshawur. We have now a new element in carrying despatches, reports, orders, and the like. The development of cycling has possibly ■furnished what was wanted in the transmission of despatches. The cyclist moves noiselessly, at a great pace, and for a long distance without getting sensibly tired. He can follow the scouting parties, moving along the roads, and convey to the rear speedily the information they have acquired. When one is sent back, he will do easily from 20 to 24 miles in two hours, and, instead of handing his despatch over to a fresh bearer, would, generally speaking, carry it right through to its destination. To replace him, it would only be necessary for the first detach- ment he came across to send another cyclist forward to where he came from. By employing cyclists for this purpose, we relieve the hard- worked horses of the independent cavalry divisions, and keep more horsemen present with their troop or section. A small group of cyclists could, we imagine, conceal them- selves better than the like number of mounted men. A mounted man, on one hand, can escape and avoid capture by taking to the open country or passing through woods, whereas the cyclist must follow the roads ; nevertheless, the latter can put on a much greater pace, and is a smaller target than a soldier on horseback. The horseman can certainly use his arms, which the cyclist cannot, even a rifle or revolver would be of little use to him whilst moving, he must rely entirely on his speed. Despatches and orders often miscarry, and the consequence of their falling in the enemy's hands is attended with unfortunate results. The bearer of all such should be fidly alive to the fact that no written document should be sufiered to be captured; before there is a chance of its being seized it should be destroyed. The best way to do so is the one recommended by De Brack, to place it in the barrel of a pistol, which can be fired off when the u 290 The Art of Marching. bearer's capture is imminent. With the destruction of the docu- ment all will not be lost, as long as the precaution has been taken to make the bearer commit the gist of the contents to memory, a plan which should be followed on every occasion, save those in which special reasons call for absolute secrecy. When the practice is followed of sending two or three men by different roads with copies of the same document, the capture of one of the bearers without his missive will do little harm. Despatches from the advanced parties, though intended for the officers commanding divisions or brigades, should be shown to the first officer commanding troops the bearer may happen to come across, for he may often have to take action on the information they contain. Captain E. de Biensan, in his " Conduct of a Contact Squadron," observes : " Whenever an officer, of the staff or otherwise, meets an officer engaged in reconnoitring duty, he ought to get all the information he can from the scouting officer ; this he slaould take down in his pocket-book, being careful to enter each item in the order of its occurrence, and on returning to his corps he should lose no time in communicating it to the general, either directly or through the usual channel. In fact, he should remember that every despatch does not arrive at its destination. Eight times out of ten the information he brings will be already known, but this should not deter him from repeating it ; some day, perhaps, his report will supply an important omission, and so render an inestimable service to his superiors." , Drill books in general presuppose that we are having the best of it, and that the adversary is more bent on simply protecting himself from the enterprises of the enemy than in boldly grappling with him, which is the proper course to follow. We should look on both sides of the question ; we should never expect to meet with exceptionally favourable circumstances, but, on the contrary, we should anticipate serious and active resistance. Should the enemy attempt to drive back the exploring patrols, the scouts should clearly know that their action in such a case is to retire slowly, continuing to examine the enemy's dispositions all the while, and not ceasing to pass on information to those who follow in rear. Should the adversary endeavour to pursue them, they should fall back on their supports, but ready to resume their special work the moment the pursuit slackens or is abandoned. Principles of Exploration. 291 The action of the divisional cavalry in watching and hanging on the trail of the enenay should never cease. Colonel Bonie, who took part in the retreat from the battle- field of Woerth in the summer of 1870, gives an account of the demoralizing effect which a handful of German scouts had on the retiring French. Confidence was partly restored at Sarrebourg, but the sight of the enemy's cavalry caused the order to retire to be given. ' " From that moment," writes the Colonel, " until we reached Luneville, their scouts watched us unceasingly. Linked to their army by horsemen, they gave an exact account of our positions, of our halts, of our movements, and as they watched us from some little distance, incessantly appearing and disappearing, they spread uneasiness. " In place of acting in a similar way, we kept our cavalry in masses difficult to move, which did not protect the army, and rendered no service whatever." On the 26th of August 1870, the apparition of a few handfuls of German cavalry, despatched in the direction of Vouzieres, so alarmed the staff of the 7th French Corps, that the troops were kept under arms the entire night in pouring rain in expectation of an attack. Owing to this, the French march to the east received a serious check as early as on the 27th of August. The French allowed themselves to be imposed upon, and never in that disastrous campaign seem to have taken any pains to ascertain the exact strength of the horsemen who followed their footsteps, or to copy the German model. The annoyance which a properly handled cavalry division can cause to an enemy by its never-failing presence is invaluable. It willdemoralize the enemy's troops by engendering an uneasyfeeling of insecurity, for such a relentless pressing forward will be taken as a clear proof of a determination to carry out the operations with unheard-of vigour. Troops so harried will never be able to take tlie necessary rest. In support of this we borrow Denison's words. " The genius of Frederick the Great, the marvellous skill and steadiness of his wonderful army, and the extraordinary ability of his leading generals, barely enabled him to issue successfully from a struggle where the most important element against him, was the force of irregular light horsemen that swarmed around him. Napoleon, after conquering almost the whole of Europe, succumbed to the same cause." 292 The Art of Marching. With regard to Napoleon, he lost half of his cavalry in 1812 in his advance on Moscow, through the immense labour which Murat had injudiciously imposed on it, by his indefatigable energy and desire to come up with the enemy. The other half was lost after the capture of Moscow through want of forage, or destroyed in the incessant skirmishes that occurred when moving in search of it. As cavalry takes a long time to train and bring to perfection, what mounted troops the emperor was able to gather together in the last years of his reign were inefficient and lacked the necessary experience. Should the enemy neglect to employ his cavalry in screeniag his own army, we may act with smaller patrols and squads. Should he, on the contrary, employ his cavalry with ability, ours will have to act in more compact masses to have any effect. Mounted infantry, or infantry conveyed in requisitioned carts, can follow the cavalry, if necessary, and afford it invaluable support. To attach infantry to cavalry is to deprive the latter of its speed. The great value of cavalry, its speed and far-reaching power, is gone the moment it has to march under the protection of infantry. A cavalry division covering the advance of an army may have to fight when it finds it impossible to accomplish its task, when it is opposed to a bold adversary who holds steadfast and prevents the piercing of the screen. The signal services which the German cavalry divisions rendered in the beginning of the Franco-German War of 1870-71 were much facilitated by the knowledge of the constitution of the French army, by the carelessness of the French in scouting and outpost duty, and by the peaceful attitude of the population. The German scouting parties penetrated everywhere without hesitation, and always went to the right place for intelligence. They thus obtained a wonderful amount of information with a remarkable small loss. Their cavalry was numerous, with educated men in the ranks, which gave to it considerable advantage in scouting and patrol- ling. The German officers showed great enterprise and activity, day and night they were on the watch ; but they had the great moral impetus of success to stimulate them, Their daring went so often unpunished, that it seemed as if nothing could check their audacity. Eeally rien ne riussit comme le succes. Principles of Exploration. 293 In the second part of the war, the German exploring parties could not display quite the same enterprise as they had exhibited in the earlier stages of the campaign. The population had become mucli more hostile. The very long range and accurate sighting of the present rifle constitute a danger which patrols and scouting parties will have to face. The difficulties of reconnoitring are much increased thereby. What a temptation it must be for any of the people to have a shot at the enemy, when the distance they can fire from allows them to do so almost with immunity. Even if pursued by cavalry, the individual who fired would have a very great start in his favour. The full meaning of this will be gathered from De Brack's testimony of the services rendered by the Cossack cavalry in Napoleon's last wars. "The Cossacks were an arm which rendered the war highly dangerous, especially to such of our ofScers as were intrusted with making reconnaissances. Many among them, and especially of the general staff, selected by the Major-General, preferred forwarding the reports which they received from the peasantry to going to a distance and exposing themselves to the attacks of the Cossacks. The Emperor then could no longer know the state of affairs." When, at about 5.30 p.m., D'Erlon's corps approached the battle-field of Ligny, Vandamme reported to Napoleon that an enemy's column was issuing from the woodland in his rear. He had sent an A.D.C. to reconnoitre, the A.D.C. being afraid to re- connoitre too closely, assumes that it was part of the enemy's army. Fortunate will be the leader who from the very commencement of the campaign will be able to establish a decided superiority over his adversary, taking the initiative entirely out of his hands. Should the enemy's cavalry assume the offensive and attack, the squadrons assailed may have to fall back on their supports. The others, however, should resolutely push on, because it will be their diversion on the flanks and rear of the enemy which will mostly lead to make him suspend the attack. A leader should always bear in mind the words of Frederick the Great, " Ten men. on the flanks and rear of the enemy do more than one hundred in front." Besides, acting in this wise, there will be a fair prospect of getting an insight as to the compositioa and strength of the attacking force, which under all circumstances are most important particulars to know. 294 . The Art of Marching. In the event of the enemy assuming the offensive in earnest all along the line, the commander of the cavalry should lose no time in acquainting the commander-in-chief. He himself will retire in the direction which has been indicated to him, or, better still, endeavour to draw the enemy in a wrong direction, in doing which the latter may be induced to lay his flank open to an attack from our forces. The cavalry must pave the way for the army up to the battle-field. Having done this it must give place to the other arms, and fall back behind them ready either to complete a victory by a pursuit or to regain touch of the enemy. Never- theless, it should not be withdrawn from the front until the last moment. The range and rapidity of fire of the present fire-arms will be very destructive to cavalry, unless every opportunity is taken to shelter their masses from view by taking advantage of woods, plantations, undulations of ground, etc. The cavalry divisions after they have completed the first part of their task, must be kept in rear of the other arms, protected from losses, until a fresh opportunity arises for their employment. Until the decimating effect of fire has either shaken the morale of the opponents, or has caused large rents in their ranks, cavalry cannot be launched forth with a fair prospect of success. With the best troops a hot fight engenders such disorder that it is difficult to initiate a rapid pursuit. Should the adversary sustain a defeat, and his army, from the results of the battle, be driven asunder, then the independent cavalry divisions should step in, striving to separate the two portions of the beaten army more and more, making it impossible for them to reunite. The cavalry should menace the adversary's retreat from the very commencement of the battle. This is often possible, for generally the troops in the fighting line are so entirely engrossed with their immediate opponents to take much notice of parties approaching from quite a different direction. Harassing a retreating army is also part of the role assigned to the independent cavalry divisions. It should be done by small parties of horsemen hovering on the flanks of the column in retreat. These parties should make their presence felt beyond the actual tail of the retiring force. This manner of acting will generate a continuous feeling of uneasiness which will Principles of Exploration. 295 gradually demoralize the enemy, cause him to hurry his march, and consequently soon weary his men. Never did Stonewall Jackson express himself more to the point than when he tersely said, " The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy retreats." 296 The Art of Marching. CHAPTER XII. DISPOSITIONS FOE THE MAECH. For convenience and despatcli an army must march in column — Length of the columns — Lieut.-Colonel Brunker's estimate — An army should be divided for marching — ^A number of roads should be simultaneously used — Precautions against crossing — Example of a march from Guildford towards London — A division a complete unit capable to do battle — Marching to the sound of the guns — Grouchy on the 18th of June, 1815 — The 9th Don Cossacks on the 19th of July, 1877 — Front of an army marching by parallel roads— Communication to be kept with the lateral columns — Column of direction — French and Austrian armies marching before the battle of Solferino — The columns must close in as the enemy is neared — Alviuzi attacked and beaten before all his columns had time to come up— Columns to be in touch with each other ready to afford mutual aid — A separate advanced-guard needed for each column — Arrangements for an army or an army corps marching on a single road — ^Risks attending a flank march — Arrangements when they are considered indispens- able — All columns to set out at about one time — The hour of setting out — Not to be unduly early — Considerations which indicate the best hours — Grouchy delays to pursue the Prussians on the 18th of June, 1815 — Jackson's habit of making an early start — Time required by the troops to get ready to march — Troops exposed to unnecessary fatigue if assembled before the appointed hour of march — To be marched separately to the initial point of the march. When in carrying out a movement there is a possibility of an encounter with the enemy, the troops should be formed in such order as to be prepared to confront the adversary without delay. The readiest way for securing this object would be to march the army deployed in order of battle ; as, however, a long advance in such a formation, even if it were possible to find suitable ground, must necessarily be slow and fatiguing, the troops, for convenience of marching and despatch, are ranged in consecutive order from front to rear in a lengthy column.* Drawn up in this manner, owing to the very small front that an army occupies and to its great depth, it will evidently require a considerable time before the rearmost troops in the column can be in a position to take their place in the line of battle. * The column is a formation for the march and for manoeuvring, rarely now a formation for action. Dispositions for the March. 297 The greatest industry needs to be observed when making the dispositions for the march of an army. It is only by proper arrangements that marches of any length and rapidity can be accomplished, and that we can secure the early arrival of the indispensable convoys in camp or bivouac. Should the arrange- ments be faulty, should the supervision be slack, the marches will be to a certainty slow and wearing. A pattern formation for the march is necessary, if for no other object than to serve as a basis of calculation. This has been established by a proper appreciation of the principles which have guided the best marches, of large masses of troops on record. It can be made elastic, and thus applicable more or less to most cases. The leading principle in all marches is that the army should move in that formation from which it can most readily assume the order of battle. From this it naturally follows that every- thing in the column should be arranged in the order in which it is likely to be wanted. A very necessary point in what relates to the march of an army, therefore, is to possess a correct idea of the length of any given column. The lengths which the various units and special bodies will occupy in column of route must be known, for the ofScers to be in a position to make many necessary calculations, as, for example, to determine the exact position in which any part of the column may be at any given moment, to compute the time a division or an army corps will occupy in closing to the front or in deploying into line, or to ascertain how soon we may expect the co-operation of some neighbouring body. The spaces taken up in column of route must vary with the alterations introduced from time to time in the war establish- ments.* For a matter of study we have adopted the latest estimate, the one made by Lieut.-Colonel H. M. E. Brunker,t which sets them down as follows — Yards. Battalion of Infantry, 800 men in the ranks 350 1 machine gun 2 S.A.A. carts 1 tool cart 1 medical cart ... 2 mules, ammunition 10 20 10 10 8 Total 408 * Is there ever a chance of our ceasing to play at paper organization? How perplexing is the want of finality in our regulations and in our establishments, t Lieut.-Oolonel H. M. E. Bruiiker, " Chart of an Army Corps." 298 The Art of Marcldng. Cavalry in sections, 1 yard per man. ,, fours, J yard per man. „ files, 2 yards per man. Artillery, Field Battery „ R.H.A. Battery, detachments nlongside guns Field Company B.E. Bearer Company Vehicles : One or two horses „ Four hoi ses „ Six horses Pack animal ... 240 ... 240 in sections between guns 300 in files between guns ... 360 ... 185 ... 170 ... 10 ... 15 ... 20 4 To arrive at a proper idea of the march of aa army in column of route, it is necessary in the first instance to see of what corps and arm of the service the larger units are constituted. If we direct our attention to a division, the first unit which comprises the three arms of the service and other details, we shall see that it consists of a total of 10,034 ofScers, non-commissioned ofBcers, and men, 1780 horses or other animals, 306 carriages. This force is drawn up according to the following plan. Battle Akeay of a Division. 2l?Bri besides, very desirable to establish the outposts and take the other measures of security betimes, for thus only can the troops on outpost duty have time to become familiar with the ground and with the roads leading to the front. The lot of the cavalry soldier on the march is not an enviable one. He is often the first to leave camp and the last to return to it, and after coming in he has to groom, water, and feed his- horse before he can think of himself. When there is a choice of hours, in marches of course conducted at a distance from the enemy, the mounted troops should move the last. This is. reasonable, as they take longer than the infantry to prepare, and the horses do not feed well in the very early morning. Dispositions for the March. 329* The rotation in which the troops take the lead, saves the same- troops having day after day to get ready to set out at a very early hour. From 4 to 6 a.m. in the summer, and from 7 to 9 a.m. in the' winter are apparently the best hours for making a start. When the best part of the day has to be spent in marching, the sooner the march commences the better. After the repose of the night both men and animals will be in the best condition to march. In the summer the hottest hours are from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.^ and no march, if possible, should be carried on during those hours. In fixing the hour of departure, we should always consider the last troops to move, those which being roused with the rest will come into camp last. If the troops, say a division, starts at 6 a.m., with the object of making a fifteen miles march, it will take about seven hour& (including a long halt) to reach camp. The troops would be there between 1 and 2 p.m., get their baggage up between 2 and 3, and settle down by 4 p.m. But the same division, if it had to- make a twenty-two mile march, and, being winter, started an hour later, would not reach camp until 9 p.m. We are here simply considering the general question of the hour of departure in consecutive marches. In marches which have a special object in view the hour of setting out must more than ever be governed by circumstances. There is a striking- example in point in the Waterloo campaign. On the 17th of June, Marshal Grouchy had been told off to- lead a large force in pursuit of the Prussian army, defeated the previous day by Napoleon at Ligny. The Marshal was directed to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat and the in- tention of their general, to whom it was open to retire towards the Prussian base on the Hhine by Liege, or to effect a junction with the British forces under Wellington. The battle of Ligny ended at 9.30 p.m. on the 16th. The Prussians were not followed up, all touch of them was lost, and there was nothing to indicate their line of retreat. The pursuit^. hy the corps which had suffered most in that contest, was only taken in hand in the afternoon of the following day. For this delay Napoleon alone was answerable, for he did not issue his orders until he visited the battle-field on the 17th, at about mid-day. Then the orders given rested on a wrong conception, for the idea 330 llie Art of Marching. predominant in his mind at that time was that the Prussians were retreating in the direction of Namur.* Grouchy, receiving no orders from the Emperor, had on his own initiative sent reconnaissances under Excelmans and Pajol in the direction of G-embloux and Namur. With singular want of forethought, none were pushed on the roads by which the Prussians actually retired from the field of Ligny. The roads 'by Gentinnes, Gery, and Mont St. Guibert were not explored, -and to this neglect much of what followed is to be attributed. The Prussian retreat from Ligny, bad as the conditions were, •was effected with remarkable speed. They had many hours' start, and were allowed to gain more time ; for, when there were two roads at least leading to Gembloux, the French marched on a single one. The orders issued at about 10 p.m. of the night of the 17th — when the pursuing force was in and round Gembloux— for the following day contemplated an advance on Sart-a-Walhain. The 3rd Corps, which was bivouacking somewhat in advance of Gembloux, was to set out at 6 a.m., covered by Excelmans' •cavalry, the bulk of which was then posted at Sauvenieres. The 4th Corps, from Gembloux, was to follow the 3rd at 8 a.m. Now, •though it is light very early in Belgium in the month of June — at about 3.30 a.m. — the hour laid down by Grouchy for starting was far too late for troops which were intended to overtake the enemy. The orders given for the march of Gerard's -cavalry specify a la petite pointe du jour (the greying of the jnorning), Pajol was to start a la pointe dujour (dawn), but these injunctions were not carried out. There seems to have been a very great absence of enterprise, for the cavalry did not set out before 7.30 a.m., and the two infantry corps were each one hour behind time in starting. The Marshal, moreover, did not hasten the pursuit when he had arrived at the conclusion that the mass of the Prussians •were retiring on Brussels, via Wavre. It was at 11 a.m. on the 18th that Grouchy wrote to the Emperor to acquaint him that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps of Bliicher's army were marching in the direction of Brussels. -Napoleon knew earlier still that they were retiring on Wavre. The Marshal, who was already far in rear of the Prussians, by * Napoleon seems to have been strengthened in this belief by the arrival at Fleurus of a battery of eight pieces captured from the enemy by Pajol's cavalry on 'the Namur road. Dispositions for the March. 331 his tardy setting-out lost some good four hours. This of itself was a serious enough fault, but it was made more so by marching 33,000 men in a single column by the road Nil St. Vincent- Corbaix-La Baraque-Wavre, when there were parallel roads not far away from each other. Grouchy arrived in front of Wavre at 4 o'clock p.m. ; had he started his troops from Gembloux at daybreak they would have been at Wavre by noon, and at that hour some of the Prussians were only getting under way for the field of Waterloo, and had not crossed the Dyle. Grouchy never anticipated that Bliicher would leave a force at Wavre to meet him, marching with the rest to the assistance of Wellington. The Emperor himself little expected it.* Stonewall Jackson always marched early ; so much so that the men of his brigade used to say that he always marched at dawn, except when he started the night before. Lieut-Colonel Henderson, writing of the Confederates, says: "they were old acquaintances of the morning star, and to march while the east was still grey had become a matter of routine." In the iinal advance on Omdurman, the Anglo-Egyptian army set out at 5 a.m., and kept marching, with occasional short halts, till 2 p.m. ; by four it had settled down in camp. This was at the end of August. The cavalry reconnoitred five miles ahead. The following arrangement for the ordinary march of a body of cavalry was suggested by Marshal Bugeaud. Half an hour before daybreak the cooks and men to draw billets should set out. At daybreak the horses receive a partial grooming and are fed. Two hours later the troops have their breakfast, followed half an hour later by the boot and saddle. If the column is composed of a regiment or a brigade it can march by squadrons, each squadron keeping an interval of 100 yards from the one in its front. If it consists of several brigades, the intervals can be maintained between regiments. The transport will follow the column, being escorted by the dismounted men. As it proceeds at a walk, it will naturally fall far in rear of the troops. It may, however, possibly march by a parallel road, and in many cases can set out at an earlier hour than the main body. The time necessary for communicating to the various units of * Grouchy did not enjoy the confidence of his comrades; they had warned Napoleon not to give liim an independent command. 332 The Art of Marching. an army an order to march, and the time they must have to make everything ready to move off, should be taken into account. If it is desired to see when the troops can be expected to arrive at a given place, this factor cannot be left out of our calculations. It will take some time before the warning to make ready to move reaches every one. It must first be communicated, to the headquarters of the army corps, subsequently to those of the various divisions, then to the brigades, and lastly to the regiments and details. From the time it leaves the divisions we may well reckon on an average that 45 minutes have elapsed, the orders for a brigade will be out 30 minutes after that, and those for the regiments will be promulgated 15 minutes later ; this will make a total of 1 hour and 30 minutes. If to this be added one hour which the troops will necessarily require to complete their pre- parations for marching, it will be seen that it will take about 2J hours for the head of the column to move off after having received a sudden order to march. This supposes a case in which, the troops are all encamped or bivouac together. Napier relates that so intelligent had the troops of the Light Division become, that seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms at night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day^ to bring it in order of battle to the alarm post, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear.* We have said that about an hour will be the time required for troops to get ready to step off. When the troops bivouac with- out tents half an hour will give ample time, but when tents have to be struck and packed, and the wagons loaded, particularly if all this has to be done in the dark, a full hour will be none too much to allow. It stands to reason that when troops are in move- ment everything which will not be required should be packed and loaded in the evening so as to lighten the work in the morning. One of the causes which contributed most to ruin .the- French cavalry in the campaign of 1812 in Russia, was the mistake made by Murat of marching the immense body of cavalry placed under his immediate command in one mass, often in one column, with the same hour for turning out for every regiment alike. Thus it happened that some regiments had to remain mounted and stationary for hours before they set out; the horses were saddled and loaded for a period of time very * Napier's " Peninsular War," book xi. chap. iv. Dispositions for the March. 333 much in excess of that which they would have occupied in marchino;. In 1870, the French cavalry committed the same fault. Some ■cavalry corps which were got ready to set out some time before •daybreak did not actually file off till after noon, that is to say, that they were bridled and saddled for many consecutive hours uselessly, thus causing great fatigue to the horses. Nothing tires troops more than being moved backwards and forwards with a view to their assembly before starting. Much time is lost by this, the troops are afoot much earlier than neces- sary, and consequently they are deprived of a portion of their rest. It is a waste of time and strength. Were the entire force to assemble before marching off, the rearmost troops, those which would march in rear of the column, would have to remain standing for several hours at the rendezvous ground. Their being called under arms long before they are actually wanted would irritate them, and add very much to the fatigues of the •day. A unit is often seen parading first on its own assembly ground, then going from that to the rendezvous ground appointed for the brigade, and finally marching to that of the division — going through a little field day before starting. It is a wise measure to allow the soldiers to rest in their camps or bivouacs up to the latest possible moment. The general principle now observed in every army is that the troops should be spared all unnecessary fatigue. According to this principle, the practice often followed of assembling the troops in large units previous to their engaging in a march is condemned. The approved system which now obtains is to get each body under arms in succession, and for it to leave its camping or bivouacking ground in sufficient time to allow of its taking its proper place in the column at the right time. The spot it will have to reach is the initial point of the march; in other words, the locality in front of the camp, cantonment, or bivouac, after passing which all the units and details will have taken their assigned place in the column of march. Now let us take the case of a corps composed of two divisions, encamped on either side of a road which the corps will have to march over on the morrow. Marching at the rate of 2 J miles per hour, 78 minutes will elapse after the head of the leading division has been put in motion before the rear of it is able to set out. Now, if both divisions were to be ordered to get under 334 The Art of Marchini/. arms at the same hour, the second division would be kept stand- ing under arms for 1 hour and 18 minutes to no purpose whatever. This applies in like manner to the various parts of a division, which should get under arms in succession, carefully timed to follow the preceding troops in their proper place without leaving an interval in the marchiog column. The same consideration should extend to troops marching in separate columns but following two roads which converge and become one after a certain point. Were they both to set out at the same time, the last to arrive at the point of junction would have to halt until the other corps has passed. Either one of these columns should set out from camp at a later hour, or, if com- pelled to halt until the road is clear, advantage can be taken of the delay to give the troops a rest or to make them cook their dinners. ( 335 ) CHAPTER XIII. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS IN THE COLUMN OF MARCH. Division into advanced-guard, main body, and convoy — Objects of the advanced- guard — To be composed of the three arms — Advanced-guard to secure the deployment of the main body — Details of its composition to be left to the G.O.C. — Danger of making an advanced-guard too strong — Cavalry superior to infantry for exploring — The march to open with a body of horsemen — Two guns near the head of the advanced-guard — The infantry to be furnished by the leading brigade — Disadvantages of composite corps — -A body of Eoyal Engineers to march with the advanced-guard — Protection on the flanks — ■ Action of the flankers — Mounted signallers with flankers — Austrians marching from Olmiitz without flankers — Subdivision of the advanced-guard — The advanced-guard to be led by an intelligent oilieer — Distance between it and the main body — Troops ranged in the order in which they will have to join in the combat — iPosition assigned to the artillery — Danger of artillery marching un- escorted — Josephus describes the march of a Roman army— Osman Pasha's order of march from Widdin to Plevna— The commander never to expose him- self by marching at the head of the advanced-guard — Death of Lord Howe — Napoleon personally urges the pursuit of the British from Quatre Bras — The position the commander will occupy during the march to be known — Daily inspection on the march — Staff officer leading — A column rightly marshalled should easily form order of battle — Friant's march to the field of Austerlitz — Some aids for finding one's orientation without a compass. Every body of troops, when not completely in readiness for battle, requires a detachment to give warning of the enemy's approach, and to afford further details regarding the strength and composition of his force. When troops are on the march advancing, a detachment, more or less strong, forms its advanced-guard. If we reverse the operation, and consider the same body in retreat, this detachment will form the rear-guard. When these troops are halted in camp, cantonment, or bivouac, there will be an extended line of small posts, called the outposts, which have to perform analogous duties. Clausewitz groups together advanced - guards, exploring patrols, and scouts, and calls them the strategical eyes. A column on the march is divided into three distinct parts ; these are the advanced-guard, the main body, and the convoy. 336 The Art of Marching. Colonel Verdy du Vernois demonstrates how unnecessary on the line of march is the subdivision of the main body, which some military writers often adopt, into maiu body and reserve. As he very justly argues, " All the troops, so far as they have not yet ■come into action, are the reserves of the leader." A fighting reserve is often held in hand to be employed only in very critical circumstances, or for the object of delivering a final blow ; never- theless, such a reserve need only be formed just before the commencement of the action. In retreats the three distinct parts mentioned above are equally represented by the rear-guard, main body, and convoy. On a march to a flank the position of the advanced-guard is •on the outer flank, on that side where the enemy is, or is expected to be. Its role is very important, because it is the advanced- guard which must prevent a surprise. Moving parallel to the main body, it should successively occupy positions which it can hold, in the event of an attack, until our forces can get ready to join in the battle. The small detachments forming the rear-guard of an advanc- ing column are detailed more for the purpose of police, for picking up stragglers, maintaining order amongst the camp followers, and seeing to the regularity of the march of the convoy, than for the adequate protection of the convoy itself, and to save it from a sudden onset. The cautious advance of the column with flanks well guarded is, generally speaking, deemed a sufficient safeguard against a sudden attack of the convo}'. These rear-guards are not of any great strength ; nevertheless, their duties are of a harassing and thankless nature. Marches, when carried out within reach of the enemy, cannot be made with too great precaution. Napoleon laid down that " when an army is in column of march, it is necessary to have advanced-guards and flankers, to scout to the front, to the right, and to the left, and at distances sufficiently great to give time to the army corps for deploying and taking up a position." The defeat at Stormberg of our troops, that were to have sur- prised the Boer camp in December 1899, has been attributed to the ignorance or treachery of the guides who led the column. To this should be added that the mea were out of condition, and that there was an absence of the most elementary precautions on the line of march: efficient scouting when on the march near the enemy was neglected. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 337 Scouting, reconnoitring the ground to the front and flanks of the troops on the march, is all the more necessary because the adversary, being on his own soil, knows the country well. Be- sides, he is, possibly, well informed of our movements, seeing how very careless we are about strangers coming in and going out of our camps. No officer, whatever arm he may belong to, should ever neglect to reconnoitre in his immediate vicinity. All must search constantly and carefully the area comprised in their command, so as to guard themselves against the most dangerous of all foes, surprise. A precaution often neglected in the Boer war.* The advanced-guard has to facilitate the progress of the main body, feel for the enemy, engage and hold him fast. It should take heed not to compromise itself too far with a superior force on one hand, and, on the other, it must guard against being imposed upon by demonstrations designedly effected by small insignificant bodies for the purpose of delaying the advance. The main object of all advanced-guards is to prevent a surprise of the main body, or its being subjected to an attack when, from its lengthy formation, it is not in a favourable condition for fighting. The division of a lengthy column into advanced-guard and main body favours the opening of an engagement without com- promising the main body ; it helps in feeling the way and in making the enemy declare himself. To secure these advantages an advanced-guard is generally composed of the three arms of the service, the infantry or cavalry predominating according to the open or enclosed nature of the country. Whilst it should be in proportion to the numbers of the forces employed, it should be strong enough to hold its ground and give plenty of time to the main body to take part in the combat or to deploy into line of battle. In column, the troops are not in a state to engage in a contest ; they require time to deploy and assume a proper fighting formation. To do this with a column of any length demands considerable time. For this reason, principally, it is the rule to * Conan Doyle writes in " The Great Boer War: " " The author cannot easily forget his surprise on meeting a crack colonial regiment of light horse between Vet Eiver and Brandfort, passing through what was practically an enemy's country, without any sort of advanced-guard or flankers — and this within a few weeks of Sauna's Post. It afterwards transpired that armed Boers were at the moment within a couple of miles of them." Z 338 The Art of Marching. push forward a small force of all arms which can be rapidly deployed, become engaged, and gain time for the rest of the command. As an army should be always and at all times ready to repel an attack, it is indispensably necessary for the general to be able to concentrate his forces at any point before the arrival of the enemy. Advanced-guards have to secure the deployment of the main body once the adversary is met ; they must strive to make him show his hand by deploying his forces, but denying him at the same time a similar advantage by screening effectively their own army. AH the details as to strength and composition of advanced- guards depend upon a variety of circumstances, which will vary more or less in every different instance. Whilst the necessity for an advanced-guard is admitted by all, still different views are entertained with respect to its proper strength, composition and employment. These points can well be left to the decision of the general commanding, who, being presumably accurately informed of the special circumstances of his case, will be able to arrange his advanced-guard to suit the occasion and the object he has in view. The advanced-guard should be a complete tactical body, in strength adequate for the purpose it is intended and nothing more. Ordinarily the infantry allotted to it is about a quarter of the infantry in the column. When the advanced-guard is made too strong, an inducement is given to its commander to commit the whole column to an action, whether such be the intention of the general commanding or not. In the two leading actions of the last Franco-German war, at Spicheren and at Worth, the too great eagerness of the Germans brought on a battle, which in both cases was not contemplated by the generals in command of the 1st and 3rd Armies. Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen calls these battles aceidental meetings. The advanced-guards became engaged, and when it was desired to break off the engagement, it was found that the troops were too seriously committed to be withdrawn.* A battle brought on so prematurely has the disadvantage that it leads to barren * On the 22nd of January, 1879, there was no intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the British. The Undi corps, the Nokenke and XJmcitu regiments, also the Nkobamakosi, the Imbonambi and the Nodwengu, in all about 20,000, were Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 339 results. It might even end in defeat were the advanced-guard to contend against superior forces, and the troops in rear could not be moved up with sufficient rapidity to its support, A division of infantry requires a detachment of light cavalry- men to clear up its march to the front and flanks, to furnish it with information, to patrol, and, possibly, to pursue any infantry which may have been defeated. A single squadron is allotted to it in the establishments for an army in the field, and is considered to be sufiScient for these purposes ; a consideration of all the work it has to perform will show that it should have more. This divisional cavalry, strictly speaking, is not meant to engage the enemy; this duty belongs to the independent cavalry divisions which constitute the main body of the cavalry, and in default of which we should have to retire were the enemy to cover its movements with numerous bodies of horsemen. Heavy cavalry are not well adapted for service with advanced or rear-guards. As the greater range of fire-arms makes it necessary to explore at a comparatively greater distance in front of an army, this fact cannot but have some influence on the proportion of light cavalry calculated in the organization of armies. The advanced-guard must reconnoitre at the greatest possible distance beyond the main body, avoiding, nevertheless, to com- promise its detachments. Properly speaking, not one of the three arms can dispense with the assistance of the other two. Infantry ■can render very little service in the way of exploration, for the pace of the infantry scouts is not far superior to that of the column. They cannot consequently outstrip the troops they are intended to protect, and cannot search the ground round the line of march sufficiently far away or with the required speed. The exploration, even at the cost of great fatigue, caa only extend beyond a few hundred paces in front and on the flanks of the column, which is not sufficient protection. This arm, therefore, can only be used for this purpose in a country where cavalry cannot act. In a very enclosed country, where the cavalry will not be resting about two miles from Isandhlwana, in native parlance the little hand. They had not been moutied (doctored), and the condition of the moon was not con- sidered propitious. Some mounted men, however, fired at the Umoitu regiment, which thereupon sprang up and advanced against them. The other two regiments of the right wing, the Nodwengu and Nokenke, followed the Umcitu, as did the Imbonambi and Nkobamakosi, which formed the centre, and the battle became general. 340 The Art of Marching. able to take the lead, the infantry must do so. Infantry and cavalry combined might with advantage be used in reconnoitring^ mountain defiles.* Cavalry does not labour under the same disadvantages as the infantry, for owing to its rapidity of movement it can proceed much further away from the other troops, and in a short time examine all the ground around without checking for a moment the advance of the column. It can discover the enemy early and send in information regarding him quickly. Horsemen, with their rapidity of movement, can dare getting far away from the other troops, penetrating between the adversary's patrols, and retiring at a brisk pace if pursued by superior forces. Should they not be able to push forward, checked by larger bodies or by infantry under cover, they can continue to keep the enemy in view and threaten his flanks and rear. In every description of country, whether it is open or enclosed, cavalry has over the infantry the advantage of being able ta gather and forward information more rapidly under all circum- stances, and this independent of the difficulties which may attend the operation of searching. Even in mountainous and wooded countries, it is admitted that a small body of horsemen, of such strength only that their retreat may not cause disorder amongst the troops that are following it, should always lead the advance of the column. The most important arm, the one that is the most indispens- able for the security of a column, is the cavalry. It is the arm to employ above all others in scouting and seeking information about the enemy. Cavalry performs a very momentous function in all that regards security on the march. It is only at night, when darkness compels it to keep to the roads, that it loses most of its importance.f * The oomMned action of Infantry and cavalry is of very old date. The Gauls had a body called Mahrelcha-droad, composed of horsemen, MahreJc, and of foot- soldiers, droad. The two fought side by side, one on foot, the other on horseback, affording each other mutual support. The Arabs had a similar way of figliting, for the historians relate how Kheir-ed-Dinn, in the battle before Tunis, placed on his left wing 12,000 Berber horsemen and as many foot-soldiers, all musketeers or cross-bowmen, who were to fight along with the horsemen. When the French were pushing back Wellington's army towards the Sierra de Busaco, they adopted a plan of pursuing the British rear-guard by sending forward light infantry with light cavalry to skirmish, intermixed, side by side, thus afford- ing mutual support to each other as the ground became either open orintersected. The British evidently employed the two arms in the same manner, for later on,, ■when Wellington, in March 1811, followed Massena who was retiring from. Portugal, the Light Division and cavalry took up the pursuit. t Baffin, " Taotique do Perizonius," tom. i. p. 117. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 341 Colonel Von Katzeler, who commanded York's advanced- guard in 1813, always desired to see a numerous cavalry with the advanced-guard. He used to say : " The cavalry is the arm by means of which I can, on one hand, procure speedily news of the enemy, on the other, brave, without compromising myself, an adversary superior in numbers. Moreover, with it I am always ready to face an unforeseen attack." At the first battle of Plevna, General Schilder-Schuldner, who was not deficient in cavalry, led his troops blindly to the assault, divided into two columns which were not in communication with each other. He had learnt nothing about the strength and position of the enemy, and was without reserves of his own. It is presumed that the exploring will be performed by the independent cavalry divisions. When this cannot be done, it will have to be undertaken by the divisional cavalry, weak as it may be. Opening the march with a body of horsemen must be done with judgment ; for a large body of cavalry thrust back on the infantry and artillery would be certain to retard their progress, if it did not introduce a dangerous element of disorder. Most roads lend themselves to the employment of two field pieces. These two guns are ordinarily placed near the head of the advanced-guard, with the object of forcing the enemy to halt and form up at a respectable distance, or otherwise to open fire on his retreating troops. The necessity for having guns as far in advance as safety permits has been proved by experience; nevertheless, no more guns should be so employed than can be efficiently worked on the road itself. The infantry of the advanced-guard should be taken from the brigade marching at the head of the main body, so that it may be supported by its cognate body. Verdy du Vernois shows how, as late as 1866, the remainder of the brigade furnishing the advanced-guard marched as a reserve in rear of the division. He argues against this separation of the brigade, and concludes by establishing the rule that the regiment which forms a brigade with the advanced-guard should always be at the head of the main body. " By this means, the advantage is gained of the first support of the engaged advanced-guard being from the body which in its organization is the most closely bound to it, and the brigadier leads his entire brigade into action, whilst the 342 The Art of Marelumj. divisional commander has a united body of the same strength at his disposal.* The advanced-guard should be composed of well-trained troops under an expert leader, for the objects it has to gain are principally to be secured by skilful manoeuvring. The faulty arrangement which makes the brigadier or other oflScer commanding the advanced-guard receive as supports troops which are totally unknown to him brings us to the consideration of composite regiments, which have been more than once advocated during the last few years. During the expedition against the King of Ashantee, 1873-74, the officer under whose immediate command the author was serving complained to him of the unreliable nature of his command, composed of hastily raised native levies, which was not what had been promised him when he went to the Gold Coast. He stated that he was to have had command of a regiment of picked men, taken from some of the best infantry regiments in our army. This arrangement did not seem a wise one, inasmuch as any battalion so got together must inevitably have been deficient of the traditional discipline and steadfast regimental pride which is such an inducement to gallant deeds.t Koughly speaking, with the desire of getting the pick of the army, the proposal consisted in taking from six battalions the best or smartest captain; this officer was to select his own subaltern and make an appeal lor 109 volunteers. Eventually H.E.H. the Duke of Cambridge, who did not countenance this innovation, sent out for the march on Coomassie three smart line battalion?. The real blot of composite regiments, the absence of esprit de corps, was clearly demonstrated in the disaster on Majuba Hill. The force detailed for the occupation of that strong position was formed of companies taken from the 2Qd Battalion Northampton- shire regiment, 2nd Battalion King's Eoyal Eifle Corps, and 2nd Battalion Grordon Highlanders ; with these was a detachment of the Eoyal Navy. When the Boers fired a volley point blank on the picquet which held the kopjie on the north-western point of the position, the soldiers who were in sight of the picket post recoiled too from the brow of the hill. * Colonel I. yon Verdy du Vernois, " Studies in Troop Leading," translated by Lieut. H. J. T. Hildyard, p. 26. t Sir John Burgoyne, in his " Military Opinions," assigns as one of the reasons- why assaults fail that the duties are often taken by detachments ; consequently the ofBcers and men neither know nor care for e;ich other, nor is there the stimulus of esprit de corps to push them on. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 343 Sir William Butler, in his life of Sir George Pemeroy-Colley, writes of this particular incident, how the general and officers sprung forward at once to the threatened point, urging the men of the reserve to follow in the same direction. " But before these mixed companies could shake themselves out and reach the fighting line, the backward wave had begun. The two lines met on the exposed slope of the hill ; there occurred here a moment of great confusion, which finally shaped itself into a general back- ward rush, and neither voice nor gesture nor reinforcement could arrest it. The men of the reserve had not been too ready to go forward when the first outbreak of sudden fire had called for their assistance, and now catching the contagion of panic which had just caused the men on the crest to abandon it, they turned and ran back towards the basin they had a moment before quitted." We iuTite the reader to compare this with the gallant per- formance of the 1st Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders at Dargai. He may then judge for himself if the panic and con- fusion when the retiring men were met by the reserves on the Majuba Hill would have been possible had both parties belonged to one battalion ; had they met old comrades eager to support them ; had their colonel and field officers been at the head of the regiment. At Tamai, sqme few years after Majuba, faulty tactics resulted in opening a large gap in a square, through which poured a mass of Hadendowas, fanatics determined to conquer or die. The right flank of the Black Watch was exposed to a fierce onslaught, and the suddenness of the attack threw it into confusion. In the desperate meUe, high above the turmoil of the battle was heard the cry, " Kally roun' the cornel ! " The highlanders did so, and the critical moment did not last long. The restoration of the formation was accomplished so quickly, that Colonel Herbert Stewart, who commanded the cavalry, expressed his regret to Colonel Greene, the colonel of the Black Watch, that so short had the crisis been that he had not had an opportunity given him for charging. The formation in squares, though it greatly curtailed the fire power of the brigades, was the best formation to employ against a nimble body of fanatics who courted death. Suddenly issuing from the bush or from a donga, the Hadendowas were given to rush to the attack with wonderful swiftness, quite regardless of the results. We have sai d faulty tactics advisedly, for the blot 344 The Art of Marching. lay in this, that having, for special reasons, adopted this formation as best suited to defeat the enemy's tactics, it was given up to charge in line with the front face of the square, thus opening a gap for the eaemy to enter. A change of formation could only have suggested itself on coming to more open country, in which the enemy could not lie in ambush. In the instance we are considering it was not so, for not far beyond the square was a Tihor, in which the Hadendowas lay concealed. The march in a square formation is irritating, and, however little prolonged, leads to disorder. This arises from the conditions of the march not being the same for the different sides of the square, for two sides march in line and two by fours. Of the two again which march in line, the front one has clear ground to march over, but the rear face is hampered by all the impedimenta within the square. If there are baggage animals for the sick, or with ammunition, water, etc. — as was the case at Abu-Klea — it is very difficult to keep the square closed up.* There can be no doubt that troops will do well the more they know their officers and put trust in their comrades. A glorious past, an old feeling of association, the animated spirit of a collective body, conduce to a very high state of efficiency. This should be sedulously fostered both in peace and in war.f With the advanced-guard marches a body of engineers, to repair bridges and roads, to remove obstacles, to strengthen villages, open passages, and the like.J Their tools should follow them close, carried in wagons or on pack animals ; in most cases the latter way of carrying them is preferable. It may occur that the companies of divisional engineers have been detached from their respective divisions for the object of carrying out some special work, in which case it will be advisable to extemporize a body of skilled artisans and workmen from pioneers and soldiers of the line. One has only to consider, in a combined movement of several columns, what unfortunate results may follow the staying of one of the columns, prevented from progressing by * Bonaparte adopted this formation in Egypt to check the impetuous rush of the Mameluke cavalry. When the French had formed up thus to receive the Mamelukes, they bid the asses and the savans enter within the square. Scott, in liis " Life of Napoleon," tells us how the French soldiers called the asses demi- savans. t " Parce qu'en guerre la centralisation fait I'ordre, et I'ordre fait la force," De Brack, " Avant-Postes de Cavalerie Ldgere," p. 130. f In ordinary marches for manoeuvres, or when an army is a good distance from the enemy, the camp-colour men — one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each corps — find a place -with the advanoed-gunrd. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 345 obstacles met on the road, to admit readily how judicious is the precaution of placing well in front of each column a body of men ■expert in the art of mending roads and bridges, and prepared to sweep readily aside any obstacles which may retard the advance of the columns. Katzeler considered it very necessary indeed to have always an officer of engineers and an officer of supplies with the advanced-guard. A comparatively small body supplied with the present arms of precision can with great difficulty be expelled from a good position. The present small arms have conferred on the defensive such advantages that a strengthened village resolutely held by an advanced-guard may delay the enemy for a considerable time : time precious for oiir troops to come up and join in the fray. There will be little fear of the defenders being speedily driven out by superior numbers, for it is always comparatively easy to hold for a short time against greater odds a position once secured and strengthened. This is therefore another argument in favour of having a party of engineers or skilled workmen with the advanced-guard. Colonel Eobert Home advocated the division of the engineers into two parts. On coming up to the first obstacle, one section was to halt and set to work to repair or clear away the impedi- ment ; the other section was to move forward and deal with the next obstacle.* A column in movement, to be safe from a sudden attack, requires not only to guard its front, but also its flanks. The flanks of a column on the march must be covered. If cavalry is posted on the wings, it will patrol and explore ; if infantry marches on either wing, it must have a detachment of cavalry to patrol and reconnoitre on the exposed flank. Flankers are indispensable for the purpose of examining woods, villages, farm buildings, quarries, ravines, etc. : all the ground, in short, which lies on ■either side of the column. These flankers are not only needed' to protect the flanks of the army, to reconnoitre and feel for the ■enemy, but they have also to prevent any of the enemy, well mounted, daring horsemen, approaching the flanks of the moving mass with the object of discovering its strength and composition, its direction, its apparent intentions. The duty of securing the flanks of a column of all arms cannot be assigned to the infantry, because the service entails * Home, " A Precis of 3Iodern Tactics," p. 163. 346 The Art of Marching. excessive fatigue, which would lead to the column having frequently to halt. Let us quote an example. In the march of the 1st Prussian Army Corps (Benin's) on Trautenau, on the 27th of June 1866, in two columns, the progress of the right column was considerably delayed, because the duty of guarding the flanks and searching the ground in that direction had devolved on some companies of infantry. These companies were only able to execute the task imposed on them with difficulty, and slowly. The column had several times to be halted to let the head of the flankers get level with the advanced-guard. These delays pre- vented the 1st Corps occupying in time and with sufficient forces the important issue from the defile of Trautenau. There is an advantage in employing horsemen as flankers, which is that a man on horseback, being raised higher above the ground, can see to a greater distance ; he can also move more quickly, and proceed much further. Infantry, when employed as flanking parties owing to a dearth of cavalry, will have to be twice or three times as numerous to produce the same effect, for the men must be closer to each other to explore all the ground from end to end. To scout effectively to the front and flanks, for patrol and orderly duties, a division will need at least four squadrons of cavalry. One squadron is a mere handful of men, totally insufficent, as we have said. These flanking bodies are furnished by the divisional cavalry regiment, and are broken up into side patrols. These patrols march on a level with the main body of the column, and protect themselves on the exposed flank with scouts or reconnoitre rs. The distance between these side patrols and the main body must depend in a great measure on the nature of the country ;. in any case, the main point is to make an exhaustive examination of the whole of the intervening groimd. The duties of flankers are fatiguing, both for men and for horses, for they have to advance independently of roads, moving over a more or less undulating country, and covering in a day's march much more ground than the troops which keep to the roads. To give warning of the enemy, but not to come into collision with him, is the object. The flanking patrols, when in the presence of superior forces, should retire slowly. When the column they belong to halts, all flanking patrols and their scouts should face outward towards the exposed flank. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 34T The reconnoitrers are not required to be constantly moving ; they can remain for a while stationary, attentively scanning the country on their outer flank, then rapidly passing from point to point and regaining their proper position with respect to the column. The men should proceed in couples, and, if the enemy should be in sight, should march as much as possible under cover ; they should always endeavour to make their observations withoxit being seen. When there are ridges or heights parallel to the line of advance of the column, the patrols should keep below them, the- scouts or reconnoitrers moving cautiously along the ridge ; and whilst striving not to draw attention to themselves, they should move so as to peep over and see what there is on the other side. When woods occur, these must be very thoroughly searched by the scouts. All inhabited localities and defiles should be care- fully examined by working round them. When a division is on one of the flanks of au advancing army,, the precautions as to flankers on the outward flank become more- than ever imperative. A body of mounted signallers, in conjunction with advanced- guards and flankers, would render important services on the- march. The squads would ride to commanding positions, both in front and on the flanks of a column, ascend heights from which an extensive view of the surrounding country may be obtained^ and search the ground with their telescopes, making their observations, and communicating rapidly to the advanced-guard or main body every item of useful information gained. For a conspicuous instance in which the precautions as to- flankers were neglected, we have only to turn to the march of the Austrian army from Olmiitz, after the battle of Sadowa. The military correspondent of the " Times " with the Austrian army gave the following account of this march. "On the 15th, the 8th Corps, and Benedek himself with his staff, followed the course taken by the 2nd and 4th Corps on the previous day. The Prussians were known to be in the neighbourhood, and the orders- were that this small army was to hold itself prepared to meet the enemy at any point along the route that he might select for an attack. How this order was carried out I leave your military readers to judge from what follows. In front of the column was half a regiment of Lancers, then a brigade of infantry, after that came four batteries of artillery of reserve, their train, and '348 The Art of Marching. finally the bulk of the corps, the other half-regiment of Lancers bringing up the rear. One of the most obvious precautions in marching through a country where the enemy may be expected 1)0 appear, is to throw out cavalry patrols and infantry skir- mishers on both flanks to give timely notice of an enemy's advance ; but this important duty appears to have been neglected, or only half executed, for the Brigade Weber, which marched on the right flank of the column, was too far to the rear, and the •cavalry division of Prince Taxis marched from Olmiitz at 8 a.m., three hours after the infantry, and did not come up until too late ■to be of any service." The result was that the column was attacked by the Prussians, and lost about 1000 men and 17 guns. The Austrian Com- mander-in-Chief, who was nearly captured, to join the Archduke Albert at Presburg, had to abandon the direct road to Vienna, and found himself compelled to march by different mountain roads through the little Carpatian mountains. Taking the case of an army corps — say in round numbers, 36,000 men — marching towards the enemy, the total of the detachments detailed to insure its safety would be about 6000 men. With the advanced-guard, on the most exposed side, 2000, on either flank, 1500, and with the rear guard 1000. The advanced-guard itself is broken up into several parts, these parts becoming smaller and smaller as they near the leading men. Each fraction has thus to obtain a certain degree of security for the one in its immediate rear, which, being in greater numbers, will need more time to get ready for fighting. In point of fact, each fraction becomes the special advanced-guard ■of the one which follows it. The advanced-guard, looking at it in another way, is formed of several bodies, which augment in strength from front to rear, so that the weaker parts in front may find a speedy support, and that the enemy may constantly meet with increasing resistance. The point of the advanced-guard being generally liable to be surprised is made small. Cavalry, when available, should be chosen for that duty. In fractioning the advanced-guard, the Germans keep in view the principle that each part of it should be so far from the next one following that the latter is not exposed to infantry fire. When the country is intersected or thickly wooded, the advanced-guard should redouble its precautions. Distribution of the Troops in the Column of March. 349' The main scope of an advanced-guard is to aiford information on all that concerns the enemy. To furnish information of any consequence, it becomes necessary to place foremost an intelligent and clear-headed officer or non-commissioned officer — when possible acquainted with the vernacular of the country — whose sagacity will enable him to judge of the value of what he sees,. and of the necessity for reporting what he deems desirable to be known. Each detachment has to connect itself with the one in its front, communicating to the detachments in rear the informa- tion which has been acquired. Taking private soldiers hap- hazard to lead the advance-guard is an error ; the post is often beyond their capacity. It is considered necessary to allow a certain interval between the advanced-guard and the main body. The object is to prevent the deployment of the latter being seriously interfered with, or the entire column being obliged to deploy on the first appearance of the enemy. The distance is generally from three to five miles. Often the adversary will try to hinder our march by occupy- ing good and strong positions on our route. From these he must be successively driven as the army moves forward, and very often it will be found that the advanced-guard is strong enough to undertake these minor operations without needing the concurrence of any of the troops which form part of the main body. As a general rule, the advanced-guard should never be sent further forward than the security of the army requires. The distance intervening between it and the main body depends on this essential consideration, that the advanced-guard should be supported in time by the main body of the column. This should be so in every case, even in the most unfavourable, in that in which the cavalry scouts come in contact with numerous forces of the enemy advancing towards them in fighting array. This consideration demands that the main body of the advanced-guard should be from the head of the main body of the column at a distance equal to what it is from the leading cavalry scouts, Stonewall Jackson's advanced-guard on the march to M'Dowell was seven miles in advance of the main body; consequently, when the Federals attacked, the main body was not at hand to deliver a counterstroke. As it is a great point to keep our movements concealed, all ■350 The Art of Marching. individuals overtaken by the advanced-guard should be com- pelled to accompany the column until any information they can give is no longer likely to prove hurtful. The space between the advanced-guard and the main body is necessary in order to prevent surprise. The distance will depend much on the respective strength and composition of the two forces. In a column of all arms of any considerable strength the advanced -guard will have to be pushed far ahead, so as to give the main body sufficient time to deploy, and this distance can be greater the more the advanced-guard itself is strong and self-sustaining. When the front of a column is well scouted by the cavalry, the advanced-guard need not be so far in advance of the main body, for notice of the enemy will be forthcoming in sufScient time. To arrive at the time necessary for a given force to deploy, we must estimate the time it will take to gather up all its units. The difference, that is, between the hour of arrival of the foremost units and the hindmost : for the former will arrive on the line of deployment or on the field of battle a long time before the latter O O U3 (M CQ in o o o -* (MCQ-^ ■O ok:i o i-H rH Cq IM O HnhW- OrH lO ^ HI* iot> o "^ i <7> Hl«KW( ■* CO Oi i O Cm H|«H* o cc o t> 13 o H»J 1 ^ HnoW H U3 o (N CO '* ■* HlNHl* rn (M « ■*•„ (M ^ HicqeolTjt ^ HN«Wr-l ^ ~< g S 1 P H a 10 g cu O 1 ■a s 1 a Eh o o lO H(M HtMHMHteq CO CO HH iXi l> CO l> CO O CO *Ci Oq (M CN CO CO CO 1-1 oq CO CO 05 (M ^ ■'ti '^ tH ■^ »o o CO x> T^ inr^ CO i—i rH rH r-H i-H I— 1 HlN'*(l H*HtNKMI 05 o i-H CO ira t- i-H CM (M (M (N CM rH (M CO CDCi N CO CO CO CO CO -^ d 1 H|ti Hfe) Hlei O rH T-H CO rH CD o)l*Hi«HWH)«oi|4« iO CO t> ■* -H 'sH i-H ^ rH rl G^ (M rH Cq CO CD OS (N CO rH tH b- rH rH i-H (M (M CI o I^^i^ hJn hJn O CD (© CO CS r-H 1— 1 Hi* MW H|*>-flN 00 C35 05 (M -^ CO r-» 1— 1 I— 1 rH(N COCOOSCq ^ ^ r-i rM T-i<^ o HfN HlN HN iO O CD C--03 O r-i HlNrW H'i'HiNMl* t> CO Oi r- ( CO »0 I— ( 1— 1 rH O rH Cq IC 00 rH r-1 rH rH rH rH (N 00 HN rtiN Hn -<^ UO lO I> CO O «WiHnhW.h»)k|* CO I> 00 O CM HO I— 1 1— t 1— 1 C5 O rH tH 1>0 o H« Hn - 00 05 05 HO M rH rH rH d U3 HiN HW P*^ CO CO TtH iO t> GO HeiHiM Hi*HjNCCl* -tl O CD 00 O IM I— 1 T-H CD t> CO rH ■* t> 1-^ r-\r^ d "* HN -l« HfM O CO CD rH rH rH d HN HN MlN (N (M CO^ CD I> COCO-* CO OS rH tH lO CD CTi (N »0 i HIM HN iM(N i-H :|* i-H cN CO in t- cn (M CO '<*H I> O CO Cm « §1 r-t C^ COCO C5(M i-H (M CO CO Oi cq 1— I rH !M CO CD OS Cq 1 o3 1 o M >-4C4 1 Hour The March of the Convoy. 381 By employing road engines, specially built of a type suitable for military transport service,* it is possible to attain a higher rate of speed and a longer movement in the twenty-four hours than can ever be got out of the best animal transport. These two properties would enable the convoys to overtake troops which have got far ahead of them. Of course they should keep a given distance in rear of the columns, for they certainly could not move with any freedom on roads crowded with men, horses, and military carriages. Road engines would not consume a large part of what the trucks carry, nothing approaching to what animal transport demands, for the weight of the fuel is far less than the weight of forage. Heat and cold does not affect them ; they do not tire and require to be put to rest ; they can do a very long spell of continuous work, and when not working consume nothing. As long as there are railways they may not be wanted, but should serious damages have been done to the lines, entailing heavy carting, the road engines will come in very useful. More- over, railways lead only in fixed directions, whereas the transport is required to follow the troops in any direction which they are compelled by the turn of events to take. If the army moves away from the general system of railways a large amount of animal transport must accompany and follow it. Steam transport on land must have good roads and solid bridges ; it will be useful when there are hard, well-made roads of fair width, with plenty of water procurable alongside. It has also been found practicable to work it on hard soil. In short,, like anything else, it has its advantages and disadvantages, and should be used where the conditions suit and nowhere else.f It will frequently be necessary to calculate the approximate length of road which a train or convoy will occupy when on the line of march. For this purpose it is well to remember that a pack horse, mule, or bullock, with the interval between each two- succeeding animals, will occupy four yards of road, a camel five yards ; a carriage drawn by two horses, mules, or bullocks, ten yards, by four fifteen yards, by six twenty. It is not to be expected that these distances will be accurately kept, above all * They should be of one standard type, with interchangeable pieces. f In the year 1898, the French experimented with motor wagons for the con- veyance of officers of the staff, commissariat, etc. See No. 251, B.U.S.I.J., of January 1899, also No. 273 of November 1900. 382 The Art of Mar clang. in a long march. We abstain from enumerating the many causes which tend to make the animals lag and their leaders or drivers inattentive in maintaining the proper pace. We have noticed the opening out of the troops, and the same will be found to occur in the army trains or military convoys. When animal transport is largely employed, the preservation of the cattle is an object of the first importance. Nothing will conduce to this so much as the division of the whole convoy into several parts or sections. In the marches these sections should take the lead in rotation, so that if on the first day they move off 1, 2, 3, on the morrow they will set out 2, 3, 1, and the following day 3, 1, 2. This arrangement will tend to make the work even for all : for, as the cattle in the rear get distressed by having to draw over ground which has been cut up by the fore- most vehicles, we render the labour more uniform by adopting this alternate leading. Another point is to send the sections by different roads, always supposing that these roads do not run into one another at any point of the march. This would lead to one of the sections having to halt until the whole of the other has passed. The necessity of moving in one column can exist only when there is some peculiar difficulty in the country, a mountain defile, the crossing of a bridge, etc. By all means the convoy must be kept together, and to assist animals which have become enfeebled through hard work and other causes, to help in drawing up steep places, etc., there should be spare animals marching here and there in the convoy. A large portion of the convoy should not be suffered to halt when a breakdown occurs ; the disabled vehicle should be at once cleared to one side of the road, and the rest kept moving on. Should a halt occur at the foot of a steep hill or the like, where the vehicles cannot continue without an interval, the carriages must be formed up, if a clear space is at hand, so that those that follow may continue under way. The horses of tlie wagons thus formed — the hindmost by preference, because they will not be required for a considerable time — can be detached to assist those ■Cfhich have inferior cattle. This rest can be taken advantage of for feeding, watering, and cooking. Vehicles thus formed in a compact mass can be better defended by the escort. When a halt is brought about by obstacles on the road, the first carriages which get through should be halted whenever they come to a suitable place, and tiiere they should wait until a The March of the Convoy. 383 •considerable number are collected together before being again set in motion. On no account should a convoy be suffered to tail oflf and occupy more space on the march than is capable of being adequately protected. The escort is composed of cavalry and infantry in the pro- portion of one-third of cavalry to two-thirds of infantry. The commander has the option of either marching slowly and in •security, or rapidly, exposed to the risk of losing a part, if not the whole, of his convoy. Should he await the attack in preference to advancing against the enemy? This must depend entirely on ■circumstances ; in most cases it is not considered the most advisable plan to keep purely on the defensive, the enemy should as much as possible be kept at a distance. Convoy duty is irksome, and .very much disliited by the troops, for convoys crawl along slowly and are a long time on the road. However, troops are often employed in guarding a con- voy on the march during a campaign, particularly when the hostility of the population renders the lines of communication unsafe. The slow pace of the animals will make it difficult for the escort to keep up the regular military step, nevertheless the •officers and non-commissioned officers must keep the men together ready at any moment to oppose the enemy. Men on escort duty ■should be severely punished for debarrassing themselves of their arms and equipment. These are to be carried by the men, and should under no pretence whatsoever be placed on the wagons. A long string of carts or pack animals should be kept steadily moving, with the object of reaching the intended destination at as early an hour as it is possible. It will take time to water the cattle, to picket the animals, and park the carriages, and all this should be done before darkness sets in. Possibly a little mending and doctoring of galled animals will have to be done, and the damage or injury will be best seen in the light of day. The leading of a convoy is not an enviable task. Much will depend on secrecy, reliable information, and speed. The main object the commander will have in view is to preserve the convoy, or any part of it, from capture or damage. No doubt it would be desirable to keep the enemy from obtaining sight of the convoy by using the main part of the escort as a mobile force, and to interpose it betweeij the adversary and the route his convoy is 384 The Art of ]\[arcking. moving on. Where a difficulty, however, occurs, is that in its eagerness to get at the enemy and engage him at a distance, the defending force may be induced to proceed too far from the convoy, so far that the adversary, either by evading the escort or by engaging it with only a portion of his forces, may slip round and play havoc with the convoy. A convoy caught on the march is in a bad predicament. Once riile-fire is brought to bear on the animals, almost every prospect of getting the convoy forward is lost. It may be parked, the escort being employed in beating off the enemy, but should the latter be provided With artillery, there will be no prospect whatever of being able to withstand the attack. Defiles are very dangerous, and should never be entered until the ground has been diligently reconnoitred and the heights on each side are occupied by the escort. On coming to a defile it will be found a good plan, if the nature of the ground is not known, to halt the first half of the convoy and to park it near its entrance. This will give time for exploring. As the information that there is no enemy or other danger comes in, the portion of the convoy still in column proceeds and crosses the defile, followed by the vehicles which had parked on the other side. Naturally, whatever happens, the convoy should keep moving steadily on ; if possible, its march should not be interrupted. The escort should furnish strong advanced and rear-guards, and, though a certain scattering of the escort is inevitable, we should endeavour to keep the minor tactical units intact. The cavalry must be pushed well forward on every side to give information of the whereabouts of the enemy. The idea prevails that an active defence is to be preferred to a purely passive one. The mobile force to this end must deal with the attack before the enemy comes within range of the convoy, for once fire is opened on the convoy itself great disorder will ensue. There is little hope of taking up a good defensive position that will effectively block the progress of the attacking force, for the assailant, being unhampered, has the advantage from beginning to end. He knows under what difficulties his adversary is labouring, and therefore is encouraged to act boldly. The great object must be to gain time, and much will be secured if the enemy can be induced into error by threatening to attack him in a distant position, by imposing on him and Tlie March of the Convoy. 385 conveying to his mind an idea of much superior forces, by- keeping him wavering under a spell of impending attack. The escort must offer a determined resistance ; when it is found hopeless to beat the enemy off, every possible effort should be made to save the most valuable part of the convoy, and to destroy, burn, or in any other way render the rest of it useless to the enemy. In the operations of Lord Eoberts in the latter part of February 1900, a convoy of about 180 wagons full of forage and provisions — articles very much needed — was abandoned to the Boers at Waterval Drift. Briefly, this is what occurred. This convoy, which had been allowed to march from Eamdam to Waterval Drift entirely unescorted, laagered on the 21st of February on the south side of the drift. The drift was guarded by a company of the Gordon Highlanders and by about 150 Mounted Infantry under Colonel Eidley. The crossing began on the following morning, but the banks were steep, and it required three teams of oxen to help each wagon up. Early the same morning a party of 300 or 400 Boers seized a range of kopjes within rifle range of the drift and opened fire on the oxen. The Gordons and Mounted Infantry soon discovered that they were not sufiiciently numerous to dislodge the Boers from the very strong position they had occupied. At about mid-day Kitchener's Horse and a field battery arrived from Weg- draai ; the Boers, nevertheless, on their side received reinforce- ments. Towards dusk General Tucker brought the 14th Brigade from Wegdraai, but the Boers by that time numbered over 1000 men, and occupied a position from which they could be dislodged only by the employment of a very considerable force. As Lord Roberts's operations necessitated a forward movement of the whole of his forces with all possible speed, it was decided to sacrifice the convoy. The wagons were left to their fate, and during the night the whole of the troops set out for Wegdraai. So many of the oxen had been shot that, even had the English force succeeded in overcoming the Boers, it would have been hampered by a number of heavily-laden wagons without means of moving them. It is well to reflect how the loss of these 180 wagons cannot but have, later on, affected the movements of an army which was not over rich in transport. The loss of this convoy at Waterval on the Eiet Kiver, in fact, caused great privation on the march through the Free States.* * Napoleon, at St. Helena, dictated some instructions on the protection of 2 386 The Art of Marching. At that period the Colesberg commando was a disquieting element on the right flank of the main advance. Instead of trusting to good fortune, Norval's Pont should have been threatened by a flying column ; this would have cleared the ground sufficiently to make the transit of our convoys safe. Colonel Broadwood, with two regiments of cavalry — the Household Cavalry and the 10th Hussars — Q and U batteries Royal Horse Artillery, Eimington's Scouts, Roberts' Horse, and Pilcher's battalion of Mounted Infantry, was at Thabu N'chu on the 30th of March. As the Boers were approaching him in large numbers from two sides, he retired to Sannah's Post. Surprised and shelled at dawn of the 31st by the enemy, the Colonel sent his two horse batteries and baggage towards Bloemfontein, covering the rear with his cavalry. In crossing a spruit (Koorn Spruit), in which a large number of Boers had concealed themselves, his force was attacked, and he lost 7 guns, 100 transport wagons, and 800 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Three hundred Boers managed to conceal themselves in a deep donga or watercourse, which cut the road at right angles some miles from the waterworks. On our side there appears to have been gross neglect ; there was no advanced-guard nor scouts thrown out to the front or flanks, the wagons and guns entered the donga in which the Boers were ambushed with the only possible result. A Mounted Infantry patrole, aware of the presence of the Boers in the spruit, neglected to raise the alarm. Burnham, the scout who, as a prisoner in the hands of the Boers, witnessed what occurred, relates, " I saw the convoy wagons rush off without an escort, each as soon as it was ready, for the spruit. The guns and troopers followed." As a correspondent rightly puts it, " the cause is traceable to the old fault — carelessness and over-confidence, failure to take pains to make sure and do all things in an orderly, business-like manner." Burnham shows the precautions taken by the other side ; he states that the Boers were so afraid lest they might themselves in their turn be entrapped,, that they had their scouts away out towards Boesman's Kop. The lack of an advanced-guard and the neglect of scouting seems to have been at the bottom of the disaster. This was convoys. In thia lie laid down the minimum strength of an escort in cavalry, infantry, and even artillery, in proportion to the number of wagons. He concluded with the following words. " Generals and other officers who allow convoys to march without the prescribed escort will be held responsible for the consequences." The March of the Convoy. 387 further intensified by the fact that the rifles of many men were out of reach, as they were being carried on the wagons. The history of the loss of the Heilbron convoy on the 4th of June was most humiliating. The supplies for the Highland Brigade having run down as low as they well could, a convoy was prepared at railhead to proceed to Heilbron. This convoy, consisting of fifty-five wagons, contained food-stuffs, a quantity of warm clothing, and ammunition for all arms. To start with, it invited attack ; for it was inadequately protected for marching in a country known to be in the occupation of the enemy, and of one which, having the full sympathy of the population, was likely to be well informed. The escort consisted of sixty details belonging to the Highland Brigade marching from Kroonstad, which was afterwards joined by one hundred more details. This scratch escort was composed entirely of infantry. It was supposed to be moving in two halves, half a mile on either flank of the convoy, but it had no mounted men to scout at a distance. So contradictory were the orders for the movements of the convoy, that it laagered on the 2nd of June north of Rhenoster. At 2 p.m. on the 2nd of June, the appearance of oxen on the right flank gave indications of the proximity of a Boer laager. Messengers were then sent to Heilbron and Vredeford road, and a very feeble reconnaisance was made. On the 4th of June, at 8 a.m., a conductor, who had been sent to Vredeford road, returned bearing the following message from an officer of the K.O.S.B. " Started with six hundred men ; got to within four miles of your camp." An hour later De Wet sent a flag of truce bearing this message, " I have twelve hundred men and five guns. Surrender at once." The officer commanding endeavoured to get terms, but in the end capitulated, the escort were prisoners of war, and the convoy, which the Highland Brigade so much needed, was captured by the Boers without a single shot having beto fired. Most of the painful incidents which have occurred in this unfortunate war in South Africa, and which Lord Eosebery, writing to one of the defenders of Ladysmitb, called humiliations unparalleled in our history since the American War, have been brought about by neglect in scouting, in taking the precautions enjoined as necessary when havjng to deal with a wily enemy whose movements were rapid and always shrouded in mystery. We have truly kept up our unenvious reputation for protecting ourselves badly. 388 The Art of Marching. On the 31st of July, another of these mishaps whicli have occurred so frequently in the Boer war was reported by Lord Eoberts. This time it was a convoy by rail that came to grief. Near Frederikstad, on the Krugersdorp-Potchefstroom railway, a supply train was moving, escorted by a detachment of the Shropshire Light Infantry. The Boers had removed some of the rails, and the train went off the line ; thirteen men, including the engine-driver, were killed and thirty-nine wounded. A special mounted patrol had been detailed to ride along the line to warn the driver when the train approached any very damaged parts of the line. However, either the patrol was not forth- coming, or the train outstripped the mounted men, with the serious consequence related above. In the management of convoys the Boers have shown singular aptitude. Here is a case in point. In the month of March 1900, Commandant Olivier was retiring from British territory, and making his way to the north-east of the Orange Free States, moving by the high roads. The Boers are very swift in their movements, but in this case they were compelled to move slowly owing to the enormous number of wagons in their train, many of which were heavily laden, not only with stores and ammunition, but also with the booty gathered during the five months' stay on British territory. Olivier's convoy was estimated at eight hundred wagons drawn by oxen. He marched encumbered by this convoy for ten days across the Orange Free State, through a country occupied by the British, and with several columns beating the roads trying to intercept him, and he succeeded in gaining a place of safety without ever being attacked. Olivier was a prominent general on the Boer side, inferior only to Joubert and Cronje. He it was who brought disaster on Sir William Gatacre's division at Stormberg in December 1899. He did much to prolong the contest. His retreat to Brandfort along the Basuto border was one of the most masterly enterprises of the war. Our attempt to stop it cost us dear : we lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Eventually he was captured near Winburg much in the same manner as our convoy at Koorn-Spruit. As the Boers were about to retire from an attack on Winburg on the 26th of August, eight Queenstown Volunteers left the town and took up a position in a donga in rear of the Boers, through which the road passed. As the Boers reached the donga in single file they were ordered to The MarcJt of the Convoy. 389 put their hands up one by one, and were placed in charge of a couple of men out of sight. In this manner twenty-eight of them, including Olivier and his three sons, were captured. Behind these followed some two hundred Boers in fairly close order. The small squad of Qaeenstown men fired a Tolley which emptied six saddles, and then continued to fire as hard as they could. The Boers, believing that they had in front of them a large force, made off in another direction. When by general consent there have been in the late war in South Africa more unfortunate incidents, more humiliating mishaps and mistakes than have been recorded in most other wars, it is a relief to turn one's eyes towards the Eland's Eiver, and contemplate the brilliant defence of their post made by a mixed detachment of Colonials under the command of Lieut.- Colonel C. 0. Hore, Staffordshire Eegiment. This defence will form some of the brightest pages in the history of the war. Palmam qui meruit ferat. After Major-Gen eral Baden-Powell's rapid march through Western Transvaal, in the month of August, the Boers gathered again in force, and the many commandos which were north and south of the main road to Pretoria made it impossible to send convoys to Rustenburg without considerable escorts. Some eighty-eight wagons of provisions had been allowed to accumulate at Elands River Post ; these were guarded by a mixed force of about 420 men, being Ehodesians,* New South Wales Volunteers, Queensland Mounted Infantry, and West Australian Bushmen. With this force were two Maxims and a 2'5 (or 7-pounder) gun. Information gathered by patrols very clearly indicated a forthcoming attack of the post by the Boers ; the commanding officer, consequently, took his precautions. He laagered his wagons, and, having unloaded the stores, run up temporary fortifications by building them into horse-shoe shaped trenches of the pattern employed in the defence of Mafeking.f The position, however, was very bad, for it was commanded all round by hills distant from 2500 to 3500 yards from the laager. Bad as it was, it was the only one available. The water supply lay * The Ehodesians proved invaluable by their knowledge of the Boer language and their ways ; they did good service both before the investment and afterwards in the defence. t These trenches are by far the best, for they cannot get raked by flanking or reverse fire. If they are narrow and fairly deep, the defenders are very safe from shell Are. 390 , The Art of Marching. about three-quarters of a mile from the post, and made it necessary for the garrison to occupy three hills which were a source of weakness for the defence. At 6 a.m. on the 4th of August, the Boers opened fire on the laager. They were under Commandant De la Eey, about 2000 in number, with four guns, three pom-poms, and one Maxim. The rifle-fire was very heavy, and, if anything, was surpassed by the fire of the artillery. The Boers brought their artillery into action by single guns and not massed, posted east, west, north, and south ; their fire was concentrated on an area measui'ing about two acres. The fire of the guns continued steadily from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., that of the small arms did not cease before 10 p.m. That day 887 shells fell in the laager, besides this the three pom-poms fired continuously.* The horses, trek oxen, and mules suffered terribly, there being no cover for them. The garrison dug all night and got better cover. The following day the Boers reopened fire, but at noon there rose some hope of relief, as the sound of guns came from the west, the direction from which General Carrington's relief column was expected. This caused a slackening of the enemy's fire, as the Boers sent one gun, one pom-pom, and about a hundred men in the direction of the cannonade. In the afternoon heavy firing was kept up on the British position from 4 p.m. till sundown. The position covering the water supply was held by Captain Butters' South Ehodesia Volunteers, and during that afternoon seventy- one shells dropped into his post. On the 6th a very heavy fire was opened ; the gun and pom- pom sent westward the day before were brought back, and posted 2500 yards to the south of the British position. At eleven that night the Boers made an attack on Captain Butters' post, which was gallantly repulsed. The Boer trenches were only 250 yards from the South Ehodesia Volunteer trenches, and the enemy advanced to 50 yards from the latter, f The trenches were much * EuBtow gives the followin!;; particulars regarding the siege of Strasburg in 1870. " The German artillery had, on the 24:th of September, 229 pieces of ordnance in their batteries, among which were 83 mortars. They had since the. commence- ment of the attack thrown 193,722 shot and shell into the town and fortress, 6,249 for each day, 260 for each hour, four to five for every minute." Tlie fire at Elands Eiver Post, 65'5 for each hour, 1'2 for every minute, was more severe, as it was concentrated on a very small area. t In this and other instances the Boers did not know how to turn their numerical superiority to account. Under the most favourable circumstances, they never attempted a counter attack; thoy did not dare to come to close quarters; they shunned personal conflict and the use of cold steel. Under these conditions it was ThQ Mar oh of tlie Convoy. 39 L improved, and the defenders began to understand the use of pick and shovel. The expert miners made wonderful progress. After firing all day on the 7th, the Boers at H p.m. made another unsuccessful attack on Butters' trenches. The object of these attacks was plain ; the Boers were eager to get possession of the drift, the only source of water the beleaguered garrison had. The water supply was the greatest anxiety of the com- mander- throughout ; indeed, a fight had to be chanced every night to get water. The Boers continued heavy firing of artillery and rifle volleys at long range on the 8th and 9th. On the second of these days, at 9 a.m., a flag of truce came in with a letter from Assistant- General De la Rey, in which he stated that he had driven General Carrington through Zeeriist ; that Oliphants Nek, Eustenburg, and Magato Nek were in his possession; that the garrison of Elands River Post was completely cut off, so, to save further bloodshed, the commander was counselled to surrender. The Boer leader added that, in consideration of the sturdy defence, he would permit the garrison, after it had surrendered the provisions and arms, to march to the nearest British post. To this summons the gallant commander replied that he held his post with Her Majesty's troops, and declined to entertain all idea of surrendering. By this time the Boer gun ammunition had began to fail, but they made up for it with musketry, firing more heavily than before. Signs of disquiet, however, were perceptible in the Boer camp, three of their guns moved in the direction of Zeerust on the lOth, and at 11 a.m. a laager at Doornkom, three miles to the south-east, broke up and disappeared behind a hill south-west of Butters' post. Musketry fire was kept up all that day on the 11th and the 12th. This latter day the Boers lighted a grass fire to the south- east, and tried to burn the garrison out ; in this, however, they were frustrated, as already for a space of a hundred yards all round the camp the grass had been burnt as a precaution against such an event. The garrison had to endure a continuous rifle fire on the 13th and 14th. On the 15th, between 1 and 2 a.m.. Captain Butters' post heard impossible for them to hope for final success. Apart from their superiority in marksmanship, stratagems, and surprises, which no one denies, there was no more clear proof wanted to show that the Boers admitted themselves in point of pluck second to their adversaries. 392 The Art of Marching. the sound of a laager breaking up ; it was the southern one, but it was vain to surmise in what direction the Boers had gone.* At 4.30 p.m. that day, a large body of troops was descried on the hills about eight miles to the south-east ; it was impossible, how- ever, to tell if they were English or Boers : a runner sent out at 8 p.m. returned at 11.45 p.m. with no information. Just after midnight a messenger came in from Broadwood, and by 8.30 on the morning of the 16th Major-General Kitchener arrived in camp. This plucky garrison,! holding a most defective position, hampered by the presence of a very large number of transport animals, and attacked by a force five times as numerous, backed by several guns and pom-poms, held its own for thirteen days. The total casualties at the end of the siege in officers, non- commissioned officers, soldiers, natives and refugees amounted to 71, Of the animals 1329 were killed, wounded or missing; accounted as follows : — horses 411, mules 224, oxen 694. The loss in animals was very great, but it was absolutely impossible to find cover for them, as every place was raked by the enemy's fire, * "When a large body of troops is preparing to move off, there is always a certain amount of clamour — striking of pegs, shouting at the baggage animals, hailing, etc. This, in the stillness of night and early morning, can be heard a long way off. t The officers who especially distinguished themselves in the defence of Elands Eiver Post, beside Lieut-Colonel Hore commanding, were Major Hopper, British South Africa Police, an officer possessing great experience of South Africa and the Boers, Major Tunbiidge, Captain Butters, Surgeon Captain Duka, Queensland Mounted Infantry, and Lieutenant Zouch. ( 393 ) CHAPTER XV. NIGHT MARCHES. Night marches when campaigning are exceptional — The eoldier has to experience want of sleep on service — Troops wearied and over-fatigued by night marches — Effect of a night march — Liability to a scare — The march to Calpee — Ooignet, the march to the Khine — Remarks by a Russian officer — Bliicher's opinion — Napoleon seldom resorted to them — His reinforcing Joubort at Eivoli — Lord Wolseley on night marches — Von der Goltz is in their favour — In all countries and at all times, night marches have been performed — As a means of gaining time — Favour immunity from the destructive fire of modern weapons — Should be practised — Principles to be observed — General Grey's night march to sur- prise General Anthony Wayne — Any fighting to be done with cold steel^The cavalry to bring up the rear^Bmployment of mounted orderlies— Short halts to be frequent — Precautions to be observed by company officers- — Troops to be given some rest before attaiJkiug — Marlborough's crossing of the non plus ultra lines — The Highland rising of 1745 — Monmouth stopped by the Sussex Rhine — • Frederick the Great defeated at Hochkirch — Prederiolc defeats Loudon's attack — Result of an attack on Wolfe by armed burghers and volunteers — Luck which attended Wolfe's seizure of the Heights of Abraham — Custine's rear-guard gets disorganized in a night march — Another instance quoted by Marshal Gouvion St.-Oyr — The battle of Alexandria — Moore's night march from Lugo to Betanzos — Preparations for the battle of Inkerman — Brigadier Penny attacked in the grey of the morning at Kerkerowlie — A night march in Morgan's raid: through Ohio — Panic during a, night march amongst the Bavarian Cuirassiers— Girard surprised at Aroyo Molino — Night march to Tel-el-Kebir — Great disorder in Sir Herbert Stewart's march to the Nile after the battle of Abu-Klea. In tropical climates, and often in sultry weather, to shield the troops from the heat of the sun during the day, they are made to march by night. The troops then start several hours before day- break, so as to reach camp before the sun's rays have become too powerful. Night marches in a campaign are quite a different thing. They are exceptional, and not much recommended. Marching in the dark when in the neighbourhood of the enemy demands great audacity and confidence in the superiority and discipline of our troops. It is more than ever difficult to gather indications in the darkness : for at night there are not those revelations of movement. 394 The Art of Marching. dust, the glitter of arms, etc., which we have by day. In night marches the action of cavalry in all that relates to scouting is also lost. Being unable in the obscurity to discover the move- ments of the enemy and being very liable to go astray, cavalry can then only march on the roads. Indeed, the obscurity, or the uncertain light of the night, renders all movements beyond the roads and beaten tracks extremely difficult. The many drawbacks which an army marching by night experiences only refer to dark and moonless nights, for many of these disappear when a bright moon lights up the march. There are other nights besides which are not wholly dark. Of all the hardships a soldier has to endure on active service, want of sleep is about the greatest. The best sleep, the one which conduces most to a recuperation of strength, occurs between mid- night and four o'clock in the morning. This is denied him when made to march by night. Those who marched in India during the suppression of the mutiny will recollect how all they could secure at night was a few hours of unrefreshing doze. Sound sleep often was impossible, what with the oppressive heat, the howling of jackals, the noise of beasts of burden chewing their cud and jingling their bells with every movement of the head. To interfere with the repose of a mass of men, already tired from the effect of the marches and combats of the preceding days, requires to be done with consummate judgment. In night marches the troops, besides feeling the deprivation of the night's rest to which they are accustomed, march in the dark, which alone wearies them and fatigues them beyond measure ; the pace is slow and the checks are frequent. With the best arrangements, a march by night will take at least one third longer than the same march performed by daylight. Should the roads be inferior, tortuous, or out of repair, the columns cannot but advance very slowly and with great labour.* How long the hours do seem in night marches. As silence increases, sleep — that tormenting and terrible companion of nocturnal marches — begins to take possession of all. The soldier, moving wearily, is overcome by a kind of drowsiness very difficult to conquer. lie steps mechanically, presses on slowly, * The inarch to sui'priso the Boers at Stormberg commenced at nine o'clock ut' a pitch dark night. The soldiers were dead-beat, for a long day's work had been followed by a long night march over broken and irregular ground. Night Marches. 395 and loses his place in the ranks. The ranks get mixed, and some of the men remain in rear. The horses also have great difficulty in overcoming the natural inclination to sleep ; they are continu- ally jostling each other, and are very liable to stumble and to fall. But one of the greatest drawbacks of night marches is the liability to go astray and take the wrong road, the mistake being only discovered when it is much too late. It is with great difficulty that discipline can be maintained, and in this kind of marches the example of the good soldier is lost. At night misconceptions, blunders, and surprises constitute a great danger. Any unforeseen event, or even an accident, may put the entire column into confusion, lead to a scare, and conse- quently bring about a failure. The slightest thing that goes wrong is quite enough to make one wish for daylight. Marching from night towards day is not so fatiguing for the troops as marching from day towards night. In the first instance, the fresh air of morning almost invariably has a cheering effect upon the tired and drowsy ; it awakens and invigorates them. The men soon recover their energy. In the second case, it is difficult in the darkness and on strange ground to pitch camp or establish the bivouac. The soldier is also tired and apt to neglect to look after his things and after his animal. Dr. Thomas Lowe narrates his experiences on the march to Calpee during the rebellion of 1857-58. " But the sun went down so quickly that before the encamping ground could be gained it was dark, and everybody and everything went wrong. We could see camp fires springing up in various directions, but no one knew where to find his place ; elephants and siege guns were moving about backwards and forwards over nullahs, utterly lost; baggage carts were getting overturned here, there, and everywhere ; every one was crying out for his friend ; and soldiers, parched with thirst, liungry, faint, and footsore, were seeking their quarters almost dispirited." * Coignet, in relating the preparations made for the descent on the coast of England and describing one of the embarkation exercises, all of a sudden glides into the march towards the Rhine. " But at ten o'clock in the evening we were made to land with our knapsacks on our backs, and start for the bridge of Briques, where we were to leave our blankets. There were shouts of joy. In an hour * Doctor Thomas Lowe, " Central India during the Kebellion of 1857-58," p. 277. ij96 The Art of Marching. the whole of the artillery was on the march for the town of Arras. Never was there such a terrible march. We had not a moment for sleep, marching by platoon all day and all night, and at last holding to each other to prevent falling. Those who fell could not be awakened. Some fell into the ditches. Blows with the . flat of the sabre had no effect on them. The music played, drums beat a charge ; nothing got the better of sleep . - ."* A Russian ofScer who had some experience in night fighting during the Eusso-Turkish war of 1877-78 remarks, "Night is the time for repose, and one ought not to violate this principle without due consideration. It must be remembered that if night operations sometimes promise to be of immense service, they, on the other hand, have great drawbacks, which may lead to disaster. In nocturnal operations, troops recognize their position with difficulty ; in the dark they have no possibility of appreciating the state of affairs ; they act in ignorance of their surroundings ; they move slowly. All these circumstances are causes of great fatigue to the men. Sometimes the most trifling obstacles, being unexpectedly encountered, cause long detentions; the ranks become broken here and there ; not only individuals, but whole detachments wander off the roads, and movements across the open country are still more difficult. The troops become very impressionable, and instances are not wanting of troops, on a groundless alarm, halting and opening fire, only to find at day- break that it has been directed on their own people." Every transaction in tactics depends on movement. Every movement, however, of the individual human being, even the simplest thing that is necessary for the fight, namely walking, in darkness is insecure. At night, as the saying goes, men's nerves are on the twitch, and it is difficult for every man to keep his wits at work. Every appearance perceptible to the senses has in darkness an effect at first surprising and alarming. This every one who remembers how often in the night anything ^has caused him throbbing of the heart will concede. Night marches, night attacks, require extreme caution. To the dead stillness of the night, already in itself awing, is added a mysterious uncertainty, a vague expectation, a disquieting feel- ing of suspense. In night enterprises the troops are about to undertake something the result of which is difficult to anticipate. " Loredan Larohey, " The Narrative of Captain Coignet." Night Marches. 397 Night has a marked effect on the spirits of animals ; darkness appears to awe and control them. Take the spirited and im- pulsive horse, that often in the light of day becomes headstrono- and takes the bit between his teeth, how very rarely he is found to bolt at night. At night horses are nervous, and will whinny to friend or foe when silence is imperative. Fiery old Bliicher, Marshal Vorwarts, man of undaunted courage as he was, used to say of night marches that they were more formidable than the very enemy. Armies cannot march and fight by night in the same for- mation as they can by day. A night attack is much akin to a night march in its preliminary stages, when the troops move off in the dark to approach the enemy and take up their position. The risks of night enterprises are very numerous, and such enterprises must be forced upon a commander either by im- perative necessity, or by the well-known carelessness of the enemy. There is nothing more terrible than a battle at night, in which so often mistakes take place. Wellington was of opinion that night attacks upon good troops are seldom successful. Olausewitz, on the score that the party attacked is more at home on the ground which forms its position than the assailant, thinks that only very special reasons can make a night attack advisable. The cases in which Napoleon resorted to night marches and attacks in his many campaigns are rare. A notable one occurred in 1797, when he profited of the night to convey reinforcements where he wished to be in force in front of the enemy. General Bonaparte, as he was then, was at Verona, waiting for the develop- ment of Alvinzi's plan. It was only on the evening of the 13th of January, after the attack on La Corona, that he detected that the real aim of the Austrian General was to break through Rivoli with his principal forces. Joubert ran the risk of being attacked and surrounded on the plateau. To prevent this, orders were sent to Massena and Leclerc to march to his aid during the night with all possible speed ; Massena with the three half-brigades of his division, Leclerc with a regiment of cavalry and two light field-pieces. At nine in the evening Bonaparte quitted Verona and, travelling by post, arrived with his staff on the plateau during the night. On the morning of the 14th, Joubert's troops engaged the enemy who was very much superior in numbers ; but Bonaparte 398 The Art of Marching. encouraged their resistance at a critical moment, and thus gave Massena time to come into line and decide the result of that great day. Alvinzi neither dreamt of finding Bonaparte present on the field nor of the arrival of the French reinforcements. Heros von Borcke, who was Chief of the Staff to General J. E. B. Stuart, remarks on the subject of the night attack at Oatlett's station : " I am convinced that our success would have been much more complete had General Stuart waited until daylight for attack. Night attacks, as my later experience taught me, are always dangerous, and ought never to be undertaken if they can be avoided. Even the bravest and best disciplined troops may by an unforeseen accident be got into a stampede, and inexperienced troops it is almost impossible to control." Lord Wolseley expresses himself thus with regard to night marches : " Owing to extreme heat it may at times be necessary to march by night, and other circumstances may render night marches necessary, but they should be avoided as much as possible ; they are very wearing to the men, and require at least as much time again as the same distance would require by day- light." We think it desirable to call particular attention to this passage. It occurs in the last edition of the Soldier's Pocket Book, published in 1886, four years after his Lordship's successful night march to attack the lines of Tel-el-Kebir. Von der Goltz, in " The Conduct of War," takes a different view, and expresses himself in favour of night marches in the following words. " Many examples from the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon go to prove that well-organized night marches are possible without injurious effect on the conditions of the troops. . . . Just before a battle, night marches can render service by enabling us to place densely crowded masses of troops in position close to the enemy before attack. With the growth of armies they will, in future, be indispensable ; for otherwise two army corps cannot very well be directed to use the same road to the field of battle." The preponderance of opinion is against night marches ; it is held that they are fatiguing and destructive, that they give rise to confusion. Owing to their many drawbacks when in the neighbourhood of the enemy, they should only be resorted to on very mature consideration, and then only as an extreme measure. Though cases of absolute necessity are extremely exceptional, it has been often opportune to march by night, however much this Night Marches. 399 measure may have been distasteful. It must always be open to doubt if troops that have been deprived of their night's rest and have been wearied by a march in the darkness are in the best physical condition to withstand the severe strain of a battle. Notwithstanding the more or less general opposition to night marches, in all countries and at all times a considerable number of night marches have been performed by armies employed in large operations, and their chiefs have evidently not been deterred by the fear of disorder and failure likely to mar them. If these marches are not recorded it is because, unless a march has been conducted under such special circumstances as to have drawn general attention to it, historians seldom trouble themselves to inquire if the movements of an army have been carried out by day or by night. In certain cases we must march by night and over bad roads, for every hour given to the enemy increases the chances in his favour. Night marches are a means of gaining time, and allow besides to attain with more secrecy the object a commander may have in view. They gain time, not because it is practicable to march as speedily by night as by day, but because by marching by day and by night there is more time to effect a given movement. There can be no question that obscurity increases the chances of taking the enemy unawares. A night enterprise has this much in its favour, that it is a very effective way of concealing one's forces from the enepiy ; it is then resorted to with the object of escaping the destructive fire of modern weapons. Commanders may think it advisable to profit by the concealment which darkness affords to draw near a strong position which they could not approach by daylight with- out running the risk of suffering heavy losses: evidently what a writer on tactics calls removing into the darkness of night that whereof they no longer believe themselves capable in daylight. At other times a march at night may be undertaken with the object of concealing the point where the principal effort is going to be made, or to withdraw an army from a dangerous position. It will be prudent to practise troops in night alarms, night marches, and night attacks, in order to make the officers and men familiar with these operations. However much opposed one may be to these enterprises, such practice is desirable, as it will conduce to lessening the effects of disorder and misconception. 400 The Art of Marching. Though night enterprises are, as a rule, to be avoided, they cannot be entirely condemned; it is best to look on them as exceptional. Under favourable circumstances, when performed with seasoned troops, when everything has been carefully calcu- lated in advance, and when in their execution every possible means of order and prudence is observed, they may render good service. The risks and drawbacks which underlie all night enterprises have been shown, nevertheless it is possible to reduce them to a considerable extent by training the troops in such movements, and by adhering to certain principles which are dictated by experience. When obvious reasons render them desirable, attention should be paid to some special points. Everything should be done without precipitation, and nothing should be left to chance. The movement should be effected on good roads, the distance should be short, and the country not broken or difficult. It is indispensable to be very accurately informed of the strength and position of the enemy ; the latter, when possible, should be carefully reconnoitred beforehand. The object of the expedition should be kept secret as long as possible, the orders being issued at the last moment. We should calculate with precision the time required to accomplish the march, and the hour of departure once iixed should not be altered. The soldiers should be warned against frantic scares ; all should know the measures to be taken in case of attack and defence. The order of march should be very simple, but adhered to rigorously. There should be plenty of trustworthy guides forthcoming. Some should march with the advanced-guard, others with the main body, with the convoy, with the rear-guard, and alongside the leaders of the various larger units in the column. Besides these guides, men should be left at cross roads to prevent the troops that are coming up deviating from the right direction. When circumstances permit it the troops should be provided with torches or lanterns. On the other hand, when the march is carried out in the proximity of the enemy, complete silence must be observed, no bugle sounds are permitted, all orders should be given in a low voice, and no light of any description shonld be kindled. Chains, scabbards, cans, anything loose which gives a sound should be firmly attached ; wheels may also be wound with straw. If the object of the night march is to surprise the enemy, the Night Marches. 401 troops should move forward stealthily and quickly. The advance should be in one direction, using one road, for in the darkness troops moving on several roads cannot keep up the necessary connection. The riiles should not be loaded, for the accidental discharge of a fire-arm may either put the enemy on his guard or disturb the equanimity of the troops. Troops in the dark and in a somnolent state are very easily alarmed. On the 21st of September 1777, General Charles G-rey (subsequently Earl Grey) surprised a force under the American general Anthony Wayne, and routed it with great loss. More than 300 Americans were bayonetted and 100 made prisoners. It had come to be known that Wayne with some 1500 men, lay concealed in the woods, watching for an opportunity to harass the British rear on its march towards Philadelphia. Major- General Grey was despatched on the 20th of September 1777, to cut off this body of the enemy ; the troops employed were the 2nd Light Infantry, the 42nd and 44th regiments. Grey surprised the enemy at dead of night when asleep ; he had taken the precaution to have the flints removed from his men's fire- locks to prevent any possible betrayal of their advance, from which incident he acquired the nickname of " No-flint Grey." In the obscurity of the night fire-arms are at a discount ; any fighting to be done should be done with cold steel, Peu de feu, et beauooup de layonette. The attacking party moving in orderly formation, pouncing suddenly on the bewildered and unformed enemy with the bayonet, and sweeping away the few who stand before them to bar the way, should prove irresistible. If it is a surprise that is intended, the first shots will simply tend to reveal to the adversaries their danger. In the combat at Magersfon- tein on the 11th of December 1899, two Highlanders let off their rifles during the advance on the enemy's position. Lord Methuen considers this — the accidental discharge of two rifles and the flash from a lantern — to have given the enemy timely notice of the march. In the same engagement a heavy fire was suddenly poured in by the Boers on the Highland Brigade, most of the bullets in the first discharges going over the men. It will be difScult to keep the troops from firing, particularly now with breech-loading weapons. It must be impressed on the soldier that his firing will tend to compromise the enterprise; he must be persuaded that his shots fired in the dark will be of 2 D 402 The Art of Marching. no use whatever, and that an attack with the bayonet alone can cast dismay and disorder in the ranks of the surprised party. If there could be some excuse for moving with loaded arms in the days of flint-locks and muzzle-loading muskets, there can be none now with fire-arms which can be made ready in an instant. In night marches, the cavalry should bring up the rear of the column. The reason for placing it behind is that, were that arm to take the lead, the pace of the horses being greater than that of the infantry, a gap would soon be formed in the column ; this interval would steadily increase, and soon the infantry would lose all trace of the mounted troops. There exists, besides, another good reason : for, should a sudden alarm occur, the cavalry in effecting a hasty retirement might with great ease overthrow the head of the column and give rise to a panic. No more should the cavalry be placed in the centre of the column, for on coming 1o a bridge or narrow defile it would have to reduce its front, and in recovering its formation on the other side would create an interval between the horsemen and the infantry. The danger lies in that the front part may possibly march briskly on, unaware that it is not followed by a considerable portion of the column. The ofScers leading each unit in marches of this kind should keep an eye constantly on the parties which go before them, so as not to lose sight of them in the windings of the road. Those who bring up the rear of each unit must bestow some attention on the troops which follow them, so as to warn them in case they should fall too far behind. In case of the column falling asunder, owing to the bad conditions of the road and weather, the smaller units — battalions, s(][uadrons, batteries, or companies — should strive to keep together. It has been recommended for the ofBcer commanding to keep by him a small squad of ten or twelve well-mounted non-com- missioned ofScers. One of these to be sent every quarter of an hour or so down the flank of the column to ascertain that every one is following, and that there is no undue interval between the various bodies. Should a gap occur, proof that a portion of the column is lagging or has diverted from the proper road, the non- commissioned officer would hasten back to report the circumstance to the officer commanding, who at once would halt the head of the column. Short halts should be more frequent than when marching in Night Marches. 403 the day time. When a halt is intended, a mounted non-com- missioned officer should be sent to pass word along the column intimating that a halt will soon be called. After having given sufficient time for the warning to reach the rear of the column, the commander would order the column to halt. In like manner, when the march has to be resumed, intimation to this effect should be communicated in succession, only in this instance it should be passed from rear to front. It is indispensable to insure the success of the enterprise for the officers to display considerable energy and alertness in a night march. This, and strict compliance with the regulations on the part of the individual soldier, will be the best means for attaining a favourable result for the undertaking. Amongst other precautions, the officers are recommended to prevent the men from sitting or lying down during the halts, as in that position they are more prone to sink into profound sleep, which would make it difficult and slow to put them again into motion. The officers must be very attentive to see that their men are not suffered to quit the ranks, for by so doing they run considerable risk of straying from the column. They must, further, endeavour to prevent any interweaving of the various units. Were this to come about, it would give rise to great confusion, and in the dark it would be akin to impossible to restore order. It is very desirable for an army, or for any body of troops, to have a period of complete repose during its halt before taking part in an engagement. The troops that have trudged pain- fully during the night should therefore be granted some refreshing rest after they have completed the march. When circumstances permit it, the troops that have marched during the night should be accorded an hour's rest before daybreak. This rest will be found to reduce to a considerable extent the fatigue caused by a night march, for it is at this time, above others, that the soldier can only with the utmost difficulty manage to keep awake. This hour's rest will give great relief to the troops, therefore it should not be disturbed by the issue of orders. All necessary injunctions and directions should have been, as far as possible, made known to them before they set out. In calculating on night marches it is prudent to allow a good margin for delays. 404 The Art of Marching. History contains some good examples of successful and un- successful night marches and attacks. Of these we shall now quote a few, to illustrate more clearly the meaning of what has been said above.* All that belongs to military science should be studied in a practical and not in a pedantic manner. Of the examples which have been selected to illustrate night marches, each one will be found to contain some more or less important principle. It is the sum-total of these which the student would do well to commit to memory. He will find here events, and not theory. One of the most successful night marches was performed by Marlborough. In the winter of 1710, Marshal Villars had thrown up an extensive series of works reaching from Namur on the Meuse to the coast of Picardy. These works constituted a con- tinuous line of defence. Villars confided so much on the strength of his position and his forces that, in writing to the king, he boasted that at length he had brought Marlborough to his non plus ultra. Marlborough purposed investing and reducing Bouchain and Le Quesnoy, to be followed in the spring by an advance into France. In June, 1711, he commenced to manoeuvre on the plains of Lens, with the object of enticing Villars away from the lines, but in vain. Marlborough could not venture to propose to a counsel of war to break through the lines by force, for the operation was encompassed by such difiiculties and danger that he felt persuaded that he would never get the generals and Dutch deputies to agree to his making the attempt. But, mindful of the maxim, that the man who never fails is the man who never tries, he set about to devise some plan for getting the best of his adversary. That portion of the lines immediately concerned in the opera- tions ran behind the river Cancbe, from Hesdain to its source. It was thence connected with the source of the Gy by a continuous line of redans, which, starting from Oppy, terminated at Montenencourt. The flanks were protected by strong redoubts. Along the Gy rivulet, to its junction with the Scarpe, and along the Scarpe to Biache, small dams had been constructed, which caused inundations. * The rulea for the conduct of night enterprises in what relates to the exploring, the formation of the column, the distance apart of the several units, the position of each arm of the service of which it is composed, are very distinctly laid down in the infantry drill book. It is from a neglect of these rules that deplorable consequences, as we have seen quite lately, ensue. To fcLCepage W4 BETHUNt PASiSAOE OF THE FRENCH LINES BY MARLBOROUGH A FosiTkh? of Mcirlboi'oiigk' ocf'Augaal' E Posifiotr op Mor-lbottouqli on rt^e evenitjg of tl?* 5?* B- PosifiOT? oF Villofa or? S'^Au^vf T Posit'iot? oP ViUafo in H5e njofnin^ of *e 6''' C- Mor'lWor'oojb's mor'cb ot» rt7e nighl^ op rf^e 4* G PoiKio'p oF MorlhoroogW to pi'svent' Villat's passing rt?eScW«l